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The sources of moral motivation – studies on empathy, guilt, shame and values
ABSTRACT

This study had two main goals: to analyze the forms of emotional reaction tendencies that are likely to motivate moral behaviors, and to find correlates for these emotional tendencies. In study 1, students’ autobiographical narratives of guilt or shame experiences were analyzed. The results showed that pure shame was more likely to motivate avoidance instead of reparation, whereas guilt and combination of guilt and shame were likely to motivate reparation. However, all types of emotion could lead to chronic rumination if the person was not clearly responsible for the situation. Study 2 focused on the connection between guilt and empathy. The relations of empathy with two measures of guilt were examined in a sample of 13- to 16-year-olds (N=113). Empathy was measured using Davis’s IRI and guilt by Tangney’s TOSCA and Hoffman’s semi-projective story completion method that includes two different scenarios, guilt over cheating and guilt over inaction. Empathy correlated more strongly with both measures of guilt than the two measures correlated with each other. Hoffman’s guilt over inaction was more strongly associated with empathy measures in girls than in boys, whereas for guilt over cheating the pattern was the opposite. Girls and boys who describe themselves as empathetic may emphasize different aspect of morality (justice vs. caring) and therefore possibly feel guilty in
different contexts. In study 3, cultural and gender differences in guilt and shame (Tangney's TOSCA) and value priorities (the Schwartz Value Survey) were studied in samples of Finnish \( (N=156) \) and Peruvian \( (N=159) \) adolescents. As expected, the Peruvians were more collectivistic and traditional than the Finns. Gender differences were found to be larger and more stereotypical among the Finns than among the Peruvians. Finnish girls were more prone to guilt and shame than boys were, whereas among the Peruvians there was no gender difference in guilt, and boys were more shame-prone than girls. Gender differences in values were smaller for the Peruvians than for the Finns. The results support the view that psychological gender differences are largest in modern, individualistic societies. In study 4, the relations of value priorities to guilt, shame and empathy were examined in two samples, one of 15–19-year-old high school students \( (N = 207) \), and the other of military conscripts \( (N = 503) \). Guilt proneness was, in both samples, positively related to valuing universalism, benevolence, tradition, and conformity, and negatively related to valuing power, hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction. The results for empathic concern and perspective-taking were similar, but their relation to the openness–conservation value dimension was weaker. Shame and personal distress were weakly related to values. In general, self-transcendence and conservation values seem compatible with prosocial tendencies, whereas self-enhancement and openness do not. In sum, shame without guilt and the TOSCA shame scale are tendencies that are unlikely to motivate moral behavior in Finnish cultural context. Guilt is more likely to be connected to positive social behaviors, but excessive guilt can still cause psychological problems. Moral emotional tendencies are related to cultural environment, cultural conceptions of gender and to individual value priorities.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are a lot of people who I would like to thank for supporting me during the process of writing this dissertation. First, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Helkama, who employed me in his research project and offered his support and advice during these years. Our research group meetings have also been very important for me; I have had the opportunity to present my ideas in an inspiring atmosphere and to get constructive criticism of my work. Thank you Markku Verkasalo, Jan-Erik Lönnqvist, Liisa Myyry, Jukka Lipponen, Ann Ojala and many others who have participated in the value seminar during these years. Special thanks to Markku and Janne for co-authoring the article IV and letting me use their conscript data.

This work was carried out at the department of social psychology at the University of Helsinki, and I would like to thank the department for offering me an encouraging work environment. The support and friendship from my colleagues has been very important. I want to thank Ari Haukkala for reading and commenting my manuscripts. I also thank Howard Sklar for his help with my English. Furthermore, I am especially grateful for relaxing peer support lunches and coffee breaks: Thank you Nelli Hankonen, Jarkko Pyysiäinen, Mia Teräsaho, Riku Perhoniemi, Inari Sakki, Inga Jasinskaia-Lahti, Eeva Kolttola, Tuuli-Anna Mähönen, Salla Ahola, Sirkku Varjonen and Päivi Berg. All that time spent sharing our problems and laughing has been essential for me to be able to finish this project.
VI

I am grateful for the positive reviews by my pre-examiners, Professor Sonia Roccas and Professor Heidi L. Dempsey. Furthermore, there cannot be research without data; my warmest thanks to the teachers who have helped me with the data collection and the students who have agreed to fill out my questionnaires. I also thank Vera Gergov for letting me use some of the data she collected in Peru.

I would like to express my gratitude to the Academy of Finland for financing this study and tolerating my recurring maternity leaves.

There are several people outside university who have supported me with my sometimes complicated life. I want to thank our wonderful nannies, Tuulia Sundgren and Leena Sillanpää, for taking good care of our children while I have been writing this dissertation. I also thank my mother-in-law, Marja-Liisa Kuhalammi for her help with childcare. Also my mother, Pirjo Haapaniemi, her husband Markku Haapaniemi and my step-brothers Niko and Teemu have helped a lot with childcare and allowed us to spend relaxing weekends in their home. My friends from high school years have been there for me; thank you Maria Niemelä, Helmi Vuorinen and Lauri and Tekla Tierala. I also thank my sister Anna Mattila and my grandfather Kurt Silfver for their support and interest: it has been very important for me. Finally, my deepest thanks go to my closest family, my dear husband Miska Kuhalammi- thank you for your love and support during these years. My lovely daughters- thank you Satu for your support and interesting discussions- for a five-year-old, you understand so much about emotions and relationships. Thank you Meri and Sointu for being lovely babies and for letting me sleep.

And last, I would like to dedicate this dissertation to the person who was the most excited to see me earning my doctorate, but unfortunately she passed away only months before. To my dear grandmother Gunnel Silfver (1931-2008) - without your loving care I would never have accomplished anything.

December, 2008.

Mia Silfver-Kuhalammi
CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION................................................................................. 1
  1 Empathy ..........................................................................................3
    1.1 Hoffman’s developmental theory of empathy ........3
    1.2 Critical views of Hoffman’s developmental model ....5
    1.3 Davis’ organizational model of empathy ..............7
  2 Guilt and shame .............................................................................8
    2.1 Hoffman’s theory of empathy-based guilt ..........11
    2.2 Tangney’s theory of guilt and shame and the TOSCA-measure .......................................................... 12
    2.3 Are there contexts where feeling guilt or shame is unhealthy? ........................................................... 16
    2.4 The positive aspects of shame .........................18
    2.5 Guilt and shame in different cultures ................21
  3 Moral emotions and age .............................................................24
  4 Value priorities ........................................................................... 26
    4.1 Values, emotions and morality ..........................30
    4.2 Culture and gender differences in value priorities ......34
  5 Gender differences in morality and moral emotions ............36
    5.1 Gender differences in the relation between moral cognition and emotion ........................................... 39
    5.2 Gender differences across different cultures .........40
  6 Conclusions ..................................................................................42

THE AIMS OF THE STUDY......................................................... 44

METHODS ....................................................................................... 46

  1 The participants and procedure ..............................................46
  2 The measures ...............................................................................48
TABLES & FIGURES

**Table 1.** Reparative behavior according to emotion ........................................57

**Table 2.** Chronic rumination according to responsibility ............................57

**Table 3.** The means and standard deviations for guilt, shame and empathy variables according to gender ..........................................................61

**Table 4.** Correlations among the TOSCA and story completion guilt scales, the IRI empathic concern and perspective taking subscales, and the TOSCA shame scale, according to gender ...................................................62

**Table 5.** Correlations between values and TOSCA guilt and shame for adolescent sample and conscript sample ........................................69

**Table 6.** Correlations between values and empathy scales for adolescent sample and conscript sample .........................................................70
Figure 1. The Schwartz (1992) value model.................................29
Figure 2. Values according to gender and nationality..................64
Figure 3. Guilt and shame according to gender and nationality........65
LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS


INTRODUCTION

Morality has always been an important topic of study for philosophers and social scientists, because it touches all aspects of human life. Topics of moral debate have been different at different times, but the basic structure of moral problems has remained the same for thousands of years: how to know what is good and morally right, and if you would know it, how to develop such a character that one could always behave accordingly? Plato believed that understanding the idea of moral good leads to moral behavior, and lack of knowledge and understanding is the reason for immoral behavior. This has been the fundamental idea behind much of the research of moral cognition, which explains variations in morality by qualitatively different, developmental stages of moral judgment (e.g., Kohlberg, 1984). Moral emotions have been seen to follow the cognition. This has been criticised by Helkama (2004), who has suggested that morality has three functions: conflict resolution, promotion of prosocial behavior and prevention of antisocial action. The two latter functions do not usually require very complicated cognitive operations. Moral dilemmas used in the research of moral judgment represent conflict resolution; there are conflicting moral principles and one has to resolve which one is more important. Moral dilemmas are an important part of morality, but not all of it. Morally relevant everyday life situations do not always include moral dilemmas. Often it is perfectly clear what kind of behavior would be moral. The question is, does the person have motivation to do what he or she knows to be right, and the
conflict is between egoistic needs and the needs of others. Of course, some cognitive abilities are needed for understanding the needs of others, but understanding does not necessarily mean that one would behave accordingly. Also a moral character is needed: the person must be strong enough to resist the temptation to pursue personal short-term interests by immoral behavior. Aristotle described moral virtues as the basis for moral behavior. A person needs to be trained to be able to react in the right way in the right situation. Moral character can be acquired through practice like any other skill. This idea is similar to the mainstream of current research on moral emotion. Emotional reaction is an important motivational force, but the emotions have to take the right forms in the right situation in order to be adaptive. Guilt, shame and empathy are often labelled as moral emotions, because they serve to restrict pursuing egoistic interests and enhance recognizing other people and the surrounding society. Other emotions have also been linked to morality, for example anger, disgust, and contempt (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, and Haidt, 1999) but these emotions are directed towards others’ moral transgressions, and therefore they are not relevant when focusing on the sources of an individual’s moral motivation. This study is focused on the motivational forces behind moral behavior. Adolescents’ tendencies for guilt, shame and empathy are studied by asking their reactions in different everyday life situations. The first question is, under what conditions guilt, shame and empathy can promote prosocial behavior and prevent antisocial behavior, and in what conditions they fail to do so. Like Aristotle, most researchers see the tendency for adaptive emotional responses as developing in different social interactions during a long period of time. Therefore it is expected that culture and cultural gender roles relate to personal value priorities and emotional tendencies. Finnish and Peruvian adolescents are compared to investigate the influence of culture on moral emotions and values. Gender differences in moral emotions and values are a central theme in this study: are there any differences, and if there are, how well these differences fit into the social
stereotypes of emotional, nurturing females and more rational and competitive males? Another question is, to what extend proneness to certain moral emotions reflects the person’s conscious goals in life? This is investigated by measuring personal value priorities using the Schwartz Value Survey. In sum, the purpose of this study is to analyze the concepts of guilt, shame and empathy: what kind of different forms these emotions can have and what are their implications. Another central goal is to study the connections between emotional tendencies, values, gender and culture.

1 Empathy

The term empathy has been used in several different ways in psychological research. Some researchers have emphasized the cognitive aspect of empathy, role-taking or perspective-taking (e.g., Hogan, 1969), while others have concentrated on affective reactivity to others (e.g., Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972). An important question has been, should mere vicarious feeling be defined as empathy, or does it have to include concern for the other? Most current approaches include all these aspects when studying empathy; cognitive role-taking and emotional reactions, including vicarious emotions and emotions that are congruent with others’ emotions (Davis, 1994). The word sympathy has also been used in several different meanings. In the current research sympathy usually refers to compassion for others; feeling something similar, but not exactly the same, as the other person (Davis, 1994).

1.1 Hoffman’s developmental theory of empathy

Hoffman (1982, 1998, 2000) has created a developmental theory of empathy. He defines empathy as an affective response more appropriate to another’s situation than one’s own. Empathy develops through five
“stages”. At first there is newborn’s reactive cry; newborns react to other baby’s cry by crying themselves. This is followed by egocentric empathic distress, in which children respond to another’s distress as though they themselves were in distress, because they still lack cognitive ability to differentiate between themselves and others. In quasi-egocentric distress they realize that the distress is the other’s distress, but they still confuse the other’s inner states with their own and try to help the other by doing what would help themselves. When children reach veridical empathetic distress, they understand better what the other is actually feeling, because they realize that he or she has inner states independent of their own, and consequently are more able to find appropriate ways of helping. Finally they will be able to feel empathy for another’s experience beyond the immediate situation and understand that someone’s life can be generally unhappy, for example homeless or war victims. Hoffman believes that the cognitive development that enables the child to differentiate between self and the other also transforms empathic distress into compassion for the victim, and the motive to alleviate one’s own aversive state is replaced by motive to help the victim. Radke-Yarrow and Zahn-Waxler (1984) have shown in their studies that reactive cry and personal distress reactions decrease with age, whereas helping and sympathetic behavior increases with age in the way Hoffman has described. They have also identified a transitional period, when children try to help by means that would help themselves, reflecting inability for cognitive role-taking. Hoffman sees empathic arousal combined with role-taking abilities as a motive for prosocial behavior. An exception to this rule is empathic over-arousal, when an observer’s empathic distress becomes so painful and intolerable that it is transformed to personal distress, which may move the person out of the empathic mode entirely. However, Hoffman believes that even empathic over-arousal can motivate helping if a person is in a relationship in which empathy, love or role-demands make one feel compelled to help. The concept of empathic over-arousal is very similar to the concept of
personal distress by Batson (1991), but Batson does not share Hoffman’s belief that also personal distress could serve as a prosocial motive. Batson (1991) has found that personal distress only motivates helping when it is difficult to escape contact with the distressed person, and thus helping serves the egoistic need to alleviate one’s own aversive emotional state.

1.2 Critical views of Hoffman’s developmental model

Hoffman’s theory has been criticized by Eisenberg and Morris (2001) who emphasize that the distinction between the vicarious experiencing of others’ emotion and sympathetic caring is important to maintain, because it is possible to experience an emotion appropriate for the others’ situation without feeling sympathy and concern for that person. In addition, Eisenberg and Morris emphasize the distinction between cognitive role-taking and sympathy. Although sympathy may often result from cognitive role-taking, empathy-related reactions are distinct from role-taking, because they involve an emotional reaction. According to Eisenberg (1986), perspective-taking is just a tool that can also be used for malicious purposes, and it does not automatically lead to sympathy. It is also possible that sympathy arises without conscious role-taking. A study of Finnish school children supports this view: Peer-evaluated social intelligence and peer-evaluated empathy were correlated, but the connection between social intelligence and all types of aggressive behavior increased when empathy was controlled (Björkqvist, Österman, and Kaukiainen, 2000). It appears that the connection between cognitive abilities and sympathy is not as clear as Hoffman describes. Furthermore, Eisenberg (1986) emphasizes differentiating between self-orientated and other-orientated empathy. Only young children experience empathic distress which can not be defined as self-or other-oriented, because they do not have a clear differentiation between themselves and others, but
adults’ empathic distress is transformed into self- or other-oriented empathy through cognitive processing. When feeling other-orientated empathy a person responds to another person’s emotion with a feeling that is similar to, but not identical with, what the other person is feeling, for example feels concern for somebody who is sad or distressed. This has usually been referred to as sympathy in literature. Self-orientated empathy, usually called personal distress, means reacting to another person’s emotional state by negative, self-orientated feeling which does not include concern for the other. Eisenberg maintains that it is crucial to distinguish between sympathy and personal distress, because only sympathy is likely to motivate prosocial behavior. Most studies support the view that sympathy is related to prosocial behavior, but personal distress is not (Batson, 1991; Davis, 1994; Eisenberg, Zhou and Koller, 2001; Litvak-Miller and McDougall, 1997).

