Self-love and self-liking
in the moral and political philosophy
of Bernard Mandeville and David Hume

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MT
ABBREVIATIONS AND CONVENTIONS

The following abbreviations and short-title references are used throughout the dissertation.

BL British Library, London
Bodl. Bodleian Library, Oxford
CUL University Library, Cambridge
ABBREVIATIONS AND CONVENTIONS

Mandeville, Part II

Bernard Mandeville, The fable of the bees, or private vices, publick benefits, with a commentary critical, historical, and explanatory by F. B. Kaye, 2 vols., Liberty Fund, [1924], 1988, volume II.

T


References to Hume's works follow the standard method of the Hume Society. I am citing the Treatise according to the policy where one cites both the Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume and the older Selby-Bigge/Nidditch (SBN) edition. The editors of the Clarendon edition of the works of David Hume have attached a number to every paragraph, and refer to particular pages by a series of Arabic numerals. Thus, “T 3.1.1.9” refers to the Treatise III i 1, at SBN 458. (My citing of the previous example would be T 3.1.1.9; SBN 458.) When I refer to this work in the text, I use either A treatise of human nature or the Treatise. I cite Enquiry concerning the principles of morals following a similar principle, citing the paragraph from the Clarendon edition and indicating the corresponding page in the Selby-Bigge/Nidditch (SBN) edition. When I have seen it necessary to modify the use of standard editions of Hume's works (including his Essays), I refer to the original edition in the footnote.

When I specifically refer to an editor's commentary of a particular work, I refer to him instead of the author. For example, F. B. Kaye's introduction to his edition of The Fable of the Bees would be cited: Kaye, The Fable of the Bees, pp. xvii-cxlvii. The same style applies to other editors and their commentary including the footnotes of the edited work.

When necessary, the information of the imprint of a particular book is given in the text, but it has not been included in the bibliography.

Since it was customary in the eighteenth century to refer to "a man" as a universal, instead of "an individual" or "she/he", I have not attempted to change all the uses of pronouns into terms that are impersonal or gender-neutral.
Self-love and self-liking
Introduction

This study offers a new narrative of David Hume's conception of the conjectural development of civil society and artificial moral institutions. Conjectural history is a familiar topic of study for Hume scholars, but the reason for approaching this anew is that the central point Hume was making has been missed.¹ This study examines one question and one line of answers to it. The question is: how to derive moral institutions from human nature? In order to provide a plausible answer, particular attention is paid to Pierre Nicole's essays, Bernard Mandeville's later works and finally to David Hume's science of man.

The argument is that what made a great difference in Mandeville and Hume's account of human nature and moral institutions was the introduction of a simple distinction between self-love and self-liking. The purpose of this distinction is that we should not debate whether we are selfish or other-regarding by nature. This kind of deliberation easily puts too much strain on the concept of self-preservation. Instead, in our theoretical discussions, once we separate self-love and self-liking into two different passions (instead of referring to man's selfish or other-regarding nature in general) we are able to streamline the general picture of human nature and the corresponding moral institutions. It is not only self-love or self-interest we are dealing with, but also self-liking or pride.²


² Regarding self-interest, for a recent account that touches upon many aspects of this work, see the admirable introduction, Scott Paul Gordon, "Spring and motive of our
symmetric passions of self-interest and pride can only be controlled by the corresponding moral institutions. This is also the way in which we can say that moral institutions are drawn from human nature. In the case of self-love or self-interest, the moral institution is justice. Concerning self-liking or pride the moral institution is politeness. There is an explicit analogy between these moral institutions. If we do not understand this analogy, we do not understand the nature of either justice or politeness.

Often the analysis of amour-propre concentrates on self-love and self-interest in a sense that the excessive attraction to the self (amour-propre) is distinguished from the proper love of the self (amour de soi) that can be argued to correlate with the love of God. This is a familiar idea of the juxtaposition between charity as a theological concept and the self-love that corrupts it. Jean-Jacques Rousseau characteristically makes a distinction between proper self-preservation (instinctual) and ‘excessive, and illusion-ridden attachment to the self’. Rousseau’s formulation of amour-propre is partly a reaction towards Mandeville’s later works that diverts the ongoing debate back towards the seventeenth-century French origins and the question of moral basis of self-love and vanity. What is significant of the French context of amour-propre for our discussion is the Augustinian background: the concept of concupiscence and the notion that human will is either utterly or in some particular way corrupted. We have many


accounts pondering what makes an author an Augustinian and whether Mandeville is one of these Augustinians. If we would like to describe Mandeville and Hume’s conception of the division between self-love and self-liking as a neo-Augustinian development, we might want to point out that both of these passions are at the same time equally natural and excessive. Self-love can develop into avarice, self-liking on the other hand can develop into excessive pride. But without either one of these passions the individual cannot exist.

I argue, that in crucial ways Mandeville and Hume’s distinction between self-love and self-liking and the idea not to treat this as an ethical question sets them apart from Rousseau and several other French moralists. The entire point of view is hence different from the familiar division between charity and self-love. This study attempts to deliberately break this mode of reading amour-propre as self-love consisting of self-preservation and excessive attachment to oneself. Or, more precisely, this was the point that Nicole, Mandeville and Hume were making when applying the distinction between self-love and self-liking. Due to the fact that the significance of the distinction between self-love and self-liking has been previously overlooked in scholarship, also the theoretical importance of a moral institution of politeness, and crucially how it correlates with justice, has not been sufficiently appreciated in the history of early modern philosophy.

The natural law theory and justice

Roger Emerson wrote twenty years ago: ‘Scottish social and political thought in the eighteenth century is usually seen as belonging to one of two traditions – to the natural law theory or to civic humanism’. In the same
year, the late Maurice Goldsmith pointed out that ‘recent studies have
discovered in the Scottish Enlightenment two “paradigms,” traditions, or
modes of political discourse: “civic humanism” and “natural
jurisprudence”’. The scholarly output has exponentially increased within
the last twenty years, but as Istvan Hont has recently reminded us, ‘modern
histories of political thought are’ still ‘routinely organized around a contrast
between Renaissance humanism, the politics of virtue, and seventeenth-
century natural jurisprudence, the precursor of the modern meta-legal
discourse of human rights’. The change from one tradition to another,
according to Hont, is often indicated to mark the birth of modern liberalism
and political economy.

Amongst the scholars emphasising the tradition of natural jurisprudence
Duncan Forbes considered Hume an advocate of the modern theory of
natural law. Forbes viewed Hume’s philosophical politics ‘as an attempt to
give the established, Hanoverian, regime a proper intellectual foundation’.
He thought of this as Hume’s ‘programme of political education’ that was
no more conservative in the end than it was in the beginning. Forbes
emphasised that ‘the legislators are a powerful influence in the fashioning of
a people’s character and manners’. Forbes’s conception of Hume differed
considerably from any form of republican thinking in which active
citizenship must be given a great role. According to Forbes, in Hume’s texts
‘the historical role of the people, as such, is uncreative and passive’. After
Forbes a number of scholars have viewed and reviewed Hume in the light

Enlightenment’, in Studies in the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, M. A. Stewart, ed.,

8 M. M. Goldsmith, ‘Regulating anew the moral and political sentiments of mankind: Bernard
Mandeville and the Scottish Enlightenment’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 49, 1988, p. 587. See also
Goldsmith’s earlier ‘Public virtue and private virtues’, Eighteenth-Century Studies 9, 1976, pp. 477–510. The conflict between these two lines of
interpretation is also apparent in Ronald Hamowy, ‘Cato’s letters, John Locke, and the

9 Istvan Hont, Jealousy of trade. International competition and the nation-state in historical
perspective. Harvard University Press, 2005, p. 11. See also the works cited there.

Philosophers of the Enlightenment, S. C. Brown, ed., Hassocks, Sussex, 1979, pp. 94–109 also
emphasises the role of the natural law tradition. For Forbes’s view of James Moore’s
account of Hume and the natural law tradition, see Duncan Forbes, ‘Natural law and the
Scottish enlightenment’, in The origins and the nature of the Scottish enlightenment, A. S. Skinner
Cosmopolitan dimension in Hume’s science of politics’, British Journal of Eighteenth-Century

11 Forbes, Hume’s philosophical politics, Cambridge University Press, 1975, p. 5. The idea
that Hume’s thinking turns more conservative over time has been famously stressed by
John Pocock.

The problem with any natural jurisprudence reading of Hume is that Hume discusses rights to a minimal extent. This general problem is apparent, for example, in J. B. Schneewind’s recent reconstruction of ethical thinking from the classical natural law theory through Grotius and voluntarism towards Kant. What is interesting in Schneewind’s project (and the reason why it is discussed here) is that it is symptomatic of most approaches to Hume’s political philosophy from the perspective of the natural law theory. Schneewind claims that Hume’s ‘division’ between ‘artificial’ and ‘natural’ virtues ‘is best understood in the light of the natural law distinction between perfect and imperfect duties’. The role of the natural law tradition for Hume rests upon the idea of perfect and imperfect duties. Hume had naturally been drilled in the natural law thinking as a law student in Scotland, but in this study I will advance a different argument of the distinction between natural and artificial virtues. In spite of certain similarities, I am quite confident that this classic distinction is not what Hume had in mind when he made the categorical distinction between natural and artificial virtues.

Through a series of debates, this study describes how, the discussion on the origin of morality evolves from French moral philosophy through the hands of Bernard Mandeville to David Hume. The distinction between natural and artificial virtues is vital for our understanding of the nature of Hume’s moral and political philosophy. But this has little to do with the natural law theory. The division between natural and artificial attributes of

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13 Haakonssen has paid close attention to natural and artificial virtues placing the individual ‘in a social context’. Knud Haakonssen, Science of the legislator. The natural jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith, Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 5. See also Haakonssen, Natural law and moral philosophy. From Grotius to the Scottish enlightenment, Cambridge University Press, 1996. The aspect of the spectator is particularly prevalent in Haakonssen’s interpretation of Hume’s social theory. Haakonssen does not give the legislator’s as crucial a role as Forbes does. Instead, Haakonssen’s emphasis is on Hume’s conception of sympathy which is in line with that of Adam Smith’s. Haakonssen, Science of the legislator, 1982, pp. 8–9.


16 Moreover Haakonssen emphasises ‘the distinction between the natural and the artificial virtues’ by stating that ‘the former are useful in each individual case, the latter need not be’. Haakonssen, Science of the legislator, 1982, p. 36.

17 This is one of the main arguments put forward below in Chapter 5, Social theory of A Treatise of human nature.

human nature and natural and artificial virtues was simply widely used by
the moral philosophers of the 1720s. Hence, setting Hume’s argument of
natural and artificial virtues in its historical context will reveal that natural
and artificial virtues and perfect and imperfect rights might seem similar,
but intellectually they had little to do with one another.

Artificial virtues also relate to a common philosophical problem of
Kantian and Aristotelian friction regarding temptation and moral worth. Talbot Brewer states that ‘Kant maintained that moral worth is most clearly
exhibited by those who perform their duty without any inclination to do so,
and even in the face of strong temptations to violate it’. He then contrasts
this with Aristotle, who ‘makes the contrary suggestion that those who feel
displeasure in virtuous action, or who feel a strong temptation to act
viciously, are not fully virtuous’. 19 The division between natural and artificial
virtues does not fit in either one of these postulations. The reason why it is
so important to keep natural and artificial virtues separate in Hume’s outline
is that there are cases in which we are obliged to perform an action without
any natural inclination to do so, even when facing a strong temptation to
violate the rule. There are also circumstances (love towards our children,
gratitude) in which we are not fully virtuous if we are not inclined to carry
out our duty. This friction regarding artificial virtues and our temptation to
violate the rules never dissolves. What is crucial is that we can develop a
habit of following rules and we approve of this trait in others. This is the
very reason why the approbation of others is so important for Hume.
Without it, the entire structure of civil society would collapse.

Another characteristic problem of the natural law reading of Hume is
the prevalence of justice. Duncan Forbes, among others, emphasises that
for Hume private property enables promises and contracts and hence plays
a foundational role in Hume’s political thinking. 20 As in many other cases,
the role of private property and justice is focal in Forbes’s account. The
anglo-american intellectual atmosphere has been dominated to a large
extent by a Rawlsian tendency to solely concentrate on justice as the
defining concept of political philosophy and to expand its scope with such
ideas as distributive justice as well as justice as fairness. These different
factors have had the unfortunate consequence of ignoring other key moral
terms. As an overall result, we have an inadequate understanding of how
Hume thought a civil society should be able to function. Justice is, of
course, a foundational artificial virtue in the Treatise, but so is politeness. For
each artificial virtue analysed in the Treatise, there is always a corresponding

19 Talbot Brewer, ‘The character of temptation: Towards a more plausible Kantian
Press, 1984, 1099a15–20, 1151b32–1152a8 and Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the

20 Forbes, Hume’s philosophical politics, 1975, p. 26. About private property and justice,
see especially James Moore, ‘Hume’s theory of justice and property’, Political Studies, 24,
1976, pp. 103–119.
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passion in human nature that needs to be controlled or redirected. However, I am not only suggesting that we have to include politeness on Hume’s list of artificial virtues. What I am proposing is that we also have to analyse how different passions and institutions interact in the conjectural history of civil society, which in other words means that we have to understand David Hume’s social theory.  

The republican tradition and politeness

It has often been discussed whether Hume is a Whig or Tory (and more recently, what sort of a Whig he is). When attempting to describe the nature of Hume’s whiggishness, scholars have often put an emphasis on active citizenship as a main quality of Hume’s political thinking. John Pocock writes and many agree that ‘The heart of Hume’s political position’ rests on civil liberty, the ‘exercise of sovereignty by the citizenship’. Other

21 For a general account of the social theory in the Scottish enlightenment, see Christopher Berry, The social theory of Scottish Enlightenment, Edinburgh University Press, 1997.


23 See for example, Fruchtman, Jr., ‘Classical republicanism, Whig political science, Tory history’, 1996, pp. 94–103.

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scholars have pointed out that Hume used the language of classical republicanism'.

Many aspects of Hume's thinking, including his ideas of military organisation have been linked to the Pocockian argument of civic humanism. Politeness in particular has played a role as a key issue in the explanation how republican ideas evolve. The well-known argument, put forward by John Pocock, is that politeness modified republican thinking by broadening the strict definition of virtue and, in a sense, rendered it suitable for the modern world. Others have also maintained that a new concept was coined that replaced the old idea of civic virtue and dominated the following accounts of politeness in the age of Enlightenment. Because this line of interpretation sees politeness as a form of virtuous sociability, it lends credence to the claim that the classical republicanism retained its position as the leading intellectual tradition in an increasingly commercial age.

In the Pocockian interpretation, Hume's political thinking is seen to represent the modern version of the classical republican tradition in which certain problems of trade and commerce have been efficiently solved. Part of this argument is that whatever criticism Hume might have towards the republican principles comes from the same tradition. John Pocock has no problem in describing Thomas Jefferson and David Hume as belonging to the same intellectual tradition. This line of interpretation sees the eighteenth-century politeness as a political culture. The third earl of

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Shaftesbury launched a campaign in order to redefine the principles of civil conversation.\textsuperscript{31} His prime instrument was a claim that the false ‘language of the court’ has finally been ‘banished’ from ‘the town, and all good company’\textsuperscript{32} Feigned politeness causes a disadvantage to civil society while ‘men have not been contented to show the natural advantages of honesty and virtue’\textsuperscript{33} Dissimulation and the hypocritical nature of politeness are denounced. It is an innate quality that has to shine through outward gestures. Although education and polishing the rough edges in children plays a role in his thinking, for Shaftesbury real politeness is the politeness of the heart.

Other features of the culture of politeness are parliamentarianism and the division between city and court with the idea that the preceding court-centred tradition had been overcome.\textsuperscript{34} Lawrence Klein has established the role of active citizenship in his interpretation of politeness-as-a-culture by emphasising that the political freedom of an individual is gained by politeness. The key phrase for this interpretation is: ‘All politeness is owing

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\textsuperscript{31} For a Pocockian understanding of Shaftesbury’s role regarding the eighteenth-century politeness, see Klein, ‘The third earl of Shaftesbury and the progress of politeness’, 1984, pp. 186–214 and Klein, Shaftesbury and the culture of politeness, 1994.

\textsuperscript{32} Anthony Shaftesbury, ‘An essay on the freedom of wit and humour’ [1709], in Characteristics of men, manners, opinions and times, J. M. Robertson, ed., London, [1900], I, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{33} Shaftesbury, ‘An essay on the freedom of wit and humour’ [1709], Characteristics, I, p. 66.

to liberty'.

According to Klein, this line of thought links Shaftesbury to 'the civic tradition in English political discourse'. For Klein, Shaftesbury's phrase is a label of what Pocock describes as the 'Whig ideology' that 'took a decisive turn toward social, cultural, and commercial values, one we associate especially with the name of Addison' at the beginning of the eighteenth-century.

It is safe to say that active citizenship is the key to the republican political thinking. Once this is compromised, an author cannot be described as a republican thinker. This is a problem that Duncan Forbes immediately spotted after the publication of the Machiavellian moment. Forbes sided with 'the traditional view' that sees 'civic humanism' as 'recessive' in the eighteenth-century 'unless one means' by it simply 'classical education' in the widest sense. By and large, once one gives up the role of active citizenship there is no additional conception that will save us from the fact that civic humanism was recessive in the eighteenth century.

In recent scholarship, as mentioned, David Hume's overall account of politeness has been interpreted as part of the tradition of the virtuous sociability. John Pocock writes that Hume, among others, had 'isolated growth of exchange, production and diversified labour as the motor force which created the growth of manners, culture and enlightenment'. True enough, Hume thought that commerce was a central social factor, but it is still problematic to argue that 'it was preeminently the function of commerce to refine the passions and polish the manners'. No matter how hard we look, the role of active citizenship does not feature in Hume's political philosophy and his conception of politeness had little to do with

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35 Shaftesbury, 'An essay on the freedom of wit and humour' [1709], Characteristics, I, p. 46.
40 Pocock, Virtue, commerce and history, 1985, p. 199.
41 Pocock, Virtue, commerce and history, 1985, p. 49.
Shaftesbury, Addison or Steele. Already before the Treatise, Hume was inclined to side with a theoretical outlook that stood in contrast with the popular eighteenth-century understanding of politeness as a natural quality of human nature.

Nicholas Phillipson has attempted to show that when Hume started to write essays, a clear change took place and ‘Hume turned to the business of Addisonian moralizing immediately after completing the Treatise in 1740’. Phillipson’s argument is tied to Pocock and Klein’s interpretation. This dissertation will advance a different interpretation linking Hume’s conception of politeness to Mandeville. Some of the texts that have been seen as key evidence supporting the prevailing paradigm were in fact designed to argue against such notions. An idea of a dominant definition of politeness is insufficient in order for us to grasp the eighteenth-century controversy over this concept. In order to understand this significant theme, we have to acknowledge the existence of rivaling interpretations.

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45 It is not my intention to claim that the entire eighteenth-century debate on politeness was merely a battle between two rivalry camps or that there would have been only two categorical definitions of politeness. For example, many religious authors addressed the topic of good-breeding and conversation. Some argued contrary to both, Shaftesbury and Mandeville, that the Christian religion in fact ‘is quite consistent with, and in some respects productive of politeness and good-breeding’. William Howdell, Religion productive of joy, and consistant with politness. A sermon preached at the Abbey-church at Bath, A pril 16, 1744, York, 1744, p. 23. There are also several other religious writers arguing consequently for and against different aspects of Shaftesburyan and Mandevillian interpretations of politeness. Cf. Richard Lucas, The influence of conversation, with the regulation thereof; being a sermon preach’d at Saint Clement Dane, to a religious society, (2nd ed.), London, 1707; Robert Burrow, Civil society and government vindicated from the charge of being founded on, and preserv’d by, dishonest arts: in a sermon preached before the .. Lord-Mayor; .. at the Guild-hall chappel, on Sept. 28, 1723, London, 1723; Henry Coventry, Philemon to Hydaspes; relating a conversation with Hortensius, upon the subject of false religion, London, 1736; W illiam Webster, Two sermons, I. O n the duty, the means, and the happy effects of living peaceably with all men. II. O n self-love and benevolence, London, 1748.
The topic of politeness is far more complicated than what had previously been suggested. Markku Peltonen has shown that Shaftesbury, Addison and Steele were not inventing a new theory of politeness, but in fact redefining the main principles of the court civility to fit their philosophical principles. This redefinition of politeness did not entail that an interpretation stressing the outward features of civility had disappeared. The remaining flaw in Mandeville scholarship regarding politeness is that even when scholars like Dickey have well understood how the French Augustinian tradition used amour-propre as 'a psychological trait that could be manipulated so as to turn pride into a principle of social order', yet, the actual implications of this tradition and the use of amour-propre and pride have not yet surfaced. In general, the scholars paying most attention to amour-propre rarely refer to politeness at all. Simultaneously, the scholars underlining the centrality of politeness do not show the role that the moral institutions of justice and politeness play in this context.

When examining Hume’s writings more carefully in this context, we realise that the link between Hume and the civic tradition based on politeness is questionable. It takes too much bending to argue that the demand that citizens need to behave politely transforms into a continuum of the idea of politically active citizenry of the civic tradition. The role of politeness is already central in the Treatise and there is no actual change in Hume’s views when he advances to essays. As this study is meant to establish, Hume’s strong argument about politeness was in fact directed against Shaftesbury, Addison and others who tried to make a link between politeness and certain qualities of the heart. Despite the fact that Hume’s
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literary style changed when he advanced from a treatise to essays, his arguments remained the same. The style that he adopted might have been that of Addison’s, but his views remained completely different. To Hume, the world simply began to seem more complex than what splendid Machiavellian maxims, such as ‘Interest will not lie’ would imply.

Philosophy, politeness and Mandeville

Eighteenth-century politeness has gathered increasing attention particularly in cultural history, but the case is rather different in the study of the history of philosophy. Scholars generally acknowledge that while interpreting the eighteenth-century philosophical works, we cannot make sharp distinctions between moral, social, political, economic or even aesthetic dimensions. Each of them was considered to be part of moral philosophy. Even when modern scholars are aware of the broad definition of the discipline, what has often been ignored is that for many eighteenth-century authors civility and politeness were just as important in moral philosophy as some of the more conventional institutions, such as justice and promise-keeping.

In 1734, Alexander Forbes pointed out that even when the value of ‘civility and politeness’ is occasionally undermined because it ‘reaches no farther than the outside’, this ‘least of all laws’ is in fact ‘more observed than any’. Forbes was not just reminding his contemporaries that, after all, ‘good-breeding or decency’ (which some claimed to have no value) had in practise proved to be indispensable for civil society. Forbes was also concurring with a particular theory of politeness that stressed the centrality of pride. As he put it, ‘the greater the pride of men, the greater dominion’ there is for politeness and civility. In other words, Forbes sought to point out that peaceful existence in civil society requires, above all, a circle of refinement where politeness and pride are cultivated hand in hand – an idea which the moralists who concentrated solely on inward attributes of the individual knew nothing of.

Alexander Forbes composed his philosophical works on the secluded shores of Aberdeenshire, but he was not stranded with his theory of politeness. Pride in eighteenth-century philosophy was increasingly considered a decisive quality, which had to be carefully kept out of sight under the veil of politeness. This is an outlook that might seem strange

52 Because of the ideological charge given to the expression by Phillipson I feel reluctant to call Hume an ‘Addisonian essayist’ as Adam Potkay, for example, does. Adam Potkay, The fate of eloquence in the age of Hume, Cornell University Press, 1994, p. 9.


55 Forbes, Essays moral and philosophical, 1734, p. 220.
from the modern perspective. We are accustomed to thinking that moral philosophy is constituted of inward attributes that are real, sincere and truly praiseworthy. Pride and hypocrisy do not seem to meet the criteria. Ever since Plato there has been a strong strand of antagonism towards hypocrisy, vanity and pride among philosophers. This has been further amplified by Kant’s attempt to reject the idea that civility is part of morality and, consequently, by his overwhelming influence on modern philosophy.

The polarisation of manners and morals in philosophy has been acknowledged in some of the recent historical studies. However, no effort has been made to re-examine this truism in the history of philosophy. Politeness, pride and hypocrisy are rarely taken up in the analysis of the moral philosophy of the canonical ‘great philosophers’. Hume’s lengthy discussions on civility and politeness have hitherto received no serious scholarly attention. For many scholars, therefore, his moral philosophy looks very much like that of Kant’s. And when Hume’s ideas of politeness have been studied, it has been carried out as if Hume’s treatment of the subject was a secluded historical phenomenon with no relevance to his real philosophy.

The intention of the dissertation is to change this. I argue that in his *A treatise of human nature*, Hume was putting forward a theory of civil society that has to be understood in the context of an intellectual tradition where outward behaviour, hypocrisy and pride were seen as qualities that enabled a large society to function. According to Hume, hypocrisy is not only allowable, but a requisite for our behaviour. If we, as the famous eighteenth-century proverb suggests, open our hearts in conversation we manage Hume asserted to do nothing but cause unpleasant sentiments in our interlocutor. I will further argue that the fact that Hume drew an explicit analogy between the ‘laws of nature’ and the ‘rules of good-breeding’ is of great consequence.

David Hume endorsed a theory of politeness similar to the one that Alexander Forbes had sketched a few years earlier and, furthermore, used it as the core of his more general theory of civil society. But, as I have already indicated, these two accounts were not isolated incidents in eighteenth-century moral philosophy. On the contrary, Bernard Mandeville, a number of other British as well as French philosophers, and even Adam Smith analysed the role of politeness and outward behaviour in a large society as part of their moral philosophy. Instead of being rejected and denounced, hypocrisy and pride became central components in eighteenth-century moral philosophy. This will also explain why it was important for Kant to reject the idea that civility is part of morality. He was not just arguing

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57 For example Nicholas Philpson, who has studied politeness and Hume in detail, does not bring to the fore the importance of the section ‘Greatness of mind’, T 3.3.2; SBN 592–602.
against a thesis that no philosopher held, but wanted to question the entire tradition of eighteenth-century moral philosophy.

As an outcome of this development, David Hume's theory of civil society departed from the Hobbesian egoistic system by making a distinction between self-love and self-liking and by admitting that there are natural, other-regarding affections in human nature. Due to structuring his theory in this manner, Hume was able to steer clear of the Hobbes argument that moral distinctions are invented by clever politicians. Although he did not reduce all human action to self-love and self-preservation, Hume did emphasise that it was only certain artificial moral institutions that enabled a large society to function.

I contend that the moral, political and social components of the Treatise can be read in the context of the philosophical tradition, in which Bernard Mandeville plays a positive role. Hume's commentators have often been quick to downplay Mandeville's influence on Hume. Mandeville has mainly been seen as a polemical target with little or no positive impact on the history of eighteenth-century philosophy. This is due to an unsatisfactory understanding of Mandeville's thought. Thus, one of the main questions of my study is the connection between Mandeville and Hume. I argue that by studying Mandeville's intellectual development we are able to form a coherent context that enables us to understand the essential features of Hume's social and political thought.

We can detect a clear and crucial change in Mandeville's philosophy. What began as a polemical, Hobbist paradigm turned into an original social theory. But this could not have happened without a rigorous revision of the initial premises and the renouncing of Hobbes's theory of civil society. I argue that Mandeville changed his mind about the arbitrary role of the politicians when he came to write Part II that was published in 1729 because he had developed a new hypothesis where justice and politeness are explained as decisive, artificial moral institutions based on previous human

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conventions - and Hume would soon commit to this scheme.\textsuperscript{60} Thus, I deem that it was not for nothing that in his introduction to the Treatise Hume singled out Mandeville as one of the modern authors 'who have begun to put the science of man on new footing'.\textsuperscript{61}

Commercial sociability

Recent scholarship has also witnessed an emergence of a more tolerable attitude towards the so-called selfish theory. Many scholars have come to accept the at least partially positive impact of Hobbes and Mandeville. Especially the influence of Hobbesm on economical thinking and different game theories has been noticeable during the last few decades.\textsuperscript{62} The re-emergence of Hobbes and Mandeville has also served as a road leading to sophisticated analyses of homo economicus as the outcome of the Enlightenment activity, which means that the economic questions, such as luxury, are above all moral and political questions.\textsuperscript{63} This general path was ploughed particularly by Albert Hirschman in his classic The passions and interests.\textsuperscript{64} Hirschman's book has much to do with self-interest and it can be seen to mark the triumph, not only of the intellectual origins of capitalism, but also the centrality of self-love as the scholarly focus. However, this has

\textsuperscript{60} Burtt for example alludes that self-liking was also an important feature in the original Fable of the Bees. Burtt, Virtue transformed, 1992, p. 130. She simply does not take into account the paradigmatic difference between the original Fable of the Bees and Part II. Also, for example, R. A. Collins, 'Private vices, public benefits: Dr. Mandeville and the body politic', unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Oxford, 1988, pp. 194–234 writes an interesting chapter on 'The discovery of manners, morals, and honour: self-love, self-liking, and speech', yet he does not make any concrete difference between The Fable of the Bees and Part II. The explanation is the customary view that 'In contrast to Part I, Part II of the The Fable of the Bees displayed less of the satiric bite of its predecessor, its tone was superficially at least more elevated and less provocative' (p. 328).

\textsuperscript{61} T Introduction 7; SBN xvii.

\textsuperscript{62} About recent studies on commerce and Hume, see R. G. Frey, 'Virtue, commerce, and self-love', Hume Studies, 21, 1995, pp. 275–288 (an example of very narrow view of Mandeville, but genuine interest to engage with the topic); Loren Gatch, 'To redeem metal with paper: David Hume's philosophy of money', Hume Studies, 22, 1996, pp. 169–191 (a refreshing aspect about the importance of concrete money among economic historical studies of Hume) and Edward Soule, 'Hume on economic policy and human nature', Hume Studies, 26, 2000, pp. 143-158. It should also be pointed out that E. J. Hundert's primary interest in Hume was political economy, E. J. Hundert, 'The achievement motive in Hume's political economy', Journal of the History of Ideas, 35, 1974, pp. 139-143.

\textsuperscript{63} Eloquently argued by John Robertson in his The case for the enlightenment. Scotland and Naples 1680-1760, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

\textsuperscript{64} After Albert O. Hirschman, The passions and the interests. Political arguments for capitalism before its triumph, Princeton University Press, 1977 there has been a renaissance of emphasis on passions and interests in political thought. For one recent example, see the collection of essays in Politics and the passions, 1500-1850, Victoria Kahn, Neil Saccamano, and Daniela Coli, eds., Princeton University Press, 2006.
not been a balanced development, because as the end result the concept of
self-interest has been exaggerated, for example, in Mandeville and Hume’s
thinking. Pierre Force’s Self-interest before Adam Smith is a recent landmark on
this path. Force puts a predominantly strong emphasis on the concept of
self-interest and ‘tangible goods’. In short, what he does is to show that
the ‘Epicurean/Augustinian tradition’ leads to the idea of self-interest that
lurks behind modern economic thinking. Bernard Mandeville, quite
naturally, plays a key role in Force’s account. The analysis can be criticised
for being too tightly attached to the concept of self-interest.

The latest significant turn in Hume scholarship on his political
philosophy has been that the juxtaposition between the republican and the
natural law tradition has evolved into a discussion about commercial
sociability, where the lines of different interpretive frameworks are
stretched and the focus is concentrated on political economy. The
importance of political economy as a moral and political question for David
Hume has been particularly stressed by Istvan Hont. Hont has pointed
out that the ‘eighteenth-century republicanism’ has ‘emerged as a key
intellectual resource for understanding capitalism’. Hont’s work on
Pufendorf has also led others to look for the roots of the Mandevillean
argument about commercial society from the natural law tradition. Although Hont acknowledges the importance of both the republican and
natural law tradition, his attempt has been to take scholarship towards a
different direction. Hont’s argument of the birth of modern political
economy is that the reason of state was extended to consider the jealousy of
trade in international relations in the European state system which resulted
in the argument of political economy.

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65 Force, Self-interest before Adam Smith, 2003, p. 38.
67 According to Force, ‘the first principle of Epicurean philosophy’ is ‘that all human
action tends to maximize pleasure’. Force, Self-interest before Adam Smith, 2003, p. 49. In
Mandeville’s case, for example, this goes astray. It misses the political nature of The Fable
of the Bees. To argue against the role of reason, as Mandeville and Hume did, was to argue
against interest calculations at the same time.
68 See in particular Istvan Hont, ‘Jealousy of trade: An introduction’ in Jealousy of trade,
2005, pp. 1–158. Earlier Hont made a great impact particularly with his The rhapsody of
321–348.
69 Hont, Jealousy of trade, 2005, p. 11.
70 Robert Wokler, ‘Rousseau’s Puffendorf: natural law and the foundations of
commercial society’, History of Political Thought, 15, 1994, p. 373–402. See also Wokler,
‘Anthropology and conjectural history in the Enlightenment’, in Inventing human science:
Eighteenth-century domains, Christopher Fox, Roy Porter and Robert Wokler, eds.,
University of California Press, 1995, pp. 31–52. Workler follows Istvan Hont. For Hont’s
Pufendorf, see Hont, The language of sociability and commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and
the theoretical foundations of the “four-stages theory”, in The languages of political theory in
Hont’s narrative is appealing and it has gained many followers. But while the argument about jealousy of trade and relevance of political economy for the Enlightenment thinking has been expanding, the scope of Hume's own thinking has simultaneously been narrowed down. The shift towards political economy in Hume means a shift away from A treatise of human nature and towards the essays that Hume wrote at a later stage in his career. Political discourses that can be described as political economy to a large extent were only published in 1752. While Hume's early notebooks before the Treatise reveal that he took economic questions seriously already at a young age, international market competition is not the focal point of the Treatise. The young Hume was not concerned with political economy when discussing politics and human nature for the first time. An essay entitled 'Jealousy of trade' made its way to Essays and treatises only in 1758. Political economy is largely a later development for Hume – a direction which Hume turned towards the later part of his career. Yet, the Treatise set forward Hume's science of man that he extends to also concern politics already in his first Essays. Certain essential aspects of commercial sociability feature also in the early essays. There are some references to Machiavelli and commerce in the 'Of the rise and progress of arts and sciences' essay, but the link between the science of man and political economy is by no means self-evident at this point. What is apparent is the necessary connection between the science of man and politeness, civilised monarchies, social distance and hierarchical structure of civil society. As this study is meant to establish, this was the primary point that the young Hume wanted to make with the connection of the science of man and politics. The relevance of

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71 For example, we may notice a change in John Robertson’s views over time. His early interest was the civic tradition. In his The Scottish enlightenment and the militia issue, Robertson emphasised the role of the evolution of ‘Fletcherian’ arguments about military in David Hume’s and Adam Smith’s thinking. Robertson, The Scottish enlightenment and the militia issue, 1985, pp. 8, 16 and 65. Political economy for Hume and Smith has lately gathered Robertson’s attention while the view is detached from the originally Pocockian perspective. Political economy also functions as a uniting force for Robertson’s case for the enlightenment and according to Robertson, ‘we do not need to follow John Pocock in supposing that different contexts fashioned plural Enlightenments’. A common goal, ‘political economy’ functioned as ‘the vehicle of a single Enlightenment’. Robertson, The case for the Enlightenment, 2005, p. 377. Hont’s latest work on the luxury debate is a consistent development of this line of thinking and particularly the emphasis put on Fénelon has opened up a new way of looking at the eighteenth-century politics. Istvan Hont, ‘The luxury debate in the early enlightenment’, in The Cambridge history of eighteenth-century political thought, Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 419-442.

72 Christopher Finlay in his Hume’s social philosophy has some problems with the distinction between self-interest and pride. He writes, for example, that ‘Hume’s account of pride was distinguished from Mandeville’s in that it could account for the circumstances in which pride arose, whereas Mandeville’s could not.’ Finlay, Hume’s social philosophy, 2007, pp. 89–90. More emphasis needs to be put on pride and politeness in order to grasp Hume’s meaning.
this link is something that the accounts emphasising the role of political economy in Hume’s thinking fail to notice.

Instead of political economy, questions such as courage, honour and greatness of mind were predominant in the young Hume’s thinking. And the relevance of these issues can be understood when we understand the role that Mandeville played in Hume’s intellectual development. At the same time the Hontian notions of questions of luxury, the European state system, wealth of nations and political economy can be seen as another symptom of the overstated role of the concept of justice and self-interest in David Hume’s political thinking and as part of the same development following Hirschman’s Passions and interests. My emphasis on the significance of the artificial institution of politeness is meant to balance this view. This, as I will try to demonstrate below, will eventually lead us to a different understanding of David Hume’s account of civilized monarchies.

Regarding method

According to James Fieser, commentaries on Hume ‘often fall into two extreme groups, each suited for specific purposes and audiences: (1) exegetical works, with minimal historical context, and (2) historical works with minimal exegesis’.73 The present work is meant to cover both of these grounds and offer something for the students of intellectual history and history of philosophy alike.74

Another aim of this study is to show how a relevant reading of Mandeville affects our understanding of Hume. In other words, we need to understand how Hume himself read Mandeville and we must realise the importance of Mandeville’s later writings for the young David Hume in order to understand his science of man. Once we realise the paradigmatic shift in Mandeville’s thinking, it will consequently affect our interpretation of Hume. At the same time, it becomes understandable that, for example, Charles Darwin, when formulating his theory of natural selection and the famous ship-analogy, had been reading Mandeville’s later works and Hume in particular, which together formed a coherent context for this later development as well.75 This can be characterised as a contextual approach to intellectual history.76

74 I am not, however, attempting a holistic reading of Hume as a philosopher, a political theorist and a historian. For such, recent account, see Claudia M. Schmidt, David Hume. Reason in history, Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003.
75 ‘1840 April, Bernard Mandeville, Fable of the bees (vol. 2)’, followed by ‘1841 May, David Hume, Collected Essays’, ‘Chronology of relevant entries from Darwin’s lost of “books read” quoted in Alter, ‘Mandeville’s ship’, p. 459.
76 For a recent and balanced account of the state of the contextual approach in political thought, see David Runciman, ‘History of political thought: the state of the discipline’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 3, 2001, pp. 84–104. For one
Arthur Lovejoy almost fifty years ago outlined that ‘the history of the theory of human nature’ is, ‘or should be, one of the major fields of investigation for the student of the history of ideas’. Lovejoy’s way of doing things in this field of study has perhaps lost its value, but he was making a good point. We need to concentrate on the relevant questions. Unit ideas are out of fashion and the views about the significance of the contextual approach are also changing. The reason for this is most of all practical. The electronic databases (such as ECCO, EEBO and MOMW of the ones that are more advanced at this particular moment in time) are changing the way we do things. Analysing vast amounts of texts is much easier these days than say, ten years ago. This is also a change that is taking place at a rapid pace.

This is also why a bibliographical approach and questions about texts and manuscripts as physical objects are all the more relevant. This study seeks to cover new ground in using the methods of book history, when combining the interpretive tools of the contextual approach and a more careful reading of philosophical texts. No tool is used for the sake of using it, it is done so to enhance our understanding of the role of self-love and self-liking in the moral and political philosophy of Bernard Mandeville and David Hume. We need the book history approach in order to understand Bernard Mandeville’s career and the publishing history of *The Fable*. This way we can grasp the paradigmatic change in Mandeville’s thinking and how Hume read Mandeville’s works. We also need to study the unpublished

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79 According to Jennifer Welchman, no one really rebutted Bernard Mandeville, see Jennifer Welchman, ‘Who rebutted Bernard Mandeville?’, *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 24, 2007, pp. 57–73. A direct answer to Welchman’s argument was published by Patricia Sheridan in her ‘Parental affection and self-interest: Mandeville, Hutcheson, and the question of natural benevolence’, *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 24, 2007, pp. 377–392. Sheridan answers Welchman that Hutcheson rebutted Mandeville with parental affection. When we have proper bibliographical information, we look at these questions differently and this is the point that I try to make. As I will show in the course of this thesis,
texts of the young David Hume in order to see the connection between Mandeville's later writings and Hume's Treatise. We need to contextualise certain aspects to understand the larger picture, but most of all we need to be philosophically aware of the different aspects of Hume's science of man. We cannot fall in the gap between these disciplines or we risk losing sight of Hume's meaning.

Outline of the work

Self-love and self-liking in the moral and political philosophy of Bernard Mandeville and David Hume is divided into two parts. The first part, 'Intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville', argues that in the previous scholarship the relevance of the paradigmatic change in Mandeville's thinking has been missed. The first three chapters draw a picture of Mandeville turning from the Hobbism of The Fable of the Bees to an original theory of civil society put forward in his later works. The intellectual context for this change is studied in detail. In order to make this change more apparent, Mandeville's career and the publishing history of The Fable of the Bees are also researched comprehensively. This interpretation, based partly on previously unknown material, challenges F. B. Kaye's influential decision to publish the two parts of The Fable as a uniform work of two volumes. The main relevance, however, of the 'Intellectual development of Mandeville' is to function as the context for the young David Hume when he encountered the new scene of thought in 1729. This, in turn, will help us interpret the role of Greatness of mind in Hume's science of man.

The second part of the work, 'David Hume and Greatness of mind', explores in philosophical detail the social theory of the Treatise and politics and the science of man in the Essays. This part will reveal the relevance of "Greatness of mind" as a general concept for David Hume's moral and political philosophy. The idea is to analyse the argument that Hume put forward regarding the nature and the development of civil society. The main argument of the study is the relevance of the division between self-love and self-liking. Hence, much attention is paid to the question of how moral institutions are drawn from human nature and how Hume's division between justice and politeness plays a role in all of his works.

Mandeville changed his mind also regarding the question of natural affection. In the original Fable he is forcefully denying its existence, in Part II he accepts it.
PART I:
INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT
OF BERNARD MANDEVILLE

‘Vice is always bad, whatever benefit we may receive from it’

- Bernard Mandeville, Letter to Dion, 1732
1. Mandeville and the publishing history of The Fable of the Bees

Bernard Mandeville has never been a neglected author. During his lifetime, he was taken seriously in Britain as well as abroad. The Italian works alone from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century include dozens of serious attempts to grasp Mandeville’s thought, especially in the field of economics.\(^1\) Of the present day Italian scholars, Andrea Branchi characteristically emphasises the context of the Italian tradition of Mandeville studies when explaining his interest in the subject.\(^2\) The French development is no different. A bulk of Mandeville’s works was translated into French: Free thoughts was already translated in 1722 before the author became notorious in 1723 and the two parts of The Fable after his death. The works were also extensively reviewed and discussed in the French press during the eighteenth century.\(^3\) The late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century


\(^3\) About the reviews of Mandeville’s works in eighteenth-century press, see F. B. Kaye, ‘The influence of Bernard Mandeville’, Studies in Philology, 19, 1922, p. 87: ‘periodicals such as the Bibliothèque Britannique and the Histoire des Ouvrages des Savans’ (footnote): ‘the Bibliothéque Angloise for 1725 gave the Fable 29 pages and Bluet’s reply to the Fable the same amount of space; the Bibliothéque Raisonnée for 1729 reviewed the Fable
French works referring to Mandeville are also many. With this long tradition in mind, it is no wonder that the French system has been able to produce such an outstanding figure in Mandeville scholarship as Paulette Carrive. The Dutch have also discussed Mandeville with enthusiasm since the eighteenth century and lately a fresh interest in the second son of Rotterdam has been raising its head. But, perhaps beyond any other European language communities, the German interest in Mandeville lead to a particularly blooming school of scholarship in the late nineteenth century, of which Paul Sakmann’s Bernard de Mandeville und die Bienenfabel-controverse in 1897 was the most shining example. This excellent monograph was no freak accident. As Bernhard Fabian has shown, there had been a vibrant tradition of studying Mandeville’s thought in Germany since the publication of Mandeville’s works.

The emergence of Frederick Benjamin Kaye (1892–1930) in the United States of America did however change the scene. His impact in the Anglophone world was so immense that it still seems as if there had practically been no Mandeville scholarship before him. Kaye’s style of scholarship was in many ways fit for his age: analytical, modern and precise. Kaye’s articles on the writings and influence of Mandeville were a step to a new level of scholarship. Nevertheless, I do not fully embrace the idea set in 44 pages; the Bibliothèque Britannique in 1733 gave 52 pages to Mandeville’s Origin of honour; Maendelyke Uittrekses for 1723 devoted 71 pages to the Free thoughts; and the Mémoires de Trévouz (1740) allotted the Fable over a hundred pages.'


6 Search a web-site [www.bernard-mandeville.nl] organised by Arne C. Jansen, which has published some up-to-date facts and new discoveries about Mandeville.

7 For example, the significance of self-liking was pointed out already by Paul Sakmann in Bernard de Mandeville und die Bienenfabel-controverse, Freiburg, 1897, p. 59. Also one might want to turn to Sakmann’s book regarding the role of luxus in Mandeville and Hume, ibid. pp. 257–60.


9 The immediate impact of Kaye after the publication of his edition of The Fable is evident for example in A. K. Rogers, 'The ethics of Bernard Mandeville', International Journal of Ethics, 36, 1925, pp. 1–17.

forward in the introduction to the influential Mandeville Studies of 1975 that Kaye had single-handedly saved Mandeville. Already in the light of the foreign reception of Mandeville this idea is hard to justify.

In England, of course, Mandeville was the scandal of his time. But he was also a source of positive inspiration in the eighteenth century as the case of Hume is meant to prove in this study. Later, quite crucially, Part II also served for example as a source of inspiration for Charles Darwin, when formulating his theory of natural selection. William Hazlitt was also an ardent reader of Mandeville among many other nineteenth-century philosophers. In addition, Mandeville, of course, plays a major role in Leslie Stephen’s The History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century in 1876. Hence, it is safe to say that his influence did not fade away in England during the nineteenth century. A quick look at some general magazines and little-known works from the mid-nineteenth century proves that in addition to Darwin’s notebooks, Mandeville was on the pages of many mediocre authors as well. When we add this to the fact that perhaps the greatest nineteenth-century collector of Epicurean moral philosophers, James Crossley, addressed a discussion in the Notes and Queries presenting himself as a leading author on Mandeville, we may say that Mandeville was everything but neglected in nineteenth-century Britain. Before Kaye, there had also been a rather serious attempt to categorise Mandeville’s thinking.

Mandeville had not been ignored, but the large number of reviews of Kaye’s edition of The Fable of the Bees in the English speaking press indicated otherwise. One reviewer exclaimed with positive enthusiasm that ‘after this
edition' Mandeville, 'will no longer be neglected in courses in eighteenth century English literature'.\(^{16}\) According to another reviewer, Kaye's 'notes upon the text are beyond praise in richness and accuracy' and the 'edition is a sound and brilliant contribution to American scholarship'.\(^{17}\) By and large, it is quite difficult to find anything but praise from the many reviews of Kaye's edition in the 1920s.\(^{18}\)

In contrast to this almost unconditional praise from the Anglophone press, a German reviewer acutely pointed out that the main reason why Kaye's edition of The Fable of the Bees was of such importance is that Mandeville's works had become rare.\(^{19}\) Mandeville's works as physical objects were hard to get one's hands on at the dawn of the twentieth century. The Fable was not on the publishing list of Everyman's library. This was about to change. Kaye's edition was first published by Oxford University Press, and later when it was signed to the roster of the Liberty Fund in 1988 as an exact photographic reproduction of the Kaye's 1924 edition (with subsidised prices) it was certain that particularly the Kaye's edition of The Fable of the Bees was within the reach of every modern student and scholar. This is where we are left today, Kaye's edition of The Fable and the Liberty Fund distribution of it play a decisive role in people's perception of Mandeville.

Kaye was a good scholar, and, for example, his work on Mandeville on the origin of language was a path-breaking topic, which has by no means been exhausted to date either.\(^{20}\) Kaye realised the importance of

Mandeville’s understanding of the evolution of society, his relationship to Bayle and conflict with Shaftesbury.21 By and large, Kaye’s notes in his edition of *The Fable of the Bees* have served as a source that later scholars have repeatedly elaborated on. There are three aspects in particular that need to be raised when discussing Kaye: the eighteenth-century influence of Mandeville, the French aspect and the bibliographical innovativeness of Kaye.

Firstly, as Kaye himself indicates, the question of Mandeville’s influence was the most important point that he had to make.22 Kaye boldly stressed the influence of Mandeville by describing him ‘as one of the most important writers of the century, whose influence is to be compared with that of Hume and Adam Smith’.23 This was a crucial point to make in the English-speaking world, which has also been largely accepted. Most Mandeville scholars today follow this path. The question of influence lead, for example, E. J. Hundert to call his important book published in a visible forum, *Enlightenment’s Fable*.24 By and large, it would be difficult to claim that Mandeville was not one of the most influential writers of the eighteenth century. This is much thanks to Kaye’s scholarship.


21 The eighteenth-century contemporaries were already broadly using this two-party-distinction. For example, John Brown pointed out that Shaftesbury was the main character of the circle that taught ‘human Nature’ to be extremely ‘uniform and noble Thing’. According to Brown, the leading figures of the opposing school were Thomas Hobbes, Bernard Mandeville and a variety of French philosophers. John Brown, *Essays on the Characteristics of the Earl of Shaftesbury*. (1751) Donald D. Eddy, ed., Georg Olms Verlag, 1969, pp. 170–171, 204. See also Laurence Nihell, *Rational self-love; or, a philosophical and moral essay on the natural principles of happiness and virtue. With reflections on the various systems of philosophers, ancient and modern, on this subject*, Limerick, 1770, pp. 137–8, who is applying the same dichotomy after Brown. Mandeville was the one of the sceptical circle who according to Brown’s understanding, appeared as Shaftesbury’s main challenger, not as a mere shadow of Hobbes, but as a philosopher in his own right. See Brown, *Essays on the Characteristics*, passim. The whole book is structured as a commentary on the contrast between these two outlooks and captivatingly approving part of Mandeville’s criticism on Shaftesbury, especially pp. 204–227. Also Brown’s later, most famous work, *Esteimate of the manners and principles of the times*, London, 1758 and the following answers to the vast criticism that the book received elaborates on this same discussion. About this, see also Max Levon Autrey, *The Shaftesbury-Mandeville debate and its influence in America*, unpublished PhD dissertation, Wayne State University, 1965.

22 For Kaye’s account of Mandeville’s influence, see especially Kaye’s introduction to *The Fable*, pp. cxiv–cxvi. For an earlier version of it, see Kaye, *The Influence of Bernard Mandeville*, 1922, pp. 83–109.


Secondly, Kaye brought to the fore the fact that the great source of Mandeville’s psychology was France. Of course, Mandeville’s relationship to La Rochefoucault and Bayle had been concrete topics of discussion long before Kaye’s time, but he still played an important role in establishing the fruitful French context. Indeed, as Kaye emphasised in all of his works, ‘Mandeville was one of the great connecting conduits between French and English thought’. This is also a path approved of by serious modern scholars. E. D. James pointed out in the Mandeville Studies that ‘Mandeville’s discussion of human egoism echoes the French Augustinians’ and ‘what by them is called amour-propre’. James also acknowledged that this is an issue that has been discussed by many. Shelley Burtt, when making this same point a little later, maintained that it has been Kaye in particular who noted Mandeville’s indebted to the seventeenth-century French moral philosophy. Indeed, we may happily remark that the context of the French Augustinian thought has been outlined well in several studies, and that Mandeville has been firmly placed within this tradition.

The third point, namely, Kaye’s bibliographical innovativeness, is a more complicated matter. Perhaps, the most significant review of Kaye’s edition of The Fable regarded the questions of bibliography. The review was written by the renowned R. B. McKerrow and published in the Library in

29 Burtt, V itue transformed, 1992, p. 130.
McKerrow compliments on the one hand Kaye's bibliographical innovativeness. On the other hand, one of the most authoritative reviewers of Kaye's The Fable severely criticised the edition, for example, regarding the use of miscellaneous unidentified reproductions of early ornaments and the unorthodox description of the different editions in Kaye's work. But the most vital issue that McKerrow singles out is the question whether there ever was a Tonson edition in 1734 where the two parts of The Fable of the Bees were published together as two volumes. McKerrow points out that 'the information which Mr. Kaye gives does not make it certain that he has got to the bottom of the matter'. It is interesting to notice that the path that McKerrow opened has not been followed.

Now, while we have several accounts of Mandeville's influence and the French connection taking their lead from Kaye's work, it seems that only a few scholars (Irwin Primer and M. M. Goldsmith leading the group) have made scrupulous efforts to actually say something new about Mandeville regarding matters such as bibliography. Kaye worked extensively in order to establish the Mandeville canon. When discussing this canon, later additions have been but a few. The most important and visible development has concerned Female Tatler. In the 1930s, Paul Buyan

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33 Apparently, Kaye was the first person to use R. W. Chapman's argument about press figures in his discussion of the sheet O of the first edition of Part II of 1729. McKerrow, 'Fable of the bees. Book review', 1925, p. 110. About the printer's numbers or press figures, see Gaskell, Phillip, 'Eighteenth-century press numbers. Their uses and usefulness', The Library, s5, IV, 1950, pp. 249-261. Gaskell's point is that the use of press numbers had to do with calculating how many sheets each press had printed (when there was more than one in use).
37 One important piece of evidence establishing a link between Mandeville and Dr. Greenfield was published by Gordon H. Ward, 'An unnoted poem by Mandeville', Review of English Studies, 7, 1931, pp. 73–6. Also in the 1930s, Kaye's attribution of A modest defence to Mandeville was questioned based on entries in Stationers' Hall records in Johannes Hendrik Harder, 'The authorship of A modest defence of public stews, etc.' Neophilologus, 19, 1933, pp. 200–3. See also, M. M. Goldsmith, 'Two more works by Bernard Mandeville?', Notes and Queries, 23, 1976, p. 346. About bibliographical matters, see also Irwin Primer, 'A bibliographical note on Bernard Mandeville's Free thoughts', Notes and Queries, 16, 1969, pp. 187–8. Pauline Carrive has since correctly pointed out that the money motive was not the only reason to publish the second edition of the Free thoughts because the second edition does include original material as well.
Anderson provided conclusive evidence making a clear and sound case about Mandeville's involvement in Female Tatler. Later, Maurice Goldsmith in particular has emphasised the significance of Female Tatler in the Mandeville canon. Meanwhile, the most important line of Mandeville bibliography, the publishing history of The Fable of the Bees and the unresolved puzzles pointed out by McKerrow have remained untouched.

It is the intention of this chapter to augment these omissions and to tell a more complete story of Mandeville and the publishing of The Fable. This will bear importance for the interpretation of Mandeville's philosophy, which will follow in the other chapters on Mandeville. I claim that there is a clear paradigmatic change in Mandeville's thought from The Fable of the Bees and other early works to Part II and later Mandeville. The intellectual change is not only visible in the content of the books and this can also be noticed by following the publishing history of Mandeville's works. This is a path that has not previously been followed in Mandeville scholarship. For the first time in Part II Mandeville is trying to get to the bottom of the question: how to derive fundamental moral institutions from human nature? The evolutionary model is not yet developed in the initial Fable. This is the reason why Part II was so important to Mandeville and the reason why he wrote this separate book to begin with. There is a change from political issues to a more abstract social and moral theory. In Part II, Mandeville is not attempting to defend the view he previously set forward. He turns against what he had been saying by asking different questions. In order for


us to clearly grasp this change, we need to appreciate the bibliographical problems revolving around The Fable of the Bees.

At the same time, we start noticing points about Mandeville that call for improvement. Kaye and most of the subsequent scholars tend to say that Mandeville does not mean what he says, even when this is precisely what he does. By and large, there exists a certain intriguing dichotomy regarding Mandeville’s role in modern scholarship. For the sake of clarity, we may reduce this to one concrete question of particular importance, namely the role of the politician inventing moral distinctions. This is a problem concerning the original Fable in which Mandeville writes: what ‘first put man upon crossing his appetites and subduing his dearest inclinations’ was ‘the skilful management of wary politicians’ and ‘the moral virtues are the political offspring which flattery begot upon pride’.40 But what does he mean?

Modern philosophers, who are often suspicious of the Dutch author, sometimes find this quote as a reason to dismiss Mandeville.41 On the one hand, it seems to show that to Mandeville the moral distinctions are an artificial and arbitrary invention. Mandeville denies the existence of other-regarding affections, therefore he is not to be considered in relation to Hume, for example. On the other hand, the students of Mandeville are at pains to vindicate their master. The defence usually culminates into the claim that he is not to be read literally. Instead, we are supposed to take into consideration already here the evolutionary aspect of civil society and moral institutions. Kaye was eager to point out that ‘it is very important’ to understand ‘that Mandeville did not really believe that virtue was ‘invented’ on particular occasions; he was at pains several times to qualify the false impressions created by his Enquiry into the origin of moral virtue’.42 Now, all the evidence that Kaye has to show comes from Part II and Enquiry into the origin honour. Indeed, Mandeville changed his mind regarding these issues. However, the evidence does not indicate that Mandeville did not really mean that virtue was an arbitrary invention in the original Fable.

This aspect of Kaye justifying Mandeville by telling what Mandeville did not mean when he explicitly stated certain things was noted by a critical

40 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 51.

41 Cf. Norton, David Hume. Common-sense moralist, 1982, ch. 2. Also J. L. Mackie writes that for Mandeville politicians are the ‘sole source of the moral virtues’, Mackie, Hume’s moral theory, 1980, p. 85, see also pp. 23–25. It is usual to put the emphasis on the first part of The Fable, even by those who have more than just passing interest in the Dutch moralist. See for example, Donald Winch, Riches and poverty. An intellectual history of political economy in Britain, 1750-1834, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 2. There is of course nothing wrong with this, if we are interested only about the idea of private vices and public benefits. However, scholars mainly interested in history of moral philosophy ought to realize the difference. Schneewind, for example, does not notice the difference between The Fable of the Bees and Part II. Schneewind, The invention of autonomy, 1998, pp. 323–329.

42 Kaye, The Fable, I, p. 47 footnote.
German reviewer. Notwithstanding, in recent scholarship, the defence of Mandeville has often culminated in the same claim that Mandeville is not to be read literally. Instead, we are supposed to take in the original *The Fable of the Bees* the evolutionary aspect of civil society and moral institutions already into consideration. In some of the best works on Mandeville the question has actually turned into a debate whether his mature position was articulated already in *Female Tatler* in 1709–10 or in *The Grumbling Hive* in 1705. My simple suggestion is that when we consider a change in Mandeville's thought and consider his intellectual development this problem dissolves.

Kaye has been subjected to criticism other than bibliographical criticism. For example, from the perspective of English literature it has been claimed that *The Fable of the Bees* is not to be read as a philosophical work at all, but completely as a satire. By and large, certain flaws in Kaye's scholarship have been pointed out, but the most burning issue of them all is that the publishing history of *The Fable of the Bees* and Kaye's decision to publish the two separate parts of *The Fable* together has been left alone. The

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44 This is a position taken by Laurence Dickey in his many ways outstanding article against Maurice Goldsmith's emphasis on *Female Tatler*. Dickey, 'Pride, hypocrisy, and civility in Mandeville', 1990, p. 390.
most focal point of criticism towards Kaye concerns his edition of The Fable of the Bees in general. Kaye, who died when he was only thirty-eight years old, made a choice sometime in the early 1920s that has had a deep impact on how Mandeville has been read and interpreted ever since. The choice in all its simplicity was to confirm the tradition of publishing the two parts of The Fable of the Bees together that developed only towards the end of the eighteenth century. Kaye edited The Fable of the Bees as his PhD dissertation when he was less than 25 years old. It seems that he cut a few corners that he should not have. As a result, The Fable of the Bees and Part II are customarily considered as two volumes of the same work. So, the natural idea is that Part II is just an enlargement of the first Fable. As we will learn, this is not the case. It also seems that in a material sense this was not meant to be the case either.

My reading of Mandeville, in a nutshell, is the following: in the original Fable Mandeville is preoccupied with a set of questions arising from a political framework. We may say that his foremost intention was to participate in an elaborated discussion about the European state system. In a manner familiar to us from seventeenth-century Dutch line of political thought Mandeville discusses questions such as the balance of power, political economy, luxury and other issues as such. Now, the theoretical foundation on which Mandeville bases these political arguments seems quite clear-cut to me. What I will argue is that up until 1724 Mandeville’s theoretical understanding of human nature is a straightforward Hobbist interpretation that explains the ambiguity between Mandeville’s emphasis on the benefits of luxury and the repressive nature of his system. But this does change. Part II and Origin of honour are based on different “science of man” and Mandeville is trying to put forward an original analysis of the development of civil society and the nature of moral institutions.

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46 As Kaye wrote in his ‘prefatory note’, dated 31. December 1923, ‘This edition is an elaboration of a dissertation presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Yale University in 1917’ [when Kaye was 25 years old] (p. xii).

47 For the differences between the two parts of The Fable in Mandeville scholarship, see especially J. Martin Stafford, ‘Introduction’, in Private vices, publick benefits: The contemporary reception of Bernard Mandeville, Ismeron, 1997. See also, Goldsmith, private vices, public benefits, 1985, p. 62. It seems that Goldsmith has later become to appreciate more explicitly the difference between the first and the second part of The Fable. See for example his review of Hundert’s Enlightenment’s Fable, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 6, 1998, pp. 295–6. Also in his ‘Introduction’ to the By society of ladies, p. 50 Goldsmith stresses the significance of Part II: ‘The suggestion in Female Tatler 62 (25-8 November 1709) of a progressive evolution from primitive savagery to luxurious civilization eventually expanded into a conjectural history which formed a large part of Part II. That said, it needs to be pointed out that Goldsmith does not provide a theory that explains this nor the crucial elements such as the role of natural virtues that makes this expansion (should we desire to use this word) comprehensible. In short, for Goldsmith there is no paradigmatic change in Mandeville’s thought. For Goldsmith, Mandeville only ‘extended and refined his view’ without actually changing it. Goldsmith, Private V ices, Public Benefits, 1985, p. 65, see also p. 107. Goldsmith confirms this in his
In 1705, Bernard Mandeville published a poem called *The Grumbling Hive*. He added long explanatory remarks and some essays to it in 1714. This was entitled *The Fable of the Bees* with the famous paradox added as a subtitle: Private vices, public benefits. This paradox has caused great problems of interpretation ever since as a good paradox is supposed to. Before getting into the complicated question of the publishing history of *The Fable of the Bees*, we need to begin our story from the beginning, that is to say when Mandeville landed in London.

What did Mandeville do during his first decade in London before composing the poem called *The Grumbling Hive*? The facts that we currently hold are frustratingly few. He had arrived around 1693 (approaching his mid-twenties), practiced medicine, married and had a few children on the side. His hitherto known first literary fingerprint in England, a Latin poem

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49 The exact date of Bernard Mandeville's arrival in London is yet to be confirmed. On November 17th, 1693, he was 'summoned to appear by Royal College of Physicians' for unlicensed practice, which means he had been practicing medicine in London for some time. It is possible that he left the Netherlands at the same time his father, Michael, was banished from Rotterdam, earlier that year. It is also possible that he already came in 1692. See M. M. Goldsmith, 'Mandeville, Bernard (bap. 1670, d. 1733)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004) <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/17926>. I will refer to this article hence: Goldsmith, 'Mandeville', *ODNB*. The ground-breaking essay of Mandeville in the Netherlands before 1693 and particularly on the reasons why Mandeville might have left his home country is Rudolph Decker, "Private vices, public
defending Joannes Groenevelt against accusations of malpractice put forward in the College of Physicians of London, can be traced back to 1698 (below I present evidence of a translation by Mandeville published in 1695). The first actual works that have until now been attributed to him are a politically motivated Pamphleteers, in which he defends William III’s character and policies, and a translation of Fontaine’s Fables in – as late as – 1703 (late, that is judging by his future literary output).

Mandeville was not a poet by profession. Verse was, as he himself conveys, a recreation, something he wrote in the ‘Hours’ when he ‘had nothing else to do’. When discussing his career in London, and especially the early years, we need to keep the medical side steadily on the horizon. Throughout Mandeville’s early career we may detect a clear attempt to penetrate the inner circles of London’s medicine. As one would expect, he was also active, to a certain extent, within the Dutch community, but as a

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52 Bernard Mandeville, Some fables after the easy and familiar method of Monsieur de la Fontaine, London, 1703. An enlarged edition of the collection was printed for Richard Wellington in 1704 under the title Æsop dress’d or a collection of fables writ in familiar verse, in which the author is indicated as ‘B. Mandeville, M.D.’.

53 Mandeville, Some fables, 1703, preface, [iv–v]. Mandeville makes the point rather forcefully: ‘I could wish to have furnish’d you with something more worthy of your precious time: But as you’ll find nothing of very Instructive, so there’s little to puzzle your Brain’.

MANDEVILLE AND THE PUBLISHING HISTORY OF THE FABLE OF THE BEES
docor he managed to establish himself on a larger scale. An eighteenth-
century owner of The Fable described Mandeville on an endpaper to have
'practised physic not without success'. The 'ingenious Doctor Mandeville'
and the 'Hysterical Disease' were discussed in print in 1724. Indeed,
Mandeville was cited in print as an authority on the stomach in medical
works during his lifetime and as late as 1777. This good repute of a doctor
was not founded on Mandeville's own medical work, Hypochondria or the
shock value of The Fable. It was, first and foremost, his character as a man
of quality and learning which gained him access to the right connections.
This reputation was consciously constructed since the day he set foot in
London. How exactly did he first establish himself as a doctor and as a man
of letters? At least part of the answer lies in his hitherto virtually
unacknowledged career as a translator.

Both, Pamphleters and (two editions of) the translation of Fontaine's
Fables came from the same publisher. In order to make a plausible

55 Mandeville's limited activity within the Austin Friars circles is indicated by the
Latin poem in defence of Groenevelt in 1698 and the translation of Screvelius's sermon
in 1708. We also know that he retained a close connection to John and Cornelius Backer
(who were active in Austin Friars and are in fact buried there). Nevertheless, Mandeville
does not appear in the detailed records of the Dutch church in London and neither were
his children baptised there. This, however, does not necessarily exclude his involvement
with the community.

The copy has a bookplate of 'The Honble Mr Murray', with the clan motto: "Furth Fortune and fill the Fetters".

57 Peter Shaw, The juice of the grape or, wine preferable to water. A treatise, wherein wine is
shown to be the grand preserver of health, and restorer in most diseases. With many instances of cures
perform'd by this noble remedy; and the method of using it, as well as prevention as cure. With a word of
advice to the vintners, London, 1724. The Fable of the Bees is discussed in Shaw's more
historical works, see for example, Peter Shaw, The tablet, or picture of real life, London, 1762,
pp. 23–25.

58 Mandeville's opinion about wholesome food is quoted in the Society of Physicians
in London, Medical observations and inquiries, London, 1757-84, VI, pp. 119–120. For
Mandeville's character in contemporary medical biography, see Benjamin Hutchinson,
Biographia medica; or, historical and critical memoirs of the lives and writings of the most eminent
authority in miscellaneous contemporary medical works, see for example Thomas
Apperley, Observations in Physick, both Rational and Practical, London, 1731, pp. 183–4 and
Thomas Withers, Observations on Chronic Weakness, York, 1777, pp. 115–6. It seems
somewhat misleading to say that Mandeville's medical expertise was hypochondria and
hysteria (or vaguely passions). As a stomach-seated disorder, hypochondria naturally falls
within his specialisation, but a better way of describing Mandeville's specialisation in
general, would be to say that he was an expert on the stomach. We should not be carried
away by the fact that the title of his published medical work in 1711 was A treatise of the
hypochondriack and hysterick passions. After all, in 1730 it was changed to A Treatise of the
Hypochondriack and Hysterick Diseases.

59 Both publications from 1703, Some fables after the easie and familiar method of Monsieur
de la Fontaine and Pamphleters include advertisements of Richard Wellington. The imprint
does not give details of the author or publisher. The title-page of the 1704 edition of
Fontaine's Fables is a cancel. The explanation is the inclusion of the author and the
conjecture of Mandeville’s early days in London, we need to concentrate on Richard Wellington. According to Plomer, Wellington started his career as a printer in 1693, around the time when Mandeville disembarked to live in London. Richard Wellington was one of the most important and respected publishers of his time. John Dunton describes him as ‘industrious and indefatigable in his calling’, a publisher that ‘has the intimate acquaintance of several excellent pens, and, therefore, can never want copies; and trust him for managing and improving them’. Unlike some other famous publishers, Wellington was also commended for being a man who ‘has a pretty knack at keeping his word’. What Plomer’s Dictionary does not tell us is that Wellington was also a publisher of several medical treatises and translations.

One of the first, and largest (based on a page-count), literary undertakings of Mandeville seems to have been a translation of François de la Calmette’s Riverius Reformatus from Latin into English. Richard Wellington was an enthusiastic advertiser of his books. Many of his publications come with an added list of books published and, like many other publishers, he used the tails of the title-pages and blank versos to advertise forthcoming titles. The third edition of Etmullerus abridg’d printed for ‘Andrew Bell; and Richard Wellington, 1712’ includes advertisements of both publishers. The first book on Wellington’s list is ‘Riverius reformatus, or the Modern Riverius ... ‘translated from the third edition, in Latin. By Dr. Mandeville’. This 534-page English translation was issued twice in 1706 and in 1713. Modern Riverius is a straightforward medical treatise, an attempt for ‘a Compleat Practical System of Physick’, as stressed in the 1706 preface


62 The role of Mandeville translating Modern Riverius has previously been analysed in Francis McKee’s unpublished dissertation ‘The anatomy of power’. McKee looks at the classical theory of imitation and its relationship to the notion of digestion and frames Mandeville’s translations in the context as his main focus is on digestion.

63 The first Geneva edition of Riverius Reformatus was published in 1688. The Lyons edition appeared in 1690. The second Geneva edition, that Mandeville says that he used as his copystex, came out in 1696. Before the English translation appeared, there was also a second Lyons edition of 1704. New Latin editions of Riverius Reformatus kept appearing well into the eighteenth century (at least in 1706, 1712, 1718 and 1735).

64 The book was entered into the Term Catalogues by Wellington in [May] Easter term 1706 under ‘Physick’. Richard Wellington published also Michael Ettmüller, Opera omnia in compendium redacta, London, 1701.
by Mandeville. The translation is rather faithful to the second Geneva edition of 1696. The translated texts in the two issues of the book are identical. In 1713 Dr. Richard Mead’s Treatise of the power and influence of the sun and the moon on humane bodies: faithfully translated that has a separate pagination was annexed to the work. On both occasions, the translator is indicated on the title page as ‘a Doctor of Physick’. Based on the identification of Mandeville as the translator in the advertisement and the fact that Wellington was Mandeville’s early publisher, it is safe to conclude that this was one of the most important early literary undertakings of Bernard Mandeville (that we know of). And we should not forget that

65 François de la La Calmette, Riverius reformatus; or Modern Riverius, 1706 [translated by Bernard Mandeville], preface, A2r. About Mandeville’s understanding of ‘the great difference between the Speculative and Practical part of Physick’, see Mandeville, A Treatise of the hypochondriack, 1711, p. 59.

66 The chapter headings correspond with the 1696 edition. The only exception is the last chapter of the first book. The first book of the 1696 edition has only 32 chapters, whereas the English translation has 33. I do not know where the chapter XXXII, ‘Of the Ischury and Strangury’ in the translation comes from. Other than that, without some exceptions, the chapters seem to be more or less a straightforward translation from the copytext. However, I have not undertaken the comparison of the whole book with the 1696 Geneva edition. I have only checked some chapters that are interesting in the light of what we previously know about Mandeville’s inclinations. For example, Mandeville did not add anything of his own to the chapter, ‘Of hypochondriack melancholy’. It was still perfectly common to improve original works and translations in the eighteenth century.

67 For an eye-opening analysis of the idea of textbook and the open-ended nature of any text (printed and other), see D. F. McKenzie, Bibliography and the sociology of texts, Cambridge University Press, 1999, passim. and p. 60 in particular. See also the discussion of the textbook used by Bernard Mandeville’s father below. The use of the concept ‘textbook’ seems to have become standard in medical treatises by 1770s. See for example, Benjamin Gootch, Practical treatise on wounds and other chirurgical subjects, 2 vols., Norwich, 1767, II, p. 50; Andrew Duncan, Elements of therapeutics, Edinburgh, 1770, p. iv and William Cullen, Institutions of medicine. Part I. Physiology. For the use of students in the University of Edinburgh, Second edition, corrected, Edinburgh, 1777, p. A1v.

68 Even the advertisements of the books printed at the end of the work are the same in 1706 and in 1713. Based on the ESTC, the first time a part of the Riverius Reformatus was translated into English is Treatise of feavers in 1701 for E. Baldwin. The only existing copy identified in the ESTC is in the National Library of Medicine, Bethesda (Maryland). I have not had the opportunity to compare this translation with the Modern Riverius.

69 It is rather telling of Mandeville’s private irony and critical self-reflection that already in the first edition of Hypochondria in 1711 there is a section ‘The various arts of getting into practice made use of by moderns’ where Mandeville outlines different ways for a young doctor to supplement his skill: ‘shew your self a Scholar, write a Poem, either a good one, or a large one; compose a Latin Oration, or do but Translate something out of that Language with your Name on it.’ These were all, more or less, practical means for a practical end that Mandeville had himself sought. The autobiographical nature of the Hypochondria is common knowledge.

70 The only other Dr Mandeville in the early eighteenth-century material that I have come across is Dr. John Mandeville [not the medieval namesake]. He was, however, not a doctor of physic, but of divinity. Instead of translating medical works, he spent his time in the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in foreign parts.
Riverius was a favourite Classic in Leiden, where Mandeville earned his doctorate in medicine; and that there was also a tradition of translating Riverius into vernacular in Britain.\textsuperscript{71} What else did Mandeville translate? Along with La Fontaine’s Fables (1703/4) and Modern Riverius (1706), a third item that we know of is A Sermon preach’d at Colchester, to the Dutch Congregation. On February 1\textsuperscript{st} 1707/8. Since at first glance it seems that the translation of Screvelius’s sermon fits ill in the Mandeville canon, it has previously been left without much attention - even when it is clearly signed by the translator, ‘B. M. M. D.’.\textsuperscript{72} Why would the anticlerical Mandeville translate sermons? Well, the answer seems quite logical: because he was Dutch and a translator. The context of the “Screvelius sermon” is a triangle between consistories of the London Dutch Church, the Dutch community in Colchester, and Leiden. There was a shortage of Dutch ministers in England. In April 1707 a young Cornelius Pieter Screvelius was appointed as an assistant minister for the London Dutch church. The Dutch-community in Colchester, who at the time where without a minister, desperately wanted to appoint the same person and ‘unanimously elected’ him ‘Pastor’ in November. However, the London-Dutch Church was unwilling to release him before they received a new assistant minister from Holland. They wrote to Leiden insisting upon the matter, but competent people were difficult to get from Holland. On 23 January, a letter was written from London to Colchester compromising that ‘we cannot decide to discharge Dom. Screvelius’, but ‘we give him permission to do duty in your community for three Sundays, beginning from the next, being 25 January, under condition that he is to return at once to our community if our ordinary minister came unexpectedly to fall ill’. The sermon that Mandeville translated falls within this three week “loan-period” (On February 1. 1707/8). It clearly had significance in the Dutch Church politics as a sermon preached by Screvelius in Colchester. Without further evidence, to answer the question whether Mandeville played any other role but that of a hired-pen would be a plain guess.\textsuperscript{73} The Screvelius sermon was not the first text related to liturgy and the Dutch point of view that Mandeville translated. It seems that the first hitherto unacknowledged literary undertaking by Mandeville in Britain was the translation of Petrus Francius’s An oration of Peter Francius, upon the funeral of the most august princess Mary II. Queen of Great Britain, France and Ireland from

\textsuperscript{71} I would like to thank Professor Harold Cook for reminding me of this in personal communication.

\textsuperscript{72} The translation is listed in Kaye, ‘the Mandeville Canon: a supplement’, 1924, among “Doubtful”, instead of “Authentic works”.

Latin into English in 1695. The Latin epitaph at the end of the translated oration is signed: 'B. D. Mandeville. Med. Doct.' Given all the evidence above of Mandeville’s early career as a translator, it is very likely that the signed epitaph indicates that Bernard Mandeville was also the translator of the oration. To my knowledge, this is a new discovery and it has not previously been discussed in Mandeville scholarship and it marks the earliest literary undertaking of Mandeville in London, partly filling the gap from 1693 to 1703 and confirming one hypothesis of this study. If Mandeville is the translator of the Oration of Peter Francius, it is possible that he translated some of the other funeral orations of the same occasion published by John Dunton (that follow the same format), which are not signed. The Dutch connection is evident in all the orations (funeral orations, pronounced by public authority in Holland upon the death of the most serene and potent princess, Mary II) and the original orations were published in Delph. What this proves beyond doubt is that Mandeville had a career as a translator and maintained his link to the Dutch community in his early days in London. Since he laboured as a translator for both Wellington and Dunton, this also gives new light to comments made about Dunton about the relationship between Wellington and his employees.

As a result, here we already have four different works in three different languages translated into English by Mandeville. As Modern Riverius proves, he did not attach his name or initials to everything he performed. We may be moderately optimistic that more of his translations will be identified in the future; we should be particularly alert to translations that have something to do with the Dutch point of view between 1693 and 1703. It is also clear that Mandeville’s job as a translator was a crucial part of his early stay in Britain. But another possible translation that we ought to consider here is a medical text and directly attached to the 1713 issue of Modern

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74 Petrus Francius, An oration of Peter Francius, upon the funeral of the most august princess Mary II: Queen of Great Britain, France and Ireland, London, 1695, p. 24. The oration is also included in A collection of the funeral orations, pronounced by public authority in Holland upon the death of the most serene and potent princess, Mary II: Queen of Great Britain, &c. By Dr. James Perizonius, professor of eloquence, history, and the Greek tongue, in Leiden. Dr. George Grevius, professor of theology, in Utrecht. P. Francius, of Amsterdam. Mr. Ortwinius of Delft. And, the learned author of the Collection of new and curious pieces. To which is added, the invitation of the chancellor of the electoral University of Wittenberg, in Saxony, to George William Kirchmaier, to pronounce a funeral oration upon the Queen’s death, &c. Done into English from the Latin originals. London, 1695.

75 One possible point of speculation is a translation of Giorgio Baglivi’s De praxis medica in 1704 as The Practice of Physick. As E. J. Hundert informs us, ‘Baglivi’s text was cited repeatedly’ in Hypochondria and ‘receives Mandeville’s greatest praise’. Hundert, Enlightenment’s Fable, 1994, p. 41. We may also note that the translation of Baglivi’s Practice and Part II share the motto: ‘Opinionum Commenta delea dies, Naturae judicia confirmat’. However, the use of this familiar quote of Cicero in the eighteenth-century publications was more of a routine than novelty.
Riverius, namely Richard Mead’s Of the power and influence of the sun and moon on humane bodies; and of the diseases that rise from thence.\textsuperscript{76}

The first question that comes to mind is why “Dr Mandeville’s” role as a translator was leaked in an advertisement of 1712/3, when we cannot find even the familiar initials B. M. (or B. M. M. D.) from the title-page of Modern Riverius, either in 1706 or 1713? The reason may be that instead of taking the credit for Modern Riverius, Mandeville desired to – without making the point plain and rude – imply that he had done a service and tribute to Dr Mead by translating his work. Mandeville clearly had the habit of marking his territory as a translator as the signed epitaph reveals. What suggests that the 1712 translation of Sun and moon was not authorised by Mead, or that he may not have known about this undertaking before it was published, are the words ‘faithfully translated’ on the title-page. Anne Goldgar, in her study of scholarly practices in the eighteenth-century Republic of Letters, illuminates the tradition of unauthorised translations. Pierre Coste, for example, in the mid-1690s ‘was asked by the libraire Henri Schelte to translate John Locke’s Some Thoughts concerning Education into French’. ‘A task’, Goldgar informs us, ‘Coste took on in part to improve his English’. The translation was well received by the public and eventually by Locke, nevertheless, it ‘was made without Locke’s knowledge or permission’.\textsuperscript{77} Coste was obviously after patronage.

It is of course possible that Mandeville did not translate Mead. However, this would hence call for proof. If he did not translate Sun and moon, why else would Wellington have ‘annex’d’ Mead’s treatise to Modern Riverius, since the work was also issued separately? Who supplements a textbook with an unconnected work? ESTC recognises less than 250 different titles that include the word ‘annex’d’. A quick study reveals an obvious rule that annexed work is by the same author as the original title or that there is some other causal connection between the pieces. The exceptions are indeed few, and perhaps they all have a logical explanation. Therefore, we ought to take the fact that the translator, ‘Doctor of Physick’, comes after the description of Mead’s work on the title-page in 1713 as a

\textsuperscript{76} There are three independent eighteenth-century translations of Mead’s De imperio solis ac lunæ in corpora humana. The original work, first published in Latin in 1704, was first translated into English in 1708, under the title A discourse concerning the action of the sun and moon on animal bodies; and the influence which this may have in many diseases (appearing independently and also in the second edition of Royal Society’s Miscellanea curiosa in 1708). The 1712 translation was issued both separately and ‘annex’d’ to the Modern Riverius. Authorised translations of most of Mead’s works, including A treatise concerning the influence of the sun and moon upon human bodies, and the diseases thereby produced were undertaken by Thomas Stack in 1740s. Stack does not refer to either one of the previous translations and the work incorporates new corrections and additions by Mead. All three translations differ considerably from each other.

probable indication that the translator was the same person who translated Modern Riverius, namely Dr Bernard Mandeville.

In 1726, John Woodward was instigating Conyers Middleton to attack Mead. In his letter, the delightfully outspoken Woodward points out that 'Dr. Mead, who himself took his Degree abroad, set up for a grand Patron of all the foreign Graduates'. In addition, Woodward claims that Mead is an enemy to 'the Church, Nation, and Constitution'. An important part of this argument was that 'The wicked Principles, that have prevailed here so much of late, are imported partly by this foreign Education, and partly by so great a Number of Foreigners as have for above 30 Years past been poured in [words struck out] upon us'.

We need not assume that Woodward is here necessarily referring to The Fable of the Bees, even when the letter was written while the heat of The Fable was most absorbing. It looks as if we would have enough proof indicating that there was at least some sort of a professional connection between Mandeville and Mead. Nevertheless, it is most unfortunate that only two of Mandeville’s letters have been found and we have to rely upon this kind of probable reasoning and conjectures in order to understand him and his career.

Maurice Goldsmith has suggested that Abigail Baldwin introduced Mandeville as a potential author, when replacing the previous publisher of Female Tatler. This is possible, although the trade publishing line that Goldsmith advances might mean that a trade publisher did not necessarily hold much authority in the literary circles. It could be that at the time, he

78 BL, Add. 32457, ff. 49 Woodward to Middleton, Nov. 14, 1726. Particularly Woodward’s letters suggests that the harsh competition between different camps of doctors in London was epitomised in the question of right treatment of small-pox. See for example CUL, Add. 7647 ff. 123–125. June 20, 1717, Maurice Emmett to John Woodward and CUL, Add. 8286, Sept. 21, 1699, John Woodward to Mr. Baker. Much of the fighting was carried out in print. It raises the question of the involvement of Mandeville’s sarcastic pen. The controversy seems to have also taken some dramatic turns. To further follow the interesting development of the conflict between Woodward and Sloane, see Sloane 4026 ff. 295–6. The first brief document states that Sloane declares ‘that he intended no offendent to Dr Woodward’ who likewise ‘declares he is sorry he misunderstood him and beggs his pardon’. In the next piece of paper Dr Sloan declares that he did not intend any Affront to Dr Woodward: but he is Sorry that he use’d any Actions or Gestures that Dr Woodward could believe were intended to Ridicule and Affront him’. The saga continues when ‘Dr Woodward declares that the Return he made to Dr Sloane was the Effect of his Resentment for that Scorn and Contempt which not only himself but Indifferent By-Standers apprehended to be Exprest by Dr Sloan’s Behaviour: but he is Sorry that his Mistake induce’d him to make that Return.’ It did not take long before Woodward was expelled from the Royal Society. Perhaps the talk of a duel between Richard Mead and John Woodward was not merely a rumour. Was Mandeville in the middle of all of this?


simply earned his slot in *Female Tatler* based on his increasing reputation. Nonetheless, Goldsmith has once again pointed us towards the right direction, namely, author-publisher relations.

It is important for us to know that Mandeville had an early career as a translator. But equally important is that we now know that his relationship with Richard Wellington was substantial because of this career. This connection, it seems, was decisive for Mandeville’s development as a literary figure and for his reputation as such. His publishing career, both medical and literary, started under Richard Wellington’s wing. It is noteworthy that even in a miscellaneous work published by other hands Mandeville refers to Wellington as an authority. It was no-one else but ‘Well[ling]ton’, who famously told Mandeville that his ‘Dish of Fables’ went ‘down’ with the general public ‘like chopt Hay’.\(^81\) Despite this commercial shortcoming, he was evidently one of the able pens that Wellington had at his disposal. Their publishing relationship continued for a decade, from 1703 to 1713, but the link might as well have been established some years earlier.

Richard Wellington was well connected to other publishers. His deep involvement with the Tonson publishing house particularly deserves our attention. After all, it is the younger Tonson who plays an important role in making the image of *The Fable of the Bees* such as we see it today. We may study the Wellington-Tonson co-operation through imprints. The first time these two names appear together on a title page is in 1697.\(^82\) Richard Wellington and Jacob Tonson (senior) published together the collected plays of some of the most important authors of their time, Aphra Behn, John Vanbrugh and John Dryden. Among other things, they co-operated on Butler’s *Hudibras* and Congreve’s works, as well as on Milton. Their partnership is best remembered through the shared ownership of William Shakespeare’s copyrights.\(^83\) The mutually beneficial collaboration between

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81 Bernard Mandeville, *Typhon: or the wars between the gods and giants: a burlesque poem in imitation of the comical Mons. Scarron*, London, 1704, p. A4r. It is rarely remembered that Mandeville, like he said, did not publish the four remaining pieces of *Typhon* he had already finished in 1704. They only appeared in the miscellaneous verse collection, *Wishes to a Godson* in 1712.

82 Timothy Nourse, *A discourse upon the nature and faculties of man, in several essays: with some considerations upon the occurrences of humane life*, London: printed by J.O. for Jacob Tonson, and sold by R. Wellington at the Lute in St. Paul's Church-yard, and J. Graves, next White's Chocolate-house in St. James's street, 1697.

Tonson publishing house and Wellington’s descendants lasted long after Richard Wellington died in 1715.  

Mandeville’s transformation from almost complete obscurity into fame through the publication of the second edition of *The Fable of the Bees* in 1723 has been exaggerated. It seems that he was well received and respected in the London medical and literary circles – which went very much hand-in-hand – already before. It looks as if that by the time he came to put together the second edition of *The Fable*, he had earned his spurs in and out of print. Even when the younger Tonson evidently had good sense for business, it is doubtful whether the only reason that *The Fable* was immediately picked up by the Tonson publishing house – after it started making noise and bustle – was because he recognised a future blockbuster. It is probable that there was a prior connection. For instance, Mandeville’s evident skill as a translator might have reached Tonson senior’s ears through Wellington already years before. In the light of the evidence that we have discussed, it could be seen as perfectly possible that Mandeville played second violin in one of the large and numerous translation projects orchestrated by Tonson. The one that particularly comes to mind is of course Bayle’s *Dictionary*, set for printing in 1701 and eventually finished in 1710. It is possible that Mandeville had not only ‘effectively “translated” Bayle for English readers’, as John Robertson has suggested. Perhaps we may quietly drop the quotation marks from the word “translated”, if Mandeville operated in the actual translation process as a hired pen.

This is not as wild a hypothesis as it may first appear to be. Mandeville did not only translate medical works. Fontaine’s *Fables* is a plain literary work translated from French. Moreover, the question of whether in fact Mandeville was involved in translating *The World Unmask’d* later in his life needs to be reconsidered. With his evident linguistic ability, it would indeed be surprising if Mandeville had not undertaken some prose translation. We need to remember that such a work as Bayle’s *Dictionary*

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84 After 1715, as was customary, the Wellington books start to appear with an indication of M. Wellington (for Mary, Richard’s widow) on the imprint before the business gradually transferred to their children and before the legal havoc took over.


87 Kaye’s outright dismissal of Mandeville translating Marie Huber’s *Le Monde Fou Préféré au Monde Sage* based on ‘objective proof’ [sic!] that ‘Mandeville could have had nothing to do with this work’ because part of the translation was an answer to a work that ‘did not appear until 1733’ and ‘Mandeville died in January of that year’ is absurd. These are different pieces that could most certainly have been translated by different hands. The logic of the argument dismissing Mandeville’s Muralt translation based on this premise is also unreliable. The question whether Mandeville translated these pieces remains open. Kaye, *The writings of Bernard Mandeville*, 1921, p. 466–7. It is perfectly possible that Mandeville’s career as a translator is not only an early career, but continues throughout his life.
was translated by several hands. The problem studying this line of argument is of course that the translators usually remain unidentified. There is no adequate study on the different translations of Bayle’s Dictionnaire into English and even Pierre Des Maizeaux’s role (in the actual translations) remains unclear. What is established to a point of commonplace is Bayle’s direct influence on Mandeville. It has been insinuated on several occasions that Mandeville studied under Bayle in Rotterdam and that he had a personal contact with his predecessor. The question of Bayle’s direct influence on Mandeville is naturally interesting, just as whether Mandeville participated in translating Bayle or not. Since thus far there has been no actual reason to reflect upon Mandeville as a translator, no speculation of his involvement in the Bayle-translations has been made.

Irwin Primer points out in the introduction to his edition of Free thoughts that ‘if there is anything original in [t]his highly derivative book, it is probably the fact that so much of it is constructed from the words and thoughts of Pierre Bayle’. Indeed, regardless of the question whether Mandeville participated in the translation of Bayle’s works, his Free thoughts, even by the eighteenth-century standards, is plagiarism. If he played some part in translating Bayle, his actions become understandable, if not justifiable. Recycling Bayle is undeniably a question that contemporary criticism has touched upon. The only known letter addressed to Mandeville concerns Free thoughts. The anonymous author says to ‘have read your book’ and ‘wish for your own sake, you had write nothing but ye preface’. Among other things, the author claims that what ‘is good or solid in your book has been a thousand times said before you’ and all ‘ye facts you mention’ are ‘from Bailes Dictionary’. A comparison between the 1710 edition of the Dictionary and Free thoughts confirms this point.

One of the most disquieting contemporary criticisms on The Fable is Bluet’s Enquiry from 1725. He begs his audience to compare The Fable to Bayle. Bluet calls Mandeville ‘a blind follower of this Frenchman’ – adding a

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88 Irwin Primer, Free thoughts on religion, the church and national happiness, New Brunswick, N. J., 2001, p. xviii.
89 Bodl., Rawlinson D. 1302 f. 152. ‘A letter to Bernard Mandeville containing animadversions of his Free thought on religion’. The letter is written in the same handwriting as 1302.f.50, which is Dr Daniel Waterland’s defence of Samuel Clarke. The letter to Mandeville seems to be a transcript. Since Mandeville’s correspondence does not survive, we have no way of knowing whether the letter was actually sent. It is addressed to the author of Free thoughts. The nature of the letter suggests that it was written shortly after the book was published in 1720. I have never seen a reference to this or any other letter addressed to Mandeville before finding this letter.
90 It is unfortunate that Primer was unable to use the first Tonson edition of Bayle’s Dictionary in 1710. It is from this edition to Mandeville’s works that all the numerous, quotes come from. I have carried out an extensive comparison between Free thoughts and 1710 edition of Bayle’s Dictionary. I will not however, start documenting this evidence here, because it only multiplies the evidence that has been established by Kaye.
91 I follow Kaye’s example here. Other ways to spell the name are Blewitt and Bluett.
rider – ‘When I say Mr. Bayle, I would not be understood to mean Mr. Bayle in the original; no, he must go one step further, and take the English translator of him’.\textsuperscript{93} Indeed, this argument that Mandeville has not copied the original Bayle, but ‘his English translator’, is repeated twice in Bluet’s Enquiry.\textsuperscript{94} Is he insinuating that Mandeville was himself this ‘English translator’ in the same way he insinuated that the author of The Fable had also written Hypochondria and Free thoughts? Perhaps not, but this leaves us with a strange dilemma. If Mandeville did not translate Bayle, and his copying of the recent English translations was this apparent to the contemporary audience, what can we say about his literary pursuit at this point in his career? Evidently, in this respect, he transpires to be lazy and careless, even if his “innocent” concern was to approve and promote Bayle. After all, Mandeville was a translator himself. For him to copy paragraph after paragraph from someone else’s English translation (without having any connection to the work) seems odd. The only solid conclusion to be drawn – before we find more fresh evidence – is that careful judgement is needed in order to see which are the original parts in Mandeville’s works and which are not.

We tend to forget that Mandeville first came to London as an immigrant medical doctor, a medical doctor with a family line of medical doctors. What he was occupied with in his early years in London was medicine, both as a practicing doctor as well as a medical author. Indeed, he developed one of the most influential social theories of the eighteenth century some decades later, but earlier he was mainly occupied with translating works such as An oration of Peter Franciús, upon the funeral of the most august prince Mary II and Riverius reformatus from Latin into English. He was not a political theorist by profession.

It has been previously argued that we need to look at Mandeville’s medical theories in order to understand his moral and political thought. A PhD dissertation in Oxford has examined ‘the relationship between Mandeville’s medical and non-medical thought, to assess the relevance of the former for an understanding of the latter’.\textsuperscript{95} The thesis is that there is a significant bearing of the former to the latter. There is some truth to this argument. However, the thesis is not as concerned about a change in Mandeville’s thought as it perhaps should be. For example, in the second/third edition of Hypochondria Mandeville makes a 36-page addition to the work regarding mathematics (which to my knowledge has not been discussed in Mandeville scholarship).\textsuperscript{96} This added medical discussion is

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{93} Bluet, Enquiry, 1725, pp. 127–8.}\n\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{94} Bluet, Enquiry, 1725, p. 132 and pp. 121–138 passim.}\n\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{95} Collins, ‘Private vices, public benefits: Dr. Mandeville and the body politic’, 1988.}\n\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{96} The “mathematical” addition to the second (and third) edition of the Hypochondria runs from page 171 (‘Of the soul’s power without the body’) to (‘Many things are corporeal that seem to belong to the soul’) on page 207. The new Tonson edition of Hypo was first published under the title: Mandeville, Bernard. A treatise of the}
important in order for us to understand Mandeville’s position regarding a priori truths, experimental method, and the relationship between medicine and moral science. It explains how Mandeville differs from some self-claimed Newtonians of the time. It also clarifies what the often used, but rather vague term “Newtonian philosophy” means in the contemporary setting. In Mandeville’s opinion it is plainly ridiculous to try to square goodness. He has respect for mathematics, but he points out that they should not be brought to fore in places where there is no use of them. Medicine and morals are connected in a methodological sense simply because mathematics cannot be applied to either of them as they are applied in astronomy and natural philosophy. This is also relevant in Hume’s context. The reason for the new addition was that Mandeville’s thinking developed and his later works ought to be our concern (in many different respects).

I would like to put an emphasis on the point that we need to look at Mandeville’s medical practice to understand how it delays the development of his original thinking. My claim is that the original Fable is still but a rhapsody, where Mandeville is advancing a simple, however clever Hobbist argument very familiar in the Dutch context. Like many of the educated Dutch people of that time, Mandeville was trained in the Hobbesian line of political thought. The basic argument of The Fable is also something to be

hypochondriack and hysterick diseases. In three dialogues. By B. Mandeville, M.D. The second edition: corrected and enlarged by the author, London, 1730. Since there had been an authorised second edition in 1715, in which the copyright of the work changed hands and the remaining of the stock was sold with a cancelled title-page, the title page of the 1730 Tonson edition was also soon cancelled and changed to Mandeville, Bernard, A treatise of the hypochondriack and hysterick diseases. In three dialogues. By B. Mandeville, M.D. The third edition, London, 1730. It is highly relevant that Mandeville’s name is on the title-page.

expected from a witty doctor and it is of little wonder that philosophers tend to sneer at it. At the same time it is forgotten that Part II is a result of a deep analysis how this first attempt failed in the light of the extensive criticism that The Fable received.

The reason why one should put such a strong emphasis on the medical side (practice, not theories) of Mandeville is because we cannot understand his intellectual development without it. It is doubtful whether his contributions to Female Tatler are the culmination of Mandeville's moral and political philosophy, as Maurice Goldsmith would have it.\textsuperscript{101} It seems that Mandeville was not yet seriously developing his own views on civil society and social development - even when he expanded The Grumbling Hive into the two first editions of The Fable of the Bees in 1714 and in 1723. For instance, still in Free thoughts of 1720 Mandeville was satisfied with collecting thoughts and sentences from Bayle on a massive scale and putting them forward as he found them. This is not to say that these works, where Mandeville veils himself in borrowed garments are of no value. Undeniably, they form a clever and coherent stance on the political topics of the day. But Mandeville simply had not yet matured into the original social thinker that he would later become, which is perfectly understandable, also in the light of the great number and extent of his ongoing projects. Mandeville's early political writings are a textbook case of a topical Whig in Whig colours.

Mandeville's publishers and the steps away from The Fable of the Bees

When discussing Mandeville's publishers, F. B. Kaye - following a pattern of seeing the two parts of The Fable as one work of two volumes - put his faith in James Roberts.\textsuperscript{102} The name of James Roberts appears on the title-page of the first editions of The Fable of the Bees and Part II.\textsuperscript{103} When this is combined with the assumption that Mandeville owned the copyrights of his own works, it seems to make a neat case about the idea that the two different books are complementary pieces and intended by Mandeville as such. This is nevertheless a mistake.

\textsuperscript{101} See for example Goldsmith's review of E. J. Hundert's Enlightenment's Fable and the updated introduction to his cyber-edition of his own book on Mandeville.

\textsuperscript{102} For a brief biography of James Roberts, see Michael Treadwell, 'London printers and printing houses in 1705', Publishing History, 7, 1980, 43–44.

James Roberts, as Maurice Goldsmith has emphasised, was a trade publisher.¹⁰⁴ A trade publisher did not come first in the pecking order of the London publishing industry. It seems to have been 'an appropriate occupation for a bankrupt bookseller' or 'poor widow'.¹⁰⁵ Basically, a trade publisher published in bulk for others without a serious input in the actual publishing process. To put it briefly, 'in the case of trade publishers there is no shortage of imprints'.¹⁰⁶ Michael Treadwell has informed us that 'in the period from about 1675 to 1750 a substantial proportion of the London retail book trade, particularly the part concerned with pamphlets and periodicals, was in the hand of a very small group of men and women known to their contemporaries in the trade as 'publishers'.¹⁰⁷

What is relevant is that the trade publishing business, at least in part, seems to have been politically motivated. The 'major Whig' trade publishing shop was located 'near the Oxford Arms in Warwick Lane', 'opened at the time of the Glorious Revolution by Richard Baldwin, and continued after his death in 1698 by his widow Abigail'.¹⁰⁸ James Roberts married into it and during the 'first twenty years after taking over the business in 1713, James Roberts put his name to more books, pamphlets, and periodicals than anyone else in the trade'.¹⁰⁹ Among those imprints are the first edition of The Fable of the Bees in 1714 and The fable of the bees. Part II in 1729. The obvious conclusion that Kaye reached was to assume hence that Roberts was the printer behind the two parts of The Fable.¹¹⁰

It is indeed true that James Roberts's shop was a place through which many of Mandeville's books were distributed. In addition to The Fable of the Bees and Part II, also Free thoughts on religion in 1720, An enquiry into the causes of the frequent executions at Tyburn in 1725 and A letter to Dion in 1732 passed through the shop as did numerous other books by various different authors. It is also possible that the Tonson editions of Mandeville's works were at least partly distributed by Roberts, although this is not indicated on the title-page.¹¹¹ But this does not mean that the role of Roberts in Mandeville's literary career makes a significant difference. This question has also played a significant role in the interpretations of Mandeville's philosophy because of

¹⁰⁴ For Goldsmith's account of Mandeville and Roberts, see By society of ladies. Essays in the Female Tatler, 1999, pp. 46–47.
¹¹⁰ Goldsmith follows Kaye's interpretation by only making a few reservations to the idea that 'the Baldwin-Roberts dynasty was closely connected with virtually all of Mandeville's important writings' and that 'Mandeville himself owned the copyright of his works'. Goldsmith, By society of ladies. Essays in the Female Tatler, 1999, p. 47.
¹¹¹ About imprints, see M. A. Shaaber, 'The meaning of the imprint in early printed books', The Library, s4, XXIV, 1944, pp. 120–141 and A. T. Hazen, 'One meaning of the imprint', The Library, s5, VI, 1951, pp. 120–123.
a common assumption that the two separate parts of The Fable are to be read as one work.

Some crucial facts have hitherto been ignored. First of all, when we talk about actual publishers, as I have already shown, the role of Richard Wellington as Mandeville’s first publisher was crucial and due to the attention paid to Roberts it has been missed in previous scholarship. In addition to this, many familiar names of the eighteenth-century publishing business appear on the imprints of Mandeville’s miscellaneous works (Pero, Illidge, Nutt, Morphew, Leach, Taylor, Woodward, Baker, Dodd, Rivington, Jauncy, Strahan, Mears, Stagg and Peele). In this light, Mandeville’s involvement with Abigail Baldwin at the time of publishing The Grumbling Hive in 1705 tells us nothing else than that the whiggishness of the piece is most evident. It certainly does not indicate any lasting commitment between the two parties. Mandeville did publish through the Baldwin-Roberts establishment, but other works came across other lines as well.

Secondly, it is somewhat striking that while the investigations regarding James Roberts and Abigail Baldwin have been extensive, Jacob Tonson’s role in publishing The Fable of the Bees and Mandeville’s other works has been almost ignored. Tonson publishing house was the largest player in the publishing scene of eighteenth-century London. Most certainly it was Tonson who played the most significant role in Mandeville’s publishing career.

Thirdly, the role of Mandeville’s later publisher, John Brotherton, who was after all the witness to Mandeville’s will, has been left without much attention. Towards the end of Mandeville’s publishing career, John Brotherton played the same kind of role as Richard Wellington in Mandeville’s early publishing career. Brotherton was the publisher of the second edition of Free thoughts on religion in 1729 and most importantly, he was also the publisher of the second part of Part II in 1732, entitled An enquiry into the origin of honour. But because Kaye’s choice was to argue that The Fable of the Bees is a work of two volumes, these points have not been fully established in Mandeville scholarship. At the same time, the intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville has not been articulated.

It is interesting that what really launched Mandeville’s career as a theorist of civil society, that he left The Fable of the Bees behind, was partly a development of the copyrights of this book.\(^\text{112}\) It is worth mentioning that

\(^{112}\) Richard Sher in a refreshing account of the book history of Enlightenment puts his main argument against the exaggerated role of the copyright in the history of the eighteenth-century publishing. This is a valid point to make of the eighteenth-century book history in general, but in the case of Mandeville, the question of copyright is the key to understanding the publishing history of the book. About the exaggerated role of copyright and Sher’s argument, e.g. Richard B. Sher, The Enlightenment and the book. Scottish authors and their publishers in eighteenth-century Britain, Ireland, and America, The University of Chicago Press, 2006, pp. 25–34.
copyright laws changed during Mandeville’s publishing career. Previously, the copyright based on common law had been perpetual. The Copyright Act of Queen Anne in 1710 ‘limited the tenure of copyright already in existence to an additional twenty-one years’. It placed more emphasis on the author’s right to the published material. For example, if the copyright of a work had been sold to a certain publisher, the copyright switched back to the author after 21 years, if no agreement for new edition had been reached. In addition, the legislation protecting the pre-1710 copies wore out in 1731. These are crucial pieces of information of the history of publishing Mandeville’s works. It needs to be remembered that ‘the most substantial profits in the eighteenth-century London bookselling world lay in the ownership of copyrights’ of best-selling books. It is quite obvious that instead of giving in to the new act, the booksellers ‘continued (until 1774) to maintain that there was a common-law basis for perpetual copyright unaffected by the Act’. One of the major players in this scene was the Tonson publishing house.

