ARCHAEOLOGY AND AUTHENTICITY

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Master’s thesis
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March 2011
[A]uthenticity is implicitly a polemic concept, fulfilling its nature by dealing aggressively with received and habitual opinion, aesthetic opinion in the first instance, social and political opinion in the next.

(Trilling 1972: 94.)

[S]ome signs, or past meanings, are possible to comprehend.

(Preucel and Mrozowski 2010: 31.)
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SUMMARY

BIBLIOGRAPHY
PROLOGUE

On archaeological knowledge, truth, and interpretation, and on the relationship between theory and data in archaeology¹

Hedgehogs and foxes

In his essay *The hedgehog and the fox*, Isaiah Berlin (1953), referring to a Greek poet Archilochus (c. 650 BC), divides people roughly into two types, hedgehogs and foxes. ‘The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing’². Both types of people build and base their knowledge and view of the world on the very things they know. Even though the fox is very resourceful, he is powerless in front of the hedgehog’s one and only defense.

Even though, according to Berlin (1953: 2), this kind of division is very simple and even a bit ridiculous and absurd, it contains enough truth to provide a setting or a starting-point for any kind of study or at least a bona fide examination, or ‘genuine investigation’, as he writes.

Berlin’s study was about Tolstoi’s philosophy of history but his classification serves my purposes well. Every archaeologist is, when interpreting his or her research material, confronted with a task of explicating his or her view of the relationship between theory and data (i.e. empirical observations). Even though no explicit theory or model is utilized in his or her study, the researcher should eventually (at least when writing a master’s thesis) have to explain his or her standpoint on notions like knowledge, truth, and interpretation. Even if it were impossible to say anything positive or final about them, it is most beneficial for the reader to know what the author thinks of them.

¹ The prologue has been published in Finnish in Marila 2011a.

In this chapter, I will present my view of knowledge, truth, and interpretation. In addition, I will give an example of the relationship between theory and data. My objective is to approach the aforementioned concepts by making brute distinctions. In relation to knowledge, I have divided people into pragmatists and rationalists. In relation to truth, I have divided them into realists and relativists. When it comes to interpretation, people can be divided into those who believe in historical meaning-making processes, and those who believe in non-historical meaning-making processes.

The topics in this chapter may appear banal and as absurd and ridiculous as Berlin’s division of people into hedgehogs and foxes. It is, however, best to approach the meaning of theory in archaeology by assessing the most profound concepts, and by making absurdly simple divisions. It is the very simplicity where the power of this approach lies. This approach is also justified since the history of archaeology has always been written by making simple distinctions. Historiographers of archaeology like dividing researchers into processualists and postprocessualists, realists and relativists, for example.

**On knowledge**

In the history of archaeology, and all human thought for that matter, there can be seen two distinct ways to think of knowledge. The first is usually referred to as rationalism. Even though René Descartes is often blamed for inventing it (Descartes 2002; e.g. Olsen 2010: 64, 98), it is hard to say how old this philosophical outlook is. It is undoubtedly as old as thinking itself. According to the maxim of rationalism, it is possible to doubt all empirical knowledge. Only thinking (and therefore doubting) is the only certain entity the existence of which we need not nor should doubt. After all, there has to exist a mind that senses the real and false experiences. Rationalists therefore think people have knowledge before experience. In archaeology this would mean that research is not necessarily
done from the researcher’s own cultural background characteristic of his or her time, but independently of all burden of history.

The other way of thinking of knowledge is often referred to as pragmatism. This way of thinking was made popular by scientist, philosopher, semiotician, mathematician, and logician Charles Peirce and his contemporaries during the latter half of the nineteenth century (Waal 2005: 1). A pragmatist thinks experience precedes all knowledge. Therefore, since we can only have knowledge that is based on experiences, it is pointless and unnecessary to categorically doubt all experiences systematically. Peirce called such doubting ‘paper’ doubting and despised Descartes' approach to knowledge (Misak 1991: 50). According to Peirce, it is pointless to doubt all knowledge just because some knowledge may be false (Misak 1991: 50). His response to Descartes was as follows, ‘[l]et us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts’ (EP1: 28).3

The pragmatist’s approach to knowledge is characterized by a method of building a system of beliefs and justifying knowledge distinctive of that of the rationalist’s. Whereas a rationalist may base his or her system of knowledge on one or few small hypotheses, a pragmatist bases his or her system of knowledge on many small hypotheses. Built like this, a system will be more resistant in situations where one or more hypotheses are falsified. A system that is based on big hypotheses is more likely to collapse if even one of the founding hypotheses becomes falsified.

A pragmatist does not want to base his or her system of knowledge on big hypotheses, but will acknowledge the basis of all beliefs to be in a system of many small hypotheses dictated and continually shaped by new experience and new knowledge.

On truth

When speaking of knowledge, Berlin’s distinction is somewhat clear; hedgehogs are rationalists, whereas foxes can no doubt be classified as pragmatists. People can be divided into hedgehogs and foxes also when it comes to knowing the truth. The matter becomes somewhat complicated when we can, on the one hand, identify realists who believe in one objective truth as hedgehogs, but on the other hand, relativists who believe in one subjective truth can also be identified as hedgehogs. Berlin’s choice for Tolstoi as the subject of his study is interesting since Tolstoi can, in his nihilistic and pessimistic view of history, be identified as a fox, who does not believe it to be possible to say anything true about history. Even though Tolstoi saw things to be predestined and thought the individual will ultimately have very little, if any, historical significance or power in making decisions, he thought everything is more complicated than anyone can understand (Berlin 2004: 123, 126-127). In this sense Tolstoi can be seen as a hedgehog, who believed the universe to function as a unity of which certain ‘truths’ (however abstracted, arbitrary, and ultimately untrue) can be averred since all knowledge is based on experiences, but it must not be done by believing blindly in the all-explaining nature of natural sciences (Berlin 1953: 73; 2004: 119-121).

Peirce’s view of truth was a realist one (EP1: 120). He thought there is nothing that has a starting-point, and all meaning is necessarily historical. To Peirce, the world is a unity in which all meanings are interconnected. In his philosophy, reality is what it is, regardless of what you, me, or anyone else may think about it (Waal 2001: 64). The conduct of inquiry is the process of seeking the truth. The truth therefore can ultimately, at the end of the hypothetical day, be reached, but it is only a final opinion of a group of scientists whose object reality is (e.g. Misak 1991: 80-81). The final opinions reached by inquiry do not necessarily match reality, which, to us, remains necessarily anthropomorphic.

When the inquiry is conducted far enough, certain truths can be averred about the past. The real past, however, will most likely remain unknowable, since some
events will, according to Peirce, remain ‘buried secrets’\(^4\). Buried secrets will remain unanswered even if the inquiry was carried on forever.

**On meaning and interpretation**

The way one experiences history has the most profound significance when making interpretations of the meanings of past events. In this distinction, dividing thinkers into hedgehogs and foxes becomes even harder. Both can be found among those who believe meaning is based on relations of things solely in the present, as well as among those who think meaning is based on historicity. Those who believe in diachronic, i.e. historical meaning-making practices can be identified as foxes, but the fact that they believe in a historical unity makes them hedgehogs. Also those who believe in synchronic meaning formation can be identified as foxes. They believe meaning is formed in a horizontal meaning-making horizon. What distinguishes synchronism from diachronism is that in the former meaning is continually being reevaluated and cannot be justified with historical ‘facts’.

It is fairly easy to describe Descartes' thinking as characteristic of a hedgehog, whereas Peirce would no doubt seem to be a fox who combines data from various fields of science open-mindedly. Both, however, strived for a systematic approach to forming a coherent structure in which all experience, knowledge, and meaning could be justified. In this they succeeded. It is therefore by no means totally clear if Peirce was ultimately a hedgehog or a fox. Defining him as either is as hard as Berlin said it to be to define Tolstoi. It, then, so often happens that a fox only thinks he or she is a fox, whereas historiography could eventually categorize them as hedgehogs.

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\(^4\) For a concise account of buried secrets and Peirce’s view of truth, see Misak 1991.
On the relationship between theory and data

Above, I presented my view of the basic and underlying concepts important when discussing theory in research and particularly in archaeology. I divided people roughly into two categories; hedgehogs and foxes. Even though in the end it is hard to say which researchers are hedgehogs and which are foxes, it appears possible to divide them into different types of hedgehogs who believe in one personal truth, and different types of foxes who believe in one objective truth, or one world and many world philosophers, as proposed by Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (2011).

In order for this account on knowledge, truth, and interpretation to be more than trivialities, it is most important to clarify what theory means in research. It has become somewhat a proverb in archaeology to state that theory and data are inseparable. This notion is indeed valid, but it remains a bit ambivalent, and does not provide a starting-point for a genuine investigation. It is necessary to approach the problem by providing an absurd example:

The relationship between theory and data could be compared to seeing. I look around in a room, make observations, and collect data. I memorize certain details that are important or significant to me. Some details, in fact most of the information, I ignore or simply do not observe.

I close my eyes and think about what I saw in the room. What color was the bookshelf? Was it brown like the one my parents had when I was little? I think that bookshelf was light brown. Every time I open my eyes, I see the bookshelf a little bit differently (which happens also when writing and reviewing a master’s thesis like the one I am writing at the moment). Also my memories seem to change a little. New observations and new data affect my theory on bookshelves. I have an image of a bookshelf that I see when I close my eyes. Still, when I keep my eyes open, I can recognize an object as a bookshelf, and I can distinguish one bookshelf from another.
The objects in the room appear to be real, but they seem to change constantly. The same phenomenon can be seen when interpreting archaeological material. An archaeologist makes observations of material the maker’s motives of which he or she has no certain knowledge. The archaeologist, nevertheless, makes hypotheses that are based on his or her own theory on material culture, his or her motives and values, his or her way of looking at the world. The source of this theory is the material world, experience, and life. Charles Peirce once said, already at the age of fifteen, that life is a theory.

**How to read this master’s thesis**

This master’s thesis is a study of the concept of authenticity, both in philosophy and archaeology. Having been written in essay form, it is divided into a prologue and five chapters:

- Prologue
- I Introduction
- II Authenticity in philosophy
- III Authenticity in archaeology
- IV Authenticity as semiosis
- V Discussion

The prologue can be read as a theory part that explicates the writer’s approach to the topic, which occasionally rests on rough generalization and divisionalizing, but only so to provide a viable starting-point for approaching such a difficult and ambivalent concept as authenticity. The prologue also provides an introduction to some of the basic concepts used in the following chapters, the two most important of them being *interpretation* and *meaning*. 
Chapter I, introduction, is, as its name implies, an introduction to the concept of authenticity. It particularly addresses the questions discussed in chapter III, authenticity in archaeology, but also presents the main questions this thesis aims to answer.

Chapter II, authenticity in philosophy, presents the two main philosophical outlooks that have influenced and affected archaeology most. Modern archaeology is a product of modernity, whereas postprocessual archaeology is more connected to postmodernism. Chapter II also serves as an introduction to chapter III, which deals partly with issues of modernity and postmodernism.

Chapter III, authenticity in archaeology, forms the core of this thesis. In this chapter, I provide an account of how the concept of authenticity has been understood in modern archaeology (or archaeological literature), particularly in postmodern postprocessual archaeology which, in this thesis, is implicitly presented as popular archaeology. It also issues the question of demarcating between scientific archaeology and popular archaeology. The main thesis in this chapter is, that the contemporary postprocessual understanding of authenticity as contextual is not valid.

Chapter IV, authenticity as semiosis, continues where chapter III ends. In this chapter I argue that authenticity is ultimately the same as meaning. Meaning in turn is not entirely social, but has its basis in the material realm, in materiality. I use Charles Peirce’s theory of sign to illustrate that meaning, and authenticity, is a semiotic process that manifests as semiosis (often also referred to as semeiosis).

In chapter V, discussion, I provide a brief discussion of the concept of authenticity in archaeology and the implications of using a Peircean theory to define

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5 Eero Muurimäki (2007: 98) puts it well when he explicates Cornelius Holtorf’s view of the relationship between popular culture and scientific archaeology. ‘For Holtorf, archaeology in popular culture means every context but scientific where the word archaeology is used in public. But, when scientific archaeology also gets its meaning in the service of popular culture, all that is left is popular archaeology in the last instance.’
authenticity. In addition, I argue that, in archaeology, Peircean pragmatism can be seen as a synthesis of processual and postprocessual archaeologies, and I go as far as proposing a pragmatistic archaeology as the possibility of a new scientific archaeology.
I

INTRODUCTION

The type of authenticity discussed in this master’s thesis

I became interested in the problem of authenticity already in the beginning of my studies in 2007 after having read Cornelius Holtorf's (2005) book *From Stonehenge to Las Vegas - Archaeology as popular culture*. His approach to archaeology was, and still is, radical and innovative. For Holtorf, the appeal of archaeology lies in its metaphorical nature. Archaeology deals with very potent notions of being buried, going underground, doing detective work and going on an adventure. According to Holtorf, it is not the real pastness of archaeological sites or artifacts that is important to people, but the experiences and strong emotions they are capable of arising; the magic of doing archaeology and imagining the past. Therefore, in the postprocessual spirit, the authenticity of an artefact is not thought to be inherent to the object, but is always experienced by an individual in a context. This allows for an authentic experience of the past in theme parks, TV, and popular culture. In fact, for Holtorf, archaeology is popular culture. (Holtorf 2005: 159.)

In this introductory chapter, I will describe what authenticity has traditionally meant in archaeology, how its relevance was challenged in and after the beginning of the 1980s by some archaeologists, and how the division between two traditions in scientific archaeology also marks the bifurcation of two lines in the treatment of the concept of authenticity. I will also explicate some of the essential notions like the distinction between historical and metaphorical authenticity, and context and convention.

Determining the authenticity of archaeological artifacts or ancient sites has always been an important task of the archaeologist, or anyone studying the past for that
matter. Traditionally in archaeology the notion of authenticity has based on the idea, and been used with reference to, of a real past as it once happened regardless of what you, me, or anyone else may think about it. The notion of authentic past was reserved for the positivist, and most of all, scientific (Western) representation of the past. With its critique against the so-called new archaeology, postprocessualism targeted the, in their view, false idea of one true and therefore authentic past envisioned by archaeologists hitherto.

Lately archaeologists have been more preoccupied with a different kind of notion of authenticity. One that is more deeply rooted to multiple alternative ways of experiencing the past and the pastness of things rather than determining the real past of artifacts or sites. The concept of authenticity has been extended to landscapes (see for example Palang and Fry 2003) and even theme parks (Holtorf 2005, 2007; Ikäheimo 2010). People today want authentic experiences, at their local nearby historical site, and when traveling abroad and experiencing other cultures and cities.

