6 Research Results

6.1 Research Process

This chapter presents the results of the empirical study to develop and test the new model of effective lobbying and to answer the general research questions. The operations to process and interpret the empirical material will be discussed in the Sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2. Eisenhardt (1989) presented a road map to build a theory from case-study research. She described the research process step by step from the beginning to the end. First, to get started, a researcher defines the research questions and possibly builds some a priori constructs. Then, he or she specifies the population for the study and selects the cases. Thirdly, the research instruments and protocols are crafted. Fourthly, the researcher enters the field. This phase of data collection overlaps with the next phase, the analyzing of data. Thus, flexible and opportunistic data collection is made possible. In the analysis phase, within-case and cross-case patterns are searched for. The sixth phase is for shaping and testing hypotheses. Iterative tabulation of evidence and the use of replication logic characterizes this step. After confirming, extending, and sharpening the theory, the results are compared with similar and conflicting literature. Finally, closure is reached when theoretical saturation is achieved. (Eisenhardt 1989, 533.) These eight steps apply very well in this study, too. The description of field work and analysis specific for this study are dealt with in greater detail in this chapter.

6.1.1 Field Work

The field work for this study was begun by sending a contact letter to the potential interviewees. In the letter, the author and her supervisor asked the recipient to participate in the study and agree to be interviewed on matters concerning lobbying. The letter informed them about the questions of the interview that would deal with the lobbyist’s every-day work experiences on lobbying issues for his or her organization. It was promised that any material obtained in the study would be kept confidential as regards the source of information. The letter was posted in February 28, 1997. After a week, the researcher called the interviewees and asked them whether they would participate in the study. Everyone agreed to be interviewed. They were, then, sent a letter that described the research project in more detail and presented
the themes of the interview. The interviewees were also given a format to help them select cases and to remember essential matters of interest to the study. These would be discussed in detail during the interview. (The letters are presented in Finnish [original] and in English [translated] in Appendix 4.) During the phone calls, the places and times for the personal interviews were set. All the interviews were carried out in March and April 1997. The interviews took approximately an hour-and-a-half plus some time for informal discussion on related subjects and for the presentation of the research project. However, the shortest interview was only 45 minutes long and the longest was 3 hours long. All the interviews were audio tape recorded with permission. Related to the interview, some documents were gathered on the interest group, the organization, and the issues. A minimum amount of notes were taken based on observations.

After each interview, the tape recordings were transcribed during the following days. Transcriptions were literal, word for word, even emotional reactions and some meaningful behaviors were written down to help interpret the material. The transcriptions were printed for analysis. The analysis of the empirical material was begun immediately after the first interview. This made it possible to refine the questions of the interviews, to evaluate the need for additional material, and opportunistic data collection. In this way, an overlap of data collection and analysis was achieved. Detailed analysis of the material was conducted in May and June, 1997. Immediately after the interview period, legal documents on the issues and decisions discussed were gathered from the library of the Finnish parliament and Internet. This material was used to verify information received by interviews, to support claims presented by the interviewees, and to form a complete picture of each political process related to the political decisions.

Later, at the end of the research process, the interviewees were sent a copy of the findings of the study and asked for their permission to use their names and the names of their organizations in this dissertation. This was considered important because the open use of the names would help the readers of this dissertation to understand the significance of the findings and the societal context of lobbying that affects how a group can lobby. It would also increase the transferability of the findings. Arranging a chance for interviewees to make corrections to their quotes and the interpretations of the researcher would also increase the credibility of the findings.

6.1.2 Analysis Operations

The research questions can be answered generally, describing the principles
of lobbying, or in relation to the specific cases of lobbying and the model. Thus, the analyses were divided into two phases. First, general descriptions were built. Then, a case analysis was conducted. The research question 1 on how and why the interest groups lobby in the way they do gets a descriptive answer through the themes 2 (organizational structure and planning), 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 (objectives, publics, means, contingencies, results in each phase of the political process), and 9 (effectiveness) of the interviews (See Appendix 1 for the themes of the interviews.). The themes were operationalized with specific questions pertaining to each topic assisting also in the classification of empirical material in order to find answers to the research questions.

Research question 2 on the dynamics of communication, that is how a lobbying strategy changes according to the changes of the situation, gets a general answer through themes 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 dealing with lobbying in different phases of the political process. Under each of these themes, questions on changes in organizational action and actions by their publics and changes related to the political process of each issue were posed. Research question 3 on differences in lobbying different types of issues was specifically addressed in the theme 10. Question 4 on differences in lobbying at different levels of political decision-making was dealt with under theme 12. Theme 11 on the effects of the EU-membership of Finland on lobbying gives also some information on the differences between lobbying the national decision-makers and eurolobbying.

The case analysis is founded on themes 4 to 9 that addresses organizational actions in specific issues and themes 10 to 12 that give information on the extent of applicability of the new model. The general assumptions of the model can get support also from theme 2. The case analysis was begun by classifying the cases and the situations they included. Based on these situations, they were matched with the situations of the new model. After this, it was possible to see how the strategies of real cases corresponded to those suggested by the model and if the results achieved were as predicted by the model. After this, the cases confirming the model (where similar strategies determined by a situation were found) were summarized. The cases revealing differences were divided into two: those that gave different information for predictable or explainable reasons (different situation determining the strategy or different strategy determining the result) and those revealing differences not explained by the model. Predictably different cases were compared with each other. The cases of disconfirming evidence were, then, summarized and analyzed in more detail in order to find the explanation, and the model was refined based on this new evidence. In addition, the dynamics of lobbying occurring in the cases were analyzed and the model was used to explain it.
Then, it was possible to compare cases of different political sectors and levels with each other. After this preliminary analysis, a more detailed analysis was made based on the theoretical framework and the schemes built for this study.

After the general descriptive answers and the case analysis described, the propositions covering the new model were detected in all the material, across the cases, and in relation to specific cases. The results of this analysis are also presented separately. It was found that the interest groups may not act as rationally as the thinking behind the model suggests. Explicit statements of rules constructed for making the model more systematic and for testing it in reality were hard to elicit. However, the situations of political participation and the strategies used corresponded to those suggested by the model which implies rational planning and concordance in the thinking behind the planning and the modeling. Despite the difficulties, some evidence on thinking consistent with the rules were found in the empirical material.

6.2 Results

The results of the analysis phase are presented in this section. First, the descriptive answers will be given to each research question. Then, the case analysis and its results are presented. Initial findings of these two parts of this study were published in Jaatinen (1997) and Jaatinen (1998). Further analysis revealed some new interpretations. No quotations were given in Jaatinen (1997) and Jaatinen (1998). The issue of dynamics was not dealt with. Here, following the case analysis, the dynamic features of some cases will be described and the model will be applied to explain it. Finally, the propositions will be observed across cases and in specific organizations. Initial findings on propositions were presented in Jaatinen (1997) and Jaatinen (1998). Results will be discussed in Chapter 7.

6.2.1 Description of Lobbying Issues at the National Level and the European Level

The interest groups who participated in this study can be classified into three groups: 3 groups represent traditional lobbyists such as trade unions (the Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions), employer associations (The Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers), and economic groups (The Central Chamber of Commerce of Finland); 3 groups are large sector organizations such as associations for banks (The Finnish Bankers’ Association), insurance companies (The Federation of Finnish Insurance Companies), or associations for forestry (The Finnish Forestry Association); and 2 groups are characterized by significant citizen involvement such as
consumer organizations (The Finnish Consumers’ Association) and environmental issues groups (The Finnish Association of Nature Conservation). The classification is made for the purpose of describing the lobbying activities in a way that confidentiality can be maintained to the appropriate extent and to characterize the interest groups as lobbyists briefly. In reality, differences between the lobbying activities of these groups are minimal. The essential differences will be revealed in the course of the presentation of the results. The presentation is divided into sections according to the research questions to be answered.

6.2.1.1 Organizational Lobbying of Issues

In answer to the question 1) how do the observed interest groups lobby and why do they lobby in the way they do, the empirical material reveals the following results: As to the definition of lobbying, the Finnish lobbyists agreed lobbying is influencing political decision-making. Seven of the interviewed lobbyists emphasized that lobbying is about both scanning and informing the relevant publics, i.e., it is interaction. In addition, informing is accompanied by efforts to influence these publics. One lobbyist emphasized the centrality of influence above all else. All lobbyists agreed that influence is based on good relations, and 6 organizations engaged in profile creating activities. A representative of one of the traditional lobbyists said:

The content of our lobbying principally is to tell what effect a potential solution or proposal would have on [our sector]. It is our fundamental mission that we keep ourselves up to date with information and, on the other hand, deliver that information... It is interaction. We set general objectives for ourselves but how far we get is dependent on interaction... We have to take into account the economic and political realities and try to find solutions that the others can live with as well... This kind of initiatives and influencing is partly public and visible but a big part of it happens invisibly so that we just attend committees and task groups or discuss with people. (Ulla Sirkeinen, The Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers)

Another traditional lobbyist defined lobbying in the following way:

Before Max Jakobson used the word lobbying, we had used the words influence and interest surveillance for it. The purpose is to influence political decision-making, public opinion, opinions of companies, everything. Lobbying is achieving objectives set... Lobbying requires a sense of time and place... Timing is important.—Be informative. Listen to what they say. A good lobbyist does not irritate. He is allowed to deliver his message. (Sampsu J. Saralehto, the Central Chamber of Commerce of Finland)

Still another representative of traditional lobbyists stressing the influence
Table 6-1. Forms of communication included in lobbying according to the interviewees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization/Definition</th>
<th>Employees</th>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Banking</th>
<th>Trade</th>
<th>Employees</th>
<th>Forestry</th>
<th>Consumers</th>
<th>Interest</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scanning</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informing</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence/ as</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symmetrical</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations &amp; Profiling</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lobbying is influencing people’s behavior and presenting the objectives of the association you work for so that you get as many people behind these objectives as is possible. There is no one clear way how to be successful in lobbying. It is always dependent on the moment. You have to find the right route and the right people. A lobbyist needs connections to many networks. He/she has to know people at different layers of the society. He/she has to have good human relations skills. (Tuulikki Kannisto, the Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions)

The representatives to the citizen groups agreed with these definitions, but two of the sector organizations had chosen a little bit different approach: issues raising and emphasizing discussion.

Today, there are some matters in which the whole sector thinks it is wiser to influence together than alone, because efforts to influence alone are interpreted as the “propaganda” of the interest group. We deliver information, e.g., to schools. We also try to maintain skills and knowledge of journalists in issues of interest to us. We are a source of information but we are also active issue raisers offering material for TV-news and the press. Thirdly, we raise issues... and offer information... for decision-makers.

Especially, we try to give them a clear framework that helps them to put things in the right context. ...it is a new... way of influencing by means of communication and interaction. We don’t have a prepared message but we let people find it out by themselves. (Juhanı Karvonen, The Finnish Forestry Association)

We follow trends by discussing... and listening to our target groups or constituencies, political decision-makers,... opinion leaders in the mass media,... consumer groups,... and the authorities... We try to create a two-way discussion.. By
this discussion approach, we try to maintain good interaction and mutual understanding. [Lobbying] is interactive talk and delivering of information... It is influencing by means of discussion and giving information. (Reijo Olikainen, the Federation of Finnish Insurance Companies)

Based on this evidence, the new definition of lobbying reflects the reality well. The purpose of lobbying is to influence decisions and the way to do it is through communication. According to the Finnish lobbyists participating in this study, lobbying can also be symmetrical communication: persuasion and being persuaded. Thus, lobbying can be described as both cooperation and competition. Compromises are usually inevitable but also valued.

In order to achieve an objective, one often has to look for a compromise. You have to change or take into account the views of the opposing side... You have to remember all the time that some compromises have to be made because there are many other parties in addition to this association... [A compromise] seems worth striving for to me... Peace and harmony is better than a controversy or use of heavy weapons. Sometimes it is good to go ahead slowly... and try again later. You have to take the political situation into account... [A compromise] is a longer-lasting solution because there are at least two parties committed to the solution after negotiations. No force is used. (Tuulikki Kannisto, the Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions)

This excerpt is also evidence on the conflict management approach: it describes a step by step effort to achieve an objective and to take other’s interests into account at the same time. A win-lose solution, sometimes even the compromises, create pressure for change among the dissatisfied. This was described by one of the experts interviewed in the following words:

It would not be a good thing if one party won completely and the other party... began planning some rebellion. It is better that we achieve a compromise, even if we were not completely satisfied with it. Everyone is committed to [the decision]. It is better. (Leif Fast, Economic Information Bureau)

The possibility to achieve an integration of interests might be more like an ideal than reality because of the abundance of stakeholders and their contradictory interests in the political decision-making. In a system that is based on parliamentarism, one of the missions of the opposition is to resist change which makes an interest integration seem almost to be an impossibility. Interests behind the positions of the opposition are usually, however, taken into account by the government in a democracy. The resulting compromise still gives something to every party. In conclusion, the empirical material suggests that conflict resolution theory can be applied to lobbying. If the theory of lobbying as conflict accommodation is formulated into three principles of two-way symmetrical communication, fitting objectives and
tactics in the situation, and evaluating the effectiveness of lobbying as success and sensitivity, the first two principles are given support by the evidence presented above. This ideal model of lobbying seems to be at least a normative model for the Finnish lobbyists participating in this study but the model was also found to be used in practice. This suggests that the model can be a positive model as well as a normative model in Finland.

