

GLOBAL PROCESSES, LOCAL STRATEGIES
Migration of Educated Dominicans

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<p>The aim of this thesis is to examine migration of educated Dominicans in light of global processes. Current global developments have resulted in increasingly global movements of people, yet people tend to come from certain places in large numbers rather than others. At the same time, international migration is increasingly selective, which shows in the disproportional number of educated migrants. This study discovers individual and societal motivations that explain why young educated Dominicans decide to migrate and return.</p> <p>The theoretical framework of this thesis underlines that migration is a dynamic process rooted in other global developments. Migratory movements should be seen as a result of interacting macro- and microstructures, which are linked by a number of intermediate mechanisms, meso-structures. The way individuals perceive opportunity structures concretises the way global developments mediate to the micro-level. The case of the Dominican Republic shows that there is a diversity of local responses to the world system, as Dominicans have produced their own unique historical responses to global changes.</p> <p>The thesis explains that Dominican migration is importantly conditioned by socioeconomic and educational background. Migration is more accessible for the educated middle class, because of the availability of better resources. Educated migrants also seem less likely to rely on networks to organize their migrations. The role of networks in migration differs by socioeconomic background on the one hand, and by the specific connections each individual has to current and previous migrants on the other hand. The personal and cultural values of the migrant are also pivotal.</p> <p>The central argument of this thesis is that a veritable culture of migration has evolved in the Dominican Republic. The actual economic, political and social circumstances have led many Dominicans to believe that there are better opportunities elsewhere. The globalisation of certain expectations on the one hand, and the development of the specifically Dominican feeling of 'externalism' on the other, have for their part given rise to the Dominican culture of migration. The study also suggests that the current Dominican development model encourages migration. Besides global structures, local structures are found to be pivotal in determining how global processes are materialised in a specific place.</p> <p>The research for this thesis was conducted by using qualitative methodology. The focus of this thesis was on thematic interviews that reveal the subject's point of view and give a fuller understanding of migration and mobility of the educated. The data was mainly collected during a field research phase in Santo Domingo, the Dominican Republic in December 2009 and January 2010. The principal material consists of ten thematic interviews held with educated Dominican current or former migrants. Four expert interviews, relevant empirical data, theoretical literature and newspaper articles were also comprehensively used.</p>			
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<p>Tutkielma tarkastelee korkeasti koulutettujen maastamuuttoa Dominikaanisesta tasavallasta globaalien prosessien valossa. Nykypäivän globaalit kehityssuuntaukset johtavat yhä globaalimpiin muuttoliikkeisiin. Toisaalta ihmiset muuttavat yleensä enemmän tietyistä paikoista kuin toisista. Kansainvälinen muuttoliike on samanaikaisesti yhä valikoivampaa, mikä näkyy koulutettujen siirtolaisten suhteettoman suuressa määrässä. Tutkielman tavoitteena on saada selville ja selittää korkeasti koulutettujen dominikaanien henkilökohtaisia ja yhteiskunnallisia vaikuttimia muuttaa maasta ja palata maahan.</p> <p>Tutkielman teoreettisessa viitekehyksessä korostetaan muuttoliikkeen dynaamisuutta sekä tutkitaan kansainvälistä muuttoliikettä osana muita globaaleja ilmiöitä. Muuttoliike nähdään mikro- ja makrorakenteiden vuorovaikutuksen tuloksena, jotka yhdistyvät toisiinsa lisäksi välissä olevien mesorakenteiden avulla. Tapa, jolla ihmiset tulkitsevat mahdollisuusrakenteita konkretisoi globaalien ilmiöiden suodattamisen mikrotasolle. Dominikaanit kehittävät omia historiallisesti ainutlaatuisia vastauksiansa globaaleihin muutoksiin, mikä havainnollistaa paikallisten toimintatapojen moninaisuutta suhteessa laajempiin globaaleihin ilmiöihin.</p> <p>Tutkielma osoittaa, että sosioekonomisella taustalla ja koulutuksen tasolla on merkittävä vaikutus dominikaanien siirtolaisuuteen. Siirtolaisuus vaatii taloudellista, sosiaalista ja kulttuurista pääomaa, joka on helpommin koulutetun keskiluokan saatavilla. Yhtäältä verkostojen merkitys siirtolaisuudessa eroaa sosioekonomisen taustan mukaan, toisaalta jokaisen yksilön henkilökohtaisilla sosiaalisilla suhteilla nykyisiin ja entisiin siirtolaisiin on merkitystä siirtolaisuuteen. Mikrotasolla vaikuttavat myös henkilökohtaiset ja kulttuuriset arvot.</p> <p>Tutkielman keskeinen argumentti on, että Dominikaaniseen tasavaltaan on kehittynyt ”siirtolaisuuden kulttuuri”. Siirtolaisuuden kulttuurissa maastamuutto nähdään hyväksyttävänä tai jopa toivottavana tapana parantaa tulevaisuuden näkymiä. Maan tosiasialliset taloudelliset, poliittiset ja yhteiskunnalliset olosuhteet ovat saaneet monet dominikaanit uskomaan, että maan ulkopuolella on parempia mahdollisuuksia. Yhtäältä odotukset tietynlaisesta elämäntyylistä ovat globalisoituneet, toisaalta dominikaanien kulttuurissa kehittynyt yleinen ulkopuolisuuden tunne on vaikuttanut omalta osaltaan siirtolaisuuden kulttuurin kehittymiseen. Nykyinen Dominikaanisen tasavallan kehitysmalli näyttää lisäksi rohkaisevan maastamuuttoa. Paikallisilla rakenteilla onkin keskeinen merkitys globaalien rakenteiden materialisoinnissa ja suodattamisessa paikallistasolle.</p> <p>Tutkimus toteutettiin laadullisilla tutkimusmenetelmillä. Tärkeimpänä menetelmänä käytettiin temaattisia haastatteluja, jotka sopivat hyvin subjektin näkökulmien esille tuomiseen ja antavat täysinemmän ymmärryksen siirtolaisuudesta ja koulutettujen liikkuvuudesta. Keräsin aineiston pääasiassa kenttätöajanjakson aikana Santo Domingossa Dominikaanisessa tasavallassa joulukuussa 2009 ja tammikuussa 2010. Aineisto koostuu ensisijaisesti kymmenestä nykyiselle ja entiselle dominikaanisiirtolaiselle pidetystä temaattisesta haastattelusta. Tutkimuksessa käytetään lisäksi laajasti neljää asiantuntijahaastattelua, tutkimuksen kannalta merkityksellistä empiiristä aineistoa, teoreettista kirjallisuutta ja sanomalehtiartikkeleita.</p>			
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ACRONYMS

CESDEM	Centro de Estudios Sociales y Demográficos / Centre of Social and Demographic Studies
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency of the United States of America
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDR	Human Development Report
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
ILO	International Labour Office
IPS	Inter Press Service
IOM	International Organization for Migration
INDH	Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano / National Human Development Report
OBMICA	Observatorio Migrantes del Caribe / Observatory of Migrants in the Caribbean
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONE	Oficina Nacional de Estadística, República Dominicana / National Office of Statistics, Dominican Republic
ONU en RD	Sistema de las Naciones Unidas en República Dominicana / System of the United Nations in Dominican Republic
PNUD	Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo / United Nations Development Programme (in Spanish)
PREAL & EDUCA	Programa de Promoción de la Reforma Educativa en América Latina y el Caribe & Acción para la Educación Básica / Programme of Promotion of Educational Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean & Action for Basic Education
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UN-INSTRAW	United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women
US	United States of America
WB	World Bank

1 INTRODUCTION

Clearly it is that the benefits, the employment, the redistribution, the earnings that you have there - thousand times greater. Because there with a basic salary, a minimum wage, you have a better standard of living than here. For you to have a basic standard of living here, you have to have a good salary, good economically. So you compare and you say "No, it's better I stay there". Many people there have the illusion of making a future, building a future, to have money, to come back someday, to come back here. Many already... In other words, what I tell you is that my generation and the younger no longer tends to, it has already distanced itself more. (Carolina, 30, returned from Spain in 2008)

Like Carolina, many Dominicans are contemplating stay and go alternatives. Already today, every fourth Dominican with a tertiary degree is counted to have left the Dominican Republic and between 10-20 percent of the whole population has migrated (Gonzalez-Acosta 2007; IDB 2004; ILO 2004, 20). What is more, over half of Dominicans residing in the Dominican Republic wish to move abroad (New York Times 3.9.2007; UN-INSTRAW 2006, 32). The Dominican Republic represents a case of national scale migration that touches the whole society. Dominican migration has increased constantly for over 50 years and consists more and more of the educated. The country currently faces one of the highest emigration rates for both the educated and the population as a whole. Besides representing wider tendencies in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Dominican Republic exemplifies many of the global migratory trends.

Human migration is as old as humanity itself. Forms and patterns of migration have varied through time and there is both continuity and transformation in migratory movements. What makes present day migration unique is its relation to economic and social processes of globalisation. Migration is an inseparable feature of the contemporary world since most parts of world experience increasing flows of people. (Castles & Miller 2009, 2-7.) Several simultaneous and often overlapping patterns of migration can be observed such as the falling number of refugees and the increasing flows of labour, family and student migrants (OECD 2008, 22; UNHCR 2006, 9). Today, the number of international migrants is estimated to be 214 million or 3.1 percent of the world's population (HDR 2009, 21). Yet the effects of trans-border migration touches much larger parts of the population especially as people tend to move from certain places rather than others in large numbers (Castles & Miller 2009, 7). Crucially, migrants do not necessarily move to the closest or richest destination, but to places that are already historically, politically, economically and socially connected to

their countries of origin, relying heavily on networks created by earlier migrants (Massey & Taylor 1998).

Intensifying globalisation creates both new opportunities and new risks. Globalisation is defined in many different ways, but most often it refers to the world becoming increasingly interdependent. Besides increasingly global circuits of capital, globalisation also means increasingly global circuits of labour. The main driving forces behind increased international migration are rooted in the expansion and consolidation of global markets. People are displaced when nations are structurally transformed. (Massey & Taylor 1998.) Consequently, the number of migrants is expected to increase in the search for better opportunities. Diverging demographic trends between the North and the South and declining transportation and communication costs are other reasons cited for the expected continuation in the increase of international migration (Özden 2005, 2). One of the ironies of globalisation though, is that unlike capital and commodities, the movement of people is still very much affected by national borders (Nyberg-Sorensen 1998, 262). Importantly, global migration is becoming increasingly selective as many migrant-receiving countries give more preference to educated and skilled migrants. Today's migratory movements characteristically consist of labour migration of the educated from South to North and East to West (Tanner 2005, 12).

Globalisation has led to the diffusion of space-time compressing technologies that allow for intensifying exchanges between migrants and their places of origin, leading to international migration becoming more transnational. Migrant-led transnationalism, transnationalism from below, includes maintaining social networks across borders, sending and receiving remittances, and forming hometown associations, among others. Transnationalism from above on the other hand describes state-led developments, such as attempts to incorporate the diaspora into the home country's politics and development. These complex linkages between migrant sending and receiving areas form a phenomenon beyond households and individuals, incorporating entire communities in the globalisation process. (Popkin 2004, 1.) The big changes in transport and communication favour the development of transnational lives and identities, challenging stable models of identity, nation-state and citizenship (OBMICA 2010).

Migration and development are related phenomena, yet they have no simple relation of causality. However, especially in countries where emigration rates are high, development aid, trade and other policy areas need to be assessed together with migration. For instance, remittances sent by migrants clearly exceed official development aid in terms of capital flow, and they are vital for many families' income and survival. The overall long-term development impact of migration and remittances remains nevertheless highly contested. The important point here about migration and development is that the indirect effect of remittances on economic growth largely depends on the type of migrant leaving the country. Arguably, the more highly skilled the migrant is, the larger is the potentially adverse growth effect. (Solimano 2003, 7.)

All in all, migration involves a complex web of political, economic, social and geographical factors. Migration is hardly ever a simple individual decision, but a long process that affects both the rest of the migrant's life and the life of following generations. Migration is a collective action that comes out of social change and it has a profound impact on both the sending and receiving societies. The process has also internal dynamics based on the social networks at its core, which can lead to developments not originally intended by the migrants or the states. (Castles & Miller 2009.) Individual decisions to migrate constitute patterns that form global circuits of migration, yet at the same time individual decisions are very much affected by the surrounding context. The relationship between structures and agencies is reciprocal: individuals make their decisions in interaction with local structures that mediate effects of global processes, which in turn are comprised of a multitude of interacting local processes.

1.1 The Dominican Republic represents many sides of migration

The case of the Dominican Republic is of interest for both migration and brain drain research. The country has high migration rates of the population in general, and the educated in particular. Dominicans are often cited as an example of a contemporary diaspora or transnational migration (e.g. Jorge Duany 2005, 2008, Eugenia Georges 1990, José Itzigsohn 1999, Peggy Levitt 1998, Ninna Sorensen-Nyberg 1994, 2005, Alejandro Portes 2009). It is to these bodies of research my master's thesis aims to contribute.

Studies show that the total emigration rate of the Dominican Republic is comparatively high; the estimations range from 10 to 20 percent (e.g. Adams Jr. 2003, 27; Gonzalez-Acosta 2007; IDB 2004; ILO 2004, 20; Suki 2004, 10). Most Dominicans have someone in their immediate or extended family who has left the country, and those who do not still hear the general discussion and experiences of migration in society and the media. The virtue of the Dominican Republic is that its experiences are well compatible with both Latin American and Caribbean countries. In migratory statistics the Dominican Republic is situated between Central American and Caribbean countries for both brain drain and migration in general. The Dominican Republic typifies the democratisation and neo-liberal waves that occurred in Latin America and the Caribbean since the 1980s. In addition, the Dominican state has made some recent efforts to better incorporate its diaspora, which also makes it an interesting subject in migration research. (Docquier & Marfouk 2004, 16; Gonzalez-Acosta 2007.)

Dominican migration follows global migration trends in many ways. Dominican migration is increasing in numbers, but it does not consist of refugees. Dominican migrants are more educated than the population remaining in the home country, which is a phenomenon observed throughout the world. Dominican migrants are still heavily concentrated in the East Coast of the United States, but during the last decades they have also started to migrate to Spain and other European countries, exemplifying the trend of diversification of destinations. Remittances sent by Dominican migrants amount to over a tenth of GDP of the Dominican Republic, and nearly quadrupled between 1994 and 2004. Regionally, Latin America and the Caribbean receives the highest volumes of remittance in the world, but remittances have also increased globally during the last decades to become a key macroeconomic factor. (Adams Jr. 2003; UN-INSTRAW 2006.)