Authenticity, when taken to mean something other than simple nominal authenticity, is one of those highly ambivalent and hard to grasp concepts that, despite their ambiguous nature, have a great relevance on the way people assign meaning to things. Nominal authenticity is a term used in art history. It refers to the process of linking a certain work of art to a particular author. I have deliberately taken this term and used it in this context to refer to the technical authenticity of a certain artifact of archaeological site. This kind of authenticity is relevant when determining whether the artifact or a site is genuine, i.e. not a reproduction or fake, but also when studying the meaning of objects (see chapter IV).

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6 With tradition I refer to the fact that archaeology has always been inspired by the positivist notion of knowing the real, and authentic, past. This view was only challenged in the beginning of the 1980s when the so-called postprocessual archaeology started stressing the relevance of the present context of the scientist studying the past and proposed that everyone’s perception of the past is equally valid and real, therefore compromising the archaeologists’ monopolistic position in/to studying the past.
While often acknowledged as a modern phenomenon ‘invented’ to alleviate the stress the modern and individualistic world has placed upon humans (e.g. Taylor 1992: 2; Holtorf and Schadla-Hall 1999: 231), the need for authenticity remains a widely discussed topic even today. One recent example of this discussion is the so-called Holtorf-Kristiansen debate (Holtorf 2008; Kristiansen 2008). Kristian Kristiansen comments on Cornelius Holtorf’s (2005) book From Stonehenge to Las Vegas - Archaeology as popular culture:

[---] Holtorf sets out to deconstruct some of the foundations of archaeological heritage: the notions of authenticity (chapter 7) and of preservation (chapter 8). While I welcome a theoretical discussion of the various approaches to authenticity in modern society, Holtorf’s goal becomes obvious when you read the next chapter. By declaring that perceived ‘pastness’ is more important than real past it becomes easier to defend his attack on archaeological preservation in chapter 8. This chapter is full of misunderstandings and Holtorf is ignorant of the most basic information about archaeological preservation, some of which I have pointed out earlier in print and verbally to Cornelius Holtorf, but apparently to no effect [---]. This may come as no surprise as academic expertise is superfluous in his brave new archaeological world. (Kristiansen 2008: 489.)

In his book, Cornelius Holtorf (2005: 115) states that ‘[d]espite the theoretical difficulties in defining it, authenticity is arguably the single most important property of archaeological finds and exhibits’. It is not the definition of authenticity they are discussing, but the consequences of labeling authenticity as irrelevant or relative and contextual when it comes to experiencing archaeological artifacts and heritage sites. Kristiansen is deeply worried about Holtorf’s ‘attempt to deconstruct archaeology as a historical discipline in order to allow modern market forces to take over the archaeological heritage and the consumption of the past as popular culture’ (Kristiansen 2008: 488).
It is, however, not only the uncertain future of cultural heritage Kristiansen is worried about. Authenticity is also very closely tied to authority and power. Archaeologists have always had a more or less authoritative disposition in defining what is authentic and therefore worth saving and protecting. According to Holtorf (2005: 159), archaeologists should not be telling other people what to think about the past. If non-archaeologists are allowed access to defining the authenticity of archaeological artifacts and heritage sites, everybody becomes an archaeologist. In fact, Holtorf (2005: 160) has explicitly proposed that ‘we are all archaeologists’.

Defining authenticity in any way will have ramifications beyond mere theoretical discussion. What is considered real and authentic will affect the way we value things (Gilmore and Pine 2007), and, in the case of archaeology, the cultural heritage. If the modern market forces are allowed to take over archaeological heritage, like Kristiansen envisioned in his response to Holtorf, the past will be rendered a product that can be used to make a profit. In a way selling your own past would mean selling yourself, and that is unethical in the individualistic Western culture (Taylor 1992).

This goes to show that authenticity has been approached and treated in many different ways in archaeology, and it is my view that none of the approaches has produced an adequate explanation of the concept. The recent trend has been to label authenticity contextual, which has led to the treatment of the concept as highly ambiguous. Since one of the central objectives of this master’s thesis is to provide a clear distinction between context and convention, and explain how the authentic experience is based on conventions rather than context, let me now propose one such distinction.

When, at a museum exhibition, I say ‘this particular stone axe is authentic’ I may refer to a stone axe in relation to other stone axes which, to me, look like fakes. Therefore I perceive the authenticity of the axe in question as a contextual attribute, i.e. the same axe can be taken to be authentic or inauthentic depending on its relation to other elements in the same context. However, when I visit the
same exhibition with my friend, who does not know stone axes as well as I do, we could both utter the same sentence and point at a different axe. In this case both our propositions are true because we are both perceiving the authenticity of the axe in relation to our conventions (acquired habits), not simply in relation to other axes.

It is my view that two kinds of authenticity exist, one of historical, and the other of a metaphorical kind. Let me make that distinction clear. Historical authenticity could be described as the artifact's ability to provide answers to questions regarding the past. In this sense the context of a particular find is important. In order to be authentic, a historical (one that is relevant to archaeologists in the traditional sense) artifact has to be able to tell us something about the past in the present (Shanks 1992: 19). There are multiple contexts intermixed and the artifact’s authenticity is defined by its ability to depart from the present context (Shanks 1992: 19), i.e. stand on its own, free from present values, in a sense. Metaphorical authenticity, on the other hand, is what makes it possible for a reproduction of an authentic artifact to be authentic (e.g. a stone axe and a reproduction of it). The same process enables for an authentic experience of the past for example in theme parks where nothing actually old is needed in order to experience the past.

The kind of authenticity I am interested in emerged as a result of the linguistic turn in social sciences and anthropology in the 1970s and in archaeology during the 1980s (Preucel and Mrozowski 2010: 11, 21). The same can be seen to have happened to context. Context has, of course, always been a central factor in archaeological inquiry but toward the end of the 1980s context acquired a new meaning when hermeneutics was more intensively integrated as part of the practice of archaeological interpretation. Context was now seen to apply to much more than the original find context of an object.

The new notions of context and authenticity need to be seen to reflect a change in attitude in archaeology. More emphasis was put on the context of the scientist studying the past than on the past as something real. If archaeology had hitherto
been inspired by positivist notions of natural sciences as true science, the 1980s saw the emergence of a set of theories that drew their ideas from social sciences, literary studies, linguistics, and semiotics. In a sense archaeology became a science where ‘anything goes’ (Oestigaard 2004: 35). This may be one reason context and authenticity remain ambiguous concepts in archaeology.

The objectives of this master’s thesis

One of the objectives of this master’s thesis is to evaluate how the concept of authenticity has been understood and used in what has been referred to as postprocessual archaeology (i.e. a set of archaeologies or archaeological theories that deny the possibility of one real and therefore necessarily authentic past), and what kind of scientific or philosophical terrain the notion stems from. I will be using archaeology’s role in popular culture (popular archaeology) as a specific and recurring example of discussion since it is one field of archaeology where the significance of authenticity has been heavily questioned (e.g. Holtorf 2005). I will give examples of how the past is experienced, reproduced, and ultimately made authentic; all notions stemming from postprocessual archaeology.

The contemporary notion of authenticity as contextual is of particular interest to me. Therefore, in the course of the following sixty or so pages, I will argue that authenticity can be seen to operate on a metaphorical level, as well as on a level that is based on material meanings and historicity. Authenticity therefore is not only a construction that has truth value only in one context, but a convention, a habit of acting that stems from the historical meaning-making practices, or materiality. This point is explicated in the final chapter Authenticity as semiosis (chapter IV), where I use Charles Peirce’s sign theory to make my point. Authenticity remains an ambiguous concept due to lack of systematic treatment of it. I believe one systematic approach is provided by Peirce’s theory of sign.

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15 If propositions were only true in one context, we would not need science (Klejn 1973: 701).
Besides archaeology, I have studied philosophy and semiotics. Therefore this master's thesis will present a somewhat philosophical approach to the concept of authenticity in archaeology. I will issue the two most important philosophical outlooks, modernity and postmodernism and clarify their significance to modern archaeology and postprocessualism in particular. Modernity and postmodernism will be addressed in chapter II.

**Some important topics not included in this master’s thesis**

It is, of course, impossible to cover all relevant topics within a limited amount of pages. That is why only certain themes I find relevant have been issued. These include philosophy and semiotics as a background or parallel evolutionary lines for postprocessual archaeology.

I have, however, not discussed some relevant topics. These include museology and architecture. Museology is, of course, a relevant topic because it deals with authenticity through exhibitions. I have, however, provided a chapter on experiencing the past, and I am most positive the same questions are of relevance in museology. There is also a more pragmatic reason for leaving museology outside of this thesis; I have more competence in philosophy and semiotics which both provide ample material for studying authenticity.

Another important topic that has been left out is architecture and the restoration of heritage sites. Ruins and their restoration are relevant questions when it comes to perceiving the authenticity of an object or a heritage site. I have, however, discussed notions like aura, which is closely connected to the questions of restoration. Some suggested reading for architecture, restoration and ruins include _The seven lamps of architecture_ by John Ruskin (1974), _A history of architectural conservation_ by Jukka Jokilehto (1986) and, a more recent article by Gregory Jusdanis (2004), _Farewell to the Classical: excavations in modernism_ which includes an extensive bibliography.
One regrettable aspect of this thesis is that it does not address the discussion of authenticity in Finnish archaeology. There is, however, a clear reason for this. There has not been a theoretical discussion of authenticity in Finnish archaeology. It could even be averred that theory in general has been avoided in Finnish archaeology (Herva 1999; Kärki et al. 2006: 55). Some refreshing exceptions, however, include for example Eero Muurimäki (2000), whose licentiate's thesis deals with epistemology in archaeology.

One could also point out in disappointment that no case study is provided in this thesis to put theories into use. This, I argue, is not necessary when discussing highly abstract concepts such as authenticity which, in the end, has its roots in the material world that surrounds us. In this respect, there is no essential difference between archaeological material and the rest of the material world we are surrounded by and are part of.8

8 These very same arguments are used by Bjørnar Olsen (2010: 17) in In defense of things, in which he does not apply his theories in a case study.
II

AUTHENTICITY IN PHILOSOPHY

Authenticity and modernity

Introduction

Authenticity is often seen as a product of the modern Western world and tied to the notion of modernity (e.g. Sherry 2007: 481). Western archaeology was developed from the same modern social background (Thomas 2004a, 2004b: 17; Lucas 2004: 109). Therefore in order to understand what authenticity means in contemporary Western archaeology, it is most beneficial first to try to understand what modernity means and what are the philosophical grounds modernity grew from.

In this chapter, I will explore the philosophical grounds that gave rise to what has been called modernity. I will also present some of the ‘malaises’ of modernity, which have been held responsible for the false modern notion of authenticity.

Western scientific archaeology was developed in the modern philosophical atmosphere. Therefore the notion of authenticity in archaeology stems from the philosophical treatment of the notion. In addition to discussing the development of modernity, I will make recurring notions about its significance to archaeology and anthropology and the treatment of the concept of authenticity in archaeology. Let me now begin with an introduction to modernity.
What modernity is

Even though a concise description is impossible to give, modernity is often seen as a development of a certain kind of philosophical outlook. Central to modernity are the emergence of nation-states, legal systems, capitalism, industrialization, urbanization, the constant feeling of change and the loss of tradition. This in turn has lead to an emphasized idea of individuality and the notion of the present as radically different from the past. (Thomas 2004a: 2; 125-126.)

One can come up with many elements that characterize the modern era, but, of course, no certain boundaries can be set around a block that could be called the modern era. It is more beneficial to think of modernization as a process that has its roots in ancient Greek and Rome (Thomas 2004a: 3). According to archaeologist Julian Thomas (2004a: 3), what made the modern period modern, is that a forgotten ‘cluster of understandings’ achieved a position of hegemony and people started to structure their lives according to a more global disposition of thinking. In this way modernity is a philosophical outlook that draws its ideas from enlightenment, rationalism, mechanism and positivism. The modern era is a process that strives toward a final state of affairs (Johnson 1999: 163-164; Thomas 2004a: 3). The modern philosophy holds in it an idea of perfection that can be reached⁹.

Modernization is said to have brought with it a feeling of uncertainty and chaos (e.g. Hodder 1989b: 65). An integral part of the modern is therefore the ‘legislative’ (Thomas 2004a: 3) nature of philosophy. Modern philosophy tries to define good and bring order into chaos (Bauman 1992: 119). There is an upheld distinction between reason and action. Abstract thinking is thought to precede action. They are, in fact, thought as separate. Modern life appears planned ahead. That is one reason utopian thinking is so distinctive of modernity (Bauman 1992: xv). This is also a recurring theme when discussing the distinction between theory and practice in archaeology and other sciences.

⁹ For more on utopia and dystopia, see also Shanks et al. 2004: 75-76.
Modernity gave birth to modern archaeology, and to archaeological thinking in general (Holtorf 2010b: 10; Thomas 2004a). What distinguishes antiquarianism from archaeology is that the former treated past objects as mere objects in the present, whereas the latter approaches past material as evidence that is able to tell us something about the past when studied systematically (Schnapp 2008: 396; Thomas 2004a: 3, 157).

The modern way of acknowledging the past life and past values as separate from those of the modern society of today has lead to a situation where past cultures are treated as blocks in time and space (Lucas 2004: 109)\textsuperscript{10}. According to Thomas (2004a: 4), this is what still burdens archaeology. The tendency to think about the material (past and present) as separate from the human is a line of thought that has its roots in the mechanistic and rationalist philosophy distinctive of modernity. In archaeology this philosophy has been challenged only recently by such scholars as Michael Shanks (2007) and Bjørnar Olsen (2003, 2007, 2010). This approach has been labelled symmetrical archaeology since it acknowledges the symmetry of humans and material objects. Mind and matter are inseparable parts of the same spectrum. Symmetrical archaeology is therefore based on a monist ontology, an ontology that has not been very influential in archaeology ever since the birth of modern scientific archaeology, but one that will most likely be a guiding philosophy or, if such vocabulary is allowed, at the heart of the next paradigm of archaeology.

Modernity brought with it a world of mass-production and mass-consumption that lead to an illusory view of the world (Olsen 2010: 11). Replicas and machines filled the world and became ‘the incarnation of our inauthentic, estranged, and alienated modern being’ (Olsen 2010: 11). Things became what epitomize

\textsuperscript{10} Vincent Sherry (2007) has proposed that modernity means conceiving time in intervals of decades, a period relevant on the individual level.
inauthentic, while an idea of freedom and emancipation from things was upheld (Latour 1993: 137-138, 2002: 138-139).

