Mia Jaatinen

Lobbying Political Issues

A Contingency Model of Effective Lobbying Strategies
Words are also actions
and actions are a kind of words.

Emerson, Ralph Waldo 1803–1882
Essays "Poet"
Abstract


This study describes and explains lobbying by Finnish interest groups at the national and EU-level and builds general theory of lobbying. The purposes of this study was to test the new model of effective lobbying strategies developed by Jaatinen (1994, 1998), to add a dynamic aspect to the model, and to find out whether the model can be applied in different issues at the different levels of political decision-making.

The research strategy consisted of abductive thinking and multiple-case study design. The data collection methods were a personal interview, observation, and the collection of documents. Eight lobbyists were interviewed on issues they had successfully lobbied. Fifteen cases were constructed based on these issues. Two experts were interviewed to test the preliminary findings. The qualitative data was classified and quantified to find patterns and to test propositions.

This study provides a new definition of lobbying and a new theory of the strategic management of lobbying. It also presents a new theory of lobbying as conflict accommodation that leans heavily on the two-way symmetrical model of public relations developed by J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1992). It is concluded that the theory is applicable to lobbying both in the normative and positive senses. Support was found for the conceptualization of effectiveness as success and sensitivity to situations. A political metaphor of organizations, a total communications point of view, and the management by results approach lay a general framework for conceptualization.

The study introduces a view on the dynamics of lobbying that is founded on a contingency view and a new theory of group activation developed on the basis of the situational theory presented by J. Grunig (1984). The contingency view is based on the theory developed by Wiio (1977, 1989, 1992) and Åberg (1989). The concept of issue life-cycle presented by Buchholz (1988) and T. Marx (1990) was also tested but evidence was not found on the phasic change of the means of lobbying.

The new model of lobbying for conflict accommodation is a contingency model that indicates the appropriate lobbying strategies in the prevailing situations of political participation and explains the dynamics of lobbying due to the change of situation. It can be used as a tool for planning and evaluating lobbying. It is applicable to the different types of issues at both the national
and EU-level.

*Keywords:* lobbying, public relations, public affairs, conflict resolution, issues management, change management, strategy, effectiveness, contingency theory, abduction.
Preface

Research into lobbying from a communication point of view has been rare in Finland. In 1993, however, communication scholars from the University of Helsinki and University of Tampere started a research project on publicity, communication campaigns, and citizen opinion formation related to the referendum held on Finland’s membership of the European Union. The project was financed by the Finnish Academy. Related to this project, I studied interest groups’ efforts to lobby for and against EU membership. The study revealed that lobbying is a very contradictory subject in Finland and the concept needs clarification and a modern definition. The model of lobbying strategies developed in that study could be used to describe lobbying for a big issue at the national level of political decision-making. The strategies and tactics used by the advocates and adversaries were advanced and showed that the latest developments in theory of lobbying could be used to explain lobbying in Finland. The question remained whether the new model could be applied to different kinds of issues and at different levels of decision-making but also if the model could be used to describe the dynamics of lobbying. As Finland became a member of the EU from the beginning of 1995, lobbyists and political decision-makers had to learn how to participate in the political decision-making of the EU effectively. The EU-level also provided an interesting arena in which the new model might be applicable.

My interest in the subject of lobbying was first aroused when I was working for a big national construction company that was highly dependent on government subsidies. Later, having gone into the theoretical literature and research on lobbying more deeply, I found a new motivation to continue my research: guarding the democratic political system at the national level, securing interest surveillance at the EU-level, and providing practitioners help in planning ethically responsible lobbying activities. The changes in the political system of Finland made lobbying an issue of the day and, thus, offered a needs based and fruitful object of study. Without experience as a practitioner, I have had to rely on the opinions of my interviewees in revealing the reality of the situation. If these value-based sentences are used to judge my subjectivity, I must claim to having kept within rigorous scientific methods and lines of reasoning and respected the evaluations of my research subjects.

As a Finnish citizen and resident, I am in a special position to apply foreign theories in my country. I have the advantage of being able to make connections with important people and to interpret the data from the Finnish
point of view. A disadvantage that I might have is I might be blind to some aspects of my culture and it might be difficult for me to use a critical eye. Anyhow, I believe I have made a contribution to the research into lobbying and my research has some theoretical value to an emerging European theory.
Acknowledgments

The conception of this book happened in 1993 when I chose to begin research on lobbying for my Master’s thesis. I was very much interested in studying the scanning of the political environment of private companies but it was a breakthrough idea of Professor Leif Åberg that I should start studying the flow of information from an organization outwards to its political environment, lobbying. I decided to study the two-way flow of information between organizations that lobby and those who they lobby. I am greatly indebted to Leif Åberg for making this study possible in the first place and, secondly, for helping me along the whole process of climbing the ladder of excellence in scientific research.

My studies at the University of Maryland refined my perspective to my research subject and made me grow as a responsible researcher. I am deeply grateful to Associate Professor Larissa Grunig for her firm guidance and continuous encouragement. She introduced me to many important ideas that contributed directly to this study. I would also like to thank Professor James Grunig for his candid support and intellectual nourishment.

I could not have done this study without the consent of my interviewees. Their contribution was crucial since this study relies to a great deal on their accounts. Thank you all for your interest in my study and the wealth and significance of information you provided. Especially, I would like to thank Director Kari Jalas and Ulla Sirkeinen for their contribution to my understanding of eurolobbying. I want to express my special gratitude to Leif Fast for his insightful comments that only his long experience could provide.

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Without family and friends, a project of this size could be too demanding. I want to thank my beloved husband Vesa Välimäki for his caring and loving attitude. He stood by my side even if I flew to the U.S. for a year for this study. His many visits and our holidays together helped me carry on with this project. What could have been more wonderful than a beautiful wedding on the home stretch? Thanks to my parents Eila and Mauri Jaatinen for believing in me and the worth of my efforts. Thanks to Ursula Ströh, Yunna Rheec, Virginia
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Espoo, Finland, April 27, 1999

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1 Introduction

1.1 Lobbying and the Political Process

Lobbying on Governmental Policies and Legislation

The word “lobbying” in English originates from the word ‘lobby’ that means a large waiting room or hall in front of parliamentary chambers, the House of Commons and the House of Lords, or in the corridors of the U.S. Congress. It is a room where representatives of external groups come to meet their legislator and discuss matters of common interest. In Finland, it is more common to meet in a little cafeteria next to the entrance-hall of the Parliament. The Finnish parliament meets in one chamber, the General Assembly, but bicameralism is given some foundation by the Grand Committee that has the right to revise proposals for legislation and the right to information and consultation on all norms related to the European Union. The semi-presidential system has given strong means of influence to the President and the Government that is elected from the General Assembly and it has to enjoy the confidence of the Assembly. It is the Council of State that makes proposals for legislation and the President who confirms them. From the beginning of 1995, Finland has been a member of the European Union which has meant transferring some of the legislative powers from Finland to the confederal EU. Intergovernmental policy-making has acquired a totally new meaning in Nordic politics.

In the Nordic “negotiation economy”, interest groups and organizations have been given informal permanent representation in many committees dealing with issues of sectional interest to these groups. They are invited to give their opinions on laws under preparation, given membership of a task force, and invited to parliamentary committees. In political theory, this type of interest representation is often called neo-corporatism or societal corporatism in which both corporatist and pluralist features of interest representation co-exist. It is common to many European countries, and characterizes the EU to some extent, as well. At the EU-level, the sectional interests are represented in the Economic and Social Committee, the Regional Committee, and in the national preparation organizations. The other ways to lobby are mostly forms of external influence directed at rule-making institutions of the EU: lobbying the European Commission, the members of the Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament. Social dialogue,
however, is mainly conducted in negotiations between European interest groups.

The interest groups observed in this study engaged in proactive issue detection, strategic planning, communication to solve public disputes, and everyday lobbying activities. The lobbyists interviewed revealed how they succeeded in achieving their objectives on issues important to the interest group. Lobbying involves communication with all the groups participating in political decision-making.

Right to and Ethics of Participation

Participating in political decision-making is an inherent right of a citizen in a democratic political system. In a direct democracy, all citizens gather together to discuss their desires and problems and make decisions concerning them. In a representative system, an individual can influence his fate and the future of his/her nation by contacting directly and alone his parliamentary representative, but a more common form of influence, in addition to voting in elections, is indirect participation through an interest group. In a direct democracy, all expertise is inherent in the decision-making body, but in a representative democracy, the representatives have to get information for decision-making from outside the decision-making body (external sources). In a complicated modern society, this is effectively done only through some kind of representation, because it is simply impossible for everyone to contact his representative and it is quite natural that organizations are more capable of producing the required expertise than individuals.

If democracy is defined, as Aristotle (cited by Berndtson 1992) did when he classified political systems, as a system in which everybody (many governors) furthers his own interests and some sort of allocation is produced by integrating these efforts (Aristotle according to Berndtson 1992, 194–195) —“something to everyone” if viewed as fair allocation—then interest representation is just an advanced, group mode of democratic participation. The crisis of credibility of political systems and the diminished confidence in interest groups which are seen to be all too powerful is a movement denying the rights of interest groups to influence political decision-making. The criticism that democracy is distorted should be taken for serious but it should not lead to the total extinction of one form of participation. Indeed, a modern society needs several cooperative and competitive groups to inform decision-makers of the opinions and interests of their members and to convey information from decision makers to citizens.

This form of communication is essentially lobbying. Lobbying is, in ever-increasing sense, about delivering information, now, that lobbying has
become more democratic. Lobbying does not have to be conspiratorial, self-interested, and disruptive of democracy. Lobbying has begun to mean expert help for political decision-makers. It is no longer characterized so much by direct pressure on individuals, privileges for certain groups, and financial contributions to mold the opinions of decision-makers. Corruption is condemned by the public, self-respecting decision-makers, and in courts. Group power is criticized, and reforms are planned to reduce the influence of individual trade associations on national-scale incomes policy.

I think some principles of democratic lobbying can be formulated, conditions stated, and advice given on how to lobby in a democratic way. These principles can be applied with regard to both the American democracy and the parliamentary democracy more common elsewhere (About the differences between these systems see Birch 1993, 43–68). The first condition of democratic lobbying is that its main characteristic is information exchange made easier by good relations and a honest profile. The second condition is that no illegitimate power relations should affect the political decision-making. These conditions serve two cardinal principles of democracy: “government by the people” or “based on the consent of the governed” and “equality” (Macridis 1992, 22). For example, in a democracy, a power generated as a result of representing a large group of citizens and using resources to acquire expertise is legitimate but if this power is used to keep somebody quiet, to distort someone’s public image for no reason, or to dominate society it becomes illegitimate. The use of power may, then, determine the legitimacy of influence.

The third condition for lobbying to be democratic is pluralism in values. For a lobbyist and a decision-maker, it means that they should tolerate several points of views on an issue. The fourth condition relates to the system in which lobbying is exercised: it is open access to every group in one form or another. “Individual rights and freedoms” and “pluralism”, i.e. rights of groups as long as they do not coerce the individual,—both including the right of “participation”—are also central principles in definitions of democracy (Macridis 1992, 22–23, 34–44). The fifth condition is transparency in decision-making so that external control can be performed.

A lobbyist can execute his task democratically if he or she is ready to adapt his or her specific interests to the common interest and promote the latter in a favorable form and, secondly, if he or she uses his or her political resources in a legitimate way. Using pressure or corruptive means will only lead to a bad image and loss of rent. The third practical advice that can be given to a lobbyist is that he or she should search for mutual gain, win-win solutions. This means preferring cooperation to competition, building
coalitions instead of attacking others, and being informative and open to persuasion. The fifth advice is to use arguments that can be published. In this study, the issue of ethics of lobbying is raised and a theory of ethical communication is provided—an issue closely related to democratic lobbying.

Conflic Resolution and the Political System

The political decision-making process is a conflict resolution mechanism of the society. Participants in a political process engage in interaction in which the final decision is determined by the share of supporting opinions gathered on the side of each party to a dispute. When parties try to further their interests in a dispute over an issue, this leads to conflicting, competitive and cooperative efforts to solve the problem. Parties try to influence decision-making through the decision-makers and other parties taking into account the setting of opinions and powers of the other parties. This setting and the communicative efforts to influence it can be described as a process. It is a process in which political power, values, and resources are allocated.

According to the Oxford Dictionary of English, the word 'game' means a play or sport with rules. It is used of athletic contests such as the Olympic Games, and it implies that in a competition participants have an objective to win a match or a championship and they have a plan how to do this (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary 1989, 507). This definition is in accordance with the definition given in Webster's Dictionary of English (Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary 1996). However, the word 'game' also has a meaning of cooperation. Playing somebody's game means furthering somebody's plans intentionally or unintentionally. All the parties to a dispute can be integrated in a game of cooperation in which a common interest replaces pure self-interest. In the political process, participants look after the public interest in which their own self-interest is also served. Cooperation has the greatest potential to find a mutually acceptable decision and to resolve a dispute permanently.

If parties are not willing to engage in a joint-effort, they may build up opposition. Competition over scarce resources is based on certain rules of a viable system such as tournaments and political markets, but conflicual behavior is an illegitimate way of influencing the state of affairs and it is directed at parties' identities. As weakly regulated and tension arousing, conflicual behavior is highly likely to transform into a protracted litigation. Conflict is not a game, it is a destructive activity, however, parties in a conflict can be persuaded to resolve their differences through peaceful negotiation. In mixed-motive conditions, these negotiations will be carried through by cooperative and competitive actions. A mixture of cooperation and
competition is the most effective means of resolving and managing conflicts. In this study, using the theory of lobbying as conflict accommodation, I will look deeper into the problem of conflicts of interests and efforts to solve them.

The Political Metaphor

Many organizational theorists (e.g. Pfeffer 1982, Mintzberg 1983, and Bolman & Deal 1991) have used a political metaphor to better understand the role of power, interests, and conflict in organizational life (Spicer 1997, 109). Mintzberg (1983) extended the political framework to the external control of organizations (Mintzberg 1983). The political metaphor is particularly useful for studying the role of public relations in organizations (Spicer 1997, 109; Simões 1998, 9). It focuses on the political aspects of communication inwards and outwards of organizations. Thus, it is fruitful in studying the phenomenon of lobbying. In addition, lobbying is a part of the societal political system. It is a kind of interaction mechanism between a focus organization and the macro political system. So, it naturally plays a part in the general political theory, too.

Throughout this study, the assumptions of the political metaphor will serve as a larger framework within which the phenomenon of lobbying will be studied. These assumptions might be very similar to the assumptions a lobbyist uses to interpret his or her external environment and makes decisions on actions to follow. Revising Bolman and Deal’s (1991) propositions and applying Pfeffer’s (1982) and Mintzberg’s (1983) ideas, four assumptions have been made for the purpose of this study. In general, decision-making in an organization and the political system of a society concern the interests of different groups and subgroups and allocation of scarce resources based on negotiated agreements. The assumptions are:

1) Organizations and the societal political system are constituted by groups that are interdependent because they share one or more common pools of resources.

2) These groups have common and different goals and interests.

3) There are conflicts because the resources are scarce.

4) A group will engage in conflicts over issues that are salient to it if it has enough power or potential for influence.

The political perspective of organizations have been criticized for underestimating the potential for rational action and collaboration as well as
providing a pessimistic view of reality (Bolman & Deal 1991, 237–238). However, the perspective applied in this study gives emphasizes collaboration and adopts a middle point in the continuum from rational to irrational action. The study provides guidelines for effective conflict resolution (an optimistic, normative characterization).

1.2 Objectives of the Study and Research Questions

Objectives of the Study

This study sets out to develop a modern definition of lobbying, observe lobbying strategies and tactics, conceptualize the effectiveness of lobbying, and model lobbying strategies. The purpose is to develop further a new model of effective lobbying strategies that was introduced in the Master’s thesis of the author of this Doctoral dissertation. The model describes appropriate strategic choices and derived tactics in contingency situations of political decision-making. Contingency factors determining the situations are selected from the external environment of a lobbying organization. These factors affecting the success of lobbying are constituted by the opinions and actions of participants in the political decision-making.

In this study, the dynamic aspects of lobbying will be added to the model, i.e. lobbying will be observed as it changes according to changes in a situation. Specifically, the objective is to develop a view on situational sensitivity, that is, how a change in contingency factors is detected and how a lobbying strategy is changed according to changes in the state of these factors. Furthermore, dynamics can be produced in lobbying by the progress of the political process in which a decision on a certain political issue is made. This aspect of dynamics will be captured by using the concept of issue lifecycle.

The second objective of this study is to bring the general model closer to practice by observing lobbying in different types of political issues and interviewing lobbying experts on aspects related to applications of the model. The objective is to make the new model easy to apply to actual lobbying, thereby assisting lobbyists by giving them a tool for planning and evaluating lobbying.

The third objective is to find out how added levels of political decision-making and interaction between the international and national level affect lobbying. Finland became a member of the European Union at the beginning of 1995, and the Finnish lobbyists are adapting to the realities of multiple-level decision-making and lobbying. This development may also have an
effect on the structure and applicability of the new model that was developed in the national context before Finland joined the EU. An effect of intergovernmental policy-making on the structure could appear as a need to add a new contingency factor to the model. An effect of added levels on the applicability of the model, on the other hand, could appear as a possibility to use the model in planning the lobbying of the institutions of the European Union (eurolobbying) and the political institutions of other member countries (foreign lobbying). This study will look into many issues at a variety of levels.

In addition to these main objectives, new insights will be produced on concepts such as lobbying, strategy, competition, and power. All new definitions of the central concepts of this study will be flavored with conflict resolution theory that provides an alternative view to a strategist or marketing perspective for lobbying. It will be demonstrated that lobbying communication is essentially related to management communication and the public relations functions of an organization and has potential to be considered as democratic participation in the political decision-making concerning the vital interests and needs of a lobbying group.

The main theories used in this study include the new model of effective lobbying (original Jaatinen 1994), a new theory of group activation based on the situational theory developed by James Grunig (Grunig, J. & Hunt 1984), a new theory of lobbying as conflict accommodation (Jaatinen 1998a) leaning heavily on the two-way symmetrical model of public relations developed by James and Larissa Grunig (Grunig, J. & Grunig, L. 1992), a new definition of lobbying (original Jaatinen 1995a) and a new theory of the strategic management of lobbying. Contingency view (Wiio 1977, 1989, 1992) is the technique used to construct a model of effective lobbying. The view on dynamics is based on the contingency view and the concept of issue life-cycle (Marx, T. 1990). The general research strategy consists of abductive thinking (Niiniluoto 1983) and a multiple-case study design (Yin 1989). The main data collection methods are a personal interview (Merton et al. 1956, Nachmias, D. & Nachmias, C. 1981, Hirsjärvi & Hurme 1985, Mishler 1986), observation, and collection of documents. Despite the qualitative nature of these methods, the data has been quantified in order to look for patterns.