While the number of migrants is increasing worldwide, emigration rates in most countries are not very high. Adams Jr. (2003) finds in a study on 24 major labour-exporting countries that overall only four countries have a total emigration rate to the United States exceeding 10 percent: the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Jamaica and Mexico. Mexico belongs to the North American Free Trade Zone and has a unique relationship to the United States (Massey et al. 1994, 739). Besides Mexico, the

countries have rather small populations. The over-representation of small countries is no coincidence as the main destination worldwide, the United States, has an immigration policy that sets annual limits to the numbers of migrants coming from each country regardless of its size (Adams Jr. 2003, 14).

Adams Jr. (2003, 11-12) discovers that besides Mexico, 83 percent of all migrants from the 24 major labour-exporting countries in the United States have a secondary school degree or higher. However, while migrants worldwide are well-educated, not all countries experience a high-level of brain drain. According to Carrington and Detragiache (1998, 1999) and the OECD (in Katseli et al. 2006, 19), brain drain is particularly high from the Caribbean, Central America and some African countries. With more precision, Adams Jr. (2003, 19) finds out that only a handful of major labour-exporting countries suffer from brain drain. In Latin America, these countries are Mexico, Jamaica, El Salvador, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, all of which are located close to the United States. Similarly, the most comprehensive quantitative data set on brain drain to date classifies these countries as experiencing a detrimental brain drain (Beine et al. 2008, 646-647).

Other quantitative data on brain drain suggests that besides the size of the population, geographical proximity, colonial links and quality-selective immigration programmes in main destination countries play a role in brain drain as well (Docquier et al. 2007, 193). Smaller countries and especially island states have high emigration rates for the highly educated while larger countries such as China, India and Brazil have some of the lowest rates. In the Dominican Republic all the potential brain drain factors are in place: a relatively small population, geographical proximity to the United States, historical links with the United States and Spain, and quality-selective immigration programmes in many of the main destination countries.

1.2 Research on brain drain and Dominican migration

In economic research, there has been an interest in the mobility of highly educated individuals and its impact in their developing countries of origin since the 1960s. The research has been largely theoretical and until recently, systematic empirical data on brain drain has been almost unavailable. Carrington and Detragiache (1998, 1999) made

probably the first extensive estimation on brain drain, but called for more research especially on the impacts of the phenomena and on the reasons for such migration. Since then, Docquier and Marfouk (2004) and Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2008) have presented the most comprehensive data set on the subject. The statistics should nonetheless be treated with caution. For instance, the Dominican Republic does not have full statistics on the number of Dominicans with tertiary degrees, even less so for the ones that have migrated or returned. In destination countries, the level of education of immigrants may not be known or recognised.

Besides lacking quantitative data on brain drain, qualitative explanations from educated migrants' point of view are very limited to date. The voices of these migrants have rarely been heard, let alone from the focus country of this thesis, the Dominican Republic. There have been some important studies on Dominican migration and transnationalism in general though, such as "The Making of a Transnational Community: Migration, Development and Cultural Change in the Dominican Republic" by Eugenia Georges in 1990, "The Transnational Villagers" by Peggy Levitt in 1998 and "Dominican Migration: Transnational Perspectives," edited by Ernesto Sagas and Sintia E. Molina in 2004.¹ Also authors such as Alejandro Portes, José Itzigsohn and Luis Eduardo Guarnizo have written several articles on Dominican migration and transnationalism, and the Dominican Studies Institute of the City University of New York has produced some studies on Dominican migrants.

Already in 1990, Georges analysed historical transformations in a Dominican village using a world systems perspective. She carefully explains how and why the people of a village, in which 40 percent of households have a family member abroad, become transnational. Yet there is no analysis on subjectivities of migrants, and her theoretical analysis on transnationalism is rather light. Levitt's research from 1998 explains the changes occurring in a Dominican village after 65 percent of the households had a member who had emigrated, mainly to a neighbourhood in Boston. According to Levitt, Dominicans living in these two places are constantly connected, resources are exchanged and the people form a network of shared identities and culture. She defines in her study the concept of social remittances, arguing that these are a form of cultural

¹ Unfortunately I did not have access to these three publications, and had to rely on second hand information and several reviews and references available.

diffusion that links global changes to local actions and attitudes. Issues of power and changes in family roles may for instance take place, but these impacts are not inherently positive or negative. The book edited by Ernesto Sagás and Sintia E. Molina (2004) is a collection of articles about Dominican transnationalism from political participation to evolution of transnational music and dance. Changes in gender roles, identity and assimilation are other aspects covered. Also, the United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (UN-INSTRAW) has been working for some years on the issue of migration with relation to gender, development and remittances. Two of the case studies concern Dominican migration and provide some valuable analysis on the dynamics of gender, remittances and development especially in the Dominican context, and make clear, action-oriented recommendations.

However, like those mentioned above, most studies concerning Dominican migration consist of case studies in different local and often rural communities. There is still no comprehensive picture of Dominican migration (Gallardo Rivas 16.12.2009). Earlier also Massey et al. (1994, 739) and Guarnizo (2003, 692) noted deficiencies in the literature, including the lack of attention to certain prominent migrant-sending countries such as the Dominican Republic. Dominican migration is large-scale and migrants are more educated than average in the home country, but this fact is not widely taken into analyses of the subject. Another aspect to be taken more into account is the generally young age of Dominicans at the time of migration, which is also true globally (Gallardo Rivas 16.12.2009). The different stages of the life cycle have an effect on their economic and social position as well as on culture and consciousness (Castles & Miller 1998, 36). The interplay between socioeconomic background, age and gender needs better analysis, so understanding the individual points of view of young educated Dominicans provides new and interesting insights into the phenomenon of migration.

1.3 Research question: strategies of the educated in global developments

This master's thesis is about the context of emigration of the educated and the effects it has on the country of origin. Tensions and interactions between structures and agencies, i.e. larger developments on the one hand and migration decisions of individuals on the other, are on the focus of this thesis. There are diverse local responses to global developments, which make case studies worthwhile. The emphasis is on individual

strategies and experiences of migrants in the light of global developments. Migration of the educated poses difficult questions for individuals and bigger actors, such as states. In international migration research there has been interest in individuals, their experiences and understandings, but this focus is less common in research on brain drain and in world politics analysis. Yet the understandings of individuals have important influence on migratory processes, which in turn are conditioned by other global developments.

The aim of this master's thesis is to discover individual and societal motivations that explain why young educated Dominicans decide to migrate and return. The way individuals perceive opportunity structures concretises the way global developments mediate to the micro-level. Thus more precisely, this research seeks to find out what are the main factors that influence the migration decisions of young educated Dominicans, how the individuals explain migration decisions, and how they see the consequences of migration and the prospects of society as a whole. In addition, the aim is to provide suggestions and analysis on why these societal changes come about in light of larger developments. The principal concerns analysed in this research are summarised in the following two questions:

1. How do individuals adapt their personal strategies to global processes?
2. How do local structures mediate the effects of the global economy and global politics?

This thesis is mainly based on thematic interviews held with ten educated Dominican current or former migrants. Four expert interviews, relevant empirical data, theoretical literature and newspaper articles are also comprehensively used. The thematic interviews cover motivations for leaving and returning, migration processes, transnational ties, views on Dominican migration and on the home country policies, and the future. The main theory used in analysing the interviews is migration systems theory and the concept of a migratory process as presented by Castles and Miller (1998, 2009) and Faist (1997a, 1997b). However, other theories on migration, globalisation, development and brain drain are extensively used as well. My original hypothesis was that Dominican migration is importantly conditioned by socioeconomic and educational background. This hypothesis held fast. Besides underlining the importance of

socioeconomic background in migration analyses, this study sheds light on the way a culture of migration develops.

The thesis is divided into seven chapters. After the introduction, a short presentation of the Dominican Republic is provided in chapter two. In chapter three, general developments in international migration worldwide, in Latin America and in the Dominican Republic are presented. Major academic debates relevant to this study concerning international migration in light of globalisation are presented in chapter four. The methods and material of the study are presented in chapter five, and analysed in chapter six. Finally, concluding remarks and a short discussion are provided in chapter seven.

1.4 Definitions

Brain drain usually means skilled migration that causes permanent losses, for instance economic or political, to the country of origin. *Brain flow* generally refers to skilled migration in a more neutral way. *Brain circulation* takes place when skilled migrants return to the country of origin. A related term is *circular migration*, which basically refers to temporary migration of any kind. *Positive feedback effects*, such as brain circulation, remittances or exchange of other valuable information, may reduce the negative effects of brain drain. Therefore, brain drain may later change to brain circulation. (Tanner 2005, 16-21.) Feedback effects can also be negative.

Brain export, *brain exchange*, *brain waste* and *brain gain* are other related terms. Brain export refers to a strategy in the country of origin to educate and export skilled workers for economic gain. The term brain exchange is used for the import of educated migrants to compensate for brain drain, or to refer to new communication and information technologies that facilitate long distance professional contacts and exchanges of skills and information (Martínez Pizarro 2008, 276). Brain waste refers to the inefficient use of educated migrants, for instance if engineers from developing countries work as taxi drivers in developed countries. Brain gain is a situation opposite to brain drain, where educated migrants seek to enter a country in larger numbers than the ones leaving. (Tanner 2005, 21.)

Home country, sending country and *country of origin* all refer to an emigration country. Similarly, *host country, receiving country* and *destination country* refer to an immigration country. All these labels have their pros and cons, but in this thesis they should only be taken to imply a de facto country of immigration or emigration. (Hammar & Tamas 1997, 16-17.)

Diaspora can be simply defined as the dispersal of a people from its original homeland. Diaspora was first used mainly to describe the dispersion of Jewish people, but has in past decades come to have a wider meaning. Most scholars define diaspora by some basic features. Diasporas are not just temporarily abroad, but rather communities with a distinct cultural and social life over longer periods of time. The members of diaspora have some relationship to an actual or imagined homeland, which provides the foundation of the diaspora identity. Diaspora combines the individual experience with the collective history of the group. (Butler 2001, 189-192; Faist 1997b, 273.) According to Castles and Miller (2009, 31) the more recent term *transnational community* may refer to this same phenomenon.

Emigration means leaving one's own country and settling in another. The focus of this study is on voluntary emigration, thus, not on forced migration that can be caused by famine, conflicts, disasters and so on. (Tanner 2005, 16-17.) However an important qualification is that migrants cannot always be categorised as either forced or voluntary. Rather, the idea is to think more of a continuum from completely forced migrations to completely voluntary ones. (Hammar & Tamas 1997, 17.)

Skilled migration, or migration of the educated, can be defined in many different ways. Some include only certain professional categories while others take the level of education as a mark (Martínez Pizarro 2008, 277). In this study, the tertiary level of education is the common denominator.

2 THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IN BRIEF

2.1 Statistics: stable but unequal growth

Dominican Republic	2008
Area (sq km ²)	48,670
Population (millions)	9.7
Population density per km ²	203
Population ages 0-14 (%)	32
Population growth (%)	1.5 (2000-2008)
Urban population (%)	69
GDP per capita (\$US)	4,654
GDP per capita in PPP (\$US)	8,217
Economic growth (%)	4.1 (2007-2008)
Unemployment (%)	15.1 (2009)
Informal sector employment (%)	55
Persons living under \$2 a day (%)	15.1 (2005)
Persons living under national poverty line (%)	42.2 (2004)
Rank in Gini index (most unequal)	26
Adult literacy rate (%)	89
School completion, basic level, 4 yrs (%)	83
School completion, medium level, 8 yrs (%)	22.8
Life expectancy at birth men/women	69/75
Annual net migration ²	-30 755

Table 1 The Dominican Republic in numbers.

Sources: CESDEM 2008; CIA 2010; INDH 2010; ONE 2009a; WB 2008, WB 2010

The Dominican Republic is located on the second largest island of the Caribbean, Hispaniola. It covers two thirds of the island while the Western third is occupied by the Republic of Haiti. After Cuba, the Dominican Republic is the second largest Caribbean nation both by area and population. The country covers 48,670 km² and has an estimated population of 9.7 million, which makes the population density rather high. The climate is tropical maritime with little seasonal temperature variations, and the landscape is mountainous with 22.5 percent arable land. The majority of the people are

² Average annual value for a five year period of 2005-2010

of mixed European-African ancestry, the main language is Spanish and the main religion is Roman Catholicism. (CIA 2010; Dominican Republic 2009.)

The Dominican Republic is classified as a lower middle income country by the World Bank (2009, 351). The average annual population growth of the country was 1.5 percent between 2000 and 2008, and over a third of its population was under the age of 14 in 2008 (WB 2010, 378). The economy was traditionally dominated by sugar, coffee and tobacco production, but became increasingly diversified in the late 20th century when the country experienced high economic growth rates. Today, the gross domestic product (GDP) of the Dominican Republic is for the most part composed of services (68.2 %), followed by industry (21.3 %) and agriculture (10.5 %). (CIA 2010.) The average economic growth was 5.4 percent annually between 1961 and 2002 (ONU en RD 2004, 5). In 2002-2004 the country was hit hard by an economic crisis caused by fraudulent bankruptcy of several Dominican banks and economic problems in the United States following September 11th, among other factors (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 23). In 2008 GDP per capita was 4,654 US dollars, with a purchasing power parity of 8,217 US dollars (WB 2008).

The economy of the Dominican Republic is largely dependent on the United States, which is the destination of around two-thirds of its exports. Remittances sent from the United States alone form over 10 percent of GDP, corresponding to half of exports and three quarters of tourism revenues. The service sector is the economy's largest employer (63.1 %), especially as a result of growth in tourism and free trade zones. Industry employs 22.3 percent of the labour force, and agriculture 14.6 percent. Unemployment, underemployment and informal employment remain significant problems in the country. The estimated unemployment rate was 15.1 percent in 2009 with great differences between men (9.1 % in 2007) and women (25.4 % in 2007). (CIA 2010; ONE 2009b.) More than half of the employees worked in the informal sector in 2000-2007 and a third of the employees were counted to be underemployed in 2007 (INDH 2010, 13-16).