Things became a threat to the authentic, free, and individual human self. This in turn lead to a somewhat distorted image of the individual and the human as the incorruptible constant. This philosophy that can be traced back to Protagoras whose famous line ‘man is the measure of all things’ can be seen to characterize a line of thought that is over two millennia old.

The most notorious and perhaps the most often blamed of the philosophers that can be held responsible for creating a modern divide between humans and the material world is René Descartes (e.g. Jameson 2002: 31). In his view, the human is basically composed of thought and is independent of all time and place, and all things material.

In Descartes’ reasoning, all experiences can and must be doubted. The same line of thought can also be seen in Immanuel Kant’s philosophy. His ontology denies all access to things. Things are at best anthropomorphic abstractions which, nevertheless, ultimately remain transcendental, unattainable, and out of reach. In Kant’s philosophy, knowledge is not directly based on the object world. The world, however, is an object created by man.

It is no wonder things and the material world became evil things that were seen as humanism’s other (Olsen 2010: 90-91). The dualistic philosophy combined with mass-production and replicating of things raised issues of alienation and inauthenticity. The material world became deceptive.

While modernism has often been said to have given birth to humanism (Olsen 2010: 102), which can be seen to hold in it very noble notions of equality, solidarity, and hegemony, these attributes have nevertheless been subjected only to humans. The material world, however, remains unattached and distant, even malign and suspicious.
Eugene Rochberg-Halton (1986: x) sees modernity as cultural nominalism. A philosophy that denies general ideas and universal attributes and is based on dichotomous abstractions such as conventional versus original, fact versus value, and social versus individual. Rochberg-Halton’s objective is to reconstruct a pragmatist social theory that targets such issues as materialism and meaning. It is also an attempt to bring the notions of memory and continuity back to social theory, something that could well have been expected from a Peircean pragmatist interested in social theory in the postmodern times of the 1980s. After all, Peirce was a realist (Waal 2001: 51).11

The Cartesian alienation from the material world gave birth to a project of upholding the idea of an authentic self, since there had to be something that could be taken to be the final cause of things, the original that is not a copy. Therefore one of the most central questions modernity raised was that of individuality.

**Individuality and other malaises of the modern**

In the previous chapter, I gave a brief introduction to what modernity is usually taken to mean. I also mentioned some of the key modern philosophers, the most well known of them being René Descartes, and explained their relevance to the modern understanding of the world. Their philosophy has since been upholding the binary conception of the world where the human and the material things are seen as separate (Harrison 2004: 36). This has lead to the idea of the self as an autonomous, irreproducible, and authentic, individual. One philosophical school that has been identified with and been upholding the notion of authentic individual and authenticity is existentialism.

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11 The discussion of realism versus nominalism is interesting. Peirce, however, avoided this by making a distinction between what is real and what exists. Universals may be real, but do not necessarily exist. Not all that is real, exists. Existence is the object’s relation to other objects of its kind, whereas being real is the object’s relation to our thoughts about it. (Waal 2001: 51)
It must be noted that the introduction to existentialism provided here deals with early Heidegger and his anthropocentric existentialism. Heidegger’s philosophy is diverse and later becomes anti-humanist and anti-anthropocentric. In this respect Heidegger later criticizes subjectivism and idealism. Therefore my take on Heidegger should be read as a prelude to Adorno’s critique of existentialism and the jargon of authenticity, not as criticism of Heidegger’s philosophy, or existentialism for that matter.

Existentialism

Paul Tillich (1944) describes existentialism as an over one hundred (now closer to one hundred and fifty) year old movement of rebellion against the dehumanization of man in industrial society. While modernity can be seen to have given birth to a certain kind of humanism, it has alienated the human subject (remember the discussion of modernity and humanism above).

Existentialism is one of the central philosophical schools or attitudes of the modern time that stress the individual above all. Some aspects of Kant’s transcendental philosophy greatly influenced such philosophers as Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Heidegger. Their philosophies emphasize the importance of the authentic individual and man’s existence in the uncertain and modernly unattainable world. Existentialism is therefore deeply fond of the idea of authentic existence. Existentialism denies the practical supremacy of reason and the universality of moral values (Grene 1952: 266). Existentialism is therefore a nominalist philosophy descriptive of the crisis of its time (Grene 1952: 273; Rochberg-Halton 1986: x; Taborsky 1998: 15-19).

12 In Brief über den Humanismus (1946), but also in his works after that, Heidegger rejects existentialism, humanism, and the naturalist and scientific conception of man (Philipse 1998: 199).

13 In fact, Heidegger’s anti-intellectualism has been identified by Richard Rorty, himself an anti-intellectualist neo-pragmatist, with the kind of pragmatism John Dewey advocated. William Blattner (2000) provides an account of this.

14 With crisis, Grene (1952) is most likely referring to the Holocaust.
Heidegger and Sartre have very different ideas of what it is that drives the individual toward authenticity. Marjorie Grene (1952) provides an account of these differences. According to Grene, Heidegger sees death to be the ultimate fear one has to face in order to reach genuine existence. Death is the only experience not interchangeable with those of other individuals. It is therefore the death of the individual, not that of everyone, that the individual comes to meet. Death therefore becomes the one thing that is really the reason to uphold an idea of freedom, the one thing that remains pure, and ultimately the authentic experience, the ultimate reason and bringer of meaning (Johnson 2000: 27-28). Theodor Adorno (1986: 133) puts it well in *The jargon of authenticity* when he writes that ‘[v]iolence inheres in the nucleus of Heidegger's philosophy'.

For Sartre, however, existence is not that much about the death of the individual since it is one experience that does not become part of the individual's experiences but has more significance to others. Sartre’s existentialism is about freedom and the individual’s ability to confront the nature of his or her freedom. Sartre therefore places more emphasis on life than he does on death. (Grene 1952: 268-269.)

Both Sartre and Heidegger’s philosophies still deal with notions of freedom and loneliness. Existentialists see the individual as ‘thrown into the world’ and always responsible for his or her actions and destinies. The authentic individual has courage to deal with his or her freedom to make choices, something the inauthentic individual is afraid to do. Sartre and Heidegger's existentialisms are

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15 A more detailed description of death and Dasein is provided by Peter Gordon (2010: 174): “One’s own death is a future possibility of complete individuation that every person must experience only for him- or herself. But because it puts an end to the Dasein that is in each case “mine,” death itself cannot be an object of phenomenological reflection. The possibility for understanding oneself as a whole can therefore emerge only from the anticipation of death, the future-directed or “not-yet” structure Heidegger called Being-toward-death. Heidegger therefore insisted that his phenomenological treatment of death and anxiety should not be mistaken for morbid fascination, nor for an anthropological commentary on the centrality of death for human experience. Rather, the anticipatory anxiety for Being-toward-death lights up the temporal primacy of the future within Dasein’s ontological structure.”

16 For more on metaphysics of death and the identity of the dead body see for example Carter 1984 and Rosenberg 1984.
therefore attempts to understand the nature of man’s loneliness in the world as the ultimate locus of authentic experience and authentic individuality. (Grene 1952; Johnson 2000.)

Cornelius Holtorf (2005: 144-145), even though not an existentialist, states that the kind of archaeology that has been inspired by modern philosophy has been characterized by an obsession of maintaining and valuing seemingly objective and unchanging monumental sites like Stonehenge. It is therefore contradictory that in the ethos of the very same modern archaeology it is totally accepted and expected to destroy a site and replace it with seemingly unchanging and objective scientific documentation.

An interesting point and an implication of a Heideggerian existential philosophy in archaeology then is the way heritage sites and artifacts can be seen as existential signs. The authenticity of an artifact or site can very well be seen to stem from the notion that death or destruction renders an object authentic. Archaeologists have a lot of power since excavation is always destructive. The site’s life is brought to an end and its authenticity is in a way fixed and proclaimed when archaeologists destroy them.

Heritage sites are valued and protected before and after excavations but they only become significant to modern scientific archaeology after they have been ‘destroyed’. After their destruction very little can be said about the actual site but future archaeologists have to rely only on documentation and gathered artifacts. It is no wonder Christopher Tilley (1989) compares excavation to theatre (more on this in chapter III).

**Individualism**

After the brief introduction to existentialism, let me now explain in more detail some of the key concerns modernity has raised regarding authenticity and the
individual. The objects of this concern are sometimes referred to as the malaises of modernity (Taylor 1992).

Since modern times, there has always been a need for authenticity. Richard Handler (1986: 2) writes that authenticity is (1) a cultural construct of the Western world, it is (2) closely tied to notions of individuality, and (3) the tendency to unite authenticity and individuality sits tight in both common sense and anthropological theories about other cultures. Handler sees authenticity in anthropology to be closely tied to the notion of individuality.

Anthropology’s dependence on the idea of an authentic individual has lead, and will lead, to a distorted image of other cultures. It is, of course, impossible to free oneself from any subjective interpretations but the realization of the fixation on the individual could possibly lead to a less biased understanding of the past and past people’s reasoning.

The objective of all authentic individuals is to be true to oneself. This moral understanding of the connection between individuality and authenticity was put forward by Lionel Trilling in Sincerity and authenticity (1972). After his formulation authenticity began to be seen as equivalent to self-fulfillment and being true to oneself; sincerity, as the title of his book implies.

Charles Taylor (1992: 15) uses the word authenticity in the same sense Trilling does. His approach is also ethical as the title of his book The ethics of authenticity implies. Taylor’s study is about the modern condition of the society and the malign ideas modernity has brought along; the concepts that, in his view, define modernity.

Some people think individuality is one of the great advancements modernity brought with it. Taylor, however, sees it as a source for worry. According to Taylor, individuality is one of the ‘malaises of modernity’. Individuality is the human being’s ability to choose his or her own path and destiny. The individual is not
bound to the ties of tradition or history. Past (premodern) people belonged to a
great chain of being that gave the sense of meaning to their lives. The modern
man, however, as he is detached from the larger social unity, has to look for
meaning elsewhere. Taylor sees concentration on the individual to flatten and
narrow life, make it poorer in meaning. It also makes it harder to take others and
the society into account. (Taylor 1992: 2-4.)

Taylor’s second source of worry is the supremacy of instrumental reason in the
modern society. He sees this to lead to the overemphasized importance of
technology and reliance on machines when answers ought to be looked for
elsewhere. This attitude has lead to the identification of the human body with
machines. The human body is treated as a machine instead of acknowledging it as
an entity that operates on the level of whole. One that has a life history. (Taylor
1992: 5-7)

An interesting point concerning human being in the modern world of material
mass production and mechanical reproduction is made by philosopher Hannah
Arendt. According to Arendt (1958: 95-96), ‘the reality and reliability of the
human world rest primarily on the fact that we are surrounded by things more
permanent than the activity by which they were produced, and potentially even
more permanent than the lives of their authors’. Taylor (1992: 7) sees this
permanence to be compromised in the modern world.

Taylor’s third malaise of the modern, then, is that the modern technology-based
society paradoxically limits the individual’s ability to make choices. The modern
world limits our freedom but also affects us. The choices we make in the
instrumental world seize to be our own and are more dictated by the society and
the bureaucratic system we live in. For example, individuals’ choices are limited in
certain cities where it is almost impossible for a public transportation to function
since the cities are designed for private transportation. (Taylor 1992: 8-9.)
The above-mentioned three malaises of the modern have primarily lead to the loss of meanings in the society, an attribute that matters most when it comes to experiencing the past and the authenticity of archaeological artifacts.

Even though much of the twentieth century archeology has been dominated by perspectives which emphasize the role of the social whole, the more recent reaction against this view (postprocessualism, also known as archaeology of the individual) has resulted in the identification of an independent and autonomous individual. Modern archaeology is immersed in the individualistic thinking and finds itself in trouble when making interpretations regarding the past. (Thomas 2004a: 119-148, 2004b: 27.)

**Jargon of authenticity**

One of the most well known criticizers of the existential philosophy is Theodor Adorno. Adorno was a member of the Frankfurt school of critical theory. His approach is Hegelian-Marxist as opposed to what Adorno himself calls Heidegger’s Platonic idealism (Adorno 1986: xiii, xvii, 140).

Since no objective validation for the disappearance of the modern industrial domination exist, members of the Frankfurt school uphold the ideal of critical reason, which they say lacked from the existential theoreticians’ philosophy. Critical reason therefore includes the possibility of the contingent nature of the limitations nature and history set. (Adorno 1986: x.) Adorno (1986: 137-138) criticizes Heidegger’s idealism as something that sets the real world as secondary to mortality which is the only tangible for Heidegger. This kind of thinking evades all real problems in the world and, in the end, leads to nihilism. This is obviously what upsets Adorno.

Adorno argues that the terminology of existentialism has become a jargon that aims to portray the magic of existentialism, something Walter Benjamin (2008)
called aura. To call it jargon is to express the language’s inability to express truth. That is also one of Adorno’s (1986: 41-45) worries. Existentialism expressed the need for historical meanings and liberation but this resulted in the mystification of the relationship between language and the object world. The jargon compresses objective consciousness into self-experience. This is what lead to idealism in existentialism. (Adorno 1986: xiii.)

In *The jargon of authenticity* Adorno (1986) set out to salvage what is left of the concept of subject after the existentialists’ treatment of it. In the existentialist philosophy the authentic individual is ultimately identified with and reduced to the level of an idea. For Heidegger it was death, and for Sartre freedom. Adorno hopes to return the individual its subjectivity in the irreducible form. For Adorno, the subject is, however, also mystification of domination. Critical theory for him therefore becomes a moment of class struggle. (Adorno 1986: ix.)

Adorno, then, addresses the questions loss of meaning in the modern society has raised. Adorno (1986: 35-36) writes that:

> Socially the feeling of meaninglessness is a reaction to the wide-reaching freeing from work which takes place under conditions of continuing social unfreedom. The free time of the subjects withholds from them the freedom which they secretly hope for; their free time chains them to the ever-same, the apparatus of production - even when this apparatus is giving them a vacation.

And he continues:

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17 An interesting point about Adorno’s dissatisfaction is the way in which he criticizes what Kierkegaard wrote about agape as a form of love that transcends all class boundaries. According to Adorno (1986: x-xii), Kierkegaard’s radical Christian inwardness evades the actuality of secular injustice and inequality in society. (See also Marila 2010.)
Adorno criticizes the goal existentialists set. What man already is becomes his goal. Adorno hopes for the disappearance of meaninglessness along with the disappearance of this kind on nonsense. (Adorno 1986: 37-38.)