Research Questions

The objectives of this study are approached by posing the following questions:

1. How and why do interest groups lobby in the way they do? Does it correspond to the way described and explained by the contingency model of
effective lobbying?

a) What kind of objectives or goals do the lobbyists participating in this study have in the chosen political issues they were successful in?
b) How do the lobbyists participating in this study try to affect political decision-making in the political issues chosen by them and why do they do so?
   - What kind of factors do they think have to be taken into account if a lobbyist wants to be successful in influencing political decision-making?
   - What kinds of strategies and tactics do the lobbyists use in lobbying? What is the order of effectiveness of different means of lobbying?
c) How do the lobbyists participating in this study evaluate their performance?

2. How and why does a lobbying strategy change according to the changes of the situation? Does it correspond to the way described and explained by the contingency model of effective lobbying?
   a) How do the lobbyists participating in this study notice a change in the situation (contingency factors) around a political issue? How does a lobbyist distinguish between an important change and random variation?
   b) How do the lobbyists change their strategies (because of a change in the situation or to change the situation more favorable to themselves)?
   c) How does lobbying change with shifts from phase to phase of the political process (issue life-cycle)?

3. What kind of differences are there in lobbying different types of issues? Can the contingency model of effective lobbying be applied in the same way to different issues?
   - What is the difference between lobbying issues which receive widespread attention and issues generating less interest?

4. What kind of differences can be found in lobbying at different levels of political decision-making? Can the contingency model of effective lobbying be applied in the same way at different levels of political decision-making?
   - How does lobbying at the national level differ from lobbying at the EU-level?
   - How does interaction between the national and EU-level of political decision-making affect lobbying?
1.3 Research Traditions

*Perspectives on Lobbying*

Lobbying is an ancient form of political activity, but research into lobbying has its beginnings in the 1950's, and ever since lobbying has been of interest to economic, political, management and communication theorists. A thorough inquiry in previous research reveals that there are several research traditions defining lobbying in different ways. Six lines of investigations will be reviewed here: 1) lobbying as a part of public relations, 2) social responsibility of organizations, 3) lobbying as a two-way communication, 4) issues management and crisis communication, 5) the theory of political strategy, and 6) strategic management as political planning. In addition to these lines of investigations, interest group theory, the theory of managing external environment of organizations, mass communication theory, and the theory of conflict resolution have made contributions to the field.

The origins of the field of public relations goes back to Germany in the late 19th century and the early 20th century North America. It seems that the field developed in these two places independently, from Öffentlichkeitsarbeit or the information dissemination model in Germany (Bentele & Grazyna-Maria 1996) and from press agency or publicity model in the U.S. (Grunig, J. & Hunt 1984). In Finland, since its inception in the 1920's the field has undergone a change from focusing on publicity to influencing public opinion in the 1940's, to emphasizing dialogue in the 1960's and corporate citizenship-thinking in the mid 1970's, and to focusing on scanning in the early 1980's (Åberg 1990, 15). The research into the field has, however, become dominated by English speaking cultures—the U.S. and the U.K., especially.

In the U.S., public relations originated in the 1920's as a management tool to defend special interests against journalism and government regulation. In the beginning, public relations was defined as one-way persuasive communication and molding of public opinion. Only after World War II was public relations conceptualized also as a two-way communication, its main characteristics being reciprocity and relationships, and it won widespread acceptance among organization leaders. (Stanley 1985, 4-12; Cutlip et al. 1994, 1-21.) Public relations theorists define lobbying as part of public relations function and claim its main task to be the building and maintaining relations with government. Research into lobbying has dealt with issues such as the history, role, and nature of relations between business and government and the goals and means of relationship building (Jaatinen 1994, 4).

The increasing criticism of corporate policies and public relations
activities in the 1960's had a consequence on generating demands on the social responsibility of corporations. The public relations function was disintegrated, and government relations were renamed “public affairs”. The theory of social responsibility is a theory of ethics. It states that corporations and professionals should be concerned with the consequences of their operations and actions to the society. The role of public relations is to help corporations take responsibility for solving social problems. (Cutlip et al. 1994: 32, 438-443.) Researchers on social responsibility conceptualize lobbying as cooperation between lobbying organizations and government decision-makers. It can also be inferred that the essence of effective lobbying activities is the furthering of public interest. The main themes in the research have been the importance of taking responsibility, the significance of communicating responsibility to the success of the organization, the activities of social responsibility, and the factors predicting corporate philanthropy (Jaatinen 1994, 4).

Conceptualizing lobbying as two-way communication between lobbyists and legislators is a widely accepted approach in lobbying research and has its roots in interest group theory. According to this perspective, the purpose of lobbying is to directly influence governmental policies, and it is achieved by applying pressure on decision-makers (e.g. Miller 1987, 127; Jordan 1991, 15, 20). In this line of investigations, lobbying research has concentrated on issues such as tactics, strategies, and the effectiveness of lobbying, historical reviews, cultural differences, and ethics. Two of the newest objects of study are eurolobbying and the effects of economic-political integration on lobbying activities in general (Jaatinen 1994, 5).

Furthermore, the effects of lobbying on governmental policies and distribution of power in society have been of interest to political theorists (Jaatinen 1994, 5). The economic theorists in this line of research define lobbying as an exchange of advantages or information between interest groups and decision-makers, interest groups and their members, and decision-makers and their constituencies. The exchange approach also lays the foundation for Hayes's theory of political markets (Hayes 1981, 41-63). In addition, competition among interest groups and their search for advantages and reduction in charges have been of interest to economic theorists. (Jaatinen 1994; 5, 22.) The social-psychologists come close to economic theorists in their definition of lobbying as an interaction in which participants’ expectations and behavior change in the course of time (Jaatinen 1994, 22). For example, Zeigler and Baer (1969) claim that interaction is determined by the image of an actor which, in turn, is influenced by the interaction. Influence on behavior is dependent on the usefulness of actors to each other. (Zeigler &
In the 1970’s, management theorists followed the changes in practice and detected a new form of influencing governmental decision-making: issues management, a concept introduced by Chase and O’Toole. The management of organizations engaged public relations professionals to identify public policy issues with potential influence on organizations and to design corporate responses (Stanley 1985, 9; Cutlip et al. 1994, 16). The purpose of issues management was to respond to challenges posed and to make use of the opportunities generated by political decision-making. The goal was to shape public policy to the benefit of an organization and its key audiences. (Heath et al. 1988; 26, 182.) Management theorists promoted strategic planning of public affairs and integration of this to the strategic planning of the entire organization (e.g. Marx, T. 1990). Research in this field concentrates on studying the identification, management, and management systems of issues, proactiveness, and crisis communication. A lot of attention is given to individual tactics for influence; mostly to advocacy advertising and political action committees (and contributions); somewhat less to direct contacts between lobbyists and legislators (called lobbying), grass-roots mobilizing, and coalition building. (Jaatinen 1994, 5.)

A few management scholars in the 1980’s introduced a new concept “political strategy” that incorporates the notions of the strategic planning of political action and a public policy process in which decision-makers respond to the self-interest of getting reelected. The idea is to cultivate natural constituencies of business and to build coalitions to make corporations more effective in the public policy arena by creating an incentive for decision-makers to take these constituencies into account. All these efforts should be an important part of long-range corporate planning. Problems should be anticipated and political objectives created. (Keim 1981, Keim et al. 1984, Zeithaml et al. 1985.) The definition of lobbying under this tradition emphasizes the understanding of the political process that is necessary for building effective strategies. Strategic alternatives are, then, assessed on the basis of how they take into account the relationship between groups of voters and decision-makers (e.g. Keim & Zeithaml 1986) and the competition among the lobbyists (e.g. Keim & Baysinger 1988). Research into lobbying in this tradition has dealt with issues of formulation and implementation of a political strategy and effectiveness of strategies in different situations of legislative decision-making (Jaatinen 1994, 5).

The strategic management of organizations is a natural field for political considerations, and some management theorists have engaged in research on the political environment of organizations, its effects on organizational
planning, and the effects of organizational operations on it (Jaatinen 1994, 5). Taylor (1992) classifies main styles of strategic planning: planning based on 1) central control, 2) innovation, 3) change, 4) power, and 5) future (Taylor 1992, 270). The fourth philosophy, that of political planning, is concerned with the process in which power and resources are allocated. According to this view, there is a continuous battle over resources inside an organization and, outside, a continuous competition between organizations for support from political decision-makers and the public. This struggle for survival influences the image and capacity for action of an organization. Political planning should, therefore, resolve these conflicts and guide the operations of entire organization. (Taylor 1992, 279–281.) The school promotes mobilizing power and influence as the central activities of management and lobbying as a central form of participation in the struggle in a society.

All the reviewed lines of investigations have had an influence on the view presented in this study. Ideas are especially borrowed from the traditions of issues management, political strategy, and political planning. More detailed citations will follow related to specific issues raised in the theoretical part of this dissertation. Next, all these traditions will be gathered together and put into a communications perspective.

Contribution of the Communications Perspective

One early but frequently cited example of a definition of lobbying from a communications point of view was given by Milbrath (1963) who stated that...

_”Lobbying is the stimulation and transmission of a communication by someone other than a citizen acting on his own behalf, directed at a governmental decision-maker with the hope of influencing his decision._ (Milbrath, L. W. 1963, 8).

After Milbrath, many researchers have given their definitions, but discussion on the merits of each have continued to this date. From recent publications, a conclusion may be made that lobbying is about influencing decisions and not just building and maintaining contacts with politicians. Networking seems to lay a foundation for strategic actions on specific issues, and these strategic actions are essentially informational and persuasive interactions between organizational representatives and other participants to the political process. I will return to the definitional issues of lobbying later, but I think I should underline at this point that all political actions reviewed in the previous section involve communication. All the presented lines of investigations can be gathered together under the heading of communication management that
will be viewed in a total communications framework.

Research into lobbying can be located in the middle-ground between communications research and political research. Economic theories are principally applications used in political science. Social-psychological contributions can be included in communication theories. In political research, a common synonym to lobbying is interest representation which is exercised, as it seems to me, through political communication. In my opinion, this is a justification of lobbying as essentially communication. Lobbying can be made more sophisticated only if more knowledge is generated from studying it as communication. Communications theory sheds light on questions such as effectiveness of efforts to influence and the nature of interaction between groups.

In communications research, lobbying is a part of external communications of an organization, and it is closely related to issues of interpersonal or group communication (e.g. negotiation research) and of mass communication (e.g. research into the political power of mass media and the role of the media as an arena of public discussion). Lobbying is planned as a part of all communication inside organizations, but political actions are directed to the external environment. As soon as the communication flows over the organizational boundaries, it makes use of and is assisted or hindered by the mass media. In some issues, it is possible to act without public attention and to concentrate on negotiations with political decision-makers and organizational or interest group representatives. However, it is often necessary to involve the public-at-large in political decision-making either for gathering support or just serving the principles of democracy. (Jaatinen 1998a, 24.)

Lobbying theory may be particularly enriched by the ideas of negotiation theory. The communication-centered approach views negotiation as a process in which there are two or more interdependent parties who have incompatible goals and who engage in social interaction and exchange of proposals in order to reach an outcome that is mutually satisfactory (Putnam & Roloff 1992, 2–5; Vasquez 1996, 60–61). The possibility to hinder the goal-attainment of others and the need to cooperate in order to reach one’s own goals characterizes interdependence. Potentially incompatible goals result in differences in demands and different preferences for outcomes prior to negotiation. (Putnam & Roloff 1992, 2–5.) Social interaction comprises means to carry out negotiation—from explicit information exchange to tacit nonverbal signals—and entails a production of meaning (Vasquez 1996, 60–61). The exchange of offers and counteroffers are efforts to find a solution and are based on strategies, tactics, and assessments of others’ behavior
When applied to lobbying, the primary characteristics of negotiation communication must be refined. Interdependence results from a scarcity of resources sought for and from constraints of political decision-making such as the principles of democracy. Parties may also affect each others’ goal-attainment. Incompatibility of goals has to be considered as perceptual and the finding of a shared mission possible or even necessary for permanent resolution of a conflict. There may be both individual interests and common interests, and both may be satisfied. Social interaction emerges as tactics used to interpret and shape lobbying context (political setting) and content of an issue (agenda). This is often called framing and reframing in the issue development negotiation literature (e.g. Putnam & Holmer 1992, Vasquez 1996). The exchange of proposals is based on strategies, use of power, and assessments of others’ strategies, opinions, and strength. The strategic goals (adapted or not) will determine the proposal made. Proposals and counter-proposals for solution are communicated between participants to political decision-making.

The model of effective lobbying concentrates on the social interaction component of shaping the negotiation context. It simply assumes an agenda in which the main orientation of, for or against, divides participants into two or more quarrelling camps that build coalitions to tame internal differences and reach the position of a majority supporting a specific proposal. The objective of a successful lobbyist is to reconcile variations in goals using tactics to shape the political setting and adapting its own goals. Information concerning the content of an issue and a proposal for decision is exchanged related to tactics of shaping the context, e.g., the tactic of directly contacting a political decision-maker may convey information on a lobbyist’s views on issue contents and procedures of decision-making or on majority-forming elements such as opinions of decision-maker’s constituencies or coalitions built to support the lobbyist’s course. The use of tactics is based on understanding the purpose of their use that is guided by a lobbying strategy.

The merits of the negotiation approach to lobbying are of a fundamental nature. The political decision-making process is a conflict resolution mechanism in a society, and negotiation literature provides means to describe the solving or managing of disputes. The interaction between lobbyists and other participants to the political decision-making is essentially negotiation about the means to govern and about goals of the future direction of a democratic society.
1.4 Concepts Used in This Study

In this study, some concepts appear several times and should be given a general definition.

A lobbyist is a group of people organized on the ground of common interests to influence political decision-making. A person acting on behalf of the group and with delegated authority or commercial assignment is a representative. In this study, both the lobbying group and the representative will be called “lobbyist”.

A strategy expresses how to respond to threats posed and utilize opportunities created by the environment by making good use of the strengths of the organization, so that strategic goals are achieved. It may be either an overall strategy of the whole organization including the mission, culture, and position of the group and defining the political role of the group in the society, or it may be a lobbying strategy that is defined by the general communication policy of the group (expressing public relations and profile concerns) and the political campaigns in specific issues of interest to the organization. Strategic planning is long-term planning, and in the strategic planning of communication, a policy supporting the overall strategy is created. Short-term planning includes tactical and operative plans.

A political decision-maker is a person who is a target of lobbying and may be either a legislator (parliamentary and/or government representative) or a regulator (official). This study concentrates on modeling parliamentary lobbying which is why a legislator usually is the target whose opinion is taken into account when planning lobbying.

An actor is an organization, a small community, an institution, or an individual who tries to influence political decision-making. An actor may be a lobbyist, a competitor, a political decision-maker, a mass medium, or a citizen.

Opinions are manifest or latent orientations, demands, or preferences. These positions are based on motivating interests, desires, and concerns that on the other hand are based on values related to needs that give rise to advantageousness of a certain conditions of affairs. Human needs cause individuals to come together into social groupings that aggregate into larger groups creating the society. These larger groups promote certain values and pursue common interests in whose purpose they express their desires and preferences on issues important to them. Those acting for others less tied to one group use their opinion-giving power to further the ideas of the groups close to them, e.g., a legislator advancing propositions of his party or other constituents. Individual interests may sometimes compete with group interests.
and group interests with public interest, and the opinions expressed may not comply with all of them. In political decision-making, however, opinions are the focal point to determine the fate of a specific motion and also the starting point in the new lobbying model to determine how a lobbyist acts in a situation. Still, it may be helpful for finding a solution to a dispute if a lobbyist knows the others’ interests which their opinions underpin.

A contingency model can be used to describe phenomena—how organizations operate under varying conditions—propose relationships between variables and patterns of relationships, but it may also be normative in the sense that it can be used as a tool for planning and evaluating organizational action in specific situations. A contingency view proposes that communication must be adapted to the internal and external conditions of an organization if it wants to achieve its goals (Wio 1989, 98–106)—or the conditions must be changed. This view is adopted in the new model of effective lobbying strategies that suggests appropriate lobbying strategies in certain political situations based on relationships between actors participating in political decision-making.

Scanning is a system of communication that makes it possible for the organization to be aware of internal and external changes affecting its operations and take these into account early in the organizational decision-making (Åberg 1989, 302). Scanning is gathering and processing data, interpreting essential information, and reorientating operations according to what is known. Monitoring is following and analyzing public discussion (Åberg 1989, 303). Gathering media clippings are a common form of systematic monitoring. Forecasts assist in strategic planning. They are used to predict developments and events especially in the external environment of an organization (e.g. extrapolation, budgeting, trend impact analysis, cross impact analysis, delphi study) or to develop plans for alternative futures (computer simulations, sensitivity analysis, contingency plans, scenario planning) from among which the most probable or desired sequence of events is chosen and promoted or adapted to. In this study, scanning, monitoring, and forecasting are referred to as the information gathering and analyzing activities of an organization.

A political environment is a part of the total external environment of an organization. The factors of the external environment and of the internal conditions that affect the operations and policy of the organization, can be classified as economic, technical, social, cultural, or political ones. All these factors reside in interdependent sectors. Thus, it is common that a change in the socio-cultural sector of a society generates a change in the economic-technical sector or vice-versa, and this, in turn, generates a demand for
changes in the political sector. New legislation, elections, wars, and revolu-
tions are common examples of changes in the external political sector. These
events and actors inducing them have to be taken into account when planning
organizational goals and action.

*Creating a profile or profiling* is the sustained building of desired
associations about the nature and goals of an organization and the values
underlying its actions in the minds of target groups (Åberg 1989: 78, 305).

*Public relations* and lobbying are conceptualized within the framework
of total communications theory. Communication is defined as management of
the exchange of messages, and its purpose is to assist in the management of
the entire organization by integrating the parts of the organization into the
whole. Communication by results means that communication is a resource
used as a strategic tool to achieve organizational goals (Åberg 1989, 224).
Communication have some crucial functions in the organization and different
forms of communication serve these functions. Public relations and lobbying
are two forms of communication both principally serving the functions of
creating the profile and scanning and informing the external and internal
constituencies of the organization. Public relations concentrates on commu-
nicating and building and maintaining relations with members of the organi-
zation and external key publics such as the media, citizens, associations, issue
groups, and companies but also other groups on whom the organization has
consequences or whose action has consequences on the organization.
Lobbying is essentially interaction between organizational representatives and
governmental and parliamentary decision-makers but also other groups
participating in or trying to influence political decision-making. The publics
of lobbying are determined by the object of influence, whereas the focus is on
the organization when publics of public relations are determined. Public
relations may be used to assist in lobbying, e.g., in advocacy advertising,
mobilizing grass-roots level, and shaping citizen opinion.
2 Lobbying

2.1 Lobbying, Targets, and Publics

Having above reviewed previous research on lobbying and some general concepts to be used, I will turn to the general features of lobbying and issues in this chapter. The nature of lobbying activities will be discussed, and a new definition of lobbying will be presented. The definition of lobbying and the general theory of lobbying as conflict accommodation are developed in the context of the Finnish political system and its connections with the political system of the EU. Thus, the observed reality and the empirical test concern lobbying conducted by the Finnish. However, the definition and the general theory might be applicable to other western countries because the theories used to develop them have American, British, Swedish, French, even Belgian roots. The theory of strategic management of lobbying is outlined in Section 2.2., and the effectiveness of lobbying is discussed in Section 2.3.

