Helsingin yliopiston kirjaston verkkojulkaisu
2011

Baltic Sea:
Security Tomorrow – Three Future Scenarios

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Brussels: Boston University, 1995

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Baltic Sea
Security Tomorrow-
Three Future Scenarios

Research Project

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March 21, 1995
Brussels
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5.2. How Will and How Should The Baltic Sea Security Develop?
1. Introduction

1.1. General

The geopolitical situation around the Baltic Sea is currently changing more than during the last two centuries combined, as concerns both economics and security. The European Union has lately expanded towards Sweden and Finland, thereby attaching the Baltic Sea to the common EU sphere of interest. Denmark, and especially Germany, have strongly promoted the northern expansion of the EU: Denmark sees the increase of Nordic states within the Union as an increase in the number of like-minded partners, whereas Germany enhances its geopolitically central role through the membership of the two Nordic nations. Thus, the importance of the Baltic Sea and the increase in this importance as a consequence of the memberships are bound to have been in the calculations of the Danish and German policy makers when advocating the admission of these nations.

In Russia, the still continuing change of the system has raised questions about the future commitments of this former - and current - superpower within the Baltic region. Parallel to this alteration, new, independent states have emerged in the Baltic sphere: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These nations, in turn, remain question marks as to their future preferences within the global family. Apparently, in order to strengthen their fragile independence, the Baltic States will favour commitments with the traditional western structures. Poland, a rapidly improving economy, stresses its relations with the EU and Germany, and presumably later its full membership in NATO. The Baltic Sea, however, functions as the only sea route for its considerable merchant fleet.

Due to the above alterations and considerations in these nations surrounding the Baltic Sea, pondering the general future security of the region seems a logical and even inevitable consequence of the change. Security matters will be put on the official agenda, in order to chart and cement such status quo within the Baltic Sea that shelters
and enhances the optimal form, quantity and continuity of trade and other relations in the region. This essay will indicate that independent of the form of the future security arrangements within the Baltic Sea, this area will become a core focus concerning European security in the coming years. The well-being and harmony there may to a large extent contribute to total Euroatlantic security. Conversely, false politics and short-sighted actions around the Baltic Sea may cause severe damage to world order.

The essay consists of five sections. In this section, the geographic scope of the research will be defined, as well as the key international institutions that are of relevance in the future of the region. In the second part, a dense summary of the historical background of the Baltic Sea area will be provided, concerning such developments and situations that are adequate when discussing the present and the future of this region. Third, the present situation section will give a broader view of the recent past, since the 1989 regime change in Russia until the membership of Finland and Sweden in the EU. The fourth section contains three simplified models of the future of the Baltic Sea, the substance, implications and consequences of which the author clarifies. The conclusions support the hypothesis: Whichever of the three scenarios materialises, the future importance of the Baltic Sea will increase as regards economy and thereby security. Nevertheless, the fulfilment of one scenario is less painful than the others in the future security pursuits in the area. Hence, a recommendation will be made of the optimal, if not ideal manner of reaching a satisfactory security status quo as the framework for functioning trade and other relations in the Baltic context.
1.2. Defining the Actors to Be Referred

1.2.1. The Nations in the Baltic Sea Region

The definition of this area may be construed on any of several grounds. The author has chosen to include nations that either are physically adjacent to the Sea, or nations that otherwise have a close contact to the Sea and/or to several nations adjacent to it.

The Baltic Sea itself, since January 1, 1995 partially an internal EU sea, is located in north-eastern Europe, surrounded in the south by the European continent (including Poland), the heartland, in the west by the Danish peninsula, in the north-west by the Scandinavian peninsula, in the north and north-east by Finland, and in the east by Russia and the Baltic states. The Sea serves active maritime traffic, and before the improvement of internationally satisfactory land routes in the Baltic states as well as the bridge/tunnel connection between Sweden and Denmark, the Sea will function as the major trade route between the European continent and Fennoscandia, as well as the St. Petersburg area and the Baltic states.

To the nations directly adjacent to it belong clockwise, starting from the south-west, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Norway does not possess coast facing the Baltic Sea, but due to its close contact to navigation from the Baltic Sea region (at the easternmost part of the North Sea), and a traditional commitment to Nordic co-operation with Sweden, Finland and Denmark, Norway will be included in the Baltic Sea context.

1.2.2. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NATO

NATO was created in 1949 to "...safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations."¹ This transatlantic collective-defence organisation states in its key

provision that, "...an armed attack against one or more of them [the parties to the treaty] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all."¹

In the Baltic Sea context, Denmark, Germany and Norway are currently members of this collective-defence organisation, whereas Russia, the Baltic states and Poland are involved in the North Atlantic Co-operation Council NACC, concentrating on "...consultations and co-operation..."² between NATO and nations in Eastern and Central Europe that, for one reason or another, cannot yet be attached to the core collective-defence Finland and Sweden, in turn, no longer maintain a high profile neutrality, and thus, there are no direct obstacles to them joining NATO. At the moment, however, the EU arrangements are preferred to NATO ones in the respective countries. Nevertheless, all the Baltic Sea area states are involved in either NATO, NACC or the Partnership for Peace, the latter being a co-operative and discussing rather than practical institution for further concerns in the transatlantic security prospects.

1.2.3. European Union (EU)

As a consequence of the Baltic Sea becoming an internal European Union sea, a demand has emerged for charting and arranging the security of this area as an internal EU security matter. The first pillar of the Maastricht Treaty 1992, Common Foreign and Security Policy, provides the Union a future vision of co-operation and even centralisation of decision-making within this area in the Commission. Today, however, major concentration is on economics and expansion. No earlier than in the scheduled intergovernmental conference in 1996 shall foreign and security prospects of the Union

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² NATO handbook, p. 17
be scrutinised. Hence, this reference will not become essential before 1996 as concerns the security of the Baltic Sea. At that time, the idea of a dense, all-covering Western European Union will be reconsidered.

1.2.3.1. Western European Union (WEU)
The idea of an all-encompassing security arrangement in Western Europe is by no means new: already the Treaty of Rome addressed the need for this kind of arrangement for cementing the European status quo. That time, however, the threat from the Warsaw Pact cluster constituted the main reason for such thoughts. NATO was considered as a sufficient means for meeting this threat. In the coming 1996 intergovernmental conference, however, the focus will be set on preventing nationality conflicts between and within the member countries, instead of defining a common adversary, not from east nor from the south, although the fundamentalist tendencies south of the Mediterranean will be taken into consideration. In the Baltic Sea region, given the facts that the Economic Union membership is bound to be a condition for the WEU membership, and that Russia, the Baltic states and Poland are far from fulfilling the economic criteria of joining the EU, the WEU arrangements are not likely to become an all-compassing Pan-Baltic solution for at least the near future security of this region.

1.2.4. The Conference (Organisation) for Security and Co-operation in Europe CSCE
In contrast to the legally binding WEU and NATO, the co-operative and consensus-based CSCE, initiated in Helsinki in 1975, "... strives for...non-intervention and peaceful inter-European relations internationally. It links national and international factors in order to promote a versatile and stable state of peace as well as favourable circumstances for trade and security in Europe." Of the states of the Baltic Sea area, all those that existed at that time signed the Helsinki Final Act 1975. At that time, the

4 Tanner, A. "CSCE And Human Rights - Legally Normative But Morally Binding ?" (Brussels 1994). p 1
Soviet Union was the predecessor of current Russia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. According to current international customary law, in case of state succession, the successor state may or may not accept a pre-existing treaty. In the case of the Baltic states, it is at least implied that they have accepted their commitment to the CSCE, since in the case of the recent disputes between the large Russian minorities and the natives, a CSCE delegation was sent to Estonia. Thus, independent of whether formalities after the succession have been performed, at least the customs - as indicated through the sending of the delegation - shows that also the Baltic states are a part of the system.