I have already pointed out that there is an important link between Richard Wellington’s publishing business and Tonson’s regarding the copyrights of Shakespeare’s collected works. As Terry Belanger has shown, these were ‘among the most valuable of the Tonson’s’ literary copyrights. It is also possible that Mandeville was involved with the Tonsons before the first Tonson edition of The Fable was published in 1724. The only existing argument of the copyrights of Mandeville’s works is that most likely Mandeville owned the copyrights of all of his works. This is not true. Mandeville’s first literary undertakings were translations that he carried out for Richard Wellington. Among Wellington’s literary remains were copyrights of Riverius Reformatus. For example, on 17th of November, 1737 in a sale of William Feales’s remains, lot 61 included the whole copyright of Riverius Reformatus and lot 51 consisted of a Wellington published book described as ‘Mead on the sun and the moon’. It is unlikely that Mandeville would have owned the copyright to any work published through

115 Michael Harris, ‘Paper pirates: the alternative book trade in mid-18th century London’, in Fakes and frauds varieties of deception in print and manuscript, Robin Myers and Michael Harris, eds., Oak Knoll Press, 1996, p. 48. The second edition of Mandeville’s Virgin unmasked was published in 1731, which would make it a case of a work for which legislative protection wore out that year. The first edition of the Virgin unmasked was published in 1709.
117 Bodl., John Johnson Collection, Ward catalogues. The Wellington copies feature in both Ward and Longman copies so frequently that there is no use in indicating all of the occasions.
Wellington including Fontaine’s Fables. Richard Wellington was a serious copyright owning publisher. It would be very unlikely that a publisher of such character would act as a trade publisher on behalf of the author. Mandeville did not own the copyrights to his earliest works. Hence, as we ought to assume, Mandeville worked for Wellington as a translator and as a miscellaneous author.

In contrast, Mandeville did own the copyrights of Hypochondria of 1711. He did not publish the book that introduced his own character as a doctor through Richard Wellington. Mandeville’s publishing career with Wellington ended with the second issue of Riverius reformatus in 1713 (as we remember, the advertisement of this book identified Mandeville as the translator). If we study Richard Wellington’s publishing profile towards the end of his life (he died in 1715), we notice that he only published a few works where his own name appears on the title-page and Hypochondria does not really fit into this profile.

Keith Maslen has described the practice of printing for the author in the eighteenth century. The procedure from the author-as-a-publisher perspective was not the easiest. An author ‘who wished for whatever reason to become his own publisher’ would ‘deal directly with the printer, relying on the latter to lay in paper, which was a costly commodity that would otherwise have been sent in and paid for by the bookseller’. What was also needed was a ‘distributor’, often ‘one or more of the ‘topping’ booksellers whose prime function he had just usurped’. The other choice that the author had was to distribute the books himself (as Mandeville partly did, because of the nature of Hypochondria, which is a work that advertised his medical practice). More ‘often’ than not in the eighteenth century the author ‘shared the venture with the bookseller’. This kind of practice was by no means unusual. Gentlemen often published their own books relying on publishing through subscription. Aspiring authors often had difficulties finding booksellers willing to publish their work. The ‘booksellers may have been the more ready to oblige a new author who had shouldered all the financial risk, in the hope of the future business. Later editions of works first printed for the author were often taken over by the bookseller, as imprints indicate’, Hypochondria might be one of these cases.

Mandeville owned the copyright of the first edition of The Fable of the Bees. The Baldwin-Roberts establishment was a natural place to print a

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120 James Roberts entered The Fable for Mandeville into the register of the Stationer’s Hall in 1714. It should be noted that not all licensed books were systematically entered in the registration of the Stationer’s Company. For example, a Royal Licence did at times operate as an alternative for the registration. In the case of Free thoughts there was no royal licence involved, obviously. The entries in the Stationer’s Company’s register simply are not fully accurate. Of the Royal licences in general, see Shef Rogers, The use of Royal
whiggish work such as the original *The Fable of the Bees*. After all, also *The Grumbling Hive* had been printed in the same shop. Since the book came through a trade publisher, it is understandable that Mandeville would own the copyright himself. Mandeville owned the copyrights of the second edition as well, this time published by Edmund Parker.\(^\text{121}\) The book was entered into the Stationer's Hall register for Mandeville by the printer Edmund Parker, whose publishing profile mainly consists of theological works.\(^\text{122}\) What is interesting about Parker's publications with regard to Mandeville is that in 1724, a year after the second edition of *The Fable*, Parker's list of publications includes the only English edition of Pierre Nicole's four volumes of moral essays, uniting the work into a sensible whole.\(^\text{123}\)

Mandeville's ownership of the copyright of the two first editions of *The Fable* is of minor consequence compared to the question of what happened when the younger Jacob Tonson took over the business of publishing *The Fable of the Bees*. The most substantial profits in the 18\(^{th}\)-century London bookselling world' – Terry Belanger has informed us – 'lay in the ownership of copyrights, not the retailing of books whose copyrights were owned by

\(^{121}\) Nine years lapsed from the publishing of the original *Fable of the Bees* to the second edition of 1723. It is generally assumed that *The Fable of the Bees* was not known before the 1723 Parker edition. This was Kaye's basic assumption. It is also confirmed by Burtt, *Virtue Transformed*, 1992, p. 129. This is however not entirely accurate. In a list advertising 'Books printed for T. Jauncy' included in the second, corrected edition of a poem entitled 'The last guinea, with the year 1720 on the title-page, *Free Thoughts* is advertised as a book 'by the author of the *Fable of the Bees*. Since Jauncy died in 1720, it would be difficult to see why his books would be advertised in 1723 (assuming that *The Fable of the Bees* was not known before that year and that the publication date of the second edition of *Last guinea* could be false). Hence, it is quite likely that *The Fable of the Bees* was already known before the 1723 edition, since *Free thoughts* was advertised as a book 'by the author of the *Fable of the bees*. Francis McKee has found out that *Grumbling Hive* was noted already in 1705. McKee, 'Early criticism of the *Grumbling Hive*', 1988, pp. 176–7. Yet, it is obvious that the attention that it received was nothing compared to the second edition. After the second edition in 1723 had been published it seems to have become customary to advertise Mandeville's other works by mentioning Mandeville's name as the author as well as that he was the author of the *The Fable of the Bees*. Cf. Daily Journal, February 17. 1723–4: 'This Day is publish'd, *The Virgin unmask'd, or Female dialogues. Betwixt an elderly maiden lady and her niece, on several diverting discourses: On love, marriage, memoirs and morals, &c. of the times*. By Bernard Mandeville, author of the *Fable of the bees*. Printed and sold by J. Stag in Westminster-Hall; W. Mears at the Lamb without Temple-bar; and G. Strahan at the Golden Buck in Cornhill. Price 4s.‘

\(^{122}\) The sign of his shop was an ornament of Bible and Crown.

\(^{123}\) The edition of Nicole's essays itself is not of the best quality and the text is precisely the same as in 'the third edition, with amendments', printed for Samuel Manship in 1696. But the idea of this fourth edition to bring the works into an accessible form in two books is important. The moral essays, as a whole, make much more sense in this edition than before.
other men'. The rule of thumb is that an important bookseller most likely entirely or partly owned the copyright of the book that included his name. Quite naturally, 'the booksellers whose names are the most familiar ... The Tonsons, the Lintots, ... Andrew Millar, and so forth - all were large copyright owners (and thus wholesalers), even though they all had substantial retail shops as well'. Important booksellers were also very conscious and proud of their profession. John Peele, for example, in his private memorial described that his 'proper business is that of a Publisher', not a printer. Among the familiar names of London booksellers, 'there is, perhaps, no name recorded in literary history of one who contributed so little directly, and yet is so inseparably connected with certain and important parts of' the history of English bookselling than that of Tonson. The Tonsons are a textbook case of a copyright owning publisher. Tonson publishing business made the most significant part of its fortune by owning the copyrights and not printing or distributing books. 'The Tonson copyrights were sold in 1767 for about £10000'. And this was at a moment when the dynasty was coming to an end, not at the height of its glory.

The story about the two eighteenth-century generations of Tonson publishing - Tonson, the elder and the younger (his nephew) - seems to be an epic saga. The older Kit-cat publisher is often presented as a literary

124 Belanger, 'Booksellers' sales of copyright', 1970, p. 3.
126 Belanger, 'Booksellers' sales of copyright', 1970, p. 3.
127 CUL pressmark P75 15.
129 Tonson's copyrights did not only consist of books entered into the Hall-book. Tonson's royal licences from 1701 to 1728 included such major works of the time as Bayle's Dictionary, Selden's Latin works, Echart's History, Nicholson's poems and posthumous work of Newton. Rogers, 'The use of Royal licences', 2000, pp. 149–150.
130 Regarding the eldeer Tonson, see the ODNB article and also Harry M. Geduld, Prince of publishers: a study of the work and career of Jacob Tonson, Bloomington, IN, 1969 and George F. Papali, Jacob Tonson, publisher: his life and work (1656–1736), Auckland, 1968. These books have been (unfavourably) reviewed by Terry Belanger, 'book reviews', Library, s5, XXV, 1970, pp. 166–8. See also K. M. Lynch, Jacob Tonson: Kit-Cat publisher, Knoxville, TN, 1971. If the scholarship on Tonson the Elder is rather thin, the younger Tonson is even a less studied figure in the publishing history. The elder Tonson kept 'a voluminous correspondence with his nephew. John C. Hodges, William Congreve. Letters and documents, London: Macmillan, 1964, p. 78. However, most of the letters (at least included in BL, Add 28276) are very topical having more to do with the retirement of the elder Tonson and brewing cider. They do not reveal much about their publishing business. Some other letters have been edited in Sarah Lewis Carol Clapp, Jacob Tonson in ten letters by and about him, The University of Texas Press, 1948. I would like to thank professor Raymond N. MacKenzie for confirming my ideas regarding the scholarship on Tonsons and discussing other matter regarding the Tonsons in personal correspondence.
patron caring for his authors. The younger Tonson seems to have been more of an opportunist. Even when the scholarship on Tonsons is not so strong in order for us to fully dismiss all the possible romantic notions that this setting includes, it also has a kernel of truth, even if the older Tonson was not as loving and caring as he is sometimes presented to be.

This contrast between the two Tonsons becomes apparent, for example, upon comparing how they handled editing Milton. One commentator has pointed out that ‘Jacob Tonson the Elder had kept very tight control over the publication of Milton’s works, and clearly prided himself on his fidelity to Milton's texts. His nephew seems to have taken a more mercantile approach to publishing’. 132 Regarding the later editions of Milton’s works, it has been suggested that ‘the motive on Tonson’s part was quite simply to exploit Alexander Pope’s ‘reputation as a critic and a man of taste’ by including him as the editor of the works. Pope agreed that his name would be included in ‘a sumptuous edition’ of Milton, but he declined Tonson’s further ideas of how to cash in with his reputation. 133 In addition, ‘the younger Tonson saw the publication of Bentley’s Milton as a similarly profitable venture, and the resulting controversy as good for business’. 134

By and large, in the words of Stuart Benett, The younger Tonson does not seem to have been well-loved by his writers, and the rise to prominence and acquisition of authors like Pope and by publishers such as Bernard Lintot corresponds to the time when the younger man took control of the Tonson publishing empire. 135

The younger Tonson also attracted some major authors of the time. We have many existing examples of different contracts and agreements between the eighteenth-century booksellers and the authors. 136 Before any book projects, a contract was typically made also between Tonson and his literary employees. These contracts were detailed, especially for larger literary undertakings. One of such contracts survives in the British Library between the younger Tonson, Pierre Des Maizeaux and another co-author of St Evremond’s works. The contract is very particular when giving details about the presentation copies and charges and expenses of paper and print. 137 Perhaps the most famous case of a signing by the younger Tonson

136 For example, BL, Add. 38728, ‘Original assignments of manuscripts between authors and publishers principally for mathematical and elementary works: from the year 1707 to 1818; collected by William Upcott of the London Institution. 1825’ includes several informative agreements between John Nourse, the publisher and his authors.
137 BL, Add. 4289 f. 91. For Tonson’s agreements with Alexander Pope, see BL, Egerton 1951. Joseph Almagor has noted in his inventory of PDM letters and papers that this item ‘contains also later additions dated: 2.8.1699; 9.8.1699; 4.7.1699. Joseph Almagor, Pierre Des Maizeaux (1673-1743), Journalist and English correspondent for Franco-Dutch
is that of Joseph Addison’s. The selling of the copyright of the Spectator has been presented to us in detail.\textsuperscript{138} As a result, after 1715 the Tonson publishing house remained as the sole owners of the Spectator, which they reprinted in its entirety or partly several times. The copyright of the Spectator was remarkably expensive at the time and raised particular questions about the new copyright act. A contemporary source tells us that ‘there is a reason to think that it would belong to him [Tonson] ‘for ever’.\textsuperscript{139} Immediately after Joseph Addison died, the younger Tonson published also Addison’s Works.\textsuperscript{140} This was a controversial move in its opportunism, because Tonson did not possess the copyrights of all of Addison’s works. He nonetheless printed them. It is inconceivable that the Tonson publishing house would not have owned the copyrights to The Fable once they started printing it. Once the second Parker edition of 1723 had become infamous, started selling and was cleared of the charges from the Grand-Jury, the younger Tonson stepped in.

The 1724 edition of The Fable

Mandeville was a consciously provocative author starting from his first publications in Britain. Pamphleteers in 1703, for example, is a satirical, topical and direct work. When the reactions to The Fable of the Bees started pouring in twenty years later, they must have been a shock to the author, even when with the “charity school” essay Mandeville was practically

\textsuperscript{138} ‘the purchase of the Spectator was concluded in three different bargains; Joseph Addison and Richard Steele sealed at the Fountain Tavern on 10 November 1712 the surrender of a part of their rights in the first seven volumes of the periodical to Jacob Tonson junior for a consideration of 575 pounds [Hist. MSS. Comm., Rep. II, Appdx, p. 71]; at the same time they had sold the other “moiety” for an equal amount to Sam Buckley [BL, Add. 21110] Buckley sold his right to Jacob Tonson Junior for 500 pounds paid to him on 13 October 1714 [Endorsement on the reverse of BL, Add. 21110] And Joseph Addison did, by a further deed-poll dated 27 August 1715, ‘bargain, sell and sign to the said Jacob Tonson all that his full and sole right in and to the copy of the 8th volume of the Spectator from no. 556 inclusive to no. 635 inclusive which said copy to be and remain unto the said Jacob Tonson Junior, his heirs, assigns for ever. [BL, Add. 36193]’ Papali, Jacob Tonson, Publisher, 1968, p. 40. In comparison, fly leaves inserted in the BL, Add. 38728, from Gent. Mag., Apr. 1824 read: ‘Joseph Addison on 7th April, 1713, received of Tonson £107 10s. for the copyright of Cato.’ The money was hence substantial that Tonson paid to Addison at the height of his fame.

\textsuperscript{139} BL, Add. 36193 f. 100. The Spectator is also discussed in detail regarding the history of the printing and the selling of the copyright in BL, Add. 36193 f. 109. About the disagreements regarding the common law and Queen Anne’s act in general, see ff. 93–146, also for arguments such as ‘the common law knows no thing of Literary property’ (BL, Add 36193 f. 110).

\textsuperscript{140} Papali, Jacob Tonson, Publisher, 1968, pp. 41–42. See also, BL, Add 28275, f. 86. The Spectator is also discussed in detail regarding the history of the printing and selling of copyright in BL, Add. 36193 f. 109.
begging for trouble. Edmund Parker's first advertisement of the second edition of *The Fable of the Bees* appeared in the *British Journal* on April 20th, 1723. In the same journal, on 15th of June 1723 appeared Cato's essay 'Of charity schools'. The news section in British Journal on July 13th, 1723 announced that 'The last day of the term the Grand jury of Middlesex, of which Sir Thomas Clarges was foreman, presented *The British Journal*, no. 26, 35, 36, and 39, and *The Fable of the bees*. After the second edition of *The Fable* was published, it took less than three months for Mandeville to end up in front of the grand jury.

The presentment of the Grand Jury of 1723 includes the usual accusations of 'diabolical attempts against religion', which in the case of *The Fable of the Bees* is more of a curiosity. It is possible that the political nature of the book is one reason why *The Fable* received such a hostile welcome. However, it is undeniable that the "charity school" essay combined with some of the more controversial passages of the book were unusually provocative regarding current affairs that concerned many. The real accusation of the presentment hence is 'a direct tendency to propagate infidelity, and consequently to the corruption of all morals'.

After the presentment, Mandeville's own approach rapidly changed from a confrontational attack to a careful defence of his own reputation. On August the 10th, 1723 a vindication of *The Fable* was published in the *London Journal*. This vindication was also included in the later editions of

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141 The Grand Jury indictment and advertisement of the second edition of *The Fable* can be found in the same issue of the *Evening Post*, the issue from Saturday July 13 to Tuesday July 16, 1723.

142 The presentment of 1723 is included in The presentment of the Grand Jury for the county of Middlesex, to his Majesty's court of King's-bench, at Westminster, against infidels and sodomites, and impious books, London, 1728.

143 For consideration of the political nature of the Grand Jury affair, see W. A. Speck, 'Bernard Mandeville and the Middlesex Grand Jury', Eighteenth Century Studies, 11, 1978, pp. 362-74. Speck's suggestion is that much of the controversy regarded the fact that the makeup of the jury was Tory at heart.

144 Kaye, *The Fable of the Bees*, p. xi. Kaye's stipulation about the vindication is to be found in Kaye, *The Fable of the Bees*, p. xxxiv. Kaye writes, 'this defence he had reprinted upon sheets of a size such that they could easily be bound up with the 1723 edition'. The evidence that Kaye offers for this is a reference to p. 7 of *Letter to Dion* where Mandeville discusses the vindication. Mandeville writes, 'I took care to have this printed in such a manner, as to the letter and form, that for the benefit of the buyers, it might be conveniently be bound up, and look of a piece with then the last, which was the second edition'. Bernard Mandeville, *Letter to Dion*, London, 1732, p. 7. I have no knowledge of any evidence of the vindication to have been published as a six-penny pamphlet nor that it was bound with the second edition. Hence, I have an alternative hypothesis that I will present below. Perhaps at the time of writing the *Letter to Dion* Mandeville did not remember all the facts. I believe that Mandeville was responsible for printing the vindication in a form that was added to *The Fable* (which was not the original idea at the time of printing), however this did not concern the second edition, but the third. I would like to thank Richard Noble for discussing this with me in private correspondence. He
The point of publishing it in the London Journal and including it in The Fable was the same, that is to say, Mandeville started defending his own character.

F. B. Kaye was struck (and simultaneously stuck) with an argument about ornaments used in the eighteenth-century books. He also proposed a rather far-reaching plot claiming that there are some similarities between the ornaments in different Mandeville books that can be used as evidence. For Kaye, the ornaments bridge a void, indicating that James Roberts acted as the printer of all of Mandeville's major works and Mandeville owned the copyrights. Kaye's general assumption was that more or less any book that we could find with the same ornaments would be that of Mandeville's, because he owned the woodcuts. To me this seems too complicated. What particularly captured Kaye's fancy was what I have come to call the "Ugly Lion" ornament. For example, Kaye's entire case for claiming that Sakmann mistakenly denied the attribution of Mischiefs that ought justly to be apprehended from a Whig-government of 1714 to Mandeville is based solely on this ornament.145 I think this is all too problematic. The ornament most likely belonged either to the printer or the actual artist carving woodcuts compiled several of the same ornament and sold them to separate (or somehow) linked publishers or printers. I just do not see an eighteenth-century author walking to a printing house with a manuscript in one hand and a couple of woodcut blocks in the other.

We cannot make such far-reaching conclusions based on the use of ornaments in printed books. If we follow the use of ornaments in eighteenth-century London we face a different reality. We come to accept the bibliographical fact that it is extremely difficult to make plausible arguments based on single ornaments. There is no straightforward correlation between the used ornaments and the publisher, or the printer of the work. With little effort we come to notice that they are used in several books that have different names on the imprint.

This case can be made by examining the use of two different motifs from 1714 that are similar and can be seen as variations of each other. One motif widely used in the early eighteenth century was one that I have come to call "satyr and his thorns" ornament. In the books printed in 1714 (the pointed out to me that we have good grounds to question whether the vindication was ever published separately as a six-penny pamphlet.

145 The pamphlet has the same "Ugly Lion" that is to be found in the 1714 edition of The Fable and Free thoughts, therefore the manuscript ascription in the Bodl. copy of this work to Mandeville, according to Kaye has to be correct, even when he is sceptical of the title-page annotations elsewhere. By this rationale, A detection of the sophistry and falsities of the pamphlet, entitul'd, the secret history of the white staff... Part II. London: Printed for J. Roberts, near the Oxford-Arms in Warwick-Lane, 1714 is also by Bernard Mandeville since it has the "Ugly Lion" on page 1. The work is anonymous, but this answer to Defoe's pamphlet is usually attributed to John Oldmixon, (which of course could also be wrong). Kaye himself says he was unable to locate this ornament elsewhere despite extensive research (he did not have the privilege of using online databases).
year that the first edition of The Fable was published), “satyr and his thorns” appears in at least one item that has James Roberts on the title-page, in two books of John Morphew, in four of John Baker, in two of Ferdinand Burleigh, in two of John More, in one of anonymous printer and in one in which the publisher is not indicated but which was sold by Andrew Dodd. If we take another ornament from 1714, very similar to the “satyr and his thorns”, we notice that it also was widely in use. I call this ornament “flowers with horns”. This ornament and its slight variations were even more common in the 1714 books than “satyr and his thorns”. While I was able to detect “satyr and his thorns” in thirteen different books with seven possible publishers/printers, “flowers with horns” appears in a much larger number of books.

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146 Anon., A dvice to W higs and Tories. [London: Printed for James Roberts], 1714, p. 3.
147 Anon., A letter to the author of the history of the L utheran church, [London: Printed for John Morphew], 1714, p. 3; Anon., The present ministry justify’d: or, an account of the state of the several treaties of peace, [London, Printed and Sold for J. Morphew], 1714, p. 5.
151 John Fisher, A treatise concerning the fruitful saying of D avid, the King and Prophet, in the seven penitential Psalms. [Printed in the year MDCCXIV], p. 1.
connection between the possible publishers and printers. The names of Roberts, Pemberton, Knaplock, Knapton, Parker, Curl and Tonson can all be found in the imprints. We cannot make a connection from the ornament to the publisher. But even more so, to make assumptions of a particular eighteenth-century author and the use of a certain ornament would be absurd. Based upon the evidence of “flowers with horns” ornament, we may say for example that John Darby used “flowers with horns” in some of the books that we know he printed for different publishers, but it would be a mistake to assume that the use of this ornament indicates that he is necessarily in any way connected to a work that includes such an ornament. The “flowers with horns” printing blocks were evidently in use in many printing houses in 1714.

Based on this evidence, it seems that the manufacturers of woodcuts carved several blocks with the same motif that they sold to different printers, which would be a natural thing to do. They also most likely developed variations of certain motifs. Once the old blocks wore out, the printers would buy new blocks from the artists, who naturally were inclined to base their new blocks upon the old motifs. The artists were in the business of making a living. It is a fact that there are several similar, yet slightly different ornaments to be found among different publishers and printers of the early eighteenth-century. Although there were no assembly lines in place in the eighteenth century, it was only natural for a craftsman to reproduce what one (or someone else) had previously created. The conclusion is that no publishing argument can only be based upon the fact that certain ornaments can be found in certain books.

This further refutes Kaye’s ideas about the strong link between Mandeville and James Roberts. Once Kaye kept on following the line emphasising James Roberts, Jacob Tonson was more or less forgotten. But

what is likely to have happened is that once the business of the presentment to the grand jury was resolved, the younger Jacob Tonson bought the copyright of The Fable and printed it so that it was published late in 1723 (the imprint indicates 1724).\footnote{Applebee's original weekly journal, 18 Jan 1723/4 p. 3198 has a likely advertisement of the 1724 edition of The Fable by Tonson.} James Roberts might have been involved in the publishing process, but his role can by no means be described as essential at this point in Mandeville's publishing career.

Once a copyright had been turned over to a bookseller, a contract for the further editions was usually made, in which the author received a fixed monetary compensation and a certain amount of the printed book, which he could either give out as a presentation copy or sell for his own profit.\footnote{An example of this kind of contract is the one made between Thomas Woodward and Pierre Des Maizeaux, BL, Add. 4289 f. 335 April 27. 1724: 'In consideration of Mr Des Maizeaux his having assigned over to us the Copy of his Historical and Critical Account of the Life and Writings of Mr Chillingworth we promise (over and above what he has already received) to deliver him thirty of the said Books in Sheets [word crossed out] as soon as it is first printed and to pay him five Guineas on its being reprinted in any Form. Tho. Woodward'.} This is most likely what happened to The Fable of the Bees once Tonson became the publisher of the work. He simply bought the copyright from Mandeville and an agreement was made regarding the fixed compensation that Mandeville received for the subsequent editions. At the same time, the right to print The Fable of the Bees as it was, was turned over to Tonson. It did not take long for Mandeville to have no (or extremely limited) role in the publishing process of the further editions of The Fable.

What is evident is that once one started working for Tonson, one joined something resembling a publishing "factory" that followed certain practices for all the published works. F. B. Kaye has tried to emphasise the unique nature of the editions of The Fable of the Bees. He was so charmed by the book that he included some of the early eighteenth-century ornaments in his 1924 edition for Oxford University Press. It is however noticeable that The Fable of the Bees looks like any other of Tonson's books. Particularly striking upon comparison are the similarities between The Fable of the Bees of 1724 (and 1725) and Laurence Echard's The history of the revolution of 1725. The history of the revolution was entered in the register of the Stationer's hall on May 24, 1725 for Jacob Tonson. Hence, we know for a fact that the younger Jacob Tonson owned the copyright of this work. These two different works were printed as if they had come from the same mould. If one ignores the content, the front-matter of each of the books could easily be mistaken to be from the other work.\footnote{The history of the revolution looks very much like the first Tonson Fables. The preface commences on A2r with the same ornament of two angels looking away from a triumph in the middle that is to be found in The Fable on top of the Preface of the 1724 edition. Also the contents pages end with a nonchalant decorated ornament that is to be found on p. 44 of the 1725 printing of The Fable. But above all, the sheet that would have first been printed (that came after the front-matter in a bound book), B1r of The Fable of the} It is very clear that Tonson

155 A pplebee's original weekly journal, 18 Jan 1723/4 p. 3198 has a likely advertisement of the 1724 edition of The Fable by Tonson.

156 An example of this kind of contract is the one made between Thomas Woodward and Pierre Des Maizeaux, BL, Add. 4289 f. 335 April 27. 1724: 'In consideration of Mr Des Maizeaux his having assigned over to us the Copy of his Historical and Critical Account of the Life and Writings of Mr Chillingworth we promise (over and above what he has already received) to deliver him thirty of the said Books in Sheets [word crossed out] as soon as it is first printed and to pay him five Guineas on its being reprinted in any Form. Tho. Woodward'.

157 The history of the revolution looks very much like the first Tonson Fables. The preface commences on A2r with the same ornament of two angels looking away from a triumph in the middle that is to be found in The Fable on top of the Preface of the 1724 edition. Also the contents pages end with a nonchalant decorated ornament that is to be found on p. 44 of the 1725 printing of The Fable. But above all, the sheet that would have first been printed (that came after the front-matter in a bound book), B1r of The Fable of the
printing industry reused different moulds and skeletons between the works published around the same time. And why wouldn’t they? The end result that we still see today is that the bound books look very much alike.\textsuperscript{158} There are also other works in which case we know that Tonson owned the copyright as well as the ornaments and the book resembles that of the Tonson’s Fable.\textsuperscript{159}

But a book that is particularly interesting considering the publishing history of Mandeville’s works is Satire III of The universal passion by Edward Young. This is a work that on the title-page is said to have been ‘printed for J. Roberts’ in 1725. The copyright was owned by Tonson and the later editions in 1740s were printed for J. and R. Tonson. The similarities to The Fable are also striking. The ornamented L that commences the Universal passion on p. 1 is precisely the same as the “L” in the beginning of the sentence ‘Laws and government are to the Political Bodies...’ in the preface to the 1725 edition of The Fable. What is likely is that Tonson was the owner of the copyright and the actual publisher of these works even when the title page states: ‘printed for J. Roberts’. It might be that Roberts acted as the printer. Especially, if Tonson publishing house used to divide the work at hand between different printing shops, this is indeed possible. It is evident that Tonson made use of several printers instead of publishing with just his own press.\textsuperscript{160} However, it could also be that the reason why the name of James Roberts is on the title-page of so many Tonson books is that he was the main retailer, nothing more and nothing less. As Michael Treadwell has pointed out, ‘vastly the most important group to make use of the trade publishers was formed by copyright-owning booksellers, and the two principal motives which inspired them were concealment and

\textsuperscript{158} The part of the book that was printed last, but read first by the buyer was of course the front-matter, which was hence the most relevant part of the book from the publisher’s perspective. The beginning of the book had to be appealing. Hence, it might be that a better printer, more lavish ornaments etc. were used for printing the front-matter and the actual text was given to a cheaper press with less ornaments and inferior type. This could be the case with Etchard’s History of the revolution.

\textsuperscript{159} For example, Thomas Southerne’s play Money the mistress that was entered to the Stationer’s Hall register in March 11, 1725/6 for Jacob Tonson. Stationers’ Company, Index of titles and proprietors of books entered in the book of registry of the Stationers’ Company ... from 28th April 1710 to 30th Dec 1773, [London, 1910]. Also the seventh edition of the Spectator of 1724 fulfils this criteria and includes the same decorated letters as the Tonson Fable.

\textsuperscript{160} Papali, Jacob Tonson, publisher, 1968, p. 51.
convenience’. As W. W. Greg has stressed, it is always safest to assume that 'any work bearing the imprint of a known trade publisher was published for someone else'. It is evident that Tonson used trade publishers. He might have been involved with different congers as well. There are also other clear incidents when the name of Roberts appears in works belonging to Tonson. So it seems likely that Tonson owned the copyright of The Fable of the Bees after 1724 and Mandeville was no longer in charge of what happened to this work.

The 1724 edition has been researched rather extensively in the process of preparing this study. Regarding the edition, it should be first remarked that the paper and the quality of the book improved noticeably from the second (Parker) edition of 1723 to the printing of the first Tonson edition of The Fable in 1724. The paper that was used for 1724 edition of The Fable is presumably Italian. Except for the two last gatherings the paper of the first Tonson Fable came from a stock with an IO watermark, and CC

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161 Treadwell, 'London trade publishers 1675–1750', 1982, p. 120.
164 I am grateful to the staff of various institutions (including the 32 libraries listed below) that have helped me with my inquiries regarding their copies of the third edition of The Fable of the Bees of 1724. The ESTC lists little over 60 known copies of the first Tonson edition of The Fable (the ESTC list is not fully accurate and there are some other known copies in public libraries as well. My assumption is that one could perhaps find 75-100 existing copies of this edition that are within public access). However, a much smaller portion of the edition is enough for us to make a plausible conjunction regarding the edition as a whole. I have confirmed information regarding 35 copies. The following institutions were more than helpful in either assisting and allowing me to investigate the copy in their possession or confirming that their copy matches my description if I was unable to travel in order to investigate the copy myself: British Library; King's College Library (Keyes library), Cambridge; Trinity College Library (Sraffa library), Cambridge; Bodleian Library, Oxford; The National Library of Finland; National Library of Scotland; Northwestern University Library; University College of Wales, Aberswyth, Hugh Owen Library; London Library; University of Tennesee, James D. Hoskins Library; University of North-Carolina at Chapel Hill, Wilson Library; Bowdoin College Library; Cornell University Library; Bryn Mawr College, Canaday Library; Memphis State University Library; Connecticut College Library; University College, Dublin, James Joyce Library; University of Wisconsin, Madison Libraries; University of Oklahoma Libraries (2 copies); University of Iowa Library (2 copies); Purdue University Libraries; Birmingham University Library; Trinity College Library, Dublin; University of Virginia Library; Trinity College Library, Hartford, Watkinson Collection; University of Oregon Library; John Rylands University Library, The University of Manchester (2 copies); Boston Public Library; Amsterdam University Library; Emory University Candler School of Theology Library; Brown University, John Hay Library; University of St Andrews Library. All of the abovementioned copies match the description regarding the paper.
165 I examined a copy of the 1723 edition of The Fable in CUL (pressmark Nn.17.24). The paper is of worse quality than the Tonson Fable and the quality of the printing clearly inferior.
166 I would like to thank Richard Noble of Brown University for the suggestion that the paper of the work is most likely Italian.
counter/ cornermark in the same half of the sheet. Paper in the last two gatherings is different from the rest of the edition. This can be easily detected because of the visible difference in the quality of the paper (after page 449). The last gatherings are of thinner paper. The pages in many copies have been yellowed more than in the rest of the book (or the paper noticeably darkens and becomes rather splotchy). The paper is evidently of less quality and has far more impurities than what precedes in the book. There is also more show-through from the printing on the other side. The main paper stock of the third edition of The Fable can be described as fine paper and the two last gatherings are of ordinary (British) quality at best.\footnote{167}

The watermarks are also missing from the two last quires.\footnote{168}

What does this evidence of the paper tell us? In Letter to Dion, Mandeville quite surprisingly brings to the fore his own role in publishing the vindication. 'I took care', he declares, 'to have this printed in such a manner, as to the letter and form, that for the benefit of the buyers, it might be conveniently be bound up, and look of a piece with then the last, which was the second edition'.\footnote{169}

Kaye took this possibility seriously and assumed that the vindication would have been published as a six-penny pamphlet to be bound up with the second (Parker) edition. There is no evidence that the vindication had been published immediately after it appeared in the London Journal and reissued in a format matching that of The Fable and then incorporated in the subsequent editions. There are no known copies of the second edition that would include the vindication either. What we do have is the entire third edition with the vindication published on different paper than the rest of the work. The last part of a book to be printed was the front-matter. The title-page and the introduction of the 1724 edition are printed on presumably Italian paper, because enough of it had been reserved for this purpose. This also explains why the title-page is not a cancel, even when the vindication was added to the book after the bulk of the text had been printed. It is also noticeable that the errata was printed at the end of the vindication and thus the vindication is by no means a part that was bound to the third edition. We can also stipulate that the errata to

\footnote{167} The three main qualities of eighteenth-century paper defined by Gaskell were 'fine, second, and ordinary'. Phillip Gaskell, 'Notes on eighteenth-century British paper', The Library, s5, XII, 1957, p. 34.

\footnote{168} The CC cornermark shows in the gatherings, on the fore-edge of the tail in one of the four leaves with a signature [B1, B2, B3, B4...F1, F2, F3, F4... etc.]. CC cornermarks in the BL copy [pressmark 8405.e.31], for example are on leaves A3, B4, C4, D2, [E missing]. F4, G1, H4, I2, K3, L3, M1, N3, O3, P2, Q4, R1, [S missing], T1, U2, X4, Y4, Z4, 2A4, 2B3, 2C1, 2D1, 2E1, 2F4. The CC is missing from the two last gatherings (2G–2H). The CC corner- (or countermark) itself is most likely a meaningless set of initials 'generally chosen from among ten or a dozen conventional and apparently meaningless ciphers, names and initials', which does not necessarily indicate a connexion between the countermark and quality. Gaskell, 'Notes on eighteenth-century British paper', 1957, p. 37.

\footnote{169} Mandeville, Letter to Dion, 1732, p. 7.
this particular work was quite likely prepared by the author. While preparing the errata, Mandeville came to the conclusion that the vindication must be printed with the work, mainly for the purpose of defending his character. Hence, it seems that simply at the time of writing Letter to Dion Mandeville's memory was hazy or, more likely, with the second edition he plainly points to the first Tonson edition in 1724.

What the evidence of the paper tells us above all is that the vindication was not originally planned for the third edition at all. Had it been, surely enough paper would have been reserved for the vindication (and if for some reason they had ran out of the original stock of paper, surely the two last quires would not systematically have been on different paper in the entire edition). Percy Simpson in his classic account has informed us that in the eighteenth century a new custom was introduced in the printing industry of charging for extra corrections from the author. ‘These extra charges’, Simpson writes, ‘must have been made for author’s revision of the proof-sheets, especially for additions and cancels’.\(^{170}\) In other words, if an author wanted to add or change something at a late stage of publishing, he ended up paying for the additions and changes himself. Simpson also introduces a number of examples of this practice. In order to get his later corrections in a printed book, the author had to go through a painstaking and costly process. This is most likely the case of the vindication being added at a late stage of printing of The Fable in 1724. Mandeville did indeed himself pay for publishing the vindication in such form that it would be incorporated in subsequent editions of The Fable and the third edition of 1724 in particular. It was not however a six-penny pamphlet. But also because Mandeville paid for this himself, it is of little wonder that he underlined his role in his description of the incident in Letter to Dion.

This fact about the paper also tells us about the intentions of the author. My suggestion is that it was in fact the author Mandeville (not Tonson, the publisher) who desired to add the vindication to the third edition of The Fable of the Bees at a very late stage of printing and this is the explanation why the two last gatherings came from different stock than the rest of the book. What the question about paper also suggests is that Mandeville started to be excessively worried about his own reputation and what that The Fable might have been doing to it. Adding two quires of material to a work at his own expense was no small matter for an author like Mandeville. It is also relevant that there are no relevant author's changes or corrections to be found in The Fable in the editions that came after 1724.\(^{171}\) Hence, if this

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\(^{171}\) As a curiosity it can be mentioned that there are some claims that no proper bibliographical arguments have been established about the role of paper. I believe that the case of Mandeville and the vindication functions as an example that this is however possible.
hypothesis is true, the vindication added to The Fable of the Bees surely is the greatest part that Mandeville himself played in editing The Fable after it had been cleared from the charges of the grand jury.

There are two significant differences between the 1724 and the 1725 octavo editions of the Tonson Fable. The 1725 (fourth) edition was printed in full on the paper that was used for the sheets of the 1724 edition (except for the two last quires). The use of this particular paper was not a default practice of the Tonson printing house. The fifth edition of The Fable in 1728 was printed on different paper, but of similar quality. The most significant change between the 1724 and the 1725 editions is that on page 465 there is one line less of text in the 1725 edition compared to the 1724 edition, hence the pages from here on start to run in a different order until the end of the book. Kaye points out that the ‘next edition, in 1725, was identical except for a number of slight verbal alterations, some of which are probably by Mandeville’. The significance of the alterations is in fact very slight and the evidence pointing to Mandeville as their origin also thin.

A fact is that Mandeville did not make any substantial alterations to the 1725 edition that would have called for resetting the type and increased the price of printing. At the time, Mandeville must have been extremely keen on making alterations and corrections because this was the time when The Fable and Mandeville’s character were under the most intense attack. For example, John Dennis’s direct offensive against The Fable of the Bees had been published in April 1724. Around the same time, in August 1724, A defence of Charity Schools addressing The Fable of the Bees was also published (not in 1725 as the imprint and ESTC indicate). The end result did not however yield any substantial changes to the subsequently published edition of The Fable of the Bees. What is significant from the point of view of printing the fourth edition is simply the purposeful alteration of the order in which

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172 The CC countermarks can be found for example in a copy of the 1725 edition in CUL (pressmark 7720.d.444) from the leaves: A1, B4, C7, D2, E1, F2, G3, H1, 12, K3, L2, M4, N1, O1, P1, Q3, R3, S4, T1, U4, X1, Y4, Z3, 2A3, 2B3, 2C3, 2D2, 2E2, 2F1, 2G4, 2H4.
174 CUL, pressmark, 1028.c.1.
175 Kaye, Intro, p. xxxv.
176 Advertisement in the Evening Post, April 9 to April 11 1724.
177 Advertisement in the Evening Post, August 25 to Aug 27 1724.
the text ran towards the end of the book. It was a logical way to establish that the book is a different edition from the 1724 printing while the same skeletons were used to print the bulk of the book. The fourth edition had everything to do with sales, nothing with defending the character of the author through the means of editing the book. Mandeville's defence of his character and thinking was carried out on a different front than editing The Fable.

Bernard Mandeville 'apparently left no literary MSS'. To be sure, I have conducted a systematic study of the different depositories and auction sale catalogues in order to locate Mandeville's letters, manuscripts and to find out more information about the publishing history of The Fable of the Bees. The study confirms that there is apparently very little to be found on Mandeville compared to Hobbes and Hume.

During the rather extensive research, only one letter was found addressed to Mandeville that has not, to my knowledge, been previously discussed in Mandeville scholarship. What happened to Mandeville's own manuscripts is not known. It might be that Mandeville was one of the old fashioned authors who actually took care that his private papers were burned. But for whatever reasons here lies the true Mandevilllean paradox. Several scholars today agree that he was an original thinker who belongs to the same class as Hobbes and Hume. Yet, quite unlike Hobbes and Hume today, Mandeville is still seen as an anomaly. While the biographical material that reveals the man behind the myth is lacking, it is still easy to conclude that he was the Man Devil instead of a man with original thoughts. The most likely scenario in the case of the preservation of Mandeville's manuscripts and letters is that it became a vicious circle where no one took care of collecting or preserving them,

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178 Margaret M. Smith, 'Mandeville' in Index of English literary manuscripts, Vol. III, 1700-1800. Part 2, Mansell, 1989, p. 185. The almost complete lack of primary sources of Mandeville was noted by Kaye; this was reiterated by Irwin Primer in Mandeville studies, p. ix.

179 The researched material relating to different auction sale catalogues of autograph letters in microfilm has been rather extensive (I have covered autograph letters at Sotheby's 1734-1936, Puttick and Simpson catalogues 1846-1870, Thomas Thorpe's catalogues 1818-1851 and a number of other miscellaneous records). In clear contrast with Mandeville, the correspondences of Hobbes and Hume form consistent bodies for detailed biographies. Meanwhile, Mandeville remains a mystery, although there is no reason to assume that he would not have engaged in at least a moderately extensive correspondence typical of a man of quality and learning. However, there is a total of 210 letters in the Hobbes correspondence. The current editions of Hume's letters include 642 letters and these do not include the letters addressed to Hume. In this company, Mandeville's fate seems truly sorry. Only two of his autograph letters have been found to date (both in BL). Regarding my search of auction sale catalogues and the correspondence of Thomas Hobbes, see Noel Malcolm and Mikko Tolonen, 'The correspondence of Hobbes. Some new items', Historical Journal, 51, 2008, p. 485.
instead of him being a victim of a conspiracy to remove his letters from the respectable collections.\textsuperscript{180}

Manuscript material directly relating to Bernard Mandeville is thus scarce. One interesting affiliated item of the 1724 edition can be found in J. M. Keynes’s collection in King’s College, Cambridge.\textsuperscript{181} The copy includes an annotated index with more than 80 different manuscript additions and cross-references in ink amending the first Tonson printing of The Fable. The reason why this item is interesting is that it is possible that this was the author’s copy of the 1724 edition and the corrections were meant for a future edition of The Fable of the Bees.

The location of the copy in Keynes’s collection is essential. Apart from being avid collectors of Thomas Hobbes and David Hume, Keynes and Pierro Sraffa, who worked together in bibliographical matters, also collected items relating to Bernard Mandeville.\textsuperscript{182} As collectors and scholars, their impact on the history of philosophy has been significant.\textsuperscript{183} In fact, Sraffa and Keynes made the single most significant twentieth-century finding of Hume scholarship by discovering that David Hume himself composed the abstract to the Treatise. Keynes’s collections of Mandeville are impressive. They incorporate most of his works, including both issues of the first edition of The Fable of the Bees of 1714. Keynes had also acquired many rare Mandeville items, for example a unique copy of Aesop dress’d of 1704 that includes some additional material printed for the first time.\textsuperscript{184}

Keynes was not the first collector working on Mandeville for ideological reasons. James Crossley of the Chetham Society in the second half of the nineteenth century had also collected Hobbes, Mandeville and Hume. In the Notes and Queries, Crossley acted as a leading authority on Mandeville,

\textsuperscript{180} I am unwilling to conclude, however, that the attributes that help preserve the correspondence of one leading author of its time would be fully accidental. If the initial collection was destroyed or did not exist, more than two letters should have turned up. The most probable reason for the small number of Mandeville’s letters seems that he has been overlooked. People have not been actively searching for Mandeville’s letters as they have in the case of Hobbes and Hume. Extensive searches for Hobbes’s and Hume’s letters have been carried out on several occasions. The groundwork on Mandeville still relies on Kaye’s efforts in the 1920s. Of course, the question of censorship and wilful destruction of sources is another matter of speculation. Hobbes and Hume were controversial characters, but Mandeville was even worse according to the general public at the time. It is possible that someone played a private hangman when organising, for example, Hans Sloane’s library or other collections at the British Museum.

\textsuperscript{181} Pressmark Keynes.F.19.34.

\textsuperscript{182} References to the Keynes Papers, located at King’s College, Cambridge, will be to KP. KP: PP/ 55A MS is an autograph manuscript accession list of philosophical and literary works in J. M. Keynes’ library. It includes a full checklist of Mandeville’s works.

\textsuperscript{183} About Keynes as a collector, see the fascinating essay by A. N. L. Munby, ‘The book collector’, in Essays on John Maynard Keynes, Milo Keynes, ed., Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp. 290–298 (which, however does not establish the importance of Sraffa).

\textsuperscript{184} The importance of this item is discussed in a letter from M. M. Goldsmith to Keynes, 14.6.1965, enclosed with the book, pressmark Keynes.F.19.20.
one who had been following everything related to him for decades. As a
Hobbes scholar, Crossley was able to gather ten per cent of the letters in
Noel Malcolm’s edition of Hobbes correspondence from different sources
and his efforts on Hume were no less considerable. When Crossley died,
unfortunately his vast collections were sold at auction and dispersed in
different directions. Nevertheless, what we do know about Crossley is that
one of the main sources of his acquisitions was Thomas Thorpe, whose
catalogues from 1818 to 1851 have been preserved. A manuscript
annotation on a blank verso of the Keynes’s copy of the 1724 edition of The
Fable of the Bees in King’s College, Cambridge refers to Thorpe’s catalogues
in 1820 and to a relatively high price of 14 shillings. Given the nature of the
copy and its possible origin, it would not be surprising if the copy in
question and now in the Keynes’s collection had passed through Crossley’s
hands.

Unlike rare book collectors today, when J. M. Keynes bought his rare
books, he had the privilege to choose the copy that he liked best. For
example, in the case of a later edition of The Fable of the Bees, Keynes bought
the item, but returned it to the seller because he did not like what he saw. His aim was to collect all the impressions of all the editions of Mandeville’s
works. Most of the copies that he acquired are crisp, clean items – the
best copies available in the early twentieth century. The only copy that
strangely sticks out breaking this pattern of Keynes’s collection of
Mandeville’s works is the 1724 edition of The Fable.

The 1724 edition of The Fable of the Bees as such is not in any particular
manner rare. Thirtyfive copies of this book have been inspected for this
study and, according to the enquiries that have been made, none of the
copies are in as bad shape as the Keynes copy. The edges of the Keynes
copy are characteristically untrimmed. The condition of the binding is of
noticeably low quality. The boards are loose and the binding cracking.
The book is barely held together with 6 or 7 stitches. Some of the pages
have been folded over the years. There are stains and different sorts of

185 KP: PP/56/11/20 ‘McLeish & Sons 1932 Sept 23 Mandeville Fable of the bees,
1795; 10s’. There is an annotation by Keynes indicating that he returned it, because he did
not want it ‘now that I see it’.

186 KP: PP/56 booksellers bills 1903–46. Includes bills of dozens of Mandeville
purchases, but not the 1724 edition.
187 Regarding the prices that we know that Keynes paid for Mandeville items: two
invoices from B. H. Blackwell in 1934 regarding Mandeville books (that do not specify
what work was in question) stand out because of their high price. Keynes paid on
February 12, 1934 £12 10s. for one Mandeville item and on August 20, 1934 £7 10s.
for another. KP: PP/56/13/3,28. In comparison, when Keynes bought Hume’s Abstract
from Pickering & Chatto in October 1933, he only paid 18s. The high price, however,
does not necessarily indicate the importance of a particular item. Collectors have always
been herding around certain items, which naturally raises the prices (i.e. obsession about
the first impression of the first edition).

188 KP: PP/57/1/33 indicates that Keynes usually seems to be very particular about
the bindings.
impurities throughout the book. There is a noticeable amount of ink-stains left from the printing process and there are also letters printed on the right hand side of the margin on different pages. Some of the pages have been purposely pierced and some of the leaves have been cut from the margin. In short, adding this evidence to the elaborated and precise annotations and additions to the index, the Keynes copy fulfils precisely the description of the author’s copy in bibliographical reference books.

The manuscript annotations in the copy have been done in at least three different hands, two of them are from a later origin than the eighteenth century. What matters is that the annotations to the index are consistently written in an eighteenth-century hand. Whether the hand is that of Mandeville’s, upon comparison to the two autograph letters and Mandeville’s will reproduced in the Liberty Fund edition of Keye’s Fable it is difficult to say. Mandeville’s use of loops and descenders on certain characteristic letters is not uniform. However, the most characteristic formation of a letter in Mandeville’s handwriting is the lower case h, which is different in the annotated index. At the same time, the formation of some other letters (d, p, e) is very similar upon comparison of the Keynes copy and the letter to the Parker in 1726, which might indicate that the items are from the same author. Without comparing the annotated index to more Mandeville manuscripts from the same period (that we do not have), it is difficult to tell whether the handwriting is that of Mandeville’s or not. However, if it proves that the hand is not that of Mandeville’s, the annotations could still be his.

The annotations themselves, the virtue of their nature, and the trouble of making annotations to a copy of such improper quality indicate however that they were meant for a further edition of The Fable. Many of the additions point to the ideas that Mandeville elaborated in his later works. For example, one of the new entries points out a part in The Fable that discusses ‘Self Love’ and ‘how to guard against it’. One addition to the index stresses ‘Self preservation’ and another stresses how ‘Vanity will make a man despise death’. It is also interesting to notice that quite a few of the additions refer to the author of the work. One entry states that the ‘Author, seeks not the approbation of the multitude’, another claims that ‘to be good the author lays down as first principle’. There is also another entry that points directly to the ‘opinion’ of the ‘author’. There are also other additions, such as the one advising how to guard against flattery, that indicate that one reason for making additional entries to the index is to underline that the author of The Fable did not claim that vice is to be commended, quite the contrary. On the other hand, there are also many detailed and seemingly insignificant points among the many additions to the index: Fryars, Gin, Conquest of Mexico, Mahomed Eddendi, Nuns, Ptolemy and how hospitals are built... By and large, not only the substantial matters are noted in the additions to the index, but also the kind of points that would not be made by an ordinary reader of the work.
What is evident (besides the question whether part of the intention of the index was to defend the author by clarifying what he was saying) is that at the time of publishing the third edition in 1724 Mandeville evidently did have the urge to emphasise that the public did not understand what he was saying. When publishing the third edition, he had made the effort himself to change public opinion by including the vindication in The Fable, even when this most likely meant that Mandeville had to pay for it himself. However, the vindication did not change the public view. At the same time there was a further need for Mandeville to defend himself. What was Mandeville to do?

One plausible scenario is that Mandeville first thought about amending The Fable of the Bees. After all, this is what the eighteenth-century authors customarily did. David Hume spent a third of his active life as an author editing his works rarely producing any new material. An obvious choice for Mandeville would have been to make several additions to the index that point to the correct pages in The Fable in order to prove what he was actually saying. But a fact is that whether the new entries to the index were compiled by Mandeville or not, the additions did not make it to any edition of The Fable. Why didn’t they? A plausible explanation is that the publisher was not willing to reset the type. The Fable was a book that sold rapidly in 1724 and 1725. It was of vital importance to get a new edition out as soon as possible. If Mandeville had sold the copyright to Tonson, he did not have much saying regarding further editions or possible changes. It’s very possible that the picture of the younger Tonson and his money-grabbing-hand is not completely faulty. If some corrections or additions such as the annotated index had been published, it would have required resetting the type in an entire gathering, which would have cost money and delayed printing. It is very interesting to notice that instead of making any further additions or changes to The Fable of the Bees, the third edition, which is the first Tonson edition is in effect the last edition of the work. The rest of the editions are just reprints with some typographical changes that do not affect the copytext. From the printer’s and publisher’s point of view, one does not need to reorganise the type after the first Tonson edition in order to print subsequent editions. Mandeville had to find different channels to voice his opinions.

F. B. Kaye writes that ‘the editions of 1728 and 1729 are unchanged except for small variations which are probably due to the compositor’. We are better off pointing out that there are hardly any changes to The Fable of the Bees after the first Tonson edition was published in 1724. It is also certain that the variants to the 1729 printing did not originate in Mandeville or Tonson’s printing house because the “first” sixth edition of 1729 is a pirated edition. This pirated edition includes an advertisement on an otherwise blank verso after the preface: ‘Just published, the tenth edition of

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189 Kaye, The Fable of the Bees, p. xxxv.
190 I have consulted the 1729 pirated edition in BL (pressmark 8407.bb.29).

Upon examining the 1729 edition, it does not take long to realise that the title-page is false and the 1729 edition of The Fable did not have anything to do with Tonson. The ornaments are a few and the printing cheap, as it usually is in pirated editions. This pirated edition is accompanied with a pirated duodecimo version of Part II in 1730, which also includes an advertisement of Samuel Fairbrother.\footnote{I have consulted the pirated edition of Part II of 1730 in Bodl. (pressmark Vet.A4f.403). It cannot be an approved Dublin reprint of Tonson’s sixth edition, because the sixth edition does not appear before 1732.}

By and large, since it became famous, The Fable of the Bees was a prime example of the fact that ‘the London Trade owned the copyrights of the most important and widely sold books and maintained a near monopoly over their distribution nationally’.\footnote{Belanger, ‘Booksellers’ sales of copyright’, 1970, p. 4.} The battle for literary property was mainly fought between London copyright-owning booksellers and the printers of Scottish and Irish editions. The authors were usually mere pawns in this game. That The Fable was, of course, still in the later half of the century topping sales is proved by the fact that it was included in John Whiston’s list of the most likely pirated works.\footnote{Whiston’s list runs: ‘Spectators, Tatlers, Guardians, Shakespear, Prior, Gay’s fables and poems, Swift’s works, Temple’s works, Prideaux’s connection, Barrow’s works, Rollin’s ancient history, etc. Gil Blas, Whiston’s Josephus, Burnet’s theory, 2 vols, Young’s works, Thomson’s seasons, etc. Milton’s poetical works, Parnell’s poems, Hudibras, Waller’s poems, Fable of the bees, 2 vols, Young’s night-thoughts, Turkish Spy, Travels of Cyrus’. Whiston, John, Some thoughts on the state of literary property, p. 18; quoted in Gwyn Walters, ‘Bookseller in 1759 and 1774: The battle for literary property’, Library, s5, XXIX, 1974, p. 292.}

The question of copyright of The Fable of the Bees also resulted in the fact that Mandeville did not have much to do with the work after he had relinquished the copyright.

Instead of pointing this out, Kaye incorporated textual changes from a pirated printing of The Fable into his edition simultaneously omitting most of the changes derived from the errata. About Mandeville as an editor, Kaye writes, ‘the variations between the editions show Mandeville to have been a conscious stylist, carefully polishing’.\footnote{Kaye, intro, p. xxxv.} This is an exaggeration. There are only few significant changes after the first Tonson edition was published,
most of them are so slight that it cannot be said whether they were made by
the printer or the author. Compared for example to David Hume,
Mandeville did not act as the editor of his own works at all. In short, he
finished the work, sold it to the publisher and moved on. This was basically
what Mandeville did with The Fable of the Bees in 1724.

Part II and the turn away from private vices and public benefits

Defending his character was a common topic for Mandeville after 1724.
The preface of Part II dated October 20th 1728 commences with a sentence:
‘Considering the manifold clamours, that have been rais’d from several
quarters, against The Fable of the Bees, even after I had publish’d the
V indication of it, many of my readers will wonder to see me come out with a
Second Part, before I have taken any further notice of what has been said
against the First’. Mandeville was disappointed that the vindication had
not served the purpose that he had designed for it. He had an urge to
defend himself but it was not the first time he tried. Indeed, ‘from the
appendix that has been added to the First Part ever since the third edition’,
Mandeville announced, pointing to the vindication, ‘it is manifest, that I
have been far from endeavouring to stifle, either the arguments or the
invectives that were made against me’. About the different ways of
defending himself, Mandeville mentions that he ‘once thought’ of compiling
‘a list of the adversaries that have appeared in print’. The reason why this
plan was given up, according to Mandeville, was that the adversaries were
too many and the points they were making too few. The reason given by
Mandeville for his apparent five-year silence was that simply reading ‘some
part or other, either of the Vindication or the book it self’ should prove the
raised accusations against The Fable wrong. An annotated index or other
similar corrections might have, of course, served as a guide in pointing out
these relevant parts in the text. No corrections or additions were made and
Mandeville sought other ways to defend his character.

Despite his public silence as the author of The Fable of the Bees,
Mandeville tells that he had compiled a full manuscript defending himself
already in 1726. It is surprising how little notice this has received in
Mandeville scholarship. ‘I have wrote’, Mandeville exclaims in the preface,
‘and had by me near two years, a Defence of the The Fable of the Bees’, in
which I have stated and endeavour’d to solve all the objections that might
reasonably be made against it, as to the doctrine contain’d in it, and the
detriment it might be of to others’. Hence, one simple explanation why

196 Mandeville, Part II, p. i.
197 Mandeville, Part II, p. ii. The vindication is mentioned for the third time on p. iv of the preface.
198 Mandeville, Part II, p. ii. Kaye argues that Remarks upon two late presentments of the
Grand-Jury of the county of Middlesex would be the defence of The Fable that Mandeville is
making alterations to the first part of The Fable was not necessary for Mandeville was that he started writing a separate defence. Most evidently Mandeville wanted to make his thoughts understood. What did he do about it? He dropped The Fable altogether in Tonson’s hands. Instead of editing the book in order to answer critics, he turned to writing a new book as a full-fledged answer. It would be important to verify the existence of this manuscript defence. What Mandeville says about the manuscript is that ‘a considerable part of the Defence I mention’d, has been seen by several of my friends, who have been in expectation of it for some time’. It is doubtful that Mandeville would be making up that many of his friends had seen the manuscript. Mandeville also clearly states that his intention was to publish the defence. ‘I have stay’d’, he says, ‘neither for types nor paper, and yet I have several reasons why I do not yet publish it’. But ‘whenever it comes out’, ‘most of my adversaries’ will ‘think it soon enough, and no body suffers by the delay but my self’. Even if we are never able to find this unlikely. Particularly because Mandeville’s main point is that it is a work that has not been published and the Remarks was already published in 1724.

199 Kaye has proved that Mandeville was not the author of True meaning of the Fable of the bees of 1726 and certainly this is not the defence of The Fable that Mandeville refers to. This work has been mistakenly attributed to Mandeville, for the correction, see Kaye, ‘The writings of Bernard Mandeville’, 1921, pp. 463–4. The anonymous author of True meaning of the Fable of the bees defends a view that all moral distinctions are made by politicians tricking men to act against their passions. Anon, True meaning of the Fable of the bees, London, 1726, p. 10. He also tries to reduce all the passions to self-love. Anon, True meaning of the Fable of the bees, 1726, p. 71. These are the kind of claims that Mandeville wanted to take distance from by writing Part II. The author of True meaning might have captured one meaning of The Fable, but by 1726 Mandeville’s own thinking had started to change.

200 I have no knowledge of previous efforts to locate it. While researching the matter, I found out that there is a manuscript (Bernard Mandeville, The fable of the bees accompanied with explanatory notes. James Marshall and Marie-Louise Osborn Collection, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University) entitled “The fable of the bees accompanied with explanatory notes in which the author defends himself against the charges brought against the work by the interested clergy and others who had commenced a prosecution against him because he had affirmed that no ‘nation was ever great and powerful without being at the same time wicked’” in Beinecke library, which might be taken to point towards this “lost manuscript”. This partial manuscript transcript of the first part of The Fable of the Bees does not, unfortunately, include any of the explanatory notes mentioned in the title. I would like to thank Richard Serjeantson for acquiring a microfilm of the manuscript.

201 One affiliated and possible point of interest is that Malcolm Jack has identified passages in Hutcheson’s Enquiry that are not to be found in The Fable of the Bees, even when they are indicated by Hutcheson as passages from The Fable. It is thus possible that more of Mandeville’s manuscripts relating to The Fable of the Bees were in circulation, if Hutcheson is not in fact quoting from some other work. Malcolm Jack, ‘Hutcheson and Mandeville’, Notes and Queries, 24, 1977, pp. 221–22. Kaye has also identified passages that point towards circumstances that Mandeville had consulted some of Joseph Butler’s poems in manuscript form. Hence, it would not be impossible that Mandeville was in direct contact with these famous authors customarily circulating different manuscripts.

recover this manuscript, what is beyond doubt is that Mandeville had a need to defend himself and he was more than willing to take action. At the end of the preface to Part II, for example, he spends five pages denying accusations that he had publicly burned The Fable of the Bees.203

Newspapers were an important channel that Mandeville used in the 1720s to express his views. While Mandeville’s role in Female Tatler has received attention, it is rather seldom pointed out that Mandeville was in fact involved in different journals throughout his career. The detailed article on Mandeville appeared in Nouveau dictionnaire historique et critique in the 1750s and emphasised ‘le Journal Anglois’ among Mandeville’s publications.204 This is interesting because it seems that British Journal also played a larger part in Mandeville’s career than for being just a venue for publishing A n enq i ry into the causes of the frequent executions at Tyburn for the first time.205

We need to see Mandeville’s involvement in British Journal in a larger context. Thomas Gordon and John Trenchard published Cato’s letters in London Journal until September 22, 1722. From that date on Cato started writing for British Journal. It is very likely that this particular date also marks Cato’s concrete political switch from the opposition to a publicly more favourable approach to Walpole’s government. The switch of Cato’s Letters from London Journal to British Journal was not a small matter. An advertisement in Evening Post of a collection of Cato’s Letters added that ‘Cato’s Letters which were formerly printed in the London Journal, and which alone occasion’d the great sale of it, will for the future be publish’d only in the British Journal’.206 These letters were introduced in British Journal by a claim that because ‘the managers of London Journal’ have ‘made some difficulty to publish some of Cato’s letters’ it is ‘necessary for him to publish these letters hereafter in this Journal; where care will be taken, that no such remora’s will be thrown in their way’. Somewhat mysteriously, ‘the publick’ was ‘left to judge’ if ‘Cato has, in any instance, chang’d his conduct or his politicks’.207 It is quite probable that money had exchanged hands.208 Later in his career, Thomas Gordon dedicated his translation of Tacitus to Walpole.

204 Jacques George de Chaufepié, Nouveau dictionnaire historique et critique, pour servir de supplément ou de continuation au dictionnaire historique et critique, de Mr. Pierre Bayle. 4 vols., Amsterdam, 1750–6, p. 16.
205 Frequency of executions at Tyburn was still discussed in Robert Hovenden, Crime and punishment, or the question how we should treat our criminals, practically considered, London, 1849, pp. 35–36.
206 Evening Post, From Tuesday February 12 to Thursday February 14. 1723.
207 British Journal, September 22, 1722.
208 However, according to Simon Targett, Thomas Gordon was not bought with money to Walpole’s side. His financial situation was secure enough anyway. He had admired Walpole for a long time. Targett, Simon, ‘Sir Robert Walpole’s newspaper, 1722–1742: propaganda and politics in the age of Whig supremacy’, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1991, p. 148.
In British Journal, there was an editorial atmosphere favourable to the likes of Bernard Mandeville and the court Whigs. Edmund Parker also used British Journal extensively in 1723 to advertise the second edition of The Fable of the Bees. As the Cato introduction promised, no restrictions of expressions of confrontational views upon topical issues were made. The ‘Of charity-schools’ - essay of Cato’s letters appeared in British Journal on June 15, 1723. This was a piece that set the wheels in motion and landed the authors of The Fable of the Bees and Cato a presentation to appear in front of a grand-jury. Since then, it took little more than a month for Cato to end his career in British Journal. In July 27, 1723 Cato claimed that he had done nothing wrong and therefore ‘I shall now with cheerfulness lay down this paper, which I am well informed will be continued by an able hand’. The new pen taking over was called Criton. On August 3, 1723 Criton started his career in British Journal by sighing: ‘Cato is no more!’ The aftermath of the grand-jury incident was that Cato gave his letters up, while Mandeville’s involvement with British Journal was just beginning.

A new author taking over Cato’s slot meant that an even more direct and confrontational approach was taken in the British Journal. It is noteworthy how much in line Criton is with Mandeville’s opinions. In his first letter Criton manifested: ‘In politicks I am an Englishman; and my zeal embraces the good of the whole. I never enter’d into the fierceness and partiality of party, nor received its wages. I was born neither Whig nor Tory, and have liv’d long enough to condemn the excesses and ridiculous antipathies of both’. There was, however, no doubt that Criton had grown up as a Whig.

Early on in his letters Criton unravelled the philosophy behind his political views by stressing how ‘self-love is no more separable from men than the love of life; and partiality is inseparable from self-love’. In a Mandevillean sense, Criton claimed that this ‘blindness’ is in fact ‘a blessing’ because it ‘sanctifies their failings’, enabling ordinary people to be happy. Only ‘where education and acquired prepossessions have concurr’d to heighten the innate vanity of men, it is a great misfortune to themselves, and makes them always unsociable to others’. Other crucial topics for Criton were charity and charity schools as well as the ‘condition of great ministers’. Clearly, beyond any other, a favourite topic for Criton was good breeding, which he evaluated on several occasions during his spell in British Journal that lasted precisely for one year (August 3, 1723 to August 1, 1724). Criton did not just extol politeness. He emphasised that it was the

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209 Parker advertisements of The Fable appeared at least on April 20, May 4, June 20, July 20 and July 27 in the British Journal.
210 British Journal, August 3, 1723.
211 British Journal, September 7, 1723.
212 British Journal, November 30, 1723.
213 Letters concentrating solely to analyse the nature of politeness appeared at least on British Journal, August 31, 1723; October 5, 1723 and November 16, 1723.
'failities and passions, so natural to men' that 'make what we call good breeding so requisite amongst men'. These views present a clear overlap with Bernard Mandeville's later writings.

As Mandeville, Criton also praised Pierre Bayle. In one of his letters, instead of presenting his own material, Criton published what he referred to as 'an excellent passage out of Mr. Bayle's Miscellaneous thoughts upon the comet'. According to Criton, it was 'one of the best books that ever was conceived by the heart of man against superstition: for learning, wit, and reasoning, it stands in the first rank of modern or antient productions'. Criton, as he himself emphasised, made 'use of the English translation', and so did Mandeville.

The most important item linking Criton to an atmosphere favourable to Mandeville was published in British Journal on May 30, 1724. It was addressed as a letter to Criton on Criton's usual slot. It was signed A. B. and it included a full chapter from Mandeville's Free thoughts (namely, chapter 9, Of Toleration and persecution). The letter presenting the piece is just as interesting; Criton, 'you have, not long since, given us several papers upon charity and persecution', it commenced. Because the subject is important and difficult, let me 'present to you with a very good paper out of an excellent book, too little known. It is Dr. Mandeville's Free thoughts on religion, &c.'. The presentation also emphasised that 'to the reproach of our taste, it has been twice translated into French, and yet is scarce known in England' and that it had been written 'for the interest of the establishment; and yet the friends of the establishment have, for want of reading it, not promoted it'. At least the publishers of British Journal were doing their best to promote Mandeville.

Taking all this evidence into consideration, it would be unsurprising if Mandeville himself was in fact more involved with the pieces published in British Journal in the early 1720s than the available proof we have shows. What is beyond doubt is that the publishing atmosphere in British Journal was favourable for Mandeville's views. After Criton's contract expired in August 1724, Pomponius took over for a short period of time. His style and opinions (how, for example, a man with his sublime reason should have authority over a woman) were quite different from the court-Whigs and Mandeville.

While the vindication that Mandeville mentions on so many occasions first appeared in London Journal in 1724, in the words of F. B. Kaye, 'the six chapters of' An enquiry into the causes of the frequent executions at Tyburn 'were contributed as letters to as many issues of the British Journal'. This happened just a year after the vindication and the first Tonson edition of

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214 British Journal, Augugst 31, 1723.
215 British Journal, October 26, 1723. For Criton's other Bayle-related letters cf. December 21, 1723.
The Fable had been published. Mandeville’s case follows the same pattern of Cato’s Letters, changing from one Whig-newspaper to another. The form in which the chapters were published was the same as the communications presented by Cato and Criton.

Mandeville signed these chapters of Frequent executions at Tyburn as Philantropos. Kaye also notes that beside these weekly communications between February 27 and April 3, 1725, there is also a Letter to the British Journal signed Philantropos, in issues April 24 and May 1, 1725, hence continuing the pattern of weekly communications. Kaye does not make any further comments about these letters. The first additional letter concerns the famous eighteenth-century outlaw Jonathan Wilde. The second letter is an answer to a letter received from a reader of the journal regarding Wilde. What is interesting is the way in which Mandeville responds to this letter. He acts as if he was one of the editors. This answer to the correspondent is signed Philantropos and it reads: ‘Our kind correspondent will find that we have made use of all his favour, and left out nothing but his excuses for not having better digested and polish’d his letter, which we thought superfluous’. Following the chronological order of publishing the Philantropos-communications in British Journal, it necessarily comes to mind that Mandeville might have been more involved in the journal than what is commonly assumed.

The most interesting part of the weekly communications of Philantropos from February until the end of May 1725 is however not what came after the chapters of Frequent executions at Tyburn, but what actually preceded them. In February 20, 1725 (Kaye does not note this issue), one week before Mandeville started publishing the chapters under the name of Philantropos a solitary letter by Philanthropos was published. The spelling of the name is different (with an extra h), but we must take into consideration the connection this pseudonym might have with Mandeville because the topic is so crucial regarding what Mandeville advanced in Part II.

The author argues contrary to ‘different writers concerning human nature’ who have presented man as an evil creature. Instead, Philanthropos stressed that man has ‘a natural affection to the species, and an inclination to serve and do good to mankind’. According to Philanthropos, the individual is ‘a sociable creature, which he cannot be without a natural affection towards his own species’. In the end Mandeville also accepted the possibility of natural affection. This makes a difference in the evolution of the Mandevillean doctrine from a simplistic Hobbist outlook of The Fable towards a more nuanced view presented in Part II. As we will learn, accepting the possibility of natural affection fitted quite well in Mandeville’s

218 British Journal, February 27, March 6, March 13, March 20, March 27, and April 3, 1725.
220 British Journal, May 1, 1725.
new doctrine and it is therefore quite telling that the correspondence of this topic was published under a similar pseudonym as Mandeville’s a week before he started publishing his chapters of Frequent executions in British Journal.221 It is also important to understand that all these different episodes that took place after Mandeville had given up The Fable of the Bees and before he started writing Part II three years later had an impact on the change occurring in Mandeville’s thinking.

The reason for concentrating on the circumstances before Part II was published is that there is a change in Mandeville’s political theory. In fact, I will argue that this change is so vast that it was one of the reasons why the two separate parts of The Fable were not to be published together before 1755. In the preface of Part II, Mandeville writes about the work at hand: ‘The reader will find, that in this Second Part I have endeavoured to illustrate and explain several things, that were obscure and only hinted at in the First’.222 Mandeville had come to realise that the doctrine he had been advancing in The Fable was a torso. Naturally, the rhetoric in which he described The Fable was subtler than the actual meaning. It is debatable whether the parts ‘that were obscure and only hinted at in the First’ really exist. Mandeville had simply changed his mind on certain issues and there is a clear contradiction in some parts when comparing these two different works.

Part II was published in mid-December 1728 (title-page indicates the year 1729, the preface is dated October 20th 1728).223 It is also evident from internal evidence that Mandeville did not write Part II before he had been able to react to most of the vast criticism in his defence of The Fable manuscript. The likely time of Mandeville composing the bulk of Part II is between 1727 and 1728. As Kaye perceptively notices, ‘Mandeville was writing the second dialogue’ of Part II after the time when ‘Gibraltar was fruitlessly besieged by Spain’ from ‘Feb. 1727 to Mar. 1728’.224 There is also more proof confirming this estimate to be the likely time of the composition of Part II.225 It means that the new work was composed after Mandeville had finished the manuscript of the defence of The Fable, which he clearly found insufficient for a reason or another - he did not go through the trouble of publishing it, although he was a veteran in publishing

221 British Journal, February 20, 1725. There is also a third pseudonym quite close to these two contributing to the British Journal in the 1720s. However, the letters signed Philanthropus (from 1723 until 1729) are quite different from Mandeville in particular. Philanthropus writes mainly about theological issues, such as war against false religion (September 19, 1724).

222 Mandeville, Part II, p. vi.

223 Kaye, The Fable, p. xxxvi.

224 Kaye, Part II, p. 73, footnote 1.

225 For example, Kaye makes a comment about the ‘Royal Academy of Music’ that also implies that the Part II was composed in 1728. Kaye, Part II, p. 105, footnote 2. Later in the text of Part II, there is a ‘Handel’ incident that also points to time after 1726. Kaye, Part II, p. 155, footnote 1.
different kinds of literary works at this point in his career. The suggestion of this study is that the reason is that Mandeville himself found the doctrine of The Fable of the Bees insufficient and desired to craft his moral and political thinking anew.

What we need to understand about eighteenth-century publishing is the impact of the printer and the publisher on the final decisions of the end product (the printed book). It was often greater than the impact of the author. It is also interesting that it seems that the opportunities for an ordinary author to influence the printing process got worse by eighteenth century. Percy Simpson, in order to demonstrate the ‘normal practice’ of ‘the ruthless determination of the printer to treat the author as an intruder if he offered to set foot inside the printing-house’ discusses the case of Charles Viner in the eighteenth century, who uttered that against the printers ‘the State of authors I find by experience is like the State of war’. The authors did not always have the opportunity to have a say how their work was presented in print. W. W. Greg has discussed the case of a seventeenth-century play, which included autograph corrections, a new added title and instructions for the stage. To the surprise of many, it turned out that the author was responsible for the corrections and annotations, but it was the director of the theatre who had added the instructions and the new title of the play. Hence, it might be that things were not that different in the seventeenth century either. We have also the case of James Roberts, the trade publisher, altering a title of a work. This happened in the process of publishing a theological pamphlet. In his diary, the first Earl of Egmont complains that the ‘title I gave it was, A dialogue between a church of England man affectionate to the government and a dissenter concerning the taking off the test, but the publisher has given it’ a completely different title when it was published.

Hence, in the case of Part II, we may take into consideration that the publisher and the printer could have easily influenced the title of the work. After the enormous publicity of The Fable of the Bees, there was an urge to profit from the title anew. In the case of Part II, the likely explanation why the book is entitled Part II of The Fable of the Bees is the money motive. What is also significant about the title is that while the memorable part of The Fable of the Bees was the subtitle, “private vices, public benefits”, it does not feature in Part II. It was this thesis that Mandeville wanted to distance himself from.

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228 Manuscripts of the Earl of Egmont. Diary of the first Earl of Egmont (Viscount Percival). 1734–1738. 2 vols. Historical Manuscript Commission, 1923, I, pp. 303–4. The publisher had changed the title to The controversy in relation to the test and corporation acts clearly disputed, in a dialogue between a dissenter and a member of the established church. The arguments on both sides containing a full explanation of everything relating to this important question.
In all likelihood, both the publisher and the author profited from Part II. So, I am not claiming that Mandeville would not have been at least partly responsible for the title.229 When one actually compares The Fable of the Bees and Part II, one realises that they do not have that much in common besides the title and the author. Hence, why do we still read them as two volumes defending the same thesis?

The publisher of Part II

Who was the publisher of Part II? In Pierro Sraffa’s collection in Trinity College, Cambridge there is an interesting rebound set consisting of the first Tonson edition of The Fable of the Bees of 1724 and Part II of 1729.230 The back of the books read ‘Fable of the bees, Vol. I’ and ‘Vol. II’, a clear indication that they were bound anew at a later date. The notes that Sraffa made regarding the cancelled title-page of Part II are interesting. He noticed that beside the obvious indication of stubs after the title-page, wire lines on the title-page and the following leaf do not match and the title-page ‘is certainly a cancel’.231 Further research had taken Sraffa to Keynes’s Library where he had found a copy of the same book including evidence of the original, cancelled title-page.232 Sraffa did not find out what the imprint in the original title-page was, but he assumed that this concerned the role of James Roberts. A copy in the National Library of Finland confirms Sraffa’s assumptions.233 Measuring the different words on the cancellandum234

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229 It was customary in eighteenth-century publishing to use famous titles in different ways to prop up sales. For example, in 1708 William Taylor printed a second edition of a translation entitled The art of speaking. This was advertised on the title-page as a book ‘written in French by Messieurs Du Port Royal: in pursuance of a former Treatise, Intituled, The Art of Thinking’. The authors of the French work were not Nicole and Arnauld, but Bernard Lamy. The connection between this work and the original was mostly imaginary. The obvious reason for advertising the work as a sequence to the Art of thinking was of course to increase sales. This was not uncommon at all in the eighteenth century and the case of Part II is similar.

230 Pressmarks Sraffa 344/1 and Sraffa 344/2.

231 ‘Wire lines of A1 (t.-p.) and A2 (i–ii) should coincide exactly (as they do between A3 and A4). But they do not: and actually A1, has a different wire (see two close vertical lines near edge) from all other pages of A. Therefore, t.-page is certainly a cancel’. Sraffa also noted that ‘offcast at the back of the title-page is doubled’. Sraffa 344/2.

232 In the words of Sraffa: ‘at the back of t.-p. the set-off is partly of a t.p. and partly of p. i of Preface (sig A2) showing clearly that when the present t.p. was superimposed there was still in position part of a torn t.-p.’. What Sraffa noticed was that the ‘main difference in what is left is in the imprint: the word “printed” is much closer to the left vertical rule and is not followed by a colon. Also difference in the vertical spacing of the counterpartments: the top comp. (title) being shorter + the bottom one (imprint) longer’.

233 Pressmark H69.VI.22. This is also a rebound set of the 1724 Fable and 1729 Part II. The fact that the title-page is a cancel is obvious. The partly torn, original title-page is to be found on the last page of the book before the index (ee8v; p. 432). In a copy in NLS (pressmark L.C. 2092) the impression of the title-page is on p. xiv (a8v). The copy in the National Library of Finland is more legible giving the details of the missing words.

One definition of ‘a misleading imprint’ is that ‘while containing actual place, date, names, and addresses’ it ‘presents the information in such a way as to misrepresent, deliberately or not, the actual roles of the various people involved’. According to this definition, the imprint of Part II counts as such, due to the fact that it conceals the actual publisher. The original imprint, ‘printed for J. Roberts’, indicates that Roberts would have been the printer and the publisher. This imprint, however, was cancelled. Why? As we know, the form ‘London: printed and sold by A. B.’ does not necessarily indicate ‘Printed by A. B.’, but more often it simply means ‘Printed in London and sold by A.B.’. The use of the phrase ‘London printed’ was common in the eighteenth-century book trade. We also know that ‘there exist a large number of imprints which describe a work as ‘printed for’ someone who neither owned the copyright nor in any sense financed the operation of its publication’. If the original imprint (‘Printed for J. Roberts’) had been left standing, this would have been misleading indeed. Roberts was not the publisher of Part II, as he was not the publisher of Tonson editions of The Fable of the Bees. The cancellandum (‘London, Printed: And Sold by J. Roberts’) is more accurate, because according to the common eighteenth-century standards, it simply indicates that the main distributor of the book was Roberts. But the cancellandum is also misleading, because it does not reveal the actual publisher. My assumption is that, just like in the case of The Fable of the Bees after 1724, the actual publisher of Part II was Jacob Tonson. The similarity between Tonson editions of The Fable and Part II is strong enough for us to assume that they came from the same publisher or press. Also, the fact that Tonson did publish the second edition of Hypochondria in 1730 (as the imprint indicates) is a reason to assume that the publishing relationship between Mandeville and Tonson continued in 1729–30.

The word printed is about half a centimetre closer to the border than the cancellandum. Also the year, ‘MDCC...’ [ripped partly] is much closer to the centre of the page, which means that ‘Warwick-Lane’ was not set on the same line with the publishing year, MDCCXXIX. After the word ‘Printed’ there is a recognisable ‘o’, from ‘for’. Also, there is an upper-case ‘R’ and lower-case ‘b’, which comes from Roberts.

Cancellandum: ‘Warwick-lane’ (2,5 cm), ‘J. Roberts in’ (3,3 cm). If you place these (5,8 cm) on the line of the cancelled title-page, it fits precisely.

After this there would have been a border and the year ‘MDCCXXIX’ would have been on its own line. The measurements fit. The year is more or less in the centre.


See Hazen, ‘One meaning of the imprint’, 1951, p. 120.

Greg, Some aspects and problems, 1956, p. 32.
Tonson had plenty of reasons to conceal that he was the publisher of Part II. Mandeville appeared in front of the grand-jury, not once, but twice. What is important to understand is that the people who were tried in this kind of cases were the authors, printers and publishers - not the distributors of the book. The second time The Fable was tried happened in 1728 and it concerned the fifth edition published the same year. This time, the presentment did not only concern Mandeville but also the publisher, the younger Tonson, who was also named in the presentment. The reasons given for The Fable to be charged were just as vague as the first time. This time, however, the presentment included a reference to the first presentment:

we beg leave humbly to observe, that this infamous and scandalous book, entituled, The Fable of the bees, etc. was presented by the Grand-Jury of this county, to this honourable court, in the year 1723, yet notwithstanding the said presentment, and in contempt thereof, an edition of this book has been published, together with the presentment of the said Grand-Jury, with scandalous and infamous Reflections thereon, in the present year 1728.

Because of Tonson's involvement the second presentation was naturally a serious occasion. Tonson was an important figure. In 1729, he was 'made the Prince's Stationer'. It only is natural that he would, at the same time, push for publishing Mandeville's new work riding the fame of The Fable while leaving out his own involvement in the imprint.

A vital piece of bibliographical evidence strongly suggesting that the two parts of The Fable are different works and intellectually apart, is that Part II has a sequel whereas The Fable of the Bees does not. Enquiry into the origin of honour, and the usefulness of Christianity in war of 1732 is the volume two of Part II. It continues the dialogues between the same characters as in Part II, but most importantly, it elaborates the same theory about the correspondence between human nature and civil society that Mandeville first put forward in Part II (not in The Fable of the Bees). Kaye published his edition of The Fable of the Bees and Part II as a work of two volumes. At the same time, he left Origin of honour without a single mention in the section of his edition entitled 'History of the text'. He does not mention the fact that Origin of honour is the continuum of Part II. It seems that if we were to publish the different “parts” of The Fable of the Bees in more than one volume, we should at least include the third volume, Origin of honour.

Why isn't Origin of honour entitled The Fable of the bees, Part III? Maurice Goldsmith has considered the matter. He finds this as a 'mystery' and speculates that 'perhaps Mandeville thought that a new title would catch new trade'. A new title does not seem to be such a mystery when we

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239 Speck does not discuss a second time that The Fable of the Bees was presented in 1728. Speck, 'Bernard Mandeville and the Middlesex Grand Jury', 1978, pp. 362–74.
240 The presentment of the Grand-Jury for the county of Middlesex, 1728, p. 4.
241 Flying post or the weekly medley, January 18, 1728–9.
242 Goldsmith, Private vices, publick benefits, p. 121.
consider that Part II should have had a different title to fit the content. In the case of Part II, Mandeville and the publisher were driven by the money motive when choosing the title. But when it came to the sequel of this work, it was only natural that Mandeville took further distance from The Fable of the Bees by giving the book a different title. It was sufficient to notify that the author of the book was the same as that of The Fable of the Bees.

What we witness in Origin of honour is Mandeville expanding the theory presented in Part II to consider the phenomenon of honour in more detail. This is a book about manliness, courage and greatness of mind. The actual theory on which the analysis of the topic is based in this book is a direct continuum of Part II. It is these two works that ought to be read together, as for example the young David Hume did naturally because of his age. He was 18-years old when Part II was published and 21-years of age when Origin of honour emerged from the printing press. To publish Origin of honour under a different title also marks the final step that Mandeville took away from the burden of The Fable of the Bees, even when he, at times, hints that these thoughts would be in line with the first work, which in reality they are not. We need to understand that Mandeville was most of all defending his own character when defending The Fable of the Bees. He simply could not publicly announce that he had changed his mind. But what happened with the Origin of the honour was inevitable: in the end, a new thesis resulted in a new title.

Another factor adding up to the circumstances that Origin of honour is not The Fable of the Bees, Part III is the change of publisher. Origin of honour was not published by Tonson and it was not printed in the same press as Tonson’s editions of The Fable.243 There is no reason to doubt the imprint (printed for J. Brotherton) and the most likely publisher of Origin of honour was John Brotherton. Therefore, Tonson did not own the copyright of Origin of honour. For one reason or another, Mandeville had parted ways with Tonson and started working for Brotherton. John Brotherton was, after all, also the publisher of the second edition of Free thoughts of 1729. A different publisher in this case probably meant a different copyright holder.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century the custom of rebinding The Fable of the Bees and Part II with matching covers developed.244 It is nevertheless debatable whether this is an indication that the two different parts of The Fable were commonly read as two volumes outlining a unitary

243 I have examined the three copies in BL (pressmarks): 1028.c.4(2); 855.d.26; G.16237 and two copies in Keynes Library in King’s College Cambridge (pressmarks): Keynes.F.19.51 and Keynes.F.19.52. The bibliographical details in all of the copies match. E.g. in all of the copies K4r, the last piece of the text is on the same line as the leaf number and the catchword. Upon comparison the style of printing is very different from Tonson’s books. Also, there are no printers’ numbers in Bernard Mandeville, An enquiry into the origin of honour, and the usefulness of Christianity in war, London, 1732.

244 Such rebound copies can be found for example in Trinity College, Cambridge (pressmark Sraffa 344/1 and Sraffa 344/2) and National Library of Finland (pressmark H69.V1.22).
thesis. For example, when The Fable was translated for the first time into German in 1761, it was ‘a translation of Part Two of the Fable only’. The original Fable of the Bees was not published in German until 1818. We have also other British eighteenth-century comments noticing the difference between the two parts of The Fable. One commentator for example noted that ‘in the preface to the Pastoral Letters of the Bishop of London’ it has been pointed out that Mandeville published a ‘second part, in which the author endeavours to soften what he said in the first’ part of The Fable of the Bees.246

F. B. Kaye came to a different conclusion. In his ‘Writings of Bernard Mandeville’, Kaye puts a strong emphasis on the alleged fact that ‘after 1732, the two volumes were published together’. For him, this seems to have functioned as the decisive evidence and justification for publishing the two parts of The Fable as two volumes. Kaye underlines that Jacob Tonson advertised ‘The two-volume edition’ of The Fable ‘under the date of 1734’ in London Magazine in December 1733. This however, does not indicate that the two-volume edition was actually published. R. B. McKerrow, in his review of Kaye’s Fable raised doubts about Kaye’s decisions. Kaye, after all, had not seen an actual copy of the 1734 edition. He based the information about the two-volume edition on the advertisement only. Instead of outlining that ‘after 1732, the two volumes were published together’, we might want to consider putting an emphasis on the fact that during Mandeville’s lifetime, the two parts of The Fable were never published together. As it seems, the first time the two parts were published at the same time was in 1755 in a pirated Edinburgh edition. We may also remark that in this edition, Part II is called Part II and not volume two.

It is however true that the 1734 two-volume set was advertised by Tonson. Hence, there was at least an indication that the edition was to be published. There exist a handful of copies in which the title-page indicates that it would be a copy of this edition. The title-leaves in all of these

245 Fabian, ‘The reception of Bernard Mandeville in eighteenth-century Germany’, 1976, p. 697. Free thoughts, without a reference to Mandeville, was translated already in 1726 and again in 1765. It should perhaps be pointed out that none of these were a commercial success.


248 Kaye, ‘The writings of Bernard Mandeville’, 1921, p. 433. Also, in an issue of Daily Journal of December 6, 1733 there is an advertisement of an octavo, ‘New edition of The Fable of the bees’, ‘Printed for J Tonson’. This small advertisement was not repeated in further issues of the journal. Most of the ‘next week will be published’ advertisements were printed for many weeks in a row (and hence were not all fully accurate).


250 There are three known copies of a complete set of the supposed 1734-edition in Amherst College Library, Guelph McLaughlin Rare Books Collection and Arizona State University Libraries. Different catalogues also indicate a fourth copy in Walter H., and Leonore Annenberg Rare Book & Manuscript Library University of Pennsylvania, but
books, however, are cancels. Actual facts about these existing copies of the supposed 1734 edition signal that the edition was not published.\textsuperscript{251} The text in all the known copies of the supposed 1734 edition matches precisely the 1755 edition. The physical description of the book is the same as the one given in the ESTC for the 1755 edition.\textsuperscript{252} The few ornaments in the books also match precisely the 1755 edition. And most importantly, the book (except for the title-leaves) is a duodecimo, with chain lines horizontal, gathered in twelves, just like the 1755 Edinburgh printing of The Fable. All the Tonson editions of The Fable (and other Mandeville titles) were octavo books, with chain lines vertical, gathered in eights. Tonson also advertised the forthcoming 1734 edition as an octavo edition of two volumes. There is no reason to think that he would have changed the format all of a sudden in 1734.

Most likely all the copies in question are copies of the pirated 1755 edition with a fictional title-page. Furthermore, between 1724 and 1732, Tonson published four editions of The Fable of the Bees (his name never appears in the imprint of Part II before this “1734-Edinburgh edition”) and he also published several other Mandeville items. Of all the genuine Tonson editions we have dozens, if not hundreds of copies that have survived. And since Mandeville, one of the great controversialists of all times, had passed away in 1733, it would be natural to think that Tonson (a businessman) would have cleared up with an extensive edition (as he did after Joseph Addison had died and which clearly was his intention). If Tonson would have published the two-volume set of The Fable after Mandeville’s death, it is certain that we would have many copies of this edition available. We have no real evidence indicating that the book was actually printed or that it would have been distributed to the booksellers. Hence, the conclusion is that the 1734 edition was not put on the market as other Tonson editions of The Fable.

What is interesting is the question of the cancelled title-leaves. It does in fact seem, as McKerrow points out, that the publisher of the pirated edition of 1755 had gone through an unusual amount of trouble when pirating the edition.\textsuperscript{253} It is a small mystery that the title-leaves are probably octavo
leaves because of the vertical chain lines, unlike the bulk of the book with horizontal chain lines of a duodecimo book. Why is this the case?

As we recall, The Fable was one of the books mentioned in the ongoing publishing war between the London and Dublin-Edinburgh booksellers in the 1760s. It is clear that the 1755 Edinburgh edition itself was not legitimate and called for some sort of a cover-up from the publisher. But to produce such a clever plan of issuing the pirated edition with a cancelled title-page of an edition that was advertised but never printed, does indeed sound quite incredible. In order to do that, the Edinburgh printer should have had access to the 1734 title-page. Even when this does sound far-fetched, this is a possibility that should be taken into account, given that the title-leaves most likely came from an octavo-sized book.

Another possibility is that the printer went through the trouble of printing the title-leaves so that the book appeared to be an octavo printing and hence he printed the fake title-leaves on different stock of paper than the rest of the book. This, while of course possible, would indeed be a very unusual sign of determination in a pirating printer. When one looks at some of the pirated editions (for example, the Dublin printing of The Fable in 1729), one realises that no particular care was usually shown in the printing process. The quality of the printing in a pirated edition compared to an original one, usually suffered drastically.

The bookseller of the 1755 edition had a good reason to cancel the title page in some of the copies and to insert a fake title page of a previous edition, in order to prove that the edition was genuine. If the fake title-pages originated from an original printing, what would be better for counterfeiting purposes? This sounds more plausible than the printer going through the trouble of printing these fake title-leaves himself. It is possible that the 1734 Tonson edition had been printed but not distributed to the booksellers. Therefore, it is possible that a bulk of the title-leaves had also been saved. This, however, is also an unlikely scenario because it is likely that the paper would have been recycled by 1755.

Yet, the mystery remains and there exist copies of the 1755 edition with 1734 title-leaves. How is this possible? It is a fact that Tonson advertised this edition as forthcoming. Jacob Tonson seems to have been an efficient advertiser of his products. His intention was actually to publish the two volumes in 1734. The edition was not published, perhaps the actual printing never took place, it was stopped during the print run or the copies were destroyed before they reached the customers. Since the advertising took

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254 This is also indicated by a letter from Lawrence Theobald to Jacob Tonson on 2 Jan. 1733. Theobald writes to Tonson: 'As I have very few days left before I must close my list, I beg for these next six days, Shakespeare may every day be advertis'd in Daily Post, Daily Journal and Daily Advertiser, & in Evening Posts. (These infrequent & scattering advertisements do me no manner of service.) I have sent a number of my printed advertisements herewith for this purpose.' BL, Add. 28275.
place in newspapers, perhaps title-page advertising also took place. By
title-page advertising I refer to a practice of printing extra-sets of title-leaves
to be used as posters and circulating them in coffee-shops etc. Publishing
the two parts of The Fable together for the very first time immediately after
the author had died would have been a major literary occasion. It most
obviously did not go through as planned since there are no surviving, real
copies of the edition. Nevertheless, if the edition had already been widely
advertised, some of the title page advertisements might have survived.
Therefore, it would explain how the copies of the 1734 title page would
have reached the counterfeiting Edinburgh bookseller. So, if there used to
be a tradition of advertising books by printing extra-copies of their title
pages and using them as advertisements, the puzzle can be solved. If such a
tradition of advertising existed, then naturally the Dublin and Edinburgh
illegal printers in general would have been eager to get their hands on
original title-pages so they could insert them in some of their copies in
order to prove that their stock was legitimate (for example, while they were
upon the act of transporting the pirated books to London). The war against
counterfeiting was fierce in the eighteenth century. The puzzle still remains,
but this is one hypothesis that seems quite logical.

Conclusion

Quite evidently, when first publishing The Fable of the Bees in 1724, the
younger Jacob Tonson owned the copyright of the book. He is also the
most likely candidate to have originally owned the copyright of Part II. Why
then, would he not have printed the two volumes together in 1734? By this
time it is very probable that Tonson had sold the shares of the copyrights
forward to other publishers. It was a common practice to sell, divide and
resell the copyrights that one had. In fact, ‘joint ownership of copyrights
was if anything more common after 1710 than before; the more booksellers
concerned in a copyright, the less chance that a pirate would risk the wrath
of its owners by infringing their rights’. Also, ‘small shares of popular
books were commonplace’. This idea of breaking the copyright to smaller
pieces seems to be a likely later distribution pattern of The Fable of the Bees.

The Tonsons gradually dispersed their copyrights of Shakespeare. The
remaining ‘Tonson copyrights were sold in 1767 for about £10000’. The

255 A very general introduction to the question of title and book itself stressing the
commercial significance of a title page in early modern history is Eleanor F. Shevlin, ‘“To
reconcile book and title, and make ‘em kin to one another”: the evolution of the title’s
contractual functions’, Book History, 2, 1999, pp. 42–77. p. 52: ‘Since published titles were
typically devised not by the author but by the publisher they were frequently generated
with solely sales – and not the subject – in mind.’


records of the sale indicate that the Shakespeare copyrights formerly owned by the Tonsons had already been scattered over to several booksellers. A similar pattern most likely concerned The Fable of the Bees. The famous Tonson sale of 1767 does not include the copyright of The Fable or Part II, a possible reason is that the copyrights had been divided into smaller pieces and sold to other booksellers. Mandeville's works, including The Fable of the Bees, feature occasionally in different sales of books in quires in Longman and Ward catalogues, but the only conclusion to be drawn from these sales is that in the 1730s and 1740s the two parts of The Fable were sold separately by many different booksellers. There are no traces of copyright sales of Mandeville's works in these catalogues. The only larger Mandeville related item in the Tonson sale were 350 books in quires of the Tonson edition of 'Mandeville's diseases' [Hypochondria]. But we need to remember that public sales of the copyrights were only the tip of the iceberg. Much more was going on behind closed doors.

In any case, the idea of Mandeville owning the copyrights himself seems highly unlikely (after the first Tonson edition). A plausible scenario is that the copyrights had been handed through Tonson over to a printing conger. This would also be a probable explanation that caused the controversy of the 1734 edition that ended in having it recalled from the market. Therefore, the actual reason why the two parts of The Fable were not published as two volumes concerned business. Tonson did not own the right to publish the two parts of The Fable as a posthumous edition. Hence, the other parties involved with the copyrights stopped Tonson before the 1734 edition was actually published and distributed to customers. The irony is that this is what Mandeville would have probably desired. After all, the two parts of The Fable are intellectually wide apart.

Mandeville defended his own character until the bitter end. Tonson's vision about bookselling was quite different. For him, good controversy always meant good business. It is of little wonder that Tonson is the publisher of George Berkeley's A léphron: or, the minute philosopher in 1732. It was the first Berkeley book that Tonson published and Tonson was also the owner of the copyright. In 1732, Mandeville, once more, attempted to defend himself and answered Berkeley in print with his Letter to Dion. This time, however, Mandeville was not in the need stressing that private vices are not promoted in The Fable of the Bees and 'to be good is pointed out as a first principle' in the book. This time, he was able to draw from the

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260 When bookseller Edward Symon's stock was sold in 1741, he had six copies of Part II in his stock, and none of the first. Evidence that they were, indeed, separate books. A catalogue of books in quires, and copies, being the stock of Mr. Edward Symon, deceased. Which will be sold by auction to a select number of booksellers of London and Westminster only, at the Queen's-Had Tavern in Pater-noster-Row, on Tuesday the 1st of September [1741].

261 BL, C.170.aq.1(156) Longman sale catalogues, Catalogue of books in quires, being the genuine stock of Jacob and Richard Tonson, Esqrs. which will be sold by auction, to a select number of the booksellers of London and Westminster... on Tuesday, May 26, 1767, p. 2.

262 Indicated in the Longman sale records.
arguments presented in Part II and Origin of honour. In other words, he was still answering same accusations that he faced in 1724, but now he was defending a different thesis. But history has not been as kind to Mandeville as it has been to Berkeley. As a hint of this irony, the day after Mandeville died, 'his Majesty' promoted 'Dr. George Berkeley, Dean of Derry, to the Bishoprick of Cloyne'.

Kaye has remarked that Mandeville made several apologies for the 'lowness' of his similes. Mandeville's overtly ironic style might be one reason why his legacy was not as respected as that of George Berkeley's. Direct attacks on his character followed even after his death. An unconfirmed contemporary report tells us that Bernard Mandeville 'was no hermit in his diet'. The intention of the eighteenth-century gossip was of course to question the philosopher's character and with his ad hominem argument introduce Mandeville as an epicurean whose philosophy did little more than justify his own sensual inclinations. Indeed, it does seem that Mandeville was no hermit. His works are filled with colourful dietary remarks. Even when someone's lifestyle does not bring to question his or her philosophy, it is important to know the inclinations of the author because it helps us to understand his prose, analogies and metaphors.

In Mandeville's case an important simile is that between wine and civil society. They both are topics that are particularly dear to the author. We may also notice a change in this respect between The Fable of the Bees and Part II. In 'the moral' of The Grumbling Hive in the original The Fable of the Bees, Mandeville concludes: 'Do we not owe the Growth of Wine / To the dry shabby crooked Vine? / Which, whilst its shoots neglected stood, Choak'd other Plants, and ran to Wood, / But bless us with its Noble Fruit, / As soon as it was ty'd and cut'. What Mandeville is effectually claiming in The Fable of the Bees - as will be demonstrated shortly - is that it is the skilful management of the politicians first with fear and then with flattery that makes men sociable. This is also precisely what the wine simile in the 'Moral' of The Grumbling Hive indicates.

Mandeville's use of the wine simile in Part II changes. He now emphasises that 'Nature has design'd Man for Society, as she has made Grapes for Wine' and instead of hinting to any management by politicians, or tying and cutting, he brings to the surface a new concept, fermentation. Instead of saying, like he did in The Fable of the Bees, that naturally vicious human nature needs to be shackled, he chose a different route. As he in the

263 London Gazette, Saturday 19 to Tuesday January 22. 1733.
264 Kaye, Fable of the bees, p. 105 (e.g. Free thoughts (1729), pp. 100 and 390, Executions at Tyburn, p. 37, Modest defence of publick stews (1724), p. xiv and The Fable, p. 354 and Part II, p. 322.)
index of Part II points out, 'Mutual commerce is to Man's Sociableness what Fermentation is to the Vinosity of Wine'. Mandeville's philosophical perspective changed. In Part II, he was pointing out that individuals become sociable by living together in society. This is a turn away from private vices and public benefits. I will now turn to consider in philosophical detail this intellectual change and show why it is important.
2. Early Mandeville and Pierre Nicole

On several occasions Bernard Mandeville has been considered in the Whig context of Walpolean England. According to Isaac Kramnick, the heart of Walpolean political thinking was flat-out defence of corruption, which has since been debated. Simon Targett, for example, has pointed out that the defence of corruption was not the heart of the Walpolean political thought, but vigorous emphasis on institutional settings in civil society. Although Targett’s report of his research is by no means conclusive, the point he is making is however a valid one. It is precisely the emerging emphasis on the institutional setting of the government that explains how the early modern republican thinking was finally abandoned. Especially regarding authors like William Arnall, the concept of virtue simply lost its meaning while the emphasis changed towards the question of institutional organisation of civil society. This is where Mandeville played a crucial role.


5 Among old Whig-discussions of opposition and court parties of Walpole etc. there are some fresh views considering court as an extra-parliamentary dimension to political life. See particularly Hannah Smith, The Court in England, 1714-1760: A Declining Political Institution?, History, 90, 2005, pp. 23–41.

6 There is very little scholarship on William Arnall. The best account of his career and thinking is Horne, ‘Politics in a corrupt society’, 1980, pp. 601–614. I have studied Arnall in more detail, but decided to leave these parts out of the thesis.

7 On Mandeville and court Whigs, see Kramnick, Bolingbroke and his circle, 1968, p. 201, Thomas A. Horne, The social thought of Bernard Mandeville. Virtue and commerce in early
The most emphatic overall account of Mandeville as a political thinker has been put forward by Maurice Goldsmith. During the later part of the twentieth century stress was usually placed on Mandeville's economic thinking. Goldsmith would have none of it. He extensively argues that Mandeville is not an economic theorist. Goldsmith sees *Female Tatler* as the foundation for all the relevant aspects of Mandeville's political thinking. He puts well the levelheaded position that Mandeville holds: The general message of *Free thoughts on religion* is the same as that of *The Fable of the bees*, do not complain and grumble, but enjoy life's real comforts and blessings. He also succeeds in making a consistent story of Mandeville as a critic of the civic tradition (private and public virtue) and Mr Bickerstaff in *Tatler* in eighteenth-century England, Columbia University Press, 1978. The book is based on Horne's PhD thesis (with the same title) in Columbia University, 1976. See also Thomas A. Horne, 'Moral and political improvement: Francis Hutcheson on property', in *The politics of a fallen man: essays presented to Herbert A. Danner*, M. M. Goldsmith and T. A. Horne, eds., Exeter, 1986; H. T. Dickinson, 'Bernard Mandeville: an independent Whig', *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century*, 152, 1976, pp. 559–570 and Burtt, *Virtue transformed*, 1992, p. 128.