2.1.1 Definition of Lobbying

Efforts to Influence Political Decision-Making

As mentioned earlier, Milbrath defined lobbying as initiating discussion and transmission of information for the purpose of influencing public policy. According to Milbrath, a lobbyist is not someone acting alone on his own behalf, but some two or more persons targeting a governmental decision-maker. (Milbrath 1963, 8.) Zeigler and Baer suggested that communication may be two-way and it may involve both pressure and informing (Zeigler & Baer 1969, 9).

Berry (1977) would not have totally agreed with them. Instead of focusing on formal channels and the content of communication, he claimed that a lobbyist always has an intention to influence a political decision and that this is the essence of lobbying. The object is the decision, and the communication may be either informative or persuasive. (Berry 1977, 46.) This active definition of lobbying is given a lot of support also in empirical findings on the nature of lobbying activities. Although lobbying research has its origins in public relations theory in which lobbying is conceptualized as the creating and maintaining of relations with politicians, lobbying in
practice, consists of the means that are used to achieve a certain objective, a
certain kind of decision. A political decision-maker, even if he is an
intermediary of opinions, is just a point in the process of decision-making.
Thus, it is rational and well founded to define lobbying as efforts to influence
political decision-making. This view is adopted by several researchers on
lobbying, nowadays (e.g. Cates 1988, 238-257; Hannaford 1988; Van
Heuverswyn & Shuybrock 1990, 133; Jordan 1991, 20; Bern 1994, 17; and
Farnel 1994, 21).

Targets and Publics in the Political Process

Influence on political decisions is achieved by keeping in touch with those
who are central actors in decision-making. According to the traditional point
of view, lobbying is directed at decision-makers who have power and
opportunities to influence a final decision. Several researchers emphasize,
however, that all power holders are not this kind of decision-makers and that
the important targets of lobbying are those who are in central positions in the
political or legislative process in which the decision is made on the lobbied
issue (Miller 1987, 128; de Wilde 1988; Taylor 1992, 281). According to
them, it is essential to understand the political process in order to lobby
effectively. In fact, the idea is the same as in the theories of marketing that
communication should be directed precisely to the right destination, at likely
(potential) consumers.

In the political process, the central positions are occupied by those who
can generate or hold back public discussion on a political issue and who
participate in the preparation, decision-making, and implementation of the
decisions and control realization. In addition to parliamentary representatives
(legislators and members of the government—the Council of Ministers in the
EU), actors in these positions are usually officials in public administration
(regulators, executive officers, commissioners), interest groups, issue groups,
public and private companies, the mass media and journalists, and individual
citizens. The internal publics of a lobbyist such as employees or members of
an organization are also important. Their relevancy comes through the
maintenance of legitimacy and credibility of the organization when it
participates in the political process—a problem central to systems
characterized by societal corporatism. Given this, it can be concluded that
these actors can affect the success of lobbying efforts and therefore these
actors should be taken into account when planning lobbying.

In 1995, Jaatinen (1998a) maintained that they can also be divided in the
direct and indirect channels of influence in lobbying: the former consists of
political decision-makers and officials, the latter of associations, compani,
mass media, citizens, and constituents (Jaatinen 1998a, 24). This classification was introduced by the author in 1995 (see Jaatinen 1995b). Later in this dissertation, when the expression “the political decision-maker” is used, it will refer to the whole group of actors that serve as direct channels of influence unless otherwise stated.

These actors at whom communication is directed may be called targets as in theories of strategic management and marketing, but this word has military connotations and implies one-way communication. Public relations theorists use the concept of a public that is founded on a stakeholder position. A public may have an interest in common and act on it. It allows interactive communication between an organization and its publics. (Grunig, J. & Repper 1992, 125-132.) This notion is important in lobbying theories, and, therefore, the author would recommend the use of the concept ‘a public’ instead of using ‘a target’.

Publics of lobbying can be most appropriately identified using James Grunig’s (1992) situational theory of publics for public relations. The theory is based on the assumption that populations can be separated into publics according to how passively or actively they communicate about an issue and how actively they try to support or constrain an organization’s pursuit of its goals. Stakeholders are those on whom the behavior of the organization have some consequences and whose behavior has consequences on the organization. Stakeholders are potential members of publics. When individuals perceive that they are involved in what an organization does, that this constitutes a problem, and that there are no constraints on their actions, they may aggregate into active publics on that issue. Two additional variables explain the formation of publics: the dependent variables of information-processing (passive) and information-seeking (active). (Grunig, J. & Repper 1992, 124-125, 132-138; Dozier & Ehling 1992, 170-176; Grunig, J. 1997a.) Active publics are most likely to join activist groups (Grunig, J. 1989, 17). In general, organizations should communicate with these publics and possibly involve them in the organizational decision-making in order to prevent a conflict from occurring. (Grunig, J. & Repper 1992, 124-125, 132-138; Dozier & Ehling 1992, 170-176; Grunig, J. 1997a.)

In the same way, a lobbyist should identify relevant publics in the political process of an issue. In addition to group formation of citizens and already existing groups, a lobbyist should identify mass media active on the issue and put political decision-makers into various opinion groups. Political decision-makers are the natural publics of a lobbyist, because they are representatives of already existing political and sectional groups and the division of opinion among them can always be measured. If a legislative
decision is made, all legislators may be of concern to a lobbyist. Relations should be built with these publics if they do not yet exist and points of views communicated. Taking all these publics into account may assist in finding a resolution that is beneficial to everybody and in proposing a decision that has potential to become permanent. Even though it may not be resolved, the conflict may still be easier to manage.

General Means of Lobbying

Lobbying communication is based on built and maintained relations, i.e. networking and creating of profile, but its main features are informing and persuading publics and being informed and persuaded by these publics—not just keeping in touch with them. Based on a thorough literature review on lobbying, the general means of lobbying may be divided into those of influence, competition, emergency tactics, and scanning.

The most common tactics of influence are direct contacts with political decision-makers (means from face-to-face meetings to indirect forms such as letters), campaign contributions (political action committees and financial help), coalition building, melding of public opinion and advocacy advertising, and grass-roots (letters, marches, mass demonstrations) and constituency mobilizing (Keim & Zeithaml 1986, Van Heuverswijn & Schuybroek 1990, Van Schendelen 1994). The tactics of competition consist of timing, distinctive-ness (e.g. good relations and expertise), and resources (e.g. the adequacy of resources, uniformity of opinions, and effective planning) (Keim & Baysinger 1988).

Emergency tactics used by a potential loser include efforts to change the process and all kinds of means of last resort, e.g., preventing the bringing up of an issue in an institution's working schedule, efforts to deny the right of an institution to decide on the matter and a demand for transfer, logrolling, causing confusion and a split among the opponents, generating credibility crises, and choosing the best alternative from many poor (Lundquist 1986, 123–124). Some of these means are questionable and may hurt good relations and the profile of a respected organization. Thus, before using them, they should be carefully examined. Scanning, monitoring, and forecasting are common means of gathering information for organizational decision-making (Aguilar 1967, Goldhaber et al. 1979, Salonen 1987, Åberg 1989).

The use of different kinds of means of conflict resolution and management in lobbying is of interest in this study. These means can be characterized as changes of objectives and means of lobbying to take into account the interests of other groups (e.g. negotiation, integration of interests into a proposal, change of strategy, or adaptation). In the literature review,
these means did not, however, appear as common tactics of lobbying. It is the purpose of this study to find out what role these tactics play in lobbying.

The basic elements of communication seem to be the same at the national and the EU-level. Van Schendelen (1994) maintained that the main differences are that eurolobbying is more long-term, the environment is more complex, and the costs are higher. Coalitions are ever more important whereas media relations do not work as well as at the national level. (Van Schendelen 1994, 12–15.) Grass-roots lobbying is rare at the EU-level (Gardner 1991, 108).

In conclusion, a new, modern definition of lobbying can be given: lobbying is influencing political decision-making in the interest of a group by communicating with publics relevant to the political process of a certain issue. These publics are the political decision-makers and officials, competitors, the mass media, citizens, and the constituents of the lobbyist. The definition Jaatinen gave in 1997 (Jaatinen 1997, 1; Jaatinen 1998a, 24) has been added with the limitation of “in the interest of a group” and with internal publics of an organization. Competitors of a lobbyist consist of other actors trying to influence the same issues: these are, e.g., trade unions, associations, companies, research institutions, and public institutions (Jaatinen 1998a, 24). The constituents of a lobbyist are internal publics such as employees or members. The publics mentioned in the definition constitute also the contingency factors of the new model of effective lobbying. These factors have to be taken into account when planning political actions so as to ensure the success of lobbying.

2.1.2 Symmetric Features

In the communications literature, there has been same kind of discussion concerning the terms ‘strategic’ and ‘manage’ as there has been about the term ‘target’. They tend to have negative connotations for many people. ‘Strategic’ implies self-interest, and ‘manage’ implies manipulation or control. J. Grunig and Repper (1992) defined the term ‘manage’ as proactive planning and ‘strategic’ as symmetrical rather than asymmetrical communication (Grunig, J. & Repper 1992, 123.) Asymmetrical communication is one-way or two-way communication that purports to persuade publics to change their behaviors, and symmetrical communication is interactive and interpersonal (Grunig, J. & White 1992, 38–40). A mixed-motive communication includes both kinds of communication (Grunig, J. & Grunig, L. 1992, 311–312). Grunig, J. and Grunig, L. (1992) presented a two-way symmetrical model of communication that characterizes public
relations as mixed-motive negotiation (Vasquez 1996, 61).

In this study, lobbying theory is enriched with negotiation theory and the mixed-motive assumption will lead to a neutral use of the term strategy that may be either an asymmetrical or a symmetrical approach depending on the motives of a lobbyist. These approaches are realized in lobbying communication. In this chapter, the features of asymmetrical and symmetrical communication and their applicability to lobbying communication will be looked at in more detail.

**Interaction**

The assumption that communication is interactive contains the notion of two-way communication. Lobbying is essentially two-way communication because of the requirements for scanning or monitoring. In fact, lobbying can be described as multi-way communication: a lobbyist interacts directly with all of its publics (two-way and multi-channel), but it also communicates indirectly, via other actors, with political decision-makers and other actors (from two-step to multi-step) (Jaatinen 1998a, 24). Information from a lobbyist may reach a political decision-maker in the form of a citizen taking contact to his or her representative or through an interest group representing the original lobbyist. In this way, a piece of information may end up in the political decision-maker’s desk in many ways and in many forms. Information from a politician usually reaches a lobbyist in a more direct way but may be transmitted through a chain of representatives. Thus, one-way asymmetrical communication does not characterize lobbying very well and it may be left out of the description of lobbying communication.

**Persuasion**

The assumption concerning the way persuasion goes separates asymmetrical from symmetrical communication. The distinction is made using the purpose of communication. (Grunig, J. & White 1992, 38–40.) Two-way symmetrical lobbying is interaction in which a lobbyist persuades a political decision-maker but the decision-maker may also persuade a lobbyist (Jaatinen 1998a, 24). Opinions, contents of a decision, and objectives in political issues may be discussed together and an agreement made on how to go on. After all, it is important for a lobbyist to listen carefully and be ready to change its behavior when necessary or when it serves its long-term goals. Being persuaded does not mean that a lobbyist could not ensure that its own views are also taken into account in the political decision-making. In fact, adapting behavior and objectives may help to manage conflict, to find a permanent resolution to a dispute, and increase the efficiency of operations. (Issues related to effec-
tiveness will be discussed later in Chapter 2.3.) For a resolution to be permanent, it requires that the interests of the lobbyist are also satisfied.

The importance and effectiveness of symmetrical communication have been advocated by many researchers. According to many theorists, the success of lobbying is dependent on the willingness of a lobbyist to cooperate with political decision-makers and to further public interest (e.g. Metcalfe 1978, 45–47; Heath et al. 1988, 34; Kotler 1992, 39–46). Grunig and White claim that symmetrical communication is more effective than asymmetrical in the long run and that it makes the entire organization more efficient and helps direct the strategy so as to help in making use of opportunities and avoiding threats posed by the environment (Grunig, J. & White 1992, 38–50). Symmetrical communication is also inherently ethical whereas asymmetrical communication requires disclosure if it is to be considered ethical (Grunig, J. & Grunig, L. 1996, 44–45).

Negotiation researchers prefer cooperation to competition (e.g. Deutsch 1973), integrative to distributive negotiation (e.g. Walton & McKersie 1965), and problem-solving (e.g. Pruitt & Carnevale 1993; 3, 36–46, 104–107). (See Figure 2-1.) The first parts of these pairs of concepts are different names for communication in which actors try to find a mutually beneficial, win-win, solution to a dispute. Among the chaos theorists, Aula (1994) has called these
types of communication integrative and dissipative (Aula 1994, 100–104). In this study, competition or asymmetrical communication will be accepted along with cooperation or symmetrical communication as a legitimate way of furthering interests. It may sometimes be the only way to defend oneself against adversary tactics and be equal in competition with other lobbyists.

Furthermore, it is possible to be both cooperative and competitive in the same lobbying campaign, e.g., some tactics can be used for either purpose and different tactics can be used for different purposes at the same time. Both kinds of communication can be directed at the same public, but communication may be more symmetrical with complying publics than with resistant ones. It is generally advisable to choose a cooperative orientation in order to insure that a problem is solved but to employ competitive tactics when necessary (Pruitt & Carnevale 1993, 137).

This kind of an approach is typical of mixed-motive games in which both sides are ready to cooperate but still defend their own interests (Murphy 1991, 125–127). Two motives determine the behavior of a lobbyist: a motive to further the specific interest of the group it represents and a motive to advance public interest (Jaatinen 1998a, 24). Tuleja (1985) explained this kind of situation when it is faced by an employee with his concept of divided loyalties (Tuleja 1985, 173–175). Mixed-motives lead to the use of a mix of asymmetrical and symmetrical elements in lobbying. Likewise, Pruitt and Carnevale (1993) maintained that high self-concern will lead to a contending orientation and high joint-concern to collaboration and that both of these orientations are used in negotiations (Pruitt & Carnevale 1993; 104–118, 137). A communication scholar, Plowman (1995) characterized mixed-motive public relations with five negotiation strategies: collaborating, contending (satisfying the organization’s interest), accommodating (satisfying the interests of publics), compromising, and avoiding (Plowman 1995, 100; Plowman et al. 1995, 240). (See Figure 2-1.)

The symmetrical model of communication has also been criticized. Some scholars have claimed that it is too idealistic to be applied in reality. Often this criticism seems to be due to an interpretation of symmetrical communication as a conceding approach (e.g. Van der Meiden) or due to its similarity with Habermas’s model of the ideal speech situation (e.g. Kunczik 1994, Fiezka 1995, L’Etang 1995) (Grunig, J. 1997b, 31). The two-way symmetrical model, however, is based on empirical research and it has been revealed to be effective in solving problems encountered in public relations. The IABC Excellence study revealed that the most excellent organizations used both two-way asymmetrical and two-way symmetrical communication more often than organizations of lesser excellence (Dozier et al. 1995,
Johnson (1992) made an empirical study of how lobbying can be described with models of public relations. He found that lobbying exhibits elements of two-way models of public relations, but that it is difficult to match lobbying with any specific model (press agentry, public information, two-way asymmetrical, or two-way symmetrical model). Johnson concluded that lobbying may be viewed as communication varying along a continuum from pure asymmetry to pure symmetry. (Johnson 1992; 145, 152–154, 193.) Parties to a dispute are interdependent because of the scarcity of resources they seek from government. Even if they have incompatible goals, they need to cooperate and find a shared mission in order to solve their problem. The new model of effective lobbying is also a mixed-motive model in which tactics to implement strategies may be used for either purpose. It may be assumed that the symmetrical use of tactics dominate strategic alternatives in favorable situations and asymmetrical in unfavorable situations.

Dozier, L. Grunig, and J. Grunig (1995) presented a new formulation for models of public relations in which both internal and external communication are depicted (Dozier et al. 1995). This model, however, elevates the public relations person into a position where he or she can decide for others what is a mutually satisfying outcome of negotiation between managements and publics. The public relations person communicates asymmetrically with internal and external publics but within some kind of larger symmetrical framework (Dozier et al. 1995, 48–49). (See Figure 2-2 presenting an interpretation of the two-way model.) A more fruitful approach would be to allow these publics to persuade the public relations person, as well, and describe both internal and external communication as mixed-motive communication. This is the approach adopted in this study. Indeed, the IABC Excellence project is expected to conclude following Huang (1997) that the model should be changed into 4 dimensions of public relations strategies: 1) asymmetrical–symmetrical, 2) one-way–two-way, 3) interpersonal–mediated, and 4) ethical– unethical (Huang 1997). Eight different combinations of the extremes can be allowed to describe public relations strategies. In this study, the mixed-motive model includes both interpersonal and mediated communication. On the dimension of ethics, an ethical approach is recommended.

Vasquez (1996) criticized J. Grunig’s (1992) two-way symmetrical model of lack of specificity in its description of social interaction (production of meaning) and the exchange of offers and counteroffers that characterizes negotiation communication. According to him, if the model is used to define public relations as negotiation, it is not enough to present cooperation or
Figure 2-2. The two-way model of public relations. The arrows describe how a public relations person acts as a mediator between the top management and the public (Adapted from Dozier et al. 1995, 48–49).

competition as a form of interaction and exchange. Strategies, tactics, demands, concessions, and assessments of the other parties’ behavior should be incorporated into the conceptualization. (Vasquez 1996, 65–68.) In the theory of lobbying presented in this dissertation, the use of specific tactics account for the social interaction component and the exchange component of lobbying as negotiation that the distinction between the asymmetrical and symmetrical approach may not explain adequately (Jaaninen 1998a, 25).

2.1.3 Boundary-Spanning

A modern society is a society of organizations. Humans grow up going through institutions of education and caretaking, work in private companies or public institutions, attend associations for leisure and community life, and get old in homes for the aged to be buried by religious communities. Political decision-making is a meeting point for interests of all these organizations, and it itself is an organization of political decision-makers. For all these external organizations to be able to participate in political decision-making, they need to be represented in various ways. Decision-makers are themselves also representatives. Thus, final decisions are made and conflicts solved by representatives of several groups with the consent of the represented. A
representative of an organization acts in a role of a boundary-spanner—the activities of which characterizes also the activities of a lobbying person representing the lobbying organization. In this chapter, lobbying will be viewed as representative communication.

**Boundaries and Boundary Spanners**

The concept of boundaries originates in General Systems Theory. Boundaries separate the organization from its external environment. They are rigid in closed systems and permeable in open systems. They filter inputs and outputs of a system. In a social organization, boundaries are defined by organizational activities. A boundary spanning function is the one that deals with a specific set of inputs and outputs of an organization. In boundary spanning roles, persons influence and are influenced by both the insiders and outsiders. (Kast & Rosenzweig 1984; 101–104, 126–129.)

Lobbying persons occupy this kind of a boundary spanning role in their organizations. Their task is to present organizational views on a certain issue to relevant publics and to listen to these publics presenting their point of view in the hope that the final political decision on that issue would be favorable to the lobbyist but also satisfying to others. The views presented by the lobbying person are founded on consensus reached between his or her views and the views of his or her constituents in internal negotiations of the organization. The negotiator in this kind of a role may merely represent the desires of his constituents or try to mold their positions so as to balance the internal and external demands (Turner 1992, 233–234).

