



Faculty Faculty of Social Sciences		Institution– Department Network of European Studies (Political Science)	
Author Adam Gordon Mackie			
Title The Impact of National Identity on the Brexit Vote: Explaining the Variance in Support of the European Union Between Scotland and England.			
Subject: European Studies (Political Science)			
Level: Masters Thesis		Date: May 2018	Number of pages: 80
Abstract <p>This thesis will explore the variance in support of the European Union between Scotland and England and explain the Brexit referendum vote through a focus on identity and nationalism. A theory of allegiance is developed to explain the linkage between Scottish and English nationalism and opinion formation vis-à-vis the European Union. The paper finds that national identity played a key role in how people voted in the Brexit referendum as it shapes where individuals locate the terminal political community.</p>			
Keywords: Brexit; nationalism; national identity; globalisation; theory of allegiance; terminal political community			
Säilytyspaikka – Förvaringställe – Where deposited			
Muita tietoja – Övriga uppgifter – Additional information			

**The Impact of National Identity on the Brexit Vote: Explaining the Variance in
Support of the European Union Between Scotland and England.**

Adam Mackie
University of Helsinki
Faculty of Social Sciences
European Studies
Political Science
Master's Thesis

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	5
Abstract	6
Introduction	7
Structure of the Thesis	9
Research Question	11
Chapter One: A Brief History of Britain in Europe	11
Chapter Two: The Challenge to the Elitist Project and the Increasing Importance of Public Opinion and the Ways in which it is Shaped	15
2.1: From ‘Permissive consensus’ to ‘constraining dissensus’.....	15
2.2: Approaches to Analysing what influences Opinion on European Integration.....	17
2.2.1: Cognitive Mobilisation.....	17
2.2.2: Domestic Politics	19
2.2.3: Utilitarian Theories	21
2.2.4: Theories of Identity	22
Chapter Three: The Current Approach to Explaining the Brexit Result	25
3.1: Linking Globalisation to Brexit	27
3.1.1: Globalisation as a Concept.....	27
3.2: Conceptualising the EU- How to View the European Union as a Power	29
3.3: The Desideratum of Managing Globalisation and the Lack of EU Intent	32
Chapter Four: Nationalism, Identity and Allegiance: A comparison of Scotland and England	36
4.1: Developing a theoretical background to examining the impact of the construction of identity on the formation of opinion of the EU	36
4.2: English Nationalism	37
4.2.1: English Nationalism: A Problematic Existence.....	38
4.2.2: The (Re) Birth of Englishness and English Nationalism.....	38
4.2.3: English Nationalism as the Substitute for Imperial Power	39
4.2.4: English Nationalism as the Product of Asymmetric Devolution	40
4.2.5: European Integration as the Cause of Emergence of English Nationalism.....	42
4.2.6: Summing up English Nationalism	44
4.3: Scottish Nationalism	45
4.3.1: The Construction of Scottish Nationalism	45
4.3.2: Contemporary Scottish Nationalism.....	45
4.3.3: The Problems with the decolonialisation Argument	46
4.3.4: 20 th Century Scottish Nationalism: A Leftist Movement	47
Chapter 5: Methodology	49
5.1: Data Selection	49
5.2: Dependent Variables	50
5.3: Independent Variables	51
Chapter 6: Results and Discussion	52
6.1: Results.....	52
6.2: Discussion of Results	55
Conclusion	58
References	60

Annex I.....65
Annex II.....69
Annex III.....73
Annex IV.....77

Acknowledgements

Writing theses is a long and difficult process and requires help from others. This is a short thank you to those who have helped with the formulation of ideas, the writing process, the methodological approach of the paper and the editing of the paper. First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor Sergei Prozorov from the University of Helsinki who helped with the development of ideas through critical discussion. I would also like to thank professor Mikko Mattila who helped in the early stages of the thesis, with the turning of an idea into a workable project. While the writing process was relatively trouble free, I have very little experience with statistical analysis so I would like to thank Achillefs Papageorgiou who gave advice regarding the type of statistical model to use. Lastly, and by no means least, I would like to thank Annarosa Suojanen who spent time reading and re-reading a draft of the thesis, ironing out grammatical errors.

Abstract

This thesis will explore the variance in support of the European Union between Scotland and England and explain the Brexit referendum vote through a focus on identity and nationalism. A theory of allegiance is developed to explain the linkage between Scottish and English nationalism and opinion formation vis-à-vis the European Union. The paper finds that national identity played a key role in how people voted in the Brexit referendum as it shapes where individuals locate the terminal political community.

Introduction

The Brexit referendum revealed one of the great underlying tensions in the United Kingdom, that the 'constitution of the United Kingdom has always had something of a Jeekyll and Hyde nature; an internal and uneasy tension between its unitary and union state identities' (McCorkindale 2016: 354). The result of the referendum has exemplified the stark political, economic and social divisions between Scotland and England. The result has brought accusations of a democratic deficit- 'not since the poll tax has the democratic deficit at the heart of the union been so clearly exposed' (McCorkindale 2016: 356). This thesis is concerned with the exploring of the differences between Scottish and English public opinion vis-à-vis the European Union. The thesis seeks to explain the very pro- EU attitudes found in Scotland and the Eurosceptic attitudes found in England by introducing identity and its construction into the debate on the causes of the variations in voting patterns across the constituent states of the United Kingdom in the Brexit referendum.

Since the early 1990's, academic attention has turned to studying what influences public opinion on the European Union. The early decades of European integration post second world war were characterised by elite decision making out-with the watchful eye of the European public, gaining support through permissive consensus (Hooghe and Marks 2008). The turning point came with the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty 2001 which fundamentally changed the relationship between national citizens and the European Union. The treaty politicised the EU, brought European integration into the realm of domestic party politics and mobilised public opinion on Europe. Numerous approaches have been adopted to explain public opinion towards the EU and European integration, from cognitive mobilisation (Inglehart 1970), to utilitarian arguments based on economic cost-benefit analysis (Gabel and Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998), as well as those stressing the importance of the domestic political situation (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Franklin 1995; Anderson 1998). Another area of study has concerned the impact of national identity. Carey and Lebo (2001) have looked at the levels of attachment to nations in relation to other geographic political entities, McLaren (2002 and 2007) has looked at the perceived cultural threat that European integration poses to the existing national culture. Some have attempted to transcend identity. Van Kersbergen (2000) adopted a theory of allegiance and argued that people only support European integration in the instance of the existence of a secondary allegiance, which

occurs when such secondary allegiance facilitates the primary allegiance through material support, aiding the ability of the primary political power to fulfil its obligations to the ruled. This thesis will test all approaches mentioned above and will put forward an argument that combines rather than separating Van Kersbergen's theory of allegiance and identity in order to explain national differences in support for the EU between Scotland and England.

The referendum itself was born out of political fear and grave miscalculation. The growth of Euroscepticism that has developed apace across the continent has its strongest sentiments in England. Britain voted to leave the European Union by a majority of 52%. Yet, there were great variations in voting patterns, particularly national variations, which are most obvious between Scotland- voted by a 62% majority to remain with every electoral region voting to remain- and England, which voted by 52% to leave. Thus far, as a result of the temporal proximity to the event, there has been little academic research on the main drivers of the Brexit result and secondly, on the national variations in support for European integration. The first publications, like those on the rise of populism in general, have taken globalisation as the explanatory factor behind Brexit (Hobolt 2016). The globalisation of culture and of the economy have created distinct winners and losers. The winners representing those with a high education level who can both compete and flourish in a more open and competitive market. The losers representing to lower echelons of society who occupy low skilled jobs and are vulnerable to foreign competition. While this may seem to support the Brexit result, it cannot explain Scotland's support for European integration, as it has equally high income inequality, is as economically diverse and has higher per capita levels of immigration, thus, Scotland is a significant exception to the globalisation argument.

This paper will employ national identity and a theory of allegiance (Van Kersbergen 2000) to explain both the Brexit referendum result and the national variations in support of European integration and the European Union. It will show that in Scotland the terminal community is the European Union due to the existence of a dual allegiance amongst the Scottish public, which is created through necessity, whereby the EU is seen as an essential organisation in the relationship between the primary ruler and the ruled in Scotland as it aids with the rulers' obligations- that being the creation of an independent Scotland within European political structures. Conversely, it will show that in England, due to numerous factors including history and global

position, the terminal community is Westminster and thus the strength of dual allegiance is much lower, resulting in lower levels of support for and attachment to the European Union.

Structure of the Thesis

This paper will be divided into six chapters. Chapter one gives an overview of the the history of the United Kingdom within the European Union. It describes the U.K.'s oft cited 'awkward relationship' with Europe. The chapter briefly discusses the emergence of Eurosceptic ideas in the 1970's and 1980's before detailing the domestic political consequences of the Maastricht Treaty 1992 and the resulting popularisation of Euroscepticism in British politics. Finally, it will give an introduction to the referendum and the Brexit campaign.

Chapter two will give a theoretical overview of the most substantiated arguments of what mobilises public opinion on European integration. It will discuss the theory of cognitive mobilisation which predicts that those who are of higher cognitive facilities are more supportive of the European Union. Secondly, the chapter will deal with utilitarian theories which argue that those who benefit economically or professionally from European integration will be more supportive of the European Union. The chapter will then introduce the theories of public opinion which relate to the domestic political context, whereby supranational politics is seen as something beyond the comprehension of the general public, thus public attitudes towards European integration develop from political cues arising from the domestic political context. Lastly, the chapter will discuss works relating to the role of national identity in forming citizen attitudes towards European integration in which the extent to which the national identity is inclusive or exclusive is the determining factor in whether a country is supportive of or in opposition to European identity. Linked to identity, is the theory of allegiance which will also be discussed, giving an insight into why people may locate the terminal political community in an institution beyond the national government.

Chapter three details the limited publications concerning the Brexit referendum, analysing the only current approach to explaining the Brexit vote. The chapter discusses the approach by Hobolt (2016) and dispels the focus on utilitarian arguments. The thesis, however, does have interest in Hobolt's linking of globalisation to the Brexit result, which is addressed later in the chapter. The chapter seeks to link globalisation the EU and the effects of globalisation felt within national communities.

Although the EU is synonymous with globalisation, it is important to tease out the actual linkages. The chapter seeks to do this through exploring the type of power the EU is and whether it has the power to influence global globalisation, limit its negative effects and protect European states. The chapter establishes that as a normative power with considerable market influence, the European Union should be judged in its performance of globalisation management. It is this judgement which is important- how individuals feel the EU performs in relation to the management of globalisation impacts upon how they view the cultural threat emanating from membership of the European Union.

Chapter four develops the argument of the thesis, discussing how Scottish and English identity are constructed differently and how these differences in construction make the respective populations more or less Eurosceptic. The chapter will link English nationalism to an attachment to British history and British institutions and show that where European integration interferes with either, 'Europe' is conceptualised as the 'other' thus creating exclusive English nationalism. It will subsequently be argued that the dominance of the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) in the Scottish parliament and the recent rise in support of an independent Scotland has led to those with Scottish identity to locate their terminal community at the EU level, with the EU being characterised as a facilitator of what Scottish nationalism seeks- an independent socially democratic European state. Chapter four is a short history of the UK in the European Union, with the simple aim of illustrating the claim of the UK as the awkward partner of the EU.

Chapters five and six present the methodology and the results of the analyses on the data. The thesis will test the theoretical approaches to explaining how public opinion on the European Union is shaped in relation the Brexit referendum by running statistical analysis on factors such as level of education, income level and type of employment. The data comes from the wealth of information located in the 7th wave of the British election study. Once the linkage between identity and attitudes towards the EU is confirmed, the paper will then look at the referendum debate north and south of the border and show how the debate mobilised identity vis-à-vis European integration.

Research Question

This thesis has one aim- understanding the stark divide in support of the European Union between Scotland and England. It seeks to understand the Brexit vote, and why it occurred, through an analysis which challenges the current explanatory approach- one which combines globalisation and measurements of individual economic utility arguments. It argues that the difference can, in part, be explained by nationalism and how it is constructed. The construction of nationalism and what it means for the location of the legitimate sovereign power is seen by this paper as an important driver in how individuals view the European Union and, therefore, the nationality with which one identifies is important in shaping their views on European integration. This paper seeks to answer the following question;

To what extent did national identity affect how individuals voted in the Brexit referendum in 2016?

Chapter One: A Brief History of Britain in Europe

The United Kingdom has always had an awkward relationship with European integration, the U.K has often fluctuated between acceptance of integration and opposition to it. The EU has always been 'among the most divisive issues in British politics' (Oliver 2015: 77). The UK's history within the European Union has been one of 'aloofness, vetoes and opt-outs, within a political and media debate that has been largely negative, even hostile, and sometimes xenophobic' (Oliver 2015: 77). What separates British Euroscepticism from continental Euroscepticism is the centrality of the sense of belonging, with respect to Great Britain and Europe, 'the sense of belonging is always in doubt' (Daddow 2012: 1221). This chapter will give a brief overview of Britain's Europe question and describe the awkward partnership between the UK and the EU before giving a brief introduction to the Brexit referendum campaign in 2016.

The post world war era saw the development of international institutions and with the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC) came into existence. The project was born out of the desire for Europe to move in a new direction in the second half of the 20th century, one removed from the trauma of two world wars and the general consensus was that Europe required 'a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom...(it required) a kind of United

states of Europe' (Churchill 1946). Churchill supported the beginning of the European project, however, opted for British involvement from a distance. The first half of the 20th century, according to Britain, was the result of a continental problem, thus the project should be a continental project which excluded the integration of Britain. The Treaty of Rome was initially ratified by the six founding members- France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries. The UK first announced interest in joining the community under the Conservative leadership of Macmillan, yet, it was not until 1973 that British integration into the European Economic Community occurred.

There is no left-right ideological basis to Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom, rather it has been a discourse which has troubled all political parties. Both of the major British political parties oscillate between hard and soft Euroscepticism over time. Soft Euroscepticism is a rejection of specific EU policies or where there is a prominence of national interest over integration. Hard Euroscepticism is a more general and fundamental rejection of the European Union. It is between these two points that the British political elite oscillate between. The EU is a political phenomenon 'that is central to the contemporary dynamics of government and opposition' (Gifford 2014: 514). The British political system, with its first past the post electoral system encourages and party oscillations vis-à-vis policy towards Europe, intensifies electoral competition and makes difficult any cross-party consensus on Europe, thus giving the UK-EU relationship a distinctive uncertainty.

