3 Modeling Effective Lobbying Strategies

3.1 Previous Models

Political and economic theory abounds in models of lobbying. However, there are not many models of lobbying from a communications point of view and only some of these address the whole process of lobbying. In this chapter, previous models of lobbying will be presented and critically assessed.

3.1.1 Early Models of Lobbying

Early models of lobbying give us important information on potential factors which influence the success of lobbying. These models are mainly descriptive in nature. In the 70’s and 80’s, a lot of research was made on campaign contributions (PACs) and charity work. These studies in economics and political science sought to understand what determines and increases the probability that a lobbyist will try to influence political decision-makers. Some researchers tested the assumption that these efforts have some influence on electoral outcomes and legislative voting. Studies to construct models of contributions cumulated in evidence for certain determinants: some of them are related to a lobbyist and its environment such as market and institutional factors, and others are related to the target of lobbying such as the ideological background of the political decision-maker or his positions in certain issues and his expected success in elections. (Jaatinen 1994, 22.) In some of these models, the demand side determinants are taken into account along with the supply side determinants which gives these models some features common to models of interaction.

There are three distinctive lines of research modeling interaction between lobbyists and political decision-makers. The political scientists developed interaction models based on interest-group theory and social-psychological theory to describe communication, behavior, and exchange of benefits between lobbyists and political decision-makers. According to these researchers, interaction is determined by the actors’ expectations and images of each other. The economic theorists presented exchange models that explain the relationship between a political decision-maker and his constituents and the relationships of interest-groups to their members and to political decision-makers. The exchange is determined by potential benefits to actors in a
relationship. These models lay the foundation for the theory of political markets developed by Hayes (1981). The principal–agent models are also creations of this line of research. (Jaatinen 1994, 23.) The exchange models highlight the importance of taking into account the relationship of a political decision-maker to his constituents in models of lobbying.

The third group of interaction models constitute of game theoretic models originating in Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) and Rapoport’s (1964) economic theory. These models describe rational players trying to maximize their gains in situations of perfect knowledge. The models assume interaction and concentrate on describing strategic choices of participants and outcomes of interaction. The interaction between actors is characterized by cooperation or competition, and the possible outcomes are to lose or to win. Game theoretic models claim the outcome of interaction to be dependent on the strategies, resources, and power of the actors. The early bargaining theory was also dominated by game theory, but later a need for a noneconomic model of processes of negotiation was acknowledged by many researchers (Putnam 1985, 130–133).

*Process models* reveal change in interaction. The process models of bargaining describe either cyclical patterns of exchange or phasic development of interaction in both of which communication plays an important role (Putnam 1985, 134). In lobbying, other processes intervene in the micro-processes of interaction between dyads and affect the outcome as well: the political process in which the decision on an issue is made and micro-processes between other dyads or macro-processes of interaction in multi-party situations. These partly overlapping processes complicate the picture even more. Thus, a call for a systems approach on lobbying from the macro point of view is certainly not premature. The context themes help in constructing such a theory of lobbying.

3.1.2 Communication Strategies and Organizational Context modeled

In academic research, studies to construct models of communication strategies used in organizational political action are rare. It might be fruitful to apply models of communication by objectives or campaign models, but most of them are only descriptive in nature. They are also too general to explain strategic choices of lobbying. However, some of them adopt a contingency view or include context themes. Theories of strategic planning of organizational ccommunication deserve attention, too.
Wiio (1974) presented a model of communication by objectives that adopts a contingency view. The model explains the role of communication in achieving the effects sought for. Wiio divided the elements of a communication strategy into constraints and optional factors. The constraints consist of target groups, competition, personal, internal and external noise, resources, and timing. The optional factors include time-span, communication channels, and message content and form. Depending on these factors, communication may change the knowledge, opinions, attitudes, and behavior of a target group. These changes are conceptualized as actual effects that are compared with the original objectives set before communication. (Wiio 1974, 37.) The model is very general in nature and does not explain choices between different kinds of communication strategies. Target groups are included in constraints that a communicator can not choose which implies the model is to be used at the tactical and not at the strategic level of planning. In strategic communication, publics are segmented and chosen to be targets of communication.

Another kind of models of communication strategies are campaign models. According to Åberg's earlier model of planning campaigns with a limited time-span, a campaign consists of situational factors, change factors, result factors, and evaluations on effectiveness (Åberg 1989, 123). The situational factors are determined in the early phases of a campaign. These consist of the theme and content of the message, objectives on effects, target groups, channels used, timing, resources, and possible noise factors including competition. A change factor is the campaign itself. The result factors consist of the effects achieved. The evaluation requires feedback. (Åberg 1989, 124–136.)

Later, Åberg (1994) developed a dynamic model of continuous campaigning or a series of campaigns. He concentrated on two sets of factors: behavior of actors and effects of their action. The central idea is that behavior of an actor is influenced by his previous actions and effectiveness of those actions. In addition, the changes in the theme of a campaign or issue, the changes in the opinions of target groups, and actions by other actors influence the behavior of the campaigner. The quality of scanning affects the possibilities of taking into account these factors in planning the campaign strategy. (Åberg 1994, 1–2.) This model represents a clear progressive trend when compared with previous models of campaigns. In this model, some of the relevant context factors in political campaigns are taken into account. These include factors such as the issue process and competition. The actors are usually collectivities trying to influence large groups of individual citizens.
and have an effect on public opinion on a certain issue. In issue lobbying, the final target is a collective decision-making body, often a parliament. However, campaign models are also general in nature, restricted in one-way persuasion, and applicable at the tactical, not at the strategic, level of planning.

*Strategic planning and Contingency Analysis*

Strategic planning of communication has interested many researchers from the latter part of the 80's. Remarkable progress has emerged from applications of contingency theory of organizations. Willo (1989) developed his contingency view of communication that states that communication is always dependent on internal and external factors (Willo 1989, 102–103). Åberg continued Willo’s work by developing a practical framework for contingency analysis of communication in organizations. This was meant to help organizations to improve their communication with important stakeholders and to use communication as a tool to achieve the strategic goals of organizations. The effort turned out to be a crucial step towards the strategic planning of communication.

Contingency analysis lays the foundation for strategic thinking that guides all lower level choices as well. In his model of contingency analysis, Åberg divided contingency factors into external environmental factors and internal factors. An external environment consists of those actors who are in an exchange relationship with the organization and those who expect something from or value something in the organization. Internal factors include structural, management and leadership factors, factors related to the personal, and other organizational resources such as economic, technical, and communication resources. All these factors affect how communication is organized and if communication is effective. (Åberg 1989, 227–241.)

Communication programs should be planned taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of the organization and the opportunities and threats posed by the environment. Especially the strengths and opportunities should be combined, and the threats should be turned into opportunities. (Åberg 1989, 53–55, 225.) This kind of situational analysis is usually called SWOT or force-field analysis (Cutlip et al.1994, 326–328).

The model of contingency analysis for communication gives only loose guidance to lower level forms of communication such as lobbying. A new theory is required if we want to understand the special characteristics of lobbying and to relate lobbying to the planning of communication in general and to the strategic planning of an organization. The new model of effective lobbying is applicable to the specific field of political action within this total
communications approach and purports to give tighter guidance for actions in this special field.

3.1.3 Strategic Choices Modeled

In the development of the new model of effective lobbying, it was considered essential to reveal connections between different kinds of lobbying strategies and external environment. A few previous models explain this kind of strategic choices within the field of organizational political action. Some features of the new model are borrowed from these models. Thus, they deserve to be discussed more thoroughly.

The Behavioral Model of Sethi

Sethi (1982) presented a model for strategic choices that are the foundation for organizational political activities. Organizations tend to behave in one of three different modes that are dependent on certain external environmental and internal organizational conditions. Each mode of organizational behavior has its risks or consequences. The possible modes of behavior are 1) defensive, 2) accommodative, and 3) positive activism. Each include suggestions for the use of certain political strategies: campaign contributions, direct contacts, coalition building, and indirect lobbying can be used for different purposes. The modes can be seen as three developmental stages of which Sethi preferred the last one, political activism. The more active the organization, the more diversified the selection of strategies in use. The model shows how historical conditions are conducive to a certain mode of behavior and what risks this kind of behavior contains for the organization. An organization should determine which conditions prevail and which activities are appropriate for it. (Sethi 1982.)

The model helps in identifying the way an organization behaves and the conditions that prevail. It also shows how organizational political action can be improved by taking social responsibility and participating actively in political change. Despite its merits, the model has many problems too: The assumptions constituting the possible conditions are tied to historical circumstances, and strategic choices are made between overall behavioral response styles; the model does not describe which communication strategies are appropriate for specific situations. In addition, the response styles are tied to the developmental stages of an organization.

Buchholz’s Model Based on Issue Life-cycle

Issues management theorists have presented life-cycle models of which
Figure 3-1. Buchholz’s (1988) issue life-cycle model.

Buchholz’s 3-phasic model is maybe the most comprehensive and relevant here. According to Buchholz (1988) the strategic choices of organizational political action can be explained based on an issue life-cycle. Her model shows which communication strategies are appropriate at each phase of an issue’s life-cycle. (See Figure 3-1.) In the first phase named public opinion formation, when the activist groups contend for dominance in defining the content of an issue, the appropriate communication strategy for a lobbyist is to try to mold public opinion. The lobbyist may publicize its positions in the media, deliver yearly reports and newsletters, arrange meetings and training, build its image, give press releases, send reports to the government, and participate in public discussion on radio and television. In the second phase of the life-cycle, when the public officials prepare a proposition for legislation and the legislators make their decision on the issue, a lobbyist may try to influence the formulation of public policy. Participatory means of communication such as coalition building, campaign contributions, and direct contacts to political decision-makers dominate this phase. In the third phase, public officials implement the political decisions made. In order to influence the decision-making of this phase, a lobbyist may use compliance strategies: to cooperate with officials or to refuse to obey the new laws. The lobbyist may also try to raise discussion on the issue again in order to promote changes in
legislation with which it is not satisfied. The main actors of the three phases of the issue life-cycle, the activist groups, the legislators, and the officials, constitute an iron triangle. If they all agree on certain legislative issue, the iron triangle is impregnable and it is difficult for a lobbyist to change the situation. (Buchholz 1988, 57–62.)

Buchholz’s model takes into account the political process in which the decision on an issue is made. It describes the political actions of a lobbyist for a single issue which is both its strength and its weakness: it describes choices among specific strategies but is limited to a single issue. When planning lobbying, organizations usually have many issues on their agenda and actions on these issues should be integrated in order to gain synergy. However, the model contributes to knowledge about who decides what and in which phase of an issue life-cycle and reveals the need for setting specific objectives for each phase. The model also purports to show which publics are important at each phase and which strategies are appropriate in order to influence these publics. The latter point may be true, but the former is an oversimplification. Same publics may be active in many phases of an issue’s life-cycle and have a different kind of effect at each stage. This is why all these publics should be taken into account for each phase. Instead of using phases to segment publics, a more appropriate criteria that can be used to classify relevant publics could be that of power. The model refers to the power variable only by alluding to the iron triangle. In the new model of effective lobbying, all relevant publics are taken into account during the whole political process and the influence of these actors is evaluated based on their political resources, communication strategies, and timing. An effort is also made to take into account the competition among different publics, an issue that Buchholz leaves untouched.

The Legislator-centered Principal–Agent Model by Keim et al.

Keim and his colleagues integrated public choice-theory and management theory in order to provide their model of business political action. Keim and Zeithaml (1986) presented a model of legislative decision situations that determine the effectiveness of organizational political strategies. It is an exchange model in which situations of legislative decision-making are constructed based on the relationship between a legislator and his constituents. Based on these situations a lobbyist can assess its possibilities to influence political decision-making and evaluate different political strategies. (Keim & Zeithaml 1986.)