Pruitt and Carnevale presented three perspectives on the relationship between representatives and their constituents in their intergroup negotiation theory. The one-way influence perspective assumes that constituents determine the policy of their representative. The mutual influence perspective assumes negotiations between constituents and their representative and implies that the representative negotiates simultaneously with the external group’s representative. Pruitt’s and Carnevale’s network perspective extends the relationship to include chains of influence and communication that begin in one organization, crosses the boundaries, and continues in the other. At the ends of the chains are stakeholders, and all the others in between them are intermediaries reconciling interests with adjacent members of the chain. Adjacent members are both boundary-spanners of their own groups and carry with them views from the opposite ends of the chain. (Pruitt & Carnevale
Figure 2-3. The network model (Adapted from Pruitt and Carnevale 1993, 158).

1993, 152–160.) (See Figure 2-3 for the network model.)

The first two perspectives each provide a partial view of reality and should be at least integrated with each other. The third perspective extends our understanding of internal negotiations or makes it possible to trace the source of the conveyed message that has been adopted by a larger coalition representing many groups. The chain model reveals the indirect channels of influence that a lobbyist may use. However, it still lacks an overall view. The political decision-making is a meeting point of many chains, and a lobbyist may communicate with many intermediaries of the chains simultaneously. Thus, a more appropriate view to this multi-way effort of a lobbyist would be one in which both internal and external negotiations are allowed and in which simultaneous efforts to communicate with intermediaries at different levels and of several chains (many representatives) are encouraged. In addition, it should be possible to approach stakeholders and unorganized citizens. One of the most important indirect channels of influence, the mass media, does not fit in the picture of chains at all. The integrated perspective on representation complete with multiple external publics would be the most fruitful view on boundary-spanning after all. The multi-way view adopted in this study was presented in Section 2.1.2.

Boundary-Spanning Activities

Persons in boundary roles of a lobbying function have been found to engage in activities of information transmission, persuasion (Turner 1992, 235; White and Dozier 1992, 103; Pruitt & Carnevale 1993, 159), representation (Turner 1992, 235; White and Dozier 1992, 103), and problem-solving (Pruitt &
Carnevale (1993, 159). Each activity should be considered potentially bidirectional, and they are performed both in relation to constituents and in relation to external publics. From a communication theoretic point of view, these activities could be reduced into three, because problem-solving (cooperation and competition) is included in communication activities of information processing and persuasion (symmetrical and asymmetrical). It is not a separate activity but describes the nature of communication produced by different orientations to persuasion.

It is also difficult to see how representation as communication is independent of the other two activities left. In fact, White and Dozier express their point of view in the way that the external representative function of a communications manager consists of informing and persuasion (White and Dozier 1992, 103). Turner, for his part, defines the representative function as a type of content of communication conveying information or arguments from or about another party (Turner 1990, 57–58, 65). White and Dozier’s view will be adopted in this study. However, one activity could be added to the two: the activity of networking. It is a separate activity of building and maintaining relations with relevant publics and creating profile along the way. In sum, the boundary-spanning activities of the representative of a lobbying organization are information transmission, persuasion, and networking.

2.1.4 Issues and Goals

Political decision-making concerns issues important to a lobbyist. A decision may pose a challenge or create an opportunity for organizational goal-attainment. The decision may affect the interests of many organizations in a society, and these interests may be in conflict with each other. This is why there is often a dispute on how to settle an issue. Each party to a dispute sets self-interested goals for negotiation, but parties also share a goal for solving or managing a public dispute. A protracted conflict will incur costs and generate uncertainty in the external environment of organizations. The permanent solution of a dispute requires that the needs of all the parties are satisfied for the issue. (Jaatinen 1998a, 26.) In this chapter, political issues will be defined and a theory of lobbying as conflict accommodation developed.

Political Issues

Bartha (1982), as public policy scholar, defines an issue as a problem or situation that have an influence on people and requires government
involvement (Bartha 1982, 82). There are, however, issues which do not lead to political decision-making. Issues that are objects of negotiation research can usually be settled between parties which do not represent public government. (Jaatinen 1998a, 26.) In the issue development approach to negotiation, issues are defined as items in agenda or topics of concern (Putnam & Holmer 1992, 138). According to the social-psychological approach, issues require decisions and they entail alternatives on which positions are stated. Issues change as do interests, needs, and values underlying positions change and as they can be combined to form an issue group. (Pruitt & Carnevale 1993, 14-15.) Public relations scholars define issues as situations or problems arousing conflict (e.g. Grunig, J. 1992, 134), and do not require government involvement. They stress that publics make issues out of problems (Grunig, J. & Repper 1992, 146). Publics have cognitions and affections about issues and communicators strive for affective, cognitive, and behavioral changes in people through communication programs (Jaatinen 1998a, 24).

The issues management scholars, Heath and Nelson (1986) define issues as questions of policy, values, or facts that are contestable (Grunig, J. & Repper 1992, 146), and Stanley (1985) defines them as matters of public dispute with unclear public interest (Stanley 1985, 18). They tend to emphasize public debate in which matters are contested in the search for public interest. Issues may, however, be dealt with in the absence of public attention. There are also issues in which the general public has no interest, but a lobbyist has to negotiate on them with other lobbyists and decision-makers. (Jaatinen 1998a, 26.)

In this study, an issue is defined as a social problem in which there are opposing opinions, differing goals that may lead to conflict, competition, or cooperation between parties in order to solve the problem. It is common for a problem to originate in a socio-cultural sector of a society and to generate a need for change in the economic-technical sector or in the reverse order, and this, in turn, generates a demand for change in the political sector. Problems dealt with in political decision-making are political issues. Bartha’s definition of issues is close to this conceptualization of political issues, but does not stress interaction aspects. Buchholz (1982) defined a public issue “as a public policy question that can be acted on by affected corporations, and either is, or is likely to be, the subject of proposed government action” (Buchholz 1982, 466). Her ‘societal political issues’ fall in the category of political issues as defined here. Her definition of ‘public’ does not seem to be an opposite of latent but rather an opposite of private.

The main issue may include many specific issues of interest connected
to the rain problem. The main issue is about making a general choice of yes or no, and the specific issues are concerns related to the means of implementation and, e.g., standards of fair allocation. When promoting interests, lobbyists present positions which are possible solutions to the problem, as proposals for a decision that would settle the issue. (Jaatinen 1998a, 26.)

Issues may generate public or latent disputes. If there is no dispute, there is no need to lobby extensively. There is only the need to inform decision-makers of the general opinion. A public dispute is a controversy which affects primary negotiators but also members of the public (Carpenter & Kennedy 1988, 4). Public disputes are characterized by a complicated network of interests: there are many organizational parties that use different forms of power and different procedures for decision-making. In addition, they have differing values and interests that lead to a broad range of specific issues. (Carpenter & Kennedy 1988, 4–11.) These kinds of disputes are usually accompanied by large-scale public attention. Political issues are public issues but they do not necessarily get a lot of public attention. In addition, there are always governmental parties in political issues. Procedures for political decision-making and participation are highly formal which makes lobbying in political issues distinct from negotiating for public disputes in which government is not a party or a mediator.

Bartha (1982) presents two kinds of public disputes: universal issues directly affecting large numbers of people who demand a governmental solution and advocacy issues affecting large numbers of people who react favorably to a proposed remedy (Bartha 1982, 83). Public disputes may refer to a complete issue life-cycle (defined in Chapter 4), use of the whole scale of possible lobbying tactics, and involvement of several publics. This is to say that a political process is always complete, but the issue may fade away. It either dies because of a lack of support or becomes latent because there is no public interest in it.

A latent dispute is a controversy resolved among the primary negotiators, lobbyists, and decision-makers, without the need for public debate. Bartha presents two kinds of issues in this category: selective issues dealing with matters of special interest but incurring costs to the public at large and technical issues in government’s regulatory activities in which public has no interest (Bartha 1982, 84). Latent disputes may refer to an abridged issue life-cycle, the use of a limited scale of tactics, and involvement of few publics. In my previous study, I concentrated on a public dispute concerning Finland’s membership in the EU, but in this study, other kinds of disputes will be dealt with as well. Despite of universal influence, disputes at the EU level do not usually involve general public or generate a lot of public debate in the mass
Table 2-1. Characteristics of issues falling in different categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature/Level</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Affects members of public</td>
<td>Affects every member country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Many interests</td>
<td>Many interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Broad-scale public attention</td>
<td>Intense media attention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Highly political: government and parliament</td>
<td>Highly political: Council and Europarlament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Andersen &amp; Elaissen 1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latent</td>
<td>Primary negotiators</td>
<td>Primary negotiators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Few interests</td>
<td>Few interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Concentration on administration: ministries</td>
<td>Concentration on administration:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Commission (Andersen &amp; Elaissen 1991)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

media. This form of participation will, however, increase along with democratization of the EU decision-making procedures.

Political issues may involve different levels of political decision-making: the international, national (domestic or foreign), regional, and local level. All these levels are interconnected: there is a division of labor and interaction among decision-makers. In this study, issues in the field of certain policies will be observed at the European and the national level that are the main political arenas in the European political life. The local arena is distinctively emphasized in Nordic countries but may diminish in importance as these countries are integrated into the political system of the EU. Regional arrangements are still in a developing phase in Finland, but the future regions will correspond to a great extent to the historical provinces.

Political issues may be arranged along with dimensions of public–latent and international–local. Table 2-1 presents some characteristics of issues falling in each category.

Conflict Resolution

The political decision-making process is a conflict resolution mechanism in a society. Participants to the political process negotiate about the means to govern and about the goals of future direction of a democratic society. Decisions are used to allocate power and resources for the implementation of an agreed policy and, thereby, affect the interests of participants. Because
interests or positions may be in conflict, disputes arise over the contents of a decision. Disputes may be solved by a mutually satisfactory decision. (Jaatinen 1998a, 26–27.) Lobbyists try to detect issues raising disputes early in the political process. They generate positions to propose possible solutions to the problem or to give their opinion on propositions presented by other participants. They negotiate, adapt, and persuade in order to find a permanent solution and prevent disputes from reoccurring. If they do not succeed in resolving the issue, they may resort to managing public disputes. Symmetrical communication with relevant publics communicates the willingness of a lobbyist to take into account the interests of others. Temporary settlement reached by using power, third-party decision making, or escalation-prevention may give time to find a permanent resolution either by negotiating or using a decision-maker as mediator. Prevention of disputes from arising requires continuous symmetrical communication and possibly adaptation. However, it may not always be in the interest of a lobbyist to kill disputes. Conflict may be a fruitful phase in progress, and it may be better to resist adaptation to some issues and demand it from other participants—hence the need for competitive tactics.

From the discussion above, we can also conclude that lobbying is related to conflict resolution in two specific ways. In addition to negotiating about the development of the society and their role in this political conflict resolution process, lobbyists try to resolve the conflict between themselves and the external groups on what they do and what are the consequences. Lobbying is a part of conflict resolution mechanisms that an organization develops in order to survive in its environment. This process often requires negotiation internal to the organization, too. (Jaatinen 1998a, 27.)

Conflict resolution theory, as a formal field of study, has its origins in the 1950’s primarily in relation to international relations. It studies conflict, its nature, and prevention. Conflict resolution theory promotes a theory of decision-making that takes into account human needs fulfillment. (Burton & Dukes 1993; 1, 3–4.) There are three approaches within the field: 1) the strategic studies based on a realist approach, i.e., balance of powers and authoritative control, (but reframable in the context of human interests) and interested in management issues, 2) the conflict research based on a pluralist approach or a world society perspective and interested in sources of conflict, relationships in a systemic framework, and resolution of conflict by supportive means, and 3) peace research based on a structuralist approach and interested in structural violence and revolution through power politics (Burton & Dukes 1993, 7; Groom 1993, 71–96). This study mainly represents the second approach but it also includes elements of the first.
From among the applications of conflict resolution theory, a problem-solving approach is the most appropriate for the study of lobbying. The problem-solving approach provides techniques of negotiation to reach outcomes that are advantageous to all parties in a dispute. These techniques encourage parties to redefine their conflict situation as a joint predicament (patterns of ideas changed), divest parties of their roles as adversaries (social structure changed), and generate cooperation by analysis of the conflictual relationship. The outcome becomes self-supporting when it is based on needs fulfillment, self-adjustment, and free acceptance of a solution. (de R Eck 1993, 183–188.) Interactive problem-solving, especially, focuses on interactions creating and escalating conflict. It promotes the introduction of interactions that reverse and deescalate these processes. It views communication as a process designed to provide information sharing and mutual learning. It enables parties to learn to influence each other and transfer these changes to policy arena. (Kel man 1993, 199–206.)

Conflict resolution theorists have put forward some strategies for resolving conflict. They have set up normative rules that regulate the process of dealing with a dispute. (Grunig, J. & Grunig, L. 1992, 316–317.) Mary Parker Follett (1924) is one of the first scholars, maybe the first one, who advocated a cooperative or integrative approach to solve conflicts and to find mutually satisfactory outcomes (Wren 1994, 258). Fisher, R, and Ury (1981) present a method of principled negotiation which consists of four elements: 1) Separate the people from the problem, 2) focus on interests, not positions, 3) generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do, and 4) insist that the result be based on some objective standard (Fisher, R. & Ury 1995, 11). The first element makes negotiators concentrate on the problem cognitively and hef set aside emotions that make negotiating difficult. The second component draws attention to underlying interests that the result should satisfy and helps ignore stated positions. The third element invites the participants to create solutions for their mutual benefit and not to search for one right option under pressure. The fourth component implies that the agreement be based on fair standard that is independent from the parties' wills. All these four propositions should be used through the three stages of negotiation: analysis of the situation, planning problem management, and discussion on possible agreement. The goal is a wise agreement made efficiently and amicably. (Fisher, R. & Ury 1995, 11–14.) J. Grunig and L. Grunig suggested the method to be used as one form of implementation of cooperation or two-way symmetrical communication (Grunig, J. & Grunig, L. 1992, 316).

Ury (1992) suggests a breakthrough strategy to deal with difficult people
and difficult situations. The strategy helps in overcoming barriers to cooperation. Not reacting to an opponent's tactics helps keeping sight on one's own interests, disarming an opponent with an unexpected acknowledgement defuses his negative emotions, changing the game by framing the interaction as problem-solving stops positional bargaining and tricks, bridging the gap between interests should reduce skepticism, deploying power should reduce an opponent's perceived power and make him come back to the table (Ury 1992, 7–10).

Collaboration is just one strategy for dispute resolution. Other strategies for dealing with conflict include negotiation through competition, concession making, inaction, and withdrawal; and alternatives to negotiation such as mediation, third-party decision making, and separate action (Pruitt & Carnevale 1993, 4). Ury and others (1993) present a classification of dispute resolution approaches: 1) interests-based approach of negotiation and mediation, 2) rights-based approach of adjudication, and 3) power-based approach of contests and use of threats to determine who will prevail. Withdrawal will lead to the dispute ending without resolution. (Ury et al. 1993, 4–10). Carpenter and Kennedy (1988) would add that power can be used positively to encourage cooperation, e.g., using rewards, sharing new information, and empowering parties (Carpenter & Kennedy 1988; 217–218, 223).

The resolution of conflict may always be a goal, but sometimes one has to be satisfied with managing the dispute. A comprehensive approach to carrying out the process of managing conflict is described by Carpenter and Kennedy. They divide the process in three phases: 1) preparing the plan includes analyzing the conflict, designing of strategy, and setting up of a program, 2) conducting a program consists of adopting procedures, educating parties, developing options, and reaching agreements, and 3) carrying out agreements includes establishing a monitoring system, working out details, renegotiating sections, and handling of violations (Carpenter & Kennedy 1988, 67). The approach of coping with conflict stressing the power of process emphasizes stepping into the others' shoes for being aware of their perceptions and interests, defining a manageable problem, choosing a purpose for direction and an attainable goal, and designing a problem-solving process that encourages new thinking (Fisher, R. et al. 1994, 3–18).

Some theorists actually presume the managing or regulating approach. They concentrate on the administrators or managers' role in managing everyday conflict in allocation of scarce resources. They prefer an approach in which parties whose interests are most affected are assisted in working through their conflict and try to increase their abilities to self-regulate or
manage the conflict. Escalating conflict would invite external actors to intervene and regulate conflict according to their definitions of it and its control. (Laue 1993, 259.) The ‘managing’ does not necessarily mean mere settlement of conflict with force and manipulation as might be assumed in traditional strategic studies, but implies efforts to prevent conflict.

The theory of lobbying as conflict resolution and management consists of the following components: the two-way symmetrical model of communication, a contingency view, issues management thinking, a theory of group activation and the political process, the philosophy of political planning, and a conflict accommodation approach. From symmetrical communication, the author borrows the mode of negotiating with publics; from contingency view, the necessity to adapt objectives and tactics; and from issues management, the idea of anticipating the issues. The dynamics of conflict and lobbying are explained by interaction of groups and phases of the political process. The philosophy of political planning reminds us of effects on an overall strategy of a lobbying organization. The idea of issues management on anticipating issues, the philosophy of political planning on the effect on the overall strategy, the contingency view on objectives, and conflict accommodation theory are related to the definition of the effectiveness of lobbying, a good result (See p. 71).

All these theories except conflict accommodation are explained elsewhere. The approach of accommodating conflicts is adapted for the purposes of this study from the principles of communication presented by van der Merwe and others (1993), and the approach is presented here. Conflict accommodation includes all methods, practices, and techniques that are used to resolve or manage disputes (van der Merwe et al. 1993, 217). The approach makes the assumption that structural conflict requires usually structural change. Other kinds of conflicts may be solved by negotiation. Cooperation and competition are complementary forms of communication between conflicting parties. Conflicting behavior is also part of the communication process and should be interpreted as efforts to communicate concern or frustration in needs-satisfaction. Gross power differences between parties hamper negotiations for mutually beneficial outcomes; power holders have competitive advantage. The weaker parties may be empowered for meaningful negotiation to take place; empowerment may be achieved by conceding legitimacy (deriving strength from a grassroots base), a right for representation, and an opportunity for participation. Negotiation relationships should be structured and processes institutionalized; relationships must be legitimate (legitimate representation), and institutions must be legitimate (based on perceived satisfaction of the needs of those controlled). (van der
The goals of resolution and mutually satisfactory outcome are complementary. Planned incremental steps are the way to achieve a desired eventual goal. (van der Merwe et al. 1993, 223–224: principles 14 and 15.) When negotiation between represented groups in an issue is not proceeding, mediation is required. A mediator (decision-maker who has an interest in the outcome) facilitates communication, suggests possible solutions, and assists parties in reaching an agreement. The decision-maker may also enforce decisions. (van der Merwe et al. 1993, 224–226, 231: principles 16 and 17.) When negotiation between a lobbyist and a decision-maker is not proceeding, the decision-maker has a possibility to choose to ignore the lobbyist or an intermediary (such as a larger interest group) may be invited to assist in negotiation. The lobbyist may also look for another decision-maker. Parties are held responsible for their actions to their constituencies. The progress in negotiation may be facilitated by taking the constituencies into account (contributions to face-saving and public education) or involving them in the process (van der Merwe et al. 1993, 231: principles 18, 19, and 20). Emphasis in negotiation on fundamental, universal needs, rather than on cultural values, interests, and positions, promotes the chances of the resolution of conflict (van der Merwe et al. 1993, 228–230: principle 21). Within a society it is advisable to focus on interests behind stated positions (Jaatinen 1998a, 27).