Although there have been improvements in the health of the Dominican population, the relatively strong economic growth has not translated into equitable growth in the wealth of the population (ONU en RD 2004, 5). Malnutrition of children under 5 was halved between 1990 (8.4 %) and 2000-07 (4.2 %), and the under-five mortality rate was

reduced from 6.3 percent in 1990 to 2.9 percent in 2006. Life expectancy at birth was 72.4 in 2007. (HDR 2007, 229-346.) Overall, the Human Development Report (2009, 229) ranks the Dominican Republic 90th in the Human Development Index. Yet the country ranks higher, number 78, in the GDP per capita index (WB 2008), indicating the unequal division of wealth and income despite maintained high economic growth. The Gini index, which measures the degree of inequality in family income, ranks the country 26th most unequal of 134 countries. The poorest half uses under one-fifth of GDP while the richest tenth enjoys almost 40 percent of GDP. (CIA 2010.) 5 percent of the Dominican population lived under 1.25 dollars a day, 15.1 percent under 2 dollars a day, and 42.2 percent under the national poverty line between 2000 and 2006 (HDR 2009, 229-346). More worrying yet is the increase in the percentage of people living under the national poverty line, from 27.7 percent in 2000 to 42.2 percent in 2004, due to the economic crisis in the country (WB 2010, 380).

The adult literacy rate in the Dominican Republic is 89 percent. In 2007, 89.1 percent of children enrolled in primary school. 83 percent of those that enrolled completed four years of schooling. Remarkably, only 22.8 percent of the population had completed 8 years of education in 2007. There were no great differences between the sexes. (CESDEM 2008, xxxii.) The coverage of primary education in the country has improved, but the Dominican Republic still ranks low in education compared to other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2004, the Dominican Republic was the third lowest of all countries in Latin America and the Caribbean in middle education attendance (5th to 8th grade) by children of corresponding ages. (PREAL & EDUCA 2006.) With regard to the tertiary level, an estimated 15.1 percent of Dominicans aged 20 years or above had completed at least one year of tertiary education in 2007 (CESDEM 2008, 20)³. 80 percent of the 332,000 students attending tertiary education in 2005 were studying just seven different careers: education, law, administration, accounting, marketing, medicine and computing. The number of professionals in basic sciences is consequently very low. (INDH 2008, 188.) Problems faced by the educational sector in the country include the poor quality of education, the old age of students, unequal access to education, as well as low salaries and the relatively weak capacity of teachers. Despite being one of the fastest growing economies in the world

³ Numbers calculated by the author of this study from the statistics available in the survey by CESDEM

during past decades, the investment in education in the Dominican Republic is one of the lowest in the hemisphere. (Alvarez 2000; PREAL & EDUCA 2006.)

2.2 History: from Trujillo era towards democracy

The island of Hispaniola was inhabited in the 7th century by Tainos, the indigenous peoples from Antilles, Lesser Antilles and Bahamas. Christopher Columbus reached the island in 1492 and soon after the first European settlement of “the new world” was established. Santo Domingo, the current capital of the Dominican Republic, served as Spain’s capital in the new world for several decades, hosting the oldest university, cathedral, monastery and hospital in the Americas. (Dominican Republic 2009.) The settlement became neglected after the Spanish conquests in Mexico and Peru, and in 1697 Spain was forced to cease the Western third, later Haiti, to France. The Dominican Republic was first declared independent in 1821. The Haitian revolution at the end of 18th century was followed by the Haitian occupation of the whole island between 1822 and 1844. In 1861 the Dominican Republic voluntarily became a part of the Spanish empire again, but a couple of years later began another war which restored independence in 1865. (Haggerty 1989.)

The latter half of 19th century was filled with political instability and dictatorships. In the beginning of the 20th century political and economic instability continued while the United States started to take a greater interest in the Caribbean region. The assassination of the Dominican president Ramón Cacéres in 1911 led to increased instability in the Dominican Republic, and leaders changed quickly. The United States occupied the country as well as Haiti between 1916 and 1924. Following the change of the presidency in the United States in 1921 and a relatively successful presidential election in the Dominican Republic in 1924, the United States withdrew the same year. (Ibid.)

After a couple of years of political stability, the power struggle in the Dominican Republic began again. The commander of the National Army, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, assumed control of the country in 1930, marking the start of a brutal dictatorship that lasted 30 years. His tyranny is considered to be one of the cruelest of the 20th century, and was also marked by a personality cult. He had monuments around the country, and changed the name of the Dominican capital to Ciudad Trujillo. Trujillo ruled the

country as a feudal lord and possessed fortunes together with his family. He was famous for effectively monitoring and eliminating his opponents, even abroad. His most brutal single action was the order of the massacre of more than 20,000 Haitians in the country in 1937. He was also behind the attempt to assassinate Venezuela's president Rómulo Betancourt in 1960. Trujillo was assassinated in 1961, and it is commonly claimed that the CIA supplied the weapons used. (Ibid.)

The left-wing Juan Bosch was democratically elected the president of the Dominican Republic in 1962, but was disposed by a military coup in 1963. The following years were marked by political instability, and a brief civil war in 1965 initiated with an uprising to restore Juan Bosch. The country was occupied by the United States in 1965, sparked by the fear of a "new Cuba". The troops withdrew the following year when Joaquin Balaguer, a more right-wing candidate and a protégé of the former dictator Trujillo, was elected president. Especially Balaguer's first 12-year authoritarian government was characterised by oppression and persecution of political dissidents. Balaguer ruled the country on and off until 1996 when international reactions to flawed elections forced him to withdraw. (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 22.)

Today, the Dominican Republic is counted as a democratic country. Leonel Fernández from the Dominican Liberation Party was democratically elected president in 1996, followed by the centre-left Hipólito Mejía in 2000. Hipólito Mejía's term saw a major economic crisis and inflation of the Dominican peso caused by the fraudulent bankruptcy of various Dominican banks among other things. (Ibid.) Leonel Fernández was re-elected in 2004 and again in 2008. Nevertheless the Dominican Republic still appears at number 101 in the corruption list of Transparency International (2010), indicating big problems concerning corruption and democratic governance in the country.

3 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IS MORE GLOBAL THAN EVER

3.1 Towards global yet diversified migration

International migration is increasingly global. The reach of migration began to extend after 1945, but since the 1980s migration has expanded sharply to include all the regions of the world. Today, international migration continues to grow in scale and diversity. Even if the economic crisis may temporarily slow the growth, the underlying causes of the globalisation of migration remain the same. Contemporary migration is characterised by its global scope, centrality to politics, economic and social consequences, and challenges to sovereign states. (Castles & Miller 2009, 2-7; IOM 2010a.)

Currently there are more international migrants in the world than ever before. The number of international migrants is estimated to be 214 million, which equals 3.1 percent of the world population. The number is over 60 million more than in 2000, and more than double the number of international migrants in 1980. The impacts of international migration are greater than the current percentage of the world population suggests. People tend to move in groups, and the socioeconomic and political effects on sending and receiving countries can be considerable. (Castles & Miller 2009, 6-7; IOM 2010a, b.)

Hirst and Thompson (1999, 23-26) argue that international migration was equally significant already in the century following 1815. Yet migration decreased sharply between the two world wars due to war, xenophobia and economic stagnation. The difference is that in the 19th and early 20th century, the vast majority of migration was transatlantic (Castles & Miller 2009, 2). In the 19th century the numbers also had greater variations than in the years since 1945. International migration before the First World War was significant, but the importance of the global scope, scale and dynamics of migration today should not be underestimated.

Until 1914, migration occurred most importantly due to industrialisation, colonialism and capitalism in the process of creating a world market. After 1945, migration to industrialised countries consisted largely of different patterns of labour migration to reconstruct Europe, such as permanent, post-colonial and guest worker migration. Until the oil shock of 1973, the economic strategy of large-scale capital was to invest and expand production in the developed countries. This resulted in immigration from less developed countries to more developed ones, and economic motivations of migrants predominated. In the period between 1945 and 1973, immigration was mostly economically beneficial for the receiving countries and the areas of origin became more diverse. Low-skill migration was in the majority. (Castles & Miller 2009, 79-123.)

The recession following the oil crisis of 1973 started a restructuring of the world economy, which included changes in the patterns of world trade and investment. Technological changes have reduced the demand for manual workers especially in developed countries, while the service sector has expanded. Casualisation of employment is increasingly common. Rural-urban migration following population growth and the 'green revolution' leads to international migration because the new jobs created are not always enough to replace the old ones. These changes have resulted in new patterns of migration, and especially since the late 1980s the increasing volume and complexity of migrations are notable. Other forms of migration besides labour migration, such as family reunification, are becoming more important. Many Southern and Central European countries have turned from countries of emigration to countries of immigration, in North America and Oceania the migrants' areas of origin have shifted considerably, and highly-qualified persons are increasingly mobile. (Ibid., 96-107.)

While there are currently several different patterns of migration, some general tendencies can be identified. Castles and Miller (2009, 4-12) identify six tendencies, which are presented along the same lines in other studies: globalisation of migration, acceleration of migration, differentiation of migration, feminisation of migration, politicisation of migration and proliferation of migration. The results can be seen in the growing ethnic diversity within countries and deeper transnational connections between societies and states. Migration to the OECD countries is currently increasing, most importantly in family and labour migration. Between 2000 and 2006 the increase in the foreign-born population of OECD countries was 18 percent, accounting for 12 percent

of the population in those OECD countries where the statistics were available in 2006. (OECD 2008, 22–24.)

At the same time, there are significant migratory movements between developing countries as well, for instance from Haiti to the Dominican Republic. South-south migration is currently estimated to represent around a third of migration worldwide, while migration from developing to developed countries accounts for 37 percent. Another third moves between developed countries, while 3 percent of international migration is from developed to developing countries. Almost half of all international migrants move within their region, and around 40 percent to a neighbouring country. Geography however is not the only thing that matters, as 60 percent move to a country with same religion and 40 percent to a country with the same dominant language. The number of international refugees is slowly falling, while the number of internally displaced people is growing. (HDR 2009, 21-22; IOM 2010b.)

In general, most people move to a country with a higher level of human development. Emigration is more common from countries with moderate levels of development than from the least developed ones, and migrants do not usually come from the poorest segments of society. There is a strong inverse correlation between the size of a population and emigration. The remoteness of a small country increases emigration even more. Around half of migrants are women, but their share has not increased much during the last decades. However, regional differences in female migration are considerable, and several studies have shown that there are significant qualitative changes in that women are now moving more independently. Temporary or circular flows of people are replacing permanent settlement, yet the exact numbers are difficult to count. Notably, the remittances sent by migrants have grown exponentially from 132 billion US dollars in 2000 to an estimated 414 billion US dollars in 2009, although the percentage of international migrants increased only slightly from 2.9 to 3.1 percent. 76 percent of remittances went to developing countries. Formal and informal remittances could amount to three or four times the official development aid. (HDR 2009, 21-26; IOM 2010a, b.)

At the time of writing, it is too early to assess any fundamental shifts that the global economic crisis, which started in 2008, may have caused. There have not been any

major flows of return migration or decreases in migrants stocks this far. New labour migration and irregular migration have slightly declined while other forms of migration are less affected. The growth rates of remittances have declined, but there is no sharp fall in transfers and the levels of remittances on the whole have been maintained. In the end, the long-term economic, demographic and social factors that cause migration have not changed. (Castles & Miller 2010.)

3.2 Substantially bigger parts of the educated migrate

Consistent data on migration in general, and skilled migration in particular, is limited. In many countries, only permanent residence holders are counted as migrants and therefore exact numbers are difficult to find. The statistics across countries are not harmonised and the estimates of international institutions are often different. Time series of migration are lacking as well as key data on the characteristics of migrants. Even basic questions about the number of people leaving from certain countries to others, or the occupations they take up in receiving countries, often remain unanswered. (E.g. HDR 2009, 28; OECD 2005, 128.) Yet it is known that most countries do welcome highly-skilled migrants, at the very least temporary ones. The 1965 amendments to US immigration legislation first encouraged skilled migration, and soon after Canada and Australia followed. Improvements in educational systems outside developed countries have increased the flows of the highly qualified even more. (Castles & Miller 2009, 63-64.)

Carrington and Detragiache (1998, 1999) estimated in the late 1990s that there is an overall tendency for emigration rates to be higher for the highly educated. The majority of Asian and African migrants in the United States, the single biggest receiving country of migrants in the world, had a tertiary degree and were likely to be more educated than the average population in their home country. Mexico was the largest sending country of all, but a large majority had a secondary school degree and some 13 percent had a tertiary degree. The same pattern applied for Central American countries, while migrants from some of the Caribbean countries consisted mainly of the highly educated. For South America the split between migrants with secondary and tertiary education was almost even.

Overall, skilled working-age people are over-represented in migrant populations. This migrant selectivity reflects the effects of geographical, economic and political barriers that make it more difficult for low-skilled people to move. (HDR 2009, 27.) The tendency is towards increasing proportions of educated migrants. Docquier and Schiff (2009, 20) counted the skilled emigration rate for developing countries in 2000 at 7.4 percent, while the average emigration rate for those countries was only 1.5 percent. Revealingly, the stock of skilled immigrants in the OECD increased by 64 percent between 1990 and 2000 against a 14 percent increase for unskilled immigrants. The vast majority of these educated immigrants come from developing countries. (Beine et al 2008, 631.) Similarly, Kugler and Rapoport (2007, 159) counted that between 1990 and 2000, the number of immigrants in the United States with a primary education decreased by 19 percent and the number of immigrants with a secondary education by 4 percent. On the contrary, the number of immigrants with a tertiary education in the country increased by 44 percent, which points to a clear pattern even if the data of the study only included 55 source countries. Tertiary graduates make up 35 percent of working-age immigrants in the OECD, while they only form 6 percent of the working-age population in non-OECD countries. 71 percent of migrants in developed countries are of working age, while the share in their countries of origin is 63 percent. Emigration rates for skilled workers are higher in smaller countries than in larger ones. (HDR 2009, 27.)

For skilled migrants, an increasingly important way of accessing developed country labour markets is through the “academic gate”; studying at tertiary level in these countries (Castles & Miller 2009, 65; Pellegrino 2001, 117). Especially in developed countries a domestic degree may have a relationship to employment opportunities, as education and degrees are not always easily transferable between countries. In addition, a student visa is most often easier to get than a work visa. A degree in a developed country university is likely to pave the way for better jobs either in the home or the host country. Tellingly, the number of international students in the OECD rose by 50 percent between 2000 and 2005 (OECD 2008, 22-23). In the United States, which is the major destination for international students, the number increased from fewer than 50,000 in the academic year 1959/1960 to a record 672,000 in 2008/2009 (Institute of International Education 2009; Pellegrino 2001, 117). There is no systematic data on stay

rates after completion of studies, but for instance 63 percent of foreign students in doctoral programmes in the United States in 1995 planned to remain in the country (OECD 2008, 23; Pellegrino 2001, 118).