In answer to the question 1.b. on how the lobbyists try to affect political decision-making in a chosen issue, the planning activities and political activities of the lobbyists will be presented. The Finnish interest groups lobby according to the overall strategy of their associations. The organizations that participated in this study can be divided in two different groups: the planning organizations (5 organizations) and the value-driven organizations (3 organizations). Both groups included traditional lobbyists, sector organizations, and citizen associations. In the first group, the overall strategy is a formal political strategy in addition to which most of the associations make a separate communication plan and a tactical plan including a budget. Furthermore, these organizations sometimes have issue campaigns. In the other group, the lobbying activities are based on an overall strategy consisting of basic principles or values of the interest group. These values determine a loose framework for all operations. In some issues, these organizations prepare issue specific plans, and sometimes they campaign. They may have a communications plan defining principally media and constituent relations activities, and a budget for the organization is made regularly. In these organizations, the overall strategy of the organization and the general principles of communication seem to be inseparable. As a criticism to the planning approach one of the expert interviewees said:

There are so many matters you have to influence every day that I understand it is difficult to create strategies... Of course, they have strategies for certain issues... We have had a strategy only in the biggest issues. In the EU-issue, we had [a strategy]... and it changed many times... If the public opinion changed, we had a different plan in reserve... It is often so—which explains why there is not a comprehensive plan—that it is very difficult [to make a strategy]... [because] there are so many opinions among the members of the central organization. (Leif Fast, Economic Information Bureau)

In general, the division of labor in lobbying was defined by the expertise of the employees of the organization and with regard to the content of the issue. All organizations had also units in which media relations were centralized. People in this unit assisted others in lobbying with regard to communication activities. Some of the relations with important publics were usually established by the employees before entering the organization. The
rest of the relations were formed while working for the interest group. The relational activities of the organization were partly taken care of in a decentralized way, in relation to some issues by activities of each employee, and partly by centralized activities for building and maintaining relations.

As to the communication activities, the common publics for lobbying consist of political decision-makers, public officials, parties, parliamentary groups, voters, competitors, mass media, citizens, and internal publics (See Appendix 2). These correspond to the publics included in the new definition of lobbying and to the publics whose characteristics form the contingency variables of the new model for effective lobbying. The selection of tactics used by the Finnish lobbyists is advanced (See Table 6-2.): All the interest groups participating in this study use direct contacts with political decision-makers and public officials; cooperate with the like-minded or build coalitions; use competitive tactics such as distinctiveness for expertise, trust, credibility, good relations, and representativeness (resources); use media relations; and mold the citizen opinion. In the cases included in this study, two of the organizations used grass-roots mobilization, one a traditional lobbyists and the other a citizen group. Seven lobbyists used constituency mobilization. Four organizations used emergency tactics such as efforts to change the process of decision-making, and six of the organizations tried to reach the constituencies of the legislators by local activities or by mobilization of citizens. Those two organizations that did not were both sector organizations. Five of the groups participating in this study considered political parties as important publics of lobbying and had direct contacts with them regularly. Five organizations considered parliamentary groups as important publics and met them regularly. Also 5 organizations considered internal publics as very important for lobbying. Those three types of publics—parties, parliamentary groups, and internal publics—were more important for the traditional lobbyists and the citizen groups than for the sector organizations. However, the tactic of campaign contributions is used rarely if compared with, e.g., American and British lobbyists. If the Finnish interest groups use campaign contributions, it is usually in the form of financial contributions to parties or the campaign organizations, not to individual representatives for certain issues, or sale on space for advertisements of individual candidates during their election campaigns. A common form of contributions is to provide information or information resources for candidates and their campaign events.

Before elections, we always send papers on contemporary issues to all candidates... They are made by experts and... delivered by our organization... Every candidate gets a catalog of facts... I do not know how much they use it. (Leif Fast, the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization/Tactics</th>
<th>Employers</th>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Banking</th>
<th>Trade</th>
<th>Employees</th>
<th>Forestry</th>
<th>Consumers</th>
<th>Insurance</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct contacts</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition building</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive tactics (incl. contacts with competitors)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media relations</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molding public opinion</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization of citizens</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization of constituents</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign contributions</td>
<td>(x)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>If Q = Information resources only</td>
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<td>Conflict accommodation</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td>Emergency tactics</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacts with voters</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties/parliamentary groups</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: 10 10 7 9 12 7 9 9

Economic Information Bureau

Also the tactic of grass-roots mobilization is rarely used in Finland. It is more common to trade unions, and was successfully used by the adversaries to the EU-membership of Finland in 1994. However, it might be more like a measure of last resort or a measure used when citizens have a direct influence on political decision-making just like they had a say in the referendum held for the EU-membership.

The new model of effective lobbying is based on the assumption that lobbyists take into account environmental changes, especially the opinions and actions (including resources) of publics participating in the political process in an issue important to the lobbyist. The empirical material reveals that the planning of lobbying is preceded by scanning and environmental analysis that reveals the issues important for the lobbyist and the political setting that has to be taken into account. The political setting includes opinions of all the publics able to influence the decision. Seven of the
organizations made or ordered reports on issues studies. One lobbyist claimed that issues for lobbying were selected based on how important the issue is for the members of the association and whether it is possible to have influence on the decision to be made on the issue. Seven organizations stressed the importance of the situational analysis. All eight organizations took into account the opinions of other publcs when trying to influence political decision-making. Five organizations took also the resources of these publcs into account when lobbying on an issue. Internal publcs were assessed by five organizations based on the opinions of the members. In addition to taking these opinions into account, five lobbyists explicitly maintained that they planned lobbying according to resources available. Three lobbyists stressed the importance of effectiveness of the organization. In the light of these findings, the theory of the strategic management of lobbying seems to be accurate in its description on the components of a lobbying strategy and the relationships between different levels of planning (See Figure 2-3). The view on the need for adaptation and anticipation of issues is also confirmed in the evidence on the issues research made and taking into account the political setting.

To answer question 1.a. on the objectives and goal lobbyists have and 1.c. on evaluation of lobbying, we might refer to the interviewee who said that “Lobbying is achieving objectives set”. Lobbying activities are purposeful, i.e., directed at achieving objectives. There are main objectives concerning the final result and minor objectives. Specific objectives in certain issues are always related to objectives in other issues. Efforts to achieve some objectives should not undermine efforts to achieve other objectives. Coordination is essential. Lobbying activities are generally evaluated based on results achieved (See Table 6-3): in six organizations, results were determined by passed proposals; in five organizations, the results were reflected in the inputs or resources used to achieve them; in seven organizations, results were evaluated based on feedback from members; three lobbyists evaluated communication effects; five organizations took into account the difficulty of the situation or the possibilities of the group to have an influence in the prevailing situation. However, the organizations that participated in this study did very little formal research on the effectiveness of their communication: three were involved in image studies, three made systematic evaluations based on results achieved (MBO/R organizations), and three had some research made on their media relations or educational activities. One of the expert interviewees explained the state of affairs:
Table 6-3. Criteria for evaluation of success.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization/Criteria</th>
<th>Employers</th>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Banking</th>
<th>Trade</th>
<th>Employees</th>
<th>Finance</th>
<th>Consumers</th>
<th>Insurance</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Passed</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Input</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feedback</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
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<td>N</td>
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<td>4</td>
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</table>

There is not enough time [to do research]. The next issue comes too soon... We collect some clippings and some videotapes but no one goes further to ask the reader. (Leif Fast, the Economic Information Bureau)

The five criteria used in the organizations participating in this study can be classified as action results (passed proposals, feedback, and effects) and supportive results (input and taking the situation into account). For associations, it is common to strive for a balance of income and expenses rather than for profit such as in business organizations (Santalainen et al. 1987, 102). This might be why the business results do not appear as central criteria of evaluation in the case organizations. Evaluation concentrates on the final result of lobbying, the final decision, as recommended in this study.

In addition, some of the activities seem to be more like routines and difficult to decipher by the lobbyists. This questions the intentionality of some of the activities. This issue will be dealt with more thoroughly later in Section 6.2.3.4. In general, these findings on the criteria used to evaluate lobbying give support for the theoretical conceptualization of a good result. It is given support also by the views on how to resolve conflicts. These were dealt with at the beginning of this section. These principles confirm also the third principle of the theory of lobbying as conflict accommodation: defining effectiveness as success and situational sensitivity.

The question on the order of effectiveness of different tactics or means of lobbying does not seem relevant here. It is more the situationally appropriate selection of tactics that matters. Thus, the problem is the order of effectiveness of strategies that are combinations of the tactics used. It would
effective or at least more forceful than tactics in favorable situations. Based on the empirical material, mobilization and direct molding of citizen opinions are used only in difficult situations. They are also tactics included only in strategies used in unfavorable situations. When asked in what kind of situation a lobbyist uses mobilization, one of the expert interviewees explained:

Particularly when a group interprets a certain development to be going against their vital interests, it is easy to mobilize people. A large-scale mobilization is a European organization would also include lobbying on a national level. Every national member federation would be asked to contact the national government concerning that particular issue. (Kari Jalas, the Representation of Finnish Industry and Employers, Brussels)

At the operational level, the persuasiveness or forcefulness of specific means should be considered and it was discussed in the theoretical part of this study. This issue was not one of the foci in the empirical part.

As to the new model, the empirical material suggests that the new model of effective lobbying reflects the lobbying by the interest groups very well. It confirms that the publics and tactics included in the model are the most important publics and the most common tactics also in reality. It supports the view that the political situation is taken into account when planning lobbying. The criteria of evaluation correspond to those of the model.

6.2.1.2 Dynamics of Communication

In answer to the question 2) how and why does a lobbying strategy change according to changes of a situation, the empirical material reveals the following results. Lobbying strategies are formed in a prevailing situation, according to the circumstances: 1) Publics are selected based on the context of the issue, power of the decision-maker to influence the decision, and the activity of the participants in the political decision-making. 2) Strategies are selected based on the political situation. 3) Tactics are selected based on who is chosen as a public. Question 2.b. addressed the way of and reasons for changing a strategy. A lobbying strategy in an issue is changed based on information on changes in the proposal for a political decision or legislation and on changes in opinions or the actions of relevant publics.

...when you get information that the proposal has been changed..., it is worth taking a position on that and not on every opinion presented... it depends on if it is a single very important matter and resources have been allocated to that..., then you may be able to act in relation to every actor more actively... (Ulla Sirkeinen, the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers)
When the adversary became active, I gave speeches that were published widely in the media as well. (Leena Simonen, The Finnish Consumers’ Association)

In answer to the question 2.a. on how a lobbyist notices a change and assesses its importance, the empirical material revealed that the lobbyists get this kind of information by scanning. Seven lobbyists said they usually get this information through contacts, i.e., when they make contact with or are contacted by relevant publics.

...members of [the parliamentary] committee and also the officials of the ministry had formulated a proposal that did not satisfy us and maybe thanks to the good relations we found that out, we got to know what kind of a proposal was going ahead... [The information] came through contacts and... in the middle of one of our meetings late in the evening... We worked on it the next night. (Tuulikki Kannisto, The Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions)

The two sector organizations that were also issue-raisers put emphasis on scanning by means of discussion with publics. One of the interviewees described this with this example:

The head of [a department] of the foreign ministry attended [the seminar] and I was surprised how happy the members of our organization were about the information he was able to give, and he, on the other hand, got information from us on what kind of circumstances prevailed on the markets... It was a relief... to us because he knows with all that experience he has. (Juhani Karvonen, the Finnish Forestry Association)

Six lobbyists maintained they get important information on changes doing issues research. Five lobbyists stressed also the importance of monitoring public debate in the mass media.

We try to follow very keenly the political debate so that we can assess what kinds of matters will possibly emerge... and we try to keep functioning this kind of early warning in different ways so that we could prepare... These kinds of weak signals on how things develop, it is a combination of the mass media, international debate, products of different research institutes and so on... The setting on the political field with regard to different matters, someone hears something about it all the time or someone gets a paper from some political party... this is always communicated, and in that way, we get a complete picture... (Ulla Sirkeinen, the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers)

This information is, then, assessed based on certain criteria: whether the source can be trusted and whether the change is essential and affects the interests of the interest group so that something should be done. Information can be verified by double checking, e.g., from another source. Sometimes these changes have an effect on the operations and objectives of the lobbyist, sometimes the changes are a result of the actions of the lobbyist. A new direction is selected based on the new circumstances, and the general criteria

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for planning apply to the planning in the new situation.

No evidence appeared in the data on group formation but the situational theory of publics would be a good explanation on how the lobbyists segment their publics. Some lobbyists referred to the level of interest (problem recognition) of citizens or some competitors on certain issues. Involvement can be seen as a reaction to issues that affect the interests of the group. Some lobbyists referred to the power (constraints) competitors have. One of the interviewees explained when he was asked based on which criteria his organization usually chooses the groups to be in contact with:

Those who can influence the matter. Those who are listened to. Let’s say we know [certain] associations have power. They discuss a matter and, then, it is useful to consider these matters with their experts, and it happens very often also that they react... when there was discussion on [an issue], a [certain] association reacted on its own initiative, [another] association reacted with very sharp arguments. That is you have to manage coalitions... associations start moving... We try to be prepared for this by discussion and having a network. (Reijo Ollikainen, the Federation of Finnish Insurance Companies)

Another lobbyist described lobbying at the EU-level as less sensitive to expression of mere opinions:

Lobbying Europe—when there are numerous parties [to a negotiation]—it is not possible to react... to all their opinions. Only when it is known that there will be a changed proposal or else, it is worth taking a stand. Not to all expressions of opinion. It depends a little on if it is a single awfully important matter and a lot of resources have been allocated to it... then, it might be possible to be more active about every actor. (Ulla Sirkeinen, the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers)

The situational theory gets support from the notion that the activity of publics are taken into account (See last 4 paragraphs of this section.).