An interesting question, then, is what kind of jargon of authenticity is used when discussing the relationship between scientific archaeology and popular archaeology. There seems to exist a particular jargon of authenticity in archaeology. On the one hand, archaeologists with strong faith in historical authenticity emphasize the meaning of restoration and conservation. For them, material cultural heritage is irreplaceable. Their jargon of authenticity rests on the same themes and notions as an existential philosophy does; uniqueness, authenticity, personhood, identity, original, etc. On the other hand, one can identify archaeologists like Cornelius Holtorf, whose view of the past is based on maxims of popular archaeology. The jargon of authenticity in contemporary popular archaeology (postprocessualism) often includes notions like the past as a renewable resource, multivocality (i.e. relativism), metaphor, individuality. Even though the former believe in a real past more often than the latter, there seems to exist one common theme in both discourses - the idea of individuality.

Bettina Arnold (2008) has proposed that a certain kind of jargon has been in use when the past has been used to legitimize political objectives. According to Arnold, professional archaeology rests on such vocabulary that easily obscures, rather than clarifies meaning. The study of prehistory is often vulnerable to such manipulation. It depends on minimum of data and maximum of interpretation. (Arnold 2008: 141.)

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18 An interesting point is provided by David Lowenthal (2008: 7). He sees the notion of authenticity in the age of cultural relativity to be a contradiction in terms. In this sense the notion of authenticity in postprocessual archaeology is very much part of a jargon.
Summary

In this chapter, I have discussed modernity and some of the implications of modern philosophy in archaeology. Modernity brought with it a sense of discontinuity and detachment from tradition, and other forms or sources of meaning had to be constructed. Among these are the existentialist notion of an authentic individual, a notion promoted by Heidegger in his early existentialist philosophy. Individuality has also been termed one of the malaises of modernity by Charles Taylor.

Also distinctive of modernity is the binary thinking that has its roots in the enlightenment philosophy of Descartes. Some of the most important binaries in archaeology and anthropology are the authentic versus inauthentic, social versus individual, and theory versus data.

Recently, however, another kind of ontology has emerged in archaeology. One that acknowledges the material as essentially inseparable from the immaterial. This so-called symmetrical archaeology is reluctant to make a distinction between mind and matter.

Another distinctively modern phenomenon is the tendency toward systematic thinking. This legacy can be seen to have characterized scientific archaeology throughout its history, from culture history to processualism and postprocessualism, which all rely on a notion of system or a systematic approach to studying the past.19

After this chapter on modern philosophy and the significance of modern thinking in archaeology, I will turn to presenting another philosophical outlook. One that has affected modern archaeology at least as much as modernity, namely postmodernism.

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19 Leo Klejn (1973: 695-696) has pointed that type, style, and archaeological culture in culture historical archaeology can be seen as early moves toward systems thinking in archaeology.
Authenticity and postmodernism

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I presented modernity as the philosophical grounds for modern archaeology and the notion of authenticity. There is undoubtedly much of the traits of modern thinking in the way authenticity has been conceived in archaeology. During the last 30 years or so, archaeology and the question of authenticity have been more affected by postmodernism. If modernity is a concept hard to outline, postmodernism is perhaps even harder. Matthew Johnson (1999: 162) calls it a ‘red herring’, which is probably what has happened to it. Postmodernism may not be very fashionable in current archaeology, but it has nevertheless had a profound influence in, or developed in the same social atmosphere with, postprocessual archaeology (Johnson 1999: 166). There is a clear connection to be seen between postmodernism and postprocessual archaeology.

Whereas there seems to exist a somewhat unified consensus of accepting modernity as a philosophical outlook and a social condition, some postmodern authors (most famously Michel Foucault) have rejected the postmodernist label that has been put on them, and postmodernism as a discourse or an era has been rejected in general. There exists no consensus of postmodernism.

While some authors remain skeptic, I acknowledge postmodernism as a set of certain isms and a continuity of certain modern philosophical traditions, namely relativism, nominalism, structuralism, and poststructuralism. The postmodern ‘era’, if one can speak of such, must also be seen as an important background for postprocessual archaeology, which adopted many instruments from poststructuralism in particular. There is therefore no question that postmodernism

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20 I call postmodernism an ism because it is more an attitude and a way of seeing things than it is a wide-reaching and long-lasting era or a social condition.
could not be seen as a certain philosophical outlook that has affected archaeology greatly, just like modernity has.

In this chapter, I will provide a brief introduction to postmodernism. I will also discuss some aspects of postmodernism which can be seen as the malaises of the postmodern, namely the poststructuralist text metaphor in material culture studies. Postmodernism can also be seen as a crisis of authenticity with its notions of constructivism and simulation.

**What is postmodernism**

Probably the most well known definition of postmodernism has been given by Jean-François Lyotard (1984: xxiv): postmodernism, for him, is ‘incredulity toward meta-narratives’. Meta-narrative, or grand narrative, for Lyotard includes the idea of one historical narrative, the all-explaining nature of natural sciences, and free will or any kind of progress of humankind, all beliefs characteristic of the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century (Johnson 1999: 162-163). According to Lyotard, postmodernism is not a new age but a rewriting of certain themes modernity pretended to have gained, the general emancipation of humankind in particular (Readings 1991: 53).

Postmodernity is therefore seen as the coming of age of humanity (Bauman 1996: 17). Robert Eaglestone (2001: 7 in Thomas 2004a: 50), among others, has proposed that the Holocaust was what ended modernity. The Holocaust was a disaster on such a grand scale that it awoke humanity to realize what the objectives modernity pursues (e.g. utopia, recall previous chapter on modernity) can produce. This brought modernity to a new era of postmodernism.

Zygmunt Bauman (1996) gives some examples of what postmodernism is in *Postmodernin lumo* (The enchantment of postmodern), a collection of his papers. According to Bauman, postmodernism is a state of mind of which a certain kind
of ‘destructivism’ is characteristic. Postmodernism aims to deconstruct and ridicule. It is a critical attitude, but in its criticism lies a paradox. Postmodernism has destroyed everything it is critical of. Therefore there is nothing to stand against to, and this has lead to the disappearance of critique. (Bauman 1996: 22.)

Bauman (1996: 21) also states that postmodernism is freedom to do whatever we want.21 This, and the incredulity toward meta-narratives, can be seen to have influenced postprocessual archaeology which has, in general, abandoned the possibility of finding out certainties about the one objective past. Postprocessualists have also started to stress the role of archaeology in popular culture. Since there exists no real past, everyone can know their own past. The postmodern invention of ‘little narratives’ (Readings 1991: 64) has reduced narrativity to the level of individuality instead of collectivity. This is most evident in recent postprocessual archaeology which has been called the archaeology of the individual (e.g. Johnson 1999: 104-105).

At the heart of postmodernism is the idea that meaning can only be seen as referentiality in one horizontal semiological system of references (remember the discussion of diachronism and synchronism in the prologue). Therefore all meaning is non-historical and all things are authentic as they only acquire meaning in relation to other things in the same synchronic system. This has lead to questions of simulation and hyperreal, also relevant questions when it comes to knowing and experiencing the past (see chapter III). To these themes I turn next.

Simulation and the hyperreal

Jean Baudrillard (1988: 166-184) has stated that the postmodern culture is dominated by simulation. Objects have no firm origin, no referent, no ground or foundation (Baudrillard 1988: 1). This aspect of postmodernism is a very modern phenomenon (remember the discussion of loss of meaning in the previous chapter.

21 A good example of this is the so-called ‘Sokal Affair’ (Sokal 2008).
on modernity). Postmodernism continues the modern condition in its search for the mechanisms, or structure, behind meaning-making practices.

Following the ethos of poststructuralism, and postmodernism in general, Baudrillard rejects traditional assumptions (historicity, I assume) about referentiality. According to him, the link between a concept and an object ‘is broken and restructured so that its force is directed, not to the referent of use value or utility, but to desire’. He argues that the meaning of things can only be reached by using a semiological model (more on semiology and semiotics further in this chapter, and in chapter IV). (Baudrillard 1988: 1-2.)

Baudrillard follows Lyotard's famous statement and rejects the possibility of a meta-narrative. He even goes as far as suggesting that the contemporary modern society is returning to a premodern organization (Vanhanen 2010: 130). This is due to human nature in which, according to Baudrillard, is to value modes of production which do not contribute to a utilitarian system of consumption and accumulation of wealth (Vanhanen 2010: 130), but to the organization of all this (Baudrillard 1988: 21-22). All objects of consumption are signs that are consumed for their difference, not their materiality. Only the idea is consumed. (Baudrillard 1988: 22, 24-25.)

An important aspect of Baudrillard’s philosophy, and all postmodernism, is the role of the individual in the consumption society. Baudrillard (1988: 52) states that, as a consumer, the individual has become necessary and even irreplaceable. Consumption, for Baudrillard (1988: 52-53), then, is social labour; an element of control by atomizing or necessitating individual consumers.

For Baudrillard, the end of modern consumption and modernity marks the beginning of the age of simulacra, characterized by a unique mode of ‘simulation’. What was once real, labour, production and use-value, has been

22 Is this why Shanks (e.g. Shanks 1992, 1995, 1998) keeps referring to the process of making the past through desire? More on this in chapter III.
abolished. Objects have become signs that refer to other signs in an infinite recession. Reality has become to emulate its simulations, as if everything has shifted to a meta-level of articulation, essentially putting an end to the distinction between real and simulation (Vanhanen 2010: 131.) Simulation, for Baudrillard, however, is more real than reality, it is hyperreal (Baudrillard 1987: 67; Vanhanen 2010: 131).

By postmodernism, we have arrived at the hyperreal state of affairs. Postmodernism is characterized by the end of production (but not consumption), the end of ideologies (a modern trait), and the end of critique. (Vanhanen 2010: 131-132.) For Baudrillard, Las Vegas and the Disneyland are what epitomize simulation. They are not artificial copies of the original since artificiality no longer exists. One can go to Luxor to see the Pyramids, or go to Las Vegas and do the same. There is no longer an essential distinction between the two. (Baudrillard 1988: 171-172; Vanhanen 2010: 132.)

The past in postprocessual archaeology has become an object of consumption and can be experienced as even more real than the real past which does not exist in the first place. The past, since it is simulation in the simulated present, can be reached and experienced in theme parks (Holtorf 2005, 2007, 2010a; Shepherd 2002: 185. See also chapter III in this thesis, especially Holtorf on time travel).

‘It is no longer a question of a false representation of reality (ideology), but of concealing the fact that the real is no longer real’. Disneyland is presented as imaginary so that that which remains outside can be made look real, when in fact what remains outside is hyperreal and simulation (Baudrillard 1988: 172), just as Disneyland itself.
Poststructuralism and the text metaphor

Poststructuralism is often seen as a postmodern outlook in literature studies. Whereas postmodernism strives to deconstruct, poststructuralism, however, aims to uphold an idea of a structure. Poststructuralism is therefore more a semiotic discourse based on the structuralist semiotics, or semiology, of Ferdinand de Saussure (1990). One example of a structuralist approach in archaeology is systems thinking; another is the tendency to assign agency to things and humans, as proposed by Anthony Giddens (e.g. 1987) and his successors. These are not postmodern approaches per se. In fact, examples of systems thinking can be seen throughout the history of archaeology. Structure therefore is not a postmodern notion but, in archaeology, should be seen to stem from Saussurean semiotics. There is, however, a distinct difference between structuralism and poststructuralism.23

One of the most influential concepts in poststructuralism is the treatment of material culture as text (e.g. Preucel and Mrozowski 2010: 15). This approach, I think, is also one of the malaises of postmodernism and poststructuralism, since it alienates us from the material world and reduces the material to the level of idea. The basic tenets of this kind of philosophy are that text can be read in different ways and text can mean different things to different people (Johnson 1999: 105). A text, then, can always be read differently in different contexts, just like in Holtorf’s (2010a: 37) reasoning authenticity can mean different things to different people according to the context of the observer (see chapter IV).24

23 Paul Ricoeur, whose philosophy has been called philosophical anthropology (Ricoeur 2000: 7), is one of the key figures in poststructuralism as he can be seen as one of the first philosophers (or anthropologists) to extend the concept of text to the study of material culture (Ricoeur 2000: 27-30). Preucel and Mrozowski (2010: 15) note that Ian Hodder (e.g. 1986) borrows his notion of material culture as text from Ricoeur.

24 Material culture as text and its implications has been widely discussed in archaeology and one may note that it is not of relevance in current archaeological theory. It is, however, an important topic and a background for what I propose further in this thesis, namely in chapter IV.
The wide-ranging poststructuralist notion of material culture as text has been immensely influential in archaeology (Hodder 1986: 34), but few have noticed the difficulties it arises. In order for the material culture assemblages to be studied as text, certain syntactical rules have to be found or presumed. The material culture has to be assumed to be constructed according to certain sequences or structures, or a syntax. Evidently the notion of material culture being structured by the same rules and sequences as linguistic (written or spoken) texts will not hold.

Ian Hodder (1986, 1989a) has, in true poststructuralist spirit, pointed out that material culture texts differ from language. According to Hodder (1989a: 260 in Preucel and Bauer 2001: 87) material culture texts are different from written text, in three aspects. In written texts, words are always largely arbitrary since they are written in specific social contexts. Hodder calls this the arbitrariness principle for the reason that spoken and written words are always more or less arbitrary in that they are used in relation to the user's context. The second is called the linearity principle for the reason that written texts are read in a linear fashion, while there is no certain sequence by which to read material surroundings. The third is called the sensory principle since written texts and spoken words are only read using two senses, sight and hearing, while reading of material culture texts involves smell, touch and taste as well. (Hodder 1986: 122-123; 1989a.)

That may very well be one of the reasons none of the semiological (structuralist) theories applied in material culture studies have been successful in explaining material culture meanings. The semiological theory of signs may be effective and even necessary when studying language (Hénault 2010: 106) or musical and visual signs, as has been noticed after some rereading of Saussure (Hénault 2010: 114). Hodder (1989a) thereby correctly identifies differences between material culture as text and written texts.

According to Preucel and Bauer (2001: 87), to Hodder and some other postprocessualists, it is the applicability of semiotics where the problem of the text metaphor lies. Bauer (2002: 39) and Preucel and Bauer (2001: 87), however, have
noticed that it is not that much the application of semiotics but that of the Saussurean *semiological* view of sign that is ‘outmoded’. They then go on to suggest the use of the Peircean model for the *semiotic* study of material culture. The pragmatistic approach, in their view, is especially suitable for the archaeological study of material culture.