The intensity of brain drain can be measured in absolute or relative terms. In absolute terms, countries with large populations are more affected: Philippines, India, China, Mexico and Viet Nam. The relative brain drain is strongest in countries with a population under four million: Suriname, Haiti, Jamaica and Guyana. The distance from the United States is an additional factor, but historical, cultural, linguistic and colonial ties also explain destination choices. However, the distance from an OECD country cannot alone explain the differences between the emigration rates of countries. The dispersion of brain drain in Latin America and the Caribbean is highest of all regions. Besides countries with populations below four million, the brain drain is particularly high in the Caribbean, Central America, and Eastern, Middle and Western Africa. In general, the highest brain drain rates are observed in middle income countries, and the rates decrease when the size of the population increases. The country size, GDP per capita, inequality and poverty rates all seem to play a role. The relative effects of selection, networks, economic, political, cultural and historical determinants, and their potentially differential outcomes among groups of different skills, need to be analysed in each context. (Docquier & Marfouk 2004, 28-31.)

3.3 Latin American dream: from immigration to emigration

South-North migration continues to dominate migration trends in the Americas, representing the highest South-North migration rate in the world. The South-North figure equals 87 percent of total migration in the region, and the remaining 13 percent of migration is to other Latin American and Caribbean countries, meaning that there is hardly any migration to developing countries in other parts of the world. Practically all Latin American countries experience some movements of people, and many are countries of both emigration and immigration. In 2005, 25 million Latin American and Caribbean citizens lived outside their country of origin, equalling 4 percent of the population in their home countries. The number increased by four million between 2000 and 2005. The reasons to migrate are many, but at least economic crisis, social conflicts,

violence, environmental catastrophes and gradual social and economic changes have shaped the patterns of migration in the region lately. Still, migration from Latin America is these days mainly counted as economic, the number of refugees being comparatively small. Tellingly, remittances received in the region are of increasing importance, amounting to over 60 billion US dollars in 2007, which was over 16 percent more than the previous year. (IOM 2008, 423-427.)

Around three quarters of migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean live in the United States. The United States is the principal destination country of migration in absolute numbers for both the Americas and the whole world. Mexico is the largest single source country, but China, the Philippines, India and the Dominican Republic are important as well. Over half of all the migrants in the United States come from other parts of the Americas. At the same time, other destination countries such as Spain, Japan, Portugal and Italy have become more popular destinations for Latin American and Caribbean migrants during the last 15 years. The increasing inflows of Latin Americans are especially evident in Spain and Portugal. (IOM 2008, 423-427; OECD 2008, 23.)

Latin America and the Caribbean were largely areas of immigration until mid-20th century. Between 1800 and 1970 the region received around 21 million immigrants. The bulk of them came from Southern Europe migrating mostly to the Southern Cone. African slaves were brought especially to Brazil and the Caribbean until the 19th century. In the 19th century there were migrants arriving from China, Japan and the Middle East as well. European immigration waned almost completely in the 1930s due to the economic depression except for Venezuela, which received over 300,000 immigrants in the 1950s. At the same time, intra-continental migratory movements started to develop for instance from Haiti to the Dominican Republic, from neighbouring countries to Argentina, and from Colombia to Venezuela. Labour migration was in the majority. (Castles & Miller 2009, 170-173.)

An economic crisis that started to spread in the 1970s changed Latin America to a net emigration region, increasing migration flows towards the United States and other developed countries. The most important reason was declining economic performance, indebtedness and subsequent employment problems, but causes included population

growth and political instability as well. Latin America had a relatively good average economic growth rate from 1950 to 1978, which was actually higher than the industrialised market economies. A crisis gradually spread through the region when the import substitution model was replaced by free exchange and an opening toward international trade started to take place. Changes in economic models led to major shifts in the labour market, combined with the "debt crisis" and drastic structural adjustment programmes, and caused reductions in the quality of life for large parts of population. (Castles & Miller 2009, 173-178; Pellegrino 2001, 113.)

Besides global economic changes and the so-called push factors in Latin America and the Caribbean, receiving country policies have played an important role. Large-scale migration from the region to the United States started rather late, partly due to restrictive US legislation enacted in the 1920s. Only the law amendments in 1965 removed the discriminatory national-origins quota system, resulting in large-scale migration from Latin America and Asia. In 1990, the Immigration Act was changed again to increase the number of immigrants based on skills, while the family reunification and refugee levels were maintained as well. The temporary labour recruitment programmes and political and military interventions of the United States in Latin America and the Caribbean have played their part as well. (Castles & Miller 1998, 74-85.) While in 1960 one million persons born in Latin America and the Caribbean lived legally in the United States, in 2000 the number was 14 million and in 2008 over 20 million (Pellegrino 2001, 113-114; US Census Bureau 2008a).

Migration from Latin America and the Caribbean towards other countries of the developed world started with refugees and political exiles, and continued later with the extension of citizenship to the European and Japanese emigrants' descendants. Canada and Australia admitted refugees, but skilled migrants as well. (Pellegrino 2001, 113-114.) Currently Spain, Portugal and Italy are some of the main receiving countries, underlining the role of colonial and historical ties. While intraregional migration in Latin America still remains important, emigration flows increasingly towards other continents. Europe has become a major destination due to continuing economic and political instability in the home countries, demand for labour in Europe, stricter immigration controls in the United States and increasingly strong migrant networks. As with global migration tendencies, Latin American migrants are mainly at an

economically active age and have a higher level of education than the population remaining in the home country. (Castles & Miller 2009, 175-177; Solimano 2008b, 22.)

3.4 From isolation towards Dominican York

The Dominican Republic is simultaneously a country of emigration and immigration. While there are variations in statistics, all point to similar patterns. As Dominicans move mainly to the East Coast of the United States and also lately to Spain, Haitians cross the border to the Dominican Republic both legally and irregularly in large numbers (Castles & Miller 1998, 8). Dominican emigration has increased constantly at least for half a century. The official annual migration rate for the Dominican Republic was minus 8,700 between 1960-65, increasing to an annual loss of 30,000 between the years 1995-2000 and maintaining that level ever since (ONE 2009a). The departure rate is estimated to have increased from 2.8 per thousand in 1960 to 105.7 per thousand in 2002. Following the economic crisis between 2002 and 2004 in the Dominican Republic, an expansive cycle in Dominican migration started again. (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 22.) Taking into account the influx of Haitians, irregular Dominican emigration and other statistical problems, the numbers may be much higher. Descriptively, over 49,000 Dominicans received legal permanent resident status in 2009 in the United States alone (U.S Embassy 2010).

A moderate estimate of Dominicans abroad was already close to a million in the year 2000 and is now situated somewhere between one and two million. In other words, 10-20 percent of persons born in the Dominican Republic live abroad. The main destination of Dominican migrants is North America (77.9%), followed by Europe (10.7%), Latin America and the Caribbean (6.4%) and Asia (3.8%). The shares of the United States, Puerto Rico and Venezuela have been slightly declining since 1980 when migration to Europe, and particularly to Spain, started. (Gonzalez-Acosta 2007; HDR 2009, 148; IDB 2004; INDH 2005, 124; Suki 2004, 10.) A moderate estimate of legal Dominican-born residents in the United States was 348,000 in 1990 and 772,000 in 2008. For the same year, 1,330,000 persons were counted to be of Dominican origin. The Dominican Republic is in the top 10 of sending countries for all foreign-born residents in the United States. In 2009 it ranked already fifth in sending legal migrants, just behind Mexico,

China, the Philippines and India, all with populations many times greater than the Dominican Republic. (DR1 20.7. 2010; Grieco 2004; US Census Bureau 2008a, b.) In Spain, the number of Dominicans was 6,700 in 1990, and over 125,000 in 2008. The Dominican community in Spain differs in that it is 61 % female and mainly of rural origin, while migration to the United States is led more by middle-class urban men. (Hoy 14.3.2008; UN-INSTRAW 2006, 24.)

The migratory flows can be explained by historical, political, economic and social factors. Travelling of Dominicans was very much restricted under the dictatorship of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo (1930-1961). He only gave passports and visas to his few trustees, even though some political refugees managed to leave the country as well. Emigration first became significant in the 1960s. Since then, Dominican emigration can be divided into two phases, characterised by different volumes and factors affecting departures from the country. The first period between 1961 and 1979 laid the foundations of modern Dominican emigration when around 300,000 persons moved abroad, mainly to the United States. Dominican-American relations date back to the 19th century when the option of annexing the island to the United States was considered. The United States occupied the whole island between 1916 and 1924. Later, the assassination of the dictator Rafael Leonidas Trujillo in 1961 led to political instability that culminated in a civil war and a military intervention by the United States in 1965. (Haggerty 1989; UN-INSTRAW 2006, 22.)

The fall of the Trujillo dictatorship eased the restrictions on travelling abroad and started a policy of open emigration by the Dominican state that has been in place ever since. The fear of a “new Cuba” and changes in US migration legislation in 1965 also set a policy of open migration policy towards Dominican immigration to the United States. Geopolitical concerns of the United States have been cited by many as an exceptionally clear start of Dominican emigration. Annual migration from the Dominican Republic was only a few hundred persons per year before 1961, but after the fall of the dictatorship it increased to over 10,000 persons per year. During the authoritarian presidency of Joaquín Balaguer 1966-1978 that followed the US military intervention in 1965, Dominicans continued to escape socioeconomic instability and political persecution. Changes in the productive system that led to urbanisation and imbalances in the labour market were other internal factors that played a role in

increased Dominican emigration. (Castles & Miller 2009, 175; Massey et al. 1994, 727-728; UN-INSTRAW 2006, 22.)

The second period running from 1980 to the present marks the consolidation and expansion of Dominican migration. Around one million Dominicans are counted to have left the country during this period. Similar to other countries in the region, changes in the international context and the integration of the Dominican Republic to the world economy resulted in economic restructuring processes. The economic crisis also started because of changes in the United States' sugar import quotas (WB 1990, 122). The economy of the Dominican Republic shifted from an agro-export and import substitution model to one based in services such as tourism and industrial duty-free zones. This caused major changes in the labour market, including increased unemployment. Also, drastic structural adjustment programmes were put in place in the move towards a new economic model, resulting in continued currency devaluation, inflationary processes and eroded public services. Inequality increased and the quality of life was reduced for most Dominicans. During the second half of the 1980s, social protests increased along with economic problems and the largest wave of Dominicans to date migrated between 1987 and 1994. At the same time, the dynamics of the migration process itself started to show especially as families reunited in the United States. (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 22-23.)

During the second half of the 1990s the Dominican Republic experienced significant economic growth rates, which showed in a decreased rate of migration though not in gross departures. More restrictive migration policies in destination countries played their role as well. Still, between 1990 and 2000, the number of Dominican migrants to the United States almost doubled. The economic crisis experienced by the country between 2002 and 2004 started a new wave of migration from the country. The effects of the current global economic crisis cannot be fully assessed yet, but no major declines have been reported in Dominican migration. (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 22-23; US Embassy 2010.)

Migration has had significant effects on Dominican society, demographics, economy, politics and culture. Almost 12 percent of GDP⁴ of the Dominican Republic consists of inflows of remittances, and the country is among the top remittance recipient countries in the developing world. In 2004, 59 percent of remittances originated in the United States, 30 percent in Europe and 9 percent in Puerto Rico. (Dominican Today 10.6.2009; Suki 2004, 10.) Remittances sent by Dominican migrants have been growing constantly for decades. The growth was fairly moderate until 1993, but between 1993 and 2003 the remittances tripled from 721 million US dollars to 2.061 billion US dollars. An estimated 3.414 billion dollars in remittances were sent to the country in 2007. The average money transfer is 289 dollars 12-15 times per year. (HDR 2009, 160; UN-INSTRAW 2006, 28-31.)

Dominican migrants have also traditionally been active in home country politics. One of the main Dominican political parties, Partido Revolucionario Dominicano, was established in New York City in 1940s, and Dominicans are known to campaign in the city. After a rather lengthy campaign by Dominican migrants, the constitutional and legal reform in the mid-1990s gave Dominican citizens living abroad the right to vote and the possibility of dual citizenship. The fact that Leonel Fernandez, the current president of the Dominican Republic, grew up in New York City describes the situation. (Faist 1997a, 213; Gonzalez-Acosta 2007.)

3.5 Latin American and Dominican brain flow

The economic crisis of the 1980s in Latin America and the Caribbean, including the Dominican Republic, and the massive emigration towards the North took much of the academic and political attention for some time. Since the mid-1990s, the intensification of globalisation processes, technological developments and increasing demand for specialised skills have slowly enhanced the interest for skilled migration. (Pellegrino 2001, 114.) Again, the following statistics should be taken as indicative.

Latin America and the Caribbean has turned into the region that sends the most professionals to the OECD countries, and the number is increasing (Listín Diario

⁴ As with other aspects of migration, exact figures regarding remittances vary from one source to another.

20.7.2009). The number of professionals and technicians from Latin America in the United States quadrupled between 1970 and 1990, although the numbers vary greatly between sending countries (Pellegrino 2001, 116). One estimate is that 28.1 percent of Latin American and Caribbean migrants were highly educated in 2000, while the proportion of highly educated workers in the home countries was 11.8 percent. However, the brain drain rate for South America was much lower (5.7%), while the Caribbean had the highest brain drain rate of the world (40.9%), followed by Western Africa (26.7%), Eastern Africa (18.4%) and Central America (16.1%). (Docquier & Marfouk 2004, 16-22).

The Central American and the Caribbean regions have on average the highest overall emigration rates in the world, 17.8 percent for the Caribbean and 15.6 percent for Central America, followed by 6 percent for Southern Europe in the year 2000. The same goes for total migration rates: 13.9 percent for the Caribbean and 11 percent for Central America, followed by 6.8 percent in Northern Europe. At the same time the emigration rates for persons with tertiary education are above 10 percent in all but one of the Central American and the Caribbean countries, in some even 50 percent or higher. (Ibid.)