In this study, special interest was laid on interaction between competing lobbyists. Seven lobbyists said they take these competitors into account when planning their activities. Coordination of activities is important in coalitions or other forms of cooperation. The adversaries has to be taken into account when communicating with the political decision-makers and public officials. Specific arguments are used to indicate advantages and disadvantages of the opinions of the opponents. Two lobbyists claimed they would also imitate their competitors. They get ideas from what the opponents say. Sometimes it is important to react to the arguments and tactics used by the adversaries. One of the expert interviewees gave an example of this:

This EU-campaign was very carefully considered. The final result was good... it is sure that [the campaign] had an effect, because the adversaries had their own
campaign going on all the time and there had to be another point of view [available].
(Leif Fast, the Economic Information Bureau)

Other times, the lobbyists try to avoid reacting so as not to appear to be a keen follower of others. Still other times, it is not necessary to react to the activities of closely like-minded groups, because their activities will take the matter further and there is no need to put ones own resources to further this matter. Seven lobbyists said, however, that they try also to discuss matters with their opponents and try to influence the adversarial groups. The aforesaid gives support for the following (taking into account and imitating) and the influencing element of the theory of group activation.

Also the segmentation of political decision-makers can be explained with the situational theory. Decision-makers are selected to be targets of communication based on their expression of concern or announcing of opinion on some matter (problem recognition), expertise in the issue (internal involvement) or the potential effects the issue has on their re-election (external involvement), and the power they have to influence the decision (constraint recognition). There is also evidence of this kind of behavior on the part of the organizations of the interviewees. One of the interviewees explained:

One first time legislator made this [issue] a theme of his campaign... When he came out, I contacted him immediately and I tried to take care of the matter by informing him before it became public, that is, when I learned that he had made a written question (weak interpellation) out of it. [But] Let’s say... if somebody is... interested in an issue, it is natural to ask that person, but I do look more at the position of that person. Let’s say that in party X somebody becomes a chairman, a member, or the secretary of the socio-political task group, then, we try to contact this kind of a person. (Reijo Ollikainen, the Federation of Finnish Insurance Companies)

Based on these criteria, a decision-maker might be more likely to make contact with the lobbyist (information seeking) and the lobbyist should communicate with these active decision-makers. Active decision-makers might also gather around them more supporters and form a public. As a member of a party, this kind of a decision-maker can also act as an activist. As a group of like-minded individuals, these kind of decision-makers become interested in other groups and engage in monitoring (following) and influencing (influence) other groups. In the empirical material collected, there was also some evidence of lobbyists segmenting journalists based on criteria such as interest and initiative.

Changes in the political process, addressed in question 2.c., seem to matter in introducing actions but not very much in selecting tactics in certain issues. The selection of tactics is dependent on which publics are active. Each
public may be active in each phase of the political process but their importance is dependent on the approach the lobbyists use. Two of the sector organizations participating in this study used an issue-raising approach giving much emphasis to the mass media. Since these organizations tried to be proactive agenda-setters and raise issues in public discussion in the mass media, they usually gave more importance to the media as a public in the initial phases of the political process than the other lobbyists. However, the political parties seem to matter more in the beginning phases of the process, and the parliamentary groups in the last two phases of the political process. The flow of the political process is important for the lobbyists to follow in order to know what is going on at one moment but it mostly affects only the content of communication and the means to take direct contacts to decision-makers. Different decision-makers are central to the decision-making in different phases of the political process. One of the interviewees explained the importance of understanding the political process in the following words:

It is important that we understand political decision-making and how the authorities operate so that we know what is reasonable and possible... During the process... of some matter... important to us we continuously keep contact with those preparing [the proposal]... and in that way we can keep up with what’s going on... what kinds of proposals are prepared, in which phase there will be changes, what kind of political pressures on government will be created. If and when it goes to... the level of government or the parliament... that phase is often more unpredictable. There might be elements that are dependent on the situation at the time and on other things and there will be connections... on which it is difficult to have any influence in that phase. (Ulla Sirkeinen, the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers)

Based on this evidence, the flow of the political process does not seem to affect the selection of tactics in the way that Buchholz’s issue life-cycle model claims. This model seems to be more like a normative model for organizations applying an issue-raising approach. The form of political process in an issue, however, may play a significant role in explaining the importance of different publics or contingency factors in an issue. If a referendum is held, ordinary citizens are important. If the issue goes to the parliament, the constituents of the decision-makers are important. If the issue is solved by negotiations, then the other parties or competitors are important. One of the expert interviewees confirmed this in the following manner:

(Which publics are more important than others?) It depends on the matter. If a referendum is held, then, of course, all the citizens... In the issue of building new nuclear power plants, the parliamentary representatives, of course. They make the decision. ...they are, however, dependent on... the voters and other constituents... interest groups... (Leif Fast, the Economic Information Bureau)
In addition to the factors related to the political process, the importance of different contingency variables is determined by features specific to the political sector, e.g., employer–employee-communication gives a special tone to the sector. Furthermore, the importance is determined by the dimension active/passive. If the public is not concerned, it is not involved and active. If a public is active, it has to be taken into account.

In one issue... These were matters that it was not worth telling about to the citizens. It was enough to talk to the politicians, political parties. Of course, we approached the mass media. We did not take into account the opinion of the citizens. We did not need to. (It was not asked?) One thing is that they did not understand those matters. The people did not want change... One should not be too worried about the public opinion,... because, otherwise, there will not be any change. That is why a referendum should not be held on all matters... (Leif Fast, the Economic Information Bureau)

If [a public] is active, it has to be taken into account. I think this issue on equality that has been discussed very much in public... When the government appointed some committees... and it was found that there were only a few women in them, then some group of women... an association... raised hell about it, and it was corrected... It has an effect if some group has an opinion and it is anticipated that things are wrong. But if [that group] had not made a stink about it, nothing would have happened. (Leif Fast, the Economic Information Bureau)

The determination of the importance of different publics explains at least partly the evolutionary dynamics of lobbying.

6.2.1.3 Lobbying Different Issues

In answer to the question 3) what kind of differences are there in lobbying different types of issues, the following can be observed: All the publics can be active in each of the political sectors or main issues studied. Their relevance is also of the same degree: political decision-makers first, the media and the citizens last. Only the employee–employer relations sector seem to emphasize the importance of competitors over decision-makers, because in negotiating wages, social benefits, and taxes, the solution has to be reached among competitors and the decision-makers only lay the framework of incomes policy within which the result must rest.

Some differences might, however, be found between different issues. For example, the activity of publics might be dependent on some specific characteristics of an issue. The extent of interest an issue arises can make a difference that affects the selection and introduction of different tactics of lobbying. If the public discussion in the mass media begins, then the lobbyist has to participate in it. If the issue concerns many, then building of coalition
might be appropriate. Also the political decision-making process may make a
difference: if a referendum is held, the citizens are given more emphasis than
they would have if no direct democracy is used. The level of attention or
interest in the issue has an effect on how many and how powerful publics are
active and has to be taken into account and be communicated with.

Combining from the suggestions made by the interviewees, the effect of an
issue is more appropriately defined so that it affects the substance of
communication, the form of the political process, timing of lobbying
activities, and relations considered important. These differences, however, do
not affect the applicability of the new model.

6.2.1.4 The National and the European Level

In answer to the question 4) what kind of differences are there in lobbying at
different levels of political decision-making, the following can be observed:
Some differences can be observed in the Finnish interest groups’ lobbying at
the national and at the European level of political decision-making, but these
can be explained by the division of labor between the Finnish interest groups
and the European associations for cooperation or by factors outside the
model.

We have a certain kind of division of labor with [the European association for
cooperation] which we are a member of. It lobbies there... It takes care of matters
and organizes press conferences. [The European association] lobbies the media at
the European level... It might be so that at the same time, we translate the press
release of [the European association] and send it to the mass media here. [The
European association] determines its position by asking the opinions of its members,
and it is possible to influence the position... The national organizations act in
relation to their national governments. Sometimes we have common operations
[with the European association]... (but) We have direct contacts with the
Commission. (Leena Simonen, the Finnish Consumers’ Association)

The rationale for dividing labor is efficiency. This was explained by one of
the expert interviewees in the following way:

The European association is an instrument for the national associations. It has to be
decided case by case, how to effectively pursue one’s goal. It is always a question
of cost-effectiveness. The basis of any lobbying activity has to be a clearly identified
common interest. If no such common interest exists, effective lobbying is
impossible. The key to successful lobbying on the EU level is to convince the
European legislator that a certain way of acting is also in the best interest of the
Community. The fact that it is also in the best interest of that pressure group is self-
evident, and need not be stressed. (Kari Jalas, the Representation of Finnish Industry
and Employers, Brussels)
If a common interest cannot be found, a national group cannot turn to a European association for support but it has to find a way to go about its objective alone. Anyhow, the group should find a way to convince the legislator that it is in the interest of the EU that it serves the group’s interest.

The practice of dividing labor seems to be of the following kind: The European associations take care of relations with the European media and keep contacts with the European correspondents of the national media in Brussels; the national interest groups take care of relations with the national media in general and with the citizens of their own country. At the EU-level, the tactics of direct contacts to citizens and grass-roots mobilization are less frequently used. If mobilization of grass-roots is used, it is conducted by the national associations that are members of the European association. Three of the organizations participating in this study have their own offices in Brussels to monitor decision-making in the EU and to build relations with the European decision-makers. Since the organizations participating in this study are central organizations of their interest group at the national level, some lobbyists found coalition building more frequent at the EU-level than at the national level. However, at the national level they themselves are embodiments of coalitions.

At the EU-level, communication with political decision-makers is more formal than in Finland. Formal face-to-face meetings are a more appropriate way to keep in contact with decision-makers and to negotiate about political matters than are the informal phone calls and fax commonly used in taking care of businesses with the national decision-makers in Finland. In Finland, the lobbyists know personally all the people they need to know in order to carry on with their businesses. In addition, at the EU-level, a knowledge of foreign languages is a prerequisite for all operations. Excluding a few exceptions, the Finnish interest groups can usually communicate directly only with the English-, German-, French-, and Swedish-speaking publics. This limits the extension of their operations to other member countries.

A few interviewees suggested also that the decision-making processes are more complicated at the EU-level than at the national level and that there are more targets and game-players at the EU-level. At the EU-level, the context of communication has more to do with exchange of national experiences in relation to hard negotiation on outcomes in which objectives of different interest groups are dovetailed, than it has to do at the national level with exchange of new ideas between different interest groups in relation to hard negotiation. At the EU-level, the political discussion follows more the division into political sectors than the national political discussion. At the EU-level, the Finns have to take the initiative in order to be listened to whereas at
the national level, the interest groups may have a permanent representation at many committees or are listened to regularly. These differences suggested by the lobbyists do not, however, affect the applicability of the new model.

A few lobbyists suggested that eurolobbying might involve operations at many layers of decision-making at the same time whereas lobbying at the national level involves only one layer. For example, eurolobbying requires lobbying of the national decision-makers as well, and eurolobbying usually begins with persuading the national decision-makers to support the interest group’s demands. This claim can, however, be refuted by taking into account operations concerning regional or local politics when lobbying the national institutions. Furthermore, lobbyists keep in contact with parliamentary representatives in the phase when the public officials are preparing the proposal and with the officials when the parliamentary representatives deal with the matter in the many committees of the parliament. Thus, the claim that the differences between the processes of decision-making make eurolobbying a more multiple-layer action than lobbying at the national level might not elucidate differences in lobbying strategies at different levels of political decision-making.

Finland’s membership of the EU has brought about some changes in lobbying at the national level. The national decision-making is now limited by the frames laid by the decisions of the EU. The processes of political decision-making have become slower and the decision-makers are more busy. The cooperation among the Finnish interest groups and the decision-makers has increased. The interest groups can use a new means of influence or emergency tactic to affect national decisions: the opportunity to appeal to the European Commission or the European Court. In addition, matters under preparation at the EU-level can be referred to when trying to influence decision-making at the national level. However, one lobbyist suggested that this might not be an appropriate tactic in issues that involve people who oppose Finland’s membership of the EU. In general, lobbying at the EU-level has an emphasis on the preparation phase of the political decision-making, at the national level, interest groups participate actively in the implementation phase as well. Implementation can concern either decisions of the EU or of the national institutions. These differences have to be taken into account when planning lobbying but they do not affect the structure of the new model. Instead of providing an additional contingency factor, intergovernmental lobbying can be taken into account as higher levels laying framework for the content of the issue at the lower level.

The central organizations of the Finnish interest groups lobby both at the national and the EU-level, but regional and local operations are rare or they
are taken care of via or by the local member associations. In addition, the regional and local level political decision making processes and institutions in Finland have been extensively restructured during the last few years. Thus, they provide an additional level of research objects for research into lobbying but only after some consolidation takes place. Furthermore, the nature of decision-making processes and the position the decision-makers occupy at these levels are very different from the two levels observed in this study and suggests a need for a separate study beginning with contemplations of what kind of differences there are between the decision-making structures at the national and at the regional or local level.

6.2.2 Results of the Case Analysis to Test the New Model

Case analysis consisted of two phases, the preliminary analysis and the analysis according to the theoretical framework. In this section, they are presented separately as a research process. The schemes describing case features are presented in Appendix 5. The complete results are described in the tables presented.