10 It is interesting to notice how much Goldsmith's view is in line with F. A. Hayek and J. M. Keynes, who were perhaps the greatest economists of the twentieth century. They were also fierce intellectual rivals. One common point of interest for Hayek and Keynes was Bernard Mandeville. For both, Bernard Mandeville represented the anti-rational, sceptical tradition materializing in the Enlightenment. This tradition, according to Hayek resulted in a theory about the 'spontaneous evolution of society', an idea, which Hayek himself developed in his own theories. F. A. Hayek, 'Dr. Bernard Mandeville', Lecture on a Master Mind series, *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 52, Oxford University Press, 1966. On the idea about spontaneous order, see Ronald Hamowy, *The Scottish enlightenment and the theory of spontaneous order*, Southern Illinois University Press, 1987. Another commentator states that in 'Volume II of the Fable' Mandeville sets forth 'a general theory of spontaneous self-organizing systems that goes far beyond the narrow economic focus of the paradox of private vices and public benefits'. A. 'Mandeville on the Sources of Wealth', *Population and Development Review*, 17, 1991, p. 325. Keynes's interest had more to do with Mandeville as an epicurean philosopher and his link to George Berkeley. But what is evident is that only later commentators interested in economics have been keen to consider Mandeville as a more straightforward economic theorist. For Hayek and Keynes, Mandeville was first of all a moral philosopher. Hence, we may also remark that the trend of separating Adam Smith and others as economical theorists is a late development indeed.

particular.12 Indeed, if anything, Female Tatler mocks Richard Steele.13 This is one story about Mandeville that is worth telling. The problem with Goldsmith is that he wants to see Mandeville's position as a consistent one

12 Annie Mitchell has used Mandeville by linking Cato's Letters to his position as an outright attack on the question of republicanism of Cato's Letters against the Pocockian interpretation. It is a rather simplistic argument, and not entirely successful. Mitchell, 'Character of an independent Whig - 'Cato' and Bernard Mandeville', 2003, pp. 291–311 and Mitchell, 'A liberal republican “Cato”', 2004, pp. 588–603. It needs to be pointed out that Pocock's interpretation has been under attack from different directions since the publication of the Machiavellian moment.

13 Regardless of the question whether the following note in Mary Cowper's diary is true or not, it is evident that Mandeville's mocking stance towards Richard Steele was evident to contemporaries. Mary Cowper writes in 1716: 'Mr Horneck [Philip Horneck, author of an Ode to the earl of Wharton] who wrote The high German doctor, came here. He is just made a solicitor of the Treasury, a place worth 200l. per annum. He told me that Sir Richard Steele had no hand in writing the Town Talk, which was attributed to him; that it was one Dr. Mandeville and an apothecary of his acquaintance that wrote that paper; and that some passages were wrote on purpose to make believe it was Sir R. Steele.' Mary Cowper, Diary of Mary Countess Cowper (1714-1716). London, 1864, p. 64. In the Library of the University of Cornell there is a second edition of The Fable from 1723, signed 'M Cowper' with a bookplate of 'Lord W. Kerr'. Lord Walter Talbot Kerr (1839-1927) married into the Cowper family, which explains why he was in the possession of Mary Cowper's copy of The Fable. It should also be pointed out that William Cowper was a very good friend of Macclesfield's. Mandeville was linked to lord Macclesfield, but most of the details of this relationship are still missing. Kaye's assumption was that the final curtain might be raised by studying Macclesfield's commonplace books, to which he had no access. G. S. Rousseau, who did have the access, later proved that there was nothing to be found. G. S. Rousseau, 'Bernard Mandeville and Macclesfield', Notes and Queries, 18, 1971, p. 335. The Macclesfield library has since famously been sold. Although the cataloguing of the Macclesfield papers moved to CUL has not yet been finished, it seems unlikely that any of Mandeville's papers will appear in Cambridge. A useful historical detail that has not received attention in Mandeville scholarship is the link between the Backer brothers and Thomas Parker. These Dutch merchants and the earl of Macclesfield have both independently been linked to Mandeville as potential patrons, but the link between these two parties has not been made. A biographical piece on Mandeville in the European Magazine points out that Mandeville 'had a pension from some Dutch merchants in this country, which Mr. H. a very eminent attorney in the city, used to pay him'. European Magazine, Feb. 1790, vol. 17, pp. 96–9. The Dutch merchants are of course Cornelius and John Backer, naturalised in 1719 by the House of Lords. Now, the eminent lawyer H seems to be Macclesfield's lawyer Henry Hatrell. The "Correspondence of Lord Macclesfield etc. 1704–1739" in Stowe collection in British Library (that includes the only remaining letter from Mandeville to Macclesfield) indicates that Mr Hatrell was Macclesfield's lawyer. BL, Stowe 750 f. 273. A curious detail is that Remarks upon two late presentments of the Grand-jury of the county of Middlesex: wherein are shewn, the folly and injustice of mens persecuting one another for difference of opinion in matters of religion, By John Wickliffe, London, 1729 (that has sometimes been attributed to Mandeville) has also been indicated to have been written by Henry Hetsell, also a barrister, who died in 1762. Even when the approximation of Hatrell and Hetsell is obvious and Hatrell's link to Mandeville and the presentment of the Grand-jury is evident, further research is needed in order to get to the bottom of the matter of Henry Hs and the Remarks upon. The possibility that this is in fact the same person still remains. Hence, it seems clear that Thomas Parker had a hand in the question of Mandeville's livelihood.
ranging from Female Tatler of 1709 to Letter to Dion of 1732. This eschews our understanding of The Fable of the bees and slips towards Kaye's idea that Mandeville does not mean what he says. It is true that the original Fable (and Female Tatler) includes some seeds of the rather revolutionary theory of the evolution of civil society, but the original Fable is mainly a topical work, and indeed an attack on Steele and Addison.

This topicality of Mandeville's early prose is something that needs to be stressed further. The strong political (and topical) commitment is present already in the 1703 Pamphleteers, which was painted in thick Whig colors. It is also true that The Fable of the Bees should not perhaps be read as a direct defence of Walpole's government or corruption per se. After all, we have no evidence tying Mandeville directly to the Walpolean mob. However, the message of The Fable is quite straightforward and it is as Whig as it can be. Hence, the limited connection to defending the Walpolean political thinking is a valid one to make.

The original Fable functions almost as a single-minded thesis applicable on different topical issues as clever hack-like writing does. It contains a very simplistic argument that is put to operate on specific issues. What are these issues? Well, nothing that has not been discussed in previous scholarship: The charity school question, the issue of reformation of manners and the Whig question in general. The main point about Mandeville's whiggishness is that everything functions at a very topical level until things change. The concrete role of the politicians in Mandeville's thinking before Part II ought to attract our attention. What is most important is the change regarding the institutional setting from The Fable of the Bees to Part II. This idea is not developed in the first Fable. Originally, the emphasis is solely on the role of rigid government and managing ordinary people from above. Only later Mandeville starts to consider the evolution of the institutions itself.

In contrast, Goldsmith consistently stresses that 'the skilful politician need not be taken literally' and that 'this device, the 'skilful Politician', stands for the long, gradual development of social institutions'. Goldsmith

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14 Francis McKee has suggested that also Grumbling Hive of 1705 was strongly Whig in character supporting the Duke of Marlborough. Francis McKee, 'Early criticism of the Grumbling Hive', Notes and Queries, 1988, 35, pp. 176–7.

15 Throughout his works Harold Cook has emphasised the impact of society for the reformation of manners in Mandeville's works and the possible effect that this has on the development from the first to the second Fable. See especially, Cook, 'Bernard Mandeville and the therapy of “the clever politician”', 1999, pp. 101–124. About the Reformation of Manners Societies, see also Jennine Hurl-Eamon, 'Policing male heterosexuality: the Reformation of Manners Societies' Campaign Against the Brothels in Westminster, 1690-1720', Journal of Social History, 37, 2004, pp. 1017–1035. The significance of this article is that it underlines that the movement was not only directed towards the poor, but the middle-class men alike based on first-hand material in London Metropolitan Archives. For another recent contribution, see Faramerz Dabhoiwala, 'Sex and societies for moral reform, 1688-1800', Journal of British Studies, 2007, pp. 290–320.


17 Goldsmith, Private vices, public benefits, 1985, p. 64.
is reaching quite far when making these claims. True enough, since the time of *Female Tatler* Mandeville did ponder upon questions such as how the arts and sciences have developed over a long period of time by incremental stages. But the story about the politicians in *The Fable* is yet what it is. Skilful politicians play a clear role in deceiving men without the connection to the question of arts and sciences. This might be explained partly due to the satirical style in which Mandeville writes, but we still need to wait for Part II to see the story change.

There might be some elements of the evolutionary theory of civil society present in *Female Tatler*, as Goldsmith claims. But even more so, the main elements that feature in *The Fable of the Bees* are similarly emphasised in *Female Tatler*, namely, the explicit denial of man as a ‘sociable creature’ and the claim that ‘the greatest numbers may be made subservient to one another, and by skilful management compose a lasting society’. Indeed, precisely as he does in *The Fable*, Mandeville states in *Female Tatler* that ‘it is the business of the skilful politician, to make every thing serve in its proper place, and extract good from the very worst, as well as the best’ and ‘happy is the land, whose constitution is so well fenc’d with wholesome laws, that fear and prudence may supply the place of honesty’. There is no choice but also to take the role of the skilful politician literally in *Female Tatler*.

The Hobbism of *The Fable of the Bees*

In *The Fable*, Bernard Mandeville establishes his arguments on Hobbism. As Jon Parkin’s *Taming the Leviathan* shows us, the history of Hobbism is an entangled story with many byways and highways. But when we take some distance from the particulars, basic arguments directed against Hobbism in the eighteenth century appear to be rather simple. Accusations of Hobbism after Hobbes principally consisted of two claims: that it is atheism due to materialism and that it is a political argument couched on self-

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21 There are clearly two schools among scholars regarding the issue of politicians. Most take after Kaye that Mandeville never really claimed the importance of politicians and emphasised from the start the evolutionary scheme. Even when Goldsmith’s variation of this line of interpretation regarding Mandeville’s use of politicians as a symbol of society has been quite generally accepted, there are other scholars who put weight on the concrete role of politicians. For example, J. W. A. Gunn has stressed with a reference to Goldsmith’s works that there are also several occasions when Mandeville uses the term politician in a narrow sense. See especially Gunn, ‘Mandeville: poverty, luxury, and the Whig theory of government’, in *Beyond liberty and property*, 1983, pp. 102–3. Jacob Viner made a different point along the same path that ‘skilful management’ means government planning. Jacob Viner, *The long view and the short: studies in economic theory and policy*, Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1958. But beyond any other previous scholar, Shelley Burtt has emphasised the role of politicians extensively. Burtt, *Virtue transformed*, 1992, pp. 137–8.
preservation. As Noel Malcolm writes, on most occasions the charges of Hobbism ‘had little to do with Hobbes’s philosophical arguments’. I am not concerned about getting the full story straight. What I am interested in is how the accusations of Hobbism in 1720s affected Mandeville’s thinking. As we will see, the allegations of Hobbism in the eighteenth century switched quite considerably towards questions of moral philosophy rather than questions of atheism. Traditionally after 1650s ‘to call something Hobbist was to infer that it was heterodox, blasphemous and unacceptable’. I do not use the umbrella of Hobbism in this sense at all. In fact, I leave the question of religion and theology mostly aside.

By Hobbism, I understand a general theory that a) claims that all moral distinctions are artificially invented b) is put forward to explain all human action by ultimately reducing it to self-love and self-preservation c) based on the previous two points claims that fear is the only useful passion that civilises men. It might well be that this was not Thomas Hobbes’s own stratagem when he strongly emphasised the last point. In his Leviathan, Hobbes maintains that out ‘of all passions’ fear is the one ‘which enclineth men least to break the lawes’. Furthermore, ‘it is the only’ thing ‘that makes men keep them’. It is possible that Hobbes was not applying such a doctrine that would incorporate all of the above mentioned points. Perhaps he was simply describing the nature of a political society through hypothetical speculation. However, this was not the way that Hobbes’s contemporaries understood his theory. According to some calculations, there are more than fifty accounts specifically written to argue against Hobbes before the turn of the century. Many of these solely deal with religion and atheism, but there are also several interesting moral arguments that reveal that along the obvious point c, also the other two (a and b) were closely linked to the early conception of Hobbism.

26 Sterling P. Lamprecht, ‘Hobbes and Hobbism’, The American Political Science Review, 34, 1940, p. 32. It is highly likely that this number has increased considerably in some calculations that are more “up-to-date”. However, even if someone would have recently counted that there were actually 300 critical accounts, this does not change anything. Hobbes simply created a lot of negative responses.
27 It should be pointed out that there are also seventeenth-century British authors who openly praise Hobbes. Walter Charleton, an early member of the Royal Society, for example, was a public admirer of Hobbes and the epicurean tradition. In his introduction
We may look at some examples from the 1670s. Thomas Tenison, in his *Creed of Mr Hobbes examined*, claims that Hobbes had only ‘mention’d certain natural laws’. In Tenison’s opinion, Hobbes should not be considered part of the natural law tradition, because he does not derive ‘them from the reason and equity of their nature’, but merely ‘from self-preservation’. John Eachard, likewise, points out that in the Hobbian theory ‘self interest is to be looked upon as the first principle of nature’ and ‘the world is wholly disposed of, and guided by’ it. The list of the critics who argue that a Hobbian doctrine is entirely based on self-love and self-preservation goes on. To put it briefly, a Hobbian moral theory was coined, not so much by Thomas Hobbes himself, but mainly by his critics. It was self-love, self-

to the Natural history of the passions (1674) he writes that regarding ‘the description of many of the passions’ he has ‘interwoven some threads taken from the webs of those three excellent men, Gassendus, Des Cartes, and our Mr. Hobbes; who have all written most judiciously of that obstruse theme.’ (pp. xxxvi–xxxvii) Thus, Charleton does not merely praise Hobbes, he acknowledges that English people should be proud that one of the contemporary greats is their Mr. Hobbes. Regarding Hobbes’s influence, especially Charleton’s understanding of laughter seems to be based on Hobbes’s theory (Natural history, pp. 144–147). By and large, Natural history of the passions is an interesting book that relies heavily, along with the abovementioned ‘three excellent men’, on the works of two of Hobbes’s friends, namely Kenelm Digby and Thomas Willis. It is no news to scholars that Charleton publicly admired Hobbes (cf. Jon Parkin, ‘Hobbism in the later 1660s: Daniel Scargill and Samuel Parker’, Historical Journal, 42, 1999, p. 91. Parkin points out that already C. D. Thorpe, *The aesthetic theory of Thomas Hobbes*, Michigan, 1940, pp. 176–88 lists Charleton’s many references to Hobbes.) Nevertheless, this raises the interesting question of whether there was a self-sustaining tradition of Hobbism and Epicurean principles among seventeenth-century physicians, not only on the continent, but also in Britain?


30 According to Lambrecht, at least twenty-nine hostile writers prior to 1681 were concerned with Hobbes’s political ideas, Lamprecht, *‘Hobbes and Hobbism’*, 1940, p. 31.

31 The classic study of Hobbism is Samuel I. Mintz, *The hunting of Leviathan: seventeenth-century reactions to the materialism and moral philosophy of Thomas Hobbes*, Cambridge University Press, 1962. Also the concept of a Hobbist and Hobbism was widely used in eighteenth-century Britain. For example, Matthew Tomlinson wrote about the ‘principles of the Hobbits, those late pretenders to reason and philosophy, who would have all religion to depend upon the laws and edicts of princes, and the will of the magistrate; nor can any supposed utility, however speciously pretended, support so groundless and anti-scriptural a doctrine.’ Mathew Tomlinson, *The protestant’s birthright, or the Christian’s right of judging for himself in matters of religion. A sermon ... preached at Worksop in Nottinghamshire, June 1, 1743 ...* and now published, as a seasonable antidote against popery, Methodism, modern Hobism, the author of Christianity not founded on argument, and some other late writers, London, 1746, p. 21. Another commentator noted in 1718 that ‘Hobbism has has long been thought a heresy in politics, and buried in contempt and ignominy’ but now Dr. Broughton ‘has thought fit to revive this monster, and fright the world afresh with the divine right of power, a notion destructive, as well of religion, as of government.’ George Smith, *A vindication of lawful authority: against some principles lately advanc’d to undermine the same or, a confutation of
interest and self-preservation that were generally understood as the axiomatic foundation of this theory. This, of course, raises a further question: if Hobbes was not a Hobbist and the entire concept was created by his critics while renouncing such a theory, then, who is a Hobbist? If we want to keep on advancing this line of thought, we do not have to end in the conclusion that there never was a pure Hobbist in the world. There is no reason to deny that Bernard Mandeville in his first part of The Fable is a Hobbist.

Attention should be paid to what Bernard Mandeville says about his theoretical position at different times. In the preface to Part II, the author makes a comment stating that already 'two years' ago he composed an unpublished 'defence of the Fable of the bees'. Perhaps Mandeville did not publish it because he had given up his original doctrine. However, what he says about the 'defence' tells us a great deal about his scientific principles and what he thought of his own work. According to Mandeville, 'the only thing' that he 'ever had any concern' for were the 'objections that might reasonably be made against' – not the work itself – but 'the doctrine contain'd in it'. These objections that actually challenged the original theory were the ones worthy of being 'stated and endeavour'd to solve'. Thus, this tells us two things. Mandeville closely followed the criticism that The Fable received. He took the criticism seriously because he was not a mere

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32 The vindication published in the London Journal that was later added to the first part of The Fable was published already in 1723, thus this is not the defence that Mandeville was pointing at in the preface. Kaye's hypothesis is that this defence may have 'formed part of Remarks upon two late presentments, 1729, if this work is, as is very possible, by Mandeville.' Kaye, The Fable of the Bees, p. 4, footnote 2. I do not find this plausible. In the ESTC the work is commonly attributed to John Wickliffe i.e. Henry Hetsell/ Hetrell.

33 Mandeville, Part II, p. 4.

34 It should be pointed out that, even when Mandeville was more often criticised than approved of, he nevertheless had imitators who obviously approved of his reasoning, but did not acknowledge the source. For example, regarding the central relationship between pride and behaviour, Erasmus Jones in his The man of manners: or, plebeian polish'd, London, 1737, p. 23 quotes a crucial part of The Fable almost verbatim: The Man of Sense and Education never exults more in his Pride than when he hides it with the greatest Dexterity; and in feasting on the Applause, which he is sure all good Judges will pay to his Behaviour, he enjoys a Pleasure altogether unknown to the short-sighted Subalterns of the Guards, or the simple City Common-council Men, that shew their Haughtiness glaringly in their Countenances, and neither pull off their Hats, nor deign to speak to an Inferior.' Cf. Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, pp. 79–80. About Mandeville's influence on Erasmus Jones, see also Erasmus Jones, Luxury, pride and vanity, the bane of British nation, London, 1736. Regarding the same issue, Henry Fielding also wrote 'I have often thought that such wise men as conceal their vanity, make a large amends to themselves by feeding this passion with contemplation on the ridiculous appearance of it in others.' Henry Fielding, Champion, London, 1740, p. 107. It is also interesting that while the first criticisms of The Fable begins in 1723, so do the positive reactions. For example, Robert Burrow in his sermon preached in September 1723, argued that some of
polemist, but a philosopher who was advancing a specific doctrine. Mandeville was committed to his work. If his doctrine was proved wrong, he was willing to change his position. I believe that this is precisely what happens in Part II, which is not a vindication of The Fable, but bases its arguments on a whole new theoretical foundation.

But what is this specific doctrine that Mandeville claims to have advanced in The Fable? Is it that private vices will produce public benefits? This is the famous paradox that plays a crucial role in The Fable, but I believe that this is a side product of the theory and not the doctrine itself.35 One occasion when Mandeville reflects upon his doctrine is one of the last additions to The Fable of the Bees – before he stops making these additions altogether. When pondering upon the negative responses that The Fable receives, Mandeville sighs, 'I sincerely believe, that it is chiefly self-love', not the defence of luxury or private vices, 'that has gained this little treatise (as it was before the last impression) so many enemies'.36 I believe Mandeville was right. A Hobbsist theory does not receive a positive response because the overriding presence of self-love is contrary to human experience. This is what Mandeville came to accept and this is the reason why he wrote two new books where he based his arguments on a new theory different from his preceding Hobbism.

We do not have to sink knee-deep into Mandeville's philosophy in order to find out what his first doctrine was. It is enough if we look at the table of contents.37 The clearest topical proof that in the first part of The Fable Mandeville advances a Hobbsist doctrine comes from such entries as The first rudiments of morality were broad’d for the ease of governors’,38 ‘All desires tend to self-preservation’ and ‘Man is civiliz’d by his fear’.39 In other words, as I defined earlier, Mandeville manifestly claims a) moral distinctions are artificially invented, b) all human actions centre in self-preservation and c) moreover, fear plays a great role in taming the savage in a peculiarly Hobbsist manner. To emphasise my general argument, I think that Mandeville drops these axioms in Part II, where moral distinctions are no longer considered straightforward artificial tricks played by politicians upon ignorant people.

the dictates of The Fable are not necessarily contrary to religion, Burrow, Civil society and government vindicated, 1723.

35 In the literature one can find an extensive discussion on the paradox and its true meaning. For this discussion one might want to consult Charles Prior's comprehensive selected bibliography of Bernard Mandeville in http://www.c18.rutgers.edu/biblio/mandeville.html. I do not want to say that the paradox does not play a great role in Mandeville’s thought, only that I believe that Mandeville was quite sincere in his Letter to Dion, 1732, p. 38 when he pointed out that the reason for the paradox in the title was mainly to ‘raise attention’. A successful choice, indeed.


37 It should be pointed out that the table of contents was not printed after the second edition. Kaye, ‘Descriptions of the editions’, Part II, p. 388.


The role of politicians is completely different, the definition of self-preservation changes, fear is no longer staunchly emphasised and, what's more, Mandeville admits that all human actions cannot be reduced to self-love and self-preservation.

In order to do justice to Mandeville's genius, instead of trying to prove that he does not really mean what he emphatically stresses, it is reasonable to admit that in some ways, *The Fable of the Bees* is just as defective as the critics claim. For the doctrine contained in it, the skilful politician is not a literary device. The arbitrary, and almost sudden, invention of morality is a particularly strong element underlying the overall thesis. Mandeville is not even close to the subtle and nuanced conception of the long evolutionary process of civil society and moral institutions that he later develops. And the reason why the role of politicians who artificially invent morality is so strong is that in every single case that he can think of, Mandeville is trying to apply a theory where all human actions are reduced to self-love and self-preservation. He is a Hobbist and there is no reason why we as Mandeville scholars, should not admit it.

**Passions, desires and self-preservation**

Even when I think that the table of contents tells us that Mandeville is a Hobbist, we should perhaps dip our toes into his prose. Throughout *The Fable*, Mandeville holds as his first foundational premise that whatever a human being, or any other animal, does, it is naturally done in order to please the agent. 'All untaught animals are' so 'solicitous of pleasing themselves' that it is only through a learned process that they start 'considering the good or harm' that their actions 'will accrue to others'. Mandeville holds fast to this definition. He does not allow that an individual could naturally have any other end for his passions or desires. Whether we are 'savages or politicians', it is simply 'impossible that man, mere fallen man', Mandeville writes, 'should act with any other view but to please himself'. Not even 'the greatest extravagancy either of love or despair', he emphasises, 'can have no other centre'.

For Mandeville being pleased and avoiding pain is just another way of saying that an individual is acting for his self-preservation. It is 'the law of nature' that 'no creature' is 'endued with any appetite or passion but what either directly or indirectly tends to the preservation either of himself or his species'. Ultimately, it is 'nature' that 'obliges every creature continually to stir in this business of self-preservation'. There are different 'means' to promote this end and this is why 'desires' are 'grafted in' a man. Different passions 'either compel him to crave what he thinks will sustain or please him, or command him to avoid what he imagines might displease, hurt or

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destroy him’. Mandeville’s idea is to reduce all our ‘desires’, ‘passions’, ‘all their different symptoms’ and ‘various denominations’ to self-preservation. The entire doctrine contained in the first part of The Fable is based on the idea that eventually everything that is natural in a living creature, even ‘our love of company’ and ‘aversion to solitude’, they ‘all center in self-love’.

We may look at this same question from a slightly different perspective. What Mandeville is aiming at, is to point out that experience effectively proves that ‘the real pleasures of all men in nature are worldly and sensual’. Mandeville explains what he means by ‘men in nature’. The only ones who hypothetically make an exception are ‘devout Christians’, who have been ‘regenerated and preternaturally assisted by the divine grace’. Thus, what Mandeville is doing is using a rigorous, Jansenist definition of virtue to support his Hobbist doctrine. After excluding the ones who have efficient grace from his account, it turns out that an individual can be said to be virtuous only through self-denial. Since all ‘the real pleasures’ point towards ‘worldly and sensual’, the only way, Mandeville thinks, anyone can be said to have ‘a rational ambition of being good’, is if he is willing to sacrifice his real pleasures. This is indeed self-denial. At the same time, if we reject this definition and hold on to some ‘imaginary notions that men may be virtuous without self-denial’, we are turning towards ‘a vast inlet to hypocrisy’. We give way to our natural desires while imagining that we are doing something different. Once this becomes ‘habitual, we must not only deceive others, but likewise become altogether unknown to our selves’.

Mandeville defends himself by claiming that he ‘cannot see what’ is the ‘immorality’ in revealing, in a similar manner as the Jansenists had done, ‘the secret stratagems of self-love’ and ‘the origin and power’ of ‘passions’ that ‘so often, even unknowingly’ lead a person ‘away from his reason’. However, this is not the problem with The Fable. The problem is that Mandeville is bending everything to match this Hobbist doctrine.

Mandeville uses the idea of self-denial to make a distinction between ‘real and counterfeited virtue’. ‘Actions’ that are really virtuous are only those that ‘proceed from a victory over the passions’. By the same token, the good actions that are ‘the result of a conquest which one passion obtains over another’ are not. They are ‘counterfeited virtue’. Meanwhile it turns out, as some of the critics point out, that Mandeville’s rigorous definition becomes virtually useless. Any action produced through the stratagem of countervailing passions is only a counterfeited virtue. This allows Mandeville to support his paradox that private vices (here vice is
understood in the widest possible sense and such passions as pride and envy are thought of as vice) produce public virtue, but what is the point besides sophistry? Why define virtue in this manner if it turns out that it is humanly impossible to attain and one does not have any other normative or religious doctrine to offer instead?

We may detect a similar, exemplifying case in Mandeville’s treatment of charity. Mandeville defines that ‘charity’ is a ‘virtue by which part of that sincere love we have for ourselves is transferr’d pure and unmix’d to others’ who are ‘not tied to us by the bonds of friendship or consanguinity’ and who ‘we have no obligation to, nor hope or expect any thing from’ them. If we lessen, Mandeville claims, ‘any ways the rigour of this definition, part of the virtue must be lost’. Mandeville is framing a virtue that according to his own definition, is humanly impossible. Then he says that if we lessen the definition, some of the virtue is lost. This is a confusing argument. Instead, Mandeville could just as well say that according to his naturalistic interpretation, the idea of ‘pure and unmix’d’ charity is contrary to human nature.

Mandeville also makes some highly polemical examples to demonstrate his idea that real virtue necessitates self-denial and all our actions and desires lean towards self-preservation. For example, he famously claims that ‘there is no merit in saving an innocent babe ready to drop into the fire’. This action ‘is neither good nor bad’, because if we did ‘not strove to hinder it, it would have caused pain, which self-preservation compell’d us to prevent’. Thus, Mandeville claims that we do not chose to act because of the infant, but ‘we only’ oblige ‘our selves’. He aims to prove that, in the end, the actions that we think virtuous are performed for our own sake. The same holds true, for example, for ‘a man’ who ‘acts in behalf of nephew or nieces’. He is not really virtuous, but he is performing the action ‘partly for his own sake’. Mandeville’s rationale is that if he did not ‘have a greater regard to’ his kin ‘than for strangers’, he would have to ‘suffer in his character’ and ‘reputation’. This might well be partly true, but there is no need to jump to the conclusion that this proves the meanness of human nature, or that the man could not have any other than a selfish motive when he helps his nephew. My intention when pointing out these examples is not so much to criticise Mandeville (other writers have done this often enough), but my idea is rather that through these examples it becomes evident that there is a clear doctrine in The Fable. The doctrine is that our self-preservation and self-love are the source, means and end of all our actions.

We may also look at Mandeville’s speculation upon a noble, seemingly other-regarding action. There is nothing, he claims, that can make us perform ‘a noble action’ if we are not ‘conscious’ that by performing it we shall receive some worldly pleasure, which in this case is ‘the applause’ that

50 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 56.
we expect from others. Thus, it may be said that ‘a noble action’ is joined to ‘superlative felicity’ that the agent acquires by performing it, but in the end, he is feasting ‘in self-love’ and there is nothing of real virtue in the action itself.  

Even ‘the humblest man alive’, according to Mandeville, ‘must confess, that the reward of a virtuous action, which is the satisfaction that ensues upon it, consists in a certain pleasure he procures to himself by contemplating on his own worth’.  

Since we are performing the noble action in order to enjoy our self-love, this is counterfeited virtue at best. But is there really a point in claiming that a virtuous action is not really virtuous since it is accompanied by the satisfaction of doing a virtuous deed?  

In The Fable of the Bees, Mandeville seems to think that he may logically deduce all the passions from the preceding doctrine. What particularly caught the eyes of his critics, and what perhaps later made Mandeville re-evaluate his position is his treatment of natural affection. With a firm belief in the overriding presence of self-love, Mandeville picks up the topic and maintains that even when some claim that ‘mothers naturally love their children’, does not actually mean anything more than saying that a man naturally loves his beautiful house. A mother’s love for her child is ‘a passion’ among others. Since ‘all passions center in self-love’ it might, just as well, be subdued by any superior passion, to sooth that same self-love.  

But he does not stop here. He carries on denying the originality of natural affection and that it would be particularly independent of self-love. He claims that ‘our love to what never was within the reach of our senses is but poor and inconsiderable’. In other words, ‘women have no natural love to what they bear’ while pregnant and ‘their affection begins’ only ‘after the birth’. And, moreover, ‘even when children first are born the mother’s love is but weak’. Natural affection, according to the interpretation given in The Fable, only ‘increases with the sensibility of the child’ - once the child starts to give a reciprocal response to the mother’s affection. Thus, even such a categorical, seemingly real virtue as natural affection is directly linked to the idea of ‘pleasing our selves’ in the first part of The Fable.  

And, since there is ‘no merit’ in self-love, even natural affection is dubbed morally indifferent. Mandeville clearly believed that everything is to be explained away with self-love.  

Mandeville’s description of other passions, such as envy, is also deduced from the same line of reasoning. He claims that ‘it is impossible’ that a man ‘should wish better for another than he does for himself’, if there is the slightest chance that he may ‘attain to those wishes’. What this means is that ‘when we observe something we like and do not have, this causes ‘sorrow in us for not having the thing we like’. According to Mandeville, ‘this sorrow is incurable’ when ‘we’ actually ‘esteem’ the ‘thing we want’. But,

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52 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 55.  
53 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 57.  
54 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 75.  
55 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 76.
since we are not able to get what we desire, 'self-defence' that is 'restless' and 'never suffers us to leave any means untried how to remove evil from us' steps in. In the end, 'experience teaches us, that nothing in nature more alleviates this sorrow than our anger against those who' have 'what we esteem and want'. Thus, our anger is working for our self-preservation and 'we cherish and cultivate' it in order 'to save or relieve our selves, at least in part, from the uneasiness we felt' because we did not get what we esteem.\textsuperscript{56}

But envy is not the only passion that Mandeville reduces to self-preservation. In an analogous manner, more or less everything is linked to self-love and there is no other end to Mandeville's Hobbist doctrine. 'As every body would be happy, enjoy pleasure and avoid pain if he could, so self-love bids us look on every creature that seems satisfied, as a rival in happiness'.\textsuperscript{57} The same line of reasoning is used when explaining friendship, love\textsuperscript{58} – even politeness.\textsuperscript{59} And, of course, love between sexes is considered analogous to the previous examples, since it 'prompts us to labour for the preservation of our species'.\textsuperscript{60}

Politicians, moral distinctions and civil society

After learning the logic of The Fable, we are ready to pick up the notorious claim that all moral virtues are an artificial invention of the politicians.\textsuperscript{61} I seek to argue that Mandeville's original position is extreme and that the formation of civil society is emblematically described, not as a long evolutionary process, but almost as a sudden stroke 'after which savage man was broke'.\textsuperscript{62} Indeed, an individual is truly comparable to a wild horse in this account – first fully intractable, but after being tamed by force and tricks played by the politician, becomes an obedient and beneficial creature as a result.

We may also point out another reason besides the obsessive idea of the prevalence of self-love for the rigid position that Mandeville adopts. In The Fable, the importance of small, family society in the development towards a civil society is utterly dismissed. In fact, Mandeville outright denies any role that natural affection might play in the formation of civil society, which is not considered social evolution, but a crude display of power and deceit. 'If by society' we understand 'a number of people, that without rule or

\textsuperscript{56} Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 135.
\textsuperscript{57} Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 139.
\textsuperscript{58} Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 142.
\textsuperscript{59} Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 342.
\textsuperscript{60} Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 142.
\textsuperscript{61} Goldsmith's account of Mandeville's use of politicians as a symbol of society has been quite generally accepted, but J. W. A. Gunn has pointed out with a reference to Goldsmith's works that there are also several occasions when Mandeville uses the term politician in a narrow sense. See especially Gunn, 'Mandeville: poverty, luxury, and the Whig theory of government', in Beyond liberty and property, 1983, pp. 102–3.
\textsuperscript{62} Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 46.
government should keep together out of a natural affection' as 'a heard of cows or a flock of sheep, then', Mandeville writes, 'there is not in the world a more unfit creature for society than man'. Only 'under' authentic 'subjection' and 'fear of' a 'superior' any set of men can 'live together' without 'quarrelling'. Thus, since Mandeville's idea of human nature is so categorically pessimistic, it is unsurprising that an acting sovereign in a Hobbesian manner is considered important for civil society.

Indeed, the role of a politician in The Fable is concrete and emphatic. He is given the essential part in the establishment of civil society and, what Mandeville defined as, 'real' and 'counterfeited virtue'. Mandeville emphasises that it is the 'chief thing' of the 'lawgivers and other wise men, that have laboured for the establishment of society' to 'make the people they were to govern, believe that it was more beneficial for every body to conquer than indulge his appetites, and much better to mind the publick than what seem'd his private interest'. It is the politician that in a very concrete manner invents moral distinctions and what Mandeville calls 'real virtue'. As plainly as Mandeville himself put it, 'the first rudiments of morality' are 'broach'd by skilful politicians' in order 'to render men useful to each other as well as tractable'. The moral distinctions 'were chiefly contrived' so 'that the ambitious might reap the more benefit from, and govern vast numbers of them with the greater ease and security'.

It is the politician that first deceives people so as to believe in the significance of real virtue. However, it is doubtful 'whether mankind would have ever believ'd' in it. In fact, Mandeville reminds us that it is unlikely 'that any body could have persuaded' people 'to disapprove of their natural inclinations, or prefer the good of others to their own, if at the same time he had not shew'd them an equivalent to be enjoy'd as a reward for the violence, which by doing so they of necessity must commit upon themselves'. This is why the politician also invents the scheme of 'counterfeited virtue' where the dialectics of countervailing passions is set forward. It is for this very reason, Mandeville tells us, that the politician came to realise that 'flattery must be the most powerful argument that could be used to human creatures'. In other words, men are tricked into self-denial - to conquer their natural inclinations. Thus, we are only a step away from the claim that what 'first put man upon crossing his appetites

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64 Ever since the publication of the important Mandeville Studies in 1975, it has been somewhat of a trend in Mandeville scholarship to hint at some of his less-famous works about some particular doctrine or idea. Regarding skilful management by politicians one such interesting clue might be derived from a discussion on Louis XIV in Mandeville, The virgin unmask'd: or, female dialogues betwixt an elderly maiden lady and her niece, on several diverting discourses on love, marriage, memoirs, and morals, & c. of the times. 2nd ed., London, 1724, p. 145.
65 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 42.
66 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 47.
67 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 42.
and subduing his dearest inclinations' was 'the skilful management of wary politicians' and 'the nearer we search into human nature, the more we shall be convinced, that the moral virtues are the political offspring which flattery begot upon pride'.

Additionally, we might want to trace the detailed description of the origin of civil society that Mandeville provides. The Fable introduces a mixed idea of politicians first suffocating people's passions and later taking advantage of them. By and large, this account is inconsistent and reveals the problems of Mandeville's original Hobbist conceptions.

Mandeville begins his outline of the formation of civil society by considering the concept of anger, the desires causing it and the significance of fear. He indicates that the two principal causes of anger are hunger and lust. Men, like all other animals, become angry when their desires, roused by either one of these appetites, remain unsatisfied. Both of the original 'appetites' point directly to 'the pursuit of self-preservation'. Not a single creature could 'subsist without food' and no species could continue 'unless young ones' are 'continually born as fast as the old ones die'. Mandeville makes a descriptive distinction between different types of animals. 'The beasts of prey', such as wolves, must 'perpetuate as well as increase their hunger', which 'becomes constant fuel to their anger'. In contrast, Mandeville indicates a different group of animals, such as 'bulls and cocks', whose anger is aroused by 'lust'. Those 'creatures, whose rage proceeds from hunger, both male and female, attack every thing they can master, and fight obstinately against all'. The other animals, 'whose fury is provoked by a venereal ferment, being generally males, exert themselves chiefly against other males of the same species'. The human being is not an exception. Human behaviour is directed by both these appetites. The influence of hunger on men might be 'less violent than that of wolves' and 'lust in man is not so raging as it is in bulls'. Nevertheless, according to Mandeville, these primary appetites of self-preservation are the original foundation that set men in action.

As one might expect, Mandeville starts his description of the origin of civil society by deriving all the principle appetites from self-preservation. In The Fable, pride does not function as one of the original appetites. It is not described as being in anyway characteristic of a man in his original state. Pride only begins to operate at a later stage in the development. It is an instrument that politicians are thought to adopt in order to flatter subjects into subjection. It seems as if pride does not affect savage men. This is clearly defined in the Remark R as well as in 'The search into nature of society', where Mandeville writes, that 'hunger, thirst and nakedness are the first tyrants that force us to stir' and only 'afterwards, our pride, sloth,

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69 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 51.
71 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 203.
72 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 204.
sensuality and fickleness are the great patrons that promote all arts and sciences, trades, handicrafts and callings'. This categorical distinction of the effects that passions have on the different stages of historical development adds up to a fair amount of confusion in Mandeville's first account of civil society.

In a Hobbist manner Mandeville denominates 'Fear', 'laws' and 'self-preservation' as the predominant factors for the establishment of civil society. The difference between a barbaric and a civilized state of men is that in the latter people do not vent their natural impulses of anger. Great trust has to be placed on the force of laws. Mandeville emphasises that it is 'the first care' of all governments to inflict 'severe punishments' in order to 'curb' a man's hurtful anger. Mandeville carries on to give a description how laws are highly effective in increasing fears and preventing 'the mischief' that anger 'might produce'. 'When various laws' are 'strictly executed' in order to restrain a person 'from using force', we are led to realize that 'self-preservation must teach him to be peaceable'. Mandeville tries to bring home the point that, 'as it is everybody's business to be as little disturbed as is possible, his fears will be continually augmented and enlarged as he advances in experience, understanding and foresight'. Thus, Mandeville reaches the summit of his first theory of the origin of government. From the previous premises he concludes that 'as the provocations' of 'anger will be infinite in the civilized state, so his fears to damp it will be the same, and thus in a little time he'll be taught by his fears to destroy his anger, and by art to consult in an opposite method the same self-preservation for which the nature before had furnished him with anger, as well as the rest of the passions'.

As we can see, Mandeville's theory of the origin of civil society is based on self-love. Self-preservation alone ought to do the trick of turning passions against each other. In the 'Search into the nature of society' Mandeville repeats that a man 'is a fearful animal, naturally not rapacious', in other words, a creature that 'loves peace and quiet'. In both of these accounts Mandeville principally draws his conclusions from what he calls 'the business of self-preservation'. The concluding essay of The Fable ought to demonstrate that 'sociableness' of a man 'arises only from two things', the 'multiplicity of his desires, and the continual opposition he meets in his endeavours to gratify them'. Only self-preservation can teach an individual to suppress his anger. Mandeville's first analysis of society is couched on self-love. The idea of pride is detached from the principles Mandeville thought to be prevailing in nature.

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73 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 366.
75 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 348.
76 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 344.
77 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 344.
Within his initial system, Mandeville faces a problem when explaining how an individual who is first suppressed by rigid laws finally starts to cultivate his passions and to benefit the society at large. Mandeville's solution is to furnish cunning politicians with even greater power. First, they curb man's anger with inflexible laws. Now they have to alter the matter and enable themselves to benefit from the same passions they had suffocated. When Mandeville discusses the unavoidable fact that at some point in history a society 'may have occasion to extend their limits further, and enlarge their territories, or others may invade theirs, or something else will happen that man must be brought to fight', he provides a solution that is inconsistent with his initial theory. Later he quietly dismisses this first account and constructs a new system of sociability on completely different principles described in the various dialogues between Horatio and Cleomenes.

Nevertheless, the politicians who manage to shake off man's natural anger are now in The Fable obliged to 'take off some of man's fears' in order to make him 'fight'. Mandeville presses the point, in stark contrast with the republican political ideals, that 'natural courage', anger, is not just brutal, but 'altogether useless in a war to be managed by stratagem'. Yet, something 'equivalent for courage' is needed to 'make men fight'. This is, of course, honour. The 'principle of honour' is appointed as 'the tye of society'. There would be no living without it in a large nation', Mandeville instructs. The politician's task is to persuade men to believe that they possess a 'principle of valour distinct from anger'. Since the principle itself is fully artificial, valiant men in reality feel 'nothing' of it and are in fact 'mistaking pride for courage'. Hence, a lawgiver has 'to take all imaginable care to flatter the pride of those' who brag of valour. In due course 'the fear of discovering the reality of his heart, comes to be so great that it out-does the fear of death it self'. Mandeville brings the line of thought to a close with a lesson teaching us: 'Do but increase man's pride, and his fear of shame will ever be proportioned to it; for the greater value a man sets upon himself, the more pains he'll take and the greater hardships he'll undergo to avoid shame'.

In Mandeville's later theory honour is also described as an artificial principle of utmost importance. What is different is its primary function.

78 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 207.
80 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 218.
82 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 209.
the earlier version it supposedly inspires a man ‘with as much horror against shame, as nature has given him against death’. Later it is coined as the ultimate proof of civility, epitomizing that men are ready to sacrifice their lives (self-love) in order to prove the notion of their own worth (self-liking). In other words, concerning honour, Mandeville’s focus shifts from the fear of shame to the cultivation of pride. It comes as no surprise that in The Fable he feels justified when claiming that ‘nothing civilizes a man equally as his fear’.

Mandeville sustains that ‘nature’ is ‘always the same, in the formation of animals’, which in his first outline of civility simply means that also ‘men, whether they are born in courts or forests, are susceptible to anger’. This anger might be useful to ‘a single creature’ living ‘by himself’, but ‘society’ has ‘no manner of occasion for it’. Structuring his primary analysis from the concepts of ‘anger’, ‘appetites’, ‘pride’ and ‘fear’, Mandeville concludes that ‘fear’ is ‘the only useful passion then that man is possessed of toward the peace and quiet of a society’ and a man ‘will be’ more ‘orderly and governable’ the more you ‘work upon it’. In this first outline of the origin of civil society pride has only an instrumental value, which is unsurprising. It is, after all, a Hobbist doctrine.

**Lust, women and fear**

When examining the appetite of lust, Mandeville again affirms his primary interest in self-love. The authority of fear and its close connection to self-preservation turn out, once more, to be the key issue. Lust, being a natural source of desire, does not obviously evaporate once a civil society has been established. It makes an impression upon virtually all the young and ‘healthy people of either sex’, but now it is kept a secret. Mandeville indulges his fascination with paradoxes by noting that even when lust is ‘most necessary for the continuance of mankind’, it has become ‘odious’ and the ‘epithets commonly joined to’ it are ‘filthy and abominable’. Hence, ‘among well-bred people’ it is ‘highly criminal to mention before company any thing’ related to this appetite ‘in plain words’.

Why is lust ‘never to be talked of in publick’? Evidently because ‘the peace and happiness of the civil society’ requires it. This is simply a further elaboration of the idea that passions leading to anger distort the peace and quiet of the society and have to be repressed. Overwhelming fear is once more harnessed as the key instrument performing the task of reverting...
odious passions. In civil society ‘where the rules of religion, law and
decency, are to be followed, and obeyed before any dictates of nature, the
youth of both sexes are to be armed and fortified against this impulse, and
from their infancy artfully frightened from the most remote approaches of
it’.\textsuperscript{91} Especially women seem to be in a very awkward position with their
natural inclinations.

In order to avoid shame, women have to ‘flatly’ disown ‘all the
symptoms’ of lust, and if possible ‘with obstinacy’ deny that they were in
any way ‘affected by them’. Lust for women is a prime example of how
Mandeville’s Hobbist doctrine unintentionally turns into a repressive
system, where there is nothing pleasing for the agent in certain actions, and
the objective is to avoid shame. This is very interesting because Mandeville
carefully explains elsewhere in The Fable that for example ‘a man of sense
and education never exults more in his pride than when he hides it with
greatest dexterity’.\textsuperscript{92} Why couldn’t the same principle apply to women and
their lust? Why couldn’t they as well take pride in hiding their appetites?
The reason is simple. All the primary passions are directly connected to self-
love in this first analysis. Pride is a very odd component in this structure.
Mandeville is unable to fully operate with it while it is cemented to a
Hobbist theory. Instead, Mandeville corners himself into a contradictory
position when trying to cope with strong, original appetites. Compared to
them pride is only secondary. Thus, the only solution Mandeville has at this
point is to keep these primary appetites firmly in awe by suppressing them
with fear rising from self-preservation. Yet, he spells out that ‘lust, pride,
and selfishness’ are ‘passions’ that ‘ought’ no more than to be hidden ‘for
the happiness and embellishment of the society’.\textsuperscript{93} Mandeville also visibly
stresses that ‘good breeding merely requires’ that ‘we should hide our
appetites’.\textsuperscript{94} He just does not give a plausible explanation in The Fable of
how it would be humanly possible to hide an original passion since it is so
strong that it only may be restrained with overwhelming fear. He even
describes in a colourful passage how a virgin may submit herself to a
gentleman in the silence of the night and when the sun rises no-one would
speak ‘a word of what they have been doing’.\textsuperscript{95} Nevertheless, Mandeville is
unable to show how these remarks are connected to the Hobbist theory
that he introduced. Instead, he resorts to a rigid position when trying to
explain how women remain chaste. Mandeville concludes, ‘it is the interest
of society to preserve decency and politeness’ which means that ‘women
should linger, waste, and die, rather than relieve themselves in an unlawful

\textsuperscript{91} Mandeville, \textit{The Fable of the Bees}, p. 143.
\textsuperscript{92} Mandeville, \textit{The Fable of the Bees}, p. 79.
\textsuperscript{93} Mandeville, \textit{The Fable of the Bees}, pp. 68–69.
\textsuperscript{94} Mandeville, \textit{The Fable of the Bees}, p. 72.
\textsuperscript{95} Mandeville, \textit{The Fable of the Bees}, p. 73. About ‘young women’ and ‘civil gentlemen’,
see also Mandeville, \textit{Virgin unmask’d}, pp. 143–4.
manner’. These contradicting accounts are not plausibly fixed in The Fable. The reason for this is that Mandeville tries to build his entire theory of passions and society on self-love. After introducing self-liking and constructing a novel theory, the outcome is different in this respect also.

In The Fable, Mandeville classifies pride and shame as two distinct passions. In Origin of honour, Cleomenes tells Horatio that this was ‘an error’ that he knew the author was ‘willing to own’. If we keep our focus on lust, we can detect a different view in Origin of honour. ‘Fear of shame’ is indicated as an important principle, but in a different manner than the one stated in the first analysis. It is described to have its ‘foundation in self-liking’ and ‘manifestly derived from that and no other passion’. There is no need to note that shameful women might try to avoid showing any signs of their passion during the daylight and act in the opposite manner during the night. Instead, Cleomenes reminds Horatio that they both are ‘acquainted with women’, who might be in the dark ‘in the midst of temptations’ with ‘a passionate, deserving lover, whose person they approve of and admire’, where no-one would ever know what they are doing and still they resist the temptation. The tables are turned. In a high note Cleomenes declares that ‘the motive therefore of these women is no other, than what I have called it, their vanity, the undoubted offspring of self-liking, a palpable excess, an extravagant degree of the passion, that is able to stifle the loudest calls of nature, and with a high hand triumphs over all other appetites and inclinations’. Mandeville no longer needs to make passions arising from the same source, self-love, work against each other, which had led him to a blind alley. Now he has a new spring, self-liking, that could intelligibly be described to concur all the appetites materializing from self-love. To bring the point safely home, Cleomenes stresses the argument with a clarifying question. ‘Would you mortify or flatter; lessen or increase’ the passion of self-liking in women ‘in order to preserve their chastity’? Horatio replies that this is obviously a rhetorical question, since his interlocutor has already provided in their previous discussions ‘plausible reasons why pride should be more encouraged in women than in men’.

As we have learned, this is not apparent in The Fable, where the civilizing method is to curb the passions with fear. The mortifying ‘ingredient’ of ‘shame’ is indicated as highly necessary ‘to make us sociable’. In accordance with everything said above, Mandeville affirms again that ‘all creatures are ever labouring for their own defence’. Man would strive to ‘conquer his shame’, but this would be ‘detrimental to the society’. This ‘sense of shame’ is something that ‘we endeavour to increase instead of lessening or

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96 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 144.
100 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 59.
101 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 60.
destroying’ in education. Mandeville is determined to remark that ‘politicians would sooner take away’ a man’s ‘life’ rather than to ‘rid or cure him’ from his shame.\(^{102}\) Since pride and shame are defined as separate passions, this plainly means that Mandeville wants to keep people in awe.

Politeness and self-interest

There is little doubt that in the original Fable Mandeville follows a well-established tradition of court civility.\(^ {103}\) The idea of a ‘courtier’ denotes ‘the well-bred gentleman’ who ‘places his greatest pride in the skill he has of covering it with dexterity’.\(^ {104}\) Nevertheless, the Dutchman also argues that ‘all passions centre in self-love’\(^ {105}\), which he refutes in Part II. The usefulness of pride is directly connected to self-love in helping men to acquire wealth. In The Fable, everything is connected to self-interest, and politeness makes no exception.

When embracing pride and pressing the point that ‘we are possessed of no other quality so beneficial to society, and so necessary to render it wealthy and flourishing as this’, Mandeville implicates its materialistic value instead of social function.\(^ {106}\) ‘Pride’ has no ‘equivalent’ for ‘the support of trade’.\(^ {107}\) The topics of material well-being and trade are picked up, because they are supposed to be undisputable examples of how private vices could further elaborate a man’s self-love through possessions. Throughout the centuries, some of Mandeville’s commentators have insisted on a self-love theory couched on self-interest and on an automatic transformation of vices into wealth. They are right if they are discussing the first part of The Fable. In this version of the description of civil society Mandeville thinks that ‘it would be utterly impossible, either to raise any multitudes into a populous, rich and flourishing nation, or when so raised, to keep and maintain them in that condition, without the assistance of what we call evil both natural and moral’.\(^ {108}\) But when we turn to Mandeville’s later works, it is a different matter altogether.

Until 1729, when Mandeville published the first dialogues between Cleomenes and Horatio, pride is considered with its connection to self-interest. Before the distinction between self-love and self-liking Mandeville was facing difficulties in explaining how a person could take pride in something that is not directly connected to her self-interest as we saw in the case of lust. Naturally people might even use unlawful means in order to pursue their own interest. The only explanation for prudential behaviour is

\(^{102}\) Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 68.
\(^{104}\) Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 132.
\(^{105}\) Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 75.
\(^{106}\) Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 124.
\(^{107}\) Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 126.
\(^{108}\) Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 325.
the sense of shame, which is considered a separate passion from pride. Hence, the overwhelming effect of self-love results in the conclusion that a person would not remain within the boundaries of equitable judgement simply because he took pride in it. Instead, the only incentive is that he is afraid of social punishment.

In his ‘Search into the nature of society’ Mandeville gives two examples of how politeness connects to self-interest. The first illustration considers two ‘Londoners, whose business oblige them not to have any commerce together’. These men may daily meet ‘upon the Exchange’, yet they treat each other ‘with not much greater civility than bulls would’. But if they meet at ‘Bristol’, the matter is then different. Now they ‘pull off their hats, and on the least opportunity enter into conversation, and be glad of one another’s company’. The other example consists of men who are ‘at enmity’. They would never have anything to do with each other; but if they were ‘forced to travel together’ their behaviour would alter accordingly. Now they would be ‘affable and converse in a friendly manner, especially if the road be unsafe, and they are both strangers in the place they are to go to’. Mandeville indicates that these examples are given in order to counter the ‘superficial judges’, who ‘are attributed to man’s sociableness, his natural propensity to friendship and love of company’.109 The fundamental purpose at this point is to firmly establish that the goal of politeness is only ‘to strengthen our interest’ and the only ‘causes’ that we ‘are moved by’ are founded on this self-interest. In short, Mandeville’s first analysis on civility is based on the idea that ‘the various motives’ behind ‘our love of company’ undoubtedly ‘center in self-love’.110 Politeness is not copiously described as containing the character that would enable the transformation of natural desires into a behaviour that would benefit society and pleases the individual. Instead, Mandeville places a heavy accentuation on self-preservation and fear, which are the main components of the Hobbist theory of society constructed around the concept of self-love.

The charm of politeness is that it can be simultaneously beneficial to society as well as pleasing to the individual. Without the concept of self-liking, this idea does not materialize even when peculiar instances of it are described in The Fable. Hence, fear plays a dominant role. Even if in a civil society there has been a shift concerning fear from direct physical punishment to the fear of shame and the judgement of the audience, Mandeville, who lays such a substantial importance on natural instincts, has not yet provided a scrutinized solution to the question of how these inescapable instincts could be directed in a way that benefit society. He has not found a way out of his own paradox. His only concern is how to suppress anger. Instead of formulating his system to readjust men’s desires, Mandeville concentrates on countering their effects. The case is rather different in Part II.

The critique of Hobbism in the 1720s

Perhaps one of the most path-breaking of Kaye's findings concerns Joseph Butler's role as a critic of The Fable and, moreover, what effect this had on the development of Mandeville's thought. What I attempt to do, is to locate Butler's criticism, which in my opinion was not so much a reaction against The Fable per se, but in Hobbist system in general that The Fable epitomised, in its intellectual context. I argue that the incentive that pushed Mandeville to reconsider his views and swap from straightforward Hobbism to Nicolean naturalism was the impact of the criticism of the 1720s on his system. The contemporary attack on Hobbism (not only on Mandeville, 112

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111 Kaye's suggestion is that Mandeville added self-liking to his system due to Butler's attack in 1726. Kaye, Part II, pp. 129–130, footnote 1. Kaye's interpretation has been particularly questioned by James, who points out that 'Butler's distinction is not the one Mandeville makes'. James, 'Faith, sincerity and morality: Mandeville and Bayle', 1975, p. 54. James is right that adding self-liking does not alone counter Butler's criticism. However, to notice that Mandeville reacts to the 1720s criticism (and particularly to Butler) is important and when we also take into account other aspects of this criticism and Mandeville's response, we come to understand the paradigmatic change in his thought. Regarding Butler's moral philosophy, see Terence Penelhum, Butler, Routledge, 1985, who, appropriately, stresses that Butler's understanding of conscience is the central feature of his moral philosophy. Of Penelhum's account of Butler's link to Hume, see his 'Butler and Hume', Hume Studies, 14, 1968, pp. 251–276 that neatly sums up the central lines of his interpretation of Butler's moral philosophy. See also Robert M. Stewart, 'Butler's argument against psychological hedonism', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 22, 1992, pp. 211–221, who wants to challenge the commonplace that Butler manages to counter psychological egoism. It is also interesting to notice that unlike Mandeville, Butler does not seem to have been much appreciated as an original thinker in eighteenth-century France. For example, an interesting detail is that none of Butler's works were translated into French in the eighteenth-century according to Charles Alfred Rochedieu, Bibliography of French translations of English works 1700–1800, University of Chicago Press, 1948. It is also interesting that Francis Hutcheson's Essay and Enquiry were translated into French as late as 1749, ibid. p. 163.

112 The core of the 1720s criticism of The Fable that I will not account for because it seems to me that it affected very little Mandeville's later postulations consists of: William Law, Remarks upon a late book, entituled, the The Fable of the Bees, London, 1724. [this is the basic argument that many seem to follow; explicitly for example, Robert Burrow, Mediaeval Arringtoniana. A n essay upon divine providence with a particular view to its symmetry in reference to the natural, and more ... London, 1725, p. 99.Other classic criticisms of The Fable include: Richard Fiddes, General treatise of morality, London, 1724; John Dennis, Vice and luxury publick mischiefs, London, 1724; Bluet, Enquiry, 1725; John Disney, A view of ancient laws, against immorality and profaneness; ... Collected from the Jewish, Roman, Greek, Gothic, Lombard, and other laws, down to ... Cambridge, 1729 and [generally much more interesting] Archibald Campbell, A retelogia or, an enquiry into the original of moral virtue; wherein the false notions of Machiavel, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Mr. Bayle, as they are ... Westminster, 1728. Apart from general criticism, The Fable generated different discussions upon particular issues, especially upon charity schools, such as William George Barnes, Charity and charity schools defended. A sermon preach'd at St. Martin's Palace, in Norwich, on March 6. 1723 ... London, 1727; William Hendley, A defence of the charity-schools. Wherein the many false, scandalous and malicious objections of those advocates for ignorance and irreligion, ... London, 1725. Not all
which I think is vital to understand) did not only result in Mandeville adding self-liking to his system, but moreover made him accept the possibility of fully natural other-regarding affections (out of which parental affection towards children is the prime example). And what more, these new ingredients amounted to a novel theory about the evolution of civil society and moral institutions.

The critique on Hobbsism culminates in the question of whether there is any de facto other-regarding affection natural to man. The basic idea of the critics is that if we can prove that such a passion exists then the Hobbian scheme of reducing all human action to self-love is invalid. As Butler puts it, if we can show that there is ‘some degree’ of ‘real good-will in man towards man’, it is ‘sufficient’ to prove that ‘the seeds of it’ are ‘implanted in our nature’.¹¹³

Now, as I have emphasised, we have to see this discussion on Hobbsism as an extensive process, starting from Hobbes and changing its face through decades of debate. The significance of the first part of The Fable is that it epitomised Hobbsism in the early eighteenth century. This is also why it received such a vast amount of negative responses.¹¹⁴ The matter of natural affection that parents have for their children sums up the whole dispute of the 1720s.¹¹⁵ At the beginning of the eighteenth century natural affection was not such a commonplace as it might seem to us.

An interesting question is what Thomas Hobbes thought himself about this particular issue. The answer is that, at least in what we understand as his most important political works, he did not think about it much at all. It is true that in Leviathan, Hobbes does mention that there is some kind of ‘natural inclination of the sexes one to another, and to their children’.¹¹⁶ In


¹¹⁴ Hobbes and Mandeville were indeed thought to have the same conception of human nature (something that Mandeville wanted to change), see for example, Thomas Jeffery, Christianity the perfection of all religion, natural and revealed. Wherein some of the principal prophecies relating to the Messiah in the Old ... London, 1728, pp. 80–1. Also: ‘the rank dregs of Hobbes and Mandeville’ were discussed in A collection of poems in four volumes. By several hands. [The fourth edition]. London, 3 vols., 1755, III, p. 294. The link between Hobbes and Mandeville was also established in Lucifer, The doctrine and practice of Christianity, inconsistent with the happiness of mankind, clearly demonstrated in a letter to His Grace the ... London, 1760, p. 60 and Philip Skelton, Deism revealed. Or, the attack on Christianity candidly reviewed in its real merits, as they stand in the celebrated writings of Lord Herbert, ... London, 2 vols., 1751, II, pp. 267–8.

¹¹⁵ In this chapter I concentrate on Hutcheson, Butler and Balguy, but there are other significant authors that discuss this topic, for example Isaac Watts writes about natural affection at length in his The doctrine of the passions explained and improved: or, a brief and comprehensive scheme of the natural affections of mankind, London, 1729, pp. 44–45, a work where he points out that to draw a ‘system’ of passions ‘is not only desirable’, it is ‘part of the science of human nature’, ibid. p. iv.

Elements of law, Hobbes also briefly touches upon ‘natural affection of parents to their children’ by explaining that it is ‘contained’ in the concept of ‘good-will and charity’ and that ‘the Greeks’ explained it to be ‘that affection wherewith men seek to assist those that adhere unto them’. But whatever Hobbes meant by this, it does not play any consequential role in his political or moral philosophy. And, as we have learned from The Fable, it could be explained away in a Hobbist system by claiming that it is just one passion arising from self-love, which may be countered by any stronger passion arising from the same source. However, I do not think that this was Hobbes’s intention and he certainly does not put forward clear and distinct arguments pointing towards this direction. In short, he does not trouble himself refuting natural other-regarding affections simply because he is not concerned with such issues. When deriving duties, rights and obligations from jurisprudential perspective, the question of whether some inclinations or passions are natural is quite negligible.

The long discussion on parental dominion in chapter IX of De Cive does not take into account the natural affection that parents might have for their children. If Hobbes had concerned himself with this matter he would not have written that ‘he who is newly born is in the Mother’s power before any others, insomuch as she may rightly, and at her own wil, either breed him up, or adventure him to fortune’. This does not mean that he necessarily was a Hobbist claiming that mothers do not really feel for their children but only for themselves. Hobbes’s concern lies elsewhere. In De Cive, he is continuously equating a ‘subject’, ‘sonne’ and a ‘servant’. He does not see any difference between their relationships towards the authority in question. To put in other words, because Hobbes wants to draw the symmetry between the subjection of a son to his parent and a subject to a sovereign in order to illustrate the nature of institutional relations, the question of natural affection has no room to play in this project.

Also the treatment of parental dominion in Leviathan solely concerns the question of who has the ‘right of dominion’ and what this sovereignty in its effects means. When Hobbes characterises a family, it does not only include parents and children, but also servants. In fact, sons and servants are once more thought to stand in equal position towards the head of the family. The ‘soveraign power’ is equally distributed over ‘children, and servants’. The idea that parents naturally love their children, or any effect that it might have, simply does not materialise. It does not, of course, mean

119 Hobbes, De Cive, IX.9, see also IX.7.
120 Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 20, p. 141.
that Hobbes would necessarily deny that such an affection might be de facto real, but in his system it has no relevance.

My intention is not to analyse Hobbes’s political theory in any further depth, it is to make the point that when Mandeville, who is often seen as a Hobbist psychological egoist, in Part II he admits that parents have natural affection towards their children, this is something that Hobbes never did (regardless of what was actually Hobbes’s own position). Subsequently, this bears an immediate and momentous consequence for Mandeville’s system. If we are of the speculative kind, we might hypothesize that Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Mandeville (in his later works) were not Hobbists in this respect at all. Hobbes, because this was not an issue for him, and Mandeville because he came to realise that his early Hobbist position was verifiably false.

Whether based on the misconception of Hobbes’s works or not, a Hobbist doctrine was coined by his critics and it started immediately to draw countering arguments. One line of attack took the question of natural affection highly seriously. In 1675, a commentator writes against Hobbes that you must be ‘an atheistical fool’ in order to deny that generally speaking all of God’s creations ‘love another better than ones self’. A simple look at ‘bears, dogs, hens, bees, lions’ and ‘ants’ shows that ‘they die for their young-ones’. The same goes for ‘fathers’, ‘mothers’ and even ‘friends’. Most of these critical assessments were just lashes in the air. It seems that the late seventeenth-century authors were generally agitated about the possibility of a system where everything is reduced to self-love and self-interest.

Another characteristic and somewhat more constructive account comes from a female philosopher towards the end of the century. Anne Conway uses the idea of natural affection to prove a general point about universal benevolence. The foundation of her argument is the undeniable fact proved by experience that ‘even wicked men and women’ love ‘their children’. They do it, because all creatures ‘cherish’ their offspring ‘with a natural affection’. According to Conway, this sentiment is natural and you have to be ‘extremely perverse’ if you are ‘void of parental love’. But Conway goes

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122 We have to also bear in mind that the traditional interpretations of Hobbes are being constantly revisited. For example, due to careful scholarship it has become evident that his idea of state of nature was not carved in stone from the start and there are many ‘hesitations, uncertainties, and alterations’ regarding the state of nature in his ‘different works’. Francois Tricaud, ‘Hobbes’s conception of the state of nature from 1640 to 1651: evolution and ambiguities’, in Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes, G. A. J. Rogers and Alan Ryan, eds., Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 107–123. The dark picture of Hobbes as a psychological egoist has also been recently questioned. See for example Bernard Gert, ‘Hobbes’s psychology’ in The Cambridge companion to Hobbes, Tom Sorell, ed., Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 165–8.


further in her materialist philosophy. The reason that there is natural affection is that ‘children are of the same nature and substance’ as their parents. Therefore parental love is as real as loving one self. And since there is some kind of a resemblance in everything, Conway concludes, there must also remain ‘something of universal love in all creatures, one towards another’ because ‘in regard of their first substance and essence’ everything was ‘all one and the same thing, and as it were parts and members of one body’. In other words, everything in this world is somehow related and thus universal benevolence is something natural and real.\(^{125}\)

Now, if we advance in time to the eighteenth century we start to notice a general rupture also among contract theorists regarding natural affection. For example, Mathew Tindal departs from Hobbes’s parallel between children towards parents and subjects towards sovereigns. He points out that the nature of these two relationships is different. The only ‘relation’ that ‘is call’d a natural relation’ is ‘between parents and children’, ‘because it does not come by compact and agreement, as all others do which men enter into for their own sakes’. What this means is that ‘the duty which children’ owe ‘to their parents’ has a natural foundation and it should not cease when the interest ceases. This family relationship is contrasted with most of the other ‘relations of life’ that are ‘reciprocal dutys’ that ‘oblige’ men ‘no longer’ than ‘they receive’ their ‘suitable return’. In government, for example, ‘the dutys are conditional’. When subjects do not ‘receive’ ‘protection’ from the ‘government’, they no longer have ‘to pay obedience’. However, the ‘gratitude’ that children have for their parents does not end even if the interest ends, because the relationship is not founded on a compact or an agreement. The relationship is natural and it is not designed to serve mutual interests.\(^{126}\)

Francis Hutcheson and natural affection

When examined from a wider perspective, the critique of Hobbism in the 1720s transpires to be unsurprising. For example, Francis Hutcheson’s target, when seen in this earlier context, is altogether familiar. Even if it is true that ‘he could’ not give a ‘lecture from his chair at Glasgow without criticizing Mandeville’, we have to realise that it was not solely Mandeville that was the focus of his criticism.\(^{127}\) Especially in Inquiry, Hutcheson aims

\[\text{\footnotesize \(125\) Conway, The principles of the most ancient and modern philosophy, 1692, pp. 98–99.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize \(126\) Mathew Tindal, Four discourses, London, 1709, p. 122. Also, of course, some Christian authors emphasised the importance of natural affection. See for example, Richard Lucas, Sermons, 2nd ed., 3 vols., London, 1722, I, p. 98.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize \(127\) Hundert, Enlightenment’s Fable, 1994, p. 57. Hutcheson once wrote regarding The Fable that it is ‘unanswerable’. Francis Hutcheson, Reflections upon laughter, and remarks upon the Fable of the bees, Glasgow, 1750, p. 41. For Norton’s interpretation regarding Hutcheson’s morals with regard to Hobbes and Mandeville, see Norton, David Hume. Common-sense moralist, 1982, ch. 2.}\]
at Hobbism in general. As James Moore has well summarised, Hutcheson’s ‘project in his philosophical treatises of the 1720s was to prove that our ideas of beauty and virtue and our kind affections and desires were real ideas, perceived by internal senses whose sensibilia were quite distinct from the dependent and contingent sensations of the external senses’. A main feature of this project was to argue against Hobbism and prove that beyond any doubt men have other-regarding affections. It is notable that when natural affection is considered, Hutcheson’s argument is presented with particular care.

We have, Hutcheson claims, ‘practical dispositions to virtue implanted in our nature’ and thus, a Hobbist system is evidently false. One of Hutcheson’s important arguments concerns the existence of moral vocabulary. If all moral distinctions were artificial, as the Hobbists claim, and there were no real ideas of moral virtue, it would be impossible to have such an extensive moral vocabulary as we do. However, even ‘Lucretius and Hobbes’ themselves, as Hutcheson points out, ‘are full of expressions of admiration, gratitude, praise, desire of doing good; and of censure, disapprobation, aversion to some forms of vice’. They plainly show ‘themselves in innumerable instances struck with some moral species’. This argument is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, the idea of the undeniable existence of moral vocabulary points directly towards Hobbes and Hobbism. Secondly, on several occasions when Hume touches upon this issue, he plainly concurs with Hutcheson, which gives us further reason to reconsider what is his actual position and what are simple concessions towards Hutcheson and other likeminded moral philosophers.

Hutcheson’s list of virtues, that are always approved of and natural, includes ‘natural affection’, ‘gratitude’, ‘pity’ and ‘friendship’. However, of these four, it is ‘natural affection’ that particularly receives a careful analysis.

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128 This is a point that Hundert does not introduce in his Enlightenment’s Fable, 1994.
130 Francis Hutcheson, An inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue, London, 1725, p. 195.
133 Hutcheson, An essay on the nature and conduct of the passions and affections, 1728, p. 310.
In Inquiry, Hutcheson takes up as his task to ‘establish’ a ‘true’ virtue that is ‘some determination of our nature to study the good of others; or some instinct, antecedent to all reason from interest, which influences us to the love of others’. Hutcheson boasts that ‘this disinterested affection may appear strange to men impress’d with notions of self-love as the sole motive of action’. To put it more bluntly, the one who upholds a selfish hypothesis to explain human actions is a mere ‘sophist’. These Hobbists are a collection of confused ‘philosophers’, who do not rely on experience, but only based on some farfetched system, try to deny what even a plain ‘farmer’ undoubtedly feels. Every normal person ‘studies the preservation and happiness of his children’. He indisputably ‘loves them without any design of good to himself’. Any argument claiming that this natural affection is caused by ‘self-love’ is futile. Hutcheson juxtaposes this disinterested love with a hypothetical example of ‘merchants’ whose ‘partnership’ occasions mutual ‘gain’. According to Hutcheson, their partnership is a ‘plain’ example of ‘conjunction of interest’. In no way is the ‘affection’ that ‘parents’ have towards their ‘children’ comparable to it. In a similar vein, it would be absurd to claim that ‘child’s sensations’ could ‘give pleasure or pain to the parent’. As Hutcheson confidently concludes, natural affection is ‘antecedent’ to any ‘conjunction of interest’. Parental love towards children is ‘the cause of’ a possible conjunction of interest – ‘not the effect’ – and it ‘then must be disinterested’.

An argument (resembling what Anne Conway advanced) stating that ‘children are part of our selves, and in loving them we but love our selves in them’ is plain sophistry to Hutcheson. He turns the argument on its head and says that we do love our children as much as we love ourselves, but only because we have ‘natural affection’ that is an instinctive quality and not because we would be ‘conscious of their sensations’. Neither can one argue that ‘the affection of parents’ is ‘founded on merit or acquaintance’. Natural affection is not only ‘antecedent to all acquaintance’ that ‘might occasion the love of esteem’, but, moreover, it ‘operates where acquaintance would produce hatred’. No man would willingly associate with a malicious person, but parental affection points ‘even toward children’ who are ‘apprehended to be vitious’. And, of course, this does not mean that ‘natural inclinations’ could not, ‘in many cases’, be ‘overpower’d by self-love, where any opposition of interests’ takes place. But this is not the point. The point is that natural affection is an original passion – it cannot be reduced to self-love.

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134 Hutcheson, Inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue, 1725, p. 143.
135 Hutcheson, Inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue, 1725, p. 144.
136 Hutcheson, Inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue, 1725, p. 143.
137 Hutcheson, Inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue, 1725, p. 144.
138 Hutcheson, Inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue, 1725, pp. 143-4.
139 Hutcheson, Inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue, 1725, p. 196.
140 Hutcheson, Inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue, 1725, p. 148.
After arming himself with such a battery of arguments for proving the existence of natural affection, Hutcheson turns his scope towards the arch of Hobbism – the first part of The Fable. He easily refutes Mandeville’s derivative of the self-love system, namely that ‘natural affection in parents is weak, till the children begin to give evidences of knowledge and affections’. Hutcheson’s quip is that all that The Fable proves is that ‘moral capacity can be the occasion of increasing love without self-interest’, which was of course contrary to Mandeville’s own intentions. By and large, Hutcheson’s treatment of natural affection is conducted in a way that mocks Mandeville. He wittingly manages to turn his opponent into ridicule and to reconsider his views.

But natural affection is only the sticking point for Hutcheson. Taking his cue from here, he proceeds further. Even when parental affection is the most important example of an original other-regarding affection, Hutcheson wants to extend his analysis also to ‘gratitude’ and ‘some other’, somewhat unspecified, ‘disinterested tie’. According to Hutcheson, ‘there is the same kind of affection’, as ‘in parents towards children’, ‘among collateral relations, tho in a weaker degree’. It is particularly the ‘disinterested’ and ‘strong determination in our nature to gratitude, and love toward our benefactors’ that supposedly proves Hutcheson’s idea of universal benevolence and moral sense right. According to Hutcheson, ‘nothing will give us a juster idea of the wise order in which human nature is form’d for universal love, and mutual good offices, than considering that strong attraction of benevolence, which we call gratitude’. Thus, Hutcheson thinks that he dismantled Hobbism, grounded moral virtue solely on our internal and natural sense of morality and made sure that the author of The Fable will not raise his ugly head ever again. Little did Hutcheson know that an elaborated counterattack was looming in his own backyard.

Joseph Butler, passions and unintended consequences

The most original and versatile eighteenth-century criticism on Hobbism came from Joseph Butler’s pen. Butler’s general argument is consciously

141 Hutcheson, Inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue, 1725, p. 145. This is a direct quote from Fable.
142 Hutcheson, Inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue, 1725, p. 146.
143 Hutcheson, Inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue, 1725, p. 179.
144 Hutcheson, Inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue, 1725, pp. 195–6.
145 Hutcheson, Inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue, 1725, p. 197.
146 A telling example of how generally ‘Butler’s ‘refutation’ of psychological egoism’ is known is Francis Snare’s comment – ‘Butler would be proud’ – after Snare himself had detected some other ‘armchair ploys’. Francis Snare, Morals, motivation and convention, Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 96, 121. For another ‘Humean’ account of the connection between Butler and Hume, John P. Wright, ‘Butler and Hume on habit and moral character’, in Hume and Hume’s connexions, 1995, pp. 105–118. See also Stewart,
directed against ‘persons’ advancing ‘a system which excludes every affection’ that ‘tends to the good of our fellow-creatures’. Butler ironically notes that these men have a ‘pleasant method to solve’ the affections that seem to be of this kind. They ‘tell you’ that ‘it is not another you are at all concerned about, but your self only’. Instead of admitting the existence of a ‘manifest fact’ the Hobbists ‘substitute’ the affection with ‘another, which is reconcileable to their own scheme’. According to Butler, it was particularly ‘Hobbs’ himself who argued, for example, that ‘fear and compassion are the same idea, and a fearful and a compassionate man the same character’.147

The fact that Butler does not name Mandeville or The Fable as the target of his criticism should tell us that his focus was not just on Mandeville alone, but on Hobbism in general.

Butler’s refutation of psychological egoism is constructed of two parts. First, like Hutcheson, the idea is to show that experience proves that there is real other-regarding affection in human nature. Second, unlike Hutcheson, Butler wants to point out that human nature is more complex than philosophers have previously presumed. The question is not whether it is self-love or benevolence that explains our actions. Similarly, we have a number of different passions that cannot be reduced to either one of these sources.

As many others do, Butler takes the seemingly obvious fact that parents disinterestedly love their children as the point of his departure. ‘Affection of parents to their children’, Butler writes, is the prime example of a ‘natural’ other-regarding passion.148 This ‘natural affection’ manifestly ‘leads’ parents ‘to take care of, to educate’ and ‘to make due provision for’ their children.149 Butler’s argument of natural affection is particularly directed against Hobbes himself. It seems that Butler took Hobbes as a person who attempts to reduce natural affection to the desire of power. The passage from which Butler constructs this idea, and which he directly quotes, is the only section in the Elements (or the 1650s abridgement, ‘Human nature’, that Butler used) where Hobbes discusses natural affection. Hobbes writes that ‘there can be no greater argument to a man, of his own power, than to find himself able not only to accomplish his own desires, but also to assist men in theirs’.150 Butler’s contention is that it is ridiculous to claim that the appearance of ‘good-will’ or ‘good-nature’ could always be reduced to ‘desire of power’.151 I do not think that this was necessarily what Hobbes

147 Butler, Fifteen sermons, 1729, p. 80.
148 Butler, Fifteen sermons, 1729, p. 33.
151 Butler, Fifteen sermons, 1729, p. 7. For another direct reference to Hobbes’s ‘Human nature’, see Sermons, p. 83. It should be noted that these quotes are the only direct critical quotes in the Sermons.
wanted to claim. However, Butler's argument functions as a refutation of Hobbism in general. If there be any such thing as the paternal or filial affections, Butler insists, 'if there be any affection in human nature' in which 'the object and end' is 'the good of another' then 'this is itself benevolence, or the love of another'. Thus, to show that natural affection exists is to show that benevolence is something real and natural. 'Be it ever so short, be it in even so low a degree, or ever so unhappily confined', to Butler it 'proves' the 'assertion' that we have a 'natural principle of benevolence'.

After establishing that men have natural affection towards their children and generalising that this undoubtedly proves that men have natural other-regarding affections, Butler notes that we have efficiently proved that self-love and benevolence are both natural passions – or as he calls them – two sides of an individual. Butler's analysis of self-love and benevolence is written in a smooth style that gives the impression that the entire fuss around the issue has been futile. He sees no problem in reconciling self-love and benevolence. Men have two different natures: one obliging him to take care of himself and another 'having respect to society, and tending to promote public good, the happiness of society'. According to Butler, 'these ends do indeed perfectly coincide'. They 'are different', but 'we can scarce promote one without the other'.

From here Butler advances to the original part of his analysis. In order to refute Hobbes and others who stressed the prevalence of self-love, it is not sufficient to prove that there evidently is a thing called benevolence. Additionally, we need to show that our inward frame is constituted of many other passions and affections that cannot be reduced to self-love nor benevolence.

In fact, there is no reason for Butler to try and refute that 'every man hath a general desire of his own happiness' that 'proceeds from, or is self-love'. However, what is crucial for Butler's argument is that self-love has to be understood in connection with reason. Self-love, Butler claims, is directly linked to those 'sensible creatures' that have the ability to 'reflect upon themselves'. This is also why Butler keeps talking about 'cool principle of self-love'. The object of self-love 'is somewhat internal',

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152 For an account that treats this particular textual clause from the point of view of what Hobbes might have actually been saying with the conclusion that 'Butler's criticism is ill-founded', see Tom Sorell, Hobbes, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986, pp. 97–8.
153 Butler, Fifteen sermons, 1729, pp. 8–9, 6.
154 Butler, Fifteen sermons, 1729, p. 5. See also p. 9.
155 Butler, Fifteen sermons, 1729, p. 9.
157 Butler, Fifteen sermons, 1729, p. 203.
158 Butler, Fifteen sermons, 1729, p. 204.
159 Butler, Fifteen sermons, 1729, p. 206.
namely ‘our own happiness, enjoyment, satisfaction’, but additionally what is required is the faculty of reason to chose the means to satisfy this general desire. By making this point Butler is bringing a staunch contrast to the surface. In addition to self-love, there ‘likewise’ exists ‘a variety of particular affections, passions, and appetites’ that solely tend ‘to particular external objects’. These ‘affections’ are ‘distinct from reason’ and the ‘pleasure arising from them’. They are passions that seek their object without reflection. Indeed, at times they might serve our general interest, but the point is that this is not their end. The principle we call self-love never seeks anything external for the sake of the thing, but only as a means of happiness or good’, while ‘particular affections rest in the external things themselves’. They both are an equally important ‘part of humane nature’ and we cannot possibly claim that all our passions center in self-love, even when we were able to explain away benevolence and natural affection.

Butler constructs his own version of the argument emphasising the usage of common language. If it was true that ‘no creature whatever can possibly act but merely from self-love’, this would also mean that ‘we should want words to express the difference, between the principle of an action, proceeding from cool consideration that it will be to my own advantage’ and ‘an action’ proceeding from some passion seeking the external thing itself. However, ‘this is not the language of mankind’. There is a clear difference in the way we discuss cool self-interest and, for example, ‘revenge’ or ‘friendship’, where ‘a man runs’ even ‘upon certain ruin, to do evil or good to another’ without further reflection on his own interest.

Thus, ‘it is manifest’ that ‘the principles of these actions are totally different’. Indeed, it is true that both of them ‘are done to gratify an inclination in man’s self’. However, ‘there is’ a ‘distinction between the cool principle of self-love, or general desire of our own happiness’ and ‘the particular affections toward particular external objects, as another part of our nature, and another principle of action’. Consequently, everything cannot possibly be ‘allowed to self-love’ or that it would ‘be the whole of our inward constitution’ since ‘there are other parts or principles which come into it’. These ‘particular affections’ that ‘tend towards particular external things’ function independently of the question ‘whether’ their object is ‘our interest or happiness’. Therefore, we make a distinction between ‘an interested action’ and ‘an action’ that ‘has its denomination of passionate, ambitious, friendly, revengeful, or any other, from the particular
appetite or affection from which it proceeds'. In short, Butler claims to have ‘stated and shewn’ that ‘self-love’ is ‘one part of humane nature’ and ‘the several particular principles’ (in ‘themselves, their objects and ends’) are ‘the other part’.\(^{166}\)

What is interesting about Butler’s distinction between the passions that are inclined towards external objects and the self-love that aims to private advantage, is that even when Butler’s intention is to make a strong case against Hobbism, he is also criticising the Hutchesonian idea that public virtues are solely founded on benevolence. Human nature is constituted of passions, tending to private good, that cannot be reduced to ‘self-love’, but there are affections and passions that promote ‘public good’ even when they are different from ‘benevolence’.\(^{167}\) In short, ‘men have various other passions, and particular affections, quite distinct both from self-love, and from benevolence’.\(^{168}\)

This paves the way to the question about the unintentional effects of passions. Butler is very sensible of the fact that men often act in order to gratify a certain passion, but unintentionally benefit the public and ‘no body will call the principle of this action self-love’. Butler’s prime example is the ‘desire of esteem’.\(^{169}\) The desire of esteem is a ‘publick passion’ that is ‘given to us in order to regulate our behaviour towards society’ and it cannot be reduced to ‘self-love’. The reason why Butler calls it a ‘public passion’ is because he thinks that it cannot ‘be gratified without contributing to the good of society’. When men act ‘merely from regard’ of ‘reputation, without any consideration of the good of others’, they commonly ‘contribute to public good’. As indicated by Butler, in this case men are ‘plainly instruments’ in the hands of ‘providence, to carry on ends, the preservation of the individual and good of society, which they themselves have not in their view or intention’.\(^{170}\)

Another passion closely linked to ‘desire of esteem’ that cannot be reduced to self-love is the ‘natural passion emulation’. According to Butler, ‘emulation is merely the desire or hope of equality with or superiority over others, with whom we compare our selves’.\(^{171}\) Just like in the case of desire of esteem, desire of superiority often turns out to be a passion that has a positive public effect. ‘If that peculiar regard to ourselves’, Butler writes, ‘leads us to examine our own character with this greater severity, in order really to improve and grow better, it is the most commendable turn of mind possible, and can scarce be to excess’.\(^{172}\)

\(^{166}\) Butler, Fifteen sermons, 1729, p. 207.
\(^{167}\) Butler, Fifteen sermons, 1729, p. 13.
\(^{168}\) Butler, Fifteen sermons, 1729, pp. 12–13.
\(^{169}\) Butler, Fifteen sermons, 1729, p. 11.
\(^{170}\) Butler, Fifteen sermons, 1729, p. 12.
\(^{172}\) Butler, Fifteen sermons, 1729, p. 187.
In Butler’s argument of human nature, sociability and civil society prove to be a stronger case against Hobbism than Hutcheson was able to provide. Butler establishes benevolence as a natural passion, but avoids the pitfall of making a naïve case about man’s naturally virtuous nature. Instead, he refutes Hobbism on its own ground by proving that a theory based on the prevalence of self-love is too simple and cannot possibly give an accurate analysis of the world.

The most original part of this refutation is that with the examples of desire for esteem and emulation Butler is able to prove that our idea of the self is completely dependent upon the opinion of others. Therefore, it truly turns out to be a ‘speculative absurdity’ to consider ‘ourselves as single and independent, as having nothing in our nature which has respect to our fellow-creatures, reduced to action and practice’.\textsuperscript{173} If the Hobbist argument is that man naturally avoids pain and desires pleasure, experience proves contrary to it. As for Butler, ‘mankind is so closely united’ that ‘there is such a correspondence between the inward sensations of one man and those of another, that disgrace is as much avoided as bodily pain, and to be the object of esteem and love as much desired as any external goods’.\textsuperscript{174} I would call this constructive criticism. Butler’s account was designed to counter Hobbism – not to build a Newtonian system of human nature. The unintended effect it had on Mandeville was that it provided a path to evolve from a straightforward Hobbism into a system that cannot be reduced to psychological egoism.

John Balguy, reason and brutes

An interesting reaction against Hobbism – as well as Hutcheson – comes from John Balguy, a year before the publication of Part II when Mandeville must have been already working on it.\textsuperscript{175} In modern philosophy, Balguy is usually considered a “rationalist” alongside Samuel Clarke and others. They stand at the receiving end when Mandeville and Hume argue that reason ought to be the slave of the passions and morality does not have its foundation on reason. I believe that this is a rather accurate description of the relationship between Balguy’s thinking and that of Hume and Mandeville’s. When Balguy is considered in his immediate intellectual context, this broadens our understanding of some aspects of Mandeville and Hume’s moral philosophy, which does not only counter Balguy’s rationalist position, but also uses some of its components to bolster its own case.

In his Foundation of moral goodness, Balguy considers the familiar 1720s criticism of Hobbism. ‘Without countering experience’, he concedes, one

\textsuperscript{173} Butler, Fifteen sermons, 1729, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{174} Butler, Fifteen sermons, 1729, pp. 16–17.
\textsuperscript{175} John Balguy, The foundation of moral goodness: or a further inquiry into the original of our idea of virtue, London, 1728.
cannot deny that ‘in our minds’ there are ‘benevolent affections towards others’. Balguy recognises that a common trend in moral philosophy is to call these benevolent sentiments ‘natural affection’, which is, not only undeniable through experience, but an ‘instinct’ in human nature. Balguy thinks that it is particularly Francis Hutcheson who claims that this ‘natural affection’ is the ‘true ground and foundation’ of virtue.\(^{176}\) However, Balguy expresses his doubts whether Hutcheson is right when claiming that this ‘affection’ and ‘moral sense’ are the ‘only two pillars on which moral goodness rests’. Indeed, ‘virtue should’ not ‘be looked upon as wholly artificial’\(^{177}\), but as Balguy has it, Hutcheson’s idea of virtues ‘depending entirely upon Instincts’ is equally wrong.\(^{178}\)

Balguy’s reaction is interesting for different reasons. It confirms the contemporary trend in moral philosophy. The so-called instinctive virtue under investigation is first and foremost ‘natural affection’ that is commonly understood as being directed towards the ‘offspring’.\(^{179}\) Alongside natural affection other virtues that Balguy describes as natural (in the strict sense of the word) are ‘gratitude’ and ‘relief of a person in distress’.\(^{180}\) Balguy admits that we have instincts in our nature that turn us towards these virtues. However, he is genuinely worried about Hutcheson’s idea of grounding all virtue on natural affection and moral sense. The problem with Hutcheson’s philosophical position, in Balguy’s understanding, is that it undermines morality. We have to make a clear distinction between natural and moral good. If all morality is founded on human nature and instincts, it would mean that all ‘acts of kindness are unchosen and unavoidable’, thus ‘they are no kindness at all’ nor could we ‘infer’ any ‘obligation’ from them.\(^{181}\)

Balguy’s own philosophical position is evident. We have to look at virtue as ‘rational’ – and not as purely ‘instinctive’.\(^{182}\) What this means is that ‘there is something in actions, absolutely good’, which is ‘antecedent’ to both ‘affections’ as well as ‘laws’. In this common Voluntarist perspective, this ‘moral goodness’ is, of course, God’s will, and the pivotal point about the role of reason is that we may rationally grasp it – even if we did not have any natural inclinations or laws that binded us to certain type of actions. It is only God’s orders that give us a moral obligation. ‘Deriving virtue merely from natural affection’, Balguy writes, ‘implies it to be of an arbitrary and

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\(^{176}\) Balguy, The foundation of moral goodness, 1728, p. 7. About ‘natural instinct’ and our aptness ‘to restrain natural affection to our kindred’ see also John Balguy, The duty of benevolence and brotherly love and the ill effects of a party spirit, London, 1727, pp. 1–2.

\(^{177}\) Balguy, The foundation of moral goodness, 1728, p. 8.

\(^{178}\) Balguy, The foundation of moral goodness, 1728, p. 9.

\(^{179}\) Balguy, The foundation of moral goodness, 1728, p. 18.

\(^{180}\) Balguy, The foundation of moral goodness, 1728, p. 12. This should be kept in mind when examining natural virtues in the Treatise.

\(^{181}\) Balguy, The foundation of moral goodness, 1728, p. 10.

changeable nature’ and moreover ‘our judging and approving it by a moral sense implies the same’.  

Thus, Balguy’s conclusion is that (even in the strongest possible case) we may only claim that a ‘benevolent instinct’ supports morality, but it does not mean that without it we would be ‘altogether incapable of virtue’. The point is that our instincts assist and push us towards certain type of virtuous behavior (in some cases more than in others), but nevertheless, even without these instincts the virtues would exist, although they might be more rare to come across.

I have revisited Balguy’s own rationalist position so that we may see how the discussion about natural affections and instincts evolves. The rationalists and moral sense philosophers sit around the very same table and participate in a dialogue. It is not surprising that this also has an immediate bearing on the naturalistic moral accounts. What is particularly noteworthy in Balguy’s case is his idea to consider natural affection and moral sense among brutes. The arguments derived from this analysis are above all meant to highlight the difference between natural and moral good.

The question that Balguy asks is Baylean in nature. Are ‘brutes’ capable of virtue? In nature it is apparent that all kinds of animals ‘shew affection to their respective kinds, and a strong degree of love and tenderness towards their offspring’. If they have natural affection, how can we say that this is moral virtue? According to Balguy, we cannot do this without seriously undermining morality. Thus, if we argue, like Hutcheson does, that virtue is solely depended upon instincts and natural affection, we run into a situation where we would have to admit that even brutes are virtuous. Evidently they are also capable of ‘kind affections, and suitable actions’. But what Balguy claims is that these brutes might have ideas about ‘natural good’, but ‘none of moral’.

To prove his point, Balguy develops a moral calculus based on natural affections (clearly motivated by Samuel Clarke and the idea of perfect and imperfect duties in the natural law tradition). The further a person is removed from us, the more moral value our kind action towards him has. Thus, ‘an act of kindness done to a child, or a friend, is certainly less’ virtuous ‘than doing the same to a stranger’. Why? Because ‘to be determined to the doing of good action, merely by the reason and right of the thing, is genuine goodness’. Moreover, the calculus also works in the opposite direction – ‘the stronger the instinct, the more vicious is the violation of it’. Thus, to lack natural affection is not only morally wrong it is also unnatural.

\[183\] Balguy, The foundation of moral goodness, 1728, p. 25.
\[184\] Balguy, The foundation of moral goodness, 1728, p. 12.
\[186\] Balguy, The foundation of moral goodness, 1728, p. 15.
\[187\] Balguy, The foundation of moral goodness, 1728, p. 16.
\[188\] Balguy, The foundation of moral goodness, 1728, p. 17.
In the case of natural affections, as well as in the case of moral sense, Balguy picks up the topic of brutes and assumes that they are also in some measure capable of this supposed moral sense. 'If the reasons and relations of things are out of the question, and this moral sense means no more than a natural determination to receive agreeable or disagreeable ideas of certain actions; I think it will be very difficult to prove brutes incapable of such a sense'. From Mandeville and Hume's perspective Balguy is right. All they have to do is turn this into a positive principle by accepting it. The irony is of course that Balguy is using this argument about brutes as a proof that Hutcheson's argument is inadequate because brutes cannot be virtuous. What happens is, that this is precisely what Mandeville and Hume go on to use as the argument that enables them to hold on to Mandeville's initial claim that the virtues that uphold civil society are artificial and yet they do not have to reduce all human action to self-love and self-preservation. By turning Balguy's argument on its head Mandeville and Hume are able to admit that there are natural other-regarding affections in human nature. Nevertheless, our moral sentiments depend on artificial conventions.

Interestingly, Balguy attempts to elaborate his case by considering different kinds of societies. He picks up a comparison between a clan-based society, where the patriot leader is led by his natural affections to govern the society on a deserted island and another kind of society, where there are 'no equal attachment of nature', but still the 'equal number of people'. If the 'legislator' manages to rule this society with 'equal care, prudence, gentleness, and moderation' as the chief in the family society, as maintained by Balguy, it is evident that this second ruler would deserve more merit for his virtue. Balguy goes on to point out that in the first case, 'a great share of the merit would be placed to the account of Natural affection, commonly so called. In the latter, expecting the weaker attachment of common humanity, we discover nothing but pure virtue, and a sense of honour and duty'. Mandeville's and Hume's argument against these speculations would be of course that societies are never formed in the way that Balguy describes in his second example. However, Balguy's criticism of Hutcheson's idea of moral sense comes surprisingly close to the position adopted later by Mandeville and Hume.

Pierre Nicole's Essays: the outlines of amour-propre

Pierre Nicole's essays were mainly composed in the 1670s. The first translated volume was published in England already in 1680. John Locke compiled his own translations of three of Nicole's essays between 1675 and 1678. By the turn of the century Nicole's essays were widely known in Britain. However, it was not before 1724 that they were published together

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in a same edition. The publisher of the 1724 edition was Edmund Parker. Incidentally, Parker was also the publisher of the second edition of The Fable of the Bees in 1723. I am not arguing that there is a necessary connection between Bernard Mandeville and Edmund Parker publishing Nicole’s essays. However, it is only in Mandeville’s later works that Nicole’s direct influence is apparent (even when Mandeville’s rigid idea of virtue in the original Fable is clearly influenced by Jansenist thinking). My general point about Nicole is that it is his analysis of amour-propre and civil society that makes a clear impact on the intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville. This is the reason why I break the natural chronology of treating Nicole as a seventeenth-century author before the first Fable and place my analysis of Nicole’s essays between Mandeville’s Hobbism and his later writings.

Pierre Nicole’s essays can be read in different ways. We may read them with a view on a normative doctrine, which spells out in terms of basic Christian principles of toleration, charity and respect. We could even consider Nicole’s view of Christian politeness. However, Nicole’s essays also include a perceptive, naturalistic analysis of civil society based on basic principles of human nature. The descriptive account may be seen as independent from the normative side of Nicole’s essays. In this study Nicole’s essays are interpreted as a blueprint towards the development of moral and political philosophy in the works of Bernard Mandeville and David Hume. It will solely concentrate on this descriptive side of Nicole.

The concept of concupiscence plays a crucial role in the Augustinian moral tradition to which Pierre Nicole belongs. For Pierre Nicole it is a general term referring to the position of the fallen man that has left him in direct contrast with God. Nicole’s argument is geometrical in design. He claims that a man is either motivated by God or this worldly ‘inclination’ that, in short, is a ‘general propensity of our corrupt nature’. Nicole is not attempting to pin down the actual concept in all its implications, but points out that all the ‘sentiments of concupiscence’ are ‘contrary to the law of God and his eternal justice’. This, however, does not imply that the

191 I find Moriarty, Fallen nature, fallen selves, 2006 as the most useful account of Augustinian background for eighteenth-century French thinking. About Pierre Nicole, including his Augustinian background, see above all, E. D. James, Pierre Nicole, Jansenist and Humanist A study of his thought, Martinus Nijhoff, 1981.

192 Pierre Nicole, Moral essays, contain’d in several treatises on many important duties, vol. 3, London, 1680, p. 4. I have compared all the quotes that I use with the original French text. If I have seen it necessary to modify the translation, I give the original French text in the footnote. Otherwise, I only indicate the pages in the French edition that I have used. However, for clarity’s sake I have substituted most of the references to ‘self-love’ used in the translation with ‘amour-propre’, if there is no indication that Nicole in that particular point is clearly pointing at the ‘self-love’ side of amour-propre. Pierre Nicole, Essais de morale [D oument électronique]: contenus en divers traittez sur plusieurs devoirs importans, (Reprod. de l’édition de, Paris: G. Desprez, 1701), 1997, III, pp. 4–5.

outward actions motivated through these sentiments would necessarily be in conflict with God’s will.

It is important to notice that concupiscence is characterised as an inclination. We are either drawn towards God or pulled away from him. Nicole explains this dichotomy by writing that in ‘the bottom of the heart’ we can find two separate, conflicting principles, the love of ‘God’ and the love of ‘creature’. The matter is epistemologically simple. Either our actions are motivated by the love of God or concupiscence. Only a few live in God’s grace and sincerely love God. This is possible only if God’s will, placed in the heart, touches the person in a certain way, which in other words means that he has been given efficient grace. Such person treats other people with charity. Perhaps the easiest way to understand the role of grace is to say that the ones who act through grace have God’s will as their motivating principle. Their love of God “spills over” towards other people as charity. The rest are sinners. They have God’s light in their heart, but it does not sensibly motivate them.

The idea that the soul needs to be sensibly touched by God is important for Nicole. It is, he thinks, perfectly logical to state that God’s justice is implanted in every human heart, but only a select few are effectively moved by it. The idea of being touched is important also in other respects. For example, Nicole does not have to revert to an unconvincing argument that God’s light or justice would be dim or weak in some people and stronger in others. God is the truth and there cannot be any variations of it. This also explains how most people are motivated by another principle. Only from the ‘insensibility towards’ God ‘springs’ our ‘sensible and lively esteem for creatures’. The human soul simply ‘cannot be without some inclination, and must always fix her self on some object’. Thus, if it is not God and our love for him that moves us, it must be something else, which in Nicole’s vocabulary is termed as concupiscence.

This dichotomy is the root of Nicole’s rigorous Jansenist conception of sin. However, by constructing his theory in this way, Nicole leaves a third option open. A sinner can become a good Christian by trying to reform the wicked state of his soul and desiring to live according to God’s law. Since God’s light is implanted in the soul, even when it does not sensibly motivate us, everyone is able to know God’s eternal law and will. In fact, not even the worst of human beings are able to escape the ‘penetrating rays of his justice’. Thus, everyone who truly desires (and is capable of using his faculty of reason) is able to learn ‘the law’, ‘the will’ and ‘the order of God’. However, for these sinners God’s justice is not an intrinsic, motivating principle for the soul and it never will be if God does not...

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194 Nicole, Moral essays, III, p. 118.
change their inner constitution. These men have to strive for the truth by trying to conquer the contrasting inclination, concupiscence, which is a naturally the motivating principle of the heart. The main point of Nicole's normative doctrine is the idea that it is possible for men to consciously carry out good acts (those that God wills us to do and that are in accordance with his law and order) and lead the life of a good Christian, even when they do not have efficient grace and God's will does not efficiently move them.  

My interest in Nicole does not lie in his normative doctrine, but in the naturalistic description of the world and human nature. On most occasions Nicole uses concupiscence as a rather vague, general term referring to an overall inclination to drift away from God. Amour-propre, on the other hand, when directly linked to this propensity, is a faculty that is more precisely pinned down. In fact, Nicole's significance as a moral philosopher should perhaps be evaluated as an attempt to analyse this difficult concept and form a logical system of its implications.

It has perhaps always been a somewhat empty truism that man is a more or less selfish creature who does not care too much about anything but himself. Even the theorists that consider selfishness as man's first principle and revert to psychological egoism are often rather vague about what they actually mean. It is precisely the fact that this highly relevant feature of human nature had become an empty truism that Pierre Nicole had set out to challenge. The aim of his moral essays is to render amour-propre under a painstaking analysis that would help us 'to form' a 'true idea of it'. He emphasises that a reference to the fact that a man loves himself 'is not sufficient to make us know its nature' because 'we may love our selves divers ways'.

For Nicole amour-propre is the first principle. The idea of concupiscence might remark the fact that our souls are inclined towards creatures, but we are not really drawn to all the creatures. Nicole's way of further unravelling this inclination is with a necessary reference to amour-propre. A man is in love with himself instead of God. When describing our fallen state, Nicole remarks that 'we bring into the world with us a will totally taken up with the love of itself, and incapable of loving any thing but with relation to our selves'. A man does 'not only love himself'. He 'loves himself without limits, and without measure; loves only himself, and refers all to himself'. He simply cannot even desire anything that does not stand in a certain 'relation to himself'. It is evident that without efficient grace there is no

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198 About God, grace and concupiscence, see especially James, Pierre Nicole, Jansenist and Humanist A study of his thought, 1981.
199 For example, Bernard Mandeville in his first part of Fable, when he has not yet formed a coherent theory of human nature is vague in his attempt to render everything to selfishness.
posibility for a universal benevolence, but how does Nicole’s account differ from the Hobbists who also claim that a man is an utterly selfish creature, naturally incapable of other-regarding affection?

Some commentators think that it does not differ at all. Pierre Force has emblematically argued that ‘Nicole agrees entirely with Hobbes on the description of human nature’.203 I agree that there are passages in Nicole’s essays that might give the impression that his understanding of human nature is in accordance with what has often been taken as Hobbes’s view. Nicole argues that we have ‘a secret inclination to seek all things’ for ourselves. A man, Nicole writes, has a natural propensity to ‘make himself the center of all’. This principle is also characterised as ‘a natural tyranny’.204 This ‘tyrannical disposition’ to centre everything to us is irresistibly ‘stamped in the bottom of’ our ‘hearts’. It ‘renders’ us ‘violent, unjust, cruel, ambitious, flatterers, envious, insolent and quarrellous’. As Nicole dramatically rounds off his argument – it is truly ‘a monster’ that ‘we harbour in our bosoms’.205

It might well be a monster, but it is not a Hobbist monster. In a Hobbist system the reason why self-love enganges men to hurt others is a battle for survival. We may debate whether this was Thomas Hobbes’s own first principle, but we have to accept this when we talk about Hobbism. In this theory, self-preservation is the beginning as well as the end. Nicole agrees that all our wrongdoings are caused by amour-propre. It certainly ‘includes the seeds of all the crimes, and of all the misdemeanors of men, from the smallest, even to the most detestable ones’.206 ‘The love of our selves’, Nicole underscores, is the ‘fountain of all our maladies’ and it ‘gives us a violent inclination for pleasures, for promotion, for all that doth nourish our curiosity’ and it ‘disposes us to procure’ our ‘desires by all sorts of means how unjust and how criminal soever they may be’. But Nicole’s conception of amour-propre is different from that maintained by Hobbism. First of all, Nicole’s idea of what makes us revert to unjust means is not a struggle to preserve ourselves no matter what. The only reason why our worldly inclinations are so violent is that by centring everything around us, we are desperately trying ‘to full up’ that ‘terrible vacuity which the loss of our true happiness hath caused in our hearts’.207

This wretched state of the soul is the characteristic feature of a fallen man. A man cannot ‘bear the interior reproach’ of his ‘disorder’.208 He does not become aware of his disorder by a conscious process, but has felt it ever since the day he was born and thus ‘inclines continually to fly from himself’. It is because of this desperate misery of not being touched by God that we

203 Force, Self-interest before Adam Smith, 2003, p. 77.
207 Nicole, Moral essays, III, p. 64. Nicole, Essais de morale, III, p. 76.
revert to means that are unjust and criminal. ‘A man without grace’ is such ‘a great punishment to himself’ that he ‘looks’ even ‘upon himself in some sort as his own great enemy’.\footnote{209} We are unconsciously trying to put ourselves in God’s place. Inevitably Nicole thinks that this is an uphill battle. The urge to succeed is so violent that without outward restrictions we might turn to any means necessary. Simultaneously, our miserable life is uncontrollably swayed by ‘violent passions’ that ‘spring from an unknown root’ and ‘proceed from a hidden abyss’.\footnote{210} Nicole does not understand the prevalence of amour-propre as simple self-preservation. He is constructing his theory from a different perspective. Meanwhile, he has no problem in using and modifying Hobbes’s ideas.