The emigration rate for the persons with tertiary education in the Dominican Republic (21.7%) was higher than the average for the Central American countries (16.1%), but lower than the average in the Caribbean (40.9%) in 2000. The total migration rate (12.5%) for all educational groups of the Dominican Republic is also just between Central American (11 %) and Caribbean rates (13.9 %). (Ibid.) As in most countries, the emigration of Dominican professionals has been increasing compared to other educational groups. For instance, 19.5 percent of Dominicans admitted to the United States in 2000-2001 were highly skilled, compared to 14.6 percent 1987-1990 (INDH 2005, 131). In 2007, there were 204,000 Dominicans with a tertiary degree residing in the OECD member countries, equalling at least 22 percent of all tertiary level graduates in the Dominican Republic, but even higher levels of brain drain - 28 percent - have been stated in other studies (Hoy 15.5.2010; Listín Diario 4.6.2007, 5.8.2009).

A reason for brain drain may be the “over-education” phenomenon, which means that the ability of national labour markets to absorb professionals does not match the number of graduates, which also affects the level of compensation. This aspect has not been

studied well in Latin America. Besides wage levels, other work conditions and possibilities for social mobility affect decisions to migrate, and the economic crisis that spread across Latin America and the Dominican Republic in the 1980s decreased these possibilities. (Pellegrino 2001, 120-121.) The over-education phenomenon, or mismatch between educational level and labour market, is demonstrated in the Dominican Republic by the fact that unemployment does not really decrease with higher levels of education (INDH 2005, 178).

In general, political and social violence and instability have been significant causes of migration from Latin America, even though the historic context in each country is also important. In the Dominican and other cases, the emigration started with the exodus of the elite opposition that later turned into migrations of greater heterogeneity. In terms of employment possibilities, the increasing number of migrant networks is important. Data that would allow evaluations on whether Latin American skilled emigration is of permanent or transitory nature is scarce. A data set from the mid-1990s suggests that brain circulation is not the predominant model for Latin America, yet besides numbers other linkages should be considered. (Pellegrino 2001, 118-121.) One study estimated that around 80 percent of Dominicans that do their master's degree or doctoral studies abroad do not return, (Listín Diario 3.6.2007) indicating the use of the "academic gate".

4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: MIGRATION IN GLOBALISATION

This chapter presents and discusses the main concepts and theoretical framework used in this thesis. Migration as a research field is intrinsically multidisciplinary as for instance political science, sociology, history, economics, geography, demography, psychology and law are all relevant (Castles & Miller 2009, 21). In order to get more meaningful explanations, migration in this study is related to larger developments in the world, which are captured under the concept of globalisation. Movements of commodities and capital almost always evoke movements of people, which are additionally increased by technologically facilitated global cultural interchange (*ibid.*, 4-5). Although there are different perspectives on globalisation, the link between globalisation, capitalism and migration is increasingly recognised in the literature (Robinson 2003, 270).

4.1 Open-ended globalisation processes move unevenly

Globalisation is a recurrent term with a number of definitions that can be associated with a series of economic, political, social and cultural processes worldwide, including growing global inequality, the impact of free trade, problems of development, and migration flows. The concept of globalisation is intensively debated among scholars, political actors and the general public. The academic field of globalisation studies expanded substantially in the 1990s and has a different emphasis than the more traditional field of international relations. There are plenty of different perspectives on globalisation, yet most seem to agree that the world has become more interconnected in recent years. For globalisation studies, the world is a single interactive system and the focus is on transnational processes, interactions and flows rather than on relations between nation-states. In academic world, globalisation affects all social sciences and humanities. (Appelbaum & Robinson 2005, xi-xiii.)

The temporal dimension of globalisation and the degree to which global integration, including migration, is unprecedented, forms one of the main issues in the academic globalisation debate. Three main approaches can be distinguished. In the first approach,

the globalisation process is nothing new. Rather it dates back at least 5000 years, with a recent acceleration. Hirst and Thompson (1999) offer one of the most cited studies where they argue that global trade, economic integration and international migration were at similar levels already in 19th century. In their view, the importance of nation-states is strengthening in many ways and the events taking place are purely contingent rather than marking structural changes in the world economy. Others argue along similar lines that the current wave of globalisation started as early as the 1830s with peaks in the 1880s, 1920s and today (Appelbaum & Robinson 2005, xv-xvi). An interesting related viewpoint is presented by Nayyar (2009, 41-42), who argues that the past could be a pointer to the future with regard to the role of developing countries in the world economy. He points that the decline and deindustrialisation of Asia, Africa and South-America started in the 1820s, and their economic significance fell sharply from 1870 until 1950. Since 1950, however, these countries have recovered and circa 2005 the significance of South is around same level as in 1870. The changes in the balance of economic power are now visible, yet Nayyar admits the aggregates are deceptive. Much of the increase is attributable to just a dozen countries and economic growth does not automatically translate to development.

The idea about the historic continuity of globalisation is consistent with a second approach, which encompasses many of the world systems theorists. For them, globalisation is associated with the spread and development of capitalism, in which recent developments are just one of many stages forming long cycles in the world economy. (Appelbaum & Robinson 2005, xv-xvi .) In world systems analysis, economy, politics and socio-cultural fields are not separable phenomena. According to Wallerstein (1991), the international economy is a global system made of different production areas that are characterised by different ways of controlling labour. The capitalist process is based on constant technological progress and market expansion. The dynamics of expanding capitalism work by centralising surplus increasingly in the hands of a small number of accumulators, and include structures that motivate technological progress. Capitalist production also includes mechanisms that punish those who do not focus on maximising profits and accumulating surplus. Wallerstein proposes that a future world systems analysis could compare different world systems and the polarising effects of globalisation on different groups of people. (Wallerstein 1991, 228-273.)

Contrary to the other two approaches, in a third approach globalisation is a transformative force and an open-ended contingent historical process. In this approach, globalisation is associated with great social and other changes taking place in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. The rise of transnational actors and institutions is said to fundamentally change the nature of global politics and economics, requiring a more global framework and a move away from the nation-state centric paradigm. (Appelbaum & Robinson 2005, xv-xvi.) All these approaches to globalisation have their strengths. Capitalism has been an international system for a long time and world systems analyses on the connections between economy, politics and socio-cultural fields are valuable. Yet both world systems and historic continuity of globalisation theories often downplay cultural and social factors as well as socially transformative processes currently taking place. On the other hand, nation-states will most probably not disappear either.

Rather, novel forms of interdependence, transnational society, and bilateral and regional cooperation are changing the lives of people and weaving together societies and states (Castles & Miller 1998, 1). The increasing inequalities between and within countries also appear to grow as a result of production, exchange and finance becoming increasingly global (Gwynne & Kay 2004, 7). Globalisation can be seen as a process of risk diffusion on a new scale with uneven impacts across the world. Different processes of globalisation move unevenly, involving some groups more than others and creating new divisions of winners and losers. Governance and the ways groups of people collectively make choices play an important role in how the diverse scenarios of globalisation may become reality. (Garsten & Jacobsson 2007, 143-145.)

4.2 Multiple theories of migration

The unprecedented migration and geographical dispersion of populations since 1945 is one key process that stands out in the dynamics of globalisation (Appelbaum & Robinson 2005, xxiii). There have always been migratory movements, but only during the last decades has migration become a truly global phenomenon when the global supply of migrants started to shift from Europe to developing countries (Massey et al. 1998, 1-2). The individual decisions to migrate can be economic, political, sociological or a combination of different factors. Only some people migrate and they always have a

reason and a destination (Forsander & Trux 2002, 6). However, distinctions between various types of migrations are only relative, since most population movements are indicative of modernisation and globalisation, which are leading to accelerating processes of economic, demographic, social, political, cultural and environmental change. These fundamental societal changes reshape traditional forms of production, social relations, nations and states, leading to migratory movements. Migrations are collective phenomena rooted in these larger developments and should be studied as one facet of societal change and global developments. (Castles & Miller 1998, 22, 29.) Yet, there are many different theories explaining migration, some stressing macro-level push-pull factors, others emphasising micro-level individual decisions. As explained below, most theoretical models capture only parts of reality and therefore need to be combined and compared to find better explanations.

In the neoclassical economic perspective, migration flows at the macro-level are processes of labour supply and demand or processes involving push and pull factors. This approach dates back to the earliest known systemic theory of migration, formulated in the 19th century by geographer Ravenstein on the statistical laws of migration. In this tradition, theories are rather general, stressing the tendency of people to move from low- to high-income areas, or the relation between migration and business cycles. In neoclassical economic models, the global economy is based on the free flow of factors of production, including labour, between countries. Constraining factors, such as legal restrictions on immigration, are treated as mere distortions of the rational market that should be abolished. At the micro-level, neoclassical economic models consider that individuals make rational decisions to migrate in order to maximise the profits of work, know-how or human capital. The reality is though that free movement is only partly true for certain groups in some core countries. There are plenty of inhibiting factors, especially for migration that originates in developing countries. In these theories, the real role of states, history, and cultural and social factors in migration is often downplayed. (Castles & Miller 1998, 20-21; Gwynne & Kay 2004, 11.) At the micro-level, the importance of context, family relations and social safety nets is largely ignored.

If only economic push and pull factor assessment were used, the results would indicate much larger numbers of migrants than exist in reality (Forsander 2002, 83). Wages

worldwide would become more equal, leading towards economic equilibrium in the long run. Push-pull and supply-demand theories fail to explain why migration occurs in some places and not in others with similar conditions. Historically, labour migration has been frequently forced or the migrants have been discriminated against. Neoclassical economic models tend to be individualistic, ahistorical, simplistic and incapable of predicting future movements of people. (Castles & Miller 1998, 21, 49; Robinson 2003, 271.) Empirical evidence shows that emigration rates of people over the age of 15, or of the highly skilled from most developing countries, do not strongly correlate to the unemployment rate or to GDP per capita in purchasing power parity in the country of origin (OECD 2005, 131). Actually, emigration rates are lowest of all for the group of countries with low human development (HDR 2009, 71). Thus, while push and pull factors do explain parts of migration, for people often move seeking better opportunities, there is a need a more historically and socially contextualised framework.

Another important approach to migration is related to world systems theories and could be described as historico-structural. The roots of this approach are found in Marxist political economy, which emphasises the asymmetrical distribution of economic and political power in the world. Movement of capital, goods and labour are seen as intertwined (Ylänkö 2002, 18). Migration is considered to be a way of getting cheap labour for capital, making the rich countries even richer. In this approach, labour migration has played a key role in both colonialism and industrialisation, in population building and in the construction of a capitalist world market. (Castles & Miller 1998, 22-23, 64-65.) Yet, currently globalisation is changing the link between labour and territoriality in important ways. Besides global circuits of capital, globalisation has resulted in all the more global circuits of labour. The circulation of labour becomes increasingly global because of the very dynamics of capitalist development and its expansion to new areas. (Robinson 2003, 270.)

Consequently, an international division of labour is appearing alongside ever more integrated production, exchange and consumption processes as labour migration is linked to economic globalisation in multiple ways. Labour migration and geographical shifts of production present two alternative forms to achieve the optimal mix of capital and labour. (Ibid., 270-273). Growing global inequalities are outsourced to poorer countries or populations by purchasing jobs at a low cost on the global labour market

(UN-INSTRAW 2006, 4). Unlike capital and commodities, the movement of people is very much affected by national borders. In worst cases, a problem between democracy and capitalism may formulate. Besides labour, regulations of economy tend to be more local than capital. Capital can play one state or regulatory system against another, and one group of workers or communities against another. Capital can also use special economic zones to protect its profits, reduce its taxes and avoid national regulations it does not like. (Gill 2009.) Thus, the flows of capital put pressure on the movement of labour while at the same time immigration regulations become increasingly selective (Forsander & Trux 2002, 227).

State policies and controls do not usually prevent the movement of labour, but rather control it juridically (Robinson 2003, 273). Consequently, the flows of migrants are far from even, as much bigger parts of the educated migrate while the least educated stay (Carrington & Detragiache 1998, 3). Legal migration to core countries is often only possible for professionals, highly-skilled and rich people (Gwynne & Kay 2004, 11). At the same time, many have pointed to a trend towards polarisation or *differentiation* of migration in highly specialised activities on the one hand, and personal services and non-skilled areas on the other (Pellegrino 2001, 112). Labour market segmentation is another related feature of many migrant receiving societies (Castles & Miller 2009, 23). Besides class and ethnic divisions, gradual *feminisation* of migration characterises the new global division of labour, as female labour from poor countries tends to be the least expensive. Women need to provide increasingly for the household, as the male role of the economic provider deteriorates especially in developing countries. The incorporation of women to the "productive" market in developed countries has also increased the need to outsource the reproductive work, often to a migrant woman, forming "global care chains". (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 4). In the historico-structural approach, individuals and families decide to migrate when faced with socioeconomic disruptions and hardships. Migration becomes a strategy for survival, which is made possible by labour demand abroad and made viable by the conditions of globalisation. (Robinson 2003, 271.)

All in all, international division of labour, differentiation of migration and labour market segmentation are visible trends today underlining the importance of world systems and related theories. History and structures are important, yet the interests of capital and Western countries should not be seen as all-decisive. For instance, migration policies of

Western countries have often failed to achieve their declared goals (Castles & Miller 2009, 27). People tend to move after better opportunities, which underlines the importance of push and pull factors. At the same time migration still occurs in some places rather than others with similar socioeconomic conditions. Thus, to complement economic and historico-structural theories on migration, sociological theoretical models focus on studying the decision to move and its effects on societies. In social capital theory, the perpetuation of international migration is explained through the growth and expansion of migrant networks (Massey et al. 1998, 220). While the progressive and path-dependent character of migration is rightly stressed in social capital theory, the significant role of states and other structures is largely left out. Whereas the above mentioned theories are not completely incompatible, combining and assessing their validity in each context of migration is important.

4.3 Interplay between micro- and macrostructures in migration systems

Migration systems theory encompasses important traits from all the theories presented above. Migration systems theory has its roots in geography, but lately it has been especially influenced by network theories. The central argument is that migration is closely related to other linkages that develop between different areas in an accelerating process of globalisation. The idea is to examine ties between countries or regions based on links such as colonialism, politics, culture, trade, and investment flows, which underline that migratory movements usually arise from prior links between countries. The emphasis on networks for its part highlights the importance of social ties. In this approach, movement is not a one-time event, but rather a dynamic, complex and self-modifying process influenced by various factors in both sending and receiving societies. The theory suggests that migratory movements should be seen as a result of interacting *macro- and microstructures*, which are linked by a number of intermediate mechanisms, *meso-structures*. Macro- and micro-structures interact at all levels, showing the various sides of a migratory process. (Castles & Miller 2009, 27-48; Faist 1997a, 192; White 2007, 696.)