6.2.2.1 Preliminary Analysis

There were 8 interest group representatives interviewed and 15 cases constructed based on the interviews. Eight national level issues and seven EU-level issues were looked at in detail. Based on evidence on the states of the contingency factors and the interviewee’s interpretations of the situations, the cases were matched with the situations proposed by the new model of effective lobbying. Then, the strategies of the lobbyists used and the strategies suggested by the model were compared. The results achieved were assessed. After this, the cases confirming the model (where similar strategies determined by a situation were found) were summarized. The cases revealing differences were divided into two: those that gave different information for predictable or explainable reasons (different situation determining the strategy or different strategy determining the result) and those revealing differences not explained by the model. Predictably different cases were compared with each other. The cases of disconfirming evidence were, then, summarized and analyzed in more detail in order to find the explanation, and the model was refined based on this new evidence. Next, the cases are discussed separately at each level of decision-making and cases of different political sectors and levels are compared with each other.
Table 6-4. Situational match, strategies used, and success in cases at the national level.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Result</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>failure → success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>same + media relations</td>
<td>failure → success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>same + media relations</td>
<td>success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>same + media relations</td>
<td>success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>same + direct contacts</td>
<td>success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>success</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>same + media rel. - mobilization</td>
<td>success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>success</td>
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*Lobbying in Issues at the National Level*

From the 8 national level issues or cases, 13 situations of political participation and appropriate lobbying strategies (main strategies) were separated. The strategies used in each situation corresponded very well to the strategies suggested by the model, and these strategies led eventually to success in goal-attainment. The cases covered the situations and main strategies 1-5, 2-10, 3-11, and 12 put into groupings to indicate overlap in components of a strategy (One main strategy may include each strategy if all the decision-makers are targeted despite their opinions.). In one of the cases, the strategy used at first was not comprehensive if compared with that suggested by the model, and it led to failure. The situation changed to be more unfavorable, but the interest group was able to change its strategy to better correspond to the situation. Now, it expects to be successful. In another case, another interest group used a strategy corresponding to that suggested by the model but was unsuccessful at first. This was, however, explained by an overlap in minor issues in the same political sector. Another issue raised during the decision-making process was about to lead to failure in the final
decision. It changed the division of opinions among the decision-makers and changed the situation to be more unfavorable. The interest group in question changed its strategy to better correspond to the situation and was at least partly responsible for changing the situation to be more favorable to its goal-attainment. In the end, it got what it wanted.

Despite good correspondence between reality and the model, a few observations must be made. In six of the situations, the strategies used by the lobbyists included tactics not suggested by the model. In four cases, this additional tactic was media relations. In one case, it was mobilization, and in another, direct contacts with decision-makers. The use of media relations might be explained by what it was used for. The model suggests the use of media relations to mold opinions of the representatives of the media. The use of the media to approach large audiences is called molding public opinion. The interest groups that used this tactic when not suggested by the model, seemed to have in their mind the influencing of the decision-makers via media. This tactic should, therefore, be added to the selection of tactics suggested by the model at least in situations where decision-makers potentially hold the same opinion as the lobbyist, and the competition is unfavorable, but the public discussion in media favorable. Two of the four cases suggested the use of this tactic in this kind of a situation of political participation. In the case where the additional tactic was that of direct contacts, the emergence of this tactic is quite natural. The model assumes that all the tactics used in more favorable cases can be used in more unfavorable ones but does not explicitly mention all the good tactics in all difficult situations. In the case where the additional tactic was that of grass-roots mobilization, the tactic activated citizens to write in local papers about their opinions on the issue and on the actions of their representative. Thus, the tactic was used to involve the constituents of the representatives in the issue, and the purpose was not general mobilization of citizens that is assumed to be the purpose of using this tactic in the new model.

At this national level of decision-making, in almost all the cases, all the contingency factors were active. Only in one case including two situations, were both the publics constituting the third contingency factor passive. Instead, in five situations, the third contingency factor was constituted by only the media and the citizens were rather passive. Still the interest groups tried to mold the citizen opinion via the media in three of these cases.

*Lobbying in Issues at the EU-Level*

From the 7 EU-level issues or cases, 9 situations of political participation and appropriate lobbying strategies were found. The strategies used in each
Table 6-5. Situational match, strategies used, and success in cases at the EU-level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>same - all but direct contacts and media relations</td>
<td>success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>same + media relations (elections)</td>
<td>success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>same + media relations + constituency mobilization</td>
<td>success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>same + direct contacts</td>
<td>success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>same + media relations</td>
<td>success</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

situation corresponded very well to the strategies suggested by the model, and these strategies led eventually to success in goal-attainment. The cases covered the situations and main strategies 1, 3-7-11, and 4-12. A few observations must be made, however. In four of the situations, the strategies used by the lobbyists included tactics not suggested by the model. In two cases, this additional tactic was media relations. In one case, it was media relations and constituency mobilization, and in the fourth case, direct contacts with decision-makers. As at the national level, direct contacts can be explained by the lobbyist still using the tactics of more favorable situations. In the case of media relations, an explanation can be found in the purpose the tactic is put to: media relations is used to influence the decision-makers. In the case where both media relations and mobilization were used as additional tactics, the explanation might be that the lobbyists fear that the citizens might be given power to decide on the issue, and it is not enough to have the majority of political decision-makers favorable to the lobbyist’s views if a referendum is held.

Two of the cases at the EU-level were interesting because of the connections to national level operations. In the other case, the influence on EU-level decision-making was achieved by making contact with a favorable Finnish decision-maker who, then, took the proposition and negotiated successfully on it with the EU’s decision-makers. No EU-level operations
were needed to exert influence. The other case related to the national elections of MEs. By informing and persuading the candidates and voters on the issue in Finland, the interest group was able to prepare the elected candidates to confront the issue at the EU-level. This kind of influence mechanisms could be claimed to be outside the scope of the new model, but can be included by taking into account the interaction between different levels of political decision-making and treating the operations in Finland as efforts to have an influence on the background factors of the decision-makers in the EU.

At the EU-level of decision-making, all the contingency factors were active in almost all the cases. However, in two cases, both the publcs constituting the third contingency factor were passive, and in five situations, the third contingency factor was constituted by only the media. Still the interest groups tried to mold the citizen opinion via the media in all the five cases.

Comparison of Lobbying in Different Issues and Levels

When the cases were compared with each other as issues of different political sectors, no differences were found in how the situations were interpreted or how the strategies or success corresponded to those suggested by the model. When the issues of the same political sector were observed at both levels, no differences were found in how the lobbying by the interest groups corresponded to lobbying suggested by the model. The differences in tactics used can be explained by the activeness of publcs and by the division of labor between the national interest groups and their European associations. The same explanation applies when all the national level cases are compared with all the EU-level cases.

General Findings

The overall distribution of the cases included in this study tells us about the real life distribution of lobbying cases in general, because they were gathered by asking lobbyists to determine an appropriate case. This analysis reveals that the occurrence of certain kind of cases might be more frequent than other kinds of cases (See Table 6-6.). In the empirical material, it was found that cases in which the political decision-makers and the public opinion agreed on the issue were more typical than cases in which the opinions of the groups constituting these two factors were contradictory. The three dimensions separated are the concentration to situations one and three, and a cluster around situation 10. Based on the general rule implied, situation 12 is also likely to occur but lobbyists often choose to adapt, and so success stories are not created. The four dimensions can be named based on the interviews as a
Table 6-6. The overall distribution of cases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation/Level</th>
<th>FIN</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation/Level</th>
<th>FIN</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Just do it” or a conducting strategy (situation 1: all contingency variables favorable), a “Go public”—or a publicizing strategy (situation 3: competition unfavorable but otherwise a favorable situation), a “defensive” or argument providing strategy (situation 10: decision-makers and public opinion unfavorable but competition favorable), and a “Heavy weapons” or an adaptive strategy (situation 12: all contingency factors unfavorable).

Another general finding made was that more cases in which the decision-maker held a positive opinion were collected than cases in which decision-makers were against the objectives of the lobbyist. One reason for this may be that lobbyists choose to adapt in the most difficult cases. It should be noticed that the situations in which decision-makers in the decision-making body are neutral are temporary situations that occur only in the first phases of the political process.

6.2.2.2 Analysis According to the Theoretical Framework

After the preliminary analysis, the cases were arranged so that they could be compared based on choices made with regard to publics behind one contingency factor. Choices made in different states of the contingency factor could be contrasted in this way. The theoretical framework presented in Section 5.1.2 assists in classifying the cases and using the logic of replication. (See Table 6-7.)

Choices Concerning the Decision-makers

When the cases were compared based on the choice lobbyists had made concerning the political decision-makers, the following was found: There
Table 6-7. Number of situations in each category of the theoretical framework (levels of decision making and the states of contingency factors).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level/ Factor</th>
<th>FIN</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision-makers +</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-makers 0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-makers -</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level/ Factor</th>
<th>FIN</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Competition +</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition -</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level/ Factor</th>
<th>FIN</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media &amp; citizens +</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media &amp; citizens -</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

were 7 positive, 5 negative, and 1 neutral situation at the national level, and at the EU-level, 6, 2, and 1 respectively. At the EU-level, negative cases are underrepresented for literary replication to occur in full, because it was difficult to find these kinds of cases. A possible explanation might be that at the EU-level in those kinds of circumstances, the lobbyists tend to choose to not lobby but to adapt. It is also difficult to use strong tactics required such as mobilization and emergency tactics. Despite the low number of these cases, they can be compared with cases at the national level and with different cases at the EU-level. The low number of the neutral cases is not a severe problem because it is only a temporary category before the political setting stabilizes at the end of the political process close to the final decision.

As to the results, in the positive group of the national cases, having direct contacts with the decision-makers (7 situations) and contacts with parliamentary groups (3 situations) seemed to be enough to achieve the objectives the lobbyists had set. Constituents of the decision-makers were approached through local organizations by the two citizen organizations (2 situations). In the negative group, the additional strategies used included direct contacts with the political parties (1 situation) and the constituents of the decision-makers, i.e., constituents of the lobbyists were mobilized to influence local media and to inform citizens (2 situations) and to mobilize them (1 situation). Furthermore, emergency tactics appeared (2 situations) as a way to change the level of political decision-making. Alternatively, a lobbyist chose to lower its objectives and to adapt (1 situation). The neutral case included only tactics used also in the positive group.

This pattern repeated itself also in the situations at the EU-level. In the positive group, the tactics of direct contacts with political decision-makers and public officials (5 situations) and contacts with the parliamentary groups
(3 situations) were used. One traditional lobbyist used the media to inform decision-makers (1 situation). One sector organization additionally used constituency mobilization (1 situation). Still another sector organization used molding of opinion of decision-makers’ constituents (1 situation) which is explained by elections held at that time. In the neutral case, contacts with the Finnish constituents of the decision-makers through local organizations and constituency mobilization appeared, too. In one negative case, constituency mobilization was used in addition to direct contacts with the decision-makers and parliamentary groups. At the EU-level, contacts with the parties and parliamentary groups overlap in the sense that the parliamentary groups do not form an independent force that would affect the decision-makers but they just represent the parties in the parliament. In addition, MEPs are contacted also as national groups when an interest group is willing to present a national point of view on some matters.

In conclusion, tactics common in positive situations include direct contacts with the decision-makers themselves and with the parliamentary groups. Tactics common to neutral and negative situations are additionally constituted by contacts with the constituents of the decision-makers and the political parties. Furthermore, media relations to influence the image of the decision-maker, constituency and grass-roots mobilization, and emergency tactics might occur in the negative situations. An exception to the rule is that the citizen associations might use the tactic of grass-roots mobilization also in the positive situations. In general, these results confirm the strategic choices included in the model. However, there are some implications to the propositions: proposition 3 might be added with the tactics of mobilization. (See Figure 6-8.)

**Choices Concerning Competition**

With regard to competition, there were 7 favorable and 6 unfavorable situations at the national level and 5 favorable and 4 unfavorable situations at the EU-level. In the favorable group of the national cases, building coalitions or using coalition power (7 situations) and using the competitive tactics of distinctiveness such as expertise and good relations (3 situations) seemed to be enough to achieve the objectives of the lobbyists. In the unfavorable group, the additional tactics used included using competitive tactics of organizational resources such as securing the uniformity of opinions among the members of the organization (1 situation) and direct contacts with the competitors (2 situations), even efforts to influence them (1 situation). Direct contacts to decision-makers could also have been used to undermine competitors’ arguments (1 situation).
CONTINGENCY FACTORS

1. Decision-maker
2. Competition
3. Mass media & citizen opinion

LOBBYING STRATEGIES

for the 12 contingency situations

1. **Maintenance strategy.**
   Strengthen and maintain the stand held by the decision-maker. Indicate the support of the constituents if they think the issue is important.

2. **Support strategy.**
   Enhance and maintain the stand held by the decision maker; evade publicity or try to change the division of citizen opinions; strengthen the visibility of the organized interests.

3. **Publicizing strategy.**
   Show the narrow support for competing interests. Integrate the opponents' interests with those of yours.

4. **Integrative negotiation.**
   Act first. Don't wake up the publicity and competitors. Otherwise, the possibilities to influence the decision-maker will be much reduced. Integrate interests.

5. **Informing.**
   Create a majority to your side of the issue among the constituents of the decision maker. Strengthen the visibility of the organized interests.

6. **Concessions.**
   Act as you would in situation 5 but don't go public or you should persuade people to accept your stand. Change your strategy to take into account the interests of opponents.

7. **Being unconditionally constructive.**
   Strategy 5 applies but you should make use of your distinctiveness and indicate the narrow support for competing views. Show the supporting consensus of the public opinion to the decision maker.