The theory of lobbying as conflict accommodation can be formulated into three principles. Lobbying is directed at achieving strategic organizational goals but also at resolving and managing conflicts. Thus, lobbying is characterized by

1) two-way symmetrical communication strategies,
2) a contingency view on fitting objectives and tactics to the situation around an issue, and
3) conceptualizing the effectiveness of lobbying as achievement of organization’s goals but also taking into account the interests of publics.

The theory of lobbying as conflict accommodation outlines an ideal model for lobbying. The purpose of this study is to find out to what extent this view on lobbying is relevant to practice in the field: if it is a positive or only a normative model for lobbying or if it is not a normative model either.

Ethics of Lobbying

Lobbying is a controversial practice that appears in the news almost every day. Abuses of campaign contributions and public opinion make the headlines
every other day in the U.S. However, a lot of accusations have been cast on lobbying based on misunderstanding of what lobbying is about. Media emphasize abuses and ignore everything else (Milbrath 1963). Thus, it is important to make clear what constitutes lobbying, what is illegal, and what kind of changes there have been in the practice of the profession. There are also cultural differences and differences arising from the special characteristics of a political system in which lobbying is practiced. This is why we should not import images of lobbying from one country to another without consideration.

The definition of lobbying presented in this book within a European framework and definitions given by many American researchers on lobbying (e.g. Milbrath 1963, Grunig, J. and Hunt 1984, and Hannaford 1988) emphasize the function of lobbying to insert information into political decision-making and to monitor political process for information on decisions affecting group interests. This function of information has increased in importance also in the U.S. along with the modernization of society (Seib & Fitzpatrick 1995, Lanouette 1980). Mack (1989) regard “funneling important information, analysis, and opinions to government leaders to facilitate informed and balanced decision-making” as one of the main functions of lobbying (Mack 1989). Zeigler and Baer (1969) concluded that the use of pressure is ineffective or counterproductive whereas the combination of persuasion and informing is effective (Zeigler & Baer 1969).

Making contributions should be regarded as only one means of lobbying. It is the tactic of lobbying used that have earned the lobbyists their bad reputation (Seib & Fitzpatrick 1995). Even in the U.S., money and entertainment are considered as less effective means of influence. These are methods of helping in getting access or keeping the channels of communication open (Zeigler & Baer 1969). Bribery is more an exception than a rule. It is illegal. Money is given for campaigns not for specific causes. Money giving is regulated and interests are disclosed in the U.S. The importance of money has diminished in Finland, too, though we do not have a register of lobbyists or regulation on lobbying.

When making a decision to lobby, certain guidelines can be used to help in selecting an ethically appropriate course of action. If a lobbyist considers 1) the consequences its decisions and actions have on different publics and to itself and 2) the appropriateness of the means it uses to lobby, it should be possible to make ethically sound decisions. The former approach is advocated by teleological ethics, the latter by the deontological movement.

John Stuart Mill (1808–1873) and Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832)—representatives of the teleological approach—used consequences of decisions
and actions as standards against which the ethical nature of these decisions and actions can be evaluated. According to this utilitarian point-of-view, ethical decisions or actions maximize pleasure and minimize pain produced to greatest amount of people (Bernal 1992, 5–6; Seib & Fitzpatrick 1995, 29–31). This approach is applied when lobbyists take into account the loyalties they have to different publics. Hanson (1996) explained that public affairs practitioners have divided loyalties: a duty to their clients, to the public, and to themselves (Hanson 1996, 426). Seib and Fitzpatrick (1995) distinguished five levels of loyalties: loyalty to self, loyalty to employer, loyalty to profession, loyalty to customer, and loyalty to society (Seib & Fitzpatrick 1995, 16–18). Using the definition of lobbying outlined in the previous section of this book, a lobbyist has to balance the duties it has to political decision-makers, public officials, interest groups, mass media, and citizens involved and affected by the lobbying efforts and goals chosen and achieved.

**Deontological ethical philosophy** evaluates the ethical nature of decisions and actions based on whether they reflect common values and principles. This movement emphasizes the means used to achieve goals, and its supporters try to find universal principles to guide the choice of means (Seib & Fitzpatrick 1995, 32–34). Some scholars have tried to define common, universal values that could be used to evaluate the ethical nature of actions. In 1993, Michael Josephson (Josephson 1993 cited by Seib & Fitzpatrick 1995) arrived at ten such values: honesty, integrity, promise-keeping, fidelity, fairness, caring for others, respect for others, responsible citizenship, pursuit of excellence, and accountability (Seib & Fitzpatrick 1995, 21).

Examples of basic principles are “obey the laws” and “follow the ethical codes” (Seib & Fitzpatrick 1995). In 1995, the Public Affairs Council adopted Ethical Guidelines to help practitioners manage the ethics of public affairs in the U.S. The three fundamental principles of the guidelines state that practitioners should “maintain professional relationships based on honesty and reliable information”, “protect the integrity of the public policy process and the political system”, and “understand the interrelation of business interests with the larger public interest” (Hanson 1996, 430). In Finland, there is no ethical code for lobbyists, but the EU has created a register for those who lobby the Europarliment, and a set of codes is under development to regulate lobbying the European institutions in general. However, some general rules that can assist in selecting an ethical course of action can be found.

J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1996) argued that the two-way symmetrical
model of public relations could be a universal standard for ethical public relations when asymmetrical communication is accompanied with disclosure. It satisfies the requirements laid down by the biblical Golden rule “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” and Gouldner’s “norm of reciprocity” (Grunig, J. & White 1992, 46–47). Johnson (1994) and Jaatinen (1998a) showed that this principle is applicable to lobbying, as well. Jaatinen observed that many Finnish peak associations actually conduct lobbying using an approach that can be characterized by two-way symmetrical communication. Along the same lines, Hanson (1996) argued that advocacy should be limited by public interest and accompanied by appropriate disclosure (Hanson 1996, 424–426). He also recommended two-way communication that could lead to a change of organizational policies. McElreath (cited by J. Grunig & L. Grunig 1996) presented a practical TV rule: “do only those things you would feel comfortable explaining to a national TV audience” (Grunig, J. & Grunig, L. 1996).

Zeigler and Baer (1969) found that there are also informal ethical rules that are consistently applied and informally enforced in legislator–lobbyist relationships. Examples of these rules are “don’t pressure legislators”, “don’t interrupt another lobbyist while he is talking to a legislator”, and “don’t attack another lobbyist’s position if it is not necessary for defending your own position” (Zeigler & Baer 1969). These types of rules, however, are most likely to differ from one political culture to another within a country and from one country to another. When lobbyists take into account their duties to different publics, follow the rules outlined in this section, and communicate with their publics using two-way symmetrical communication, lobbying can be regarded as ethically sound.

The idea of public interest is related to the concept of social responsibility and teleological ethics. At first, social responsibility was a kind of general notion to take into account the public interest (Carroll 1991, Vercic & Grunig, J. 1995) but, in the 1970’s, it got a form of social responsiveness meaning that organizations have a responsibility to respond to stakeholder demands (Grunig, J. & Grunig, L. 1996). Taking into account the public interest and interests of stakeholders of the organization and the political system are also fundamentals of lobbying. If the lobbyist takes these interests into account, it is more likely to have an effect on political decision-making because the decision-makers have to take these interest into account anyway. Thus, this would actually make lobbying more effective.

In the 1980’s, ethical responsibility was added to the notion of social responsiveness (Carroll 1991, Vercic & Grunig, J. 1995). This responsibility, social rectitude, can be taken by using two-way symmetrical communication.
The latest phase of social responsibility thinking calls for strategic reasoning (Veicic & Grunig, J. 1995). Carroll (1991) saw this phase of social reasoning as a stage of philanthropic responsibility which urges organizations to actively take part in creating social welfare by contributing resources to the community (Carroll 1991).

The author of this dissertation would characterize the latest phase as active participation in solving societal problems by engaging in dialogue with various parties affected by the problem and being able to provide solutions. This would entail both logical reasoning as well as contributing resources to solve common problems. It is also the positive role that lobbying can play in society when it is directed at resolving conflicts and takes into account the public interest (Jaatinen 1998a). Mack (1989) stated that one of the functions of lobbying is "providing means for the resolution of conflicts, essential to the perpetuation of a democratic and mutually tolerant society" (Mack 1989, 6). When a lobbyist uses a framework of principles to guide selection of actions based on relevance of loyalties and considers the conditions laid down by the real problem, it is possible to arrive at ethical decisions and actions the purpose of which is to help in resolving conflicts in the society.

Some of the scholars and practitioners, however, do not see the fourth stage as a role for corporations to play. The pluralist argument on interest groups—the founders of which are Bentley, Truman, and Schnattschneider (Milbraith 1963)—also emphasizes a view that when multiple groups compete with each other and the legislators balance these interests, no group will have too much power over the others and all the interests will be satisfied. This argument is supported also by Mack (1989) who sees as the third function of lobbying "creating a system of checks and balances, comparable to that within our government, by which competition among interest groups keeps any one of them from attaining permanent power" (Mack 1989, 7). This claim has been seriously challenged in European political systems that are characterized more by corporatist features of decision-making.

In more pluralist systems, the task of balancing also puts a lot of responsibility on decision-makers to choose ethical courses of action. This notion is relevant in more corporatist societies, too. It should not be regarded as the sole responsibility of lobbyists to arrive at ethically sound political decisions. The decision-makers themselves have a role to play in political decision-making. Josephson (1988), Callahan and Jennings (1988), and Thompson (1988) argued that decision-makers have ethical responsibilities. Indeed, they have more power than lobbyists in their relationship, because lobbyists need more from the decision-makers than decision-makers can get from lobbyists. They are interdependent, the decision-makers can set the rules.
of game, and enforce the rules by sanctions (Milbrath 1963). Thus, they should also be held responsible for their decisions more so than lobbyists. Lobbyists are responsible for their own actions.

Discussions on the ethics of lobbying center around the power of lobbyists and the influence of lobbying on the functioning of democracy. In the introductory chapter of this thesis, some principles of democratic lobbying were formulated based on conditions set for political systems in definitions of democracy. Most of those principles can be followed by taking into account the loyalties a lobbyist has and communicating in a symmetrical mixed-motive manner with various publics. Other principles are related to the system within which lobbying is practiced.

2.1.5 Summary

In the empirical part of this study, lobbying practitioners are asked to define lobbying and discuss the objectives, means, and publics of lobbying. In this way, the definition developed in the theoretical part will be tested. In this section, lobbying was conceptualized as conflict accommodation. This ideal model is characterized by two-way symmetrical communication between a representative of a lobbying organization and the members of the organization and between the representative and the publics of lobbying. It is also characterized by selection of objectives and means of lobbying so that they are appropriate to the situation. The effectiveness of lobbying is measured by achievement of own objectives as well as by the extent to which the final solution takes into account the interests of all affected groups.

The relevancy of the conflict accommodation view on lobbying is tested in the empirical part of this study. This view is in accordance with the contingency view on communication presented later in this study. The contingency model of effective lobbying is developed in this study to provide better assistance in implementing this vision of lobbying. The explanatory power of issues in lobbying is observed in empirical cases of lobbying in which Finnish interest groups try to affect political decision-making.

2.2 The Process of Lobbying

The role of lobbying in an organization can be best understood in a total communications framework. In this study, communication is defined as management of exchange of messages and its purpose is to assist in the management of the entire organization by integrating the parts of the
organization into the whole. *Communication by results*, CBR, means that 
communication is a resource used as a strategic tool to achieve organizational 
goals. Communication has five functions in an organization: 1) it supports 
production and assists in sales, 2) it is used to create a profile and 3) to scan 
and inform external and internal constituencies, 4) it assists in making 
employees acquainted with their work and organization, and 5) it serves the 
function of social interaction that may not be easy to control or manage. 
Communication by results consists of the first four functions of 

The using of Åberg’s pizza in this study is based on its value as a 
thoretical framework in making distinctions between different forms of 
communication, in its capacity to integrate all functions and forms of 
communication in organizations, and ability to explain how results are 
evaluated or effectiveness assessed. Even if the model was developed to 
describe communication in private companies, many institutions that are a 
part of public administration in Finland use it. Furthermore, companies are 
one important group of organizational lobbyists. The usefulness of the CBR 
approach in explaining interest group activities is given support also by the 
evidence that many of the organizations participating in this study apply 
MBO/R on which the CBR is based.

Different forms of communication serve the five functions. Åberg’s 
(1989) classification of public relations and lobbying into the sector of 
external informing (Åberg 1989, 159), however, gives too narrow a view on 
these two forms of communication. Public relations and lobbying are two 
forms of communication which both principally serve the functions of 
profiling and scanning and informing the external and internal constituencies 
of the organization. Public relations concentrates on relations with internal 
and external key publics on whom the organization has consequences or 
whose action has consequences on the organization (Grunig, J. & Hunt 1984, 
9–11). Lobbying is essentially interaction between organizational representa-
tives and governmental and parliamentary decision-makers but also with 
other groups participating in the political process in issues important to 
lobbyists or both the lobbyists and decision-makers. Public relations and 
employee communication can be used to assist in lobbying.

The role of social interaction and the resulting networks are important in 
lobbying since these groupings of people might share certain attitudes and 
opinions on issues relevant to lobbying. Being aware of these groupings 
might help a lobbyist to understand how political opinions form and can be 
influenced. These groupings might be a kind of background factors that will 
be discussed more related to the presentation of the new contingency model.
for effective lobbying. Constituency mobilization is one way of activating these informal networks for the purposes of a lobbyist. Unfortunately, the CBR theory does not give these networks a central role in an organization. Research into these networks is highly relevant for lobbying.

Lobbying has a twofold role in strategic planning. Lobbying should be involved in the strategic management of an organization and it should be managed strategically. In this chapter, processes of planning will be discussed and a lobbying strategy will be defined.

2.2.1 Scanning and Effect on Strategy

Lobbying is a part of organizational communications that gather and analyse information for organizational decision-making and transmits effects on internal and external environment. Scanning and affecting the political environment of organization is most relevant to lobbying. Managers receive strategic information through organizational boundary-spanners and direct organizational activities according to challenges posed and opportunities provided by the environment for organizational goal-attainment. A lobbying person may be delegated a task to alleviate threats or to create a favorable political climate.

Lobbying as Environmental Scanning for Planning the Overall Strategy

Lobbying persons engage in environmental scanning when they are in contact with political decision-makers and other relevant publics in the political environment of the organization. Broom (1986) claimed that public relations personal gather information about publics and environmental forces and Dozier (1986) that they try to define emerging problems early (Dozier & Repper 1992, 186–187). Just as public relations personnel, the lobbying personnel gather and analyze information on issues important to the organization.

Åberg (1989) defines environmental scanning as a system which helps the organization to note external and internal changes important for the functioning of the organization early and to take these into account in organizational decision making. Scanning can be divided into 6 phases: 1) important internal and external factors are recognized, 2) techniques of monitoring are developed, 3) weak signals of changes are interpreted and may result in 4) recommendations for action, 5) action, and 6) monitoring and controlling of actions. (Åberg 1989; 246–247, 302.) Techniques of information gathering and analysis have different time-spans. Scanning and monitoring are continuous and systematic in effective organizations and are
directed at early detection of changes (Åberg 1989, 248), forecasting purports to trace trends further into the future and lays premises for long-term planning.

The information gathering on external changes is most relevant to the lobbying function. The information on political issues may be highly strategic and, therefore, needs to be conveyed to the strategic management. The strategic management of an organization uses strategic information collected by boundary-spanners of the organization to change the overall strategy of the organization if necessary (Aguilar 1967, 5–7; Kast & Rosenzweig 1984, 111, 133, 355–356).

Stoffels (1994) uses such terms as domain definition and domain navigation strategies of scanning to describe information gathering for strategic decision-making. The first type of strategies help in setting the mission of the organization and the second type of strategies help in staying tuned to changes. (Stoffels 1994, 19.) Organizations scan their environment in order to deal with the uncertainty arising from the dynamism and complexity of the external environment and new information needs generated within the organization. Since information is always filtered, it is the perceived environment which determines the decisions made. (Stoffels 1994, 21.)

Scanning research should be regarded as different from research for feedback that is directed for the evaluation of programs (Dasher & Repper 1992, 186). However, there is scanning at different levels of an organization that focuses on different things. Scanning for the whole organization should be distinguished from scanning for the communication strategy.

Lobbying as a Means to Change the Conditions of Survival

The alternative to organizational adaptation is to try to influence environmental conditions of the organization. It is the essence of proactiveness that an organization selects and shapes the environment in which it operates. (Kast & Rosenzweig 1984, 138.) Efforts to affect the political environment of the organization are transmitted mainly through the lobbying personal to relevant publics. Lobbyists try to mold opinions of relevant publics and change the perceived distribution of power among the supporters of different opinions. This may help in preventing unfavorable legislation to pass or in ensuring the passing of favorable legislation. If the conditions become more favorable to organizational goal-attainment, the organization may not have to change its strategy. It may, however, be also in the interest of the organization to stay tuned to information on economic and social changes and to change its strategy.
2.2.2 Strategic Planning of Lobbying

In addition to having a role in the planning of the overall strategy of an organization, lobbying communications may be planned strategically. The lobbying process consists of phases of information gathering and analysis, planning, implementation, and evaluation. This categorization is based on Cutlip’s and others’s (1985) descriptive model of planning public relations strategically (Cutlip et al. 1985) and will be related to planning models of lobbying in this section. The effectiveness of lobbying increases if lobbying is planned strategically and the planning of it is integrated with planning of other organizational functions, especially the planning of an overall strategy (Marx, T. 1990) and the planning of public relations.

Lobbying Strategically Planned

An advanced lobbying strategy is based on the overall strategy of the organization and lays foundation for networking and lobbying tactics. Formulating the strategy requires gathering and analysis of information on political issues and relevant publics so as to find out which issues are important for organization’s survival and how the organization is going to respond. Interpretations of the prevailing situation in an issue direct the selection of appropriate tactics. Thus, scanning is a continuous effort to redirect the strategy. The first phase in a lobbying process is, then, information gathering and analysis on issues and the political situation that is preceded by a review of planning premises, e.g., defining the political role of the organization in the society, and an evaluation of previous lobbying efforts. Research done for formulating the strategy can be divided into environmental scanning (detecting issues, segmentation of publics, opinion polls, surveys, image studies) and focused investigations on interests and communication effects on publics constituting the relevant political situations (focus group studies, audience analysis through clippings).