Archaeology is interested in the long-term meanings of objects, and that is one of the central differences between material culture as text and linguistic texts. Written, as well as spoken texts are to a great extent material, and their full meaning extends beyond their semantic meanings\(^{25}\). Material objects, however, have a different kind of ability to transform or maintain their meanings over time (Preucel 2006: 84; Preucel and Bauer 2001: 87, 94). These are the main reasons why the semiological (Saussurean) theory of signs is not as suitable as the pragmatistic approach for material culture studies. Peirce’s theory of knowledge as historical should turn out to be particularly well suited for the semiotic study of material culture meanings and authenticity. To this I turn in chapter IV.

**Summary**

In this chapter, I have discussed postmodernity and its influence in postprocessual archaeology. I started by giving some definitions of what postmodernity is. After that I presented the concepts of hyperreal and simulation and discussed their role in postprocessual archaeology. Then I argued the problems of the once influential text metaphor in archaeology and the study of material culture. It is my view that the text metaphor can be seen as a malaise of the postmodern. It detaches the human from the material, a symptom that is frequent in postprocessual archaeology.

\(^{25}\) With this statement, I refer to the material traits of language, such as the material form in which text is produced on paper, but also to the material aspects of voice, and the more pragmatic aspects of language, such as metaphors which are often based on material attributes.
In the next chapter, the core of this thesis, I will discuss more explicitly the question of authenticity in archaeology. In the next chapter, there is, however, constant resonating to be seen with what I have already written here. After all, postprocessual archaeology has, in my view, been mostly influenced by postmodernism, philosophy, literary studies, linguistics, and semiotics. This very brief chapter on postmodernism therefore also serves as an introduction to the next chapter.
Introduction

In archaeology, authenticity has often been taken for granted. Still, it has been a subject of discussion ever since the 1980s when archaeologists became interested in alternative ways of experiencing the past. In the contemporary postprocessual, postmodern, popular archaeology only scientific archaeologists, who are more often than not preoccupied, and even obsessed, with measuring the past as accurately as possible, share a common crave for the authentic archaeology. Troy Lovata (2007: 21) points out, very astutely, that ‘not everyone even wants authentic archaeologies - whether scientific or not - and understand what this fact means for professionals who work in the public sphere’.

In this chapter, I will discuss the notion of authenticity in archaeology. I will mostly be discussing the treatment of the concept in postmodern postprocessual archaeology, but I will also present a genealogy of the postprocessual archaeology, starting from culture historical archaeology and processual archaeology.

An important notion to be kept in mind when reading this chapter is the distinction between postprocessual archaeology as popular ‘anything goes’ archaeology (Oestigaard 2004: 35) and postprocessual archaeology as scientific archaeology. While postprocessualists often emphasize the significance of alternative approaches to knowing the past, they welcome them as something to be taken seriously (Johnson 1999: 166-167). That is one of the postmodern traits of postprocessual archaeology; the disappearance of the limits between disciplines, and the disappearance of faith in knowing the one truth (Johnson 1999: 166), a meta-narrative, has lead the archaeologists to accept all understandings of the past as equally valid. Only in some extreme cases does this manifest in total relativism.
Even though, in this chapter, I approach the topic with an open mind, I maintain that archaeologists (yes, scientific archaeologists) still have the advantage in knowing the past most accurately (e.g. Dane and Pratt 2007). Not all forms of acquiring knowledge are equal (Preucel and Mrozowski 2010: 4).

**Experiencing the past - tourism, theatre, and time travel**

What Kristian Kristiansen (2008) was concerned about, has very much happened to archaeology and the cultural heritage (see for example Rowan and Baram 2004). It has been subjected to the open market forces - popular culture that is - and rendered a product. To know the past today is about experiencing and consuming the past in the present (Holtorf 2005: 127; Ikäheimo 2010: 19). That is why it is important to provide the reader with some insight to what it means for archaeologists to be dealing with a product of consumption.

I argue that people are experiencing the past in a way similar to that of a tourist’s experience of unfamiliar and exotic settings (Stronza 2001: 261; Shanks 1992: 58). There is always something very existential about the encounter between a tourist and an unknown and unordinary location. The same, then, can be applied to experiencing the past (Holtorf and Schadla-Hall 1999: 236; Lowenthal 1985). In a way the tourist is always confronted with a set of existential and transcendental signs, be they signs of a long lost culture or civilization, or a living culture very different from that of the tourist’s own background. Therefore theories of tourism and the tourist may prove very valuable and applicable when it comes to defining what kind of experiences people are looking for and what parts of their heritage they find valuable and meaningful.

Tourism, as well as authenticity, is widely acknowledged as a modern phenomenon (Culler 1990; Enzensberger 1996; Gemünden 1996; MacCannell
and theoretical discussion of the tourist and tourism probably started as early as in the 1950s. Even though the beginning of tourism can be dated back to ancient Greece and the beginning of the modern era (Adler 1989 in Chi 1997: 63), it was not until well after colonialist times and the WWII in the twentieth century that saw the beginning of mass tourism, which in turn sparked the theoretical considerations of tourism.

Hans Enzensberger’s (1996) *A theory of tourism*, first published in 1958, is probably one of the first attempts to theorize tourism as a modern phenomenon. In his article Enzensberger sees modern tourism still being motivated by romantic ideas of untouched (authentic) worlds. This ‘quest for authenticity’ (Baudrillard 2005: 81) then paradoxically falls in on itself since it becomes harnessed by the very same society that in all of its incoherency produced the need for authenticity in the first place. (Gemünden 1996: 113.)

If the modern world is incoherent and unorganized and therefore continually in search for authenticity and a kind of fulfillment, is it not because of the chaotic nature of the modern society that an idea of a stable, coherent and unified society is held? Is it somewhat an illusion that such an authentic past in the form of the rural and peasant society would ever have existed, and, furthermore, if authenticity is indeed an illusion, how come we usually accept that illusion with such happiness, joy, and content?

Dean MacCannell (1989) formulates his theory of modern tourism and approaches the question of authenticity in *The Tourist*. He uses the concept of staged authenticity to explain the tourist experience; people know what they are

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26 Although in the introduction to the 1989 edition, the introductory chapter of his 1989 reprint of *The Tourist*, MacCannell admits that the tourist and tourism is also a postmodern phenomenon, and all that has been written in the first edition still applies and is valid today. The Tourist was first published in 1976, and at that time postmodernism was not a well-established concept. The end of modernity, and in a way the advent of postmodernism (although Zygmunt Bauman (1996: 17) does not see the transition from modernity to postmodernity to be a form of liberation, but rather the modern becoming self-aware), is often thought to have happened right after the Holocaust (Eaglestone 2001: 7 in Thomas 2004a: 50). If the beginnings of modern tourism are said to date to the postwar period after the WWII, then it is a truly postmodern phenomenon.
experiencing is not real and authentic but feel content with it anyway. According to MacCannell (2008: 334) staged authenticity is authenticity's negation, an attempt to move beyond the front-back binary made famous by Erving Goffman (1959), very much similar to what Edward Bruner (2005: 5), also hoping to transcend such binaries as real versus show, authentic versus inauthentic and front versus back, wrote in Culture on tour.27

To Goffman (1959), all social action is play, and he uses theater as an analogy when he explains how people will alter their social roles according to their position (front or back) on the stage. The idea of people necessarily withholding some aspects of their personality will ultimately lead to a position where the tourist is always confronted with a staged play, never allowed backstage to experience authenticity.

The theatre analogy has also been used in archaeology. In Excavation as theatre, Christopher Tilley (1989) proposes that too much emphasis has been placed upon the acquirement of archaeological material in excavations. There is, more importantly, a need for reporting the findings in a fashion that is more accessible to the wider audience. The reason archaeologists are only able to produce a very one-dimensional picture of the past is due to the fact that the past is being produced material through excavations. According to Tilley (1989: 278) ‘[t]he excavation is only partly to do with the effective (obtaining information) but owes much more to the affective - socially mediated responses to the traces of the past’. In a way archaeologists decide what interpretation of the past is presented to the public, i.e. how the past should be experienced. Because the interpretation of the material mostly happens after the excavations, archaeologists should be more concerned with interpretation in relation to an audience for whom both excavations and site reports are produced matter (Tilley 1989: 278-280). Excavations are therefore a form of theater in which neither the archaeologists nor the audience have much power over the produced perception of the past.

27 Bruner (2005: 5) rejects such postmodern concepts as simulacra. According to him, there is no simulacra in tourism because there is no original.
In *Theatre/Archaeology* Mike Pearson and Michael Shanks (2001) provide an extensive study of the theatre analogy in archaeology. Experiencing the past is also about a performative model of the construction of archaeological knowledge; the past is not discovered (even though that is one potent metaphor) but produced in a process of ‘recontextualisation’ (Pearson and Shanks 2001: 10-11).

In his recent article, Holtorf (2010a) discusses the possibility of time travel and its significance to experiencing the past. Holtorf proposes that the possibility of time travel is solely dependent on the definition of the present, the past, and the future. He acknowledges the absurdity of traveling back and forth along the linear timeline, but he does not see time travel to be only a metaphor or simply imaginative. In his definition, the past and the future are not physical realities to which one can travel. The present, however, is a reality definable as the sum of all human experiences and social practices. Therefore reality is virtual and all time travel possible. (Holtorf 2010a).

Time travel is not only an important factor in experiencing pastness (and futureness), but also crucial to the way people relate to the past in general (Holtorf 2010a: 37). Because the past is readily available to all people, it should also be of interest to the professionals to value heritage and past material culture because of their potential to evoke the feeling of pastness (Holtorf 2010a: 37), not only for their scientific value or historical authenticity.

Time travel, theatre, and tourism are of great relevance to experiencing the past. They are very well worthy of study when addressing the question of authenticity in archaeology. Staged authenticity, front and back, and theatre are valid analogies when it comes to experiencing the authenticity of heritage sites and artifacts, since they issue the question of how accurately and authentically the past can in fact be reached.
After this chapter on experiencing the past, I will turn to introducing a more explicit example of experiencing the pastness of things, namely aura, and address the question of the reproducible nature of the past and what questions that can raise in archaeology.

Reproducing the past - pastness and aura

Since modern times, there has always been a need for authenticity. Richard Handler (1986: 2) writes that authenticity is a social construct of the modern Western world, mainly a product of the individualist attitude and the essentialist ontology. There is a need for real and genuine (Handler 1986: 2). In order for something to be or become genuine it first needs to be reproduced. What is it, then, that distinguishes the original from a reproduction (also recall my dealing of this question in the chapter on postmodernism)?

Walter Benjamin (2008) addressed this question in his essay *The work of art in the age of its technical reproducibility*. According to Benjamin, what distinguishes an authentic artifact from a reproduction is its *aura*, a certain authoritative element that is obtained by identifying with a unique place and time. What is compromised or eliminated in reproducing authentic objects is aura. Reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition. For Benjamin, aura is the perceived history of an object. (Benjamin 2008: 22-24.) The ability to instantaneously reproduce an object denies the reproduction a historicity, an issue also of relevance when, for example, defining whether, and in which cases, the contemporary built environment is worth protecting.

For Benjamin, mechanical reproduction is benign and inevitable. It, for example, underlines the question of assessing the artistic value of painting in contrast to photography - whether photography is art or not (Benjamin 2008: 28-29). Benjamin (2008: 35) compares painters and cameramen (photography and film) to magicians and surgeons. The magician heals a person with his or her touch,
whereas the surgeon penetrates the human body and uses invasive methods to heal his or her patient (Benjamin 2008: 35). This suggests a somewhat unnatural disposition for the cameramen. The painter on the other hand is much more authentic and sincere in his or her reproduction of reality. The painter maintains a distance to nature (reality), while the cinematographer penetrates it (Benjamin 2008: 35). The cameraman’s method, surprisingly, will provide a more accurate account of reality:

The images obtained by each differ enormously. The painter’s is a total image, whereas that of the cinematographer is piecemeal, its manifold parts being assembled according to a new law. Hence, the presentation of reality in film is incomparably the more significant for people of today, since it provides the equipment-free aspect of reality they are entitled to demand from a work of art, and does so on the basis of the most intensive interpenetration of reality with equipment. (Benjamin 2008: 35.)

When it comes to photography, Benjamin’s essay may be a bit outdated. The same analogy could, however, be used in archaeology when comparing the realist and constructivist positions. Cornelius Holtorf’s (the constructionist surgeon) idea of the past and cultural heritage as renewable and dynamic differs from that of Kristian Kristiansen (the realist magician), who maintains that the material past is finite and needs to be protected (against surgeons). It is therefore ironic that surgeons like Holtorf are able to deliver a more detailed and less detached image of the reality of the past, since that picture is less dependent on mechanical equipment and allows for a wider variety of interpretations of the past.

The interesting question concerning the possibility of an authentic past, now, is whether archaeological material is renewable or not. The reproducible nature of cultural heritage would undoubtedly lead to a number of questions concerning the authenticity of this material. Holtorf and Schadla-Hall (1999: 299) write that the past is partly and potentially renewable, whereas Holtorf (Holtorf 2005: 132;
Holtorf and Piccini 2009: 14) later writes that the past is a truly renewable resource, and, moreover, the past only exists in the present. If the past is a renewable resource, everything is in a way necessarily authentic, since there is no way to make inauthentic copies of authentic artifacts for example. When an artifact is copied or reproduced, one is left with an authentic copy.28

With his statements regarding the authentic experience of a reproduction Cornelius Holtorf follows Michael Shanks, one of the postprocessualists who has written extensively on experiencing the past, and authenticity as well (Pearson and Shanks 2001; Shanks 1992, 1995, 1998). Shanks (1998: 19-20) refers to Walter Benjamin (2008). Aura is what creates the feeling of otherness and distance, no matter how close the object having it may be. Both Shanks (1998: 20) and Holtorf (2005: 127) maintain that aura is not something that is brought to the object but something that is made. In their view authenticity is created through desire, a desire for things that are dead and do not change or go wrong (Holtorf 2005: 121; Pearson and Shanks 2001: 114-115; Shanks 1992, 1995: 20, 1998: 19).29

People’s perception of authenticity affect how artifacts and heritage sites are valued. One of Holtorf’s (2005: 133) points is that archaeological material is valued because it is protected, not because it is valuable. This material is, of course, not valuable because it is irreplaceable. The reproducible nature of archaeological material will not only lead to a situation where the authenticity of the past is compromised whenever reproducing it, but also to a situation where much of the past operates at the level of metaphor. This is one of the reasons for archaeology’s great power also according to Holtorf (2005, 2007). The past is being remade in every present, often through metaphorical means (Holtorf 2005: 159). These metaphors can be material (in which cases the understanding of past meanings can be based on material of functional similitude, like the functional

28 Gilles Deleuze (1968: 355 in Frow 1991: 126-127), on the other hand, wrote that there is no authentic object since the original is already a copy.