Later, Keim and Baysinger (1988) developed the model further in order to take into account the competition between lobbyists. They conceptualized the
exchange model as a principal-agent model in which the legislative agent serves the interests of a lobbyist in a specified set of issues in exchange for some benefit. This kind of an agency relationship exists also between the legislator and his constituents and the legislator and the public officials (regulators). There is, then, competition between principals to establish these kinds of relationships with a fixed number of political agents. In order to have influence on decision-makers, the lobbyists have to employ competitive tactics. (Keim & Baysinger 1988.)

Jaatinen (1994) gave her version of Keim and colleagues' model in a graphic form translated into English for this dissertation (See Figure 3-2.). The basic idea in the model is that a legislator acts according to his constituents' opinions in order to ensure his reelection. The legislator's tendency to act this way is dependent on the salience of an issue for the legislator's constituents (voters) and on the degree of consensus among the constituents regarding the issue. When the issue is salient for the constituents and there is a consensus among them, a legislator will support the opinion of his constituents. However, when there is a conflict among constituents regarding the issue, a legislator has many alternatives. The legislator may support the position that has most advocates among the constituents, or he/she may prefer the position of those for whom the issue is most important. If constituents are divided evenly between different positions, a clear position may be a risk to a legislator. In this case, the legislator may obfuscate his/her opinion by delegating the decision-making to someone else or by supporting an ambiguous solution, or he/she may choose to do nothing or choose the position according to the opinion of organized interest groups. (Keim & Zeithaml 1986, 836–838.)

When the issue is not salient to constituents, a legislator may enjoy political discretion: He/she may choose to support his/her personal ideological position, sell his/her vote for this issue in exchange for votes for some issue more important to his/her constituents (logrolling). He/she may also vote according to the preferences of organized interests, the preferences of his/her colleagues and experts, the preferences of contributors, or the expected preferences of the constituents in the future when they receive more information on the issue. (Keim & Zeithaml 1986, 836–838.)

When a lobbyist chooses strategies and tactics to influence political decision-making, it can determine the appropriateness and effectiveness of its strategies on the basis of the situations encountered by its chosen target decision-makers. When the issue is salient for the constituents of the decision-maker and there is consensus among the constituents, it is easy for the lobbyist to exert influence in the same direction. The lobbyist may achieve its
Figure 3-2. Adaptation of the legislator-centered model by Keim et al. (1986, 1988). The decision-maker chooses his/her position according to the opinions of his/her constituents. The strategy of a lobbyist is affected by the decision-situation of the legislator. Competitive interests may make the efforts of a lobbyist ineffective. The tactics of competition are used to gain competitive advantage. Next page: The tactics to implement the strategies.

The objectives by informing the decision-maker and enhancing his/her position by direct contacts, campaign contributions, and coalition building. If the constituents of the decision-maker object to the position advocated by the lobbyist, it is almost impossible for the lobbyist to influence the decision-maker. The lobbyist may try to create a division of opinions among the constituents of a decision-maker and show the strength of its own position.
For this purpose, a lobbyist needs effective tactics of influence such as grassroots and constituency mobilization and coalition building. (Keim & Zeithaml 1986, 838–840.)

When the constituents of the decision-maker are divided evenly between different positions, the lobbyist faces a difficult task, too. It may try to create a majority among the constituents of the decision-maker to the other side of the issue. When the lobbyist is opposed to some decision, it may use grassroots mobilization. When it supports some change in legislation, it may use also coalition building. It is important to continuously monitor constituents’ opinions and to ensure the permanence of the conflict. When the issue is not important to the constituents of the decision-maker and he/she enjoys political discretion, many different lobbying strategies may prove effective: direct contacts, campaign contributions, advocacy advertising, grass-roots and constituency mobilization, and coalition building. (Keim & Zeithaml 1986, 838–840.)

In all the cases discussed above, the efforts of the lobbyist to influence political decision-making may be no avail if competitors appear in the political markets. In order to be successful in competition, the lobbyist may use the tactics of competition. The timing of actions is important. The lobbyist may gain competitive advantage by a strategy that can completely not be initiated. Firstly, the lobbyist has to ensure that its opinions have some potential value: there is demand and enough support. Secondly, the lobbyist may choose influence tactics that its competitors can not use because of a lack of resources, or the lobbyist may use its strengths that its competitors do not have, such as good relations with constituents and decision-makers or
reputation produced by continuous profiling. Thirdly, the lobbyist should ensure that it has enough resources available, that there is uniform support among the organization’s constituents, and that the planning and implementation of lobbying are effective. Success requires that all these tactics of competition are taken into account at the same time. (Keim & Baysinger 1988, 170–176.)

Keim and his colleagues’ model shows how some motivating factors influence the opinion formation of political decision-makers. It explains how a lobbyist can make the decision situation more favorable to itself by changing the factors that led to the situation. When the factors have changed, the decision-maker will automatically act according to the new situation. The model shows which strategies are effective in changing the situation. The case of political discretion means just that some factors normally motivating the decision-maker have no effect on him, but it is important for a lobbyist to understand because it leads to increased competition. The idea that a lobbyist can influence situational factors and the factors having influence on the opinion formation of a decision-maker is very fruitful and will be applied also in the new model of effective lobbying developed in this research.

Despite its strengths, the model has some flaws, too. It does not cover all the important factors motivating political decision-makers and is anchored very tightly to the relationship of an individual decision-maker to his constituents. The contingency factors are defined by the exchange relationship between a decision-maker and his constituents, and they do not include other factors important to the decision-maker such as his parliamentary group or party. Even the relationship between a lobbyist and the decision-maker is dominated by the exchange of benefits and does not take into account other relationships important to a lobbyist such as other decision-makers, the competitors, the media, and the general public. In the new model of effective lobbying, the relationship of a lobbyist to the decision-makers is explained as a network of relationships including also groups outside a principal-agent relationship. This kind of an extension makes it possible to take into account the share of competitors in the exchange of benefits. The one who makes the best offer, will gain most, but usually many other groups will gain something, too. The central actors participating in the political process are revealed by the segmentation model that is presented next.

**Segmentation Model of Imperial Oil**

Bartha (1982) stated that organizational political action should be planned within an analytical framework that makes environmental information
relevant to organizational decision-making. He recommended an approach that was found to be useful in a Canadian company, Imperial Oil. The model explains how social issues emerge and lead to political and legislative decision-making, which are the key actors, and what role the different segments of the public play in formulating public policy. The model shows also how a lobbyist can influence the political process. The ideas of the Imperial’s model originate in the Corporate Priorities models of Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, Inc. (Bartha 1982.)

In the Imperial’s model, the public is segmented and five key publics are identified: the general public, media, interest groups, political leadership, and public service. Each of these publics have distinct roles in identifying issues, and they act in a different way regarding the issues: some generate issues, some advocate or oppose, some make the decisions, and others implement them. The issues are classified into four types that have different characteristics and follow different paths of development. The issue types are the universal, advocacy, selective, and technical issues. The criteria for classification include questions concerning who is affected, how and when, and what can be done about it. The universal issues affect many people directly and personally. They arouse concern among people, and people expect political leaders to find a solution to the problem. The advocacy issues are not the central themes of everyday discussion, but once solutions to a recognized problem are advocated by interest groups, many people react favorably to a remedy. The selective issues are of concern to groupings of specific interests, but the costs of a solution are paid by the public-at-large. The technical issues are abstract and do not interest the general public. These issues are left to experts to deal with. (Bartha 1982, 79–84.)

The key publics and issue types can be crisscrossed to form a matrix of 20 elements that describes the different roles of different key publics in different types of issues (See Figure 3-3.). The different roles of key publics in raising an issue to a political agenda are brought out in the model. The role of each public is different depending on the characteristics of an issue. The issues may change over time, from one type to another, and this brings about a change in the roles of key publics, too. The assumption is that different kinds of issues activate key publics into different roles. (Bartha 1982, 79–50.) In the case of universal issues, the general public identifies issues and demands solutions, the media reflect public opinion, and the interest groups focus the debate. The political leadership develop solutions, and the public service implement them. In this situation, a lobbyist should provide simple and direct solutions that attract the general public. (Bartha 1982, 84–85.) In the case of advocacy issues, the interest groups identify issues, set agenda,
**Figure 3-3.** Imperial Oil’s model according to Sethi (1982). The table is a combination of figures presented by him. The patterns of issue development are represented by arrows. Issue shifts occur in the vertical direction.

and advocate solutions. The media arouse awareness and support or oppose a solution. The general public expresses its support. The political leadership takes the role of developing solutions that are finally implemented by the public service. A lobbyist should respond to external demands based on an accepted solution. (Bartha 1982, 85–86.).

In the case of selective issues, the general public is indifferent. The interest groups identify issues and lobby for special interests. The media attract public attention. The public service negotiate with the interest groups and the political leadership, but the political leadership adjudicate the decision.
at the end. In this situation, a lobbyist has two alternatives: it may keep the issue out of public discussion or go public and make headlines. Success is dependent on the ability of a lobbyist to transform its special interest into a public interest, because the solution will transfer costs to the taxpayers. (Bartha 1982, 86–87.) In the case of technical issues, the general public is unaware of issues, because the decision does not affect them. The media either ignore the issue or engage in specialized reporting. The interest groups identify issues, develop solutions, and negotiate on them. The role of the political leadership is to formally accept them. The public service identifies issues, develops solutions, and implements them. In order to influence decision-making in this situation, a lobbyist should have expert representation for its case, because negotiation is on factual basis. (Bartha 1982, 88.)

Comparing the developmental paths of different issues, it can be noticed that the key publics central to decision-making change. A transfer from universal issues to technical ones means, in general, that the role of the general public and media decreases and the role of the interest groups and the public service increases. The political leadership is most active in advocacy and selective issues. (Bartha 1982, 84–88.)

The Imperial’s model clarifies the complex nature of political issues and its meaning by looking at lobbyists’ actions. The classification criteria for issues are fruitful, but there might be other constructive criteria, more close to practical level of lobbying operations, as well. The model takes into account the most important contingency factors, in this case ‘key publics’, and their role in the decision-making. However, the influence of these publics’ political opinions and strategies on the success of a lobbyist is obscure. The suggestions for lobbying strategies are not comprehensive, and the model does not provide guidance for selecting appropriate communication tactics. The nature of the objectives of a lobbyist and the power of different publics do not seem to have any role in this model.

3.1.4 Summary

All the previous models on lobbying reviewed in this section have some deficiencies or are not focused on the most essential points. There is a need to construct a new model that explains the strategic choices of effective lobbying from the point of view of a lobbyist trying to understand the contingencies of its actions.
3.2 Contingency Modeling

Contingency modeling holds special promise for understanding the strategic choices, formulating strategies, and taking into account the environment of a lobbyist (Jaatinen 1998a, 29). In this chapter, the general features of contingency theory and advantages of contingency modeling will be discussed.

3.2.1 Organization, Environment and Systems Theory

Contingency theory has its roots in General Systems Theory originating in the theories of Ludwig von Bertalanffy, Norbert Wiener, Talcott Parsons, and Claude Shannon (Wiio 1989, 96). Bertalanffy, a biologist, suggested that dynamic interaction is the basic problem in all fields of modern science and that its general principles for all systems can be discovered. Applied in the study of organizations, systems theory provides us with a view of an organization in interaction with its environment. (Kast & Rosenzweig 1984, 97–98.) A contingency view on organizations, then, explains more specific patterns of interrelationships among variables. It seeks to understand how organizations operate in specific circumstances. (Kast & Rosenzweig 1984; 20, 115.)