The lack of satisfactory opportunities in the home country is clearly the main driving force behind growing migration (ILO 2004, 18). Besides wage gaps, international

migration reduces the risks and the capital constraints faced by households in many developing countries. However, economic factors alone are not enough to explain international movement, because economic causes have their roots in social, cultural and political processes and changes. A minority of countries still account for the vast majority of migrants and usually these are not the least developed ones. As receiving countries adjust their policies to changing conditions, potential migrants adjust their strategies to fit the prevailing regulations and rules. Migration is hardly a simple individual decision, but rather a collective action that affects societies as a whole. Migration essentially involves a complex interplay between the agents and geographic, social, economic and political structures. (Castles & Miller 2009, 123; Massey et al. 1998, 8-13.)

Castles and Miller (2009, 21, 30) present the concept of *migratory process*, which intertwines micro-, meso- and macrostructures. The aim is to understand all aspects of the migratory process in relation to political, economic, social and cultural practices and structures. A complex set of factors and interactions leads to international migration and influences its course. Analysis should take into account relevant factors, from individuals, households and social networks, to the nature of economic exchanges, borders and geographical spaces. The concept of the migratory process includes changes in the area of origin, opportunities in the destination area, the development of social networks and other links between the two areas, structures and practices regulating migration and settlement, the turn from migrants to settlers and its differing effects on different societies, the effect of settlement in receiving societies, changes in the sending area due to emigration and return migration, and the development of new linkages between sending and receiving societies.

Castles and Miller (2009, 28) define *macro-structures* to be institutional factors along the key topics of historico-structural approaches: the global political economy, interstate relationships, and the laws, structures and practices of the states. Indeed, the development of production, distribution and exchange in an increasingly globalised economy and the role of states have clearly been important in determining migrations. Faist (1997a, 195) adds the influence of political stability, demographic changes, normative expectations and collective identity to structural factors that affect migration. For instance, cultures of migration have developed in certain parts of the world where

migration is seen as an accepted and desirable way of achieving a better quality of life. While the states and even international organisations and norms play a major role in migration, the declared policies have often been ineffective and failed to achieve their declared goals - one reason being the dynamic nature of migratory processes (Castles & Miller 2009, 27-28). Current political initiatives can roughly be divided between tightening restrictive measures in the receiving countries and the efforts to deal with the South-North divide considered to be the root cause of migration (Castles & Miller 1998, 98). In sending countries, the policies seek to either regulate and control migration or to be proactive and facilitative (HDR 2009, 83).

The definitions of *micro- and meso-structures* vary between different authors. According to Castles and Miller (2009, 28-29) micro-structures are the informal social networks developed by migrants themselves to deal with migration and settlement. Other academics use the term *chain migration* in this context. Castles and Miller only briefly mention meso-structures as individuals, groups or institutions that mediate between migrants and political or economic institutions. Faist (1997a, 196-197) on the other hand argues that social ties that form network patterns and collectives constitute the meso-structures. These social ties vary in density, strength and content. His argument is similar to the social capital theories mentioned above. According to Faist, a meso-level analysis places the focus on how decisions are made in and between groups of people. The emphasis is on the internal dynamics of migration, which can be seen as a “self-feeding process of cumulative causation”.

While meso-structures form the relational context of migration for Faist (1997a, 196-197), micro-structures refer to the individual. At the individual level international movements form a continuum according to the degrees of freedom that individuals have. At one end of the continuum, slaves and convicts would have no decision-making powers, and at the other end there are individuals with a high degree of autonomy based on different resources. The degree of freedom is limited by the relational and structural context. Migration decisions may be taken at different levels by individuals and groups, or they may be imposed by outside collective actors, such as governments. The basic assumption is that both individuals and groups always relate to other social structures along a continuum of degrees of freedom. Importantly, migration is not a straight line interrupted only by external factors. On the contrary, individuals and groups take

advantage of the opportunities offered by macro-level constraints, implying the dynamic nature of migration. Crucially, there is a diversity of local responses to world developments (Sahlins 1985, viii).

Both *cultural and social capital* are important in starting and sustaining migratory networks. According to Castles and Miller (2009, 28-29), cultural capital includes information, knowledge of other countries, and capabilities for organising travel, finding work and adapting to new environment. For them, social capital refers to informal networks and links including personal relationships, family patterns, community ties, and mutual help in economic and social matters. The argument is that the migratory process has internal dynamics based on social networks, which can lead to initially unintended developments, such as permanent settlement of a migrant community in a new country. Faist (1997b, 256) and Massey et al. (1998, 42) specify that social capital exists if social action is facilitated within and between collectives, institutions or networks through mutual trust and the norms of reciprocity and solidarity. Social capital links individuals to social structures and serves to mobilise financial, human, political and cultural capital. The value of networks to potential migrants and the capacity to employ social capital depends on the amount of other forms of capital available to the network participants. Movers with higher amount of human and financial capital tend to depend less on networks. Also, networks may sometimes retard the integration of movers to the receiving society. (Faist 1997a, 199-208.)

The roles of family and community are crucial, as interpersonal links and information are vital resources for migrating individuals and groups. Migration is in many cases made possible by family linkages that provide the financial cultural and social capitals needed. Previous research shows that migration decisions are usually not made by individuals but by families, and migration of a family member is sometimes a survival strategy for the entire family. The family migration decisions are more often made by the elders and especially by the men, while women and younger persons are expected to obey, implying different degrees of freedom in the language of Faist. (Castles & Miller 2009, 28-29.) The period when mobility is desirable varies between cultures, the most obvious being the period of leaving the childhood residential unit. The period may also be different for men and women. (Bjerén 1997, 231.)

The family motivations correspond to an increasing international demand for female labour contributing to *feminisation of migration*. In addition, women are often seen as more reliable in sending remittances and their labour may be more dispensable on a farm. (Castles & Miller 2009, 28-29.) Besides an increase in the number of female migrants, the feminisation of migration refers to the gradual change in women becoming more independent movers. Becoming financially independent and escaping domestic violence are other cited factors behind female migration. Although female migration does have potentially empowering effects, it takes place within a framework of demand for inexpensive labour in the growing service economy of destination countries. Gender roles and inequalities are often used and reproduced at the global level. Also, the more traditional forms of migration strategies such as family reunification or marriage still remain. Importantly, different migration strategies have a differential impact on levels of empowerment. (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 4-5.)

Both Castles and Miller (1998, 2009) and Faist (1997a, b) base their respective theories largely on migration systems theory. The strength of Castles and Miller's version is the concept of migratory process, which encompasses all aspects under one single concept. On the contrary, Faist (1997b, 247-249) presents three concepts to analyse migration. *Migratory space* means the causes or the context of decision-making, which are the sum of personal projects, perceptions and images as well as the structure of opportunities available for potential migrants, linked by intermediate mechanisms such as networks. Decisions are made in the framework of larger aggregates. Life course, the projects potential of migrants, the character of kinship groups and community, and different kind of ties are all relevant. The second concept, *local assets*, means information including economic, cultural, human and social capital which can be non-transferable or difficult to transfer. The third concept is *cumulative causation*, which means the process of migration. The idea is that migration begins structural changes that make additional migration more likely. Hence, the feedback effects of migration on economic, social, cultural and political change are important.

The weakness of Faist's theory (1997b) is the division between causes and the process of migration, which seems a bit arbitrary. Migration is a dynamic process rather than a one-time event, and as a consequence decision-making, motives and access to resources can be difficult to distinguish. At the macro-level, the same structural opportunities and

constraints often affect both the decision-making and the process. Castles and Miller's (2009) weakness on the other hand is the lack specificity in the ways macro-factors shape micro-level decision-making, and the significance of social and political units between micro- and macro-levels. Even though they are without a doubt right in that there are no clear dividing lines between macro-, meso- and micro-structures, the different levels of analysis in migration as presented by Faist (1997a, b) are helpful. At the micro-level, the focus is on individual decision-making, on individuals' motives and access to resources, and on the variety of time-space strategies available to potential migrants. At the meso-level, the focus is on the social relational context of choice, alternatives to geographical movement, and on interactive uses of capital and time. At the macro-level, structural opportunities and constraints and location-specific assets are analysed.

Faist (1997a, b) also aims to explain the reasons behind prevailing immobility while Castles and Miller hardly touch upon the theme. While the analysis of Castles and Miller (2009) is in general comprehensive, it can be criticised for concentrating on labour migration at the expense of other increasingly important migrations, such as those for marriage or studies. Although a short chapter on brain drain is included, the increasing educational level of migrants is mostly left out from the rest of the analysis. Their view on the impacts of migration in both receiving countries and sending countries is rather reserved compared to the Human Development Report of United Nations Development Programme, (2009) where the argument is that migrants tend to benefit from movement and that migrants boost economic growth at little or no cost to locals in receiving countries.

4.4 Chain migration becomes transnational

The terms cumulative causation, snowball effect and chain migration all refer to the tendency of migratory movements to become self-sustaining processes (Castles & Miller 2009; Faist 1997b; Massey et al. 1994). Seeing labour migration as a process of progressive network building helps to explain differential tendencies to move and the enduring character of migrant flows (Robinson 2003, 271). Migratory movements are typically started by an external factor or by an initial movement of pioneers, who have

traditionally been young and male. Once the movement is established migrants tend to follow same paths, relying on the help of family and friends already living in the destination area. The links between the immigrant community and the area of origin may last over generations. The amount of remittances and the number of visits home may decrease, while familial and cultural links stay. Links usually affect both the migrant and the area of origin. (Castles & Miller 2009, 28-29.)

Yet under the same macro-structural conditions, the number of people migrating from similar villages may be very different. Threshold models of collective behaviour can give situation-specific explanations of moving and staying. Decisions to migrate depend on the number or proportion of other potential movers who decide before another stayer does so. The term *relative deprivation* used in the theories suggests that individual and household satisfaction does not only arise from improvement in absolute economic and social status but also from comparison with others in the reference community. Social status and income distribution in the community may change due to migration, which might lead to additional migration. Besides income, relative deprivation can relate to ways of life. (Faist 1997b, 209-211.)

Historically, an *inverted U-shaped curve* has been identified in populations that have made the transition from emigration to immigration. At the same time, cumulative migration experience may take the form of an *S-shaped curve* concerning the percentage and the social diversity of migration. As the networks expand, the costs and risks of migration fall and the migration encompasses more groups in the sending area. Migration also becomes more independent of economic conditions in the receiving country as migrants settle and family reunification becomes more common. There may be spill-over effects to other communities. As virtually all groups are captured by migration, the value of migration declines and the volume of migration declines. When the migrant potential is gradually exhausted, some migrants stay abroad, some return and others stay in between. (Ibid.; Massey et al. 1998, 49-50.)

Transnationalism has become a useful framework for analysing migration after being introduced by Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc in 1994. They argue that the lives and experiences of migrants are not always sharply divided between the home and the host societies. Households, activities, and identities may stretch across borders,

which is facilitated by rapid improvements in technologies of transport and communication. All these different activities are not fragmented but seem to form a single field of social relations, a “transnational social field” as the migrants sustain multiple involvements both in the home and the host societies. (Basch et al. 1994, 5-6; Castles & Miller 2009, 30.) Faist (1997b, 272-273) defines transnational space as relatively permanent flows of people, goods, services and ideas across borders tying stayers and movers in both areas. This exchange is enabled by a multitude of strong, weak and symbolic ties between the sending and receiving communities and regions. This space depends on twofold local assets that are located both in the sending and receiving countries. Transnationalisation of culture takes place when the circulation of people, goods and ideas creates a new transnational culture that combines values, behaviours and attitudes from sending and receiving countries to create a new, largely autonomous social space that transcends national boundaries (Massey et al. 1994, 737).

Migrants may participate at the same time in the social and political life of more than one state, however, individuals, communities and states rarely identify as transnational. Migrants often use the term “home” for their society of origin and identities continue to be rooted in nation-states or areas of origin. These home countries can be perceived as “deterritorialized”. (Basch et al. 1994, 7-8.) Portes (1997, 2009) and Popkin (2004, 1) distinguish between transnationalism from above, which means activities conducted by institutional actors, and transnationalism from below, which means activities by migrants and their home country counterparts putting the emphasis on human agency. In addition, a country’s rank in the world’s geopolitical order can affect the general status of its diaspora, but at the same time different cultural practices such as membership in a clan or ability to invent kinship groups constitute different patterns of transnational involvement. Specification of these different social fields is still needed as well as how they are related to class, gender, age, race and nationality. Categories such as nationality may include extremely heterogeneous groups. (Levitt & Jaworsky 2007, 144.)

Transnationalism has been criticised for being theoretically ambiguous and analytically confusing. The number of migrants involved in transnational activities is not always high and activism correlates importantly with age, gender, and human and social capital. The political and cultural influence of nation-states still remains strong as for instance transnational political activities are linked to the existing political system. Importantly

however, participation in transnational activities and incorporation in the host country do not seem to be incompatible. (Castles & Miller 2009, 32; Guarnizo et al. 2003.) While avoiding an inflationary use of the term transnational, a transnational framework of analysis does usefully underline simultaneity and the importance of two-way linkages. Transnationalism calls for studying not only those who move but also those who stay behind, blurring the distinction between the internal and the external. Even if nation-state borders are a relatively recent phenomenon in human history, governance, social movements, and income-earning do change when they are enacted across borders. Concepts such as identity and democracy must be rethought in response. (Levitt & Jaworsky 2007, 146; Robinson 2003, 272.)

4.5 No simple causality between migration and development

The growing patterns of migration have major implications for welfare and growth in both sending and receiving countries. The relation between migration and development remains nevertheless multifaceted and complicated. The need to tackle poverty is hardly contested, but the concept of development and the ways to pursue it are much debated. The concept of human development put forward by the United Nations Development Programme (2010) places people at the centre of development and presents a welcome alternative for often one-sided economic concepts of development. The idea is “about expanding the choices people have to lead lives that they value” (ibid.). Human development is also intimately linked to human rights, calling for a look not just at development processes but at how these processes are made (UN-INSTRAW 2008, 46).

International migration is an important consequence of the gap in living standards, economic structure, social conditions and political stability between North and South, (Castles & Miller 1998, 104) even though there are major divisions inside these broad groups as well. The global distribution of capabilities is unequal and migration can be a way of expanding the choices people have, but currently the migration opportunities between different groups and individuals vary a lot. Middle-income countries are more likely to send migrants than the poorest or richest ones, suggesting that the absolute level of development matters. This implies that development may first increase emigration, as the inverted U-shaped curve theory also proposes. At the same time,

almost three quarters of international migrants move to countries with higher human development than their country of origin, suggesting that relative development also matters. (HDR 2009, 1-5.)