Euroscepticism, although not termed as such, first arose in Britain during the mid 1970's with Labour being elected in 1974 on an election campaign promising a referendum on continued EEC membership. Wilson's government argued for an exit from the union, with a preference for maintaining strong links with Britain's colonial past, with the commonwealth, and in doing so protecting national interest. The referendum result in 1975 was overwhelming, almost 70% of voters voted to remain in the EEC, however, the result did show regional and national variations with Scotland being revealed as the most Eurosceptic area of the United Kingdom. Although the vote convincingly kept the UK within the EU, it brought Europe into domestic politics. While Thatcher was pro European integration in 1975, by the 1980's the Conservative's commitment to Europe had begun to decline. Conservative support for Europe was predicated upon a 'narrow trade-based idea of European integration that was unlikely to be adaptable to the ambitious programmes for political and economic integration that were launched in the 1980's' (Geddes 2004: 192). Yet, with deepening integration

in Europe, particularly as a result of the Single European Act, the Thatcher government began receding back to the worries of the Wilson government by engaging with concerns relating to the protection of parliamentary sovereignty. During her Brugge speech (1988) Thatcher laid out her concerns relating to the ever growing influence of the European Community and from then on, proclaimed Britain's superiority over European integration, arguing that 'British democracy, parliamentary sovereignty, the common law...(may be) subordinated to a remote European bureaucracy, resting on very different traditions' (Thatcher 1995: 743). From Thatcher onwards, the Conservative party have been divided on the issue of Europe. Interestingly, however, the anti-Europe sentiments which arose from the Thatcher era were countered in Scotland. With Thatcher's neoliberal economic policies, deindustrialisation and the breaking up of the trade unions, Scotland began to look towards Europe as a force of social policy. While Thatcher effectively developed a discourse that was anti-European Community based upon British political traditions and the threat to their existence, her domestic policies and the impact they had on Scotland led to Scotland gradually transforming from the most Eurosceptic of the British nations to a prominent Europhile.

As a direct consequence of the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the creation of the European Union, Euroscepticism came into both terminology and political discourse, particularly in the U.K. The most significant result of Maastricht, in relation to the growth of Euroscepticism in Britain, was the forming of the Anti-Federalist League, which would go on to become the U.K. Independence Party (UKIP)- a centre right Eurosceptic party. The party sought Britain's withdrawal from the European Union and in doing so constructed a discourse relating to the protection of 'Britishness', promoting a Britain that is better off both culturally and economically without the EU (Vuorinen 2015). The rise of UKIP has been noteworthy. While it has continuously polled much better in second-order elections, the rise of the party has been impressive. The party won its first European Parliament seats in 1999, winning 3 seats, by 2014, UKIP were the largest British party represented in the European Parliament, receiving 27.5% of the vote (Polgar 2016: 86). The rise of UKIP, while only notable at European Parliament elections, fundamentally altered the politicisation of Europe in Britain, not simply keeping Europe in domestic political debate but making it the most important issue in British politics.

The rise of UKIP gave Euroscepticism increased visibility and influence, albeit from outside the governing elite. Their influence is, however, easily overstated. It was leading figures within consecutive governing Conservative parties who have kept Euroscepticism within the political mainstream (De Vries and Edwards 2009). By 2013, with the rise of UKIP, Eurosceptics within the Conservative Party had become more visible and after some backbench defections from the Conservatives to UKIP there was pressure for the Conservative leadership to engage with the issue of Europe at the 2015 general election. To appease the Eurosceptics within the party and stave off the challenge of from UKIP and the 2015 general election, David Cameron announced an in/out referendum on Europe if the Conservatives were elected. As with most other referendums, the Brexit referendum arose from domestic political contention and intra party divisions (Prosser 2016).

The Conservative 2015 general election manifesto promised a referendum on continued British membership of the EU by the end of 2017 if the party were elected to government. The Conservative majority win in 2015 began the referendum process. Cameron initially began negotiations with Brussels and the member states to illicit a new deal for the U.K within Europe. The 'new settlement' which covered issues such as migrants working benefits, protecting the financial interests of London and a treaty alteration which removed the U.K from being bound to 'an ever closer union' was ridiculed within the British public sphere as amounting to very little (Hobolt 2016). The perceived insignificance of the 'new settlement' by both the general public and the media led to it playing very little role in the Brexit campaign. The campaign itself was dominated by the two official campaign groups, 'vote leave' and 'Britain Stronger in Europe' with the campaign focussing primarily on the economy, immigration and parliamentary sovereignty, which was conceptualised as Britain 'taking back control'. The result of the referendum, which saw the U.K vote to leave the European Union revealed not only the awkward relationship between Britain and the EU but critically the stark differences in support for the EU between the constituent nations of the United Kingdom. Currently, explanations for the result have focussed on socio-economic issues, problematizing and covering up differences in support for the EU across Great Britain.

The puzzle that arises and the one which this thesis is concerned with is why Scotland and England have dissimilar levels of support for the European Union. England voted to leave the European Union by a majority of 53.4% while Scotland

voted to remain by a considerable majority of 62%. The thesis seeks to engage with this disparity through taking as its object the delineating feature between Scotland and England- nationality. It will test to what extent nationality played a role in the way in which individuals voted in the referendum and link in to how the respective nationalities are constructed vis-à-vis European integration, using concepts of the theory of allegiance to explain the stark contrasts in the levels of support.

Chapter Two: The Challenge to the Elitist Project and the Increasing Importance of Public Opinion and the Ways in which it is Shaped.

2.1: From 'Permissive consensus' to 'constraining dissensus'

Citizens of the European Union have historically had little opportunity to directly affect the major political decisions taken in the EU (Carrey 2002). The project of European integration, which led to the formation of the European Union, has often been referred to as an 'elitist project' (De Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). The elite driven nature of the European process has meant that decisions and policy output is neither particularly responsive to public preference nor sufficiently scrutinised by the public through channels which would encourage the democratic exchange of policy and critique (Scharpf 1997). In simple conclusion, the role of opinion of the general publics of European states was minimal, if not entirely absent. This, however, has begun to change. The role of public opinion has taken centre stage in the European integration process, shown by the steps taken to democratise the European Union, by the development of the pro-anti European integration cleavage in domestic political arenas across Europe and the growth of the Eurosceptic narrative.

During the first three decades of European integration, public opinion vis-à-vis integration was dormant. These decades saw European integration in a state of 'permissive consensus' (Hooghe and Marks 2008) whereby deals at the European level were at the sole preserve of elites. Haas (1958: 17) effectively summarises the popular feeling relating to European decision making,

“The emphasis on elites in the study of integration derives its justification the bureaucratized nature of the European organisations...in which basic decisions are made by leadership.”

Not even the development of the institutional set up at the European level was sufficient for the politicisation of European integration and for the active involvement of the mass public. Integration was a non-issue for the mass public, primarily due to the prevailing facts that public attitudes towards integration were superficial (thus preventing the creation of a stable cleavage which could shape party positions on Europe), that the issue of integration was of low salience to most Europeans and that issues which arose from integration were 'sui generis' to the traditional cleavages which structured domestic political competition (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 6-7). These 'facts', as identified and described by Hooghe and Marks (2008) have been fundamentally reconstructed. Public attitudes have matured and have become genuine thus resulting in a stable European cleavage within the domestic political arena. European integration, which the dominant cleavage is based upon, has become an issue of high salience and no longer are the issues that derive from integration seen as independent from domestic politics. Evidence of this can be found in domestic elections- in the 1970's national elections in the U.K saw campaigns which neglected the European issue, only 2.5% of campaign statements concerned European integration, by 2005, the issue of European integration topped the campaign statements (Hooghe and Marks 2008).

The era of 'permissive consensus' came to an abrupt end during the 1990's, with the Maastricht Accord 1991 beginning the process of European integration by 'constraining dissensus' (Hooghe and Marks 2008). The terminological shift from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus, according to Hooghe and Marks, reflected the change in reality that future European integration was faced with- elites are no longer both insulated from public opinion but rather must 'look over their shoulders when negotiating European issues' (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 6). This shift is a reflection of the growing competencies of the European Union. As the competency of the EU grew and there was a greater ceding of power from national governments to the European level, simultaneously there was a greater politicisation of the decision making processes of the European institutions which engaged the European citizenry. With the Maastricht Accord 1991 and the signing of the treaty in 1992, 'decision making on European integration entered the contentious world of party competition' (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 7). With this has come the increasing importance of public attitudes and opinion towards the integration process and thus they have become 'a field of

strategic interaction among party elites in their contest for power' (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 9).

Maastricht was a turning point, with the monetary union and the harmonisation of economic policy. The integration process has created a confluence between the European level and the national domestic level with both levels mutually affecting the other. The opening up of the national political arena to European influence through the ceding of sovereignty and the simultaneous impact that national politics has on the development of the European union and integration has increasingly brought public opinion to the fore, removing the veil of independence that European integration once had as an elitist project. Although 'few scholars would argue that European integration is driven solely by public sentiment, even fewer would argue that public opinion plays no role in the process of integration' (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993: 508). Thomassen (2009) has further argued that this increased awareness of public opinion has become central to discussions concerning European integration and the legitimacy of the EU.

Therefore, unlike the era of permissive consensus, it is now accepted that any current or future plans regarding integration are reliant upon the general support of European citizens (Hobolt 2009). The increasing centrality of public opinion in debates concerning the future of Europe and the integration process has led to the explosion of research on what drives public opinion and attitudes towards integration. What follows is a summary of the existing literature before an opening up and in-depth analysis of how national identity affects public opinion on European integration and how this may provide some explanations for why Scotland is pro-European Union and England is much more Eurosceptic.

2.2: Approaches to Analysing what influences Opinion on European Integration

2.2.1: Cognitive Mobilisation

The earlier approaches focussed predominantly of the effects of cognitive mobilisation on individual attitudes towards European integration (Inglehart 1970; Inglehart 1977; Hurrelman 2014). Inglehart (1970) argues that those individuals with a high cognitive capacity are more likely to support supranational decision making bodies and likewise those with lower levels of education are, for reasons such as feeling threatened by the unknown, more inclined to be against European integration.

Inglehart (1970) begins with the observation that in the post world war two era, levels of education and affluence rose markedly and widely across the European continent with many gaining access to televisions and individual motorised modes of transport. Televisions were crucial to the development of communication infrastructure, bringing the general public into extensive communication networks. Inglehart (1970) adopts a similar approach to the one taken by Lerner's (1958) approach which is an analysis of the transformative process which took place in the 19th century as societies moved from parochial to cosmopolitan. This process, labelled 'social mobilisation' (Lerner 1958) which is based upon the expanding network of communication.

The expansion of communication allows for an integration of the general public into national political debate (Inglehart 1970). Inglehart (1970) explores whether the development of communication which helps facilitate the political education of the people will have integrative or disintegrative consequences for European integration. He hypothesises that the rising levels of education and development of mass communication networks will favour integration at the supra-national European level. This is based on the idea that it is a necessity for there to be a wide distribution of political skills in order for the general public to be able to cope with an extensive political community (Inglehart 1970: 47) which helps to build a relationship between the people and the remoteness of the European institutions.

The development of mass support for the European level is based on two processes; the rising levels of cognitive mobilisation which develops individual capacity to come into contact with and understand messages relating to the European level and, secondly, the internationalisation of values (Inglehart 1970: 48). The paper ultimately finds that the individuals that are most engaged with cosmopolitan communication within their nation states and are of the intellectual capacity to interpret such information are more predisposed to supporting European integration. There is, however, one caveat to the results, Inglehart (1970) finds that the UK is a strong outlier in the results- high cognitive mobilisation in the UK is not a powerful explanatory factor in whether one supports or opposes integration.

Inglehart's conclusions are problematic, while the general conclusion that higher cognitive facilities are a relatively strong predictor of support for European integration (Hobolt 2016), both the way in which Inglehart (1970) views the relationship between cognitive ability and support for integration, as well as the development of mass

communication and support for integration are vexed. The current age of mass communication has begun to limit individual exposure to cosmopolitan news and views (Sunstein 2017). Technological advance and the movement from print to online news, particularly the gaining of news from social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter, increase connectivity but limit as opposed to facilitating the development of cosmopolitan communication through filtering. Through filtering, social media limits what an individual is exposed to, based upon his or her own interests and opinions, thus creating 'echo chambers' (Sunstein 2017). The development of mass communication has a non-linear monotonic relationship with the promotion of cosmopolitan communication. At a certain point, communication is reduced to no more than what Lerner (1958) described as word of mouth communication found in parochial societies.

Moreover, Inglehart's (1970) relationship between cognitive mobilisation, cosmopolitan media and support for European integration runs in a counter direction in the present. Inglehart argues that those with high cognitive ability follow the opinion of media on European integration (1970: 48), however, evidence on Brexit (see Hobolt 2016) has suggested that the educated are in favour of European integration in a media atmosphere that is Eurosceptical. While there is a connection between education and support for European integration, this relationship has evolved from what Inglehart (1970) found. As Hobolt (2016) identified, the more educated the individual, the more likely it was that they voted to remain in the EU, however, although this may capture the general picture of the Brexit referendum, it fails to explain the variation of support for the EU between Scotland and England. England has consistently, year on year, had a higher percentage of its youth population attending university than in Scotland, in the year 2016, the percentage of 18 year olds entering university was 33% (fullfact.org) compared with 21.3% in Scotland (the Scotsman). Therefore, while the expectation is that the results will indeed show a strong correlation between education and support for the European Union, they will not explain the variance in the levels of support for the EU between Scotland and England.

2.2.2: Domestic Politics

Another approach to explaining public opinion on Europe has been to analyse the impact of the domestic political context. The previous studies relating to the impact of the domestic political can be separated into two groups- those that the domestic

political context acts as a cue which influences public opinion (Anderson 1998) and those which focus on government approval (second order theory) (Franklin 1995, Reif and Schmitt 1980).

Anderson (1998) builds on the cognitive mobilisation approach, arguing that due to the complexities of European integration and complex linkages between the different European institutions, citizens require direction from the national political elites. The idea of Anderson (1998) therefore, is that citizens use proxies based upon attitudes towards domestic politics when making decisions and formulating opinions relating to European integration. He finds that system and establishment party support are the most powerful determinants of whether a citizen has a positive disposition towards European Union membership.

Second order theory does not engage with the idea of an information gap and need for elite cue taking in order to formulate opinions, but, rather reduces the importance of European level politics to a popularity contest for the ruling party or the domestic political system. Therefore, voters in European elections vote for candidates not simply on the values they are representing on certain issues within the second arena but, also, critically, on basis of political circumstance in the main political forum- the national forum. As a result, the campaigns of political parties during second order elections are altered as they are influenced by political calculations concerning the main arena. 'European' elections, therefore, become a debate on national political issues without the domestic political consequences thus giving voters the opportunity to vote freely.

Reif and Schmitt (1980) identify several dimensions of second order elections. The first dimension engages with the essential nature of second order elections- 'there is less at stake' (Reif and Schmitt 1980: 9). With lower salience, naturally there is lower engagement of the public with debate and issues and levels of participation are depressed vis-à-vis national level elections. The second dimension includes the increased opportunities for smaller parties- the absence of perceived importance means that voters are more likely to vote for a party that is closer to their own values but who do not have the electoral credibility in first order elections. Second order elections also often see ruling parties defeated, this is linked to both voters seeking the opportunity to punish the ruling party and the timing of European elections. The electoral cycle is a popularity cycle for a ruling party, their popularity increases immediately after election before decreasing and then rising again on the eve of the

next election. With European elections typically falling in between national electoral cycles, citizens voice discontent with the ruling party and punish them. The effect of this is more severe where the national system is prevalent to alterations in the government party (Marsh 1998).