This phase is described in many classifications of the planning process in lobbying. In their 5-stage model of planning the political program, Zeithaml and Keim (1985) separates three different stages relevant to this phase: planning premises, program assessment, and issue identification. The two other stages are that of program formulation and program implementation and evaluation. (Zeithaml & Keim 1985, 23–29.) Buchholz’s (1982) issues management flow-chart for formulating a strategy to influence public policy consists of 6 stages of which the first three are relevant to this phase of the lobbying process and correspond to the third stage of Zeithaml’s and Keim’s model: issue identification, impact assessment, and research and analysis. The
three other stages of this flow-chart are developing a strategy, implementation and tactics, and evaluation of the results and the program. (Buchholz et al. 1985, 47–52.) Greer (1991) also describes 6 stages which make up a lobbying campaign: information gathering and identification of a problem, analysis of the legislative process and the legal framework, planning the strategy to solve the problem, implementation, monitoring and feedback, an achieved result (Greer 1991, 117–118). The first two stages of this model are relevant to the first phase of the lobbying process described here.

The second phase of the lobbying process consists of setting the strategic objectives and planning the lobbying activities. It corresponds to Zeithaml’s and Keim’s fourth stage of program formulation, Buchholz’s fourth stage of developing a strategy, and Greer’s third stage of planning a campaign strategy. This phase includes selecting the important issues, setting the general goals and specific objectives, formulating the strategic alternatives of adaptation or influence, assessing and choosing the strategies (Zeithaml & Keim 1985, 29–30). The success of a strategy is dependent on the prevailing conditions determined by internal factors such as uniformity of support and amount of resources available and external factors such as opinions and resources of other participants in the political decision-making. The model of effective lobbying strategies can be used for this.

The third phase of planning lobbying strategically is the implementation
of the strategy. All planning models presented in this chapter refer to it as one of the final stages of planning. Implementation of a chosen strategy requires selecting the tactics and planning the operations. In addition to strategies, the model of effective lobbying indicates the tactics for implementing the strategy. Effective lobbying is based on continuous building and maintaining of relations with relevant publics and the creating of a favorable profile. This breaks ground for the effect of influence tactics. Continuous scanning and analysis of the situation may indicate the need for introducing new tactics or the abandoning of some tactics in use, e.g. competitive and emergency tactics. Some tactics are appropriate in certain phases of the political decision-making process the flow of which will be discussed in Chapter 4.1. The tactics suggested by the model are derived directly from the strategies according to their use.

The fourth phase of evaluation is directed at all three previous phases: information gathering and analysis activities, strategy formulation, and program implementation must be evaluated using certain criteria. The evaluation phase is included also in Zeithaml’s and Keim’s, Buchholz’s and Greer’s planning models. Evaluation produces feedback and inserts corrective inputs to the process. It is, however, conceptually different from scanning which produces environmental inputs for the whole system (Dozier 1992, 339). Broom (1986) has presented three forms of program evaluation feedback: performance control feedback, measuring implementation; program adjustment feedback, measuring preparation; and organizational adaptation feedback, measuring impact (Dozier & Repper 1992, 186). The implementation evaluation corresponds to evaluating the third phase of the lobbying process. The preparation evaluation corresponds to the evaluation of the planning phase, the second phase of lobbying. The impact evaluation measures effects of the program planned and implemented. The most important criteria used in lobbying should be whether desired or adapted results concerning issues important to the organization are achieved. These results may be, e.g., the passing of favorable legislation, the ratification of an agreement, or preventing unfavorable decisions; change in opinions, attitudes, or behavior; maintaining good relations, or building a respectful profile. The evaluation of the information gathering and analysis phase of the lobbying process requires reviewing criteria for environmental scanning research. Also the criteria used to evaluate different phases should be reviewed in order to make better judgements. Figure 2-5 shows a feedback loop and the different levels of scanning for symmetrical lobbying.
Lobbying and Public Relations

In organizations, lobbying is usually exercised by the top management or specialists on governmental relations. The political activities of these people should be integrated in a general communications policy so as to achieve uniformity in organizational policy and action. Lobbying should be integrated especially with the public relations function because this assists in taking into account the entire political environment of the organization. The molding of public opinion, grass-roots mobilizing, and advocacy advertising activities are lobbying tactics useful in efforts to influence public policy and to a great extent overlap with public relations activities. Organizational resources may not be devoted enough to carrying out a program of lobbying that takes into account the general public as a participant in political decision-making. In this case, public relations personnel are needed to cooperate with lobbying personnel in order to involve citizens and the media in public discussion. If lobbying is performed within the framework of the public relations function of the organization, it is most important to integrate the planning of these
activities with the planning of the overall strategy of the organization in order to achieve the necessary impact on the overall strategy and uniformity in organizational action at different levels.

2.2.3 The Strategy and Tactics of Lobbying

The overall strategy of an organization defines the organization’s political role in a society and is the foundation for an organization’s political objectives (Jaatinen 1998a, 25). Robert Heath (1988) stated from an issues management point of view that an advanced political strategy may be expressed as a political plan that tells us how an organization adapts to the constraints of the environment and how it makes use of the opportunities open to it. A political plan may consist of 1) the organizational mission and political objectives, 2) a statement of social responsibility, 3) a summary of the political issues developing in the environment, 4) an assessment of how these issues affect organizational goal-attainment, 5) tactics of choosing an opinion and using power, 6) short-term and long-term objectives in communication and internal and external means to achieve them, 7) a statement of the delegation of tasks and responsibilities, and 8) criteria for evaluating the success of a lobbying plan. The important political issues, organizational opinions, objectives and means to achieve them can be gathered together into a separate communication plan. (Heath et al. 1988, 32-35, 114.) In this study, the political plan is conceptualized as a lobbying strategy and the communication plan as tactics to implement the lobbying strategy.

In general, the issues management approach has been criticized for an attitude of trying to control and manage issues for the benefit of an organization (Grunig, J. & Hunt 1984, 57; Cullip et al. 1994, 16). A more sophisticated and realistic attitude is sensitizing an organization to its environment and concentrating on early detection of issues and prevention of crisis by making appropriate decisions (Grunig, J. & Hunt 1984, 57). However, if an issues management program is necessary, the most effective response is interactive (Buchholz 1982, 464), i.e., two-way symmetrical communication (Grunig, J. & Hunt 1984, 296). The general features of the lobbying strategy and tactics used to implement it are discussed in this section.

Lobbying Strategy

An advanced lobbying strategy is based on the overall strategy of the organization, and it consists of two elements: 1) a general communications
Figure 2-6. The plans of an organization and the lobbying strategy (Jaatinen 1998a, 25). Kotter (1989) explained that management for results requires a vision on how things should be, a strategy to implement that vision, a network of relationships, and teamwork with motivation. This kind of strategic thinking can be extended to lower levels of organization as well. (Kotter 1989, 35–36.) We can formulate a strategy for lobbying and public relations people as well. What this means to communication in an organization, from Communication by Results, CBR, point of view, is described in the picture above.

*policy* which determines how the building and maintaining of relationships and creating of organizational profile are exercised, and 2) *strategic planning in specific issues* (Jaatinen 1998a, 25). The relationship policy is usually expressed in an overall communication policy or a profiling plan of the organization (Åberg 1989, 226–227). Political activities in issues require a separate issues management plan. Plans for each issue may be integrated in it so as to achieve some synergy (Jaatinen 1998a, 25). See Figure 2-6 for relationships between strategies of different levels and communication forms.

In his model of a political plan, Heath did very carefully not address the role of continuous relationship building in lobbying. He states that the plan
should include a statement of social responsibility—typically a concern for public relations function—but does not explain that it could be carried out through relations maintained with societal actors or all publics in an exchange relationship with the organization. These relationships are important means of adaptation and persuasion that may actually prevent the development of a dispute. They can be used in scanning and in breaking down for the effect of influence tactics in specific issues. However, Heath’s concentration on issues makes the model a good starting point for developing a lobbying strategy from a communication point of view. His political plan includes a reference to the overall strategy and consists of essential components related to the second element of a lobbying strategy, the strategic planning for specific issues. Issues management theory makes its contribution to lobbying theory by stating the requirement for anticipation of issues.

The political strategy described by Keim (1981) consists also of the political objectives of the organization, anticipated problems and opportunities, tactics to influence the public policy process, and constraints and resources taken into account. However, he maintains that organizations should begin with developing an informed and motivated constituency and maintain contacts with politicians directly and via the constituents. (Keim 1981, 44, 47–48.) This seems to be one of the most comprehensive and well reasoned views expressed on lobbying strategy in the scientific literature. In this study, a view common among public relations theorists (e.g. Cullip et al. 1994) that lobbying is based on relationships is adopted and modified. Influences efforts are claimed to be assisted by good relationships and a respectful profile that are used in tactics before issue campaigns. It is added that relationships are also the primary means of scanning that produces information for the planning of a lobbying strategy and an overall strategy. It is argued against public relations hegemony that lobbying is an independent function carrying out its task of influencing political decision-making and not just relationship building with specific publics, an activity included in the public relations function.

Having given the reasons for including both elements in the lobbying strategy, the contents of the elements have to be described. The relationship element consists of determining the publics for political communications, determining the objectives, principles, and tactics of relational, profile-creating communication with them, and delegating the tasks, responsibilities, and resources. The issues element consists of anticipating issues development and making campaign plans for specific issues that include setting objectives and principles, choosing tactics, and delegating the tasks, responsibilities, and resources. The relationship and the issues element are integrated in a lobbying
strategy in which they supplement each other and are governed by the chosen principles of communication (common to all functions) and the political goals of the organization (the overall strategy and the derived political objectives of communication). (Jaitinen 1998a, 25.)

The planning approach to strategy have been challenged by an evolutionary approach to strategy. The planning approach assumes that the strategic goals and the way to achieve them has to be developed in advance, whereas the evolutionary approach assumes that a strategy emerges over time as a series of decisions. (Robbins 1990, 121–122.) In the contingency view developed in this study, it is assumed that certain guidelines can be chosen in advance but they might be changed and new guidelines might be created along the way so that the eventual strategy might be different from that originally proposed. When the situation changes, the strategy has to be changed, too. The contingency view helps in taking these changes into account.

Another criticism of planning rationality is that some approaches assume that organizations have unitary goals and common interest that dominates individual and group interests (Robbins 1990, 247). The contingency view developed in this study makes an assumption that it is possible to find common interests and goals but that there are competing interests and goals, too. The strategic choice is made in the process of internal negotiations with competing groups, taking into account external demands, and sometimes one group over-powering others.

**Lobbying Tactics**

A communication strategy provides long-term principles of communication such as creating a profile of social responsibility and purports to achieve the **strategic objectives** of the overall strategy of the organization—such as being a respected representative in cooperation with political decision-makers. In addition, the **political objectives** of the organization such as favorable opinions and passed legislation should be included in the lobbying strategy. These objectives may be tactical objectives from the point of view of the overall organization, but they are strategic objectives of communication.

A strategy of lobbying purports to achieve the strategic objectives by using the capacities of the organization and taking into account small environmental changes. A larger change would generate a change in the strategic objectives. When environmental conditions are favorable to organizational goal-attainment, a strategic objective of supporting a decision and good relations with all participants in the decision-making could be achieved by a strategy of maintaining and enhancing opinions of relevant
publics. If the conditions become hostile (situational change), the lobbyist may have to turn to a strategy of changing the opinions of these publics. (Jaatinen 1998a, 25.) The above mentioned favorable situation could be handled by cooperative negotiation and, if necessary, by coalition building tactics (e.g. later in the political process). Unfavorable situations could be dealt with using the tactics of competitive negotiation, campaign contributions, and, at the right time, with tactics of molding public opinion, and constituency and grass-roots mobilizing (a change in the strategy of how to achieve the objective) if these tactics are included in the potential tactics determined in the strategic plan.

From the description above, it can be concluded that tactics are means for the implementation of strategies. Cutlip and others state that a strategy is the overall game plan to achieve a goal whereas tactics are methods used to implement the strategy (Cutlip et al. 1994, 353–354). The new model of effective lobbying suggests a selection of tactics needed along the political process to implement strategies in specific circumstances.

Tactics can be derived from strategies. If a strategic objective of lobbying is set—the achievement of which requires generating effects on certain publics (a strategy)—and the uses of available tactics (specified in a strategic plan) are known, the appropriate tactics can be chosen, i.e., one tactic directed at each of those publics. For example, if a lobbyist needs to create favorable public opinion in order to persuade decision-makers to vote positively, the lobbyist has to use the tactic of molding public opinion, media relations, or grass-roots mobilizing—the first of these would have real effects on citizens and the other two would create a change in perceptions. If the lobbyist needs to influence the parliamentary group of a decision-maker, he/she would choose a tactic of making contact with the group or a tactic of giving campaign contributions to the decision-maker in order to encourage him to ignore the opinion of his parliamentary group.

The model of effective lobbying strategies is based on strategic choices in which environmental conditions are matched with an appropriate strategy including clues to change the environment, i.e., influence publics, or to adapt organizational actions (Jaatinen 1998a, 26). The strategy shows directly the tactics to implement it. The tactics will be described in details related to the presentation of the model. The choices are called strategic instead of tactical because they suggest an advisory scheme for action coupled with an entire selection of tactics needed and should also direct the selection of potential tactics included in a strategic plan.

In general, the tactics refer to the operational level (Cutlip et al. 1994, 354). In this study, tactics are defined as communication programs directed at
selected publics (Jaatinen 1998a, 26). No assumption of their symmetrical or asymmetrical nature is made; it is a choice dependent on the purposes given to external communications and on the environmental situation. Specific objectives can be separated for these communication programs: changing the opinion of the public or involving it in the lobbying campaign (Jaatinen 1998a, 26). These objectives are components of the goal in the entire lobbying strategy and can be called tactical objectives. Tactical decisions include decisions made during the implementation of the strategic plan (Cullip et al. 1994, 353) such as when or how to introduce one of the tactics in the selection suggested by the lobbying strategy. A tactical plan indicates how the tactical objectives are achieved, what kind of program should be used. Tactical objectives of lobbying can be translated into operative ones, e.g., a tactic of direct contacts and a tactical (partially strategic) objective of changing the opinions of a parliamentary group is operatively efficient by allowing two employees to devote some time to give two presentations (specific means) to a few members of a parliamentary group.

As was mentioned before, the strategic objectives of communication are tactical objectives for the overall organization. Some clarification of the relationships between concepts may be necessary. Planning is exercised at both the organizational and the functional level. Strategic planning at the organizational level defines the mission, position, and culture of the organization and sets the overall strategic objectives that may be reflected in communication strategies. Tactical planning at the organizational level is about binding resources so that the strategic objectives of the organization can be achieved (Åberg 1993, 59). A tactical plan of the organization indicates what means are used to achieve tactical, measurable objectives and how resources should be allocated (Åberg 1989, 56). Some of these objectives are strategic objectives of the communication function, and this resource allocation is reflected in the strategic plan of communication. The tactical planning at the functional level deals also with the problems of resource allocation (Åberg 1989; 225, 242). Operative planning at the organizational level is about how to act with delegated authority and resources (Åberg 1989, 261). This concerns also the tactical and operative plans of the communication function.

2.2.4 Summary

In this study, lobbying is conceptualized as a strategic activity highly dependent on events in the external environment of a lobbying organization. Scanning is, therefore, an essential part of detecting changes inside and
outside the organization. The choice of political objectives of an organization and the objectives of lobbying should be based on information received by scanning. In the theoretical part of this study, the process of lobbying is conceptualized as a multiple-level circular action in which communication is directed according to information received from the environment and interpreted as relevant for the lobbying activities. A lobbying strategy is conceptualized as a combination of strategic relational communication and strategic issues communication based on the political role and objectives defined by an organization for itself. The tactics of lobbying are conceptualized as communication campaigns.

In the realm of lobbying, there are activities that are left out of the scope of this conceptual framework such as communicating on matters not planned to be issues-based. These activities include, for example, regular reporting to the authorities on matters that are not concurrently one of the main issues of an organization. In the empirical part of this study, the systems of planning applied, the extent of scanning, and the selection of objectives and means of lobbying in the Finnish organizations participating in this study are discussed in general and related to the specific cases of lobbying. The interplay of the relational and issues communication is pervasive.

2.3 Effectiveness of Lobbying

Issues management scholars (e.g., Buchholz 1988, Heath 1988) and researchers on political planning (See Taylor 1992) have underlined the importance of planning in lobbying. Both lines of investigations represent efforts to increase the effectiveness of an organization by stressing the significance of lobbying in the gathering of strategic information and emphasizing effective lobbying as a means to achieve organizational goals. According to the issues management tradition, the purpose of lobbying is to influence the challenges posed to organization’s survival and to make use of the opening opportunities generated by the effects of political decision-making on organizational action (Heath et al. 1988, 26). Heath claims that...

The purpose of issues management is to locate and create opportunities for advancing the interest of the company (maximizing wins) while identifying and responding to stress points (minimizing losses) (Heath et al. 1988, 26). Issues management ... It requires expertise in business planning and sensitivity to how public policy can interrupt business planning. It is the corporate function that brings together those persons
who plan and guide corporate activities and ethics, those who manage operations, those who market products and services, those who monitor the corporation’s sociopolitical environment, and those who communicate with key audiences. Effective issues management integrates these components into a holistic combination of attitudes and activities: listening, analyzing, controlling, and communicating. Combined, these can become part of each company’s culture. (Heath et al. 1988, 3.)

Cates (1988) adds to this view that...

Lobbying... provides two-way communication between a company and a select group of listeners. ... The primary role of lobbying is to bring about or prevent legislation in a company’s interest, which also is in the interest of those who count on the company to deliver goods and services, pay wages and taxes, and provide profit and dividends. The ideal effective lobbying is to help achieve reasonable, sound, and fair public policy. (Cates 1988, 238–257.)

The theory of political planning describes how political planning guides organizational strategy. It is founded on the assumptions that inside organizations and between them in the society, there is a battle over power and resources and that these are allocated in the organizational decision-making. Because these processes are important for the survival of an organization, the strategic management of the organization should be based on the process of allocation. Planning becomes a process of resolving conflicts, and it becomes essential for management to communicate with publics and to put forward their case. (See Taylor 1992.)

A major danger with this political game is that it can take everyone’s eyes off the business of creating wealth. In their own interests and in the interests of society, managers and employees should be mainly concerned with building businesses... If the political battle inside and outside the firm becomes too intense, then the energies of business leaders and trade union officials can become absorbed in continual in-fighting and negotiation... The businessman has much to learn from politicians, trade unionists and the leaders of political pressure groups when it comes to influencing public opinion and using the media. (Taylor 1992, 280.)

Both of these research traditions, issues management and political planning, have developed an entire philosophy to guide organizational action but neither of these can answer concretely enough to questions concerning their
effectiveness from the communication point of view.

Research into the effectiveness of communication dates back to studies on mass media effects on audience: Lippmann’s (1922) research on the press and public opinion, Lasswell’s (1927) research on war propaganda, Lazarsfeld and others’ (1948) research on radio in elections, Hovland and others’ (1949) research on persuasive films for soldiers, and Katz and Lazarsfeld’s (1955) research on the two-step flow of communication. Scholars on organizational communication have borrowed much from mass communication theory and management theories. However, the problem of measuring communication effectiveness has not yet been adequately solved. The attempts to define, evaluate, and model the effectiveness of communication deserves to be discussed, but measuring the effectiveness of lobbying requires refinement and integration of these previous approaches.