Emigration can have both positive and negative effects for sending countries. Positive effects include the ease on population pressures and unemployment, as well as remittances. For instance, officially recorded remittances sent by migrants were four times the size of official development aid in 2007. The main negative effects include various kinds of social disturbances and brain drain, which have the potential to halt development. Impacts on income, consumption, education, health and broader social and cultural processes are complex, context-specific and change over time, especially as migrants usually come in large numbers from specific places. It depends on who moves, how they make it abroad and how connected they stay to the place of origin. Even though many migrants face various kinds of problems, most individual migrants do derive significant net benefits from migration. Yet the net impact of migration to sending and receiving communities is less clear. In many situations migration is likely to be of minor importance for the overall development of a country, but this depends on the scale of migration as well as the particular circumstances. The important issue overall is to minimise the disruptive effects of large-scale international migration and enhance its development impact. (Faist 1997b, 269-270; HDR 2009, 1-5.)

Similarly, emigration of the educated has mixed impacts to sending countries. One argument is that migration of the educated, even brain drain, is mainly a positive phenomenon. Larger flows of migrants mean larger flows of remittances, also migrants may return home after acquiring better productive skills, and this may give an incentive for residents of home countries to acquire better skills (Faini 2003, abstract). As emigration raises returns on investment in human capital, it might invite more investment in education with positive future growth effects (Solimano 2008a). Thus, migration can generate employment, accumulate human capital, and result in remittances, diaspora networks and return migration (Katseli et al. 2006, 7).

From an opposite perspective, emigration of the educated is a problem as sending countries lose their most educated citizens. The potential costs for the sending country include loss of skills, loss of ideas and innovation, loss of the nation's investment in

education, loss of tax revenues and loss of critical services in the health and education sectors. Large-scale emigration can also cause regional inequalities, pressures on families, and crime. (OECD 2007, 65.) The impact of migration and remittances on education in the sending country varies, but in general migrants leaving the developing world have a higher level of education and more resources than those who stay (Beine et al. 2008; HDR 2009, 75-80). The recognition of the important role of human capital in development and increasing returns to knowledge raise worries in many migrant sending countries. Low levels of education are a contributing factor of poverty, and many countries aspire for more knowledge-based economies. (Carrington & Detragiache 1998, 4). In countries where the human capital stock is already low, the loss is relatively greater. Developing countries have a greater need for human capital to build both their physical infrastructure and human capital stock. An outflow of educated individuals reduces the stock of human capital with a potentially negative effect on growth and innovation (Solimano 2008a).

The experiences of emigration of the educated vary across regions, but have some general common characteristics as well. Mobility of talent does not solely occur from developing to developed countries, but also between both groups. Worldwide, many migrant-sending countries do not experience high levels of brain drain. The relative size of the educated population in the country and the percentage of population that emigrates matter (Docquier & Marfouk 2004; Beine et al. 2008). For a handful of labour-exporting countries, international migration does cause brain drain. The largest developing countries do not seem to be very much affected, while some of the smallest countries especially in the Caribbean and in Africa suffer from high rates of brain drain (OECD 2005, 134-135). Countries that gain the most from mobility of talent tend to be developed countries. They seem to be also countries that systematically invest in higher education, innovation and research opportunities.

The increasingly global labour market, especially for the educated, is a good example of globalisation creating both new opportunities and new risks. Skilled migration has grown rapidly since the 1980s and is an important element in globalisation. State policies, economic and social considerations are all important. The rise of information technologies and societies has increased the demand for skilled and educated people worldwide. Besides the aspired technical competencies, the ageing population of

developed countries needs to be replaced in the labour market and requires more labour and resources in health care (OECD 2005, 132). Student mobility is closely linked to skilled migration and is usually encouraged by receiving states. Skilled migrants are sought after and they are perceived as bringing economic benefits for the receiving countries. Selective migration policies and better access to information on existing opportunities make educated individuals more mobile than ever before. Many of the highly skilled people also tend to concentrate in "world cities" with attractive income levels and lifestyles. (Castles & Miller 1998, 92.)

Human capital may emigrate when there is not enough reward for talent. Obstacles and the absence of professional tracks as well as poor net incomes are all causes for brain drain. (Solimano 2008a.) Expectations for lifestyles that have globalised in significant ways are also important. Purchasing power reveals an additional cause of migration of the educated. Education is partly, but not entirely, international capital, pointing to the importance of local assets. Migrating to a country without real possibilities to use a person's human capital is waste of talent. Then again, a pay that is rather low by the standards of the receiving country may allow for a better standard of living than in the country of origin, which may form an incentive to migrate. Nevertheless, the relationship between the probability to migrate and the status of the educated in the salary scales in the country of origin seems inconclusive, as situations vary widely. Yet emigration to developed countries has become a promising alternative especially for the middle class with a high educational level that has often seen social mobility blocked in significant ways in the country of origin. (Pellegrino 2001, 120-121.)

Of course, any individual decision to migrate is affected by the larger context of financial means, legal ways, employment opportunities and personal contacts. Public services and infrastructure, security, conditions of the labour market, the educational system and employment of family members are other important factors that can affect migration decisions. As is the case with all migrations, at least some of the educated should not leave only or even mainly due to economic reasons. Lack of social, cultural and physical infrastructure could play a role. A very uneven society could lack career opportunities and might be a less intellectual or innovative environment than a more just and educated one. This is assumedly the case especially for the middle class, which is

more vulnerable to economic, social and political instability than the richest part of the society.

In any case, the rights and freedom of individuals to opportunity and to leave one's country outweigh the rights of states that educate them. Even if international migration cannot guarantee development and economic growth in sending countries, contributions in remittances, investments, tourism and easing unemployment can be significant (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 73). Properly managed migration has the potential to create gains for sending and receiving countries and the migrants themselves. However, an important qualification is that over-reliance on labour export has historically not yielded good results, as migration cannot be a substitute for a wider development policy. Migration and development policies should be coherent with other important policy areas such as trade and investment. (Massey et al. 1998, 291.)

Remittances can have various positive effects for the recipient country, but these are often quite short term. Low-skilled migration can have a pro-poor impact as these migrants tend to come from disadvantaged families (Katseli et al. 2006, 10). Currently however, receiving families are often the wealthier segments of population, individual remittances decrease over the migrant's time abroad and require constant flows of emigration, and more than half of remittances are used for basic commodities, which is not macroeconomically effective. (Tanner 2005, 55–56.) The total indirect effect of remittances on growth largely depends on the type of emigrant leaving the home country. The more highly skilled the migrant is the larger is the adverse growth effect. (Solimano 2003, 7.) There is little evidence showing that the highly-skilled composition of migration would have a positive effect on educational achievement or a higher flow of remittances (Faini 2003, 1). A recent study on 76 low- and middle-income countries actually concludes that countries exporting a large share of educated migrants receive less per capita remittances than countries exporting a larger share of low-skilled migrants (Adams Jr. 2009, 98-99). Finally, remittances are private money and must not be used as a substitute for state responsibility to create conditions that allow people to stay in their home country (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 73).

The effects on both sending and receiving societies are always more than just economic, because migration reshapes social and demographic structures, political institutions and

cultures. Mobility has the potential to affect social and political life in the country of origin. Migrants and their descendants may return and engage in politics and civic affairs with new values, expectations and ideas. Or, migrants may affect patterns of participation through investment, visits or collective initiatives. There is evidence that emigrants have spurred more rapid democratic reforms in countries which have sent students to universities in democratic countries. In general, individuals that have more connections to international migrant networks participate more in local community affairs, are more supportive of democratic principles and are more critical of their own country's democratic performance. (HDR 2009, 77-83.)

Current estimations show that around 75-80 percent of all migrants from developing countries stay in the host country. The rate is fairly similar for the highly skilled, yet there are significant variations between countries of origin. (OECD 2008, 172-177.) Return flows of people and capital have the potential to balance the negative effects of migration as well as contribute to development in its own right. Diasporas can play a key role in creating long lasting links between the two areas that promote trade and investment flows (Katseli et al. 2006, 9). Temporary or virtual returns could also promote the transfer of skills and technology. Reinforcing ties could support development processes and eventually help return migration. (OECD 2008, 26; Solimano 2008a.) Developed countries could also facilitate *circular migration* for instance through visa policies, flexible employment schemes, transferability of pension benefits, and incentives to participate in temporary return migration programmes (Katseli et al. 2006, 10). The right mix of domestic policies and international co-operation plays a key role by attempting to create opportunities for research, innovation and entrepreneurship. Besides increased contacts between sending and receiving countries, it is important to systematically invest in education and career possibilities. In the best cases, brain exchange can refine know-how and increase employment and productivity of work. The point is to transform brain drain into a brain bank. (Cervantes & Guellec 2002.)

In the long run, addressing the underlying structural problems will be of utmost importance. Individual and local developments are very much affected and constrained by structures. Blaming brain drain on migrants themselves for instance ignores the structural problems, such as inadequate financing and weak institutions. Many of the

educated migrants would not necessarily have had great opportunities to work in their field at home (OECD 2005, 133). Instead, the sustainability of development models need to be assessed, structures do need interventions to allow for better opportunities locally, the role of public institutions must be enhanced, and a transnational perspective is needed to correctly address migration in places of destination and origin as well as globally. Migrants' possibilities to help development in the country of origin should be improved and encouraged. As remittances do amount to large sums of money, more reliable and formal lower-cost transmission channels would make sending remittances more beneficial. Initiatives in promoting investment possibilities and engaging migrants in development projects should also be developed. Migrants should be seen as subjects that in their part constitute development, decide over it and benefit from it. International migration can complement development when well-managed and should be mainstreamed to national development agendas. (HDR 2009, 3-5; UN-INSTRAW 2006, 79; UN-INSTRAW 2008, 30-34.) The overall development potential of migration is dependent on how the structural factors will enable or constrain development.

5 RESEARCH METHODS AND MATERIAL

5.1 Migration of the educated middle class

Migration and mobility touches the life of an increasing number of Dominicans and is changing the country in many ways. In previous chapters, I have presented Dominican migration in relation to worldwide developments and developed a theoretical framework for this study. In this chapter, I will present the research material and methods, which are followed by analysis and results in the next chapter. Studying migration and mobility of the educated from a subject's point of view to find motivations and explanations is significant. Individuals constitute larger patterns and mould structures yet at the same time their choices are affected by the surrounding context. Giving voice to these individuals and taking into account the subjective actors is important. At the same time, the aim is to link these micro-perspectives to global structures and processes.

International migration consists disproportionately of the educated. Even though many different patterns can be seen, international migration is increasingly a South-North and an East-West phenomenon. Migrants always have a reason and a destination and they tend to come from certain places in large numbers. There are qualitative studies on Latin American and Caribbean migration, and there are quantitative studies on the migration of the educated. The two topics have rarely been combined. To create a deeper understanding and generate new knowledge on the subject, I have focused on the Dominican case, which could however contribute to the perception of similar processes elsewhere. The case of the Dominican Republic is compatible with both Latin American and Caribbean countries and has the potential to provide insight into phenomena that other countries face, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean (Gonzalez-Acosta 2007).

5.2 Methods and material

The focus of this thesis is on qualitative interviews that reveal the subject's point of view and give a fuller understanding of migration and mobility of the educated. The aim is to find important and meaningful points of those that move. According to Guarnizo

and Smith (1998, 26), qualitative methods can give a deeper and fuller understanding whereas quantitative methods help to present wider evidence. Qualitative research is worthwhile when the research problematic aims to reveal how an individual or a group experiences, perceives, and understands, or what they intend to express through a phenomenon, an object, an incident, an action or a practice. The aim can also be to find out what an individual or a group intends, wants, wishes or is afraid of in relation to a phenomenon, or what they believe, think or know about it. (Ruonavaara 2008.) This thesis matches very well to these descriptions as the aim is to discover and explain individual and societal motivations of young educated Dominicans when making migration decisions.

Thematic interviews are the main method and material used in this thesis, for they are well equipped to reveal new aspects and shed light on the active agency of the subjects. In social sciences, issues are so multidimensional that flexibly using multiple methods gives better information. (Hirsjärvi & Hurme 1982, 8.) Therefore besides the thematic interviews, four expert interviews, some newspaper articles, and earlier research relevant to the subject are extensively used for the analysis. Eight of altogether ten thematic interviews were carried out in December 2009 and January 2010 in the Dominican Republic, and two were conducted online during the spring 2010. One of the online interviews was a repetition of an interview carried out first in the Dominican Republic, which however was destroyed due to technical problems. The thematic interviews last between 20 and 70 minutes. All of them were recorded. The aim was to have the interviews in a peaceful environment, which however did not always prove successful. All the on-the-site thematic interviews were either held at the interviewee's workplace (4) or in a café (4) to make it as easy as possible for the interviewees. However, workplace interviews included people coming and going or the phones ringing in a couple of the cases. In cafés the surroundings were sometimes noisy.

The Christmas time was chosen for the visit as it is the time when migrants are most likely to visit their home country. The common qualification was that all the interviewees had a tertiary degree or were studying at a tertiary level and were between 20 and 33 years of age. Including different age groups and generations would have provided more of a historical perspective, which certainly is of interest, but would have made the analysis thinner, provided the limited space of a master's thesis. Also, the

stages of the life cycle have an important impact on economic and social position as well as culture and consciousness (Castles & Miller 1998, 36). The period when migration is desired varies between cultures, but in general migrants tend to be fairly young and at the age of being economically active (Bjerén 1997, 231; HDR 2009, 27). Four of the interviewees were women and six were men, to allow for a fairly balanced view in terms of gender. Four of the interviewees were Dominican migrants residing outside the country and six were Dominicans that had lived abroad, but later returned to the Dominican Republic.

Name	Gender	Age	Origin	Destination	Returned
Carmen	F	32	Capital	Argentina, Spain	Yes
Carolina	F	30	Santiago	US, Spain	Yes
Ana	F	29	Moca	Spain, US, Costa Rica	Yes
Vanessa	F	20	Capital	US	No
Juan	M	33	Capital	US, Brazil	Yes
Ivan	M	29	Capital	Canada	No
José	M	28	Capital	US, Germany	No
Cristian	M	28	Capital	Germany	Yes
Eduardo	M	29	Capital	Spain, UK	No
Daniel	M	27	Capital	Italy, France	Yes

Table 2 Characteristics of the interviewees.