8. **Distributive negotiation.**
   Act as you would in situation 6. In addition, use your distinctiveness. Act first; if the adversaries are strong, possibilities to affect decision making will be much reduced.

9. **Win-win or no deal.**
   Create a division of opinion among the constituents of the decision maker. Strengthen the visibility of the organized interests and the public opinion.

10. **Defensive strategy.**
    Use strategy 9 but try to keep the issue away from public discussion or build favorable public opinion.

11. **Rights-based negotiation.**
    Strategy 9 applies but don't wake up the competition or act first and distinctively.

12. **Adaptive strategy.**
    "Impossible to influence." Adapt your organization and its constituency to the new conditions and different circumstances.
Figure 6.1. The revised model. Lobbying for conflict accommodation.

Reading instructions for the figure on the previous page: Beginning from the left hand side of the decision-tree, choose the states (for/neutral/against) of the contingency factors prevailing in the specific situation. The states constitute the prevailing situation of political participation and indicate the appropriate lobbying strategy that is presented on the right hand side of the figure next to the prevailing situation. A change of the state of a contingency factor leads to a change of the situation and the strategy accordingly. There are 12 different possible situations and appropriate strategies presented in the model.

Above: Tactics to implement the strategies suggested by the model in each situation.

The pattern repeated itself at the EU-level. Coalition building was used as a tactic in all the favorable situations (5 situations) and competitive tactics of distinctiveness such as expertise and good relations (1 situation) appeared in the favorable group. In the unfavorable group, competitive tactics such as uniformity of opinions (1 situation) and timing (1 situation) were added and direct contacts with the competitors (2 situations) were introduced.

In conclusion, tactics common in favorable situations include direct contacts with the decision-makers, coalition building, and competitive tactics such as good relations and expertise (non-situational or non-reactive in nature). Tactics common to unfavorable situations are additionally constituted by direct contacts with the adversaries to change their opinions and competitive tactics such as resources, uniformity of opinions, and timing of actions. In general, this pattern gives support for the choices presented in the model. Proposition 5 could be added with coalition building efforts if the
group is not yet a coalition.

*Choices Concerning the Mass Media and the Citizens*

Choices concerning the mass media and the citizens were observed in 8 supportive and 5 opposing situations at the national level and in 7 supportive and 2 opposing situations at the EU-level. There are only two cases in the negative group at the EU-level, because it was difficult to find these kinds of cases. One explanation might be the passiveness of these publics at the EU-level, especially the passiveness of citizens. Thus, such cases in which the citizens are in opposition are rare in reality. In addition, most of the relations with media at the EU-level are directed at EU-correspondents of the national media and, thus, are partly national level operations. Relations with the European media are less intense. Furthermore, it might be that interest groups choose to adapt in difficult situations at the EU-level more often than at the national level.

In the support group of the national cases, the tactic of media relations (5 situations) and the molding of citizen opinions via the mass media (5 situations) seemed to be enough to achieve the objectives of the lobbyist. Some used additionally mobilization of citizens (2 situations) but it seems more like an exception than a rule. In both of these situations, the explanation could be a strong competitor. In the opposing group of the national cases, the tactic of molding the citizen opinion via direct contacts with them (2 situations) was used in addition to the tactics used also in the support group. However, use was not made of the mobilization of the citizens in this group. Mobilization of citizens requires that they have a positive opinion. This tactic can be used in situations in which other publics or at least the decision-makers hold negative opinions. If the majority of citizens hold negative views, it is enough that the group to be mobilized has a positive opinion. Evidence for this might be scarce in this study because the Finns do not often use this tactic and because the negative group did not include any citizen associations.

The pattern repeated itself at the EU-level. In the support group, the tactic of media relations (6 situations) and molding the citizen opinions at the national level (3 situations) were used. In one opposing group, direct contacts with the citizens to mold their opinions at the national level appeared (1 situation).

In conclusion, tactics used in supportive situations included media relations and molding citizen opinions via the media. Tactics used in opposing situations are additionally constituted by molding citizen opinions directly. In general, these findings confirm the choices presented by the model. Situations 6, 8, 10, and 12 will be added with the tactic of molding
public opinion. Proposition 9.b. could be specified with the notion of the importance of directly communicating with the citizens.

6.2.2.3 Evidence for Dynamic Features

Eight of the cases included changes or anticipated a change in the external environment. Five of these cases were national level cases, three EU-level cases. In six cases, an external change led to a change of strategy or tactics. In three cases, the change was caused by the lobbying efforts of the interest group. In fact, all the groups operating in a situation in which a majority of the decision-makers held negative opinions were able to create a majority on their side at least partly by their own efforts. To describe the dynamic features of the cases and to compare real action with the model, a few examples are presented in this section.

The issue of hunting wolves is a good example of a case in which an external environmental change leads to a change of strategy and an internal change of strategy leads to a change in the environment. In this case, the environmental citizen group participating in this study, the Finnish Association of Nature Conservation had made an initiative to form a task force to solve the issue of protecting and hunting big wild animals in Finland. In fall 1996, the task force gave a unanimous report in which they declared that no regulations will be changed. The report was evidence for the formation of positive attitude towards protection of wolves among these participating in the task force, decision-makers, public officials, and interest groups. Timo Helle, the chairman of the association, described it as “a bearable compromise that everybody was willing to accept, but it did not necessarily correspond to everybody’s ultimate goal” (a result of two-way symmetrical communication).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chart 1</th>
<th>Chart 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision-makers: 0</td>
<td>Decision-makers: +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitors:</td>
<td>Competitors: +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>Citizens</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- direct contacts with decision-makers and competitors, coalition

However, public discussion began on the subject just after the publication of the report and there were some incidences in which wolves had eaten dogs in the province of Northern Carelia. Local media in the region
reflected a negative citizen opinion towards the protection of wolves.

The members of the task group took the negative positions of the citizens into account and tried to convince them that this does not mean Finland would fill up with wild animals and some took a position against “extended” protection. The nature conservationists, however, trusted no changes would be made and the regulation on hunting would be adopted by the government as such. It came as a surprise to the group that the regulation was changed in December. What had happened was that the opinions of the political decision-makers had changed.

The Finnish Association of Nature Conservation began to look into EU-directives concerning the issue in the hope of finding that the Finnish regulation was contradictory to them. After it came up with confirmation, it decided to threaten to appeal to the European Court if the regulation was not restored to its previous form (asymmetrical communication). The interest group expected to win the case in one way or another because the decision-makers of the EU were on their side and the European citizen groups had already taken action, a campaign of sending faxes to the minister in charge in Finland. If the Finnish decision-makers change their mind, then the association does not have to appeal the decision.

If the case is explained using the new model of effective lobbying, we can find similarity between the described situations and the situations depicted in the model. The second chart corresponds to the second situation of the model. The model would suggest the use of direct contacts to decision-
- direct contacts with decision-makers, coalition, emergency tactics (n-level), mobilization

makers, coalitions, and the molding of public opinion, even campaign contributions (not used in Finland in relation to specific issues). This is exactly the selection of tactics the association used with the exception of molding public opinion because the media and citizens were not active (The model presented in Figure 3-7 presents only cases in which all the 3 contingency factors are active).

The fifth chart reveals a significant change from the second chart and corresponds to situation 10 described in the new model. In this kind of a situation, the model would suggest the use of direct contacts with decision-makers, coalitions, and grass-roots or constituency mobilization. The Finnish Association of Nature Conservation planned to introduce the tactic of molding public opinion by organizing information events at the local level on how to neutralize the harmful effect of wolves without killing them. This is perfectly consistent with the model that suggests building favorable public opinion if public discussion has begun. The interest group planned also to mobilize citizens or constituents if necessary. The use of appeal is a means that belongs to the emergency tactics recommended by the model in situations 9 to 12. It might not be necessary but could have a strong impact on the situation changing it to be more favorable to goal-attainment—just as the lobbyist expected it will turn out to be (the two final charts).

Chart 1 can also be contrasted with the new model, but the chart 1 is the beginning of the lobbying process where there is not yet a political issue but the lobbyist creates it by making an initiative. Chart 4 depicts a situation in which the lobbyist is “sleeping” and does not have signals of the situation getting worse. It has, however, introduced media relations because the media has become active as shown in chart 3 and some negative positions are published. Charts 1, 3, and 4 describe changes from one situation to another and are not, therefore, explained here using the new model in the form depicted in Figure 3-7. Instead, it is more fruitful to refer to Figure 4-2 in which the change from situation 2 of the model to the situation 10 of the model is described as an arrow ‘a’ from number 4 (2 in the brackets) to
number 6 (10 in the parentheses).

In the issue of energy taxation, one of the traditional lobbying organizations participating in this study, the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers had participated the preparation phase of the new energy policy and expected to achieve its objectives on energy taxation. However, another issue was dealt with in the political decision-making at the same time and changed the opinions of the decision-makers towards the objectives of the interest group. At the same time, public discussion in the media was favorable to the points of views of the opposite side in the negotiations and did not support the initial objectives laid down for the energy policy. In that situation, the interest group found it necessary to choose between two of its main objectives in order even to achieve the other one (symmetrical communication and taking into account interests of other groups).

**Chart 1**

| Decision-makers | 0 |
| Competitors     | + |
| Media           | - |
| Citizens        |   |

- direct contacts with decision-makers, coalition, media relations, molding public opinion

**Chart 2**

| Decision-makers | - |
| Competitors     | + |
| Media           | - |
| Citizens        |   |

- direct contacts with decision-makers, coalition, media relations, conflict resolution, constituency mob.

**Chart 3**

| Decision-makers | + |
| Competitors     | + |
| Media           | - |
| Citizens        |   |

After the change of objective, the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers did not expect another backlash but that was to come when the proposal for legislation reached parliament. A group of legislators from different political parties made their own proposal for legislation on energy taxation. This time the majority, however, supported the original proposal that was finally approved. The debate was heated in parliament, but the process was short because of a need to make the decision by the end of the year which
created a barrier to efforts to exert a lot of influence. In this battle, the interest
group had still to compromise with some minor objectives (symmetrical
communication). Ulla Sirkeinen, the representative of the group participating
in this study, said the group should have done more in the spheres of media
relations and citizen activities but two weeks for discussion, after the other
issue changed the situation, was too short a time to take the required action.

Now, explaining the case using the new model, we can find correspondence between charts 1, 3, 5, and situation 2 of the model. The model suggests the lobbyist should use direct contacts to decision-makers, build coalitions, and mold public opinion. The interest group did this in addition to which it used media relations. As the situation changed from number 2 to number 10 of the model that corresponds to chart 2, the interest group introduced constituency mobilization just as the model would suggest. The interest group asked its members to deliver information and influence local media but also to influence their parliamentary representatives. The interest group also tried to solve the conflict by changing its lobbying strategy giving up some of its objectives or demanding less. This strategy corresponds to the conflict accommodation strategy suggested for situations 5 to 8 but seems to have been enough to make the necessary change. The use of emergency tactics might not always be a good idea. The interest group might have done some adaptation of its plans for the following years—which was not, however, revealed by the data but can be concluded based on the changed objectives. This tactic is appropriate in situations 9 to 12. Chart 4 describes the potential development of an unfavorable situation but the threat was not too serious to change on which side the majority resides.

To take an EU-level example, the case on telecommunications directives
will be presented last. The Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers
trying to influence these directives had already ensured the support of the
national authorities for liberalization before they were able to participate fully
in the EU-level decision-making made possible by Finland’s membership of
the EU. The directives for opening the markets were supported by the
majority of the member countries, but the directives to implement this faced
strong resistance. From the beginning, the interest group cooperated with
other interest groups and as a member of a European association for cooperation it belongs to a coalition. The European association took care of most of the operations at the EU-level such as media relations and some of direct contacts with the decision-makers. However, the interest group also had direct contacts with the European Commission and, later, with the members of the European Parliament. It has a representative, the lobbyist participating in this study, also at the Economic and Social Committee and an office in Brussels headed by one of the expert interviewees. When the resistance was getting strong among the member countries of the EU, the interest group increased coordination with its constituencies who on their own behalf lobbied at the EU-level. The case had an exceptional ending as the Commission decided to use its right to give a directive and got things moving on. It may have anticipated that there would not be a majority for the directive in the Council of Ministers and took action because of that. It would be only an educated guess to claim that the Commission was also influenced by the lobbyists in its decision.

Chart 1 corresponds to situation 1 of the new model, and the tactics used are the same as suggested by the model. However, the European coalition used also media relations. Chart 2 corresponds to situation 10 of the new model, and the interest group involved its constituencies in the process in the way the model would suggest. The media relations activities of the European coalition might have extended to the molding of public opinion via the media.
but, then, these activities would have come down to the national level. This is not, however, indicated by the data on the part of the Finns who were anyway favorable to liberalization. The unfavorable media coverage was mainly combated by the Commission itself, so, the interest group, at least the Finnish group, did not think it was necessary to influence public discussion in the media at EU-level.

In general, the model was successful in explaining changes of a strategy and the environmental changes in the cases included in this study. However, one has to be cautious in applying the model in this way because of the multivariate nature of reality. The model helps a lobbyist monitoring its situation in an issue to better anticipate changes and to understand the possible causes and consequences of the changes and its own actions.

6.2.2.4 Propositions Verified Across the Cases

When the propositions were observed across cases, it was found that the interest groups may not act as rationally as the thinking behind the model suggests. Explicit statements of rules constructed for making the model more systematic and for testing it in reality were hard to elicit. However, the situations of political participation and the strategies used corresponded to those suggested by the model which implies rational planning or concordance in the thinking behind the planning or action and the modeling. Action maybe was not that goal-oriented and rational as assumed by the model.