When we understand the foundation of Nicole’s point of view, another vital aspect of amour-propre becomes comprehensible. The inherent need to centre everything around ourselves is not called a tyrannical propensity for nothing. The simplest and most primitive way of trying to fill up the emptiness of our soul is to ‘dominate over’ the ‘fellow-travellers in the same unfortunate road’.\footnote{211} A fallen man is never fully cured of this instinctive quality and all men ‘inevitably’ have an inclination ‘of domineering and lording over’ other ‘men’.\footnote{212} This desire manifests itself in all the possible aspects of life. It does not only concern material and physical premises. A particularly strong feature of human nature is a ‘desire of domineering over the minds of others’.\footnote{213} Once a man has obtained some opinion, he is ‘naturally wedded to’ it, not necessarily because it is a token of good judgment in particular, but because he is ‘never free from a desire of lording it over others by all ways possible’.\footnote{214}

It is clear that the simplest and most inevitable function of amour-propre is to covet ‘sovereignty’. Once we are ‘regarded and looked upon by others as great and powerful’ and ‘we stir up in the hearts of others motions of respect and submission’, this grossly supports our secret design to put our own image in the place of God’s.\footnote{215} This is the self-love part of amour-propre that is derived directly from Hobbes’s account and which is couched to material goods and self-preservation. Like Hobbes, Nicole claims that in a society where there is no government, ‘every one would be master, and tyrannize over others’. In this state it would be ‘a necessity’ that ‘the stronger become lords, whilst the weak remain subject’.\footnote{216} Pierre Force is correct when he writes that Nicole agrees with Hobbes about the origin of government.\footnote{217} Indeed, in his key essay, ‘Charity and amour-propre’, Nicole

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follows Hobbes’s description of the origin of the government to the letter. But I think that in order to understand Nicole’s argument we have to see what he is doing when he agrees with Hobbes. Nicole’s idea is to redefine the Hobbist conception of amour-propre. In this particular essay he retains parts of Hobbes’s argument while his concrete point is to criticise the actual theory.

If the idea is to ‘represent’ the ‘disposition of the hearts of men’ towards ‘one another’ in the hypothetical state of nature, we may plausibly state that it is, of course, a ‘condition of war’ and ‘each man is naturally an enemy to all other men’.

Nicole carries on in this Hobbist vein. The only way that the ‘multitude of people’, who ‘only endeavour the ruin of one another’, can be rendered into ‘societies, commonwealths, and kingdoms’ is when amour-propre ‘which is the cause of this war’ changes its ways and eventually guides people how to ‘live in peace’. A man ‘loves domination’. He ‘loves to enslave all the world to it’, but he ‘loves yet more life and convenientness, and an easie life more than domination; and sees clearly that others are no ways disposed to suffer themselves to be domineered over’. Once men realise the ‘impossibility of succeeding by force’ in their tyrannical designs, they are obliged ‘to submit ones self to the care of his own preservation’ by uniting with other men. To strengthen this union, laws are made, and punishments ordered for those who violate them. Thus by means of tortures, and gibbets set up in publick, the thoughts and tyrannical designs of every particular mans self-love are withheld’. It is indeed true, Nicole thinks, that ‘fear of death is then the first tye of civil society, and the first check of self-love’.

Consequently, after a government and laws have been enforced, the way that the self-love side of amour-propre and our bid for power operate change. Since ‘open violence’ is ‘excluded’ from men’s options, they ‘seek other ways’ to win the worldly contest. They ‘substitute craft for force’. When men can no longer keep on ‘tyrannizing over’ others, they have no other option but ‘to content the self-love of those whom they’ need. There could not be a clearer expression of the Hobbist idea of how justice and self-interested commerce come into the world. The idea is still to overpower everyone else and beat others in the competition of gathering supplies needed for self-preservation, which is the most obvious way a man can reinforce the idea that everything centres around him. It is not, Nicole reminds his audience, that ‘this tyrannical inclination which makes us have a desire to rule and govern by force over others’ would be lost after a government and laws have been installed. It is still ‘lively in the hearts of

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221 Nicole, Moral essays, III, p. 127. I have retained the use of self-love in this particular quote, because Nicole is clearly pointing to this side of amour-propre instead of talking about the broader concept in general. Nicole, Essais de morale, III, p. 152.
men’. In his darker moments Nicole even hints that men are ‘forced to 
dissemble it, until they are strengthened by gaining others by sweet ways, to 
have afterwards the means to bring them to their bent by force’. Thus, 
the only thing that has actually changed concerning the self-love side of 
amour-propre is that the means are different and now we have laws and justice 
that restrict how men play their little game. The greatest restraint in men is 
obviously the fear of ‘the punishment, which the laws threaten to those 
who have recourse to violent ways’. Consequently, since men are ‘forced’ 
to ‘obey the laws’, they at least momentarily ‘forget these vast thoughts of 
domination’ because it is ‘so impossible’ for ‘them to prosper therein’.

Self-interest and commerce replace the physical struggle concerning the 
self-love side of amour-propre in a political society. Pierre Nicole is very 
specific in his description of this interested commerce. He uses such terms 
goods’, ‘merchandises’, ‘traffick’, ‘trade’, and ‘commerce’ in the same 
paragraph to describe it. According to Nicole, even the exchange of 
civilities can be seen as part of this interested commerce, if the idea is that 
for ‘vain complacencies we obtain effective commodities’. It is indeed ‘by 
the means and help of this commerce, all necessaries for this life are in 
some sort supplied for’. I suppose that this kind of thinking has 
motivated modern scholars to study the concepts of amour-propre, self-love 
and self-interest in the early modern period. However, what I find 
interesting is that this self-love side of amour-propre is for Nicole something 
that has to be accounted for before getting to the actual point that he is 
making.

Self-love and pride

As we have seen, up to this point everything seems to be in complete 
agreement with a common perception of a Hobbist account of the origin of 
civil society. But all of a sudden a rapid change takes place in Nicole’s 
argument. After saying all that he says about laws, justice, self-love and 
interested commerce, Nicole is quick to point out there are ‘many people’, 
whose ‘inclination of making themselves be beloved is stronger than that of 
domineering and lording over men’. Thus, we have not said enough about 
amour-propre. It is only now that Nicole starts to develop an original part of 
the analysis. The previous observation is the key to Nicole’s moral 
philosophy. Nicole’s argument is that amour-propre has two different sides, 
the self-love side, which in the Hobbist theory is more or less accounted 
for, and another side, which has been forgotten. This theoretical distinction

is once more geometrical in design. The self-love side of amour-propre makes us want ‘to be rich and powerful’, but this inclination is often overshadowed by another side of amour-propre, which takes into consideration the ‘judgements’ of others and makes us avoid their ‘hatred and aversion’. Like self-love, this is a universal propensity and there is not a human being that would ‘not desire to be loved’ and take ‘great pleasure’ when others are ‘turned towards them’ and look favourably upon them.

When examined from this perspective, it seems clear that Nicole’s attitude towards Hobbism and the self-love side of amour-propre is in fact uninspired. Nicole freely borrows the idea of the origin of government from Hobbes. He runs fast through it, without giving it too much thought, in order to get to his actual point. Nicole is generally fascinated by the idea that we are often completely unaware whether our motives are sincere or not. However, in the case of the self-love side of amour-propre we often ‘easily’ distinguish ‘what we do, either through human fear or through gross interest’. In other words, there is no real intellectual challenge here for Nicole. The matter is completely ‘different regarding the subtlety of the love and esteem for men’.

This distinction between the two different sides of amour-propre leads Nicole into a theoretical conclusion about civil society. Because of this division in amour-propre, Nicole maintains that there are three attributes that ultimately render the existence of civil society possible. Two of these seem to be directly borrowed from Hobbes. First, amour-propre hinders us ‘through fear of chastisement’ and death ‘to violate the laws’ and removes us ‘by this means outwardly from all the crimes’. Second, amour-propre ‘comforts the necessities of others’ in ‘the sight of’ man’s own ‘proper interest’ (thus, the idea of justice and interested commerce.) These two principles, in Nicole’s understanding, are the quintessence of Hobbes’s conception of self-love. But Nicole’s point is that in human life ‘there are many occasions, where neither fear nor interest have any place’. Therefore we additionally need to take into consideration a third feature of amour-propre in order to form a coherent theory of it. The most general’ passion that ‘springs from amour-propre’ is ‘the desire of being loved’ that Hobbes did not take into consideration. Nicole’s insight is that ‘there is hardly any action’ that we would take in order to ‘please God’, ‘whereunto amour-propre cannot engage us to please men’.

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230 Nicole, Moral essays, III, p. 135: ‘it is not’... ‘the same of love, and esteem for men’, Nicole, Esais de morale, III, p. 160 ‘il n en est pas de même de la recherche de l’ amour et de l’ estime des hommes’.
principles, it is the third, the inclination that renders us to please others, that is the most effective in upholding civil society. As a feature of amour-propre it is 'much more extended than the two others'. This is the core of Nicole's redefinition of amour-propre and his criticism of Hobbism. If the idea is to form a theory of civil society based on human nature and this third feature is missing from our definition of amour-propre, it is unsurprising that civility and politeness are not an integral part of the Hobbesian understanding of civil science. Simultaneously, it becomes overtly clear that theoretically, politeness has little to do with commerce.

But what is precisely this other side of amour-propre? Men desire to be loved and therefore they please others. Does this not sound more like an insignificant detail rather than an original insight in moral philosophy? Indeed, this would be a commonplace, if it was just a passing comment and not burdened with theoretical implications. When Pierre Nicole discusses this other side of amour-propre, it is precisely what Mandeville later pointed at when he wrote about self-liking.

The reason why 'we desire to be belov'd', Nicole emphasises, is 'that we may love our selves more'. The sole object of this propensity is to support the good opinion that we have of ourselves. The love which others bear us makes us judge we deserve to be belov'd, and makes us frame of our selves a more lovely idea'. For Nicole, people's approval is 'the object of our vanity' and 'the nourishment of amour-propre'. But in fact, Nicole highlights, it is more than this. It is 'the bed or couch whereon our weakness rests'. Our opinion of ourselves is laid on such a vulnerable ground that 'it cannot sustain it self without being under-propt by the approbation and love of others'.

All human beings, except perhaps the ones who have efficient grace, are proud and vain to some extent and eager to entertain a good opinion of themselves. It is unquestionably a token of vanity if we love ourselves instead of God. On several occasions Nicole calls attention to the fact that this self-liking side of amour-propre is directly linked to what is commonly called pride. 'Pride', Nicole in one of his essays defines, is 'a swelling of the heart, by which man dilates and magnifies himself in his own imaginations'. Men have an inherent inclination to overvalue themselves, which 'imprints' them with fantastic ideas of 'strength', 'greatness' and 'excellence'. The only reason why we additionally so passionately 'desire' the 'approbation of others' is that when we acquire it 'we are settl'd and fortifi'd in the idea we have of our owne excellence'. It simply persuades us that 'we are not mistaken in the opinion we have of our selves'. It is the 'greatest pleasure of a proud man' to 'contemplate the idea which he makes of himself', which

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‘is the origin of all his vain satisfactions’. In the human mind practically everything is related to this idea of the self and for a proud man ‘nothing pleaseth him but in proportion as it contributes to puff it up, to adorn it, and to render it more lively’. In brief, when ‘the world looks on us with esteem’, we ‘settle in us a better opinion of our selves’. By and large, ‘the true end and aim of the ambitious and voluptuous man, is but to underprop and hold up his weakness by some externe support’.

Inevitably, since the approbation of others is ‘so necessary to keep up our hearts’, ‘we are naturally inclin’d to seek and procure it’. Human weakness might perhaps not be anything to rejoice in, but when judged from the perspective that underlines social cohesion in a secular world, the attitude seems to be much more ambivalent. There is indeed a positive, natural effect of the fact that ‘we must be flattered and caressed like children to be kept in a good humour’ or ‘in our fashion we fall a crying, as children do in theirs’. It is only from the supposition of our weakness that Nicole may conclude that ‘there is hardly anything that makes a stronger impression upon the mind’ than ‘the fear of mens judgements’ that ‘springs only from vanity’. It is the insecurity of the opinion of ourselves (for Nicole a human being is always an insignificant being, thus this insecurity is always apparent) that makes us desirous of other people’s approval, which in turn renders us sociable.

Self-love, pride and politeness

Nicole reminds his audience that men have a natural desire to boast their pride and expose it for all the world to see. ‘There is’, he writes, ‘a pleasure in hearing amour-propre speak when it is not disguised at all’. In fact, ‘every one’ has ‘a desire either to disparage others, or to distinguish himself from them’. The implication is, of course, that since everyone is affected by these very same drives, amour-propre takes a different route. Perhaps we are not too far from Nicole’s point if we say that human life in a civil society is a balancing act on a fine line between these two opposite inclinations. We want to please people and we desire their approval, yet we are not deprived of the need to differentiate ourselves from everyone else.

Nicole calls attention to the fact that we are unable to fully understand the workings of our own amour-propre because it cunningly deceives us, but we are extremely sharp ‘when we perceive it’ somewhere else. In others it

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‘appears’ to us ‘under its natural form, and we hate it by so much more as we love our selves’. But why do we hate it? Simply because of the fact that amour-propre of ‘other men opposes all’ our own ‘desires’.247 Consequently, this has a direct impact on the development of civil society. Once people have been living in a society for some time, everyone becomes perfectly sensible that he is not the only one that has the urge to speak freely and to express the sentiments of the esteem that he has for himself. They learn that ‘nothing’ draws as much ‘aversion’ as this inclination. A mour-propre simply ‘cannot shew it self without exciting it’. Men ‘are not able to suffer’ pride when they ‘discover it’. Thus, ‘it is easie’ for them to ‘judge’ that the case will not be any different when others discover their true sentiments.248 It is this experience of the world that ‘inclines those who are sensible of the hatred of men’ to try ‘not to expose themselves thereunto’. As a result, they withdraw their amour-propre ‘from the sight of others’, they ‘start to disguise and counterfeit it’ and from henceforth they never ‘shew it under its natural shape’. The method is simply ‘to imitate the behaviour of those who would be entirely exempt from it’.249 These might be somewhat common notions in seventeenth-century France, but it is Nicole’s original contribution to moral philosophy that shows us how the rules of good-breeding and politeness are derived from the self-liking side of amour-propre – in a parallel manner as laws and justice are derived from the self-love side of amour-propre.

The core of politeness is simply that pride should not be visible. It is ‘this suppression of amour-propre’, Nicole stresses, ‘which makes human civility’.250 Politeness is ‘but a kind of traffick’ of the self-liking side of amour-propre, ‘wherein we endeavour to’ lure ‘the affection of others by owing a kindness for them’.251 We may easily point out the connotations to commerce and trade in this quote, but we have to be careful not to make the mistake of assuming that there is some sort of material interest involved in the trafficking of the self-liking side of amour-propre. In humane civility there are no gross interests involved. Nicole indeed wants to indicate the analogy between the interested commerce (that is the way self-love side of amour-propre functions in civil society) and the reciprocal nature of politeness. However, he is even more eager to keep these two different institutions apart. There is a good reason why useful and agreeable are separate concepts. Of course, material interest and cupidity can motivate individuals to behave politely, but as we saw earlier, in Nicole’s theory this kind of behaviour falls under the realm of interested commerce and self-love, not humane civility and self-liking. If one flatters a person in order to

get some money from him, one’s behaviour is part of the interested commerce (that Nicole looks down with contempt). If one flatters the same person, so that he would approve of one’s character so that one may entertain a better opinion of oneself, this is humane civility (towards which Nicole’s attitude is much more ambivalent). In practice, it might perhaps be impossible to keep these two spheres from overlapping, but theoretically, it is important for Nicole that they are not confused as being the same.

Nicole also demonstrates how politeness keeps evolving. He points out that ‘these demonstrations of affection for the most part are false’. They ‘run into excess’ and ‘we make a shew of more love than we have’. In fact, ‘in the room of real love, we substitute a language full of affection’.252 Plainly put, the ‘discourses of civility’, which are ‘so ordinary in the mouths of men’ are far apart ‘from the sentiments of their heart’.253

But if the development brings about a custom of flattery and insincerity, moreover, men will soon learn to ‘keep themselves generally to a distance from all that seems vanity’. Hence, the tolerable appearance of ‘modesty’ comes into the world.254 In fact, ‘civility’ does not only make men dissimulate and smooth the appearance of their ‘base vain glories’ (which they actually are so eager to show). Since men in general are so ‘extremely subtile in discovering the by-ways which may be taken to make manifest in us what we desire to shew’, ‘civility renounces these small crafts, and studies to avoid them’. Simultaneously, a new fashion comes about and, at least in theory, soon there is nothing ‘more simple and humble’ than the ‘discourses’ of the world. Because of the nature of amour-propre, it is rendered as ‘a general rule’ that a man is ‘never to speak of himself’. If he is forced to make a comment about himself, it has to be done ‘with more coldness and indifferency than of others’.255 However, this does not mean that people who have adopted this new fashion would actually be humble. As Nicole points out, ‘pride’ is ‘born with man’ and it ‘never abandons him’. Therefore, ‘in the conduct’ that seems humble we may often find ‘a more cunning and delicate sentiment of this pride’.256

It goes without saying that Nicole’s normative position is different from his naturalistic description of politeness. However, I have no interest in attempting to show Nicole’s conception of Christian civility. Additionally, the actual methods of how to operate politeness (or laws that protect self-love) and the locus where they are practised are not of much concern for this study. The idea is to examine the theoretical foundation behind artificial moral institutions and how they are derived from human nature. ‘It is manifest’, Nicole clearly points out, that all ‘conduct’, which falls under the institution of politeness, is in the end aiming ‘directly’ at the self-liking side

of ‘amour-propre’, since the idea is to ‘obtain the esteem of the friendship of men’. In my opinion, what is crucial for Nicole is this link between the moral institution of politeness and the passion (self-liking side of amour-propre) and the idea that this is analogous to justice and the self-love side of amour-propre.

However, what I do find intriguing is that even when Nicole stresses that the expressions of civility are exaggerated and often false, the institution compels us ‘to praise voluntarily what is praise-worthy, to set a value as great as we can on other mens good qualities, and not to refuse even to our enemies our testimonies of esteem which they deserve’. If we fail to follow these obvious guidelines, we are very unlikely to meet with any approbation. We also have to remember that men are not judged by single instances but by the overall impression of their character. Nicole goes so far as to claim that ‘an extreme indulgence for other mens faults’, hiding and excusing them as much as possible, ‘never’ condemning anyone, explicating ‘all to the best’, being ‘easily satisfied’ and rather being ‘deceived’ than giving ‘way to suspicions which are hurtful’ to others are all part of civility. For Nicole, ‘all this tends directly’ in the end ‘to amour-propre’. Perhaps Nicole is right that this is the only way that amour-propre actually ‘hinders us from passing for proud and presumptuous’. At least, if we take Nicole’s word for it, it seems that in order to even uphold our self-liking it takes much more than an empty shell to actually ‘prosper in the design of making our selves beloved’, to ‘acquire friends’, ‘pacifie our enemies’ and to ‘keep a good correspondence with all the world’.

Nicole does not think that an individual ever succeeds in his forlorn battle of loving himself as he ought to love God. Our high ‘opinions’ about ourselves ‘are grounded only upon a voluntary error’. For Nicole, it really does not matter what we have achieved in the world. The opinions about ourselves ‘are never firm and sure’, but ‘always mixed with mistrust, and consequently with melancholy, trouble and molestation’. Instead of ‘pure joy’ and ‘full and entire satisfaction which amour-propre aimeth at, all it can do’ is ‘to suspend for some time the sentiments of sadness, which are nourished at the bottom of the heart’. A Nicolean man is pathetic, but it is difficult to imagine a civil society more progressive than the one inhabited by these men.

The idea of God’s justice and order imprinted in mankind is a basic Christian doctrine, uninteresting as such. However, Nicole is effectively using it also as part of his naturalistic description of civil society. I think that because of this paradoxical contrast between the love of God and the love of self, Nicole’s explanation of human progress seems almost unmatched in
dynamism. It is the agonising conflict within every individual that leads a secular life that keeps the world in motion. People are always in a genuine search after what they can consider true and good. According to Nicole, every human being has to believe, at least in some very confused and obscure manner, that what he does and what he is, ultimately is worthwhile. Nicole is very precise when he says that ‘we can love nothing which we do not think good’ and ‘true’. We ‘cannot’ even ‘enjoy’ anything, if we think that it is ‘false’. Thus, even when stirred by base motives and false judgement, ‘people’ have to ‘justify in themselves and flatter themselves, that their stubbornness, and their inflexibility in their sentiments, proceed only from the love they have for truth’. They ‘are so fashion’d by nature, that they lay hold on nothing but what is by the understanding presented to them under the appearance of some good’.

What, of course, happens is that this seemingly noble quality turns upside down. The love of truth’ is hailed as the first principle by everybody, but it usually unveils as an ill-servant because ‘the chief and principal use we make’ of it ‘is to persuade us that what we love is true’. As it often unfolds, we do not ‘love’ things ‘because they are true’, but ‘we believe them true, because we love them’. Thus, we manage ‘to add’ the ‘idea of truth’ into our ‘inclinations’, which only fixes us ‘more firmly’ in our meaningless ways. It might seem that in this manner Nicole drains the meaning out of our love of truth, but he does not do so entirely. It becomes apparent that ‘men would not be men, did they not run after some true, or false light’.

If men always have to justify to themselves that they are looking for something that is good and true, it is equally natural that they think that they are ultimately in search of harmony. The ‘life of a true Christian’, Nicole writes, would be ‘a life of peace’, but the life of a man driven by his concupiscence is a constant motion searching for peace that he cannot find. God’s will is ‘immoveable’ and ‘the bent and inclination of a virtuous man is towards silence as much as possible he can’. The inclination of the common sinner is ‘to fly from himself’ believing that ‘his happiness consists in being forgetful of himself, and running headlong into this forgetfulness’.

As mistaken as they might be, men are genuinely and naturally aiming for the satisfaction that is not to be found. The scenario is further complicated by the fact that even when men are constantly turning their eyes away from themselves, they have a natural desire to think that they are

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262 Nicole, Moral essays, III, p. 31. Nicole, Essais de morale, III, p. 35.  
268 Nicole, Moral essays, I, p. 76. Nicole, Essais de morale, III, p. 158.  
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doing the very opposite. A Nicolean man is truly a paradox. We have ‘two inclinations’, one which ‘makes us to fly’ from ourselves, and ‘the other’, which makes us ‘seek the knowledge of our selves’. They are both ‘natural’ and ‘spring’ from ‘the same fountain’.\(^{270}\) Knowing and not knowing ourselves is difficult. A ‘vain’ man, sooner or later, ‘will’ always ‘see’ his meaningless and worthless self.\(^ {271}\) ‘Truth always makes it self a little light through all those clouds wherewith men strive to obscure it’. Once amour-propre is at the brink of acquiring satisfaction, there are ‘always some rays’ that come and ‘incommode pride’ and ‘trouble’ the ‘false quiet which it endeavours to procure it self’.\(^ {272}\) Naturally, a man ‘avoids seeing’ his actual state, ‘because being vain he is not able to suffer the sight of his faults and miseries’. ‘To accord these two contrary desires’ a man has to be extremely astute to find ‘means’ that are ‘worth his vanity’ and ‘satisfy’ both of these inclinations ‘at the same time’. It truly takes ‘craft or subtility’ from the Nicolean man to be able to ‘cover all his faults’ and ‘only to include’ this ‘image which he’ forms ‘of himself’, those ‘qualities which may raise him in his own thoughts’.\(^ {273}\) It is interesting that Pierre Nicole puts so much effort in proving that a man has to genuinely succeed in deceiving himself (not just other people) and believe that he is as worthy as he would like to think.

Meanwhile, what happens is that these Nicolean men are constantly forced to ‘renew the idea of their me’. It is ‘this idea’ of self that causes ‘their pleasure during their fortune’ and ‘their displeasure during their disgrace’.\(^ {274}\) Once the former ground where men had placed the idea of their own excellence (or virtue) crumbles down – as it always does – they have to find some new ground where they can build it anew or at least support the old foundation. They are in constant motion and renewing the idea of self. There is ‘no other end’ than ‘amour-propre’ for their ‘actions’, but ultimately what is directing these actions is the need to ‘joyn always to the idea that they have of themselves, new ornaments and new titles’.\(^ {275}\) Nicole’s explanation for the cause of human progress is admirable. The idea is that ‘our vanity remains’ only ‘half satisfied’ – at best.\(^ {276}\) Thus, our whole personal identity becomes dependent upon movement. We are, at least in some sense, continuously refining and progressing, but only because there is no end to it. There is no goal and no true satisfaction that we can achieve. If the motion ceases we simply cannot bear ourselves. The only way that the love for ourselves is supported is by ‘leaning to a number of petty supports’, and we need an innumerable amount of these ‘little props and helps’ to ‘keep it in repose’.\(^ {277}\) But once we come to realise (as we sooner or later


\(^{272}\) Nicole, Moral essays, III, p. 25. Nicole, Essais de morale, III, p. 29.


always do) that the old supports were not enough to fully satisfy our vanity, we have to start looking for some new ones and the circle continues. Only ‘by continual changes the soul maintains it self in a condition it can away with, and that it hinders it self from being overwhelmed with grief and melancholy’. Nicole’s dramatic summary is that ‘the soul subsists only by art’. Thus, we manage to create a vicious circle that is not completely tilted off track, because we have to genuinely believe that what we are looking for is true and good and we are also fully dependent on the opinion and approval of others. Life is simply a postponement of melancholy and sadness. Yet, men keep on searching and refining their petty little ways. Meanwhile, bridges are built, fashions change, etc. In short, at least all the necessities of life are supplied for, and conversations are more or less agreeable.

Without the idea that the truth and God are implanted in us, Nicole’s scheme (of course, if one wanted, one could give these divine attributes a secular explanation) would go astray. Even when we are constantly fooling ourselves and desperately renewing the image we have of ourselves, we need to be able to believe that the things we love are actually good and real – that we are true and good. A man would not be a man if he did not think that he is searching for the truth. But if one is not looking in the right place, Nicole in his normative doctrine lectures, one will never find it. One’s vanity will always remain, at best, half-satisfied. However, the choice that Nicole has to offer does not look too appealing for the common sinner. In fact, a fallen man is not too willing to look for inner peace, because the price to pay is too high. It would take too much to accept his worthlessness. Even the idea of facing the fact that he is not as great or virtuous as he would like to be shuns him. Thus, instead of giving it even a passing thought, he keeps trying to satisfy his self-liking, time and again, using his able imagination to think of different ways of achieving the impossible.

Justice, politeness and civil society

Pierre Nicole has received the attention of modern scholars because he is one of the first early modern authors to outline the idea of how a secular society can be rendered peaceful based on enlightened self-interest.279 ‘One may say truly’, Nicole writes, ‘that absolutely to reform the world, that’s to say to banish all the vices’, all you need to do is ‘give every one an enlightened amour-propre’ [amour-propre éclairé]. Such a ‘society’ might be ‘corrupt’ inside, but ‘there would be nothing better ordered, more civil, more just, more peaceable, more honest, more generous’ and, significantly, more ‘admirable’ than this. The reason why this society is admirable,

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according to Nicole, is that even when nothing but amour-propre moves it, amour-propre ‘would not appear there’ at all.\footnote{Nicole, Moral essays, III, p. 165. Nicole, Essais de morale, III, p. 197.}

This idea of ‘amour-propre éclairé’ has usually been understood in the narrow Hobbist sense as ‘enlightened self-interest’.\footnote{See Kley, ‘Pierre Nicole, Jansenism, and the morality of enlightened self-interest’, 1987, pp. 69–85, who implicitly points out that Nicole is adding something to Hobbes’s account, but which however does not bring out the clear and apparent theoretical framework that is Nicole’s actual contribution to the Enlightenment thought. The overall question is not whether enlightened self-interest is pointed out as morally good, as Van Klay seems to think. The question is what do we mean with amour-propre éclairé in the first place and how do we derive moral institutions from amour-propre.} If anything, we have to take into consideration both sides of Nicole’s conception of amour-propre and put a strong emphasis on self-liking, instead of self-love, since this is Nicole’s own invention. Even when ‘true interests’ are certainly involved in this society, curiously the self-liking side, which is the crux of Nicole’s line of reasoning, has somehow escaped modern scholars. To put my argument in short, it is both justice and politeness that have to be accounted for if we want to talk about Nicole’s idea of enlightened amour-propre. And for Nicole, it is the idea of the self-liking side of amour-propre that plays the foundational role in rendering a secular society tolerable.

The idea that two moral institutions, justice and politeness, (both derived from amour-propre) are needed to render a society enlightened follows consistently throughout Nicole’s essays. As he clearly points out, ‘we owe some things to our neighbour by certain laws of justice; which are properly call’d laws’. Analogously, we owe him some other things ‘by the bare laws of civility’. Even when these laws of civility are not laws in the strict sense of the word, ‘the obligation’ to follow them ‘springs from a consent amongst men’ who have agreed ‘to blame such as shall be defective in them’. Ultimately, it is ‘men’ who ‘have established all these laws’.\footnote{Nicole, Moral essays, I, p. 141. Nicole, Essais de morale, III, p. 282.}

Based on ‘justice’ and the ‘motion of interest’ men can ‘expect’ certain ‘duties from us’. It is exactly ‘the same’ that ‘happens in the duties of civility’. Just like in our debts, if we ‘are wanting’ in civility, ‘others are effectively offended’.\footnote{Nicole, Moral essays, I, p. 143. Nicole, Essais de morale, III, pp. 285–6.}

By and large, it is the rules of ‘civility’ (not honesty, as the anonymous English translator repeatedly suggests) and ‘justice’ that are needed in civil society.\footnote{Nicole, Moral essays, III, p. 315. Nicole, Essais de morale, III, p. 315: ‘les regles de l’honnêteté et de la justice’. Nicole is consistently using this parallel between civility and justice in his essays when he is discussing the principle moral institutions. Yet, the English translation repeatedly mistakes honesty for civility. Cf. Nicole, Moral essays, III, p. 268 ‘those who are wanting in what may lawfully be expected from them, do undoubtedly wrong honesty [sic!] and justice, and ‘tis enough to judge them guilty of infidelity’ Nicole, Essais de morale, III, p. 322 ‘ceux qui manquent à ce qu’on peut attendre légitimement d’eux, blessent sans doute l’honnêteté et la justice, et il suffit pour les juger}

\footnote{Nicole, Moral essays, III, p. 165. Nicole, Essais de morale, III, p. 197.}

\footnote{See Kley, ‘Pierre Nicole, Jansenism, and the morality of enlightened self-interest’, 1987, pp. 69–85, who implicitly points out that Nicole is adding something to Hobbes’s account, but which however does not bring out the clear and apparent theoretical framework that is Nicole’s actual contribution to the Enlightenment thought. The overall question is not whether enlightened self-interest is pointed out as morally good, as Van Klay seems to think. The question is what do we mean with amour-propre éclairé in the first place and how do we derive moral institutions from amour-propre.}

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number of wants'. Thus, they are obliged ‘out of necessity to live in society’ since ‘each particular’ is not ‘able to subsist without others’. Now, it is obvious that this implies different kinds of interests and commerce. However, what Nicole particularly wants to stress is that ‘for keeping up society amongst men’, it is of ‘absolute necessity’ that ‘they should respect and love one another’. As always, Nicole wants to specifically point out that in this moral institution there are no interests or money involved. There are a number, he writes, ‘of small matters’ which are ‘highly necessary for life’. People should realise that they ‘are bestowed gratis’ and never ‘to be sold’ because they ‘can only be had for love’. It is precisely the fact that ‘society’ is ‘compos’d of men full of love and esteem for themselves’ that special ‘care’ has to be taken ‘reciprocally to please and humour one another’. If not, ‘it would prove a loose company’, ‘ill pleas’d and dissatisfied amongst themselves’ and, in the end, not able to ‘continue united’. Logically, ‘since this mutual love and esteem appears not outwardly, they have thought convenient to establish amongst themselves certain devoirs, which should be so many tokens of respect and affection’. Thus, it is the institution of politeness that is of importance in the concept of ‘enlightened amour-propre’.285

Only when we take into account Nicole’s broad definition of amour-propre that has two different sides, we may understand why he thinks that a secular civil society is able to function. My argument is that this forms the foundation for Bernard Mandeville and David Hume, who follow Nicole in this overall distinction. They both take their cue for their moral and political philosophy from the idea that we may derive justice and politeness from human nature, namely from the two different sides of amour-propre. Of course, both Mandeville and Hume seriously modify the description of civil society by paying close attention to natural and artificial moral qualities and the evolutionary nature of moral institutions in the conjectural history of civil society. However, it was Pierre Nicole who first outlined the overall blueprint for this project.

coupables d'infidélité'. And Nicole, Moral essays, III, p. 317 'they may observe in this point, in respect of others, what honesty [sic!], charity, and justice demands of us.' Nicole, E ssais de morale, III, p. 317 'garder sur ce point à l' égard des autres ce que l' honnêteté, la charité et la justice demandent de nous.' Keohane has pointed out that when talking about ‘the idea of l'Honnête in ‘the last half of the seventeenth century in France’ the word ‘honesty is surely the wrong English word to use here’ and instead ‘the best terms’ for ‘capturing the meaning of l'honnêté are ‘civility, politeness’ and ‘propriety’’. Keohane, Philosophy and state in France, 1980, pp. 283-4. It is interesting that the translator of Nicole’s essays made this precise mistake and thus this mistake in English was already deeply rooted in the seventeenth century. According to Rogers, ‘In praise of vanity’, 1994, the best study of the many on honnête is J. P. Dens, H onnête homme et la critique du goût: E sthétique et société au XVIIe siècle, Lexington: French Forum, 1981.

3. Later Mandeville and the history of civil society

The starting point of Mandeville’s history of civil society in his later works is a ‘wild couple’ in a ‘state of simplicity’. Before embarking into his conjectures, he alerts his readers that this austere state is a ‘condition’ hard to grasp for men ‘born in society’. Mandeville was well aware of the theoretical puzzles of the concept of state of nature and the argument under construction was a direct reference towards jurisprudential authors, who in their descriptions of the concept were not concerned with the evolutionary aspect of civil society. Mandeville’s predecessors had not deprived the savage man of the qualities and institutions that are not original, but products of society. We are so used to our various wants and needs, Mandeville carries on manifesting his novel point of view, that without training in ‘abstract thinking’ it is difficult to even imagine a man with ‘so few desires, and no appetites roving beyond the immediate call of his untaught nature’.

Mandeville’s later theory of civil society is particularly focussed on amending the intellectual efforts of Thomas Hobbes and to counter, what one scholar has come to describe as, the idea ‘that liberty itself engendered conflict and that the pursuit of natural rights produced a state of war’. There are no natural rights among untaught animals and neither is there a state of war in nature. All the moral distinctions arise from social relations as new wants and appetites are generated. The first savage pair was not aware of the social needs. Who would think, Mandeville points out, that ‘such a couple’, for example, ‘would not only be destitute of language, but likewise never find out or imagine, that they stood in need of any; or that the want of it was any real inconvenience to them’? We acquire all our knowledge from experience and ‘it is impossible, that any creature should know the want of what it can have no idea of’.

It is equally important, Mandeville lectures, to realise that a savage man would not have any use for spoken language, because while ‘he has nothing to obey, but the simple dictates of nature, the want of speech is easily

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supply'd by dumb signs' and ‘our wild couple would at their first meeting intelligibly say more to one another without guile, than any civiliz’d pair would dare to name without blushing’. There is a significant lesson in this tongue in cheek comparison. As I mentioned, Mandeville’s fundamental criticism towards earlier natural law theorists is that they furnish the savage man with artificial qualities that are the products of society. An essential point derived from this insight is that a savage man does not need society for the sake of his self-preservation. He is, to a large extent, self-reliant. It is the ‘civiliz’d people’, who ‘stand most in need of society’. There are ‘none’ who need society ‘less than savages’. Mandeville carefully points out that he is not making the same mistake that natural jurists make when talking about the weak or aggressive condition of men in the state of nature, which are not natural, but are social traits. To make this as explicit as possible, Mandeville makes Horatio ask his spokesman: ‘Don’t you fall into the same error, which you say Hobbes has been guilty of, when you talk of man’s necessitous and helpless condition?’ Cleomenes’s answer is a quip remarking the progressive nature of society and spelling out that more advanced men are in civility, ‘the more necessitous and helpless they are in their nature’. Nowhere does he claim that wild men were unable to help themselves or that timidity was an original human quality.

Another important part of Mandeville’s criticism of the modern school of natural law concerns the role of reason, will and self-preservation in the history of civil society. It is true that ‘all passions and instincts in general were given to all animals for some wise end’ and they all tend to ‘the preservation and happiness’ of the animal herself or her ‘species’. However, Mandeville holds a view that this does not happen by rational calculation or by a direct act of free will. This may, he articulates, already be inferred from the first savage, who does not choose to reproduce, but ‘propagates, before he knows the consequence of it’. Mandeville diligently brings home the point that naturally the actions of an individual are not dictated by his ability to reason, but by his passions. ‘A savage man multiplies his kind by instinct, as other animals do, without more thought or design of preserving his species, than a new-born infant has of keeping itself alive, in the action of sucking’. If this is true, how can we describe that the step from the state of nature into the civil society is guided by the right use of reason and free will in the act of self-preservation? We certainly cannot. Our ‘every action’ cannot be ‘determin’d by the will’, if ‘we are violently urg’d from within, and, in a manner, compell’d, not only to assist

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4 Mandeville, Part II, p. 286.
5 Mandeville, Part II, p. 287.
6 Mandeville, Part II, p. 181.
8 Mandeville, Part II, p. 91.
9 Mandeville, Part II, p. 228.
in, but likewise to long for', and even 'be highly pleased with, a performance, that infinitely surpasses our understanding'. Mandeville's theory stating that passions control human actions instead of reason is designed to argue that the question of free will is indifferent where the development of civil society is concerned. Even if a man would have been given a superior capacity of understanding compared to other animals, it makes little difference in the grand scheme of civil society. In nature there are no duties or conflicts of rights. A man in his uncultivated state is like any other animal. His wants are few, he has no use, desire or ability for artificial conventions and the first principle that makes him associate with others is lust.

With the description of the wild couple Mandeville is not addressing a hypothetical state of nature in order to explain how the natural laws are derived by the right use of reason, but he is setting up the basis for an anthropological analysis of society that will help us grasp the nature of civil society. If the preceding theories about natural law were erroneous while dressing savage men up in artificial clothing, in a similar manner the benevolent school (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson) is mistaken for taking artificial qualities as natural. Mandeville stocks the wild and civilised man with the same natural human propensities. He insists that there is 'no difference between the original nature of a savage, and that of a civiliz'd man' and 'what belong to our nature, all men may justly be said to have actually or virtually in them at their birth', and 'whatever is not born with us, either the thing itself, or that which afterwards produces it, cannot be said to belong to our nature'. According to Mandeville, the predominant natural human quality 'obliges us continually to assume every thing to ourselves'. If a man had remained in the state of simplicity, he could never have learned to be other-regarding. 'Whilst' men are 'uninstructed' and 'let alone', they 'will follow the impulse of their nature, without regard to others'. Only art, education and communication with other people may change this. But what is this 'impulse of nature' that men naturally follow? In The Fable we have seen an attempt to draw all the passions from the concept of self-love, which turned out to be an inconsistent theoretical solution. In order to avoid the problems of his first theory of civil society, in Part II, the 'natural impulse' is coined as 'the instinct of sovereignty'. This is a peculiarly Nicolean definition of a 'tyrannical disposition' that centres everything in us and is irresistibly 'stamped in the bottom of' our 'hearts', which is not, as we have learned, a necessarily Hobbist concept. The wild couple's actions were also bound to be motivated by this instinct that naturally has some

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13 Mandeville, Part II, p. 121.
15 Mandeville, Part II, p. 269.
16 See the previous chapter on Nicole.
resonance in Hobbes’s idea that ‘nature had given all to all’.17 Like Hobbes, Mandeville concedes that this principle of selfishness, when acting at liberty, is the grand obstacle of society, but unlike Hobbes and much like Nicole, he wants to remind his audience that simultaneously this instinct, for various reasons, is necessary for the development of civil society. Mandeville seeks to define this instinctive principle, how it operates in human beings and what is the precise role that it has in the conjectural history of civil society. Naturally (that is to say without education and experience of society) ‘man would have every thing he likes, without considering, whether he has any right to it or not; and he would do every thing he has a mind to do, without regard to the consequences it would be of to others’.18 Another way that Mandeville describes this instinct is that paradoxically ‘all men are born with a strong desire, and no capacity at all to govern’.19

The process of a man becoming sociable starts immediately after the wild couple propagates. Hypothetically speaking, their children are born sociable. The plot of Mandeville’s Part II is a perpetual clash between natural and artificial principles within every sociable being as well as a conflict between men, which can only be meliorated by living in a society and by inventing and mending conventions that are designed to cure the frailties of human nature. The problem is that we naturally have ‘a desire of superiority’ and if we only followed the natural dictates of our nature we would grasp ‘every thing’ for ourselves, whereas ‘the notions of right and wrong’, are ‘acquired’ and arise artificially through social relations.20 Furthermore, since ‘the desire as well as aptness of man to associate’, do not proceed from ‘his love to others’21, the only way ‘we’ can ‘be cured of’ this instinct of sovereignty is ‘by our commerce with others, and the experience of facts, by which we are convinc’d, that we have no such right’ that our selfishness bids us to claim.22

Natural stage of the conjectural development of society

The idea of a contract plays a marginal role in Mandeville’s historical understanding of the origin of civil society. Any idea of an agreement as such cannot be the foundation of civil society, because it would not hold among ‘ill-bred and uncultivated’ people, of whom ‘no man would keep a contract longer than interest lasted, which made him submit to it’.23 It is important to notice that Mandeville makes a distinction between a man that

17 Hobbes, De Cive, I.X.
18 Mandeville, Part II, p. 271.
19 Mandeville, Part II, p. 320.
20 Mandeville, Part II, p. 223.
21 Mandeville, Part II, p. 178.
22 Mandeville, Part II, p. 223.
is made ‘merely sociable’ and a man that is ‘civilised’. In the description of the origin of society, we cannot leap from a wild couple in a state of simplicity into civil society that has a government and is regulated by laws. By doing this, Mandeville is significantly turning against the view he himself set forward in the original Fable. In other words, Mandeville is arguing that contract theories, even when the natural jurists are indisputably on the right path with their intellectual efforts, are an insufficient and bewildered explanation of the origin of civil society. The story has to be told as an evolutionary history and more attention has to be paid at a preliminary social stage, family society, which is formed following the natural qualities of human nature, before we start examining the entry to later stages of civilisation. Again, this functions against the theory Mandeville had earlier set forward. When the question about the origin of civil society is examined within the boundaries of a conjectural history, the confused argument about contract and sovereignty dissolves. In Mandeville’s new theory the emphasis is on the process and conventions that make men sociable and, which in turn are the basis for civil society. Intriguingly, for Mandeville there is no difference between social and moral progress. In this sense, all morality is artificial in its nature, but it does not mean that the distinction between right and wrong is an arbitrary invention of a politician to trick men into self-denial, as Mandeville had earlier argued. In order to be social, men have to follow a coherent system of artificial moral principles that function in accordance with the propensities of human nature.

In the course of Part II, Horatio insists on every solution he can think of while trying to guess the origin of civil society, but Cleomenes turns all his suggestions down. If a contract could not explain the foundation, neither can the right use of reason. In fact, ‘superiority of understanding in the state of nature’ would ‘serve to render man incurably averse to society, and more obstinately tenacious of his savage liberty, than any other creature’. Another clarifying example of the role of reason in Mandeville’s theory is the speculation of whether a man in ‘his savage consort’ is miraculously given a perfect ‘capacity in the art of reasoning’, he would not come to entertain the ‘same notions of right and wrong’ that any man of middling capacity, without an effort, holds in a civil society. Mandeville’s argument is that ‘no man can reason but à posteriori, from something that he knows, or supposes to be true’. Thus, since we cannot deduce an intelligible idea of justice from natural relations, only the ‘persons’ who remember ‘their education’ and live ‘in society’ with ‘others of their own species’ that are independent ‘of them, and either their equals or superiours’ may know the ‘differences between right and wrong’. Attention should be paid to how clearly Mandeville underlines that the idea of justice can only be learned through transactions between equals.

25 Mandeville, Part II, p. 300.
Mandeville also amplifies his arguments about the impossibility of knowing anything a priori and the artificial nature of justice on several occasions. He spells out with clarity that 'from nature' we do not have any 'thoughts of justice and injustice' and without a proper education and social relations a man 'would naturally, without much thinking in the case, take every thing to be his own, that he could lay his hands on'. And since Cleomenes, despite his interlocutor's objections, remains categorical about the fact that there is no 'love of man for his species' implanted in human breast, Horatio eventually raises his hands and sighs: 'How came society into the world?'

Before we dwell into Cleomenes's multifaceted answer that society came into the world 'from private families; but not without great difficulty, and the concurrence of many favourable accidents, we have to first stress that what Mandeville is eventually after is the civil society that is 'entirely built upon the variety of our wants' and governed by written laws, which in turn are modified and executed by magistracy. Thus, in one sense, what Mandeville is aiming at is in line with the modern school of natural law. The problem with natural jurists is that they oversimplify and confuse the course of the development of society by paying no or only little attention to the differences between the natural and artificial stages of this process. Mandeville persistently insists that 'the undoubted basis of all societies is government'. It is clear that on most occasions when he is discussing the 'origin of society' he has a political society in mind. But he also points out that the authority the 'parents' hold 'over their children' is one form 'of government'. In order to understand the origin of civil society, we have to realise that the first private family is already a form of society, even when the first wild couple are not themselves sociable creatures or even able to teach and govern their children.

The first savage couple had been drawn together by lust, which is the first principle that makes humans associate. Mandeville stresses that these first parents were entirely moved by their instinct of sovereignty and unable to govern their children. It is significant to realise that by the ability to govern Mandeville does not mean a power to hold authority, but the capacity to 'built upon the knowledge of human nature', which enables one 'to promote' and 'reward all good and useful actions on the one hand; and on the other, to punish, or at least discourage, every thing that is destructive or hurtful to society'. It is equally important to understand that in Part II

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31 Mandeville, Part II, p. 349.
34 Mandeville, Part II, p. 321.
this ‘art of governing’ is not ‘the work of one man, or of one generation’, but the ‘greatest part’ of it is ‘the product, the joynt labour of several ages’.\textsuperscript{35} Since the first parents do not have the experience of society, the knowledge of different patterns of governing or any idea what would promote or be destructive to the common good, for that matter they simply follow their natural instinct, consider their children as their property and make them labour for their few needs.

However, this does not render the children helpless or without care. We need to notice a difference between an artificial and a natural quality, namely the art of governing and ‘natural affection’, which ‘prompts all mothers to take care of the offspring’.\textsuperscript{36} According to Mandeville, ‘all creatures naturally love their offspring, whilst they are helpless, and so does man’.\textsuperscript{37} This ‘natural affection’ is such a powerful principle that it would, without any concern for his own interest, render ‘a wild man to love, and cherish his child’.\textsuperscript{38} It is noteworthy that in stark contrast with the original Fable, Mandeville now characterises this natural affection as a pure and durable passion. Even without the intermixture of self-love or self-liking, ‘natural affection’ can ‘make wild men’ and women ‘sacrifice their lives, and die for their children’\textsuperscript{39}. From Mandeville’s treatment of this original passion it becomes apparent that it is difficult, or in fact ineffective, to claim that Mandeville is now arguing that a man by his nature is wholly incapable of other-regarding affection. Thus, we cannot simply deduce Mandeville’s second thesis of sociability from an Augustinian/Epicurean line of thought, where self-interest is seen as the only motivating principle.\textsuperscript{40} In the light of this evidence it is clear that Mandeville no longer supports such reasoning and self-interest pledging arguments that insist that parents would take care of their children hoping that when they are old their children will return the favour.\textsuperscript{41} What this also indicates, is that we cannot simply ignore Mandeville by labelling his moral system utterly selfish (any more than we can do this with David Hume and his confined generosity), which has often served as a justification for paying little or no attention to what Mandeville is actually saying, when Hume and the history of philosophy has been under investigation.

\textsuperscript{35} Mandeville, Part II, pp. 321–2.
\textsuperscript{36} Mandeville, Part II, p. 189.
\textsuperscript{37} Mandeville, Part II, p. 199.
\textsuperscript{38} Mandeville, Part II, p. 201.
\textsuperscript{39} Mandeville, Part II, p. 240.
\textsuperscript{41} An impression given by Force, Self-interest before Adam Smith, 2003, pp. 62–3.
What is remarkable about Mandeville's understanding of ‘natural affection’ in human beings is that it does not end when children are old and experienced enough to take care of themselves. Unlike ‘the young ones of other animals’, who, ‘as soon as they can help themselves, are free’, ‘the authority, which parents pretend to have over their children, never ceases’. The reason is that in human beings the natural tenderness towards the offspring ultimately mixes with ‘the desire of dominion’, which is ‘a never-failing consequence of the pride, that is common to all men’. As a consequence, ‘our savage pair would’ not only consider their own children as their ‘undoubted property’, but they would naturally extend their ‘title’ also over the ‘grandchildren’. Hypothetically speaking, ‘without intermixture of foreign blood, they would look upon the whole race to be their natural vassals’. Mandeville’s spokesman, Cleomenes, asserts that he is ‘persuaded, that the more knowledge and capacity of reasoning this first couple acquired, the more just and unquestionable their sovereignty over all their descendants would appear to them’.

By making this intellectual move of integrating ‘instinct of sovereignty’ with ‘natural affection’, Mandeville is able to explain how the first wild pair turned into a small clan following the natural principles universally implanted in men. This development is also supported by the fact that ‘in the wild state of nature, man multiplies his kind much faster, than can be allow’d of in any regular society: No male at fourteen would be long without a female, if he could get one; and no female of twelve would be refractory, if applied to; or remain long uncourted, if there were men’. On the one hand, Mandeville stresses that this kind of natural family is the very counterpart of civil society, where the idea is to ‘preserve peace and tranquillity among multitudes of different views’ and not just within a group that is related through blood or belong to the same race. On the other hand, the strong affection that human beings naturally have towards their children has a crucial role in Mandeville’s system. It plays an important part also in later stages of civil society, because it not only ‘renders’ men ‘solicitous about’ the ‘education’ of their children, it also ‘makes’ them ‘take pains to leave their children rich’. To understand Mandeville’s later idea of social development, it is important to realise that he thought it natural for men to take care of the education of their children. Nevertheless, despite all the sociable effects, ‘this eternal claim’ over their children that men ‘naturally’ have in their hearts is so ‘general and unreasonable’ that ‘every civil society’, Mandeville in his peculiar manner points out, ‘is forced to make’ particular ‘laws’ that limit the ‘paternal authority to a certain term of

42 Mandeville, Part II, p. 204.
43 Mandeville, Part II, pp. 204–5.
44 Mandeville, Part II, p. 205.
45 Mandeville, Part II, p. 201.
46 Mandeville, Part II, p. 318.
years’ in order ‘to prevent the usurpation of parents, and rescue children from their dominion’. This, of course, does not necessarily mean that otherwise children are subjected to physical labour, servitude or material inconvenience of any kind. In a more advanced civil society this may better be illustrated by saying that some children might feel the smothering affection of their parents, which is indeed natural, for the whole course of their lives while the parents want to stick their noses in all of their children’s business. Nevertheless, what becomes evident in Mandeville’s treatment of natural affection is that we have to allow that he endorses a view that men have naturally confined generosity towards their family that might even outdo their care for themselves.

The first wild couple was destined to live without the social abilities that would enable them to restrict their instinct of sovereignty, but this does not hold true with their children. According to Mandeville, it was ‘very unworthy of a philosopher to say, as Hobbes did, that man is born unfit to society’. It is noteworthy that here Mandeville is not only writing against Hobbes, but against his own principal idea of The Fable. In the table of contents that was dropped after 1714, for example, it clearly states that ‘Man without government is of all creatures the most unfit for society’. After considering this foundational question anew, Mandeville accepts that every child is born into a society of some sort, where he can perfectly well learn to be sociable simply by living in this society. There are also certain human propensities that support and guide this course of action. First of all, every ‘savage child would learn to love and fear his father’. According to Mandeville, ‘these two passions, together with the esteem, which we naturally have for every thing that far excels us, will seldom fail of producing that compound, which we call reverence’.

As we see, in Part II, Mandeville is no longer obsessed with

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48 Mandeville, Part II, p. 204.
49 In my opinion, this is an ingenious theoretical insight from Mandeville into the artificial moral principles, bringing clearly to the surface the difficulty of distinguishing between naturally amorous passions and instinct of sovereignty; a mixture, which makes one, at times, completely unable to see the possible misjudgements of one’s own actions, which one himself cannot consider but as perfectly virtuous and justified.
50 Mandeville, Part II, p. 177. For Goldsmith’s understanding of the relationship between Mandeville and Hobbes regarding this comment, see Goldsmith, Private vies, public benefits, 1985, p. 50. This also reveals the difference between Goldsmith’s interpretation of Mandeville and the one put forward in this thesis. This relation to Hobbes is very important. Goldsmith reads Mandeville’s position as a whole and therefore takes his remarks in Part II regarding Hobbes as unjustified. Goldsmith is correct that Mandeville’s position is close to Hobbes. But this is the case in the original Fable. In Part II, the criticism distancing Mandeville’s own interpretation of Hobbes is fully justified given that he is at the same time distancing himself from the position taken in the original Fable.
52 Index can be found in Kaye’s commentary, Mandeville, Part II, p. 388.
the idea that all passions are directly derived from self-love. This is already a
leap away from Hobbism. 'Reverence to authority' is 'necessary, to make
human creatures governable', Mandeville declares.\textsuperscript{54} When Horatio
complains to Cleomenes that they have not made any 'progress' towards the
origin of civil society in their conversation, his interlocutor answers that 'the
introduction of the reverence, which the wildest son must feel more or less
for the most savage father, if he stays with him, had been a considerable
step'.\textsuperscript{55} If we look at reverence from a theoretical perspective and consider
its position in this overall system of sociability, we come to realise that what
Mandeville was aiming at was an ambitious attempt to give an alternative
account of the idea of voluntary servitude presented in the preceding
contract theories, which is consequently a vital component in his challenge
to revise the works of Grotius, Pufendorf and Hobbes.\textsuperscript{56}

Mandeville rejects the idea that men enter the society by an explicit or
tacit agreement that transfers the authority to a sovereign, for the simple
reason that this is the wrong way of examining the question. Mandeville
stresses this point by illustrating that the idea of 'two or three hundred
single savages, men and women, that never had been under any subjection,
and were above twenty years of age, could ever establish a society, and be
united into one body' is futile, for the plain reason that 'societies never were
made that way'.\textsuperscript{57} Without an agreement of any kind every child is born into
the subjection of his parents, which is already one form 'of government'.\textsuperscript{58}
Mandeville defines that a creature is governable 'when, reconciled to
submission, it has learned to construe his servitude to his own advantage;
and rests satisfied with the account it finds for itself, in the labour it
performs for others'.\textsuperscript{59} Evidently, Mandeville's idea of a governable creature
includes the idea of voluntary servitude. However, instead of jumping into
the conclusion of how men agree to this voluntary servitude in civil society,
Mandeville invokes the same concept to explain how the first generation
was naturally rendered governable (in other words, born to servitude, able
to accept their condition and to make the best of it). In a later stage of
development, this same principle dissolves the question about original
contract by explaining the foundation of civil government in historical
terms.

In order to augment his point regarding the respect towards authority,
Mandeville also mentions that in the Decalogue the 'best method is made
use of' in order to 'inspire men with a deep sense of' fear, love and esteem,
which are 'the three ingredients, that make up the compound of

\textsuperscript{54} Mandeville, Part II, p. 278.
\textsuperscript{55} Mandeville, Part II, p. 221.
\textsuperscript{56} About voluntary servitude for Hobbes, see Hobbes, \textit{De cive}, VIII and especially,
\textsuperscript{57} Mandeville, Part II, p. 132.
\textsuperscript{58} Mandeville, Part II, p. 241.
\textsuperscript{59} Mandeville, Part II, p. 184.
reverence’. The law, or fear of punishment for breaking it, does not create the original compound of reverence. It simply supports and strengthens the reverence that children naturally have for their parents. Thus, we have advanced a long way towards a civil society even when we have only gone one generation down from the first wild couple. The reverence of children to parents is 'of the highest moment to all government, and sociableness itself'. However, 'experience teaches us, that this reverence may be overruled by stronger passions'. Mandeville also remarks that 'God thought fit to fortify and strengthen it in us, by a particular command of his own; and moreover to encourage it, by the promise of a reward for the keeping of it'. Civil society cannot exist without laws. This does not mean that the moral distinctions could be considered an invention of lawmakers or clever politicians. Laws fix the artificial conventions, but the conventions do not originate from these laws or the makers of them.

Unambiguously, 'the very first generation of the most brutish savages, was sufficient to produce sociable creatures'. Natural respect towards authority plays a part in this scheme, but more importantly, 'children, who' simply 'conversed with their own species, though they were brought up by savages, would be governable' and when they come 'to maturity, would be fit for society, how ignorant and unskillful soever their parents might have been'. One of Mandeville's claims is that 'society' is 'entirely built upon the variety of our wants'. Mandeville also pays attention to the relation between the size of the society and the variety of wants and desires. In the state of nature the wild couple only has to satisfy the immediate needs. Evidently, 'the smaller' the 'society', 'the more strictly the members of it' would 'confine themselves' to the 'wants' that are 'necessary for their subsistence' and consequently 'the larger the numbers are in a society, the more extensive they have rendered the variety of their desires'. The process of creating artificial wants and desires is necessary for the advancement of a family society towards state formation, but how is this development triggered? Why is it that men in general, and particularly the savage men, who originally had no superfluous wants to satisfy, are first drawn towards society, if they do not have 'a desire, out of a fondness' towards their 'species', superior 'to what other animals have for theirs', as Mandeville maintains?

'Sufficient motives' to be 'fond of society', Mandeville claims, are a man's 'love' for 'ease and security' and his 'perpetual desire of meliorating his condition'. According to Mandeville, the first savages were self-reliant

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60 Mandeville, Part II, p. 279.
61 Mandeville, Part II, p. 280.
62 Mandeville, Part II, p. 231. See also p. 267.
63 Mandeville, Part II, p. 349.
64 Mandeville, Part II, p. 350.
65 Mandeville, Part II, p. 183.
and since the ‘condition’ of human nature only becomes increasingly
‘necessitous and helpless’ as he advances in civility, the foundational motive
to make a man desirous of society is his infinite desire to advance his
circumstances. In other words, a conventional definition of self-
preservation cannot explain the origin of society. But the claim that no-one
in reality needs society ‘less than savages’ does not mean that the first
generation would not desire it in hopes of bettering their condition.67
Mandeville places a strong emphasis on the argument that ‘the first
generation of the most brutish savages’ produces ‘sociable creatures’68 and
the ‘desire of meliorating our condition’ is ‘so general’ that ‘not one that can
be call’d a sociable creature’ is ‘without it’.69 In other words, the first
generation that had been sprung out of the wild couple was sensible that it
is within their interest to ‘enter into society’.

Mandeville augments this important point on different occasions. ‘I am
willing to allow’, he confirms, ‘that among the motives, that prompt man to
enter into society, there is a desire which he has naturally after company’.70
As I have already highlighted, we should pay close attention to what
Mandeville calls natural and artificial. The cause of this desire is not the
fondness of our species, but the desire of society is nevertheless so strong
that it is hard to tell whether it is natural or not. Instead of austerely
dismissing the possibility that this desire is in a strict sense natural,
Mandeville leaves the question open and remarks that if a man was more
‘desirous’ of ‘society’ by nature ‘than any other animal’ this would not be
anything ‘to brag of’.71 This argument is, of course, directed against the
writers emphasising the noble generosity of human nature. Instead of
natural benevolence, Mandeville thinks that a man has this desire ‘for his
own sake, in hopes of being better for it; and he would never wish for,
either company or any thing else, but for some advantage or other he
proposes to himself from it’.72 Thus, certain authors are right when claiming
that the men who are born in a sociable condition desire society, but only in
hopes of advancing their own interest.

Already the first children were slowly gaining the knowledge of how to
turn their submission to their own advantage, curbing their natural instinct
of sovereignty and starting to be contented with their situation. Mandeville’s
point about civil society arising ‘from private families’ within a course of
‘many generations’, ‘great difficulty’ and ‘concurrence of many favourable
accidents’ simply means that even when the first children are sociable,
‘much more’ is ‘required’ to ‘produce a man fit to govern others’.73 This has

68 Mandeville, Part II, p. 231.
69 Mandeville, Part II, p. 181.
70 Mandeville, Part II, p. 183.
72 Mandeville, Part II, p. 183.
73 Mandeville, Part II, p. 231.
nothing to do with the emergence of a clever politician who would trick ignorant men into self-denial. The particular question concerns the state formation and moral progress: How are different family societies united into a civil society? While forming his second theory of society, Mandeville takes painstaking care to point out that the role of a single individual is minimal in his outlook. What is required, and what renders a man fit to govern others, are several artificial conventions and social institutions that enable the mutual and peaceful existence of contrasting views and interests. These moral conventions can only be developed through an extensive period of time and surmounted experience. When these institutions have been established, any man of middling capacity is fit to govern others. To some it might seem ‘inconceivable to what prodigious height, from next to nothing, some arts may be and have been raised by human industry and application, by the uninterrupted labour, and joint experience of many ages, tho’ none but men of ordinary capacity should ever be employ’d in them’.  

One man does not make a difference in mankind’s march toward a peaceful and amiable existence, which is the implicit purpose of civil society. The reason why Mandeville draws a striking contrast between a family and civil society is that these conventions have to be established by written laws and executed by government, in order to gain a permanent status among a large society that consists of people who are not necessarily related or even acquainted with each other. Until some rigid rules have been formed, men ‘without doubt would encrease in knowledge and cunning’ and ‘in the particular things, to which they apply’d themselves, they would become as expert and ingenious as the most civiliz’d nations: but their unruly passions, and the discords occasioned by them, would never suffer them to be happy; their mutual contentions would be continually spoiling their improvements, destroying their inventions, and frustrating their designs’. Nevertheless, the first children did, by trial and error, start building different artificial conventions designed to help them to live in social relations, which eventually would form the framework of civil society, even when their efforts, due to the lack of experience, were doomed to crumble down to pieces for generations to come.

A rtificial stage of the conjectural development of society

In Part II, Bernard Mandeville explains how a wild couple expanded into a relatively large family society following the natural inclinations of human nature without the help of the moral or artificial institutions. What is noteworthy in the natural stage of his conjectural history is the change that occurred in the first children compared to their wild parents. By explaining how the first children were already born into society, Mandeville gives them the most important attribute of human sociability, the ‘desire of meliorating

74 Mandeville, Part II, p. 141.
75 Mandeville, Part II, p. 267.
our condition’, which is a sufficient motive for a human being to desire society.

If the progress until this point had been advanced mainly relying on natural human propensities, the moral development that is launched in connection with the oblique search after society has to depend on artificial conventions. As a manifest slogan for his conjectural development of society, Mandeville maintains that ‘the restless industry of man to supply his wants, and his constant endeavours to meliorate his condition upon earth, have produced and brought to perfection many useful arts and sciences’. When mentioning these arts and sciences, Mandeville refers to a wide variety of different artificial abilities and customs such as language, politeness, justice, lawmaking, art of governing, distribution of land, division of labour, monetary exchange, construction navale, viticulture etc. None of them are ‘invented by reasoning a priori’.76 Mandeville points out that there is a flaw in our thinking to ‘often ascribe to the excellency of man’s genius, and the depth of his penetration, what is in reality owing to length of time, and the experience of many generations’.77 All of the important conventions have originally been founded on an ‘uncertain era’, and if we start pondering upon the reason behind them, ‘we can assign no other causes’ to them, but ‘human sagacity in general, and the joynt labour of many ages, in which men have always employ’d themselves in studying and contriving ways and means to sooth their various appetites, and make the best of their infirmities’.78 This is the heart of the ‘Mandevillean’ idea of civil society, which is a pivotal contribution to modern social thought. It initiated a plethora of positive analysis by Hume, Rousseau, Smith and several others.

In Mandeville’s understanding, the arts of building boats and making soap, as well as the inventions of iron and money, also took a long time to instigate and were co-products of many generations instead of single strokes of a solitary genius. Technical innovations have contributed to the development of civil society by soothing some of man’s appetites, by meliorating his condition and, simultaneously, by creating several new appetites and needs. Nevertheless, emphasis has to be placed on those artificial conventions that enable the moral development of mankind in its everlasting battle against the instinct of sovereignty. As Mandeville unambiguously states, naturally, a ‘man would have every thing he likes, without considering, whether he has any right to it or not; and he would do every thing he has a mind to do, without regard to the consequences it would be to others’.79 Whether it is possible to overcome this infirmity is the most important question for human happiness, since otherwise ‘mutual contentions would be continually spoiling their improvements, destroying

76 Mandeville, Part II, p. 145.
77 Mandeville, Part II, p. 142.
78 Mandeville, Part II, p. 128.
79 Mandeville, Part II, p. 271.
their inventions, and frustrating their designs'. This cannot happen by the sudden appearance of a clever politician who tricks others into self-denial or by an original contract to advance sociability.

So far I have only briefly discussed the instinct of sovereignty without connecting it to Mandeville’s distinction between self-love and self-liking. This becomes relevant only now when we are considering the artificial conventions that enable men to control and redirect their passions at the artificial stage of the conjectural history of society. Mandeville introduces for the first time the concept of self-liking in the third dialogue of Part II. He argues that it consists of two components. Cleomenes instructs Horatio that ‘nature has given’ men ‘an instinct, by which every individual values itself above its real worth’. This natural instinct is aligned with ‘an apprehension’ for the fact that we ‘over-value ourselves’, which ‘makes us so fond of the approbation, liking and assent of others; because they strengthen and confirm us in the good opinion we have of ourselves’. These definitions ought to be seen in the light of Pierre Nicole’s writings.

Mandeville did not invent himself the distinction between self-love and self-liking nor the idea that other people’s opinions are the crux of the opinion that we entertain of ourselves. The main part of Mandeville’s originality lies on his emphasis of how the inclination to over-value one’s own worth has remained constant throughout history, while an individual’s relationship to the opinion of others takes different patterns, which in turn plays a crucial role shaping the commonly shared values in different cultures.

When Horatio tries to suggest that ‘self-liking is evidently pride’ Cleomenes cannot accept this. Self-liking is the cause of pride, but only when ‘excessive, and so openly shewn as to give offence to others’ it is called pride. When it is kept out of sight it has ‘no name’, even when men act ‘from that and from no other principle’. When Horatio proposes that the passion should be called ‘a desire of the applause of others’, Cleomenes disagrees yet again. The effects of self-love should not be classified as a passion and neither should self-liking be confined to its consequences.

Mandeville has a good reason for this intellectual move. The fundamental part of his thought is the separation of the two different origins of the so-called selfish passions. Also in his Origin of honour, Mandeville reminds his audience that self-liking is ‘plainly distinct from self-love’.

The importance of the concept of self-liking for Mandeville is by no means a new discovery. Already Paul Sakmann emphasised its significance, F. B. Kaye singled it out as an important concept for

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80 Mandeville, Part II, p. 267.
81 Mandeville, Part II, p. 130.
82 Mandeville, Part II, p. 131.
83 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 3.
84 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 4.
85 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 3.
86 Sakmann, Bernard de Mandeville und die Bienenfabel-controverse, 1897, p. 59.
Mandeville and Maurice Goldsmith perceptively noticed how it functions as part of the conjectural history of civil society. Lately, increasing attention has been directed towards self-liking. The primacy of self-liking over self-love is slowly being established in scholarship. Perhaps the best specimen of this development is Bert Kerkhof’s article in the History of Political Thought. He makes an explicit division between self-love and self-liking. He describes self-liking as our propensity to ‘overestimate ourselves’ in ‘comparison with others’. Because of this quality man can be described ‘as an animal living in constant anxiety about the opinion of others’. One result is that at times self-liking ‘conquers the ‘fear of death’ (self-love)’, which can be used to explain such phenomena as bravery in battle, dueling and suicide.

Markku Peltonen has since made a crucial contribution to Mandeville studies by taking this discussion further with his analysis of how self-liking functions in the context of the early modern ideas of dueling and politeness. The present study attempts to expand the scope of the discussion by showing that the reason why amour-propre is important in moral and political philosophy is that it is the key concept behind the moral institutions of justice and politeness.

What is often ignored is the important overriding presence of the instinct of sovereignty in the midst of both, self-love and self-liking. This instinct is prevailing in all animals. ‘The desire of uncontrou’d liberty, and impatience of restraint’ are similar in a wild horse and a savage man. What


68 For example Marchi, ‘Exposure to strangers and superfluities’, 2001, p. 67 takes the role of self-liking as given.


70 Kerkhof, ‘A fatal attraction? Smith’s Theory of moral sentiments’ and Mandeville’s ‘Fable’, 1995, pp. 219–233. On the relationship between Mandeville and Smith, see also Thomas A. Horne, ‘Envy and commercial society: Mandeville and Smith on “Private Vices, Public Benefits”’, Political Theory, 9, 1981, pp. 551–569. Horne also points towards the relevance of the distinction between self-love and self-liking (p. 556). There are, however, many important articles on Mandeville that do not pay attention to the distinction between self-love and self-liking. This is why Kekhof’s article is vital. For example, Dickey, ‘Pride, Hypocrisy, and Civility in Mandeville’, 1990, pp. 387–431 does not pay attention to the distinction.


distances a civilised man from a brute is that a brute ‘wildly follows the unbridled appetites of his untaught or ill-managed nature’. In Cleomenes’s vocabulary this instinct is also called ‘a domineering spirit, and a principle of selfishness’. It is said to make its mark upon all the passions. Not only on self-love or self-liking, but in the operation of both. It affects self-liking because ‘all men are partial in their judgements, when they compare themselves to others’. It directs self-love because a ‘man in his anger behaves himself in the same manner as other animals; disturbing, in the pursuit of self-preservation, those they are angry with; and all of them endeavour, according as the degree of their passion is, either to destroy, or cause pain and displeasure to their adversaries’. As we can see, with this instinct, Mandeville seeks to outline the very source of all the frailty in human nature and what stood at odds with civil society. Mandeville’s definition of a savage is a man ‘who is naturally for making every thing centre in himself’ and ‘very prone to look upon every thing, he enjoys, as his due; and every thing he meddles with, as his own performance’. In other words, he is a person who could not, for one reason or another, check his instinct of sovereignty.

Why is this instinct so important? Isn’t this just another way of saying that men are naturally selfish? Yes, but there are two main reasons why this strategic move is an integral part of Mandeville’s idea of civility. First, we should remark that in his description, Mandeville is carefully holding on to his distinction between self-liking and self-love. The instinct of sovereignty affects both, but the effects are different. Second, when describing selfishness as an instinct that has an effect on all the passions, Mandeville does not have to say that all men are always concerned about their self-interest, but they are instead naturally inclined to be selfish. The key is to understand that in this way Mandeville detaches himself from the traditional definition of self-preservation that he had himself endorsed in the original Fable – a step that was meant to unshackle his scheme of civility from its Hobbist chains.

In The Fable of the Bees, necessary appetites and anger aroused in their pursuit were presented as the motivating passions. It was of first importance for the government to suppress the anger caused in men while they were trying to gratify the passions arising from self-love. In Part II these passions are only perceived to be of secondary importance in the making of a man. Instead, pride is now indicated as the ‘hidden spring, that gives life and motion to all’ man’s ‘actions’. A different approach is also adopted when contemplating how this motivating passion should be treated. Not a single step towards civil society could have been taken before it was realised that ‘pride was not to be destroyed by force’, but ‘to be

93 Mandeville, Part II, p. 270.
94 Mandeville, Part II, p. 272.
95 Mandeville, Part II, p. 211.
96 Mandeville, Part II, p. 79.
governed by stratagem’, which was of course ‘by playing the passion against itself’.97

This should be seen as a decisive turn away from Hobbism and Mandeville’s first analysis of civil society. For Mandeville’s purposes it proved inadequate to try and modify a Hobbist idea in which the civil society starts to function when the fear of death taught men to use their rational capabilities and to seek peace. Mandeville had first attempted to add pride at a later stage of society’s historical development to support the Hobbist scheme, but it proved unsatisfactory. The root of the system was still the strict idea of self-preservation.

Mandeville consumes a considerable amount of time and space redefining the concept of self-preservation in Part II. In their third dialogue Cleomenes and Horatio deliberate over the matter at length. Cleomenes carefully brings the familiar characterization of this concept into their discussion. ‘In the affair of self-preservation’ even in the behaviour of a savage we commonly note that ‘self-love would first make it scrape together every thing it wanted for sustenance, provide against the injuries of air, and do every thing to make itself and young ones secure’,98 Horatio readily agrees that ‘self-love’ induces a man ‘to labour for his maintenance and safety and makes him fond of every thing which he imagines to tend to his preservation’99, but Cleomenes is not just pointing at a well-established fact. He is redefining the concept. Cleomenes argues that not only self-love, but also ‘self-liking’ is a passion ‘given to man for self-preservation’.100 In order to stress the novelty and importance of this redefinition Horatio is made to express his doubts several times. It is plain to see that self-love plays a role in man’s self-preservation, but ‘what good does the self-liking to him?’ Horatio cannot see what ‘benefit’ men ‘could receive from it, either in a savage or a civilized state’. He thinks that ‘self-liking’ would rather be ‘hurtful to men, because it must make them odious to one another’.101 After all, Cleomenes had defined that ‘self-liking’ forces a savage to ‘seek for opportunities, by gestures, looks, and sounds, to display the value it has for itself, superiour to what it has for others’.102

Cleomenes answers with a determined tackle on the Hobbist idea of civil society. ‘Self-liking’ may easily be defined as a passion working for our self-preservation. It is so necessary to the well-being of those that have been used to indulge it that they can taste no pleasure without it’. ‘It doubles our happiness in prosperity, and buoys us up against the frowns of adverse fortune’. Mandeville calls self-liking ‘the mother of hopes, and the end as well as the foundation of our best wishes’. He considers it ‘the

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97 Mandeville, Part II, p. 78.
98 Mandeville, Part II, p. 133.
100 Mandeville, Part II, p. 135.
102 Mandeville, Part II, p. 133.
The strongest armour against despair, and as long as we can like any ways our situation, either in regard to present circumstances, or the prospect before us, we take care of ourselves; and no man can resolve upon suicide, whilst self-liking lasts'. Nothing could be said to contribute more to our self-preservation than the passion that gives us the will to live.

The importance of these passages is that by linking self-liking to the concept of self-preservation, Mandeville is refuting the core of straightforward Hobbism. Self-preservation no longer means what it used to. Simultaneously, Mandeville may point out that he was not altogether wrong in what he claimed in The Fable of the Bees. Yet, after changing the entire concept, he is holding a view that is contrary to what he originally argued. Mandeville became bitterly conscious in The Fable that if one takes up self-love as the starting point of the analysis of civil society, it leads to a dead end. Instead, there has to be a wholehearted shift from the emphasis placed on self-love to self-liking. With the ‘instinct of sovereignty’ Mandeville is also able to emphasize that the ‘principle of selfishness’ is extremely ‘difficult’ to ‘destroy’ and ‘pull out of the heart of man’. When any man, regardless of how learned or civilised he might be, ‘heartily covets a thing, this instinct, this principle, will overrule and persuade him to leave no stone unturned, to compass his desires’. Mandeville tries to make sense of an important fact that ‘this innate principle, that bids us gratify every appetite’ might easily force us do things that we normally would not agree upon. It might just as easily occur that we do not even realise the consequences of our actions.

What becomes evident in Mandeville’s treatment of the key passions is that self-love and self-liking as such cannot be described to be vicious or virtuous. According to Mandeville’s stoic sounding insight, ‘all passions and instincts in general were given to all animals for some wise end’. They all tend to ‘the preservation and happiness’ of the animal herself or her ‘species’. Mandeville prescribes it as ‘our duty to hinder’ these passions and instincts ‘from being detrimental or offensive to any part of the society’, but there is no reason why we should ‘be ashamed of having them’. Mandeville defends the view that both self-love and self-liking, which are the principal passions that explain our actions, should be considered morally neutral. In order to make his science of human nature stem with his scheme of civil society, Mandeville invokes the instinct of sovereignty as the sole detrimental cause of manmade misery. Most of the laws, for example, are directed in one way or another against it. Mandeville points out that the ‘regulations and prohibitions, that have been contrived for the temporal happiness of mankind’ are designed for one reason: ‘to cure and disappoint that natural instinct of sovereignty, which teaches man to look upon every thing as centring in himself, and prompts him to put in a claim to every

103 Mandeville, Part II, p. 136.
105 Mandeville, Part II, p. 91.
thing, he can lay his hands on’.106 This holds true with both, self-love and self-loving when they are guided by the unrestrained movement of this instinct. What follows is very logical: the two redeeming principles, that ‘hinder’ this instinct in connection with self-love or self-loving ‘from being detrimental or offensive to any part’ of the civil society, are justice and politeness. The laws defining and securing justice protect the self-love of every individual and politeness in turn guarantees that everyone may cultivate his self-loving. These are the imperative moral conventions designed to make the best of our infirmities, developed by several generations and ultimately fixed by rigid rules.

Forming a moral institution

Mandeville’s conception of a moral institution needs to be analysed in detail, and the best way to do this is to carefully consider self-loving and politeness, which he discusses at length on several occasions, but particularly in the first half of Part II. Good manners, politeness, courtesy, civility and good-breeding are terms which all describe an artificial moral institution that in Mandeville’s understanding is meant for one specific purpose, ‘concealing’ our ‘pride’.107 Politeness is an excellent illustration of Mandeville’s comprehension of a moral convention. First, it is the prime example of playing a passion ‘against itself’.108 Only when men learn to hide their pride they start to boast in their self-loving.109 Second, all the aspects of the formation of a moral convention in Mandeville’s conjectural history are precisely sketched in his treatment of self-loving. Politeness serves as an explicit example of the formation of a moral institution in the historical development of civil society.

The bedrock of a moral institution is that it has to become accepted and adopted by most part of the society, which can only happen when it proves to be in practice advantageous to people. Politeness passes this test by improving the sociability between men. Mandeville pronounces that ‘once the generality begin to conceal the high value they have for themselves, men must become more tolerable to one another’.110 But how is this accomplished? How do we advance from the savage state to a situation where the majority start concealing their pride? Mandeville invokes, once again, conjectural history to unfold his argument. Cleomenes asks Horatio to consider only ‘two things’ to understand that all civil societies are compelled to form a principle such as politeness, where the aim is to teach men to hide their true sentiments from the high value they hold for

106 Mandeville, Part II, p. 271.
107 Mandeville, Part II, p. 150.
110 Mandeville, Part II, p. 145.
themselves. 'First', Mandeville emphasises, 'from the nature of that passion' called 'self-liking', 'it must follow, that all untaught men will ever be hateful to one another in conversation', 'if their thoughts were known to each other'. Mandeville points out that it is solely the passion of self-liking that needs to be redirected in order to render a conversation agreeable. It is significant that Mandeville in his treatment of politeness explicitly articulates that the moral institution is not meant to serve our self-love. Where self-interest is concerned, also uncivilised men might be able to conceal their pride, but this cannot be considered politeness qua moral institution. Such pattern of behaviour, where the mask falls once the interest ceases, does not count as civility. Mandeville points out that by a conversation he means a casual situation between 'equals', 'where neither interest nor superiority are consider'd'. What happens is that in a conversation 'among un-civilized men' outward 'declaration of their sentiments' often happens and 'render them both insufferable to each other'. It is plain to see that 'without a mixture of art and trouble, the outward symptoms' of self-liking 'are not to be stifled'. Men instinctively value themselves above their real worth. Thus, it automatically happens that the conversation between two equal, uncivilised men, who have not learned to change the course of self-liking and hide their sentiments, is doomed to be unsatisfactory for both of them.

Cleomenes's second point of concern is that a man is a creature 'endued with a great share of understanding', fond of his 'ease to the last degree, and as industrious to produce it'. Thus, 'in all human probability', the 'effect' this 'inconveniency arising from self-liking' has upon men is that they start searching for ways to meliorate this frailty in their social relationships and eventually redirect their passion. What this means in relation to the conjectural development of a moral institution is spelled out in plain words. 'The disturbance and uneasiness, that must be caused by self-liking', 'must' in turn 'necessarily produce at long run, what we call good manners and politeness'. Mandeville staunchly underlines that the cause of this development is evident, but the historical progress is not straightforward. A moral institution is not established in a single stroke, but many 'strugglings and unsuccessful trials to remedy' the uneasiness of pride will 'precede' this point of perfection.

The ingenious design of Mandeville's conjectural development of moral institutions explains how an invaluable moral practise is developed without the actors being conscious of what is happening, nor is their intention to contribute to the moral progress. If the evolution of the fundamental moral institutions is logical and compelled to follow a certain course, the actual moral agents can be fully unaware of the process that they are participating in. This is a point that is difficult for us to overemphasise when considering

113 Mandeville, Part II, p. 138.
what is original in Mandeville’s thinking. After Cleomenes has illustrated the two points that explain how politeness is a natural product of the development of civil society, Horatio recaps what he understands as the main part of the conjectural development of politeness:

Everybody, in this undisciplin’d state, being affected with the high value he has for himself, and displaying the most natural symptoms, which you have describ’d, they would all be offended at the barefac’d pride of their neighbours: and it is impossible, that this should continue long among rational creatures, but the repeated experience of the uneasiness they received from such behaviour, would make some of them reflect on the cause of it; which, in tract of time, would make them find out, that their own barefaced pride must be as offensive to others, as that of others is to themselves.¹¹⁴

Horatio’s summary is presented as informative, but he unfortunately misunderstands the role of reason and intention in this process. One metatext stratagem that Mandeville employs is to flag a mistake his character makes. An example of this is Cleomenes pointing to Horatio that ‘what you say is certainly the philosophical reason of the alterations, that are made in the behaviour of men, by their being civiliz’d: but all this is done without reflection’. Mandeville systematically insists, by giving different examples, that even when the conjectural development of moral institutions is deemed to follow a certain course, this is not a conscious process. Men do not intentionally aim to establish any moral conventions. Eventually, at some point in time, they will establish them, because of the inconvenience caused by the passion in question, but they are unable to directly strive for these institutions since they are controlled by the very same passions that have to be redirected. Cleomenes argues that ‘by degrees, and great length of time’ they ‘fall as it were into these things spontaneously’.¹¹⁵

One might think that once politeness has become an established moral institution people would realise its worth and follow its principles because they understand that it is the reasonable thing to do. Mandeville does not think that a later stage of civilization makes a difference in this respect. ‘Even now’, Cleomenes lectures, when the art of good manners is ‘brought to great perfection, the greatest part of those that are most expert, and daily making improvements’ in it, ‘know as little of the Rationale’ of it, as the ‘predecessors did at first’.¹¹⁶ This is an intriguing point, because not only the role of reason, but also the question about proper motives and intentions vanish in conjectural history. It does not make a difference why people are polite or just. ‘In the choice of things we are more often directed by the

¹¹⁵ Mandeville, Part II, p. 139. The idea of spontaneous order has been stressed in relation to modern political principles, such as laissez-faire. I do not necessarily agree with this view, because it often misses the crucial role assigned to the executive power of government by Mandeville and some of his contemporaries despite the idea of spontaneous development of necessary moral institutions.
¹¹⁶ Mandeville, Part II, p. 144.
caprice of fashions, and the custom of the age, than we are by solid reason, or our own understanding'.\(^{117}\) What makes a difference is that there is politeness and justice; and people follow these general rules, whether they do it out of habit, because of self-liking, self-love or whatever wavering motive they might have at that fleeting moment in time.

Mandeville also gives his readers a step by step sketch of how a moral institution comes into the world from a meagre, savage society. This is not presented as an actual historical development, for example, in Britain, France or Greece. As Mandeville expresses through the words of Cleomenes: ‘I don’t speak of our nation in particular, but of all states and kingdoms in general’.\(^{118}\) The conjectural progress of politeness is set out in common terms in order to stress the fact that the development in all civil societies is bound to follow these very same lines. The first incentive in most primitive actions is self-interest. According to Mandeville, it is ‘the most crafty and designing’ that will ‘be the first’ to ‘learn to conceal’ the ‘passion of pride’ for ‘interest-sake’. Imitation is a powerful social tool. Once an example is set forward ‘in little time no body’ in this abstracted savage society ‘will shew the least symptom of’ self-liking ‘whilst he is asking favours, or stands in need of help’.\(^{119}\) Thus, the rudimentary progress of politeness starts in search for self-interest, but this is just the beginning of the process, where the significance of the moral institution is placed on self-liking instead of self-love.

Mandeville emphasises that moral institutions are constantly developing and changing. Ineptly uncivilised men first learn that when asking for favours it is within their interest not to show their pride. This is a mean beginning, but more is soon to follow. Mandeville highlights that ‘once the generality begin to conceal’ their self-liking, ‘new improvements must be made every day’. It will not be long, ‘till some of them grow impudent enough, not only to deny the high value they have for themselves, but likewise to pretend that they have greater value for others, than they have for themselves’.\(^{120}\) In turn, ‘this will bring in complaisance, and now flattery will rush in upon them like a torrent’. This marks the turning point when the most influential part of society slowly starts to shift their behaviour from securing self-love towards the cultivation of self-liking. The natural affection that parents feel towards their children also has a role to play in this scheme and ‘as soon as’ men ‘are arrived at this pitch of insincerity, they will find the benefit of it, and teach it their children’.\(^{121}\) In other words, that is plainly teaching children what we call manners.

\(^{117}\) Mandeville, Part II, p. 247.
\(^{118}\) Mandeville, Part II, p. 323.
\(^{119}\) Mandeville, Part II, p. 141.
\(^{120}\) Mandeville, Part II, p. 145, see also p. 150.
\(^{121}\) Mandeville, Part II, p. 145.
Mandeville underlines the importance of education in his social theory. According to him, the only ‘reality’ of ‘the compliment we make to our species, of its being endued with speech and sociableness’, is ‘that by care and industry men may be taught to speak, and be made sociable, if the discipline begins when they are very young’. He also emphasises that it takes various generations before a decent level of civility is reached. He does not think that this development is brought to a closure when a civil state is established. Self-liking is far more difficult to redirect than self-love. Human nature is tremulous and the first private ‘family descending from such a stock, would be crumbled to pieces, re-united, and dispers’d again several times, before the whole or any part of it could be advanced to any degree of politeness’. However, what happens in the conjectural development is that ‘the knowledge of parents’, regardless of the fact of how useless it might be in practice, is communicated to their offspring, because they have a natural affection concerning their well-being. Only ‘few parents are so bad as not to wish their offspring might be well accomplish’d’, and thus ‘every one’s experience in life, being added to what he learn’d in his youth, every generation after this must be better taught than the preceding; by which means, in two or three centuries, good manners must be brought to great perfection’. And, even after reaching a high level of politeness, Mandeville insists, most people who follow these guidelines do not reflect upon their actions. He skilfully separates the question of proper motivation from the idea of a beneficial moral institution. Who could deny that the ‘doctrine of good manners’ is ‘taught and practised by millions, who never thought on the origin of politeness, or so much as knew the real benefit it is of to society’?

So, here we have Mandeville’s understanding of the conjectural development of a moral institution in a nutshell. He goes out of his way to explain that the development of the pivotal artificial moral conventions follows a somewhat natural course in all human societies because the common propensities of human nature are the same for a savage as well as for a civilised man. ‘All the precepts of good manners throughout the world have the same tendency, and are no more than the various methods of

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123 Mandeville, Part II, p. 191.


126 Mandeville, Part II, p. 341.


128 Mandeville, Part II, p. 141.
making ourselves acceptable to others, with as little prejudice to ourselves as is possible'. This, of course, does not mean that men in their manners and morals are predestined for a certain mould. The methods of making ourselves acceptable to others might, and do change, even if the semantic value of manners is fixed. In the sense that the inconvenience caused by self-loving sets men to seek customs of concealing their pride and the disturbance caused by self-love makes them look for ways to restrict the unbound movement of their selfishness, the development of civil society is natural. 'The art of good manners', according to the Dutchman, is 'a science that is ever built on the same steady principle in our nature, whatever the age or the climate may be, in which it is practis'd'. The convention is always established for the same reason and following same basic principles. The inconvenience caused by self-loving forces all the civil societies to look for a custom such as politeness where the idea is to redirect the course of self-loving so that it is not converted into outward manifestations of pride. There is, of course, a great variance in how this is, at different places and times, laid out in practice. For example, modern honour, according to Mandeville, is the most important contribution to eighteenth-century European politeness, but not a part of his general explanation of the development of civil society, because it is strictly attached to the development of this particular society instead of being a universal practice.

Mandeville and justice

It is time to turn from politeness to the other pivotal moral institution, justice. The principal idea of justice and politeness as remedies against the instinct of sovereignty is consistently applied in Mandeville's scheme of civil society. It is vital to realise that the idea behind these institutions is symmetric. The passion in question is turned against itself. This is the only way that these violent passions that are guided by the instinct of sovereignty can be controlled. How the institution of justice is established is a parallel story with the art of good-breeding. The difference is, of course, that politeness is a necessity for every civil society because of the nature of the passion called self-loving and justice is needed because of self-love. Precisely in the same manner as in the case of self-loving and politeness, the inconvenience caused by self-love must produce the moral convention of justice in a long run. This conjectural development is not a process advanced by conscious agents, but an indirect path requiring experience and time.

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129 Mandeville, Part II, p. 147.
130 Mandeville, Part II, p. 146.
131 I will analyse Mandeville's idea of courage only later, in the part below that shows the significance of honour in Hume's greatness of mind project.
Mandeville makes good use of the neo-Augustinian idea of countervailing passions for his own purposes. The security of private property, after it has first been invented, serves everyone’s self-interest. Men learn through experience that they can better advance their selfish needs by simultaneously letting everyone enjoy what is their own. This is a straightforward conclusion derived from experience: otherwise there could not be any commerce between men or advancement of society; a fact that the children of the first wild couple were already sensible of. The theoretical principle is to ‘play the passion against itself’. Experience eventually teaches men that it is within their self-interest to restrict the unbound movement of their self-love. General behaviour starts to be rule-guided once some people set an example that others willingly imitate. In time, it becomes obvious that this convention is advantageous to everyone’s interest and thus parents, because of their natural affection, start to educate their children to act according to it. Meantime, the convention is daily improved and shaped. Taken into consideration the volatility of human nature and the primacy of the instinct of sovereignty, it is clear that this convention can only become fully effectual when operated through laws. This is why a strict rule of law is necessary, which cannot be executed without a government. Nevertheless, the convention precedes the law and thus the conjectural development of this moral institution is the only way to grasp the nature of justice.

Mandeville calls attention to his insight that there cannot be any natural or a priori way of finding out the difference between right and wrong. We do not have any natural ‘thoughts of justice and injustice’ and ‘raw, ignorant, and untaught men, fix their eyes on what is immediately before, and seldom look further than, as it is vulgarly express’d, the length of their noses’. However, simply by living in society, men in due course become sociable and acquire these notions when experience enables them to understand human nature and to form moral conventions. Eventually, the inconvenience caused by self-love will make men aware that the ‘endeavours’ of a man ‘to advance his fortune’ are ‘always restless, and have no bounds; but where he is oblig’d to act openly, and has reason to fear the censure of the world’. What is important is that a civil society can function perfectly well without everyone being conscious of its foundational principles or knowing why certain conventions are necessary. There is a difference between understanding the abstract nature of justice and being

132 About Pufendorf’s idea of negative community in Mandeville, Part II, cf. p. 222: ‘Nothing likewise seems more true to all, that have made any tolerable use of their faculty of thinking, than that out of the society, before any division was made, either by contract or otherwise, all men would have an equal right to the earth’.
133 Mandeville, Part II, p. 125.
135 Mandeville, Part II, p. 211.
136 Mandeville, Part II, p. 112.
sensible of the operation and requirements of this principle in practice. Mandeville carefully points out that a basic understanding of the rudiments of justice does not only concern ‘men of great accomplishments’ or that an ability ‘to think abstractly’ would be necessary for one to be sensible of the principles of justice. Instead, ‘all men of middling capacities’, ‘in all countries, and in all ages’, ‘that have been brought up in societies’ will ‘always find out the difference between right and wrong in things diametrically opposite’.137

This means that ‘there are certain facts’, which a man ‘will always condemn, and others which he will always approve of’. For example, ‘to kill a member of the same society, that has not offended us’ or ‘to rob him, will always be bad’. In a similar manner, everyone will ‘always’ agree that ‘to cure the sick, and be beneficent to publick’ is ‘a good rule in life’.138 But how is the knowledge of these facts acquired, if we do not know them a priori, they are not derived from any natural principles of human nature and we do not understand the abstract nature of justice? The uniformity of human passions compels all human societies to form certain guidelines. When something becomes commonly accepted it is within a man’s nature to follow the general example. A man ‘naturally loves to imitate what he sees others do’.139 These rules cannot be called natural in a sense that we find them by rational calculation or that to follow them would be natural for human nature. However, the process of forming these artificial guidelines always follows a similar path. All men brought up in civil societies will agree upon the same basic facts (which of course does not mean that they would always act according to the rules themselves), because the fundamental moral institutions established in the course of many centuries are similar in their function and once these conventions are established imitation and education do the rest in order to furnish men with the sentiments of approval and disapproval. Most importantly, ‘experience and imitation’ teach men ‘to act as they do’.140 According to Mandeville, ‘the foundation of all accomplishments must be laid in our youth, before we are able or allow’d to chuse for ourselves, or to judge, which is the most profitable way of employing our time’141 and ‘children have no opportunity of learning their duty, but from their parents, and those who act by their authority or in their stead’.142

An important part of Mandeville’s understanding of moral institutions is that conventions precede laws. This is also crucial with a reference to the modern theory of natural law. In his interpretation of the process of civil

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137 Mandeville, Part II, p. 222.
138 Mandeville, Part II, p. 222.
139 Mandeville, Part II, p. 284.
140 Mandeville, Part II, p. 139.
141 Mandeville, Part II, p. 341.
142 Mandeville, Part II, p. 280.
society he leaves little room for God. A higher power does not prescribe natural law to men. Instead, with his examples, Mandeville secularises the role of religion and explains how God’s laws function as any other manmade legislation. The Decalogue itself was established upon certain preceding moral conventions. If we examine the hypothetical moment when God gave his commands to men, we realise that even these laws had to be based on human experience. Mandeville reminds his audience that ‘The Israelites, whilst they were slaves in Egypt, were’ already ‘govern’d by the laws of their master’. Cleomenes speculates that the ‘Israelites’ had already come a long way in the moral development and ‘were many degrees remot’d from the lowest savages’, but ‘yet far from being a civiliz’d nation’. They were already advancing and developing moral institutions, which had not been yet confirmed by prohibitions and punishments regulated by a government. Cleomenes notes that ‘it is reasonable to think, that, before they receiv’d the law of God, they had regulations and agreements already establish’d, which the ten commandments did not abolish’. In other words, what Mandeville wants to foremost emphasise is that all laws, even the once said to be handed down by God, have to be based on preceding human conventions. In his historical example Mandeville maintains that already prior to Moses it ‘is demonstrable’ that the Israelites ‘must have had notions of right and wrong, and contracts among them against open violence, and the invasion of property’.

Thus, Mandeville turns the theological argument, maintained also by many modern natural law theorists, that God gave men the ability to reason in order to discover His natural law of advancing sociability on its head. We do not need to refer to God nor reason in order to explain the origin of the natural law. Instead, we can perfectly well give a secular explanation also to the role of religion in the conjectural development of civil society. Mandeville is also able to dissolve the question of original contract as the foundation of civil society by explaining the origin of society in historical terms. Men do not agree to be governed, they become governable, which is in turn part of the explanation why they can be called sociable. Once men are plainly born into a social condition, they start obliquely seeking after such conventions that will advance their own interest by enabling them to live peacefully in society and which in turn will form the structure of civil society. This structure cannot become fully effectual without a government executing laws. Thus, the remaining question, after the historical process of establishing necessarily artificial conventions has been accounted for, is how

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144 Mandeville, Part II, p. 272.
145 This intriguing secular interpretation of religion and especially the role of catholic church in the development of modern civility is advanced especially in The origin of honour and usefulness of Christianity in war.
these moral institutions are rendered effective and permanent. This, however, is a question concerning state formation and not the conjectural development of conventions that precede the establishment of a civil state.

Establishing a civil state

All the main components of the ‘Mandevillean’ scheme of society are constructed in accordance with the conjectural development of moral institutions that we have studied in detail. Without this process, underlying the established conventions of politeness and justice, civil society could never have emerged. However, in so far as the origin of civil society is concerned, we also have to pay close attention to the monumental point in history when these conventions are rendered effectual. When different multitudes are thought to come to be governed by written laws is a defining moment in Mandeville’s social philosophy.

The moral development of mankind was naturally launched when the children of the first wild couple were born into a pre-social condition. The oblique search after society made these savages indirectly form different conventions that would enable them to meliorate their condition. Mandeville explains how the first savages, following the natural principles of human nature, might have expanded into a relatively large clan and while the first generation was making moral progress within this natural family society. Cleomenes’s suggestion, that society came into the world from private families; but not without great difficulty, and the concurrence of many favourable accidents; and many generations may pass, before there is any likelihood of their being form’d into a society\textsuperscript{146}, is given with an apparent reference to the formation of a state, where various family societies come to live together eventually forming a civil society. Thus, Mandeville’s three renowned ‘step[s] into society’, instead of telling the whole story of the origin of society, which started much earlier, principally explain how these different families are eventually united in a civil state.\textsuperscript{147}

To explain my interpretation in short, the steps to society, without the pivotal connection to the conjectural development of moral institutions, mean very little. In what follows, these three steps will be examined from this perspective.

According to Mandeville, the first step towards state formation is a ‘common danger, which unites’ even ‘the greatest enemies’.\textsuperscript{148} This has nothing to do with individuals who would strive for society for the sake of self-preservation. Instead, ‘it is possible’, Cleomenes speculates, ‘that several

\textsuperscript{146} Mandeville, Part II, p. 200.
\textsuperscript{147} One further line of investigating Mandeville’s idea of the birth of society would be to consider it in accordance with Gassendi’s theory of the birth of the state in three stages. About Hobbes and Gassendi on this point see Gianni Paganini, ‘Hobbes, Gassendi and the tradition of political Epicureanism’, \textit{Hobbes Studies}, 14, 2001, pp. 21–24.
\textsuperscript{148} Mandeville, Part II, p. 230.
families of savages might unite, and the heads of them agree upon some sort of government or other, for their common good. It is very likely that an external threat of wild beasts might have endeavoured ‘different families’ temporarily ‘to live together’, but they would have had ‘little use to one another, when there’ no longer was a ‘common enemy to oppose’. Simultaneously, these families started to quarrel. Cleomenes calls this ‘danger’ that ‘men are in from one another’ as ‘the second step to society’. This step includes an important correction to Mandeville’s previous scheme of civil society.

One of the shortcomings of The Fable regards the civilising method. Previously Mandeville had only been using one explanatory device: the Hobbist idea of self-preservation countering the odious passions of self-love. This added up to a major flaw. The theory could not answer this foundational question: how and why would anyone become a lawgiver or politician, if all the original appetites concerned necessities or reproduction and men wanted to peacefully cultivate their primal passions?

As soon as Cleomenes introduces self-loving to Horatio, he immediately hurries to give a hypothetical example of how this passion effects the formation of a state. For ‘a hundred’ savage ‘males’, all ‘equally free’, coming together for the first time, having ‘their bellies full’ and no external reason for a dispute, it would take ‘less than half an hour’ for ‘this liking in question’ to ‘appear in the desire of superiority’. In The Fable there had not been any indications of an original drive towards government. Like mushrooms lawgivers simply popped up at a certain point in history with their inflexible laws curbing men’s anger caused by self-love. In Part II, Cleomenes argues that the instinct of sovereignty and self-loving play a dual role in the formation of a civil society, since ‘multitudes could never have been formed into societies, if some of them had not been possessed of this thirst of dominion’. Horatio agrees that underlying a governed society there has to be some ‘peculiar instincts, that belong to a whole species’, which could not be ‘acquired by art or discipline’. The second step to society means that ‘many families could not live long together’ until ‘actuated by the principle’ of self-loving some ‘would strive for superiority’. The apparent dilemma is how could these families desiring to dominate others eventually maintain their superiority?

For once Cleomenes accepts his interlocutor’s suggestion. Horatio is right that the ‘same ambition that made a man aspire to be a leader, would make him likewise desirous of being obeyed in civil matters’. After an unspecified, but considerably long period of time, leaders would eventually

149 Mandeville, Part II, p. 132.
151 Mandeville, Part II, p. 266.
152 Mandeville, Part II, p. 132.
153 Mandeville, Part II, p. 205.
look into ‘human nature’ and realise that ‘the more strife and discord there was amongst the people they headed, the less use they could make of them’.\textsuperscript{155} Underlying this self-interested action is the artificial moral progress that already started with the first generation of wild savages. A chieftain looking into human nature simply means that the maturity of the moral institutions and the historical circumstances are at a sufficient level to establish a civil state. Leaders create ‘prohibitions and penalties’ confirming the conjectural development of justice, which could be rendered effectual only now when the laws were written down.\textsuperscript{156} Thus, ‘the third and last step to society’ is ‘the invention of letters’.\textsuperscript{157}

We may see that this third step towards society is a crux where the main storylines come together. The moral institution of justice, that is a product of the conjoined experience of several generations, only becomes effectual when regulated through prohibitions and penalties that are executed by magistracy. At this point in time politeness is much further away from perfection than justice. This idealised moment of conjectural history marks the actual origin of government. Mandeville’s strong belief is that ‘the undoubted basis of all societies is government’.\textsuperscript{158} According to him, ‘it is inconsistent with the nature of human creatures, that any number of them should ever live together in tolerable concord, without laws or government’.\textsuperscript{159} As plain as it is: ‘No multitudes can live peaceably without government; no government can subsist without laws; and no laws can be effectual long, unless they are wrote down’.\textsuperscript{160} One cannot sufficiently stress the importance of the plural form in the word ‘multitudes’ in the former quote. Mandeville’s focus is on the idea that in the formation of a civil state different family societies are united into a body politic.

An important feature of the connection between the theory of state formation and conjectural development of moral institutions is that the penalties and prohibitions that are created are not arbitrary, but in line with the moral progress made by previous generations. ‘All sound politicks, and the whole art of governing’, according to Mandeville, ‘are entirely built upon the knowledge of human nature’, which is the sole product of the conjectural development of moral institutions. The great business of ‘a politician is to promote, and, if he can, reward all good and useful actions on the one hand; and on the other, to punish, or at least discourage, every thing that is destructive or hurtful to society’.\textsuperscript{161} The politician does not define what is right and wrong. His role is to think of different methods of how to promote sociability. Nevertheless, even this cannot be considered to

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\item \textsuperscript{155} Mandeville, Part II, p. 268.
\item \textsuperscript{156} Mandeville, Part II, p. 268–269.
\item \textsuperscript{157} Mandeville, Part II, p. 269.
\item \textsuperscript{158} Mandeville, Part II, pp. 183–4.
\item \textsuperscript{159} Mandeville, Part II, p. 309.
\item \textsuperscript{160} Mandeville, Part II, p. 269.
\item \textsuperscript{161} Mandeville, Part II, p. 321.
\end{itemize}
be ‘the work of one man, or of one generation’, but like all the other human conventions the art of governing is ‘the joynt labour of several ages’.\footnote{Mandeville, Part II, p. 322.} Laws cannot be arbitrary, if they are based on the preceding convention that is formed following universal principles of redirecting the passions.