2.2.3: Utilitarian Theories

Utilitarian approaches to explaining public attitudes towards European integration and the European Union came to prominence in the 1990's. Dalton and Eichenberg (1991) argue that an individual's economic interests affect their support for European integration. Their argument is that Europeans evaluate the European Union on the basis of their perception of the economic performance of their nation state. Gabel and Palmer (1995) find this line of argument unconvincing, arguing that it is unlikely that an individual holds the European Union to account for national economic performance and, rather, that the EU is judged on its policy output. Gabel and Palmer (1995) state two areas of policy which citizens use to judge the performance of the EU; firstly, policies which liberalise European economies, for example the creation of the monetary union, the elimination of trade tariffs and the creation of a wide regulatory framework which helps maintain a free and open internal market, secondly, policy which seeks to maintain and strengthen peace and security within the European Union.

It is the first policy arena with which this paper is concerned and, indeed, the one which has subsequently has garnered more attention in studies relating to public opinion and the EU. The last three decades have been a period of intense integration of European markets, beginning with Single European Act 1986 (SEA) which established the single internal market facilitating the free movement of people, goods, services and capital. Further, in 1992 the Maastricht Treaty was signed, establishing the European monetary union and led to the harmonisation of economic policy across Europe. Gabel (1998) argues that both integrative processes have led to a differentiation of experience for European citizens. The basis for the diverging experience of European citizens are educational attainment, occupational skill and wealth (Gabel 1998; Gabel and Palmer 1995). The liberalisation of capital markets benefits citizens who fall into this category primarily because 'Europeans with higher education levels and more marketable occupational skills are better prepared to apply

the talents in diverse international settings and to adapt to economic changes in their production sector' (Gabel and Palmer 1995: 7). The liberalisation of capital markets further benefits the wealthy as it creates greater opportunities for investment as a result of increasingly open and competitive markets (Gabel 1995). In contrast, European citizens with low levels of formal education, poorly skilled workers are at threat from their increasingly expendability as a result of the free movement of people, as well as services which can simply move location to seek cheaper labour. Moreover, the currency union and harmonisation of European economic policy limits fiscal policies, which means that those poorly educated and low skilled individuals who are most reliant on social welfare find government expenditure on welfare systems constrained.

Utilitarian theories of the relationship between public opinion and European integration centre around the impact of integration on different socioeconomic groups, and individuals derive their support or oppositions from cost/benefit analyses of these impacts. The general expectation of these theories is that the wealthier, more educated and professionally employed individuals are supportive of European integration due to the opening up of opportunity, whereas, the less well educated, poorer and non-skilled workforce oppose European integration as it threatens their economic livelihoods. This relationship is expected to be confirmed in the analysis of the Brexit referendum, with those that are threatened by European integration more likely to vote to leave the EU. The inclusion of variables relating to identity is expected to offset the explanatory power of utilitarian variables, thus generating a deeper understanding of why Scotland voted so emphatically to remain as part of the EU, yet England voted to leave.

2.2.4: Theories of Identity

The central tenet of theories of identity vis-à-vis public support for European integration is that 'opposition to the European project is less about hostility to the institutions of the EU or concerns about personal economic losses and more to do with forms of symbolic threat to the national community' (McLaren 2007: 236). When expressing support for the European Union and European integration more generally, citizens rely on their feelings regarding national attachment and their understanding of perceived threats to the nation state (Kitzinger 2003). Europeans have come to accept

and have internalised their relationship with the state- they submit to the sovereign, who then subsequently guarantees their wellbeing- which has been challenged by European integration, thus threatening the symbolic value of the nation state (Mclaren 2002). Identity politics is combative, it seeks to claim an authentic sense of a community through binary variables relating to what is conceived as essential to the nation. It 'expresses a defiance against marginalisation and disadvantage...this is what imbues it with psycho-emotional force' (Heywood 2013: 160).

Simultaneous to the economic developments which have arisen as a result of integration, the European Union has attempted to forge a community within Europe. There has been a reorientation from a purely economic, market making project, to one which seeks to develop a political community and pursue normative goals. This has occurred through the developing of a supranational citizenry who 'participate in a common political structure' (Niedermayer and Westle 1995: 41). The Maastricht treaty fundamentally changed the relationship between the individual European and the European Union. The treaty sought to create an 'ever closer union' and created a European citizenship- 'every person holding the nationality of a member state, shall be a citizen of the union'. The goal was not to replace national identities but create some common sense of 'Europeanness' in order to generate greater support for integration and to bestow greater legitimacy on the European institutions, which has been and is currently seen as essential for future integration (Laffan 1996).

Humankind has developed an emotional capacity 'for intense group loyalty and such loyalties can be powerful in shaping views towards political objects' (Hooghe and Marks 2004: 416). Social identity theory holds that 'identity is important for the human psyche and that people become protective of even the most artificially constructed identities' (Mclaren 2007: 237). These constructed identities and the groups they create build upon people's 'innate ethnocentric tendencies' (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 12) and shapes individual self- conception, leading one adopting biases and preferring their group over another. Such identities and feelings of belonging are developed prior to adolescence, however, they are not fixed, rather, they are 'continuously constructed through socialisation and political conflicts' (Hooghe and Marks 2004: 417). Political conflict is central to the interplay between national identity and European integration, 'the sharper the decisions among national elites on the issue of European integration, the greater the scope for national identity to be mobilised, and the more we expect exclusive national identity to bite' (Hooghe and Marks 2004: 417).

While people are protective of identities, people often identify themselves with several territorial communities simultaneously, thus having multiple and often layered identities (Citrin and Sidy; Diez Medrano 2003). What matters is not the strength of attachment to a national identity but whether the identity is inclusive or exclusive. The constant 're-imagining of exclusive national communities within the context of integration has defied expectations and increasingly challenged the legitimacy of the European Union' (Gifford 2015: 362). Exclusive national identities are built upon contestation and otherness, creating an in-group/out-group scenario. Based upon group categorisation, 'people tend to show a favourable bias towards members of their own group and an unfavourable one against members of other groups. Thus, people have a tendency to make in-group/ out-group distinctions that are advantageous for the in group and unfavourable for the out-group' (De Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005: 64). Due to mankind's innate tendency to form groups and identities in order to satisfy the demand for belonging, it is not in-group favoritism per se that is problematic for the simultaneous side by side existence of different groups but rather a negative out-group bias (De Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005). Therefore, in terms of European integration, what is decisive is 'not the group with which one identifies, but how the group identities relate to one another, and how they are mobilized in elite debate' (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 12).

With the political, social and normative developments which have occurred in the European Union post 1990, the encroachments into national political and social space have increased. This has unearthed a fundamental tension in Europe between the increasingly 'rapid jurisdictional change and relatively stable identities' (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 13). With the incursion of a European system of law, social ideals and the ceding of sovereignty from the nation state to the supra-national European level and the movement of European integration as an issue from the elite level to the public forum, bringing it into the 'contentious world of party competition' (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 7) and making it susceptible to politicization. Politicization of identity by elites over the issue of European integration occurs through the reconstruction of the national identity and the conceptualizing of the EU and the European integration process as an outside group which poses a threat to the national identity. For this to occur, two conditions must be met, firstly, the tension must be salient,

'The scope and depth of European integration have perceptibly increased, and their effects have been magnified because they are part of a broader

breakdown of national barriers giving, giving rise to mass immigration and intensified economic competition' (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 13).

Secondly, political entrepreneurs mobilise the tension (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 13). The links between national identity, cultural and economic security and European integration are not necessarily natural connections, thus they have to be constructed by elites (Hooghe and Marks 2008).

Chapter Three: The Current Approach to Explaining the Brexit Result

With the temporal proximity of the both the Brexit campaign and the result of the referendum and also the slow process of the production of literature, the work focused upon explaining Brexit is limited. At present, the most developed idea on Britain's decision to leave the European Union comes from Hobolt (2016) and her argument that globalisation was the driving force behind the referendum result. This section seeks to give an overview of the approach taken by Hobolt (2016), then identifying its faults before building up the arguments of this paper in the next chapter.

Hobolt (2016) places emphasis on the concerns of globalisation, immigration and European integration, arguing these issues have increasingly been mobilized by the populist right parties. The mobilisation of these concerns has centered around two perceived threats- cultural and economic (Hobolt 2016). Although Hobolt (2016) sets out by discussing both cultural and economic threats with which both globalisation and European integration are seen as being at the core of, she operationalizes them in terms of economic cost-benefit analyses. The paper argues that leave voters were predominantly those who were both anti-immigration and demographically both older and lesser educated than remain voters- "this divide between those who feel left behind by the forces of globalisation and mass immigration and those who welcome such developments is also the driving force behind the increasing support for Eurosceptic parties" (Hobolt 2016: 1260). Hobolt (2016) finds that the Brexit vote is reminiscent of the generational and education divisions in the country with less well educated and those in low skilled employment being more anti-immigration and thus more sceptical regarding European integration leading ultimately to them voting by large majority to leave the European Union. Conversely, Hobolt (2016) finds that those who have higher levels of formal education and those who are in more educated skilled employment, voted in large part to remain in the union.

The analysis of the referendum result given by Hobolt (2016) is problematic. Firstly, any notion of individuals carrying out a cost-benefit, which underpins the utilitarian explanation for support or opposition to European integration, is problematic. For the utilitarian explanation to hold, then the individual would need to be expected to understand the costs and benefits to the individual from integration. Numerous studies have refuted that the average European individual processes the knowledge to make such an informed decision on the European Union. Anderson (1998) showed that citizens are poorly informed regarding the European integration process and how developments affect them in their daily lives. Further, Hurrelmann (2014: 102) argues that while E.U. integration is a highly salient and politicised issue, within public discourse it is 'uninformed politicisation'. This lack of understanding of the European Union and the effects of the integration process limits the ability of individuals to arrive at utilitarian justifications for support or opposition to the integration process and, therefore, questions whether such judgements are really behind voter choice in the European Union.

The second issue arising from Hobolt (2016) relates to the issue of Scotland. If the argument that it is those who are left behind by the forces of globalisation and European integration who vote to leave the EU, why then do the stark differences appear in relation to Scotland's support of the European Union and England's opposition, when in EU terms the countries have a shared material experience due to them acting under the unified umbrella of the United Kingdom? Thirdly, while Hobolt (2016) does acknowledge the role of 'geographic identities', these are not operationalised nor sufficiently independent of the other variables, neither does she attempt to link 'geographical identities' to actual outcomes in the referendum, thus failing to understand why the constituent states of the UK voted the way they did, within the different voting patterns lies deep explanations for the public attitudes towards the European Union.

This paper will build on the deficiencies identified above, hypothesising that the introduction of identity to the debate, operationalised in a way that both captures the identity and its construction, can help to understand the deep underlying explanations of public opinion on the European Union. It should also give an insight into the stark divisions in opinion towards the EU between the different countries of the United Kingdom. Where this paper does agree with Hobolt (2016) is in the effect of globalisation and how globalisation, both enhanced and facilitated through European

integration, has been perceived by citizens to have impacted upon their identity. Due to the high salience of the issue, political cues by parties seeking to maximise support through constructing identity in opposition or in conjunction with European integration helps to strengthen public attitude towards the EU. The next section seeks to unravel the relationship between globalisation, European integration and public opinion as the relationship is not immediately obvious.

3.1: Linking Globalisation to Brexit

3.1.1: Globalisation as a Concept

Conceptualising globalisation is difficult- it is a term often cited and has become fashionable, it is one of the major 'buzzwords' of the 20th century and yet, it is also a 'highly indeterminate concept' (Hamelink 1999: 1). While the term gained prominence in the latter half of the 20th century, what it encompasses has a history beyond the 20th century, 'contemporary globalisation and its economic and political consequences, have not arisen out of a vacuum, but from a world wide process of uneven economic development that has been centuries, if not millennia, in the making' (O'Rourke and Findlay 2007: xvi).

Globalisation has not been a process of linear development with its progress dependent upon the global political system. World War one brought the 19th century liberal economic order to an abrupt halt (O'Rourke and Findlay 2007) with the imposing of trade blockades between the conflicting protagonists and well as the centralisation of economies, whereby governments imposed restrictions on trade and shipping, prescribed the composition of imports, closely coordinated and supervised private enterprise (O'Rourke and Findlay 2007: 430). These governmental wartime interventions in the international economy reversed the process of globalisation, with the world economy entering a state of de-globalisation. Re-globalisation, and even then on a limited scale, did not occur until after the second world war. The ending of the second world war effectively divided the world in two- 'the world war set in motion forces that would isolate countries from international markets, rather than integrate them' (O'Rourke and Findlay 2007: 476) as a result of the impossibility of Russian and US interests which ultimately restricted global trade, which resulted in the deepening of Western integration and the increasing isolation of the East.

The western hemisphere, unlike its eastern counterpart, began the restoration of the Atlantic economy after the second world war. Europe began an integration process

of both economies and politics, which effectively ended the return to protectionism which had characterised the first half of the 20th century. The development of the Bretton Woods system, led to the founding of IGO's such as the IMF which ensured the operating of the free market through the minimisation of tariffs and the privatisation of industry and firms. Other organisations such as the WTO also came into operation which sought to 'encourage reciprocal and mutually advantageous agreements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade' (O'Rourke and Findlay 2007: 490). The post war era in Europe has been an era of the gradual return to a market economy and a moving away from government interventionism. Ultimately, it has been about the erosion of the sanctity of national boundaries.

Above are some of the western developments which, bundled together, form a part of the process of globalisation. In an attempt to conceptualise globalisation for the purposes of the paper, Ohmae's (1989) notion of globalisation as a 'borderless world' will be used as it perhaps captures best the increasing permeability of today's political borders. This conception does not simply restrict this increased permeability to the movement of capital but also to the globalisation of the political sphere and movement of people and the resulting cultural effects that this carries with it. Ohmae (1995) advances his ideas on globalisation and the end of the nation state, challenging Fukuyama (1992), he argues that the fall of communism and the collapse of the ideological war did not bring history to an end but rather created the beginnings of a new history: one in which there was a new demand for global visibility (Ohmae 1995: 4).

The demand for visibility within the global community comes from the way in which investment is no longer constrained by international borders. From the fact that industry is both able and actively seeking new attractive markets, the advancement of information technology which facilitates the emergence of multi-national companies and the development of the international individual consumer (Ohmae 1995). The impact of these economic changes have conditioned individuals and their lifestyles- it has removed government control over what the consumer purchases. Individuals are no longer conditioned to purchase national products, rather they seek the highest quality at the lowest price.

Globalisation has led to competing consequences- never has the world been richer- the second half of the 20th century saw remarkable economic growth, with world GDP rising by 185% (Maddison 2003)- and yet inequality has never been greater. The

liberalisation of trade has become the object of globalisation- the signing of Free Trade Agreements have been aimed absolutely at the minimisation of transaction costs and the reduction of barriers to trade, leading to the power of corporations over national governments and over individuals. With this focus, not only do certain countries and regions profit from globalisation while others lose, it creates classes of winners and losers within countries for which globalisation has been prosperous. The ending of protectionism has had grave consequences for primary and secondary sectors in developed countries, effectively ending such sectors due to the minimisation of trade barriers and the availability of cheaper labour and manufacturing costs in lesser developed countries. Within countries that gain from globalisation, it is only those who are educated and are employed in the tertiary sector who gain from globalisation.