Eisenberg and Fabes (1991) suggest that individual differences in emotional intensity and ability to regulate emotions explain differences in empathic reactivity. The tendency to feel sympathy instead of personal distress requires good coping skills and ability to regulate one’s emotions. If the vicarious feeling becomes too uncomfortable, it is difficult to concentrate on others and their needs. This view has got empirical support. Okun, Shepard and Eisenberg (2000) found that negative emotional intensity was positively related to both personal distress and sympathy but not to perspective-taking, and regulation was positively related to perspective-taking and sympathy, but negatively related to personal distress. Those prone to personal distress experience negative emotions intensely but are relatively unregulated whereas people prone to sympathy also experience negative emotions intensely but are relatively well regulated. Murphy, Shepard, Eisenberg, Fabes and Guthrie (1999) found that the ability to regulate emotions at age 10 predicted dispositional sympathy at age 12. Eisenberg, Wentzel and Harris (1998) emphasize that trying to enhance understanding of others’ emotions is probably most beneficial to unemotional children, who tend
to misinterpret, ignore or distort others’ emotions. However, for children who are prone to intense, negative emotions, enhancing emotional responsivity is not helpful. Instead, they need to learn techniques for regulating emotions, which help them to cope with their emotions and prevent over-arousal, which in turn is likely to increase other-orientation and prosocial behavior. There is a lot of evidence that supportive parenting enhances children’s regulatory skills, which in turn increases social competence (e.g., Spinrad et al., 2007). Supportive parenting includes recognizing and labelling the child’s emotions and offering ways to cope with negative emotions, as well as interacting with the child in warm and child-centred ways.

1.3 Davis’ organizational model of empathy

Davis (1994) has summarized different empathy-related processes in his theoretical framework, the organizational model of empathy. He believes that empathy should be defined broadly, including different cognitive and emotional components. He defines empathy as “a set of constructs having to do with the responses of one individual to the experiences of another”. Davis’ organizational model depicts empathy as a process that is composed of four components. First there are antecedents: the person’s biological capacities, individual features and learning history, and the situation; how empathy-arousing the situation is and what the degree of similarity between the observer and the target is. Secondly, there are three kinds of processes creating the emotional response. First, there are non-cognitive processes, like motor mimicry that refers to unconsciously imitating the target, and primary circular reaction, for example newborn reactive cry. Cognitive processes are divided to simple (classical conditioning, direct association, labelling) and advanced (language-mediated associations, elaborated cognitive
networks and role-taking). The results of these processes are intrapersonal outcomes. Affective outcomes are divided to parallel responses, reproduction of the emotion of the target in the observer, and reactive outcomes, empathic concern (often referred as sympathy), empathic anger and personal distress. Non-affective outcomes are interpersonal accuracy, the successful estimation of other people’s thoughts, feelings and characteristics, and attributional judgments of the target’s behavior. Finally there are interpersonal outcomes, helping, social behavior and reduced aggression. The same behavior can be a result from different processes, for example sympathy-motivated helping can occur without role-taking, or cognitive processing, like role-taking, can lead to helping without any emotional reaction. Davis has developed his own empathy measure, Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), which distinguishes between three components of other-oriented empathy and self-oriented personal distress. Empathic concern is characterized by compassion and concern, perspective taking assesses the disposition to take the other’s perspective in real-life situations, and fantasy taps identification with fictional characters and other forms of role-taking in the fictional domain. Personal distress measures the tendency to experience distress and discomfort in response to negative emotions in others. Davis believes that all these components and their interrelations should be considered when studying empathy.

2 Guilt and shame

In ordinary language guilt refers to a troubled conscience caused by something the person has done or has not done. Guilt arises from feeling responsible for unwanted consequences. Shame is more focused on the self than the behavior: it is a painful feeling arising from negative self-evaluations and fear of others’ negative evaluations of the self. Guilt and shame, as well as embarrassment and pride, are labelled as self-conscious
emotions. Self-conscious emotions have been studied less than basic emotions (e.g. anger, sadness, fear, happiness). Tracy and Robins (2004) believe that this is due to methodological difficulties: self-conscious emotions are cognitively more complex than basic emotions, and it is not always possible to measure them by facial expressions or physiological indices, or create them using certain stimuli in laboratory settings, because they arise from individual cognitive appraisal processes. Self-conscious emotions occur later in development than basic emotions, because they require differentiated conceptions of self and others and relatively stable self-representations. Tracy and Robins (2004) point out that self-conscious emotions are based only on social goals, whereas basic emotions are also based on biological needs of survival and reproduction. However, there is also evidence that the earliest forms of self-conscious emotions can be observed in very young children: even 17-month-olds show reactions that can be interpreted to reflect embarrassment and guilt (Barrett, 2005). Of course, it is impossible to know for sure how very young children feel when reacting a certain way. According to Tracy and Robins (2004), self-conscious emotions arise from complicated appraisal processes, where self-representations are activated: is certain perception relevant for self-concept is it consistent or conflicting with the ideal self, are there external or internal causes for the event? Attribution defines the emotional outcome: external attribution elicits basic emotions (e.g., sadness, anger), whereas internal attribution elicits self-conscious emotions. Shame arises, when internal attributions are stable and global, and guilt when they are not. Embarrassment occurs in public situations, and it is cognitively simpler than guilt or shame; it requires internal attribution, but evaluation of stability or globality is not needed. According to a study of Tangney, Miller, Flicker and Barlow (1996), embarrassment experiences were described as less negative and more fleeting than guilt or shame, and the situations were often rather trivial and humorous and did not involve a sense of moral transgression; the transgression was against a social convention rather than a moral
principle. However, it must be noted that the attributional model of Tracy and Robins (2004) has been criticized to be applicable only to individualistic cultures, because the attributional processes depend on cultural the self-concept (Mesquita and Karasawa, 2004) The question of cultural differences in guilt and shame is addressed in more detail in chapter 2.5.

There is some evidence that shame may be a more “primitive” emotion than guilt; it is characterized by certain gestures and expressions that are familiar in different cultures, and therefore shame is often included in the list of universal basic emotions, whereas guilt is not (e.g., Izard, 1971). Self-conscious emotions are central in identity formation and social behavior, and thus affect a variety of psychological and social phenomena. Although cognitive processes are important part of self-conscious emotions, the emotional reactions can be differentiated from cognitive functions. Damasio (2003) has studied persons with damage in the frontal lobe of the brain, and he has found that even though the patients’ cognitive functions were normal, they were unable to experience embarrassment, sympathy, and guilt, which caused serious problems in decision-making concerning social relations and personal life. Damasio suggests that these emotions, which he labels as social emotions, are to some extent separate from reasoning and other higher cognitive functions, and they have developed earlier in evolution, because also other primates appear to experience emotions such as compassion and embarrassment. He sees social emotions as the essential basis for morality.

Within psychological research guilt and shame have traditionally been associated primarily with mental disorders, and they have been seen as something we should free ourselves of (for a review, see e.g., Bybee and Quiles, 1998). According to Tangney and Fischer (1995), emotions in general have been seen as significant within psychoanalytical research and in the context of mental disorders, whereas in social sciences emotions as a research topic have been considered secondary to
cognition and behavior. However, since the 1990s there has been more and more research of self-conscious emotions in interpersonal context. Especially guilt’s positive potential in interpersonal context has been emphasized by several researchers (Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton, 1995; Quiles and Bybee, 1997; Tangney and Dearing, 2002). Guilt-proneness has been found to relate to a higher ideal self-image (Bybee and Zigler, 1991); guilt prone individuals demand more of themselves than others do. In general, guilt and shame are no longer seen as private emotions, but as an important component in social behavior and interaction. Social comparison has been found to be significant for the intensity of shame and pride: people feel more ashamed if they look worse compared to others, and also more proud if they look better than others (Smith, Eyre, Powell, and Kim, 2006). There has been a lot of discussion of different types of guilt and shame: on what conditions these emotions can be adaptive and have positive influence in interpersonal context, and when they are likely to be connected to psychological problems.

2.1 Hoffman’s theory of empathy-based guilt

Hoffman’s view of guilt is based on his theory of empathy development. Hoffman (2000) defines guilt as an emotion characterized by tension and regret, which arises when a person feels empathy for the victim and understands that he/she is responsible for the victim’s distress. Thus the same cognitive development which makes mature empathy possible is also necessary for mature guilt to occur. Empathy is not always a part of a guilt experience, because the consequences for the victim are not always visible, but ability to feel empathy is a prerequisite for the ability of feeling guilty. In order to feel mature guilt a child has to be able to make accurate causal attributions of his or her actions. He or she also has to have elaborate representations of others, which makes it
possible to feel guilty in abstract contexts, for example of hurting somebody’s feelings or violating a general moral rule. When the ability for abstract thinking has developed enough, it is possible to feel guilty in complicated contexts, beyond any particular situation, for example of being a member of a privileged group oppressing others, even if the person has not directly hurt anyone. Hoffman has made a classification of different empathy-based guilt situations. First, there are “innocent bystander”-situations, where the question is, should one intervene, and the possible guilt arises of not doing something. In transgression situations a person has knowingly done something immoral he or she feels guilty of, and in virtual transgression a person feels guilty, even though he or she is not actually responsible for the situation, for example survivor guilt. Conflicting moral demands can also make a person to feel guilty no matter what he or she decides to do. In a “multiple claimants”-situation one has to decide, whom to help (for example in an accident situation), and in a “caring vs. justice” –situation one has to choose which principle to follow, for example whether one should break a moral rule in order to help somebody. Hoffman sees all these forms of guilt as beneficial, because guilt always makes us consider the needs of others. Even virtual guilt is not completely virtual; it is always possible to do more for others, and thus also virtual guilt serves as a prosocial motive.

2.2 Tangney’s theory of guilt and shame and the TOSCA-measure

When defining guilt and shame, different researchers have emphasized different aspects. Based on several empirical studies conducted in the US, Tangney (1998) has identified eight dimensions on which guilt and shame differ. She believes that the same situations can give rise to both emotions, but the emotional experiences of guilt and shame are different in some important respects. First, shame is directed
to global self, “I did that horrible thing” whereas guilt focuses on specific behavior “I did that horrible thing”. In shame self is “split” into observing and observed selves, and self is impaired by global devaluation, but in guilt it is not. Shame involves mentally undoing some aspect of the self, whereas guilt involves mentally undoing some aspect of behavior. Phenomenological experiences differ as well: an ashamed person experiences “shrinking”, feels small, worthless and powerless, whereas a guilty person experiences tension, remorse and regret. Consequently, shame is a more painful emotion than guilt. Furthermore, an ashamed person is concerned with others’ evaluation of self, but a guilty person is concerned with one’s effect on others. Tangney believes that guilt and shame give rise to different motivations: a person feeling guilty is motivated to confess, apologize or repair, whereas an ashamed person feels a desire to hide, escape or “strike back”, to behave aggressively towards the person inducing shame. As a result, being prone to shame would be a maladaptive tendency, whereas guilt proneness would enhance moral or prosocial behavior. Based on this differentiation, Tangney has created a scenario-based measure for guilt and shame proneness, the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA), in which the respondents evaluate the likelihood to react in certain ways in a set of hypothetical situations. The words guilt and shame are not explicitly used. Using the TOSCA, shame proneness has been found to relate to low self-esteem, anxiety, depression and psychoticism (Averill, Diefenbach, Stanley, Breckenridge, and Lusby, 2002; Tangney and Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Burggraaff and Wagner, 1995; Woien, Ernst, Patock-Peckham and Nagoshi, 2003), whereas guilt proneness has been connected to positive characteristics, such as interpersonal skills (Covert, Tangney, Maddux and Heleno, 2003), perspective-taking (Leith and Baumeister, 1998), anger control (Lutwak, Panish, Ferrari and Razzino, 2001) and empathy (Fontaine, Luyten, De Boeck and Corveleyn, 2001). Smith, Webster, Parrott, and Eyre (2002) point out that although guilt and shame can occur in same contexts, shame is more strongly linked in
non-moral experiences of inferiority, whereas guilt is mainly characterized by private feelings of remorse and troubled conscience. In addition, their results showed that public exposure was associated more with shame than with guilt, whereas Tangney does not consider actual public exposure relevant, but thinks that the important difference is whether the person is concerned about others’ evaluation of self.

There is also a lot of empirical evidence showing that the TOSCA guilt and shame scales have different connections to the empathy scales of the IRI. According to the studies reviewed by Tangney and Dearing (2002), personal distress has shown much higher correlations with shame than with guilt, whereas the three other-oriented empathy components are more closely related to guilt than shame. Perspective-taking has been largely unrelated to shame, but empathic concern and shame have correlated in several studies, although weakly. Similar results of shame relating mainly to personal distress and guilt relating to empathic concern and perspective-taking have been obtained by Joireman (2004), Konstam, Chernoff and Deveney (2001) and Leith and Baumeister (1998), with the exception that in the Leith and Baumeister study guilt was related only to perspective-taking, not to empathic concern.

Guilt and shame scales have some overlap, but Tangney and Dearing (2002) emphasize that shame scores should be partialled out from guilt, because when fused with shame, guilt can become maladaptive. However, shame-free guilt, no matter how intense, is never maladaptive. Tangney’s theory has faced some criticism, mostly concerning the operationalization of guilt and shame in the TOSCA: what do the guilt and shame scales actually measure? For evaluating the results obtained by the TOSCA, this is an important question to solve. Several studies have shown that the TOSCA measures a different construct than most other measures designed to assess guilt-proneness (Ferguson and Crowley, 1997; Harder, 1995; Quiles and Bybee, 1997). This is probably due to the fact that the TOSCA guilt items include socially appropriate solutions for the hypothetical situations, while most
other guilt measures describe only emotional states, not the behavioral reactions following the emotions. Luyten, Fontaine and Corveleyn (2002) analyzed the TOSCA by principal component analysis and found that items referring to reparative behavior had the highest loadings on the guilt factor (e.g. “You would feel unhappy and eager to correct the situation”) whereas the items including negative self-evaluations had the highest loadings on the shame factor (e.g. “You would feel incompetent”). They constructed new scales for guilt and shame by using only the guilt items referring to reparative behavior and the shame items referring to low self-esteem and found similar pattern and magnitude of correlations obtained with the original TOSCA scales. Furthermore, the situations in the TOSCA are not very serious, the transgressions are not intentional and there are obvious ways to correct the situation. Therefore shame reactions in these situations, characterized by self-blame and avoidance, may be especially likely to reflect pathological tendencies, whereas guilt-items referring to reparation probably describe psychological stability and good social adjustment. Ferguson, Brugman, White and Eyre (2007) got empirical evidence that shame operationalized as withdrawal, avoidance and self-criticism was not seen as a warranted response to minor and isolated wrongdoings, such as the situations in the TOSCA. They also point out that some TOSCA items do not refer to emotional states at all; it is possible to react by reparation for some other reason than guilt feelings, for example because it is a easy way out from the situation.