Hence, as all the Baltic Sea region countries are a part of the CSCE, and in order to define its significance in the reality security context, let us shortly ponder the pertinent underlying ideas within the CSCE. It has to be kept in mind that the baskets and the principles have only an indirect binding effect: they are to be comprehended as normative, as results of co-operation. In the Helsinki Final Act 1975, mentioned formerly, the sixth principle of the first, security and military matter basket deals with non-intervention, the core prerequisite for security. This is also one of the most important definitions within the CSCE process. The non-intervention principle enforces the refraining from any kind of intervention against "...domestic jurisdiction of another state, regardless of their mutual relations." Without the fulfilment of this prerequisite, all security efforts in the Baltic Sea are doomed to fail. Unfortunately, the obedience to this principle is by no means self-evident, will be later indicated.

All in all, despite its non-binding status, the CSCE is currently the only functioning regional, Pan-European institution in the field of security that covers all the Baltic Sea area nations. Nonetheless, as formerly indicated, its function is dependent and based on the moral standards and also consensus of the member states. As the Budapest

6 Weston, B.H. et al Basic Documents in International Law (West Publishing co./ St Paul 1990). p. 116
conference in December 1994 indicated, in case of relating to the Bosnian and Chechnyan crises, the moral is sometimes lacking - and the consensus often. No common statement concerning the crises could be achieved, let alone a synchronised plan for action, this partly due to Russian subjectivity in the issue, partly due to the double standards of the Western European nations.

1.2.5. Other Factors of Relevance

In addition to NATO, EU, WEU and CSCE that are focusing the region from a purely European or a transatlantic (NATO) point of view, global institutions are also involved in European, as well as Baltic security. Western Europe constitutes a geopolitical unit of more than 350 million inhabitants, whereas the Baltic Sea region, taking into account only the Saint Petersburg area in Russia and the northernmost parts of Germany and Poland, counts up to roughly 55 million people. No doubt also the UN is aware of the alteration continuing in this large, northern fragment of Europe.

Despite the current internal dilemmas concerning the sticky decision-making as well as the nebulous extension of the peace-keeping mandate, and the substance of it in the UN, the United Nations still plays a considerable role securing peace, also in northern Europe Boutros Boutros-Ghali indicated in the An Agenda for Peace in 1992 the determined willingness of the UN to stay alert in a cumulatively aggressive world environment. The role of the UN in the Baltic region would become relevant if neither an extended NATO nor an active WEU would be established, and the CSCE could not handle a particular conflict within its auspices, i.e. in a consultative and co-operative manner. If either of the participants in such security dispute in the Baltic region was Russia, one could, on the other hand, speculate the involvement of NATO if its interests were at least indirectly threatened.


Ancient

Since the Viking era, the Baltic area has been considered as an entity, hence causing numerous contacts between the regions of the Sea. Navigation on the Sea, not only "military" but also trade, became even more lively in the Middle Ages, when the Hansas from the north German coastal towns of Lubeck, Hamburg and Kiel started shipping "luxury" goods of that time, such as grain, salt or textiles to the north. In the northern ports of Aboa (Finnish Turku) or Reval (Estonian Tallinn), the locals could offer tar and wood in exchange.

Not only was economic activity lively in the Middle Ages, but also cultural and especially religious activity existed. Protestant Christianity, originated by Martin Luther in Germany, was more or less "shipped" via Sweden eastwards and northwards, as were Estonian, Finnish or Swedish scholars of various fields to the universities of Bologna or Heidelberg. The Russians, proud of their century-long Byzantine heritage, could resist the Protestant landing from the Baltic Sea. Economically, nonetheless, the Baltic Sea functioned as the only suitable route of Russian goods to continental markets. Thus, also the significant Russian "merchant fleet" utilised this route for transporting furs, minerals and rare wood types to Europe.

Due to this centuries-long naval activity, the current genealogical and racial heritage of the Finns, for example, now consists of roughly 30 per cent Nordic/Germanic genes, 30 per cent Baltic, and 30 per cent eastern. In northern Germany, in turn, the scientists have discovered an inherited heart disease-causing gene that only exists elsewhere in south-western Finland.  

8 This information was provided by Aira Kemiläinen, a Finnish anthropologist, in the Finnish TV1 in December
2.2. The World Wars

The time period between the Middle Ages and the nineteenth century was marked by the power struggle between Sweden and Russia for the mastery of the northern regions. Often, the Baltic Sea served as the battlefield for crucial naval conflicts, leading to total slaughters, and thus even to a temporary disappearance of the loser from the map of that time. Rule over the Baltic Sea meant a rule over a much larger area than merely that limited to the coasts of the Sea.

The First World War was characterised by the independence aspirations of Finland and the Baltic states from Russian oppression. The causes and conditions for war in central Europe played only a marginal role in the power struggles of the Baltic Sea. Not Russia nor Sweden, not even the bloody civil war in Finland could hinder the fragmentation of the north-eastern Baltic Sea region to small independent states: Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania emerged as states, not only nations any longer, in the aftermath of the First World War.

The eve of the Second World War was also in the Baltic sphere coloured by the division into Nazi or anti-Nazi blocs, as well as to Communist-favouring and Communist-resisting groupings. The south and the south-west of the Baltic Sea, however, were initially attached to the German sphere of interest, independent of the division indicated above. Poland, Denmark and Norway could not resist the mental and physical superiority of Hitler totalitarianism. Finland and the Baltic states, however, were in the Ribbentrop pact transferred to Soviet authority control. In Stalin’s and Hitler’s common aspirations, these nations would function as a buffer zone between the two future superpowers, the Third Reich and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. In this phase, Sweden wisely presented a low profile, not committing itself to the dilemmas of its neighbours, Norway and Finland.
As Hitler's pursuits failed, and the weak Baltic states were not able to resist the Soviet Union, these were easily transferred to the Soviet hegemony. Finland, in turn, after a miserable episode on the German side - this due to the practical insignificance of the Ribbentrop pact - finished the war without any power occupying its territory. However, it would be daring to argue that the Finns won something in the war. Quite the contrary: The Soviet Union, one of the winning powers, dictated strict conditions for Finland to finance massive war reparations.

Poland, fortunate enough to survive somewhat after the German aggression, became so paralysed that one can reasonably discuss whether Poland had ever been attached to the Soviet sphere of interest without the slackening effect of the Second World War. In contrast to Poland, that at least marginally survived, Germany became more or less of a tabula rasa, an empty blackboard, rendering vulnerable the mere existence of the German nation. The nations under German control, Denmark and Norway, could naturally encounter a relief, as the suppression ended parallel to the destruction of the Nazi structures. Sweden, too, was relieved, though it was not physically directly threatened by the war. Indirect risks and limitations in politics and trade, however, declined, and Sweden could, again, open up and flourish.

2.3. The Cold War
The Second World War meant a considerable change in the Baltic Sea region, and that not only militarily but also economically and socioculturally. The war produced a power vacuum to the south of the Baltic Sea, which was recognised among the leaders of the other superpowers. Given additionally the fact that the main objective of the winning powers was to keep Germany down and under, talented statesmen and strategists, especially in the USSR, saw the importance of the Baltic Sea.

The worsening of the superpower relations in the 1950's was largely a consequence of the expansion of the Soviet Union in its near abroad. After Russia's tormenting of the
Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), and succeeding in it, Poland followed on the Russian agenda. And as the Berlin situation became acute, resulting in a new Soviet-related puppet, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Soviet Union had ensured that the Baltic coast line, from near Saint Petersburg all the way to near the significant West German ports of Kiel and Lübeck, was either under her own control, or under the control of a friendly puppet state.