2.3.1 The Concept of Effectiveness

The effectiveness of a lobbying strategy can be studied from a point of view of the entire process of lobbying, of a strategic plan, of a particular tactic, or of the different components in the interaction/transmission. The effectiveness of the process of lobbying may be determined by the effect lobbying has on the overall strategy and by the efficiency of the strategic planning of lobbying. Of particular interest in this study is the effectiveness of a strategic plan: whether the lobbyist achieves its strategic goals by acting according to the plan and what determines the result. (Jaatinen 1998a, 27.) One of the factors contributing to the success of the lobbying plan is the effectiveness of the tactics. One tactic constitutes also a process of interaction or transmission and can be studied in detail from the point of view of its components.

All these point of views constitute four levels of effectiveness. The effectiveness on one level affects the effectiveness of other levels. For example, the effectiveness of a lobbying strategy is influenced by the effectiveness of planning (Heath et al. 1988; Marx, T. 1990), the efficiency of organization, the resources available (Keim & Baysinger 1988, 174–176; Huttunen 1994), and the cooperative nature of the strategy (Metcalfe 1978)—all factors related to the higher level of evaluating the effectiveness of the entire lobbying process. Also, the lower level factors contribute to the effectiveness of a lobbying strategy: the effectiveness of tactics and the nature of the components of a communication process. For example, continuous profiling and maintenance of good relations (that are tactics or characteristics of the sender of a message) breaks ground for the effects of influence tactics (Heath 1988). In this section, definitions of effectiveness will be reviewed
and the situational definition refined.

Effectiveness and Efficiency

Research on the effectiveness of organizational communication is based on concepts in information theory and input-output models. According to information theories, an information rich message is semantically right and true (reduced uncertainty), used syntactically right (accurate transmission), and is pragmatic, i.e., increases the knowledge of the receiver (Littlejohn 1983 according to Huttunen 1994). According to information theorists, a message has an effect on a system if it changes the purposeful state of an organism. A system has at least two alternative courses of action to achieve a valued outcome. These alternatives are not equally efficient. An effective message, then, informs the system of the different probabilities reducing uncertainty and increasing the probability of choosing a course of action. An effective message also instructs the system on how to achieve an outcome and might change the efficiency of the alternative courses of action. An effective message may also motivate a system by changing values attached to different outcomes. Thus, increasing the probability of choosing an even more desirable outcome. (Littlejohn 1983, 120–122.)

A more sender-centered definition have been given by input-output models. Farace and others (1978) define communication effectiveness as the degree to which the response to the message sent is consonant with the objectives of the sender. According to this view, communication is effective when its outcome can be accurately predicted. (Farace et al. 1978; 272, 274.) It reduces uncertainty and increases control over the receiver (Farace et al. 1978, 271). The degree of efficiency is, however, dependent on the amount of resources used to achieve predictability. Communication efficiency is defined as the outcome of the relationship between the amount of resources used to send the message and the utility achieved by sending the message (Farace et al. 1978, 274). Thus, the achieved result is evaluated from the point of view of the profitability of action or what an organization can afford. If the objective is important for the organization, more resources may be allocated to communication which, in turn, makes it possible to increase the effectiveness of communication—but not necessarily its efficiency.

Using the distinctions made by Åberg (1993) between concepts of change, desired change, and efficiency, Huttunen (1994) enlarges the definition of Farace and others. She maintains that the effectiveness of organizational communication can be described as a relationship between results achieved and resources used. Effectiveness can be divided into two components: success and efficiency. The success describes the achievement
of desired effects, and the efficiency describes the achievement of these
effects with as little resources as possible and as quickly as possible. The
success component measures the results achieved in relation to objectives set,
and the efficiency component measures the results achieved in relation to the
resources used. The objectives set may be of technical or processual nature,
e.g., the use of channels and messages, or concerning desired effects, such as
change in knowledge, attitudes, and behavior of the receiver. (Huttunen 1994,
abstr., 6–7.)

In the new model of effective lobbying strategies, effectiveness is mainly
conceptualized through the desired effects achieved. The efficiency
requirement is taken into account as a need for dovetailing the objectives set
with the constraints posed and a need for adjusting strategies with
environmental conditions so as not to use too much resources on efforts to
change something that cannot be changed by the organization. (Jaatinen
1998a, 28.) It is also simply impossible to measure the resources used by all
case examples observed in this study using only one woman’s abilities. The
model assumes efforts to make operations efficient and concentrates on
conditions affecting the achievement of objectives concerning effects.

Communication Effects

Communication effects is a traditional field for mass communication
research. Effects are observed within the framework of a communication
process. Lasswell (1948) stated the process to be composed of five elements:
who (sender) said what (message) to whom (receive) over what channel
(channel) with what effect (purpose or consequence) (Lasswell 1948, 37–51).
The early stimulus-response view of direct effects was revised using this
conceptual-ization as a stimulus-organism-response view of mediated effects
(Lowery & DeFleur 1988, 139; Wiio 1989, 84–85; McQuail 1990, 260–261).
This view still has relevance to lobbyists because it helps in evaluating the
effectiveness of the tactics used.

According to Atkin (1981), factors affecting the effectiveness of
communication are related to the source, the message and presentation style,
the channel, and the audience (Atkin 1981, 272–278). The credibility,
trustworthiness, expertise, and attractiveness of the source increases potential
accuracy, reason, political attractiveness (Atkin 1981, 276; Holboche 1991,
143), richness in fact (Zeigler & Baer 1969, 106–109, 174–178; Atkin 1981,
276), fairness, equality, and consonance with security and welfare needs
(Buchholz 1988, 66–72; Heath et al. 1988, 111) makes it more probable that
the message is attended and learned. Zeigler & Baer (1969) claim that
Figure 2-7. The continuum of effectiveness of communication channel (Zeigler & Baer 1969).

communication is most effective when it is composed of both informative and persuasive elements. Pressure is too visible and reduces the effect of a message. (Zeigler & Baer 1969, 122–128.)

The channel is more effective, the more direct and the more personal it is. The means of lobbying can be arranged along a continuum (See Figure 2-7.) according to these characteristics: direct, personal communication includes giving speeches and working in committees; mediated but personal communication includes, e.g., contacts taken by lobbyists or constituencies; indirect, impersonal communication includes letters from citizens and the publication of voting results; and the most ineffective end of the continuum, characterized by maintaining the channels open for communication, includes means such as visits and campaign contributions. (Zeigler & Baer 1969, 174–178.)

The last element of the communication process, the audience and the reception event, has a lot of influence on the effectiveness of message transmission. The social context, competitive messages, and abundance of communication should be taken into account. Effective messages are constructed so that they are understood by and attractive to audiences targeted, this requires information about the audiences (Atkin 1981, 273–274; Culp et al. 1985, 205–207). The actual effects sought for are usually classified as effects on knowledge or opinions (cognitive), on attitudes and feelings (affectual), and on behavior (action), and these are said to follow each other in a logical order (McQuail 1990, 256).

Later in the 1950’s the communication process was formulated as a two-step or multi-step flow of communication via opinion leaders and other influencers (Wiio 1989, 85–86) giving rise to diffusion theories of information (Lowery & DeFleur 1988, 210–211). Lobbyists involving relevant
publics in the lobbying process should take this kind of flow into account and make use of the influential, indirect links to the final receiver. Indeed, the new model of effective lobbying is based on the assumption of multi-way communication and a political decision-maker as the final receiver. The multi-channel approach is typical of campaign theories referred to later in this section but, here, it is given an additional meaning of multiple steps used for influence, e.g., citizens contacting decision-makers because they are motivated by a lobbyist. Other publics than political decision-makers may also be communicated to via indirect channels.

Two of the most popular contemporary views on communication effects are also relevant to organizational communicators: the view promoting the agenda-setting function of the mass media and the uses and gratifications perspective (Dozier & Ehling 1992, 164). According to the agenda setting school, the mass media have the power to select the topics of public discussion, to emphasize certain issues in their output, and to be silent on others (Lowery & DeFleur 1988, 329; Wiio 1989, 239–240). The organizational communicator, however, has a role in shaping the coverage (Dozier & Ehling 1992, 165). The uses and gratifications perspective conceives audiences as active participants in the process. They select channels and contents offered by media according to their expectations on satisfactions obtained. (McQuail 1990, 233–235.) According to the reception theory that derives partly from the uses and gratifications perspective, audiences interpret the messages and construct meanings (McQuail 1990, 243). They negotiate with the texts offered. The organizational communicators have to take this into account and direct their messages to relevant publics and use symmetrical communication with them (Dozier & Ehling 1992, 165–166).

**Objectives and Results**

Communication management theories borrow a lot from management theories. Central to evaluating the effectiveness of communication has been efforts to adapt the management by objectives, MBO, theories and management by objectives and results, MBO/R, theories to organizational communication. One of the essential developments in the field has been the realization that if the objectives for communication are set and defined concretely enough, it is always possible to measure their achievement (Åberg 1989, 285–286). The effectiveness is, then, defined as a relationship between objectives set and objectives achieved.

MBO/R is a theoretical development of MBO, and it focuses on results and on coordinating objectives and action plans among organizational subunits (Kast & Rosenzweig 1984, 438). It is, nowadays, in wide use in
Finnish companies and public administration. In MBO/R, an organization first defines its values and goals; the vision. Then, the strategic key areas are identified. When tasks are delegated to functional units, the objectives, the key results to be achieved, and the resources are defined. (Åberg 1993, 61–63.) Results may be business results (e.g., profits, market share, number of members), action results (e.g., quality, effectiveness, success), or supportive results (e.g., level of expertise of employees; reputation, image, or profile; social responsibility, sensitivity to stakeholder demands, efficiency) (Suntala et al. 1987, 38, 100–103). The objectives (expected results) are revised and the achievement of these objectives (actual results) evaluated regularly (Kast & Rosenzweig 1984, 439).

Åberg (1984, cited by Ilkävalko 1996) stated that communication by results, CBR, means that communication is a resource used as a strategic tool to achieve organizational goals (Ilkävalko 1996, 55). Communication by results strives for the development and coordination of different functions of communication in a way that supports the achievement of the overall objectives of the organization and the achievement of results (Åberg 1989, 63–64). Just as results are measured in relation to objectives in MBO/R, so are the results of communication measurable in CBR. Objectives may be set for effects in knowledge, opinions, attitudes, and behavior of the receivers, and these may be evaluated on the basis of results achieved (Åberg 1989, 286). Lobbying is one form of communication in organizations, and it can be integrated into the CBR philosophy. However, the range of possible objectives and results should be extended to better fit with the purposes of lobbying. The areas for extension include context themes and collective phenomena such as climates of opinion or institutional types of communication that has been addressed by renewed mass communication research on communication effects (McQuail 1990, 254).

Recent developments in the field of public relations give emphasis to program evaluation. The Institute of Public Relations Research and Education, IPRRE, published its standards for evaluating effectiveness in 1997. The principles for evaluation include requirements for setting objectives, considering both the output and outcomes of programs, segmenting publics, and linking PR with overall organizational goals and strategies (Lindenmann 1997). With regard to objectives, the innovation of making a distinction between short-term results (outputs) and long-term results (outcomes) is an important thing but it does not help in developing the measurement of lobbying with regard to the new model. All the results dealt with here belong to outcomes. It is, however, important to notice that one cannot achieve the objectives for outcomes if the outputs are not good.
Jackson (1997) criticized the IPRRE standards for giving too much emphasis on measuring outputs and, thus, justifying one-way communication. In evaluating two-way communication, more stress should be put on measuring outcomes. An important area of measuring outcomes is emerging as research on evaluating relationships goes ahead. (Jackson 1997, 1–2.) J. Grunig and Hunt (1984) proposed a way to measure two-way communication. Using cccorientational measures, an effect on cognitions would manifest itself in the accuracy of perceptions and understanding. An effect on attitudes could be measured as mutual agreement. Effects on behavior could be measured as actions to achieve joint-gains (Grunig, J. & Hunt 1984, 134). Huang (1997) presented new concepts for measuring relationship outcomes: control mutuality, commitment, trust, and satisfaction (Huang 1997). According to J. Grunig and Huang (1998) both relationship outcomes and maintenance (process) has to be measured and they have to be measured on both sides. They listed a fifth measure of relationship outcomes: goal-attainment. Process could be measured using its symmetrical nature, conflict resolution, and disclosure (Grunig, J. & Huang 1998).

Campaign research represent a specific field of communication study in which objectives have been given a lot of weight. The theoretical roots of the approach are in mass communication research on effects but the applications are typical for political communication in elections, advertising, marketing, public relations, and public information campaigns (McQuail 1990: 268, 293–295). McQuail (1990) defines a campaign as a situation in which a number of channels are used to achieve an informational or persuasive purpose with a chosen public. Campaigns tend to have specific aims and a limited time-span, and they are, therefore, open to evaluation. (McQuail 1990, 248.) McQuail proposes a mediated effects view on the influence of a campaign but recognizes the limitations posed by intervening circumstances and conditions of competition (McQuail 1990, 268–270).

Åberg (1989), as a representative of scholars of organizational communication, first defined campaigns as an entirety of actions to achieve predetermined objectives within a certain time (Åberg 1989, 300). A campaign plan helps in the implementation and assessment of results (Åberg 1989, 133). The effectiveness of a campaign can be assessed by comparing the objectives set and objectives achieved as a change in knowledge, attitudes, and behavior (Åberg 1989, 134–135). Later, Åberg (1994) developed a theory of continuous campaigning or a series of campaigns that relaxes the assumption of a limited time-span, concentrates on long-term strategies, ignores limits on themes, and deals with complex messages. Furthermore, the theory takes into account external environmental factors that may change
drastically and unpredictably. The previous definitions and models of campaigns have been applicable only to cases in which the influence of external situational factors have been small or predictable. (Åberg 1994, 1; Åberg 1996, 243.) However, the effectiveness of communication is still defined as effects on individuals without taking into account the environmental conditions and collective behavior of organized publics.

First of all, the objective of lobbying is an effect on a political decision that has a collective nature. Furthermore, the effectiveness of lobbying should be evaluated on the basis of real effects on the issue process that is a context factor including the effects on the (recurrence of) the political process and the taking into account of constraints posed by competing influencers. Thus, results should be assessed on the basis of the final political decision: do they remind us of the objectives set by the lobbyist (effects of communication on the collective decision) and do they resolve the conflict permanently (adaptation of objectives and strategies to meet the needs of other participants).

Sensitivity to Situations

The contextual or situational factors of communication are specifically addressed in the contingency theory in which the effectiveness of communication is claimed to be dependent on the situational constraints internal and external to an organization (Jaatinen 1998a, 28). A comparison is made between effects sought for and effects achieved and the match or difference is due to communication variables action, noise, constraints, and feedback (Wiio 1989, 104). According to the contingency view, the communication system and the objectives of communication has to be adapted to internal and external constraints in order to bring about the desired effect (Wiio 1989, 98–106).

The context factors relevant to influencing efforts in lobbying belong to the constraints according to this traditional view of contingency theory. It is better than if these factors are included in the uncontrollable noise factors. However, in this study, it is suggested that these factors should not be treated as impediments to influencing but as factors that can be influenced and made supportive of influence efforts. This is why they should be called neutral situational factors instead of constraints. This concerns especially the context factors if not all the distinguishable constraints. Thus, the contingency view on lobbying can be formulated in the following way: lobbying and the results achieved by it are dependent on internal and external situational factors. (Jaatinen 1998a, 28.)

The efforts to measure the context of communication event has been net
with difficulties because of the abundance of variables. In this study, it is claimed, however, that by selecting the most essential variables a lot of progress can be made in planning communication and in making it more effective. (Jaatinen 1998a, 28.) The context factors which influence the effectiveness of lobbying include the political resources of participants, the decision-making history and the characteristics of the political arena, and the political action field.

The political resources are a form of power used by lobbyists and other participants to political decision-making in which resources are allocated. They are important for success in lobbying efforts. Allardt (1976, cited by Nousiainen 1991) distinguished three groups of political resources of individual citizens: political rights, general social resources such as the power-position in the society and good relations with decision-makers, and attitudinal requirements (Nousiainen 1991, 334). Elvander (1966 cited by Nousiainen 1991) divides the requirements of political action for a group to the primary influence and the moving influence. The primary influence is based on the permanent position of the group in the political system and consists of political resources and relations with the political and institutional environment. This corresponds to the first two of Allardt’s groupings. The moving influence is based on the effects of a group’s activities in a particular situation, and it is determined by the contents of communication and the agitative effect of the presentation. (Nousiainen 1991, 95.)

In this study the effects of lobbying are determined by the opinions and actions of the participants. The action component includes the strategies and political resources. The strategies correspond to the moving influence component of Elvander’s classification. The political resources are determined by the permanent position (rights) of the group in the political system and the society in general and by the use of these resources as power (relations). These will be called the strength of the group to making a distinction from the manipulative and dominative uses of power (Pietilä, J. 1978, 42–44).

In the negotiation literature, power is usually defined as control of resources such as power to reward and power to punish (e.g. Pruitt & Carnevale 1993, 130) or as opportunities to generate a good alternative to an agreement (e.g. Fisher & Ury 1995, 106). Pruitt and Carnevale defined relative power in relation to the power of other negotiators and absolute power as negotiators’ power over each other (Pruitt & Carnevale 1993, 130–132). Relative power or powerfulness is related to the permanent position of a group, and absolute power to the relations between groups. Fisher and Ury’s definition of power as the Best Alternative to the Negotiated
Agreement, BATNA, is related to the use of expertise and other resources to generate power over the other party in the relationship (Fisher & Ury 1995, 106) and can be included in the relationship component of the strength of a group.

The factors related to the decision-making history and the characteristics of the political arena include, e.g., the context or the service function of democratic decision-making, the history of the development of the society, the political culture, general policies determining the individual decisions, the cycles of the election period, the decision-making methods and procedures (e.g., legislative process, parliamentarism, jurisdiction), and scarcity of resources (Jaatinen 1994, 18–19). Particularly, the division of political systems according to the type of interest representation has explanatory power. The political systems of different countries can be classified into three different types: corporatism, pluralism, and societal corporatism in which both the corporatist and pluralist sphere co-exist (Zeigler 1988.) It is a matter of degree of corporatism and pluralism whether a system can be classified in one of these types.

The Finnish system represents societal corporatism (Helander 1979). In this type of system, no group has been granted representational monopoly or power to implement political decisions but pressure groups are in a disadvantaged position because they are unequal in consultation with groups in the corporatist sphere (Cawson 1986, 42). This state of affairs also influences the objectives of a group and the means it uses. Both pressure politics and negotiation is used depending on the sphere a group is operating in. In addition, some issues are settled in the corporatist sphere, other issues are decided in the pluralist sphere. Different types of publics pose a challenge to a lobbyist in the corporatist and pluralist phases of the political process. J. Grunig and Jaatinen (1998) made a remark that it is most likely in societal corporatist systems that communication with government is characterized by strategic symmetrical communication or at least a strategic symmetrical schema for public relations. As for objectives, in societal corporatism, access might not be difficult to gain but legitimacy concerns surface, as interest groups have close relationships with the government. (Grunig, J. & Jaatinen 1998, 1999.) All the interest groups participating in this study had earned a place in the corporatist sphere of decision-making but some groups operating mainly in the pluralist sphere participated in the study for the author's Master's thesis.