The necessity of goal formation was criticized by Virtanen (1994). He referred to the concepts of intentionality defined by Hintikka (1982) as something not directed at some object or content but as a broader experience in which it is possible to compare and take into account different possible states of affairs or series of events (Hintikka 1982, 70–73). It is fairly possible that lobbyists’ action was intentional though not goal-oriented. It was selected from among many possible courses of action. Virtanen’s (1994) definition of intentionality centers around the processing of meaning. According to him, “formation of reason for action requires creation of meaning” (Virtanen 1998, 26). Intentional action can be purposive or non-purposive, intentional, the latter type of action includes thought processes such as beliefs in certain means though an individual is not aware of these beliefs (Virtanen 1994, 27). Examples of non-purposive but intentional action include 1) action that is part of a longer series of actions the parts of which were not separately intended, and 2) selection of means that is good enough or takes one closer to a goal but is not necessary. An individual might not be able to explain the reason for choosing a specific action as it might have been based on a preference only.
3) A third example of non-purposive but intentional action is participating in an institutionalized practice (routine behavior) such as responding to a symbolic demand, such as a question or order, though it is not necessary or responding to duties (role expectations) in social roles, a right to do something. Also necessary action such as observing laws, codes, and some traditions are participation in institutionalized practice. (Virtanen 1994, 29–35.) This type of routine behavior, however, can not be part of rules for choosing a lobbying strategy and tactics.

Despite the difficulties, some evidence on thinking consistent with the rules were found in the empirical material. The tables for results are included in Appendix 2.

Evidence for the rules for influence from number 1 to number 3 was found in the actions of all the organizations participating in this study. Evidence for rule 4 was found only in one interview. Rules 1 to 4 concern the decision-makers and their background factors and how to influence them.

1. When the political decision-maker has the same (positive) opinion as the lobbyist in a certain issue, the opinion can be enhanced and maintained by indicating the supportive opinions of his/her background factors (opinions of his/her constituents, parliamentary group/ government position, and the party) and other participants in the political process (at least public opinion concerning the decision-maker’s tirage and actions).

2. A neutral political decision-maker can be influenced by creating a majority among his/her constituents on the positive side of an issue, by disengaging the decision-maker from or convincing his/her parliamentary group and the party, and by efforts to influence public opinion concerning the decision-maker’s image and actions.

3. An opinion (negative) of an opposing decision-maker can be changed by creating dispersion among his/her constituents, by disengaging the decision-maker from or convincing his/her parliamentary group and the party, and by influencing public opinion concerning his/her actions (his/her public image).

4. The personal preferences of the political decision-maker has more influence on the decision-maker’s behavior when his hands are not tied by the opinion of his/her constituents, parliamentary group or party. These can be negotiated.

At the national level, the lobbyists used the following descriptions:

Let’s say that a minister has an opinion of something. We find out what he thinks about the thing and try to figure out why he has such an opinion. Then, we contemplate if he will change his opinion based on what we can tell him or should we deliver the information to his assistant or his background groups depending on the situation. (Samps J. Saralehto, the Central Chamber of Commerce of Finland)

I tried to discuss with [the opponents] and to explain what this model means but it
was hopeless. ... We wanted to bring counter-arguments and help those who have to discuss with the opponents. (Ulla Sirkeinen, the Confederation of Finnish Industry and employees)

We have the information or we gather the information on the positions of different parties and that, of course, has an influence on our lobbying and also the content of lobbying. It is different to lobby those who are supportive of our course from lobbying those who are adversaries. (Timo Helle, the Finnish Association of Nature Conservation)

In this phase, we lobbied the parliament, and the parliamentary groups are influential there (Leena Simonen, the Finnish Consumers’ Association).

One of the lobbyists interviewed as an expert explained the importance of contacts to both the parties and the parliamentary groups in the following way:

It is very often the case that the leaders of a party have a different opinion on a matter from the opinion of the parliamentary group... It is easier to have influence on party organizations than legislators because they are tied to their electorate. (Leif Fax, the Economic Information Bureau)

The importance of the constituents of the decision-makers was described in the following way:

Since we knew this matter would go to the parliament and the voters are there... of course the legislators think a lot about their constituents... we tried to get the message to the ordinary citizens, too. (Ulla Sirkeinen, the Confederation of the Finnish Industry and Employees)

Because the parliamentary representatives listen to what people say in their electoral district, it led us to allocate more resources to local activities and influencing there...

Since we did not have a local organization, it was created... (Leif Fast, the Economic Information Bureau)

At the EU-level, the lobbyists described thinking consistent with the rules 1-3 and revealing the important publics in the following words:

The first thing that we always try to do is to get our national officials to take the same stand as we do and, then, try to influence together... At the EU-level, we have our [European association for cooperation] and our small office [in Brussels]... We have [contacts] also directly to the Commission, MEPs, and so on. (Ulla Sirkeinen, the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers)

First, you have to ensure that the minister of your own country is supportive of the outcome of the negotiations if we ourselves are ready to accept it. You have to convince the minister, first, and then, you have to convince his or her assistants and the officials of the Finnish EU-Embassy in Brussels, too... We are not allowed to attend the meetings of the Council of Ministers. We have to trust the negotiators of our [European association]. Of course, the head of our office in Brussels has to keep

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up with what is going on and he meets... people and... can influence. (Tuulikki Kannisto, the Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions)

Lobbying should always be organized according to the structure and characteristics of decision-making system to be influenced. On the EU-level, you have to understand the different roles and working styles of European institutions: the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament, and even the European Court of Justice. In some cases, you even have to include other important EU organs such as the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions. (Kari Jalas, the Representation of Finnish Industry and Employers, Brussels)

At the EU-level, the political process is preceded by discussions in the European Council, actions of the member countries, and discussions in the Commission. A proactive lobbyist participates affairs as early as this phase. After this phase, the political process begins from the Commission, the proposal goes through the Council of Ministers to the European Parliament, ECOSOC, and the Committee of Regions returning to the Commission and the Council. An effective lobbyist follows the process and lobbies the right institution at the right time.

A special feature of the political decision-making at the EU-level is that the interests emphasized alternate according to the phase of the political process. The European Council and the Council of Ministers as well as the implementation phase give stress to the interests of the member countries. The Commission and the European Parliament represent transnational, European, interests. Specifying from this point of view, one of the interviewees explained how an interest group can influence the phases in which the interests of the member countries dominate:

For instance, one has to be aware of the fact that officially the different interests of Member States come into play quite late in the decision-making process, when the Commission’s proposal is passed on to the Council. In the Council, it is the voting procedure that matters. If unanimity is required, it is enough for interest groups to make sure that at least one country will oppose the proposal. In the case of majority decisions, one has to assess the probability of different outcomes. Influencing a majority decision will require national level action that, however, has to be coordinated on the European level. Lobbying does not stop when a piece of European legislation is passed. Lobbying also includes the monitoring of the national implementation of that piece of legislation. (Kari Jalas, the Representation of Finnish Industry and Employers, Brussels)

The interviewee explained also how to influence the European Parliament:

It is indeed the increased use of majority decisions in the Council and the growing powers of the European Parliament that have enhanced the need for European level lobbying. In the European Parliament, an individual MP acting as rapporteur is the
key contact for pressure groups. There are two dominant parties in the European Parliament. It is important to maintain continuous contact with the leading figures in those two parties. There are almost thirty committees in the Parliament that have to be rated according to their importance in a given matter. There is little point in trying to influence the European Parliament via national parliaments. The European Parliament has a very distinctive feature that makes it different from national parliaments: it is not divided into government and opposition. (Kari Jalas, the Representation of Finnish Industry and Employers, Brussels)

The parliamentary groups are not as important influencers in the European Parliament as they are in the Finnish parliament. At the EU-level, it is enough to be in contact with the MEP and the European party. The individual citizens of member countries as constituents of the MEPs do not play such a big role as they do at the national level. The national parties, however, are central constituents of the MEPs.

Based on these quotations, at the EU-level, rules 1 to 3 should be refined to include appropriate publics. The background factors of the rule 1 consist of opinions of the national constituents, European party or parliamentary group (for MEPs only), national government and parliament (at least for members of the Council), and national party. Rules 2 and 3 could be supplemented with the strategic advice of convincing the national decision-making institutions.

1. When the political decision-maker has the same (positive) opinion as the lobbyist in a certain issue, the opinion can be enhanced and maintained by indicating the supportive opinions of his/her background factors (opinions of the national government and parliament in case of representation in the Council or during the implementation; European party or parliamentary group and his/her national party and constituents in case of representation in the European Parliament) and of other participants in the political process (at least public opinion concerning the decision-maker’s image and actions).

2. A neutral political decision-maker can be influenced by creating a majority among his/her constituents on the positive side of an issue, by disengaging the decision-maker from or convincing his/her parliamentary group and the party, by convincing the national decision-making institutions, and by efforts to influence public opinion concerning the decision-maker’s image and actions.

3. An opinion (negative) of an opposing decision-maker can be changed by creating dispersion among his/her constituents, by disengaging the decision-maker from or convincing his/her parliamentary group and the party, by convincing the national decision-making institutions, and by influencing public opinion concerning his/her actions (his/her public image).

Evidence on the rules for influence from number 5 to number 6 concerning competition appeared also in all the interviews. Evidence was not found for the rule 7. This rule, however, is an exception to normal
circumstances.

5. When the state of competition between participants in the political decision-making concerning an issue is favorable for the lobbyist (supports a positive decision), the political decision-maker can be motivated to take the same (positive) stand and influenced by improving the visibility of the organized interests.

6. When the state of competition between participants in the political decision-making concerning an issue is unfavorable to a lobbyist (supports a negative decision), the political decision-maker can be motivated to take a stand held by the lobbyist and influenced by increasing the power of the lobbyist’s side by building coalitions with like-minded groups, using competitive advantage, and persuading opponents to change their mind.

7. In political decision-making, an advantage is gained by those groups who favour the status quo, as compared with those trying to bring about a change. If a lobbyist tries to change the prevailing situation, he/she has to try to gain competitive advantage in relation to other interests.

At the national level, rules 5 and 6 were expressed in the following way:

It is very much dependent on the situation. If we promote some course and there are others who lobby for opposite views, we try to indicate the weakness of the opponents’ arguments and bring up the strong or good sides of our own views. (Timo Helle, the Finnish Association of Nature Conservation)

It is easy to cooperate with like-minded groups and bring up common views. Taking care of the opposite side is about giving factual information. (Timo Helle, the Finnish Association of Nature Conservation)

We have the knowledge. We have the best people in Finland... If you want to be a lobbyist, you have to know what you want and... be a recognized expert... (Sampsa J. Saralehto, the Central Camber of Commerce of Finland)

One of the issue-raisers from a sector-organization said:

It is not very fruitful to discuss with like-minded groups because they say “yes, yes, I agree”. But discussion where tension is created and there are different kinds of people can be a very good one. (Reijo Ollikainen, the Federation of Finnish Insurance Companies)

At the EU-level, the rules appeared in the following form:

It is especially at the EU-level in that way that we try to cooperate with like-minded groups but [usually] we do not have time to try to talk opponents into changing their opinion. It is a different thing if those opponents can change the official preparation is some way... It goes principally like this... if some citizen group presents its views visibly... and demands something... those who have different opinions present arguments to the decision maker in relation to those opinions. They do not necessarily participate in the public discussion. (Ulla Sirkeinen, the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers)
8. a) When the majority of the media support the lobbyist’s views (the positive decision), the lobbyist can try to influence the political decision-maker by informing him/her of this situation or by publicizing its views in the media, i.e., influencing public opinion.

8. b) When the citizen opinion supports the lobbyist’s views (the positive decision), the lobbyist can try to influence the political decision-maker by informing him/her of this situation or by publicizing public opinion polls in the media.

9. c) When it is probable that the media will oppose the lobbyist’s views, the lobbyist can try to hide their opinion until public discussion begins. Hiding means that this opinion is not asked for and these actors are not informed on the decision-making process. When the adversaries have woken up in the media, the political decision-maker can be influenced by persuading the representatives of the media to charge their opinion (take a positive stand).

9. b) When it is probable that the citizens will oppose the lobbyist’s views, the lobbyist can try to hide their opinion until public discussion begins. Hiding means that this opinion is not asked for and these actors are not informed on the decision-making process. When the adversaries have woken up, the political decision-maker can be influenced by creating support for the lobbyist’s views (positive stand) among the citizens.

10. When the opinions of the media and the citizens are dispersed, these do not have an influence on the behavior of the political decision-maker. In this case, the lobbyist can try to mold the opinions of the representatives of the media and the opinions of citizens.

At the national level, the lobbyists gave the following kinds of evidence for thinking consistent with the rules 8 and 9:

It is always a question of assessment if you should go public and take advantage of it or if you should avoid it... That is also a part of the tactical planning. ...If something ungrounded is published, we try to have some influence on it, but it is very difficult because the journalists always have the last word. (Ulla Sirkeinen, the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers)

I think it is a tactical choice that... if our constituent organizations say anything the citizens disagree... it is better not to say anything on this issue. We do not go public with this. (Matti Stipl, the Finnish Banker’s Association)
We refer to the public opinion and ride on it. If we have 32,000 members, then these thoughts are quite general everywhere in the society and we... take the right to promote the interests of larger citizen groups. (Timo Helle, the Finnish Association of Nature Conservation)

The reason we got ahead... was that the press was supportive of our views, at least the principal media... We got good publicity for our stand. (Leena Simonen, the Finnish Consumers’ Association)

One of the interviewees explained the relationship between the media and the citizens as factors to be taken into account.