The Baltic Sea had become another arena for the Cold War. As Norway and Denmark decided to seek membership in NATO, in order to increase the credibility of their own, minor armed forces, Sweden decided consequently to follow its policy of staying out of the interest conflicts of the superpowers: it declared that it would follow the principle of neutrality. In the case of Finland, the consequence was the same, though the reason different, remaining neutral was not entirely a question of Finland’s free will. Rather, Finland took its geopolitical position into consideration. In order for a small nation to remain independent adjacent to an unpredictable superpower and a militarily critical Sea, it had to take the objectives of this superpower into account. This was called neutrality by the Finns. Some cynics later called the rationality of this kind as Finlandisation, or Finlandisierung.

In sum, the Baltic Sea was between the end of the 1940’s and the end of 1980’s clearly divided into three parts, the pro-NATO, the pro-Soviet (the regimes, not necessarily the public) and the neutrals. For the USSR, this Sea was critical: its Western Navy, based in Kronstadt, near Saint Petersburg, constituted the largest proportion of total Soviet naval strength. The sea route for the Soviet military vessels to the Atlantic, however, was either closed or open in the Danish Sound, depending on the contemporary superpower politics. In times of détente, or the peaceful coexistence under Khrushchev, the Russian military vessels could count on sailing through, but presumably not when the Cold War became freezing, such as during Brezhnev, Chernenko or Andropov. Despite certain submarine-spying suspicions of the Swedish
Defence Department against the Russian Navy in late 80s, the transfer of Michael Gorbachev to power,
and his Glasnost, openness, relieved the tensions somewhat, although the Soviet Union could not still be
considered as democratic. Not until Boris Yeltsin came to power did the worst taboos disappear from
around the Baltic Sea.

Considering the Baltic history as a whole, one can recognise the length, width and depth of the relations
among the Baltic Sea states. This dimension increases the significance of the restructuring of the Baltic
Sea region security: The question here is not of creating another geopolitically motivated cluster on some
artificial grounds for some vague purpose. Here, the future security arrangements will not only reflect the
current, short-term objectives of each state, but they will imply the learning of the lessons from the past,
in order to create a long-lasting state of harmony that facilitates beneficial contacts among the Baltic Sea
states.

3. The Present Situation in the Region

Now that the present security arrangements and the history of the Baltic sphere have been discussed, the
author will study some intrinsic current factors in the states themselves, that are of importance when
sewing together the diverse security needs of the states around the Baltic Sea, in the form of a possible
common security arrangement or at least more dense co-operation. The domestic situations and foreign
policy objectives do vary widely not only between the states but also within the states. This section
discusses the vast quantity and mutual complexity of domestic and foreign factors that should be
interconnected and synchronised if a common security arrangement were aspired to. The task is
problematic, though not impossible, as soon as the rational leaders of the respective Baltic Sea nations
recognise which essential role the harmony in the near region plays in the domestic successes of these
nations.
3.1. The Unstable Russia

Fundamentally, the political struggle within Russia is over whether Russia will be a national and increasingly European state or a distinctively Eurasian and once again an imperial state. Currently, the Russian political map is divided to three, First, roughly a third of the politicians and executives are pro-Western. Second, again roughly a third are "Eurasian", i.e. that prefer a superpower distinctively out of the European context. The third group includes the rest that either can or want not to make up their minds, or prefer a compromise, "the berries from both cakes", such as an economically Western but politically Eurasian Russia

3.1.1. The Current Importance of the Baltic Sea for Russia

For the European-oriented Russians such as Andrei Kozyrev, the current Foreign Minister, or Sergei Kovalev, President Yeltsin's human rights commissioner, the Baltic Sea is bound to serve as the window to Europe, economically, politically and, especially, in security. As, however, formerly noticed, there is no one official opinion in Russia towards Europe, and the Baltic Sea. The Eurasianists, most Communists and Nationalists, are willing to establish a new superpower Russia, and hence, the Baltic Sea is unlikely to be seen as the nest for harmonious and beneficial trade and political relations Rather, this area is seen as a strategically important sea, and a feasible site for conflict.

Specifically, the current Russian relation towards the since 1991 independent Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has been under discussion, due to probable human rights disputes of the Baltic officials against Russian minorities on the one hand, and due to the restrictive attitude of the Russians towards Baltic involvement in international organisations on the other hand,

9 Brzezinski. Z. "A Plan For Europe" Foreign Affairs (Jan./Feb. 1995), p. 31
The relationship between Russia and the Baltic states is one of those areas where Western policy may in fact make a substantial difference, particularly by ensuring that Russia accepts that it must fully conform to international norms of behaviour.\textsuperscript{10}

3.1.2. European And Global Security Arrangements as Reflected upon the Russian Attitude towards the Baltic Sea

The Soviet Union was the power to actively promote the CSCE process prior and at the time of the CSCE Helsinki summit 1975. Thereafter, too, the USSR and its partial successor, Russia, have favoured consultations within this co-operative, pan-European security instrument. Today, as concerns Russia's status towards NATO - as formerly stated - it is a part of both the NACC and the Partnership for Peace. But what importance does the NATO connection have to the future security of the Baltic Sea?\textsuperscript{7}

According to contemporary scholars, Russian membership in NATO does not explicitly mean a more beneficial North-European security environment, and should not thus necessarily be taken as an end in itself,

\textit{..Russia's participation would so dilute [NATO] as to render it meaningless...It is not even clear whether the Russians wish to be part of NATO. But if excluded and rejected, they will be resentful, and their own political self-definition will become more anti-European and anti-Western [and anti-Baltic].}\textsuperscript{11}

Moreover, the time frame of extending NATO towards the north-east is rather seen in decades than years. In this vision, it is already presupposed that some of the Baltic Sea nations bordering with Russia- Norway naturally excluded- would be members of NATO,

The question of Russia's participation will have to be faced only when a wider NATO has actually reached the frontiers

\textsuperscript{10} Bildt. C. ""The Baltic Litmus Test"" \textit{Foreign Affairs} (Sep./Oct. 1994), p. 84

\textsuperscript{11} Brzezinski. p. 31
of Russia - and only if by then Russia satisfies the basic criteria for membership. Neither is likely soon.\textsuperscript{12}

Nor is likely the WEU membership as addressed formerly. Thus, the Russian contacts within the Baltic Sea region in the near future will presumably be organised either through mutual, bilateral arrangements, through an extended CSCE (OSCE) mandate or through "toy versions" of NATO or the WEU. These alternatives will be discussed in the fourth section.

3.2. The Recently Independent Baltic States And Poland

Perhaps the largest change between 1989 and 1995 has occurred in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania: They have regained their independence from Slavic rule, their economic system has changed from planned to market economy, and most significantly, they have gone through a most painful metamorphosis from totalitarianism to democracy. These nations are small, altogether roughly 8 million people, but important as indicators of the Russian treatment of its "near abroad." "...Russian conduct towards these states will show the true nature of Russia's commitment to international norms and principles."\textsuperscript{13}

Poland, in turn, with its circa 25 million business-oriented inhabitants and ingeniously exploding economy has been seen as a mere market appendix to Germany. However, this, northern Europe's biggest totally Catholic nation, and one of the largest Slavic nations possesses hidden potential that, if used properly, may mean a further kick for the Baltic Sea commerce. The possible future improvement of the currently controversial relation between President Lech Walesa and the Parliament plays a key role in the evident future success. As far as foreign policy is concerned, Poland is searching for a rapid membership in both the EU and NATO. It may become the first EU and NATO borderland with the Commonwealth of Independent States.

\textsuperscript{12} Brzezinski. p.31
\textsuperscript{13} Bildt. p. 72
3.3. The Old EU and NATO members Germany and Denmark

These nations have recently promoted Baltic co-operation most, partly due to causes expressed in the introduction, partly due to security reasons. As the Baltic states are now independent and at least neutral if not very pro-Western, and Finland and Sweden non-divisive parts of the European Union, German Defence Minister Volker Ruhe may now bury the horror picture of the Russian Western Navy conquering the northern ports of Germany, Kiel and Travemunde, in 48 hours.