Is the motivation to make amends always connected to guilt the way Tangney assumes? Bybee, Merisca and Velasco (1998) studied narratives of guilt experiences and concluded that the emotional state labeled as guilt can also be followed by defenses: alleviating guilt by using justifications or excuses. It is also possible that the person does not find a way for reparation and continues to feel guilty. Chronic, unresolved guilt is related to psychopathological symptoms (Bybee and Zigler, 1996; Quiles and Bybee, 1997). When Fontaine et al. (2006)
studied reactions associated to guilt and shame feelings in Hungary, Belgium and Peru, they found that, against Tangney’s theory, self-criticism and rumination where actually more closely related to guilt than shame, whereas concern for how others perceive the self and desire to disappear where more closely related to shame than guilt. Consistent with Tangney’s theory, regret and willingness to repair related to guilt clearly more than to shame. The results were very similar across the three cultural groups. Tangney believes that guilt becomes maladaptive when it is fused with shame, but shame-free guilt is always beneficial. But perhaps the shame component in chronic guilt is a consequence of inefficient coping rather than its cause. Using the word guilt only of well-managed, quickly alleviated shame-free guilt is problematic, because most researchers and lay people do not define guilt so narrowly.

2.3 Are there contexts where feeling guilt or shame is unhealthy?

Some researchers suggest that there are situations when feeling guilt or shame is not reasonable, and feeling guilt or shame in those situations is connected to psychological disorders. Ferguson and Stegge (1998) point out that many of the situations used to assess guilt are the ones in which the consensual response would probably be guilt. For that reason these measures may be unable to detect maladaptive forms of guilt: exaggerated sense of responsibility and tendency to feel guilty in situations where most people would not. Donenberg and Weisz (1998) believe that too strong guilt proneness can cause problems as well as lack of appropriate guilt. A person can have such a strong sense of responsibility that he or she feels weighed down by life, the person feels unable to express him or her self, and he or she has focused all the attention to others’ needs at the expense of his or her own needs. A typical example of this type of situation is small children taking care of
their parents who are suffering from substance-abuse or mental problems. Taking more responsibility than one can cope with is likely to cause anxiety and depression. Even shame-free guilt has been connected to parent-reported internalization and externalization symptoms in children, but the connection was found only for girls (Ferguson, Stegge, Miller and Olsen, 1999). Ferguson et al. explain this by higher demands placed on girls in terms of prosocial and moral behavior, which may cause anger and rumination. Ferguson, Stegge, Eyre, Vollmer and Ashbaker (2000) tested the influence of the context of guilt and shame with children, and their data indicated that the tendency to feel guilty in ambiguous situations (the person is not clearly responsible for the situation) was as closely related to psychological symptoms as was the tendency to feel shame. Similar results have been found also on adolescents (Donatelli, Bybee, and Buka, 2007): adolescents were more depressed when they experienced chronic guilt over things of which they were not at fault compared to those who felt guilty in specific situations. Furthermore, mothers with a history of depression were more likely to make their children feel guilty over things beyond their control (e.g., parent’s own problems) than non-depressive mothers, who mainly made their children feel guilty over specific violations of norm or rules.

Ambiguous situations defined by Ferguson et al. (2000) and Donatelli et al (2007) are very similar to Hoffman’s concept of virtual guilt. However, where Ferguson et al. (2000) and Donatelli et al (2007) suggest that excessive guilt is connected with mental disorders, Hoffman does not see this problem, but believes that feeling guilty in a situation where one is not at fault is still a motive for prosocial behavior. Both may be right: possibly this kind of guilt is related to both prosocial behavior and psychological problems. Gilligan’s (1982) theory of the development of care ethic is analogous to this phenomenon: self-centered thinking develops towards stronger other-orientation, and an excessive sense of responsibility is seen as a stage on the way towards the highest stage, which is characterized by the ability to balance successfully
between one’s own needs and the needs of others. It is reasonable to assume that the tendency to feel guilty in ambiguous situations easily leads to chronic guilt, because it is difficult to find a way to reconcile the situation. According to Tangney and Dearing (2002), guilt is adaptive even in situations when there is no means to correct the situation, because one can always decide to behave differently when faced with a similar situation in the future. But what if you are not sure what you should have done or how you could have behaved differently? Guilt is probably most adaptive in situations when a person knows what he or she should do to set things right, and the question is, whether the person has the motivation to do it.

2.4 The positive aspects of shame

If guilt is not all good, shame is not all bad either. Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera and Mascolo (1995) believe that shame can not be labeled as maladaptive in all contexts. They emphasize that the adaptive value of a certain emotion can be determined by looking at the function the emotion serves in a specific context. In some cases guilt can serve as a defense in a maladaptive way. A person can feel guilty for uncontrollable events, because he or she can not accept the fact that there are unwanted, uncontrollable events, e.g., illnesses. Feeling guilty rather than ashamed can be a way to avoid exploring one’s motives, because guilt only concentrates on certain behaviors, not the whole self. Shame can help to pay attention to more permanent qualities of the self and motivate pursuing the ideal self. On the other hand, shame is likely to be maladaptive when the ideal self is unattainable or unrealistic, or if the whole self is condemned on a basis of single characteristic, which can make a person feel helpless and unable to make changes. Also Barrett (1995) believes that both guilt and shame serve important, but different functions. Both shame and guilt highlight social standards and help to
acquire knowledge about the self. The central difference is the perception of the self: shame draws attention to the self as an object perceived by others; it communicates deference and submission to others and thus helps to maintain social hierarchies. Guilt, on the other hand, helps to understand self as an agent, brings a person closer to others and motivates to repair the caused harm.

It seems that guilt does not always “take a turn for the worse when shame enters the picture” like Tangney and Dearing (2002) suggest. There is some empirical evidence against the view that only shame-free guilt is likely to be adaptive. Harris (2003) studied drunk-driving offenders using his own measure based on the definitions of guilt, shame and embarrassment found in literature. He found three factors in his data: shame-guilt, embarrassment – exposure and unresolved shame (including both shame and externalization responses). Shame-guilt was strongly related to empathy and negatively related to anger/hostility, whereas unresolved shame was strongly related to anger/hostility, but the relation to empathy was weak. Based on Harris’s data it seems that regret and concern for the victim can be combined with negative self-evaluations and fear of judgment by others and still motivate reparative behaviors. Shame seems to be maladaptive when it is combined with negative defenses but not with guilt. Ahmed and Braithwaite (2004) got similar results when studying school bullying. Shame displacement (managing shame by defenses like other directed blame and anger) in bullying situations appeared to increase bullying, whereas shame acknowledgement decreased it. Shame management also partially mediated the effects of family, school and personality variables on bullying. It is likely that the problems are caused by the inability to cope with shame in the right way but not shame as such.

There are also researchers who believe that shame combined with guilt can serve important functions in interpersonal context. Van Stokkom (2002) discusses the role of guilt and shame in restorative justice conferences in the context of crimes. He agrees with Tangney that
guilt has an important role in restorative process and direct shaming of the offender is likely to cause defensive reactions. According to Van Stokkom, however, shame-free guilt has some limitations. It does not have the same capacity to trigger the victim’s empathy towards the offender as guilt combined with shame. To be able to empathize with the offender and forgive him or her, the victims need to see in the offender’s gestures that he or she is feeling ashamed, distressed and helpless, and thus taking the crime seriously. Shame also has the potential to make the offender reconsider his or her whole identity and motives behind the behavior instead of only concentrating on changing certain behaviors, which may be necessary when transgressions are serious. Van Stokkom believes that it is important to recognize the social nature of shame. Even though shame is painful for the individual feeling shame, it has important impact on those observing shame, and therefore it can serve an important function in preserving harmony in interpersonal relations. Of course, if shame is combined with defenses like aggression, it does not serve this purpose because others only see the aggression, not the shame behind it. The nature of transgression probably affects the adaptive value of shame, but at least in serious transgressions feeling shame-free guilt can seem callous in the eyes of others. Tangney and Stuewig admit (2004) that in the case of criminals it is more encouraging if they feel shame than neither shame nor guilt, but they believe that feeling shame-free guilt is still the most desirable aim.

Ferguson, Brugman, White and Eyre (2007) conducted a series of studies to clarify the role of shame in moral motivation. They found that persons prone to both guilt and shame were evaluated as more moral by others than persons experiencing mainly shame-free guilt. They suggest that self-criticism is an important part of an adaptive guilt experience, and shame-free guilt can reflect motivation “to get off the hook” by reparation without a serious commitment to self-improvement. Also narrative data showed that experiences of combined guilt and shame had more positive consequences than guilt or shame alone. Consistent with
Van Stokkom’s view, empirical data by Ferguson et al. (2007) confirmed that shame was seen as a warranted reaction by others in situations where the agent was deemed responsible or capable of changing motives, intentions, or behaviors having harmful consequences. The persons experiencing shame also reported that shame served as a useful reminder of one’s moral ideals. In conclusion, shame cannot be labeled as a purely maladaptive emotion. Shame can motivate pursuing morally ideal self, when shame is experienced of something one has control over.

2.5 Guilt and shame in different cultures

Large part of the data concerning self-conscious emotions has been collected within western cultures, and it is possible that experiences of guilt and shame differ across cultures in some respects. There is very little research on individual differences in guilt and shame proneness in different cultures, which may be caused by difficulties in measuring guilt and shame. The concepts are different in different cultures: Bedford and Hwang (2003) have identified seven different concepts referring to different types of guilt and shame experiences in Chinese language. However, Frank, Harvey and Verdun (2000) have found corresponding shame experiences in American data, even if there are no separate concepts for them in English. It seems that concepts regarding guilt and shame can be different in different languages, but there are similar underlying experiences. Scenario-based measures using simple wording are therefore likely to be useful in intercultural research. Still their limitation is that they can not include culture-specific situations, and thus guilt or shame proneness can only be evaluated with respect to the situations that are familiar in different cultures.

Shame-proneness has traditionally been associated with collectivistic cultures (e.g., Benedict, 1946), in which the sense of self is especially dependent on how others perceive the self, whereas guilt-proneness has
been seen as typical of individualistic cultures where personal standards of behavior are emphasized. However, there is evidence that collectivistic people would be more prone to both shame and guilt than individualistic people (Bierbrauer, 1992). Also Eid and Diener (2001) found that guilt was considered as a more desirable emotion in collectivistic than in individualistic cultures, whereas pride was seen as more important in individualistic than in collectivistic cultures. It is possible that both guilt and shame are more emphasized in collectivistic cultures, because these cultures highlight individual’s social relations and dependency on others. Of course, the results of cultural comparisons depend on what exactly is compared and how guilt and shame are defined. Culture affects the appraisal of emotion-eliciting events: in what kind of situations certain emotions arise, how often emotions are experienced and what are the consequences of certain emotional experiences (Tracy and Robins, 2004). According to Mesquita and Frijda (1992), when studying cultural differences and similarities in emotions, emotions should be understood as processes consisting of different phases, when cultural similarity in one phase does not necessarily imply similarities in other phases. They divide emotion process in seven phases: antecedent events, event coding, appraisal, physiological reaction patterns, action readiness, emotional behavior and regulation. Cultures differ in what kind of events elicit emotions, what kind of meanings are attached to a certain event, what are the event’s expected implications, what are the following action tendencies and how the behavioral impulses are regulated. Even the attributional processes eliciting emotions may be different depending on culture. Tracy and Robins (2004) suggest that internal, global and stable attributions would elicit shame: “Something negative happened because there is something wrong with me as a person”. According to Mesquita and Karasawa (2004), in East Asian cultures this type of attribution is not needed for shame, but shame is elicited when a person feels being negatively evaluated by others, no matter what the reason for this negative evaluation is.
Tangney’s (1998) view that the experience of shame always leads to harmful behavioral impulses has been challenged by intercultural research. Some researchers believe that coping with shame depends on the cultural concept of self, which is different in different cultures. Kitayama, Markus and Matsumoto (1995) suggest that the link between shame and defensive reactions like anger is typical of individualistic cultures like the U.S., where the sense of self as independent is valued, and expressing shame to others can be interpreted as a sign of weakness, because it communicates submission. From this perspective, hiding shame with anger and avoiding the others causing shame is a reasonable thing to do, but in collectivistic cultures, where interdependence is valued, defending the self against shame this way is probably seen useless. Instead, showing shame to others is seen as a brave and positive thing to do, because social hierarchies and submission are not seen as humiliating, but as an essential part of social interaction. When comparing students from Indonesia and the Netherlands, Fontaine, Poortinga, Setiadi and Markam (2002) found that in Indonesia guilt and shame were more closely associated with fear than in the Netherlands, whereas in the Netherlands these concepts were seen closer to anger than in Indonesia. Bagozzi, Verbeke and Gavino (2003) compared Dutch and Filipino salespersons’ experiences of shame as a consequence of customer actions. The emotional shame experience was very similar for both groups (painful, self-focused emotion, felt threat to the core self), but the behavioral reactions to it were different: for Filipino employees shame enhanced customer relationship building, where as for Dutch employees shame diminished it. Consistent with this finding, Mesquita and Karasawa (2004) reported that one of the most frequent Japanese responses in shame situations was gambaru that can be translated as a resolve to self-improvement. Fischer, Manstead and Mosquera (1999) compared Spanish and Dutch students’ conceptions about shame and found that Spanish students were more likely to report sharing shame experiences with others, and they also expressed more positive beliefs
about shame, for example that shame is a sign of strength and it makes others see you positively. Shame also appeared to be more social experience for the Spanish: they were more likely to report shame experiences involving public performance and social judgment, whereas the Dutch were more likely to report self-centered experiences of personal failure (Mosquera, Manstead and Fischer, 2000.) Walbott and Scherer (1995) have obtained extensive empirical evidence of cultural differences in shame experience. In collectivistic cultures, shame is a rather acute, short-lived emotional experience compared to individualistic cultures, and it is seen having fewer negative influences on self-esteem and on social relationships than in individualistic cultures. For guilt experience, on the other hand, clear cultural differences were not found. This difference is probably due to different styles of coping with shame. People in collectivistic cultures seem to be more able to cope with shame constructively. They see their sense of self depending on their social relations, and the only possibility to regain the positive sense of self is to repair the relationships. People in individualistic cultures are more likely to react in defensive ways which harm interpersonal relations, possibly because they feel that it is easier to relieve shame by avoiding others or shifting the blame to somebody else than taking responsibility for the situation.