The political action field is a construct developed for this study in order to take into account the essential context factors affecting lobbying. It consists of all the participants in the political process and the political decision-making
arenas in which the decisions are made. (Jaatinen 1998a, 28.) The participants usually consists of political decision-makers, several interest groups and private companies, mass media, and individual citizens. The situation in the political action field influences the final outcome of the political decision-making. The arenas of decision-making consists of the government, parliament, and public administration at the local, regional, national, European, and international level. There are several direct and indirect channels of influence that can be used by a lobbyist in the political action field. Instead of direct contacts with political decision-makers, a lobbyist may use larger interest groups or constituents as intermediaries. It may use mass media to shape public discussion, or appeal to citizens and competitors. In order to be effective, the lobbyist should choose its opinions, plan its strategies, and use its strength taking into account the objectives, strategies, and resources of other participants (Keim & Baysinger 1988, Heath
et al. 1988, 27–28). (See Figure 2-8.)

In this study, the effectiveness of lobbying communication is defined as success in achieving results and sensitivity to situational factors. Thus, the traditional criteria used to assess the effectiveness of communication are supplemented with other essential criteria in evaluating lobbying: the factors related to the political process, especially political participation. As an organization purports to influence these situational factors through communication, they should be taken into account in the assessment of effectiveness as objects on which effects are brought about. Especially, the essential situational factors selected for the new model of effective lobbying strategies are the opinions and strategies of the external publics and of individual political decision-makers constituting a collective decision-making body. These are actors in the political action field. The context factors of issue lifecycle, political process, and competing influencers are constituted by these situational factors. Therefore, both the definitional elements, the success and sensitivity, can be assessed on the basis of objectives set for the effects on the final political decision. They are incorporated in the definition of the results aimed at. Individually, success can be measured by objectives achieved and sensitivity by adaptation of objectives and strategies (permanence of a decision as a result). (Jaatinen 1998a, 28–29.)

Lobbying is effective if the results aimed at are achieved. A good result can be the original objective or the desired effect (a victory, but possibly a short-term effect only) or that objective/effect adapted to the demands made by other actors (a mutually satisfying result, i.e., a permanent solution to a problem). The preparedness to adapt objectives is sensitivity to the situation. This does not mean making concessions easily but is an outcome of symmetrical communication with publics. (Jaatinen 1998a, 29.) (By adapting, an organization also achieves efficiency: when the possibilities to influence, probabilities of having an effect, are known, an assessment can be made of how much resources the organization is prepared to spend to achieve a result.)

The strategies and tactics used to achieve good results should also be adapted to the situation, i.e., to the opinions, actions, and political resources of other participants to the political decision-making. These factors should also be taken into account in the planning and modeling of effective lobbying. (Jaatinen 1998a, 29.)

2.3.2 Evaluating Effectiveness: Opinions, Attitudes, Behavior, Result, Situation

In this section, problems related to the measurement of effectiveness will be
discussed. The previous definitions presented above have guided the selecting of objects to be measured. However, in lobbying, more variables are needed to explain and measure the effectiveness of communication. The results may be quantified as costs incurred because of a continuous conflict, as costs of influence efforts, and costs produced by changed conditions or legislation. In this study, the main concern is the qualitative aspects of results and the only effort made to quantify the results achieved is to classify them. Even if it would be useful to quantify results as resources spent, this is beyond the scope of this study. The problems related to quantifying are revealed by difficulties in assessing even the qualitative effects of lobbying.

Predicting Individual Behavioral Change

Evaluating the effectiveness of lobbying is a complex task. There are many factors affecting success, and there are problems related to the measurement of effects. The effects of lobbying may occur as a change in or persistence of the opinions, attitudes, and behaviors of the publics influenced. However, the lobbyist may not know if it has affected a decision-maker if the decision-maker does not act like the lobbyist would have liked. Still, the opinions of a decision-maker or his perception on the lobbyist’s profile may have changed. This just has not produced a change in his/her behavior. Greer (1991) maintained that sometimes decision-makers may refrain from taking actions which would be a result of persuasion even if the lobbyist has good relations with him or her and his supporters and, sometimes, this is the reason why the decision-maker decides not to comply (Greer 1991, 119–120). Thus, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of lobbying at the individual level.

Even if the decision-maker acts like the lobbyist wanted him/her to do, this does not guarantee that the final result will be favorable to the lobbyist. The final result is dependent on the number of decision-makers supporting the lobbyist’s view and prepared to vote for it. Thus, focusing on individuals does help in predicting whether the objectives on the decision will be achieved only if effects on all the decision-makers are assessed. Still, only the contents of the final decision indicates how much and what kind of an effect the lobbyist has had on it, and it is different from the summed effects on decision-makers. The agenda of an issue is formed early in the political process, and the substance of contents and the procedures to be used in decision-making are decided before bargaining on details and voting on the bill. The lobbyist must be involved from the beginning of the process in order to have a maximal effect on the final decision.
Taking into Account the Political Process

The achieved effects or the result has to be weighed against situational constraints. Otherwise, objectives which are impossible to achieve or are of short-term duration are set and the measurement of effectiveness gives the wrong picture, underestimates or overestimates the results. The situational factors may have an countereffect on a decision-maker or shorten the perseverance of effects. Specifically, the political participation is a distinct phenomenon affecting collective political decision-making. Two factors influence the final result, especially: competing influencers around the decision-makers and the possibility of recurrence of the political process.

There is a continuous competition around the decision-makers for their final opinion on an issue. A decision-maker is guided in his actions by competing motivators: his personal views, his affiliations with different groups (i.e. background factors), and external participants (actors defining the political situation). The background factors and the participants to the political process are competing influencers. Participants to the political decision-making such as political parties, parliamentary groups associations, companies, mass media, and citizens (some of which constitutes the constituency of an individual decision-maker) have an influence on the opinion formation and the voting behavior of a decision-maker. These may produce a countereffect to the effects sought for by the lobbyist. Greer (1991) reminded us that it is possible for both sides to be effective in their lobbying efforts which makes it difficult for either of them to achieve their objectives. Furthermore, if one side does not lobby at all, its results will be negative. (Greer 1991, 120.) Keim and Zeithaml (1986) stated that it is actually easier to resist a change that has wide support than to advocate a change that does not have the support of decision-makers and public opinion (Keim & Zeithaml 1986). The opinions and strategies of the groups participating in the political process should, therefore, be taken into account in setting the objectives. The advice that a mutually satisfying agreement should be looked for is relevant, again. In the assessment of the effectiveness of lobbying, this may be measured in objectives achieved as adaptations or as influences on competing influencers or in relation to them.

Furthermore, the final result may be achieved only for a short time. Miller (1991) described the effect of new trends and temporary legislation (Miller 1991, 63). In accordance with issues management theories, some unsatisfied actors may generate discussion on the issue and start the political decision-making process, again. Long-term results require satisfied participants who do not have a need to reverse the political decision. The theory of conflict resolution reveals the need for a mutually beneficial decision. In the
assessment of the effectiveness of lobbying, this may be measured as permanence of effects achieved and as adaptation of objectives. The two factors of participation can be described and taken into account by using situational definitions and models of communication effectiveness. This argument will be elaborated in the next section.

2.3.3 From a Linear Model and an Interaction Approach to Contingencies

Research has produced different kinds of models that help in assessing the effectiveness of communication. Fisher (1978) presented a classification on perspectives on communication that can be used to classify at least dyadic bargaining and dyadic communication (Putnam & Roloff 1992, 10). The mechanistic—psychological tradition has created linear process models, and pragmatic (or the systems-interactional) and interactionistic (symbolic-interpretative) traditions have created models of interaction (Fisher, B. 1978). Many studies, however, combine these approaches, and studies on multi-party negotiations cannot easily be fitted in the classification (Putnam & Roloff 1992, 10). In this section, the linear and interaction models of communication effectiveness will be reviewed and the relationships between objects measured discussed. At the end, the interactional contingency view on effectiveness of communication in multi-party, multi-way negotiations will be presented.

The Causal Chain Re-evaluated

In research on organizational communication, many instruments of measurement have been developed to measure different aspects of effectiveness or efficiency of communication. The measurement has concerned the publicity (e.g. coverage in media), the reach and attendance by publics, the noticing and retaining of messages by individuals, and the effects caused by these messages in the knowledge, attitudes, opinions, and behavior of the receivers, and their perception on a company's profile. (Lampinen 1993, 5; Huttunen 1994, 10–11.) A few instruments have been developed to measure the overall effectiveness of communication functions, e.g. advertising and communication campaigns (Huttunen 1994, 15–16).

The most promising results in measurement of the overall effectiveness have been achieved in an integrated model of effectiveness developed by K. Huttunen, S. Jaatinen, A. Korkiakoski and T. Lampinen (See Huttunen 1994, 3). It is not possible to follow continuously all the essential elements of effectiveness by using previous models of effectiveness. The new model was
created to make it possible to control all communication functions in organizations with one system of follow-up. (Lampinen 1993, 7.) The model claims to measure context factors of effectiveness in addition to traditional criteria of effectiveness, the changes in knowledge, attitudes, and behavior of individuals. However, the criteria to measure context are still bound to an individual (perception on sender’s image) or to a relationship between the sender and the receiver. (Lampinen 1993, 10–11.) The relationship is described by degree of binding or acceptance: the readiness to receive communication, self-selected messages from the sender through self-selected media (Huttunen 1994, 31–36).

The results achieved in research on communication effects are based on a linear process model of communication and the measurement of characteristics of its components: communication is deemed to be effective if the sender is credible, the message politically attractive, the style of presentation informative, the channel direct and personal, and the social context of reception favorable—as a result opinions, attitudes, and behavior of the receiver are changed in this logical order. The reception research reverses the direction of the process and adds an uncontrollable component: a receiver selecting and interpreting messages sent. Messages may be made comprehensible and attractive to the receiver, but the receiver selects which message he/she learns. Thus, from the point of view of a sender, this finding does not help predicting the behaviors of a receiver.

In both of these research traditions, effects of communication are evaluated only on some objects important in assessing the effectiveness of lobbying and the effects are assumed to occur in a causal chain. In evaluating the effectiveness of lobbying, it is not enough to measure the advancement of change from opinions to behaviors of an individual. In lobbying, results of collective decision-making should be evaluated. The models of communication by objectives and campaign models (e.g. Wiio 1974, Åberg 189) extends the process of communication to the evaluation of results, but expected results are imposed on traditional objects of influence. The lobbying is directed at the political process, this sets additional requirements for success. The final result is dependent on generating a large enough majority of opinions and votes among the political decision-makers to support the lobbyist’s view.

Furthermore, the order of occurrence of the effects on individuals has been contested (McQuail 1990, 256). The causal chain that links the message and media activities immediately to behavioral change has been under suspicion since the rise of the mediated effects view. Now, it is claimed that changes in knowledge-level, attitudes, and behavior may occur in different
orders or that changes may happen only in some of these factors. A change in a factor is more difficult to achieve the further one tries to go along the chain (Grunig, J. & Hunt 1984, 124–126; Dozier & Ehling 1992, 163–166; Dozier & Repper 1992, 189).

The final result being the new factor to be influenced by lobbying would be located at the fusion point of the ends of many chains. This may count for the difficulty of achieving it, but in the light of different possible orders the finding may not have much relevance to the planning for generating the result. Thus in lobbying, the final result should be the starting point of assessing effectiveness and not the last point.

*Interactors and Indirect Influence*

As an explanation of lobbying effectiveness, the linear process model is seriously weakened by interactional features of negotiation and indirect forms of political participation. A negotiation process consists of a series of linear influence efforts by alternating parties striving for an agreement. In fact, the parties interact. They inform and persuade each other representing their constituencies. Constituents exercise indirect influence on decision-making through their representatives. The parties may influence each other also indirectly, through their own constituents or through the constituents of others. A change in constituent opinion has effects on the opinion of the representative. This indirect form of influence adds to the complexity of explaining the effectiveness of lobbying. The constituent opinions are a dynamic phenomenon in which a party has many constituents whose opinions may change during the course of the negotiation process.

The negotiation literature suggests that the effectiveness of interaction might be determined by the decision reached. Communication is effective or has not been a hindrance if an agreement predicted by psychological, structural, and cultural variables is made. Communication is ineffective if the prerequisites for a resolution exist but a problem is not solved. This view is reflected in the approaches that treat communication as having *limited, mediating, or moderating effects on negotiation outcomes* (Putnam & Roloff 1992, 8–9). The *independent effects approach* that treats communication as directly influencing negotiation outcomes states that the use of a particular kind of arguments increases the likelihood of reaching mutually satisfying outcomes or not satisfying outcomes (Putnam & Roloff 1992, 9). In general, symmetrical communication or cooperative orientation is most likely to lead to a mutually beneficial decision. Asymmetrical or competitive orientation may serve the purposes of an individual negotiator better than symmetrical communication. However, the solution achieved may not be a permanent one
and the wins may be lost in the next negotiation process. In the long run, it seems to be that the two-way symmetrical communication serves also the interests of an individual participant. Thus, it constitutes a principle to be followed.

In negotiation research, the relations between parties and constituents are described as another arena of negotiation in which the parties engage in solving a problem. Its effects on the external negotiation arena are described by changes produced by constituents' expectations in the behaviors of the representative (e.g. Turner 1992). The representatives may also affect the opinions of their constituents, but there has not been research on the use of different publics as intermediaries of influence on other parties—only the mass media has been described as an external party affecting the negotiation outcome and activating constituents formed by audiences (e.g. Douglas 1992). This study on lobbying may be the first to address the entire field of political participation that is operationalized in multiple actors and direct and indirect channels of influence.

More thorough-going models of negotiation focusing on communication as interaction suggest the effectiveness of communication should be determined by micro-processes such as patterns of verbal and non-verbal messages altering the course of interaction or as the creation of shared meanings by the use of language and symbols. The former explanation may be classified in the systems-interactional perspective and the latter in the interpretive-symbolic perspective on communication identified by Fisher. (Putnam & Roloff 1992, 10.) The former perspective includes, e.g., studies on negotiation process, strategies, and tactics and the latter, e.g., studies on the role of language and meaning in the use of arguments, framing of issues, the expression of threats and promises, and the use of facework (Putnam & Roloff 1992, 11). The distinction is used by Fisher to classify actual communication research not necessarily studying negotiation. The systems-interactional perspective includes, e.g., pragmatic studies on sequences of communication behavior and changing balance states of systems, and the interpretive-symbolic perspective rhetorical, conversational, discourse, and semiotic studies.

Generally, these interaction models describe the negotiation behavior of parties at the negotiation table in detail or with their own constituencies, but do not account for the interaction external to the table, e.g., indirect influence mechanisms. Even if they address multi-party negotiations or multi-public communication (e.g. Heath 1994), these theories only tell us how to influence and build relations and not whom to influence and build relations with in order to have an effect on a political decision. Thus, the explanations of these
micro-processes are not very fruitful in explaining the higher-level strategic choices of lobbyists in an interorganizational context. An explanation of macro-processes in a macro context is required. The general principles of symmetrical/cooperative orientation and asymmetrical/competitive orientation suggested by the negotiation and communication literature do, however, provide advice that has been taken into account. In this study, the systems-interactional view is used in the macro context of the entire political environment, not just in relation to a certain public. Interaction is fit into the framework of contingency theory explaining macro processes related to strategic choices.

Sensitivity to the Situations in an Issue

Taking the point of view of an organization trying to manage its external environment, we can look at the whole field of political participation. There are many kinds of organized actors with different political opinions trying to influence political decision-making using strategies and power. In order to manage or resolve a conflict, a lobbyist has to take these actors into account and possibly communicate with them. A political decision is made on the basis of the political situation in the issue. The lobbyist should construct the political situation in the political issue for itself and choose its strategy according to the essential elements of the situation. The situation consists of the opinions and strength of all actors. The influence efforts of these actors may change the situation, and they have to be taken into account in the situational analysis of the lobbyist.

Through interaction with other actors, the lobbyist may change the situation to be more favorable or come to realize the need for adaptation. The lobbyist may use direct or indirect channels of influence to make contact with the other actors in the environmental system. It also has to use its influence in the internal communications of its own system in order to synchronize all its subunits and to mobilize them. The other actors also have to balance the differences between their own systems and the environmental suprasystem. The subsystems of these actors are their background factors which influence their opinions, strategies, and power. The lobbyist may try to influence these subsystems in order to have an effect on an actor. The indirect channels of influence are provided by these background factors and by the actors constituting the components of the political situation because changing the overall situation may have an influence on individual actors as well.

Contingency theory provides the means for conceptualizing all interaction variables for a lobbyist planning to participate in the political decision-making. As far as is presently known, no previous efforts has been
made to apply the contingency theory in modeling lobbying in a macro context. Contingency theory describes appropriate actions in specific situations, and the fit between the situation and actions is conceived to measure effectiveness (Kast & Rosenzweig 1984, 115–116). The political situations in an issue can be described as specific situations called contingency situations. These contingency situations are constituted by the states of contingency factors, i.e., by the opinions, strategies, and strengths of actors participating in the political process. The actors correspond to the contingency factors, and just as the opinions, strategies, and strengths of actors may change, the contingency factors may have different states at different times.

The contingency situation determines the appropriate strategy that the lobbyist should use. The new model of effective lobbying strategies is developed to indicate these strategic choices and will be presented in the next chapter. When the situation changes (a change in the state of a contingency factor), different strategies should be introduced. The strategies are directed at changing or enhancing the opinions, strategies, and strengths of other actors, i.e., the states of contingency factors, thus, producing a change in the situation. Alternatively, the lobbyist may adapt its own objectives and strategies to the situation. The state of a contingency factor is dependent on the actor’s background factors and the participants in the political process. A change in a state may be induced by a change in the actor’s background factors or through the participants. Thus, a possible strategy would be an effort to influence an actor indirectly through its background factors or other external actors instead of making efforts to influence it directly. The effectiveness of lobbying is ultimately determined by sensitivity to the contingency situations: the preparedness to adapt one’s own objectives and strategies or to influence other parties’ objectives and strategies. The success component of the effectiveness is, then, determined by the result achieved. The view on modeling the effectiveness of lobbying using contingency theory will be refined in the following chapters.

2.3.4 Summary

In this study, the effectiveness of a lobbying strategy is in focus. Success in achieving the strategic objectives and sensitivity to the situation in a political issue are the criteria, the application of which is observed in real-life settings of lobbying cases. The different criteria lobbyists use in evaluating lobbying are observed in the empirical part of this study. The consistency of these criteria with the conceptualization of results as success and sensitivity is
discussed. This study does not deal with the issue of efficiency or the effectiveness of the means of communication.

The conceptualization of results as success and sensitivity is consistent with the new relational measures of effectiveness: the level of understanding, mutual agreement, achievement of joint-gains, the symmetrical nature of the process, conflict resolution, and satisfaction. The extent to which the results achieved in real-life lobbying cases satisfy the condition of conflict resolution is observed in the empirical part of this study. The contingency view on the situational determinants of effectiveness also explains the conditions for conflict resolution.