System Levels

Systems theory continuously provides a general framework for contingency models. The general principles explain the relationship of an organization to its sub- and suprasystems (its environment). The organization theorists Kast and Rosenzweig (1984) defined a system as an organized whole composed of interdependent subsystems and delineated by its boundaries from its environmental suprasystem (Kast & Rosenzweig 1984, 18). In this study, the focused whole is a lobbying organization of which a lobbying unit is a part, one of the subsystems. The subsystems most often referred to include the values and goals of the personnel of the focus organization and of member organizations. The lobbying subsystem deals with the values and goals of the focus organization and with the values and goals in the external environment. The suprasystem or environment is provided by the political system of the society. The suprasystem consists of many organizations representing more specific environmental variables. These organizations are also subsystems of the political system which explains their interdependence and their influence on the political system. If a lobbyist can negotiate with these organizations, it
can also influence the state of the political system in an indirect way. In order to understand these organizations, it is important to note that they are also systems constituted by subsystems. Influencing them requires influencing their subsystems or the suprasystem setting conditions for them.

According to Pearson (1990), three different points of view on the applicability of the systems theory can be identified in public relations literature: 1) the doctrine of internal relations, 2) the adoption of a heuristic tool, and 3) the adoption of the mode of systematic thinking. This study represents the second point of view, which emphasizes the ideas of interdependence and interconnectedness but does not see MBO or MBO/R as an incompatible idea. (Pearson 1990, 222.) This type of thinking refutes the idea of logical necessity that a change in one part of a system must have an impact on other parts of the system. Rather, it maintains that responding to change is strategically useful and ethically important (Pearson 1990, 223).

Systems theory is often related to functionalism, which stresses the objectives of system maintenance and environmental control (Pearson 1990, 227). Pearson (1990), however, distinguished between systems theory and functionalism saying that when an organization can adapt according to an understanding reached on its environment generated by analysis of input, the systems theory goes beyond functionalism (Pearson 1990, 228–229). According to Pearson, a systems theory escapes the charges against functionalism if it moves from an approach emphasizing taken-for-granted system needs and regulation mechanisms to an approach emphasizing purposeful goal selection and acceptance of conflict or change (Pearson 1990, 229–231). New questions arise, however, on whether decision-making can be considered rational and free from forced consensus (Pearson 1990, 232).

Some Universal Principles of Interaction

There are some general principles especially suitable for explaining the interaction between social organizations and their environment. Systems can be relatively open or relatively closed. An open system receives inputs from its environment and transforms them into outputs. A continuous recycling of resources is important for survival. In this interaction, a system achieves a dynamic equilibrium for which a sufficient amount of resources is brought in and sert out and a capacity to transform them is maintained. The system boundaries regulate the impact of environmental factors on the system. In closed systems in which boundaries are rigid, there is no impact. In open systems in which they are permeable, the input is selective. The organization can redirect its operations based on feedback. Social organizations have goals that they purport to achieve. The principle of equifinality states that these
objectives can be achieved with different initial conditions and in different ways. (Kast & Rosenzweig 1984; 101–104, 107–108.) As can be seen, the universal principles are very general in nature and are not enough to explain variations in organizational actions in specific situations. This is where we need the contingency theory.

3.2.2 Premises of the Contingency Approach

The contingency approach was presented by organization theorists Lawrence and Lorsch in the 1960’s. They found that the external environment has an impact on organizational structure and management. Thus, they concluded that there is not one best way to organize; the forms of organization has to be adapted to the environmental conditions. (Lawrence & Lorsch 1969; 3, 156–158, 209.) Later, the contingency approach has been formulated as a means to understand interrelationships among sub- and suprasystems and to define patterns of relationships between key variables. It is directed toward understanding how organizations act under varying conditions and which actions would be the most appropriate for specific situations. (Kast & Rosenzweig 1984, 20.) The contingency view was introduced in communication research by Osmo A. Wiio in the 1970’s. He, then, developed a contingency theory of communication.

The Contingency View and Communication

Wiio (1977) formulated the basic tenets of the contingency view as follows:

1. Communication can be defined as a system of elaboration of information in which information is exchanged between systems and subsystems.

2. The basic unit of communication is a communication system.

3. Several internal and external constraints of the system and its subsystems affect a communication event. The constraints set conditions for the states of the systems at each moment: constraints determine also the conditions for the elaboration event in the system.

4. The constraints of a system are dependent on the situation, the states of the suprasystem, and subsystems.

5. The constraints of a communication system bring about errors in the communication system, that is, noise that has an effect on the elaboration of information in the system.
6. Two types of constraints affect a communication event, fixed or long-term and contingency constraints that are mainly short-term constraints.

7. As a consequence of communication, there are changes in the communication system and in the environment of the system. (Wiio 1977, 110–111.)

In this study, some revisions are suggested to this view to emphasize the interactive nature of communication, autonomy of decision-makers, the possibility to change external conditions, problems of perceived reality, and evolutionary dynamics.

1. Communication is a system of communicative actions in which information is exchanged between different levels of a system.

2. The basic unit of communication is a communicative interaction.

3. Communication is affected by internal and external factors of the system and its subsystems. Contingency factors determine the possible conditions of a system and the possible communicative actions, but communication can also be used to change these conditions. Within the conditions, there is space for choice.

4. The states of factors in a system and the relevancy of factors for a system are dependent on the conditions set by the suprasystem and the subsystems.

5. The decision-makers in a system perceive and interpret the conditions and translate them into actions. The internal and external publics engage in these activities, too. As a result, some distortions of reality may occur and this inaccuracy hampers effective responses.

6. Two types of factors affect a communication event: slowly changing constraints in the environment and contingency factors that can be influenced.

7. As a consequence of communication there might be changes in the system and/or its sub- and suprasystems.

Contingency Models of Communication

According to Wiio, the contingency models of communication describe communication as a dynamic event that is influenced by internal and external constraints of the communication system (and its sub- and suprasystems). Communication, in turn, has consequences for the communication system and
environment. In organizations, a communication system and the objectives of
communication has to be fit to the internal and external states of an
organization in order to achieve the effects sought for. (Wiio 1989, 98–106.)

A contingency model can be presented as an equation in which the effect
achieved \( (E) \) is a function of the effects sought for \( (G) \) and communication
variables \( (K) \).

\[
E = f(K, G)
\]

In a contingency model, closer analysis of communication variables is
required. Communication variables are dependent on action \( (I) \), noise \( (D) \),
constraints \( (C) \), feedback \( (F) \), an effect achieved, and its permanence.

\[
K = f(I, D, C, F). \quad \text{(Wiio 1989, 104.)}
\]

According to Wiio, constraints can be fixed and permanent (long-term
constraints) or temporary (constraining for a short time). The latter he called
contingency constraints. Because of the connotations of the word constraint,
the author prefers a neutral word contingency factor. It allows efforts to
influence these variables and a possibility to change the states of these factors.
Contingency factors may, then, include variables that are more or less easy to
have some influence on.

Wiio defined action as information. In the new model, the essential
actions of lobbying consist of strategies and the means of communication.
Every lobbying action carries a meaning to other actors in the environment.
These actors perceive the lobbying and interpret it. Their responses are
perceived and interpreted by the lobbying unit. These perceptions and
interpretations are not always accurate which is why some distortion might
appear. These filters of information generate what Wiio called noise. The
lobbying unit gets the information only by scanning the environment for
information and feedback. The filtered information is, then, transformed into
decisions on lobbying activities and organizational policy. This decision-
making is affected by the conditions of internal and external contingency
factors.

The new model of effective lobbying concentrates on revealing patterns
of relationships between external environmental variables and lobbying.
These variables or contingency factors are constituted by dynamic actors and
may have different states. The states of these factors constitute different
external situations that along with internal contingency states of an
organization affect, possibly constrain, lobbying. Thus, a more detailed
specification for contingency factors can be presented by dividing them in
internal \( (L) \) and external contingency factors \( (M) \). (Jaatinen 1998a, 29.) The
former includes factors such as organizational resources and planning processes, and the latter includes, e.g., economic fluctuations, cultural norms, and environmental policy.

\[ C = f(L, M) \]

According to Wiio, the contingency models are among the most complex when compared with other models of communication. They are constructed to explain as much variance of a communication event as possible. This is accomplished by incorporating numerous contingency factors in one model. However, what we gain in the wealth of information, we lose in the controllability of the model. Thus, some limits should be set for a model and some of the contingency factors could be included as constant variables in order to make the model useable. (Wiio 1989; 103, 108.) The contingency models that are developed to assist in organizational decision-making, are created to help control internal and external change. It is not, however, possible to eliminate all uncertainty created by context. Thus, its perfectly acceptable to base decision-making on some essential factors. In this study, the new model of effective lobbying is constructed so that only the most essential contingency factors are included. However, these factors are selected so that they provide a lot of information: they are condensed information concerning the background factors that have influence on these contingency factors and reveal the complexity and variability of reality.

The contingency factors for the new model of effective lobbying are selected based on the relevance of the environmental sector and on the influence of a factor on political decision-making and on the success of lobbying. The internal and external environment of an organization can be divided into economic-technical, socio-cultural, and political-legislative sectors. First, the model of political communication is limited to the last sector and to the political contingency factors (Lpol and Mpol) accordingly. In addition, lobbying is mainly directed outwards from the organization, and the effect or result achieved is dependent, especially, on the situation in the external environment. Thus, secondly, it is possible to concentrate on the factors of the external environment as distinct from the internal environment, leading to the selecting of only external political contingency factors (Mpol).

The contingency factors constituting the new model include the opinion of a political decision-maker (Np), competition, i.e., strategies and power of competitors (Ns), and opinions of the mass media and citizens (Nr + v). The external situation taken into account in the new model can be presented in the following way:

\[ Mpol = f(Np, Ns, Nr + v) \] (Jaatinen 1998a, 29–30.)
A fundamental assumption of the contingency view is that congruence between an organization and its environment or among its subsystems leads to greater effectiveness. The organization is more effective if it acts in a way that is appropriate for the specific situation. (Kast & Rosenzweig 1584, 115–116.) A contingency view on communication means that communication has to be adapted to the situation. (Wiio, 1979, 16; 1992, 95–96). If actions (I) are appropriate for the contingency situation (C), requiring that feedback (F) is provided and noise (D) is minimal, then communication (K) should bring about the desired effect (G = E). In the new model of effective lobbying, this is formulated in the following way: if the lobbying strategies (I) are appropriate for the situation of political participation (Mpol + Lpol), requiring that scanning and feedback is effective (F) and the perceptions and interpretations of the situation (D) are accurate, then lobbying (K) should bring about a good result (G = E). (Jaatinen 1998a, 30.)

A Viewpoint to Change

Situations may change, but an organization has to survive and maintain its effectiveness. This requires sensitivity to dynamics, continuous fitting of strategies to new situations—in one word: flexibility. The contingency view captures the change of actions according to various conditions. Effectiveness does not mean just achieving a desired effect but its definition includes situational sensitivity. The early warning system of the scanning process should inform the lobbyist of a change in a state of a contingency factor, and the lobbyist should direct its internal and external communications accordingly. The lobbyist should also consider effects on the overall strategy: if the organization should adapt or respond positively. By maximizing congruence between actions and situations over time, the lobbyist may increase the probability of achieving a good result. (Jaatinen 1998a, 30.)