In addition to the mere selfish geopolitical and military reasons, Baltic Sea cooperation itself fascinates Germany and Denmark. Common matters may then be pondered in one table, as has already happened recently, concerning the environmental issues around the Baltic Sea. And the increase in maritime trade acts as a stimulation that, sooner or later, brings prosperity also to the south-eastern and eastern coasts of the sea.

3.4. Finland and Sweden: New Nordic States Within the EU

Of the Nordic counterparts within the Baltic Sea system, Finland and Sweden have approached their south-western neighbours Germany and Denmark through becoming members in the European Union. For Finland, for the time being recovering from the quantitatively worst depression ever in its history, the formerly essential Baltic Sea has now become critical. Humble Soviet markets no more exist, nor do the Finns have a monopoly in the rock-hard Russian markets. Due to the new situations, an essential proportion of the Finnish trade is conducted across the Baltic Sea, with Sweden, Germany and Great Britain.

In the case of Sweden, also endeavouring to recover from an ugly regression, the Baltic Sea remains being of high significance, though not primarily economically: Even though Sweden's trade with Russia and the Baltic States is increasing, most activity occurs towards the continent over the narrow Danish Sound. Hence, not much of the
Swedish merchant fleet utilises the Baltic Sea. Sweden's interests are in the security of the Baltic Sea itself. During the Cold War, especially during Olof Palme's political activity, it was particularly Sweden that functioned as the conscience of the Baltic Sea. Often, huge assets were invested in chasing foreign submarines along the Swedish east coast. No doubt these vessels were considered to be Soviet. Once, in the late 1980's as the Swedes succeeded in catching a Soviet submarine, heavy notes were directed towards the Kremlin, concerning a violation of the CSCE principle of non-intervention: the submarine spying was considered as such. If the Swedish aspiration towards high morals still exists, then a beneficial future security around the Baltic Sea will provide the framework for Sweden to consistently carry on with its morally appreciable policies

3.5. Norway: Within the NATO but outside the EU
The security position of Norway cannot be compared to the one of its eastern neighbour Sweden; Norway already possesses a heavy security insurance policy through membership in NATO The current regime (still successfully lead by the Social Democrat Gro Harlem Brundtland despite the loss of her pro-EU front in the October -94 voting) sees the importance of the Baltic Sea. If a conflict was to occur around the Baltic Sea, whichever were the threatener and the threatened, it would have a direct effect on Norway's security. It can be seen on the map that Norway is an extremely long but also narrow country geopolitically. If, say, an imperialist Russia could stroll over a weakly organised Baltic Sea area, over Finland and Sweden towards the Atlantic, the ingredients of a global conflict would already be there. NATO, in order to shelter the strategically extraordinarily essential North Atlantic area, would concentrate a large number of troops on the Norwegian coast. Thereafter, it would only be a question of time when a full-scale war broke out. Due to this purely military factor, Norway is eager to keep the tension around the Baltic Sea minimised, and she will also be interested in contributing to such arrangements under the auspices of which these tensions may be managed. It has to be stressed that Norway will negotiate not only
under the authority of NATO but also independently. Norway is capable of this kind of action, as seen in the Middle East peace process: It was a Norwegian patron that originated and hosted the beginning of the seemingly successful peace talks between Arafat and Rabin during 1992.

4. Future Scenarios Concerning the Security of the Baltic Sea Region

Taking the basically different political situations and objectives of the respective Baltic Sea nations into consideration, predicting the future of this region seems highly complicated. Nonetheless, co-operation will be preferred, if it seems, in the considerations of the decision-makers, that this co-operation is parallel to the national interests of these nations. As formerly discussed, the national interests of the Baltic Sea environment are by no means limited only to distinctively military or distinctively economic interests. Rather, the two areas of interest are closely interconnected with social, cultural and other factors.

Despite the diverse interests around the Baltic Sea, it is nonetheless surrounded by quite developed nations, and therefore it differs from other focal points of future international relations, such as the Israel-Jordan-Syria-Lebanon-Egypt region or the area between the Caspian and Black Seas. The difference gives more predictability. Around the Baltic Sea, the high education level, a similar religion (diverse forms of Christianity), several common commitments to global or European institutions, independence of the mass media and even the relatively non-fanatic characteristic of current northern culture allow the scholar of international relations to make anticipations. The probability of these anticipations materialising is higher here than similar predictions would be in the Middle East or in Chechnya. The latter and many other areas in international focus lack even relative stability, economic but especially religious and sociocultural, whereas the Baltic Sea region, fortunately enough, lacks
the possibility of complete foreign political surprises due to positively stiff formalities in proceeding with diverse matters and issues.

The author is encouraged to state the preceding notwithstanding the situation in Russia: Despite the current rigorous domestic power struggle, Russia desperately endeavours to maintain a "boy scout" image towards the outer world. For example, the Chechnyan war was according to President Yeltsin caused by the turmoil within the army, not within the policies of the nation. Without formally predictable relations and procedures towards the outer world, and with a subsequent isolation, a fatal turmoil would emerge in Russia. The Russian realist top politicians know this, and thus, the author can count on a Russia that carefully protects its outside commitments, even if it started growing remote from Europe towards Eurasia. The foreign relations are critical to the existence of Russia.

Consequently, as the mutual actions of these states are likely to follow some expected patterns, simplified models of the future of the Baltic Sea may be construed. Four variables will be taken into consideration interactively: the feasibly deepening and extending character of the WEU after the 1996 EU intergovernmental conference; the possible decrease or eastward extension of the scope of NATO, the future compatibility or aggressiveness of Russia towards Europe, and finally, the role of the OSCE (CSCE) in case of the passivity or withdrawal of the other relevant institutions from the Baltic context.

4.1. Scenario 1: Stabilising Russia Increases Co-operation With the EU, WEU Emerges in Full Scale, NATO's Importance in Europe Diminishes

The basic preconditions for a future of this kind would demand, at a minimum, two things: First, the opinion of an extended and even denser European Union should win support within the Community before the 1996 intergovernmental conference. This

would require that a) the supporters of the two-speed Europe (Benelux, France, Germany) should withdraw from this idea, and that b) the "bad guys" Great Britain and Denmark should be persuaded to follow common ideals. Without an economics-related improvement of this kind it would also be hard if not impossible to reach a consensus in security matters. The fulfilment of these two prerequisites, hopefully together, would then promote the equal and collective nature of the Union. Under these circumstances, the 1996 conference would be able to decide upon the "activation" of the WEU in a large scale, i.e. extending it also towards the Baltic Sea.

The second prerequisite, critical to the fulfilment of this scenario in general, and to the activation of the WEU in particular, would be the diminishing involvement of the United States in Europe. The reduction of US involvement would then call into question the significance of NATO as a transatlantic security arrangement. Why would the United States become less committed to European matters? Either due to the transfer of interest to domestic or, say, Pacific matters or due to a diminishing US power in the area. Apparently, the reduction in US influence would at least be a consequence of the fulfilment of this scenario, but it could also act as a cause of it. If, for example, the present US government failed in or ignored its Europe policies, and stressed domestic policies or Asian relations, it could be interpreted as a slackening US authority in Europe. This would obviously also question the importance of NATO and increase the visibility of the advantages of the WEU.

Consensus within the EU and the diminishing US commitments to Europe could make the ground fertile for an arrangement such as the WEU. This improvement would be noticed not only within the EU but also without. We could hypothesise that in Russia, at least those still in doubt and suspicious of the United States could now be persuaded to start favouring the alternative of Russia as a distinctively European, instead of Eurasian, superpower. This could, then, even facilitate the stabilisation in Russia if the
pro-Europeans could convince the pro-Eurasians of the sincere and true purposes of the future Europe.