3 Moral emotions and age

Adolescence is an important phase in personality development, because adolescents form their identity and develop a more elaborate self-concept (Damon, 1983). This includes emotional components; emotions towards the self and others and tendencies to react emotionally in different situations. An interesting question is, whether there are some kind of developmental changes in guilt, shame and empathy during adolescence.
Tangney and Dearing (2002) found in their longitudinal study that adolescents’ guilt and shame proneness remained very stable from age 10 to 18-year-old. On the basis of these results it seems that guilt or shame proneness develops quite early in childhood. On the other hand, Bybee and her colleagues (see Bybee, 1998) have found decrease in guilt during adolescence. However, it must be noted that in their measure respondents were asked to rate how guilty the target person would feel in various situations, and thus guilt was not defined as a separate reaction from shame. In addition, there seems to be developmental changes in the situations evoking guilt: Williams and Bybee (1994) found that reporting guilt over inaction, neglect of responsibilities, and failure to attain ideals increases with age, whereas guilt in situations where one is not at fault decreases with age. This can be explained by cognitive development during adolescence: older adolescents are able to experience guilt in more abstract contexts than younger adolescents. There is also some evidence of developmental changes in empathy-related tendencies. Henry and Sager (1996) found in their study of 13-18-year-old adolescents that perspective-taking increased with age, where as personal distress decreased. Davis and Franzoi (1991) also found decrease in personal distress during adolescence, and increase in perspective-taking and empathic concern, but this pattern was found only for girls. Eisenberg, Cumberland, Cuthrie, Murphy, and Shepard (2005) got similar results in their longitudinal study: perspective-taking and prosocial moral reasoning increased from adolescence to adulthood (from 15-16 to 25-26 years old), whereas personal distress declined. Increase in self-reflective empathic moral reasoning was found only for girls. These results indicate that the ability for orientating to the others’ emotions instead of one’s own can continue to develop during adolescence, but there may be some gender differences in the developmental path.
4 Value priorities

Values have often been seen as important constructs influencing behavior. According to Rokeach (1973), “A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence. A value system is an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end-states of existence along a continuum of relative importance”. Accordingly, Rokeach classifies values to terminal and instrumental values. Terminal values are end-states, which can be self-centered, for example pleasure and social recognition, or society-centered, for example equality and a world at peace. Instrumental values are ways to achieve certain end-states, and they can be defined as moral values, like loyal and honest, and competence values, like intellectual and competent. Instrumental values reflect desired identity; what kind of person one prefers to be and how he or she wants to be perceived by others. Values include cognitive, affective and behavioral components; values are cognitions of the desirable that foster emotions and motivate behavior. In this study values are examined using the model of Schwartz (1992), which has been developed based on the work of Rokeach. Schwartz describes values as “the criteria people use to select and justify actions and to evaluate people and events”. Values are defined as behavior-directing general goals, which are ranked in terms of their relative importance. The values for this model were derived from basic human needs: biological needs, requisites of coordinated social interaction and survival and welfare of groups. What is special in this model is the way it has been constructed; the values and value items have been chosen based on a large empirical dataset from different cultures around the world. By using multidimensional scaling, Schwartz has identified a set of values that are understood similarly in different cultures. This means that there is a cross-cultural consensus on which of these values are compatible and
which are in conflict. The values form a circle from power to security by two dimensions: conservation vs. openness to change and self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence. Values of tradition, conformity and security represent conservation, whereas self-direction and stimulation represent openness to change. Values of universalism and benevolence represent self-transcendence: willingness to transcend selfish concerns for the benefit of others. Power and achievement represent self-enhancement values: motivation to enhance one’s personal interests. Hedonism is usually seen to represent both self-enhancement and openness. Correlations between values and other variables should form a sinusoid curve: if some variable correlates positively with benevolence, it should correlate negatively with achievement, and the correlations should decrease when moving from benevolence towards achievement around the circular structure. Schwartz and Boehnke (2004) have obtained statistical confirmation for this model by using confirmatory factor analysis. However, it must be noted that this model does not include values that lack an intercultural shared meaning. For example spiritual values (inner harmony, a spiritual life, meaning in life) were left out of the original model, because they were differentially located in different samples.

Values and their contents (single value items in parentheses) by Schwartz:

**Power**: social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources (social power, authority, wealth, preserving my public image).

**Achievement**: personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards (successful, capable, ambitious, influential).

**Hedonism**: pleasure and sensuous gratification for one-self (pleasure, enjoying life, self-indulgent).
**Stimulation:** excitement, novelty and challenge in life (daring, a varied life, an exciting life).

**Self-direction:** independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring (creativity, freedom, independent, curious, choosing own goals).

**Universalism:** understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature (broadminded, wisdom, social justice, equality, world at peace, a world of beauty, unity with nature, protecting the environment).

**Benevolence:** preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact (helpful, forgiving, honest, loyal, responsible).

**Tradition:** respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self (humble, accepting my portion of life, devout, respect of tradition, moderate).

**Conformity:** restraint of actions, inclinations and impulses likely to upset or harm others, and violate social expectations or norms (politeness, obedient, self-discipline, honouring parents and elders).

**Security:** safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self (family security, national security, social order, clean, reciprocation of favours).
These values have been found to relate to different personality characteristics, attitudes and behavior. For example, personal value priorities in the Schwartz’s value survey have been found to relate to religiosity (Saroglou, Delpierre and Dernelle, 2004), to alcohol abuse (Dollinger and Kobayashi, 2003), to moral sensitivity (Myyry and Helkama, 2002), to political choice (Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, and Barbaranelli, 2006), to attitudes towards genetically modified and organically grown food (Dreezens, Martijn, Tenbült, Kok, and de Vries, 2004), behaviors corresponding the Schwartz’s values (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003) and behaviors reflecting independence,
activity and insightfulness (Sagiv and Schwartz, 2004). Sometimes the connections have not been very strong, but of course there are other explaining factors for personality, attitudes and behavior than values. Especially the connection between values and behavior has been a much debated question. Bardi and Schwartz (2003) emphasize that there are normative pressures posed on behavior: one cannot always behave according to one’s preferences. Furthermore, people do not always have the ability to behave according to their preferences, or they do not believe in their abilities. For example, a person can value world peace, but does not believe that anything he or she does could make a difference. It is also important to remember that values do not refer to desires or hopes, but to things the person believes are worth desiring; people can want things they believe they should not want (Pohjanheimo, 2005). For example, it may be that a person believes that healthy lifestyle would be desirable in the long run, but still is unable to resist temptations. Nevertheless, the Schwartz’s values appear to reflect important underlying constructs that relate to personal tendencies and behavior, even though there are several others factors that weaken the connection.

4.1 Values, emotions and morality

Both value priorities (Rest, 1984) and moral emotions (Eisenberg, 2000; Hoffman, 2000; Tangney and Dearing, 2002) have been suggested to be the motivational basis for morality. However, there is very little research on the connection between value priorities and proneness to guilt, shame and empathy, although such a connection would be logical. By looking at the content of the Schwartz values, it can be expected that empathy dimensions are positively related to universalism and benevolence, because these values concern the well-being of others, all people or the
close ones. The opposite values, power, achievement, and hedonism, emphasize one’s personal interests that may be conflicting with empathy. The relation between empathy and the conservation-openness-dimension is less obvious; if social norms support empathic reactions, then empathy might correlate positively with conservation values, but in circumstances where empathy is not normative, it could relate to self-direction values. Myyry and Helkama (2001) and Juujärvi (2003) both found in Finnish samples that empathy measured by Mehrabian and Epstein's (1972) Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Empathy (QMEE) related positively to self-transcendence values and negatively to self-enhancement values. For other values there was no clear consistent pattern of connections.

Even though guilt measured by the TOSCA and empathy are closely related, they perhaps are not related to values in the same way. The TOSCA includes interpersonal situations where empathy is essential, and guilt proneness, as well as empathy, is likely to relate positively to self-transcendence values and negatively to self-enhancement values. However, the TOSCA also describes situations of conforming to a norm, e.g. fulfilling one’s obligations in work or at school. Therefore it is probable that the TOSCA guilt relates positively to conservation values and negatively to openness to change values. Consistent with this view, Jaari (2004) found in a Finnish adult sample that universalism, benevolence, conformity, tradition and security values were positively related to valuing honesty and respect of moral norms (a subscale of the Machiavellism scale by Christie, 1970), whereas self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement and power were negatively related to it.

Personal distress and the TOSCA shame proneness are both neurotic, maladaptive tendencies, and therefore they are likely to be weakly related to values that are defined as conscious goals in life. In line with this view, Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, and Knafo (2002) found that neuroticism had weaker connection to values than the other Big Five personality traits
had. However, it is possible that those who value self-enhancement highly do not react to others’ emotions or opinions at all, and thus would be less prone to personal distress or shame than those valuing self-transcendence.

In contrast, the cognitive measures of morality seem to relate positively only to self-transcendence values, not to conservation values. Kohlberg’s moral reasoning stages have most often been found to relate to universalism and sometimes also to benevolence and self-direction, but for conformity only negative associations have been found (for a review, see Helkama et al, 2003). Openness values have also been found to relate positively to educational level (Pohjanheimo, 1997). Based on these findings, it could be assumed that valuing conformity or tradition is relevant for constructs that emphasize conforming to norms or rules, whereas valuing benevolence or universalism is related to measures that emphasize independent thinking and understanding others’ perspectives. According to Helkama (2004), different values correspond to different functions of morality: Valuing conformity/tradition is conceptually related to the prevention of antisocial action and benevolence to the promotion of prosocial behavior, whereas universalism, with its focus on justice, most closely relates to solving moral dilemmas. Consequently, all these values represent important motives for different aspects of moral behavior. Lay people’s view of the moral values appears to be quite consistent with the above analysis. In a study by Schwartz (2005a), a sample of Israelis was asked which of the Schwartz values they considered moral values. Eighty percent of the respondents labelled all benevolence value items as moral values, and 70 percent of the respondents maintained that all or most of universalism, benevolence, conformity, tradition and security value items were moral values. Consistent with Schwartz’s model, the opposite value items reflecting self-enhancement or openness to change were considered moral very rarely.
There is no clear causal relation between values and emotional tendencies. They may have a common cause, for example parenting practices, which have been connected to both values and emotional tendencies (e.g., Abell and Gecas, 1997; Padilla-Walker, 2007): parents who teach their children self-transcendence values probably also teach empathic responding to others and guilt over hurting others. Also gender has been found to relate both values and moral emotions (e.g., Schwartz and Rubel, 2005; Ferguson and Eyre, 2000). However, emotional tendencies are likely to appear earlier in development than values, because values are abstract concepts and therefore require ability to abstract thinking, whereas earliest forms of empathy, guilt, and shame can be found even in toddlers (Barrett, 1998; Hoffman, 2000). Children probably do not understand value concepts very well, but it has been shown that adolescents’ understanding of values is similar to adults’ understanding, as the hypothesized value structure can be found in adolescent samples (Verkasalo, Tuomivaara, and Lindeman, 1995). Furthermore, the causal relation between values and emotions may be bidirectional; having certain emotional tendencies may affect the way value priorities are chosen, but it is also possible that appreciating certain values elicits matching emotions. For example, being prone to empathy can increase valuing the well-being of others, and considering the well-being of others important draws attention to others’ emotions, which is likely to foster empathy. The direction of causality may also depend on the studied concept; some tendencies are perhaps more easily changed to be consistent with one’s goals in life, while for other tendencies values are adjusted to be compatible with them. For example, it is unlikely that a fearful person would value stimulation very highly.

In sum, previous studies suggest that self-transcendence values relate positively to different indexes of moral and prosocial tendencies, whereas self-enhancement values relate negatively to these measures. For the conservation-openness value dimension the picture is a bit more complicated; openness values relate positively to moral judgment stages
and educational level, but conservation values can be expected to relate to measures emphasizing compliance. It is interesting, however, that self-transcendence and conservation values do not seem to relate to measures of subjective well-being. Sagiv and Schwartz (2000) studied students and adults from Israel and Germany, and found that achievement, stimulation and self-direction correlated positively and tradition negatively with subjective well-being. In contrast, benevolence and universalism were unrelated to well-being in all six samples. Jaari (2004) obtained similar results for self-esteem: among Finnish adults self-esteem measured by the Rosenberg scale correlated positively with self-direction and stimulation, and negatively with tradition and conformity. These findings contradict the common assumption that prosocial individuals are also the happy ones. Also self-enhancement and openness to change are important to a certain extent: it possible to be too prosocial, and to take too much responsibility for others’ well-being, as noted in the context of guilt and shame. It is also possible that those who do not experience their well-being as being very high, are not able to be so ambitious, adventurous or independent, and therefore they downgrade those qualities.

There is no simple answer to the question of ideal values. In order to be happy and psychologically healthy it is necessary to be selfish to some extent, and being intelligent requires independence and openness to new ideas. However, valuing self-enhancement and openness to change highly may relate to antisocial characteristics, lack of empathy and appropriate guilt.

4.2 Culture and gender differences in value priorities

The cultures included in this study, Finland and Peru, are interesting for comparison because Peru can be expected to be clearly more collectivistic, hierarchical and traditional than Finland. Several marked
differences between them have been found on Hofstede’s (2001) value
dimensions. The dimension of individualism-collectivism refers to the
degree to which individuals are supposed to look after themselves or
remain integrated into groups, usually around family. Peru has been
found to be strongly collectivistic, and Finland moderately individualistic
(individualism: Peru 16, rank 45; Finland 63, rank 17). Power distance,
which refers to the extent to which the less powerful members of
organizations and institutions accept and expect that power is distributed
unequally, is larger in Peru than in Finland (Peru 64, rank: 21/23; Finland
33, rank 46). Uncertainty avoidance, how strongly a culture programs its
members to feel uncomfortable in unstructured situations, is also stronger
in Peru than in Finland (Peru 87, rank 9; Finland 59, rank 31/32). In
addition, Peru is a somewhat more masculine culture than Finland.
Masculinity refers to emphasizing “masculine” values, achievement,
power and wealth (Peru 42, rank 37/38; Finland 26, rank 47).

The structure of values has been found to be the same for both genders
(Prince-Gibson and Schwartz, 1998; Struch, Schwartz and van den
Kloot, 2002), but in most samples gender differences in value priorities
have been found. When studying Finnish adolescents, Verkasalo,
Tuomivaara and Lindeman (1996) found that power, achievement and
hedonism were valued more highly by boys than by girls, and
universalism and benevolence were valued more highly by girls than by
boys. Pohjanheimo (1997) and Jaari (2004) have got similar results in
adult samples: women valued benevolence more than men, and men
valued power more than women. Puohiniemi (2002) found in a
representative sample of Finnish adults that women valued universalism
more than men did, and men valued security and conformity more than
women did. Only one study was available of the gender differences in
Peru: Schwartz and Rubel (2005) report that in a student sample men
valued power more than women did, but there were no differences for
any other values. In the same article considerable differences were
reported for Finnish students: women valued benevolence and
universalism more than men did, whereas men valued self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, conformity and tradition more than women did. When all 70 studied cultures were considered, Schwartz and Rubel (2005) found that men tend to value power, stimulation, hedonism, achievement and self-direction more than women do, whereas women tend to value benevolence, universalism and, less consistently, security more than men do. However, culture differences were large, and for some values they were in an unexpected direction. For example, gender differences in power and benevolence (men valuing power more and women valuing benevolence more) were largest in countries with greater gender equality. Watkins et al. (1998) got similar results using a different value measure (the ASSEI); they found in a study of 15 cultures that women appreciated family values and social relationships more than men did, but only in individualistic cultures; for collectivistic cultures gender differences were not found.