Due to the somewhat totality of the concept, a reductionist definition would be unsuccessful in capturing the essence of globalisation. Thus, what will follow is an understanding of globalisation as the heading towards a borderless world through the gradual disintegration of national boundaries in an economic, cultural and political sense.

3.2: Conceptualising the EU- How to View the European Union as a Power

The outline of globalisation given above is in line with Hobolt's conception of the term, that globalisation creates economic winners and losers. Damro (2012, 2015) argues that the European Union is simply a free market, it is 'fundamentally a large single market with significant institutional features and competing interest groups' (Damro 2012: 682). The EU has been an economic experiment of regional integration, which has simultaneously had subsidiary goals relating to the political and social orientations of Europe, yet consistently the European project has been characterised by the continued integration of the market (Damro 2012). The project began as the ECSC in 1951 as an attempt to create a European common market in critical sectors- coal and steel- which, in 1957, with the accession of the Treaty of Rome, became an attempt to integrate European markets more generally. The Single European Act (SEA) 1986, brought confirmation of the European demand to entrench market integration, with the single market becoming the delineating feature of the European Union (Young 2006: 37).

Damro (2015) recognises three characteristics of Market Power Europe (MPE) - market size, the EU as a regulatory body and the externalisation of its rules and regulations. With regard to market size, Damro (2012: 686) argues that 'today the EU exists as the largest advanced industrial market in the world,' including 28 states and a population of over half a billion people. Markets of sufficient size have the ability to constrain national government's desires to revert to other regulatory standards and, in doing so, compels external actors to shape their regulatory structures in such a way that they are compossible with those of the internal market.

The second characteristic which leads to the adopting of market power Europe as the analytical framework through which the EU is conceptualised, is that of the institutional make-up of the EU, in particular the EU's identity as a regulatory institution (Damro 2012, 2015). Studies of the EU in the 1990's focussed on the conceptualisation of the European Union as a 'regulatory state' (Majone 1994, 1997) and, although these have subsequently been challenged and carry little weight in current research, the fact is that 'the EU generates a considerable amount of economic and social regulation, which can either liberalise or restrict market activity' (Damro 2012: 687). The European Union has been a project of 'experimentalist governance' (Sable and Zeitland 2010) whereby rule making occurs through consensual intergovernmental governance for the internal market and externalised on a global scale. There is an absolute centrality of internal rules vis-à-vis the EU and by having both regulatory expertise and coherence grants the European Union the platform from which it can shape global rule making and regulatory standards. .

There is a wealth of self affirmation of the European Union as 'market power Europe'. The EU's Single Market Review (2007) particularly revealing regarding both the EU's aims and how it conceptualises itself. The review is built upon the recognition that the EU is the world's largest market (Commission 2007: 7) which has created a new dimension of the single market. The purpose of the single market is not limited to the bringing of benefits from European integration but also about 'the leverage it brings to meet the challenges and opportunities of globalisation' (Commission 2007: 7). This is achieved through the 'promotion of EU high quality rules and values around the world,' (Commission 2007: 5) and, ultimately, leading to the EU as the 'global standard setter' (Commission 2007: 7). Thus, according to Damro (2012), when analysing the European Union as a power, MPE is the most appropriate analytical framework through which to understand and explain the European Union as the combination of

the three characteristics (relative market size, institutional features and interest group contestation) 'provides the EU with the basis for its identity as MPE' (Damro 2012: 689).

The approach taken by Damro (2012) is somewhat controversial. The literature concerning the power and the EU has often fallen on the side of the European Union as a normative power. Yet, his approach is one that, although not explicitly, has been ever present in the study of the European Union. To conceptualise public support for the EU based upon utilitarian economic calculations is implicitly to reduce the union to a market. Debate concerning the type of power that the EU is have been ongoing since its conception. It has been examined as a civilian power, a soft power, a gentle power (Orbie 2002), however, the EU as a normative power has been the approach which has garnered most support- 'the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or says, but what it is' (Manners 2002: 252). The orientation of such a conception is that it transforms the debate into one which is concerned with an ontological study of the EU as opposed to one based upon function. The European Union is much more than an organization which seeks to reduce transaction costs and facilitate open markets, it is 'part of a multi-level system of governance which facilitates social interaction across national boundaries, increases immigration and undermines national sovereignty' (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 11).

While the EU's ability to make markets and facilitate the development of open markets through the reduction of transaction costs and the implementation of regulation makes it a power with substantial market oriented goals, it does not take away from its identity as a normative power. Although the commission has affirmed its status as an important market player, it does so through reference to it being a standard setter and a promoter of high quality rules. These are normative aims, often aimed at the promotion of human health and safety or ecological preservation, which in addition improve markets. Moreover, access to the EU market is only ever granted with adherence to the Copenhagen criteria which promotes normative goals such as the the development of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The European Union is, first and foremost a normative power seeking to ensure the continuing peace and security in Europe as well as human security through the improvement of citizen rights. Therefore, Hobolt's approach is in need of updating, if globalisation is behind Brexit, it is so in a more fundamental manner, not simply because of its economic consequences.

3.3: The Desideratum of Managing Globalisation and the Lack of EU Intent

‘The challenge of today is to readjust our governing arrangements in ways that allow for the more equitable distribution of the fruits of globalisation’ (Konstadinova 2017: 135).

With globalisation being seen as a primary causal factor behind the Brexit referendum result, it is important to discuss the management of globalisation by the European Union- whether the EU indeed has the capability to control globalisation and the extent to which the EU exercises that ability.

The self affirmation by the EU as being the ‘global standard setter’ (Commission 2007: 7), is a calculated political response to the concerns of the European electorate. The Eurobarometer poll 62 found that 57% of respondents considered globalisation as a threat to employment in their country, with 40% considering globalisation as whole to be bad for their country along with 45% believing globalisation to be bad for themselves personally. Along with collecting Europeans’ views on the effects of globalisation Eurobarometer 62 also measured citizens’ beliefs regarding whom they trust to control the effects of globalisation. By a significant margin, citizens trusted the EU as being more competent in the management of globalisation than national governments. Thus, it is politically advantageous for the EU, at least in rhetoric, to attempt to manage globalisation and, with higher levels of trust to carry out such management, the European Union has a legitimate mandate to control globalisation.

Although this thesis advocates the conceiving of the European Union as a normative power which promotes and implements rules and regulations- the basis of a soft, or normative power. The European Union, through its global standard setting role, has the ability to manage globalisation by allowing Europe to thrive in the opportunities brought by globalisation and, simultaneously, protect and limit the impacts of the threats attached to unfettered ad hoc globalisation.

Managed globalisation, according to Jacoby and Meunier (2010: 300), is the seeking of actors, either public or private, to make certain that the ‘liberalisation of rules about international flows of goods and services, capital, and labour goes hand in hand with formal practices to bind markets players and governments.’ It concerns the controlled opening up of the market, whereby liberalisation is closely followed by limits with actors being bound by a single set of rules designed around efficiency and equability. Managed globalisation should be viewed as one point on a continuum

running from old fashioned protectionalism- the excluding of goods, services, actors and/or labour from a market- to ad hoc globalisation, the liberalisation of markets without common consensus on good practice.

Meunier and Jacoby (2010) identify five ways in which the EU attempts to manage globalisation. First they point to policy expansion, through which regulation is developed in order to shape global governance. The EU is used as a forum for joint European policy. Secondly, they point to the EU's regulatory power, evidence of which comes from the undeniable fact that in many sectors (food, chemical and telecommunications) the European Union is the world's largest regulatory power. Thirdly, they point to the EU's attempts to empower international institutions. The European Union, sought to be the rule making body, to enhance the institutional infrastructure of international institutions in order to help with the development of regulation and to increase the scope of such institutions to enable them to implement rules and monitor adherence to them (Meunier and Jacoby 2010). The EU has also sought to expand the territorial sphere of its influence. This has been most obvious with the rounds of EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007, taking the union to 28 states. With expansion into eastern Europe, the EU was faced with incorporating virgin economies- market economies that had been built without institutional frameworks, instead making a very uncoordinated transformation from centrally planned economic. With applications to join the European Union, the EU demanded and facilitated the implementation of the *Acquis Communautaire*, which, among other things, forced domestic markets to enter a process of deregulation which was a necessity for these markets to survive within an international economy dictated by the processes of globalisation. All four of the above means through which the EU attempts to manage globalisation are proactive- they are attempts to limit the negative impacts of globalisation before they occur. However, the EU also have reactive processes to help limit the negative impacts of globalisation.

The EU seek also to redistribute the costs of globalisation- 'managing globalisation means not only building a framework of rules within which exchange may occur, but also the redistributing of costs and benefits' (Meunier and Jacoby 2010: 310). This takes numerous forms, such as the EU's structural funds which seek to support economic development across Europe. Other such attempts include the European Globalisation Adjustment fund which aims to help those who have lost their jobs as a direct consequence of globalisation through providing work related training and a

relocation programme. Such attempts at redistribution are underwhelming- firstly, the scope of the programme is very narrow, leaving behind many more who have suffered the negative consequences of globalisation and, secondly, any programme of redistribution, particularly when it concerns the movement of people, is met with resistance at the national political level.

The EU, therefore, has both the ability to manage globalisation as a result of its market size and regulatory influence and it has, at least on the level putting in place measures to deal with the effects of globalisation, shown a desire to manage globalisation, yet, the conclusions which must be drawn are that despite its ability and willingness, the European Union has a very mixed record when it comes to managing globalisation.

For the EU to be seen as an effective bastion against ad hoc globalisation in any economic sphere, then it must be able to manage the globalisation of the financial sector which is the 'engine of cross border activity' (Posner and Veron 2010: 400). Thus, the 'governance of banking, insurance and investment ought to be an exemplary case of European efforts to manage globalisation' (Posner and Veron 2010: 401). With the creation of the monetary union, the European Union was granted greater rule-making authority, which, due to the size of the market, gave them the upper hand in deal making vis-à-vis the U.S (Posner and Veron 2010: 402). Posner and Veron (2010) find that the result of the transatlantic negotiations concerning capital adequacy rules, covered by the EU's Financial Conglomerates Directive (2002), which determines the required capital reserves of the banking industry, was not the EU advocating a specific EU regulatory agenda which pursues a common public purpose but rather their desire to minimise the asymmetries present within the transatlantic market. The result of which has been a loosening of solvency and liquidity requirements, giving greater control to financial institutions over risk assessment analysis, thus challenging the rhetoric of 'managed globalisation', instead showing an approach which supports ad hoc globalisation. 'Rather than promoting a managed approach to globalisation...(the EU) did not challenge the dominant normative ad hoc globalisation framework' (Jacoby and Meunier 2010: 307) and instead took instruction from the American and British models of financial regulation.

The management of globalisation by the European Union has been a mix of success and failure, where it has been the world leader in shaping global rules and regulation on the environment (Keleman 2010), it has endorsed an approach to

financial regulation which is not based upon some principle of common good. This may be as much of a result of the dual logic of managed globalisation as it is the failure of the European Union. The EU resembles a 'Trojan horse' (Jacoby and Meunier 2010)- on the one hand it has aided globalisation through the creation of the single market, yet, on the other, the development of the single market and its resulting size and market power, mean that the EU is perhaps the greatest bastion against ad hoc globalisation. Nevertheless, the fact that the EU has only a modest record in its attempt to manage globalisation, means that individual people and entire communities are being left behind as a result of these efforts. For such people, therefore, globalisation is the process which challenges their livelihoods and the European Union is the facilitator of this.

The paper will measure the perception of the management of globalisation through two measurements, firstly, through immigration and how the European Union facilitates the cross border movement of people. Immigration has been a hugely politicized issue and has developed from a national to a European issue. Through measuring perception of the management of the movement of people, we not only gain an understanding of whether people believe that the European Union is an effective institution for the management of globalisation but also, it will enable a deeper understanding of the argument of the paper- the extent to which the nationalities of Scotland and England are based upon inclusiveness or 'otherness', giving a better understanding of their respective relationships with the European Union. Secondly, the paper will measure the European Union's ability to manage globalisation through survey participants' perception of EU regulation, this will also measure the willingness of individuals to live in a global political community with decision makers out with the national community. Therefore, unlike Hobolt (2016) the focus is not on the economic consequences but rather upon the interaction between globalisation, culturally and politically, with national identity.

Chapter Four: Nationalism, Identity and Allegiance: A comparison of Scotland and England

4.1: Developing a theoretical background to examining the impact of the construction of identity on the formation of opinion of the EU

The link between whether elites and populations reconstruct the national identity in opposition to European integration is related to the location of the 'terminal community'. 'People who believe in a shared European identity see the EU as the terminal political community and are more likely to recognize the authority of the EU to make public policy' (Carey 2002: 393). European identity operates alongside national identity, not instead of national identity. There is, therefore a duality of identity, it is what Van Kersbergen (2000) has labelled as double allegiance in his developing of a theory of allegiance. The basic principle is that a European allegiance is derived from the national allegiance, thus European allegiance is secondary.

The theory of allegiance conceptualizes allegiance as 'the willingness of a national public to approve of and support the decisions made by government, in relation for a more or less immediate and straightforward reward or benefit' (Van Kersbergen 2000: 1). European allegiance is dependent upon the existence of a double allegiance, whereby the primary allegiance of the individual facilitates the secondary allegiance. The secondary allegiance 'exists only to the extent that European integration facilitates nation states in the provision of the resources upon which the primary allegiance hinges' (Van Kersbergen 2000: 1). The ontological difference between the primary allegiance and the secondary, European, allegiance arises from the differences between state formation and state integration in Europe. State formation is, in part, a product of nationalism and the creation of national identities (Van Kersbergen 2000: 2), European integration, on the other hand is dependent upon 'nested identities'- the existence of 'multiple coexisting identities with local, regional and supranational territorial communities, alongside an identity with the nation' (Marks 1997: 35).

The theory of allegiance seeks to move past the conceptual issues created by identity, particularly the ever elusive and mercurial notion of the 'European' identity. It seeks to explain support and opposition for European integration based upon how the existence of the European allegiance facilitates the state in the fulfilment of its duties as dictated by the primary allegiance. The relationship, as conceptualized by Van

Kersbergen (2000), surrounding the primary allegiance is deduced from classical political theory coming from Hobbes (1651), whereby there is some social contract between the ruled and rulers, creating the dyadic relationship in which 'the subject has the right to be protected as well as the duty to obey and support'. It is within this right to be protected that the secondary allegiance is born, it develops when it can facilitate the protection of the national citizen. Allegiance is, therefore, a relationship of exchange. A national public will 'support the national political elite in its supranational activities on the condition that these activities serve national social and economic security' (Van Kersbergen 2000: 9).