It should be noticed that in this study, the actions of a lobbyist are also directed at changing the situation to be more favorable to the lobbyist. In this way, the change is not just brought about by a change introduced outside an organization, but it may be created by the lobbyist. (Jaatinen 1998a, 30.) Thus, increasing the positive forces or decreasing the negative forces determining the situation or the state of a contingency factor may help a lobbyist to create a more favorable situation which leads to the achieving of a good result such as a new law increasing profits that the organization gains in its main operations. This kind of view of change is advocated by force-field analysis that shows how an equilibrium state of conditions can be moved by
changing the relationship between driving and restraining forces (Kast & Rosenzweig 1984, 580–581). Situational dynamics of lobbying will be discussed in more depth in the Chapter 4. Here, only the general premises are dealt with.

Buckley (1967) suggested that equilibrium is not a suitable concept for open systems or process and adaptive systems models. He presented a theory of morphogenesis for sociological research. He moved from equilibrium and homeostasis to a description of morphostasis and morphogenesis. Morphostatic processes aim at maintaining the system based on negative feedback whereas morphogenic processes aim at changing the system based on positive feedback. (Buckley, 1967). Applied to lobbying from the contingency point-of-view, morphogenic processes can be seen as initiating change in the external environment of an organization or in organizational strategies. This change might even be chaotic. According to the contingency view, the evolutionary features in internal and external conditions—such as formation of publics—have to be taken into account. Contingency models are actually capable of describing strategies to deal with this type of change, too. Morphostatic processes maintain the chosen direction of the organization. This might be achieved by eliminating restricting forces in the environment by changing them and correcting deviant operations in the organization. In general, the contingency view is not restricted to maintenance of an organization but can also be used for communication to make the existence of the organization unnecessary.

The general form for the dynamic model of effective lobbying can be presented as an equation in which the actions of a lobbyist at one moment (I_m) are a function of its objectives (G_m), previous results achieved (E), the contingency situation before actions (C), scanning and feedback to determine it (F), filtering causing errors (D), and previous actions (I). The contingency situation is a function of the internal state (Lpol) and the external states of the organization (Mpol). Constraints can be added with other factors than characteristics of publics, e.g., the issue process (S) that might produce variations in strategies within contingency situations. In this study, the external states concern the political decision-maker (Np), the competition (Ns), and the public opinion (Nr + v). (Note. Time is denoted by t.)

\[ I_m = f(G_m, E, C, F, D, I), \]

where \( C = f(Lpol, Np, Ns, Nr + v, S). \)

The above model is a derivative of Wibo’s model presented on page 59. It resembles Åberg’s dynamic campaign model in that the variables chosen to represent the contingencies are constituted by the opinions of target groups, the actions of other actors, and the situation of an issue process, but in the
model of effective lobbying, the opinions of many publics and the actions of every public are taken into account, and the internal states of the organization play some role, too. Furthermore, the general form of the model includes objectives and feedback that are not components of Åberg’s model. The new model of effective lobbying will be presented in detail in section 3.3.

The possible situations presented in the model are the following:

Situation 1 = \{N_{p1}, N_{q1}, N_{p+q1}\},
Situation 2 = \{N_{p1}, N_{q1}, N_{p+q2}\},
Situation 3 = \{N_{p1}, N_{q2}, N_{p+q1}\},
Situation 4 = \{N_{p1}, N_{q2}, N_{p+q2}\},
Situation 5 = \{N_{p2}, N_{q1}, N_{p+q1}\},
Situation 6 = \{N_{p2}, N_{q1}, N_{p+q2}\},
Situation 7 = \{N_{p2}, N_{q2}, N_{p+q1}\},
Situation 8 = \{N_{p2}, N_{q2}, N_{p+q2}\},
Situation 9 = \{N_{p3}, N_{q1}, N_{p+q1}\},
Situation 10 = \{N_{p3}, N_{q1}, N_{p+q2}\},
Situation 11 = \{N_{p3}, N_{q2}, N_{p+q1}\}, and
Situation 12 = \{N_{p3}, N_{q2}, N_{p+q2}\}, when
\nt N_{p1} = \{N_{p1}, N_{p3}, N_{p+q1}\}, N_{q1} = \{N_{q1}, N_{q3}\}, and N_{p+q2} = \{N_{p+q1}, N_{p+q2}\}.

The weak signals for, e.g., \( N_{p+q1} \) to change into \( N_{p+q1} \) include activation of publics, change of opinion of some of the background factors and efforts of these publics to influence the decision-maker, and change of opinion or activities of other publics. The theory of group activation presented in chapter 4 is particularly useful in interpreting changes in the external publics. There will be more discussion of these related to the presentation of the new model.

3.2.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Contingency Modeling

The contingency view has produced many models of organization, management, and communication, but it has also got competitors. Chaos theory and catastrophe theory are the latest newcomers. In this section, the strengths and weaknesses of contingency modeling are discussed, and the contingency view is compared with some alternative approaches to modeling communication. The contingency view is repositioned in the objectivism—subjectivism continuum and redefined within a stakeholder approach.

Strengths of Contingency Modeling

The contingency view provides a holistic approach to the study of communication phenomena. Based on the systems theory, it claims that a
system can be explained only as a totality. A system is composed of interdependent subsystems, and the whole is more than just the sum of its parts. (Kast & Rosenzweig 1984, 100, 102; Wiio 1989, 98.) Thus, the components of a system are affected by each other, and the relationships between them matter. The contingency view explains these relationships and the influence of the subsystems on each other. It offers descriptions of specific relationships between variables. A contingency model can capture a lot of variance in reality by taking into account an abundance of variables.

The contingency theory is especially suitable for modeling decision-making, because the factors taken into account in organizational decision-making and planning of communication can be easily converted into contingency factors of a strategy. When the publics of communication are selected from among the important organizational stakeholders, communication can be put into service of the overall strategy and the goals of the organization (Åberg 1989, 226–241). These publics and stakeholders are important contingencies for all decision-making. The stakeholder approach was first introduced to management science by Freeman (1984) who defined stakeholders as one or more people who can affect organizational goal-achievement or who are affected by organizational action. Organizations have to manage their relationships with these people. An organization with a capability to manage stakeholders takes the concerns of these people into account and interacts with them to find win-win solutions to issues affecting their interests. An effective organization interacts with people who can affect the organization. A socially responsive organization negotiates with people whom it can affect. (Freeman 1984.) Along the same lines, J. Grunig (1996) explained that public relations makes a strategic contribution when it helps an organization to identify strategic publics and builds long-term relationships with these publics. Strategic public relations identifies important publics and designs communication programs to deal with them.

The contingency view is especially suitable to modeling the dynamics of communication and change in variables affecting communication, because it aims particularly at taking into account the variation in a communication event. In fact, it is better to use the theory with restraint because an excess amount of information may render the model uncontrollable. Thus, it is advisable to group important stakeholders into analytical categories such as publics, sectors of society, and powerful or less powerful.

Also the pluralist approach to organizational research dealing with interests, power, and conflict (Burrell & Morgan 1967) can be taken into account in the contingency view. Interests define the content of communication, and symmetrical communication is designed to take interests
of different publics into account. Power can be treated as a characteristic of a public, as a state of a contingency factor, or considered as one independent variable.

The contingency view helps in understanding and measuring total effectiveness of actions. It defines effectiveness in relation to the objectives and takes into account the context of communication. It is suitable for treating lobbying as a process of conflict resolution in which the objectives and actions of the lobbyist often have to adapted to those of the other parties to the negotiation if a permanent resolution is a goal.

Repositioning the Contingency View

Burrell and Morgan (1967) classified sociological paradigms for organizational research based on how objective or subjective they are and to what extent they allow change. He used four dimensions to form his objectivism–subjectivism continuum: ontological debate, epistemological debate, human nature, and methodological debate. The ontological debate concerns the degree of nominalism or realism that a theory stands for. A realist theory believes there exist a physical reality outside a human mind whereas a nominalist position supposes the social world exists only in the human mind. The epistemological debate concerns the nature of research in the paradigm. Positivists try to find causal explanations for social phenomena whereas anti-positivists see reality only in terms of meanings individuals attach to phenomena. The debate on human nature divides theories into voluntarists and determinists. The determinist view assumes that individual behavior is completely determined by the situation or the environment. The voluntarist position assumes that people can choose their actions independent of their environment. The methodological debate concerns the research methods applied in the paradigm. An ideographic approach emphasizes historical analysis of the research subject whereas a nomothetic approach uses quantitative methods. Burrell and Morgan’s objectivist end of the continuum consists of theories adhering to a realist, positivist, determinist, and nomothetic position. The subjectivist end can be characterized by nominalism, anti-positivism, voluntarism, and the use of ideographic methods. (Burrell & Morgan 1967.)

Burrell and Morgan located the contingency view as well as the systems theory in the objective end of the objective–subjective continuum. Wiio’s contingency view belongs quite clearly to the objectivist tradition but the development of a stakeholder approach and theory of scanning has produced a more subjective approach within the contingency view. The framework adopted in this study is better characterized with a middle-point position in
the nominalist–realist dimension. The reality of actors is constructed through perceptions and interpretations. An intersubjective agreement might occur when people in an organization make decisions together. Thus, the contingency view can be repositioned to conform to a hermeneutic attitude.

The contingency view presented in this work also qualifies the objective nature of research. A researcher can not be completely objective and free from subjective biases which is why a researcher has to reveal the possible weaknesses in her approach to her research subject. The author of this dissertation would like to limit advocacy of researchers to matters for which there is scientific evidence that a problem exists. This position takes a step toward a phenomenological attitude that science, too, is intersubjective. This is an approach in a middle-point on the anti-positivist vs. positivist continuum. Accordingly, the use of qualitative methods are recommended to capture the meanings individuals give to their actions and to negotiate the meaning between the research subject and the researcher. This position takes the contingency view toward the ideographic end of the fourth dimension. However, the author believes that a systematic approach makes it possible to make generalizations to theory and find patterns of behavior chosen by actors.

The contingency view has been criticized for adopting a deterministic view to reality. This argument should be countered by clarifying that the approach taken in this study emphasizes the centrality of decision-making in organizations. The decision-makers are free to choose a course of action and there might be many courses of action that take the organization to where the decision-makers want. It is, however, acknowledged that the internal states and the external conditions should be taken into account if a most effective way to achieve the goals is being looked for. This point will be elaborated later when dealing with the criticism encountered by contingency theorists.

*Weaknesses of Contingency Modeling*

The contingency view asserts that adapting organizational communication to the situation of the external environment leads to greater effectiveness (Wiio 1979, 12; Wiio 1992, 95–96). There are two problematic presumptions supporting this assumption. First, adaption requires an open system in order for the system to be able to receive information from the environment and the feedback to direct organizational change. Secondly, producing a good fit requires rational action, i.e., the selection of the best strategy and the willingness to adapt. Schreyögg (1984) blamed the contingency theory on planning rationalism. It regards environmental uncertainty as an error that can be eliminated by adapting the strategy to endogenous and exogenous changes. It claims that a right fit is achieved by systematic observation and planning. In
addition, the contingency theory confines activities to certain alternatives: it is assumed that the right counterparts can be discovered and that the strategy indicated by this kind of fit is the only option leading to success. Still, for a strategic orientation to be explained in a meaningful way, there has to be space to move. Schreyögg concludes that contingency models make a strategy an impossibility. (Schreyögg 1984, 231.)

Freedom of choice might be restricted in many models, but a lot can be done by selecting the contingency variables of a model from among factors that leave several alternatives to an organization. For example, if we choose to include size as one variable in a model and let it have either the state of being small or being big, then it restricts the alternatives of the big organizations into half of all the alternatives provided by the model. If we choose the other variables of the model in this restricting manner, it definitely leads to a situation where there are no alternatives. But if we take one big organization and create the model based on its situation, this organization will have several alternatives to choose from. Small organizations have to be provided with a model specifically created for them if the same model does not suit them. Thus, the result depends both on the variables and the perspective. In a model describing appropriate strategies, a lot of space to move can be left by suggesting many strategies to deal with the conditions following the principle of equifinality. It should also be acknowledged that the conditions might change by themselves not having anything to do with the strategy or tactics used by the focus organization.