What this in its simplicity means, is that even when a perfect legal system might never be found and the ‘best forms of government are subject to revolutions’\footnote{Mandeville, Part II, p. 318.}, ‘the principal laws of all countries have the same tendency’.\footnote{Mandeville, Part II, p. 271.} Every one of them is ‘plainly design’d to ‘cure and disappoint that natural instinct of sovereignty, which teaches man to look upon every thing as centring in himself, and prompts him to put in a claim to every thing, he can lay his hands on’. The ‘obstacles to society’ should not be called as ‘faults’, but ‘rather as ‘properties of our nature’ and all ‘the principal laws’ point at ‘some frailty, defect, or unfitness for society, that men are naturally subject to’.\footnote{Mandeville, Part II, p. 271.} Mandeville repeats on different occasions that the function of ‘the principal laws of all countries’ is that they all ‘are remedies against human frailties’. Pledging his physician background, Mandeville elaborates that these laws ‘are design’d as antidotes, to prevent the ill consequences of some properties, inseparable from our nature; which yet in themselves, without management or restraint, are obstructive and pernicious to society’.\footnote{Mandeville, Part II, p. 283.}

Mandeville scrupulously emphasises the centrality of the role of an established civil society in the conjectural history of society. The slow and painstaking moral progress starts to make rapid advancement. His interpretation is that ‘once men come to be govern’d by written laws, all the rest comes on a-pace’.\footnote{Mandeville, Part II, p. 284.} This change in tempo is noteworthy for different reasons. The formation of a civil society, controlled by written laws and executed by a government, has a serious effect on men. People ‘discover a restless endeavour to make themselves easy, which insensibly teaches them to avoid mischief on all emergencies’. What this means in accordance with the formation of civil society is that ‘when human creatures once submit to government, and are used to live under the restraint of laws, it is incredible, how many useful cautions, shifts, and stratagems, they will learn to practise by experience and imitation, from conversing together’. This remark is connected to a reminder that this happens ‘without’ the particular people ‘being aware of the natural causes, that oblige them to act as they do, viz. The passions within, that, unknown to themselves, govern their will and direct their behaviour’.\footnote{Mandeville, Part II, p. 139.}
The immediate outcome of the written laws is that a system of justice is rendered effective and 'now property, and safety of life and limb, may be secured'. The primary purpose of civil state is thus to provide security for every individual's self-love. In consequence, breakthroughs will occur upon other fronts as well. The general security of individual self-interest 'naturally will forward the love of peace, and make it spread'. This mutual trust in turn considerably advances the commerce between reliable individuals and 'no number of men, when once they enjoy quiet, and no man needs to fear his neighbour, will be long without learning to divide and subdivide their labour'. With regulations on self-love a government is able to stabilize society and its numbers start to grow. This is also the first time that the faculty of reason is adopted in Mandeville's scheme. 'When laws begin to be well known, and the execution of them is facilitated by general approbation, multitudes may be kept in tolerable concord among themselves'. It is then that it appears, and not before, how much the superiority of man's understanding beyond other animals, contributes to his sociableness, which is only retarded by it in his savage state. As we may plausibly infer, Mandeville places much weight on the formation of a civil state that eventually teaches men, as he called it, 'a method of thinking justly'. But no matter how crucial this artificial convention of justice might be, it only confirms one side of the bilateral moral progress. After reaching the culmination of establishing laws and a government, we still have to explore how the overall shift from self-love to self-liking takes place. The formation of a civil state is a crucial moment in history, but we are still far from stepping into a civilised state.

Politicians, politeness and gallantry

The moral progress does not end when the civil society has first been established. An ever-developing legislative system that provides security for every individual's self-love is a landmark in the history of moral institutions, but we are still far from the emergence of a truly civilised person, who has been 'educated in a society, a civil establishment, of several hundred years standing'. I will concentrate on this idea of change by examining the modern development towards politeness presented in Part II and its connection to voluntary servitude. I will also pay attention to the new role of politicians and to the link between the modern customs of honour and adultery, which, in their highly polemical nature, are the best examples of the social shift from self-love to self-liking.

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169 Mandeville, Part II, p. 284.
170 Mandeville, Part II, p. 300.
171 Mandeville, Part II, p. 219, see also p. 236 where Mandeville talks about how long it will take until men are 'capable of thinking justly'.
172 Mandeville, Part II, p. 301.
When describing the civilising process, Mandeville was fully aware of the social theories that emphasised self-preservation, in fact, he was earlier in the process of developing such a theory himself. What Mandeville offers in his later works is an alternative to these accounts. The problem with such theories was that they understood self-preservation solely in terms of preserving life. Reason was usually stressed in one way or the other as the element triggering the progress towards civility. Mandeville critically emphasises that self-preservation, or self-love in this sense, is not the passion that men follow when they have the least dint of civility. Civilised men are not governed by reason or by primitive appetites. Their motivating passion is self-liking. Mandeville describes politeness as a social change that highlights the turn from a savage state based on self-love to a civil society founded on self-liking.

Being governable in Mandeville’s terms means that a man is, in spite of everything, yielded to servitude. People are ‘reconciled to submission’. Regardless of this submissive state, Mandeville maintains that men are able to take advantage of their condition and are satisfied in their servitude. How is this possible? When we remember the new concepts that Mandeville coins – self-liking and the instinct of sovereignty – we can recognise the difference between being submissive and being governable that Mandeville is after. When a man is rendered governable he has to compromise his ‘domineering spirit’. He cannot roam free and indulge his natural liberty at will. He has to curb the natural inclinations that arise from self-love. But a man still has his self-liking to indulge and it does not mean that the instinct of sovereignty is pulled out of a man’s heart. The cornerstone of civility is that men start to cultivate their self-liking. It is ‘the management of self-liking’ that ‘set forth the excellency of our species beyond all other animals’.  

A crucial factor confirming Mandeville’s idea of the shift from self-love to self-liking is the new role he bestows on politicians in Part II. In the version of the history of civil society given in the original Fable, politicians were described as ruthless men, who suffocated men’s primal passions at will. Mandeville emphasized that it was ‘the first care’ of all governments to inflict ‘severe punishments’ in order to ‘curb’ a man’s hurtful anger. He later enhances this argument considerably. In Origin of honour, Cleomenes emphasises that ‘the first business of all governments’ and the actual ‘task which all rulers must begin with’ is ‘to make men tractable and obedient’. There is only one way to do this effectively. ‘Human nature ought to be humoured as well as studied.’ Whoever ‘takes upon him to govern a multitude’ has to ‘inform himself of those sentiments that are the natural result of the passions and frailties which every human creature is born with’. A politician has to be skilful enough to make use of the ‘fear of the

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173 Mandeville, Part II, p. 175.  
175 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 20.
invisible cause' inherent to all men. He has to come up with the different measures of how to discourage men's instinct of sovereignty and make them labour for the common interest. The lesson that a politician has to learn is that 'all human creatures are swayed by their passions'. It does not matter how 'fine notions we may flatter our selves with'. Even the ones who act suitably to their knowledge, and strictly follow the dictates of their reason, are not less compelled so to do by some passion or other, that sets them to work, than others, who bid defiance and act contrary to both, and whom we call slaves to their passions'. The difference is that civilised people know the principles that they have to follow in order to be able to manage self-liking. Whereas the ones who are slaves to their passions do not. Already in the first dialogues Cleomenes fully endorses this new role of the politicians. He reminds us that 'all lawgivers have two main points to consider'. Firstly, 'what things will procure happiness to the society under their care' and 'secondly, what passions and properties there are in man's nature, that may either promote or obstruct this happiness'. Cleomenes attempts to teach his friend an important lesson about governing. It is his firm contention that a multitude cannot be forced to 'believe contrary to what they feel, or what contradicts a passion inherent in their nature'. But, by the same token, 'if you humour that passion, and allow it to be just, you may regulate it as you please'. This, of course, means the management of self-liking.

As I have tried to show, in the original Fable politeness was outlined as a significant aid for an individual to promote his self-interest. Most importantly it was represented as a technique that would permit a person to hypocritically benefit from social relations. In Part II, politeness is still perceived as artificial but even if politeness could at times directly contribute to one's self-interest this is not prescribed as its main function. The significance of the revisions that Mandeville makes to his theory of civility is that now he is able to give a plausible explanation for why politeness is the central moral institution that renders people governable and upholds modern society. Politeness is a practise that benefits society as a whole. It is the only way to successfully control the instinct of sovereignty and without it a multitude cannot possibly be governed as a body politic. Politeness is an integral part of the process towards refinement and the reason why we may talk about civilised society in the first place.

In Part II, Mandeville is still preoccupied with the concept of anger, but this time only when describing the break between barbarity and civility. 'Man in his anger behaves himself in the same manner as other animals'. In his 'pursuit of self-preservation' he will disturb those who he is angry with.

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177 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 31.
178 Mandeville, Part II, p. 275.
Thus, he will try to either ‘destroy, or cause pain and displeasure to’ his ‘adversaries’.\(^{180}\) This is natural for a man. Mandeville never changes his definition of anger, which is said to arise from self-love (mainly, hunger or lust). According to Cleomenes, we may ‘observe’ also ‘in infants of two or three months old’ the presence of an ‘instinct, something implanted in the frame’ that ‘raises their anger, which is easily and at most times unaccountably provoked; often by hunger, pain, and other inward ailments’.\(^{181}\) Mandeville is not trying to argue that men in a civil society are sincerely peaceful. People are still affected by their instinct of sovereignty and they are continuously crossed in the business of self-preservation, but now their passions are described to be operating in a different way.

The use of ‘ill language’ or insults is a prime example of how some ‘half-civilized’ individuals give ‘vent to their anger’ that is too ‘troublesome’ for them ‘to stifle and conceal’. The ‘obvious, ready and unstudied manner of venting and expressing anger, which nature teaches’ is to come to blows. If someone ‘called another rogue and rascal’, this would have been accompanied in an uncivilised state with knocking the adversary down. Thus in a society where ‘people call names, without doing further injury’ this is not only ‘a sign’ that they have laws ‘against open force and violence’, but it is also an indication that there has been a significant change concerning men, since they are obeying these laws in the first place. Cleomenes emphasises that men in a functioning society do not necessarily submit to laws because of ‘self-denial’.\(^{182}\) Neither do they exclusively restrain from the use of violence because they have realised that it is within their self-interest. They are still governed by their passions, no matter how capable they were in using their understanding. Hence, there has been a change concerning the operation of their passions. The reason why men do not fight is that they are moved by another passion that is able to overcome the instinct of sovereignty directing their self-love.

The people using foul language are called ‘half-civilised’ because they are expressing their antagonism even if this is solely done through words. A fully civilised man never vents his anger because he feels that his self-liking is superior to his self-love. If he emits his natural passion (anger), this would lessen his self-liking since his audience would find this unpleasant. In this light, it is comprehensible that Cleomenes maintains that politeness ‘in its original’ was ‘a plain shift to avoid fighting, and the ill consequences of it’.\(^{183}\)

All men born in a society start to cultivate self-liking. As we recall, Mandeville describes that this passion had two vital components. Men involuntarily value themselves above their real worth. Nevertheless, they have some sort of a notion of the fact that they do actually misjudge their

\(^{180}\) Mandeville, Part II, p. 271.
\(^{181}\) Mandeville, Part II, p. 295.
\(^{182}\) Mandeville, Part II, p. 295.
\(^{183}\) Mandeville, Part II, p. 295.
value and this makes them very fond of the audience’s approval. The best way to seek the good opinion of others is by mutual discretions. Since everyone thinks, in a way or another, too highly of themselves, we are not to reveal this passion in public. Only then there is enough room for everyone to look for different ways to cultivate the notions of their own worth. In short, Mandeville fully endorses the long established tradition of renaissance court civility. In his second attempt to theorise about civil society, the advancement of politeness is presented to be equivalent to the development of civil society.

Mandeville portrays politeness as a refining circle. According to Cleomenes, ‘life is one continued scene of hypocrisy!’ There is nothing inappropriate in this. The true object of pride or vain-glory is ‘the opinion of others’. This is highly beneficial to society, since the ‘more pride’ men ‘have and the greater value they set on the esteem of others, the more they’ll make it their study, to render themselves acceptable to all they converse with’. If a man stops adorning himself, the effects are drastic to the person itself and to society. The more dependent men become on their self-liking and the opinion of others, the further they drift away from the need to vent their anger. At the same time, self-liking and politeness are rooted even deeper in the society. The doctrine of good manners is described to teach ‘a thousand lessons against the various appearances and outward symptoms of pride’, but it has nothing against passion itself. True gentlemen go to the lengths of taking ‘uncommon pains to conceal and stifle in their bosoms every thing, which their good sense tells them ought not to be seen or understood’. Thus, they try to give the impression that their artificial way of behaving is actually natural. The manners have to seem genuine. Simultaneously, ‘when men are well-accomplished, they are’ in fact ‘ashamed of the lowest steps, from which they rose to that perfection’. Hence, ‘the more civilized they are, the more they think it injurious, to have their nature seen, without the improvements that have been made upon it’. Some of the courtiers were even able to deceive themselves and to believe that their mannerly tricks epitomise their sincerely refined nature.

Mandeville emphasises that a man ‘naturally loves to imitate what he sees others do’. Human understanding has little to do with the civilizing process. Most importantly, ‘experience and imitation’ teach men ‘to act as

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184 Mandeville, Part II, p. 130.
186 Mandeville, Part II, p. 80.
187 Mandeville, Part II, p. 64.
188 Mandeville, Part II, p. 65.
189 Mandeville, Part II, p. 66.
190 Mandeville, Part II, p. 65.
191 Mandeville, Part II, p. 303.
192 Mandeville, Part II, p. 284.
they do’. Beau monde functions ‘in all countries’ as ‘the undoubted refiners of language’ and most parts of society try to imitate their example the best they can. The emphasis should lie on ‘most parts of the society’ because self-liking could easily operate in other ways as well. ‘Some men’ might ‘indulge their pride in being shameless’. According to Cleomenes, it is self-evident that the ‘man of honour and one that has none,’ both act ‘from the same principle’. At the same time, the role of education and government turns out to be highly crucial in civil society. There is nothing that some men may not be taught to be ashamed of. The same passion, that makes the well-bred man and prudent officer value and secretly admire themselves for the honour and fidelity they display, may make the rake and scoundrel brag of their vices and boast of their impudence.

Living in a society simply renders men depended upon it. When even the rogues are motivated through pride, it is fundamental for a society to diminish its outward expressions. Politeness is an important custom that teaches men to ‘play’ pride ‘against itself’. As Cleomenes proposes, men have to be ‘allowed to change the natural home-bred symptoms’ of pride, ‘for artificial foreign ones’. When all the possible efforts are taken regarding dress and appearance, the gentlefolk are also distanced from the natural expressions of self-love. This does not mean that men are not affected by hunger or lust. They continuously use their understanding and look for different ways how to please themselves and make their lives easy. But when people try to artificially appear pleasing in commerce to others, society is able to function. The question Mandeville tries to answer is how a society may realistically operate and not what an imaginary society founded on something else than human nature might look like.

It is an undeniable truth, according to Cleomenes, ‘that the valour and steadiness of men of honour are the grand support of all states and kingdoms’. It is just ‘as unquestionable’ that ‘not only the peace and tranquillity, and all the blessings we enjoy, but likewise the king’s crown and safety would be precarious without’ men of honour. Thus, ‘all wise princes, magistrates and governours’ will ‘take all the imaginable care’ to ‘cultivate and encourage the most noble principle of honour’ and ‘to encrease the numbers of the worthy professors of it, by favouring and on all occasions shewing them the most tender affection, as well as highest esteem’. Honour is the key principle that underlies courtly society, as Markku Peltonen has recently shown.

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193 Mandeville, Part II, p. 139.
195 Mandeville, Part II, p. 91.
196 Mandeville, Part II, p. 90
197 Mandeville, Part II, p. 125.
198 Mandeville, Part II, p. 300.
200 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 72.
never vanish from the civil society, but it could be redirected and managed by artful government and principles, which might not be virtuous, but are in reality beneficial to the society.

Alongside duelling, the custom of gallantry was often criticised as immoral in early-modern Britain. In fact, sometimes gallantry and adultery are taken as synonyms. The anonymous author of Essay upon modern gallantry starts the tract by stating that there cannot 'be a stronger proof of the degeneracy of this age, than the state of modern gallantry', which according to the writer is 'a total dissolution of manners, attended with the basest and most dishonourable practises'. The given definition of gallantry remarks that 'the modern sense of that word, is to be understood, a constant application to the good works of adultery and fornication'. This new custom is not exclusively to be blamed. The 'modern authors' have furnished the fops 'with excellent arguments', which 'certain late assemblies' have given 'proper opportunities to enforce'. As the author rather bluntly puts it, 'the sole business of all our late diversions, the whole tune of most modern books, and the subject of polite conversation seems calculated for this end'. In short, the essay is directed to tackle the arguments that justify adultery by promoting modern gallantry, 'the introduction of foreign customs, and the influence of too general an example'.

In contrast, gallantry is praised by some authors for providing a considerable refinement on manners, since gentlemen have to go to the extremes in their courtesies to please the ladies. Some think that gallantry, along with honour, is a constituent of politeness. As I have tried to show, when considering the natural appetite of lust in The Fable of the Bees, Mandeville's remarks were contradictory. He attempted to justify a notion derived from the tradition of court civility claiming that lust has to be concealed in modern society. But because the foundation of his project was the hobbist idea of self-preservation, he came to insist that women have to keep their natural passions at awe and try to curb lust by all means. It had not yet occured to him that women might be proud not to indulge their natural appetites. In Part II, Cleomenes solves these problems by construing an original theory about civility. Mandeville is finally able to fully endorse the arguments set forth by the renaissance tradition of courtesy.

In his 'Preface' to Part II, Mandeville alludes that the arguments about to take place are in agreement with the principles of civility described by the

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202 For a recent study of this topic, see Davidson, Hypocrisy and the politics of politeness, 2004, pp. 46–75. For a recent study of the cultural history of adultery in this period that however does not discuss Mandeville, see Turner, David, M., Fashioning adultery. Gender, sex and civility in England, 1660–1740, Cambridge University Press, 2002.


204 [Anon.], A n essay upon modern gallantry, 1726, pp. 10–11.

205 [Anon.], A n essay upon modern gallantry, 1726, p. 11.

206 [Anon.], A n essay upon modern gallantry, 1726, p. 9.
‘court-philosophers’. Mandeville had corrected his account and was able to accentuate that ‘a civil behaviour among the fair in publick, and a deportment, inoffensive both in words and actions, is all the chastity, the polite world requires in men’.

In the first part of *The Fable*, Mandeville had tried to justify the point he was about to make. A gentleman’s ‘reputation’ would never suffer, regardless of what ‘liberties’ he granted ‘himself in private’, as long as ‘nothing criminal can ever be proved upon him’.

Nevertheless, he had previously failed to connect these notions with the theory of civility that he was promoting.

The theoretical issue at hand, the ‘too general an example’, is how to behave in the presence of women in general. The translator of François Bruys’ *The art of knowing women* notes that ‘the French’ have ‘made the knowledge of women an art’. ‘Vanity’ is the ‘distinguishing characteristic’ of women, causing the distressing fact that all the real ‘principles are in a state of corruption’.

According to Bruys, ‘flattery’, incompatible with truth, ‘nourishes the vanity of women’. In consequence, ‘the best of people are dupes and slaves to their pride and vanity’. But when reflecting on infidelity in a section entitled ‘Dissertation concerning adultery’ Bruys’ surprisingly drops his moral criticism and notes that ‘since custom will have it so, should I pretend to moralise upon it, I might only be laughed at for my pains’. Whether pejoratively or not, Bruys concludes that ‘there is no quality more necessary in a husband, than an entire indifference as to his wife’s behaviour’.

According to Mandeville, adultery is a common and somewhat harmless practice if it is kept a secret. When Horatio tries to pursue the rationalist point that the ‘end of love, between the different sexes, in all animals, is the preservation of their species’, Cleomenes retorts with a grim remark. If one takes a glimpse at a savage, one would realise that ‘he propagates, before he knows the consequences of it’. Not even the ‘most civilised pair, in the most chaste of their embraces, ever act from the care of their species, as a real principle’. Nevertheless, a civilised person is not forlornly besieged with his natural appetites. His vanity dictates his actions. Natural appetites are of course present and difficult to overcome. Lust has to be concealed. ‘Pride’ produces ‘the honour in women’, which has ‘no other object than their chastity’. Hence, the gallantry shown to the ladies has to be as discrete

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207 Mandeville, Part II, p. 12.
209 François Bruys, *The art of knowing women*: or, the female sex dissected, in a faithful representation of their virtues and vices. London, 1729, p. 2.
211 Bruys, *The art of knowing women*, 1729, p. 23.
214 Bruys, *The art of knowing women*, 1729, p. 163.
216 Mandeville, Part II, p. 228.
and refined as possible. Women always have to look like they have kept their ‘jewel entire’. In this manner they will ‘apprehend no shame’. If they have ‘sinned in private’ they will do whatever it takes ‘to hide’ this frailty ‘from the world’. The actual practise of adultery never sees daylight. Simultaneously, the manners are refined.

When adultery is considered a part of the institution of politeness and under social control, it is viewed in a different light than what the Christian perspective provided. In Mandeville’s conjectural history a pivotal role is given to the idea that the instinct of sovereignty may be redirected in ways that eventually benefit society. In any case, the custom of gallantry, at least in theory, seldom results in actual adultery, since the proudest women are as cautious as possible regarding their chastity. Thus, truly civilised women are too vain to indulge their natural appetites even if they have an opportunity for getting away with their crime.

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PART II: DAVID HUME AND GREATNESS OF MIND

‘As the mutual shocks, in society, and the oppositions of interest and self-love have constrained mankind to establish the laws of justice; in order to preserve the advantages of mutual assistance and protection: In like manner, the eternal contrarieties, in company, of men’s pride and self-conceit, have introduced the rules of GOOD MANNERS or POLITENESS; in order to facilitate the intercourse of minds, and an undisturbed commerce and conversation.’

– David Hume, Enquiry concerning the principles of morals, 1751
4. Portrait of a gentleman

The purpose of the second half of this dissertation is to explain how Hume’s conception of greatness of mind is linked to the idea of self-liking, which Hume introduced in Enquiry concerning the principles of morals as ‘the sentiment of conscious worth, the self-satisfaction proceeding from a review of man’s own conduct and character’ which is ‘the most common of all others’, yet it ‘has no proper name in our language’. As we recall, in his Origin of honour, Mandeville discussed ‘Means which Men by Conversing together have found out to please and gratify one another on Account of a palpable Passion in our Nature, that has no Name, and which therefore I call self-liking’. Also on another occasion Mandeville emphasised that when this passion is kept out of sight it has ‘no name’, even when men act ‘from that and from no other principle’. When Hume’s own definition of this passion that has no name is compared to Mandeville’s, it is beyond doubt that Hume had Mandeville’s later works in mind when structuring the social theory of his Treatise.

Allan Ramsay jr. painted his first portrait of David Hume in 1754. This portrait is not as famous as Ramsay’s later twin study of Hume and Rousseau that carries an obvious load of political and intellectual weight. Although Ramsay’s friendship with Hume and his later portrait have gathered justifiable attention, little has been written on the earlier portrait aside from the fairly straightforward discussion on it by Alastair Smart in

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1 EPM Appendix 4.3; SBN 314. In the footnote Hume added: ‘the term, pride, is commonly taken in a bad sense; but this sentiment seems indifferent, and may be either good or bad, according as it is well or ill founded, and according to the other circumstances which accompany it. The French express this sentiment by the term, amour propre, but as they also express self-love as well as vanity, by the same term, there arises thence a great confusion in Rochefoucault, and many of their moral writers’.


3 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 3.

PORTRAIT OF A GENTLEMAN

his monographs and catalogue relating to Allan Ramsay. However, this early portrait is a document revealing something of Hume's philosophical position.

The painting features a healthy looking Hume, who had just finished publishing his Political Discourses and the first part of History, gazing past the spectator. The portrait was painted right after Hume had, for the second and last time in 1751-2, tried and ‘failed to get professorships at Scotland’s leading universities’. When Hume sat for Ramsay, it was clear that he was never to advance an academic career. The few remarks in secondary literature on the painting assume a scholarly nature of the setting, which in fact is not apparent. Any reference to the cap that Hume is wearing being a “scholar’s cap” or that the image of Hume would somehow represent his scholarly character are simply false. On the surface, there is nothing in the painting that distinguishes Hume from any other fashionable person of the time (regardless whether it was a man of learning or not).

Hume’s clothing is however significantly symbolic. The turban-like cap is an important part of Hume’s outfit. The clothing is an example of the East Indian fashion, increasingly popular among the up-to-date Europeans and peaking in the 1770s. The portrait surfaces Hume’s lifelong desire to be looked upon as a fashionable man. Hume was dressed à la mode already when he came back from France. Miss Elizabeth Mure in her ‘Remarks on the change of manners in Scotland during the 18th century’ recalls Hume returning to Britain in the late 1730s with his French cut jackets. Elizabeth’s father, Hume’s dear friend Baron Mure, was himself very much in favour of the French style of education and later Hume himself took much care of the education of his own nephew, as well as the Baron Mure’s children.

As such, the 1754 painting could be taken to have no hidden agenda. From a perspective of an innocent eighteenth-century Parisian spectator,

5 I would like to thank Douglas Fordham for confirming this in private correspondence. Smart is Ramsay’s biographer. For a summary of Smart’s works on Ramsay, see Fordham, ‘Allan Ramsay’s enlightenment’, 2006, footnote 11.


8 It seems that Mure, not Adam Smith, was Hume’s dearest friend. Smith was certainly important to Hume in the sense of an intellectual equal by merit and accomplishment, but friendship is not only about being at the same intellectual level, even if you are a philosopher. The editor of the Caldwell papers points out that ‘the correspondence’ that was commenced between Hume and Mure in 1742 ‘was maintained through the remainder of their lives. Sir Gilbert [Elliot] and David Hume, as they were among the earliest, are described by Mr. Mure, at a late period of his life, as his two best friends.’ Mure, Caldewell papers, Glasgow, 1854, I, part II, p. 28.

9 Mure, Caldwell papers, Glasgow, 1854, I, part I, p. 42.
for example, the turban-like cap simply replaces a wig protecting Hume’s shaved head. But the painting features a man who often masked his own opinions even in his philosophical works and the painter of the portrait was his cheeky friend.\textsuperscript{10} There is something concealed behind Hume’s muted smile and his Oriental style clothing did also function at different levels. What was innocuous in Paris carried a different meaning in the Highlands. Hume’s outfit was first of all, a message to all the authors who condemned luxury and its eastern origins. In Hume’s case, wrapping oneself (literally) in Ottoman clothing when the East Indian fashion had only started to become popular in Europe in the 1750s was not a religiously neutral message either.

Even when Hume’s position in the luxury debate is obvious and his general attitude towards the clergy outright provocative, there is a more nuanced and perhaps more interesting message that the painting set forward. Ramsay cropped Hume’s lower body and the bulk of his arms from the painting so that the focus is on Hume’s chest. Hume’s head is slightly turned and he is looking past the viewer, which is common in Ramsay’s portraits. But what is unconventional in this type of setting in a male portrait is that Hume’s shoulders are geometrically lined in front of the viewer so that the viewer’s eyes are immediately clasped to his chest.\textsuperscript{11} The main effect of the painting is the dualism that the resonance between Hume’s caftan-like, plain coat and the underlying lavishly decorated silk shirt implies. Symbolically this presentation of Hume’s chest is the dualism between a man’s outer and inner parts and the painting can be seen to mark a redefinition of the concept of greatness of mind (from a more cynical perspective one might also add that these artistic choices make Hume look less plump).

On the surface, this part of the outfit, of course, also functions as an epitome of a very distinctive feature of Ottoman dress: the idea of layering.

\textsuperscript{10} About Ramsay’s “cheekiness” one can read his letters. For example, notice the excessive irony in a letter from Allan Ramsay to David Hume on 13 March 1756, NLS, MS. 23156. Ramsay’s stand on luxury was blunt: ‘Can a Man, a Philosopher, be both sorry and glad at the same time? If the thing is possible, I am in those circumstances. For I am glad to hear that there is any society of men amongst you who have a particular attention to the improvement of the arts of Luxury, so conducive to the riches, the strength and liberty of our dear Country; but am afraid at the same time that this Scheme, by bringing in a new set of Members of another Species, will destroy that which we had set on foot’. Also, Ramsay commends Hume’s extremely negative description of Shakespeare – especially, when Ramsay himself had advised Hume regarding it: ‘The Character of Shakespeare, which, as it stood in the Manuscript was subject to much exception, has now become one of the shining parts of the work, by the means of the two paragraphs which you have since inserted for its introduction; and looking upon them as the consequence of my advice, I felt as much vanity in reading them as if I had been their Writer.’

\textsuperscript{11} Out of the 87 portraits associated with Ramsay and viewable in the National Gallery’s website, most male portraits follow a similar pattern in which, if the head is turned and the eyes are not directed at the viewer, the position of the body is similarly aligned.
Ramsay did not paint Hume’s sleeves, but the neck and the open front of the coat give us a glimpse of the sumptuous underlying garment. At the same time, the portrait also paints a picture with a more subtle meaning about greatness of mind. It is the outer garment, the plain-buttoned caftan, which barely covers, but yet smooths out the lavish silk decorations underneath, that dominates the portrait. The caftan is like politeness topping and covering man’s pride, which is one principle of a broader concept of greatness of mind that Hume studied in all of his published and unpublished works from pre-Treatise times onwards, as we will soon learn.

The color of the caftan is equally important. The thick and heavy garment of the coat is red. An eighteenth-century dictionary defined ‘Gules’, derived from Persian origin, as ‘Red, or Vermilion Colour, which signifies greatness of Mind, Courage, Generosity, &c.’. When we understand that the concept of greatness of mind is the lynchpin of Hume’s moral and political philosophy, we start to pay more attention to these details. In short, one way to look at it is that Allan Ramsay jr. painted David Hume in 1754 to embody greatness of mind, which was a key concept for David Hume the philosopher.

Greatness of mind, David Hume and previous scholarship

Greatness of mind has gathered some attention in Hume scholarship. Amongst the more recent works, Katie Abramson’s idea is that greatness of mind is the ‘all-important link between Hume’s view about moral evaluation and the questions about moral motivation’. She perceptively identifies some of the problems of the standard interpretations of greatness of mind, but then attempts to change greatness of mind into strength of mind missing the point about self-liking, self-conceit and pride in accordance to Hume’s redefinition of greatness of mind and its context. As Abramson points out, the section entitled ‘Of greatness of mind’ of the Treatise is ‘commonly read as a mere illustration of the principles of Humean moral

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As I will try to demonstrate, much more was at stake. My purpose is to make a comprehensive and detailed analysis of greatness of mind as a general concept that offers us a more thorough understanding of David Hume's moral and political philosophy.

Greatness of mind in scholarship is generally a vague concept – often used, but seldom defined. A general image of it is the idea of magnanimity or greatness of soul along Aristotelian lines. Even when Aristotle has much to say about human excellence, I think we are better off reading Hume without tying him too closely to the relevant passages of the Nichomachean Ethics. My reading of greatness of mind and other aspects of Hume's thinking stands in contrast, for example, with a common view expressed by one commentator, who emphatically writes that 'Hume is a virtue ethicist, albeit one in modern dress, who, poised between the ancients and moderns, self-consciously chose to align himself with the ancient tradition, asserting its superiority over the modern'. What I will be arguing is that Hume did in fact the exact opposite and self-consciously presented a view that stood in contrast with what we understand as the ancient tradition.

Abramson reads Hume's account of greatness of mind in accordance with Aristotle's conception of megalopsuchia and Cicero's vision of magnitudo animi. What I will be arguing is that we should make a distinction between the Aristotelian understanding of magnanimity and the Ciceronian understanding of greatness of mind. My emphasis will be on the role of Cicero for early modern conception of greatness of mind. I will argue that particularly the Ciceronian line functions as a counterpart for David Hume's redefinition of the concept, which he intentionally formed to counter this tradition along the example set by Bernard Mandeville. I also believe that at the level of personal history, we should link Hume's crisis at the end of the 1720s directly to this struggle over the idea of greatness of mind. Hume did indeed realise the importance of greatness of mind while reading the classical sources and modern spins of the Ciceronian greatness of mind. However, the intellectual and physical crisis changed Hume's perception of the world and led (in accordance with other sceptical leanings) to the redefinition of greatness of mind – literally embodied in the Dialogue and symbolically in the 1754 portrait of David Hume himself.

The general tendency of modelling Hume into a virtue ethicist in line with the ancient tradition leads to further misconception. Modern scholars are 'increasingly convinced that Hume's Treatise was, in part, a normative project'. Katie Abramson also reads Book 3 of the Treatise as a normative
undertaking. What I will try to show is that in order to understand the 'Of Morals' – part of the Treatise, we should not read it as a normative project. On the contrary, we need to read it as a descriptive account of human nature and conjectural development of moral principles and civil society. This misconstruction also leads Abramson to make a case of greatness of mind as a general disposition with a strong link to strength of mind and a vague idea of goodness, which I believe is wrong. By and large, the recent fixation upon Hume’s supposed normative project ends in an attempt to turn greatness of mind into an all-encompassing meta-virtue, incorporating all the possible attributes and sub-virtues into strength of mind.

Another common feature of Hume scholarship is to somehow reject the warlike connotations of greatness of mind and pride. This can be accomplished, for example, by putting a strong emphasis on the point that Hume ‘would never agree that greatness of soul arises only from pride in one’s military courage and heroism’. It seems that to underline any warlike features of greatness of mind would somehow be unworthy of a philosopher of Hume’s stratum. Perhaps, this is also the reason why the fact that Hume had a military career (he was a secretary to General St Clair, wore the uniform of an officer, and accompanied the general on an expedition in 1745) is often ignored in the history of philosophy. Andrew Sabl, for example, underestimates the serious implication that military heroism actually plays in Hume’s works. Sabl, instead, emphasises the Ciceronian motivation for public service. Even when there are certain ironic tendencies in Hume’s treatment of greatness of mind with regard to the stock example of Alexander the Great, it was in fact crucial for Hume’s moral and political philosophy that the concept of greatness of mind retained its warlike connotations. This does not exclude the fact that the role of humanity becomes increasingly important in Enquiry concerning the principles of morals, as I will try to show towards the end of my study, but humanity cannot be realised without enabling courage to flourish in some artificial manner. This is why pride and its link to military courage and heroism is something that Hume would embellish and not ignore. Pride and warlike courage formed one of the main arguments in Hume’s case against the Christian and republican authors who used Cicero’s conception of greatness of mind as the basis of their moral and political philosophy.

Cicero and the disposition to be great

What is greatness of mind? A general preliminary remark that we can make before studying the different uses of this difficult concept, is that greatness of mind generally implies a disposition. Greatness of mind is not a duty. It is not a virtue as such. And as a concept it is much broader than for

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example courage (being courageous is usually seen as part of having greatness of mind). In short, greatness of mind is a disposition to act in a certain manner, which naturally makes it difficult to pin down. For the history of early modern political thought, the most important classical source using it as a disposition was Cicero’s *De Officiis*. Especially in the third book of the *Offices*, Cicero gives us a definition that set the standard for magnanimity and greatness of soul for centuries to come. I will consider Cicero’s the *Offices* in more detail shortly. Regarding the early modern examples implying that greatness of mind is a disposition, I would like to only mention Pierre Charron at this point, who in his important early sixteenth-century book *Of wisdom* defined ‘Greatness of Mind’ as a ‘universal Temper’. A somewhat virtue-oriented compiler of the Gentleman’s library on his behalf reminded his readers that it is the ‘Honesty of Disposition, which always argues true Greatness of Mind’. This use of greatness of mind as a disposition has been noticed in Hume scholarship. One commentator has eloquently stated that ‘Greatness of mind is not a particular virtue, but a category of what Hume refers to as the “heroic” virtues’.

Greatness of mind was also a disposition that the authors of contested perspectives would praise. Rochefoucauld had a maxim claiming that ‘Greatness of Mind sets off Merit, as good dressing does handsome Persons’. Spéctator wrote that greatness of mind ‘attracts the Admiration and Esteem of all who behold it’. Nevertheless, we will shortly learn that while its amiability and dispositional quality were commonly acknowledged attributes, the actual implication of greatness of mind turned out to be a contested issue. My purpose is not to make a definitive analysis of Cicero’s use of magnanimity or greatness of mind as such (especially when I will be attempting to show that Hume’s use of greatness of mind implies a view strongly emphasising that this disposition of mind did not exist in Cicero’s time). Nevertheless it is useful for us to start our discussion with the *Offices*. Cicero, and particularly his *Offices*, has proved to be a fertile source of

22 It goes without saying that magnanimity was a concept discussed by all the classical authors from Aristotle onwards. However, for the points that I am about to make regarding Hume, we ought to concentrate on Cicero. One could of course make a different choice as well. For example, Solomon, ‘Hume on “Greatness of soul”’, 2000, p. 129 takes Aristotle’s views on “great-souled man” as the starting point of his treatment of greatness of mind in Hume. I obviously disagree and claim that in order to understand Hume’s redefinition of greatness of mind we need to see how it stands in contrast with the Ciceronian tradition of greatness of mind, instead of the Aristotelian use of the concept. These “traditions” and different uses naturally coincide, but I still think that there is a crucial point in reading them in this contextual sense.


different interpretations of human nature. The variety of reading the
influence of Cicero ranges from the typical Stoic perspective to a more
sceptical way of looking at Cicero’s influence that might even befit David

In the Offices, the basic framework of a man is relatively simple.\footnote{For this brief recap of the Ciceronian principles I have used the L’Estrange translation (Marcus Tullius Cicero, Tully’s offices, in three books. Translated into English, By Sir R. L’Estrange. The sixth edition, revised throughout, and carefully corrected according to the Latin original, London, 1720) instead of the Cockman edition (Cicero, Marcus Tullius, Tully’s offices, in English. The third edition, revised and corrected. By Mr. Tho. Cockman, London, 1714) because of the familiar booksellers involved in the L’Estrange edition (Tonson, Knaplock, Strahan, Ballard, Mears). The assumption being, that this connection to Mandeville (and Hume) might take us indirectly closer to these philosophers.} There are certain qualities that are common to all living creatures and others that set a man apart from the rest of the animals. In the Offices, Cicero stresses that ‘All Living Creatures’, including men, ‘are Originally mov’d by a Natural Instinct, toward the means of Self-preservation’. This instinct, not only of self-preservation - but also the instinct of what man interprets as means of self-preservation, leaving room for misattributions of what self-preservation actually implies - extends from ‘the Defence of their Lives, and Bodies; the Avoidance of things hurtful to them; the search, and provision of all Necessaries for Life’ to ‘The Appetite to Propagating and Continuing their Kind’ in accordance with ‘a certain Care, and Tenderness for their Issue’.\footnote{Cicero, Offices, (Sir R. L’Estrange), 1720, pp. 7–8.} While this broad understanding of self-preservation is presented as the first clause for a living creature, what sets a man apart from animals for Cicero is the human bid for glory. In fact, this quest for glory is the cornerstone of Cicero’s thinking. ‘Where is the Man’, Cicero ponders, ‘who after all his hazards, and Travels, does not desire, and expect Glory, as a reward of his Adventures?’\footnote{Cicero not only emphasises that all men desire glory, but he also uses greatness of mind in a sense that there really is true glory and all the hazards and travels could not have been undertaken in vain. The contrast, for example, with Hobbes’s later definition of glory as joy of being foremost in comparison to others (or, plainly put, power) is palpable. This in turn gives Cicero a foundation to base his psychological principles on the high-minded idea of human dignity.} Cicero not only emphasises that all men desire glory, but he also uses greatness of mind in a sense that there really is true glory and all the hazards and travels could not have been undertaken in vain. The contrast, for example, with Hobbes’s later definition of glory as joy of being foremost in comparison to others (or, plainly put, power) is palpable.\footnote{For Hobbes’s notion of glory, see Gabriella Slomp, ‘Hobbes on glory and civil strife’, in The Cambridge companion to Hobbes’s Leviathan, Patricia Springborg, ed., Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 181–199 and especially Slomp, Thomas Hobbes and the political philosophy of glory, London: Macmillan/ New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000.}
The centre of Cicero’s understanding of dignity, which in short means the extent of the range of actions that are worthwhile for a man to undertake, is indeed this ‘Noble, and Exalted Mind’. This implies ‘a Mind advanced to the Contempt of Fortune, and Worldly things’. The image of an elevated hero looking down on fortune is the cornerstone of Ciceronian dignity. The idea of movement (or progress that the mind makes) is also important. For Cicero greatness of mind is a disposition founded on the idea that true ‘Virtue’ is ‘to be reputed the most Glorious’. Greatness of mind is this exalted disposition ‘from whence all Virtues, and Duties flow’. In other words, Cicero gives a man a natural sense of autonomy and the ability of self-rule due to our greatness of mind. It facilitates our reading that Cicero underlines that in the end there are in effect two central qualities that characterise greatness as ‘a Disposition of Mind’. The first one is a peculiar ‘despise’ for ‘outward things’ and, the second quality is that a man only ‘attempts things Great, and mighty Profitable; but withal, very difficult, laborious, and dangerous’. These two aspects will naturally produce glory.

Now, all of these three attributes (contempt of unimportant things, attempt of great things and glory that naturally follows) imply that there really is something identical to true virtue and real glory. Achieving true greatness will naturally render us powerful also in comparison to others who are less fortunate in their actions. However, it is the glory and virtue per se that we seek when setting off to our journeys. Hence, power does not seem to motivate a Ciceronian man. For Cicero, magnanimity is the disposition to act according to the dictates of an elevated mind. This, however, leaves many doors open and as we will see, each door could serve a different purpose for later commentators. From a more sceptical perspective, for example, we may point out that this idea of dignity is fully based on the openly vindicated pride – and this, indeed, is what David Hume with his redefinition of greatness of mind sought to overcome.

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33 Cicero’s thinking can be described as actor-oriented.
34 Cicero, Offices, (Sir R. L’Estrange), 1720, p. 36.
35 Cicero, Offices, (Sir R. L’Estrange), 1720, p. 39. The Cockman translation is perhaps even more expressive in this passage than the L’Estrange translation on the point of Ciceronian “true magnanimity”: true Greatness of Soul is ‘an Enemy to Covetousness, to the Desire of Applause, and of Power’. It ‘produces a calm and unpassionate Mind’. Significantly, ‘all true Courage and Greatness of Mind’ is first of all ‘a generous Contempt or Disregard of all outward Goods, proceeding from an Opinion, That ‘tis unworthy of a Man to admire, or wish for, or endeavour after any thing, unless it be that which is Honest and Becoming’. Cicero, Offices, (Thomas Cockman), 1714, p. 47.
36 I take it that this Ciceronian point of view that Hume is set out to counter differs from the Aristotelian account of dignity as human flourishing. One could see that one line of the Aristotelian account of magnanimity comes quite close to Mandeville and Hume regarding the centrality of pride. Nevertheless, it is different in other crucial respects and I will not engage in this issue here any further.
Christian greatness

Two Ciceronian qualities, the neglect of everything below and the elevation towards the truly honourable, remained as the defining attributes of the disposition of greatness of mind throughout centuries. Magnanimity was of course one of the scholastic debates and renaissance authors wrote many books upon the subject. What we are interested about here however is how the discussion had been shaped towards the turn of the eighteenth century. While the Ciceronian emphasis on these two different qualities prevailed, it gave an incentive Christian authors in particular to bolster their case.

What is important in the Ciceronian understanding of dignity and excellence is the upward movement, elevation. When we study early modern examples of magnanimity, we realise that a familiar feature of them is this same emphasis. It was common to link attributes such as 'Height' to 'Greatness of Mind'. 37 A schoolbook entitled An epitome of ethics expounded, for example, that it is 'the praise of Magnanimity, that it does not disquiet the Mind with minute or numerous Cares; but rather lifts it up to the Ambition of doing great and excellent things, whereof the number can be but small'. 38 The Anglican Edward Stillingfleet in his sermons emphasised another aspect of this same disposition when he wrote that 'Greatness of Mind raises a man above the need of using little tricks and devices'. 39 Meanwhile, the Ciceronian aspect of overlooking fortune was retained.

A conspicuous contempt for everything beneath us was also directly stressed. Another Anglican minister, Richard Fiddes, in his Théologia speculative praised the 'greatness of mind, which will not suffer a man' under any circumstances 'to do any thing below the dignity of human nature'. The idea of elevation of the mind as dignity is important to Fiddes. 'To be of a degenerate mind' is described 'as if gradually converting into some creature of another species'. 40 To lose the elevation of the mind, to seek things below us, not only corrupts, but turns a man into a non-human being. Another commentator reminded his readers that he who has 'greatness of mind will think it below him so much as to take notice of every little injury' and it is 'the property of small and mean wretches to be always retaliating'. 41 Stillingfleet rather eloquently described how 'Greatness of Mind' carries 'a Man on in doing what becomes him, without being discouraged by the Fears of what may befall him in it'. 42 And the grammarian William

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38 Anon., An epitome of ethics or a short account of the moral virtues for the use of schools, London, 1723, p. 229.
39 Edward Stillingfleet, Fifty sermons, London, 1707, p. 258 (Stillingfleet died in 1699, so the sermons on several occasions were all composed in seventeenth century).
42 Stillingfleet, Fifty sermons, 1707, p. 442.
Willymott in his Peculiar use and signification of words in Latin quoted directly from the Offices: 'True Courage and Greatness of Mind is seen in two things: the one of which lies in a Contempt of outward Things: the other in performing such Actions, as are glorious, and profitable, but withal very full of Labour and Difficulty'. In the light of the strong emphasis that Cicero himself had put on these two attributes of greatness of mind, this might seem an obvious path for the early modern commentators to follow. However, what is particularly important is that it is not only the character of Cicero that lurks behind the early modern conception of greatness of mind, but that the emphasis on these two particular points turned greatness of mind into a particularly Christian concept.

There is only a short step from the Ciceronian idea of dignity to the Christian idea of elevation of mind, which is a concrete image of a man resembling God. At times, even such strong terms as the ‘Spirit of Christian Magnanimity’ were applied and this Christian magnanimity was couched directly to ‘Cicero’. As it turns out, this was a common early modern definition of greatness of mind, which also explains why Hume was so eager to redefine it with such vigour. Pierre Charron argued that a man who has ‘Greatness of Mind’ is ‘a Character so beautiful, that it in some measure resembles God himself’. According to Richard Fiddes, ‘there is something great and noble, and God-like in Greatness of Mind’. It is a moral perfection ‘of the Divine Nature’. God had created man in his own image and when a man in his earthly struggles manages to keep his dignity, that is greatness of mind, there is naturally something ‘God-like’ in this. A later commentator crystallized the idea by claiming that ‘the only true Honour of a Christian, is to resemble his Father which is in Heaven. This is the only true Greatness of Mind, which ought to distinguish a true Christian’. Following this same line of thought, another author wrote, it is ‘a Heavenly Institution, which teaches such true Greatness of Mind as this’. Hence, Richard Steele in his aptly entitled The Christian Hero had appropriate justification within this tradition when he put it rather bluntly that ‘True greatness of mind is to be maintain’d only by Christian Principles’. Meanwhile, this obvious argument of elevation of mind approaching God also created different types of moral images in the early eighteenth-century texts. An anonymous author of Christian’s duty, for example, described that ‘it shews greatness of mind to be unmoved, and to disdain affronts, and to keep it self serene, and clear, like the pure Heavens, when free from Clouds. And become like God

43 Willymott, Peculiar use and signification of words in Latin, 1704, p. 270.  
44 Stillingfleet, Fifty sermons, 1707, p. 443.  
45 Charron, Of wisdom, 1707, II, p. 185.  
46 Richard Fiddes, Practical discourses on several subjects, London, 1712, p. 22.  
In a somewhat peculiar manner, Christian’s duty combined aspects of Ciceronian idea of greatness of mind, Stoic clarity and basic Christian principles. In his serene moments a man was thought to become (and not remain) God-like, which was the same as being clear and free from the clouds, as the Stoic ideal dictated. If this link between magnanimity and Christianity seems obvious, the other move that had occurred in this tradition that christened the Ciceronian greatness of mind was of a somewhat more peculiar nature, namely, it put together benevolence and greatness of mind. It made the connection between amiable generosity and greatness of mind seem natural when the connection might not be apparent. To some extent, of course, Cicero’s _Offices_ emphasised the role of generosity in relation to greatness of mind. Since part of a man’s dignity was established by overlooking worldly things, it was psychologically convenient to be willing to share some of the means of self-preservation with the people in need. However, in the Christian tradition the idea of generosity was given a new and stricter meaning.

Greatness of mind in the Christian context implies a way in which a man resembles God. As we have learned, the link was made through the elevation of the mind towards God, being like God or becoming God-like. This idea of elevation could also be couched directly to Cicero. What was the most commonly used attribute of God? His goodness. Therefore, God’s goodness was consequently in the Christian tradition linked to greatness of mind. What followed for example from Charron’s argument that a man ‘resembles God’ is that because of greatness of mind a man is also ‘a Copy of his Communicative Goodness’. This was also the move that Richard Fiddes made after defining greatness of mind as something ‘God-like’. According to Fiddes, it was because of this godliness that in fact ‘Generosity, or a Disposition to do good, is properly termed Greatness of Mind’. Naturally, there is no logical or necessary connection between the original Ciceronian idea of greatness of mind as elevation of the mind and the attribute ‘communicative goodness’ as it was put in Christian terms. But once the image of greatness of mind as a man resembling God was added to this discussion, it was also easy to make a strong link between the Christian ideal of generosity, goodness and clemency to greatness of mind. It is worthwhile noting that even Samuel Pufendorf linked the ‘Vertue of

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50 Anon., Christian’s duty, or divine meditations and essays. London, 1703, p. 303.  
51 About a concept often linked to generosity, gratitude, being a distinctively modern concept difficult for Rousseau, which as such did not feature in Cicero or Seneca because of their different kind of interest in magnanimity, see Patrick Coleman, ‘Rousseau’s quarrel with gratitude’, in Politics and the passions, 1500–1850, Victoria Kahn, Neil Saccamano, and Daniela Coli, eds., Princeton University Press, 2006, p. 151.  
52 Charron, Of wisdom, 2nd ed, 1707, II, p. 185.  
53 Fiddes, Practical discourses, 1712, p. 22.
Generosity and true Greatness of Mind' together. David Hume's redefinition of greatness of mind removed all these Christian connotations and deliberately burned this straw-like bridge from greatness of mind towards man's God-like goodness. It is of little wonder that he was not much appreciated in the Kirk.

Following this Christian tradition, Baltasar Gracian in his Compleat gentleman claimed that 'Generosity is inseparable from a Greatness of Soul' and 'Christianity is the true Foundation of that unlimited Greatness of Mind, which extends it self universally to all Things, and to all Persons'. As we see in this example, the attribute of universality was rather easy to add to greatness of mind, since omnipotent God does not deal with particulars. When applying a Christian concept of greatness of mind, an author had no need to justify a man's natural benevolence because this was granted due to the link between God's goodness and greatness of mind. It was easy to argue that we express 'the greatness of our mind by being merciful to pardon injuries, by clemency, and slowness to anger'. Hence it was only natural to claim that in men of real greatness 'the Greatness of their Mind exempts them from Fear, and makes them least concerned for any Accident of their own, yet none condole and sympathise more heartily than they'. To put it in short, 'the most generous Dispositions' were thought as 'the most Compassionate'.

In this light we may notice that the definition of civility set forward in Antoine de Courtin's famous Rules of civility, fits well in this Christian context. 'Civility being', Courtin defines, 'the effect of Modesty, Modesty of Humility, and Humility being a true mark of Greatness of the Mind, and indeed the true Greatness, it is that which obliges, which gains upon the Affection, and makes a Man belov'd wherever he comes'. What followed was that attributes such as clemency started to be linked to this newly defined greatness of mind. In his essays, Anstruther wrote that 'there is more Real Courage, Boldness, Magnanimity, Honour, and Greatness of Mind, requisite to forgive our Enemies, and be religious in this dissolute and Atheistical Age, than to take a fortified city, or beat an army'. After all these steps it seemed as if 'greatness of mind' would have always been the natural companion of 'constancy', 'humanity' and 'meekness'. Almost as if a

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54 Samuel Pufendorf, Of the law of nature and nations, Oxford, 1703, p. 178 (De jure naturae et gentium was first published in 1672).
55 Baltasar Gracian, The compleat gentleman: or a description of the several qualifications, both Natural and Acquired, that are necessary to form a great man, 2nd ed., London, 1730, p. 30.
56 Anon., Christian's duty, 1703, p. 303.
58 Antoine de Courtin, Rules of civility; or, the maxims of genteel behaviour, London, 1703, p. 185 (Nouveau traité de la civilité was first published in French in 1671).
59 William Anstruther, Essays, moral and divine; in five discourses, Edinburgh, 1701, p. 179.
man of true greatness of mind would be Jesus Christ himself and the ideal that modern Europeans could follow, would be something close to ‘St. Stephen, and the rest of the Disciples’.60

The clever part about the Christian greatness of mind is that while adding emphasis to the traditional Christian attributes such as clemency, it sought to also retain the more warlike features of the secular use of greatness of mind. If the Christian link between greatness of mind and clemency is rather artificial, the link between greatness of mind and courage originates in Cicero.

This original link was also retained in most early modern works discussing greatness of mind. Baldassare Castiglione in his Courtier made it explicit that ‘to prefer Honour and Duty before all the Dangers in the World’ is ‘true Magnanimity’.61 Jean de La Bruyère mentions physical force and greatness of mind in a same passage.62 In a similar manner, ‘undaunted Courage’ and ‘Greatness of Mind’ were often discussed as natural, connected attributes of the noble, who were ‘born for Great Performances’.63 In accordance with the usual historical reference to Alexander the Great, Charles the Fifth started to become a stock example of natural ‘Martial Spirit’, ‘Generosity and Greatness of Mind’.64 In a similar manner, some historical works broadened the use of ‘natural greatness of mind or usual bravery’ to natural characteristics of certain people.65 By and large, the anonymous author of the Gentleman’s library spoke for many when he wrote that ‘true Greatness of Mind’ is ‘usually accompanied with undaunted Courage and Resolution’.66

While stressing the role of clemency in true greatness of mind, the Christian authors had a need to explain how the Christian hero would be a true hero in a sense that he is able to fight and defend his country when necessary. Now, some of the distinctly Christian authors seemed to have no

61 Baldassare Castiglione, Il cortegiano, or the courtier, London, 1727, p. 270 (Il libro del Cortegiano was first published in 1528).
62 Jean de La Bruyère, Works, 2 vols., London, 1723, II, p. 201 (La Bruyère’s Caractères was first published in 1688 in French). ‘Courage and Greatness of Mind’ were also linked in more classical sources, such as Lucian, of Samosata, Works, 4 vols., London, 1715, I, p. 105.
64 Prudencio de Sandoval, History of Charles the Fifth, London, 1703, p. [A3] (the Spanish historian died in 1620). For Charles the Fifth and greatness of mind, see also for example, Goodwin, History of the reign of Henry the Fifth, 1704 and Marius D’Assigny, History of Earls and earldom of Flanders, London, 1701, p. 173. The link between Alexander and greatness of mind was a stock example, for a variety of different genres using it see for example, The Guardian, 2 vols., London, 1714, I, p. 184, William Howell, The elements of history from the creation of the earth, to the reign of Constantine the Great, London, 1704, p. 216 (the work first appeared in 1661) and Hume’s discussion of Alexander in the Treatise.
66 Gentleman’s library, 1715, p. 205.
problems using ancient examples when describing the warlike attributes of greatness of mind. The English critic John Dennis explained that it was particularly ‘Greatness of Mind’ that excited ‘the Greek to Battel’.\(^67\) One early eighteenth-century sermon emphasised a man’s innate patriotism by explaining that ‘Heathens died for their Country out of natural Gallantry and greatness of Mind’.\(^68\) By and large, there was usually a short step from the Greeks going to battle to the greatness of mind of Richard Steele’s Christian Hero, who would maintain his courage ‘by Christian Principles’.\(^69\) This feature was well summoned by the anonymous author of the Paraphrase and comment upon the Epistles and Gospels when he explained that ‘Honour, truly understood’ is ‘greatness of mind, which scorns to descend to an ill and base thing’. The crux of the Christian argument about greatness of mind was that as long as ‘our Virtue continues unblemished’ our ‘Conscience cannot reproach us’, which consequently means that ‘we are always superiour in the Combat’.\(^70\) Richard Fiddes presented ‘fortitude’ and ‘preserving a man’s virtue’ identical, which according to him explained ‘why cowardice is thought so great and insupportable a reproach’ – even ‘by men who shew very little regard to any other moral consideration of good or evil’.\(^71\) In psychological terms, the argument about true Christian greatness of mind used the same attribute of self-esteem and confidence based on one’s unblemished excellence that Cicero had also put forward.

Stoic calmness, conquering passions and neo-Platonist use of reason

As the point got across that there was no apparent conflict between the Ciceronian magnanimity and the Christian principles, a number of authors started linking greatness of mind also to another vastly popular argument of the late seventeenth-century philosophy: the prevalence of reason in human actions. The argument states that it ought to be reason and not passions that governed men. Richard Bulstrode, educated at Pembroke College, Cambridge, quite fabulously explained that ‘true Greatness of Mind rather consists in conquering one’s self, than the World’.\(^72\) The problem, however, that most commentators were struggling with was that passions, and particularly pride, might be spoiling the idea of true greatness of mind regardless of the fantastic slogans claiming otherwise. Especially in the Christian version of magnanimity there was categorically no room for sinful pride and the authors faced remarkable difficulties when making the shift

\(^{67}\) John Dennis, The select works of Mr. John Dennis. 2 vols., London, 1718, II, p. 23.

\(^{68}\) Thomas Manton, Fifth volume of sermons, London, 1701, p. 744 (Manton’s collected sermons were first published in 1678, a year after his death).

\(^{69}\) Steele, The Christian Hero, 1701, p. 78.

\(^{70}\) George Stanhope, Paraphrase and comment upon the Epistles and Gospels, 4 vols., London, 1705–9, II, p. 94.

\(^{71}\) Fiddes, Theologia speculativa, 1718–20, II, p. 490.

\(^{72}\) Richard Bulstrode, Miscellaneous essays, London, 1715, p. xxv.
that explained why pride held no role in their conception of greatness of mind.

Even Stillingfleet, who argued for the ‘Spirit of Christian Magnanimity’, observed that it was usually the ‘ambitious Man’, who at least seemingly ‘hath the greatness of mind’. But a lesson that one could read even in popular sources such as Plutarch’s Lives was that ‘Ambition’ often takes ‘measures’ that are ‘unsociable and brutal’, as the example of Pyrrhus ‘returning gloriously home’ from battle and entertaining ‘himself with the sense of his own Honour and Greatness of Mind’ reveals. Other popular sources like Fables of Aesop also declared that it was a balancing act to remain pure from ‘an extreme Ambition’ and find ‘true Greatness of Mind’. Richard Fiddes as a particularly Christian author tackled these conceptual problems by emphasising the need for ‘Prudence’. ‘Pride’ simply cannot assume the name of ‘Greatness of Mind’, he pointed out. Passions, for Fiddes, were not a problem that the exercise of prudence could not handle. Pufendorf also recognised the problem of pride and argued that ‘honest humility’ instead of ‘empty pride’ was needed for ‘true Greatness of mind’. Pufendorf acknowledged that the difficulty with ambition was that the ‘Rule of Equality’ is often ‘transgress’d by Pride, when a Man for no Reason, or without sufficient Reason, prefers himself to others, bearing a lofty carriage towards them, as base Underlings, unworthy of his Consideration or Regard’. Conceptually, it was not all that clear that this dilemma between ambition and pride was easily resolved (and pride was not part of ‘greatness of mind’), although Pufendorf claimed that Descartes’s ‘Treatise of the Passions’ proved otherwise. There are also authors who explicitly contrasted magnanimity and pride claiming that it is possible and necessary for a person to show ‘Greatness of Mind, and no Pride’. One later commentator of the topic created a clever medical simile arguing that ‘whatever Similitude there may seem to be betwixt Pride and Honour, Ambition and true Greatness of Mind, they are as far asunder as the Swelling of a Dropsy, from a full and robust Habit of Body’. Without pausing, the commentator carried on writing ‘that the Root of Pride is Folly, that Ignorance is the Mother of Vanity, I shall endeavour to prove, and whether

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73 Stillingfleet, Fifty sermons, 1707, p. 29.
75 Aesop, Fables of Æsop and other eminent mythologists: with morals and reflexions, London, 1704, p. 234 (the Ancient Greek collection of fables was a popular item in early-modern Europe, translated and admented on several different occasions).
76 Fiddes, Practical discourses, 1715, III, p. 205.
77 Pufendorf, Of the law of nature and nations, 1703, p. 178.
78 Pufendorf, Of the law of nature and nations, 1703, p. 179.
Ignorance and Folly be consistent with true Honour and Greatness of Mind, Let the silliest Reader judge’.  

Now, in accordance with the catchy slogans and rhetoric, theoretical support (other than Descartes) also started to appear for the argument that ‘true Greatness of Mind rather consists in conquering one’s self, than the World’. It was the neo-Platonist use of reason combined with a tempered Stoic idea of harnessing the passions that supplemented the argument about Christian magnanimity. At least one author saw no difficulty uniting ‘Greatness of Mind’ and ‘Impartiality of Judgement’. Nevertheless, most authors were more careful when trying to establish the objective foundation of greatness of mind. The seasoned Stillingfleet, for example, emphasised that ‘Greatness of mind’ is an attribute of a ‘Wise Man’, which implies that it is difficult to acquire. It is the right use of reason and ‘calm and sedate Courage’ that reveal true Greatness of Mind instead of ‘any sudden and violent Heats, which rather shew the greatness of the Passions than of the Mind’. Another clergyman also pointed out that ‘a fierce ungovernable Temper does only shew the Greatness of a Man’s Passion, not that of his Mind’. John Cockburn in his History and examination of duels used historical examples to embody real greatness of mind as a man who has ‘a fix’d Resolution to resist a popular Current’. Cockburn rested his argument on the words of Cicero stressing that ‘to do another Prejudice for the sake of one Pleasure and Profit, is more against nature than Death or Grief or the like’.  

What is important in all of these eighteenth-century examples of greatness of mind is that we may notice how the focus is explicitly on the control that man needs to exercise over his passions. George Royse made it particularly clear in his sermon that ‘the Greatness of a Man’s Mind’ consists ‘in the Command over its Passions’. Once again, the idea of the juxtaposition of conquering the world and oneself was introduced. ‘Office of Ruling and Managing our Tempers’, Royse wrote, ‘does shew more true Bravery and Greatness of Mind, than the advancing the greatest Conquest and Dominion over others’. Indeed, it is ‘the true Fortitude and Bravery of the mind to quell those Passions, that are Enemies to our Reason’, Royse preached in full accordance with the neo-Platonic argument about a man’s rational capabilities. This sermon is important because it aired a popular view about greatness of mind in a direct form.

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80 Hildrop, Essay on honour, 1741, p. 28.
81 Bulstrode, Miscellaneous essays, 1715, p. xxv.
83 Stillingfleet, Fifty sermons, 1707, p. 443.
84 George Royse, A sermon preach’d before the Queen, at Windsor, September 23. 1705, Oxford, 1705, p. 10.
86 Royse, A sermon, 1705, p. 11.
87 Royse, A sermon, 1705, p. 10.
This broad, rationalist context could be shaped to serve many ends. A Scotsman, Archibald Campbell in his extremely interesting *Enquiry into the original of moral virtue* for example linked greatness of mind to our desire of esteem and used it to prove our rational nature and the prevalence of God. Campbell claimed that there are different ways in which ‘Desire of Esteem’ can ‘spread and diffuse itself’. In this sense it is a ‘social Appetite’ that can spread ‘all over the Face of the Earth’ and stretch ‘up particularly towards the great Father of Mankind’. In fact, according to Campbell, this is ‘natural to the highest Degree, and shews the great Head of the rational Creation, and all our Fellow-men; which distinctly speaks an Openness and Greatness of Mind, divinely noble and glorious, and which, with good Reason, may be deem’d the Desire of true Glory’. Hence, in one sense a circle was closing in Campbell’s *Enquiry*. Rhetorically, the concept of greatness of mind had witnessed many shifts, but Campbell put it back to its original Ciceronian use. He only emphasised that the true use of reason, our desire of esteem and Christianity are in accordance with it. It is only ‘if in this Desire of Esteem we leave out God, and confine ourselves to Mankind, it is then manifestly less natural; the social Appetite begins to be vitiated, and the Mind to grow narrow and contracted’. But if a man would just keep on elevating his mind towards God, reaching for true glory, true greatness of mind would prevail. This was an argument that probably both, Charron and Fiddes, would have approved.

At the same time, the argument of Christian greatness of mind faced conceptual difficulties. A common strategy to defend it (and a sign that the momentum of the Ciceronian greatness started to wear off) was a practical attack on pride and luxury; and particularly on any authors that might even hint that these attributes would have something to do with greatness of mind. Abbé de Bellegarde’s letters to a lady of the Court of France discussed a true example of ‘Greatness of Mind’ that consisted of a noblewoman ‘renouncing her Kingdom, from a Contempt of the World’. The seed of this argument was planted in the *Offices*. As we remember, one crucial Ciceronian attribute of greatness of mind was a hearty contempt of everything beneath oneself. Yet, it is interesting that the current of the time had changed so that even Bellegarde spoke with a moralising tone against the luxurious age of the late seventeenth century. Before, a noblemen had functioned as the epitome of greatness of mind. At the turn of the eighteenth-century the argument had changed so that ‘none but great Souls are capable of great Designs, and few Courtiers have had Greatness of Mind enough to procure the Promotion of Science, which is the Exaltation of Human Nature, and the Enlargement of the Empire of Reason’. This

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tells something about the structural changes in European societies. But what it shows more explicitly is that the widely popular Ciceronian idea of greatness of mind did not fit well into the modern world.

Some of the British authors took this trend of renouncing the fashionable world even further. At the same time, the argument about the Ciceronian greatness started to crumble. For example, it is not all that clear that the main features of greatness of mind could still be distinguished in some of the arguments advanced in An epitome of ethics published in 1723. A move claiming that the ‘perfection of Generosity’ is that ‘a Man is not’ ruled by ‘popular Applause’ might still be fitted within the Ciceronian framework. However, to attack ‘the Itch of common Glory’ with a claim that ‘Mind is satisfi’d and corroborated’ in certain acts themselves without any regard for glory, is to turn away from the Ciceronian principles. Without some notion of glory, there is no Ciceronian greatness of mind. An earlier author, still remaining in the Ciceronian framework when discussing greatness of mind, but yet attacking the luxurious age with an alarming vigour, was the English clergyman John Wilkins. In his sermons, Wilkins levelled his criticism particularly strongly against the people who sought material goods. His example of greatness of mind consisted of a person who ‘look’d down upon Wealth, as much as others admire it’. There was a short step from this kind of expressions of the Christian greatness of mind to the early modern republicanism that struggled with concepts such as luxury.

Typical moralism poured more water into the well. Mary Astell, who has sometimes been called the first English feminist, serves perhaps as the best example of an author embodying the trend that unites the aspects that we have previously discussed with outright republican principles. First of all, she strongly argued that ‘he who is a Slave to his Appetites, must never pretend to stand up for his own and his Fellow Citizens Liberties’. Astell defined freedom in the traditional terms of non-interference, which included internal restrain caused by a man’s own passions. She continued her attack against luxury and sensibility by underlining the need for ‘a Vertuous Poverty’ exemplified by the ‘High-Spirited Romans’. It was the Romans, Astell explained, who had ‘true Greatness of Mind’. These remarks suit none better than the acknowledged republican authors of the early modern period. The Roman link in their thinking has been well established in scholarship. Regarding greatness of mind, the prototype-republican Charles Davenant referred to the example of ‘Roman People’.

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91 Anon., An epitome of ethics, 1723, p. 229.
92 John Wilkins, Sermons preached upon several occasions, 2nd ed, London, 1701, p. 29 (first published in 1682).
93 A somewhat similar idea is also expressed by hack writer Charles Gildon in his Post-man robb’d: the fear of the Christians and republicans alike was that the ‘common People’ will be corrupted by the example of the luxurious nobility and become ‘as idle as debauch’d, by which they’ lose ‘all Greatness of Mind, all Military Virtue, and in the End their Empire’. Charles Gildon, Post-man robb’d of his mail: or, the packet broke up, London, 1719, p. 117 (first published in 1692).
when discussing ‘Modesty and Greatness of Mind’. True Roman Courage, and Greatness of Mind’ were also used with a strong emphasis in Echard’s Roman History. And Francis Bacon also looked back to ‘Augustus Caesar’ when searching for a historical example of a ‘Mortal Man’ with ‘greatness of Mind’. Astell saw that the problem was the modern authors arguing against this ‘Vertuous Poverty’ and claiming that ‘Pride’ had a role to play in the actions of the ancient people. What these modern authors were doing only attempted to ‘depress the Generous Mind’. As for Wilkins and Astell, a person of true greatness of mind was embodied in a person ‘who Dispises Money as much as they Adore it’.

The moral and political stance expressed by Astell started to be an increasingly untenable position to hold in the eighteenth-century world. It had its foundation in Cicero’s greatness of mind and it implied a common early eighteenth-century view that combined Christian and republican aspects. David Hume devoted his life to the redefinition of the concept of greatness of mind. In 1754, he presented himself as the embodiment of it. Hume thought that one of his achievements was to bring down the Ciceronian greatness of mind together with its Republican and Christian spin-offs that had proved futile for the modern world which Hume himself inhabited. The positive part of this was that he had worked extremely hard replacing this outdated concept with a fully different analysis of greatness of mind and pride, that we will shortly turn to.

Robert Boyle and noble designs

We unfortunately know very little of the young David Hume, therefore even minor details from the pre-Treatise times attract considerable attention. One such detail, which has not yet perhaps been fully exhausted, is that Hume read Robert Boyle as a student. Michael Barfoot in his seminal article about Hume’s scientific upbringing emphasises that Boyle, not Newton, was the centre of the scientific courses that Hume followed in Edinburgh. What is equally significant is that Boyle was well represented in the physiological library that Hume used as a student. Barfoot makes a point

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95 Laurence Echard, The roman history, from the total failure of the Western empire in Augustulus, to the restitution of the same by Charles the Great. Containing the Space of 324 Years. Vol. IV. London, 1704, p. 250.
96 Francis Bacon, The essays, or counsels, civil and moral, London, 1701, p. 166 (first published in 1597).
97 Mary Astell, Moderation truly stated: or, a review of a late pamphlet, entitul’d, Moderation a vertue, London, 1704, p. 108.
99 For Norton’s emphasis on this point: David Fate Norton, ‘Historical account of A Treatise of Human Nature from its beginnings to the time of Hume’s death’, in David.
that theology was a section that was emphasised in this particular library. The third chapter in the second volume of Boyle’s *Theological works* published in 1715, is entitled ‘Of the Greatness of Mind promoted by Christianity’. This chapter is an extensive and elaborated discussion along the general lines of the Christian greatness of mind that we have studied. The obvious conclusion is that Boyle’s account of Greatness of mind would have easily been within Hume’s reach and Hume might well have been directly acquainted with it as a young man given the importance that was placed on Boyle in the classroom. And even if Hume had not been reading Boyle’s outline of greatness of mind as a student, Boyle’s views were in no manner unusual, only remarkably explicit, hence Boyle’s case of Christian greatness serves as the perfect counterpart to launch Hume’s redefinition of greatness of mind.

The emphasis of Boyle’s analysis of greatness of mind is on an implication of ‘an Heroick Temper of Mind’. Boyle’s use of this dispositional concept is clearly Ciceronian in this sense. The foundational idea behind it, according to Boyle, is that we must ‘elevate the Mind and make it Heroick’. In a distinguishably Ciceronian vein, Boyle carries on stating that ‘to aim at high and Noble Designs, is both a Genuin Mark and Effect of greatness of Mind’. In short, ‘to have a Noble design is the chief sign’ of greatness of mind.

After establishing the Ciceronian origin of greatness of mind, as Christian authors in general did, Boyle struggles to separate greatness of mind and pride. Boyle states that his argument is directed against the ‘Atheistical and Sensual Persons’ who claim that greatness of mind should not be linked to Christianity. Boyle’s purpose is to account for the factors that ‘make up Magnanimity or Greatness of Mind, which is composed of a great many elevated and radiant Qualities’ which ‘Christian Religion is at least consistent with each of them, if it does not promote it’. Again, what is looming behind the argument is the problem of ambition and pride. On the one hand, Boyle leans towards this direction, by claiming that there is no conceptual problem when uniting greatness of mind and Christianity. On the other hand, he has the need to categorically separate greatness of mind and pride.

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Boyle attempts to do this by making several distinctions. For example, he points towards the difference between ‘real Greatness inherent in a Man’ and ‘that Pompous One annexed by Fortune’. Boyle also stresses the Christianity of greatness of mind by putting his faith on a commonplace that ‘True Greatness of Mind resides in the Soul’ while ‘Extrinsick Greatness’ and ‘great Bustle and Noise in the World’ adds nothing to it.

The real intellectual effort that Boyle undertakes is that instead of pride, he attempts to introduce humility to accompany greatness of mind. From a Christian perspective, pride is a very visible vice. In contrast, Boyle acknowledges that ‘Humility is a Virtue’, but ‘at the first sight’ it ‘seems different from greatness of Mind’. What Boyle tries to argue is that ‘in Conjunction with other Qualities, which make up greatness of Mind’, humility ‘adds to their Number, and though not so bright as some of them, yet it adds Loveliness to the rest’. The problem is that humility is in fact very different from any other possible quality of greatness of mind and it is not all that clear whether Boyle is convinced of the argument linking humility to greatness of mind. He even acknowledges that ‘though other Virtues assist one another, they all conspire to overthrow Humility’. The problem lies with pride, since being virtuous makes us easily proud. Boyle writes that ‘Pride is so strange an Adversary, that sometimes by being foyled, it overcomes; for when we use the best Arguments against it, the success tempts the Master of them to be Proud’. But Boyle’s real problem is not with the deceiving nature of pride. The problem is that he has not really been able to establish how greatness of mind could be conceptually separated from pride, no matter how he tries to push his Christian principles. The best he can do is to argue that ‘Noble Attempts though they fail of Success, yet they gain Esteem’. This might be a good argument establishing that virtue in rags is still a virtue, but this kind of arguments surely did not convince David Hume of the Christian greatness of mind – despite his own acknowledged early religious aspirations. What happened is that while greatness of mind became the cornerstone of Hume’s moral and political philosophy, all the hints about its Christianity were fully swept aside.

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After studying the context of different uses of greatness of mind, the significance of the 1754 portrait and the task that Hume set for himself in his philosophical works relating to greatness of mind, seems obvious. Greatness of mind had to be shown as a concept of significance, but without any metaphysical implications. Hume’s task was to weld greatness...
of mind into the naturalistic account of the progress of civil societies. Hence, he launched a full-fledged program relating to the concept of greatness of mind. Hume had the need to show that without any reference to a man’s God-like nature greatness of mind could even have more significance than what it had been given in the republican or Christian traditions. But Hume’s greatness of mind was part of his science of man project that not only countered the Christian and republican authors, but also the neo-Platonist writers that extolled the role of reason. Therefore, it is not surprising that theoretically, one of the most important section of Book 3 of the Treatise is entitled ‘Of greatness of mind’.

Sympathy, moral sense and artificial virtues

An entry in the Oxford English Dictionary defines pride as ‘having a high or exalted opinion of one’s own worth or importance. Usually in the negative sense: disposed to feeling superior; having inordinate self-esteem; haughty, arrogant’. In contrast, David Hume made the surprisingly strong case that pride is a positive passion, indeed necessarily boastful in human beings. One of the main points of this study is to show how haughty pride can maintain its positive role in Hume’s account even when exposed pride causes harm to others. In other words, pride plays a crucial role in greatness of mind.

While some aspects of pride have been covered in Hume scholarship, one main line remains unexplored, namely, what is the relationship between self-love and pride. In moral and political philosophy this is one of the most important paths for us to take. What Hume is concerned with is to establish how politeness functions precisely in the same way as the well-known story about justice in relation to self-love. This point about the analogy between the spheres of self-love and pride (and justice and politeness) and the implications that they bear are the main focus of the remaining part of this study.

While pride, self-love and justice have played roles in Hume scholarship, politeness has been left with much less attention. The link between pride

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108 A typical discussion of a certain “neglected” part of Hume’s intellectual activities opens by pointing out that ‘Hume the aesthetic theorist has always been overshadowed by Hume the epistemologist, the metaphysician, and the moral theorist’. Steven Sverdlik, ‘Hume’s key and aesthetic rationality’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 45, 1986, p. 69. The aesthetics is in fact not at all a neglected aspect of Hume scholarship. The actual problem is that the modern focus is on such fragmented fields of study as aesthetic theory instead of the Hume’s science of man as a whole. For example, the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism does not lack discussion on Hume's standard of taste. In that particular journal in addition to Sverdlik's article, we may find also Noel Carroll, ‘Hume’s standard of taste’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 43, 1984, pp. 181–194 and James Shelley, ‘Hume’s double standard of taste’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 52, 1994, pp. 437–45. On standard of taste, see also Jeffrey Wieand, ‘Hume’s two standards of taste’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 34, 1984, pp. 129–142 and works cited there. For more
and politeness has gone more or less unnoticed. There are plenty of general discussions on pride in Hume scholarship, but only a few links to politeness. Simultaneously, we have no understanding of the role of pride in Hume's moral and political philosophy and only a few studies stressing the importance of civility in his philosophy.\(^\text{109}\)

One reason why politeness, which is the artificial virtue that concerns pride (as this study seeks to establish) has received very little notice is that artificial virtues in general were neglected for long time. While Hume's philosophy has been the object of extensive scholarship since Kemp Smith's grand postulation of it in the 1940s, it was still possible to open an article published as recently as 1979 stating that 'a generally accepted view holds that the distinction' between 'natural and artificial virtue' is 'of little importance'.\(^\text{110}\) Although this is not entirely true, for example, Knud Haakonssen had just published a very original article arguing that since there is no natural obligation for artificial virtues as there is for natural virtues, and since we lack the motive to be "artificially virtuous", we come to dislike ourselves for lacking the original motive and this self-hate functions as a motive for artificial virtues.\(^\text{111}\) Yet, there is still much work to be done with artificial virtues and I join Ted A. Ponko's words: 'In essence,
I shall urge that a sharper distinction is needed between the artificial and natural virtues'.

Virtues in general have of course always gathered vast attention. There is, for example, a great deal of modern philosophers discussing Hume from the perspective of virtue ethics. Some commentators are excited that 'Hume discusses about 70 different virtues in his moral theory'. My point is that this is a direction that misses the rather simple, but all the more important point that Hume is trying to establish with the discussion on artificial virtues in the Treatise. Of the first class philosophers, only John Mackie has consistently underlined the significance of artificial virtues. He writes that regarding ‘artificial virtue’, those ‘who came closest to anticipating this insight were other sceptically inclined writers like Mandeville and Hobbes. But in some ways Hume’s thought is subtler than that of either of these predecessors’ – which is certainly true. Mackie’s problem, as I will show later more precisely, is that he underestimates the importance of the distinction between natural and artificial virtues. Mackie states that ‘Hume’s treatment of the natural virtues is both less interesting and less defensible than his treatment of the artificial ones’. While Mackie is certainly correct that our emphasis should be on the artificial virtues, yet the only way to grasp the significance of the artificial virtues is by realising the significance of the distinction between natural and artificial virtues, which is the reason why we should not dismiss the natural virtues either.

Lately artificial virtues have also gathered increasing attention in the history of philosophy, but the emphasis has almost solely been on the importance of justice. To make a long story short, it will be the purpose

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115 Mackie, Hume’s moral theory, 1980, p. 82.


117 There are many useful general discussions of justice as an artificial virtue, regarding the more philosophical ones, see for example, Marcia Baron, ‘Hume’s noble lie: an account of his artificial virtues’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 12, 1982, pp. 539–555; Sharon R. Krause, ‘Hume and the (false) luster of justice’, Political Theory, 32, 2004, pp. 628–655 and especially the work of Rachel Cohon. Her concern has been particularly the question of non-moral motive. E.g. Rachel Cohon, ‘Hume’s difficulty with the virtue of honesty’, Hume Studies, 23, 1997, pp. 91-112. Cohon’s interpretation is that Hume’s requirement of the virtue of honesty is that person’s approval of honesty is strengthened so that it becomes a motivating sentiment to be honest. It also needs to function in all the cases ‘required by the rules of property’. Hence, ‘mere rule-following is not enough for this virtue; one needs morally-motivated rule following’. Cohon, ‘Hume’s difficulty with the virtue of honesty’, 1997, p. 102. Of the other artificial virtues, chastity has received attention with the rise of interest in women in philosophy. E.g. Ann Levey, ‘Under constraint: chastity and modesty in Hume’, Hume Studies, 23, 1997, pp. 213–226.
of the remainder of this study to account for the link between greatness of mind, pride and politeness and present a more coherent view of Hume’s moral and political philosophy.

Norton and Moore debate

From a broader perspective, one of the most important developments in scholarship regarding Hume’s moral philosophy concerns the difference between the Hutchesonian and more sceptical aspects of Hume. This development has been personified in a struggle between two leading international scholars, David Fate Norton and James Moore. A significant moment in Hume scholarship took place at the 32nd Hume Conference in 2005 in Toronto. Perhaps the peak of this struggle was reached in that particular occasion; Canada being the home soil of both of these scholars. Before David Fate Norton started reading his paper, the chair promised James Moore that he would get to utter the first words during the discussion part of the session. The topic was the author of the successive critical reviews of Books 1 and 3 of *A treatise of human nature* which appeared anonymously in the Amsterdam journal, *Bibliothèque Raisonnée*, in 1740 and 1741. James Moore had suggested in a previous article that these might have been written by Francis Hutcheson, who David Fate Norton, together with Dario Perinetti, was now set to oppose.

On that occasion the topic was bibliographical, but at the core of the debate was the interpretation of the nature of Hume’s moral philosophy. To put it in simple terms, Norton has consistently placed a strong emphasis on the concept of sympathy and Hume’s link to Francis Hutcheson, Moore, on the other hand, is inclined towards reading Hume as an Epicurean moral philosopher with sceptical undertones. This study will side with James Moore’s interpretation. In fact, it is my attempt to show how Moore’s intuitive stance since his first profound article on the topic in 1976 is a correct one. However, it needs to be significantly supplemented with additional evidence and worked into a plausible argument about Hume’s moral and political philosophy that grasps the Mandevillian division between self-love and self-liking.

The major issue at stake in the Norton-Moore debate is the origin of morals. Norton has stressed the role of sympathy and its connection to Hutcheson’s conception of moral sense. For quite some time the

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118 This is a traditional reading of Hume and Hutcheson, regarding modern scholars should be mentioned that for example E. J. Hundert writes that Hume was ‘Hutcheson’s pupil and friend’. Hundert, *Enlightenment’s Fable*, 1994, p. 82.

119 The diminishing role of sympathy in the transition from Treatise to the second Enquiry is a standard question in Hume scholarship. For recent contribution to this topic, see Remy Debes, ‘Humanity, sympathy and the puzzle of Hume’s Second Enquiry’, *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 15, 2007, pp. 27–57. Debes makes the case for humanity instead of sympathy.
question of sympathy and moral sense has been treated as the decisive question of eighteenth-century moral philosophy.\textsuperscript{120} While these certainly are important concepts and some of the discussions on them are very sophisticated, one general point of this study is that their significance for Hume's system has been overstated.\textsuperscript{121} It is natural to give a central position to the concept of sympathy/moral sense, if we assume that Hutcheson was the most significant positive influence on Hume's moral theory.

This has indeed been assumed. Hutcheson being a “gateway” for Hume to morals is a common line of argument established by Norman Kemp Smith in his The philosophy of David Hume. This was also J. Y. T. Greig's understanding. In an explicit letter to J. M. Keynes, Greig emphatically stresses the significant role that Hutcheson played in Hume's life:

> There is no doubt whatever that Hume met Francis Hutcheson, at least once, and probably several times. In one of his letters to Hutcheson he says: 'Since I saw you, I have...' And between 1740 and 1745 he paid more than one visit to his friends the Mures of Caldwell, who lived just outside Glasgow and who were rather particular friends of Hutcheson's. It was Hutcheson, too, who first made Hume and Adam Smith acquainted, though the latter was only a seventeen-year-old student at the time. Hume was rather hurt when Hutcheson, cautious man, declined to support his candidature for the Chair of Ethics and Pneumatic Philosophy in Edinburgh.\textsuperscript{122}

A common view in the 1960s was that ‘there can be no doubt but that Hume's moral theory had roots in the writings of Francis Hutcheson’.\textsuperscript{123} In 1976 Duncan Forbes wrote that ‘that the philosopher who was intellectually closest to Hume, especially in what concerned morals, at the time of the publication of the Treatise was probably Francis Hutcheson, the most forward-looking thinker of his day in Scotland, and no doubt a hero to many young men at the Scottish universities’.\textsuperscript{124} A few years later, T. D. Campbell emphatically stated that 'it is now generally acknowledged that Hutcheson is the 'father' of the Scottish Enlightenment. Hume's ethics are largely Hutchesonian'.\textsuperscript{125} Hutcheson's role as the father of the so-called


\textsuperscript{121} For a monograph regarding these premises that originally extends perhaps the furthest (covering almost all aspects of Hume’s works with sympathy), see Jennifer A. Herdt, Religion and faction in Hume’s moral philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1997.

\textsuperscript{122} J. Y. T. Greig to J. M. Keynes, 25 June, 1928, JMK/PP/87/24/11, Cambridge University, King's College Archive Centre: The Papers of John Maynard Keynes.


\textsuperscript{124} Forbes, Hume’s philosophical politics, 1975, p. 32.

Scottish Enlightenment had of course been set forward already in the 1940s (along Kemp Smith’s postulations) by Gladys Bryson’s Man and Society.126

The influence of Hutcheson in modern scholarship has been most closely felt through the presence of David Fate Norton, who has integrated his interpretation to this long line of scholarship when stressing the relevance of the concept of sympathy for Hume.127 The core of Norton’s philosophical interpretation of Hume’s common-sense moral philosophy was established in his book in 1982.128 The book is an important one due to its sound epistemological and metaphysical understanding. Regarding moral philosophy, perhaps the clearest expression of Norton’s understanding of Hume in the eighteenth-century context has been put forward in his ‘Foundations of morality debate’, published in the Cambridge history of eighteenth-century philosophy.129

Although Norton describes Hume’s account of what he calls the “two-foundation theory” as complex, it still quite neatly lines up as a variation of Hutcheson’s account of sentiment. Norton’s understanding of sympathy for Hume is also extensive – bridging the gap between Hume and Hutcheson. According to Norton, sympathy is for Hume the source of the moral distinctions, it makes vicarious and disinterested pleasure possible and also artificial virtues depend on it. Norton emphasises that after general rules have been first formed, it is the principle of sympathy that enables the development of civil society and the principle of justice.

The point that I want to make is that on the one hand the question is much more complicated from the outset than what Norton implies. Mandeville, who is one of the main influences on Hume, is not a simple egoist whose moral theory has no foundation on the nature of things. Also, Hume’s conception of sympathy does not crack open the social theory of the Treatise even when there most certainly is something for us to crack (and this is the reason why I think it is best for us to discuss the social theory instead of the moral theory of the Treatise).130 On the other hand, the overall plot is simple. Once we get a good grip of the change in Mandeville’s thinking expressed in a separate, published work in 1729 – and come to see that he was pushing towards an actual theory of human nature and civil

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127 Norton has carefully pointed out that Kemp-Smith and others overlook the religious differences between Hutcheson and Hume. However, I do not think that this was the major issue at stake as I will try to prove in this thesis. Hence, I see no problem reading Norton himself in this way in the same line of scholarship as Kemp-Smith and others.
129 David Fate Norton and Manfred Kuehn, ‘The foundations of morality’, in The Cambridge history of eighteenth-century philosophy, 2006, pp. 939–986. I am grateful to Professor Norton for sending me this article prior to its publication upon request.
130 For a recent account leaning towards the same direction, see Christopher Berry, ‘Hume’s universalism: The science of man and the anthropological point of view’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 15, 2007, pp. 535–550.
society in which the possibility of natural virtues is clearly established – we also understand the Treatise much more precisely.

In contrast, James Moore has stood his ground against the overwhelming majority of commentators since Kemp-Smith linking Hume to Hutcheson. In his ‘Hume’s theory of justice and property’ (1976), ‘Hume’s political science and the classical republican tradition’ (1977) and ‘The Social Background of Hume’s Science of Human Nature’ (1979) Moore established a strong backbone for reading David Hume as an Epicurean moral philosopher including the proper context for this anti-Hutchesonian interpretation of Hume. Particularly in ‘Science of human nature’, Moore makes an introduction to the idea of society in Hume’s science of human nature unmatched in the history of philosophy. Even when he does not develop the issue very far, Moore indicates the question of politeness as an artificial virtue with a relation to Mandeville’s works as a crucial issue and points towards all the relevant evidence available (including the “politeness letter” to Ramsay and Hume’s early essay on modern honour). The point that I want to make is that Moore’s articles constitute perhaps the most unappreciated coherent stance in Hume scholarship. Although Moore is renowned among a small circle of sensible intellectual historians and certainly not neglected, in larger circles the fruits of his work have not yet been fully collected. The differences between Norton and Moore have always been concrete, but the conflict escalated

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131 The most explicit expression of Moore’s reading of the relationship between Hume and Hutcheson can be found in Moore, ‘Hume and Hutcheson’, 1995, pp. 23–57.

132 Moore, ‘Hume’s theory of justice and property’, 1976, pp. 103–119; Moore, ‘Hume’s political science and the classical republican tradition’, 1977, pp. 809–839 and Moore, ‘The social background of Hume’s science of human nature’, 1979, pp. 23–42. The core of Moore’s interpretation, ‘Hume’s theory of justice and property’ is a product of its time. Moore’s is very close to Duncan Forbes’s understanding of Hume’s place in the history of philosophy with regard to the natural law tradition. (About Moore’s understanding of natural law tradition, see also James Moore and Michael Silverthorne, ‘Gershom Carmichael and the natural jurisprudence tradition in eighteenth-century Scotland’, in Wealth and Virtue, 1983, pp. 73–87.) ‘Hume’s theory of justice and property’ article is particularly important, because it brings out the crucial difference between small, family-society and large, civil society and the primary nature of law. The main point of criticism is the typically overwhelming role of justice over the other artificial virtues. In ‘Hume’s political science and the classical republican tradition’, Moore was first of all set out to make the clear interpretation that ‘Hume’s political science can best be understood as an elaborate response to the political science of the classical republicans.’ Moore, ‘Hume’s political science and the classical republican tradition’, 1977, p. 810. It is interesting to notice that even when this article was published just a year after the Machiavellian moment, it was not used as clear evidence of how Hume should not be considered as a neo-republican political thinker. The most visionary, yet tentative article by Moore has been ‘The social background of Hume’s science of human nature’.


134 Particularly John Robertson has realised the importance and originality of James Moore’s ideas. Robertson, ‘The Scottish contribution to the enlightenment’, 2000, p. 47.
only recently after the publication of Moore's explicit interpretation of Hutcheson and Hume in 1995.  

Even when it is still common to assume a close relationship between Hume and Hutcheson, some general doubts have been cast. What has particularly struck people is the fact that (in the words of James Moore) 'Hutcheson adamantly opposed Hume's candidacy for the professorship of pneumatics and ethical philosophy at the University of Edinburgh'. Scholars agree that this is one reason to rethink their relationship, but there is disagreement on whether this tells us anything about the nature of their moral philosophy. Moore's explanation for the incident is a fundamental difference in the nature of their moral philosophy. He writes that 'Hutcheson's principal complaint against Hume as a moral philosopher', as he expressed it in a letter to Hume (known to us only from Hume's reply), was that Hume's moral philosophy lacked 'a certain Warmth in the Cause of Virtue'. Hume responded that this was not an accident: 'his philosophy was not designed to recommend virtue but to explain the operations of the understanding, the passions, and morals'. In the end Hume was not appointed to the Chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh; the appointment went to William Cleghorn, one of several candidates recommended by Hutcheson.  

Norton in contrast thinks that the relationship between Hume and Hutcheson turned sour later in the 1740s and Hutcheson opposed Hume's candidacy because of theological issues. Norton maintains that the awareness of these theological differences is what sets Norton's interpretation apart from Kemp-Smith and his followers. According to Norton's understanding, since this is a question that concerns Hume's later career, this is not necessarily any proof that Hume would not have been close to Hutcheson's understanding of sympathy at the time of writing the Treatise.

John Robertson acknowledges both of these possibilities. 'Hume's letters to Hutcheson in December 1739 and March 1740 may be read as an ingenuous attempt to persuade the senior philosopher that the arguments of the Treatise were a legitimate development of his own. But it is also possible,' Robertson writes, 'that Hume was aware of important differences between them, and that his deference belied a determination to advance

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136 See the concise account of Hutcheson in Robertson, The case for the Enlightenment, 2005, pp. 283–289.
137 About the case of Hume's professorship, see Emerson, The "affair" at Edinburgh and the "project" at Glasgow, 1994, pp. 1–22.
arguments of his own." It seems that Robertson himself is inclined towards Moore on this issue.

Some experienced Hume scholars have steered clear of the Norton-Moore debate. For example, M. A. Stewart seems quite careful not to cast his vote before all the facts are in. On the one hand, Stewart has underlined the Baylean side of Hume, but on the other, concerning the differences between Hutcheson and Hume in 'Hume's intellectual development', Stewart mentions that Hume met 'the challenge of Hutcheson's opposition to his psychologically founded natural jurisprudence', but much of this challenge 'was theologically motivated'. Hutcheson's concern about theology in the light of Hume's outright anti-clerical opinions is of course a sensible point to make in the light of current evidence. But it simultaneously leaves some of the foundational issues unresolved.

The issue hence has much to do with the now lost letter that Hutcheson sent to Hume and which we know through Hume's reply. But the clash over the professorship does not resolve the conflict. We only know that Hutcheson opposed Hume. The reason behind this without introducing any other evidence could equally well be a theological matter or the sceptical and epicurean nature of Hume's system. Hence, some other supporting facts such as Hume owning a copy of Shaftesbury's Characteristicks in the late 1720s, have become highly relevant in this debate about the nature of Hume's moral philosophy. Moore or his associates have not been able to show how the line from Kemp Smith to Norton stressing the influence of Hutcheson would necessarily be incorrect. It is one purpose of this study to prove that already at the time before the Treatise we have good reasons to doubt Hume's sincerity towards Hutcheson and whether some passages are actually leaning towards Hutcheson at all.

Regardless of the question of the differences between Hutcheson and Hume, caution, indeed, must be used when considering the question of professorship as evidence. It might well be that Hume's public image as an 'antichristian apostle', as Elizabeth Montagu referred to him, was the reason why he would not be appointed to a University post. For example, Adam Smith wrote to William Cullen in 1751 that 'I should prefer David Hume to any man for the college, but I am afraid the public would not be of my opinion, and the interest of society will oblige us to have some regard to the


\[143\] Elizabeth Montagu to the Duchess of Portland, July 29 [1772?], Historical manuscripts commission, Calendar of the manuscripts of the Marquis of Bath, preserved at Longleat, Wiltshire. 3 vols., 1904, I, pp. 334–335.
opinion of the public’. By that time, Smith, of course, had secured his own professorship in Glasgow.

While Hutcheson’s relationship to Hume is a standard topic in Hume scholarship, what has not been covered is Mandeville’s influence on the young Hume. It has, nevertheless, become increasingly common to assert that Mandeville had some effect on Hume’s thinking and to even discuss ‘the Mandevillian side of Hume’. However, these comments are usually supplemented with remarks such as: ‘Hume’s discussion of the natural character of our moral sentiments’, as this particular article notes, ‘can be seen as an attempt to partially rebut well-known views of Hobbes and Mandeville, in which self-love or self-preservation are seen as the primary motive for engagement in social and political relations’. Even James Moore, after identifying relevant similarities between Mandeville and Hume, points out that ‘Hume’s artificial rules were not artifices or tricks played by politicians and men of fashion, as Mandeville had claimed’. By 1729 Mandeville had modified his position. By and large, even when there are scholars that notice the link between Mandeville and Hume, it is much more common to claim that Hume is very different from Mandeville. Also E. J. Hundert, who is one of the few people who have studied Mandeville in depth, never put the same kind of effort on Hume, while

144 Sraffa mss, H1/13, Trinity College, Cambridge. Photocopies of correspondence between Adam Smith, John Home, William Strahan, Joseph Black and Pat Clason with a “scrapbook” of printed and typescript copies of Smith’s letters (15 docs), Adam Smith to Dr William Cullen, Edin., Tuesday, November 1751 [transcript of the letter in John Thomson, An account of the Life, Lectures and Writings of William Cullen. 3 vols., Edinburgh, 1859, I, 606.]


Maurice Goldsmith has studied Hobbes and Mandeville sagaciously, but leaving Hume’s science of human nature quite untouched. Hence, the role of Mandeville in Hume scholarship has been limited for these reasons as well.

Among Hume scholars in particular it has been common to see Mandeville as a representative of ‘out-and-out scepticism’ that thinks that ‘moral rules’ are ‘invented by moralists and politicians’. Since this has been the perception of Mandeville, Hume scholars naturally claim that there is a wide gap between Mandeville and Hume. There are, of course, exceptions. Antony Flew points out that ‘Hume’s approach to the origin of social institutions’ is ‘evolutionary as opposed to creationist’ and it is ‘not without reason’ that Hume ‘lists Dr Mandeville among his predecessors’. But a common view, as M. A. Box expresses it, is that Hume, ‘not only refutes, but disparages’ Mandevillean egoism. Regarding the question of why Hume in his refutation of Mandeville ‘never mentions Mandeville by name’, Box conjectures that he preferred to ‘attack a movement rather than an individual’ and ‘it was Mandeville’s egoism that would have come to readers’ minds when Hume speaks of those ‘who have denied the reality of moral distinctions’. I believe that this is true in the sense that Hume definitely wants to appear as if he was refuting Mandeville. However, the question is much more complicated as this study seeks to establish. It should also be pointed out that Hume had no problem mentioning Shaftesbury by name when Hume criticises those who have misunderstood the idea of modern civility and railed against gallantry.

The question of Mandeville’s influence on Hume relates directly to the Norton-Moore debate. In the end, it is this question that tips the balance towards James Moore’s side. There are experienced Hume scholars balancing between Norton and Moore regarding the influence of Mandeville. For example, John P. Wright has been captivated by Mandeville’s thinking throughout his career. Wright has for example carried out a detailed comparison between Hume’s first known essay on “Modern honour” and Mandeville’s works pointing out that there is a clear

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150 David Miller, Philosophy and ideology in Hume’s political thought, Oxford University Press, 1981, pp. 41 and 116. For a recent, perceptive reading of Hume’s relationship to scepticism, see Dario Castiglione, ‘Hume’s two views of modern scepticism’, History of European Ideas, 32, 2006, pp. 1–16.
153 Box has offered us an interpretation of Hume’s account of politeness that mistakenly links it to Addison and Steele and claims that in his letter of politeness from Paris in 1734 Hume prefers ‘English manners’ to ‘French’, see Box, The suasive art of David Hume, 1990, pp. 142–8.
154 Already in John P. Wright, The sceptical realism of David Hume, University of Minnesota Press, 1983, pp. 190–1 and 236–7 Wright paid close attention to the role of Mandeville and hypochondria in Hume’s famous letter to a doctor of 1734.

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influence of Mandeville in young Hume. However, the contrasting conclusion that Wright makes is that Hume’s ‘moral philosophy had probably been largely influenced by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and it is their assumptions that form the philosophical conception of virtue in the background of’ Wright’s interpretation. I am inclined to put much more emphasis on the positive influence of Mandeville.

With regard to the younger generation of Hume scholars, Michael B. Gill’s articles are invaluable. The core of Gill’s works has concentrated on the principle of the association of ideas. In an article entitled ‘Fundamental difference between Hutcheson and Hume’ Gill shows in detail how ‘Hume’s associationism’ is ‘particularly revealing of his distance from Hutcheson’. In short, Hutcheson’s negative use of “fantastick” association of ideas gets a positive role in Hume’s system in which an original passion is not given a privileged role over an associative one as in Hutcheson. At the same time, Gill has convincingly argued against the idea of Hume’s test of morality through reflexivity. In other words, the system offered in the Treatise is non-reflective in a way that Hume’s moral system does not attempt any justification beyond that of explaining human action. This is a point that goes directly against the mainstream reading of Hume.

Gill has also studied the evolutionary aspect of Mandeville’s account of civil society in detail and agrees that, regarding the artificiality of justice, Hume is Mandevillean. What Gill sees as a foundational difference between Hume and Mandeville is that for Mandeville all morality is hypocritical while for Hume ‘people really do exhibit the non-self-interested virtue of justice’. I do not see this as a profound difference, as I will later attempt to establish in my treatment of justice for Hume. Although Gill’s point about the differences between ‘static or originalist view of human nature’ and ‘dynamic or progressive view’ is useful, I think it is somewhat too categorical a distinction to be applied for the case of Mandeville and Hume. Mandeville’s view is simply not as static as it might seem.

But it needs to be pointed out that also for Gill the aspect of theology and Hume’s secularism is a founding feature. Gill’s recently published book

\[155\] John P. Wright, ‘Hume on the origin of modern honour: a study in Hume’s intellectual development’, a paper presented at the 32nd International Hume Conference, University of Toronto, July 19–23, 2005. I am grateful to professor Wright for allowing me to quote this unpublished paper and for discussions on different occasions.


is about the ‘birth of secular ethics’. The theological conflict and context is implied. Also in his ‘Fundamental difference between Hutcheson and Hume’ Gill commences by pointing out that Hume attacks the ‘theological conception of human nature on all fronts’ and it is ‘out of these attacks that Hume develops his own “science of man”. Besides being anti-Hutchesonian, this study is founded on the assumption that Hume was also anti-Shaftesburyan in many a sense.

Hume attacked theological conceptions of man, but it is the theory of civil society that Hume is relying on that is the decisive issue, and this ought to be carefully linked to an understanding of Hume’s associationism as this study attempts to establish. Although Gill’s analyses of Hume are very precise and useful, he does not quite go far enough. Gill does not in fact establish what Hume’s theory of civil society is about, although in ‘Hume’s progressive view of human nature’ he goes a long way towards this direction. Gill never discusses pride or politeness. The fountainhead of Hume’s social theory is the analogy between self-love and pride. My point is that there is something substantial underneath Hume’s secularism and it is Hume’s reliance on the later part of Mandeville’s works.