The theory of allegiance as described by Van Kersbergen rests on the basic principles of the utilitarian approach- that individuals make some cost/benefit calculations vis-à-vis the ability of European integration to maximize economic and social security, however, the premise of this paper is that the existence of the double allegiance is not dependent upon economic considerations but, rather, upon the construction of the national identity. It is expected that this will prove fruitful for explaining the diverging trends in support for European integration between Scotland and England. The former experiencing somewhat of a rebirth of nationalism, where it is foreseen that European integration can facilitate the successful development of the nation state, whereas the latter, with a proud national heritage based in sovereignty, views integration as a threat to fundamental foundations as a state. It is, therefore, argued that what lies behind Scottish pro-EU attitudes is that the EU enables Scotland to become the European social democracy upon which Scottish nationalism is based. The next sections will discuss the relationship between the construction of both English and Scottish identity and the European Union.

4.2: English Nationalism

The previous chapter identified the link between globalisation, the EU and member states. By nature, the European Union is a facilitator of globalisation. It has opened up markets, created institutional arrangements for the free movement of people, capital and services and has also attempted to create some notion of supranational culture and identity. Due to the European Union's market power and size, however, it does have the ability to control globalisation, allow Europe to benefit from the positive effects of globalisation while mitigating the negative impacts. The chapter concluded, that the EU has a mixed record when it comes to the management of globalisation, and as one

of the foremost concerns of European citizens, this has led to anxiety and concerns that unfettered globalisation impacts upon the entirety of society, causing cultural and national antagonisms. Such antagonisms have the ability to begin or further entrench the 'othering' of Europe. This section seeks to explore English and Scottish nationalism and their respective relationships to the European project, it will do so through reference to the spectre of European political globalisation.

4.2.1: English Nationalism: A Problematic Existence.

English nationalism is new, very new. So much so that it attracted little academic attention before 2000. The earlier literature did little to advance an understanding of English nationalism, rather it stalled its academic scrutiny. Abel et al (2007) argued that English nationalism is a myth as England is nothing more than an imagined community, this coincides with the approach taken by Scruton (2001) who argues that England as a country is dead. More useful and a better starting point, however, comes from Bryant (2008) who argues that England as national entity exists physically, however, the notion of England as a political community is both weak and vulnerable. Questions concerning its existence and accusations of its vulnerability arise from its unwieldy attachment to 'Britishness'. The construction of Great Britain and Britishness arose from the Union of the parliaments 1707 and saw 'the English set about creating a British identity that, while not necessarily substituting for other identities, provided a capacious umbrella under which all groups could find shelter' (Kumar 2006: 7). Although the union created an overarching, common identity, it did not replace the national identities in Scotland, Northern Ireland or Wales. Yet, as the dominant force in the United Kingdom and the main driver of the union project, it was England who subordinated herself most to Britain and Britishness and has, therefore, created conceptual difficulties in delineating England from Britain, English identity from British identity. Nevertheless, the 2000's has witnessed the emergence of English nationalism, which has become a major factor in British politics (White 2015).

4.2.2: The (Re) Birth of Englishness and English Nationalism

The appearance of a nascent English national identity in the 1990's become increasingly profound as the 2000's wore on. For the purpose of the thesis it is important to discuss the origins of this emergence, to explore from what English

nationalism emanated and how its origin has shaped views vis-à-vis European integration. This chapter will focus on three of the theories of the origins of English nationalism- a reactionary occurrence from the loss of imperial status and great power status, secondly, the idea that English nationalism is a political nationalism and thirdly, that English nationalism is an ideology with its roots in Euroscepticism. It is the latter which this paper will advance, that English nationalism is inseparable from Euroscepticism and has arisen from the penetration of populist politics into mainstream political debate and competition.

4.2.3: English Nationalism as the Substitute for Imperial Power

The Reaffirmation of Englishness as a result of the trauma of a loss of great world power status has been an approach that has been keenly adopted and studied thoroughly (see Kumar 2006). Britain has an unescapable attachment to imperialism and the Commonwealth, so much so that it has often interfered with Britain's relationship with Europe. Kenny (2016) sums up this line of thought particularly well, stating that,

‘the trauma associated with the abandonment of the empire and the inability of the United Kingdom's elites to deal with the external challenges associated with post imperial decline that have played a key role, freezing the national consciousness of the English into a kind of cultural melancholia and an endless lament for a global status’ (330).

The development of Britain and a British consciousness began with the Union of the Crowns and was further entrenched with the other two great signifiers of ‘Britishness’; the Industrial revolution and the British Empire (Kumar 2006). The former led to the latter and resulted in world power status being conferred upon Britain with England containing central political unit. The argument, therefore is that decolonialisation and a loss world status has led to the development of English nationalism, which has the aim of filling the void left by the collapse of the empire, upon which ‘Britishness’ was, to a great extent, based upon.

This line of thought has begun to lose its potency. Kenny (2016) and Wellings (2012) argue that it lacks credibility as, in the main, the UK transitioned successfully through the decolonialisation period due to its open economy thus there was no great

rupture from which nationalism would emerge. Moreover, Kenny (2016) cites other examples of colonial powers, such as France, who had a less smooth transition yet has seen no great upsurge in French nationalism post 1960's. Drawing such correlations is problematic, the French state was a unitary political and cultural entity, the empire was a purely economic project. The British empire, however, helped to reinforce the overarching identity of a multinational state, thus the relationship between empire and identity is fundamentally different in the case of Britain. A much greater line of inquiry relates to why English nationalism appeared four decades after decolonialisation and why it is English nationalism and not British nationalism which has arisen. As previously discussed, English nationalism pre 2000 was conceptually weak, apparent but intimately tied to Britishness. In order to understand English nationalism, it is essential to uncover its foundations and these foundations are not explicitly concerned with the return of England to a pre-eminent world power.

4.2.4: English Nationalism as the Product of Asymmetric Devolution

The asymmetric devolution argument conceptualizes English nationalism as political nationalism. Devolution has had an irreversible impact on British politics. Although technically the various acts of parliament which govern devolved administrations, devolution has fundamentally altered the political landscape within the United Kingdom. Famously, the shadow Scottish Secretary, George Robertson, claimed in 1995 that 'devolution will kill independence stone dead', however, quite the opposite has occurred, at least in Scotland, where the independence movement led almost to the secession of Scotland in 2014. This section will look at how the asymmetric devolution that occurred under New Labour and gave differing levels of home rule to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland has affected the status of England within the United Kingdom and how this has influenced the emergence of English nationalism.

The debate on the affect of the devolution on politics has ranged from it being conceived of as a failure to properly decentralise power with devolution only allowing for superficial concessions (Nairn 2000) to it being seen as the end of the British constitution (Bogdanor 2005). The reality is somewhere in between, the powers devolved for example in Scotland have been enough to introduce a fairly extensive leftist political program around which a greater degree of Scottish consciousness has

developed. Devolution has not torn up the British constitution, as it has not impacted, at least theoretically, on the central pillar of the constitution- parliamentary sovereignty. The critical issue relating to devolution is not simply that powers were devolved but rather how they were devolved and the asymmetries in the power that were devolved to the home nations. Scotland gained most from devolution with the creation of the Scottish parliament which became the most extensive legislative body outside of Westminster. England, on the other hand, was granted no England specific powers or exclusively English legislature. This asymmetry has raised questions relating to the constitutional position of England resulting in political debates regarding the creation of an English parliament, English votes for English laws and greater decentralisation of power through federalism.

The debates on the constitutional position of England have, in the main, remained in the background of political discourse in the UK. Devolution has not directly led to the emergence of English nationalism, although it has brought into question the status of England within Britain. At best, devolution has political anxiety within the English political sphere, it created a mood, as opposed to a movement (Aughey 2010: 506). This lack of political engagement with English nationalism as a result of devolution is primarily the result of England remaining the dominating nation within the United Kingdom and Westminster's continued control over high politics (Wellings 2010; Nairn 2000). Therefore, while devolution has brought to attention the political status of England, it did not lead to the rise of English nationalism.

English nationalism has not grown from negative sentiments towards the devolved institutions, it has a much greater ideological basis. Understanding its foundations, however, requires an updating of traditional nationalism theories. Nationalism is often prescribed as an attachment between a community and their geographical border, Smith (1986) argues that nationalism arises from core ethnies which determine the distinctive character of the nation. English nationalism does not concern the delineation of England's geographical borders, rather the defense of multinational political institutions. In order to understand English nationalism, the framework of analysis has to be expanded beyond a clearly defined community delineated geographically and instead recognise the location of nationalism and its ability to operate within multinational political units (Wellings 2010). Wellings (2010) offers a framework of analysis which characterises nationalism as the legitimisation of the

location of the sovereign. Through this framework, questions regarding the ontology of English nationalism can focus on the thing itself, rather than on its existence.

By adopting this framework, the acceptance of devolution and the lack of English nationalist demands for consolidating England's constitutional position can be understood. The legitimation of the location of the sovereign as the central component of nationalism serves to explain this acceptance as the sovereign which English nationalists view as legitimate, Westminster, has not fundamentally been altered, with the central pillar of parliamentary sovereignty remaining intact. This approach is essentially nationalism through a theory of allegiance, national identity forms around what is perceived to be the terminal political community. The next section will argue that English nationalism is ideologically predicated upon Euroscepticism as it is European integration which challenges English nationalists' perception of the legitimate location of sovereignty.

4.2.5: European Integration as the Cause of Emergence of English Nationalism

The emergence of English nationalism is a direct result of the deepening integration of the European Union. The argument that English nationalism comes from opposition to Europe has gained increasing support (see Wellings 2010; Vines 2014; Gifford 2014; Gifford 2015; Kenny 2016). Since the breakdown of permissive consensus in the post Maastricht era, the increasing mobilization of Eurosceptic movements at grassroots level provides an insight into Euroscepticism at the national political level (Vines 2014). Vines (2014) argues that Euroscepticism is driven by a search for national definition, however, the premise of this paper is that while English nationalism is a new movement, Euroscepticism is driven by the desire for redefinition of Westminster as the terminal political community.

English nationalism is built upon 'timeless endurance of the British political institutions' (Gifford 2015: 362). With the reshaping of political boundaries in Britain as a result of devolution, the 'cultural boundaries of Englishness have solidified and found its apotheosis in the European Union' (Gifford 2014: 362). Wellings (2010) makes a similar point, arguing that while devolution was important for identifying England as a separate community within the U.K, the ideological content of English nationalism is Euroscepticism. Euroscepticism legitimises the rise of nationalism through reference to a protection of parliamentary sovereignty. Wellings (2010) argues that English nationalism is not legitimized through its defense of popular sovereignty but rather by

its defense of popular sovereignty. Wellings (2010) attaches the rise of nationalism to populism, arguing that populism has polluted the political mainstream within the U.K with the development of 'people power' vis-à-vis European integration through referenda. Further, due to the growth of UKIP and the BNP (British Nationalist Party) and the electoral pressures that this has caused, Wellings (2010) argues that the political establishment have adopted populist policy, however, refrains from accrediting this to the electoral right, rather, he argues that populist Eurosceptic attitudes have been adopted by the entirety of the political spectrum. He argues that resistance to 'European integration has laid the ideological foundations of a contemporary English nationalism by legitimizing the defense of parliamentary sovereignty through the invocation of popular sovereignty' (2010: 490).

Wellings (2010) connection between parliamentary sovereignty, popular sovereignty and Euroscepticism has garnered support (see Gifford 2014; Gifford 2015). The other approach, set out by Vines (2014), views the 'adoption of Eurosceptic attitudes by a growing section of the political class as being driven by a desire to perpetuate a political system that protects elite power and a culture of limited democratic participation' (Vines 2014: 256). Vines' (2014) approach agrees with Wellings' (2010) argument that the ideological basis of English nationalism is Euroscepticism, however, she argues that it is not the proliferation of populism within the British political system which has led to the linking of a Eurosceptic ideology and nationalism but rather elite cue-taking whereby political elites have constructed European integration as a threat to BPT (British political tradition) (Vines 2014). British political traditions prevailed during working class demands for greater political participation- in stark contrast to the French revolution- and they survived the threat of Nazism during the early 20th century. European integration, however, has increasingly challenged British institutions and, in particular, the central concept of parliamentary sovereignty, thus creating elite opposition to the European Union (Vines 2014). Vines (2014) further argues that populism does not play a role in the linkage between nationalism and Euroscepticism as populism is in itself a challenge to British political tradition as it is predicated upon popular sovereignty which challenges parliamentary sovereignty and argues that the development of 'people power' as identified by Wellings (2010) has been 'grafted onto parliamentary sovereignty without challenging its supremacy' (Vines 2014: 261).

While the debate concerning whether populism or an attachment to British Political Tradition is the link between the rise of English nationalism and Euroscepticism is an interesting one, it is beyond the point of inquiry of the paper. This section has had the sole purpose of discussing the link between English nationalism and Euroscepticism and thus to give a basis from which Europe has undergone an 'othering' process within England. Vines' (2014) approach, however, is perhaps the most well suited to understanding the relationship between European integration and English nationalism. The advent of Euroscepticism did not occur with the forming of UKIP or the BNP, nor did it appear with the first referendum on continued membership of the European Economic Community, rather it appeared first at the elite political level. Euroscepticism arose in the rank and file of both the Conservative and Labour parties immediately after British accession to the EEC. Euroscepticism began at the elite level and filtered down to the population, facilitated by development of populist Eurosceptic parties, and has always centered around the conflict between parliamentary sovereignty and the political integration of Europe.

4.2.6: Summing up English Nationalism

English nationalism has a short history, as a nation which has surrendered itself in the fullest terms to British institutions, England is territorially in existence but politically extinct. In order to understand English nationalism, a framework of analysis which looks not at territorial units but at the location of the legitimate sovereign is required. English nationalism holds Westminster as the legitimate source of power and any threat to the sovereignty of that power is a threat to the nation and is constructed as such.

The origins of the rise of English nationalism have been discussed. Its emergence in the 1990's and its subsequent growth in the 2000's has been the result of the European Union's deepening political integration and the development of decision making and legal bodies which have brought into question the supremacy of parliamentary sovereignty in the United Kingdom. These developments have entrenched Europe as the 'other' against which Englishness is cast (Oliver 2015) and Euroscepticism becoming 'the most coherent expression of English nationalism' (Vine 2014: 256). The expectation, therefore, is that those who identify as English are more

likely to be against European integration as they perceive the EU as an inhibitor to the primary allegiance and thus the terminal political community is Westminster.

4.3: Scottish Nationalism

4.3.1: The Construction of Scottish Nationalism

Scottish nationalism is an altogether different beast from English nationalism. Scottish nationalism has a much longer history, primarily a result of Scotland subjecting itself to a lesser extent to British institutions than England and secondly because it is a unique form of nationalism, which has been described as post-nationalist nationalism. This chapter will briefly engage with the history of Scottish nationalism to dispel claims that Scottish nationalism is a novel advent and that Scottish national identity and culture was suppressed by English colonialism. The chapter will then, at more length, discuss modern Scottish nationalism, arising somewhere in the 1970's, and discuss claims that this modern Scottish nationalism is post-nationalist. The chapter will conclude that Scottish nationalism is constructed within a multi-national discourse, thus it is an inclusive form of nationalism and, for the purposes of this paper, means that Scottish nationalists can locate the terminal political community beyond the national boundaries of the country and thus legitimise the European Union as a source of political power.