In the new model of effective lobbying, there is a lot of space to move despite some constraints. The contingency factors are not selected from organizational characteristics but are based on the external situation. The organization can choose its objective and reflect it against the situation that shows what an organization should do in order to achieve its objectives. The model may suggest changing the objective or strategy, and it provides a selection of tactics to choose from. The contingency view developed in this study, incorporates the strategic choices approach that assumes that decision-makers have some autonomy and are not completely constrained by environmental forces (Robbins 1990, 239–240). In addition, the situation can be changed and anticipated. It is a typical assumption in contingency models that the environment consists of uncontrollable constraints to which an organization should adapt (Wii 1989, 98–99), but the model of effective lobbying represents a view according to which these constraints (contingency factors) can be changed and turned into opportunities. Adversaries of a policy can be neutralized, advocates can be invited to form a coalition, and neutral groups can be persuaded to support the policy. The power to influence the
environment is a common assumption added by the strategic choices approach (Robbins 1990, 241).

Furthermore, the purpose of the model of effective lobbying is to formulate a lobbying strategy, not to determine its exact contents. The objectives of the strategy and the degree of adaption can be chosen. The results sought for can be optimal or good enough (satisfying with external actors). The contents of a proposal to decision-makers is dependent on an issue and a lobbyist, only the way how it can be presented is suggested by the model. If the objectives are difficult to achieve because of wide-spread resistance, forceful tactics are recommended. The adapted objectives can be achieved using less resources, and the result will probably last longer. The suggested tactics can be used to the extent the organization is willing to spend resources on some course of action. The purpose of the model is to help an organization to achieve its strategic objectives. The model assists in regulating some essential factors which have an influence on the success of lobbying, but it does not mean that environmental uncertainty is considered non-existent.

As to the right fit and the possibility to discover it, the author thinks that it is helpful to find a good fit, if an optimal fit cannot be found. The factors not taken into account in the model and proving the model incomplete, can be incorporated in the model or should be taken into account as random variables, if they cannot be called noise. The effect of these random variables can, then, be considered as independent intervening influence, possibly controlled in a real-life event if anticipated.

Factors which make the fitting activity between an organization and its environment difficult are considered noise in the contingency view (Wiio 1989, 104–105), because they hinder organization from being effective. Sometimes even organizational culture, the beliefs concerning successful problem-solving and learned through experience (Schein 1985), may be regarded as noise. Culture functions like a worldview or a schema that directs perception and decision-making (Grunig, J. & White 1992, 33–36). According to Schreyögg, both the plan and the culture determines the strategic direction of an organization. In the contingency view, when a plan is adapted to the environmental changes and it is implemented, the unchanged culture may restrict rationalism. (Schreyögg 1984, 232.) This is especially possible when the organizational culture is matured and slow to change, enhancing the learned assumptions by reality. In this case, the culture has turned into a weakness of the organization, because it is not in consonance with the demands posed by the changing environment and the needs of the organization. It is, however, problematic to treat culture as noise, if we aim at
explaining effectiveness, because culture is often the key determinant of organizational effectiveness and should, therefore, be understood better. One key solution to the problem is to try to manage the organization within the boundaries of the culture or alternatively, to change it. (Sriramesh et al. 1992, 584–585.)

In addition to organizational culture, power-seeking of managers has an influence on the contents of a strategy and on the rationality in adaptation on which the use of the model in organizations is dependent. The contingency view also classifies as noise the state predicted by power-control theory in which managers choose the forms of organizing and communication that better serves their self-interests instead of choosing optimal solutions for responding to the environmental demands (Dozier & Grunig, J. 1992, 406–410). However, organizations do not usually know what is the most optimal solution. Instead, they choose from many good solutions (satisfying). Secondly, ineffective leaders do not enjoy their position for a long time. Thirdly, power is used in selecting one of the possible solutions.

The contingency view has also been accused of being unable to explain convincingly the necessity of fit between an organization and its environment. It is stated that a good fit leads to success and that success is a consequence of a good fit. Schreyögg criticized this vicious circle and blames the contingency view on determinism. He stated that ungrounded success cannot be taken as a proof for the importance of adaptation in advance or for the necessity of a fit. Misfit has to be defined and explained, too. (Schreyögg 1984, 233.) In the new model of effective lobbying, success based on fit is expounded by that the purpose of communication is to influence those publics who have influence on the formulation of political decisions and can in this way limit the ability of an organization to achieve its goals. If these publics do not act as impediments, then the success of lobbying is ensured (based on the definition of the effectiveness of lobbying) and the organization will achieve its goals (effectiveness is dependent on the success of the overall strategy of the organization). Thus, communication may create a situation that is conducive to success, and success is dependent on the situation that is or is not favorable to the lobbyist, but the lobbyist may try to change the situation. If the objectives and the strategy of the lobbyist are not adapted to the opinions and actions of the other actors, it is possible that political participation has a competitive focus and thus achieving good results is prevented. Possible threats to the survival of the organization and excessive need for change, when the strategic goals can not be achieved, may lead to bankruptcy. A good fit is a necessary but might not be a satisfactory condition for success.

The contingency models that focus on the multi-variable character of
events (Wiio 1989; 100, 103), often include so many assumed inter-
dependences between variables (Kast & Rosenzweig 1985, 115–118), that
there is an abundance of conditions for functioning accumulated for one
model. In the new model of lobbying, for example, the effectiveness of a
strategy in an individual situation is dependent on the interdependences
between participants to the political decision-making in opinion formation
and on the effects assumed to be achieved by using certain tactics. In addition,
publics and their background factors are interdependent. However, only some
of the factors affecting effectiveness have been chosen for inclusion in the
models. Thus, the models are always simplifications of the real structure of a
phenomenon. Furthermore, many of the assumed interdependences are
simplifications of reality. The result may be a very mechanistic model in
which it is assumed that a change in the situation leads directly to different
strategies and actions. However, noticing a change and interpreting it as
significant is already a very complex event. In addition, creating a change is
a complex process in which considerable resistance may be met and that
requires reorientating. In the model of effective lobbying, the assumptions on
the relationships between variables are founded on significant scientific
evidence. The relationships are not stacked to form high constructions of
interdependent elements but the predicted relationships are based on a few
clear, interactive relationships between variables. To what extent the lobbyists
take into account the changes in the environmental contingency factors and
when they consider signals of changes significant enough to change their
communication, is dependent on the degree of planning, how systematically
they scan, and on the interpretation of changes as random variation or
something to be taken into account. In addition, the alternative choices
presented in models should be considered as point or ends of continuums.
Intermediate points exist, too.

In sum, there are some flaws attributable to the contingency view, but
the author thinks that most of this criticism concern the contingency models
and not the view itself. Better models can be created based on the systems and
contingency theory, and there are not any real challengers. Alternative
approaches to modeling dynamics in lobbying strategies and tactics could be
provided by differential equation models, chaos theory, and catastrophe
theory. The disadvantage of differential equation models is the difficulty of
incorporating interaction in the model. Yet the interaction between
participants to the political decision-making is an essential part of lobbying.
In models based on chaos theory, the tactics of lobbying would be points on
a continuum and it would be difficult to model their connections to the results
sought for. Catastrophe theory does not yet provide any promising

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applications even to research into negotiations where the object of study is a more simple phenomenon than lobbying. (Tutzauer 1992, 73–81.)

3.2.4 Summary

The refined contingency view presented in Section 3.2.2 lays down a larger framework, a set of assumptions within which the contingency model of lobbying works. It is a general theory on the foundation of which a more practical model of lobbying is constructed. The new model of effective lobbying strategies is presented in the next section.

3.3 The New Model of Effective Lobbying Strategies

The new model of lobbying describes strategies that are effective in the prevailing conditions of a certain issue. The prevailing conditions are situations of participation in the political decision-making concerning the issue. The opinions (political position) and actions (strategy and resources) of the participants constitute the contingency factors determining the political situations in issues. A change in a participant’s opinion or action changes the situation and implies a need to change the strategy of lobbying as well. (Jaatinen 1998a, 30.) The next two sections present the new model and the third section gives some examples of fit in the lobbying game. The new model can be used to describe lobbying and as a tool for planning strategies and assessing the effectiveness of lobbying. In the next chapter, the dynamics of lobbying will be discussed in detail and the model will be applied to changing conditions.

3.3.1 Contingency Factors and Situations of Political Participation

In the strategic planning of lobbying, lobbyists take into account internal and external political factors that have some influence on the success of lobbying. Information on these factors is gathered and processed by scanning. A strategy is, then, formulated and changed based on strategic information obtained. Scanning should, therefore, be directed to factors that affect the achievement of organizational objectives. In the new model of effective lobbying, these factors are contingency variables that constitute the situations of political participation. A lobbyist can select an effective lobbying strategy based on these situations. In order to be able to take these factors constituted
by actors into account, a lobbyist has to know the opinions and background factors of the actors and how these can be influenced. In this section, the internal and external variables are presented and possible situations constructed.

Variables of the Organization and of its Political Environment

The factors of the political environment that have influence on the success of lobbying, include the opinions of the state leadership, of the legislators, of the officials, and of the leaders of the political parties, the positions of the interest groups and of the citizen groups, the efforts of private companies, the political writings of reporters, the current affairs programs in broadcasting media, and the citizen opinion if public discussion has been aroused and the citizen decision-maker has been given a chance to affect the decisions important for the lobbyist. The groups behind these factors are all important publics of communication, and they are included in the definition of lobbying used in this study. For the new model of lobbying, the essential factors have been selected and three constructs have been built for these factors in order to reduce the number of variables at the surface level of the model and to use the other factors as background factors that explain the surface factors. The surface factors constitute the contingency variables that are the following in the order of importance: 1) the opinion of the target of lobbying on certain issue, 2) the direction and intensity of competition, and 3) the support of mass media and the citizens. (Jaatinen 1998a, 30.) After the internal factors are presented, these contingency variables will be discussed in detail.

The internal organizational factors that lobbyists should take into account in decision-making include the amount and quality of resources available for lobbying, the effectiveness of planning, and the opinions of the members of an association, of the employees of a company, or of the officials of a public organization, that is, uniformity of support among constituent publics. Internal contradictions reduce credibility, and organizational inefficiency decreases flexibility. On the other hand, good relations may guarantee access. In the new model, these internal situational factors are taken into account via the tactics of competition the use of which is suggested if the factors function in support of goal-achievement. (Jaatinen 1998a, 30–31.)