29 This is already one argument against the contextual nature of authenticity and supports my view of authenticity as conventional. The next chapter, Making the past - context and convention, is a demonstration of how the past can be produced and rendered authentic based on conventions.
connection between a clay vessel and the human body’s ability to store liquids), or more abstract and literal, in which case they deal more with the meanings of archaeology rather than the meanings of past material culture.  

Both Shanks (1992) and Holtorf (2005, 2007) give multiple examples on how the act of doing archaeology, and therefore the past, can be experienced in metaphorical terms. They include such notions as detective (clues, puzzle, mystery), the law court (rules, logic, reason), adventure (exotic places, danger, romance), tourism (escapism), discovery, and excavation (finding, roots, truth, layers, Freud’s psychoanalysis as excavation, striptease).

In *Theatre/archaeology*, Pearson and Shanks (2001: 10) write that experiencing the past is about how fragments are left behind and pieced together. This is one reason metaphors such as detective work are so potent when it comes to experiencing the past.

Is it then perhaps due to the metaphorical nature of archaeology that authenticity remains such an ambiguous term? It is hard to see in which respect the past really exists and to what extent it is metaphorical and therefore an inseparable part of the present. In the next chapter, I will discuss the process of making the past in the present through subjecting it to varying contexts and conventions.

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30 For a concise account of material metaphor in archaeology, see Tilley 1999, and chapter IV in this thesis.
Making the past - context and convention

Instead of concentrating on the technical aspects of the meaning of context in archaeological fieldwork and archaeological finds, in this chapter, I will set out to explore how contextuality has been approached in postprocessual archaeology regarding the context of the individual doing the research, and the researcher’s interpretation of the past material culture, and therefore the contextual nature of meanings of material culture.

Ian Hodder (1986, 1987) was among the first ones to call his archaeology contextual. The so-called postprocessual archaeology that Hodder, among others, endorsed was born as a critique to the processual archaeology that was dominated by objectives and logic and the positivist attitude of the natural sciences, influential in archaeology since the 1950s. Central to the postprocessual archaeology of the 1980s was the idea that all knowledge of the past is constructed in a modern context, and therefore no picture of a real past can be reconstructed.

At the heart of postprocessual archaeology was, and still is, hermeneutics. A school of understanding two colliding horizons, that of the past context and that of the present context. Johnsen and Olsen (1992: 420) propose that Hodder’s contextual archaeology operates on these two particular levels; the context where the archaeological material was originally produced, and the context where this material is brought into study. Since Hodder thinks archaeology’s main task is the recovery of past meanings, he has been stressing the critical approach to the treatment of archaeological material in order to avoid ‘intellectual colonialism’ (Hodder 1986: 106; Johnsen and Olsen 1992: 426).

31 Johnsen and Olsen (1992) give a detailed description of this.

32 In fact, archaeology has been driven by positivist notions of science since the birth of modern archaeology during the 1800s. With 1950s I refer to the emergence of radio carbon dating which tremendously strengthened the importance of natural scientific methods, and physics in general, in archaeology (e.g. Watson 1992).
This dichotomizing of context may sound somewhat inconsistent with the manifesto of hermeneutics in general, but once one realizes that Hodder (1986: 94) draws his idea of reliving the past (by the process of question and answer) from R. G. Collingwood (1946: 218), his approach is well justified. With the notion of trying to understand the past author (the maker of an ancient artifact in this case) Hodder follows a certain kind of idealism, just like Collingwood’s philosophy of history does. In stressing the importance of critical interpretation, however, Hodder’s approach is in total congruence with the ideals of hermeneutics, even though Hodder’s early contextual archaeology ultimately is closer to idealism than hermeneutics.

I have given the previous as an indication of what context was originally taken to mean in archaeology since the 1980s. Hodder’s (1986, 1987) treatment of the notion has greatly influenced archaeology ever since, and it is worth noticing that the interpretive archaeology that has its roots in early hermeneutic postprocessual archaeology thrives today. A great example of that is the way authenticity has been dealt with since the 1990s. Since other interpretations of the past were accepted and considered valid since the 1980s, the past was made more readily available to the wider audience, and furthermore, the ways groups other than scientific archaeology dealt with the past were embraced rather than rejected by archaeologists. Archaeology has since become a very important theme in popular culture for instance.

In archaeology, authenticity’s ambiguous nature has often been explained by referring to its contextual nature. The idea of contextual authenticity is a natural continuation of hermeneutics and contextual interpretive archaeology (postprocessual archaeology). Cornelius Holtorf, a die-hard postprocessualist and constructivist, sees authenticity in particular to be a highly contextual attribute that varies when an artifact or a heritage site is brought into a different context (Holtorf 2005: 117-118; Holtorf and Schadla-Hall 1999: 230). Holtorf and Schadla-Hall (1999: 229) write that less emphasis should be placed on the importance of the actual age and thus the genuineness of artifacts. Holtorf (2005:
115) states, however, (as I already stated above) that ‘[d]espite the theoretical
difficulties in defining it, authenticity is arguably the single most important
property of archaeological finds and exhibits’. According to Holtorf and Schadla-
Hall (1999: 229), the public as consumers of the past has lately accepted a more
relaxed attitude toward authenticity.

Holtorf (2005: 127) writes that authenticity is not a natural property of an artifact
but the experience of their authenticity is dictated by present contexts. He notes
that artifacts and heritage sites are material but their materiality (and therefore
authenticity, I assume) is result of the relationship between people and things
(Holtorf 2005: 127-129). All of Holtorf’s reasoning can be seen to stem from the
idea that the past is a social construction that has relevance only in the present.
Since I hold a materialist position, stating that there is no clear distinction between
material and immaterial33, Holtorf’s statement sounds very materialist and
relationalist (not relativist) to me. Materiality is indeed social mediation (see
chapter IV) and therefore an important element when it comes to experiencing
and consuming the past. Contrary to the idea of heritage as inherently intangible
and the experiencing of the past being based on experiencing values and symbolic
meanings (Smith 2006: 56), I believe it to be impossible to reduce material
meanings to the level of simple ideas or social constructions.

The idea of material objects as separate from human beings as subjects is a
characteristically modern way of thinking (e.g. Thomas 2004a: 202). One man has
been held responsible for this kind of distinction, namely René Descartes34. In
addition to Descartes’ rationalism, Newton’s mechanistic worldview and Kant’s
idea of synthetic a priori knowledge should be mentioned and seen as belonging
to the same line of thought. A positivist and naturalist scientific ideal has until very

33 What ultimately exists is the mind. ‘Matter is effete mind’ (EP1: 293).

34 It must be noted that Descartes alone can not be held responsible for producing such
distinctions, and even though in Meditations on first philosophy (Descartes 2002) he does write about
the real distinction between mind and body and them being separate, he acknowledges one can not
survive without the other. Descartes’ work is more about the relationship between mind and body
rather than on their being separate.
recently dominated the conduct of archaeological inquiry and created an illusion of the natural sciences as the only pertinent and *de facto* scientific method. Only recently a new culture has arisen in archaeology; one that acknowledges the world as a system where objects are not characterized by their inherent attributes or qualities but by their relations to each other. This relationalist view has not been widely acknowledged, since the essentialist ontology persists in archaeology.

As I mentioned earlier, one way to reach the past is by metaphor. Metaphor is a way to link the contemporary meanings with those of the past (e.g. Moreland 2010: 37-74). When based solely on metaphor, however, the real past may remain somewhat distant. That is why I believe in two kinds of authenticity. That of the metaphorical kind (the past being made), and that of historical kind (the real past as it is recorded into the material realm as everything that ever existed).

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35 Postprocessual archaeologies emphasize the role of the individual above all and it (as an aggregate of archaeologies) became the archaeology of the individual level where the material culture is only used as an instrument rather than being studied as an essential element of social mediation. Postprocessual archaeology is a truly postmodern phenomenon as it emphasizes the subjective nature of knowing the truth about the past. That is one reason material culture was left out of the account and not given enough consideration. Postprocessual archaeology takes the notion of the past being only a part of the present too literally. According to this *maxim* of postprocessual archaeology past meanings can never be reached, and since no *real past* exists, the material culture should not be studied with the motive of finding objective meanings.

Today there is a new field of archaeology emerging, called symmetrical archaeology (e.g. Olsen 2003: 80), which can be seen as a pragmatistic archaeology where the material is again taken into account and the emphasis of study is not that much on the human but equally on both. The human is an integral part of its surroundings and should be treated as such when studying it. In his book *Archaeological semiotics*, Robert Preucel (2006: 14) notes that '[o]ne of the most exciting developments in contemporary anthropology is the revival of interest in material culture studies'. Material culture, including the archaeological record, has to regain its reputation as an active participator in the everyday life. For more on symmetrical archaeology see Olsen 2007 and Shanks 2007.

36 Is it then the context or perhaps our relation to objects that makes them authentic? The idea of an authentic self, being true to one’s self, can be applied in this relationalist ontology. During the recent two decades or so, much emphasis in archaeology has been placed on understanding objects of material culture as persons. In this case the idea of objects as persons is not a metaphor but an ontology, a way to characterize the nature of the world’s actual constituents. If it is possible to remain authentic as a person, it should be possible to identify objects as authentic persons. ‘If objects and people are to be held in symmetry, what is an artifact?’ (Shanks 1998: 23). Thomas Yarrow (2003: 68-71) has noted that excavation is transformative of both artifacts and people. The objects are made artifacts in the process of their finding, while the objects simultaneously make the people who found them into archaeologists.

For more on relationalism in anthropology and archaeology, see also the works of Tim Ingold (e.g. Ingold 2006, 2010).

37 Steen Larsen (1987: 197) writes that ‘*metaphors are not theories; they should not be expected to fit in every respect. The job of a metaphor is to highlight features that are important in a given context of use.*'
I now declare the discussion of historical authenticity settled (but only to return to it in chapter IV) and concentrate on what I have referred to as metaphorical authenticity (making and experiencing the past in the present). I argue that certain (if not all) metaphors are understood by literal conventions and affected by language change (Svanlund 2007: 85). Therefore changing conventions also affect the way the past is perceived by metaphor.

A case in point against the construction of the past based on systematic (contextual and fixed) metaphorical meanings would be Ernie Lepore’s and Matthew Stone’s (2010) view against metaphorical meaning in language. Josef Stern (2000: 9-10) proposed that the understanding of a metaphor requires a knowledge of a certain context and thus of the salient elements of the metaphor to understand its meaning, whereas Lepore and Stone (2010: 170, 179), however, propose that the understanding of a metaphor is based on understanding conventional literal meanings, rather than the peculiar process of metaphor meaning transference in relation to the context of the utterer or interlocutor.38

Holtorf (2005: 119-121) states that objects are not old or authentic as such, but are made authentic ‘through particular, contextual conditions and processes taking place in the present’.39 One frustrating point about Holtorf’s reasoning is that he never mentions the word convention in relation to his point about authenticity as contextual - a problem he should have issued!

The one time Holtorf (2005: 117) uses the word is in reference to Thomas Yarrow (2003: 68) when he writes that genuineness of an object is created in social circumstances, such as conversations, i.e. corresponding to current conventions (!). Holtorf and Schadla-Hall (1999: 243) propose that aura and authenticity are

38 Hintikka and Sandu (1994: 153) propose that the understanding of a metaphor is based on possible-worlds semantics. In order for a metaphor to be understood, ‘we need to understand its extensions under many kinds of circumstances besides the actual one’ (Pietarinen 2008: 318). That is what experiencing the past is about. Constructing possible worlds.

39 A case of possible-worlds semantics.
context-dependent, negotiated, and perhaps even decided upon, but they do not refer to the conventional nature of perceived authenticity. Holtorf’s (2010a: 37) statement ‘Authenticity is in the eye of the beholder’ could be seen as a reference to convention in this sense, but he does not explicate it in any way.

This could go to show that context and convention are hard to separate, which they often are (Oestigaard 2004: 35). There are, however, situations where the context (as a set of salient elements) is shared and the experience of authenticity is very different between two or more individuals.

One such situation would be an archaeological excavation. The professional archaeologists conducting the excavation have seen thousands of authentic archaeological artifacts and have very different standards when it comes to experiencing their authenticity or aura. Students of archaeology enter the business with a desire for authenticity, desire in the sense Shanks (1992, 1995, 1998) has written about it. This desire is quickly replaced by professional and analytic attitude toward the archaeological material. The students conform to certain rules of the game (Lewis 1986: 107-118). Some, or perhaps most, of this conformation is done through imitating the more experienced archaeologists who have learned the rules of conduct from their teachers (Lewis 1986: 118-121). In this sense the conventions of perceiving the authenticity of artifacts are based on power of authority, as well as desire.

When non-archaeologists enter the site, they may marvel even the most abundant and everyday material that is being dug up. Optionally the audience may have a taste for more dramatic finds, in which case their attitude toward archaeologists may be disapproving when they are unable to satisfy the audience’s desire for grand finds. They, however, may experience authenticity in a totally different way. They conform to the particular conventions of a visitor on an archaeological excavation site and are often expected to stand in awe. This is, of course, unless they are hoping to become professional archaeologists, in which case they conform
to the conventions of the archaeologists and agree with them in that this and that material is pretty everyday and not that big of a deal.

The previous chapter serves as a good example of a situation where the authenticity (aura, distance, pastness) of an object is perceived in many different ways in one context. Holtorf and Schadla-Hall (1999; see also Holtorf 2005) are correct in their notion of objects being made authentic. The process, however, is different from what they propose. The context of an object does not make it authentic, but the conventions different groups of people have agreed, or rather conformed, to act according to. A culture seeking authenticity generates its own conventions and generalities, commonplaces, and maxims (Trilling 1972: 105).

**Summary**

In this chapter, I have approached the question of authenticity in archaeology. I started out by presenting some of the key concepts through which the question of authenticity has been approached in modern archaeology and which I take to be important, but I also wrote about what authenticity has traditionally meant in archaeology. Basically it comes down to two competing ontologies, and therefore two opposite attitudes toward knowing the past; the realist and the constructivist. In archaeology these are referred to as processual archaeology and postprocessual archaeology.