5 Gender differences in morality and moral emotions

Gender differences in guilt, shame and empathy have been very consistent across different studies. Females have usually scored higher than males in written empathy measures (Lennon and Eisenberg, 1987; Myyry and Helkama, 2001), in several different guilt measures (Bybee, 1998) and in the TOSCA-guilt and shame (Ferguson and Eyre, 2000). This could be caused by respondents’ perception of social appropriateness: females are expected to be more emotional and nurturing than males, and as a result they would be more willing to present themselves as empathetic or guilt-prone than males. On the other hand, if the gender differences really are caused by expectations derived from gender stereotypes, these stereotypes are probably strong enough to influence the actual behavior as well. Lennon and Eisenberg (1987) point
out that gender differences in empathy have been found using written measures, but not in studies relying on physiological measurements. It must be noted, however, that physiological indices of empathy do not reveal whether the person is feeling personal distress or sympathy, which has been shown to be crucial for the adaptive value of the emotional reaction. Possibly there is no gender difference in the emotional reactivity, but in the ability to cope with the reaction. Adaptive guilt and empathy reactions are difficult to measure based on anything else than self-reports. Peer assessments could be useful, but others are not necessarily able to perceive others’ emotional states and motives accurately. However, it is also possible that these results reflect genuine differences, not just self-presentation. Bybee (1998) believes that females actually are more guilt-prone than males. She emphasizes that many characteristics known to be related to guilt, like criminality, aggression and academic achievement, differ across gender in the same way as guilt, which supports this view. Eagly (1987) explains gender differences in social behavior by different societal roles. Functioning in different social environments encourages men and women to develop different skills, attitudes and beliefs that are reflected in their social behavior. For example, emotionality and caring are important in professions and other domains that are labelled as feminine (e.g. child-care, nursing), and thus these qualities are associated with female gender role. These differences in psychological characteristics influence gender stereotypes, which in turn affect the ways boys and girls are socialized. Consequently, males and females face different expectations to which they conform in some degree. According to the results by Bybee, Glick, and Zigler (1990), adolescent girls and boys have different conceptions of the ideal self: Girls mentioned future marriage and improving relations to their family of origin more often than boys did, whereas boys emphasized categories related to athletics more than girls did.

Due to the feminine gender role, females are probably encouraged to be empathetic, guilt- and shame prone more than males. On the other
hand, it has to be acknowledged that the difficulty when using scenario-based guilt and shame measures is that men and women have been found to feel shame and guilt in different contexts. Ferguson, Eyre and Ashbaker (2000) suggest that females express more shame than males in scenario-based measures like the TOSCA, because the situations are more threatening to feminine than masculine identity. They created scenarios known to be especially threatening to masculine identity, and males actually reported more shame in these situations than females. However, these new scenarios described non-moral situations (being physically weak, crying in front of friends, failing in masculine tasks, for example not being able to change a flat tire). These results do not question the notion of females being more shame-prone than males in moral situations. When guilt and shame have been studied by using self-reported situations, some gender differences have also occurred. Tangney (1992) found that men were more likely than women to mention not helping others when describing a guilt-inducing situation, whereas women were more likely to mention lying than men. Williams and Bybee (1994) found when studying adolescents that girls were more likely to mention lying and inconsiderate behavior as a guilt-inducing situation, whereas boys were more likely to mention aggressive behavior: property damage, fighting and victimizing animals. Then again, these results probably reflect the frequency of certain transgressions among boys and girls more than their guilt-proneness in different situations; girls would probably also feel guilty over fighting, but do not mention it because fighting is so unusual. It is difficult to create a scenario-based measure that would not be gender biased, because males appear to commit more serious transgressions than females, and it would be questionable to ask all the respondents to identify with such situations, e. g., violent behavior.

In addition to these differences, it is possible that the factors influencing moral emotional style also differ across genders. Harvey, Gore, Frank, and Batres (1997) found that females’ guilt and shame
proneness was much less affected by parenting than males’. They suggest that one possible explanation is the feminine gender role: the cultural influence on females’ emotional tendencies is so strong that they learn to be guilt and shame-prone regardless of their family background. Genetic difference between males and females is another possible explanation, but this hypothesis is very difficult to confirm.

5.1 Gender differences in the relation between moral cognition and emotion

It has been suggested that genders differ in their general perspective on morality. Gilligan (1982) proposed that women are more focused on caring for others in their moral thinking, whereas men emphasize following rules or norms, which is referred as justice orientation. There is evidence that the associations between the components of empathy, guilt, and moral judgment would be different for women and men. Consistent with the view that women are more care-oriented than men, higher correlations between developmental measures of the ethic of care and ego development have been found for women than for men (e.g., Skoe and Diessner, 1994; but not always, see Skoe and Lippe, 2002), which suggests that care ethic is more important to women than to men in terms of their identity. Skoe, Cumberland, Eisenberg, Hansen, and Perry (2002) found in a dilemma-based measure that women scored higher than men on care reasoning, whereas men scored higher than women in justice-reasoning. Moral cognition and emotions appear to be more closely related for women than for men: Kohlberg’s developmental moral judgment stages and emotional empathy correlate more for women than for men (Juujärvi, 2003), and the same applies to the relation between Kohlberg’s stages and the Hoffman measure of guilt over inaction (Helkama & Ikonen, 1986). Furthermore, Eisenberg, Zhou, and Koller (2001) found that perspective-taking predicted prosocial moral judgment
for boys but not for girls, and other-oriented empathy mediated the connection between perspective taking and prosocial moral judgment for girls but not for boys. This can be interpreted to show that boys’ moral judgment is more directly based on cognition, whereas for girls vicarious emotional reaction is essential. However, according to a meta-analysis by Jaffee and Hyde (2000), the evidence of gender difference in moral orientation (care orientation vs. justice orientation) has been rather weak and inconsistent. On the other hand, the operationalization of these moral orientations has not always been very compatible with Gilligan’s original idea, and different measures appear to give different results. The specific situational context has been shown to be important when studying gender differences. For example, Eagly and Crowley (1986) found in their meta-analysis that in general men appear to be more likely to help than women. However, when the context of helping was analysed in more detail, it was found that men are more likely to help in situations where helping is a “heroic act”: the helper puts himself in danger and there are others observing the helping. In contrast, women were more likely to help when the helping was caring and nurturing for others in more private settings.

5.2 Gender differences across different cultures

It is important to acknowledge that most results concerning gender differences in morally relevant constructs are from western cultures, and these differences are not necessarily universal. There is evidence that gender differences in experiencing and expressing emotions, especially guilt and shame, are larger in individualistic than collectivistic cultures (Fischer and Manstead, 2000). According to the results of Fischer and Manstead (2000), gender differences in emotion are usually large in individualistic societies where the gender difference in societal roles is small. In collectivistic cultures where societal roles are more
differentiated according to gender, gender differences in emotion are smaller. Men from individualistic cultures were found to score lower in self-reported guilt and shame than women from individualistic cultures, or men and women from collectivistic cultures. Fischer, Mosquera, van Vianen and Manstead (2004) found that men from countries with small gender differences in societal roles scored lower in self-reported intensity of powerless emotions (fear, sadness, guilt and shame) than women or both genders in traditional countries. Fischer and Manstead (2000) explain these results by individualistic values: fear, sadness, shame and guilt are seen reflecting powerlessness and lack of control, which is inconsistent with individualistic conception of masculinity. Achieving and maintaining independence from others is an important goal in individualistic societies (Kitayama, Marcus and Matsumoto, 1995), but achieving this goal completely would threat social life. Therefore women in individualistic cultures have taken the responsibility for maintaining positive social relationships and emotional atmosphere (Fischer and Manstead, 2000).

The pattern of differences has been similar also for other personality dispositions. Costa, Terracciano and McCrae (2001) studied gender differences in the Big Five personality traits across cultures and found that women tend to score higher than men on agreeableness and neuroticism, but gender differences were larger in modern, individualistic societies than in traditional, collectivistic societies. They propose that the difference could be caused by differences in self-presentation: in collectivistic cultures females may compare themselves to other females, not males, and behaviors are more easily attributed to personality instead of role-demands in individualistic than in collectivistic societies. However, response bias should not affect gender stereotypes. According to a large study of Williams and Best (1990), gender stereotypes are most differentiated in modern countries (Netherlands, Finland) and least differentiated in traditional, collectivistic countries (Bolivia, Venezuela). This means that in the countries of small
differentiation there were more attributes that were equally associated with males and females and less attributes associated mainly to males or females. Cultural influence in the socialization of gender differences has also been demonstrated in an ethnographic study by Aydt and Corsaro (2003), who studied preschoolers from three different ethnic groups: lower-class African Americans, upper-middle-class White Americans and Italians. They found that gender-related behavior was different in different groups: White American children emphasized gender differences and avoided cross-sex play more than Italians and African Americans did. White American girls were also less assertive than Italian and African American girls. Gender as a category was acknowledged in all groups, but attributes connected to gender differed. For example, playing house was popular among African American boys, and rough-and-tumble play among Italian girls. In sum, the view of females being more submissive, emotional and nurturing than males is more prominent in some cultural contexts than others, which undermines the notion of biological differences.

6 Conclusions

Moral emotions are very complex phenomena, and large part of relevant scientific discussion has focused on the definitions of concepts. Being clear and precise in the use of concepts and in terms of the conclusions drawn is therefore essential. The way the emotions are defined and measured affects the results to a great extent. In this study, empathy is understood as a multidimensional concept, based on the work of Eisenberg (e.g., 2000) and Davis (1996). For measuring guilt and shame proneness, the TOSCA is used, but it is recognized that this measure taps certain types of guilt and shame in specific types of situations, which is important to remember when interpreting the results. In addition, guilt proneness is measured by Hoffman’s story completion
method (study 2) and guilt and shame are analyzed based on autobiographical narratives provided by participants (study 1). For studying values, the Schwartz value model is used, because it is the most comprehensive of the current approaches, and has obtained a lot of empirical support from different cultures.

Previous research suggests that culture and cultural gender roles affect values and moral emotions. Therefore culture and gender roles are studied as possible explaining factors for moral tendencies in the present study.
THE AIMS OF THE STUDY

The aim of this study is to analyze the concepts of guilt, shame and empathy: what kind of forms these emotions can have and how they affect social interaction? Another important goal is to find possible antecedents for prosocial emotional tendencies: how culture and gender roles relate to these emotions? In addition, the possible connections between moral emotional tendencies and personal value priorities are examined.

1. Is shame generally a more maladaptive emotion than guilt, or is the adaptive value of the emotion context-dependent? (Study 1.)

2. How do guilt, shame and empathy dimensions relate to each other? Does the relation between empathy and guilt differ according to gender? (Study 2.)

3. Are there age-related differences in proneness to guilt, shame and empathy? (Study 2.)

4. How does proneness to guilt and shame differ between individualistic (Finland) and collectivistic (Peru) cultures? (Study 3.)
5. What kind of gender differences are there in values, empathy, guilt and shame? (Studies 2-4) Are the gender differences different depending on culture? (Study 3.)

6. How do personal value priorities relate to proneness to guilt, shame and empathy? (Study 4.)
METHODS

1 The participants and procedure

The participants in Study 1 were university students or students from social psychology courses in the Open University. The participants were contacted through student mailing lists or course websites, and they were provided a link to an electronic questionnaire, where they were asked to describe a real life experience of guilt, shame or both emotions simultaneously. The participation was voluntary and no compensation was provided, so only those who were especially motivated to share their experiences answered, and therefore the sample is not representative of the students who participated on the courses or were on the mailing lists. There were 97 participants (12 men, 85 women), who provided from one to three narratives each. The total number of narratives was 120. The participants’ ages ranged from 20 to 57, and the mean age was 29 (SD 8 years).

In Study 2 the participants were 53 girls and 60 boys (aged 13-16 years) from 7th, 8th and 9th grades in an ordinary high school in Espoo. Permission for the study was received from school authorities. The students completed the questionnaires in class, and they were told that participation was voluntary and that the questionnaires were anonymous and confidential. They were encouraged to ask if they had questions about the study or the questionnaire.
In Study 3 the Finnish participants were 156 high school students (61 boys and 95 girls) from the Helsinki metropolitan area (Helsinki and Espoo). The students were 15-18 years old and were in their 10th to 12th year of schooling (Lukio in Finnish). The Peruvian participants were 159 students (88 boys and 71 girls), who were in their last year of obligatory schooling in public school in Lima, and they were 15 - 17 years old. The mean age was about 16 years for both samples, and both samples represented the local middle-class. The necessary permissions were received from the school authorities in both countries. The participants were told that participation was voluntary and that the questionnaires were anonymous and confidential. The general purpose of the research was described briefly. In Finland the data collection was combined with a presentation on psychological research methods. The participants completed the questionnaires in class and they were encouraged to ask the researcher if they had difficulties understanding any of the questions.

In Study 4 two samples were used. The first sample included 207 high school students, mainly ethnic Finns, 15-19 years old (68% girls, the mean age was 16), representing all grades of lukio (a three-year school preparing for university or college studies). The data was collected in two schools in the Helsinki metropolitan area (Helsinki and Espoo). The participants completed the questionnaires in class in the presence of a teacher and the researcher or of a teacher individually who had been instructed by the researcher. The participants had the opportunity to ask questions about the questionnaire. Participation was voluntary and no compensation was provided. The second sample consisted of conscripts at the Reserve Officer School in Hamina, Finland. They were scheduled to complete a number of personality measures. The study was conducted in collaboration with the Finnish Defence Forces Education Development Centre and approved by the Finnish Defence Forces Headquarters. A total of 514 (11 women, mean age 19.7 years) conscripts, from 697 possible, gave their informed consent and completed all of the questionnaires. However, we administered two
versions of the questionnaire, and only half of the participants (N = 258, 3 women, mean age 19.6 years) received the TOSCA, with the other half receiving an unrelated questionnaire. Due to the small number of women, analyses were restricted to men only.