Opinion and Action of the Target of Lobbying

The first of the contingency variables incorporated in the new model of effective lobbying is the opinion of a political decision-maker and his/her willingness to cooperate. The legislators making the final decision and the public officials preparing the decision are the most important publics of
Figure 3-4. The background factors or subsystems that have an influence on the strategies of the actors constituting the contingency variables.

lobbying. Their opinions and actions determine the final result achieved by lobbying. (Jaatinen 1998a, 31.) If a lobbyist does not want to adapt to the opinions of the political decision-makers, it can try to influence the decision-makers. In order to influence them, the lobbyist has to find out which background factors have influenced the formation of the opinions (a state of the contingency factor). The background factors or subsystems that have influence on the strategies of the actors constituting the contingency variables are presented in Figure 3-4. In addition to his/her personal opinions, a position of a decision-maker is influenced by the several groups whom he/she represents or who try to influence him/her, e.g., a legislator forms his/her opinion based on ideological preferences, his/her parliamentary group, the party, and the constituents but also on views of different lobbyists and public discussion in media (Jaatinen 1994; 83–92, 104–106). A lobbyist can try to influence the legislator on a certain issue by informing him/her of the opinions of these groups or by influencing the opinions of these groups. The first contingency variable is used as a construct to determine the possibilities to influence the overall situation and as a factor concerning one decision-maker when assessing the possibilities to influence an individual (Jaatinen
The new model of effective lobbying focuses on the decision situation of legislators but the actions of the public officials can also be explained by their connections to several groups. However, it is not very enlightening to put an official in place of a political decision-maker in the new model that is based on the assumption of the role of a decision-maker as a representative. The public officials are not elected but appointed in Finland. Political decisions are always made by top level politicians. Thus, the hands of the public officials are tied to the policy of the government that is held responsible by parliament. This study concentrates on issues that call for political decisions which is why the legislators’ situation is the focus. (Jaatinen 1998a, 31.) Unfortunately, this has a consequence of leaving the influence of the public officials on decisions unexplained. The model assumes that despite the several levels of decision-making in the political process, the political decisions are made at the top of the hierarchy and the lobbyists can concentrate on controlling the political setting around the top. When the public officials are preparing the proposal for a political decision, they are influenced with the outside political setting in mind. If the role of the public officials is to act as experts on their field or as lobbyists of their administration, they can be included in competing lobbyists—the second contingency variable to be taken into account in planning the lobbying efforts.

As to the hierarchy of political arenas, the higher levels of political decision-making lay the frames for the lower level decision-making and this influence is accounted by the content of communication. The content is dependent on an issue which is why the relationships between different levels of political decision-making are not included in the model. (Jaatinen 1998a, 31.)

**Competition**

The second contingency factor, competition, is defined as contention around a decision-maker for his support. All the lobbyists who try to influence the political decision-makers are competitors. When they participate in the decision-making, they put forward different views and try to persuade the decision-makers in their own direction. Even if lobbyists can often be divided in two blocs, the advocates and the adversaries, there is competition also within these camps - the object is just the details of the content of a decision. The competition is determined by the strategy and the political resources of the competitors. The determinants of the states of the contingency variables are presented in Figure 3-5.

*The direction of competition is determined by the strength relationship*
between opinion blocs (the number of lobbyists on each side and their political resources) and by the intensity of competition (the total number of lobbyists and their activeness). Thus, the competition is a constructed variable constituted by all the interest groups who try to influence political decision-making in a certain issue. Using the variable in this way, allows for the assessment of the possibilities to influence the overall situation and an individual decision-maker. (Jaatinen 1998a, 31–32.)

If a lobbyist wants to influence the state of competition, then it has to try to influence individual competitors and their relationships. The determinants of the strategy of a competitor include the opinions of the members of the association or the employees of a private company and the opinions of the other constituent groups, the support of the sector or branch, and the support of the public opinion. The lobbyist may try to influence the competitor directly or indirectly via these background factors. In order to understand and influence the relationships between competitors, it is helpful to classify all groups in one of two groups, the supporters and the opponents of a decision. Coalition building among the like-minded increases the strength of a side and may decrease the strength of the other side if some of its supporters are
Coalition building usually leads to greater uniformity among those accepted as members, but the coalition may be coherent or loose. Those outside a coalition may build one of their own, in this way balancing the strengths of the two coalitions. The coalitions may be both on the same side or each on their own side. The coalitions do not necessarily include all the views presented but towards the end of the political process, it is probable that a setting of two opposite blocs will emerge. In addition to efforts to influence the competitors, the lobbyist may use tactics of competition to gain competitive advantage.

*Mass Media and Citizen Opinion*

The third contingency variable is constituted by two different sets of actors, the mass media and the citizens. The opinion of both the groups and their efforts to influence decision-making are taken into account by the political decision-makers. The political action of the media is evident most indisputably in the editorials or leader articles of newspapers, in the choice of what is newsworthy, and in the ways the news are presented in broadcasting media. The section of the letters to the editor conveys citizen opinions, but in their role as a gate-keeper, the media select the stories to be published. In addition, public opinion polls are made and published by the media. The bias in publicity, the positions taken by the media, and the citizen opinion may supply support for a certain kind of political position on a certain issue. In this way, they have influence on the formation of the opinion of a political decision-maker but also on the opinions of other participants to the political decision-making and their readiness to act.

The division of opinions among the media and among the citizens may be different, but they are included in the same variable because lobbyists often get to know about citizen opinion via the mass media and because one of the reporters’ main task still seems to be the reflection of the feelings prevailing among the citizens. In the long-term, these opinions seem to converge. Because the division of opinion among these groups often appear to be similar, the advantage of reduction in the number of contingency variables gained by combining them was considered more important than the disadvantage that is caused by the reduction in number of the possible situations produced by the contingency variables.

If the opinions of the media are divided differently from the opinions of the citizens, the permanence of this kind of situation can be questioned because these factors have an influence on each other. It is interpreted as a passing phase eventually stabilizing to the point where the opinion of a medium and its audience are consistent. There may be many reasons for this,
one of which certainly is that the citizens are those who buy the journals and watch the programs and the media compete for readership and viewership. People select what they are interested in and what they agree with. This phenomenon is explained by the mediated effects view of communication effects, the uses and gratifications approach (McQuail 1990; 242, 260–261), and, e.g., Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957, according to Wioo 1989, 227–228). If reality proves the assumption of like-mindedness wrong, the groups can be separated and two different contingency variables formed based on their opinions.

It is also very common in practice that citizens do not participate in political decision-making directly but their voice is heard only through the mass media. It is also common that this third contingency variable is not active at all in an issue at hand. It is the media that dominate this variable in the minds of the lobbyists in almost all cases except if a referendum is held. In this case, too, it is through the mass media that the citizens get most of their information on the issue.

This contingency variable of public opinion is a construct variable constituted by all the media and citizens who try to influence political decision-making on a certain issue. It can be used to assess the possibilities to influence the overall situation and an individual decision-maker. In order to influence the state of public opinion, the lobbyists have to try to influence single mass media and individual citizens or the general public. They may communicate directly with the representatives of the media or indirectly via their constituents (background factors) that include the employees of the mass media, the audience they serve, and the general public that has influence on their opinion. The opinion of the media is determined by the strategies and political resources of the media and by the degree of reflection or their independence of the audience opinion. The support of the media opinion is determined as a simple division of opinions and resources among active media (Jaatinen 1998a, 32).

An individual citizen forms his/her personal opinion based on his/her socio-economic background, ideological preferences, and the phase or situation of life. The personal opinion of an individual is influenced by his/her personal networks, that is his/her family, friends, workplace, and connections to associations of many kinds. These groups function as the background factors of a citizen’s opinion in addition to his/her personal opinion. A lobbyist can try to influence an individual’s personal opinions on a matter by direct communication campaigns or by approaching the individual via his/her networks. In the new model of effective lobbying, citizen opinion is determined by the salience of an issue to the citizens, by the consistency or
dispersion of opinions, and by the power of citizens to influence a single decision. These are dependent on the political and social resources and the degree of activity of citizens. The support of the citizen opinion is determined as a simple division of opinions and resources (Jaatinen 1998a, 32).

States Constituting Situations

Contingency factors constitute the situations of political participation based on which a lobbyist can choose an appropriate strategy. More accurately, the state of each contingency factor is taken into account. The possible states of the contingency factor concerning the decision-maker are a positive opinion with cooperativeness, a negative opinion without cooperativeness, or a neutral position in which case the decision-maker does not yet want to take a stand in public. The contingency factor of competition can have either the state of a positive direction without intensity or the state of a negative direction with intensity. The media and citizens factor can have a supportive or an opposing state. The states of these factors at a certain point of time determine the prevailing situation of political participation. By combining the possible states of these contingency factors, we get 12 theoretically interesting situations that occur in reality and are met by lobbyists. The situations directly indicate what are effective lobbying strategies, that is, how the situation can be influenced in order to create more favorable circumstances to
organizational goal-attainment. This may require influence efforts to change the states of contingency factors or alternatively adaptation of objectives, strategy, and tactics of the lobbyist and the organization. (Jaatinen 1998a, 32.) (See Figure 3-6.)

3.3.2 Strategic Choices and Derived Tactics

The new model of lobbying describes strategic choices: the act of choosing between strategies and selecting the appropriate one for the situation at hand. As the result, we get a certain kind of strategy that suggests a selection of tactics to implement it. Different kinds of tactics can be formed and directed at individual publications whose opinions and actions serve as contingency factors. A certain tactic is then introduced if and when an actor becomes active in the political process and if its opinion on the issue is contrary or just different from that of the lobbyist. In this section, the lobbying strategies and tactics suggested by the new model are presented.

*The Situation Implies the Appropriate Strategy*

In the new model, the states of the contingency factors form 12 different kinds of situations of the political participation. The situation implies the appropriate strategy, an approach to the whole game: when to adapt and when to influence, what relationships to influence, and general advice on how to do it. A strategy could be 1) *influencing the political decision-maker and his background factors* (personal opinions, perceptions on or real states of parliamentary group, party, and constituents) or 2) *influencing the political setting around the decision-maker* (perceptions on or real states of the competitors and the public opinion). A strategy of adaptation means being persuaded or demanded to back out. A combination of efforts to influence and to adapt determines the degree of cooperation and corresponds to the two-way symmetrical communication characterized by mixed-motives. It is assumed that there is continuous profiling and relationships building and maintenance with relevant publics. If the required relationships are not yet built, they have to be built first in order to break ground for the influence of tactics to be introduced. The strategy is of direct communication in relation to the decision-maker if it is directed at the decision-makers' opinions and perceptions and in relation to other actors if it is directed at influencing them. The strategy is of indirect communication in relation to the decision-maker if it is directed at his background factors or other participants to the political process but for the purpose of influencing the decision-maker. (Jaatinen 1998a, 33–34.)
The effect of a strategy can appear in two different ways: either by changing the interdependences between actors or by changing the direction of influence of these actors on each other. Interdependence between two actors is changed if, e.g., the decision-maker is disengaged from his/her bindings to his/her constituencies and other participants to the political process. This might happen if he/she is motivated by campaign contributions to take a different position from the position of the other members of his/her parliamentary group. The decision-maker is disengaged from the influence of the other participants to the political process if the lobbyist is able to increase its power in relation to them, e.g., by building a coalition. Interdependence between the decision-maker and other actors is changed also if the decision-maker is exposed to his bindings to his constituencies. Waking up a dormant constituency of a decision-maker may make him/her dependent on them. Logrolling may help in disengaging the decision-maker in one issue if support for his views is given in another issue more important to his/her constituencies. (Jaatinen 1998a, 34.)

The direction of influence between two actors is changed if an opinion or the state of a background factor or another participant is changed because it autocratically leads to influence of a new kind by this actor in relation to other actors. This is because the previous opinion of this actor had an influence in a certain direction on other actors and the changed opinion influences in a new direction. The change in the direction of influence by the background factors and other actors on a decision-maker can be introduced by a lobbyist but the lobbyist may also motivate the decision-maker to first change his/her mind and, then, influence his/her constituencies. (Jaatinen 1998a, 34–35.)