If [a medium] oppose [this issue], we would not lobby for it... Not because of being afraid of the medium, but... [The newspaper]... is made for the public-at-large. [The media] follow public opinion and they never are very much in contradiction with it. ...they do not go public, because they are afraid of public opinion... We follow public opinion, too... The citizens might have a different opinion than the media in some issue... The people are influenced by other groups than the media, their friends and families... But citizens trust the press. In the long run,... the citizen opinion and the opinion of the media converge. (Leif Fast, the Economic Information Bureau)

This quote gives support for the rationality of combining these two factors into one contingency factor although it is possible these two publics sometimes differ in their views for a short period of time. Another interviewee explained the use of the mass media as channels to influence other publics.

The publicity, the public channels... it is very difficult to address your message to a certain group. It all goes to everyone... In targeting our member organizations and public officials with whom we have close contacts, they do not work very well, but they all read them. It is better to communicate with these groups directly if you have something to say to them. The mass media exists especially for the widest audiences and should be used to target them... (Ulla Sirkeinen, the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers)

The most systematic followers of the mass media are, however, the decision-makers, their assistants... What is the effect of reading in the paper the same thing [they have been told directly] is that, then, they know that all the citizens know that, too... Then, I have tied my hands... [the decision-maker] knows [I] really mean it. (Leif Fast, the Economic Information Bureau)

At the EU-level, an “exception” to national rules was found:

At the EU-level, outside the borders (of our country), we do not try to mold citizen opinion but we do that in the home country. (Tuulikki Kannisto, the Central
Rule 11 was divided into an integration rule 11.a., a change of strategy rule 11.b., and an adaptation rule 11.c.

11. a) When the opinions and the proposal of a lobbyist meet resistance, the lobbyist can try to integrate the interests of adversaries into the proposal.

11. b) When the opinions and the proposal of a lobbyist meet resistance and when this can hinder the lobbyist from achieving its goals, it may be useful to change the lobbying strategy on the issue so that it takes into account the interests of the opponents.

11. c) - When the possibilities to influence the political decision-making are slight because of widespread resistance to a lobbyist’s views, it may be necessary to adapt the organization and its constituents to new circumstances.

Evidence on the rules for conflict resolution from 11.a. to 11.c. was found in 6 interviews. 11.a. appeared in what was reported by 6 lobbyists, 11.b. in the discussion with 5 lobbyists, and 11.c. in the talk of 3 lobbyists. Thinking consistent with the conflict accommodation rules was revealed in the following form:

This is very typical of our actions that we try to analyze and give the public officials a solution that would fulfill their needs, too. We do not say that you can’t tax us. We say that if you need this income, such a structure would work and it would be better for us. (Ulla Sirkeinen, the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers)

In that phase, we had to choose between two principal objectives in order to be able to suggest that “if you do this, it will work”. (Ulla Sirkeinen, the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers)

We always try to set realistic objectives and take into account the world around. It comes in that phase already, but one has to modify objectives along the way. It happens very often that we do not get as far as we want but the outcome is a compromise. Another thing is that it can be such a matter that we cannot influence. If it looks like we cannot and it takes a different course, then it is not worth spending resources for. (Ulla Sirkeinen, the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers)

As I speak as a representative of an association, the objectives are not personal objectives but they are objectives of the association. You have to get the organizational decision changed or a part of that decision if a compromise is looked for. In order to achieve your own objectives, one has to look for a compromise and you have to change or take into account the views of the opposing party. (Tuulikki Kannisto, the Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions)

One of the traditional lobbying organizations, the Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions, revealed thinking consistent with Ury’s et al. (1983) different procedures for solving problems:
We tried to consider if it was possible to take care of it by negotiations, by a contract, but it would not have been possible and that’s why we chose the legislative way (Tuulikki Kannisto, the Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions).

One of the sector organizations and issue-raisers, the insurance interest group had a very proactive approach:

We try to build understanding in advance. When a crisis is on and resistance has formed, it is very difficult to influence (Reijo Ollikainen, the Federation of Finnish Insurance Companies).

Evidence on the rules of implementation was also quite impressive if it is determined based on the tactics or means used. Only implementation rule C did not appear in the interviews at all. If complete thoughts implicit in the rules are looked for, the evidence would be very scarce.

Because of the difficulties to elicit statements of the rules, it was not possible to get a complete picture of the rules applied in each specific case. Thus, it seemed to be rational to leave the analysis at the level of the organizations and to try to understand how people think and act in that organization in general (The tables on results on propositions are included in the Appendix 2.).

In all the three organizations of traditional lobbyists, it was possible to obtain evidence for rules 1 to 3 concerning decision-makers, rules 5 to 6 on competition, and rule 8 on the mass media and the citizens. The interviews of two of the organizations contained evidence for rule 9 concerning the mass media and the citizens and rule 11 on conflict accommodation. At one of the organizations, evidence was found for rule 4 concerning decision-makers. The organizations falling into the category of citizen groups seemed to apply rules 1 to 3 concerning decision-makers, rule 5 on competition, rule 8 on the mass media and the citizens, and rule 11 on conflict accommodation. One of the groups also applied rule 6 concerning competition. Two of the sector organizations revealed evidence for rules 1 to 3 concerning decision-makers, rules 5 to 6 on competition, and rules 8 to 9 on the mass media and the citizens. One of them applied also rule 11 on conflict accommodation. At the third sector organization, it was possible to obtain evidence only for rules 1 concerning decision-makers, 6 on competition, 9 on the mass media and the citizens, and 11 on conflict accommodation.

All the organizations revealed complete set of rules in the sense that the set included rules referring to each of the 3 contingency factors, e.g., a representative of the citizen associations said that...

We lobbied every legislator, the ministry. We participated in public discussions and organized local events (Leena Simonen, the Finnish Consumers' Association).
One of the traditional lobbyists revealed the rules of his organization in the following way:

The purpose is to influence political decision-making: public opinion, the opinions of companies, and so on... Lobbying is not only directed toward political decision-makers, but also associations, companies, the press, television, researchers, the whole society... It is the authorities, parliamentary representatives, members of government, everyone. (Sampo J. Sarastehto, Central Chamber of Commerce)

The representatives of the issue-raiser sector organizations expressed their thinking in the following:

We try to listen to our... target groups and constituencies and try to create two-way communication. Political decision-makers,... public officials preparing the proposals, experts on the most central sectors... opinion leaders in the press, radio, and television,... consumer groups,... the authorities,... associations... (Reijo Ollikainen, the Federation of Finnish Insurance Companies)

We consider influencing schools,... decision-makers, the media, and other key groups (Juhani Karvonen, Finnish Forestry Association).

The most comprehensive evidence with regard to all rules was found in the organization of one of the traditional lobbyists, the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers:

Rules 1–3, 4:

The task force of the ministry,... we were in contact with it, the group of ministers drafting the proposal for the parliament,... the parliamentary committees,... we met... parliamentary groups. We sent written positions and discussed with many of them.

If it is a matter that is not very clear, one has to find out the positions taken by different parties on the issue and if they are connected to some other issues.

Since we knew this matter would go to the parliament and the voters are there... of course the legislators think a lot about their constituents... we tried to get the message to the ordinary citizens, too. (Ulla Sirkeinen, Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers)

(At the EU-level) The first thing we always try to do is to get our national officials to take the same stand as we do and, then, try to influence together... At the EU-level, we have our [European association for cooperation] and our small office... We have [contacts] also directly to the Commission, MEPs, and so on. (Ulla Sirkeinen, Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers)

Rules 5–6, 7:

It is especially at the EU-level in that way that we try to cooperate with like-minded groups but [usually] we do not have time to try to talk opponents to change their opinion. It is a different thing if those opponents can change the official preparation is some way. ...It goes principally so that... if some citizen group presents its views
visibly... and demands something... those who have different opinions present arguments in relation to that to the decision-maker. They do not necessarily participate in the public discussion. (Ulla Sirkeinen, Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers)

Rules 8–9, 10:

It is always a question of assessment if you should go public and take advantage of it or if you should avoid it... That is also a part of tactical planning. ...If something which has no basis in fact is published, we try to have some influence on it, but it is very difficult because the journalists always have the last word. (Ulla Sirkeinen, Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers)

The publicity, the public channels... it is very difficult to address your message to a certain group. It all goes to everyone... In targeting our member organizations and public officials with whom we have close contacts, they do not work very well, but they all read them. It is better to communicate with these groups directly if you have something to say to them. The mass media exists especially for the public-at-large and it should be used to target them... (Ulla Sirkeinen, Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers)

Rules 11a–c:

This is very typical of our actions that we try to analyze and give the public officials such a solution that would fulfill their needs, too. We do not say that you can’t tax us. We say that if you need this income, such a structure would work and it would be better for us. (Ulla Sirkeinen, Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers)

In that phase, we had to choose between two principal objectives in order to be able to suggest that “if you do this, it will work”. (Ulla Sirkeinen, Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers)

We always try to set realistic objectives and take into account the world around. It comes in that phase already, but one has to modify objectives along the way. It happens very often that we do not get as far as we want but the outcome is a compromise. Another thing is that it can be such a matter that we cannot influence. If it looks like we cannot and it takes a different course, then it is not worth spending resources for. (Ulla Sirkeinen, Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers)

In summary, the evidence found for the propositions gives support for them. In the issues, organizations, and interviews where evidence was not found for the propositions, no evidence contrary to the stated propositions was found either. The differences in emphasis and the new findings should be incorporated in the propositions. The critique on the intentionality and rationality of the actions of these lobbyists raises its voice here even louder than in relation to the correspondence between the situations and strategies of the model and the reality. Here, the intentions are partly explicit but incomplete if they are compared with the rules of the model.
7 Conclusions

The findings presented in the previous chapter prove that the theories presented in this study represent a significant contribution to the development of the field of lobbying research from a communication point of view. Harris and Lock (1996) presented a constructive research agenda for the field: The research should address questions of 1) what is the relationship of lobbying theory to management thinking, 2) what could be core conceptual framework for a body of knowledge on lobbying, 3) how is lobbying evaluated, 4) are certain approaches to regulation more effective than others, 5) what are the common means of lobbying and how effective are they, and 6) what is the relationship between lobbying and a communication strategy (Harris & Lock 1996, 322).

This study tried to answer all these questions and addressed a couple of new issues, as well. This study showed how lobbying is related to management thinking in three different ways: management of lobbying, lobbying as management communication, and the involvement of lobbying in the strategic management of the organization. The theory of the strategic management of lobbying explains the relationship of lobbying also to a broader communication strategy. The conceptual core for a lobbying knowledge base is claimed to be found in public relations, issues management, organizational communication, mass communication, theory of strategic management, theories of political systems and interest groups, political theory on lobbying, social psychological theories on interaction, and economic theory on exchange and political markets. Issues 3 to 5 concern the effectiveness and evaluation of lobbying. They received wide attention in the course of this study. In addition to the issues on Harris’s and Lock’s agenda, the questions of how to lobby in an ethical way, what is the role of the political process in lobbying, and what kind of changes lobbying involves were addressed. The following section will present the conclusions, and possible topics for future research.

7.1 Finnish Lobbying

The Finnish lobbyists participating in this study defined lobbying as efforts to influence political decision-making. The main characteristics of lobbying communication included scanning, informing, and influencing important
publics. Sharing of information and interaction were emphasized. The publics of the definition corresponded to the common publics of lobbying. Thus, the new definition of lobbying presented in this study reflects the Finnish reality well.

Lobbying communication was also characterized by asymmetrical and symmetrical communication. The lobbyists took into account the interests and opinions of other publics when setting and changing objectives and choosing tactics. This suggests that lobbying can be conceptualized as resolution and management of conflicts. The results were assessed based on success in getting passed desired legislation but failures were evaluated referring to the situation which gives support for conceptualizing results as both success and situational sensitivity. All this is confirming evidence for the theory of lobbying as conflict accommodation. This theory has value also as a theory on how to lobby in an ethical way. It can be regarded as a normative model of lobbying in Finland. Some lobbying cases included in this study reflected this model in practice, too. Thus, the model has potential to be a positive theory as well.

The theory of strategic management of lobbying seemed to be applicable to Finnish lobbying though the overall strategy and a general communication policy fell into each other in some value-driven organizations. The planning of specific issues was not as common as the theory suggests but lobbyists took care of many matters without specific plans, more as routine work. However, the selection of tactics used by the lobbyists was advanced and they were very much aware of the situational nature of lobbying. Campaign contributions are not one of common tactics that can be selected in Finland. They seem to appear in a new form of giving information resources to candidates. Campaign contributions do not seem to be part of issue based lobbying. However, it is part of relationship building—at least, it used to be. The tactics of mobilization are not very frequently used in Finland either. The need for systematic scanning is lessened if lobbyists had good relations with decision-makers. A change of strategy usually came about through information on changes in the proposal for political decision received via personal contacts. Issues research was also an important element in scanning.

Some differences were observed in lobbying at the national and at the EU-level but these differences did not affect the applicability of the new model of effective lobbying. The lobbyist acknowledged they were still in the process of learning how to lobby at the EU-level. However, the European associations for cooperation in respective sectors took care of much of the lobbying at the EU-level and had a long experience of eurolobbying. The division of labor between the national and European associations should,
however, be taken into account when applying the new model of lobbying. No, interesting differences were found in lobbying different types of issues.