President Yeltsin indicated in his speech 16 February 1995, that the extension of NATO eastbound will not come into question, although he expressed this argument simultaneously with the promise of not threatening the fragile, new democracies in central and eastern Europe. Hence, as Yeltsin and some of his closest supporters, such as Andrei Kozyrev, the Foreign Minister, seem to remain Western-oriented (Yeltsin more hidden, Kozyrev openly), added to the fact that the extension of NATO is excluded, it is bound to be implied that Yeltsin and his men are not fiercely antagonistic toward the WEU. Yeltsin's worries concerning the more or less uncontrollable state of the army, as indicated in the recent speech, seem to disclose his (desperate) intentions of changing the status quo within the Russian military. If Yeltsin stays in power, if the WEU is interested - which it is bound to be - in close relations to Russia and if the extension of the WEU materialises, then this WEU-Russia axis could bring about a fixed round table of large importance for the peace and harmony in Europe. None of the three ifs, however, is explicit to materialise, though none is quite impossible either.

Putting these global and European tendencies in a Baltic Sea perspective brings up certain implications. It seems that if a future of this kind emerged, then the Baltic Sea would be well off. The closer the co-operation between Russia and Europe, the more harmonious and thereby safer and more effective the trade and other relations within the area would be. The issues raised would be merely technical within the auspices of this co-operation.

Nevertheless, certain problematic matters could arise: The possible minor role of a still existing NATO, the mutual "hierarchy" in this kind of WEU-Russia-axis, as well as the consequently changing US-European relations. The basis of the author's hypothesis
was the decrease of the influence and even a total ceasing-to-exist of NATO and the increase in the importance of the WEU. However, there might be reluctance towards the real military capability of the WEU. Of the Baltic Sea states certainly Germany, due to much of its defence traditionally leaning on US NATO troops, as well as Norway, due to its geopolitical sensitivity, could still persist in eliciting some guarantee from a structure similar to NATO, dependent obviously on the interests of the US. All in all, there could be some reluctant partners in this WEU-Russia axis, quite as there are reluctant partners in any alliance or body.

Another problem could arise within the axis, namely considering the problem of hierarchy. Around the Baltic Sea, Russia is the giant with more than 150 million inhabitants, whereas Germany with its 80 million and Poland with its 25 million follow. The rest of the nations are small. In order this sort of an "axis" to make some sense, the large powers should have "a louder vote" on the one hand, but the small should also have their voice heard, on the other hand, and certainly more than their population proportion would indicate. Compromising here and succeeding in it could play a critical role in the future commitments of an axis of this kind. Sceptics might call this impossible, but due to the importance of this area to Russia, as well as having Germany as a balancer, an axis of this kind may be very possible.

The US, in turn, could without NATO become worried about the close relations of Western Europe and Russia. How long would Western Europe then be considered as "loyal" to the US? If the feeling of European loyalty vanished from the mindsets of the US decision-makers, not would only Russia but also some or all parts of Europe become a threat in the US foreign-policy setting. This kind of development would obviously be intolerable for the whole world, especially for Europe - let alone the Baltic Sea that should again become a central playground for rigorous psychological - and even military - warfare. This remains only a horror picture, but calls for caution:
walk slowly and carry a big stick. In this case, the author would either prefer hiding the stick for a while or finding a carrot.

In sum, the Baltic Sea area would as a whole benefit from the establishment of an extended WEU, covering much of the Baltic Sea. A necessary condition for the success in the region would then be the stabilising of Russia, for the moment not yet certain. If the WEU were extended all the way up to Finland, Russia remaining problematic and even hostile, this would offer security through tension, not through harmony. Extreme tension would then be set to the northern parts of the Baltic Sea, and to the Fenno-Russian border in particular. Independent of how the future will look like, the extension of the WEU would increase security. Depending on the future of Russia, this security would be voluntary, aiming at harmony, or - dictated by threats. On the other hand, too close a relationship between the activated WEU and a stabilised Russia could render US-European relations vulnerable, especially if the US felt herself consciously excluded. Hence, skilful diplomatic manoeuvres will be needed to reach a satisfactory compromise.

4.2. Scenario 2: Russia Remains Unstable And Becomes Aggressive, Poland And the Baltic States Increase Co-operation With NATO, the Establishment of the WEU Is Postponed

In order for Russia to become aggressive, certain domestic and foreign factors have to be present. The most important of these factors is Russian public opinion. Yeltsin’s staggering popularity is well known, but without an increase in the credibility of his counterpart, of the pro-Eurasians, Russia will not likely become hostile to the West. Some bad news from Western Europe or the near abroad are needed, in order the Eurasianists to be able to ultimately convince the public. The increasing co-operation between the Russian near abroad (such as the Baltic states or Poland) and NATO would count as bad news, especially after President Yeltsin’s explicitly negative attitude towards the eastern expansion of NATO.
Unfortunately, as the Russian domestic state of affairs is in imbalance and the information delivered on the situation minor, both qualitatively and quantitatively, Poland and the Baltic States might not wish to wait for the uncertain future in Russia. Hence, commitments towards NATO may be pondered despite Russia's critical attitude. This indicates the vicious-circle-like tendency of this scenario. There are no certain causalities here, but, rather, either of the two arguments in this scenario can be the cause for the other.

The delay of the improvement of the WEU, in turn, would follow of two, interacting factors. First, the expansion of NATO to Poland and the Baltic States would also imply the continuity of NATO presence in Europe. Insignificant institutions do not concentrate on extending their sphere of interest. Second, partly as a consequence of the former, the old NATO members (Norway), and the old NATO and EU members (Germany and Denmark) would presumably not prefer improving the WEU, because of the futility of sustaining two institutions the objectives of which practically overlap.

Consequently, as Russia would grow remote from the rest of Europe, its near abroad growing closer to NATO, ingredients for another Cold War would exist, with the difference from 1950-89 that no neutral nations (such as formerly Finland and Sweden) nor Russian-related puppets (formerly the Baltic States as a part and Poland, East Germany as "friends") would buffer the two power blocks. The border between EU and/or NATO and Russia would stand out clearly, leading to a situation possessing enough components for frightening confrontations.

On the other hand, if a clear-cut borderline of this kind emerged, it would depend on the ultimate foreign policy settings of a Eurasian Russia whether the possible confrontations were severe and long-lasting in nature, or whether the relations could be kept calm, substantive and consistent. In the case of a border of this kind, the probable lack of tough dogmatic contrasts (compare totalitarianism vs. democracy)
could even contribute to the establishment of like-minded and consistent mutual diplomacy. However, the more Russian hostility will increase, the less probable the establishment of transborder relations of this kind would be, at worst remaining as mere wishful thinking.

In the Baltic context, the increasing remoteness of Russia, the growing importance of NATO in Europe, at least indirectly also in the northern parts of Europe, and the freezing of any future development of the WEU would bring about several constant problems, let alone contemporary issues for immediate resolution. A direct consequence of a Eurasian, hostile Russia would concern the border of Finland, the Baltic States and Poland with Russia. In case of a division as a result of this scenario, this border, starting from the Barents Sea in the north and reaching all the way down to Poland would be seen as THE strategic border. As a consequence, large masses of armed forces could be concentrated to both sides of the border. Furthermore, the actual sovereignty of small countries such as Finland or Sweden, let alone the Baltic States, could come into question. Undoubtedly, the common security interests of NATO might oblige permanent strategic military implementation of materiel and personnel in these nations, independent of domestic willingness. Of course, these perspectives would require also that the formerly neutral Nordic nations, Finland and Sweden, were bound to some binding arrangement with NATO.