This study is not motivated by the question of the nature of Hume’s naturalism. With regard to the question of naturalism, Hume is close to Shaftesbury and might well have used him as his model. But when we advance to the question of morals, Hume and Shaftesbury are wide apart. This has gone missing probably because the question of naturalism would make us assume that Hume is close to Shaftesbury in other respects as well. Hence, we may remark that Shaftesbury, Mandeville and Hume are all naturalist with regard to the juxtapositions between religion and the secular aspects of morals (unlike Hutcheson), but this has to be kept separate from the question of nature of morality. In the basic principles of morals, Hutcheson and Shaftesbury are much alike and Mandeville and Hume belong to a different school. Then again, when considering the question of

163 Also Hume’s current biographer, James Harris (much like Gill) is inclined towards Moore’s side and the sceptical and “Baylean” features of Hume. James Harris, ‘Hume’s use of the rhetoric of Calvinism’, in Impressions of Hume, Marina Frasca-Spada and P. J. E. Kail, eds., Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 141–159. However, it should also be noted that it is quite common to see Hume and Mandeville as “Baylean” writers, what ever it might mean. What I find as a significant point to make is that Bayle might be an important background figure in many respects (and particularly regarding the theologically motivated debates), but I have wanted to establish the originality of later Mandeville and that it is him that Hume consciously follows. Hence, I dissociate my own position from the “Baylean” accounts.
164 The starting point of this line of interpretation is, of course, Norman Kemp Smith, ‘The Naturalism of Hume’, Mind, 14, 1905, pp. 149–173.
165 The best discussion and narrative of this development is Gill, The British moralists on human nature, 2006.
the associative principles, Hume may in some sense be seen to follow Locke and Hutcheson, but also Mandeville in the sense that he turns it into a positive view. By and large, the real argument is that Hume turns all of these questions and different aspects of early modern philosophy to fit a Mandevillian system where the emergence of civil society is explained through the two spheres of self-love and self-liking and how they operate within the science of man. I refer to this as greatness of mind.

Bibliography matters

Norton has remained faithful throughout his career to his interpretation about Hume’s moral philosophy. But one change that we may note is an increasing interest towards bibliographical and historical questions in the later stages of his career. While the interpretations of the nature of moral philosophy are partly matters of opinion, the bibliographical questions are usually sorted our based on more concrete evidence. The best case is of course, if the bibliographical details support the philosophical interpretation. Norton’s influence as a historian and editor has been closely felt, and the matter of the author of the reviews of the Treatise in Bibliothèque Raisonnée is just one example. For instance, a catalogue that records some books of Hume’s likely reading in Norton’s The David Hume Library has been regarded as a significant undertaking166, and Norton has played his part as a major authority on other bibliographical issues as well, for example, he had the last word in recent polemics of the authorship of A bstrad to the Treatise in Hume Studies.167 But the most important way in which Norton has exercised his power in Hume scholarship is by editing the Treatise for the Clarendon edition of the works of David Hume.168

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167 David Fate Norton, ‘More evidence that Hume wrote the A bstrad’, Hume Studies, 19, 1993, pp. 271–272. Besides the polemics carried out in the 1990s in Hume Studies regarding the authorship of the A bstrad, see the often neglected J. M. Keynes and P. Straffa, ‘Introduction’ in David Hume, A n abstrad of a Treatise of human nature, 1740, a pamphlet hitherto unknown, Cambridge University Press, 1938, pp. v–xxxii. It is also a very good history of Hume’s Treatise and, after all, it was Sraffa who found out that the author was Hume himself.

168 We should also remark that much like Norton, also Moore’s own scholarly enterprises have since turned to the more practical side of the question of Hutcheson’s influence on Hume. These include editing Hutcheson, writing significant biographical entries of him and pondering such questions as the authorship of the reviews of the Treatise in Bibliothèque Raisonnée. It is interesting to notice that while the battleground is now largely bibliography, the core of the debate is yet the same. Norton claims that Hume is a Hutchesonian moral philosopher, Moore says that he is epicurean. For example, in a recent article on Cicero, Hutcheson and Hume, Moore explicitly states that he ‘proposes further that Hume’s reworking of Cicero’s De Officiis represents an
Norton has emphasised the possibility that one of Hume's concerns was to publish the second edition of the Treatise, towards which Hume had made some pen-and-ink corrections to some copies of the book. Norton, together with his wife, who is the co-editor, has sought to establish this hybrid "second edition" of the Treatise. The edition is of first-rate scholarship. But one problem, relevant to this study, is that it incorporates Hume's supposed corrections for the second edition silently without indicating them in the actual text. The corrections replace the originally published text of the Treatise as if there had been a second edition. The original text of the first and only edition that was actually published has now to be tediously sought from a supplementary volume.

The previous editor of the Treatise also pondered about the possibility of the second edition. P. H. Nidditch writes, 'I assume that Hume had the intention of getting all the manuscript amendments incorporated in their appropriate places in a corrected new edition of the Treatise that would be published in the early 1740's'. Yet, Nidditch's choice was to publish the manuscript amendments as an appendix incorporated into the Treatise instead of silently altering the original text. Nidditch also gives his learned opinion about the amendments:

although the majority of Hume's new alterations in the Hume copy are minor ones by way of corrections of incidental misprints or of solecisms, intended stylistic improvements, or rewording for the sake of somewhat greater precision or clearness, some others appear to represent changes of substance in his doctrines, especially in regard to his views of public interest and of self-interest.

This is no small concern, especially when considering the influence of Hutcheson and Mandeville.

Some of the alterations and additions in fact indicate an apparent leaning towards Hutcheson's side. For example, regarding chastity, originally Hume simply wrote that 'those, who have an interest in the fidelity of women, naturally disapprove of their infidelity' and 'those, who have no interest, are carried along with the stream'. In a pen-and-ink addition, Hume supplemented the thought with a note that reads: 'and are also apt to be affected with sympathy for the general interests of society' - an expression of a long standing disagreement with his senior contemporary, Francis Hutcheson'.

Moore, 'Utility and humanity', 2002, p. 366. There has also been other interest about the structural similarities between Hume's and Cicero's works. About Hume's Dialogues and Cicero's De natura deorum, see John Valdimir Price, 'Sceptics in Cicero and Hume', Journal of the History of Ideas, 25, 1964, pp. 97-106. About the terms used in De Officiis and Hume, see Gregory DesJardins, 'Terms of De Officiis in Hume and Kant', Journal of the History of Ideas, 28, 1967, pp. 237-242. Even when the article is based on Hume's admiration of De Officiis and bibliographical details, in fact it is another way of exploring how Hume's moral philosophy is not Hutchesonian at heart.


Emphases added.
sentence that is not in any particular way connected to the point that Hume was making. By and large, the word “sympathy” features four more times in the recently published critical edition than in the originally published Treatise. Public interest and general interest of society are terms that were also added to the text after the Treatise had been published in 1739–40.

Now, these added “Hutchesonian leanings” do not mean that Hume was in any particular way close to Hutcheson in his actual moral theory. It might equally well mean that Hume is (after having gone through a series of arguments with a senior Scottish philosopher) making some changes and additions that contribute to the image that his views are not that far from Hutcheson after all - when in reality they are. To put it in short, the influence of Hutcheson was more like pressure towards a young man to be politically correct while the real intellectual debt goes to Bernard Mandeville, a man that Hutcheson would not acknowledge as an authority.

I attempt to show in this study that Hume himself had a clear pattern in editing his works that reveals that this kind of practice was rather common for Hume. Of course, as it becomes evident from Nidditch’s remarks, like all editing also Hume’s was mainly stylistic. Hume’s editing rarely lead to express that he had actually changed his mind. But what happened often in Hume’s editing was that he took the edge off some of his expressions making it more difficult to grasp the nature of some of his thoughts. Hence, it is quite crucial for us to know the text originally published, because at times it is the clearest indication of what he actually wanted to say regarding certain matters. This is best shown in the subsequent editions of his Essays. On several different occasions, what was first published in a rather radical choice of words was later changed into a much “milder” form. This point has gone almost fully missing because of the poor rate of the modern editions of Essays.

In fact, in the case of Essays, the text of the first editions has not been available to the reader of the modern editions of Essays. The copy-text that was used in Greig and Liberty Fund edition is based on a later edition altogether. This has contributed to the fact that we have not been able to clearly grasp the radical nature of the young Hume’s texts. Now, the danger with the new Clarendon edition of the Treatise is that the same thing happens with the published text and we end up with a partly toned down version. When put together with all the other evidence provided in this study, it functions as an indication of the Epicurean nature of David Hume’s system.

It should still be noted about the Treatise that the Clarendon edition is of first-rate. The point that I want to make is that some caution must be exercised before getting carried away with the idea that the second edition

171 T 3.2.12.7; SBN 572.
would immediately take us closer to what Hume in fact wanted to say for the reasons that I have indicated above. Also, I am not claiming, of course, that Norton, who is a remarkable scholar, would intentionally have left out some parts of the published book. He just made a choice regarding the readability of the published text that, in my opinion, lead to an unfortunate result. What this mostly concerns is the influence of Bernard Mandeville on the young Hume. The supposed second edition of the Treatise and the later editions of Essays were not the first times when Hume was taking a radical edge off his wordings. Perhaps the most often used evidence of the nature of Hume’s moral philosophy is a letter to Hutcheson on 17 September, 1739 in which Hume makes for the first time the famous comparison between the anatomist and the painter of morals. The original letter is preserved in the National Library of Scotland and it includes important wordings that Hume decided to strike out.

Of the anatomist-painter letter we should first remark that the letter is a proper letter, not a polished fair-copy (like the famous “letter to the doctor” of 1734). What this indicates is that Hume might not have been overtly worried about Hutcheson as an authority at this point. But as the text of the letter indicates, there is an acknowledged, major dispute of moral philosophy at stake. In the letter Hume already outright and clearly opposes Hutcheson. Since Hume is writing to Hutcheson about their dispute, it would be natural for him to be a little cautious in order not to align himself too squarely with the authors that Hutcheson had made his career opposing. Hume had originally written that ‘Where you pull off the Skin, & display all the minute Parts, there appears something trivial if not hideous, even in the noblest Attitudes...’ Hume deleted the words “if not hideous” from the letter (but did not make them illegible). These deleted words are not mentioned in Greig’s edition of the letters. When Hume was first saying that there is ‘something trivial if not hideous, even in the noblest attitudes’ this puts his original sentencing more towards Hobbes and Mandeville than what we might assume by reading the modern edition of the letters. Hence, it seems at the same time revealing and understandable that Hume deleted “if not hideous” from the text, even when he did not go to lengths to make this illegible. In the letter he already outright and clearly opposes Hutcheson’s way of doing things (and perhaps even the purpose of Hutcheson’s moral philosophy). However, he is thoughtful enough to moderate his opinions by deleting the words that he thinks would unnecessarily widen the already large gap between their points of view. This need not be the deliberate disguising of an opinion, but

173 I would like to thank Professor M. A. Stewart for confirming in private correspondence that my transcription of the deleted words in the manuscript is correct. I am also grateful to Professor Stewart for the astute point that Hume was not deliberately covering his views when deleting these words, otherwise, he would surely have made them illegible.

174 Hume to Hutcheson, 17 September 1739, NLS, MS.23151 f. 55.
putting things into perspective, it seems that Hume would have not been too eager to put his Mandevillean ideas too bluntly to Hutcheson either.

But perhaps the most important deletion revealing something relevant about Hume’s thinking regards the manuscript of the conclusion of Book 3 of the Treatise (T 3.3.6) that is supposed to have been sent to Hutcheson.† The draft also includes words that have been struck out, only this time with such relevance that perhaps Norton could have mentioned them in the Clarendon edition. Again, I am not claiming that Hume was necessarily trying to hide his opinions, although when examining the manuscript of Book 3, we may even consider this possibility.

In the draft of T 3.3.6. Hume originally wrote: ‘The same system may help us to form a just notion of the happiness, as well as of the dignity of virtue, and may interest every principle of our nature, both our selfishness and pride, in the embracing and cherishing that noble quality’. Previously in a letter to Hutcheson Hume had deleted his words that there is something ‘hideous’ in the ‘noblest attitudes’. In the conclusion of Book 3 (also supposedly sent to Hutcheson) he deleted ‘both our Selfishness & Pride’ from the sentence indicating the principles of our nature (and hence not revealing what he means by the principles of our nature).

The observation that Hume deleted ‘both our Selfishness & Pride’ (and not just selfishness or pride) is important. Selfishness and pride include an analogy and it is vital that they are analysed together. The deletion of ‘both our Selfishness & Pride’ was made after the manuscript was finished (judging by the looks of it). But the problem is that the wording of the sentence seems a little curious.† Selfishness and pride are surely not the only principles of our nature that appear in Hume’s system. But perhaps we should read Hume’s use of the “every Principle of our Nature” in a different manner, so that he is not referring to all the possible principles in the widest meaning of the expression, but only to the most important ones. In any case, the sentence should be read in such a way that Hume would have wanted to mention only selfishness and pride (because this is what he does). In other words, he is not saying that selfishness and pride are the only principles of our nature, but he points them out specifically because together they play a crucial role in Hume’s moral and political philosophy. Also, the word “both” in conjunction to ‘our Selfishness & Pride’ gives additional weight to the case of Hume making a point about linking these two principles of human nature together. When we keep in mind that Hume made even more similar deletions later (regarding Hutcheson) in the Treatise, in Essays, and in the anatomist-painter letter to Hutcheson, we may conclude that this points clearly towards Mandeville.

Now, disregarding whether these are the only principles of our nature, these are the only ones that are indicated in the text, which also supports

† In reading the manuscript I need to rely on Norton’s reproduction in the editorial appendix of his edition of the Treatise.
† Professor M. A. Stewart alerted me to this fact.
the case made in this study. The main argument is that Hume is following Mandeville in his distinction between self-love and self-liking (or selfishness and pride), which is only introduced in Mandeville’s later works published in 1729 and 1732. It is crucial hence that Hume at relevant points in his works discusses selfishness and pride (and the derivative moral institutions of justice and politeness) together, which aligns him with Mandeville (the pre-Treatise indications of this are evident not only in the essay on modern honour, but also in the explicitly Mandevillean analysis of politeness in Hume’s letter to Ramsay in 1734). It is the link of self-love to pride followed by the link between justice and politeness that is of central importance and which is only crystallized in Book 3 of the Treatise. If only pride was important, this could equally put Hume together for example with Malebranche (or a number of French authors), but it is the distinction between interest and pride that makes this Mandevillean.

In short, selfishness and pride (together) are the main principles of our nature for Hume’s moral and political philosophy and they are the only principles of human nature that Hume mentions that explain how moral institutions can be drawn directly from human nature (justice in the case of self-love and politeness in the case of pride). Nevertheless, this does not necessarily explain the deletion of ‘both our selfishness and pride’ in T 3.3.6, but I think the deletion at least indirectly supports this study, even when we might not want to say that selfishness and pride are the only principles of human nature and that Hume did not want to deliberately disguise his opinions from Hutcheson.

The idea is not to deny the role of Hutcheson and to simply replace it with Mandeville’s name. Hume was certainly concerned about Hutcheson’s opinion and the influence it might have for the reception of the Treatise. Hume’s strategy seems to have been sending the Treatise (or its manuscript) to many influential scholars that might affect its reception (Butler, Des Maizeaux...) It does make sense that even when Hume’s moral theory has its roots elsewhere than in the Hutcheson’s writings, Hume still would be pointing out the similarities in their philosophy in his personal correspondence. Norton is correct in many of his points about Hume’s idea about the origin of morality. I just don’t know if this actually supports Norton’s overall interpretation to draw the link between Hutcheson and Hume and the dissimilarities between Mandeville and Hume. The more subtle point that I want to make is to show that the change in Mandeville affects the interpretation of Hume.

In the words of M. A. Stewart, ‘although’ Hume ‘was seeking his own independence of mind, there is no evidence that Hume had yet abandoned the ancients’ conception [mainly Cicero and the Stoics] of the philosophical enterprise when, around his eighteenth birthday (April 1729), he was confronted with ‘a new Scene of Thought’.

similar observation.\textsuperscript{178} What Brandt was indicating was the influence of Mandeville in Hume. But what has not been considered is that this is also the very time when Part II was published. There is a strong likelihood that reading the later works of Mandeville might have been one reason for Hume to adopt a more sceptical perspective around the time when Part II was published (the title is just the publishers way to cash in, the work and the theory is separate from the provocative 2nd edition of The Fable of the Bees of 1723. This is something that I think a man with a sharp mind like Hume’s would have noticed, if he got his hands on the book. Chronologically, this is also quite plausible.). We have to keep in mind that the relevance of Part II (independent of the original Fable) remained as a well-established fact in eighteenth-century Scottish thought. Adam Smith wrote a famous letter to the Authors of the Edinburgh Review in 1755. Smith quite fittingly points out that ‘the second volume of the Fable of the Bees has given occasion to the system of Mr. Rousseau’. Now, what I find fitting is not only that Smith has his finger on the right book, but the fact that he wrote this in 1755, which was the first time that there was such a thing as a printed ‘second volume of the Fable’. The first Edinburgh edition came out that year and it was the first time in England that the two parts of The Fable were issued together. The young Hume’s intellectual development took place in a world where The Fable of the Bees and Part II were two different works.

Introduction to A treatise of human nature

Hume’s ‘Introduction’ to the Treatise has been called his ‘earliest work’.\textsuperscript{179} The momentous point of the introduction is Hume’s claim that he is about to ‘march up directly to the capital or center’ of all the branches of science, ‘to human nature itself’. Hume exclaims that he is going to ‘explain the principles of human nature’ and it is this ‘science of man’ that ‘is the only solid foundation for the other sciences’.\textsuperscript{180} According to Hume, there is ‘no question of importance’ in ‘logic, morals, criticism, and politics’ that could not be ‘compriz’d in the science of man’ and human nature itself.\textsuperscript{181} Additionally, Hume points out five modern authors ‘who have begun to put the science of man on new footing’.\textsuperscript{182} The list includes Locke, Shaftesbury,

\textsuperscript{178} Brandt, ‘The beginnings of Hume’s Philosophy’, 1977, pp. 117–127. Also Stewart acknowledges that the relevance of ‘new Scene of Thought’ is ‘well made in’ Brandt’s article, which is (in the words of Stewart) ‘one of the best analyses so far of the letter to the physician’. Stewart, ‘Hume’s intellectual development, 1711–1752’, 2005, p. 29, footnote 56.

\textsuperscript{179} Frederick Whelan, Order and artifice in Hume’s political philosophy, Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 83.

\textsuperscript{180} T Introduction 6–7; SBN xvi.

\textsuperscript{181} T Introduction 5–6; SBN xvi.

\textsuperscript{182} T Introduction 7; SBN xvii.
Hutcheson, Mandeville and Butler. It was quite provocative from Hume to include Mandeville in these ranks, especially when we know his personal relationship with Mandeville’s nemesis Francis Hutcheson. In 1737, Hume wrote a letter to Henry Home explaining that he is ‘at present castrating’ his Treatise and ‘cutting off its noble Parts, that is, endeavouring it shall give as little Offence as possible’. Despite this self-censorship, Mandeville’s name remains next to Hutcheson’s in the published work. There had to be a significant reason for Hume to indicate Mandeville as the predecessor for his ‘science of man’-project when he knew that this might damage his relationship with Francis Hutcheson and be contrary to his own interest.

I find it as a sign of intellectual integrity, that Hume did in fact acknowledge his debt to Mandeville. Of the above mentioned authors, it is only Mandeville who makes a similar sketch about ‘science of man’. When discussing politics in Part II, Mandeville wrote a line for his spokesman Cleomenes that encapsulates the essence of his later works: ‘When I have a mind to dive into the origin of any maxim’ established ‘for the use of society in general, I don’t trouble my head with enquiring after the time or country, in which it was first heard of, nor what others have wrote or said about it; but I go directly to the fountain head, human nature itself’. In other words, Mandeville’s idea is that if we understand human nature, we understand the political principles in any given society. Thus, studying human nature is the first science for Mandeville, and it is also the foundation of politics.

Of course, this is not to say that Hume would be Mandeville in disguise. Hume’s scope of the ‘science of man’ is much more ambitious, ingenious and complex. Most importantly, the science of man in the Treatise is a vast project of the philosophy of mind covering aspects ranging from causal inference, aesthetic thought to social theory and politics. Nothing that Mandeville ever wrote can be compared to this. However, it is not my intention to explain the science of man in its entire magnitude or make claims about the essence of the science of man. I am concentrating on

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183 The same list of philosophers also features in the T Abstract.2; SBN 646.
184 I also find it crucial that Thomas Hobbes is not on the list, and Bernard Mandeville is. If Hume had thought, like plethora of the modern commentators, that Mandeville is merely Hobbes’s shadow, most likely he would have done homage to Hobbes, not Mandeville.
185 David Hume to Henry Home, 2.XII 1737, Hume, New letters, p. 2.
186 Mandeville, Part II, p. 128.
187 David Fate Norton has reminded the ‘readers of Hume’ to ‘be wary of those commentators who engage in the kind of historical reductivism that claims to unlock the secrets of Hume’s thought by reference to one or two authors or one intellectual tradition’. David Fate Norton, ‘An introduction to Hume’s thought’, in The Cambridge companion to Hume, David Fate Norton, ed., Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 13.
188 Although, it also changed after Hume had written his introduction, which means that we cannot possibly indicate what extensions of science of man Hume had in mind before applying it to different directions.
its social, moral and political dimensions. When we focus our attention on the conjectural history of civil society and social theory, I contend that we find significant points in common with Mandeville's later works and the Treatise, which makes it evident that perhaps they should be interpreted in the same tradition.
Modern scholars are often quick to downplay Mandeville's influence on Hume, although the only serious criticism that Hume directs towards the Dutchman in the Treatise is that all the moral distinctions cannot be the inventions of clever politicians. As we have learned, Mandeville's position considerably changed as he advanced to theorise about civil society in the dialogues between Cleomenes and Horatio. I have been arguing that we may plausibly maintain that Mandeville revised his opinion of the arbitrary role of the politicians in Part II and developed a hypothesis where justice and politeness are explained as decisive, artificial moral institutions based on previous human conventions. In the end the question about moral distinctions turns out to be of minor significance compared to the nature of artificial virtues, which in Hume's words plainly 'arise from interest and education'.

Before engaging the features that are peculiar to David Hume's thinking, we first need to establish his relation to Bernard Mandeville more particularly. A good point to commence is the argument that supposedly separates the Scotchman from Mandeville. Hume is careful to let his audience know that he censures the idea that all moral distinctions are artificial inventions putting distance between himself and the controversial reputation of The Fable of the Bees. Towards the end of the Treatise, in a part entitled 'Of the origin of the natural virtues and vices', Hume indicates that there have been 'some philosophers' who think that 'moral distinctions' only arise 'when skilful politicians endeavour'd to restrain the turbulent passions of men, and make them operate to the public good, by the notions of honour and shame'. As Hume publicly announces, he does not endorse the view where 'all moral distinctions' are represented 'as the effect of artifice and education'. He explicitly dismisses such 'system', because it is not 'consistent with experience'. Modern scholars have taken careful notice of this and it is commonplace that 'Hume forcefully rejects “the selfish philosophy” then associated with Hobbes and Mandeville'.

The anamorphosis in the prevailing interpretations derived from the remarks of

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1 T 3.2.1.17; SBN 483.
2 T 3.3.1.11; SBN 578.
3 T 3.3.1.11; SBN 578.
Hume's relationship towards Mandeville is that Mandeville had arrived to the same conclusion ten years earlier.

Hume introduces two observations to counter the claim that all moral distinctions have been invented by skilful politicians. According to his interpretation, in the selfish system all the 'virtues and vices' are thought to have a 'tendency to the public advantage or loss'. Since Hume maintains that there are other virtues as well, some, for example, that are agreeable or useful to the person itself and not in anyway to the public, he claims that in this respect the selfish system is not plausible. Hume's second point, and what modern scholars have taken as the factor that rigorously distinguishes Hume from Mandeville, is the existence of moral vocabulary. Hume indicates that if men did not have any 'natural sentiment of approbation and blame, it cou'd never be excited by politicians; nor wou'd the words laudable and praise-worthy, blameable and odious, be any more intelligible, than if they were a language perfectly unknown to us'. It seems to be that Hume's explicit intention is to make the case that anyone claiming that all moral distinctions are artificial is wrong, because we have a comprehensive moral vocabulary and thus there has to be at least some natural sentiments that approve and disapprove certain qualities without any external, socially binding force. Hume argues this point on three different occasions, twice in the Treatise and once in Enquiry concerning the principles of morals.

I do not want to claim that the argument about moral vocabulary would not be an important point in the Treatise. It certainly puts distance between Hume and the reception of The Fable. However, I cannot see how this point alone would separate Hume's interpretation of civil society and social theory in Mandeville's revised vision. In his later works, Bernard Mandeville was happy to admit that there is at least one thoroughly natural virtue in human nature, natural affection. And when we see this in the light of the 1720s criticism, we notice that Hume's position actually differs very little from the stance taken in Part II.

Hume's criticism leads us directly to the heart of the matter, natural and artificial virtues. Why are certain virtues called natural? Hume makes it plain to see that the foundation of a natural virtue is human nature. When there is an original motive implanted in our nature to act in a virtuous manner, this particular virtue is natural. When we detect a sign of what we take to be a virtuous motive in others, we instinctively approve it. This approving sentiment is natural and arises without the aid of education or social experience. Since there are certain inclinations to act in a virtuous

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5 T 3.3.1.11; SBN 578–9.
6 T 3.3.1.11; SBN 579.
7 About Butler and the argument of moral vocabulary, see p. 126 above. About Hutcheson on the same topic, see p. 121.
9 About Mandeville and natural and artificial in Part II, see pp. 162–164 above.
manner regardless of artificial conventions and public instruction, we cannot claim that all moral distinctions are the effect of artifice and education. He explains that, for example, humanity is a natural virtue and ‘when I relieve persons in distress, my natural humanity is my motive’ and even if there ‘was no obligation to relieve the miserable, our humanity would lead us to it; and when we omit that duty, the immorality of the omission arises from its being a proof, that we want the natural sentiments of humanity’. Hume makes the case for natural virtues much more forcefully when discussing a father, who takes ‘care of his children’. Taking care of his children is the man’s ‘duty’, but he also has ‘a natural inclination to it’. Natural virtues in Hume’s system are exactly what Hutcheson and other virtue theorists understood by virtue in general. I can see no interpretative difficulties regarding the nature of natural virtues. When stressing that parental affection is a natural quality, Hume conforms to the standard case of the natural affection pinpointed by Butler, Hutcheson and Balguy among others.

In his influential interpretation of Hume’s moral theory, John Mackie has argued that ‘natural virtues’ are ‘after all’ only ‘a further set of artificial virtues’. I think that this interpretation is somewhat problematic, because it seems to miss the meaning of the distinction between these two classes of virtues and, in a sense, takes an inequitable shortcut regarding the question of moral motivation. Natural affection is the only active natural virtue that operates at the beginning of the civilising process or in a barbarous age. Most of the other natural virtues are latent features of human nature, which can easily be accounted as a reason not to pay particular attention to them when focusing on the origin of human society. The latent quality of the majority of the natural virtues is also apparent. For example, Hume’s favourite example of humanity may only become effectual in a civil society, due to outward circumstances. This does not mean that men would not originally have the seeds of these inclinations, only that it takes time and social development before men are placed in a situation where they become effective. This also explains why he claims that through the circle of

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10 T 3.3.1.12; SBN 579.
11 T 3.2.5.6; SBN 518.
13 T 3.2.5.6; SBN 518-9.
14 About Mandeville and natural affection in Part II, see pp. 156–157 above.
16 How can natural virtues ‘counteract’ the ‘effects’ of ‘confined generosity’, if confined generosity is crucially caused by natural virtues i.e. natural affection? To me it seems that Mackie’s account of natural virtues overemphasises psychological role of pleasure for Hume. Natural virtue is a natural virtue because we are naturally motivated to act accordingly and we naturally approve this type of behaviour in others. This is clear enough and I do not think that there is anything to be added to this in order to understand what natural virtues are.
refinement only the contemporary Europe has become effectively humane, whereas for example the ancient Greece had remained barbarous in this respect. But it would be futile to debate whether humanity or brutality are original features of human nature because either one of these traits can be seen to actualise in a given society depending on the circumstances. It is the question of controlling these overall circumstances that is the heart of the matter. In other words, the advancement of artificial moral institutions provides the means for securing self-love and balancing economic development, which in turn gives the foundation for cultivating natural virtues in a proper manner. Without the circle of refinement and the foundational role of artificial moral institutions this would remain impossible.

Hume gives us a clarifying example in his Essays where he outlines that there are two kinds of moral duties. There are, on the one hand, ‘those, to which men are impelled by a natural instinct or immediate propensity, which operates on them, independent of all ideas of obligation, and of all views, either to public or private utility’. Such duties are ‘love of children, gratitude to benefactors, pity to the unfortunate’. This conforms precisely to the principal arguments of the 1720s criticism towards Hobbsism. On the other hand, there are also other ‘moral duties’ that ‘are not supported by any original instinct of nature, but are performed entirely from a sense of obligation, when we consider the necessities of human society, and the impossibility of supporting it, if these duties were neglected’. To put it simply, natural virtues are those beneficial acts that men are naturally inclined to perform and we consequently have natural sentiments that approve such motives that set men to perform these actions.

But perhaps the most influential recent reading of Hume’s distinction between natural and artificial virtues has been given by Schneewind in his Invention of autonomy. Schneewind interprets this distinction as a direct continuation of Grotius’s distinction between perfect and imperfect rights. Even when this distinction might be indirectly influenced by the natural law tradition, we need to realise that it was widely used by the 1720s moral philosophers, who were not necessarily participating in any discussion on rights and the natural law. To discuss natural and artificial virtues was simply a common feature of the ongoing debate.

Another common contemporary way to interpret the distinction between natural and artificial virtues is to take Hume’s words at face value and point out that the actual difference is that natural virtues ‘produce good on each occasion of their practise’ and are approved ‘on every occasion’,

17 I will treat this central aspect of Hume’s historical thought in detail below in ‘Ancient v. modern’.
19 About 1720s criticism of Hobbsism, see pp. 116–131 above.
whereas some instances of artificial virtue might “be ‘contrary to the public
good’ and be approved only as it is entailed by ‘a general scheme or system
of action, which is advantageous’ in so far as it conforms to one of the
general rules we have been disposed to form.” This is indeed what Hume
tells his audience after he had laid out the conjectural development of civil
society, where he vehemently questions the relevance of our natural moral
principles. When describing the civilising process, Hume is not highlighting
the similarities between natural and artificial virtues, he is stressing the
apparent conflict between our natural ideas of morality (that include natural
virtues) and artificial moral institutions.

When we understand that Hume is adopting a familiar form of
argument when discussing natural virtues, we also realise that the actual
concessions that he makes towards Hutcheson are very slight. The question
at hand is not whether there are some virtues that we may call natural. The
heart of the matter is whether the foundational virtues of justice and
politeness are natural. Hutcheson, following Shaftesbury, claims that a
natural sentiment of universal benevolence is the foundation of justice, thus
justice is a natural virtue. David Hume categorically maintains that ‘there is
no such passion in human minds, as the love of mankind’. He argues that
‘public benevolence’, ‘regard to the interests of mankind’ or ‘private
benevolence’ cannot be the ‘original motive of justice’ and therefore ‘we must
allow’ that this virtue is ‘not deriv’d from nature’. Instead, it arises
‘artificially, tho’ necessarily from education, and human conventions’. I
cannot see how this would be in anyway decidedly different from what
Mandeville was advancing in Part II.

The link to Mandeville’s later theory becomes apparent when one
realises the role natural virtues actually play in the Treatise. The premises that
Hume places in the first savage state are altogether familiar in Mandeville’s
discussion on the same subject. The first crucial point that distinguishes
Mandeville’s and Hume’s account from the modern natural law theory
concerns the concept of state of nature. Mandeville pointed out that we
should not overemphasise the contrast between the state of nature and civil
society because the children of the first wild couple are already born into a
social state. Thus, we can use the idea of state of nature as a hypothetical
device. David Hume also emphasises that the ‘state of nature’ should ‘be
regarded as a mere fiction’ and if we want to utilise this concept in our
reasoning we have to write about ‘suppos’d state of nature’ instead of an

23 T 3.1.12; SBN 481.
24 T 3.1.13; SBN 482.
25 T 3.1.17; SBN 483.
26 About the contrast between family and civil society in Mandeville, see p. 161–162
above.
actual condition. Like Mandeville, when discussing the first savages, Hume uses the concept of ‘wild uncultivated state’ instead of state of nature.

In his discussion on the first family society (a wild couple and their children) Mandeville singled out three original principles: lust between sexes, instinct of sovereignty and natural affection. It is a significant part of his theory of the civilising process that the first family was formed relying completely on the natural principles of human nature. Lust is the first principle that naturally draws the wild couple together. The instinct of sovereignty, that governs all their actions, makes them send their children to labour for their few needs. And, finally, natural affection, which is defined as a lasting and other-regarding passion that restricts our behaviour and can even make a savage man sacrifice his life for his children’s sake, plays an important role in various ways, not only in the development of a family society, but also at later stages of the civil society. Hume’s remarks are remarkably similar: ‘Natural appetite betwixt the sexes’ is underlined as the primary ‘necessity’ of the association between human beings. The first wild family has a natural bond, because the parents are always guided by ‘natural affection’, which for example restrains ‘the exercise’ of ‘the authority’ that ‘they bear their children’ and it is precisely the ‘passions of lust and natural affection’ that seems to render the ‘union’ within the savage family ‘unavoidable’. He also stresses that this ‘requisite conjunction’ is partly disturbed by ‘other particulars’ of human nature and ‘outward circumstances’. It is, of course, our ‘selfishness’ that is maintained as ‘the most considerable’ aspect of ‘our natural temper’ and which is considered the greatest obstacle in an established society. This is remarkably close to Mandeville’s description of the first private family. Our selfish principles are perceived as the governing feature of human nature, but because of other natural passions, namely lust between the sexes and natural affection towards kin – without any assistance from the artificial institutions – the first private family is able to function as a coherent unit.

After pinning down that selfishness is the dominating feature in human nature, Hume is quick to seemingly balance the accounts by declaring that he does not think ‘that men have no affection for any thing beyond themselves’. According to the testimony given by Hume, even though ‘it be rare to meet with’ a person ‘who loves any single person better than himself; yet ‘tis as rare to meet with one, in whom all the kind affections, taken together, do not over-balance all the selfish’. Hume carries the

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27 T 3.3.2.15; SBN 493.
28 T 3.2.3.4; SBN 486.
29 Compare the change in later Mandeville and natural affection, pp. 157–158 (above) to natural affection in The Fable of the Bees, pp. 105–107 above.
30 T 3.2.3.4; SBN 486.
31 T 3.2.3.5; SBN 486.
32 T 3.2.3.5; SBN 486.
33 See p. 155–156 above.
34 T 3.2.3.5; SBN 487.
thought further and begs his audience to ‘consult common experience’: Isn’t it evident that even when ‘the whole expense of the family be generally under the direction of the master of it’, most of these masters ‘bestow the largest part’ of their fortune ‘on the pleasures of their wives, and the education of their children, reserving the smallest portion for their own proper use and entertainment’? Now, instead of jumping to the conclusion that Hume detaches himself from Mandeville’s egoistic system, we should stop to think what he is actually saying. As we recall, Hume strictly denies that there would be such a ‘passion in human minds, as the love of mankind’. Instead, he exhausts the point that ‘we are naturally very limited in our kindness and affection’. Even when the role of the other-regarding affection is buttressed with overwhelming eloquence, in Hume’s system the affections that the savages have do not reach strangers. When we remember that a similar answer had been given by Mandeville in Part II to the 1720s criticism, the radical content of Hume’s argument turns out to be all the more striking. According to Hume, naturally generous feelings are confined within the family. And what this means is that Hume does not make any more compromises towards Hutcheson than Mandeville does. They are both emphasising the significance of ‘natural affection’ and the unifying passion between the sexes. This point can also be confirmed in Hume’s treatment of passions in Book 2 of the Treatise, where ‘love’ between ‘sexes’ is described as natural and ‘the affection of parents to their young’ ones to proceed ‘from a peculiar instinct’ in all ‘animals’, not just men. Thus, it hardly comes as a surprise that the only natural virtue that has significant relevance in this civilising scheme is encapsulated in the example of a parent, who takes ‘care of his children’, because he has ‘a natural inclination to it’. Hume indeed makes a bustle of the fact that in his system there is a place for natural virtues. Nevertheless, when discussing the common propensities for human mind in a civilised and an ‘uncultivated state’, the only original principles that he singles out are ‘selfishness and limited generosity’. Against this background, it is understandable that other natural virtues are a simple catalogue in the

35 T 3.2.3.5; SBN 487.
36 T 3.2.1.12; SBN 481.
37 T 3.2.5.8; SBN 519.
38 T 2.2.11.1; SBN 394.
39 T 2.2.12.5; SBN 398. It is noteworthy that ‘The affection of parents to their young proceeds from a peculiar instinct in animals, as well as in our species’ is so important a remark that it occupies a whole paragraph.
40 T 3.2.5.6; SBN 518–9. A curious fact about Treatise is that Hume treated natural virtues (somewhat systematically) only after he had described the conjectural development of artificial virtues. The obvious reason for this is that natural virtues made little difference for the process of a savage family society turning into a civilised state. Thus, the structure of Treatise already underscores the stark distinction between artificial and natural virtues as well as the prevalence of the former over latter regarding civil society.
41 T 3.2.2.16; SBN 494.
Treatise. Perhaps we should draw an even sharper conclusion and state that the role of the original, other-regarding passions of human nature are analogous in Part II and the Treatise.

But instead of just noting that Hume should be read in Mandeville’s context, we need to analyse his position further. What he is doing is far more outspoken, analytic and radical than what Mandeville proposed. Hume turns the two passions that are ‘evidently implanted in human nature’, ‘affection betwixt the sexes’ and ‘natural affection’ towards children, into ‘confined generosity’ and explains how it vaguely touches all our loved ones in general. After he has uttered that ‘this generosity must be acknowledg’d to the honour of human nature’, he comes up with a twist that turns the argument on its head. Hume argues that ‘so noble an affection, instead of fitting men for large societies, is almost as contrary to them, as the most narrow selfishness’. The sole intention of the civilising process, and a considerable part of Book 3 of the Treatise, is to explain how men are integrated into civil society. Instead of eulogising the natural virtues, Hume is claiming that all the generosity that we naturally have stands in stark contrast with large societies, since ‘each person loves himself better than any other single person, and in his love to others bears the greatest affection to his relations and acquaintance, this must necessarily produce an opposition of passions, and a consequent opposition of actions’. Thus, what he manages to do is to tie our selfishness and confined generosity together and, significantly, coin them as our ‘natural uncultivated ideas of morality’ that are fundamentally opposed to civil society. These natural ideas of morality are often conflicting with civil society for the plain reason that in their partiality they stand in contrast with the artificial moral institutions that are not based on any natural inclination of human nature. After analysing these uncultivated principles for three pages or so, he reaches the unambiguous conclusion that our natural ideas of morality ‘instead of providing a remedy for the partiality of our affections, do rather conform themselves to that partiality, and give it an additional force and influence’.

42 T 3.2.1.12; SBN 481.
43 T 3.2.2.18; SBN 495, see also T 3.2.5.8; SBN 519 and T 3.2.8.10; SBN 558.
44 T 3.2.2.6; SBN 487.
45 T 3.2.2.9; SBN 489.
46 Duncan Forbes also pointed out that ‘Hume deliberately rejected the continuity between family and civil society’. Forbes, Hume’s philosophical politics, 1975, p. 75. From a perspective of moral philosophy, Rachel Cohon has also written that ‘it is not only my selfishness which will lead me to use force or stealth to make off with the fruits of your labour or the whole of our joint product. My partiality to my own friends and family will lead to the same sort of behaviour.’ Cohon, ‘Hume’s difficulty with the virtue of honesty’, 1997, p. 96. Regarding the same argument about the contradiction between natural virtues and civil society, see also Baron, ‘Hume’s noble lie’, 1982, p. 545.
47 T 3.2.2.9; SBN 489. This inherent problem of men turning to their natural ideas of morality in order to justify their own actions is a significant point for understanding Hume’s moral philosophy and I will treat it later concerning both justice and politeness.
Mandeville and Hume made two interrelated conceptual distinctions: the first between a small and large society, and the second between natural morality and artificial moral institutions. The purpose of stressing these divisions is to explain an understanding of morality based on a pluralist system, where our selfishness and natural partiality are kept under control. This is also the reason why Hume vehemently stresses that 'the generosity of men is very limited' and 'it seldom extends beyond their friends and family, or, at most, beyond their native country'.

We cannot suppose that our system of justice could be based on our natural benevolence, which would only mean that it excludes most of humanity from its scope. It is remarkable that both Mandeville and Hume forcefully attack the pre-eminent position of natural generosity in the prevailing ethical systems, which, in their opinion, would interfere with a more equal way of deciding what is right and wrong. Their idea is to explain how men began their moral development, in a wild and uncultivated state, from natural morality fully based on natural motives, and how, during the long course of the civilising process, they are forced to face the fact that their natural judgement is always partial and tied to the circumstances (no matter how right it might feel). Hence, men eventually come to fix particular artificial rules restricting the movement of their natural passions. The immediate consequence of this paradigmatic change in morals is that men are able to advance their own interests, which in turn creates a new sense of a moral need for upholding the system that does not depend on their partial judgement, but that it nevertheless serves their self-interest. This is what conjectural history of civil society is all about and this is what I want to study in detail, now when we have realised that this development, in the strict sense of the term, is fully dependant upon the artificial principles.

No non-moral motive for artificial virtues

According to David Hume, justice is an artificial virtue that is founded on a previous human convention. Bernard Mandeville made a similar hypothesis. Before we start examining what Hume says about artificial virtues and the conjectural development of moral institutions, we need to make one specific clarification that will considerably help our task. Not only do we have to look for a foundation other than human nature for moral institutions that enable the civilising process, we also have to realise that we cannot find a natural (or non-moral) motive for these artificial virtues because Hume states that it does not exist.

What is still creating unrest among the philosophically oriented commentators is the supposed tension between Hume's overall definition of morality and artificial virtues. In what way is an artificial virtue to be considered a virtue? Before introducing the possibility of a virtue that does

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48 T 3.3.3.2; SBN 602.
49 See pp. 174–178 above.
not have its origin in human nature, Hume writes that ‘no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of its morality’. What causes a problem is that a few pages later he seems to refute his own system of morals by stating that ‘we have naturally no real or universal motive for observing the laws of equity, but the very equity and merit of that observance; and as no action can be equitable or meritorious, where it cannot arise from some separate motive, there is here an evident sophistry and reasoning in a circle’. Some philosophers, interested in ‘humean’ morality, have taken the requirement of a non-moral motive behind a virtuous action highly seriously and painstaking efforts have been put on different explanations of how Hume’s system of ethics meets this criteria or how it fails to do so. This is problematic because Hume unambiguously closes his analysis by stating that instead of looking for some separate motive ‘we must allow, that the sense of justice and injustice is not deriv’d from nature’.

In my reading this condition simply does not apply to artificial virtues. Or to put it more explicitly, according to Hume, it is dangerous to think that it would. The intensely examined part where he seems to be applying the requirement of a non-moral motive to artificial virtues is an illustration of what requirements justice would have to meet, if it were a natural virtue. To make such a claim is not a strategy to work my way around Hume’s circle argument, instead I am contending that in his system it is relevant that we do not suppose that artificial virtues have to meet this criteria. What Hume is doing, is to point out that there is a significant difference between natural and artificial virtues. If we do not realise this and think that artificial virtues have to have their motivating basis on human nature in the same manner as natural virtues, this will lead us to confusion and, as Hume points out, the scheme of justice, and other artificial virtues that are regulated by general rules, are jeopardized. Hence, the idea of natural (or non-moral) motives behind an artificial virtue is not only confusing, it is also harmful.

Hume argues this in his third point of the section entitled ‘Some farther reflexions concerning justice and injustice’. He examines what happens if we make the mistake of thinking that an artificial virtue is founded on the common principles of human nature i.e. on some natural motive. He claims first that in ‘the ordinary course of human actions’ the mind is never restrained ‘by any general and universal rules’ and acts according to ‘its present motives and inclination’. The circumstances always define our

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50 T 3.2.1.7; SBN 479.
51 T 3.2.1.17; SBN 483.
52 About the common topic of moral motivation in Hume’s philosophy, see for example, Donald Hubin, ‘What’s special about Humeanism’, Nous, 33, 1999, pp. 30-45.
53 T 3.2.1.17; SBN 483.
54 T 3.1.2; SBN 477–484.
55 T 3.2.6.9; SBN 531.
naturally motivated judgement and, as a consequence, ‘if on some occasions’ we try to ‘form’ strictly from our own experience ‘something like general rules for our conduct’ what always happens is that ‘these rules are not perfectly inflexible, but allow of many exceptions’. Any rules that we are able to form from particular experience in ‘the ordinary course of human actions’ are only ‘something like general rules’ and not general rules per se. In contrast, as Hume underlines, ‘the laws of justice’ are ‘universal and perfectly inflexible’, thus, they ‘can never be deriv’d from nature’ nor could they ‘be the immediate offspring of any natural motive or inclination’. Hume is very clear about our incapacity to form a coherent system of justice based on our natural passions.

As I pointed out, the reason why this section is significant is not the commonplace that justice, according to Hume, is an artificial virtue, but the explicit proof that he is trying to convince his audience why we should not try to look for non-moral motives behind artificial virtues. After making the above-mentioned analysis, he turns to consider an example of a ‘dispute for an estate’, where one of the quarrellers is ‘rich, a fool’, ‘a batchelor’ and ‘my enemy’; ‘the other poor, a man of sense’, who ‘has a numerous family’ and is ‘my friend’. The whole point of this example is that it is staged as an examination of what happens to civil society if we were to base our rules of justice on our natural sentiments of morality, which are the only non-moral motives that we have. The consequences would be disastrous. For argument’s sake, and not because it is his own premise, Hume takes up the position that ‘no action can be either morally good or evil, unless there be some natural passion or motive to impel us to it, or deter us from it’, which is the same requirement of a non-moral motive that he suggests in section 3.2.1. The conclusion that he draws from this premise is evident. If we were to solve the dispute based on our ‘natural motives’, we ‘must’ do whatever we can ‘to procure the estate to’ the poor family man. This is of course contrary to Hume’s idea of justice. In real life we have to be able to also consider ‘the right and property of the persons’ that restrains our judgement, instead of trusting our natural motives. We need an inflexible general rule that has nothing to do with the way we would naturally feel about right and wrong, which is not a constant principle, as he points out, but varies according to the circumstances. If ‘all property depends on morality’ and ‘all morality depends on the ordinary course of our passions and actions’, and these, in turn, ‘are only directed by particular motives’, Hume concludes that it is ‘evident’ that ‘such a partial conduct must be suitable to the strictest morality, and cou’d never be a violation of

56 T 3.2.6.9; SBN 531.
57 T 3.2.6.9; SBN 532.
58 T 3.2.6.9; SBN 532.
59 ‘no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of its morality.’ T 3.2.1.7; SBN 479.
60 T 3.2.6.9; SBN 532.

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Thus, if we were taking the suggested premise as a real one, without exception in this particular example our judgement would transfer the estate to the poor man, regardless of the question of ‘rightful’ ownership. Justice based on any natural motives would always be partial. As one would expect, this is an absurd claim and, as he in his conclusion indicates, this is not his position, but a demonstration of what would happen if someone, no matter how earnestly, tries to construct a system of justice trusting his natural understanding. In short, this person would always end up building his system of justice on natural motives, which are ‘a very improper foundation for such rigid inflexible rules as the laws of nature’.

Thus, the point is that if men were able to brush aside all the impressions of the artificial moral rules derived from education, they turn to consult their original principles and act according to the way they naturally feel about what is right and wrong, which would mean that all they are doing is to ‘conduct themselves’ by ‘particular judgements’ that ‘would produce an infinite confusion in human society’ and ‘the avidity and partiality of men would quickly bring disorder into the world’. This is the reason why justice is not based on natural motives and men need to be ‘restrain’d by some general and inflexible principles’. Since justice cannot be partial and our natural motives always lead us to a partial judgement, there is no primary non-moral motive that artificial virtues are based on. Instead, ‘men have establish’d certain principles in order ‘to restrain themselves by general rules, which are unchangeable by spite and favour, and by particular views of private or public interest’. Hume carries on and states that ‘these rules, then, are artificially invented for a certain purpose, and are contrary to the common principles of human nature, which accommodate themselves to circumstances, and have no stated invariable method of operation’. The ‘laws of nature’ are not founded on natural motives. They ‘can only be deriv’d from human conventions, when men perceiv’d the disorders that result from following their natural and variable principles’.

The opening section of part II of Book 3 of the Treatise, where Hume first picks the topic of justice, has understandably gathered vast attention from scholars and it might certainly seem as if he was imposing the requirement of a non-moral motive for any ethical theory, including his own description of artificial virtues. Even though the section is admittedly very curiously written, it only demonstrates what conditions an artificial virtue would have to meet if it was a natural virtue. Nevertheless, what does quite effectively prove that he is only putting forward a hypothetical premise is the reducio ad absurdum argument that I have just analysed, which demolishes the idea that our sense of justice could be based on any ‘natural

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61 T 3.2.6.9; SBN 532.
62 T 3.2.6.10; SBN 533.
63 T 3.2.6.9; SBN 532.
64 T 3.2.6.9; SBN 532-3.
65 T 3.2.6.10; SBN 533.
motive’. Here Hume specifically attacks the idea of justice based on a ‘natural motive’. If we carefully read what Hume writes about the requirement of a non-moral motive, in the section 3.2.1, we recognise that it only ‘appears’ that ‘all virtuous actions derive their merit only from virtuous motives’ and this ‘first virtuous motive’, as he emphasises ‘must be some other natural motive or principle’.66 If this was also a requirement for artificial virtues, Hume’s system would not make any sense whatsoever. But, as he goes on to explain, the requirement only concerns natural virtues, such as ‘natural affection’67, and it cannot hold true for the artificial virtues that are ‘not deriv’d from nature’, but arise ‘artificially, tho’ necessarily from education, and human conventions’.68 And what is more, since he even emphasises that we should not look for natural motives for artificial virtues, because it would be confusing and harmful to our established system, I think that we may conclude that the requirement for a non-moral motive does not apply to artificial virtues.

Conjectural development of artificial moral institutions

In order to understand Hume’s Treatise, more importance has to be placed on the different transitional phases introduced in Hume’s account of the conjectural history of civil society. Hume was not a Hobbist contractarian or an advocate of the four stage theory. Yet, the distinctions between different kinds of societies make all the difference for Hume’s understanding of natural and artificial virtues alike.69

Hume agrees with Mandeville that in a sense the ‘very first state and situation’ of a savage ‘may justly be esteem’d social’.70 Without any hesitation he emphasises that ‘the state of society without government is one of the most natural states of men, and may subsist with the conjunction of many families’.71 Hobbes claims that we only find a social condition in a civil society that is based on the infallible role of the sovereign. Thus, we should take notice of how far from the Hobbist world Hume’s social thought evolves. Mandeville explains already that relying on the natural principles implanted in human nature the first wild family expands into a clan that would coexist without any fixed government. Like Mandeville, Hume emphasises that ‘all societies on their first formation’ are ‘so barbarous and un instructed’ that ‘many years must elapse before these cou’d encrease to such a degree, as to disturb men in the enjoyment of peace and concord’. Hume’s attention is focused on making the distinction

66 T 3.2.1.4; SBN 478.
67 T 3.2.1.5; SBN 478.
68 T 3.2.1.17; SBN 483.
69 The significant division between natural society and a large society has been also stressed by Forbes, Hume’s philosophical politics, 1975, p. 75.
70 T 3.2.2.15; SBN 493.
71 T 3.2.8.3; SBN 541.
between small, clan-based societies and large civil societies. Only ‘an
increase of riches and possessions’ would eventually force men to stop
relying on their natural bonds.\textsuperscript{72}

It is against this divisional background that we have to analyse the well-
known fact that, according to Hume, it is ‘by society alone’ that a ‘man’ may
overcome his ‘unnatural conjunction of infirmity, and of necessity’ and
‘raise himself up to an equality with his fellow-creatures, and even acquire a
superiority above them’.\textsuperscript{73} The first state of society is extremely barbarous,
yet the artificial moral development starts already then. Since Hume
practically annuls the role of any generosity that we naturally have by
equating it to our most narrow selfishness, the problem is of course, how
do men acquire such a foundation of morality that functions in a large
society. One detail that Hume explicates much more comprehensively than
Mandeville (which is of course understandable since Hume’s medium was a
treatise and Mandeville’s a dialogue) is how radical the idea of artificial basis
for morality actually is. The idea of artificial virtues is to get men to act
contrary to their original principles, natural sentiments and at times against
their natural understanding of morality implanted in human nature. People
might not grasp how uncompromising a suggestion this actually is, because
they are used to living in a society where laws, custom and honour have
replaced natural conscience and men are inclined to prefer invented rules to
the natural turn of mind. However, in the eighteenth century this idea was
more sweeping than stating that all moral distinctions are artificial. When
we recognise the effective contrast between natural and artificial virtues, it
becomes apparent that at times we need to put aside the inclinations that
are original in our nature and choose a system that has been artificially
invented by men. The dichotomy between natural and artificial virtues is
more devastating to the ‘Hutchesonian’ system of benevolence than a
Hobbist outright moral scepticism that claims that all moral principles are
artificial inventions.

Another common feature of Mandeville and Hume’s descriptions of the
conjectural history of civil society is that they both firmly circumscribe the
role of reason in the civilising process. Hume writes that in the ‘wild
uncultivated state’ it is ‘impossible’ that savages ‘by study and reflexion
alone’ would ‘be able to attain’ the knowledge of the ‘advantages’ of
‘society’.\textsuperscript{74} The point is not that the savages are unable to use the faculty of
reason. The point is rather that men can only learn from experience, thus,
the role of reason cannot be on the central stage when the history of civil
society is played out. In both of these naturalistic accounts the role of
reason in the civilising process is severely limited and replaced by social
experience.

\textsuperscript{72} T 3.2.8.3; SBN 541.
\textsuperscript{73} T 3.2.2.3; SBN 485.
\textsuperscript{74} T 3.2.2.4; SBN 486.
The question about civil society and sociability concerns our passions. Precisely like Mandeville, Hume points out that a critical change occurs in the first children compared to their wild parents. ‘Custom and habit’ start to operate ‘on the tender minds of the children’ and ‘in a little time’ they make ‘them sensible of the advantages, which they may reap from society’. As we recall, one defining quality of a sociable creature for Mandeville is an insatiable desire to meliorate his condition. In the Treatise, Hume brings forward the very same feature. This desire is such a dominating characteristic of human nature that Hume goes on to declare that men would ‘never be so foolish’ as to agree upon anything but in hopes of ‘bettering their own condition’. Relying on this theoretical backdrop Hume states that by the generous aid of ‘custom and habit’ the children are ‘by degrees’ fashioned for society and slowly start to rub ‘off those rough corners and untoward affections’ that prevent ‘their coalition’. Hume instructs his audience that ‘insensibly and by degrees’, within the course of many generations men eventually become ‘sensible of the misery’ of ‘their savage and solitary condition’. Instead of guarding their natural liberty, people recognise ‘the advantages that wou’d result from society’, seek ‘each other’s company’ and make ‘an offer of mutual protection and assistance’.

Thus, the motive to seek society is that men have ‘become sensible of the infinite advantages that result from it’, and simultaneously, ‘from their early education in society’ they acquire ‘a new affection to company and conversation’ that will slowly start moulding the self-image of men to be tenaciously dependent upon the opinion of others.

The description of the process and the focus of the conjectural history of civil society are similar (or partly identical) in Part II and the Treatise, but so is the intellectual scenario that explains how this historical development of artificial moral institutions takes place. In both of them, the role of the countervailing passions is set forward as the primary civilising devise. The idea is to play the passions against themselves. What is more, the passion that has to be redirected is not only our self-love or self-interest, but also self-liking or pride. A remarkable feature of the Treatise is that it meticulously follows Mandeville’s distinction between self-love and self-applause. Hume, like his Dutch predecessor, adopts the idea that there are two original selfish passions in human nature that need to be regulated by strict rules in order to be cultivated, the direct ‘passion of self-interest’ and the indirect passion of pride.

Civil society, according to this outline, derived perhaps from Pierre Nicole and (what some scholars have come to

75 T 3.2.2.4; SBN 486.
76 T 3.2.9.2; SBN 550.
77 T 3.2.2.4; SBN 486.
78 T 3.2.3.3; SBN 502–503.
79 T 3.2.2.9; SBN 489.
80 T 3.2.2.13; SBN 492.
81 In the Treatise, Hume uses the terms pride, vanity and self-satisfaction respectively.
call) the neo-Augustinian tradition, is built by nurturing these passions. The point is that these two distinct passions are the cause of the two corresponding moral institutions. Every civil society is forced to form these two general outlines of artificial morality, because of the passion in question. Previously, justice and politeness have both been singled out as important virtues for Hume. Nevertheless, justice and politeness have not been interrelated or connected. So far no one has pointed out the apparent symmetry between the passions and the equivalent artificial virtues, nor that for Hume they are two sides of the same coin.

When making the distinction between self-love and self-liking we are referring to two different passions. Most of the other artificial virtues that Hume studies in detail, such as promise-keeping, allegiance and the laws of nations are part of justice or directly derived from it. They all belong to self-love. In addition, Hume’s system allows other artificial virtues such as chastity. However, the intellectual framework underlying chastity is different from justice and politeness. The idea in chastity is to solely curb the passion of lust, whereas in both justice and politeness the idea is to cultivate the passion in question. Hume tells his audience that even when ‘the fundamental laws of nature’ (i.e. justice) ‘impose’ a ‘restraint’ on ‘the passions of men’, in fact they ‘are only a more artful and more refin’d way of satisfying them’. The same holds true for politeness, where the idea is that ‘good-breeding’ requires ‘that we shou’d avoid all signs and expressions, which tend directly to show’ the passion of ‘pride’. However, ‘pride, or self-applause’ is ‘always agreeable to ourselves’ and ‘thus self-satisfaction and vanity may not only be allowable, but requisite in a character’. In the case of justice and politeness, Hume introduces an idea of a circle of refinement, where the moral institution strengthens as the passion of self-love or self-liking is encouraged. This redirected spiral is altogether familiar in Mandeville and can be seen as a naturalistic development of Pierre Nicole’s neo-Augustinian outline. According to Hume, in order for everyone to be able to cultivate their pride, ‘we must carry a fair outside, and have the appearance of modesty and mutual deference in all our conduct and behaviour’, while the actual feeling that we nurture is diametrically opposite to this theatrical mask. There is little doubt that concerning the pivotal artificial virtues, Hume was setting forward the idea of cultivating the passions in question by redirecting its course.

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82 The relevance of justice is a commonplace in Hume’s political philosophy, the role of politeness is often ignored, see however, Johnson, ‘Hume on manners and the civil condition’, 1998, pp. 209–222.
83 About the central importance of lust in Mandeville, see p. 152, 155, 157 and 189–190 above.
84 T 3.2.6.1; SBN 526.
85 T 3.3.2.10; SBN 597.
86 T 3.3.2.10; SBN 598.
The passions of self-interest (self-love) and pride (self-liking) are not to be confined but advanced, and the idea is to 'prevent the opposition' of these passions and not to curb them. In a large society, without giving 'a new direction' to these 'natural passions' through the laws of nature and rules of good-breeding, society would disperse. Only at this point the idea of morality, which is essentially an inclination to follow these rules, comes to play. When 'justice' is 'esteem'd an artificial and not a natural virtue', as Hume famously maintains, 'honour, and custom, and civil laws supply the place of natural conscience, and produce, in some degree, the same effects'. In other words, what Hume is doing in his Treatise is countering the common eighteenth-century understanding of justice and politeness as natural virtues and aiming for a Mandevillean goal, the circle of refinement, where the end is that men can give a boost to their pride and spring it into new spheres with the generous aid of material wealth, which consequently leads society to a situation where manners and customs are reciprocally refined.

The distinction between the two self-regarding passions has gone unnoticed for the simple reason that Hume mainly concentrates on justice in Book 3 of the Treatise. He had plausible reasons to do this. Hume might have adopted the distinction between self-interest and pride from Mandeville, but he develops this theory of civil society considerably. By explaining how our self-love is a direct passion and pride indirect, he makes it obvious that controlling the unbound movement of our self-love is the primary object in any large society. Since 'interest' is the 'passion' that is the hardest to restrain, 'the convention for the distinction of property, and for the stability of possession' is prescribed in 'all circumstances the most necessary to the establishment of human society'. An indirect passion, on the other hand, does not set men immediately into action, and 'vanity' is not directly destructive to society and can be considered 'a bond of union among men'. Thus, justice, according to Hume, is the foundational artificial virtue and it is understandable that Hume mainly concentrates on explaining its position in civil society in Book 3 of the Treatise, even when it is only one of the 'virtues, that produce pleasure and approbation by means of an artifice or contrivance, which arises from the circumstances and necessities of mankind'. This is also understandable when we remember the importance placed on the natural law tradition (and justice) in Scottish Universities at the time.

Nevertheless, Book 3 is not only about justice. Hume makes an explicit analogy between the two primary moral institutions by stating that 'as we

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87 T 3.2.5.9; SBN 521.
88 T 2.1.10.2; SBN 310.
89 T 3.2.2.12; SBN 491. The Mandevillean tone in Hume's discussion of vanity was noted already in Forbes, Hume's philosophical politics, 1975, p. 85. Forbes, however, links Hume's discussion of pride to Malebranche instead of Mandeville (p. 107).
90 T 3.2.1.1; SBN 477.
establish the laws of nature, in order to secure property in society, and prevent the opposition of self-interest', in a similar manner, 'we establish the rules of good-breeding, in order to prevent the opposition of men's pride, and render conversation agreeable and inoffensive'.

He does this in a section crucially entitled 'Greatness of mind'. I take this analogy (that Pierre Nicole had already been pointing at) to be one of the main components of our understanding of Hume's moral and political thought. One could not express with more clarity that there are primarily two self-regarding passions that need to be redirected by general rules in order to enable men to cultivate the passions in question better. Furthermore, if instead of analysing what Hume writes in Book 3 of the Treatise, we also take into account Book 2, 'Of the passions', we realise the relevance of pride.

Hume explains why it is that we establish in the same way the rules of justice that we come to form the rules of good-breeding that essentially are meant to hide the sentiments of our pride. The rules of politeness that prohibit men showing their pride are originally formed for the same reason as laws of justice. It is 'our own pride, which makes us so much displeas'd with the pride of other people'. The reason why we find the exposed 'vanity' of other people 'insupportable' is 'merely' the fact that 'we are vain' also.

This is the point that Mandeville was stressing just a few years prior to this. We have to be able to cultivate our vanity, in a similar manner as our avidity, without disturbing the pride of others. According to Hume, if had to depend on our good-nature, benevolence or simple regard for the public, this would be utterly impossible. Instead, the rigid rules of good-breeding ought to do the trick that natural virtues or our implanted ideas of morality never could. The artificial virtue in this case also creates an inclination to follow the rules of politeness once they have been established for some time. We have no interest to follow them before we have developed an inclination to be polite towards people in general except for the fact that we are concerned about our reputation and aware that through sympathy other people will spontaneously counter an unpleasant feeling when they meet with impolite behaviour. We are proud and vain, but our need to use artificial means to disguise these inner feelings is of first importance.

The distinction between self-love and self-liking also explains why Hume's idea of justice solely concentrates on property. He has also other methodical tools to explain our social existence. The entire burden of

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91 T 3.3.2.10; SBN 597.
92 T 3.3.2.7; SBN 596.
93 For example James Moore ends his important discussion on Hume's theory of justice by pointing out that 'the experience of the two centuries of social life that have passed since Hume wrote requires us to recognize that social justice involves more than security for owners of property', Moore, 'Hume's theory of justice and property', 1976, p. 119. Haakonssen also finds it 'odd' that 'Hume's concept of rights that are protected by rules of justice' are restricted 'to property rights'. Haakonssen, Šámos of the legislator, 1982, p. 13.
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sociability does not lie on justice and it is the centrality of pride that explains, to a large extent, the motivation to follow the rules of justice. Thus, some of the significant points that Hume is making are exactly the same ones that Mandeville was previously pressing. It is highly relevant that justice and politeness are recognised as interrelated concepts and seen as part of the same gradually advancing scheme of conjectural history. I will first treat the more familiar question of justice with some novel points and then I will turn to politeness. The idea is to show how politeness was a foundational theme for Hume already before the Treatise and how he developed this discussion in his works.

Self-love and justice

When studying Hume’s idea of justice, we should not forget that he is developing his analysis as a conjectural history. I find the interpretations that take Book 3 of the Treatise as a systematic ethical theory confusing. One persistent problem is the commonly and obscurely used idea of the prevalence of “enlightened self-interest” in his system.

A good reason why we have to be cautious when analysing the idea of self-interest in the Treatise is that we should not mistake it with another line of answers to Hobbism, based on a fully different view of human nature.

It was the likes of Ralph Cudworth that introduced the argument of (what we tend to call) enlightened self-interest as an immediate response to Thomas Hobbes. Cudworth proclaimed that he is set out to overrule the idea that private ‘self-interest is the primary measure and standard of our actions’. According to Cudworth, our true self-interest counters this mistaken idea. Cudworth claims that when ‘self-interest’ is ‘rightly understood and taken in its due latitude’, it does ‘not only’ denote men ‘in private capacities, but also as political and sociable creatures’. This, in turn, means that ‘what is termed self-interest’ falls ‘in with the last end and greatest happiness of nature’. Thus, the greatest public good is our true interest and, according to Cudworth, reasonable men are able to pursue this end.

What stands in contrast between Cudworth and Hume’s account is evidently the role of reason, but most importantly, the actual gap between these different lines of thought is created by the contrasting conceptions of human nature. Hume would not agree with Cudworth’s analysis of men’s ‘social’ and ‘political’ capacity and how they are ‘by their nature and

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96 Cudworth, True intellectual system, 1706, II, p. 787.
condition sociable', in other words, that men are ready to naturally prefer the
greater good to their private self-interest. According to Hume, we do not
have an implanted principle that points towards the greatest public good.

To use the concept of enlightened self-interest as a generalisation of
Hume’s social thought is misleading, because it turns Hume into a quasi-
rationalist, who thinks that predominantly in large, civil societies men are
able to reasonably pursue their long-term interests and control their self-
love (even if we would not be equating the long-term interest to public
good). Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the Treatise. Something
more dynamic and external than an individual understanding of long-term
interests is needed in large societies in order to make men respect the
property of complete strangers. The whole point of artificial virtues is to
explain how people act according to the established rules, even when it is
hard to think of anything that would be ‘more fluctuating and inconsistent’
than ‘the will of man’ and ‘human conduct’, in general, ‘is irregular and
uncertain’. Furthermore, since Hume emphasises that it is common in
large societies that men ‘act knowingly against their interest’ and ‘the view
of the greatest possible good does not always influence them’, we have to
realise that the concept of enlightened self-interest is not the cornerstone of
his system. The key is to understand that there is a comprehensive
difference between how a convention of justice is first established in a small
society and how it will eventually function in a large society. Self-interest is
the first motive to act in a judicious way in simple and rude societies, but its
role changes when people enter into societies, which have to be managed by
government and controlled by inflexible laws.

‘Society’, Hume writes, is ‘absolutely necessary for the well-being of
men’ and its ‘chief advantage’ is ‘the improvement’ of ‘such possessions
as we have acquir’d by our industry and good fortune’. In other words,
society is first meant to serve (in the strict definition of the concept) our
self-interest. If the main benefit of civil society concerns self-love, it is the
very same source that is also seen as the ‘chief impediment’ for society,
because this passion creates the ‘instability’ of the ‘possession’ of goods that
are scarce. According to Hume, it is ‘certain, that self-love, when it acts at
its liberty, instead of engaging us with honest actions, is the source of all
injustice and violence’. This problem of ‘instability’ is inherent to any
human society because of human nature. No set of ‘moralists or politicians’
could ever overcome the fact that a man is a selfish creature. We are

97 Cudworth, True intellectual system, 1706, II, p. 793.
98 T 2.1.10.7; SBN 313.
99 T 2.3.1.11; SBN 403.
100 T 2.3.3.10; SBN 418.
101 T 3.2.6.1; SBN 526.
102 T 3.2.2.7; SBN 487–488.
103 T 3.2.1.10; SBN 480.
104 T 3.2.5.9; SBN 521.
‘naturally selfish’, unable to change our nature and never ‘induc’d to perform any action for the interest of strangers, except with a view to some reciprocal advantage, which they had no hope of obtaining but by such a performance’.\textsuperscript{105} We cannot undo our selfishness and the only thing that can be done, and has to be done, is to correct and restrain ‘the natural movements’ of this passion.\textsuperscript{106} Thus, David Hume invokes the conjectural development of justice to explain how the movement of the interested passion was redirected by establishing the ‘fundamental laws of nature’\textsuperscript{107} that ‘are as necessary to the support of society’ as society is to our self-interest; and how these, in turn, provide the basis for the laws of society that conclude the conjectural development of the artificial virtue of justice.\textsuperscript{108}

An informative question of Hume’s idea of the evolution of justice, is how men come to realise that ‘we make much greater advances in the acquiring possessions’ when we are simultaneously ‘preserving society’, instead of ‘running into the solitary and forlorn condition’ that leads to ‘violence’ and ‘universal license’?\textsuperscript{109} The answer is two-fold. When first establishing the convention that gives rise to the idea of justice men have to have an impression of some sort of concrete material advantage. But once justice has been forged into a universal principle guarded by the laws of society, men no longer necessarily need to (or at times could) be conscious of this interest.\textsuperscript{110} Provided that they have been educated in a civil society, they will have such sentiments that approve of acts performed by other people that are in accordance with the laws of justice and disapprove of such that are not. Moral sentiment that arises from education is not a sufficient motive to act according to the laws of justice. It only approves and disapproves actions performed by other people. Granted, it does indirectly affect the actions that we perform ourselves, but without social, physical and fiscal sanctions, fear of reproach towards our character and loss of self-liking, this moral sentiment alone would never turn out to be a moral obligation. Thus, we may detect two stages of justice in the conjectural history of civil society. These stages follow the fundamental division between small and large societies and concern the ‘natural’ and

\textsuperscript{105} T 3.2.5.8; SBN 519. The case is crucially different, of course, with our loved ones and friends, who are not ‘strangers’ or neither do we hope to reap advantage from them in order to show our kindness. They belong to the sphere of our confined generosity, which indeed is natural and unselfish by nature.

\textsuperscript{106} T 3.2.1.10; SBN 480.

\textsuperscript{107} i.e. justice as an extended definition covering the ‘stability of possession’, ‘its transference by consent’ and ‘the performance of promises’

\textsuperscript{108} T 3.2.6.1; SBN 526.

\textsuperscript{109} T 3.2.2.13; SBN 492.

\textsuperscript{110} About similar idea of “unconscious” actors in Mandeville, see pp. 170-171, 173 and 186 above. For a similar idea in Butler (see p. 127 above) and in Nicole (pp. 142–145 above).
‘moral obligation’ of justice.\textsuperscript{111} I will now turn to examine this question starting with the first convention that takes us from the impression of interest to the idea of justice.

According to Hume, there is no original ‘principle of human mind’ that could ‘make us overcome the temptations arising from our circumstances’. If men in wild condition somehow acquired an ‘idea of justice’ without the impression of the underlying interest, this could ‘never’ inspire them ‘with an equitable conduct towards each other’.\textsuperscript{112} In order to be motivated to establish a convention that stabilises property, men need a vivid image of the fact that this convention of justice is within their interest. In a small society men arrive to this impression by concrete rewards instead of abstractly realising the advantages of society. Since ‘the principal disturbance in society arises from’ external goods, Hume emphasises that men ‘must seek for a remedy’ that ‘can be done after no other manner, than by a convention enter’d into by all the members of the society to bestow stability on the possession of those external goods, and leave every one in the peaceable enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and industry’\textsuperscript{113}. We should notice how accurately Hume follows the idea of countervailing passions. His description of the first establishment of the convention of justice fully adheres to the idea that ‘there is no passion’ that would be ‘capable of controlling the interested affection, but the very affection itself, by an alteration of its direction’.\textsuperscript{114} Thus, Hume is also able to conclude that it is the same passion of ‘self-love’ (that first rendered ‘men so incommodious to each other’) that now takes ‘a new and more convenient direction’ and produces ‘the rules of justice’. Remarkably, it is also the same passion that is ‘the first motive of their observance’.\textsuperscript{115} In other words, the ‘real origin’ of those ‘rules’, which determine ‘property, right, and obligation’ is ‘self-love’.\textsuperscript{116} And with a reference to a small society, Hume concludes: ‘every one knows what he may safely possess; and the passions are restrain’d in their partial and contradictory motions’.\textsuperscript{117}

There are few important points that we may notice in this basic account. First of all, this description concerns only small societies and the beginning of the conjectural development of justice.\textsuperscript{118} Hume stresses that ‘all the members of the society’ have to enter this ‘convention’. Hume is an outspoken and well-known critic of the contract theory and he definitely

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{111} T 3.2.2.23; SBN 498.
  \item \textsuperscript{112} T 3.2.2.8; SBN 488, cf. Mandeville, Part II, pp. 222–223.
  \item \textsuperscript{113} T 3.2.2.9; SBN 489.
  \item \textsuperscript{114} T 3.2.2.13; SBN 492.
  \item \textsuperscript{115} T 3.2.8.5; SBN 543.
  \item \textsuperscript{116} T 3.2.6.6; SBN 528–9.
  \item \textsuperscript{117} T 3.2.2.9; SBN 489.
  \item \textsuperscript{118} About small society in Balguy, see p. 131 above and small society in Mandeville, p. 162–163 above.
\end{itemize}
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did not make such claims concerning a large society. However, there is no reason why we should not read the remark about ‘all the members of society’ literally, when we remember what Hume is in fact doing. We have to realise that Hume is here dealing with small clan-based societies and not analysing civil society in general. When discussing ‘natural obligation to justice’ i.e. ‘interest’ in section 3.2.2 the discussion concentrates solely on the first instance of the convention of justice being established in a natural society, where all the connections between the members of the society are personal. In this family based society (that Hume also dubbed ‘narrow and contracted society’) everyone is affiliated with each other and the members are still largely affected by their natural generosity. This is the reason why also the examples that Hume invokes are particular and concrete, such as the famous case of the ‘two men’ pulling ‘the oars of the boat’, who ‘do it by an agreement or convention’ even when ‘they have never given promises to each other’. If we take these examples out of context and try to use them as an illustration of Hume’s system as a whole and of his idea of justice in general, we have managed to totally misunderstand his intentions. Only when we realise that Hume is talking about small, uncultivated societies we may without difficulty talk about enlightened self-interest, which means that these simpletons are consciously following their rules of justice, because the small number and plainness of their social relations makes it hard for them to lose sight of what is within their interest. Thus, it is understandable that Hume describes the first rise of justice as a relatively easy, although gradual, process. Hume outlines that ‘every member’ of this primitive ‘society is sensible’ of the ‘interest’ of stabilising property. A person expresses this sentiment to his ‘fellows, along with the resolution he has taken of squaring his actions by it, on condition that others will do the same’. Therefore, nothing else is a ‘requisite to induce any one of them to perform an act of justice, who has the first opportunity’. This, in turn, ‘becomes an example to others’. It is in this manner that ‘justice establishes itself by a kind of convention or agreement; that is, by a sense of interest, suppos’d to be common to all, and where every single act is perform’d in expectation that others are to perform the like’. Thus, we may notice how neatly Hume is able to close the circle of the first foundation of ‘justice’ that ‘takes its rise from human conventions’ in small societies, by concluding that it is evident that ‘only from the selfishness and confin’d generosity of men, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants,

119 This is widely accepted, the dissenting voice is David Gauthier, ‘David Hume, contractarian’, The Philosophical review, 88, 1979, pp. 3–38.
120 T 3.2.2.9; SBN 489.
121 T 3.2.2.24; SBN 499.
122 T 3.2.2.10; SBN 490.
123 T 3.2.2.24; SBN 498.
124 T 3.2.2.16; SBN 494.
that justice derives its origin'. Later, when emphasising the role of the government in the ‘execution and decision of justice’, Hume points out that enlightened self-interest might enable ‘two neighbours’ to ‘agree to drain a meadow’, but it is ‘very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand persons shou’d agree in any such action’. He invokes such examples to prove his point about the idea of enlightened self-interest that operates smoothly in small society can no longer be regarded as the basis of justice when the society has grown out of its wretched and uncultivated beginning. By and large, we need to take a completely different approach when examining how justice functions in large societies.

**Moral sentiments in large societies**

If Hume’s idea of self-interest and large societies is different from Cudworth’s analysis of enlightened self-interest, another eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher that in an important way concurs with Cudworth’s view is Francis Hutcheson. As we know, in one sense Hutcheson has rightly been interpreted as Hume’s predecessor, since he diminishes the role of reason in moral philosophy by emphasising the function of moral sentiments. Logically, Hutcheson’s overall account partly differs from Cudworth’s staunch vindication of reason. Nevertheless, and more importantly, it is the uniform understanding of human nature that brings these interpretations of moral propensities together and distinguishes them clearly from Mandeville and Hume. This contrast becomes obvious when we compare their ideas about how a large society is able to function.

Hutcheson’s solution for large societies, like Cudworth’s, is unproblematic. The idea of universal benevolence is an overriding concept in Hutcheson’s system. He is quick to jump to the conclusion that ‘mankind’, in simple terms, is ‘capable of large extensive ideas of great societies’. In order to support this idea, Hutcheson proposes that it ‘is’ duly ‘expected’ from men that ‘general benevolence should continually direct and limit, not only their selfish affections, but even their nearer attachments to others’. In other words, according to Hutcheson, our confined generosity does not stand in contrast with the public interest and the ‘desire of publisk good, and aversion to publisk misery’ in the natural course of human actions, it overcomes the ‘desire of positive private advantages’. Universal benevolence forces men to ‘abstain from any action which would be positively pernicious or hurtful to mankind, however beneficial it might be to themselves,'
or their favourites'. Hutcheson bases the motive of virtuous action on the passion of universal benevolence. Nevertheless, we should notice that Hutcheson comes, in a crucial way, close to Cudworth's analysis. Hutcheson claims that because of the succinct taxonomy of human passions, men can trust their faculty of reason regarding the preference between right and wrong and they are able to choose actions that are within the best interest of the public. The role of passions plays a foundational part in Hutcheson's outlook, but he is also turns back towards an analysis similar to Cudworth's and equates the public good to enlightened self-interest. However, Hutcheson was not the only one applying this strategy. It seems that one way of solving the problem of confined generosity was simply to deny that 'the partiality implanted in us to our own interests and welfare' would be 'an inclination' that interferes 'with the publick good'.

Curiously, according to Hutcheson, it is the 'power of reason and reflection, by which we may see what course of action will naturally tend to procure us the most valuable gratifications of all our desires, and prevent any intolerable or unnecessary pains'. The 'course of action' that 'naturally' provides us with 'the most valuable gratifications of all our desires' is the one that creates the largest amount of the public good. Since our happiness is dependent upon the public good that comes through our actions, and it is the faculty of reason that directs the course of actions, I cannot see how Hutcheson's account, of a man in a large society would in this sense differ from Cudworth's theory. Instead, this line of thought produces a justification for Hutcheson to conclude that we naturally 'have wisdom sufficient to form ideas of rights, laws, constitutions; so as to preserve large societies in peace and prosperity, and promote a general good amidst all the private interests'. In other words, Hutcheson's position is diametrically opposite to David Hume, who in his Treatise makes the case that it is the artificially established rules, originally formed to serve our private interest, that define our moral sentiments. In contrast, as Hutcheson put it, it is our natural, other-regarding sentiments that define the rules that guard civil society.

It seems that Hutcheson thought that large societies do not provide any considerable challenge to his moral philosophy. Men are wise and reasonable and if they follow their moral sense, the civil society will remain a peaceful and happy place. Even when Hutcheson finds the question about men in large societies unproblematic, this is one of the weakest points of his moral theory. As Hume implies, why would we have to place any emphasis on laws, if we had universal benevolence? If you 'encrease' the 'benevolence

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129 Anon., An essay concerning the original of society, government, religion and laws, especially those of the penal kind, London, 1727, p. 6.
of men’ to ‘a sufficient degree’ the whole institution of ‘justice’ is rendered ‘useless’.\textsuperscript{131} As modern day interpreters, we have to bring this explicit difference out clearly, and if we do not make a rigid distinction between the line of answers to Hobbes that Hutcheson was pursuing, and the altogether different position that Hume and Mandeville held, we lose sight of the highly relevant split between a man in small societies and a man in large societies.

Hume makes explicit the division between small and large societies and what effect it has upon moral sentiments. Self-love and the sense of an immediate advantage, induce men in small societies to naturally ‘lay themselves under the restraint of such rules, as may render their commerce more safe and commodious’. The first motive to form a convention of justice is self-interest that ‘on the first formation of society’ is ‘sufficiently strong and forcible’ to guide the actions of these uncivilised men. In contrast with this uncultivated society, Hume sees that problems concerning justice start to occur when ‘society’ becomes ‘more numerous’ and increases ‘to a tribe or nation’. The immediate ‘interest’ becomes ‘more remote’, and men no longer ‘perceive, that disorder and confusion’ that follow ‘upon every breach of these rules’ that they used to detect ‘in a more narrow and contracted society’. However, if men are brought up to respect an established convention of justice that generations of men have followed, they might ‘frequently lose sight of’ the ‘interest’ of ‘maintaining order’ of their ‘own actions’, but they would ‘never fail to observe the prejudice’ they ‘receive’ from ‘the injustice’ done by others.\textsuperscript{132}

This indeed is an interesting point. What we disapprove of in others is what we might be more than tempted to do ourselves. Or, putting it even more succinctly, we might be unaware that we are breaking the rules ourselves, but we would still have a disapproving moral sentiment towards others that are guilty of the same injustice. When analysing this idea, we should remember that Hume is not in the business of colouring and recommending moral virtues. Instead, he is explaining the human understanding of morality.\textsuperscript{133} Thus, it is understandable that he places such an emphasis on this move of pointing out that our moral outlook might often be completely hypocritical. We should not think that Hume wants to highlight this contradiction in our common way of thinking in order to moralise or condemn it in the manner that Pierre Bayle for example did. In the end, this hypocritical stance is vital for strengthening moral institutions.
and it explains how civil society functions, even when men are what they are. Even the ones who are motivated to act contrary to the established rules of justice disapprove of similar behaviour in others.

This internal logic of artificial virtues is not confined to justice, but concerns artificial virtues in general. The most explicit example concerns chastity. First, chastity for women becomes a general rule, when ‘those, who have an interest’ in their fidelity ‘naturally disapprove of their infidelity, and all the approaches to it’. According to Hume’s system of artificial virtues, this disapproving sentiment is common also among the ones, ‘who have no interest in fidelity. They are simply ‘carried along with the stream’. Finally, as a notable consequence, Hume concludes that even ‘bachelors, however debauch’d, cannot but be shock’d with any instance of lewdness or impudence in women’, which is a clear proof of the authoritative grip that the artificial moral institutions have upon our opinions. A man that seeks the company of a lewd woman cannot help having a disapproving sentiment towards the very same person.

Hume also makes a similar case about the extension of the artificial virtue of justice. He emphasises that even if ‘the injustice is so distant from us’ that it cannot in any way ‘affect our interest, it still displeases us’. This is also the section where Hume tells that ‘we partake of’ people’s ‘uneasiness by sympathy’. Modern commentators have stressed the role of this mechanical faculty of receiving ‘by communication’ other people’s ‘inclinations and sentiments’ that might be ‘even contrary to our own’. What Hume also points out is that the only direct way in which sympathy affects ‘our own actions’ is that ‘we naturally sympathize with others in the sentiments they entertain of us’. In other words, all that he is possibly saying about the connection between sympathy and moral motivation is

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134 For a recent discussion on chastity with an anthropological approach, see Christopher Berry, ‘Lusty women and loose imagination: Hume’s philosophical anthropology of chastity’, History of Political Thought, 24, 2003, pp. 415-433. What I would like to point out is that the intellectual framework underlying chastity is crucially different from justice and politeness. The idea in chastity is merely to curb the passion of lust, whereas in both justice and politeness the idea is to cultivate the passion in question. Hume’s account of chastity for women in Treatise seems to be quite common among Augustinian writers, formulated (with the exception of the idea of how a general rule might be extended to concern people who originally have no interest in a certain type of behaviour) by Pierre Bayle in his Pensées diverses sur la comète, II, cxiii-cxiv. For the English text, see Pierre Bayle, Miscellaneous reflections occasion’d by the comet which appeared in December 1680, 2 vols., 1708, II, pp. 331-334.

135 T 3.2.12.7; SBN 572. Hume’s ms. amendment to the first edition of Treatise added: ‘and also apt to be affected with sympathy for the general interest of society’. SBN 671. The Clarendon Editions of Treatise and Abstract incorporates Hume’s corrections and manuscript amendments to his works, without pointing them out.

136 T 3.2.12.7; SBN 572.

137 About Mandeville and chastity, see pp. 111-115 above.

138 T 3.2.2.24; SBN 499.

139 T 2.1.11.2; SBN 316.

140 T 3.2.2.24; SBN 499.
that we often respect the rules of justice, because we are dependent upon the opinion that others entertain of us. If we break the rules, others will disapprove of our actions and logically also of our character. We can perfectly well make, and indeed we should make, an induction of these examples to concern artificial virtues in toto. Since men automatically disapprove of the breach of the established rules, the people who are led towards these actions are condemned, but because the opinion of themselves is dependent upon the opinion of others, this is a vital restriction upon our actions. What this means for the civil society, is that in the normal course of action, there are only few people, educated in a particular society, that are willing to break the established rules, even when they have no natural motive, except for self-interest, to act according to the rules.

Since we have these approving and disapproving moral sentiments, why would they not automatically create in us a motive to act according to the rules? Well, they simply do not. In the previous case of chastity, Hume has not set out to indicate a particular motive for women to be chaste. Motives vary, just as customs vary. The only thing that is certain is that through ‘education’, the convention ‘takes possession of the ductile minds of the fair sex in their infancy’. Some of them might avoid ‘the strongest imaginable’ temptation of lust in order to avoid ‘shame’, others, might be proud to be chaste and yet some others simply follow the rules as a manner of habit. Can we say that some women are truly chaste, because they have a virtuous motive and some are not? We cannot make this distinction, if there is no sign of inclination to be unchaste. Without any discrimination, we approve of women’s character if we have no reason to doubt their fidelity. But what does this mean? Well, it means that we approve of women, who show no signs of infidelity, thus, the question about virtuous motivation never enters our minds. We simply approve of their behaviour, because it is not mischievous.

By and large, the question about motives in Hume’s project is indifferent, because he sets out to explain our common ideas of morality and how the established customs and laws affect us. In the end, what matters is that civil society is able to function. This might be a difficult point for us to accept, if we do not understand the role that pride and the opinion of others play in Hume’s system.

Self-liking and politeness

John Mackie writes that ‘good manners are minor artificial virtues’. I think they are much more than that. Politeness in the Treatise relates directly and solely to the passion of pride. This is a simple point, but extremely

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141 T 3.2.12.7; SBN 572.
142 T 3.2.12.5; SBN 571.
significant for Hume's overall social theory. ‘Good-breeding’, he dictates, is an artificial virtue that requires, nothing more and nothing less, ‘that we shou’d avoid all signs and expressions, which tend directly to show’ our pride. Equally important for Hume’s study is that he does not mean that we should actually be humble. Instead, according to him, ‘self-satisfaction and vanity’ are not only ‘allowable, but requisite in a character’. All that needs to be remembered is that ‘if we harbour pride in our breasts, we must carry a fair outside, and have the appearance of modesty and mutual deference in all our conduct and behaviour’. Hume explicitly points out that ‘humility, which good-breeding and decency require’ us to express, does not go ‘beyond the outside’ and it cannot be expected that ‘thorough sincerity in this particular’ would be ‘a real part of our duty’. In the Treatise, civility, good-breeding and politeness are interchangeably vindicated for one purpose only, to conceal the good opinion that we have of ourselves. This should not come as a surprise to those acquainted with the material written by Hume prior to the Treatise.

The first known explicit examination of the theory of politeness by Hume was included in a letter from Paris in 1734. At the beginning of the letter, he tells that he had been given ‘advice to observe carefully & imitate as much as possible, the manners of the French’. His interlocutor, Chevalier Ramsay, had, according to Hume, based his advice on an assumption that ‘the English’ might ‘have more of the real Politeness of the Heart’, but it should be acknowledged that ‘the French certainly have a better way of expressing it’. Ramsay’s published works support a similar understanding of politeness. In his Plan of education for a prince, he tells his audience that men have an ‘inward principle of justice’, which will make us ‘naturally’ do ‘justice’ to other men and by which ‘we will know how to distinguish and honour true merit’. By the same token ‘we acquire not only an universal inward beneficence, generosity, and disinterested good-nature, but also that outward politeness and delicacy of manners which expresses itself by a noble freedom and easiness far remot’d from the everlasting ceremonies of an importunate, formal and never-ceasing civility’. To put

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144 T 3.3.2.10; SBN 597.
145 T 3.3.2.11; SBN 598.
146 David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, Hume, Letters, I, pp. 19–21. According to Greig, Michael Ramsay was most likely Hume’s school friend. Based on the scholarship that I have been able to consult, his possible family connection to Chevalier Ramsay remains unknown. My analysis of this letter has been published in Mikko Tolonen, ‘Politeness, Paris and the Treatise’, Hume Studies, 34, 2008, pp. 21–42.
it briefly, according to Ramsay, true politeness springs from the soul. In his famous Travels of Cyrus, Ramsay also advances the same ‘Addisonian’ dichotomy between inward politeness and outward civility. To him, it seems clear that ‘internal politeness is very different’ from ‘superficial civility’. Ramsay underlines that ‘true politeness is common to all delicate souls of all nations’ and ‘external civility is but the form establish’d in the different countries for expressing that politeness of the soul’. Thus, all Hume could learn from the French are the expressions of civility, but not the essence of politeness.

In his letter, Hume tells his friend that Ramsay’s opinions had given him an ‘occasion to reflect upon the Matter, & in my humble Opinion, it is just the Contrary, viz. that the French have more real Politeness & the English the better Method of expressing it’. The letter is a significant evidence of Hume’s early intellectual development, which has been overlooked. In his letter, the young Hume makes a counterargument against each point that Ramsay had advanced. First, he strikes the popular idea that politeness is a quality of the heart. Joseph Addison and Richard Steele, among others, argued that politeness could be pinned as a national character trait, emphasising that the English cultivate their moral qualities, whilst the French are corrupting themselves with mindless trifles. David Hume disagrees. He annuls the adjunct ‘of the heart’ from Ramsay’s sentence and states that between these nations it is actually ‘the French’, who ‘have more real Politeness’. Since politeness is not something planted in the soul, it

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153 About Hume’s extremely ‘low opinion’ about Ramsay’s ‘philosophical abilities’, see John Valdimir Price, David Hume, Twayne Publishers, New York, 1968, pp. 39–40. I believe that Hume’s attitude towards Ramsay had much to do with modern scepticism. Richard Popkin has suggested that their controversy regarded Pierre Bayle. Richard H. Popkin, ‘The sceptical precursors of David Hume’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 16, 1955, pp. 69–70. For Popkin’s later suggestion about Ramsay’s contempt of pyrrhonists, see Richard H. Popkin, ‘Scepticism in the enlightenment’ (1963), in Scepticism in the enlightenment, Richard H. Popkin, Ezequiel de Olaso and Giogio Tonelli, eds., Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997, p. 4. Even when Popkin’s view is rather polemical, to me it seems evident that the young Hume somewhat explicitly sided with the modern sceptics. For a detailed account of ‘Hume’s Early Memoranda as evidence of a very specific reading of Bayle by Hume’, see J. P. Pittion, ‘Hume’s reading of Bayle: An inquiry into the sources and role of the Memoranda’, History of Philosophy, 15, 1977, pp. 373–386. This is not to say that I am suggesting that we should use this or any label for Hume. The fact that he is ridiculing Ramsay’s position in a Mandevillian mean is a clear indication of what side Hume had taken. Furthermore, the fact that the conflict regards politeness, a central theme for Mandeville, is important. Therefore, I do not think that David Norton is correct when he writes that ‘Hume’s moral theory’ must ‘be seen as part of this antiscceptical moral tradition’ of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and likeminded philosophers (amongst whom I would include the Chevalier Ramsay). Norton, David Hume. Common-sense moralist, 1982, p. 43.
can only be cultivated by constant application of theatrical gestures. It takes time for manners to refine, and kind expressions to become customary. Hume clarifies that 'by real Politeness', he refers to the 'Softness of Temper' and to the 'Inclination to oblige & be serviceable'.\footnote{David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, Letters, I, p. 20.} The 23-year-old David Hume was convinced that good-breeding is, above all, a deeply rooted habit.

The young Hume's point is akin to the view put forward by Bernard Mandeville.\footnote{For an interpretation of Hume's account of politeness that mistakenly links it to Addison and Steele and claims that in this particular letter on politeness Hume prefers 'English manners' to 'French', see Box, The suasive art of David Hume, 1990, pp. 142–8.} Mandeville's succinct formulation of this overall idea was printed just a few years before Hume made his first analysis on French manners. According to him, 'men become sociable, by living together in Society'.\footnote{Bernard Mandeville, Free thoughts on religion, the church and national happiness, London, 1720, p. 273. For the dichotomy: 'Porters and hackney coachmen' and 'kings and princes', see also The Fable of the Bees, p. 219. Regarding 'Hackney coachmen', see also the interesting attitude in Erasmus Jones, The man of manners, 1737, pp. 43–44: 'I believe, it will be neither thought uncharitable nor extravagant, to suppose that there are hardly half an hundred Hackney Coachmen within the Bills of Mortality, but what would with the utmost Pleasure and Satisfaction, drive over the most innocent Person whom they never knew, or receiv'd any Injury from, provided they could do it conveniently and safely, that is, within the Verge of the Law.'} Habitual expressions of politeness become a second nature for gentlemen, but only when the institution has been long established and men have become accustomed to being polite. The French experience confirms the opinion. According to Hume, 'politeness' has become 'conspicuous' in France, but 'not only among the high but the low, insomuch that the Porters & Coachmen' (which in the eighteenth century were considered the worst mannered brutes) 'are civil'.\footnote{David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, Letters, I, p. 20.} And what is more, Hume exclaims, these vulgar men are 'not only' polite towards 'Gentlemen but likewise among themselves'. Hume testifies that he has 'not yet seen one Quarrel in France, tho' they are every where to be met with in England'.\footnote{Mandeville, Part II, p. 295.} Hume's empirical fact is an entirely 'Mandevillean' observation. The Dutchman defined that politeness 'in its original is a plain Shift to avoid fighting, and the ill Consequences of it'.\footnote{Mandeville, Part II, p. 189.} According to Hume, the reason why one could not witness quarrels in France is not that they have found a way to open their hearts and to show their naturally virtuous nature. On the contrary, the explanation why there are such few quarrels in France is because the people are customarily conforming to the rules of good-breeding.
Ramsay’s second assumption, namely that ‘the French’ have ‘a better way of expressing’\textsuperscript{161} politeness than the English, is, according to Hume, as negligent a remark as his first postulation. If the French manners are to be criticised for anything, it is precisely for their inflated nature. Addison and Steele condemn the whole artificial nature of the French manners as moral corruption. Mandeville points out that outward civility might fail to create a pleasant feeling. According to him, the artificial nature of politeness should not become offensively visible. Hume agrees with the latter view. He maintains that the essence of the expressions of good-breeding is that they have to ‘please by their appearance’ and to ‘lead the mind’ into ‘an agreeable delusion’\textsuperscript{162}.

In relation to Ramsay’s first supposition, Hume argues that ‘real politeness’ simply means that good-breeding plays such a habitual part in people’s lives that they have an actual inclination (which cannot be natural, in a strict sense) to show expressions of politeness to friends, strangers and even people they dislike. It does not matter how natural a courtesy seems or how willing people are to show these gestures, we are still talking about an artificial convention. When Hume discusses the ‘expressions of politeness’, he emphasises the contrast between natural kindness and the artificial nature of politeness in general. This is the same disparity that exists between Hume’s idea of ‘real politeness’ and Ramsay’s suggestion of ‘politeness of the heart’. Politeness is now linked with ‘kindness’, which is taken to be what Ramsay was alluding in his advice about the ‘politeness of the heart’. This is a ‘shaftesburyan’ way of addressing the topic. Shaftesbury supposed that politeness is a natural feature of human nature. If men just looked into their souls, instead of following pompous ceremonies, they would be able to be spontaneously kind towards each other. Shaftesbury’s principal argument was that the court civility disabled men from being naturally virtuous. Hume makes the point that this assumption is false. Even the ‘men of the Best Dispositions of the World’ cannot naturally feel this kindness ‘towards Strangers & indifferent Persons’. We need artificial expressions to compensate for this ‘defect’, and ‘real politeness’ for Hume is an inclination to habitually show these expressions.\textsuperscript{163}

Since Hume thinks that natural benevolence is very limited, consequently the ‘expressions of politeness’ form the core of Hume’s analysis of good-breeding. These ceremonies’ have to be set apart from natural expressions. They ‘ought to be so contriv’d, as that, tho they do not

\textsuperscript{161} David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, Letters, I, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{162} David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, Letters, I, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{163} A rarely noticed overall definition of virtue that neatly fits Hume’s concept of politeness is found in his answer to the criticism (in the Newcastle Journal, 1742) regarding his essay on Walpole’s character in Gentleman’s Magazine, May 1742, XII, p. 265. Hume wrote, ‘virtue is properly, good-nature made steady and extensive by good principles. A man may have many virtues without deserving so noble a character.’ Quoted from Elliott, ‘Hume’s “Character of Sir Robert Walpole”’, 1949, p. 368. It is striking how well this definition suits Hume’s understanding of the artificial nature of politeness.
deceive, nor pass for sincere, yet still they please by their Appearance’. In
courtesies people may tumble into ‘two extremes’. A person might go astray
by making his ceremonies ‘too like Truth or too remote from it’. In both
cases, unsuccessful politeness means that the expressions do not ‘lead the
mind’ to an ‘agreeable delusion’. The first ‘extreme’ is scarcely possible since
‘whenever any Expression or Action becomes customary’ it cannot
‘deceive’. Hume’s example is a Quaker addressing himself as ‘your friend’
instead of as ‘your humble servant’. In the contrary Extreme’ it is ‘the
French’ that ‘err’ by ‘making their Civilities too remote from Truth’. Hume
highlights his point by giving an analogy of an exaggerated courtesy and ‘a
Dramatic Poet’ mixing ‘Improbabilities with his Fable’.\(^{164}\) Both of these
instances, a ceremony and a tale, ought to be credible, otherwise the mind
cannot proceed to an ‘agreeable delusion’.

This evidence links Hume’s early analysis of politeness to Mandeville.
After making some idiosyncratic speculations about the English expressions
of good-breeding, Hume turns back to consider the positive aspects of
French politeness and expels possible misgivings about him having any
sympathy for the “Spectatorian” understanding of politeness. Hume
declares that ‘after all it must be confess, that the little Niceties of the
French Behaviour, tho’ troublesome & impertinent, yet serve to polish the
ordinary Kind of People & prevent Rudeness & Brutality’.\(^ {165}\) Hume
inevitably had no intention to present himself as an eager advocate of the
English ‘expressions of politeness’. All he had been aiming at was to
counter Ramsay’s assumptions point by point and contrast them with his
‘Mandevillean’ view. In Hume’s opinion, the artificiality of politeness
should not become too visible, but it has to be acknowledged that these
artificial gestures are the essence of preventing brutality in the ‘ordinary
kind of people’. To highlight the discrepancy with the ‘Shaftesburyan’ view,
we need to recall that it was exclusively against these ‘troublesome’ and
‘impertinent’ little ‘Niceties’, that Hume endorsed, that Shaftesbury,
Addison and Steele directed the full force of their arguments.

Hume proceeds in his letter with an intriguing comparison. According
to him, ‘Soldiers are found to become more courageous in learning to hold
their Musquets within half an Inch of a place appointed’. In a similar way,
‘Devotees feel their Devotion encrease by the Observance of trivial
Superstitions’, such as ‘Sprinkling, Kneeling, Crossing &c’. Precisely in the
same manner, ‘men insensibly soften towards each other in the Practise of
these Ceremonies’.\(^ {166}\) Hume concludes his analysis by stating that ‘the Mind
pleases itself by the Progress it makes in such Trifles, & while it is so
supported makes an easy Transition to something more material: And I
verily believe, that tis for this Reason you Scarce ever meet with a Clown, or

\(^ {164}\) David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, Letters, I, p. 20.
\(^ {166}\) David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, Letters, I, p. 21.
an ill bred man in France'.

What is this ‘something more material’ that the ‘mind’ is transferred to? I take that it is not any sublime level of morality, but simply an example of how custom aids an idea to be transformed into an impression, and men acquire an ‘Inclination to oblige & be serviceable’. In other words, it is what Hume defined by ‘real politeness’. Hence, Hume has completed his circle and ended right back where he started. The French are more polite because they follow the theatrical expressions of politeness.

Towards the end of his letter, Hume seems to become aware that the addressee might want to raise some objections to his credulous enthusiasm for French politeness. ‘You may perhaps wonder’, Hume carefully approaches his friend, ‘that I who have stay’d so short time in France & who have confest that I am not a Master of their Language, shou’d decide so positively of their manners’. Hume pleads that ‘with Nations’ it is ‘as with particular Man, where one Trifle frequently serves more to discover the Character, than a whole Train of considerable Actions’. Hume reveals that for him the decisive ‘trifle’ had been the way people customarily address each other. ‘English Phraze of humble Servant’ is omitted ‘upon the least Intimacy’. The French ‘never forget’ to tell you that it is ‘the Honour of being your most humble Servant’. What is even more remarkable, according to Hume, is that this phrase ‘is us’d by People to those who are very much their Inferiours’. Hence, English manners are clearly inferior to French politeness.

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167 On the same page of the Free thoughts where Mandeville discusses ‘porters and carmen’, he also uses this same dichotomy between ‘a well-bred man’ and ‘the greatest clown’. Mandeville’s emblematic point is that virtue or virtuous sociability has nothing to do with politeness. In fact, ‘virtue is scarce, everywhere, where a well-bred man, may as much want real probity, as the greatest clown.’


170 It is a well-known fact that in his later life Hume was a great lover of Paris who snubbed London. For example, in a letter to Colonel Isaac Barré on the 16th of July, 1764, Hume simply states: ‘Paris’ is ‘the center of arts, of politeness, of gallantry, and of good company’. Hume, New letters, p. 85. A year before, Hume had called Paris the ‘centre of the polite arts’, Hume to the Comtesse de Boufflers, 22.I 1763, Letters, I, p. 375. When comparing London to Paris, Hume wrote, ‘The method of living is not near so agreeable in London as in Paris. The best company are usually, and more so at present, in a flame of politics: the men of letters are few, and not very sociable: the women are not in general very conversible.’, Hume to the Comtesse de Boufflers, 12.I 1766, Letters, II, p. 11. Thus, it is understandable, also for other than personal reasons, that Hume in a famous letter complains that ‘I have a Reluctance to think of living among the factious Barbarians of London, who will hate me because I am a Scotsman & I am not a Whig, and despise me because I am a man of Letters.’, Hume to Hugh Blair, 23.VIII 1765, Letters, I, p. 517. This was not the first time Hume called Londoners the ‘factious Barbarians of London’. Two years earlier in a letter to William Robertson Hume had used the same term. Hume to William Robertson, 1.XII 1763, Letters, I, s. 417. It makes perfect sense, that after he had learned the importance of French politeness as a young man, Hume’s lifelong fear was that the British would be remembered as a nation, ‘which
Hume's first analysis on politeness is still incomplete compared to the theoretical speculation that constitutes an important part of his Treatise. In his letter Hume has not yet said a word about self-applause or pride, which is the heart of politeness for Bernard Mandeville and David Hume. As a result, Hume has not yet properly addressed the relation between human nature and politeness — a gap, which he bridges in his Treatise.  