7.2 The Model Tested and Developed

The new model of effective lobbying was found to be an excellent reflection of reality. Some improvements were made, however, based on the findings in the empirical data and according to the philosophy of abductive reasoning. Specifically, the strategies and tactics suggested by the model in different situations corresponded well to the actual strategies used by lobbyists in real situations of political participation. The revisions made in this study include: the conflict accommodation strategies and tactics of lobbying in each situation were introduced, campaign contributions were eliminated as a potential tactic in issue based lobbying, media relations was introduced as a channel to influence political decision-makers, mobilization was defined as a tactic used in situations of positive public opinion only, molding public opinion became a tactic to be used in situations of negative public opinion, coalitions were included in the tactics of situations of favorable competition, and talking the competitors around in the tactics of situations of unfavorable competition.

The strategies suggested by the model for each situation emerged as optimum strategies but success could be achieved by using strategies which are a little bit different but which however are of the same type. For example, it is fairly possible that not all the tactics suggested have to be used in order to achieve a set objective. Some additional tactics might also be used. The conflict accommodation approach is an ideal model for lobbying, and a lobbyist might achieve its objective by less ideal tactics for a short period of time at least.

The publics selected as contingency factors of the new model of lobbying were found to be central contingencies of lobbying. At the EU-level, the citizens and the mass media were not as central actors in the political process and as central contingencies of lobbying as at the national level. Parliamentary groups did not play a significant role but fell into the same category as the European parties. In applying the model in practice, one of the weaknesses is that the mass media and the citizens are combined to form only one contingency factor. Problems arise if these two publics have opposing opinions. These kinds of situations were, however, considered to be rare and if prevailing, of short term duration since the opinions of these publics converge in the long term.

The dynamics of actions were found to follow the patterns described by
the model. The model was successfully applied to describe changes of situations and strategies of real-life cases. Evidence for the theory of group activation, however, was scarce, though some evidence on the applicability of the situational theory and on the theory on interaction between groups was found. It was possible to apply Grunig’s (1984, 1993) situational theory in describing the segmentation of decision-makers.

Evidence for the effects of the flow of political process on lobbying strategy was disconfirming of the Buchholz’s (1988) theory on the effects of the issue life-cycle. Based on the findings of this study, it could be suggested that her model is more like a normative model for issue-raisers. The model would be more useful if a distinction between the political and legislative phase was made and the first and the last phase were not made to overlap in the sense that issues are raised at both ends. When a dissatisfied lobbyist raises an issue again, it has already moved into the first phase of a new issue life-cycle. The effect of the flow of the political process seemed to be mainly the change of which decision-makers are the most important publics of lobbying. Tactics are not changed, the group within a public is. What matters is the form of the political process followed and the groups allowed a voice in that process and its distinct phases.

Despite the good correspondence between the new model of effective lobbying and reality, the rationality behind the actual selection of strategies and intentionality of the actions of the lobbyists were questioned by the empirical material. Especially, the evidence for the propositions on the rules covering the model and explaining the implicit choices was scarce in specific cases and situations. Some evidence for the rules was, however, accumulated in the course of an entire single interview. In addition, the good correspondence between the situations and strategies suggested by the new model and the actual situations and strategies implies rational planning on the part of the lobbyists and concordance in the thinking behind the actual planning and theoretical modeling.

The study confirmed a finding made by the author in her Master’s thesis (1994) that the contingency view is useful in describing lobbying strategies and dynamics of communication. From the point of view of applying contingency theory in the modeling of external or internal communication of organizations, it seems evident that the use of publics and the characteristics of these publics as contingency variables producing dynamics is a useful approach. It is especially fruitful when studying the dynamics of communication at the strategic level. Another previous finding confirmed was the usefulness of abductive reasoning in developing models in a multiple case-study.
The replication logic of the multiple case-studies makes it possible to arrive at models that have value as transferable theories. Lincoln’s and Guba’s (1985) criteria for evaluating qualitative research were chosen as appropriate for this study but it was maintained that generalizability to the level of theories can be achieved in a multiple case-study through analytical generalization. The author claims that it is probable that other successful cases of lobbying by the Finns may be found in which the new model of lobbying can be applied. The general findings of this study might have value and theoretical implications to lobbying by other groups and in other European or western countries, as well. In general, the new model of effective lobbying can be used as a tool for planning and evaluating lobbying in different issues and at different levels of political decision-making, at least at the national and EU-level.

One of the main concerns of the evaluation of qualitative research is whether the findings are credible to the research subjects. The credibility of the findings is dependent on the skills of the researcher to understand and interpret the frames of reference of the interviewees. The credibility of the findings is also dependent on the research subjects’ willingness to cooperate and give valuable and significant information. If the research subjects feel a need to conform to the interview situation and give a more positive view on themselves than is true, the findings of the study might be confounded. This kind of effect was minimized in this study by informing the interviewees before the interview that the material would be confidential and the sources of the quotes would not be published. Later, when permission for the open use of the names of the interviewees were asked for, the interviewees approved the release of information after having seen what was going to be published. However, the researcher had to rely heavily on the research subjects and could not check the material given by any other means but observing the inter-viewees during the interview and following the events related to the cases in the mass media, legal documents, and documents released by the inter-viewee’s organization.

Based on the findings of this study, I propose the following rules explain how and why lobbyist lobby as they do:

**Rules for Influence:**

1. When the political decision-maker has the same (positive) opinion as the lobbyist in a certain issue, the opinion can be enhanced and maintained by indicating the supportive opinions of his/her background factors (opinions of his/her constituents, parliamentary group/government position, and the party) and of other participants to the political process (the public opinion supporting the decision-maker’s image and actions or the position in general).
2. A neutral political decision-maker can be influenced by creating a majority among his/her constituents on the positive side of an issue, by disengaging the decision-maker from or convincing his/her parliamentary group and the party, and by efforts to influence public opinion concerning the decision-maker’s image and actions.

3. An opinion (negative) of an opposing decision-maker can be changed by creating dispersion among his/her constituents, by disengaging the decision-maker from or convincing his/her parliamentary group and the party, by influencing public opinion concerning his/her actions (his/her public image), and by indicating the majority among the citizens on the same side as the lobbyist.

4. The personal preferences of the political decision-maker have more influence on the decision-maker’s behavior when his hands are not tied by the opinion of his/her constituents, parliamentary group or party. These can be negotiated.

5. When the state of competition between participants in the political decision-making concerning an issue is favorable for the lobbyist (supports a positive decision), the political decision-maker can be motivated to take the same (positive) stand and influenced by improving the visibility of the organized interests on the same side and by using distinctiveness.

6. When the state of competition between participants in the political decision-making concerning an issue is unfavorable to a lobbyist (supports a negative decision), the political decision-maker can be motivated to take a stand held by the lobbyist and influenced by increasing the power of the lobbyist’s side by building coalitions with like-minded groups, using competitive advantage such as organizational resources, and persuading opponents to change their mind.

7. In political decision-making, an advantage is gained by those groups who favor the status quo, as compared with those trying to bring about a change. If a lobbyist tries to change the prevailing situation, he/she has to try to gain competitive advantage in relation to other interests.

8. a) When a majority of the media support the lobbyist’s views (the positive decision), the lobbyist can try to influence the political decision-maker by informing him/her of this situation or by publicizing its views in the media i.e., influencing public opinion.

8. b) When the citizen opinion supports the lobbyist’s views (the positive decision), the lobbyist can try to influence the political decision-maker by informing him/her of this situation or by indicating it through the citizens themselves or by publicizing public opinion polls in the media.

9. a) When it is probable that the media will oppose the lobbyist’s views, the lobbyist can try to hide their opinion until public discussion begins. Hiding means that this opinion is not asked for and these actors are not informed on the decision-making process. When the adversaries have woken up in the media, the political decision-maker can be influenced by persuading the representatives of the media to change their opinions (take a positive stand).
9. b) When it is probable that the citizens will oppose the lobbyist’s views, the lobbyist can try to hide their opinion until public discussion begins. Hiding means that this opinion is not asked for and these actors are not informed on the decision-making process. When the adversaries have woken up, the political decision-maker can be influenced by creating support for the lobbyist’s views (positive stand) among the citizens.

10. When the opinions of the media and the citizens are dispersed, these do not have an influence on the behavior of the political decision-maker. In this case, the lobbyist can try to mold the opinions of the representatives of the media and the opinions of citizens.

Rules for conflict accommodation:

11. a) When the opinions and the proposal of a lobbyist meet resistance, the lobbyist can try to integrate the interests of adversaries into the proposal.

11. b) When the opinions and the proposal of a lobbyist meet with resistance and when this can hinder the lobbyist from achieving its goals, it may be useful to change the lobbying strategy in the issue so that it takes into account the interests of the opponents.

11. c) When the possibilities to influence the political decision-making are slight because of widespread resistance to a lobbyist’s views, it may be necessary to adapt the organization and its constituents to new circumstances.

At the EU-level the propositions 1 to 3 should be formulated in the following way:

1. When the political decision-maker has the same (positive) opinion as the lobbyist on a certain issue, the opinion can be enhanced and maintained by indicating the supportive opinions of his/her background factors (opinions of the national government and parliament, European party or parliamentary group, his/her national party and constituents) and of other participants to the political process (at least the public opinion concerning the decision-maker’s image and actions or the position in general).

2. A neutral political decision-maker can be influenced by creating a majority among his/her constituents on the positive side of an issue, by disengaging the decision-maker from or convincing his/her parliamentary group and the party, by convincing the national decision-making institutions, and by efforts to influence public opinion concerning the decision-maker’s image and actions.

3. The (negative) opinion of an opposing decision-maker can be changed by creating dispersion among his/her constituents, by disengaging the decision-maker from or convincing his/her parliamentary group and the party, by convincing the national decision-making institutions, and by influencing the public opinion concerning his/her public image.
Rules of implementation:

A. The constituent opinion as a decision-maker’s background factor can be influenced by improving the visibility of the desired opinion, i.e., by informing the decision-maker of the supportive opinions of his/her constituents (direct contacts), by creating a majority among the constituents on the supportive side of the issue molding their opinion directly (molding the opinion of the constituents) or through the mass media (media relations), by indicating a majority among the constituents mobilizing them to inform their representative on their views (grass-roots and constituency mobilization), or creating dispersion among the constituents (molding the opinion of the constituents).

B. The personal view of a decision-maker can be influenced by negotiating about an issue with the decision-maker (direct contacts) and by mobilization of the citizens and the constituents of a lobbyist to tell the decision-maker on their views (G&C-mobilization). The parliamentary group and the party positions as a decision-maker’s background factors can be influenced by informing the decision-maker about their opinions supportive of a lobbyist’s views (direct contacts). If their opinions are against the views of a lobbyist, individual decision-maker can be influenced by disengaging the decision-maker from his/her parliamentary group and the party either by informing and persuasion of the whole group or the representatives of the party (direct contacts to these groups) or by convincing (direct contacts, good relations) the decision-maker to take a different stand from the stand hed by these groups.

C. Public opinion (in the mass media) concerning the decision-maker’s image and actions and having an effect on the decision-maker as his/her background factor can be influenced by informing the decision-maker of the support given by public opinion (direct contacts) or by efforts to influence the public opinion on the decision-maker and his/her action (media relations and molding public opinion). A decision-maker might also be influenced by informing him or her of the support for the issue in general (media relations).

D. In a situation of fierce competition, the visibility of the organized interests can be increased by informing the decision-maker (direct contacts) or by building coalitions with other actors (coalitions). In relation to the competitors, a lobbyist can gain competitive advantage by increasing its power (coalitions), by timing its actions right, ensuring resources, and by creating or using its distinctiveness (tactics of competition). The adversaries’ opinion can be changed by direct influence (direct contacts to these publics).

E. The lobbyist can inform the decision-maker directly about the opinions of the mass media and the citizens (direct contacts) or by publicizing its views and opinion polls made of citizen opinions through the mass media (media relations). The lobbyist can try to create and increase support for its course by influencing the opinions of the representatives of the media (media relations) and molding the citizen opinion (media relations, direct molding of opinions) or by indicating a prevailing majority among the citizens on the supportive side of the issue (G&C-mobilization). Adverse opinions can be hidden until they wake up and require
F. Integration is achieved by including the interests of the adversaries in one’s own proposals (negotiation). A change of strategy means changing the objectives concerning an issue so that they take into account the objectives of the adversaries (negotiation, adaptation). The adaptation of an organization means giving up the original objectives and creating new plans (negotiation, adaptation, emergency tactics).

7.3 Issues for Future Study

Research into lobbying from a communication management point of view is just in its beginning. The research agenda is formed study by study but there have no: been many studies taking a theoretical point of view on lobbying even at the EU-level. Practical guides and case studies of eurolobbying are becoming popular but there is no other integrative framework than that provided by the political scientists.

The purpose of this study has been to introduce lobbying as a research subject in communication research and to provide a conceptual framework base which could be used for other research projects. Despite the significant findings of this study, more research is needed to establish a body of knowledge on lobbying. The new model has been developed and tested in two consecutive studies by the author but different versions of the model can be developed for different fields of application. Particularly interesting research in the future would apply the model to the European associations for cooperation (interest groups), or to private organizations in Finland. Studies applying and developing the new model at the regional or local level of political decision-making or in other member countries would be welcome, too. In addition, studies looking for confirming and disconfirming evidence on the rules for influence and for conflict resolution covering the new model would help to refine the model. Studies testing the second component of the theory of group activation and continuing to develop a view on dynamics of lobbying would be interesting. For a body of knowledge on lobbying to be established, research on lobbying should address the issues laid down by Harris and Lock in their research agenda and the new issues dealt with in this study.