This might, however, not explicitly be the case. Recent discussions in the Finnish parliament, for example, do not imply a quick NATO membership.\footnote{Helsingin Sanomat. February 11, 1995, p. 13} Reasons for hesitation are several: WEU arrangements are still open. Furthermore, Finland seems to endeavour to avoid establishing a strict borderline parallel to its territory. Third, it seems that in the current situation, March 13, 1995, no immediate reason for joining NATO exists The Finnish military system is capable of protecting the Finnish territory
satisfactorily, as is Sweden in protecting itself - in the case of a regionally limited and conventionally conducted conflict.

If, however, this scenario materialised, including the possibility of the existence of three different security systems, NATO, the Russian and the non-aligned, the Baltic Sea could encounter the most active secret military activity ever. The control of the coastal length of the Baltic Sea would speak for NATO hegemony. The fiercest, most explosive area would certainly be north-eastern Estonia where the distance between the first possible NATO base and the huge Russian naval base Kronstadt near St. Petersburg could count up to less than 200 kilometres. It could resemble the situation around the Berlin Wall in the 50's, although this time with the most modern, totally destructive war equipment, and without any logistical obstacles for a full-scale conflict.

Why, then, would this kind of arrangement be considered in the round tables of the decision-makers, particularly if it seemed to merely bring about negative consequences? The traditional fear and hesitation of Poland and the Baltic States against Russia seems reasonable, as seems reasonable the Eurasian superpower aspirations of the conservative Russians. An ultimate Russian opening-up to the West would directly reduce the power of the Russian military, as it would reduce the popularity of such politicians that feed the fears of the public about the dominant Western Europe, that would suppress the glamorous Slavic heritage and traditions through market capitalism and too much democracy and openness.

In addition to these reasons, pleasure would be felt among certain interest groups in the West, too. The fulfilment of this tough border-scenario could also be pursued by populist Western politicians. Public popularity, in the West also, may be maintained through feeding fears. Xenophobia, racism and a common hostility against minorities are cousins to the fear of a Slavic superpower. Hence, in order to win support, certain politicians in Schleswig-Holstein (Germany), Denmark and Sweden, where
xenophobic tendencies already exist, could support a strengthening of a NATO-Russia confrontation. Why? Because a tension-packed atmosphere with existing threats could increase the support for extreme movements.

The true coming of this scenario is probable. As just indicated, independent reasons do exist. In addition to independent causes, dependent factors may also play a role. As happened in the Cold War, a gesture of one counterpart could easily lead to, not only a balancing gesture by the other (arms races) but even to a cumulative one. Thus, an apparently minor factor could set off an increasing avalanche and thereby cause various problems. Today, if, for example, Lithuania joined NATO despite Russian opposition and the power relations in Russia remained unclear, this could bring the extreme anti-NATOists, i.e. Eurasianists, into power in Russia, that, in order to stay in power would claim the US to have provoked Lithuania to join NATO. This move, in turn, would cause the US and NATO to become nervous about the security in the area. Thereafter, it could possibly be a question of days or weeks when the rest of the Baltic States and Poland joined NATO, leading to a contrast based on very negative premises.

Could it be possible to talk about co-operation around the Baltic Sea if this scenario materialized? Certainly, one could no longer consider the Baltic Sea as a well-functioning economic and sociocultural entity. Rather, the area would probably fragment, leaving Russia alone at the end of the Sea. Nordic co-operation could increase, although within the auspices of the EU. The Baltic States and Poland would be eager to be connected to other Western institutions, in order not to remain mere locations for the outermost NATO bases. This development, in turn, would extend the EU, too, or at least increase the amount of diverse associate agreements with the European Union and other European institutions.

In sum, this tough border scenario would feasibly lead to a less beneficial Baltic Sea than the first scenario. This scenario would, at least partly, mean a return to a bygone
era, creating stability of some sort. Unfortunately, this kind of stability is not worth aspiring to because it is based on mutual threats and the sensitive balance of these threats. This kind of stability would supposedly paralyse the general Baltic Sea context, and this not only militarily, but also trade and cultural relations would be negatively overshadowed by the security tensions.

4.3. Scenario 3: The Establishment of the WEU Cannot Be Agreed on, Russia Achieves a Stable Democracy, the OSCE Will Determine the Security around the Baltic Sea

In contrast to the two former rather far-reaching scenarios, the third one is most based on optimistic realism, leaning on hypotheses that are quite likely to come true. In this scenario, it is generally supposed that all decision-makers are distinctively rational, wiling to cause as much harmony with as few binding commitments as possible, in order to secure optimal trading and other circumstances. A delay in the establishment of the WEU may occur, due to internal disputes within the EU. An extended establishment of the WEU may fail simply because, for example, of the reluctance of Great Britain to make further commitments. Furthermore, some poor Southern European countries such as Greece could not afford some additional security measure. Consequently, even if a limited, active WEU was be founded, say between Germany, France, and the Benelux countries, it could still not make NATO insignificant on the European continent. Hence, if there were two (or more) security arrangements on the continent, none of them would achieve such a dominant position as to thoroughly and/or severely affect total North European security.

Moreover, it is possible that Russia achieves a stable democracy. President Yeltsin may not be able to be renominated in the coming presidential elections, but independent of who it is, the next president is bound to comprehend the dangers of closing doors in any directions. On the other hand, too close a co-operation with NATO, for example, would rid the president of the support of the extreme left and right. Hence, as a
consequence of a compromise due to these considerations, added to the fact of Western Europe not becoming a threat in the form of the WEU, or NATO, Russia could then successfully continue the co-operation with the West within the auspices of some co-operative, non-binding mechanism such as the OSCE.

As a consequence of a limited or a non-existent WEU, as well as a rationally and farsightedly stable Russia, the aggregate security tensions in Europe would inevitably not be critically high. Hence, NATO, already without the fulfilment of a scenario of this kind reluctant to accept new members, would without increasing tension probably not accept Poland or the Baltic states joining. If not broken, do not fix it. The consequences of NATO extending eastbound despite Russian opposition in a relatively stable Europe would be in no-one's interests.

It seems, that in this situation the OSCE would be the best solution. Despite the WEU existing, at least on the paper, and NATO hanging around with low profile - only meant to be activated in extreme situations - the OSCE would then offer the best prospectives for the future. To the benefits of the OSCE could be counted, that, "...its nature is co-operative, objectives pan-European, participation large and administration light." These characteristics could contribute to the foundation of liberal, well-functioning relations in Europe, and especially around the Baltic Sea, the region in Europe most affected by the changes in the Russia-Europe-relationship.

On the other hand, though, as the tensions in Northern Europe would be relatively low, and the OSCE would function as the basis for peace-time security matters in Europe, this would not explicitly mean that the situation would become stable. In fact, the CSCE does not ultimately provide stability. The commitments are non-

16 Tarmer. p. 19
17 This is a limited idea of the one of the Czech President Vaclav Havel, who suggested in a recent speech a European security model that would be completely based on the CSCE. without NATO nor the WEU.
binding, leaving room and even temptations for manoeuvres in contradiction to the spirits of this institution. Thus, this all-encompassing European scenario, realistic as such, would only function in good circumstances. As soon as a severe dispute emerged, the decision-makers would, in accordance to the national interests of respective states, either follow or not follow the baskets and the principles of the CSCE\textsuperscript{18}. No legally binding clause will force them to follow these. There are no threatening sanctions that could prevent the states from considering actions in contradiction to the CSCE.