171 For a text, other than the letter on politeness, written by the young Hume in the early 1730s that makes a Mandevillean analysis of the history of civil society, see 'Essay on chivalry and modern honour'. Mossner, Ernest Campbell, 'David Hume’s ‘An historical essay on chivalry and modern honour’', Modern philology, 45, 1947, pp. 57–60. The idea of ‘modern honour’ is as Mandevillean as any. Due to the known mistakes by Mossner, I have made my own transcript of the original manuscript in the National Library of Scotland: MS. 23159 f. 4 ‘An historical essay on chivalry and modern honour.’ I have made some amendments to Mossner, but cite it because it is the only edition of the essay. About Mossner's mistakes dating the essay, see especially M. A. Stewart, 'The dating of Hume's manuscripts', in The Scottish Enlightenment. Essays in Rerinterpretation, Paul Wood, ed., University of Rochester Press, 2000, p. 267. See also Brandt, The Beginnings of Hume's Philosophy, 1977, pp. 117–125. The essay also gets a central role in Donald T. Siebert, 'Chivalry and romance in the age of Hume', Eighteenth-Century Life, 21, 1997, pp. 62–79. For a recent attempt to harness the Humean honour, reading Treatise in accordance with Hume's essay on modern honour, see Ted Westhusing, 'A beguiling Military Virtue: Honour', Journal of Military Ethics, 2, 2003, pp. 195–212. See also John P. Wright, 'Hume on the origin of modern honour: a study in Hume's intellectual development', an unpublished paper presented for the 32nd International Hume Society Conference in Toronto, July 2005. About Mandeville and hypochondria in Hume's famous letter to a doctor, also written in the early 1730s, see Wright, The sceptical realism of David Hume, 1983, pp. 190–1 and 236–7 and John P. Wright, 'Dr. George Cheyne, Chevalier Ramsay, and Hume's Letter to a Physician', Hume Studies, 29, 2003, p. 139 note 44. A somewhat wild possibility would be that Hume's letter to the physician is partly satirically framed after the example of the character Misomedon (alluding of course to Hume's actual condition) in Mandeville, Hypo, 3rd ed., 1730. In the dialogue Misomedon is described as 'a Man of Learning, who whilst he has his Health was of a gay, even temper, and a friendly open Disposition; but having long labour'd under the Hypochondriack Passion is now much alter'd for the worse, and become peevish, fickle, censorious and mistrustful', ibid. p. xii. Crucially, hypochondria is refered to as 'the Disease of the Learned', ibid. p. 106. Misomedon tells that he studied law, but hated it, ibid. pp. 3–4. Instead, he had great admiration for the humanists, ibid. p. 7. He also sought advice from different doctors before consulting Philopiro, ibid. p. 20. These are all central points in Hume's letter. I would not conclude from this evidence that this would be necessarily the case, however, I will remain sceptical regarding interpretations that place great weight on the testimony given in this particular letter, even when it is evident in the light of Hume's 'Own life', that some of the facts are true. In his funeral oration of himself Hume repeats that he did not want law as his profession, that he had a passion for literature since he was a young boy and that his 'health' was 'a little broken' because of his 'ardent application' in study.
Defining pride in the Book 2 of the Treatise

What is pride? Pride is ‘simple and uniform’ and because of this ‘tis impossible we can ever’, according to David Hume, ‘by a multitude of words, give a just definition’ of it.\(^{172}\) A little later in the Treatise he however states: ‘But not to dispute about words, I observe that by pride I understand that agreeable impression, which arises in the mind, when the view either of our virtue, beauty, riches or power makes us satisfy’d with ourselves’.\(^{173}\) Although the causes of pride are extended beyond these above mentioned qualities in other parts of the Treatise, this aspect of being satisfied with ourself is the key to Hume’s conception of pride. With human nature in mind, in Hume’s system, the distinction between pleasure and pain applies to everything. Pride is always on the side of pleasure. As Amalie Rorty has promptly put it, ‘pride is a particular unanalysable pleasurable quality’.\(^{174}\) One might not be able to state precisely what pride is or segment it to particles, but the basic tenet is that pride is always pleasurable by aiding us to be satisfied with ourselves.

An important technical definition of pride is that it has the self as an object. Another way to put this is that pride is an indirect passion or secondary impression.\(^{175}\) That is to say, in a sense, pride is reflective. The object is fixed to the self. There is a crucial, double relation between an impression and an idea. A certain something (usually a quality in us, but not necessarily) strikes a pleasurable impression in our mind. If this impression is related to the idea of the self, it naturally produces the secondary impression of pride. Gabriele Taylor writes, ‘the condition for a person feeling pride is not that the object in question be connected with him, but only that he believe this to be the case’.\(^{176}\)

One way to understand the indirectness of pride is with a contrast to direct passions. Direct passions ‘arise from good and evil’ without ‘the least preparation’. What is involved is ‘an original instinct’ which ‘tends to unite itself with the good [pleasure], and to avoid the evil [pain]’.\(^{177}\) Fear and hope are examples of direct passions. They arise without the double relation of impressions and ideas. When either good or evil is uncertain, it gives rise to FEAR or HOPE, according to the degrees of uncertainty on the one side or

\(^{172}\) T 2.1.2.1; SBN 277.

\(^{173}\) T 2.1.7.8; SBN 297.


\(^{175}\) The classic starting point for this discussion is Páll Árdal, Passion and value in Hume’s Treatise, Edinburgh University Press, 1966. See also Haruko Inoue, ‘The origin of the indirect passions in the Treatise: an analogy between Books 1 and 2’, Hume Studies, 29, 2003, pp. 205–221.


\(^{177}\) T 2.3.9.2; SBN 438.
the other'. We do not need to relate the impression of likely pain to the idea of the self through the double relation of impression and ideas in order for the direct passions to arise.

Indirect passions, unlike direct passions, always need the adjustment between the primary impression and the idea of the self before the secondary impression is produced. The relation between a pleasing quality and the self need not be rationally calculated (we cannot usually make a rational choice whether we are proud of something or not, our judgement can be refined or corrupted, of course, but this is a different matter), but what needs to be understood at this point is that the association of certain impression and the self has to be made in our mind in order to produce the secondary impression of pride.

Hume emphasises that almost anything causes pride: the ‘most obvious and remarkable property’ of the ‘causes of pride’ is ‘the vast variety of subjects, on which they may be plac’d’. First of all, ‘whatever in ourselves is either useful, beautiful, or surprising, is an object of pride’. But the scope is much more vast and in the end, ‘every valuable quality of the mind’, ‘body’, other abilities and even external subjects such as ‘our country, family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens, horses, dogs, cloaths’ etc. ‘may become a cause’ of pride. Perhaps the most explicit way that Hume puts the point of almost unlimited causes of pride, is by stating that ‘any thing, that gives a pleasant sensation, and is related to self, excites the passion of pride, which is also agreeable, and has self for its object’. He does not say that there would be a right and wrong kind of pride, there is just pride caused by almost anything.

To say that almost anything can cause pride is not to say that the function of the passion is arbitrary. There are clear guidelines that Hume gives when explaining the causes of pride. The regular operation of passions is something that Hume naturally finds extremely important. ‘Tho’ the effects be many’, he reminds us, ‘the principles, from which they arise, are commonly but few and simple, and that ‘tis the sign of an unskilful naturalist to have recourse to a different quality, in order to explain every different operation’. The human mind is in one sense unaccountable and the causes of pride can be almost unlimited. However, the mechanism of how pride operates is uniform and simple. There is no simplicity in the self for Hume, but there is simplicity in the operation of passions.

The basic principle, hence, of how pride is produced is that the cause must be related to the self through the double relation of impressions and ideas. The cause must also fulfil other conditions. The most relevant of these are that the relation between the cause and object must be a close one

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178 T 2.3.9.6; SBN 439.
179 T 2.1.8.5; SBN 300–1.
180 T 2.1.2.5; SBN 279.
181 T 2.1.5.8; SBN 288.
182 T 2.1.3.6; SBN 282.
(e.g. closer than in delight or joy); the cause must be ‘peculiar to ourselves’\textsuperscript{183} and the cause must usually be evident also for others to see.\textsuperscript{184} The rareness, constancy and the durable connexion between the cause and the self influence whether something causes pride or not.\textsuperscript{185} General rules also influence the operation of pride, which is to say that what is customarily considered worthy, matters a great deal in our assessment of the worth of a particular object.

Much effort has been put in discussing these causes (and limitations) of pride. It is striking that Hume uses so much time and space to emphasise that more or less anything can cause pride. Even when it is possible to distinguish certain causes of pride, we may do this only with certain probability. Therefore, all the discussion about the “proper” causes of pride seems rather futile compared to the question that interests Hume the most: there is only one pride caused by almost anything. The point is to establish our need to be satisfied with our own self. Naturally, our mind also craves for a certain cause in order to be satisfied, but this cause is not as relevant as the existence of pride and being satisfied with our own self – even if we were not morally or publicly worthy at all. Every man (good or bad, happy or sad) needs to sustain his self-satisfaction based on pride in order to prolong his will to exist as a social being.

The nature of pride as an indirect passion is a technical topic that has been prudently discussed in scholarship.\textsuperscript{186} What needs to be stressed is the spherical and conditional sense in which Hume introduces this passion. The spherical sense of pride is based on the distinction between self-love and self-liking and can only be understood in relation to self-love (and self-preservation). The conditional role is also derived straight from Mandeville’s adaptation of the Augustinian argument of our self-doubt.

The most important way in which Annette Baier has shaped the discussion on pride is that she has been able to widen the scope of pride by emphasising that pride is a passion that must be sustained. Pauline Chazan is also on the right track when she makes the additional point that ‘we sustain our pride, and so our self-consciousness of who and what we are, by means of a continued perception of qualities and attributes related to the self, perceptions which are reflected back to us by means of the attentions, regard, and esteem of others’.\textsuperscript{187} It has not been sufficiently explained in the secondary literature why this is so. What is the purpose of sustaining aspect

\textsuperscript{183} T 2.1.6.4; SBN 291.
\textsuperscript{184} T 2.1.6.5; SBN 292.
\textsuperscript{185} T.2.1.6.7; SBN 293.
\textsuperscript{186} E.g. Inoue, ‘The origin of the indirect passions in the Treatise’, 2003, pp. 205–221.
\textsuperscript{187} Pauline Chazan, ‘Pride, virtue and selfhood: a reconstruction of Hume’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22, 1992, p. 48. The article makes a novel point about the interaction between self and pride claiming that ‘what is radical about Hume’s thesis is that pride comes into being as the self comes into being. One does not precede the other.’ (p. 51). I am not taking part in the discussion of how the self is produced and whether Chazan is correct or not. I simply find her reading of the idea of sustaining pride useful.
of pride? Pauline Chazan, for example, makes a valuable point that ‘pride’ itself ‘for Hume is to quite some degree self-sustaining’. Our mind does not need to be in an uninterrupted search for different causes of pride. We may at times operate out of simple curiosity. Yet, ‘without a continued perception of qualities and attributes’ that produces pride eventually ‘the idea of the self, together with the passion of pride, would fade away’.

These are both very good points to make, but the question of the self could be put also in a different light. The self for Hume is after all quite a mutable subject. It is a highly important concept, of course, but still a rather vague topic. What would it mean that the self fades away? If instead of plunging into the philosophical depths of the question of the self, we use Hume’s analogy between self-love and pride, the question becomes more concrete.

The generally unanalysable nature is one characteristic of pride. Another feature of it is that ‘as our idea of ourself’ is ‘advantageous’, we feel a pleasurable affection and ‘are elated by pride’. The lifting and expanding quality of pride is important. To make these two points, the unanalysable quality and the expanding nature of pride, is to draw a picture of pride in a spherical sense. There are several different aspects that fall under the sphere of the passion of pride, but it is the qualities of this uniform sphere in general that make a greater difference in understanding human nature than certain distinctions within the passion itself. Hume does not even bother to clearly separate pride and self-esteem. The reason for this is that Hume’s point is to analyse pride as a uniform passion – even the sides of pride that most people would consider separate passions altogether.

In order to understand why this is so, we should draw attention to the analogy between self-love and pride. For us to grasp the role that pride has as a spherical passion, we need to make an analogy of self-love, which is also spherical in nature. What is self-love? In the context in which Hume uses it, it is first of all assuring that our body continues to exist, in a manner of self-preservation. The concept of self-love in this sense can also be naturally extended to concern, for example, avarice or the love of gain. There are several different aspects and operations of self-love and self-preservation to be achieved and satisfied, some of which can even be discussed as independent passions, affections or desires. This is a large sphere that as such includes many aspects, among others, the most natural ones such as eating and drinking. Hunger and thirst are the prime examples of bodily functions that can of course be discussed as independent desires or appetites. But if we look beyond these details, we come to see the larger sphere of self-love (or self-preservation), which is also an unanalysable passion in this sense. The point is that we may talk about self-love as one passion that leads to prolonging the life of our body.

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189 T 2.1.2.2; SBN 277.
190 Cf. T 2.2.1.9; SBN 331-2.
Hume makes this analogy between the spherical sense of pride and self-love explicit by pointing out the most important difference that self-love and pride have towards the body. Hume writes, "there is no disposition of body peculiar to pride, as there is to thirst and hunger". Now, when we understand the analogy between the spheres, we also realise that in the Treatise, Hume particularly discusses the sustaining aspect of pride with the analogy of self-love in mind. 'Daily experience convinces us', Hume points out, 'that pride requires certain causes to excite it, and languishes when unsupported by some excellency in the character, in bodily accomplishments, in cloaths, equipage or fortune'. What is involved is an implicit comparison to hunger in the case of self-love. The difference is that hunger is a direct passion (as well as all other desires linked to self-love) and pride is indirect. Pride does not arise on its own. It is a social passion and needs some foreign objects to accompany it. This is the sole point of indirect passions. Direct passions are nothing unusual. Hume's emphasis is on the indirect nature of pride. This is also one reason why Book 2 of the Treatise commences with the indirect passion of pride and not direct passions as one might perhaps have expected.

The sphere of self-love is different in nature from pride, mainly because it has the dispositions of the body. However, even when for example hunger can be satisfied, it also varies. For the sake of self-preservation a lot less than what we eat might be enough, but as animals, we have natural restrictions as to how much food we can eat. Pride is tricky, because there really are no natural limits to it. The point of sustaining and expanding pride is the spherical nature of pride. As our pride lifts and expands, it also reveals that there is no end to it, pride cannot be saturated. Once more, the contrast between indirect and direct passions proves useful. Direct passions in general are to be satisfied, indirect passions are not.

In this light, it makes rather good sense that Hume establishes the central division between direct and indirect passions that neatly fits the distinction between the spheres of self-love and pride. This is then further tuned with the discussion of violent and calm passions. The point is that these are the main principles of human nature. Self-love aids us to exist (if we do not eat or avoid death our body no longer exists). The self is simultaneously dependent on our pride (and vice versa). As a consequence, "social death" can be seen as equally harmful to the self as natural death is to the body. This is a very different view of the distinction between self-love and self-liking compared to the Rousseauvian vision of natural self-preservation and perverted attachment to the self. Mandeville and Hume emphasised that pride is just as important for the human being as her self-preservation (in the common use of the word).

Once we understand the spherical nature of pride, it is also easy to grasp why Hume puts such an effort on emphasising that the causes of pride need

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191 T 2.1.5.7; SBN 288.
not be real. Our self-love is restricted and guided by our bodily dispositions
to a certain extent. It is plausible to say that our hunger and thirst may be
quenched. We concretely feel that we ate or drank enough. Pride does not
have these natural limitations. There is no such thing as quenched pride. It
may well languish, but it cannot be quenched.

Quite unlike our hunger, we tend to overstate and mistake our pride. Perhaps we do not even have a clear conception of it. We might just in
some vague sense feel the pleasing affection involved in self-approval
through the mechanism of pride. This is an aspect of pride that has been
occasionally surfaced in Hume scholarship without a satisfactory
explanation. One commentator has pointed out that in pride 'no real object
of any sort is necessary. All that is needed is that the proud person has
certain beliefs. He must believe that he is actually receiving, or at least that
he deserves to receive, the admiration and envy of others'.

Some find puzzling Hume's view that 'someone sufficiently determined to shine can
somehow build his pride on a relation which is not really adequate'. In
Hume's system it seems ridiculously easy to justify one's beliefs and pride.
There is always the possibility that a person believes that 'if only others
were more intelligent or less trivially minded they, too, would come to value
that thing [she is proud of], or at least come to see that it might be valued'.
It is important that a person can just be proud, without really
being proud of anything (even when Hume usually describes pride as an
indirect passion that needs a particular cause). On general level Hume does
not make a distinction between these two cases. Since Hume always puts
the basic question in terms of pleasure and pain, we should perhaps also
make a note about this aspect. In the matter of pride, the pleasure of pride
is not necessarily connected to the pleasure taken in what a person is proud
of. What is important is that the pleasure, which is pride, is sustained. The
causes vary, but the overall passion is yet the same.

Hume's theory of human nature is universal. The point is that even a
poor beggar or wretched criminal can sustain his pride. People need to be
proud of something in order to want to prolong their existence as social
beings - a matter that is not to be understood to concern only self-
preservation. If it was possible, most men would perhaps be like Alexander
the Great, conquering half of the world and receiving hence supposed
justification for their supposedly superior nature. We might choose other
ways to operate than conquering and commanding, but yet the nature and
principle of our own pride is just the same. Our way of life might be more
modest (and even unrecognisable to someone with Alexander's military
frame of mind), but in due proportion our ambitions tend to be the same -
without much grounding on due causes, just causes that vary and usually

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192 Robert W. Burch, 'Hume on pride and humility', The New Scholasticism, 49, 1975,
pp. 185-6.
194 Taylor, 'Pride and humility', 1985, p. 27.
involve a strong, social element in the form of the real or assumed approval of others. Perhaps the best way to characterise Hume’s theory of pride is to say that it assumes that a man is predisposed to feeling superior and having inordinate self-esteem by nature – which should not be viewed in a negative sense but as a natural fact.  

While our pride, in Hume’s discussion on it, tends to be boastful and overstated, he takes care to point out that there is always an element of doubt involved – even if we had factually conquered half the world or lived like sages for all our lives. This element of self-doubt seems to be missing from most of the philosophical accounts of pride. This is why this aspect is so important. Our undying need for other people’s approval does not become clear if we miss that pride is a conditional passion.

This conditional aspect of pride is one cause of self-doubt, but at the same time it is one reason for self-deception. Hume calls this the ‘quality of the mind’ by which ‘we are seduc’d into a good opinion of ourselves’. He unravels this further: ‘the great propensity men have to pride’ is partly explained in terms of taking delight in things close to us, ‘the mind finds a satisfaction and ease in the view of objects, to which it is accustom’d, and naturally prefers them to others, which, tho’, perhaps, in themselves more valuable, are less known to it. By the same quality of the mind we are seduc’d into a good opinion of ourselves, and of all objects, that belong to us. They appear in a stronger light; are more agreeable; and consequently fitter subjects of pride and vanity, than any other’. This is a robust statement that makes it more or less impossible to even think that there could be an objective foundation of pride for Hume. The only thing that is clearly established is that there is always some uncertainty in the question whether our pride is well-founded, even when we can easily account for probable causes sustaining our pride at a given time and place.

Based upon Hume’s system, if the objective foundation of our self-satisfaction is our prime concern, we have several good reasons to doubt if we should actually be proud of anything at all: no bodily disposition guides our pride, a strong social component of pride could mean that we are only looking to please others without any regard to how we acquire their approval, our mind tends to delight with things we are familiar with without real justification, somehow we crave for pride and tend to overstate it; and after all, the causes of pride need not be real at all – our self-satisfaction can be based upon views that we might not even approve of. But we are not stupid. We are extremely rational in some aspects of life. Our pride is very precarious and we realise this. This creates self-doubt and this self-doubt is perhaps the most important element that makes pride a social passion. It is this element of self-doubt that seems to be missing from most of the philosophical analysis of pride.

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195 About Mandeville, self-liking and instinct of sovereignty, see pp. 164–169 above.

196 T 2.2.4.8; SBN 354−5.
Pride, good-breeding and the theory of passions

An important part of David Hume’s intellectual development towards the Treatise was the study of how external expressions of kindness rendered civil society lenient. In the philosophical work he developed these notions into one of the cornerstones of his social theory along the same Mandevillean lines that he had adopted in his politeness-letter. As Annette Baier and some other philosophers have perceptively emphasised, pride is a ‘master passion’ for Hume. Nevertheless, in these philosophical analysis the crucial link between pride and politeness has not hitherto been established.

Hume opens Book 2 of the Treatise, entitled ‘Of the passions’, by treating pride. A relevant connection between his philosophical theory of passions and his overall analysis of politeness is that he distinguishes ‘pride’ and ‘humility’ as passions that ‘are directly contrary in their effects’. One commentator has suggested that this dichotomy is a mistake on Hume’s part and he had been ‘confusing humility with shame’. I do not however think so. We have to understand that even when Hume is making a particular analysis of passions, he is also participating in a larger debate about pride, modesty and politeness. When we analyse his theory of passions from this point of view, the dichotomy between pride and humility (and not pride and shame) turns out to be important. Hume manages to exclude all the popular accounts that claim that true modesty is the real

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198 The only article that I am aware of that tries to link Hume’s scepticism with civility is Johnson, ‘Hume on Manners and the Civil Condition’, 1998, pp. 209–222. However, in his article Johnson is not setting Hume’s theory of civility or his notions of manners in their intellectual context, thus Johnson does not establish the crucial link between Hume and Mandeville nor the link between politeness and justice, which are decisive for understanding Hume’s idea of civility and the role of politeness in his overall system.

199 T 2.1.5.9; SBN 289.

source of politeness. For a theorist who confuses his ideas, Hume is quite rigorous when he claims that it is ‘impossible’ that ‘a man can be at the same time’ both ‘proud and humble’. I think that to indicate this conceptual blunder in some of the previous accounts of politeness is exactly what Hume had in mind. He maintains that ‘pride’ is always ‘a pleasant’ and ‘agreeable’ sensation, whilst ‘humility’ is ‘uneasy’ and ‘painful’. In other words, even when pride and humility cannot operate without some external object or quality that excites passion, it is very clear that to be proud is something desirable, whereas humility or true modesty is not.

When introducing some limitations of his system of double relation of impressions and ideas concerning pride, Hume makes use of an example of a ‘feast’ where the guests may only feel ‘joy’ and not ‘pride’ by being present, whence the ‘master of the feast’ is the only one that has ‘the additional passion of self-applause and vanity’. The fact that Hume chose to use this particular example is revealing of his idea of politeness as a method of hiding pride. In his essays, Hume explains how we are able to detect this ‘master of the feast’ among ‘good company’. According to Hume, most ‘certainly’, he is the ‘man, who sits in the lowest place, and who is always industrious in helping every one’. The master is proud, but he appears to be humble. In Book 3 of the Treatise, Hume also defines that one feature of the ‘general rule’ of not revealing our ‘self-applause’ is that in order to keep ‘the appearance of modesty’ men have to ‘be ready to prefer others to ourselves’ and ‘to seem always the lowest and least in the company’. A polite gentleman is proud, and entertains a high opinion of himself, thus to ‘seem’ the ‘lowest and least’ most definitely is not something natural for him. All this has to do is the ‘appearance’, and nothing with actual modesty. In other words, because the master is the only one, who may truly feel proud of the fact that ‘delicacies of every kind’ are being served, he self-evidently is extremely careful not to expose this passion.

As Annette Baier has pointed out, Hume describes pride as an indirect passion that in a sense does not immediately cause actions, yet it is a passion that according to Hume has to last. Mandeville’s term, self-liking, captures Hume’s meaning. Hume’s own definition confirms this Mandevillean backdrop. ‘By pride’, he points out, ‘I understand that agreeable impression, which arises in the mind, when the view’ of our good qualities ‘makes us satisfy’d with ourselves’.

201 T 2.1.2.3; SBN 278.
202 T 2.1.5.4; SBN 286 and T 2.1.5.9; SBN 288-9.
203 T 2.1.6.2; SBN 290.
204 T 3.3.2.11; SBN 598.
205 T 2.1.6.2; SBN 290.
207 T 2.1.7.8; SBN 297.
existence is that we are satisfied with ourselves, in other words, we have to be able to cultivate our self-liking. This condition is dependent upon several variable circumstances. Bernard Mandeville emphasised that when self-liking ceases, life becomes a burden and thus, suicide might be a valid option. David Hume on his part emphasises that ‘no man ever threw away life, while it was worth keeping’. \(^{209}\) Since our passions are often unaccountable and extremely amendable to different situations, Hume elaborates that one turns to this option, indeed, as a last resort. According to Hume, ‘a man may be proud’ of virtually anything – not just virtue, beauty, riches and power, which are the most obvious and natural causes of pride. \(^{210}\) ‘Any thing, that gives a pleasant sensation, and is related to self, excites the passion of pride’. \(^{211}\) Most people are able to find something to be proud of, something that they think help them outshine everyone and that is closely related to the self. All of us need other people to somehow confirm (in our own mind) the opinion that we have of ourselves. This is the central part of Hume’s analysis of self-applause or self-liking. The necessary premise for us to build our self-image is that it has to be strengthened by the people whose opinion we value. This is the key point to understand how self-liking, in the end, creates social cohesion and how our ‘vanity’ is, like Hume describes it, ‘a bond of union among men’. \(^{212}\) The causes of pride, such as ‘virtue, beauty and riches’ have almost no ‘influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others’. \(^{213}\) Because our self-applause and vanity is dependent upon other people, Hume explains, ‘we’ cannot even ‘form’ a ‘wish’ that would ‘not have a reference to society’ and ‘perfect solitude’ might be ‘the greatest punishment we can suffer’. \(^{214}\)

This leads me to a point where I think Baier’s analysis needs some rethinking. Since Hume is not trying to form a prescriptive theory of ethics, neither is he taking up the Sisyphean task of explaining what is due pride and what is not. What is striking in Hume’s philosophical analysis is that he is able to consistently support an outlook based on the idea that we never know if our own pride is well-founded and everything is depended upon the fact that we follow established rules. The point is that all of us are more or less proud and so we have to hide this sentiment of self-applause. As Baier acknowledges, Hume does not treat the concept of due pride in Book 2 of the Treatise. \(^{215}\) The most problematic part of Baier’s analysis is that, in order to show that due pride is a vital concept for Hume, she finds her evidence

\(^{209}\) Hume, ‘Of suicide’, in Essays, p. 588. To me it seems that the topic of suicide was an extreme example along with duelling how to argue that self-liking was more important for men than self-love.

\(^{210}\) T 2.1.2.6; SBN 279.

\(^{211}\) T 2.1.5.8; SBN 288.

\(^{212}\) T 3.2.2.12; SBN 491.

\(^{213}\) T 2.1.11.1; SBN 316.

\(^{214}\) T 2.2.5.16; SBN 363.

from a section in the Treatise, which, in my opinion, proves that this idea is not central for Hume.\textsuperscript{216} When Baier talks about due pride, she means the pride that is well-founded. She bases her evidence on a supposed dichotomy between ‘overweening conceit’ and ‘due pride’. But Hume is not however stressing the importance of well-founded and ‘due pride’. The precise quote from the Treatise is ‘that nothing is more useful to us in the conduct of life, than a due degree of pride’, which is only another way of saying that pride, in general, is a useful passion.\textsuperscript{217} I cannot see how Hume would have been pinpointing a dichotomy between well-founded pride and ‘overweening conceit’. Baier’s further suggestion is that it was unnecessary for Hume to suggest that we have to conceal our due pride. The only ‘expression of ill-founded excessive and uncorrected pride’, she tells us, ‘should be restricted’ and we have to be able to show our due pride if it is our ruling passion.\textsuperscript{218} This might be a good basis for a contemporary philosophical stance, but it misses the point of the ongoing section in the Treatise. On the following page, Hume clearly states, and I quote his reasoning at length: ‘nothing is more disagreeable than a man’s overweaning conceit of himself: Every one almost has a strong propensity to this vice: No one can well distinguish in himself betwixt the vice and virtue, or be certain, that his esteem of his own merit is well-founded’.\textsuperscript{219} Thus, instead of making any distinctions between the right and wrong kind of pride, Hume contends with the notion that most of us are plain proud.

Of course, it might be argued that it is better, if everyone was proud of the fact that they respect the laws of justice instead of some vain notions that they are pretty or own beautiful houses. Nevertheless, these are meagre distinctions, and Hume is not making such a point. To expect that men should only have due pride is to anticipate an immense change in human nature, which Hume has ruled out as impossible. What he is saying is that – despite the causes – we always think highly of ourselves, which to us is simply a positive phenomenon since it gives us confidence and causes a pleasant sensation.\textsuperscript{220} This goes to the point that we cannot possibly be sure whether we have stepped over the boundary of ‘due degree of pride’ (if such a line could actually be drawn and the concept was not just used for descriptive purposes). On the one hand, our self-liking does not harm others as long as we do not reveal our true sentiments. On the other hand, once we start showing our pride, everything goes astray no matter how “legitimate” reasons we would have for our self-applause. The case is analogous with the laws of justice. If we turn to consult our natural ideas, instead of the fixed rules of justice, or if we start pondering whether our

\textsuperscript{216} T 3.3.2; SBN 592–602.
\textsuperscript{217} T 3.3.2.8; SBN 596.
\textsuperscript{218} Baier, ‘Master passions’, 1980, p. 418.
\textsuperscript{219} T 3.3.2.10; SBN 597–8.
\textsuperscript{220} Cf. Mandeville, Part II, p. 91. ‘The instinct of high value, which every individual has for himself, is a very useful passion’.
pride is well-founded or not, soon we find civil society in confusion and our conversations unpleasant. In the end, everyone would find the means to justify their unlawfulness and to vent their pride, which would be a setback for the possibility of cultivating self-love and self-liking. Simultaneously, the circle of refinement would be reversed. This is the reason why Hume carries on stating that 'all direct expressions of this passion are condemn'd; nor do we make any exception to this rule in favour of men of sense and merit'. I think this neatly sums up the core idea of politeness. Not a single exception is to be made to the rule that no-one is 'allow'd to do themselves justice openly'. It is the 'impertinent, and almost universal propensity of men to over-value themselves' and it is this same propensity that 'has given us such a prejudice against self-applause, that we are apt to condemn it, by a general rule, wherever we meet with it'.

Maybe the idea of 'due pride' is relevant in contemporary philosophy, but I am not convinced that it was something that David Hume himself wanted to stress.

Centrality of a section entitled Greatness of mind in the Treatise

When we realise that in the section 3.3.2 Hume is vindicating the idea of politeness instead of due pride, it also makes sense why in other places he tries to build such a strong case for our self-image being dependant upon other people's opinion. We may now give a technical explanation of how politeness and pride operate in Hume's system of mind. Here the contrary effect of pride and humility in accordance with the operation of sympathy and comparison is of vital importance.

The idea of social distance plays a notable role in Hume's system. According to the established tradition of court civility in the eighteenth century, external politeness is particularly needed within an equal social group. Hume also thinks that respect and deference towards superiors has more to do with a natural turn of the mind and does not necessarily need strong artificial rules in order to be stirred up. This means that when a person is actually above us, in rank or in some other substantial sense, the mechanism of sympathy will operate on us rather smoothly, and if we contemplate the causes that most likely create the passion of pride in a superior person it will give rise to a pleasant impression in us as well. For example, a rich man will naturally acquire our esteem, if he is placed above us.

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221 T 3.3.2.10; SBN 598.
222 Usually this part of Treatise, where Hume makes this salient point, is 'commonly read as a mere illustration of the principles of Humean moral evaluation' instead of bearing any crucial relevance for Hume's moral theory. Abramson, 'Two portraits', 2002, p. 305. See e.g. Mackie, Hume's moral theory, 1980, pp. 125–6. Abramson's idea is that greatness of mind is the 'all-important link between Hume's view about moral evaluation and the questions about moral motivation which dominate the rest of Book III', ibid. p. 305.
223 T 2.2.5.1; SBN 357, T 2.2.5; SBN 359 and T 2.2.5.10–11; SBN 361.
above us in social hierarchy, we cannot be envious of his good fortune, even when an overpowering feature of human nature is that ‘we are every moment apt to’ compare ‘ourselves with others’.\textsuperscript{224}

Meanwhile, ‘a sense of superiority’ creates in us ‘an inclination to keep’ this ‘distance’ from a person above us and ‘to redouble the marks of respect and reverence’, if we have ‘to approach him’.\textsuperscript{225} It is only natural that ‘in the presence of a great man’, we ‘sink’ in ‘our own eyes’ and are very sincere in our ‘respect’.\textsuperscript{226} This respect is an actual sentiment that we as inferiors are supposed to have, and if we do not ‘observe’ a proper ‘conduct’ towards him, it is ‘a proof’ that we ‘are not sensible of his superiority’.\textsuperscript{227} Throughout the Treatise, Hume emphasises that ‘whoever is elevated’ above ‘the rest of mankind, must’ through operation of sympathy ‘excite in us the sentiments of esteem and approbation’.\textsuperscript{228} Such person that ‘can excite these sentiments’ will also acquire ‘our esteem; unless other circumstances of his character render him odious and disagreeable’.\textsuperscript{229} In other words, in most cases, the politeness towards the people who are placed far above us comes through a natural operation of the mind. This sentiment of humility created by the presence of a great man does not mortify us.\textsuperscript{230} But if it is natural to respect people set above us in hierarchy, this does not hold true among equals, which explains why Hume in his letter on politeness was so astonished that the French ‘porters and coachmen’ are not only ‘civil’ towards gentlemen, but ‘likewise among themselves’.\textsuperscript{231}

For the convenient existence of a peer group it is indispensable that we are required to hide our sentiments of self-applause. Technically speaking, external politeness (or hypocrisy, if you like) is needed because of the natural operation of comparison in Hume’s system. In the presence of other gentlemen, no one is elevated above others. Hume denotes comparison as an operation of the mind that can function in several ways. If we (as poor people) could not be envious by comparing ourselves to the rich man, comparison in turn functions as a mechanism that explains how this rich man might boost his pride. He may compare ‘himself to his inferior’ and receive ‘pleasure from the comparison’.\textsuperscript{232} A rich man is proud of his wealth, and confirms his opinion by comparing himself to a poor man. Nevertheless, regardless of how many comparisons he makes, a rich man’s self-liking is established on thin ice, if his character is not supported by (what he can take as) the approving opinion of his equals. The self-sustaining idea of comparing ourselves to our inferiors is not the primary

\textsuperscript{224} T 2.1.6.5; SBN 292.
\textsuperscript{225} T 2.2.10.10; SBN 393.
\textsuperscript{226} T 3.3.2.6; SBN 595.
\textsuperscript{227} T 2.2.10.10; SBN 393.
\textsuperscript{228} T 3.3.4.14; SBN 613.
\textsuperscript{229} T 3.3.4.14; SBN 614.
\textsuperscript{230} T 3.3.2.6; SBN 595.
\textsuperscript{231} David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, Letters, I, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{232} T 2.2.8.12; SBN 377.
social conjunction between pride, comparison and politeness. It is significant to notice that Hume’s idea of politeness concerns men who are not separated by a social gap. As I said, this becomes clear, when we realise that Hume’s analysis, even when it has merits of its own, belongs to a certain tradition of analysing the court society.

When the principle of comparison operates within a social group (with reference to pride and humility) it has a different task than towards superiors (non-function) or inferiors (vindicating pride). Hume describes pride as a passion that is ‘always pleasant’, whereas humility, in most cases, causes a painful sensation. However, ‘humility’ is considered a virtue because it ‘exalts’ us, whereas ‘pride’ is a vice, because it ‘mortifies us’. Here, Hume is evidently referring to the effect of the sentiment that other people seem to entertain of themselves. According to Hume, it is a natural operation of the mind that ‘when we compare the sentiments of others to our own, we feel a sensation directly opposite to the original one’. In other words, if we are forced to operate through the principle of comparison, the appearance of pride in other equals will cause humility in us, whereas the appearance of humility will cause pride. ‘Through sympathy’, Hume explains, we ‘enter into those elevated sentiments, which the proud man entertains of himself’. Sympathy denotes a mechanism by which we obtain an impression by the signs of the sentiment expressed by the other person. The point is that when we detect signs of pride, the operation of sympathy is immediately blocked and this leads into ‘comparison, which is so mortifying and disagreeable’. Hume elaborates and tells his audience that ‘if we observe’ in a ‘man, whom we are really persuaded to be of inferior merit’ any ‘extraordinary degree of pride’, the ‘firm persuasions he has of his own merit, takes hold of the imagination, and diminishes us in our own eyes’. Technically speaking, the idea that we have of this man is not converted into an impression and we are forced to make a disagreeable comparison to ourselves. Vice versa, if we would actually think that he obtains these good qualities that he seems to be so proud of, this would have ‘a contrary effect’. The idea would now be converted into an impression and the man’s sentiments ‘would operate on us by sympathy’ creating approval. However, this does not happen often within a peer-group.

Hume describes it as an ‘impertinent, and almost universal propensity of men, to over-value themselves’. This premise might not turn out to be such an enormous obstacle for sympathy, if it only concerned the person expressing the good opinion about himself. Nevertheless, the inclination to over-value one’s worth holds equally true with the interlocutor that is affected by the expressed sentiment. If he happens to over-value himself,

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233 T 2.1.7.3; SBN 295.
234 T 2.2.9.1; SBN 381.
235 T 3.3.2.6; SBN 595.
236 T 3.3.2.6; SBN 596.
which is a very likely scenario, this also bears consequence on how he, in turn, interprets the merit of the other person. Thus, what commonly happens is that a due expression of pride (whatever that might mean) is still creating an unpleasant feeling. Hence, this is yet another reason why Hume is not concerned with due pride. We may conclude that the case is usually that both parties over-value themselves, and the gap between their understanding of due merit and pride is greater than expected. By and large, it is not a normal situation (in any given social framework) that the actual opinions of merit between equals meet at a level where sympathy, instead of comparison, operates. Thus, we may safely say that instead of eulogising due pride, Hume goes on and concurs with the idea that if people opened their hearts and revealed what they take as a due degree of pride, we would be facing an unsustainable situation of a never-ending circle of humility through the natural operation of the principle of comparison.  

‘Pride’ simply ‘must be vicious’, because ‘it causes uneasiness in all men, and presents them every moment with a disagreeable comparison’. Another (or rather a Mandevillean) way of saying this, is that a high degree of self-liking is a commendable quality, but once it becomes visible to others it is called pride, and turns to be vicious because it causes a setback for other people’s self-liking. Notably, here we are talking about equals, because the operation of the principle of comparison is different when the social distance is greater. The virtue of humility can only be the hypocritical appearance of humility, since the passion within is vanity, pride or self-applause (depending on which one of these synonyms for self-liking we want to use). As Hume argues, ‘while’ sentiments ‘remain conceal’d in the minds of others, they can never have any influence upon us’. In other words, we only approve of the sign (humility), not necessarily because we are mistaking it for a true quality, but because it causes a pleasant sentiment (pride) through comparison with ourselves. In the case of humility, the actual virtue is the sign of humility, and no questions about motives or real quality have to be asked. As Hume perceptibly concludes, ‘no one, who duly considers of this matter, will make any scruple of allowing, that any piece of ill-breeding, or any expression of pride and haughtiness, is displeasing to us, merely because it shocks our own pride, and leads us by sympathy into a comparison, which causes the disagreeable passion of humility’. Hume’s intention seems rather clear to me. Since pride always brings pleasure to an individual and the cultivation of our self-liking is the cornerstone of our existence, everyone should be able to be proud. Since

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237 T 3.3.2.11; SBN 598.
238 T 3.3.2.7; SBN 596.
239 T 3.3.2.3; SBN 593.
240 In other words, a theory of mistaken attribution of virtue is not a sufficient explanation for Hume’s idea of moral approval. This is an influential theory argued by Mackie, Hume’s moral theory, 1980, p. 72.
241 T 3.3.2.17; SBN 601.
other people’s visible pride usually mortifies us and brings in humility, the point is simple. We have to be proud without showing it to others. ‘Self-satisfaction and vanity’, Hume declares, ‘may not only be allowable, but requisite in a character’, but it is ‘certain, that good-breeding and decency require that we shou’d avoid all signs and expressions, which tend directly to show that passion’.\(^{242}\) This is indeed what politeness is. Hume makes this point already in Book 2 of the Treatise, but he vindicates it much more forcefully in Book 3, ‘Of morals’, where he manages to integrate it into his social and political theory.

Flattery

The system of human mind presented in the Treatise also has a relevant connection to flattery, another Mandevillean social concept. As we remember, the particular feeling that is created in us by the appearance of our peer’s sentiment has a corresponding effect on our sentiments towards him. If through sympathy we detect signs of pride, we turn to compare this elevated idea to ourselves and cannot be but mortified, which means that our sympathetic feelings towards his character are unlikely to prevail. In contrast, if we detect (through sympathy) signs of humility, this exalts us and we are also inclined to be sympathetic towards the character of the person in question. What this means, as Mandeville described it, is that in civil society men are ready to take one further step, flattery runs in as a torrent and within a peer-group people seek other people’s approving sentiments through deliberate attempts to please.

At first glance, flattery might seem to be an undemanding pastime to David Hume. He describes ‘vanity’ as a ‘passion’ that ‘is so prompt, that it rouzes at the least call’.\(^{243}\) We are very much inclined to be proud. By the same token, it should be easy to encourage this passion in others, especially when ‘nothing invigorates and exalts the mind equally with pride and vanity’.\(^{244}\) Since ‘self-applause’ is ‘always agreeable’\(^{245}\) and the ‘causes of pride’ have almost no ‘influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others’\(^{246}\), would it not be more than evident that men are very pleased when flattered and also inclined to adopt this practise themselves? According to Hume, indeed it is. ‘Whoever can find the means either by his services, his beauty, or his flattery, to render himself useful or agreeable to us, is sure of our affections’.\(^{247}\) The human mind, Hume explains, is a faculty that is ‘easily shock’d with whatever opposes’ the ‘good opinion we have of ourselves’ and likewise ‘peculiarly pleas’d with any

\(^{242}\) T 3.3.2.10; SBN 597.
\(^{243}\) T 2.2.10.4; SBN 390.
\(^{244}\) T 2.2.10.6; SBN 391.
\(^{245}\) T 3.3.2.10; SBN 597.
\(^{246}\) T 2.1.11.1; SBN 316.
\(^{247}\) T 2.2.3.2; SBN 348.
thing, that confirms our self-applause. Hume is taken by the idea that, because of certain principles of human mind, a society of gentlemen naturally produces a self-sufficient system of exchanging 'a good office' after another – a practise, which is 'agreeable, chiefly because it flatters our vanity'. To put it briefly, Hume thinks that to be in civilised company is always pleasing, because we are 'seduc'd into a good opinion of ourselves'.

To successfully flatter a person is not as simple as one might think. Like any positive social practise, flattery has rules based on the operation of the human mind. Hume takes the topic of flattery highly seriously and points out that 'the praises of others never give us much pleasure, unless they concur with our own opinion, and extol us for those qualities, in which we chiefly excel.' In other words, we are only flattered when we are praised for a reason and not a single individual can much appreciate gross flattery that fails to create a plausible illusion and convince that the person might actually mean what he is saying. As both Nicole and Abbadié pointed out, deceiving flattery is one of the worst insults, because it 'cloaks a most real contempt, under the mask of an apparent esteem'. Hume himself points out that the presence of a gross flatterer is not desirable, because the signs of his sentiments do not please. Meanwhile, the gross flatterer's own opinion about himself is unlikely to be 'seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others'. According to a vain man, 'every thing belonging' to him 'is the best that is any where to be found', Hume writes. But not even this miserable wretch can reap pleasure from praise that is not in accord with his own opinions. Consequently, the self-liking of the vain man is established on just as fragile a base as the self-applause of the gross flatterer. As a result, if he has any sense, he will learn through experience to regulate his behaviour so that it turns out to be more advantageous. And if the 'vain man' is a gentleman, how could it ever occur to us that he actually is 'a vain man', since he is able to hide his self-applause? At least theoretically speaking we cannot detect his vanity and thus we approve of his character.

Flattery is a prime example of how the natural principles of human mind can turn the social sphere into a self-regulating system that does not

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248 T 2.1.11.9; SBN 321.
249 T 2.2.2.27; SBN 346.
250 T 2.2.3.5; SBN 349.
251 T 2.2.4.8; SBN 355.
252 T 2.1.11.13; SBN 322.
253 Jacques Abbadie, The art of knowing one-self, London, 1696, pp. 259–60. Regarding Abbadie, see, Nakhimovsky, 'The Enlightened Epicureanism of Jacques Abbadie', 2003, pp. 1–14, where the idea is that 'updated Epicurianism' forms an argument about 'genuine moral behaviour and ultimately even human moral perfection' that 'could arise from the principle of self-love.'
254 T 2.1.11.1; SBN 316.
255 T 2.1.10.2; SBN 310.
need moral philosophers to tell what is well-founded pride and what is not. All we need to do, in order to realise that a man may only advance a limited way depending on flattery and politeness, is to look at the way human nature functions in society. Flattery, already by its definition, has to be based on the intrinsic worth of the attribute in question. According to Hume, ‘no person is ever prais’d by another for any quality, which wou’d not, if real, produce, of itself, a pride in the person possest of it’.

The subject matter of successful flattery has to be something that is actually considered praiseworthy, and if a person is praised for a quality that he in fact does not think that he possesses, does not think that the flatterer thinks that he possesses it or does not consider it praiseworthy, this cannot promote his self-satisfaction in any considerable way. Of course, the flattered person might be inclined to over-value himself, but even then he has to have some reason to take the praised quality as his own. Flattery has to at least resemble truth.

These premises of the definition of flattery help to explain its social nature. The fact about human nature that confirms flattery as a sociable practise is that there is no ‘original instinct’ that would create ‘a desire of fame’. If there was such instinct, flattery would be anything but a self-regulating social practice, since it would not make any difference whose ‘opinion’ is ‘favourable’ to us. In this case, all the ‘opinions’ of the world ‘wou’d equally excite’ our passions and it would not matter if the approving ‘judgement’ was passed on by ‘a fool’ or ‘a wise man’. However, this is not consistent with experience. We do not have an original desire for fame and even when ‘fame in general’ is ‘agreeable’, we ‘receive a much greater satisfaction from the approbation of those, whom we ourselves esteem and approve’. Not just any approval or disapproval will do. Our actions are restricted by us being utterly ‘mortify’d with the contempt of persons, upon whose judgement we set some value’, whereas in some cases, we might even be ‘indifferent about the opinions of the rest of mankind’. Thus, we may notice the significance that the idea of social cohesion and self-regulating practices have in Hume’s social theory.

The relevant point for Hume was that because of education and social pressure, most people will not choose the difficult path of trying to systematically take advantage of people and the established system. It would soon backfire and become a disadvantage because of the risk of ending with no-one who they would value and who, in turn, would sincerely support their self-liking. We have to remember that if people are educated to respect the established rules, they will automatically acquire a disapproving sentiment when they see these rules being broken, regardless of the fact that they might be just as tempted to break the rules themselves. As simple as it is, in a group of people a person who systematically acts in a dishonest, or

256 T 2.1.11.9; SBN 320.
257 T 2.1.11.11; SBN 321.
258 T 2.1.11.11; SBN 321.
otherwise improper manner will eventually be excluded, and the particular person might end up realising that his character is no longer approved by the people whose opinions he used to admire.

On the one hand, there are times when anyone might slip back to the strategy of a knave. But this is the precise reason why we need good education and a strict system of laws regulated by the government and established on a previous convention to take possession of the ductile minds of children. On the other hand, because men are dependent upon society, the presence of acquaintances naturally restricts the behaviour of its members (even of the ones who are more prone to knavery than others due to these operations of pride and humility that I have explained). When these attributes are combined with actual punishments regulated by the government, we may understand how it is possible for civil society to grow and yet remain intact even when human nature remains as it is.

Government and political society

The evolutionary theory of artificial virtues, as noted by Knud Haakonssen, is bold and ingenious, because it explains how such an elementary constituent of social life as 'justice is a result of human activity', but is 'not deliberately constructed by men'. I would add to this observation that the evolutionary theory was not only restricted to justice, but both Mandeville and Hume also applied the same idea to politeness and were able to argue that both of these moral institutions were the unintended consequences of individual human actions. Only now that we have conducted a detailed analysis of the nature of both of these primary artificial virtues of justice and politeness and the passions behind them, we may advance to analyse the essential role of government in the conjectural history of civil society and how the political society is thought to function in the Treatise.

We ought to start by re-examining sympathy in the conjectural history of civil society. In his influential analysis of 'Hume's theory of justice',

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259 This is one of the central points made by Haakonssen about Hume's idea of justice. Haakonssen, Science of the legislator, 1982, p. 20. Haakonssen also notes that this idea was 'clearly anticipated by Bernard Mandeville'. ibid, p. 21. However, Haakonssen goes on to point out that 'Mandeville uses the idea in a rather general way, without too much attention to the details of the links between individual causes and the over-all effect. He also uses the idea mostly in an economic context'. This comment is evidently derived regarding the common understanding of Mandeville and especially the first part of The Fable. As we have seen, Mandeville's evolutionary scheme and his idea of unintended causes particularly regarded the conjectural development of civil society and justice and politeness. Neither does Haakonssen acknowledge the role of politeness in his concise analysis of Hume's theory of justice.

260 Also several other perceptive accounts of Hume's social theory miss the analogy between justice and politeness, see for example Christopher Berry's detailed and useful analysis of 'social cohesiveness' in Treatise. Christopher Berry, Hume, Hegel and human nature, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Hague, 1982, pp. 69–95.
Haakonssen does not explicitly refer to the government. Instead, he underlines that the 'principle of sympathy' counters the problem that 'as society grows larger, the self-interested motive to observe the rules of justice grows fainter for the individual'.

I think that to omit the government from Hume's theory of justice is to overemphasise the role of the principle of sympathy. Sympathy might explain how men come to hate themselves when they consider how they are judged by their fellow men if they breach the rules of justice, but this only concerns a society that already has an established government and a specific system of laws. Sympathy is not the solution to counter the faint motive to observe the rules of justice that Hume prescribes for large societies. Without analysing the role of government in the conjectural history of civil society, we cannot understand how Hume thought that large societies are able to function. Once a convention of justice has been formed, men will – without further reflection – feel approval when observing actions that are in accordance with this convention, but this is not Hume's principal point. His major concern is that men have to observe the rules of justice in their own conduct in a large society also. Without laws that are enforced by a government, this is utterly impossible, despite the principle of sympathy. Thus, sympathy might be an important feature of the moral value of justice, but it is not the factor that enables the civil society to function. It is the purpose of this section to explain, according to the Treatise, what is the way to preserve peace in a large society. In order to do this, I will argue, we need to take into account all the central social elements - conjectural history, self-love, self-liking and the role of an established government.

Besides the methodological point of unintended consequences, another purpose of the conjectural scheme of civil society is to explain how moral institutions cannot be arbitrary inventions of clever politicians, since they are based on previous human conventions. Hume takes particular care to prove that the convention of justice precedes laws and the established government. As a result, he is able to make the point that even when 'the rules of justice' are 'artificial, they are not arbitrary'. In a same manner he goes on to declare that the 'government, upon its first establishment' derives 'its obligation' from the 'laws of nature', which effectively rejects the idea of an arbitrary role of the sovereign. The inflexible laws prescribed by a government have to be derived from a preceding convention. It is both, 'natural, as well as civil justice', that receive their 'origin from human

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262 For an overall account of Hume's theory of justice that does not omit the role of government, see Moore, 'Hume's theory of justice and property', 1976, pp. 155–166.
263 For a contrasting, but informative contextual account about the centrality of sympathy regarding civil society in Treatise, see John Mullan, Sentiment and sociability. The language of feeling in the eighteenth century, Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 18–56.
264 T 3.2.1.19; SBN 484.
265 T 3.2.8.3; SBN 541.
conventions'.\textsuperscript{266} We cannot overemphasise that in Hume’s system moral institutions are established upon human convention in order to control certain passions. Hume stresses this point by stating that it is possible that ‘men’ may even ‘preserve society for some time, without’ a government relying on a simple convention.\textsuperscript{267} However, it concerns only ‘a small uncultivated society’.\textsuperscript{268} This is why, once again, we have to be careful where the differences between small and large societies are concerned.

In a small, clan-based society, once the rules of justice have been established, everyone becomes sensible of their own interest in justice. The foundation of justice, self-interest, is immediately present, and on each occasion that justice is breached, it is something concrete and substantial that directly concerns each member of the society. According to Hume, it is a common feature of human nature to prefer ‘whatever is near and contiguous’ to ‘any object, that lies in a more distant and obscure light’.\textsuperscript{269} This is a powerful principle of the human mind. Even though ‘we may be fully convinc’d, that the latter object excels the former, we are not able to regulate our actions by this judgement; but yield to the solicitations of our passions’.\textsuperscript{270} This premise does not create intractable difficulties in a small society because justice is directly couched to self-interest that is continuously at hand. But once the society increases in size, men start to lose the sight of their own interest in justice, which was prescribed as its first foundation. At the same time, it becomes inevitable that men ‘cannot be associated without government’.\textsuperscript{271}

Hume affirms that because of the inherent weakness in human nature men might be able to assert that ‘the rules of justice’ are ‘sufficient to maintain any society’, but it still is ‘impossible for’ these very same men ‘to observe those rules, in large and polish’d societies’.\textsuperscript{272} Every person educated in human society has a moral sentiment that approves of certain rules of justice. A man does not choose to have these approving sentiments. He simply feels them. Most likely, a normal person will also pity the people whose property has evidently been violated and demand that other people act according to the principle of justice. However, it does not entail that he would be able to respect these rules himself (even when it is another common feature of human understanding to extend a general rule beyond its first circumstances). There is simply no other natural motive than self-interest in order to observe the rules of justice, and it is impossible that self-hatred and sympathy could counter the inclination to prefer what is near to what is remote until a government has been established and the principle of

\textsuperscript{266} T 3.2.8.4; SBN 543.
\textsuperscript{267} T 3.2.8.2; SBN 539.
\textsuperscript{268} T 3.2.8.3; SBN 541.
\textsuperscript{269} T 3.2.7.2; SBN 535.
\textsuperscript{270} T 3.2.7.2; SBN 535.
\textsuperscript{271} T 2.3.1.9; SBN 402.
\textsuperscript{272} T 3.2.8.5; SBN 543.
justice is enforced by strict laws. In a large society that is not run by a government 'every one' turns out to be his 'own master, and violates or observes the laws of society, according to his present interest or pleasure'.273 This is a critical statement. In Hume's system, the principle of sympathy alone is not sufficient to replace the fading motive of self-interest for justice in a large society. In a large society, without government everyone conducts along the lines of his own interpretation of the rules of justice that varies according to the circumstances - which is virtually the same as having no justice at all. To put it differently, men might have a general idea of right and wrong, however, they are carried along with their passions and are unable to control their actions according to this judgement. This is also 'why men so often', as Hume points out, 'act in contradiction to their known interest'. A common feature of human nature is to 'prefer any trivial advantage, that is present, to the maintenance of order in society, which so much depends on the observance of justice'. Once the society has become large, 'the consequences of every breach of equity seem to lie very remote, and are not able to counterbalance any immediate advantage, that may be reap'd from it'. Hume emphasises that 'all men are, in some degree, subject to the same weakness', thus, 'it necessarily happens, that the violations of equity must become very frequent in society, and the commerce of men, by that means, be render'd very dangerous and uncertain'. Hume claims that 'this quality' is not only 'very dangerous to society'; it seems that it is 'incapable of any remedy'.274

At this point in the conjectural history of civil society, despite our approval of actions that are beneficial to the public, we are facing a similar difficulty as small societies before the establishment of the convention of justice. The rules of justice have turned out to be ineffective, because there is no longer a general agreement on what they mean in practise. The convention of justice is no longer the immediate interest of every member of society. Men need another impression of their own interest in upholding civil society. This comes, anew, as an unintended consequence of their experience in society. The remaining 'difficulty' is to 'find' a method by 'which men cure' this 'natural weakness, and lay themselves under the necessity of observing the laws of justice and equity'.275 'Once' men become aware of 'the impossibility of preserving any steady order in society', they 'naturally run into the invention of government, and put it out of their own power, as far as possible, to transgress the laws of society'.276 Men 'establish government, as a new invention to attain their ends, and preserve the old, or procure new advantages, by a more strict execution of justice'.277

273 T 3.2.10.2; SBN 554.
274 T 3.2.7.4; SBN 535.
275 T 3.2.7.6; SBN 537.
276 T 3.2.10.2; SBN 554.
277 T 3.2.8.5; SBN 543.

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Hume is convinced that we cannot possibly ‘change or correct any thing material in our nature’. We cannot remove the ‘violent propension to prefer contiguous to remote’, all we can do is ‘change our circumstances and situation’. We have to revert the state of affairs and ‘render the observance of the laws of justice our nearest interest, and their violation our most remote’. In a sense, we have to return to the same situation that prevailed in a small society when our interest in justice was immediately present. But since this is ‘impracticable with respect to all mankind, it can only take place with respect to a few, whom we thus immediately interest in the execution of justice’. Hume reminds his audience that ‘all government is plainly an invention of men’, instituted in order for ‘bettering their own condition’. The idea is that ‘the persons, whom we call civil magistrates, kings and their ministers, our governors and rulers’ become ‘indifferent persons to the greatest part of the state’. The politicians can ‘have no interest, or but a remote one, in any act of injustice’. Once they are ‘satisfied with their present condition, and with their part in society’ they will also ‘have an immediate interest in every execution of justice, which is so necessary to the upholding of society’. This is the ‘origin of government and political society’. The ‘execution of justice’ becomes the business of government and now ‘men acquire a security against each others weakness and passion, as well against their own, and under the shelter of governors, begin to taste at ease the sweets of society and mutual assistance’.

Hume sees the consequences of this explicit step to political society far-reaching. ‘The rule’, he exclaims, that is ‘absolutely necessary to human society’, ‘stability of possession’ can finally ‘serve a specific purpose’. Prior to the established government ‘the general rule of justice was ‘apply’d by particular judgements’. Once society becomes a political society, justice is finally directed ‘by other general rules, which must extend to the whole society, and be inflexible either by spite or favour’. Thus, only in a political society we are governing ‘ourselves by rules’ that are ‘general in their application’ and ‘free from doubt and uncertainty’.

It is important to realise that Hume is redefining, instead of dismissing, the role of politicians and government in the conjectural history of civil society. In a sense, he is assigning the rulers the very same role that Mandeville did in his Part II. Hume is unambiguous when stating that we

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278 T 3.2.7.6; SBN 537.
279 T 3.2.8.4; SBN 542.
280 T 3.2.9.2; SBN 550.
281 T 3.2.7.6; SBN 537.
282 T 3.2.10.2; SBN 554.
283 T 3.2.7.6; SBN 536.
284 T 3.2.7.8; SBN 538.
285 T 3.2.3.1; SBN 501-502.
286 T 3.2.3.3; SBN 502.
287 T 3.2.4.1; SBN 514.
should not go too far and try 'to extirpate all sense of virtue from among mankind' and claim that politicians invent all moral distinctions. Nevertheless, the role that is prescribed to politicians in the development of civil society is, nonetheless, great. In order to understand the nature of this role, we first have to realise what the politicians cannot do. It would 'be in vain', Hume writes, 'either for moralists or politicians, to tamper with us, or attempt to change the usual course of our actions, with a view to public interest'. If their task was to correct 'the selfishness and ingratitude of men', it would be impossible that we could ever 'make any progress'. But after we have entered a political society, it becomes the business of politicians 'to give a new direction' to our 'natural passions, and teach us that we can better satisfy our appetites in an oblique and artificial manner, than by their headlong and impetuous motion'.

The scheme of countervailing passions in political society is placed in the hands of the authorities. It is the enlightened interest of the governors, not of the individual citizens, to make sure that everyone follows the rules of justice. In a sense, within the transformation from a small into a large society we have replaced the convention of justice with strict laws. Even when the laws of society are based on previous convention, it is the business of the government from now on to form and execute other general rules that guarantee that the principle of justice is rendered effective, and to 'constrain men to observe the laws of nature'. Particular laws are based on earlier convention, but they are also general rules in their own right. The idea that inflexible laws, to a certain extent, replace (and not only execute) the previous general rule of justice is vital in Hume's system. These new general rules serve the same purpose as the preceding convention, namely to prevent the opposition of self-interest for each citizen. The laws of justice are particular and concrete. Their execution through rewards and punishments restores the interest in justice for every individual.

For Hume, as some modern scholars have emphasised, the 'distinction betwixt justice and injustice' has two different foundations, 'self-interest' and 'morality'. What we have to understand is that in a large society this second foundation, morality, is rendered effective only when there is an established government. Hume uses quite freely the idea that a certain 'separate interest' may produce 'a separate sentiment of morality'. He uses this idea for justice (in general) and promise-keeping, allegiance and chastity (in particular). This of course leads us to the question of why it could not be used for other purposes as well. It is plausible that Hume's discussion on

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288 T 3.2.5; SBN 500.
289 T 3.2.5.9; SBN 521.
290 T 3.2.8.5; SBN 543.
291 T 3.2.7.11; SBN 533. This question is for example the main point that David Norton makes in 'The foundations of morality', in The Cambridge history of eighteenth-century philosophy, 2006, pp. 939–986.
292 T 3.2.10.3; SBN 554.
artificial virtues in the Treatise concerns only those moral institutions where there is a direct and evident connection to a corresponding passion. Nevertheless, the idea of ‘separate sentiment of morality’ created by a ‘separate interest’ applies to a variety of different virtues. According to Hume’s definition, anything that is useful or agreeable and that creates a certain kind of pleasant sentiment in us is a virtue, whereas anything that creates an unpleasant sentiment is a vice.

Traffic regulations would be an obvious example of artificially invented, interest-based virtue, where the rules create a morality of their own. It is easy to comprehend that the rules of traffic are based on a previous human convention established in order to organise traffic. The convention is coined and replaced by specific regulations that might vary in different countries, although the function of the rules is universal and fully in line with the preceding convention that used to organise traffic. Once we have become accustomed to specific regulations, a disapproving sentiment arises in us when we detect a sign of an action that is contrary to the regulations. The disapproving sentiment is caused by an action that breaks a specific rule (for example ignoring a stop sign), not by the violation of the idea of traffic regulations in general. We might even picture a situation where ignoring a stop sign could never hurt anyone, or be contrary to anyone’s actual interest, but this action might still create a disapproving sentiment in a bystander. It should also be noted that without considerable sanctions enforced by a government it would be impossible to organise traffic in a large society or to even get anyone to stop at a stop sign in the first place. The morality of the rule would be missing. Hence, we may ask: how could there be moral sentiments towards an action if such an action does not exist (which would be the case of justice in a large society without a government)? We may also contemplate the idea of a separate morality by sympathising with the sentiments that a traveller might have towards traffic regulations in a foreign country, where the rules and morality are different from what he is used to following.

Another example that helps us to understand the idea of moral foundation for justice concerns chess. The rules of chess create an independent morality of respecting the rules. This might be analogous with the rules of justice, but fair play in chess is not part of justice (the rules of justice in the Treatise only regard property). The moral sentiment created in a chess player (if he is a chess player in the first place) exists independent of the further reflection that without respecting the rules, it would eventually become utterly impossible to play the game, and thus, cheating is in contrast with his own interest in playing the game. A cheating chess player most likely disapproves of other people that attempt to cheat in chess. I do not think that this disapproving sentiment has necessarily much to do with the understanding of the fact that the existence of the game is jeopardised if people tend to cheat. The person simply has a moral sentiment of the rules of chess. Thus, we may claim that the rules of chess have acquired an
independent moral foundation among chess players. Does this moral sentiment stop people from cheating? Does it motivate? Obviously, not necessarily. I think that this disapproving sentiment towards cheating in a person that might cheat himself is an interesting example of how certain actions might acquire an independent moral status that affects the sentiments despite our own inclinations. But why do not chess players usually cheat? Well, if the other player is experienced enough he easily detects an attempt to cheat. What can we infer from this? Chess is a game of good rules, because it is difficult to cheat in chess.

The separate morality of a certain action (once the action or quality has been generally approved) is something factual that does create some kind of a moral sentiment in every person that is part of the society in question (with society I am referring to any number of people joined together). If human nature does not change, and it is virtually the same in all countries and all ages in history, what this means is that in every large society that is able to function there are certain moral institutions that are based on a preceding convention and originally established to counter certain original features of human nature. According to Hume's assumption, in a civil society that is able to function and last there will always be justice and politeness and the corresponding moral sentiments. Simultaneously, attempts to reform society based on unrealistic interpretation of human nature or measures contrary to the basic moral conventions are doomed to fail. Nevertheless, the actual purpose of these speculations is to point out that the idea that a separate interest produces a separate morality, is a principle of the human mind and it can be applied (and it is applied in the Treatise) in several cases beyond justice. Thus, we need to put into perspective the idea of the moral foundation of justice and consider Hume's social theory from a general point of view instead of putting too much weight on this important, nevertheless thin straw of morality.

Hume's foundational idea is that in the course of time, men will acquire an independent approving sentiment towards certain kinds of actions that originally cause a pleasant sentiment because they are useful or agreeable. What eventually happens is that a particular action detaches itself from the direct connection with the preceding interest. In the human imagination it is no longer the underlying interest that concerns men, but an impression of an action itself is sufficient to produce a pleasant sentiment. As we have seen in the case of chastity, once a certain mode of behaviour has been generally approved, not even the ones who are inclined to conduct their own behaviour in an opposite manner are able to feel anything but disapproval towards other people who break this rule. But a critical condition for a certain action to acquire this independent moral status is that it actually has to be generally approved.

In the case of chastity, we have learned that men might approve of a certain general rule merely because it serves someone else's interest and they simply go along with the stream.
I have stressed the point that in the Treatise Hume is continuously using symmetric arguments and parallels. Many of these have to do with the difference between small and large societies. As we recall, with regard to small societies, he emphasises that all that is needed, is one example of an act of justice in order for the whole society to adopt a convention that serves their self-interest. In a large society, which is not run by a government, this same method reverts the development and utterly incapacitates the principle of justice. Everyone is ‘naturally carried to commit acts of injustice’. Each ‘example’ of injustice ‘pushes’ others ‘forward in this way by imitation’ and gives them ‘a new reason for any breach of equity, by shewing’ that why ‘should’ they ‘be the culy’ of their ‘integrity’, if they ‘alone shou’d impose’ on themselves ‘a severe restraint admidst the licentiousness of others’.

In a large society that is not guided by strict laws licentiousness becomes a common phenomenon. As we recall, in small societies it was the first foundation, self-interest, that kept the convention of justice intact and once the society grew larger the general rules of justice became futile. Thus, without emphasising the role of the government and the replacement of the convention of justice by precise laws, it is difficult to comprehend what difference would it ever make that ‘morality’ is a second foundation for justice. Before government and inflexible laws, men have a moral sentiment of the rules of justice, but in a large society they are fully carried along with their particular judgements and inclination to break these rules. Meanwhile, the object of these moral sentiments becomes ambiguous, and the moral sentiments that men have turn to serve their own short-term interest. Only when we return to a situation that is as clear and obvious as the example of the two men pulling the oars of the boat there can be an actual foundation of morality in justice. This can only be accomplished with an axiomatic system of laws. The whole point of the conjectural history of civil society is to press the point that ‘rules, by which property, right, and obligation are determin’d’ are ‘changeable by human laws’. ‘Self-love is their real origin’ and since ‘the self-love of one person is naturally contrary to that of another’, only when we have a specific ‘system of conduct and behaviour’ that forces ‘these several interested passions’ to ‘adjust themselves’ in a particular manner, we may talk about a moral duty.

Thus, in the case of justice in large societies, the moral foundation in practise concerns particular, established laws and not the abstract idea of justice. Only with regard to human laws, it is unquestionable that men have a duty to act justly. This is also in perfect accordance with the fact that Hume was trying to establish a system based on a ‘very low degree of rationality’.

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294 About the relevance of the size of society in Mandeville, see pp. 161–162 above.
295 T 3.2.7.3; SBN 535.
296 T 3.2.6.6; SBN 528.
297 T 3.2.6.6; SBN 529.
the actions that are in accordance with precise laws and not with the abstract foundation behind them. He follows (and expects that other people do so as well) specific rules and might not have a slightest comprehension why these rules are such as they are. This is further enhanced by the fact that ‘men are mightily addicted to general rules’. A simple man is not addicted to the novel idea of justice. He is addicted to a law that tells him precisely what he can and what he cannot do.

Only ‘after’ the moment when ‘interest is once establish’d and acknowledg’d, the sense of morality in the observance’ of the rules of justice ‘follows naturally’. It seems that Hume is making a point that, of large societies, this can only be accomplished in a political society. Only with respect to particular laws we may say that ‘interest’ in justice is finally ‘observ’d to be common to all mankind, and men receive pleasure from the view of such actions as tend to the peace of society, and an uneasiness from such as are contrary to it’. Since the relationships between men in large societies are complicated and sometimes obscure, only a rigid system of inflexible and universal laws restores meaning to the fact that ‘we approve of such actions as tend to the peace of society, and disapprove of such as tend to its disturbance’. Hume underlines this same point in Book 2 of the Treatise by stating that it is first and foremost the ‘government’ that ‘makes a distinction of property and establishes the different ranks of men’.

Conclusion

Hume’s theory of justice has been criticised because it only concerns property and rightful ownership. It has been claimed that Hume’s system is unable to explain that there is much more to a peaceful existence in a civil society than property rights. Justice should expand to other aspects of human life, pace ‘justice as fairness’ etc. I do not think that Hume’s idea was that the principle of justice should be able to cover all the different aspects of human life. He simply does not have a positive theory of social (or distributive) justice.

Justice and property are, of course, Hume’s first concern in the conjectural history of the civil society presented in the Treatise. After a government has been established ‘self-interested commerce of men’ finally starts to take place. As we recall, also Mandeville emphasised that ‘once men come to be govern’d by written laws’ and ‘property, and safety of life

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299 T 3.2.9.3; SBN 551.
300 T 3.2.7.11; SBN 533.
301 T 3.2.11.4; SBN 568.
302 T 2.3.1.9; SBN 402.
303 For example James Moore sees this as a defect in his ‘Hume’s theory of justice and property’, 1976, pp. 103-119.
304 T 3.2.5.10; SBN 521.
and limb, may be secured'; 'all the rest comes on a-pace'.\textsuperscript{305} In this very same tone, Hume stresses that progress towards a polite society is rapid once we have entered a political stage in the conjectural history of civil society. Besides restoring morality in justice by putting a general idea back into practice by rigid and specific laws, the government and politicians also have other means to ‘preserve order and concord in society’.\textsuperscript{306} When ‘nature’ has ‘given us some notion of moral distinctions’, the ‘politicians’ may ‘extend the natural sentiments beyond their original bounds’.\textsuperscript{307} This means that rulers mould the behaviour of citizens by setting examples and supporting certain kinds of useful and agreeable actions, honourable conduct for soldiers and chastity for women being the most obvious examples. It is the effect of ‘custom’ that may give us ‘an inclination and tendency’ towards ‘any action’ that could never otherwise be an ‘object of inclination’ as long as it is not ‘entirely disagreeable’.\textsuperscript{308} For example, men may acquire an otherwise unnatural inclination to be polite towards their equals, but only when a custom of politeness has long been established.

In addition, Hume states that ‘nothing has a greater effect both to increase and diminish our passions, to convert pleasure into pain, and pain into pleasure, than custom and repetition’.\textsuperscript{309} This remark yields strong relativistic undertones, since by custom virtually anything may be turned from ‘pain into pleasure’. Mandeville had not been entirely wrong with his initial idea that at least some of the moral virtues are the effect of skilful politicians moulding the passions of common men. He was just inaccurate. Hume emphasises that on ‘some occasions’ public encouragement may even ‘produce alone an approbation or esteem for any particular action’.\textsuperscript{310} We may notice that in the Treatise, ‘publick praise and blame’ and ‘private education and instruction’, are the two sides of the same coin that guide the moral sentiments and actions of the citizens. When these are combined with the fact that our self-liking is dependent upon other people’s opinion and we have a strong ‘interest’ in ‘our reputation’, we may grasp how David Hume thought that political society is able to function.\textsuperscript{311}

The progress that is launched by establishing a government is in many respects ambivalent, and a modern reader might not be too keen on taking notice of all the effects important for Hume. For example, the social theory of the Treatise is anti-egalitarian in spirit. It is the ‘government’ that ‘establishes different ranks of men’ and it is this inequality within society that eventually ‘produces industry, traffic, manufactures, law-suits, war, leagues, alliances, voyages, travels, cities, fleets, ports, and all those other

\textsuperscript{305} Mandeville, Part II, p. 284.
\textsuperscript{306} T 3.2.8.6; SBN 544.
\textsuperscript{307} T 3.2.2.25; SBN 500.
\textsuperscript{308} T 2.3.5.5; SBN 424.
\textsuperscript{309} T 2.3.5.1; SBN 422.
\textsuperscript{310} T 3.2.2.25; SBN 500.
\textsuperscript{311} T 3.2.2.7; SBN 501.
actions and objects, which cause such a diversity, and at the same time maintain such an uniformity in human life’. Competition further amplifies the distinction between different groups of men, and it is this effort to distinguishing oneself that creates wealth, luxury and convenience. As a proof of the different ranks of men, Hume makes a comparison between ‘a day-labourer’ and ‘a man of quality’. They are said to be virtually different in all possible respects. Their ‘skin, pores, muscles, and nerves’ are different and so are their ‘sentiments, actions and manners’. According to Hume, most evidently ‘different stations of life influence the whole fabric’. To have these different ranks is not only beneficial in Hume’s opinion, but also the natural outcome of historical development. These ‘different’ ranks, Hume writes, arise ‘necessarily’ from the ‘necessary and uniform principles of human nature’.

Why is it important for Hume to emphasise the existence of different classes of men? One reason concerns the way Hume thinks that it is possible to preserve peace among human beings. If some of the utopian republican ideas became true and all men were in fact equal there would not be any natural respect towards the superiors. As we have seen in the case of politeness, Hume thinks that modesty and respect towards the people who are clearly set above us in hierarchy is produced naturally in the human mind and does not cause a painful sensation despite the fact that all of us are by nature selfish and proud. This becomes a key issue in Hume’s political philosophy presented in Essays as we will soon learn.

The artificial virtue of justice in a large society has two main effects on men. First, once the laws of justice have been established men will develop an inclination through education and living in a society to respect these established rules. Second, once accustomed to the laws of justice men will spontaneously disapprove of actions that breach these rules. These moral sentiments do not altogether prevent the strong temptation of being unjust. Nevertheless, because of the social cohesion created through the fact that our self-loving is dependent upon other people’s opinion it is possible to cultivate our self-interest and maintain social order, even when the passion of self-love itself is ‘directly destructive of society’. What is momentous in Hume’s project, is that our self-love is subordinate to our self-satisfaction. ‘Riches’ that we acquire might in many cases be the cause of vanity, but the final end is to be ‘satisfy’d with ourselves’, which is Hume’s understanding of self-loving. He writes that ‘the relation, which is esteem’d the closest, and which of all others produces most commonly the passion of pride, is that of property’. However, the cultivation of self-love and following the rules of justice could not render us satisfied with ourselves. Even if ‘riches’ were the ‘original’ cause of pride, ‘when not seconded by the opinions and

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312 T 2.3.1.9; SBN 402.
313 T 3.2.2.13; SBN 492.
314 T 2.1.7.8; SBN 297.
315 T 2.1.10.1; SBN 309.
sentiments of others’, they would ‘have little influence’.\textsuperscript{316} Additionally, living among equals requires flattery and dissimulation, since practically everyone has an over-weaning conceit of himself. Without the practice of dissimulation, our opinions and sentiments would not be seconded by mankind. It is precisely the same ‘secondary satisfaction or vanity’ that ‘becomes one of the principal recommendations of riches, and is the chief reason, why we’ desire them in the first place.\textsuperscript{317} In modern society, self-love is secondary to pride, and unquestionably, politeness, dissimulation and hiding our actual thoughts and feelings are not only beneficial for us and the safeguard of human interaction, but are a relevant part of the social theory of the Treatise. In short, the secrets to a well-functioning society are the due respect for other people’s property and pride, while boasting in our wealth and vanity.

\textsuperscript{316} T 2.1.11.1; SBN 316.
\textsuperscript{317} T 2.2.6.21; SBN 365.
6. Politics and the science of man in Hume's Essays

We have accounted for the basic social theory of the Treatise. We have not yet discussed how this is an integral part of Hume's science of man as a general expedition and how it strongly overlaps with his understanding of politics. In order to do this, we need to turn to discuss his Essays.

Essays complete the Treatise. Hume's political thought can only be understood with this link in mind. Yet, a common view is that his 'attempt to base politics upon the science of man is given up one year after being partially realized in the third Book of Treatise' and 'the political thinking recorded in the Essays Moral and Political of 1741' is not informed 'by empirical investigations of human psychology'. As the argument goes, Hume's thoughts turn into uninteresting constitutional history. This might seem to be the case, if we do not comprehend that the greatness of mind project is continued in Essays. In this case, we should not put too much emphasis on the change of genre from a treatise to essays. The two Enquiries come very close to being essays themselves (although they are entitled treatises), but when read together, we realize that Book 3 of the Treatise and the earliest essays form together a coherent political program. It is therefore doubtful that by the time of writing his essays 'Hume has come to realize that political theory' can 'be based directly upon the historical study of political events without involving any intricate psychological investigations'.

Much of the current discussion upon Hume's relation to the Treatise regards Hume's possible 'disavowal' of the youthful piece in 1775. Modern editors of Hume's philosophical works are inclined to argue that Hume's

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2 For example, contemporaries saw Enquiry containing the principles of morals particularly as essays. An ironic broadside recapping the EPM was published in Edinburgh in 1755. It was entitled 'The Quintessence of Modern Philosophy extracted from Ten Late Essays' (Glasgow University Library). It may be remarked that the Dialogue was interpreted as the essay number X, in which 'The Characters of the impure Diogenes and Pascal' were 'curiously contrasted'.


4 On this question, see Norton, 'Historical account' in T, pp. 433–589 and the works cited there. See also Beauchamp, EPM, p. xii.
renouncement of the Treatise is not in fact a disavowal of the work or constitutes only a partial disavowal. My argument is that very early on, Hume sought to supplement the Treatise. John Immerwahr has also suggested ‘the Essays, Moral and Political are not the abandonment of Hume’s original program but its natural continuation’. We have two manifestations of Hume’s science of man. One, in the form of the Treatise in three books, and the other, in form of Essays and treatises that elaborates on some crucial issues. In order to understand Hume’s moral and political philosophy, we naturally need to read both, his Treatise and Essays.

I have adopted the title of “Greatness of mind” for this second part of my dissertation, mainly to point out the relevance of this particular section in Book 3 of the Treatise, but also to highlight that the question of civil society’s ability to defend itself becomes an aching problem for eighteenth-century psychology. We may account for reasons for how a man becomes civilised, but how is it possible to do this without him becoming a coward?

Eloquence and politeness considered politically

Just over a decade ago, the history of intellectual history was in a state where David Hume started to be customarily linked with the republican tradition of political thought. In one sense, this association marked the zenith of J. G. A. Pocock’s argument about the trans-Atlantic Machiavellian moment – an interpretation, which regarding the Scottish enlightenment was originally contested by the significant student of Hume’s philosophical politics, Duncan Forbes. There undoubtedly are certain elements in Hume’s Essays which suggest that he is a republican political thinker or that he should at least be studied in close connection to this tradition. But at the same time, there are even stronger reasons to detach the study of Hume’s political thought from republicanism and start developing new analyses of Hume’s political thought. The problem, as I perceive it, is that there have not been serious attempts to understand Hume’s political thought as part of his science of man project. It is my aim to move towards such an interpretation.

First, we ought to make clear what politics are not for Hume. Throughout his oeuvre Hume raises the objection that self-rule is a futile topic in politics. For example, in an ironic description of the Stoics in Essays, Hume remarks that when ‘we have fixed all the rules of conduct, we are philosophers’ and ‘when we have reduced these rules to practice, we are sages’. What is left unsaid, and what makes this ironic is that, according to Hume, self-rule rarely applies in real life and the part of putting the rules of

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6 For the most outspoken expression of this, see Forbes, Duncan, review of Pocock’s Machiavellian moment, Historical Journal, 19, 1976, p. 555.
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cconduct into practice falls within the sphere of politics. Hume famously – in his challenging tone – declares as his own opinion that in politics ‘every man ought to be supposed a knave’. What is required hence is a political structure based on a realistic, almost cynical, understanding of human nature – quite the opposite of the society of Zeno’s sages. A basic principle of any political system, according to Hume, is the assumption that people remain just as foolish as they are without the right ‘forms and institutions’. It does not mean that we need to assume that every man is necessarily a knave. But it does mean that to talk about self-rule as a political principle is a waste of time and Hume was not a cosmopolitan Stoic thinker.

Let us first consider Hume’s essay ‘Of eloquence’ that has received very little attention in modern scholarship. What I seek to establish is how clearly Hume’s analysis of politeness differs from other kind of discussion on politeness by Hume’s contemporaries who can and should be linked to the republican line of thought. One point that has not been sufficiently stressed is the link between eloquence and politeness that certain authors make. If any human activity ought to be linked to the republican political tradition, it is rhetoric and eloquence. Once we realise that Hume deliberately detaches his analysis of politeness from this kind of interpretations, we understand what different kind of political significance his own analysis of politeness has.

Hume’s essay on eloquence highlights a problem. Eighteenth-century public speakers are inferior in their oratorical skills compared to their ancient counterparts. This was a commonplace in the eighteenth century and Hume presents it as a fact. According to him, there has been ‘so sensible a decline of eloquence in later ages’. But the essay does not seek to solve this problem and neither can it sensibly be read as any sort of promotion of the rhetorical or the republican tradition. In the early eighteenth century defending eloquence customarily went hand in hand with promoting civic values and free government. One of the most “republican” moments of Cato’s letters, for example, is a discussion on eloquence as a political attribute – how good oratorical skills directly relate to martial virtues i.e. citizens defending the realm of a free state.

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10 On Hume and eloquence, see above all, Potkay, The fate of eloquence in the age of Hume, 1994. The increasingly more negative attitude through the progress of different editions of Hume’s Essays is also pointed out by T. H. Grose in his ‘History of the editions’ in The philosophical works, Thomas Hill Green and Thomas Hodge Grose, eds., 4 vols., London, 1886, III, p. 74.
11 I use Cato’s letters as an epitome here. Even though the essays by Gordon and Trenchard are eclectic, I read them as a manifestation of republican thinking in a Pocockian manner. Hence, I do not agree with the extremely strong position taken by Annie Mitchell linking them to Mandeville.
opening line of Trenchard’s piece entitled ‘Of eloquence, considered politically’ claims that ‘in free states, where publick affairs are transacted in popular assemblies, eloquence is always of great use and esteem’. In contrast, Hume discusses the rhetorical tradition only to undermine it. He treats the question of eloquence as a trite commonplace and as a surface to plunge into more complex questions of moral and political philosophy. The essay ‘Of eloquence’ is a significant part of Hume’s political argumentation, but not in the sense that readers trained to look for clues of republicanism might expect. In the end, as it turns out, the question of politics for Hume was of a completely different nature than what particularly the English authors such as the authors of Cato’s letters generally assumed it to be.

The commonplace that Hume had decided to question in the first editions of his essays was that free government is vital for the progress of arts and sciences in eighteenth-century Europe. Hume’s attack is carried out in a sequence of essays. In the essay ‘Of eloquence’, Hume’s decision was to take up the claim by introducing rhetoric and eloquence – civic attributes customarily linked to the republican form of government. Before we may engage with the analysis of the essay, we need to make a few remarks on Hume’s style of writing. It is striking how economical he is in most of his early essays. Hume’s concepts are often clearly defined and analytically used. His distinctions are systematic and precise. This is quite the contrary to his Treatise, where he is causing frustration for commentators because of his vague use of certain definitions. But in the best of his essays, he does not blur the edges of the argument. For example, Hume designed the essay ‘Of superstition and enthusiasm’ to be an essay about religion. Together with the preceding essay ‘Of the parties of Great Britain’ it is Hume perhaps at his most topical. Therefore, these essays also need to be read as topical essays. Superstition and enthusiasm in this framework denote ‘two species of false religion’, not these particular states of mind in general.

In a similar vein, the scope of eloquence in the essay on eloquence is not eloquence in general. The essay is intentionally tied to deliberate rhetoric. Hume only discusses eloquence used in ‘popular assemblies’. This narrows down the extent of the argument (instead of touching on every possible aspect of speech) and focuses it on English authors underlining the relevance of eloquence as an example of civic and republican values. It is important that Hume’s choice was to only discuss public speaking. Consequently, he avoids turning the question into a lukewarm talk about a man’s behaviour in general. There are many examples of the contrary in Hume’s time. For example, Fénelon wrote, in a similar fashion, about eloquence with an explicit comparison between the

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13 Cato’s letters, or Essays on liberty, civil and religious, and other important subjects, Ronald Hamowy, ed., Liberty Fund, 1995, no. 103, November 17, 1722, p. 727. Written by Trenchard. [The philosophically considered piece was written by Gordon]

skill of the ancients and moderns. But eloquence in Fénelon’s prose mixes with politeness and manners becoming part of his general critique of luxury. At the same time, his discussion on eloquence loses most of its argumentative value. What Fénelon leaves his audience with is only his general critique of luxury. In comparison, Hume is more precise.

Hume’s claim about eloquence is that upon comparison with the classical examples, modern orations are but ‘lame performances’. First he treads a long mile upon the popular road stating that ‘of all human productions, the orations of Demosthenes present to us the models, which approach the nearest to perfection’. Hume labours to emphasise the premiership of ancient eloquence. Suddenly he halts and forces his audience to think. What is the modern free government that everyone always refers to? ‘England’, Hume declares, is ‘of all the polite and learned nations’ the only one that has ‘a popular government’ and which structurally forms a ‘dominion of eloquence’. Therefore, if the authors stressing the role of free government for arts and sciences are correct, we most certainly should expect England to be boasting with skilful orators. But, what is the state of eloquence in Britain? Poor, awful and wretched, Hume spells out in bright colours, which leads to the conclusion that the question of free government in the modern case of England does not count for much. Since England is the only learned nation with a popular government, it should have high standards of eloquence, if authors such as that of Cato’s letters were correct and in a country such as England ‘eloquence is always of great use and esteem’.

At the same time, Hume avoids denouncing eloquence (or free government, for that matter). Indeed, his essay on eloquence is a prime example how one can remain philosophically sensible and tolerant towards different ages and customs, yet, at the same time use arguments in a politically motivated (and severely poignant) way. In the end, he shows no real concern over the faith of eloquence in Britain, mainly because the essay is a prolegomena for Hume’s almost unreserved panegyrick of France and politeness put forward in the following essay ‘Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences’. It is highly relevant that for Hume eloquence and politeness are different customs that do not mix. Nevertheless, the essay

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16 Ibid., passim.
20 Cato’s letters, p. 727.
21 Adam Potkay has pointed out that as Hume ‘time and again revised the essay between its initial publication in 1742 and its final version of 1770, he increasingly expressed his distrust of eloquence not in philosophical terms but rather in terms of the emerging discourse of manners or politeness’. Potkay, The fate of eloquence in the age of Hume,
on eloquence has much to do with politeness, even when the concept does not feature in the text.

Hume deliberately exaggerates the difference in style between ancient and modern forms of eloquence. ‘Ancient eloquence’ was ‘pathetic’, ‘sublime and passionate’. When describing the Greek model, Hume uses such terms as ‘blaze of eloquence’, ‘swelling expressions’ and gives as his favourite example the pathetic style of the ancients ‘stamping with the foot’. In contrast, Hume describes ‘modern’ English taste for eloquence as ‘argumentative and rational’. Any stamping is only carried out in the theatre instead of a public assembly. Now, if we compare the contrast that Hume is drawing here against the context of opinions advanced during Hume’s time about the relationship between ancient and modern eloquence, we realise that Hume’s position is highly polemical. But this is intentional on Hume’s part. It did not really matter to him whether the featured contrast is real or not, because he is using it to illustrate a different point. The contrast is derived directly from what Hume calls the ‘more zealous partizans of the ancients’ are claiming about politeness. The admirers of the ancients pointed the finger towards the artificiality of modern (French) manners. The ones stressing the superiority of ‘ancient simplicity’ blamed ‘modern politeness’ of ‘affection and foppery’. What Hume does is to turn this same form of argument towards the question of eloquence that the ancients are so much praised of – and reverse it. The admirer of the Greeks that Hume singles out is of course ‘Lord Shaftesbury’. In a mock-’Shaftesburian’ sense Hume now shows that the ancient manners were perhaps plain, but their style of public speaking was extravagant and artificial while the modern British style is plain (and dull). Hume states that it is the sublime, passionate and exaggerated orations that ‘always have more command and authority over mankind’. The modern Brits were levelheaded public speakers, the ancients were extremely passionate. Yet, it is the exaggerated style that rules in eloquence. This is a direct parallel to the question of politeness and l’Art de vivre addressed immediately afterwards. It is also a volte face of the moralising voices on modern manners. Hume’s idea was to take the obvious edge from the criticism of politeness before he starts to praise it. It is also important that we realise that in Hume’s framework it is fully possible – and indeed necessary – to separate, compare and contrast the customs of eloquence and politeness in this way.

1994, p. 4. In contrast, Trenchard writes: ‘where-ever politeness, liberty, and learning subsist, rhetoric will be cultivated as part of them’. Cato’s letters, p. 733.

26 Hume, ‘Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences’, in Essays, p. 130–1.
In Hume’s Dialogue (that discusses the above mentioned ‘opposite directions’ of ‘Rhine’ and ‘Rhone’), the counterparts of this metaphorical dichotomy are not ancient Greece and modern Britain, but ‘an Athenian and a French man’.28 By and large, when Hume uses the dichotomy between ancient and modern (in an actual, and not hypothetical sense as in the essay on eloquence) the modern model that he has in his mind is always the French. There is a clear difference between ancient and modern manners and politics for Hume. And that the concept of modern is the ideal of France is one of the most significant aspects for us to grasp in order to understand Hume’s moral and political philosophy.

Hume’s move in the essay on eloquence was not to discuss France at all, which is also quite striking because the following essay ‘Of the rise and progress’ has everything to do with France. Also, within the context of contemporary discussion on ancient and modern eloquence Hume would have had other options open to weaken the enthusiasm for free government and republican values. Alongside Fénelon, a vast theoretical French literature on eloquence existed and Hume was surely aware of it. Nicole, Saint-Evremond, Fontenelle, and Charles Rollin, all wrote during Louis XIV’s reign and they all carried discussions on public speaking. These and even Blaise Gisbert’s Christian eloquence in theory and practice were translated into English and widely read. Hume was a Francophile and one easy option to dismiss the British argument about eloquence would have been to point out that the French eloquence fared just as well as the British despite the lack of popular assemblies. But the fact that Hume leaves the French completely out of the discussion (even when they were very much in his mind) shows that he follows the argument put forward by the authors he opposes. Hume demonstrates that in the end eloquence is yet another form of art (such as poetry), nothing more and nothing less.29 Hume’s point was that the political significance of eloquence had been much overrated while the importance of politeness was neglected. The most important function of the essay on eloquence is therefore to make room for the greatness of mind exposition that follows.

This puts us into the position to understand the role of eloquence in Hume’s introduction to his Treatise. He writes that in science ‘the victory is not gain’d by the men at arms, who manage the pike and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of the army’.30 Again, instead of being an actual praise of eloquence, this is a rather resentful analysis of his time. What Hume proposes – instead of inconsequential advances of ‘taking now and then a castle or village on the frontier’ that eloquence enables – is ‘to march up directly to the capital or center of these sciences, to human

28 EPM ‘A dialogue’.27; SBN 334. About eloquence in Enquiry concerning the principles of morals see e.g. EPM 6.19; SBN 241.
29 In the essay ‘Of tragedy’, Hume compares the effects of eloquence and poetry particularly to painting (and the theatre), David Hume, ‘Of tragedy’, in Essays, pp. 224–5.
30 T Intro.2; SBN xiv.
There is a clear difference between these warlike maneuvers. Hume is not suggesting here the advancement of eloquence or ‘musicians of the army’, but a method that will function as a more powerful weapon than all the pikes and swords combined. The science of man is not about eloquent trifles. It is about a method of understanding the nature of all that is human. Simultaneously, it is an attempt to harness the soul of warfare. It is indeed a scientific program.

It is revealing that the only part of Hume’s essay on eloquence where we might detect a whiff of normative attitude is his closing remarks. In a somewhat sulky manner Hume points out that little formality would help modern orators to get their point across. It is the ‘great affection of extemporary discourses’ that has made ‘modern orators’ reject ‘all order and method’, which to Hume counts as ‘a material defect’. All this is in line, of course, with Hume’s ideas of the nature of politeness. If anything, Hume is an exponent of formality. Hume in his self-taught humanism naturally appreciates eloquence as a form of art, but when it is taken as a political attribute or compared to the l’Art de vivre, perfected in a country commonly concerned to have nothing to do with free government, it surely does not count for much.

To put it in short, the essay on eloquence is best understood in the contrasting light of the essay ‘Of rise and progress’ and vice versa. It is important also to realise that the argument functions in different directions. On the one hand, it annihilates the Fénelonian mishmash where some of the edges of different arguments and concepts are blurred – where eloquence, manners, politeness, luxury, etc. become the same. Hume refuses to mix eloquence and politeness. This mixing would be quite natural to do, if one did not have such a clear and concentrated view of things. On the other hand, Hume’s discussion dismisses the republican argument about the role of free government for modern Europe and the role of rhetoric as a political parameter. Hume thought that there was something more important at stake.

The sharp edge of the essay ‘Of eloquence’ is not eloquence and modern orations. The whole political spectrum is at stake. The real significance of the essay is not that Hume opposes the republican arguments, but that he is committed to a political program of his own. It is the greatness of mind agenda that Hume advances. Hume’s paradigm is a full-fledged program because it is derived from his science of man and extended to the political realm. It not only constitutes a framework. As we will shortly learn, Hume uses it coherently to extend it to central aspects of his political theory.

It is not a coincidence that when Hume rearranged the two first volumes of his essays in 1748 into the third edition, the essay ‘Of

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31 T Intro.6; SBN xvi.
eloquence’ is placed between ‘Of liberty and despotism’ and ‘Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences’. These three essays form together the most forceful political argument that David Hume set forward. This is where Hume takes up his theory of the greatness of mind and applies it to politics.

Association of ideas and politeness

One distinguishably new element in Hume’s Essays compared to the Treatise is the relevance of the form of government. However, when we understand how the basic axiom of his science of man – the association of ideas – functions in politics, the discussion on the form of government turns out to be a logical outcome of the social theory of the Treatise. By and large, Hume’s thinking remains highly consistent throughout his prose. What turns out to look comprehensive is Hume’s emphasis on politeness. Simultaneously, it is of first importance that we understand Hume’s corpus as a constant development from pre-Treatise material onwards. Hence, we need to start our analysis of Hume’s politics as part of the science of man by examining how the principle of association of ideas features in the pre-Treatise material. We will first establish a link between Hume’s early analysis of politeness and the general principle of the association of ideas. This will lead us to the overall function of the extension of general rules in human psychology. What this then enables us to do is to analyse the different implications of general rules, which explains why Hume’s outright defence of monarchy is a natural outcome of his science of man. Simultaneously, we come to the understanding that science of man in Hume’s case actually means that the same basic principles of mind that occupy his epistemology also have a relevant role in his political theory.

David Hume’s early intellectual development has become a fashionable topic in Hume studies today. Yet, the inevitable link between the association of ideas in Hume’s early analysis of politeness and his basic epistemological principles has not been established. It has also been argued that Hume’s positive use of the association of ideas is not present in any of the surviving pre-Treatise material. Not only do I argue that it indeed is, but it forms the core of Hume’s intellectual development and his political thinking. Since the science of man is based on the analogy between

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33 Entitled, since the 1758 edition Essays and treatises on several subjects, ‘Of civil liberty’.


36 Nevertheless, about the importance of the association of ideas for the young Hume and the difference between Hume and Hutcheson, see the work of Michael Gill.
differently parts of natural and moral science, it is understandable that the
‘rules of good-breeding’ and the ‘laws of honour’ are also present in Book 1
of the Treatise in the discussions on human understanding.\(^37\) My attempt is
to take the argument further and show that the early modern theory of
politeness is one cause for Hume’s emphasis on the role of the association
of ideas in his science of man.

What is of particular significance is the letter on politeness of 1734 that
consists of three examples of the positive use of the association of ideas.
The main point for Hume, as we have already learned, was to demonstrate
why the French have more real politeness than the English. Hume argues
that ‘real politeness’ is not natural in the sense that Chevalier Ramsay had
suggested. Instead, Hume explains, because of the ‘little niceties’ that the
French practice, they develop ‘a sincere Inclination to oblige & be
serviceable’. Without education and customs men would not be serviceable,
but because of the niceties they develop an inclination to follow a general
rule. To my understanding, this constitutes a textbook case of Hume’s
positive use of the principle of association of ideas. This principle of mind
is confirmed by two other examples of habits, courage and devotion.\(^38\) In
other words, Hume offers three different cases in which the association of
ideas explains how the ‘mind pleases itself by the Progress it makes in such
Trifles, & while it is so supported makes an easy Transition to something
more material’. All of the three examples are fully in line with Gill’s overall
thesis about Hume’s use of the association of ideas.\(^39\) The case of courage
demonstrates clearly how the mind can be disciplined through any artificial
means (holding a gun in a certain way does not have any actual quality that
contributes to a person conquering his fear of death). It does not mean that
in the end the inclination that person has for being polite, devoted or
courageous would not be sincere. In short, all the three examples are
different ways of saying that once a general rule is established and
supported by certain outward objects, people develop an inclination to
follow the rule.

There is a close resemblance between the analysis offered in the
politeness letter and some of the main passages discussing the formation
and nature of belief in Book 1 of the Treatise. The main focus of the letter
on politeness is on ‘an easy Transition’ in the human mind ‘to something
more material’ – namely an inclination to be polite towards strangers. This
process of mind is similar to the one described in T 1.3.8.2, where Hume
writes that when ‘any object is presented, which elevates and enlivens
the thought, every action, to which the mind applies itself, will be more strong

\(^{37}\) Especially T 1.3.13.15–17; SBN 152–3.

\(^{38}\) Namely, by ‘Soldiers’ who ‘are found to become more courageous in learning to
hold their Musquets within half an Inch of a place appointed’ and by ‘Devotees’ feeling
‘their Devotion encrease by the Observance of trivial Superstitions’.

\(^{39}\) See especially Gill, ‘Fantastick associations and addictive general rules: a
and vivid, as long as that disposition continues’. Hume concludes, ‘when the mind is once enliven’d by a present impression, it proceeds to form a more lively idea of the related objects, by a natural transition of the disposition from the one to the other’. The evident analogy between the formation of belief and Hume’s analysis of French politeness is striking. The continuity between the question of ‘something more material’ in the politeness-letter and the question of ‘manner’ in which a belief is ‘being conceiv’d’ (i.e. how ‘something’ is ‘felt by the mind’) also seems evident.\footnote{T 1.3.7.7; SBN 629.}

One could of course argue that Hume is first and foremost thinking about epistemological questions and hence applying the discovered principles to questions such as politeness, but there is other textual evidence suggesting that it is actually his insight into the question of politeness described in the letter to Ramsay that enlivens his own epistemological thinking. Especially the discussion on ‘ceremonies of the Roman Catholic religion’ which explain the common ‘effect of resemblance in enlivening the idea’ (immediately after the passage discussed above) in paragraph T 1.3.8.4 directly relates this to the letter on politeness and the example of devotees becoming more devoted because of superstitious rituals. The passages T 1.3.8.3-5 also suggest that these parts were written in France sometime after the letter on politeness to Ramsay. In them, Hume discusses the effect of ‘a picture of an absent friend’ and being ‘two hundred leagues distant’ from home (roughly the distance from Edinburgh to Rheims / La Flèche). These were subjects that evidently occupied Hume’s mind when composing the letter comparing English and French manners.

By and large, to me it looks that the frequent examples of politeness in the Book 1 of the Treatise are no coincidence. Based upon the evidence that we have, we might well argue that Hume is inferring his conception of the science of man from the basic tenets of the theory of politeness. There are further reasons for doing this. The 1734 letter on politeness needs to be read in accordance with Hume’s first essay on Chivalry and modern honour written sometime after Mandeville’s Origin of honour had been published in 1732. John P. Wright has analysed the role of Mandeville in this early essay. Wright’s balancing argument towards Hutcheson is that Hume benefited much from Mandeville’s analysis, but yet turned towards Hutcheson to argue for the natural customs and that modern honour and manners are monstrous and ridiculous. I believe that Wright’s otherwise excellent analysis is mistaken in this point.

Hume’s attitude towards the artificiality of modern manners and even the comical features of knight-errantry is much more ambiguous than what Wright suggests. As the politeness-letter clearly implies, Hume is quite far from criticising French politeness as unnatural or condemning the courage of the “disciplined” soldiers as artificial. We need to see this analysis of French politeness also in accordance with Hume’s essay on modern honour. Yet, it is equally important to realise that this goes hand in hand
with the role that these same principles that dominate his philosophical system play in his political theory. One should not forget that Hume’s claims that his science of man extends to politics.

Essay on chivalry and the extension of general rules

Despite the growing interest, very little is known about Hume’s early intellectual development. More recently it has also been discovered that ‘modern scholarship has been dogged by poor information about the likely chronology of David Hume’s undated manuscripts’.41 This has been particularly true of his first known essay. John Hill Burton mistakenly attributed Hume’s essay on Chivalry and modern honour as an essay written by a young student.42 Hume’s more recent biographer, Ernest Mossner, followed Burton’s lead claiming that the ‘Historical essay on chivalry and modern honour’ was an ‘undergraduate term paper’ or a ‘prize essay’, written ‘at the age of fourteen or fifteen’ in ‘1725 or 1726’.43 Already in 1977, Reindhard Brandt argued that Mossner was wrong and the essay was written around 1734.44 Professor Alexander Stewart has recently published detailed evidence proving that Mossner’s dating ‘was as whimsical as his transcription’.45 This essay was composed with a more mature hand and Stewart’s suggestion is that it was written in 1731.46 However, since so little is known or preserved of Hume’s work prior to Treatise, the precise date of the essay seems to me quite insignificant. More importantly, Stewart brings to the surface with calligraphic evidence that ‘the letters to Ramsay ca. 1730-34’, the famous ‘letter to the physician of 1734’ and the ‘essay on Chivalry’ belong to the same group.47

In ‘Chivalry and modern honour’ Hume sought to investigate the birth and development of knight-errantry, which had ‘run like Wild-fire over all the Nations of Europe’ with a vast impact on the manners of the whole continent.48 If we analyse the essay on chivalry from a philosophical perspective, we notice that Hume introduces a basic psychological principle twice (and he does this for a specific reason). Wright discusses a ‘psychological principle which Hume introduces in the essay in order to account for the origin of modern honour at the time the barbarians conquered the Christianized Roman empire’. Wright calls this ‘the overreaching principle’ that explains that ‘when human beings aspire to an

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42 Burton, Life and correspondence of David Hume, 1846, I, p. 18.
David Hume and Greatness of Mind

Ideal which is far beyond their capacities, they create a distorted conception of that ideal that cannot actually be realized, or else is realized in an entirely perverse form. At the beginning of the essay, Hume points out that the 'Minds' of the Goths 'were bewilder'd' and they would 'invent at first' a new set of manners 'which was suitable to that Twilight of Reason'. I agree with Wright that the question is about how the untrained imagination 'runs in a moment quite wide of Nature' and operates in a 'fairy-ground' and 'makes us frame to ourselves, tho' we cannot execute them, Rules of Conduct different from these which are set to us by Nature'. Therefore, most certainly, according to Hume, a man has a tendency to form rules (resembling fantasies), which are too idealistic compared to his own capacity.