The propositions created for the testing of the new model describe the strategic choices and the interactive relationships between variables. A strategy of a specific situation is determined by 1–3 propositions. There are 11 propositions giving advice on lobbying and 6 rules of implementation describing the communication tactics. These cover the whole model. For example, according to proposition 1, the opinion of a like-minded decision-maker in a certain issue can be enhanced and maintained by showing the decision-maker the supportive opinions of his background factors (e.g., parliamentary group and party). According to rule B, a lobbyist can, then, influence the parliamentary group and the party of the decision-maker by informing the decision-maker of their opinions, by informing and persuading the groups (direct contacts), and by motivating the decision-maker (campaign contributions, grass-roots and constituency mobilization). In this way, the lobbyist can activate positive opinions so that the decision-maker can make an
accurate assessment of them or the lobbyist can try to change the opinions of these groups into supportive ones. In addition, if the opinions of the background factors stay unchanged and in opposition, it may be advisable for the lobbyist to use tactics that disengage the decision-maker from these groups (e.g., campaign contributions). The conflict accommodation rule would suggest efforts to include interests of the adversaries into the proposal for decision. The propositions describe the relationships of the target of lobbying (dependent variable) to the other participants to the political decision-making and the direction of influence of these relationships. In the rules of tactics, the dependent variables are constituted by the background factors of the decision-maker, the other participants to the political process trying to influence the decision-maker, and the perceptions of the decision-maker of these factors (they do not necessarily correspond to the reality). These variables are influenced by communication. (Jaatinen 1998a, 35.) (More on propositions in Chapter 5.)

Tactics Used to Implement the Strategy

A selected strategy can be implemented by a selection of tactics. The tactics can be derived from the strategy. The states of contingency factors imply appropriate tactics. (Jaatinen 1998a, 35.) In the new model, a selection of tactics may include 1) direct contacts with decision-makers, 2) campaign contributions, 3) coalition building, 4) media relations and molding of public opinion via media or directly, 5) constituency and grassroots mobilizing, 6) competitive tactics and direct contacts with opponents, 7) emergency tactics (Jaatinen 1998a, 35), and 8) conflict resolution tactics such as negotiation. In addition, 9) the continuous building and maintaining of relations and profiling breaks ground for these tactics, and 10) the scanning and monitoring of the environment assist in situational and competitive analysis (Jaatinen 1998a, 35).

3.3.3 The New Model and Examples of Fit between Strategy and Contingency Situation

Applying the contingency view, we can construct a model based on the contingency variables and their states. The model reveals the possible contingency situations and shows the appropriate strategies. The new model is presented in Figure 3-7 on page 124–125. The contingency model can be presented as a decision-tree in which a lobbyist makes its first choice based on its perception on the decision-maker’s opinion on an issue (first contin-
Having determined the opinion of the decision-maker, the lobbyist makes the second choice based on the state of competition. If the number of the lobbyists is greater on one side and they have more political resources than the other side, then this side or opinion of the issue determines the direction of competition. The less intensity there is, the less is the need for competitive tactics. If the two blocs of competitors seem equal, then the lobbyist should choose the branch of opposition. The competitor who wants to maintain the status quo has the competitive advantage. A balanced situation is rare in reality, and the model expects situational sensitivity of a lobbyist (A change in the strength relationship leads to a different strategy.). This is why a balanced situation is not included in the model. This creates the advantage of keeping the number of possible situations low.

The third choice of the lobbyist concerns the opinions of the media and the citizens. The simple division of expressed opinions and resources determine the right branch. The consistency of opinions or relative consensus and the possibilities of these actors to influence the decision-making makes it more important to take account of the variable. If the opinions are dispersed, the importance of taking this variable into account decreases. A balanced situation is, again, omitted from the model because of the assumed situational sensitivity of the lobbyists. The model, then, suggests a strategy to influence a decision-maker in a specific situation and shows the possible tactics to be used to implement it.

If the first choice concerns division of opinions among all the politicians making the final decision on the issue, then the final analysis will result in the evaluation of the whole situation and the lobbyist can determine if it has to adapt to the situation or if it can try to change the situation to be more favorable. In the latter conditions, the lobbyist can apply the model in designing strategies to influence selected decision-makers.

Based on the presented choices, 12 contingency situations are possible. The model as a decision-tree is presented from the point of view of a lobbyist who is an advocate of a certain kind of decision. If the model is to be applied by some lobbyist who is an adversary, then the model can be rearranged either by turning the order of strategies and tactics upside down in relation to situations or by following the law of like-mindedness, i.e., if the lobbyist takes a negative stand, then a decision-maker holding a negative stand and being of the same mind with the lobbyist is given a positive state of opinion and so on.

The strategic choices of the model follow the reasoning of a few suggestions:
- When the political decision-maker has a positive opinion, it can be enhanced and maintained by showing the supportive opinions of his/her background factors and of other participants to the political process.

- A neutral political decision-maker can be influenced by creating a majority among his/her constituents on the positive side of an issue or by disengaging the decision-maker from his/her parliamentary group and the party.

- The negative opinion of an opposing decision-maker can be changed by creating dispersion among his/her constituents, by disengaging the decision-maker from his/her parliamentary group and the party, and by influencing the public opinion concerning his/her actions (his/her public image).

- When the state of competition supports a positive decision and is favorable for the lobbyist, the political decision-maker can be motivated to take the same stand and influenced by improving the visibility of the organized interests.

- When the state of competition supports a negative decision and is unfavorable to a lobbyist, the political decision-maker can be motivated to take a stand held by the lobbyist and influenced by increasing the power of the positive side by building coalitions, using competitive advantage, and persuading opponents to change their mind.

- When the media support the positive decision, the political decision-maker can be influenced by informing him/her of this situation or by publicizing positive views in the media. When citizen opinion supports the positive decision, the political decision-maker can be influenced by informing him/her of this situation or by publicizing public opinion polls in the media.

- When it is probable that the media and the citizens will oppose the decision, the lobbyist can try to hide their opinion until public discussion begins. Hiding means that this opinion is not asked for and these actors are not informed about the decision-making process. When the adversaries have woken up, the political decision-maker can be influenced by persuading the media to change their opinion and creating support for a positive stand among the citizens.

- When the opinions and the proposal of a lobbyist meets resistance and when this can hinder the lobbyist from achieving its goals, the lobbyist can try to integrate interests of adversaries into the proposal, it may be
useful to change the lobbying strategy for the issue, or it may be necessary to adapt the organization to new circumstances. In general, the more supportive or favorable a public is, the more likely it is that a lobbyist chooses to communicate symmetrically with this public. The more unfavorable the overall situation, the more important it is for the organization to adapt. (Jaatinen 1998a, 35–36.)

Using these suggestions in matching the situation with the strategy, we can describe the strategies of each situation presented in the new model of effective lobbying. In the first contingency situation, the political decision-maker to be lobbied has a positive opinion on the issue important for a lobbyist, the direction of competition is favorable, and the public opinion supports a positive decision. In this kind of a situation, the model suggests that the lobbyist try to enhance and maintain the positive opinion of the decision-maker. The lobbyist should inform the decision-maker of the opinion held by his/her constituents if the issue is important for them. The appropriate tactics to implement this strategy include direct contacts with the decision-maker, campaign contributions, and coalition building. The situation is not made use of if no one takes the initiative. In that case, the lobbyist in focus should take the initiative. Since the situation does not require persuasive or mobilizing techniques and communication is about activating already existing opinions and attitudes, the strategy is labeled a *maintenance strategy*.

The second situation presented in the model is constituted by a positive opinion of the decision-maker, a favorable state of competition, and an adverse public opinion. An appropriate strategy for a lobbyist is to try to enhance and maintain the support of the decision-maker, but also to avoid arousing public attention. If the issue comes under public discussion, the lobbyist may try to mold public opinion. In any case, it should increase the visibility of organized interests. In addition to the tactics of the first situation, the lobbyist should introduce a campaign to change public opinion. The lobbyist has to convince the decision-maker of its expertise that is wider and deeper than the knowledge of other lobbyists. Furthermore, the efforts to argue for the superiority of one’s opinion in taking into account the public interest may help in gaining acknowledgement by the decision-maker. In general, this approach is about providing the decision-maker support and legitimizing the power a lobbyist has. Thus, the strategy is called a *support strategy* or a legitimizing strategy.

The third contingency situation of political participation is characterized by a supporting decision-maker but an unfavorable state of competition. However, the media and citizens give support to the views of the lobbyist. In this case, the lobbyist should create or use its competitive advantage. If he
CONTINGENCY FACTORS
1. Decision-maker
2. Competition
3. Mass media & Citizen opinion

LOBBING STRATEGIES
for the 12 contingency situations

1. Maintenance strategy.
   Strengthens and maintains the stand held by the decision-maker. Indicate the support of the constituents if they think the issue is important.

2. Support strategy.
   Enhances and maintains the stand held by the decision-maker; publicize or try to change the division of opinion; strengthen the visibility of the organizers.

3. Publicizing strategy.
   Show the narrow support for competing interests, integrate the opponents’ interests with those of yours.

4. Integrative negotiation.
   Act first. Don’t wake up the public and competitors. Otherwise, the chances to influence the decision-maker will be much reduced. Integrate interests.

5. Informing.
   Create a majority on your side of the issue among the constituents of the decision-maker. Strengthen the visibility of the organized interests.

6. Concessions.
   Act as you would in situation 5 but don’t go public or you should persuade people to accept your stand. Change your strategy to take into account the interests of the opponents.

7. Being unconditionally constructive.
   Strategy 3 applies but you should make sure of your distinctiveness and indicate the narrow support for competing views. Show the supporting consensus of the public opinion to the decision-maker.

8. Distributive negotiation.
   Act as you would in situation 6. In addition, use your distinctiveness. Act first; if the adversaries are strong, possibilities to affect decision making will be much reduced.

9. Win-win or no deal.
   Create a division of opinion among the constituents of the decision-maker. Strengthen the visibility of the organized interests and the public opinion.

10. Defensive strategy.
    Use strategy 8 but try to keep the issue away from public discussion or build favorable public opinion.

    Strategy: 8 applies but don’t wake up the competitors or act first and distinctively.

    “Impossible to influence.” Adapt your organization and its constituency to the new conditions and different circumstances.

Figure 3-7. The new model of effective lobbying (refined).

Reading instructions: Beginning from the left hand side of the decision-tree, choose the states (for/neutral/against) of the contingency factors prevailing in the specific situation. The states constitute the prevailing situation of political participation and indicate the appropriate lobbying strategy that is presented on the right hand side of the figure next to the prevailing situation. A change of the state of a contingency factor leads to a change of the situation and the strategy accordingly. There are 12 different possible situations and appropriate strategies presented in the model. Next page: Tactics.
### Tactics to implement the strategies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Direct contacts</th>
<th>5. G&amp;C-mobilization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Campaign contrib.</td>
<td>Coalitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalitions</td>
<td>Media relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Direct contacts</td>
<td>6. G&amp;C-mobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign contrib.</td>
<td>Coalitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalitions</td>
<td>Media relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Direct contacts</td>
<td>7. G&amp;C-mobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign contrib.</td>
<td>Coalitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalitions</td>
<td>Competitive tactics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Competitive tactics</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. As in the situation 1.</td>
<td>8. G&amp;C-mobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If others awakened:</td>
<td>Coalitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molding public opinion</td>
<td>Competitive tactics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Direct contacts</td>
<td>10. Direct contacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign contrib.</td>
<td>Campaign contrib.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media relations</td>
<td>Media relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. As in the situation 10 + competition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Emergency tactics</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

A lobbyist can prove the narrowness of support for the competing interests, if it acts before the others, and if it is able to stand out positively, the lobbyist can gain strength. The appropriate tactics for this situation include direct contacts with the decision-maker, campaign contributions, coalition building, and tactics of competition. Because the citizens support the views of the lobbyist, appealing to the citizen opinion or the opinions of the constituents and referring to their democratic right to decide on matters concerning them may convince the decision-maker of his/her duty as a representative to give priority to the opinions of the voters instead of the opinions of the competing special interests. In general, the lobbyist uses public opinion to support its cause. Thus, it is called a publicizing strategy.