I follow the popular trend in archaeology by making the distinction between historical authenticity (identifying artifacts with a particular time and place), and metaphorical authenticity, which deals more with experiencing the past and doing archaeology in the present and the magic they convey. I argued that experiencing the past can be understood by such metaphors as tourism, theatre, and time travel. Of these time travel is a notion worthy of more study, and it has not been widely discussed in archaeology.
After the chapter on experiencing the past, I turned to discussing the process of experiencing the pastness of things, namely aura, and how the pastness of reproductions can be experienced. Again, I propose that certain historically ‘authentic’ artifacts are more often than not of more value to professional archaeologists than the wider public, while ‘fake’ artifacts can deliver similar experiences of authenticity. This is due to the metaphorical meanings the experiencing of the past and archaeology are based on. These metaphors deal more with the process of doing archaeology than they do with producing objective knowledge of the past.

I argued that the past is constantly being made and therefore rather than irreplaceable, cultural heritage is reproducible. This leads to questions concerning the value of archaeological material. Again, maintaining that historical and metaphorical authenticity do not exclude each other’s importance and relevance for experiencing the past, or knowing more about the past for that matter, I turned to presenting my own idea of the processes behind the production of authenticity.

Diverging from the common view in archaeology, I propose, drawing my inspiration from philosophy of language, that rather than context, conventions are what govern the authentic experience of the past. I began the chapter with an introduction to contextuality and hermeneutics in archaeology and then explained what I mean with conventionality. I presented an example of a situation where the authenticity of an artifact can be experienced differently in one context by persons conforming to alternate conventions or habits of acting. The habits action is based on may be very much tied to long-term history, or they can be more conventional and based on individual intentions and authoritative power.

The authenticity of artifacts and monumental sites, authentic and fake, is based on the production of an authentic past; a process in which both professional archaeologists and popular culture have an important role. The production of an authentic past can be done by gathering archaeological material on excavations by professional archaeologists, or in popular culture by the way archaeology and the
past are presented and dealt with in movies, literature, games, architecture, and art. Authenticity is therefore always a material product deeply rooted in the material objects of the past, as well as a conventional social and ideological construct open to constant recontextualisation.
IV

AUTHENTICITY AS SEMIOSIS

Authenticity as material meanings, materiality, and semiosis

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I argued that authenticity is not a contextual attribute, but a convention, a habit of acting. There is a basis for that action in the material world (Danesi 1996: 37). That action is not only based on constant social recontextualisation but has its roots in the material world as a sign system that sits ready for us to study and interpret. It is a web of signs and references (Olsen 2010: 155). It is a meaning-making practice (the process of assigning meaning to things via interpreting them as signs of something and creating new signs, thus creating semiosis) based on objects in the real world, the sign for which they stand for, and the interpretation made from those signs.

In this chapter, I will present a theory of sign by Charles Peirce. I argue that authenticity is synonymous to meaning. Meaning in turn is the total sum of all uses and interpretations of a sign. The whole meaning of an object, and therefore its authenticity, can be understood by studying an object as a sum of its meanings. An object therefore can have various meanings in the present, just like Cornelius Holtorf (e.g. 2005) has argued. The observation, that the past only exists in the present, is based on the fact that the whole meaning of an object is in the way it is used in the present. That meaning, however, is affected by the past meanings and uses of the object, as well as the possible future meanings and uses of it. These possible meanings are constructed by knowing the past and present meanings of an object. Archaeology is about studying the past meanings of an object, its
historicity in the present. That chain of meanings and references, and knowledge in and of it, I call semiosis\textsuperscript{40}. Authenticity to me therefore is material semiosis\textsuperscript{41}.

In my view the two lines of thought in the so-called postprocessual archaeology are the structuralist view of signification, and the pragmatistic take on the meanings of things\textsuperscript{42}. Therefore, in this chapter, I will explain why and how semiotics got introduced into archaeology, how the two main scientific discourses in humanities, the structuralist and the pragmatist, differ from each other and how semiotics can be applied in order to provide a systematic approach to the study of authenticity. I will present and apply the Peircean theory of sign and show how authenticity is, in effect, produced as a byproduct in the process of assigning meaning to material objects as signs of the past. In addition to using the Peircean sign theory, I argue that the study of material metaphor is needed.

\textsuperscript{40} See also for example Winchkl 1996: 356.

\textsuperscript{41} Edwina Taborsky (1998: 3) gives the following interesting, however extensive, definition for semiosis: \textquote{All life is organized energy. That includes not simply atoms and molecules - the merest specks of matter before us - but also all the more complex forms of energy, such as plants and animals, human beings and their societies. Energy is the basis of all life, energy is the power to make work, it is the power to \textquote{make something}. There is only one things that energy desires, and that is to exist, in any form whatsoever. In order to exist, energy must be organized into a \textquote{packet} of finite energy; it must be a sign. Signs are spatiotemporally closed codifications of energy; any and all existential realities are signs - a molecule, a proton, a bird, a human being, a word, a thought, a gesture, a society. Semiosis is not \textquote{words about reality}, but \textquote{reality itself}; and takes place within architectures, which are organized regimes of knowledge.}'

\textsuperscript{42} According to Robert Preucel (2006: 6), modern semiotics is characterized by two distinct trajectories, Saussurean linguistics and the philosophical pragmatism of Charles Peirce. I share his view completely. The reason this very same distinction can be made in archaeology is due to the dramatic rise in the use of linguistic theories that happened in humanities, and archaeology, in the 1970s and 1980s due to the works of such scholars as Claude Lévi-Strauss and Roland Barthes (Preucel and Mrozovski 2010: 21). This shift in humanities is often referred to as the linguistic turn. Pragmatism, or the use of Peircean semiotics to be more precise, on the other hand, came into picture a little later after much of Charles Peirce\textquoteright s texts became widely available toward the end of the 1990s. During his life, Peirce only published short articles and the vast majority of his texts (comprising over 100,000 pages) remain unpublished even today (De Waal 2001: 3).
Semiotics of authenticity

The concept of authenticity, I argue, is very closely related to the semiotic treatment of material culture, and, despite the difficulties a semiotic archaeology has faced, I think a semiotic model can be used to explain what authenticity is and how it manifests in material culture (and archaeology).

The reason authenticity remains a ‘red herring’ (Bruner 2005: 5) is the lack of systematic approach to the topic. One such attempt has been the application of Saussurean structuralist or poststructuralist semiotics of which one can find multiple examples throughout the recent history of archaeology (e.g. Bapty and Yates 1990, Hodder 1986, Shanks 1992, Shanks and Tilley 1987, Tilley 1990, 1991). The Saussurean binary model of the sign as composed of the signifier and the signified will lead to a very fixed and static view of the material realm (Preucel and Bauer 2001: 86; Waal 2001: 70). I will return to and explain this model further in the text.

The reason Saussurean linguistics became very influential in archaeology (in forms of structuralism and poststructuralism) is linked to the fact that in his linguistics, Saussure, for the first time, set out to construct a scientific and systematic approach to language, and all of human thought for that matter (Hénault 2010: 101). This idea of a scientific and systematic conduct is in concurrence with the natural scientific approach to studying the past and knowing something certain about a

43 The Swedish archaeologist Johan Normark, has noted that the treatment of material culture as signs (semiotic archaeology) is part of postprocessual archaeology. This may be the case with most semiotic archaeologies, and very true since archaeology can still be seen mainly to be postprocessual. In fact, most of the Finnish archaeology is still culture history or processual archaeology. Normark’s attempt, however, is to move beyond postprocessual archaeology. Normark calls his archaeology neomaterialist, or posthumanocentric, object oriented archaeology (Normark 2010). He sets out to discard the concept of culture altogether! (See also Immonen 2010: 80-82.)
real past. The need for an applicable scientific model in humanities is linked to the ideal of natural sciences as the science.\footnote{Archaeology uses a lot of the methods of natural sciences but is not itself a natural science \textit{per se}. The structuralist aspirations to find out universal laws governing language and therefore all human understanding was a notion fit for the science driven processual archaeology. The notions of ‘science’ (as natural sciences) and ‘law’ were tried to fit into archaeology as part of the processual discourse, unfortunately with little or no success. It did not take long for archaeologists to realize that no such laws can be found to accord with human behavior (Olsen 2007: 582). The structuralist notion of a system, according to which social changes happen, took a dead end (Preucel and Bauer 2001: 87).}

A refreshing alternative has been offered by some archaeologists (e.g. Bauer 2002; Lele 2006; Liebmann et al. 2005; Preucel 2006; Preucel and Bauer 2001). Preucel and Bauer (2001: 87) have noted that the Saussurean view of sign is ‘outmoded’. They suggest the use of a Peircean model for the semiotic study of material culture. Peircean pragmatism, as opposed to Saussurean structuralism, in their view, is especially suitable for the archaeological study of material culture. In fact, Preucel (2006) bases his archaeology (or anthropology) solely on Peircean semiotics and pragmatism.

Archaeology, as I already stated above, is interested in the long-term meanings of objects (Hodder 1986: 80; Preucel and Bauer 2001: 94). Long-term meaning, in

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\footnote{Postprocessual archaeology has been called a relativist science where ‘anything goes’ (Oestigaard 2004: 35), and is atheoretical. Robert Dunnell (1992) identifies two reasons for archaeology's failure in becoming scientific: (i) taking physics as a model for science (processual archaeology), and (ii) common sense (already, according to Dunnell, seen in processual archaeology but particularly so in postprocessual archaeologies). According to Dunnell, the postprocessual era can be seen as somewhat atheoretical. There has been a 150 year long quest for a scientific method in archaeology, but what scientific means has not been defined accurately enough. According to Dunnell, using common sense does not advance archaeology as a science. Archaeology needs a theory of its own, that is at the moment missing. Dunnell, however, believes such theory can be found or constructed. To him a scientific archaeology would be a falsificative archaeology. The power of such science lies precisely in the theory's ability to become falsified. Dunnell labels cultural evolution and constructivism as particularly common-sensist, that are based on too big hypotheses that are too hard to falsify. On the other hand, they are based on a view of culture that is tied to the researcher’s own culture. Physics can not be taken as the ideal science since archaeology is history, not natural science. (Dunnell 75-89.)

With his notion of archaeology as atheoretical Dunnell, I think, is on the right track. Postprocessual archaeology can be seen as the relativist archaeology where anything goes. The failure in finding universal laws resulted in an emergence of a bundle of archaeologies in the 80's. In a way archaeology went from one extreme to another, but to call these archaeologies categorically atheoretical is somewhat misleading. Charles Peirce called his pragmatism \textit{(or pragmaticism) and scientific inquiry} \textit{critical common-sensism}. Dunnell is comfortable calling archaeology atheoretical and referring to common sense as one of the reasons for archaeology’s failure in becoming scientific. I, however, think that it is the Peircean notion of ‘common sense’ that holds in it the very possibility of a scientific archaeology.}
my view, is one of the key factors in explaining authenticity. The long-term meanings in turn can be studied by using a sign theory by Charles Peirce.

Peirce’s model of sign as a tripartite structure, as opposed to the Saussurean binary model, is a dynamic model that takes the human into account more effectively. The reason the Peircean model seems more applicable to me is not, however, some malign simplicity of the Saussurean method. To say that the structural model of sign does not provide a sufficient model for studying material culture would be simplifying the Saussurean school. That is not the case nor my objective. There is a more profound reason for the differences between these two schools. That is the degree in which thought and language are seen to be interconnected. In the Saussurean tradition, all human thought is taken to revolve around language. That means there is no way to think outside of language. People are prisoners of language so to speak. In the pragmatist tradition, however, language is seen as secondary to thought.

These two views of the relationship between thought and language are the fundamental difference between the structuralist and the pragmatist outlooks. The Saussurean theory of sign was designed, since language was thought to govern all thought, to apply to language, whereas Peirce maintains that material objects (including written texts) can be experienced outside and independent of language; thinking can be diagrammatic or otherwise based on images (Short 2007: 4). In fact, Peirce goes as far as stating that everything, from feelings to persons and ultimately the whole universe, is a sign (e.g. Waal 2001: 70). This could be seen as one of the downsides of the Peircean theory of sign. It explains too much, ultimately ending up explaining nothing. (Susan Haack, personal communiqué 10.9.2010.)
Peirce’s theory of sign

Authenticity is strongly connected to the way material objects acquire meaning through time. At the heart of Peirce’s semiotics is continuity, historicity, and the accumulation of knowledge through time (e.g. Houser 2010: 90; Lele 2006: 50; Parker 1998; Waal 2001: 40-42). The question, then, to be asked is how can we reach the past material meanings. The structuralist approach would lead to the treatment of material objects (as signs of the past) and their meanings as arbitrary and highly contextual since they are constantly being assigned new meanings in the present. This is a very fixed and static view of sign processes. The view of sign as a dyadic relation between the signifier (object) and the signified (the concept) does not have built in it the notion of never ending semiosis, which in turn takes the interpretant (the notion of a human interpreter) into account. That is appealing in Peirce's theory of sign. The Saussurean model of sign will not, as such, provide the historical aspect of meaning-making processes needed for studying the past meanings. I think Robert Preucel (2006: 247) puts it well: ‘[I]t is possible to show that archaeology is a pragmatic discourse constituted by meaning-making practices in the present that systematically articulate with the past meaning-making practices.’

As pointed out above, material culture differs from language. Peirce's theory of sign differs from the Saussurean one in that a sign is not thought of as a dyadic but as a triadic relation between a sign vehicle (S), the object (O) and the interpretant (I) (Waal 2001: 71) (figure 1). Saussure thought of signs as profoundly lingual (Hénault 2010: 101), whereas for Peirce, lingual signs (letters, words, sentences, sounds, utterances...) are only certain kind of signs (Bauer 2002: 39; Short 2007: 5).
Figure 1. The three placed model of sign by Charles Peirce. A sign is constituted of the sign-vehicle (S), the object (O), and the interpretant (I). Semiosis is triadic cooperation of the sign, the object, and the interpretant. The two-placed relationship between the sign-vehicle and the object can be divided into iconic relation, indexical relation, or symbolic relation. Semiosis is the action of interpreting a sign, thus creating a new one in the process. (Drawing by Marko Marila)

In Peirce's theory of sign (into which it is not necessary to provide an extensive introduction since one is easily accessible\(^\text{45}\)), the two placed\(^\text{46}\) relationship between the sign vehicle and the object can be iconic, indexical, and symbolic (Houser 2010: 92). Iconic signs share a certain kind of similarity with the object. A footprint is an iconic sign for a foot (e.g. Parker 1998: 146). These types of signs are not conventional, and their interpretation will be the same now as it was a thousand years ago. Indexical signs are pointers or indicators. This type of sign-object relation is also non-arbitrary. The often used example of indexical signs is the indicative relation between a weathervane and the direction of the wind (e.g. Short 2007: 233). Symbolic signs, however, are conventional and agreed upon

\(^{45}\) See for example Short 2007.