When we analyse Hume's second treatment of the same principle in this essay, which Wright does not take into consideration, we realise that there is also another feature in Hume's thinking, which in fact (instead of the overreaching principle) is the effective cause of the difference between ancient and modern manners. Towards the end of the essay Hume concentrates on the difference between the first rise of ancient and modern manners as forms of heroism. The overreaching principle is said to be identical in both ancient and modern times. Hume writes also that in the ancient times people would 'from the Novelty of the Subject, exceed Nature, & overcharge their Courage with something excessive & monstrous'. As Hume states, in this perspective the two cases of heroism are identical because they are both based on constant principles of mind. Therefore, it is not the overreaching principle alone that explains the peculiar nature of the gothic rules of conduct.

The actual difference between the first rise of ancient and gothic/modern manners is constituted by the role that the extension of a general rule plays in Hume's thinking. Like the explanation of the three different cases given in the letter on politeness, the explanation of the difference between ancient and modern manners and heroism is also derived from Hume's conception of the association of ideas. For Hume, the first case of ancient heroism is not an extension of a general rule because there is no prior rule of conduct to follow. Therefore, Hume argues, in this case 'the Idea of Heroism is form'd only from Men's own imaginations' and 'it cou'd not very much exceed their Abilities, but a little Practice, Experience, & Reflection must soon reduce it to Nature'. When there is no general rule which can be extended or previous examples to fuel the mind, reality soon eats up the chimera. The ideals are not removed far enough from reality and men stop following the fantastic rules of conduct suggested by their imagination. For this reason, in ancient times, men turned 'into Pirates & Robbers' instead of throwing 'into all their Behavior, the most courteous & humane Air imaginable & that sublime Generosity, which

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49 Wright, 'Hume on the origin of modern honour: a study in Hume's intellectual development'.
alwise attends the most elevate & refin’d Courage’. This kind of transitional phases are important in Hume’s historically oriented political thinking.

What explains why the modern manners were not reduced to nature (as its ancient counterpart) is that in fact the modern case is an extension of a general rule ‘beyond the Original from which they drew their first Notion’. The Moorish & Gothic Heroes had their Fancy prompted by the Footsteps of something great & gallant, beyond what of themselves they cou’d ever have conceiv’d, & far beyond what they had any light or Example to guide them in the Attainment of’. The ancient ideal in their wild imagination was transmuted into something unrecognisable. An important part in this eventually “fortunate accident” was that the corruption of the ancient civility also left room for innovation. This is also confirmed by Hume in the key essay ‘Rise of Arts and Sciences’ where he writes: ‘I have sometimes been inclin’d to think, that Interruptions in the Periods of Learning, were they not attended with such a Destruction of antient Books, and the Records of History, wou’d be rather favourable to the Arts and Sciences’. But what is crucial is that there was some sort of example (which can well be compared to the role that niceties play in turning people into serviceable, superstitious rituals in devotion or discipline in courage). The question of actually being able to live up to the set of rules is beside the point. What matters is that people were psychologically unwilling to give up the imaginary rules of conduct despite their evident shortcomings to follow these principles. Therefore, Hume writes, it is ‘no Wonder so great a grasp & so small a reach; so great an Endeavor & so small Abilities, produc’d very fantastical Effects on their manners, & such as were difficult to moderate & reduce to Nature & a just Simplicity’.

The message remains simple: if there is no general rule or concrete example guiding us (which can be in the form of a written law, custom of pulling the oars together or even a bird flying), men’s conduct animated by wild imagination eventually returns to conduct that is in accordance with human nature. Imagination alone, without a concrete example, is not enough to support the artificial principles. But what happened, quite accidentally of course, at the point of the fall of the ancient legacy is that artificial manners were invented, which did go wide off nature and did try in a sense to replace wings with an engine, and did make a man uncharacteristically polite. As Hume himself put it, if the ‘chimerical Politeness’ is ‘not better’ than ‘plain roughness’ of the ancients, “tis at least an Endeavour to be so’.

We should turn to Mandeville to grasp the essence of Hume’s argument. People laugh at the age of chivalry, yet they follow the very same customs.

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On the one hand, Mandeville lectured, the gap between the gothic and present times was not as large as people thought. On the other hand, the breach between the ancient world and modern Europe was much greater than people commonly wanted to believe. This was not only true of the principles of honour and duelling, but also of more casual aspects of politeness. Horatio asked his mentor, ‘which pray do you believe more antient, pulling off the Hat, or saying, Your humble Servant?’ Cleomenes’s answer was that ‘they are both of them Gothick and modern’.\textsuperscript{52} Cleomenes carried on instructing his friend that to this Day, taking off the Hat is a dumb Shew of a known Civility in Words: Mind now the Power of Custom, and imbied Notions. We both laught at this Gothick Absurdity, and are well assured, that it must have had its Origin from the basest Flattery: yet neither of us, walking with out Hats on, could meet an Acquaintance with whom we are not very familiar, without shewing this Piece of Civility; nay, it would be a Pain to us not to do it.\textsuperscript{53}

What was the difference between the gothic gallantry and modern politeness? Manners and customs had been refined. ‘Flattery’ had become ‘less bare-faced, and the Design of it upon Man’s Pride is better disguis’d than it was formerly’.\textsuperscript{54} It is also interesting to notice that the question of politeness as a sincere position (in the sense in which David Hume applies it in his politeness-letter) is clearly apparent in Mandeville’s later works.

In a similar manner Hume would openly laugh at the exaggerated expressions of the politeness of the Goths. This, however, does not mean that Hume would prefer the ancient form of civility, but quite the contrary. Since “real” politeness for Hume is artificial, the ancients never really accomplished to put up a set of rules that would, metaphorically speaking, lift a man off the ground. It would therefore take a long march in history before the ancient manners reached any tolerable state (and Hume’s argument is of course that they never did in fact). Here the point that the general rule that the Goths and moors followed was based on a “mistaken” association of ideas and the extension of general rules is the key. What matters in terms of Hume’s philosophical development is that in 1732-4 Hume is not far from his positive aspect of association of ideas presented in the Treatise.

Implications of the extension of general rules

Hume uses the idea of extending general rules on several occasions and in different forms throughout his works.\textsuperscript{55} Perhaps the best example is the

\textsuperscript{52} Mandeville, Part II, p. 150.
\textsuperscript{53} Mandeville, Part II, p. 151.
\textsuperscript{54} Mandeville, Part II, p. 152.
\textsuperscript{55} Importance of “good” general rules has been identified, but from the perspective of political philosophy the analysis still lacks plenty. Jack C Lyons has argued that ‘Hume distinguishes good from bad general rules (and thereby the correct from incorrect
case of chastity and modesty in the Treatise. Hume summarises this principle when recasting the argument in the second Enquiry: ‘General rules are often extended beyond the principle, whence they first arise’.

In the case of chastity, this means two things. First, the extension of general rules explains how people ‘who have no interest’ in certain general rules ‘are carry’d along with the stream, and are also apt to be affected with sympathy for the general interests of society’. What we in effect are talking about here is a “mistaken” association of ideas, since the fidelity of women is not strictly speaking the general interest of society, but of ‘those, who have an interest in the fidelity of women’ – namely their lovers and husbands. But when eventually (after the general rule has gained currency) even the debauched bachelors are ‘shock’d with any instance of lewdness or impudence of women’, we may well speak of a society having formed a general interest in the fidelity of women, even when this does not imply any kind of necessity of it being a “real” general interest. Hence, in modern theoretical terms, this is a point about social ontology. Collective acceptance makes chastity a true clause for virtue for women. The expectation of chastity does not make it necessarily right nor does it make it a real general interest. It constitutes a social fact.

The other manner in which the general rule is extended beyond the principle in the case of chastity concerns resemblance. Hume takes it as given that ‘all these ideas of modesty and decency have a regard to generation; since they impose not the same laws, with the same force, on the male sex’. Hume is not being sexist by justifying the double standard. He only describes the prevailing general rule. What Hume seeks to establish is the way in which the general rule that concerns the generation (and in fact only the women who are in their child bearing age) is extended to concern all ‘the different ages of women’. What is interesting is that there need not be any rational explanation for this extension. The initial problem is not that women beyond their child bearing age would set a bad example for the younger ones. It is the resemblance in the association of ideas that extends

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56 T 3.2.12.7; SBN 572–3.

57 EPM 4.7; SBN 207. [1751, pp. 66–7, note EPM, p. 29] Beauchamp, EPM, p. lviii (points out the difference and similarity between these passages).

58 For a recent general discussion about the principles of social ontology and social construction in early modern political theory (and Hobbes in particular), see Lena Halldenius, ‘Liberty, law and social construction’, History of Political Thought, 28, 2007, pp. 696–708. What I find interesting about the theory of socially constructed facts in Hume’s Treatise is that the force Hume places on the psychological mechanism that actually makes the debauched bachelor shocked about the lewd woman is so strong that it overrides more or less rationally constructed “We-attitudes” that Halldenius discusses.

the general rule to concern all women. This happens in our minds without reflection, following a natural train of thought. Only in Enquiry concerning the principles of morals Hume extends the discussion on chastity to also consider the question of whether ‘the example of the old would be pernicious to the young’. For Hume, the example of how ‘the notions of modesty’ are extended ‘over the whole sex, from their earliest infancy to their extremest old-age and infirmity’ is a prime example of how ‘the general rule carries us beyond the original principle’. The extension of a general rule is true for several different cases of both natural and moral philosophy. It is also good to keep in mind that in Book 1, Hume states that ‘resemblance is the most fertile source of error; and indeed there are few mistakes in reasoning, which do not borrow largely from that origin’. The reason for this is that the ‘resembling ideas are not only related together, but the actions of the mind, which we employ in considering them, are so little different, that we are not able to distinguish them’. The argument about Hume’s moral system being an error theory has hence some textual support, at least when public interest and public opinion are concerned.

The reason to discuss these mechanisms of mind is that they play an immediate role in Hume’s political theory. We may notice this problem of resemblance in the case of factions and why Hume sees political interest groups as such a taunting problem (which are of course built-in in the republican form of government). Factions have everything to do with Hume’s philosophy of the mind. Hume puts an emphasis on the mechanism through which men communicate their sentiments. He strongly stresses that the ‘human mind is of a very imitative nature’ and that it is not ‘possible for any set of men to converse often together, without acquiring a similitude of manners, and communicating to each other their vices as well as virtues’. For example, as we have noticed, men are apt to acquire a dislike for women’s infidelity. This is based on the interest that some men have in it, which in turn is extended into a general rule. In the same manner, through general rules men may develop different moral attitudes towards other questions that seem to concern the public. The mechanism of sympathy thus explains how men are public minded. However, the course is just as easily reversed: ‘when men act in a faction, they are apt, without shame or remorse, to neglect all the ties of honour and morality, in order to serve their party’. Mechanism of sympathy is not a moral sense. And since there is no moral sense, men are just as easily misled and divided into factions following the same principle of sympathy that makes them feel as if they were acting for the greater good, when in reality they are not. It is just

61 T 3.2.12.7; SBN 573.
62 T 1.2.5.21; SBN 61.
64 Hume, ‘Of the independency of parliament’, in Essays, p. 43.
as easy to develop moral sentiments considering partial rules, which we mistake for general ones. The warm feeling inside does not mean that we are correct. And in the case of factions, it is all too easy to be wrong because of the very same feeling. ‘Where a considerable body of men act together’ one ‘is sure to be approved of by his own party, for what promotes the common interest; and he soon learns to despise the clamours of adversaries’.  

Now, when we add to our discussion what I call the “lingering effect” of general rules, we understand the extent of this problem in politics. The operation of this lingering effect in a particular mind is best captured in one of Hume’s essays, where he writes that ‘The mind naturally continues with the same impetus or force, which it has acquired by its motion; as a vessel, once impelled by the oars, carries on its course for some time, when the original impulse is suspended’. In other words, our minds are not only quick to misidentify partial interests as general, they are also very thick and stubborn (which has its good and bad effects). Once we adopt some basic rules of conduct, moral principles and habits, they usually stick with us – even when the supposed interest in them has been proved to have ended – because of the way that our mind operates.

If we consider this lingering effect in politics, we notice that there are several occasions when Hume uses this argument about the extension of a rule as the causal explanation of a given phenomenon. Among other things, it explains why ‘nothing is more usual than to see parties, which have begun upon a real difference, continue after that difference is lost’. The extension of a general rule and the lingering effect go so far that after men have contracted ‘an affection to the persons with whom they are united, and an animosity against their antagonists’, these ‘passions they often transmit to their posterity’. Not only can the moral feeling be directed towards a false end, it is perfectly possible that because of the operation of our mind, prejudices are “inherited” from one generation to another. The explanatory weight that Hume charges this principle with is demonstrated through his claim that ‘those who pass the early part of life among slaves, are only qualified to be, themselves, slaves and tyrants’. In philosophical terms, this may be described as the influence of the lingering effect of general rules. In practice it means that, for Hume, breaking bad habits and acquired rules is notoriously difficult, if not impossible. But what is truly interesting is that the extension of general rules in politics provides David Hume with the most forceful argument against the republican line of thought. What was madness for some turned out to be greatness of mind for Hume.

65 Hume, ‘Of the independency of parliament’, in Essays, p. 43.
Hume’s case for monarchy

We have now gained a sufficient understanding of the different argumentative tools that Hume utilised in his Essays to analyse the political argument that he sets forward. Association of ideas in the early eighteenth century was of course strongly linked to education and different institutions independent of David Hume’s aspirations. Nevertheless, it is difficult to think of anyone who would have put as much weight on this principle and claim that ‘those who pass the early part of life among slaves, are only qualified to be, themselves, slaves and tyrants’. In this light, it is unsurprising how large a role education and institutions play in Hume’s political thought.

Hume was a Francophile, but his emphasis on French manners and even the French form of government are not mere personal whims nor are they simple examples that he used when considering the problem of public debt and voluntary bankruptcy. Instead, Hume’s emphasis on the monarchical government and institutions that promote what he considers a civilised society are integral parts of his political theory that correlates with his philosophical system. Although he expressed some concerns about the possibility of finding ‘general Truths in Politics’ elsewhere in his essays, in ‘That politics may be reduced to a science’ he argued in 1741 that ‘so great is the Force of Laws, and of particular Forms of Government, and so little Dependence have they on the Humours and Temper of Men, that Consequences as general and as certain may be deduced from them, on most Occasions, as any which the Mathematical Sciences can afford us’. This, of course, emphasises the weight put on the form of government – and monarchy, in particular – in Hume’s argument.

The reason why Hume turns towards the monarchical government is threefold. First, it functions as a part of Hume’s solution to the topical question of public debt. Second, it is an inherent part of Hume’s case for politeness as a moral institution. And third, the ultimate problem that Hume is facing is the question of unrestrained love of dominion, which

69 John Locke is of course the prime example.

70 I am not arguing that this is something that Istvan Hont is claiming, but because of the wide currency that this argument has gained, I would like to make this point clear.

71 Hume, ‘That politics may be reduced to a science’, in Essays, moral and political, Edinburgh, 1741, p. 29–30. Later Hume edited his text so that the argument becomes much more lenient. He talked of ‘consequences almost as general and certain may be sometimes deduced from them, as any which the mathematical sciences afford us’ (emphasis added). Hume, ‘That politics may be reduced to a science’, in Essays, p. 16. In the ‘Of liberty and despotism’ of 1741, Hume in contrast wrote that ‘the World is still too young to fix any general stable Truths in Politics, which will remain true to the latest Posterity.’ Hume, ‘Of liberty and despotism’, in Essays, moral and political, 1741, p. 173. Regarding this passage Hume later polished the edges of the argument by turning ‘any’ into ‘many’.

72 I mention this first, because so much focus has been lately put on this part of Hume’s thinking.
requires some kind of Hobbesian solution. Here also the question of factions and their link to the republican form of government feature strongly in the argument. Hume's choice was to turn towards a stronger monarchical structure stressing the role of the crown and importance of the real executive power. But above all, it is the second question, the question of politeness that sets Hume forward to make a case for monarchy.

One of the aims of Hume's political argumentation was the vindication of monarchy. This is a position that is extremely interesting because it is based on the same principles as other parts of Hume's science of man. Without this link Hume's stance on the question of different forms of government would be of much less interest. One of Hume's reasons for dismissing Machiavelli is that the Italian confined 'his study to the furious and tyrannical governments of ancient times, or to the little disorderly principalities of Italy' and therefore 'his reasoning especially upon monarchical government, have been found extremely defective'. One of the key moments of Hume's rebuttal of the republican line of thought is the essay 'Of civil liberty' that was originally entitled 'Of Liberty and Despotism'. Hume's main target is the popular claim that 'the arts and sciences could never flourish, but in a free government'. What he does is to assert that the first progress of civility is linked to a sufficient amount of liberty. However, he treats the actual argument that arts and sciences could only flourish in a free state as ridiculous. Hume points out that there are clear historical examples of the contrary. The most eminent Instance of the flourishing of Learning in despotick Governments', according to Hume, 'is that of France, which never enjoy'd any Shadow of Liberty, and yet has carried the Arts and Sciences nearer Perfection than any other Nation of the Universe'.

Even when Hume reconsidered his choice of words later, the argument remains palpable.

Together with 'Of liberty and despotism', the project of greatness of mind culminates in the essay 'Of the rise and progress of arts and sciences'. It is useful to compare this key essay with the initial essay on 'Chivalry and modern honour'. What Hume is doing in 1742, besides extending his discussion to consider the forms of government, is recasting his original design in a slightly different form. For example, in the early essay Hume

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73 About a similar problem and instinct of sovereignty for Mandeville and Nicole, see pp. 135–137 and 164–169 above.
75 Hume, 'Of civil liberty', in Essays, p. 88.
76 Italics are mine. They highlight the most significant changes that Hume later made to take the sharp edge of his argument. He later changed the wording so that 'never' turns into 'scarceley ever' and 'any Shadow' became 'established' and 'nearer Perfection than any other Nation' became 'as near perfection as any other nation'. Hume, 'Of liberty and despotism', in Essays, Moral and political. 2nd edition, corrected, Edinburgh, 1742, p. 178. These changes are not noted in the Liberty Fund or the Green and Grose editions of the Essays.
wrote that when the example of modern manners 'was once broken upon it run like Wildfire over all the Nations of Europe who being in the same Situation with these Nations kindled with the least Spark'. The main purpose of sympathy for Hume is to describe how general rules are spread. The same psychological principle is at play in the 'Rise and progress', when Hume discusses how easily the 'multitude' is 'seized by the common affection' and 'governed by it in all their actions'.77 Again the spreading of the ‘common affection’ is described as ‘fire’ that ‘runs along the earth’ and ‘is caught from one breast to another’. This of course regards Hume’s analysis of sympathy. But here we also need to discuss general rules. Hume emphasises that the question of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences may be ‘accounted for’ by ‘general causes and principles’ since it concerns the taste, genius, and spirit of the ‘whole people’ and not some particular individuals.78 Hume’s emphasis might be on the mechanism that explains this phenomenon, but the object of the study is the common approval.

The first cause that Hume accounts for in the ‘Rise and progress’ is the explanation why ‘it is impossible for the arts and sciences to arise, at first, among any people unless that people enjoy the blessing of a free government’.79 As it turns out, the problem is not the authoritarian form of government as such. The problem is the effect that despotism has on the people living in a small community. When the ‘arbitrary power’ is ‘contracted into a small compass’, the effects are ‘altogether ruinous and intolerable’80 and ‘people, governed after such a manner, are slaves in the full and proper sense of the word; and it is impossible that they can ever aspire to any refinements of taste or reason’.81 We ought to take notice of the difference that Hume makes between slavery and despotism. In a small society political despotism compares to domestic slavery - in a large society it necessarily does not. Hume discusses domestic slavery in the essay ‘Of the populousness of ancient nations’. The practice of domestic slavery, he writes, is the clearest implication of the ‘barbarous manners of ancient times’. What it implies is that ‘every man of rank was rendered a petty tyrant, and educated amidst the flattery, submission, and low debasement of his slaves’.82 In a strict sense, Hume’s polemical argument is that in the ancient times men were only fitted to be slaves and tyrants – an argument derived from the principles of the association of ideas. The logical conclusion is that there could not be any significant advancement of arts and sciences when there is nothing to ‘engage’ men ‘to the reciprocal duties of gentleness and humanity’.83 The argument presented

77 Hume, ‘Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences’, in Essays, p. 112.
81 Hume, ‘Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences’, in Essays, p. 117.
in the ‘Populousness of ancient nations’ is about slavery, but since Hume thinks that slavery is a problem that has been resolved in his own time (except for some of the most peripheral corners of earth where slavery still exists), the argument here is directed against the republican tradition in general and particularly against the admirers of the ancients.84

Even when Hume’s attitude remains sceptical towards the republics, he is not however about to deny the prevalence of free government in the first rise of arts and sciences. The main, positive effect of free government is that ‘by an infallible operation’ it ‘gives rise to Law, even before mankind have made any considerable advances in the other sciences’.85 This together with the necessary consequence that ‘free state’ is ‘the only proper Nursery’ of ‘arts and sciences’ are salutary points for Hume to make. What is interesting is the manner in which Hume takes these points for granted relying heavily on his philosophical principles.

The extension of general rules and sympathy create a distorting problem in the form of factions, but in his argument about civilised monarchies, Hume uses the same principles as justification. On the surface it might look as if the essay ‘Rise and progress’ would underline the importance of republican features of government. Hume writes that the ‘monarchical form’ of government ‘owes all its perfection to the republican’ form and ‘must borrow its laws, and methods, and institutions, and consequently its stability and order, from free governments’.86 The key to Hume’s philosophical system here is the word ‘borrow’. What shows that the question of free government in eighteenth-century Europe is of little moment for Hume is the consequence of the extension of general rules. The way Hume applies his science of man in the sphere of politics is mainly mechanical and geometrical. Because of the force that he puts on the idea of the extension of general rules, he now finds himself at liberty to argue that whatever the advantages of free governments, civilised monarchies are able to emulate them.

It might look like an unfounded extension of the benefits of the democracy to also concern civilised monarchies, but it turns out to have deep roots in Hume’s philosophical system. About law in general, Hume writes that ‘when it has once taken root, is a hardy plant, which will scarcely ever perish’.87 Indeed, Hume thinks that the free government plays the role of ‘nursery’ with regard to arts and sciences, but once they have first taken root, these ‘noble plants’ may ‘be transplanted into any government’.88 Our interpretation is facilitated by Hume’s use of the plant-metaphor that

signifies that law in fact is more or less the only part of arts and sciences that Hume connects to republics. The psychological mechanism that ensures that the law is ‘a hardy plant’ that survives without a free government is the “lingering effect” of general rules. It is the obvious advantage of having a legislative system that first carries the approval of it from breast to breast giving it additional support. Later, a man’s addiction to rules and the lingering effect also makes it almost impossible to root it out. At the same time, this gives Hume a justification to take his own argument further and claim that ‘the arts of government, first invented in free states, are preserved to the mutual advantage and security of sovereign and subject’ in a civilised monarchy.89

After Hume has explained why he has adopted a position of taking for granted that the benefits of free government are transported into a civilised monarchy, he turns to discuss the nature of civility in general. This is the moment in the ‘Rise and progress’ essay when the argument takes a radical turn. While a monarchy can emulate the benefits of free governments, it is much more difficult for republics to imitate monarchies. What becomes overtly clear is that civility, in the form that Hume imagined it, cannot bloom in a fully republican government in a similar manner in which – after the monarchies have “borrowed” the principles of free governments – ‘private property’ is ‘fully as secure in a civiliz’d E u rodean Monarchy, as in a Republic’. Hume takes a step even further stating that in a civilised monarchy there is no ‘Danger ever apprehended’ from ‘the Violence of the Sovereign’.90 This is the reason for overlooking the argument about arts and sciences linked to free governments.

Hume stresses that arts and sciences rise in republics, but are preserved and improved in civilised monarchies. According to him, ‘in monarchical governments there is a source of improvement, and in popular governments a source of degeneracy’.91 This is often interpreted as an argument for commerce and the topical question of public debt. Speculation about state bankruptcy is one reason for Hume’s claim that monarchies are a source of improvement. However, there is something even more important at stake. When the essay ‘Liberty and despotism’ was first published, Hume was leaning heavily towards the side of civilised monarchies. In one of his examples he claimed that even ‘with regard to the Stage’, the French ‘have far excell’d the Greeks’. Later he polished the edges of the argument by modifying the sentence so that the French have ‘even excelled the Greeks’.92 Yet, the message remains the same. What is at stake

89 Hume, ‘Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences’, in E says, p. 125.
is the whole spectrum of civility that is not necessarily tied to the question of commerce. Growth of exchange, production and diversified labour had nothing to do with the excellence of drama in ancient or modern times, the form of government, instead, does. Unsurprisingly, liberal arts were one of the decisive questions for Hume when he considered the debate of ancients v moderns.

The advantages of free government and its by-products are of particular nature since they consider everybody. These benefits in turn are usually well protected because of the natural bent of human nature. 'What is profitable to every mortal, and in common life, when once discovered', Hume reminded his audience, 'can scarcely fall into oblivion, but by the total subversion of society'. Hume's choice of words, 'profitable to every mortal', is very telling. The contrast is that 'the arts of luxury and much more the liberal arts' are 'easily lost; because they are always relished by a few only'. Hence, a hierarchical structure and outward protection of these weakly rooted plants is important for Hume.

Promoting trade does not have a necessary connection to the advancement of liberal arts. The positive effects of commerce were not on Hume's mind when discussing liberal arts. This becomes apparent in his attitude towards the Dutch. Holland functions as the prime example for Hume how 'multitudes of people, necessity and liberty, have begotten commerce' in a small republic, but simultaneously 'study and application have scarcely produced any eminent writers'. Hume's attitude towards the Dutch was harsh. He used Holland as the epitome of the claim that 'The Republics in Europe are at present noted for Want of Politeness'. The reason for this is that the ruling passion of the Dutch is avarice. When writing a letter from his travels in 1748, Hume claimed that 'Holland was undoubtedly ruin´d by its Liberty'. When William IV seized power, Hume thought that Holland had 'a chance of being saved by its Prince'. Ironically, Hume added that 'Let Republicans make the best of this Example they can'.

In the essay 'Liberty and despotism', Hume also makes a clear distinction between commerce and refined arts. His carefully chosen historical examples of advances in the arts concern governments that 'never made any Efforts towards the Arts and Sciences, till they began to lose their Liberty'. In other words, there is no necessary connection between modern republics and liberal arts. Justifying his claim that trade can be just as profitable in a monarchy as in a republic is a balancing act. At the same time, he steps far towards the side of external protection of liberal arts.

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93 Hume, 'Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences', in Essays, p. 124.
94 Hume, 'Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences', in Essays, p. 113.
96 David Hume, 'Of liberty and despotism', in Essays, Moral and political, 2nd edition, 1742, p. 177; This was later toned down: David Hume, 'Of civil liberty', in Essays, p. 90: Florence 'made its chief progress in the arts and sciences, after it began to lose its liberty'.

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Later he explicitly stated that ‘We must sometimes sacrifice somewhat of the useful, if we be very anxious to obtain all the agreeable qualities; and cannot pretend to reach alike every kind of advantage’.\(^{97}\) What this plainly means is that in Hume’s political thought, promoting trade is not an all-encompassing end, quite the contrary. It is the role of the government to interfere in order to uphold ‘agreeable qualities’, even if this means sacrificing some of the commercial advantages. Upholding a hierarchical structure is the prime example of this.

We cannot comprehend Hume’s moral and political philosophy without considering the questions of form and structure in accordance with the principles of association of ideas.\(^{98}\) The reason why republics cannot emulate monarchies concerns the role of hierarchy and social distance in Hume’s philosophy. The clearest and most important demonstration of this regards politeness.

Politeness is the best example of an artificial moral institution. In order to render it ‘general among any People’, Hume explains in the essay on ‘Rise and progress’ that ‘it seems necessary to assist the natural Dispositions by some general Motive’. We ought to notice that ‘natural Disposition’ here means an acquired disposition that has become a habit of being obliging and serviceable. However, in this essay Hume suggests that this acquired disposition alone does not suffice. Artificial politeness needs to be further assisted ‘by some general Motive’. Hume thinks that a hierarchical structure is needed in order for politeness to be general among a multitude. In all its simplicity, this is the most important function of a monarchical government. In a civiliz’d Monarchy, there is a long Train of Dependence from the Prince to the Peasant, which is not great enough to render Property precarious, or depress the Minds of the People; but is sufficient to beget in every one an Inclination to please his Superiors, and form himself upon those Models, which are most acceptable to People of Condition and Education’. The covet of this ‘train of dependence’ is consequently the reason why modern republics necessarily lack politeness. ‘Where Power rises upwards from the People to the Great, as in all Republics, such Refinements of Civility are apt to be little practis’d; since the whole State are, by that Means, brought near to a Level, and every Member of it is render’d, in a great Measure, independent of another’. Hume is clear in his choice of words: politeness can only flourish in a country that has implemented a monarchical structure. The question of politeness also turns out to be a decisive one. Not only does Hume claim that ‘Politeness of


\(^{98}\) It is useful to notice that the notion of political theory rising from Hume’s science of man project is paradigmatically so different from the context of republican political tradition that with the view of modern analysis of size of state and virtues, Hume’s position might strike as counter-intuitive. See for example the position adopted in Francisco Herreros, ‘Size and virtue’, European Journal of Political Theory, 6, pp. 463–482, which does not even mention the advantages of social distance and hierarchical structure.
Manners’ arises ‘most naturally in Monarchies and Courts’, he also takes the argument one step further by claiming that ‘where that flourishes, none of the liberal Arts will be altogether neglected or despis’d’.99

The role of form and structure also explains why the general rule of politeness cannot be extended to consider republics in the same manner the benefits of republics can be transferred into any type of government. It is the question of facility of association of ideas that decides this. The question of form functions seamlessly with Hume’s principles of human understanding. In T.1.4.1.10 Hume clearly states that ‘where the mind reaches not its objects with easiness and facility, the same principles have not the same effect as in a more natural conception of the ideas; nor does the imagination feel a sensation, which holds any proportion with that which arises from its common judgements and opinions’. For example, we are more likely to be moved by sadness when a funeral is held in a church rather than in an amusement park. The same principle can easily be extended to the general question of any habit. It is easy to see how forms of government may relate to this. With regard to politeness in democracies ‘the attention is on the stretch: The posture of the mind is uneasy; and the spirits being diverted from their natural course, are not govern’d in their movements by the same laws, at least not to the same degree, as when they flow in their usual channel’ (as they do in monachies regarding the disposition to please others). It is the ‘train of dependence’ that in a monarchy gives the ‘easiness and facility’ that helps the principles of politeness to have a considerable effect on our behaviour since we are moved once our imagination feels the sensation of a need to be polite. In democracies our ‘attention’ is always ‘on the stretch’ when we have to please others – the inclination of being polite does not feel natural – since we are more used to considering everyone our equal. In this manner, we may say that ‘Politeness of Manners’ arises ‘most naturally in Monarchies and Courts’, just in the same way that we may claim that ‘eloquence’ in turn ‘springs up more naturally in popular governments’.100 So, if we are asking how Hume’s thinking from the pre-Treatise time forwards evolved, we may notice that while his general interest in politeness retained a central role, the emphasis on the monarchical form of government is a new element that first arises in Essays.

The question of distance is of great moment for Hume. The reason why ‘a long Train of Dependence from the Prince to the Peasant’ is ‘not great enough to render Property precarious, or depress the Minds of the People’ concerns the size of civilised monarchies. Civilised monarchies are large enough, so the authority does not have a dispiriting effect. This argument about social distance is a concrete one: ‘the more the master is removed from us in place and rank, the greater liberty we enjoy’. There are two

100 Hume, ‘Of the rise and progress of arts and sciences’, in Essays, p. 119.
aspects of this liberty. First, it means that ‘the less are our actions inspected and controlled’. Second, and perhaps more importantly, ‘the fainter that cruel comparison becomes between our own subjection, and the freedom, and even dominion of another’.\textsuperscript{101} In this sense, the comparison between ‘domestic and political situation’ and the demonstration that ‘domestic slavery’ is ‘more cruel and oppressive than any civil subjection whatsoever’ is an important one. Only with these aspects in mind, it makes sense when we consider that Hume thinks that ‘human nature, in general, really enjoys more liberty at present, in the most arbitrary government of Europe, than it ever did during the most flourishing period of ancient times’.\textsuperscript{102} It is the question of social distance that makes the difference. Social distance also received considerable attention from Hume in Enquiry concerning the principles of morals. As Annette Baier has pointed out, one added condition of justice in Enquiry that does not feature in the Treatise is that ‘justice is owed’ in a “true society” only if there is a society of more-or-less equals.\textsuperscript{103} When the social distance is so great that the resentment of the other party is not felt, we then necessarily need other measures to uphold justice. In a political society this condition naturally does not matter, because the execution of justice is assigned to a third party regardless of the question of resentment. But what this also enables us to understand is that one of Hume’s contrary political messages derived from this same psychological insight was that in a civilised monarchy the sovereign ‘is so far removed’ from the people ‘and is so much exempt from private jealousies or interests, that’ the ‘dependence is scarcely felt’.\textsuperscript{104} In Hume’s science of man, political despotism was a problem of less consequence in large societies than, say, factions and the want of politeness that are the consequences of the free functioning of sympathy without external constraints and general motives that assist the natural disposition of human mind.

Ancient v Modern

The greatness of mind project is perhaps best demonstrated in Hume’s treatment of the popular eighteenth-century dispute upon the supremacy of ancient vs. modern culture.\textsuperscript{105} David Hume undoubtedly sides with the moderns in this question. His severe criticism of political circumstances during the ancient times underlines ‘the disposition of men’s minds’.\textsuperscript{106} As we have discussed it, this is an argument about greatness of mind. It is the

\textsuperscript{101} This is very much in line with the principle of comparison presented in Treatise.

\textsuperscript{102} Hume, ‘Of the populousness of ancient nations’, in Essays, p. 383.

\textsuperscript{103} Baier, ‘Hume on resentment’, 1960, p. 133.

\textsuperscript{104} Hume, ‘Of the rise and progress of arts and sciences’, in Essays, p. 125.

\textsuperscript{105} Philosophers have also shown increasing interest in the division between ancient and modern, e.g. Marcia L. Homiak, ‘Hume’s ethics: ancient or modern?’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 81, 2000, pp. 215-236.

\textsuperscript{106} Hume, ‘Of the populousness of ancient nations’, in Essays, p. 413.
dispositions of mind that matters in the end. Circumstances that constitute and create a certain types of disposition can be accounted for, according to Hume, with good probability, through an analysis of 'moral causes'. In the essay 'Of national characters', Hume explains that 'by moral causes' he refers to 'all circumstances, which are fitted to work on the mind as motives or reasons, and which render a peculiar set of manners habitual to us'.

It is understandable that for Hume this turns into a distinction between the supposed greatness of ancient commonwealths and the modern disposition of greatness of mind particularly in European monarchies.

An interesting feature of the ancient v. modern debate is that Hume claims that politeness is a fully modern disposition - therefore, it is a contradiction in terms to speak of politeness in a classical culture. Hume makes a strong contrast between 'modern politeness' and 'ancient simplicity'. The modern development of gallantry and honour together with the considerable effect of the forms of government are placed on the central stage in this conjectural history. Hume clearly marks the role of the form of government for the disposition of men's minds. 'Where the government of a nation is altogether republican, it is apt to beget a peculiar set of manners', but 'where it is altogether monarchical, it is more apt to have the same effect' because 'the imitation of superiors' spreads 'the national manners faster among the people'. The pejorative point that Hume added to this distinction is that if 'the governing part of a state consist altogether of merchants, as in Holland, their uniform way of life will fix their character'. Hume, indeed, did not think very highly of the Dutch.

While the essay 'Of national characters' puts emphasis on question of structure, the essay entitled 'Populousness of ancients' considers the question of size. In the eighteenth century it was hotly debated which was more widely populated, the ancient world or modern Europe. Hume draws many of his conclusions (throughout his works) based on the assumption that ancient states were, generally speaking, small, so it is unsurprising that he should argue that the modern European population was larger than its ancient counterpart. The more I consider this subject, Hume snorted, 'the

108 Hume, 'Of the rise and progress of arts and sciences', in Essays, pp. 130-1.
more am I inclined to scepticism, with regard to the great populousness ascribed to ancient times'.

Hume spent most part of this particular essay calculating and demonstrating this point.

Hume is consistent when describing the ancient mode of civility. ‘Almost all the nations, which are the scene of ancient history, were divided into small territories or petty commonwealths’, he writes and at the same time reminds us that because of this, ‘a great equality of fortune prevailed, and the center of the government was always very near its frontiers’. There are many aspects of Hume’s political thinking that are combined in this particular sentence. The relationship between the size of the state, social structure and concentration of political power are interrelated issues. In a small state the political circumstances start to resemble a domestic situation. This is the reason why he argues that the hierarchical structure in a small political state is unbearable. It also makes sense that domestic slavery and the enslaved minds of the ancients, together with their incapacity for reciprocal refinement (encapsulated in cruelty), were perhaps the attributes that Hume despised the most. The price to pay for frugality and simplicity of manners was simply too high for Hume.

Hume carries on pointing out that ‘equality of property’, ‘liberty, and the small divisions of their states, were indeed circumstances favourable to the propagation’ of the ancients. But because of the above mentioned political circumstances, ‘wars were more bloody and destructive’, ‘governments more factions and unsettled, commerce and manufactures more feeble and languishing, and the general police more loose and irregular’. The situation in modern Europe was de facto different. Europe, Hume wrote, ‘is shared out mostly into great monarchies’ and ‘Swisserland alone and Holland resemble the ancient republics’ (a proof of Hume’s dislike for them). The attribute that Hume often uses to describe ancient governments, both Greek and Roman, is tyrannical. The maxims of ancient politics contain’, in all simplicity, ‘so little humanity and moderation, that it seems superfluous to give any particular reason for the acts of violence committed at any particular period’. What is also clear, because of this factual difference in size and form, is that the ancient model could not possibly serve as an example for modern Europe. Why would anyone want to turn their eyes on the ‘furious and tyrannical governments of

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ancient times'\textsuperscript{120}, when Hume’s whole point was that while large states are easily kept at ease, small states turn naturally into tumultuous commonwealths?\textsuperscript{121} An easy way to grasp Hume’s conception of the form of government with regard to the size of state, is a model where a small territory and a small population are linked with a republic and a minimal concentration of executive power; while a large territory and a large population are linked with a monarchy with a highly concentrated power. This is uninteresting as such, but now when we understand the link to Hume’s science of man, also his political determinism starts to look theoretically more appealing. At the same time we realise that there is a clear contrast with Hume’s earlier essays and the essay entitled ‘Idea of a perfect commonwealth’ where Hume writes that it is ‘the falsehood of the common opinion’ to think ‘that no large state, such as France or Great Britain, could ever be modelled into a commonwealth, but that such a form of government can only take place in a city or small territory.’\textsuperscript{122}

As I have already pointed out, there is a momentous argumentative change in the essay entitled ‘Rise and progress’ between the first and second half of the essay. There are also several dozen variants between the first printing and the later editions of the essay missed by the editors Green and Grose, and consequently unrecorded in the Liberty Fund edition of Hume’s Essays. Many of the missed variants are stylistic, adding little or nothing to our understanding of Hume. But there are also variations revealing that Hume took the sharp edge off some passages in this essay. What is perhaps the most bizarre feature of the reception of Hume’s essays is that the actual argument that Hume puts forward in the ‘Rise and progress’ has evaporated because of the editing of his works.

We have come to realise what kind of significance different institutions play in Hume’s thinking mainly because of the way in which the principle of association of ideas functions in his political thought. This is already clearly implied in Hume’s essay called ‘Modern honour’ where gallantry and honour constituted an interlinked institutional pair that partly explains the modern development of politeness. The chosen title is already illuminating and it shows that Hume was aware of the theoretical disputes of his time. The choice not to treat honour in general and to specifically discuss ‘modern honour’ is important. By clearly distinguishing the modern from the ancient culture Hume was setting himself apart from the theorists (Shaftesbury in particular) who claimed that the contemporary idea of civility originates from the ancient times and that the ideals of honour and politeness should be modelled after the Greek or Roman examples. Thus, the pivotal aspect of Hume’s essay is this break between the ancient and modern culture, namely that gallantry and duelling were modern

\textsuperscript{120} Hume, ‘Of civil liberty’, in Essays, p. 88.
\textsuperscript{121} e.g. Hume, ‘Of the rise and progress of arts and sciences’, in Essays, pp. 119-121.
DAVID HUME AND GREATNESS OF MIND

concepts. It was manners, not learning, that discriminated the ancient from the modern world. In his History, Hume also presents a clear analysis of the ‘ideas of chivalry’ causing the birth of ‘modern gallantry and the point of honour, which still maintain their influence’. But what has not been noted is that originally, the idea of this complimentary pair was also the main argument set forward in the essay ‘Rise and progress’. When we understand this, we also grasp the consistency of Hume’s political argumentation.

In 1742, when Hume significantly turned to consider in ‘Rise and progress’ why moderns are more polite than the ancients, he wrote that the ‘modern Notions of Gallantry and Honour, the natural Product of Courts and Monarchies, will probably be assign’d as the Causes of this Refinement’. He carried on stressing that ‘No one denies these Inventions [in plural] to be modern’, but ‘some of the most zealous partizans of the Antients, have asserted them to be foppish and ridiculous, and a Reproach, rather than an Honour to the present Age. It may here be proper to examine this Question, with regard both to Gallantry and Honour. We shall begin with Gallantry’. In the 1770 edition, Hume omitted the reference to the institution of honour. This, most crucial change was missed by Green and Grose. The Liberty Fund edition of the essay also plainly reads that the ‘modern notions of gallantry, the natural produce of courts and monarchies, will probably be assigned as the causes of this refinement’. ‘No one denies this invention [in singular] to be modern’, but ‘some of the more zealous partizans of the ancients, have asserted it to be foppish and ridiculous, and a reproach, rather than a credit, to the present age. It may here be proper to examine this question’. So, we are left without a hint of the fact that Hume originally discussed the same institutional pair that he also emphasised in his essay on ‘Modern honour’ and in his History. After 1770, when the essay changed to only consider gallantry without modern honour and duelling, the argument no longer makes sense and it is unsurprising that so little has been made of it.

Of course, what does become apparent from the variant readings is that the essay before 1770 touched upon honour and duelling. But when Hume’s remarks on honour are presented as separate from gallantry, they strike as an utterly negative approach to modern honour, which might have been the message that Hume wanted to send out later on, but which was contrary to his original intention. It is understandable, of course, that Hume did not want to present himself as an apologist of duelling. At the same time, what is lost is that gallantry and honour for Hume were an inseparable complementing pair – a moral cause that can be analysed historically – at

123 About Mandeville and gallantry, see p. 188–190 above.
124 Hume, History, I, p. 487.
least until 1770. It is easy to see that by dropping modern honour Hume was also concealing his actual views. The mudding of his arguments, instead of being an exception for Hume, seems to have been a rather common modus operandi for him, starting with the castration of the more noble parts of his Treatise. Yet, it appears to be that he rarely changed his actual views over time. Only the form in which he set his arguments forward was altered.

Courage and honour

The reason why this matter of editing is of consequence is that the question of courage lies at the heart of the juxtaposition between the republican tradition and the greatness of mind argument that Hume had adopted.

In Origin of honour, Mandeville distinguished two uses for the 'word honour'. In its first literal sense, it is 'a Technic Word in the Art of Civility, and signifies a Means which Men by Conversing together have found out to please and gratify one another on Account of a palpable Passion in our Nature, that has no Name, and which therefore I call self-liking'. Mandeville believed that in this sense 'the Word Honour, both as a Verb and a Noun, to be as Ancient as the oldest Language'. In the second sense, 'Honour signifies likewise a Principle of Courage, Virtue, and Fidelity, which some Men are said to act from, and to be aw'd by, as others are by Religion. In this latter Sense, it is much more modern, and I don't believe to be met with a Thousand Years ago in any Language'.

Mandeville's idea of honour as 'a Principle of Courage' is vital for his distinction between the ancient and modern culture. Mandeville clarified that 'all ages and most Countries have produced Men of Virtue and Bravery', but this modern 'Term of Art' is something that 'the Ancients knew Nothing of; nor can you with Ten Words, in either Greek or Latin, express the entire Idea which is annex'd to the Word Honour when it signifies a Principle'. Honour (in this sense), the binding of modern society, did not exist in the ancient world. Moral virtues and the principle of self-denial however did. In Mandeville's system 'what we call Prowess or natural Courage in Creatures, is nothing but the Effect of Anger'. According to him, there is 'a great Difference between' natural 'and artificial Courage'. The ancient world knew a variety of methods to coax their soldiers to fight, for example 'the Greek and Roman Histories abound with Instances of the immense Use that may be made in War of Superstition well turn'd'. The ancient politicians had understood that 'the grossest, if skilfully managed, may make the fearful, undaunted, and the loosest Livers exert themselves to the utmost of their Power, from a firm Belief, that Heaven is

128 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 15.
129 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 205.
130 Mandeville, Part II, p. 86.
on their Side'. But religion and patriotism could only enhance courage to a certain extent. The modern principle of honour was specifically ‘an Invention to influence Men, whom Religion had no Power over’. This code was not founded on natural courage. The principle of honour and the courage it produced were artificial, based on the cultivation of self-liking instead of self-denial.

It is commonplace that a soldier ‘should Fight undauntedly and obstinately’. It is somewhat more difficult to reason how men could be polite without losing their undaunted courage, when it is based on anger. According to Mandeville, the ambiguity between natural courage and good manners never vanished from the Greek world. The ancient politicians used all the known arts ‘to raise and keep up’ the spirits of the soldiers ‘and their Hatred to their Enemies’. However, ‘it is the easiest Thing in the World to make’ a man ‘hate his Neighbour with all his Heart’, but a far more difficult task ‘to make’ him ‘sincerely love his Neighbour’. The Greek nations, without the principle of honour and modern politeness, were only able to support territories very limited in size. The principle of self-denial and frugality only suited small city-states. ‘Frugality is like Honesty, a mean starving Virtue, that is only fit for small Societies’, but ‘in a large stirring Nation you may have soon enough of it’. Athens did not merit on Mandeville’s list of flourishing nations, when compared to modern Europe. The example of Sparta, on the other hand, showed that once an ancient state was faced with continuous offences, it soon lost all the signs of good manners. In general, the character of a citizen living in one of the small, ancient states was not polite. It was simple and warlike. The moderns might not sincerely love their neighbour, but the principles of politeness and honour required them to act in such a manner as if they did indeed love their neighbours. In the modern world, artificial courage was directly linked to politeness through the principle of honour. This was an important factor supporting the maintenance of a large society.

In all ages, courage (whether natural or artificial) had always been the chief virtue for soldiers. It was obvious that not a single soldier ‘will serve with a noted Coward’. It was also presented as a universal rule that ‘Courage and Cowardice, in all Bodies of Men, depend entirely upon Exercise and Discipline’. The significant differences between the different ages were constituted by the principles that men follow. To be a man of modern honour, it is not enough to be ‘brave in War’. One ‘must bear no Affront without resenting it, not refuse a Challenge, if it be sent to him in a proper Manner by a Man of Honour’. Mandeville explained that

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131 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 146.
132 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 15.
133 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 135.
135 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 150.
‘the Signification of the Word Honour is entirely Gothick, and sprung up in some of the most ignorant Ages of Christianity’. To make his point explicit, Mandeville explained the ‘reason’ why he thought that ‘the origin of honour’ is ‘of Gothick Extraction’. ‘Honour’ was first invented in the age of chivalry, because ‘all other Ties’ had ‘prov’d ineffectual’ to make men keep their promises ‘and the Christian Religion itself was often found insufficient for that Purpose’.

What was central in the genealogy of honour was that this invention had been refined through an extensive period of time. The difference between the gothic knights and the eighteenth-century gentlemen was that the latter simply did not have to be enthusiastic enough to believe that there were monsters that they had to fight in order to prove their worth. A modern ‘Gentleman is not required to shew his Bravery, but where his Honour is concern’d’. In other words, natural courage, which still had a strong impact on the chivalric knights, was eventually substituted with artificial courage based on the principle of honour and politeness. However, even though the principles of honour, duelling and gallantry had been refined, they originated in the times of gothic ignorance, when they had first been invented.

According to Mandeville, the ingenuity of the principle of honour is that ‘it was an Improvement in the Art of Flattery, by which the Excellency of our Species is raised to such a Height, that it becomes the Object of our own Adoration, and Man is taught in good Earnest to worship himself’. This is the reason why Mandeville marked that ‘the invention of honour’ was ‘by far’ a ‘greater Achievement’ than the principle of virtue or self-denial. Modern honour is specifically a political principle. When men are taught to worship themselves, they are more easily governed. Politicians did not have to depend on the patriotism of their citizens. Mandeville was not trying to deny the importance of loyalty to the king and country, but he wanted to highlight its capricious nature, when not supported with the principle of honour. He spelled out that ‘the Love of one’s Country is natural; and very bad Men may feel it as warm about them, as very good Men; and it is a Principle, which a Man may as sincerely act from, who Fights against his King, as he who Fights for him’. In contrast, when depending on honour, ‘a good Politician may add to, or take from the Principle of Honour, what Virtue or Qualification he pleases’. This explained why modern gentlemen were much easier to control than the knights-errant and particularly the ancient citizen-soldiers. True gentlemen were principally concerned with the reflection in the looking glass. Natural

137 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 15. Italics my own.
140 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 42.
141 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 177.
142 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 141.
courage was substituted with artificial conduct. Meanwhile, men remained brave and modern society could grow polite, large and flourishing. Already in the first part of The Fable Mandeville explained at length that

There is nothing refines Mankind more than Love and Honour. Those two Passions are equivalent to many Virtues, and therefore the greatest Schools of Breeding and good Manners are Courts and Armies; the first to accomplish the Women, the other to polish the Men. What the generality of Officers among civiliz’d Nations affect is a perfect Knowledge of the World and the Rules of Honour; an Air of Frankness, and Humanity peculiar to Military Men of Experience, and such a mixture of Modesty and undauntedness, as may bespeak them both Courteous and Valiant.\textsuperscript{143}

Mandeville stressed that ‘the Invention of Honour has been far more beneficial to the Civil Society than that of Virtue, and much better answer’d the End for which they were invented. Ever since the Notion of Honour has been receiv’d among Christians, there have always been, in the same Number of People, Twenty Men of real Honour, to One of real Virtue’.\textsuperscript{144} The point that the idea of honour rose only after the fall of the Roman Empire is important for our understanding of Mandeville’s thought. Only when men strictly followed the principles of honour would they start paying close attention to their outward expressions. Manners started to soften, but this did not mean that courage was lost. Modern ‘soldiers are made by Discipline. To make them proud of their Profession, and inspire them with the Love of Glory, are the surest Arts to make them valiant’.\textsuperscript{145} Thus, Mandeville stated that ‘the most civiliz’d Fellows make the best Soldiers’.\textsuperscript{146} In the Greek world, bravery in soldiers was enhanced by the inflexible strain of self-denial. In the eighteenth century, natural courage was substituted altogether with artificial policy and bravery was ‘aim’d at by the Height of Politeness and a perpetual Attachment to the Principle of Modern Honour’.\textsuperscript{147} With good reason it had to be acknowledged that these customs were of ‘gothic extraction’.

Hume on courage

Hume’s scheme of conjectural history coincides with his principle of association of ideas. We ought to analyse this from the perspective of courage. The historical change of courage and honour is stated already in Hume’s essay ‘Chivalry and modern honour’. In a state of barbarity, the only possibility to attain the position of a governor was by force. According to Hume, this is the reason why ‘in all rude Ages’ and ‘in the infancy of every State’ courage ‘or Warlike Bravery’ is ‘alwise the most admir’d

\textsuperscript{143} Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 121.
\textsuperscript{144} Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{145} Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 134.
\textsuperscript{146} Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 149.
\textsuperscript{147} Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 232.
Virtue’. Another important aspect that Hume shared with Mandeville was that natural courage is not indispensable for society. Mandeville had pointed out that ‘Human Wisdom is the Child of Time’ and political ‘Inventions’ such as virtue, honour and ‘politeness’ are ‘the joint Labour of Many’ and ‘not the Contrivance of one Man, nor could it have been the Business of a few Years’. One characteristic of a polite age is that ‘courage’ is no longer the principal source of merit and the governors have introduced different precepts that will produce praise and advantage to the subjects, who attain these qualities. As Mandeville put it, in a state of civility ‘natural courage’ is substituted with ‘artificial’ bravery, which in modern Europe is ‘aim’d at by the Height of Politeness and a perpetual Attachment to the Principle of Modern Honour’. David Hume agreed. ‘Warlike bravery’ can be contested with ‘conduct or policy’, although this is ‘never apprehended, until the Age has from long Experience become considerably refin’d’. This was not the case at the time of the birth of chivalry. ‘Untaught Nature’, Hume argued, admires ‘more bodily Force, & that mental Force of Courage, which resembles it, than an Ability of a different kind, which may teach the right Use of both’. Thus, in the state of barbarity, bare force is ‘more suitable Virtue for Subjects than Conduct’ and natural courage is not only ‘celebrated’ by ‘the Example of Rulers’, but by ‘their Precept likewise’. In ‘uncivilized Nations’ it will always have the ‘approbation of all Politicians’, because they are ‘the persons, who principally reap Advantage by it’.

Like Mandeville, Hume proved his point about the prevalence of natural courage in the early stages of human societies by means of historical examples taken from Greek and Roman ‘poetry’ and Chivalric ‘romances’. Hume wrote that ‘in Rome about its earliest Time we find’ courage ‘in so great Repute that the general Name of Virtue was derived from it’. It was, he continued, ‘alone sufficient to bring a man into Credit’ and ‘without it all his other Virtues were of no avail’. Warlike bravery was also ‘the reigning Quality of the first Grecian Heroes’ and with ‘cavaliers or Romantic Heroes’ courage keeps ‘itself ready for any Call, rises at every thing which can exercise it, & courts all Dangers & every Opportunity of exerting itself’. Courage, in David Hume’s opinion, is always the chief virtue in a newly found state, but this is as far as the ‘Resemblance’ between ‘the Heroes of Poetry & of Romance’ goes.

Hume speculated that the manner in which ‘courteous Knights’ achieved their ‘extreme Civility’ was by ‘mixing love with their Courage’.

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149 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, pp. 40–41.
This ‘new scheme of manners’ resulted in two abiding principles. Firstly, it yielded ‘an extravagant Gallantry & Adoration of the whole Female Sex’. Secondly, it introduced ‘the Practice of Single Combat’. A knight-errant would not ‘be contented with a submiss Reverence & Adoration to one’ female ‘but wou’d extend in some degree the same Civility’ to all women. It was by this ‘curious Reversement of the Order of Nature’ that female sex was made ‘superior’. If gallantry was one of the main principles for men in the gothic age, duelling, which also ‘sprung up from Chivalry’, was the other. Hume emphasised the calm civility of the duellist. ‘A knight-Errant fights not like another Man full of Passion & Resentment, but with the utmost Civility mixt with his undaunted Courage’, always ‘showing his generous Calmness & amicable Courage’. The practise of duelling implied the first significant step towards substituting warlike bravery with artificial courage. By and large, in the age of chivalry ‘every thing is performed with the greatest Ceremony & Order’.\textsuperscript{155}

Also, in his published essays Hume analysed the role of courage and its connection to civility in the ancient world attentively. His point was that the relative power of the ancient city-states had been more of an exception than a rule in history. Whatever limited success they had had, they had owed it to the small size of their states and an archaic lifestyle, both of which had led to encourage warlike bravery. Hume’s provoking point was that the ancient politicians had never accomplished to substitute natural courage with the artificial principles, which had substantially demarcated the nature of their civility. This in turn explains why the ancient model never ranked high in Hume’s standards.

The primary principle to amplify courage in ancient Greece had been patriotism and self-denial. The citizens of these states were ‘unacquainted with gain and industry as well as pleasure’.\textsuperscript{156} Sparta’s military glory owed ‘entirely to the want of commerce and luxury’\textsuperscript{157} and ‘to live like an Athenian, was a Proverb for living frugally’.\textsuperscript{158} In fact, ‘no probable reason can be assigned for the great power of the more ancient states above the modern, but their want of commerce and luxury’, which had helped them to cultivate their warlike character.\textsuperscript{159} Hume stressed that ‘the ancient republics were almost in perpetual war’, which had been ‘a natural effect of their martial spirit, their love of liberty, their mutual emulation, and that hatred which generally prevails among nations that live in close neighbourhood’.\textsuperscript{160} The ancient states ‘were small’ and ‘all their neighbours were continually in arms’.\textsuperscript{161} Hume maintained, that ‘before the encrease of

\textsuperscript{155} Hume, ‘Essay on chivalry and modern honour’, p. 60.
\textsuperscript{156} Hume, ‘Of commerce’, in Essays, p. 259.
\textsuperscript{157} Hume, ‘Of commerce’, in Essays, p. 257.
\textsuperscript{159} Hume, ‘Of commerce’, in Essays, p. 258.
\textsuperscript{160} Hume, ‘Of the populousness of ancient nations’, in Essays, p. 404.
\textsuperscript{161} Hume, ‘Of commerce’, in Essays, p. 259.
the Roman power’ almost the entire ‘scene of ancient history’ was ‘divided into small territories or petty commonwealths, where of course a great equality of fortune prevailed, and the center of the government was always very near its frontiers’. Naturally, the ‘public spirit’ must increase, ‘when the public is almost in continual alarm, and men are obliged, every moment, to expose themselves to the greatest dangers for its defence’. In short, ‘a continual succession of wars makes every citizen a soldier’.

The ancients might have been masters of patriotism and warlike bravery, but Hume did not regard self-denial as a civilized method to enhance courage and enable men to fight. The wars fought in the ancient world, compared to modern times, ‘were more bloody and destructive, their governments more factious and unsettled, commerce and manufactures more feeble and languishing, and the general police more loose and irregular’. Hume’s point was to highlight that the consequences had been inhumane. ‘In ancient history’, he asserted, we meet with ‘frequent’ examples of barbarous behaviour. The ‘Greeks’ were led by a ‘determined spirit’ of natural courage closely resembling ‘cruelty’, when ‘wrought up to’ a high ‘degree of fury’. This had often ‘been destructive to human society, in those petty commonwealths, which lived in close neighbourhood, and were engaged in perpetual wars and contentions’. In the ancient world, only the Romans had been exceptional in their military organisation. According to Hume, they ‘were almost the only uncivilized people that ever possessed military discipline’. Nonetheless, their discipline was attained ‘by applying themselves solely to war’, instead of artificial courage, honour and politeness.

What is remarkable about Hume’s treatment of ancient courage is that the target of his criticism is ancient civility in general. By and large, ‘it appears that ancient manners were more unfavourable than the modern, not only in times of war, but also in those of peace’. There could be no politeness based on patriotism or self-denial. The foundational problem with politeness and courage is that once passions start to multiply and to enlarge, without some artificial principle men become feeble and cowardly. They lose the natural quality of warlike bravery. The ancient states had to rely on self-denial and discourage commerce. The fear of losing their ability to fight also explains the nature of their civility. Whatever ‘refinement and civility’ the ‘ancients’ had, they ‘owed’ it ‘all’ to ‘books and study’. In contrast, modern politeness was ‘learned from company’, not books. By the same token, in ancient Greece citizen-soldiers were not polite, whereas present day soldiers are inclined towards ‘pleasure and gallantry’ and

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‘acquire good breeding and an openness of behaviour’. An artificial turn took place in manners during the age of chivalry and it was particularly the invention of the principle of honour that explained why this modern development was possible in Europe.

On several occasions Hume treated the ancient states in the same manner as Mandeville. Ancient Greece and Rome were not polite. ‘Simplicity of manners’ was the reigning characteristic for the Greek world also at the highpoint of its civility, whereas artificiality was the chief feature of modern manners. In 1742, he pointed out in a letter to Lord Kames that reading the great Cicero ‘you may judge of the Manners of those times’. Hume thought that the conclusion was rather harsh and ‘the whole turn of’ ancient manners ‘would not now be generally admir’d’. Modern Europe was more polite than ancient Greece or Rome. In an essay published the same year, Hume also asserted that ‘I shall also be so bold as to affirm’ (the “boldness” of this sentence was later toned down) ‘that among the ancients, there was not much delicacy of breeding, or that polite deference and respect, which civility obliges us either to express or counterfeit towards the persons with whom we converse’. It was also evident in this cluster of civility that Hume was mapping that ‘among the ancients, the character of the fair-sex was considered as altogether domestic; nor were they regarded as part of the polite world or of good company’.

Besides civility and manners, ‘there are many other circumstances, in which ancient nations seem inferior to the modern, both for the happiness and encrease of mankind. Trade, manufactures, industry, were no where, in former ages, so flourishing as they are at present in Europe’. Hume’s point about commerce is not that it gave birth to politeness. Politeness and the principle of honour are partly political inventions, a set of rules and principles coined at a certain point in history. Maintaining courage is the touchstone of politeness and civility. Hume stated that ‘in general, we may observe, that courage, of all national qualities, is the most precarious because it is exerted only at intervals, and by a few in every nation; whereas industry, knowledge, civility, may be of constant and universal use, and for several ages, may become habitual to the whole people’. Mandeville had given a plausible solution to this problem. When warlike bravery was substituted by artificial courage based on the principle of honour, courage and politeness were refined hand in hand by the simple act of becoming a

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habitual part of civility. Meanwhile, trade and commerce could also flourish. Hume wrote also that even though ‘the want of trade and manufactures, among a free and very martial people, may sometimes have no other effect than to render the public more powerful, it is certain, that, in the common course of human affairs, it will have a quite contrary tendency’. Plainly, Hume was promoting commerce and trade, but before a nation could turn civil and commercial, courage as a general quality had to be secured. In general, it should be remarked that throughout his works Hume concurred with Mandeville’s view that in order for a nation to grow large and opulent, the government needs theatrical politeness and the principles of gallantry and honour in order to render its subjects tractable. Gallantry and duelling, the main outcome of the ‘new scheme of manners’ that Hume introduced in his pre-Treatise essay, were a crucial part of Europe’s historical development. It was this development that explained why greatness of mind trumped the greatness of ancient cities.

In the essay ‘Of refinement in the arts’ (originally entitled ‘Of luxury’), Hume tells his audience what ‘distinguishes a civilized age from times of barbarity and ignorance’. The true token of a civilized age is the ‘conspicuous’ character of ‘humanity’, which can only come about after ‘the tempers of men are softened as well as their knowledge improved’. The effects of humanity point unmistakably to modern Europe, which is in contrast with the ancient world. In a civilized age ‘factions’ are ‘less inveterate, revolutions less tragical, authority less severe, and seditions less frequent. Even foreign wars abate of their cruelty; and after the field of battle, where honour and interest [instead of warlike bravery and virtue] steel men against compassion as well as fear, the combatants divest themselves of the brute, and resume the man’. As we have seen in Hume’s other essays, in his opinion this was not the case in the ancient times, where wars were ‘bloody and destructive’, ‘governments more factious and unsettled, commerce and manufactures more feeble and languishing, and the general police more loose and irregular’. But how could this kind of humanity be possible in modern Europe? How could men have ‘softened’ their ‘tempers’ without losing the capability for war, which never really happened in Athens or Rome? The answer is plain: Because of the principle of honour. According to Hume, ‘we’ do not ‘need’ to ‘fear’, ‘that men, by losing their ferocity, will lose their martial spirit, or become less undaunted and vigorous in defence of their country or their liberty’. Once ‘anger, which is said’ by some ‘to be the whetstone of courage, loses somewhat of its asperity, by politeness and refinement; a sense of honour, which is a stronger, more constant, and more governable principle, acquires fresh vigour by that elevation of genius which arises from knowledge and a good

education'. Thus, in a civilized age, knowledge, politeness and humanity were refined hand in hand in a positive circle, but it is the principle of honour that renders this possible. By and large, it is the artificial principles that facilitate the 'intercourse of minds'.

Political discourses and Enquiry concerning the principles of morals

In the 1750s, Hume made additions to his published works, and in a sense, recasted his science of man. What is of interest to us is how this recasting affected his moral and political philosophy. At the beginning of the 1750s, Hume rejuvenated the argument of greatness of mind that he had first attempted in Book 3 of the Treatise and essays of the turn of the 1740s. Both, Political discourses and Enquiry concerning the principles of morals intensified Hume's attack on the republican tradition while at the same time clarifying and elaborating the original argument. These works were largely compiled in 1749 and 1750. In his autobiography Hume noted that 'I went down in 1749 and lived two Years with my Brother at his Country house'. During that time, I 'composed the second Part of my Essays, which I called Political Discourses; and also my Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, which is another part of my Treatise, that I cast anew'. The works were published in 1751 and 1752.

Political discourses, and particularly the essay 'Of Commerce' are the prime indication of how the formula of greatness of mind operates against the classical republican ideas. In Political discourses, Hume utilises the apparent Baconian conflict between 'the greatness of the state and the happiness of the subject' to make his own case. The commonly perceived problem was that 'the one can never be satisfied, but at the expence of the other'. Hume's solution to the problem is that in modern Europe there need not be any such conflict. 'Of Money', 'Of Interest', 'Of Taxes', 'Of Public Credit', 'Of the Balance of Trade' etc., as the titles of the essays in Political discourses indicate, offer a partial solution to dissolve the following paradox: 'as the ambition of the sovereign must entrench on the luxury of individuals; so the luxury of individuals must diminish the force, and check the ambition of the sovereign'. But the actual aching political problem – the question of greatness of state to which all these essays on commerce relate to – still regards the state's ability to defend itself. It is therefore central that the question of courage is at the heart of the essay 'Of commerce'. The barbarians at the 'Infancy of every State', discussed in the first modern honour essay, were naturally right to think of 'Courage or Warlike Bravery' as 'the most admir'd Virtue'. The primary political question in the modern

178 Hume, 'Of refinement in the arts', in Essays, p. 274.
179 Hume, 'Of the rise and progress of arts and sciences', in Essays, p. 132.
180 Beuchamp, EPM, p. xxiii.
181 Hume, My own life: Letters, I, p. 3.
world that needs to be addressed is how this ability of the state to defend itself is retained despite the seemingly harmful quality of humanity. A part of Hume’s solution is that ‘public advantage’ in modern Europe consists of ‘taxing’, which enables the raising of an army.\(^{183}\) Yet, without the link between ‘politeness’, ‘sense of honour’, ‘courage’ and ‘martial skill’, there is no solution to the Baconian conflict.\(^{184}\) Courage, instead of being an amplification of natural ferocity, is therefore linked to artificial politeness in modern Europe. This is the discovery that Hume presented in his political writings regarding the question of the greatness of state. But the striking move is that politeness is also linked with love and humanity. Here the direct reference to the contrast between Hume’s own position and Francis Bacon’s essay ‘Of the true greatness of Kingdoms and Estates’ is of particular interest.\(^{185}\)

The core of Political discourses is hence the same modern disposition that Hume had emphasised earlier, namely greatness of mind. Simultaneously, we understand how it operates as an argument in accordance with the ‘jealousy of trade’ doctrine. What happens in Political discourses is that since the basic questions of greatness of mind have been accounted for in earlier essays, Hume’s focus naturally switches towards the side of political economy. It does not mean that the overall argument would change.

It needs to be stressed that Hume dealt with the greatness of mind argument from the very first pre-Treatise essay onwards. It is the jealousy of trade elaboration on commerce that is built on this foundation (starting with some notebook references at the time when Hume was already writing the essay on modern honour, where the core of the greatness of mind argument had already been developed). It is also useful to understand that the essay following ‘Of Commerce’ in Political discourses, ‘Of Refinement in the arts’, is mainly an elaboration of the argument presented in the essays ‘Modern honour’ and ‘Rise and progress’. The issue of Seven years war certainly attached Hume’s mind closer to the question of public debt and political economy, but this reasoning is something that adds to the original argument of greatness of mind. The subject of luxury and the importance of political economy have been well established by Istvan Hont.\(^{186}\) I fully agree that the modern change in manners, the fact that ‘commodities come more to market, after men depart from their ancient simplicity’, is crucial for Hume. However, this is just one side of the story. For example, jealousy of trade alone reveals nothing of how Hume’s moral and political philosophy might relate to his science of man or the principle of association of ideas. As such, it is difficult to see jealousy of trade as an actual extension of the science of man unlike, for example, Hume’s case for monarchy.

\(^{184}\) Hume, ‘Of refinement in the arts’, in Essays, p. 274.
\(^{185}\) Hume, ‘Of commerce’, in Essays, p. 266.
\(^{186}\) Hont, Jealousy of trade, 2005.
Therefore, we may consider the argument of jealousy of trade as an elaboration of the project of greatness of mind.

Greatness of mind has an even more visible role in *Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals*. Hume devotes one of the nine sections of the book to discuss it in a more narrow sense. In that work Hume analyses politeness as a quality 'Immediately Agreeable to Others' and greatness as a disposition of mind that is 'Immediately Agreeable to Ourselves'. The overall point is that these two qualities are founded on the same basis, self-liking, as Hume had already argued in the *Treatise*. One significant change in *Enquiry concerning the principles of morals* is to divide the original 'Greatness of mind' section in this way in two. The full elaboration of greatness of mind project as a modern disposition then follows in 'Dialogue' closing *Enquiry concerning the principles of morals*. The main function of the Dialogue is to discuss greatness of mind and politeness in relation to modern honour in the context of a comparison between ancient Greece and modern France. We may read the Dialogue as free-standing essay, but at the same time we need to know that it recaps the argument of greatness of mind that has a central stage in Hume's moral and political thinking.

*Enquiry concerning the principles of morals* is a work where Hume re-organises some of the arguments set forward in Book 3 of the *Treatise* and manages to encapsulate some of his central concepts in a more convenient form, although the original contribution, compared to the *Treatise*, is slim. For example, as an attribute of 'greatness of mind' Hume now helpfully points out that 'a certain degree of generous pride or self-value is so requisite, that the absence of it in the mind displeases, after the same manner as the want of a nose, eye, or any of the most material features of the face or members of the body'. Hume also immediately links 'courage' as 'an obvious foundation' of self-value after introducing it. What Hume champions in section 7 is the demonstration of the problems of ancient courage in relation to greatness of mind. Hume reiterates in a characteristically Mandevillean manner that 'the martial temper of the Romans', for example, 'enflamed by continual wars, had raised their esteem of courage so high, that, in their language, it was called virtue, by way of excellence and of distinction from all other moral qualities'. In the following passage, Hume demonstrates how 'martial bravery' usually 'destroyed the sentiments of humanity' during the ancient times. In *Enquiry concerning the principles of morals* one of Hume's main arguments is that peaceful existence in civil society and humanity in general are a modern phenomenon.

In contrast to ancient times, when Hume turns to discuss the modern cases of greatness of mind in section 7, the attention switches to outward

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187 EPM 7.10; SBN 253.
188 EPM 7.11; SBN 254.
189 EPM 7.13; SBN 254-5.
190 EPM 7.14; SBN 255.
show and greatness in appearance. The role of vanity grows at the same ratio that natural ferocity diminishes during Hume’s advancement from ancient to modern examples. A splendid illustration of this switch is ‘Harry the IVth of France’. Gallantry and honour were of course attributes that Hume particularly linked to Henry IV and the king himself served as an epitome of vanity for Hume. Yet, Henry never had problems retaining his courage despite his ‘amours and attachments’. The reason was that modern courage as an expression of greatness of mind was founded on artificial principles that functioned in accordance with pride.

Amour-propre in politics

Hume’s moral and political philosophy is based on the Mandevillean paradigm of human nature also in Essays and Enquiry concerning the principles of morals. The basic axiom of Hume’s psychology is the division between self-love and self-liking throughout his works. His moral and political philosophy is constructed largely as an analysis of this division in different settings. In the view of how little attention this aspect of Hume’s thought has previously received, it is difficult to overemphasise the significance of this simple division in Hume’s thought.

Its clearest implication in a single passage appears in Enquiry concerning the principles of morals. Hume states that ‘the sentiment of conscious worth, the self-satisfaction proceeding from a review of man’s own conduct and character’ is ‘the most common of all others’, yet it ‘has no proper name in our language’. Not only are these precisely the same words that Mandeville used when introducing his concept of self-liking, but Hume also carries on in a footnote explaining that

the term, pride, is commonly taken in a bad sense; but this sentiment seems indifferent, and may be either good or bad, according as it is well or ill founded, and according to the other circumstances which accompany it. The French express this sentiment by the term, amour propre, but as they also express self-love as well as vanity, by the same term, there arises thence a great confusion in Rochefoucault, and many of their moral writers.

Mandeville’s definition was that self-liking is the cause of pride, but only when ‘excessive, and so openly shewn as to give offence to others’ it is called pride. When it is kept out of sight it has ‘no name’, even when men act ‘from that and from no other principle’. The reason that Mandeville gave for calling this passion ‘self-liking’ was simply that it has ‘no Name’, although it is ‘a palpable Passion in our Nature’.

191 EPM 7.23; SBN 258.
192 EPM Appendix 4.3 footnote 66; SBN 314.
193 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 3.
In this Mandevillean manner, what is imperative, according to Hume, is to make a theoretical distinction between self-love and ‘self-satisfaction’ (and self-love and vanity). And in order to confirm that self-liking has everything to do with his project of greatness of mind, Hume declares that this sentiment particularly arises from ‘the endowments of courage and capacity, industry and ingenuity, as well as from any other mental excellencies’. \[195\] In the Treatise, Hume wrote: ‘Provided we agree about the thing, it is needless to dispute about the terms’. \[196\] In Enquiry concerning the principles of morals he clearly took sides in ‘some verbal disputes’. \[197\]

Previously we noticed that ‘Of superstition and enthusiasm’ is an essay about different species of false religion. If we’d like to derive Hume’s general notion of certain states of mind based on this essay, this needs to be kept in sight. Hume’s general tenet towards religion is resentful. It should not surprise anyone to learn that according to Hume a basic ingredient of ‘false religion’ is ignorance. Hume remains sceptical about religion because almost everything relating to it is imaginary. The role of ignorance in false religion for Hume might be commonplace, but the basic axiom upon which the essay on false religion is constructed has not been accounted for: With this in mind, it might come as a surprise how simple the framework that Hume uses to analyse enthusiasm and superstition as two basic types of false religion actually is. Hume insists that of enthusiasm and superstition, the founding question that we need to answer is: how in these particular cases does ‘the soul’ foster ‘its predominant inclination’? \[198\]

Hume’s analysis of superstition and enthusiasm is based on the concept that Mandeville coined as self-liking. It is important to notice that the picture that Hume draws of superstition and enthusiasm is diametrical. A precondition of ‘false religion’ is ignorance. It concerns both enthusiasm and superstition. Besides ignorance, the attributes of superstition that Hume singles out in this particular essay are ‘weakness, fear and melancholy’. In a geometrical contrast, he gives ‘hope, pride’ and ‘presumption’ as the basic attributes of enthusiasm. \[199\] To cut a long story short, in the case of superstition the self-liking of the superstitious person is diminished and in the case of an enthusiast it is enlarged. Much attention regarding this essay has been put on Hume’s concept of melancholy, which is a legitimate point of interest, of course. \[200\] The point I would like to make is that the question of soul’s ‘predominant inclination’ is a question that concerns first of all humility and pride. In this context, Hume’s use of the

\[195\] EPM Appendix 4.3; SBN 314.
\[196\] EPM 1.3.7.7; SBN 629.
\[197\] EPM Appendix 4.1; SBN 312.
\[198\] Hume, ‘Of superstition and enthusiasm’, in Essays, pp. 73-4.
\[200\] Donald Livingston has lately stressed the role of right and wrong kind of philosophy by arguing that for Hume false philosophy leads either to melancholy over the groundlessness of common opinion or delirium over transcending it. Livingston, Philosophical melancholy and delirium, 1998.
term melancholy turns out to be the counterpart of presumption. Everything has to do with one’s opinion of oneself. Moreover, not only the question of false religion can (and should), according to Hume, be analysed in terms of self-liking. More or less any human phenomenon ought to be judged by how it relates to this foundation. The distinction between enthusiasm and superstition as two species of false religion is only one example of this.

The fact that the analysed objects (enthusiasm and superstition) function as a countering pair is important. Based on Hume’s understanding, ‘superstition is founded on fear, sorrow, and a depression of spirits’. He elaborates that it is of decisive importance that superstition gives the person a sensation that he is ‘unworthy, in his own eyes’. And as we have already learned, this is the very basic question of self-liking and humility studied in the Treatise. In the case of superstition, self-liking receives a blow regarding humility and sinking spirits, which magnifies the role of fear creating more imaginary obstacles for the mind to dwell on. In direct contrast, ‘enthusiasm arises from a presumptuous pride and confidence’. Religious enthusiasm in psychological terms is yet another case of strengthening one’s overweening conceit of oneself. In the Humean psychology, the gate leading towards the ‘frenzy’ that (the species of false religion called) enthusiasm requires is vanity and pride. To put briefly, religious enthusiasm is one form of swelling pride, and superstition is reduced into its direct opposite, which can be called melancholy or humility. But the precise terminology in this particular case is of secondary importance for Hume. What is of importance is the significance of pride as the foundation for human actions.

The picture that Hume leaves us with in this particular essay seems highly schematic, but this is because it has a separate function as well. The essay was topical and it only served a limited purpose. Together with the following (and later removed) ‘Of avarice’ it originally operated as a double essay in precisely the same manner as the “sibling essays” ‘Of Eloquence’ and ‘Of rise and progress’. It should be noted that certain ways of grouping essays is relevant in order to grasp Hume’s meaning. As the argument of the “sibling essays” is meant to point out, the certain way of grouping essays goes beyond the obvious case of four essays on philosophical sects (The Epicurean, The Stoic, The Platonist, The Sceptic). While ‘Of superstition’ turns out to be yet another analysis of self-liking, ‘Of Avarice’ solely concentrates on self-love. We will turn back to this a little later. Firstly we need to account how Hume operates with the division between self-love and self-liking in general in the political framework of Essays.

As we may see from Hume’s analysis of false religion, self-liking has a role in Hume’s treatment of almost any human phenomenon. This naturally applies to politics. According to him, ‘the humours and education of

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particular men’ play no actual role in the question of whether a state is ‘wisely’ or ‘weakly’ conducted. What makes the difference is ‘merely’ the ‘forms and institutions’ by which the state is ‘regulated’. To ‘merely’ talk about forms and institutions is not a way of belittling the political system in any way, quite the contrary. Two foundational questions of political thought for Hume are: What are the institutions that enable us to turn human society into a peaceful and prosperous civil establishment and, how do these instruments relate to human nature? The questions are interconnected. Both of them are derived from the conjectural history of civil society, which Hume considers in Book 3 of the Treatise, as we have already learned. What is crucial is the link to modern political framework. Politics is about a theory in practice. This is one reason why Hume continued his project of greatness of mind in Essays.

What is well recognised in modern scholarship is that Hume makes good use of the general principle of redirecting and countering passions. A ‘Republican and free government would be an obvious absurdity’, Hume writes, ‘if the particular checks and controuls, provided by the constitution, had really no influence, and made it not the interest, even of bad men, to act for the public good’. The stage was set for the idea of turning the passions to work towards the common good. It is quite obvious that the principle of redirecting and countering passions has significance for Hume. Yet, it is somewhat unclear what Hume thought that this actually means in practice.

We have already learned that the scheme of redirected passions needs the long evolution of justice and politeness, but in addition, how is the pragmatic political system to be framed? As always, Hume keeps the structure as simple as possible. In the ambitiously entitled essay ‘That politics may be reduced to a science’, Hume writes that it is most important ‘to maintain’ those ‘forms and institutions, by which liberty is secured, the public good consulted, and the avarice or ambition of particular men restrained and punished’. The emphasis is again on the ‘forms and institutions’. In this particular passage, the liberty and public good are trite points of reference. Instead, Hume puts a strong accent on

203 Hume, ‘That politics may be reduced to a science’, in Essays, p. 24. The fact that Hume uses a term ‘forms and institutions’ in conjunction with this particular essay is important. In a similar vein, Hume also uses ‘forms and methods’. The use of ‘forms and institutions’ is repeated in ibid. p. 26.

204 These are questions that relate directly to the institutions. We may notice that the questions of size and form of state and government, that we have already analysed, are just as important and interlinked to these concrete questions.


206 Hume, ‘That politics may be reduced to a science’, in Essays, pp. 15–16.

207 The essay seeks to be argumentative also by its title. It is one of the few cases in Hume’s Essays that breaks the usual “Ciceronian” title structure: an essay ‘Of Moral Prejudice’, ‘Of Liberty and Despotism’ etc.

the last part of the sentence. In a political society, it is the passions of avarice and ambition that cause all the trouble that needs to be strained. It is therefore such ‘forms and institutions’ that keep them under control that matter the most.

In the eighteenth century it was of course common to discuss ambition and avarice together. On the surface this might seem like any Hobbist or even Machiavellian way of discussing a familiar topic.209 For Hume there is a clear philosophical distinction between these two. Philosophically, the question of how to cope with avarice and ambition is intriguing. By turning his focus on these two attributes, Hume sought to put the division between self-love and self-liking in the middle of his practical discussion on politics. When Hume writes that ‘every man ought to be supposed a knave’, he in fact emphasises the role of ‘several checks and controls’ without elaborating what these checks and controls specifically are. It is particularly the ‘insatiable avarice and ambition’ of men that needs to be dealt with.210 Avarice and ambition are directly derived from the distinction between self-love and self-liking in the same manner as justice and politeness. However, to analyse them on their own terms has some added value.

In one sense, the Mandevillean idea of turning vices to public benefits applies to Hume’s system. And what is of importance is that we do not make the mistake of operating with a single idea of self-love. Again we might want to turn to Enquiry concerning the principles of morals for a more careful wording. Of avarice and ambition, Hume points out that ‘vulgarly, though improperly’, ‘avarice, ambition, vanity’ – and in fact ‘all passions’ – are ‘comprized under the denomination of self-love’. This is improper since it misses the self-liking side of amour-propre. Avarice belongs within the dominion of self-love, but ambition and vanity are based on the basic sphere of self-liking.211 With regard to the distinction between avarice and ambition this means that ‘interest and ambition’ may be considered counterparts in a similar manner as ‘friendship and enmity’ or ‘gratitude and revenge’.212 It is along these lines that the distinction between self-love and self-liking evolves into a distinction between useful and agreeable in Enquiry concerning the principles of morals.

What is ambition for Hume? One feature of ambition is our ‘desire to excel’. A pathological need to think that one is better than others is the seat of politics, and ambition is always linked to self-liking in Hume’s prose. Beyond that, we may break the question down crudely into two different sides of ambition for Hume. These two sides are the question of reputation and the question of power. It needs to be stressed that the question of power (as well as reputation) always arises from self-liking. In Book 2 of the Treatise, even the question of physical strength is turned into a question of

209 See for example Cato’s Letters, passim.
210 Hume, ‘That politics may be reduced to a science’, in Essays, p. 42.
211 EPM 9.5; SBN 271.
self-liking. ‘Strength is a kind of power’, Hume writes, ‘and therefore the desire to excel in strength is to be consider’d as an inferior species of ambition’. On the other hand, there is also a distinct quality in power (and ambition) itself. Self-liking in the form of a desire to excel is ever present, but the question of power can develop into a question of love of authority without regard to one’s reputation. If we follow Hume’s wordings of power in Book 2, we notice a strong emphasis put on the fact that ‘power or an authority over others makes us capable of satisfying all our desires’.

Several things are implied. On the most basic level this indicates that the question of power is also linked to self-preservation. Authority helps us to satisfy our basic needs. More interestingly, with regard to the principle of comparison, it means that the opinions of others still matter in the question of authority. ‘Considering the nature of ambition’ one issue is ‘that the great feel a double pleasure in authority from the comparison of their own condition with that of their slaves; and that this comparison has a double influence, because ‘tis natural, and presented by the subject’. At the same time, it should be remarked that the question of power as authority is also a path towards solipsism – a direction where Hume did not want go.

In Essays, Hume uses the expression ‘love of dominion’. The ‘love of dominion’ can be discussed in its own terms. There is a quality in ambition that separates it from the question of reputation. In the essay ‘Of the independency of parliament’ (that opens with the famous discussion on avarice, ambition and the political maxim according to which every man must be supposed a knave), Hume claims that ‘so great is the natural ambition of men, that they are never satisfied with power; and if one order of men, by pursuing its own interest, can usurp every other order, it will certainly do so, and render itself, as far as possible, absolute and uncontrollable’. In one of his later essays, Hume chose to use such strong wording that claimed ‘power’ to be ‘the most coveted’ of ‘all human acquisitions’ and ‘in comparison of which even reputation and pleasure and riches are slighted’. It seems that lust for power alone can be a cause of action according to David Hume.

When we consider these passages in the context of other attempts to base moral and political philosophy around the concept of self-liking, they turn out to be nothing unusual. Pierre Nicole and Mandeville wrestled with these same issues. Hume comes closest to Mandeville’s concept of instinct of sovereignty when arguing against contract theories. ‘Our primary instincts’, Hume writes, ‘lead us, either to indulge ourselves in unlimited

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213 T. 2.1.8.4; SBN 300.
214 T. 2.2.8.14; SBN 378.
216 A similar term in Mandeville is instinct of sovereignty, see pp. 164–189 above.
freedom, or to seek dominion over others’. This Hobbist twist in the questions of ambition, power and authority seems unavoidable. There is something irreducible in this instinctive quality that concerns human actions and cannot be easily explained away. As was pointed out, it ought to be linked to Mandeville’s discussion on ‘instinct of sovereignty’, but also to Pierre Nicole, as it was earlier demonstrated. One possible classical reference point for instinct of sovereignty is Cicero’s ‘dominatus cupiditatem’ that translates into ‘desire of governing’ in the Tusculan disputations.

Even when ‘love of dominion’ may develop into a pathological obsession, it is important to know that it usually does not. This instinctive, authority seeking side of ambition is balanced by our ‘desire of esteem and applause’. A more casual way for Hume to discuss ‘ambition’ is to talk of a ‘motive’ for man to ‘push him in his Attainments; being certain, that he can never rise to any Distinction or Eminence in the World, without his own Industry’. We need to keep in mind that one of the crucial points that Hume was trying to make in the Treatise is that pride, ambition and avarice – and in fact all the passions – are linked to the thoughts of others. It is with regard to this point that Hume stresses that ‘a perfect solitude is, perhaps, the greatest punishment we can suffer’. A ‘love of dominion’ might push someone to disregard the opinions of others in her search of authority, but if not balanced by care for one’s reputation, sooner or later this ambition starts bordering a mental disorder.

Perhaps the best example of Hume’s understanding of ambition ordinarily controlled by the care for one’s reputation comes from Essays, where he discusses the exceptional professional group of the clergy. Again, as a basic principle Hume gives the fact that ‘most men have an overweening conceit of themselves’. In other words, we have a need to excel. Therefore, logically, ‘most men are ambitious; but the ambition of other men may commonly be satisfied, by excelling in their particular profession, and thereby promoting the interests of society’. The ‘ambition of the clergy’ is different. It concerns ‘promoting ignorance and superstition’, which are a public nuisance. The logical link, or pattern, that Hume draws is helpful. Ambition concerns the satisfaction of our self-liking. Since the view that we have of our own worth is always warped, we have almost a pathological need to excel. When we excel for example in a particular profession, this promotes the ‘interests of society’. Therefore, as Mandeville might have agreed, our private vice (ambition) turns quite effortlessly into a public benefit. But there are many cases where more

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223 T. 2.2.5.15; SBN 363.
direct political meddling is required. We need the right kind of political structure concerning both ambition and avarice, if we want to live in an enlightened Europe. This is the political message that Hume's project of greatness of mind was designed to put forward.

In the Treatise, Hume drew a geometrical line from self-love to justice and property. As we have already learned, we understand the point of this picture only when considered together with the parallel line from self-liking to politeness. Nothing changes in this respect in Essays and treatises. What we should not forget is that self-liking is effectively linked to the question of politeness. Ambition, as a desire to excel, makes no exception. Perhaps the easiest way to grasp this is to consider it in contrast to its counterpart, avarice. While Hume applauds ambition, his attitude towards avarice borders hostility. We have learned that ambition through the desire to excel (in all its different cases) is inseparable from self-liking. Avarice is chained to self-love in the same manner. In Essays, Hume gives as a synonym of avarice, 'the desire of gain'. 'Avarice, or the desire of gain' is to be considered as 'an universal passion, which operates at all times, in all places, and upon all persons'. Avarice is also the very epitome of self-love. It concerns concrete, material things, which originally evolve from the concept of self-preservation. What particularly interests us here is the contrast between the 'desire to excel' and 'desire of gain' that is apparent for example in an essay entitled 'Of avarice'.

What needs to be understood is that Hume's treatment of avarice concerns 'men of immense fortunes, without heirs, and on the very brink of the grave, who refuse themselves the most common necessities of life' because they are possessed with the 'desire of gain'. This fits well into the luxury debate of the early eighteenth century. A man hoarding riches, but unwilling to spend does not contribute to the commercial system and risks his part in the international state system (one could even imagine a parallel between this 'avaricious man' and a mercantilist state). In fact, the reason why Hume has such a negative attitude towards avarice is a general criticism towards the modern, commercial system that produces these men that have avarice as their 'prevailing inclination' (one can still imagine the parallel between man and state). The argument that unfolds also explains Hume's zeal for France. There is a solution that might reap the benefits of both commerce and monarchical form of government, namely 'civilized monarchies'.

For us to understand that the main issue for Hume is not the luxury debate, we ought to turn to some of the other early essays. On the one hand, Hume naturally perceives that there is a positive side to avarice. As a

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225 Regarding the link between property, interest and justice, see also Hume, 'Of passive obedience', in Essays, p. 489. For the role of politeness, pride and self-satisfaction, see especially EPM 8; SBN 261–267 and EPM Appendix 4.3; SBN 314–5.

226 Hume, 'Of the rise and progress of arts and sciences', in Essays, p. 113.

universal, 'obstinate' passion, it is a 'spur to industry'.\(^{228}\) Avarice is one wheel that keeps civil society in motion. What we also need to understand is that self-love is the basis of this passion. One description of avarice that Hume gives in his second Enquiry is that it is 'one extreme of frugality'. Frugality, quite naturally, concerns how a person is willing to dispose of her possessions, a question concerning self-love. The extreme of avarice, 'both deprives a man of all use of his riches, and checks hospitality and every social enjoyment'. Here the link to self-preservation is inevitable, and we see the basic friction between self-love and 'social enjoyment'.\(^{229}\) In the Treatise, Hume famously explains that 'vanity' should be considered 'a bond of union among men' and pride is a social passion.\(^{230}\) It is the core of hospitality and social enjoyment. Meanwhile, at a very basic level, self-love is the opposite, as the concept of avarice reveals. What this means is that desire of gain drives men to solitude. Even in the worst case of misguided ambition social relations are apparent. But in the case of avarice, when the hoarding becomes an object in itself, reputation and opinion of others do not necessarily matter. As Hume pointed out, 'none of the most furious excesses of love and ambition are in any respect to be compared to the extremes of avarice'.\(^{231}\)

Hume's ambiguous attitude towards self-love and avarice as dominating passions is also revealed in the essay 'Rise and progress'. 'Desire of gain' as a 'universal passion' is a driving force especially in 'Holland'. The Dutch are for Hume the prime example of what is wrong with modern Europe. 'Multitudes of people, necessity and liberty, have', quite right, 'begotten commerce in Holland'; but at the same time 'study and application have scarcely produced any eminent writers' among the Dutch.\(^{232}\) In his letters, Hume expounded his personal loath of the Dutch culture.\(^{233}\) It was the 'want of politeness' that made Hume quote the abusive line of a rustic person 'civilized in Holland'.\(^{234}\) As we have already seen, this has everything to do with the role that the form of government plays in Hume's political thought. But it is the link between certain passions and the form of government that makes this interesting. The Dutch are a prime example of a republican society that operates based on the 'desire of gain' instead of refining the different forms of self-liking. The problem for Hume is not the form of government as such. It is the fact that the prevailing inclination in Holland is the 'desire of gain' instead of different forms of self-liking that refine the culture. This is the simple, foundational point that Hume makes. In the end, it is Hume's loath of culture based on self-love that makes him

\(^{228}\) Hume, 'Of civil liberty', in Essays, p. 93.
\(^{229}\) EPM 6.12; SBN 238.
\(^{230}\) T 3.2.2.12; SBN 491.
\(^{231}\) Hume, 'Of avarice', in Essays, p. 571.
\(^{232}\) Hume, 'Of the rise and progress of arts and sciences', in Essays, p. 113.
\(^{234}\) Hume, 'Of the rise and progress of arts and sciences', in Essays, p. 127.
dismiss the Dutch. And avarice, of course, is the cornerstone of this criticism.

We have learned that Hume turned even the question of false religion into a question of self-liking. Originally ‘Of superstition and enthusiasm’ functioned as a double essay together with ‘Of avarice’ in the same way as the pair ‘Of eloquence’ and ‘Of rise and progress’. While one function of ‘Of eloquence’ was to dismiss the republican arguments stressing the political significance of eloquence for modern European states, ‘Of rise and progress’ turned into a praise of French politeness, which was particularly denounced by the same authors that embraced eloquence and the ancient republican parameters. In a similar manner, ‘Of superstition and enthusiasm’ (that was placed right before ‘Of avarice’) implicates that self-liking is the natural foundation of many aspects of modern culture. And after this analysis, Hume turns to renounce self-love as a “false”, motivating passion in ‘Of Avarice’. The pointed argument in the essay on avarice becomes clear after the overall significance of self-liking has been previously underlined in a separate essay. And it is the context of these two contrasted essays that enables us to understand what Hume means in the closing of the essay ‘Of the dignity or meanness of human nature’ (which came after ‘Of Avarice’). Hume writes, ‘vanity is so closely allied to virtue’ that ‘to love the glory of virtuous deeds is a sure proof of the love of virtue’. Bernard Mandeville would have agreed with Hume, but Francis Hutcheson did not.

Hume's pragmatic message regarding a political system is simple. As a politician one ought to use the passions of men by employing the objects that satisfy them: avarice with riches, ambition with honours. In democratic and monarchical ‘forms of government, those who possess the supreme authority have the disposal of many honours’, which ‘excite the ambition’ and ‘advantages’ that in a parallel manner satisfy the ‘avarice of mankind’. Hume also expresses this is by proposing two questions: ‘Are the riches the chief object of your desires?’ or ‘Would you acquire the public esteem?’ In practice, these questions naturally overlap. Riches acquire admiration and can raise someone’s self-esteem (they also naturally function in accordance with self-preservation). Just in a similar vein, ambition usually seeks public esteem, which also entails power. Now, power can also be used to function in the direction of self-preservation and it always raises the self-esteem. The point is that these two basic principles, the axiom of human nature, cannot be accurately described. At the same time Hume reminds us that the objects of ambition and avarice vary from person to person. One man’s ambition is not the same as the other’s. Yet, the principles behind the particular objects are the same.

235 Hume, ‘Of the dignity or meanness of human nature’, in Essays, p. 86.
We are starting to grasp the significance of discussing ‘passions of interest and ambition’ together.\(^{238}\) We should also still keep emphasising the direction in which this basic division of fundamental passions evolves. And this is the direction of culture in general and Hume's later emphasis on the distinction between useful and agreeable.

Epilogue: Hume’s mature position on greatness of mind

Artificial principles can make a compelling outward appearance of greatness. Artificial principles do not, however, guarantee strength of mind, Hume reminds his readers in Enquiry concerning the principles of morals.1 ‘Strength of mind’ is ‘a steady adherence to a general and a distant interest, in opposition to the allurements of present pleasure and advantage’.2 Greatness of mind is mainly ‘a disposition or turn of mind, which qualifies a man to rise in the world’.3 Hume’s point is that we ought not to think that even people with greatness of mind would have real strength of mind. This is one reason why we should not confuse Hume’s discussion on greatness of mind with the common usage of magnanimity from Aristotle onwards. The point becomes evident when we consider Hume’s treatment of the ancient ‘heroes in philosophy’, those who are often thought to have accomplished ‘undisturbed philosophical tranquillity’. In Enquiry concerning the principles of morals, the ancient heroes of philosophy are put at the same level with the Scythians ‘scalping their enemies’.4 Stoicism is proved to be just another ‘branch’ of self-denial, which in essence is ‘extravagant and supernatural’ and not different from the feverish courage of the ancients.5

Throughout his oeuvre Hume raises the objection that self-rule is a futile topic in politics. For example, in an ironic description of the Stoics in Essays, Hume remarks that when ‘we have fixed all the rules of conduct, we are philosophers’ and ‘when we have reduced these rules to practice, we are sages’.6 What is left unsaid, and what makes this ironic, is that according to Hume, self-rule rarely applies to real life and the part of putting the rules of conduct into practice falls within the sphere of politics. As Hume famously

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1 EPM 4.13–14; SBN 209 and EPM 6.15; SBN 239.
2 EPM 4.1; SBN 205.
3 EPM 6.29; SBN 246.
4 EPM 7.14; SBN 255.
declares, in politics ‘every man ought to be supposed a knave’. What is required hence is a political structure based on a realistic, almost cynical, understanding of human nature, quite the opposite of the society of Zeno’s sages. The basic principle of any political system, according to Hume, is the assumption that people remain just as foolish as they would without the right ‘forms and institutions’. It does not mean that we need to assume that everyone necessarily is a knave. But it does mean that to talk about self-rule as a political principle is a waste of time. Hume’s overall point is that people do not cultivate such attributes as ‘philosophical tranquillity’ in ‘modern times’ as part of their character. Instead, the ‘administration of government’ has had its influence and ‘a degree of humanity, clemency, order’ and real ‘tranquillity’ has been distributed even among the vulgar together with justice and politeness. To Hume, this was a true ‘compensation’.

But what this also means is that even the modern ‘greatness of mind’ should not be too much applauded as a quality of a particular individual. The most mature presentation of the subject is included in Enquiry concerning the principles of morals. In the Treatise, the partly ironic treatment of Alexander, the Macedonian madman, as an epic illustration of greatness, is only implied. In Enquiry concerning the principles of morals, Hume consciously reveals the shallowness of greatness of mind. The ‘supernatural courage of Alexander’, that Hume also referred to in Enquiry concerning human understanding, was based upon extraordinary degree of pride.

The ambiguous character of greatness of mind becomes apparent, when we consider how Hume’s own attitude towards the relationship between natural and artificial virtues changes from the Treatise to Enquiry. In the Treatise, Hume treated natural affection and other natural virtues more or less indifferently. As we have seen, their principal function was to reveal our confined generosity, which in a way conflicts with artificial virtues that enable a civil society to function. This is unsurprising, because Hume’s

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8 For the fresh argument that ‘Zeno’s Republic and the Cosmopolitan tradition’ are in fact grounded on similar principles, see Sellars, ‘Stoic cosmopolitanism and Zeno’s Republic’, 2007, pp. 1–29. By and large, I think we have good grounds for dissociating Hume’s political theory from ideas about morality as self-governance.
9 It is quite usual to see Hume linked to Stoicism. Peter Jones has emphasised the Ciceronian aspect in his Hume’s Sentiments, their Ciceronian and French context, Edinburgh University Press, 1982. Here Hume’s remark to Hutcheson that he takes his catalogue of virtues from De Officiis instead of Whole duty of man has become a powerful rhetorical tool – although it does not necessarily imply that we need to go very far with this argument, because Hume contrasts his view quite sharply with Cicero (especially regarding manners). Also Wilson, ‘Hume’s cognitive Stoicism’, 1984, pp. 52–68, follows Jones. James Moore makes a different case of Hume’s link to Cicero, simply underlining Hume’s admiration of De Officiis in contrast to Hutcheson’s view of moral sense; Moore, ‘Utility and Humanity’, 2002, pp. 365–386.
10 EPM 7.18; SBN 257.
11 EHU 8.8.
objective was to make a point about the neglected importance of artificial virtues. A clear change in *Enquiry concerning the principles of morals* is that Hume now treats natural virtues in a more positive light, even when he still points out that 'we are naturally partial to ourselves, and to our friends' even when we 'are capable of learning the advantage resulting from a more equitable conduct'. In *Enquiry*, Hume does not discuss the difference between natural and artificial as a direct contrast (which is still implied however). Also, he is no longer discussing *de facto* natural virtues, but uses the term social (and softer) virtues. Justice is still presented as coarse (in section 3), but instead of stressing the partial role of natural virtues, Hume now turns to imply that the real significance of the social virtues (which they are now also called) is that they function as a balancing force to the greatness of mind. Nevertheless, as Hume himself points out, his 'present business' was not 'to recommend generosity and benevolence, or to paint, in their true colours, all the genuine charms of the social virtues'. His concern had much to do with 'being eminent', a central feature of greatness of mind.

An original development in Hume's moral and political philosophy when turning from *Treatise* to *Enquiry* is his emphasis on the conceptual pair of useful and agreeable. Hume engages in this subject early on in *Enquiry concerning the principles of morals* and in fact some of the earlier essays already reveal Hume's interest in the topic. Hume started off his project of greatness of mind with the Mandevillian conceptual pair of self-love and self-liking. Through a subtle analysis of interest and pride Hume drew the moral institutions of justice and politeness from this foundation by focusing his attention on the direct connection between human nature and moral institutions. In his political essays, Hume elaborated on the same foundation with his analysis on avarice and ambition and how they relate to the practical side of politics. The final step expanding this discussion was to introduce a broadly cultural distinction implied in the division of useful and agreeable.

Hume divided the section of 'greatness of mind' of the *Treatise* into sections 7 and 8 of *Enquiry concerning the principles of morals*. These two sections are the only ones discussing agreeable qualities of human nature. As Hume in the Dialogue sums up, his concern has been the 'four sources of moral sentiment', which are 'the useful or the agreeable qualities; to those which regard self, or those which extend to society'. Since two of the four qualities fall within the sphere of self-liking, we may point out that the project of greatness of mind bears significant relevance to all of Hume's philosophical works. But still, we ought to stress the enthusiasm that Hume puts to his analysis of politeness, which only refined over time. The first

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12 EPM 3.13; SBN 188.
13 EPM 2.4; SBN 177.
14 The distinction does appear already in the *Treatise*. My argument is that it becomes more relevant as a development of the distinction between self-love and self-liking in *Enquiry*.  

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paragraph of the section 8, 'Of qualities agreeable to others', is Hume at his very best and we ought to close this thesis with a full quote of it, which summarises the importance of the distinction between self-love and self-liking for David Hume's moral and political philosophy:

As the mutual shocks, in society, and the oppositions of interest and self-love have constrained mankind to establish the laws of justice in order to preserve the advantages of mutual assistance and protection: In like manner, the eternal contrarieties, in company, of men's pride and self-conceit, have introduced the rules of GOOD MANNERS or POLITENESS; in order to facilitate the intercourse of minds, and an undisturbed commerce and conversation. Among well-bred people, a mutual deference is affected: Contempt of others disguised: Authority concealed: Attention given to each in his turn: And an easy stream of conversation maintained, without vehemence, without interruption, without eagerness for victory, and without any airs of superiority. These attentions and regards are immediately agreeable to others, abstracted from any consideration of utility or beneficial tendencies: They conciliate affection, promote esteem, and extremely enhance the merit of the person, who regulates his behaviour by them.\textsuperscript{15}

The argument of politeness in the Treatise is fully retained and even enhanced in Enquiry concerning the principles of morals. But now, when this is presented as the epitome of agreeableness, it implies that the role of politeness is even further amplified. In the end, even when Hume's position became more mature, nothing really changed. It was the question of self-liking and politeness that dominated his moral and political thinking from the beginning to the end.

\textsuperscript{15} EPM 8.1; SBN 261.
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