2 The measures

2.1 Guilt and shame

The TOSCA (the Test of Self-Conscious Affect, Tangney and Dearing, 2002) has different versions for adolescents and adults. The adolescent version, the TOSCA-A, was used in the student samples, and the adult version, the TOSCA-3, in the conscript sample. The measure consists of scenarios designed to assess the respondent's shame, guilt, and defensive reactions. Each scenario is followed by four different responses representing brief descriptions of shame, guilt, and defensive responses (externalization and detachment) with respect to the specific context. The scenarios describe interpersonal situations, in most cases unintentionally harming a friend, or failure in achievement situations in school or work. The guilt items describe feeling bad about the behavior and willingness to repair the damage the behavior has caused, whereas the shame items include negative self-evaluations and motivation for avoidance. Externalization items describe avoiding responsibility for the situation, and detachment items refer to playing down the significance of the event. For example, the scenario (from the TOSCA-3) "At work, you wait until the last minute to plan a project, and it turns out badly" is followed by four responses: (a) "You would feel incompetent" (shame); (b) "You would think 'There are never enough hours in the day'" (externalization); (c) "You would think 'What's done is done'" (detachment); and (d) "You would feel: 'I deserve to be reprimanded for mismanaging the project'"
(guilt). Another example from the TOSCA-A involves an interpersonal situation: “You make a mistake at school and find out a classmate is blamed for the error” (a) I would think: “The teacher does not like the classmate.” (externalization); (b) I would think: “Life is not fair.” (detachment); (c) I would keep quiet and avoid the classmate. (shame); (d) I would feel unhappy and eager to correct the situation. (guilt).

Respondents are requested to rate, on a 5-point scale, the likelihood of their responding in each manner indicated. The scenarios were translated using back-translation procedure. Cronbach's alphas for the subscales ranged from .58-.80. (See studies 2-4 for details.)

The Hoffman (1975) story completion measure consists of two stories. The respondents were asked to complete the story, telling what the main character thinks and feels and what happens afterwards. The respondents were assumed to identify with the protagonist, who is depicted as being same sex and age as the respondent, a basically well-meaning person who committed the transgression under pressure. In one (cheating) story, the child who has lost many contests at a school picnic, wins a quiz by cheating. In the other (inaction) story, a child, hurrying with a friend to an important sports event (or movie), sees a young child who seems lost. (S)he suggests that they stop and help, but the friend talks her/him out of it. The next day the protagonist finds out the child run into the street and was hit by a car. The story completions were scored for maximum guilt, following Hoffman (1975), on a 7-point scale, in which 0=no evidence of guilt, 2= some self-criticism with low affect intensity (“his conscience bothered him”), 5= intense and long-lasting guilt that includes personality change (“She feels guilty... She never forgives herself and decides from now on to help those in need”). The validity of the measure was examined by looking at the means of perspective-taking and empathic concern by guilt score. It was found that the means of perspective-taking and empathic concern were consistently higher when the score from the story completion was higher. However, a look at the correlates of the few protocols in which the protagonist
commits suicide, to be assigned as 6 (self-punishment in extreme guilt) according to Hoffman’s system, showed that they did not fit in the pattern. They were scored as 0, because the IRI-scores of these respondents were similar as for the persons who did not express any evidence of guilt in the story completion. The references to suicide appeared to be a joke rather than an expression of extreme guilt: e. g. “He felt terrible and he decided to commit a suicide. The end!”. Two raters scored the protocols, with 87% agreement for the cheating stories and 78% for the inaction stories. The largest discrepancy was 1 point, and disagreements were solved by discussion.

Guilt and shame narratives were collected using open questions. The participants were asked to describe (in writing) a real life experience of guilt, shame or both. They were requested to answer the following questions:

What was the situation in which you felt guilt, shame, or both? What did you think, feel and do in the situation?
What kind of thoughts or behavior did you use to alleviate guilt or shame?
Were you successful in alleviating these emotions or did you continue to suffer from guilt or shame?

Participants were also asked to describe a situation when they had done something because they anticipated feeling guilt or shame afterwards if they did not do it. The data was content analysed following the example of Baumeister, Stillwell, and Wotman (1990). A deductive research strategy was applied (Mason, 2002). Hypotheses were generated in advance, and the basic dimensions that were studied were based on theory. The dimensions were emotion, situation, responsibility and coping. Each story provided by participants was classified according to its emotional content, according to whether it included guilt, shame or both. The emotion was coded based on the respondent’s own report of
whether he or she experienced guilt, shame, or both during the episode. The respondents used the terms guilt and shame in a way which was very consistent with Tangney’s (1998) definition of these emotions, with shame referring to self and guilt referring to behavior. The situations were also classified according to whether the writer was clearly responsible for the situation, or whether the responsibility was ambiguous, following the example of Ferguson et al. (2000). A situation was classified as ambiguous if the person had no control over the situation or the person did not know how the situation could be corrected. The categories for situation type and coping were created based on the data, applying qualitative content analysis according to the guidelines presented by Flick (2002). First the passages that were relevant for the studied concept were identified, and then similar passages were bundled and summarised further in order to reduce the data and reach a sufficient level of abstraction. The analysis yielded three main categories: reparative behavior, chronic rumination, and defenses. The coding was made separately for each category, according to whether the narrative included the reaction or not. In addition, the narratives were grouped into four situation types: interpersonal situations, achievement situations, norm violations and victim situations. A second coder classified 30 % of the narratives, and inter-rater agreement was between 91 and 97 % for all the categories. Differences were resolved by discussion.

2.2 Empathy

Dimensions of empathy were assessed using the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1994), a 28-item test consisting of four seven-item subscales that measure dimensions of empathy (empathic concern, personal distress, perspective-taking, and fantasy). For example, the scales included the following items: (a) "I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me " (empathic concern), (b)
"When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces" (personal distress), (c) "I believe that there are two sides to every question and I try to look at them both" (perspective taking), and (d) "I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me" (fantasy). Response choices ranged from 0 = “does not describe me well” to 4 = “describes me very well”. The items were translated using back-translation procedure. Cronbach's alphas for the subscales ranged from .62-.80. (See studies 2 and 4 for details.)

2.3 Values

Value priorities were measured using the Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz 1992). The survey contains 57 single value items, which are followed by a short explanation in parentheses (e. g., equality [equal opportunities for all]). Respondents rate the importance of each value item as a guiding principle in their lives on a 9-point scale (-1= opposed to my values; 0=not at all important; 7= of supreme importance). Ten values were formed from the single value items. To control for individual differences in scale use, proportional sum variables were used; that is, the values scores were divided by the personal mean of all 57 values (see Verkasalo, Tuomivaara, and Lindeman, 1996). The values scores, therefore, represent the relative importance to the person of each value compared to the other values, with the mean score for all 10 value scales being 1.00. The reliabilities fell within the ranges reported by Schwartz (2005b). (See studies 3 and 4 for details.)
RESULTS

1 Study 1

The aim of the study was to examine, whether shame is generally a more maladaptive emotion than guilt, or whether the adaptive value of the emotion is context-dependent. Alternative hypotheses were tested.

1. In line with the theory of Tangney and Dearing (2002), it was expected that reparative behavior would be more likely, and rumination and defenses less likely, in shame-free guilt situations than in situations of pure shame or combined guilt and shame, regardless of situational context.

2. Consistent with Ferguson et al (2000), it was expected that chronic rumination would be more likely to occur in ambiguous situations than unambiguous situations, regardless of emotion.

Based on the data, the guilt or shame situations described were divided into four categories. Most narratives described interpersonal situations (62%); the respondents felt guilty or ashamed of not being a good friend, spouse, parent, or relative. These feelings could also be directed to strangers; there were several stories of guilt or shame for not helping a drunken person lying in the street or not doing enough for poor people. Another common theme was achievement or performance (13%):
the person felt guilty or ashamed for not studying or working hard enough, eating or drinking too much or not keeping his or her home clean. These behaviours made the person feel inadequate or dissatisfied with him or her self, and the transgression was more against self than others. The third situation type was norm violations (14%): such behaviours did not directly hurt others, but they were against societal or religious norms, for example shoplifting, cheating on an exam, or having premarital sex. The fourth situation type was labelled as victimization (11%): these stories described situations in which the respondent was a victim of emotional, physical or sexual abuse, or suffered from some kind of psychological or physical illness, e.g. panic disorder. In these stories the respondents were in a victim’s role, but still felt shame or even guilt over the situation.

Combined guilt and shame occurred in 41 per cent of the narratives: There were negative self-evaluations and concern for how others perceive the self, but also concern for others and for the consequences of one’s behavior. In situations involving pure shame (24%) the focus was on others’ thoughts and reactions and on negative self-evaluations; however, in situations involving pure guilt (33%) these were not mentioned, but the focus was on one’s responsibility for the behavior’s consequences. In most stories the respondent’s responsibility was clear (73%): the writer knew how he or she should have behaved, and there was an obvious means by which the writer could have affected the situation. In 27% of the narratives the respondent’s responsibility for the situation was defined as ambiguous. For example, in victim situations it is not reasonable to hold the victim responsible, even though he or she may blame her or himself.

Coping was coded according to three categories: reparative behavior, chronic rumination, and defenses. Reparative behavior included behavior that was focused on correcting the cause of the guilt or shame. This behavior was different depending on the situation. For example, if a parent felt guilty for spanking his or her children, the person could try to
correct the situation by apologising to the children and avoiding such behavior in the future. Another example could be somebody who felt ashamed of having an unhealthy diet, which could be corrected by changing eating habits for the better. The reparative behavior category included also prosocial behavior that did not correct the original cause of guilt or shame, but was motivated by these emotions; for example that a person gets too much change in a café by mistake and does not return the money, but later gives money to charity to alleviate guilt. Also intention to behave differently in similar situations in the future were defined as reparative behavior in cases where there was no means to correct the situation, for example that the person one has not treated well has already passed away. Chronic rumination was coded when the writer described suffering considerably, and for a long period of time, from guilt or shame or indicated that he or she had not yet been able to alleviate the emotion and still continued to suffer from it. Defenses included externalising responsibility, minimising the importance of the event, or avoiding certain thoughts, persons or situations. Reparation occurred in 52% of all situations, defenses in 48%, and chronic rumination in 30% of the situations.

In order to get an overview of the data, optimal scaling was performed by SPSS. This analysis creates a distance matrix based on similarities and dissimilarities between objects. It is similar to multidimensional scaling, but it uses chi-square metrics as a basis for the distance matrix, and therefore it can be applied to categorical data. According to the created two-dimensional configuration (see the figure in article I), ambiguous situations were close to chronic rumination and combined guilt and shame, whereas unambiguous situations were close to guilt and absence of chronic rumination. This dimension explained 34% of the variation. On the other dimension, explaining 25% of the variation, shame was close to defenses and absence of reparation, whereas guilt and combined guilt and shame were nearly equally close to reparation and absence of defenses. The statistical significance of the specific
connections was tested by log-linear analysis. The interactions between responsibility, emotion and coping were not significant for any of the three types of coping. Against the expectations derived from Tangney and Dearing (2002), chronic rumination and defenses were not significantly related to emotion. However, reparative behavior was less likely in shame situations than in guilt situations or in situations of combined guilt and shame (Table 1.). The ambiguity of responsibility had no effect on the likelihood of defenses or reparative behavior, but ambiguous responsibility appeared to increase the likelihood of chronic rumination (Table 2.), in accordance with the view of Ferguson et al. (2000). A more detailed examination of the context revealed that chronic rumination occurred most often in victim situations (62%), and it was also common in interpersonal situations (34%), but it was rare in norm violation (12%) or achievement situations (13%). The three types of coping could all exist at the same time, but the likelihood of reparation was smaller when defensive thinking was used. However, neither defenses nor reparation were related to chronic rumination. In addition, emotion and responsibility were related; in ambiguous situations there was less shame-free guilt and more shame and combined guilt and shame than in unambiguous situations.
Table 1.  *Reparative behavior according to emotion*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>guilt</th>
<th>shame</th>
<th>guilt and shame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>reparative or prosocial behaviors as a coping method</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>25 (66%)</td>
<td>8 (30%)</td>
<td>28 (60%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>13 (32%)</td>
<td>19 (70%)</td>
<td>19 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. *Chronic rumination according to responsibility*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>responsibility</th>
<th>unambiguous</th>
<th>ambiguous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>reacting by chronic rumination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>21 (25%)</td>
<td>15 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>64 (75%)</td>
<td>15 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2 Study 2

This study focused on the connection between empathy and guilt, and the possible gender-specific features in these connections. Two different guilt measures were used, the TOSCA by Tangney and the Hoffman story completion measure. The two story completion scenarios are analyzed separately, because based on previous results (Helkama and Ikonen, 1986) they can be expected to show a different pattern of connections to other variables. The following hypotheses were formulated.

1. Empathic concern and perspective-taking are expected to be associated with both guilt measures.

2. In accordance with the Eisenberg et al. (2001) findings, perspective-taking is expected to be a better predictor of guilt in boys than girls.

3. Extrapolating from the Helkama and Ikonen (1986) findings, empathic concern and perspective-taking are expected to be more strongly associated with guilt over inaction among girls than among boys.

A two-way between-groups MANOVA was performed to investigate gender and age differences in empathy and guilt measures. The analyses were performed separately for empathy measures and guilt measures. There was a significant gender difference, girls scoring higher than boys, in the following variables (using Bonferroni-adjusted alpha level of 0.01): fantasy, empathic concern, personal distress, TOSCA-guilt, TOSCA-shame, guilt over inaction and guilt over cheating (see Table 3.). Significant age differences were found in guilt over inaction (Ms = 2.1, 2.3, and 2.9 for 7th, 8th, and 9th graders, respectively) and shame, (Ms = 15.4, 13.2, and 11.4 for 7th, 8th, and 9th graders, respectively); guilt over inaction was significantly higher for the oldest than the youngest
participants, whereas shame was significantly lower for the oldest than
the youngest. There was also a significant interaction between age and
gender for empathic concern. The scores for empathic concern were
higher for the oldest than the youngest girls (Ms = 16.2, 18.9, and 20.1
for 7th, 8th, and 9th graders, respectively), whereas for boys the pattern
was reversed (Ms = 14.9, 12.8, and 13.5 for 7th, 8th, and 9th graders,
respectively).