4.3.2: Contemporary Scottish Nationalism

This section refers to contemporary Scottish nationalism as it simultaneously deals with two problematic assertions that have been made vis-à-vis Scottish nationalism. The first is the linking of present day Scottish nationalism to medieval conceptions of Scottish nationalism which is predicated upon opposition to the English. The second is that contemporary gives the sense of evolution- a second common conceptual issue with the study of Scottish nationalism is to take it as a recent phenomenon, arising during the period of British decolonisation. This chapter will first deal with the latter in order to show that Scottish identity was not suppressed by British colonialism and indeed thrived during the British empire and then it will explore more deeply contemporary Scottish nationalism.

4.3.3: The Problems with the decolonialisation Argument

Jackson and Malley (2002) claim that Scotland was merely a colony of English imperialism and thus Scotland as a nation and Scottishness as an indicator of identity was suppressed. This is an inaccurate representation of the union between the England and Scotland and is not supported by historical evidence. Although colonialism proves difficult to rigidly define, at its core, it concerns 'the transfer of control over social organization from the indigenous population to the colonial power' (Connell 2004: 254). The development of the contemporary United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has been a long and somewhat complicated one, nevertheless, the Kingdom of Great Britain (Scotland, England and Wales) arose from the union of the parliaments in 1707. As the previous chapter discussed, this political union took supremacy over all constituent nation with England being the most subordinated socially, culturally and politically and legally. Thus, Jackson and Malley's (2002) depiction of Scotland's subordination to England is conceptually problematic. Moreover, even a more historically correct argument concerning Scotland's subordination to Britain and British colonialism fall foul of what Connell (2004) describes as the fundamental aspect of colonialism. The control of social organization was never fully transferred to the British institutions. Scotland maintained its autonomy over both legal and religious institutions. The retention of such institutions 'insulated Scotland from the influence of a unionist parliament' (Connell 2004: 255). The role of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland in an administrative function at the community parish level was far greater than the role played by the British parliament (Connell 2004). Along with the maintenance of distinctive legal and administrative systems, Scotland was well represented in the formal British political institutions where Scots have held positions in both chambers of parliament, and on seven occasions there has been a Scottish Prime Minister elected. Thus, contrary to conventional colonialist thought, Scotland was neither subordinated to the extent that there was a total transfer of control over social organisation and, further, Scots have populated the elites of the British political establishment. The depiction of a colonised Scotland, therefore, is conceptually problematic.

Postcolonial theories have gained support in explanations for the rise of Scottish nationalism. Postcolonialism is a problematic framework for analysis in terms of explaining the emergence of Scottish nationalism as it demands disregard of historical

truths, it is predicated upon the idea that Scotland was a colony. Scotland has always been a partner within the United Kingdom with significant autonomy in regards to the social, cultural and legal organization of the country. The rise of Scottish political nationalism in the 20th century cannot be explained through the suppression of Scotland and the opening up of opportunity within the process of decolonisation.

4.3.4: 20th Century Scottish Nationalism: A Leftist Movement

The Decolonisation argument as set out by Jackson and Malley (2002) reduces Scottish nationalism to anti-suppression and anti-English sentiments. Yet, the Scottish nationalism of the late 20th century has little connection to national signifiers such as Bannockburn and the Scottish enlightenment, rather, it based upon political ideological opposition. Contemporary Scottish nationalism has its foundations in opposition to neo-liberalism and, instead promotes a political ideology revolving around egalitarianism, democracy and the protection of a leftist political agenda (Jackson 2014). Scottish novelist Irvine Welsh captures the essence of Scottish nationalism, arguing that unionism, from the point of view of Scotland, has ‘foisted 35 years of destructive neoliberalism upon us and prevented us from becoming the European social democracy that we are politically inclined to be’ (2013). Scottish nationalism is not anti-English nor necessarily exclusive, it is merely a political programme with a leftist ideological agenda.

The Scottish nationalist movement is a leftist movement with its inspiration coming from the Labour party, or, more specifically, from images of earlier and purer forms of British Labourism (Jackson 2014). This influence has meant that ‘Scottish statehood is not so much about the expression of a national identity as an instrumental device for the realization of a more egalitarian society’ (Jackson 2014: 53). With consecutive Conservative governments in the 1970’s and 1980’s as well as in the post 2010 era Scotland experienced a breakup of the trade unions, economic depression and cuts to social welfare, prompting the rise of the nationalist movement, the electoral success of the SNP and the close independence referendum in 2016. Deindustrialisation in the 1970’s and 1980’s was the single most important event in contemporary Scottish nationalism as it aligned the SNP with classical Labour values upon which SNP strategy was built in opposition to neo-liberal shock therapy. In sum, Scottish

nationalism is not a traditional nationalism- a collective delineated by geographical boundaries, rather, it is a collective bound together by values and ideas.

Scottish nationalism is civic nationalism driven by a nationalist party with civic values at its core (Engström 2018). While Scottish nationalism is built upon a leftist ideology and demands the promotion of Scottish interests, it does not demand autarchy for Scotland, rather Scottish nationalists and political elites have articulated a vision of Scotland in which Scotland gains independence and simultaneously both self determination and the subordination to shared international institutions. Scottish nationalism challenges traditional nationalism, as it demands statehood within European integration (Jackson 2014). Alex Salmond described himself as a post nationalist, promoting an independent Scotland without ties to absolute sovereignty, rather building a post national state within a multinational framework, whereby the EU would continue to have legitimate political and legal influence over Scotland and the creation of a currency union with with England in which financial policy is effectively outsourcing national financial control to a foreign institution, the Bank of England. Scotland, within the current European context is a 'nationalist anomaly due to its pro-European and pro immigration stance' (Engström 2018: 98). The SNP have increasingly come to see Europe as a source of inspiration for an independent Scotland, identifying it as a facilitator of the creation of social democratic nation state.

With contemporary Scottish nationalism, the focus should not purely be on identity, which nevertheless plays a role, but, rather, it should focus on the location of legitimate power and its conception of where the terminal political community lies. It is clear that Scottish nationalism is not of the traditionally exclusive variety. It is structurally different. It is a form of post-national nationalism which seeks to build statehood within a multinational context. As a result, it is important that the location of legitimate power and the terminal political community is analysed. The prediction, therefore, is that due to the SNP's positive association with the EU and the belief that the EU can facilitate the development of a social democratic and independent Scotland within a European framework, those who identify as Scottish will view the European Union as legitimate and thus support integration and will have voted to remain in the Brexit referendum.

Chapter 5: Methodology

5.1: Data Selection

The thesis makes use of wave 9 of the 2014-2018 British Election Study, which was a post EU referendum online study. The study was chosen as the data set for the thesis due to the vast wealth of information contained within it and the fact that it is the most comprehensive post referendum study and thus offers the most appropriate data set for exploring the causes that lie behind the Brexit referendum result. The study from which the data has been extracted is a panel study, meaning that the four-year period between 2014-2018 measured the evolving attitudes of the same set of respondents.

As well as being the most comprehensive collection of survey data relating to the Brexit vote, wave 9 of the British election study was also chosen for the way in which it measured both 'Scottishness' and 'Englishness'. The survey asks respondents in Scotland to place themselves on a scale of how Scottish they are, and likewise in England vis-à-vis how English they are. This was of critical importance for the paper and meant that this dataset had a clear advantage over others which have adopted the Moreno scale for 'Scottishness'. The Moreno scale asked respondents whether they felt more British than Scottish which problematises comparisons between the impact of Scottish identity and English identity, thus the British election study data gives a better base for comparisons on the impact of identity on voter choice in the Brexit referendum. The data was, therefore, chosen, firstly due to the comprehensive nature of the data and secondly as it more effectively allows for the measuring of the impact of national identity on voter choice in the Brexit referendum.

The aim of the paper is to explain the variance in support for the European Union between Scotland and England, which was uncovered in the results of the Brexit referendum. The thesis uses statistical analysis to give an understanding of the impact of national identity on individual preferences relating to the European Union. Due to the dependent variable being binary and there being numerous independent and control variables, binary logistic regression was the model selected for carrying out the statistical analysis. The model is used to predict the relationship between independent and dependent variables, when the latter is binary.

5.2: Dependent Variables

Three dependent variables have been chosen to reflect the aims of the research question. The first, 'Voter Choice', was created out of the survey question 'How did you vote in the EU referendum?' The raw data was cleaned and coded (see table 1.1) in order to ensure the elimination of errors within the data and improving the statistical significance of the results. The 'Voter Choice' variable captures the central question of the thesis- to what extent did national identity play a role in the Brexit referendum and can national identity explain the variance in support of the European Union between Scotland and England. The second dependent variable engages with the theory of allegiance by teasing out where people see the legitimate terminal community. The data used relates to the question regarding whether the individual agrees or disagrees with EU regulation. This is not as effective as a question which would directly ask respondents whether they see the European Union as a legitimate political decision making body. In the absence of such a question, the thesis created the variable 'Location of Power' from the data relating to whether the individual agreed or disagreed with EU regulation in order to find the effects of national identity on the where an individual locates the legitimate terminal community. The third dependent variable focuses on linking the Brexit result to globalisation, conceptualised as being facilitated by the European Union and as a threat to national identity. While the theory section took as an example of globalisation, finance due to capital being the engine of cross border activity, the paper uses immigration to measure views on globalisation. This has a pragmatic reasoning, firstly, due to data limitations, most likely arising from knowledge capacity of respondents, questions did not relate to the effects of increasingly globalised capital, facilitated by the EU, on the U.K. but rather focused on perception of globalisation through immigration. Secondly, globalisation was engaged with mostly through immigration during the referendum campaign with immigration emerging as one of the biggest issues in the debate. The data was similarly cleaned (table 1.1) and became a binary variable depicting those who support and those who are against immigration.

Table 1.1: Constructing the Dependent Variables.

Voter Choice	The variable was cleaned, removing those who had not voted, leaving a dichotomous variable of those who voted to remain and those who voted to leave the European Union (coded as remain=0, leave=1)
Views on Immigration	The variable was cleaned, removing those who answered 'don't know' creating a scale from immigration is bad to immigration is good for the UK
Legitimacy of EU as a political power	The data was cleaned, removing those who answered don't know and creating a binary dependent variable of those against EU regulation and those in support of EU regulation

5.3: Independent Variables

The thesis explores the role of national identity in the Brexit referendum result and whether it can explain some of the variance in the support for the European Union between Scotland and England, therefore, takes as its two test independent variables, indicators of Scottish and English identity. One of the main reasons behind choosing the British electoral panel study was for its measurement of Scottish and English identity, in which respondents were asked to what extent they felt English or Scottish, in their respective countries, on a seven point scale. The specifics of the coding and cleaning of the independent variables is displayed in table 1.2. Along with indicators of identity, country of residence has been included amongst the independent variables, this will control for the varying experience of individuals vis-à-vis the European Union between the countries, controlling for the effects of Scotland being a net gainer from the European Union and England a net loser. It will also control for the impact of domestic politics. Moreover, it will help control the effects of differences between education systems and average income (which is marginally higher in England, solely as a result of the inflated salaries in London). The data was cleaned-as per table 1.2.

The other independent variables- personal income and level of education have been used to control for the theories of support for European integration in chapter two. These theories have in essence informed Hobolt's discussion (2016) on the Brexit result. Both Hobolt (2016) and Inglehart (1970) argue that high levels of education, or cognitive mobilisation, is a predictor of one's support of the European Union. In measuring cognitive mobilisation, the thesis relies upon Inglehart's conception, that of university attendance. Therefore, to control for cognitive mobilisation, the variable

'level of education is used' which is cleaned and coded dichotomously to create a variable separating those who have attended university from those who have not. Personal income has also been included to control for individual economic utilitarian arguments. This was chosen as direct measurement for operationalising the impact of individual economic utilitarian calculations. Lastly, age has been included as an independent variable. Age was included in Hobolt's (2016) conception of globalisation, whereby, the elderly were more likely to fall into the category of the losers of globalisation and, subsequent studies on the Brexit referendum result have all found a high correlation between age and how an individual voted in the referendum, thus is an important control variable.

Table 1.2: Coding and Cleaning of Independent Variables.

Income	Coded dichotomously into above average earners (assigned the value '1') and below average earners (assigned the value '0').
Education	Coded dichotomously into those who have attended university (assigned the value of '1') and those who have not attended university (assigned the value of '2').
Age	Raw data did not require recoding nor cleaning
Scottish Identity	Data was cleaned, removing those who 'did not know' or did not associate as Scottish. Coded on a 1-7 scale with 1= 'not very Scottish' and 7= 'very Scottish'.
English Identity	Data was cleaned, removing those who 'did not know' or did not associate as English. Coded on a 1-7 scale with 1= 'not very English' and 7= 'very English'.
Country of Residence	Data was cleaned with those stating residency in Wales removed. Coded- England= 1 and Scotland= 2.

Chapter 6: Results and Discussion

6.1: Results

The first regression analysis used the dependent variable of Vote choice in order to measure the effect of national identity on the way in which individuals voted in the referendum. The results shown in table 2.0 confirms that English nationality has a strong impact upon how the individual voted. An odds ratio (Exp (B)) of 1, 101 means that identification as English makes an individual 1, 101 times more likely to vote to leave the European Union per 1 interval unit rise in Englishness. Therefore, individuals who placed themselves as identifying most as English (7 on the 1-7 scale) have an

odds ratio Exp (B) of 6.606 and thus a probability of 86.8% (Exp B/ Exp B + 1) of voting to leave the European Union, compared with a 52.4% probability of voting to leave the European Union for those identifying as not very English (1 on the 1-7 scale).

With respect to the control variables, only age and level of education gave statistically significant results. Age was a much more powerful indicator of how an individual voted, for each unit rise in an individual's age, the probability that they voted to leave the European Union increases an odds ratio of 1, 014.

Table 2.0: Outcome of regression on Vote Choice

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	Personal Income	-,143	,102	1,973	1	,160	,867
	Level of Education	-1,258	,100	157,866	1	,000	,284
	Age	,014	,003	18,067	1	,000	1,014
	Identify as English	,097	,034	7,903	1	,005	1,101
	Identify as Scottish	-,033	,033	3,051	1	,305	,967
	Country of Residence	-,925	,488	3,592	1	,058	,396
	Constant	1,023	1,016	1,014	1	,314	2,780

The second regression sought to capture the effect of globalisation (table 2.1). Although this measurement has been reduced to the perception of the effects of immigration, the perception of immigration can be related to how individuals conceive foreign influences on the country, society and culture. Personal income, identification as English and identification as Scottish were all statistically significant results. The only statistically significant independent variable was an individual's identification with Englishness. Those identifying as very English (7 on the 1-7 scale) have an odds ratio of 5, 526 and thus are 84.6% less likely to view immigration positively, whereas those assigning themselves a 1 on the Englishness scale reduces the probability that they are against immigration by 36.7% to a 47.9% likelihood that they view immigration negatively. In contrast, those identifying as very Scottish have an odds ratio of 5, 538 which equates to an 84.7% likelihood that they are less likely to view immigration positively. Most significantly was the impact of level of education on the chances of an individual seeing immigration in a positive or negative light. Those that have attended university have a probability of 74.6% of being in favour of immigration.