Transferring this Pan-European prospect to the Baltic level, it seems that this scenario could also, as scenario 1, bring activity to the Sea. In contrast to the first scenario, however, a Baltic Sea sheltered by the mere principles of the OSCE and the economic regulations of the EU would not provide such security that would guarantee stability. As soon as a dispute emerged, say between Sweden and Russia, of fishing quotas off the coast of Kaliningrad\textsuperscript{19}, and Sweden would refer to some basket of the OSCE Helsinki Final Act, Russia could act in two ways - if unwilling to settle: either dispute the interpretation of the clause of the right of the Swedish fishers to fish a certain quota in front of Kaliningrad or act as if the CSCE did not exist, for example through chasing the Swedish fishing boats with Navy frigates. No credible sanctions against Russia could be enforced within the auspices of the OSCE.

In addition to certain instability remaining, the process of dealing with security matters would become more festive and more remote from the substance itself. Why? Because traditionally in the OSCE meetings, the Sunday side of the foreign policy often

\textsuperscript{18} The author has consciously referred to the CSCE, albeit the proper, current name would be the OSCE: an organisation instead of a former conference. By now, however, the author has not yet come across with any information of a change in the legal status of this institution, despite the fact that most institutions that are called organizations regularly have rules, the violence of which leads to diverse sanctions that are so critical that they prevent any tendency for disobedience. The OSCE seems to remain as non-binding as the CSCE.

\textsuperscript{19} A small Russian military enclave on the coast between Lithuania and Poland
appears; festive and all-encompassing, although all too general statements would be presented in the future meetings. Seldom would the real problems be dealt with. Even if they were, the governments could be rather careless of the consequences. This would of course on the long run also affect the credibility of the institution.

Can it be inferred that under these circumstances, the Baltic Sea could start reminding us of Shanghai in the 20's: many things are possible, but few certain? Yes, but the author sees the quite recent tendencies within the OSCE, especially in the Paris 1990 and Budapest 1994 summits as indications for a search for further stability and thereby credibility. First, an absolute consensus is no longer required for a proposal to pass. It has been refined to a consensus minus one, hindering thus the chance of the disputing nation to veto a proposal aimed at herself. Hence, in a Baltic Sea fishing dispute between Sweden and Russia, if dealt with on this forum, mere Russian ignorance of the OSCE principles could no longer suffice to hinder the process against her.

Second, the OSCE is endeavouring to increase its weight through increasing the quantity of permanent institutions. In addition to the already existing, specifically assigned offices in Warsaw, Prague and Vienna, there are aspirations to create a permanent Council in Vienna, as well as to establish a Secretariat. Then, a yearly troika, consisting of a representative of the former, current and following chairman nations, would function as the general co-ordinators of all actions of the OSCE.

What consequences would these alterations within the OSCE bring about in the Baltic Sea? The author thinks that if these changes went through, the OSCE would start resembling an all-European WEU, though strongly stressing diplomacy rather than military capability. In the Baltic Sea context, this would not only mean co-operation such as in the WEU-Russia axis indicated in the first scenario, but operation within the

20 Shea, Janne. Lecture, Boston University Brussels. February 27, 1995
21 Shea
auspices of a common arrangement, the OSCE. A temptation for dispute could decrease, as the permanent administrative structure could quickly become aware of the dispute, subordinating it to further monitoring. If the action was not in conformity with the principles of the OSCE, a vote would then offer the solution. Unless the violator were able to align with another nation, in the Swedish-Russian fishing dispute, say, Russia with Poland, the OSCE would, according to the consensus minus one rule, set Russia responsible for its behaviour. As the OSCE does not yet possess military capability of any sort, stabilising the situation and controlling Russia along its coast, if necessary, would be problematic. However, as formerly indicated, Russia has during the whole OSCE history supported it. Thus, if the OSCE succeeded in advancing this far to become a credible security arrangement, Russia would presumably not oppose any reasonable measures taken by the OSCE.

To sum up, the Baltic Sea environment could through the materialisation of this scenario give a deep sigh of relief. Despite the lack of heavy support in the form of vast military capacity around the Sea, the OSCE could still create a high level of moral norms, the breaking of which could bring the violator in a bad light in the international relations scene. This, third scenario approach is based on the hypothesis of rational states willing to establish as much harmony with as little binding measures as possible. Thus, this is not a Macchiavellian prospective. Survival through defending against threats, the other nations, as a basis for foreign policy settings would not bring about a future like this. Rather, the fulfilment of this scenario could be counted as a victory for the complex interdependence scholars: mutual interdependence between neighbouring states does exist, and the maintenance of these relations, here through the OSCE, is essential for the future successes of these nations.

5. Conclusions

These three simplified models anticipate the most probable patterns of development in the Baltic Sea future. The first, WEU-Russia axis scenario speaks for a coherent
Northern Europe, where the symbiosis between Russia and the WEU would prevail and flourish, at the expense of US-European relations. The second scenario offers some horror scenes by raising the possibility of a return to the past, to the sinister times of the Cold War. Here, however, the counterpart for an Eurasian Russia would not merely nor even primarily be the US but NATO, then consisting of the majority of the Western European states. A tough border would emerge, partly following the borderline of the former Iron Curtain. The third scenario, in turn, may be caused by conscious aspirations, or it will materialise through passivity in striving for a change to the current situation. The OSCE as the basis for Baltic security could increase activity of all kinds, though keeping the state of instability high in the area.

Independent of which of the scenarios will come true, certain common denominators remain. First, any kind of a future will increase the significance of the Baltic latitudes in world politics. If the policies are successful, economic relations will become important, as the relative and absolute purchasing power of the quantitatively huge inhabitant masses in the former USSR area increases. Satisfying the markets requires huge logistics, and the Baltic Sea seems a natural route for this trade. If, however, tensions increase, and the "soft" relations (e.g. trade, cultural, social) become paralysed, then the security and military matters make the area important. The Baltic Sea region, a northern part of the European heartland, has traditionally been seen as the strategically more critical areas in the world. In the future, a confrontation between an integrated, even fortress-like northern Europe and an imperialist Russia would be concentrating on the mastery of this sea.

Another common denominator for all the scenarios is the implicit essence of the future of Russia. The improvement there will have a direct effect on the probability of the materialisation of the scenarios. However, it has to be well understood that the changes in Russia are not independent variables. The Russian regime is thoroughly aware of the altering security map of Western Europe, consequently closely focusing
on the Baltic Sea, and adjusting the Russian policies accordingly. Achieving information on foreign matters has become even more critical than it was during the Cold War. The ones ruling communication in Russia have an enormous power. Perhaps, the murder of the chief of the TV broadcaster Ostankino, Mr. Vladislav Litjev on March 1, 1994\textsuperscript{22}, was an indication of the vast power of the mass media that the regime could not stand. Nonetheless, information from abroad has at least as large an importance for the decision-making of the Russian regime as data of and from Russian state of affairs is for European decision-makers. The causality here has two directions, but the Russian development is still in the central spotlight when pondering the future of the Baltic region.

Some scholars see Russia and its relation to the world pessimistically, "...even now the West silently accepts the ex-Soviet space and the former socialist countries as a zone of Russia's special interests and influence."\textsuperscript{23} Presumably, this kind of an approach would speak in favour of the materialisation of the third, tough border scenario. Some other scholars are more optimistic. Mr. Brzezinski talks about a plan for Europe, where Russia and the US will not only find each other but also the European Union.\textsuperscript{24} Despite his optimism, his ideas do not quite match with the ones presented in this essay. Either, according to the scenarios here, Russia and Europe will find each other (1), NATO and Europe have to find each other (2), or none of the counterparts get married, but go on with the more or less already existing arrangements (3). Of the other optimists, Mr. Bildt focuses hopefully on the Russian-Baltic States relation as formerly encompassed.

\textsuperscript{22} Helsingin Sanomat. March 2, 1994. p. CI
\textsuperscript{24} Brzezinski. p.42
5.1. A Combined Model

Consequently, focus will be set on Russia, both as a political unit receiving data from the Western abroad and making decisions accordingly, as well as a resource for essential information for the Western decision-makers pondering the future security status of Northern Europe in general and the Baltic Sea security particular. Ultimately, either directly or indirectly, Russia and development there forms the future in the Baltic Sea region. The model below indicates the relations between the causes of Russian behaviour, the behaviour itself and the implications of it on the Baltic Sea security.