The correlations between guilt, shame and empathy measures are
presented in Table 4. The differences between TOSCA guilt and shame
were consistent with previous studies. Although the TOSCA guilt and
shame scales did correlate to some extent, shame was not related to the
story completion measures of guilt or perspective-taking and empathic
concern measures. Second, the three guilt indexes were rather weakly
associated with each other, with only one significant connection (the
TOSCA and guilt over cheating for boys). Third, the guilt indexes were
in general more strongly related to empathy than with one another.
Fourth, hypothesis 2 was supported in that perspective-taking was for
boys a significantly better predictor of guilt than for girls in the TOSCA
guilt and in guilt over cheating. The linear regression between
perspective-taking and the TOSCA guilt was r-square= 0.33 for boys and
0.09 for girls, and the interaction between perspective-taking and gender
was significant, p< 0.05. For empathic concern and the TOSCA guilt
there was no difference, r-square was 0.22 for both genders. The
possibility that empathic concern mediated the connection between
perspective-taking and the TOSCA guilt was tested using Sobel’s test.
When empathic concern was entered after perspective-taking,
perspective-taking was still a significant predictor for boys (β =.485, p
<.001) but not for girls (β =.153, p=.282). The mediation effect was not
significant for boys z =1.579, p =.114, but for girls it was close to
significance, z =1.182, p=.07. Fifth, as predicted, the pattern of
connections of the two projective guilt measures with the empathy
subscales was different for girls and boys. For girls, the empathy
measures predicted guilt over inaction better than they did guilt over cheating but for boys the pattern was the opposite. The linear regression between perspective-taking and guilt over cheating was $r^2 = 0.18$ for boys and 0.05 (negative regression) for girls, and between empathic concern and guilt over cheating, $r^2$ was 0.13 for boys and 0.03 for girls. Only the first difference reached significance. For guilt over inaction the pattern was opposite: the linear regression between perspective-taking and guilt over inaction was $r^2 = 0.02$ for boys and 0.10 for girls, and between empathic concern and guilt over inaction, $r^2 = 0.01$ (negative regression) for boys and 0.10 for girls. The latter difference was close to significance, $p=0.063$. 
Table 3.  The means and standard deviations for guilt, shame and empathy variables according to gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Girls</th>
<th>Boys</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tangney TOSCA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hoffman</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt (Ch)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt (I)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Davis IRI</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathic concern</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspective taking</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fantasy</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal distress</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note.  Guilt (Ch) – guilt over cheating
       Guilt (I) – guilt over inaction
Table 4. Correlations among the TOSCA and story completion guilt scales, the IRI empathic concern and perspective taking subscales, and the TOSCA shame scale, according to gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1.</th>
<th>2.</th>
<th>3.</th>
<th>4.</th>
<th>5.</th>
<th>6.</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1. TOSCA guilt</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.47**</td>
<td>.30*</td>
<td>.31*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Cheating</td>
<td>.32*</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Inaction</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Empathic concern</td>
<td>.47***</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Perspective-taking</td>
<td>.57***</td>
<td>.42**</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.32*</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. TOSCA shame</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The correlations for girls (N= 53) are above the diagonal, for boys (N=60) below diagonal.
* p< .05, ** p< .01, *** p< .001

3 Study 3

The purpose of this study was to examine how personal value priorities and tendencies to experience guilt and shame differ between genders in two samples, Peruvian and Finnish adolescents. The following hypotheses were formulated.

1. The Peruvians were expected to be more collectivistic than the Finns, whereas the Finns were expected to be more individualistic than the Peruvians. Consequently, it was expected that the Peruvians would value tradition and conformity more than the Finns would, and the Finns would
value hedonism, stimulation and self-direction more than the Peruvians would.

2. Gender differences in guilt, shame, and values were expected to be more consistent with the stereotypes of emotional, nurturing women and unemotional, competitive men in the Finnish sample than in the Peruvian sample.

The effect of gender and nationality to value preferences was examined by two-way MANOVA. There was significant main effect for both gender and nationality, and also a significant interaction between gender and nationality. The effect was examined in more detail with univariate ANOVAs that revealed that the strongest interaction effect was found for universalism, security, and hedonism; for power and conformity, there was a weak, but statistically significant effect. However, for conformity the effect did not reach significance if the stricter alpha level of .01 was used, as recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) in cases when the assumption of homogeneity of variances is violated, which was the case for conformity.

Gender differences were significantly larger for the Finns than for the Peruvians in universalism, security, and power, but in hedonism the gender difference was larger for the Peruvians (Figure 2). There was a significant nationality main effect for power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, benevolence, tradition, and conformity: The Finns scored higher in hedonism, stimulation, and benevolence, and the Peruvians scored higher in power, achievement, conformity, and tradition. For gender, there was a significant main effect in power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, universalism, benevolence, tradition, and security; boys scored higher in all of these values except benevolence and universalism.

Significant interaction was found for both guilt and shame, as shown in Figure 3. Inspection of the means revealed that gender difference in
guilt was larger for the Finns than for the Peruvians. For shame, there was a gender difference for both nationalities, but in the opposite directions: The Finnish girls scored higher in shame than the Finnish boys did, whereas the Peruvians boys scored higher in shame than the Peruvian girls did. In general, the Finns were more shame-prone than the Peruvians, and the Peruvians were slightly more guilt-prone than the Finns. When nationalities were combined, girls were more guilt-prone than boys overall.

Values related very weakly to guilt and shame in the Peruvian sample, whereas in the Finnish sample the connections were stronger and consistent with the motivational circle of values (see the results of Study 4). This may be due to the smaller variances for values in the Peruvian sample.

Figure 2. Values according to Gender and Nationality
4 Study 4

The objective of this study was to examine the connections between value priorities and proneness to guilt, shame, and empathy. The following hypotheses were formed.

1. Guilt-proneness will be positively related to self-transcendence and conservation values, and negatively related to openness and self-enhancement values.
2. Empathic concern and perspective-taking will be positively related to self-transcendence values, and negatively related to self-enhancement values.

3. Personal distress and shame-proneness will have a weaker relation to values than have guilt, empathic concern, and perspective-taking.

Pearson correlation coefficients for the adolescent sample are shown in Tables 6. As expected, guilt-proneness was positively related to universalism, benevolence, tradition, and conformity, and negatively related to power, hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction. The results for empathic concern were similar, but it was unrelated to conformity and tradition. As expected, shame and personal distress had fewer significant correlations with values than guilt, empathic concern, or perspective-taking. We tested the integrated hypotheses that relate each moral emotion to the full set of values by correlating the predicted with the observed order of correlations between moral emotions and values. For empathic concern, personal distress, and perspective taking, the Spearman correlations between the observed and hypothesized order of correlations were .86 (p < .01), .78 (p < .01), and .98 (p < .001). Similarly, for guilt, a Spearman correlation of .71 (p < .05) confirmed the integrated hypothesis. However, for shame the integrated hypothesis was not supported (r = .21, ns).

The correlation coefficients for the conscript sample are shown in Tables 5-6. The guilt-proneness variable was clearly skewed with a very high average; therefore logarithm transformation was used to improve normality of the distribution. The pattern of correlations was very similar to the pattern found in the adolescent sample. Furthermore, the findings concerning the differences between guilt and shame and personal distress and other empathy-dimensions were replicated: shame and personal distress had weaker connections to values than guilt, empathic concern, or perspective-taking. The integrated hypotheses specified that the
correlations between the moral emotions and the whole set of 10 values would follow the motivational circle of values. As in the adolescent sample, the integrated hypothesis was confirmed for guilt ($r = .94, p < .001$), empathic concern ($r = .90, p < .001$), and perspective taking ($r = .79, p < .01$). However, contrary to the results for the adolescent sample, it was also confirmed for shame ($r = .88, p < .001$), but rejected for personal distress ($r = .47, ns$).

We used regression analyses to assess how strongly values predicted tendencies for guilt, shame, empathic concern, perspective-taking, and personal distress. However, first we looked at the effects of gender. In the adolescent sample, gender was a significant predictor for all the dependent variables, girls scoring higher than boys. Girls also scored significantly higher on universalism, $F(1, 186) = 23.54, p < .001$, and benevolence $F(1, 186) = 15.93, p < .001$, whereas boys scored significantly higher in power, $F(1, 186) = 17.10, p < .001$, achievement, $F(1, 186) = 6.94, p < .01$, stimulation, $F(1, 186) = 4.67, p < .05$, and security, $F(1, 186) = 17.80, p < .001$. The associations between values and emotions differed somewhat between genders, but the differences were too small to reach statistical significance. Therefore, the effect of gender was controlled in the first step of the hierarchical regression analyses. Neither grade level nor school was related to the dependent variables, and consequently these variables were not controlled. Two models were calculated for each dependent variable, so that the opposite values, having high negative correlations with each other, did not appear in the same model, and the problem of multicollinearity was avoided. The first model included self-enhancement and openness values, whereas the second model included self-transcendence and conservation values. In the conscript sample there was no need to control for any variables, and therefore the regression analyses were performed entering the values in the first step. In both samples, values explained more of the variance of guilt than shame, and more of the variance of perspective-taking and empathic concern than personal distress. In the adolescent sample, the
results for the stronger models were $R^2 = .32, F(6, 181) = 14.23, p < .001$ for guilt and $R^2 = .15, F(6, 181) = 5.24, p < .001$ for shame. In the conscript sample, the results were $R^2 = .13, F(5, 249) = 7.33, p < .001$ for guilt and $R^2 = .05, F(5, 249) = 2.75, p < .05$ for shame. Personal distress had a weaker relation to values than empathic concern or perspective-taking, as hypothesized. In the conscript sample, the results were $R^2 = .21, F(5, 497) = 26.71, p < .001$ for empathic concern, $R^2 = .14, F(5, 497) = 15.80, p < .001$ for perspective-taking, and $R^2 = .03, F(5, 497) = 3.48, p < .01$ for personal distress. In the adolescent sample, the differences are better observable in $R^2$ change figures, because these models include the effect of gender, but the results were $R^2 = .23, F(6, 180) = 9.40, p < .001$ for empathic concern, $R^2 = .14, F(6, 179) = 5.00, p < .001$ for perspective-taking and $R^2 = .18, F(6, 176) = 6.25, p < .001$ for personal distress. (See the detailed regression results in the article IV.)
Table 5. Correlations between values and TOSCA guilt and shame for adolescent sample and conscript sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1. TOSCA guilt</th>
<th>2. TOSCA shame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Power</td>
<td>-.20**</td>
<td>-.24**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Achievement</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.22**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Hedonism</td>
<td>-.36**</td>
<td>-.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Stimulation</td>
<td>-.34**</td>
<td>-.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Self-direction</td>
<td>-.30**</td>
<td>-.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Universalism</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>.27**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Benevolence</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.22**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Tradition</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>.14*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Conformity</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.17*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Security</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Table 6. Correlations between values and empathy scales for adolescent sample and conscript sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1. IRI empathic concern</th>
<th>2. IRI personal distress</th>
<th>3. IRI perspective-taking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Power</td>
<td>-.29**</td>
<td>-.28**</td>
<td>-.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Achievement</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
<td>-.20**</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Hedonism</td>
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<td>4. Stimulation</td>
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<td>6. Universalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Benevolence</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
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<td>8. Tradition</td>
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<td>9. Conformity</td>
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<td>10. Security</td>
<td>-.22**</td>
<td>-.12**</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
DISCUSSION

1 Discussion of the main results

1.1 The nature of guilt and shame (Study 1)

Guilt and shame experiences were analysed based on autobiographical narratives provided by students. The aim of the study was to examine whether shame is generally more harmful to psychological well-being and interpersonal relations than is guilt, or whether the adaptive value of emotion depends on the context. In the light of the findings of the present study, it seems that both guilt and shame can motivate moral behavior in some contexts. However, at least in Finnish cultural context pure shame often leads to defensive behavior, usually avoidance, instead of reparation. This may be due to a cultural self-concept that emphasizes equality and independence; hierarchies are low and submission in front of others is seen as humiliating. Therefore expressing shame to others is probably seen as more difficult than avoiding persons and situations inducing shame, or even reacting aggressively in a shame-inducing situation. According to the present study, in actual experiences guilt and shame were often intertwined, and pure guilt and a combination of guilt and shame did not appear to differ much in terms of their consequences; in most cases both motivated reparation. This is in conflict with the view of Tangney and Dearing (2002), who believe that guilt is likely to be maladaptive when it becomes fused with shame. In some narratives
shame even appeared to motivate more profound soul-searching than guilt alone would have: what is wrong with my personality that makes me behave like this? Furthermore, defenses like rationalization, excuses and justifications were equally likely to be used in guilt and shame situations. Sometimes guilt was alleviated by thinking “this is not actually my fault” or “this is not really a big deal” instead of trying to correct the situation, consistent with the findings by Bybee, Merisca and Velasco (1998). In addition, the results were consistent with the view of Ferguson et al. (2000) who believe that both guilt and shame relate to psychological symptoms, when a person feels guilt or shame over something he or she is not directly responsible for. Chronic rumination was found to be more likely in situations where responsibility was ambiguous than in situations where the writer was clearly responsible, regardless of the nature of the emotional reaction. However, reparation was equally likely in situations of clear and ambiguous responsibility, which suggests that Hoffman (2000) is right in his claim that guilt motivates prosocial behavior, regardless whether the person is really responsible for the situation or not. Still, defensive thinking may sometimes serve one’s mental health better than taking responsibility for something one cannot control. In sum, although guilt and shame can have also pathological forms, they are important for morality, because they serve to restrict antisocial behavior and motivate moral behavior.

1.2 Empathy and guilt (study 2)

According to Hoffman (2000), the ability to feel guilty is based on the ability to feel empathy. Consistent with this assumption, both guilt measures that were used in this study, the TOSCA and the Hoffman story completion measure, were related to empathy. Interestingly, the TOSCA guilt and the two different Hoffman’s scenarios correlated more with empathy than with each other. Empathy appears to be an important factor
behind guilt experiences in general, but guilt experiences may be highly context-dependent. The lack of connections between the guilt measures can be explained by the differences between the TOSCA guilt and the two story completion scenarios. The TOSCA scenarios describe unintentional transgressions that take place mainly in interpersonal situations. The transgressions are not of very serious nature and are quite easily corrected. In contrast, the cheating story in the Hoffman measure describes intentional norm violation where there is no direct victim and “getting away with it” is quite easy. In addition, the inaction story in the Hoffman measure differs from both the TOSCA guilt and the cheating story: It describes a situation where the main character has not transgressed, but has not done something he or she possibly should have done. This scenario allows shifting the responsibility away from the self quite easily and blaming the others who could have prevented the unfortunate event (a runaway child getting hit by a car). While all these scenarios can create guilt that motivates moral or prosocial behavior, different individuals can perceive different types of scenarios as the most important in terms of morality. In fact, the present study showed that the main empathy scales, empathic concern and perspective-taking, were more strongly related with guilt over cheating in a competition for boys than girls, whereas for girls the empathy scales had stronger connection with guilt over not helping a lost child than for boys. It seems that boys and girls who describe themselves as empathetic may feel guilty in different situations, and perhaps emphasize different aspects of morality. As Gilligan (1982) suggested, it may be that boys are more concentrated on justice and fairness in their moral thinking, whereas girls may emphasize caring for others more than boys do. Furthermore, the findings of Eisenberg et al. (2001) were replicated; the cognitive aspect of empathy, perspective-taking, had a stronger connection to boys’ than girls’ guilt. For girls this connection was largely mediated by empathic concern. It is possible that boys’ guilt experiences are more directly based on cognitive evaluation of the situation than girls’ guilt
experiences are. However, it must be noted that, in general, girls appear more moral than boys do, because they scored higher than boys in empathic concern and all three guilt measures.

In addition, some age differences were detected. The TOSCA shame was found to be significantly lower for the oldest than the youngest participants, whereas guilt over not helping was higher for the oldest than the youngest. The increase in guilt over inaction with age is consistent with previous findings by Williams and Bybee (1994). There was also an interesting difference in the connection between age and empathic concern: for girls it increased with age, whereas for boys it decreased. Similar gender differences have been found by Davis and Franzoi (1991) and Eisenberg, Cumberland, Cuthrie, Murphy, and Shepard (2005). The finding that empathy increases with age only for girls could be interpreted reflecting girls’ development towards emotional, nurturing gender role.