Table 2.1: Views on Immigration

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	Personal Income	-,251	,116	4,656	1	,031	,778
	Level of Education	1,081	,117	86,015	1	,000	2,947
	Age	,001	,004	,020	1	,888	1,001
	Identify as English	-,082	,042	3,869	1	,049	,921
	Identify as Scottish	-,080	,039	4,235	1	,040	,923
	Country of Residence	,459	,514	,797	1	,372	1,582
	Constant	,281	1,077	,068	1	,794	1,324

The next regression, with the dependent variable 'acceptance of EU regulation' (Table 2.3), is the first measurement of the theory of allegiance and terminal political community, seeking to measure where people locate their terminal community. Those who identify as very Scottish have an odds ratio of 6, 779 of accepting European Union regulation, creating a probability that those identifying as very Scottish are 87.1 % more likely to support EU regulation. Conversely, those identifying themselves as not very Scottish have a probability of only 53% of accepting EU regulation. Those identifying as very English have an odds ratio of 5, 089, giving them a probability of 83.2% for disagreeing with EU regulation, compared to a disapproval probability of 47.9% for those identifying as not very English. Again, level of education plays an important role, with those having attended university having an odds ratio of supporting EU regulation of 2 compared with those who have not attended university, meaning that there is a probability that those who attended university are 66.6% more likely to support EU regulation.

Table 2.3: Acceptance of EU Regulation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	Personal Income	,150	,103	2,130	1	,144	1,162
	Level of Education	,693	,105	43,763	1	,000	2,000
	Age	-,009	,003	8,156	1	,004	,991
	Identify as English	-,095	,039	6,021	1	,014	,909
	Identify as Scottish	,061	,034	3,240	1	,072	1,063
	Country of Residence	,853	,598	2,033	1	,154	2,347
	Constant	-2,031	1,232	2,718	1	,099	,131

Approval of the European Union as a political decision maker produces the most emphatic results, showing the greatest difference between Scottish and English nationality (Table 2.4). Again, this variable relates to the theory of allegiance and shows how nationality affects that allegiance. Those who identify as very Scottish have an odds ratio of 6, 816 or an 88.5% likelihood that they support the European Union as a legitimate source of political power. Conversely, those identifying as very English have a probability of 84.7% of disapproving with the European Union as a political decision maker. Both age and level of education are highly correlated with approval of the European Union with chance of those who have attended university being supportive of the EU as a political power 77% and an odds ratio of 0, 923 per one unit rise in age, meaning that as the age of respondents rises, so does the chance they disapprove of the European Union.

Table 2.4: Approval of EU

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a						
Identify as Scottish	,128	,037	12,099	1	,001	1,136
Identify as English	-,080	,041	3,839	1	,050	,923
Personal Income	-,098	,114	,735	1	,391	,907
Level of Education	1,219	,113	116,370	1	,000	3,384
Country of Residence	,562	,571	,970	1	,325	1,755
Age	-,023	,004	40,036	1	,000	,977
Constant	-1,288	1,185	1,182	1	,277	,276

6.2: Discussion of Results

As expected, the results show strong association between Scottish identity and English identity with opinion formation regarding the European Union. They show a strong connection between Scottish identity and support for the European Union and, conversely, a strong association between English identity and Euroscepticism. The most compelling results, related to the approval of the European Union as a decision maker. The results support the combining of national identity with Van Kersbergen's theory of allegiance, showing that those who most identify with Scottish nationality are most accepting of the European Union as a supranational decision making body, thus limiting, or at least affecting, the decision making powers of the current devolved Scottish parliament. The results also challenge Van Kersbergen's objection to the

combination of national identity with a theory of allegiance, as the results show that those who identify as very Scottish, as opposed to not very Scottish, are much more approving of the European Union. With Scottish identity and Scottish nationalism being based on some form of post-nationalist nationalism, whereby its construction is based on a set of anti-neo-liberal ideas and within the international community, rather than its construction relating to its delineation from others.

Likewise, vis-à-vis English identity, those who identify as very English conformed to expectation, with a strong association between English identity and a disapproval of the European Union. Both the analysis of the impact of English identity upon the approval of the EU as a political decision maker and on the acceptance of EU regulation showed a strongly negative relationship. The construction of English identity, built in opposition to European integration and around the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, places the terminal community for English nationalist in Westminster. Those identifying as very English see the terminal community as Westminster and therefore see EU interventions in political life as illegitimate and thus causing their disapproval of the European Union. This is what lies behind English euroscepticism and is ultimately why England voted to leave the European Union.

The first measurement of globalisation used- immigration- produced a result which ran counter to expectation. While it was expected that those identifying as English would be less approving of immigration due to the perceived cultural threats, which are constructed from exclusive nationalism, it was expected that those identifying as Scottish would be more approving of immigration. The result, however, produced a negative correlation between identifying as very Scottish and approving of immigration. The expectation of Scottish nationalism is of an open society, one which seeks to have national independence within international structures, thus the result defies the logic of Scottish nationalism. Immigration, however, did become an increasingly controversial issue from 2015 with the immigration crisis that occurred in Europe as a result of the war in Syria. Coupled with the crisis, the rise of terrorism in Europe adversely affected the politicisation of immigration in Europe, with it becoming a securitised issue- this has perhaps affected the results. The result may reveal public grievances concerning the EU's management of globalisation- although generally a public constructed inclusively will be more accepting of immigration and the consequences of globalisation, the relationship constructed through allegiance is two-part. First, there is the primary allegiance to the nation state, then a secondary

allegiance to the European Union. The European Union will be judged in its ability to manage the relationship in a way that facilitates the primary allegiance, thus the result is indicative of the EU's perceived declining ability to deal with immigration, resulting from the Syrian crisis.

The second measurement of globalisation- approval of EU regulation gave a result more in line with expectation. Those identifying as English were considerably more likely to reject EU regulation than those who identified as Scottish. This is the intercept at which globalisation and nationality meet- where nationality is predicated upon exclusivity, globalisation is conceptualised as a threat as it has the power to national culture and politics. Where nationality is inclusive, it is compossible with nationalism. The argument therefore, is that whereas Hobolt (2016) argues that globalisation leads to opinion formation about the European Union, this paper does not view globalisation and the European Union as mutually exclusive, by essence the European Union is globalisation and it is how nationality is constructed vis-à-vis outside outside influence determines the relationship between individuals and the European Union, and globalisation more generally. Through Scottish nationalisms focus on building a state within international structures, political influence from out with the physical boundaries of the state is seen as both acceptable and legitimate.

Lastly, the analysis of vote choice confirms both associations of identity and the location of legitimate power. Those who identified as being very English had a very high probability of voting to leave the European Union. Exploring Brexit referendum result through nationality has allowed for developed understanding, not only of the Brexit vote but also between the stark variations in support for the European Union between Scotland and England. While the control variables, in particular level of education and age, were prominent explanations for voter choice and for approval of the European Union, however, while they give an understanding of the entirety of the Brexit vote, they cannot explain the variations between Scotland and England. The expectation from the theoretical discussion was that higher cognitive ability would have a positive correlation with support for the European Union, which the results confirm, however, counterintuitively, Scotland, with its smaller percentage of university educated than England, showed greater support for the European Union. This variance can be explained by the construction of Scottish nationalism and how it seeks to build an independent Scotland within EU structures and therefore, it is one's association with a Scottish identity which makes them pro-EU.

Conclusion

The Brexit referendum exemplified the stark political differences between Scotland and England, illustrating the pro-European tendencies of Scotland and Eurosceptic tendencies of England. This has informed the object of analysis of the thesis, an exploration of the reasons behind the variance in support of the European Union between Scotland and England. There has been a great development in the theoretical basis for explaining the public opinion towards the EU, from cognitive mobilization, to economic utilitarian arguments and the impact of domestic politics. However, while these explanations can produce understandings of the formation of opinion on the micro-level, they fail to explain why Scotland collectively is pro-European and Euroscepticism is much more prominent in England, when economically the two countries are structurally similar and England has a more highly cognitively mobilized population. The thesis has explored the impact of nationalism and identity on how people voted in the Brexit referendum through attaching identity to Van Kersbergen's theory of allegiance.

English nationalism is a recent phenomenon, emerging in the 1990's and developing in the 2000's in parallel to the growth of Euroscepticism. English nationalism is predicated on Euroscepticism with its fundamental basis in the protection of British political institutions and parliamentary sovereignty. It is an exclusive form of nationalism, one which seeks to protect its social and political order from outside influence. Scottish nationalism, on the other hand, has a much richer history, however, its modern form is also a fairly recent phenomenon, arising in the 1970's and 1980's in opposition to British neo-liberal economic policy. Scottish nationalism has an ontological basis in social democracy, with the promoting of egalitarianism and social welfare. It is not nationalism in the traditional sense, it does not seek to demarcate Scotland from 'others' rather it is a form of post-nationalist nationalism, one which seeks Scottish independence within the European community and, through using a theory of allegiance, an understanding of Scottish nationalism arises- it aims for an independent Scotland within a community which can facilitate Scotland becoming the nation it seeks to be- a social democratic European nation.

The results of the paper confirm the expectations regarding the construction of Scottish and English identity in relation to the European Union. The results show that those who identify as English are much more inclined to view the European Union as

illegitimate and to have voted to leave the European Union. Whereas, those who identified as Scottish are much more likely to locate the terminal political community out with the boundaries of Scotland and the United Kingdom and thus see the European Union as legitimate, thus more likely to vote to remain within the European Union. The legitimacy of the European Union is dependent upon the existence of a double allegiance, with the primary allegiance to the nation state and a subsidiary secondary allegiance to the European Union, with the secondary allegiance dependent upon its ability to facilitate the primary allegiance.

In order to understand the Brexit vote, identity and nationalism cannot be ignored, the thesis has shown that they have played a crucial role in shaping public opinion within the UK vis-à-vis the European Union and that they have shaped how people voted in the Brexit referendum. While factors such as education and age, along with income, have proven to explain some of the referendum result more generally, the variation in support of the European Union between Scotland and England is largely the result of how their respective identities have been constructed.

References

- Anderson, C. (1998) 'When in Doubt, Use Proxies: Attitudes Toward Domestic Politics and Support for Integration,' *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 31:5, pp. 569-601
- Aughey, A. *The Politics of Englishness* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007)
- Balestrini, P., (2012) 'How Citizens Education, Occupation, Personal Economic Explanations and National Identity Interact with One Another to Sway Public Opinion on the EU,' *Swiss Political Science Review*, Vol. 18-3, pp. 371-384
- Bogdanor, V., (2005) 'Constitutional reform in Britain: The quiet revolution,' *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 8:1, pp. 73-98
- Boomgaarden, H., G., and Schuck, A., R., T., and Elenbaas, M., and De Vreese, C., H., (2011) 'Mapping EU Attitudes: Conceptual and Empirical Dimensions of Euroscepticism and EU Support,' *European Union Politics*, Vol. 12: 2, pp 241-266
- Bryant, C., (2008) 'Devolution, equity and the English question,' *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 14, 4, pp. 664-683
- Connell, L., (2004) 'Scottish Nationalism and the Colonial Vision of Scotland,' *interventions*, vol. 6:2, pp. 252-263
- Daddow, O., (2012) 'The UK media and Europe: From permissive consensus to destructive dissent,' *International Affairs*, Vol. 88: 6, pp. 1219- 1236
- Damro, C. (2012) 'Market Power Europe,' *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 19:5, pp. 682-699
- Damro, C. (2015) 'Market Power Europe: Exploring a Dynamic Conceptual Framework,' *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 22:9, pp. 1336-1354
- De Vreese, C., H., and Boomgaarden, H., G., (2005) 'Projecting EU Referendums: Fear of Immigration and Support for European Integration,' *European Union Politics*, Vol. 6:1, pp. 59-82.
- De Vries, C., E., & Edwards, E., (2009) 'Taking Europe to its extremes: extremist parties and public Euroscepticism,' *Party Politics*, vol. 15: 1, pp. 5-28
- Carey, S (2002) 'Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity and Obstacle to European Integration?' *European Union Politics*, Vol. 3: 4, pp. 387-413
- Eichenberg, K., C., and Dalton, R., J., (1993) 'Europeans and the European Community: The Dynamics of Public Support of Integration,' *International Organisation*, Vol. 47:4, pp. 507-534

Engström, R., (2018) 'The Discontinuation of Scottish Nationalism? A Discursive Comparison of the Scottish National Party and the National Collective,' *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 23:1, pp. 97-115

Fenton, S., (2007) 'Indifference towards national identity: what young adults think about being British and English,' *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 13:2, pp. 321-340

Findlay, R and O'Rourke, K. *Power and Plenty* (New Jersey: Princeton, 2009)

Gabel, M., J., (1998) 'Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five Theories,' *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 60: 2, pp 333-354

Gabel, M., J., and Anderson C., J., (2002) 'The Structure of Citizen Attitudes and the European Political Space,' *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 35: 8, pp. 893-913

Gabel M., J., and Palmer, H., (1995) 'Understanding Variation in Public Support for European Integration,' *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 27, pp. 3-17

Geddes, A. *The European Union and British Politics* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)

Gifford, C., (2014) 'The People Against Europe: The Eurosceptic Challenge to the United Kingdom's Coalition Government,' *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 52: 3, pp 512-528.

Gifford, C., (2015) 'Nationalism, Populism and Anglo-English Euroscepticism,' *British Politics*, 10:3, pp. 342-366

Gordon, M. (2016) 'The UK's Sovereignty Situation: Brexit, Bewilderment and Beyond,' *Kings Law Journal*, Vol. 27:3, pp. 333-343

Jacoby, W., and Meunier, S. (2010) 'Europe and the Management of Globalisation,' *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol 17: 3, pp. 299-317

Hamelink, C. J., (1999) 'The Elusive Concept of Globalisation,' *Global Dialogue*; Vol: 1:1, Social Science Premium Collection

Haas, E., *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958)

Haesly, R., (2001) 'Eurosceptics, Europhiles and Instrumental Europeans: European Attachment in Scotland and Wales,' *European Union Politics*, Vol 2-1 pp. 81-102

Heywood, A. *Politics*, 4th ed. (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013)

Hobolt, S., B., Spoon, J., and Tilley, J., (2009) 'A Vote Against Europe?: Explaining Defection at the 1999 and 2004 European Parliamentary Elections,' *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 39: 1, pp. 93-115

Hobolt, S., B., (2016) 'The Brexit Vote: A Divided Nation, a Divided Continent,' *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 23: 9, pp, 1259-1277

Hooghe, L., and Marks., G, (2004) 'Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration?' *Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 37: 3, pp. 415-420

Hooghe, L., and Marks., G, (2007) 'Sources of Euroscepticism,' *Acta Politica*, Vol 42, pp. 119-127.