\(^{46}\) We are here dealing with sign components rather than signs since a two placed sign relation will not induce semiosis, but a three placed (S+O+I) relation is needed. Peirce called two placed relations degenerate signs since they do not provide any information (EP2: 162, 171-172). They are, in effect, not part of semiosis. (EP2 refers to Peirce Edition Project 1998.)
Meaning in objects has to be seen as a diachronic process of semiosis where a sign is always in relation to a context as the practical consequences it produces. Materiality does not convey a static image of past social identities of humans as proposed by relations between material objects in archaeological assemblages. Materiality is social mediation and an unending meaning-making practice (Preucel and Bauer 2001: 92). Meaning is not, indeed, only in the thing itself, but it is also in the use context of an object. We will, however, have to take a look at the long term use and meanings of an object and only then can we say what the whole of the meaning of an object really is. This can be obtained by studying objects as signs in the Peircean way and placing them in the chain of unending semiosis (EP2: 411; Waal 2001: 71).

*Picture 1. Anthropomorphic clay vessels at the museum of cultural history in Oslo, Norway. Note the little nose on the smaller pot on the right. (Photograph by Marko Marila 2009)*
In addition to reaching the meaning of an object, the pragmatistic model, or theory, can help ascertain material functions. The function of an object has been and still is the object of extensive studying in archaeology. Function and meaning are, to a great extent, two inseparable aspects of an object. The meaning of an object can be seen as an assemblage of its functions, and the function of an object on the other hand as the present meaning, the practical agency of the object.

Material metaphor

I have discussed the use of the Peircean theory of sign and concentrated on the three levels of sign-object relation, the iconic, indexical, and symbolic. In addition to this, the study of solid metaphor is needed. Only then can we get closer to the past symbolic meanings.

Iconic and indexical relations can be seen in the material culture which may have been buried in the ground for extended periods of time, but past symbolic relations have been lost when the objects were left out of the semiotic meaning transference process. Using material metaphor, we can get closer to the symbolic meanings, but not reach them altogether. The whole of the meaning of an object can only be attained in the present by studying its past and present, and possible future meanings.

A convenient method, then, is to use material or solid metaphors, as also proposed by Christopher Tilley (1999), and Lele (2006: 65-67) who aims to connect language and the material culture with material metaphor. Material metaphors are based on certain similarities in materials. Wine and blood share certain attributes and it is therefore not entirely arbitrary that wine and color red is the symbol for blood, whereas color white can be associated with milk or semen (Tilley 1999: 265). Anthropomorphic relations, as well, are non-arbitrary. There is a bodily basis for (material) metaphor, and all meaning for that matter (Johnson 1987: 65). The human body can be seen as a container of intestines and fluids.
certain contexts pots and other containers have been given an anthropomorphic shape (picture 1). Solid metaphors are therefore likely to take on meanings in a way different from lingual metaphors or metonyms. Lingual metaphors, like all metaphors, are based on similarities or an iconic relationship between two or more entities (Pietarinen 2008: 317-318). Solid metaphors, however, are constrained to similarities in material attributes. This does not mean that material metaphor is based solely on iconic relations or similitude. Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (2008: 318) writes that

[s]imilarity may be qualitative, structural or functional. Hence it can be abstract and intellectual, and need not be based only in closeness in looks or in some visual or sensuous features.

Material forms, unlike words, are not only communicating meanings but actively doing something. They take active part in the interplay between humans in social meaning-making practices. They are a physical part of the Peircean never-ending semiosis. Liebmann et al. (2005: 48) have taken a somewhat similar approach in their studies of the Pueblo Revolt of 1680 in New Mexico. Their studies are based on iconic and indexical relations between objects:

It can be argued that material culture, including Pueblo architecture, carries much of its meaning through iconic and indexical properties. These levels of meaning are often less ambiguous than symbolic properties. Many signs are not arbitrary because their elements have definite relations to their referents. While it is true that the meanings of signs may change, the iconic and indexical components of signs are more fixed than symbolic meanings. (Liebmann et al. 2005: 48)

47 Caution is called for here. In chapter III, I proposed that lingual metaphors are also based on lingual conventions. This is one important distinction between lingual and material metaphor to be kept in mind. Material metaphor is also based on iconicity, but involves indexicality in that it, in its material nature, is a forced representation of reality.
It is their view that by analyzing the iconic and indexical relations and the syntactical measures of architecture more could be learnt about social changes, identity and ideology (Liebmann et al. 2005: 48). As pointed by Ulrich Veit (2007: 99), Liebmann and his associates have mainly used historical data as their evidence and it remains unclear whether the symbolic meanings could be attained purely through the study of archaeological material remains. I argue that it is not possible with the help of only the iconic and indexical relations of signs, but solid metaphors are vital when reconstructing past symbolic meanings. Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (2008: 319) has noticed that ‘the materiality of metaphors is found in the fact that meanings are always grounded in the actual world or in one of the possible worlds, including worlds of fiction’. That means the meaning of an object can not only be grounded to its past and present meanings, but also to the notion of its possible future meanings.

Peirce’s theory of sign is useful when assessing the meaning of objects by their iconic and indexical value. When assessing symbolic meanings, however, a study of material metaphor is needed. Material or solid metaphors lie somewhere between iconicity and symbolic meaning. It may not ever be possible to reach past symbolic meanings, but material metaphor will take us closer (table 1).

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Table 1. Peirce’s sign–object relation as applied in the process of reaching past meanings. Past symbolic meanings can be attained by using solid, material metaphor, whereas indexical signs are based on law-like causalities, and iconic signs on resemblance.
Summary

The poststructuralist text metaphor discussed in chapter II, authenticity and postmodernism, I argue, is not applicable in the study of past meaning-making processes. Remaining loyal to the structuralist tradition, Tilley (1991: 105) sees signs as always acquiring their meaning through relations, and in the Lévi-Straussian way, mostly by binary relations. Reading the past, as a method proposed by, for example, Ian Hodder (1986) at least when meaning is based on binary structural relations like in their work, is not pertinent to the study of materiality.

The formation of meaning in objects has to be seen as a diachronic process where a sign is always in relation to a context as the practical consequences it produces. Materiality does not convey a static image of past social identities of humans as proposed by relations between material objects in archaeological assemblages. Materiality is social mediation and an unending meaning-making practice. Meaning, indeed, is not in the thing itself, but it is in the use context of an object. We will have to take a look at the long term use and meanings of an object and only then can we say what the whole of the meaning of an object really is. This can be obtained by studying objects as signs in the Peircean way and placing them in the chain of unending semiosis, the process of interpreting signs and creating new ones. Materiality as social mediation to me is unending semiosis in the Peircean sense.

Meaning is not entirely confined to the present. Meaning can be seen as a historical continuity. It is worth noticing that the present is a notion constituted by the past and the future. Meaning is therefore in relation to the future as in what things could become, not only in what they have been and what they are. To reach past material meanings, the historical gaps in the archaeological record need to be filled by reconstructing the infinite, unending semiotic process, semiosis. Archaeology therefore is the science of reconstructing the chain of interpretations called semiosis.
Trilling’s (1972) notion of staying true to one’s self is a modern maxim of authenticity and as such has influenced modern archaeology that seeks to know the real past as it once happened. The fact that authenticity has been treated totally differently in postprocessual archaeology is due to its postmodern influences. Postmodernism rejects the possibility of authenticity and is more concerned with meaning as a synchronic rather than a diachronic process. In postmodernism, then, objects are not real or original. There is no authentic since the original is already a copy (Deleuze 1968).

Much of postprocessual archaeology rests on these notions. Deep in the ethos of postprocessual archaeology are the following notions: the past only exists in the present; the present is simulation and therefore the past can be experienced by simulating it, often by visiting theme parks, or in popular culture by reliving the past through imagery. That is why the metaphorical nature of the past is a recurring theme in postprocessual popular archaeology. Archaeology deals with very potent metaphors such as digging, layers, depth, truth, time travel, detective work, and adventure (e.g. Holtorf 2005, 2007; Marila 2011b; Shanks 1992). In postprocessual archaeology, metaphors have been dealt with in respect to experiencing the past. It has been said that the past can be reached by metaphor (e.g. Holtorf 2005, 2007; Moreland 2010: 37-74; Shanks 1992, 1995, 1998). Metaphor, on the other hand, has been treated as a contextual trope that has truth value only in one context (e.g. Larsen 1987).

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48 ‘If we were to take as the finest allegory of simulation the Borges tale where the cartographers of the Empire draw up a map so detailed that it ends up exactly covering the territory (but where, with the decline of the Empire this map becomes frayed and finally ruined, a few sherds still discernible in the deserts - the metaphysical beauty of this ruined abstraction, bearing witness to an imperial pride and rotting like a carcass, returning to the substance of the soil, rather as an aging double ends up being confused with the real thing), this fable would then have come full circle for us, and now has nothing but the discrete charm of second-order simulacra.’ (Baudrillard 1988: 166.)
The most prominent figure in recent discussion of authenticity in archaeology has been Cornelius Holtorf. His works deal with authenticity as inherently a contextual attribute, i.e. as a symbolic and arbitrary representation of the past that only has truth value in one context. For Holtorf, there exist no real past since ‘the’ past is only a social construction of the present. This approach has upset some realist archaeologists, among them Kristian Kristiansen, who see the relativist approach to compromise the role of past material culture as the object of scientific study. A good example of this discussion was provided in the introduction of this thesis (chapter I). In a way, the relativist jargon idealizes the past and therefore evades real problems, just like existentialism according to Adorno did when idealizing the human subject.

Since it may remain somewhat ambiguous whether I agree or disagree with Cornelius Holtorf on some particular issues, it is perhaps worthwhile to explicate my relationship with his writings. Cornelius Holtorf has influenced my thinking greatly. He is correct in his notion of archaeology being popular culture. He is correct when he points that the relationship between now and then is of a metaphorical kind. Archaeology and its meanings may be part of popular culture, but archaeology as a science has also objectives, motives, and questions that originate from within science, not entirely from the society in which archaeology as a science operates. Archaeology therefore is not entirely in service of popular culture. Nor is the past only reachable through metaphor. Metaphors may be relevant when discussing the role of archaeology in contemporary popular culture, but not when it comes to knowing the real past. There need to be made a distinction between what is real and what exists. Contrary to what Holtorf (Holtorf and Piccini 2009: 14) has written, it may be argued that the past does not exist in the present, it is real. This, however, is a complicated matter and need not be discussed further here. Suffice it to say that I disagree with Holtorf on the ontological level about the nature of reality, but agree on what he has written about the meaning and significance of archaeology in popular culture on the metaphorical level.
Drawing my inspiration from philosophy of language (Lewis 1986), I argue that authenticity, as a metaphorical attribute, is not contextual, but conventional and habitual and can be experienced diversely by multiple individuals in one context. Authenticity is therefore a social habit of acting that has its roots in the material world and materiality. Materiality is ‘social’ mediation of objects (humans and other). Objects in turn have meaning. Their whole meaning (authenticity, I argue) can be studied by imagining what possible practical consequences their presence might have had in the past, has in the present, and could have in the future in the system of objects. The whole meaning of an object as a Peircean sign therefore is the total sum of the consequences of its uses.

An object may have had very different meanings in the past and in the present, but this does not mean that we have to settle with knowing only the object’s meaning in the present. An object’s meanings can be studied through a rigorous scientific inquiry. The object of that study is the chain of references known as semiosis. Of course, the scientific inquiry itself is part of semiosis. That is why semiosis is also accumulation of knowledge.

The conduct of scientific inquiry is, however, painfully slow and hard. We may never know what the objects meant to the past people (some information will inevitably remain buried secrets), but we must keep doing our best to do so. Matthew Johnson (1999: 114) puts it well: ‘[A]rchaeology is very difficult.’ In fact, I would like to go as far as suggesting that the Peircean pragmatistic attitude toward knowing the past may well become the next scientific archaeology. Like Charles Percy Snow (1998: vii-viii) wrote already in the 1960s about the sciences having been divided into two cultures, ‘the literary intellectuals’ and the natural scientists, there exist two cultures also in archaeology. There are on the one hand those who believe in the natural sciences as the true scientific method, and on the other hand those who see archaeology as humanism; or processualists and postprocessualists.

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49 Preucel and Mrozowski (2010: 16) propose that the view that things mediate social relations underpins a new development in semiotic archaeology.

50 Something very similar has been proposed by Preucel and Mrozowski (2010: 28-34).
in paradigmatic terms. Both cultures share what Snow (1998: viii) called ‘a profound mutual suspicion and incomprehension’. This is where archaeology is now. There has, however, been much discussion of what is going to be the next scientific ‘paradigm’ of archaeology.

Because I do not believe there has ever been a true paradigmatic shift in archaeology in the Kuhnian (1964) sense, the new pragmatistic archaeology could be understood as a synthesis between processual archaeology and postprocessual archaeology - a new scientific attitude and the new possibility of a scientific archaeology. According to Preucel and Mrozowski (2010: 33), who also strive for a pragmatistic archaeology, studying the past is based on a science that is diverse in methods, as well as epistemology. The disunity of science need to be seen as its strength, not as its weakness. Pragmatistic archaeology will seek answers to the same questions that have always been the moving force in the conduct of archaeological inquiry.

Pragmatistic archaeology is a combination of methods from the systematic natural sciences and humanities, mainly Peircean semiotics (Preucel and Mrozowski 2010: 32). It is courage to propose small questions, and courage to occasionally err and still have faith in science. It is motivated by the melioristic idea of the accumulation of knowledge, however painfully slow it may seem. This is to imply that pragmatism is a work in process. It is an attitude, not a scientific method. In pragmatistic archaeology both hedgehogs and foxes (see prologue) will have a common goal of assessing the whole meaning of things, having knowledge of the world, and finding out the truth.
SUMMARY

In this master’s thesis, I have discussed the question of authenticity in postprocessual archaeology. Modern archaeology is a product of the modern world, and postprocessual archaeology in turn is strongly influenced by postmodernism. The way authenticity has been understood in processual archaeology is largely dictated by the modern condition. The understanding of authenticity in postprocessual archaeology, however, rests on notions of simulation and metaphor.

It has been argued by postprocessual archaeologists that the past can be experienced by metaphor, and that the relationship between now and then is of a metaphorical kind. In postprocessual archaeology, authenticity has been said to be contextual. This view has been based on a contextualist understanding of the meanings of language and metaphor. I argue that, besides being based on metaphor, authenticity is a conventional attribute based on habits of acting, which in turn have their basis in the material world and the materiality of objects. Authenticity is material meaning, and that meaning can be found out by studying the objects as signs in a chain of signification called semiosis. Authenticity therefore is semiosis.


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