1.3 Values, guilt, shame and culture (study 3)

Within the research of morality and emotions, there has been a lot of discussion on gender differences. However, the possible culture-specific features of these gender differences have been addressed only rarely. In the present study, two different cultures, Finland and Peru, were compared. As expected, these cultures differed considerably in terms of values: the Peruvians valued tradition, conformity, power, and achievement more than the Finns did, whereas the Finns valued hedonism, stimulation and benevolence more than the Peruvians did. Consistent with previous findings (Schwartz and Rubel, 2005) gender differences in values where found to be stronger among Finns than Peruvians. For the Finns, gender differences were significantly larger than for the Peruvians in valuing power, universalism, and security; girls valued universalism more than boys did, whereas boys valued power and
security more than girls did. However, in hedonism the gender difference was larger for the Peruvians; the Peruvian girls scored very low on valuing hedonism. Still both Finnish boys and girls scored higher than Peruvian boys. In general, there was less variance in value priorities among the Peruvians than among the Finns. This is consistent with the finding that conformity was considered as the most important value among the Peruvians. The cultural expectations concerning value priorities appear to be quite similar for both genders in Peru, except that even less hedonism is allowed to girls than to boys. Respecting traditions and conforming to social norms is considered very important for both genders.

The results for guilt and shame proneness were also interesting. Gender difference in guilt-proneness was larger among the Finns than among the Peruvians. Finnish boys had lower scores in guilt-proneness than Finnish girls or both genders in Peru, consistent with the findings of Fischer and Manstead (2000) concerning the difference in guilt and shame between collectivistic and individualistic cultures. For TOSCA shame-proneness, measuring maladaptive shame reactions, the pattern was especially interesting: boys in Peru and Finland did not differ much, but the Peruvian girls had the lowest shame scores, whereas the Finnish girls had the highest. It is possible that the TOSCA does not include the situations that are especially shameful to Peruvian girls (for example violations of religious norms or cultural gender role expectations), but it is also possible that Finnish girls really are more prone to maladaptive shame than Peruvian girls. This would be in line with the results of Costa, Terracciano, and McCrae (2001) who found that women tend to score higher in neuroticism than men do, but this difference is most emphasized in individualistic, modern cultures.

In sum, it seems that cultural expectations concerning values and guilt-proneness are more differentiated according to gender in Finland than in Peru. The results of the present study support the view that the attributes connected to masculine and feminine gender roles differ
between cultures. It may be that in cultures where societal gender roles are different, emphasizing certain personality characteristics is less relevant in terms of gender identity.

1.4 Values and emotions (study 4)

Values and moral emotions have both been considered as important motivational forces behind moral behavior, but relations between values and moral emotions have been studied very little. Consistent with the hypotheses, this study revealed that guilt-proneness in transgression situations measured by the TOSCA was positively related to valuing universalism, benevolence, tradition, and conformity, and negatively related to the opposite values of power, hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction in both samples that were used, high school students and military conscripts. However, achievement related negatively to guilt-proneness only in the conscript sample. It can be concluded that emphasizing one’s personal interests or independence is related to low guilt-proneness, whereas valuing others’ well-being or the stability of the social system is related to high guilt-proneness. However, it is important to remember that conforming to societal norms may not always be the moral thing to do, if the society itself is immoral, for example if a certain group of people is being oppressed.

The results for empathic concern and perspective-taking were quite similar to the results for guilt-proneness: they were positively related to self-transcendence values and negatively related to self-enhancement values, but the relation to the conservation-openness value dimension was less clear. In general, empathic concern and perspective-taking were negatively related to openness values, and positively related or unrelated to conservation values, except security, which related negatively to empathy. Possibly the relation between empathy and conservation-
openness value dimension depends on culture; is empathy normative or not in the given social context?

As expected, shame and personal distress had rather weak and inconsistent connection to value priorities. Voluntary control appears to be less significant for these tendencies: being prone to shame and personal distress has little to do with a person’s conscious life goals. Therefore it is possible that someone has prosocial values, but he or she fails to behave prosocially due to neurotic tendencies, such as shame and personal distress. These findings are consistent with the results of Roccas et al. (2002) who found that neuroticism had a weaker connection to values than other Big Five personality factors.

Gender differences in values and emotions were consistent with expectations derived from previous research (Davis, 1994; Ferguson and Eyre, 2000; Tangney and Dearing, 2002; Schwartz and Rubel, 2005): Girls scored higher than boys in guilt, shame, empathic concern, and personal distress, and in benevolence and universalism values, whereas boys scored higher than girls in the values of power, achievement, stimulation and security. These findings are in line with gender stereotypes of emotional, nurturing women and competitive, tough men.

The participants of the study were all old enough to deliberate on their life goals, and therefore it is likely that there are bidirectional influences between values and moral emotions. Thinking of values can elicit emotions (Rokeach, 1973), and experiencing emotions in certain situations can influence a person’s conceptions of the desirable life goals. It is likely that direction of influences between values and emotions depends on the emotion in question: some emotions may be so strong that they affect value priorities, (e.g., fear leads to denying the value of stimulation), while other emotions perhaps follow values, (e.g.,“I value traditions, and therefore I feel guilty over breaking traditional norms”). Values of organizations and communities are likely to affect the personality of the individuals living in them. For example, a person working in a company in which competition and personal achievements
are highly valued, may learn not to react empathetically to others’ emotions. In the light of the present findings, it seems that environments that emphasize self-enhancement or openness values are likely to discourage prosocial behavior, whereas emphasizing self-transcendence or conservation values is likely to encourage it. However, the connection between moral emotions and values was clearly stronger for the self-transcendence-self-enhancement dimension than for the openness-conservation dimension. It is possible that conservation values are more important in terms of moral motivation in traditional cultures, whereas in modern cultures, such as Finland, morality is mainly based on benevolence and universalism values. It is clear that more intercultural research is needed for better understanding of values’ role in moral motivation in different cultures.

2 Methodological concerns

2.1 The samples

As often is the case in psychological studies, the samples were not representative of the Finnish adolescent population. The samples comprised of middle-class adolescents living in urban areas, who attended certain schools and classes at the time of the data collection. Therefore the results cannot be reliably generalized to groups with different demographics. The narrative data used in study 1 included mainly women who were attending university courses, and therefore it is uncertain whether the results apply to men or persons with lower education.
2.2 The measures

Measuring individual tendencies to experience guilt and shame has been a very challenging task in psychological research, and all methods have their own limitations (Ferguson and Stegge, 1998). The TOSCA (the Test of Self-Conscious Affect, Tangney and Dearing, 2002) is based on a certain definition of these emotions, and there are types of guilt and shame that this measure does not cover. The TOSCA does not include chronic, unresolved guilt feelings that could perhaps have a similar relationship to other variables as has the TOSCA measure of shame. Furthermore, it does not include shame that leads to positive interpersonal behavior: shame is always assumed to be connected to the avoidance of responsibility. Only some of the possible contexts for feeling guilt and shame are included in the TOSCA; there are no scenarios in which the transgression would be intentional, it would have serious consequences or it would be recurrent. In addition, there are no scenarios in which behavior would harm a distant out-group instead of friends. However, the TOSCA appears to reliably measure a tendency towards socially adaptive guilt reactions.

Another method that was used in studying guilt and shame, autobiographical narratives, has some advantages compared to questionnaire measures, but also some limitations. According to Baumeister, Stillwell, and Wotman (1990), the study of autobiographical narratives has both strengths and weaknesses as a psychological methodology. It is possible that the respondents fail to report their thoughts, emotions, and behavior accurately or even deliberately lie. However, narratives can provide insight into how people construct their experiences and what kind of motivations they have. Furthermore, the advantage of narrative data is that the situations are authentic; it would be impossible to include serious and traumatizing incidents in a scenario-based measure or in laboratory research. On the other hand, creating
coding categories can be difficult: each story is a bit different, but still they need to be divided to a reasonable number of categories.

The Hoffman story completion measure (1975) has been rarely used for measuring guilt proneness. It is possible that skills to express oneself in writing affect the results to some extent. However, the validity of the measure was examined by looking at the means of perspective-taking and empathic concern by guilt score, and the means of perspective-taking and empathic concern were consistently higher when the score from the story completion was higher. Therefore this measure seems to assess empathy-based guilt the way it is intended to.

The Schwartz value survey is based on an assumption that the value structure is the same in different populations. The samples sizes were not very large in this study, so the results of multidimensional scaling would not necessarily be reliable. However, correlations among values indicate that the value structures of the samples were quite close to the hypothesized value structure. Furthermore, the reliabilities were not especially low for any of the values (.53 was the lowest), and the reliabilities fell mainly within the ranges reported by Schwartz (2005b). The reliabilities were quite similar in all three studied samples (Finnish adolescents, Finnish military conscripts and Peruvian adolescents).

All the measures that were used were self-report measures, and it is possible that some individuals try to present themselves more favourably than they really are. On the other hand, this study focused on constructs reflecting moral motivation. Individual motivations are quite difficult to study without asking the subjects themselves how they think or feel. Peer-evaluations from close friends or relatives could perhaps be useful, but they were not available for the studied samples.

The TOSCA and the IRI had to be translated for this study. The translations were made by persons fluent in Finnish and English or in Finnish, English and Spanish. The final formulations were discussed, and the translations were tested on the target groups. The factor structures and scale reliabilities were quite close to those of the original versions,
which indicates that the translated versions of the measures were reasonably reliable.

3 Future studies

In the future, research should perhaps concentrate on guilt and shame as a process: what are the antecedents and consequences of these emotions in different social environments, and how personality characteristics and situational factors interact to facilitate or inhibit coping. For example, cultural environment is likely to affect the situations that are defined as shameful or guilt-producing, and also the ways of coping with guilt or shame. Furthermore, cultural gender roles probably influence the contexts that are experienced as shameful or guilt-producing. Due to the complicated nature of guilt and shame, there is not very much cross-cultural research on the topic yet. However, understanding how guilt and shame influence social relations in different cultures would be important. Based on the present study, maladaptive shame tendency appeared to be especially strong among Finnish girls. More research is needed to find out whether this finding is due to the specific contexts in the TOSCA measure, or is it a more general tendency. If it is, where does it come from? Furthermore, more research is needed to understand how boys and girls are socialized in different cultures; how gender-related expectations differ and how men and women experience their gender identity in different cultures. Also the development of moral motivation requires further study; how values, moral emotions and moral behavior develop? Besides parenting, it would be important to study also other social relations that are likely to affect a child’s morality: other significant caregivers, siblings, and peer groups. Important question would also be how, for example, school and media communicate cultural expectations concerning boys’ and girls’ values and moral emotions.
4 Practical implications

First, this study supported the view that in order to become a moral and psychologically healthy individual, it is important to learn to feel guilty when it is appropriate, and to learn how to cope with guilt and shame in a positive way. In terms of empathy it is important to react to others’ emotions, but in a well-regulated way; to feel sympathy without becoming overwhelmed by the emotions. The basis for these skills is created in childhood, within family and other significant social environments.

The present study revealed that in spite of the societal equality between genders, gender differences in morality-related constructs are rather large and consistent among Finnish adolescents. This indicates that, at least for some characteristics, gender stereotypes are quite strict in Finnish culture. This may have some negative implications. It is possible that individual personality characteristics are not always appreciated, but certain type of behavior is expected from boys and girls, for example that being emotional and caring is not seen as appropriate for a boy. In addition, demanding more from girls than boys in terms of prosocial behavior may impede boys’ moral development. A larger range of possible ways of thinking and behaving for both boys and girls could make behavior more flexible and adaptive in different situations. Therefore it could be useful if parents and other educators would not promote very strict gender stereotypes, but encouraged versatility instead.
5 Conclusions

The moral emotions of empathy, guilt and shame are often considered important for moral motivation. However, it is important that these emotions are experienced in adaptive forms. There is a lot of evidence that mere vicarious experiencing of others' emotions does not always lead to positive empathy reactions, but it is important to be able to regulate emotions in a way that makes the emotional arousal tolerable and helps to concentrate on other people's perspectives. Regulating emotions is also important in the context of guilt and shame. Especially guilt has been seen as an emotion that motivates prosocial behavior, because it highlights one's responsibility for others' wellbeing. However, exaggerated sense of responsibility can be exhausting and damaging for mental health. It would be good to learn to feel guilty only in situations that are controllable and can be solved in a positive way. Also shame can have positive or negative effects depending on situation. In serious transgressions experiencing shame in addition to guilt is often seen as important, but coping with shame in a positive way is essential. If a person becomes overwhelmed by shame, he or she may turn to maladaptive defenses, for example avoiding responsibility when one should not or even behaving aggressively.

In addition to moral emotions, values are important concepts when analyzing the sources of moral motivation. The Schwartz value model describes the basic dilemmas in human life: how to find balance between stability and change, selfishness and unselfishness? Even though it is clear that for any individual, some degree of selfishness and independence is necessary, self-transcendence and conservation values appear to be the “moral values”. Complying with societal norms and treating others kindly is usually seen as moral behavior. Of course there are situations when societal norms are morally wrong, and not complying is the moral thing to do. Still a certain degree of conformity can be seen as a prerequisite for a stable society. Moral motivation can be defined as
a combination of values (and moral principles based on those values) and emotional tendencies. Values and emotional tendencies are related but separate concepts; values are cognitions of the desirable, and emotions may be elicited by those cognitions, or alternatively emotional reactions in certain situations can affect the cognitions of the desirable.

Two things are needed for moral behavior: ability and motivation. They are related constructs, but they can be differentiated. First, certain cognitive abilities are necessary for understanding the needs of other people and the social environment. Second, the person needs to be motivated to behave in a way that benefits others and the society. It can be assumed that there are two main reasons why a person does not behave in a prosocial or moral way. First, the person may not consider the well-being of others as an important goal in his or her life, is emotionally unresponsive to others and behaves accordingly. Second, the person may value the well-being of others, but is unable to behave in a constructive way due to neurotic tendencies, such as proneness to shame or personal distress, which have been found to be related to avoidance instead of prosocial behavior. In a similar vein, it can be assumed that there are two routes to moral or prosocial behavior, more cognitive and more emotional, although cognition and emotion can be intertwined. Some people may be more motivated by values than emotions; they may not be prone to strong emotional reactions, but realize that certain goals are more preferable than others, and thus are guided by certain moral principles. Others, for example young children, may be more guided by emotional reactions in specific situations, but do not have very clear cognitive representation of their moral principles. Consequently, moral behavior can perhaps be enhanced by appealing to either thinking (what are your goals in life, what kind of person would you like to be?) or emotions (how do you feel when you have caused distress to others?).

Both values and emotional tendencies are acquired through socialization process. Cultures differ considerably in terms of the values and emotions that are emphasized. Cultural values and moral codes are
conveyed through families, school, media and other societal institutions. However, there are also significant differences in values and morality between groups within a culture. Previous studies and the present study have shown that gender is a factor that relates strongly to individual values, moral thinking and emotional tendencies. However, gender differences appear to be stronger in some cultural contexts than others, which indicates that they are not merely biological differences, but that the differences are also affected by cultural conceptions of gender. Being a man or being a woman involves different things in different cultural environments. In the future, it would be important to understand more fully how different social groups shape individual’s values and moral tendencies.
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