Hooghe, L., and Marks., G, (2008) 'A Post Functionalist Theory of European Integration. From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus,' *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 39:1, pp. 1-23

Hurrelmann, A. (2014) 'Democracy Beyond the State: Insights from the European Union,' *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 129:1, pp. 87-105

Ichijo, A. *Scottish Nationalism and the Idea of Europe. Concepts of Europe and the Nation*. (Oxford: Routledge, 2004)

Ichijo, A., (2012) 'Entrenchment of Unionist Nationalism: Devolution and the Discourse of National Identity in Scotland,' *National Identities*, vol. 14: 1, pp. 23-37

Inglehart, R., (1970) 'Cognitive Mobilisation and European Identity,' Vol. 3: 1, *Comparative Politics*, pp. 45-70

Jackson, B (2014) 'The Political Thought of Scottish Nationalism,' *The Political Quarterly*, vol. 85:1, pp. 50-55

Jackson, E., R., and Maley, W., (2002) 'Celtic connections: colonialism and culture in Irish-Scottish modernism,' *Interventions*, vol 4: 1, pp. 68-78

Kenny, M. (2016) 'The Politicisation of Englishness: Towards a Framework for Political Analysis,' *Political Studies Review*, vol. 14: 3, pp. 325-334

Kumar, K. (2006) 'Empire and English Nationalism,' *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 12: 1, pp. 1-13

Lerner, D., *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1958)

Laffan, B., (1996) 'The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe,' *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 34:1, pp. 81-102

Lubbers, M., and Scheepers, P., (2010) 'Divergent Trends of Euroscepticism in Countries and Regimes of the European Union,' *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 49, pp. 787-817

Marks, G. (1999) 'Territorial Identities in the European Union,' in *Regional Integration and Democracy: Expanding on the European Experience*, pp. 69-91, (Boulder Co: Rowman and Littlefield)

McCorkindale, C. (2016) 'Scotland and Brexit: The State of the Union and the Union State,' *Kings Law Journal*, vol. 27:3, pp. 353-365

Mclaren, L., M., (2002) 'Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?' *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 64:2, pp. 551-566

Mclaren, L., (2007) 'Explaining Mass-Level Euroscepticism: Identity, Interests, and Institutional Distrust,' *Acta Politicus*, Vol. 42: 2, pp. 233-251.

Nairn, T., *After Britain: New Labour and the Return of Scotland* (London: Granta Books, 2000)

Niedermayer, O., and Westle, B., 'A Typology of Orientations,' in Niedermayer, O and Sinnott, R., *Public Opinion and Institutionalised Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995)

Ohmae, K (1989) 'The Global Logic of Strategic Alliances,' *Harvard Business Review*.

Ohmae, K. *The End of the Nation State; The Rise of Regional States* (New York: Simon Schuster, 1995)

Oliver, T., (2015) 'To be or Not to be in Europe: Is that the Question? Britain's European Question and and in/out Referendum,' *International Affairs*, Vol. 91:1, pp. 77-91

Polgar, I. (2016) 'Euroscepticism, an Increasing Phenomenon Among the Member States. Road to Brexit,' *Romanian Review on Political Geography*, vol. 8:2, pp. 83-93

Posner, E. and Veron, N. (2010) 'The EU and Financial Regulation: power without purpose?,' *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 17:3, pp. 400-415

Prosser, C., (2016) 'Calling European Union treaty referendums: electoral and institutional politics', *Political Studies*, vol. 64: 1, pp. 182-199

Reif, K., and Schmitt, H., (1980) 'Nine Second-Order National Elections— A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election results,' *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 8: 1, pp. 3-44

Sassatelli, M., (2002) 'Imagined Europe: The Shaping of a European Cultural Identity through EU Cultural Policy,' *European Journal of Social Theory*, Vol. 5: 4, pp. 435-451

Scruton, R., *England. An Elegy* (London: Pimlico, 2001)

Sunstein, C., R., *#Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2017)

Thatcher, M., *The Downing Street Years* (London: HarperCollins, 1995)

Thomassen, B., (2009) 'The uses and meanings of liminality,' *International Political Anthropology*, Vol. 2: 1, pp. 5–28

- Usherwood, S., & Startin, N., (2013) 'Euroscepticism as a persistent phenomenon,' *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 51:1, pp. 1-16
- Van Kersbergen, K., (2000) 'Political Allegiance and European Integration,' *European Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 37: 1, pp. 1-17
- Vuorinen, L, (2015) 'Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom Independence Party's (UKIP) policies in 2009-2015,' (Masters thesis, University of Tampere)
- Wellings, B. (2010) 'Losing the Peace: Euroscepticism and the foundations of contemporary English nationalism,' *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 16: 3, pp. 488-505
- Young, A. (2006) 'The politics of regulation and the internal market', in K.E. Jorgensen, M.A. Pollack and B. Rosamond (eds), *Handbook of European Union Politics* (London: Sage, 373–94)

Annex I

Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable: Vote Choice

Notes		
Output Created		25-APR-2018 19:36:03
Comments		
Input	Data	\\ATKK\home\al\lamackie\Desktop\British election study data.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	30036
	Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing
Syntax		LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES ReferendumVote /METHOD=ENTER PersonallIncome LevelofEducation age IdentifyasEnglish IdentifyasScottish CountryofResidence /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5).
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00,36
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00,36

Case Processing Summary

Unweighted Cases ^a		N	Percent
Selected Cases	Included in Analysis	2233	7,4
	Missing Cases	27803	92,6
	Total	30036	100,0
Unselected Cases		0	,0
Total		30036	100,0

a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases.

**Dependent Variable
Encoding**

Original Value	Internal Value
Remain	0
Leave	1

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table^{a,b}

	Observed		Predicted		Percentage Correct
			ReferendumVote Remain	Leave	
Step 0	ReferendumVote	Remain	1467	0	100,0
		Leave	766	0	,0
Overall Percentage					65,7

a. Constant is included in the model.

b. The cut value is ,500

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 0	Constant	-,650	,045	212,481	1	,000	,522

Variables not in the Equation

		Score	df	Sig.	
Step 0	Variables	PersonallIncome	18,847	1	,000
		LevelofEducation	189,078	1	,000
		Age	37,115	1	,000
		IdentifyasEnglish	20,565	1	,000
		IdentifyasScottish	2,976	1	,085

	CountryofResidence	2,856	1	,091
	Overall Statistics	234,706	6	,000

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients

		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	242,915	6	,000
	Block	242,915	6	,000
	Model	242,915	6	,000

Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	2628,852 ^a	,103	,142

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than ,001.

Classification Table^a

	Observed		Predicted		Percentage Correct
			ReferendumVote	Leave	
	ReferendumVote	Remain	Leave		
Step 1	Remain	1300	167		88,6
	Leave	543	223		29,1
	Overall Percentage				68,2

a. The cut value is ,500

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	PersonallIncome	-,143	,102	1,973	1	,160	,867
	LevelofEducation	-1,258	,100	157,866	1	,000	,284

Age	,014	,003	18,067	1	,000	1,014
IdentifyasEnglish	,097	,034	7,903	1	,005	1,101
IdentifyasScottish	-,033	,033	1,051	1	,305	,967
CountryofResidence	-,925	,488	3,592	1	,058	,396
Constant	1,023	1,016	1,014	1	,314	2,780

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: PersonalIncome, LevelofEducation, Age, IdentifyasEnglish, IdentifyasScottish, CountryofResidence.

LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES LocationofPower
 /METHOD=ENTER PersonalIncome LevelofEducation age IdentifyasEnglish
 IdentifyasScottish
 CountryofResidence
 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5).

Annex II

Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable 'Views on Immigration'

Notes		
Output Created		25-APR-2018 19:37:23
Comments		
Input	Data	\\ATKK\home\al\amackie\Desktop\British election study data.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing
Syntax		LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES SupportforImmigration /METHOD=ENTER PersonalIncome LevelofEducation age IdentifyasEnglish IdentifyasScottish CountryofResidence /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5).
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00,34
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00,34

Case Processing Summary

Unweighted Cases ^a		N	Percent
Selected Cases	Included in Analysis	1752	5,8

	Missing Cases	28284	94,2
	Total	30036	100,0
Unselected Cases		0	,0
Total		30036	100,0

a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases.

Dependent Variable Encoding

Original Value	Internal Value
Immigrationisbad	0
Immigrationisgood	1

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table^{a,b}

Observed		Predicted	
		SupportforImmigration Immigrationisbad	Immigrationisgood
Step 0	SupportforImmigration	Immigrationisbad	965
		Immigrationisgood	787
Overall Percentage			

Classification Table^{a,b}

Observed		Predicted	
		Percentage Correct	
Step 0	SupportforImmigration	Immigrationisbad	100,0
		Immigrationisgood	,0
Overall Percentage		55,1	

a. Constant is included in the model.

b. The cut value is ,500

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 0	Constant	-,204	,048	18,022	1	,000	,816

Variables not in the Equation

			Score	df	Sig.
Step 0	Variables	PersonalIncome	8,464	1	,004
		LevelofEducation	49,864	1	,000
		Age	13,466	1	,000
		IdentifyasEnglish	19,871	1	,000
		IdentifyasScottish	10,203	1	,001
		CountryofResidence	2,037	1	,153
	Overall Statistics		86,220	6	,000

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients

		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	88,561	6	,000
	Block	88,561	6	,000
	Model	88,561	6	,000

Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	2322,111 ^a	,049	,066

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than ,001.

Classification Table^a

Observed		Predicted	
		Immigrationisbad	Immigrationisgood
Step 1	SupportforImmigration	659	306
		376	411
Overall Percentage			

Classification Table^a

Observed		Predicted
		Percentage Correct
Step 1	SupportforImmigration	68,3
		52,2
Overall Percentage		61,1

a. The cut value is ,500

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	PersonallIncome	,150	,103	2,130	1	,144	1,162
	LevelofEducation	,693	,105	43,763	1	,000	2,000
	Age	-,009	,003	8,156	1	,004	,991
	IdentifyasEnglish	-,095	,039	6,021	1	,014	,909
	IdentifyasScottish	,061	,034	3,240	1	,072	1,063
	CountryofResidence	,853	,598	2,033	1	,154	2,347
	Constant	-2,031	1,232	2,718	1	,099	,131

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: PersonallIncome, LevelofEducation, Age, IdentifyasEnglish, IdentifyasScottish, CountryofResidence.

Annex III

Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable: Location of Power

Notes		
Output Created		25-APR-2018 19:36:46
Comments		
Input	Data	\\ATKK\home\al\lamackie\Desktop\British election study data.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	30036
	Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing
Syntax		LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES LocationofPower /METHOD=ENTER PersonallIncome LevelofEducation age IdentifyasEnglish IdentifyasScottish CountryofResidence /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5).
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00,36
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00,36

Case Processing Summary

Unweighted Cases ^a		N	Percent
Selected Cases	Included in Analysis	1827	6,1
	Missing Cases	28209	93,9
	Total	30036	100,0
Unselected Cases		0	,0
Total		30036	100,0

a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases.

**Dependent Variable
Encoding**

Original Value	Internal Value
No	0
Yes	1

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table^{a,b}

Observed		Predicted		Percentage Correct
		LocationofPower No	Yes	
Step 0	LocationofPower No	0	482	,0
	Yes	0	1345	100,0
Overall Percentage				73,6

a. Constant is included in the model.

b. The cut value is ,500

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 0	Constant	1,026	,053	373,679	1	,000	2,790

Variables not in the Equation

		Score	df	Sig.	
Step 0	Variables	PersonalIncome	,052	1	,819
		LevelofEducation	91,771	1	,000
		Age	2,377	1	,123
		IdentifyasEnglish	,169	1	,681
		IdentifyasScottish	5,071	1	,024
		CountryofResidence	,267	1	,605
Overall Statistics		101,323	6	,000	

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients

		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	102,629	6	,000
	Block	102,629	6	,000
	Model	102,629	6	,000

Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	2005,784 ^a	,055	,080

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than ,001.

Classification Table^a

Observed		Predicted		Percentage Correct
		LocationofPower No	Yes	
Step 1	LocationofPower No	2	480	,4
	Yes	0	1345	100,0
Overall Percentage				73,7

a. The cut value is ,500

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	PersonallIncome	-,251	,116	4,656	1	,031	,778
	LevelofEducation	1,081	,117	86,015	1	,000	2,947
	Age	,001	,004	,020	1	,888	1,001
	IdentifyasEnglish	-,082	,042	3,869	1	,049	,921
	IdentifyasScottish	-,080	,039	4,235	1	,040	,923
	CountryofResidence	,459	,514	,797	1	,372	1,582
	Constant	,281	1,077	,068	1	,794	1,324

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: PersonallIncome, LevelofEducation, Age, IdentifyasEnglish, IdentifyasScottish, CountryofResidence.

LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES SupportforImmigration
 /METHOD=ENTER PersonallIncome LevelofEducation age IdentifyasEnglish
 IdentifyasScottish
 CountryofResidence
 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5).

Annex IV

Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable: Approval of EU

Notes		
Output Created		02-MAY-2018 17:41:54
Comments		
Input	Data	\\ATKK\home\alamackie\Desktop\British election study data.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	30036
	Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing
Syntax		LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES ApprovalofEU /METHOD=ENTER IdentifyasScottish IdentifyasEnglish PersonallIncome LevelofEducation CountryofResidence age /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5).
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00,23
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00,23

[DataSet1] \\ATKK\home\alamackie\Desktop\British election study data.sav

Case Processing Summary

Unweighted Cases ^a		N	Percent
Selected Cases	Included in Analysis	1621	5,4
	Missing Cases	28415	94,6
	Total	30036	100,0
Unselected Cases		0	,0
Total		30036	100,0

a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases.

Dependent Variable Encoding

Original Value	Internal Value
,00	0
1,00	1

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table^{a,b}

Observed		Predicted		Percentage Correct
		Approval of EU ,00	1,00	
Step 0	Approval of EU ,00	921	0	100,0
	1,00	700	0	,0
Overall Percentage				56,8

a. Constant is included in the model.

b. The cut value is ,500

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 0	Constant	-,274	,050	29,942	1	,000	,760

Variables not in the Equation

		Score	df	Sig.	
Step 0	Variables	IdentifyasScottish	16,494	1	,000
		IdentifyasEnglish	28,619	1	,000
		PersonallIncome	3,172	1	,075
		LevelofEducation	125,733	1	,000
		CountryofResidence	,938	1	,333
		Age	57,536	1	,000
Overall Statistics		202,099	6	,000	

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients

		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	212,708	6	,000
	Block	212,708	6	,000
	Model	212,708	6	,000

Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	2004,251 ^a	,123	,165

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than ,001.

Classification Table^a

Observed		Predicted		Percentage Correct
		Approval of EU ,00	1,00	
Step 1	Approval of EU ,00	686	235	74,5
	1,00	307	393	56,1
Overall Percentage				66,6

a. The cut value is ,500

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	IdentifyasScottish	,128	,037	12,099	1	,001	1,136
	IdentifyasEnglish	-,080	,041	3,839	1	,050	,923
	PersonallIncome	-,098	,114	,735	1	,391	,907
	LevelofEducation	1,219	,113	116,370	1	,000	3,384
	CountryofResidence	,562	,571	,970	1	,325	1,755
	Age	-,023	,004	40,036	1	,000	,977
	Constant	-1,288	1,185	1,182	1	,277	,276

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: IdentifyasScottish, IdentifyasEnglish, PersonallIncome, LevelofEducation, CountryofResidence, Age.