In the fourth situation, the political decision-maker is still on the advocates' side, but the state of competition is unfavorable to goal-attainment and the media and citizens have turned into adversaries. An effective strategy in these circumstances would be to act before the others do and to avoid attracting the attention of competitors and the media. Otherwise, the lobbyist has to integrate their interests in its proposal or the possibilities to influence the decision-making are slight. The selection of tactics to be used include direct contacts, campaign contributions, and coalition building. If the other
actors have been awakened, the use of campaigns to mold public opinion and
the introduction of tactics of competition might be advisable. In general, the
lobbyist often has to engage in negotiation which is why an integrative
negotiation approach is suggested as the strategy.

Even if the situation is similar to these first four situations, it is always
advisable to integrate the interests of the competitors into the proposal. This
will help in the conflict accommodation task of lobbying. The disappointed
minorities may be powerful enough to start the political process again, but
good relations with all publics will help in cooperation in the future. In the
next four situations, however, it is not enough to incorporate new ideas into
the proposal. If the situation looks like in situations five to eight, it is
advisable to change the lobbying strategy so that it takes into account the
interests of the opponents.

In the fifth situation of political participation, even if the decision-maker
is neutral, the conditions of competition are favorable and the public opinion
is supportive. The lobbyist should create a majority among the constituents of
the decision-maker on the positive side of the issue at hand and increase the
visibility of the organized interests. More forceful tactics are needed,
however, than in the previous circumstances. The appropriate tactics include
grass-roots and constituency mobilization and coalition building. The general
tendency, however, is that of informing.

The sixth situation corresponds to the fifth one except for the fact that
public opinion has turned into an opposing state. The lobbyist may act like in
the previous situation but refrain from bringing the issue before the public-at-
large. If the public discussion begins, then the lobbyist can try to mold public
opinion. This situation is more typical in the beginning of an issue life-cycle,
and some concessions might help a lobbyist to get a step ahead.

In the seventh situation presented in the new model, the competition
around a neutral decision-maker is intense and unfavorable to the lobbyist.
Public opinion is, however, on the side of the lobbyist. The appropriate
lobbying strategy would be to create a majority among the constituents of the
decision-maker on the positive side of the issue and to increase the visibility
of organized interests on its side. Being distinctive in a positive way among
the competitors and proving that support for the competitors’ course is narrow
might help. The lobbyist can also appeal to the support of the general public.
To implement the strategy, the lobbyist can use grass-roots and constituency
mobilization, coalition building, media relations, and the tactics of
a mixed-motive strategy that might be an effective approach in this situation:
being unconditionally constructive, i.e., an organization should do what is
best for the relationship rather than stick to its demands and wait for the benevolence of its publics (Fisher & Brown 1988, 11). We should understand that there might be differences in perceptions concerning the issue and the parties to negotiation, and we should not be dependent on reciprocity but rather follow the Golden Rule of the Bible (Fisher & Brown 1988, 29–40).

The eighth situation corresponds to the seventh but public opinion has joined the opposition. An appropriate lobbying strategy would be to create a majority among the constituents of the decision-maker on the positive side of the issue, to increase the visibility of organized interests on its side in the eyes of the decision-maker, and to avoid stimulating public discussion or to mold public opinion. In addition, the lobbyist should time its actions right and be distinctive among the competitors. If resistance is widespread, the possibilities to influence the political decision-making will be much reduced for the lobbyist. It may have to change its lobbying strategy which is directed at an individual decision-maker. The tactics of lobbying constitute grass-roots and constituency mobilization, coalition building, and tactics of competition. In this situation, a *distributive negotiation* strategy might help the lobbyist to protect its interests.

Strategies nine to twelve deal with a situation where the decision-maker is an opponent to the proposal for decision. In the ninth situation, the state of competition is, however, favorable to the lobbyist, and the public opinion is supportive. In this case, the lobbyist can try to create dispersion among the constituents of the decision-maker and to increase the visibility of the organized interests and the public opinion. The tactics include direct contacts, campaign contributions, media relations, molding of public (and decision-maker’s constituents’) opinion, and grass-roots and constituency mobilization. The decision-maker has to change his/her position in order to get at least some advantages or some kind of acceptance for his/her views. Plowman (1995) suggested that Covey’s *win-win or no deal strategy* could be used in public relations. This strategy might be effective in the eighth situation. Covey (1989) explained that a win-win or no deal strategy means that you agree to disagree, to have no contract at all if you can not find a solution that is acceptable to all the parties in the negotiation. You can decide to work on another problem. It might be easier to work on the first problem, later. The circumstances might have changed in the meanwhile. (Covey 1992, 213–216.)

The tenth situation corresponds to the ninth except for the fact that the media and the citizens have turned into adversaries. The same strategy is applicable to this situation as to the previous one, but it is not advisable to go public or a program to mold public opinion would be necessary. A convenient
approach is to proceed step by step, considering every move carefully. A change in the opinion of the decision-maker is a result of skillful constructing. The tactics to be used include direct contacts with the decision-maker, campaign contributions, grass-roots and constituency mobilization, and coalitions. It is very likely that the lobbyist will be attacked from many sides and it has to be on the defensive.

The eleventh contingency situation is formed by a decision-maker opposing the proposal for decision and by the presence of strong competitors also opposing it. The media and the citizens, however, support the proposed solution to the problem. In this case, the lobbyist can try to create dispersion among the constituents of the decision-maker and to increase the visibility of the organized interests on its side and of public opinion. A revolt and barricades may set an appropriate stage in an oppressing situation. The demonstration of power gives the impression of being in earnest on the matter. The waking up of competitors is not wise, however. The lobbyist should act before the others and use its distinctiveness among the competitors. The effective tactics constitute of direct contacts with the decision-maker, campaign contributions, grass-roots and constituency mobilization, coalition building, and tactics of competition. A mixed-motive strategy appropriate for this situation might be rights-based negotiation. The lobbyist might refer to a right to be heard and be taken into account.

The twelfth and last possible political setting is constituted by a resistent decision-maker, a strong opposition built by the competitors, and adverse public opinion. It might be impossible to influence political decision-making in this kind of a situation. The lobbyist has to adapt its organization to new circumstances in order to survive. Emergency tactics may be used to improve the position of the lobbyist in the competition or to impede the making of decision that the lobbyist is opposed to. In fact, if the situation as a whole looks like that in situations nine to twelve towards the end of the political process of the issue, it is advisable to prepare to adapt the organization to new circumstances. Even if the lobbyist cannot change the situation so that other parties are more favorable to its point of view, it should demand their attention to its interests.

In the first study to develop the model of effective lobbying strategies, the contingency situations were constructed based on information gained from several empirical cases on national level lobbying concerning Finland’s membership of the European Union. Advocates and adversaries of the membership were interviewed, their experiences and actions recorded and analyzed, and the scheme of the model reflected back to the reality in other similar cases. In that issue, the lobbyists met with the extreme situations
presented by the model, but also less polarized strategic alternatives were experimented with. Before the referendum, a majority of political decision-makers seemed to support the EU-membership. According to the research made, also the strength relationship between the lobbyists was favorable to the advocates. The majority of the media, journalists or reporters, and the citizens supported membership.

In this situation, the interest groups and citizen groups who supported membership believed that to achieve their goal, it was enough to keep a low profile and to contribute quietly to the process. They strove to enhance and maintain the opinions of the supporting decision-makers by direct contacts with them and to gain competitive advantage by making an impression of having wide support for the proposal, i.e., by building a coalition. To ensure success, they made their views public through the media, and motivated by the referendum, they engaged in information campaigns to citizens. This kind of a lobbying strategy corresponds to the strategies suggested by the model in situations 1, 5, and 9. (Jaatinen 1994, 62–75.)

The adversary groups of the EU-membership of Finland noticed that their possibilities to influence the political decision-making were slight in the prevailing political conditions, and they resorted to different kinds of emergency tactics, e.g., demanded that referendum be held, a national subsidy be granted for agriculture, and the decision on the EU-membership be made related to this packet of subsidies and using a long decision-making procedure meant for making constitutional laws. In this way, these groups tried to achieve a better result than a total defeat. They tried to alleviate the effects of threats posed by EU-membership. One reason for lowering the objectives probably was that their efforts to influence the opinions of the decision-makers by grass-roots mobilization and to build the minority required for overruling the positive decision in parliament by persuading the parliamentary groups, did not seem to change the situation and make it unfavorable to EU-membership. The efforts to mold public opinion by influencing public discussion in the media did not seem to turn citizen opinion against membership. It was difficult to gain competitive advantage because of a lack of resources, but the adversaries were able to respond to the challenge posed by the advocates by making use of good relations with decision-makers and by building their own coalition. The strategies of the adversaries corresponded to the strategies 4 and 8 (a like-minded or neutral decision-maker as a target of lobbying, but no support for the views from the competition or public opinion) suggested by the model. (Jaatinen 1994, 62–75.)

In the 1994 study, the targets of lobbying, i.e., decision-makers were
also interviewed. This helped to construct the contingency factors of the model, especially the background factors having influence on decision-maker’s opinion. The author applied the contingency view on activist public relations in 1998. In the contingency model for activist public relations, the strategic choices of activist groups are explained. Lobbying is seen as an alternative to negotiating directly with opponents and to media advocacy. The contingency factors consist of opponents, decision-makers, and public opinion. The model was constructed partly on the basis of data gathered in this study on the consumers’ interest group. (Jaatinen 1998b.)

The new model of effective lobbying purports to be a general description of lobbying in all the possible circumstances. In reality, there might be problems related to its application. These problems concern the nature of the issue, the lobbyist, and the level of political decision-making lobbied. Bartha (1982), for example, claims that the nature of an issue is affected by the changes in the roles of key publics in participating in the political decision-making. According to him, in the universal issues that affect the public-at-large, the lobbyists stress the importance of public discussion and argue for their views and the political decision-makers develop solutions to the problems. Whereas in the technical issues that are of interest only to a few groups of people, the lobbyists develop the solutions themselves and negotiate on them and the political decision-makers just give their acceptance. (Bartha 1982.) This kind of changes in roles occupied by different publics may have an influence on the planning and effectiveness of lobbying.

Secondly, there may be differences in the nature of political action depending on the lobbyist, that is, whether the lobbyist is a private company, an interest group, or a public organization. Thirdly, the political decision-making at the international and regional level may activate different kinds of groups whose relationships of influence and power have some consequences for the applicability of the new model. For example, the influence of the citizens and the media on the political decision-making at the EU-level is less than at the national or local level which suggests a need to deliberate the essentiality of the third contingency factor. However, all these doubts can be refuted by explaining these differences as effects generated by the fact that some groups stay passive in a political issue. This passivity can be taken into account in the new model by considering how many propositions should be taken into account in determining the situation of the political game and in formulating the strategy. The proposition concerning a passive public can be forgotten. It is enough to take that public into account in the general communication policy of the organization.

In this chapter, the general model of effective lobbying strategies was
presented. It is a model which is apart from being able to describe the reality also able to suggest how the lobbyist should act in certain kinds of situations. Thus, as a tool for planning and evaluating lobbying, it is a normative model, but its positive character is revealed when reflected in the actions of Finnish lobbyists. In the next chapter, the model is applied to changing circumstances so as to describe the dynamics of communication.

3.3.4 Summary

The new model of effective lobbying strategies is tested in the empirical part of this study. Particularly, the relevance of the contingency factors defined, the appropriateness of the tactics and strategies suggested in each situation, and the changes of strategy and between different situations is observed. Whether these elements constitute the premises used by lobbyists in real-life decision-making will be tested and discussed. In this phase, the conflict accommodation strategies presented are only suggestions which will be looked for in real-life cases.