![Diagram of political behaviour and Baltic security]

It has to be kept in mind that this is an extreme simplification for clarity. As formerly discussed, the causes, too, are always consequences of some other factors, and frequently in international relations, causes and consequences interact. In addition, the three scenarios are not the only ones, not even in the main lines, but the author considers them the most probable. The numbers in the model refer to the scenarios.

The model clarifies two essentials. First, Russia remains as the key determinant for the probable Western European security alternatives, even though also its own behaviour
is dependent on the development in Western Europe. Second, the probable Western European security arrangements, much results of the Russian situation, determine what kind the future of the Baltic Sea will be.

The outcome of the first scenario could result of Russia becoming Western, certainly because of a turn in public opinion (internal cause). The public opinion could be changed by talented Western-oriented statesmen such as Mr. Kozyrev or Mr. Kovalev. Also, Western European stability and tranquillity could lead to a "westernised" Russia (external cause). As a result of a westernised Russia, the European statesmen could consider the WEU as a sufficient and suitable measure for coexisting with Russia. A Western Russia and an activated WEU would presumably make NATO inactive or at least less active. The Baltic Sea, then would become more stable under the auspices of the favourable WEU-Russia relations. Trade and other relations could flourish, although compromises would be favoured, as outcomes of mutual negotiations between the EU and Russia.

In the third scenario, too, Russia could become "westernised", due to similar, partly similar or different reasons as in the first scenario (internal and external causes). Here, however, the establishment of an activated and extended WEU would not succeed, because, for instance, of a dispute within the European Union of the necessity, importance or financing of such a security arrangement. The WEU would be postponed. With a Western Russia and without a WEU, Europe would feasibly remain tranquil. Thus, NATO would not need to be nervous of its security interests in this situation. It would not need to expand to the ex-communist Central European states, and threaten the peaceful status quo. Nevertheless, NATO passivity in the model is relative. NATO would be passive in expanding, though active in its current scope of interest. The situation being as discussed, no specific alliance nor body would become dominant, which would lead to two things; First, there could be room for "softer" bodies such as the OSCE that could still be improved to cement and sustain the low
level of tension. Second, the Baltic Sea could then function actively, without tension-packed military pressure among the surrounding countries. In contrast to the first scenario, nevertheless, the "floor" could still remain open: this scenario would lack a stabilising axis. The Baltic Sea would only be sheltered by a legally defective, though otherwise functioning organisation, the OSCE.

The materialisation of the second scenario would also stem from how Russia encounters its domestic and foreign environment. Here, however, Russia's conclusions of the internal and external factors would make it grow more distant from the rest of Europe, leading to restlessness in the West. Independent of whether the WEU was to expand or not, NATO would now negotiate its expansion to Poland and the Baltic states, for example, in order to stabilise the threat emerged through the alteration in Russia. The importance of the WEU would then sooner or later become secondary, thus leading to a passivity in some extent. In this case, the Baltic Sea area would presumably encounter stability a la Cold War, though in quite suppressive circumstances. The Baltic Sea would consequently remain of high importance, although mainly militarily, and less, if at all, in economics and culture. A tough border between the EU and an Eurasian Russian would determine the strategic position of the Baltic region.

5.2. How will and how should the future of the Baltic Sea look?

The coming two-three years in Russia and the 1996 EU intergovernmental conference will basically determine the guidelines of the Baltic Sea future. At the moment, as Boris Yeltsin seems to be losing support to the Eurasianists constantly and consistently, meanwhile Poland is persisting to joining NATO soon - despite Russian opposition, as well as Western Europe being highly fragmented, especially economically (leading to all but consensus in 1996), the momentum does not seem favourable for the first scenario. An extended WEU does not seem very probable, nor
does a Western Russia. Thus, a WEU-Russia axis would under these premises remain illusionary.

On the other hand, if Russia, however, resumed approaching Western Europe, with some other leader than the unpopular Mr. Yeltsin, the situation could be different. As the OSCE is eagerly establishing relevant institutions, and NATO seems quite reluctant to expand, at least to countries such as Poland (the associate agreements seem to suffice), the third scenario could be closest to the reality in the coming years. If the WEU, however, would still be extended, the future could look like a combination of the first and the third scenarios.

What about the second, most pessimistic scenario? Several Russian statesmen are clearly on an Eurasian course, if they once get the chance. If the coming presidential elections (1996) are won by some Eurasianist with sufficiently charisma to persuade, plus an already extensive scope of support especially in the legislative and executive bodies, European tension could consequently increase very fast. Any hostile and threatening signal from the new Eurasian regime could be interpreted as a countdown for a new Cold War in the West. Unfortunately, there are also other reasons, in addition to the presidential elections, that can cause even the current or a like-minded regime to grow remote from the rest of Europe. Some over-hasty government decision in Poland concerning its future security preferences, for example, or some too sharp a statement on the Chechnyan war by the EU or even by the UN might critically change the mindsets of the Russian public and the current regime. The consequences could also then resemble the second scenario.

Normatively, the idealist would in the Baltic context prefer the further improvement of the OSCE: this body could approach the Baltic area from a moral point of view (unfortunately, the only approach it is currently capable of), stressing the universal nature of humanitarianism. On the other hand, also the complex interdependence
scholar could favour the OSCE model. This system leaves enough room for rational manoeuvres parallel to the national interests of a given Baltic Sea state. Mutual interdependence would follow of an active OSCE in the Baltic context, though this development would not underestimate the importance of national interests.

Realists, on the other hand, would favour the tough border scenario, Here, the confrontation between the West and the Eurasian Russia would function as a clear premise to build upon. In order the player to survive, the threat, the other counterpart has to be opposed, violently if necessary. Here, a tough border through the Baltic Sea would function as the borderline. Any actor on the other side of the borderline would be considered as an adversary, the posed threat of which would be monitored and also responded to if necessary, in order for a nation to survive.

Independent of the scholarly point of view, two things remain indisputable: First, economic and/or military activity around the Baltic Sea will increase, thus adding to the total importance of the Baltic Sea within the European context. This importance, then, will compel the surrounding nations, independently or as a part of a larger entity, to establish a prompt policy concerning the Baltic Sea. These policies together are likely to lead to a fulfilment of one of the three scenarios. In policy-making, the level of stabilisation in Russia and the level of consensus within the EU are the most intrinsic individual factors determining the tomorrow of the Baltic region. Both favourable tranquillity and extreme hostility are probable around the Baltic Sea region. Related to this continuum, another continuum determines the level of activity there; Anything between reluctant inertia and open reciprocity may prevail among the Baltic area states.

All in all, as compromising functions as a certain and usual measure in the world politics of today, added by the fact that the Baltic Sea will top in the strategic considerations of NATO, WEU, Russia and other factors, due to all reasons indicated.
the most probable future of the area will become a sum of all the different, even contrary objectives of the Baltic area states. There will feasibly not be strict tensions, as such tensions would not be parallel to the objectives of the majority of the players. On the other hand, paradise-like peace will not come true, either, as such state of affairs would not only kill military activity but also healthy competition. Thus, a complex interdependence-like situation could occur, where the players, the nations and the larger organisations, would be reluctant to see the other players as threats, as this could decrease economic and other beneficial mutual activities. Simultaneously, competition would flourish, leading to an active though somewhat unstable Baltic environment Scenario 3 could best resemble the future of this kind. The one who wants to become everybody's friend, finds himself sooner or later being nobody's friend Still without being everybody's friend, one does not have to have any enemies. Skilful compromising will count here, as it has count endless times in the history of mankind.
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