Besides the thematic interviews, four expert interviews were conducted while in the Dominican Republic. I started my fieldwork by interviewing the experts to correctly set the scene before the thematic interviews. The experts were long term migration researchers or experts currently working in the International Organization for Migration, the United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women, and the Observatory of Migrants in the Caribbean. The discussions with the experts proved very useful in providing new ideas and helping to figure out the greater picture. The existing quantitative data as well as other relevant studies were revised and analysed to frame the thesis appropriately. I collected newspaper articles on Dominican migration from two main sources to get more information on the subject. The articles are from the online versions of two leading Dominican newspapers, *Listín Diario* and *Hoy*, from the period between 2007 and 2010. The search words ‘migration’ and ‘brain drain’ were used to find the appropriate articles in the online databases of the newspapers.

In addition to the thematic interviews, expert interviews and collection of written material, I had the chance to talk freely with dozens of persons on emigration and other topics related to my thesis while in the Dominican Republic. These persons included experts, migrants, foreigners living in the country, and Dominicans with different backgrounds. These conversations gave me additional valuable information that increased my understanding of the dynamics in the Dominican Republic. Of course, these kinds of conversations and observations heavily involve the person of the researcher. The findings and experiences are subjective and depend on the particular context, background and personal characteristics of the researcher. However, to get an extensive and multifaceted picture on the subject, the researcher should aim at a comprehensive experience and interpretation. These conversations helped in any case the process of interpretation, creating a deeper understanding of the context and therefore deserve to be mentioned. I have also lived for over a year in the country previously, which has increased my understanding of the dynamics in the country.

Interview classification is based on the degree the questions are structured and standardised before the actual interview takes place. Thematic interviews are a type of qualitative interview that do not require a shared experience, but stress the interviewees' world of experience and their own explications of the situations. The aim is to give voice to the research subjects. Thematic interviews also take into account the fact that the interpretations and meanings people give to different things are vital. Thematic interviews are half structured and therefore give the possibility to explore in more detail themes that can come up during interviews and might be of importance for the research. A list of themes assures that the same themes are talked through with all the interviewees. However, the interviewer also has the freedom to invent and explore questions that can help to depict certain issues. The questions in thematic interviews can be divided roughly to two categories, factual and opinion questions. (Hirsjärvi & Hurme 1982, 35-45.) In this research, questions have the traits of both categories (see: annex 3).

The themes and questions of the thematic interviews in this thesis were derived from my aim and research questions, which are based on previous research and common sense. The concept of the migratory process is useful for it sums up the complex sets of factors and interactions that lead to international migration and influence its course. Previous research underlines that macro-, meso- and micro-structures are linked at all

levels and that no single cause can be sufficient to explain migration. (Castles & Miller 2009, 30.) I started the interviews by presenting myself and explaining the purpose of the study and the confidential character of interviews. I then asked the interviewees to present themselves, making additional questions when needed. The interviews then covered motivations for leaving and returning, migration processes, transnational practices, views on Dominican migration and the home country policies, and the future. I operationalised each theme into more specific questions, which I asked when needed to make sure that roughly the same areas were covered in the interviews (see: annex 3). The interviews did not always proceed in the same order, as interviewees took up different themes on different points.

The researcher should critically reflect upon the reliability and validity of the research. Reliability refers to the consistency of the study, i.e. the degree that the procedure of making this study and the methods used are reliable. To tackle this, the procedure of making this study and the methods used are described as detailed as possible in this chapter. Validity on the other hand is about the accuracy of the study, i.e. am I really studying what I mean to. As the number of interviews could not be very high in the scope of this research, the points may not be generalisable. However, they should reveal some interesting motivations and valuations that most probably are not entirely unique as human beings are social animals. I used other material and previous studies besides the thematic interviews to increase the validity of the research, and attempted to critically reflect upon the results and the way the study was conducted.

The interaction between the researcher and the interviewees should also be analysed at least to some extent. In general, an interview is defined as a discussion that is designed in advance and has the specific aim of acquiring systematic information (Hirsjärvi et al. 2007, 202-203). All the interviews were different, depending for instance on how our interaction developed and the concrete surroundings. Some of the answers were long and a few may even have provided certain therapeutic meaning for the interviewees themselves. Other interviews were more difficult to start; two of the interviews for instance turned out much shorter (20 min) than the rest. These two interviewees seemed shy and I was not able to relax the situation the way I was hoping. This may also reflect the fact that especially qualitative interviews are not always successful in getting answers that would be long or detailed enough for a profound analysis.

However, most of the interview situations were quite relaxed. I was around the same age as the interviewees and we knew persons in common. The interviews were carried out in Spanish, which was the native language of all the interviewees. Getting an interview organised was not always easy in practise and more time in the Dominican Republic could have been beneficial. However, when managing to organise the time and the place, basically all the interviewees had a very positive attitude and helped me in finding more possible interviewees. They seemed to appreciate the idea of collecting their experiences and ideas about emigration and Dominican society in general. The fact that the respondents were highly educated may certainly affect their ability to analyse their own situation as well as the situation in the Dominican Republic rather analytically. On the other hand, I had to be careful to try to maintain sufficient analytical distance.

As a situation of communication, an interview is characterised by content designed in advance, by being non-spontaneous and asymmetrical, and by having a discussion that diverges from certain norms of discussion (Ruonavaara 2008). I used my personal contacts to find the interviewees, hoping the fact that we know the same persons would help to build confidence between myself and the interviewees. I acknowledge that my position as a white European and educated woman may affect the interview situation and may also reflect a difference in power. However, cultural, social and power differences were hopefully at least diminished for the interviewees who were highly educated and had lived abroad. I had also lived with a local family in the Dominican Republic for a longer period, which should help both the communication and interpretation of the material. Still, it needs to be taken into account that besides interview situations, my cultural perceptions may have affected the assumptions and interpretations I have made in my analysis. In addition, the interviews that were carried out online may have had a different way of interaction than face-to-face interviews. However, as they were oral interviews as well, I hope the fact we were not face-to-face did not affect the content critically.

There is a possibility that interviewees prefer to give socially acceptable answers (Hirsjärvi et al. 2007, 201). On the one hand, the confidential character of this thesis should not point that way. On the other hand, interviewees may prefer to give a certain impression in their answers. I also noticed that the interviewees did give some

contradictory answers. That might reflect the multiple and sometimes contradictory identities that subjects have. As the answers were autobiographical, they reflect the cultural constructions the subjects have, for instance concerning credible and socially acceptable ways of life. The answers are also personal, reflecting the cultural conception the person has of the self and the life lived. The interviewees may shape their answers to match their own conception of how they themselves want to be presented.

5.3 Analysing the material

The analysis of the interviews is of course affected by the chosen method. Yet interviews are not necessarily qualitative or quantitative by nature, but rather they can be used qualitatively or quantitatively. In quantitative use, interviews are revised to measure results, while in qualitative use, as in this thesis, interviews are revised to text. (Ruonavaara 2008.) I made the first comments and notes right after the interviews when the interview situation was still fresh in my mind. I recorded the thematic interviews on my minidisc player. Later, I transcribed the whole interviews to written form. The two shorter interviews are 2 pages in written form while the rest of the interviews are between 5 and 12 pages. I listened to all the interviews through another time to check the transcription and then returned to work on the theoretical and analytical concepts in order to analyse the interviews in a more systematic way.

The analysis was done by an ad hoc use of different approaches and techniques for generating meaning. I read the interviews several times and divided the texts by themes, combining the specific answers to larger patterns. In qualitative use themes, types, categorisations and phases of processes can be searched for (Ruonavaara 2008.) In this thesis, I made comparisons between the answers, noting patterns and differences, but the main focus was on themes. In the analysis proper, the aim was to develop the meanings of the interviews by illuminating the subjects' own understandings, to analyse them with the help of theoretical perspectives and other material used in this study, and to provide my perspectives on the phenomena. Direct quotes, although translated into English, are presented under each theme to illustrate the findings. Some repetitive words were also cleaned up. To respect the confidentiality of the interviewees, interviewee names have been changed.

6 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

In this chapter, I will analyse the thematic interviews with the help of expert interviews, previous studies and newspaper articles. First, I will present a profile of the persons interviewed in light of general Dominican migratory tendencies and global migratory developments. Second, I will analyse the context and causes of migration. Third, I will explore the decision-making process, and fourth, views on returning to the Dominican Republic. Fifth, I will go through the transnational practices of the interviewees. Sixth, I will explain the feedback effects of migration in the Dominican Republic, and seventh, the formation of a culture of migration in the country. Finally, I will go through the future plans of the interviewees as well as their views on the future of the Dominican Republic.

6.1 General tendencies in Dominican migration

The experiences of migrants are heterogeneous in terms of class, race, age and gender. Nevertheless, the status of the Dominican Republic in the world geopolitical order affects the status of the Dominican diaspora in general. (Levitt & Jaworsky 2007, 144.) Simultaneously, global processes also influence the way Dominican migration develops. Although this study is not quantitative in nature, going through the general characteristics and tendencies of Dominican migration helps to situate the interviews into wider Dominican and global processes.

Five of the altogether ten persons interviewed in this study have been living in the United States at least for a while. Although there has been a slight decline in the share of Dominican migrants whose destination is the United States during the last decades, around three quarters of Dominican migrants still reside in the country (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 24). The share is similar to other Latin American and Caribbean migrants. Multiple types of events initiated by historical connections and deepened by globalisation and existing networks make sure that migrants tend to follow beaten paths. In general, long-standing migratory patterns persist and appear in new forms alongside with new flows of migrants (Castles & Miller 2009, 9-10). Dominican migration to the

United States represents a half-century long migratory pattern alongside with new destination for Dominican migrants.

The other destinations of the interviewees are located in Europe and the Americas. Four interviewees have been living in Spain, two in Germany, and one each in France, Canada, Brazil and Costa Rica. With regard to the long-standing Dominican migratory pattern towards the United States, the tendency towards *globalisation of migration* or *diversification of destinations* is clear. The share of Europe, and particularly Spain, as a destination of Dominican migrants has increased during the last decades (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 24). Following the basic assumption of migration systems theory that migratory movements arise from prior links between countries, historical ties and language are obvious reasons for increasing migration from Latin America towards Spain, as the country is not the closest or the richest possible destination. The economic crisis of the 1980s in Latin America, visa-free entrance of Dominicans to Spain until 1993 and demand for labour started the migration, which later became sustained through network formation.

The global tendency towards the *acceleration of migration* is also present in the Dominican Republic. The current estimations of Dominicans abroad vary between one and two million, equalling 10-20 percent of the population born in the Dominican Republic. In 1960 there were a little more than 10,000 Dominican-born migrants in the United States; in 2008 a moderate estimation was 772,000 and some 91,000 irregular migrants. In Spain, the number of Dominicans increased from 1,000 in 1980 to 125,000 in 2008. (Hoy 14.3.2008; IDB 2004; UN-INSTRAW 2006, 24; UN-INSTRAW 2010, 14; US Census Bureau 2008a, b.) However, international migration is not an unavoidable process as the economic crisis that started in 2008 shows. Globally, new labour migration and irregular migration have fallen, but not stopped. Due to the global scope of the crisis and fear of difficult re-entry, no substantial increase in return migration has been reported either, and migrant stocks in destination countries remain almost the same. (Castles & Miller 2010, 1-10.)

During previous recessions, the only migrants likely to return were those with skills and employment prospects elsewhere, and with a legal status. Family reunification migration, the largest single entry category in OECD countries, does not seem to be

substantially affected by the economic crisis. (Ibid.) This is also relevant in the Dominican case, as in Spain more than half of the visas issued to Dominicans were due to family reunification already in 1999 (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 25). Only nine Dominicans instead of an initial estimate of 20,000 were reported to have returned from Spain as part of the country's voluntary return plan (Hoy 29.10.2009). The permanent resident statuses given to Dominicans in the United States have not declined either (US Embassy 2010).

The interviewees come from a rather uniform category of university level students or graduates. All but the youngest of the interviewees have a tertiary degree from the Dominican Republic and they all have a middle-class or upper middle-class background in the Dominican context⁵. Around a quarter of Dominicans with a tertiary degree are estimated to live outside the country, and emigration of Dominican professionals has increased in comparison to other groups (Hoy 15.5.2010; ILO 2004, 20; INDH 2005, 131). In general, Dominican migrants have completed more education than the national average, which is a global tendency. Dominican migrants also come primarily from middle-class households, underlying the fact that globally migrants do not usually come from the poorest segments of society. (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 24.) The particularity of the group which the interviewees represent, is that they are in a more favourable position with regard to migration possibilities than poorer segments of society. Due to the selectivity of migration policies and capital needed for migration, persons with tertiary education are more easily able to migrate and to use global structures for their benefit. They may also have better possibilities to influence and control the processes, which makes their interaction with structures of special interest.

At the same time, the global trend of *differentiation of migration* is present in the Dominican context. There is growth in Dominican irregular migration and trafficking on the one hand, but increases in the quality of employment of migrants on the other (INDH 2005, 144). In 2000, 17 percent of Dominicans in the United States were categorised as highly-skilled. At the same time, Dominicans had the highest poverty rates among the main Latin American migrant groups in the United States, with almost 28 percent living below the poverty line. (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 24.) The differentiation

⁵ The interviews did not include questions on class identity, but this categorization is based on my own perceptions based on educational level, income, lifestyle etc.

of Dominican migration reflects the fact that the economic situation in the Dominican Republic has not improved for most people while the receiving-country policies have become stricter and more selective (Wooding 15.12.2009).

The inverted U-curve theory proposes that development first increases possibilities for migration and later diminishes migration when incomes in the home country increase enough. One could speculate that the Dominican Republic would now be close to the top of this curve as increases in the annual volume of emigration have slowed down. As the S-curve theory proposes, the percentage of Dominicans abroad is still increasing as well as the social diversity of Dominican migration, which shows in the differentiation of migration. However, the increasing number of professionals does not entirely match the S-curve theory, in which migration selectivity is supposed to become less important over time (Massey et al. 1998, 271). A new expansive cycle in Dominican migration started following the economic crisis in 2002-2004, which shows that these curves may well take different turns.

Feminisation of migration refers to the gradual and consistent rise in female migration, which can be seen in many countries across the world, including the Dominican Republic. The proportion of female migrants from the country started to increase in 1980s, and in 2002 over 52 percent of Dominican migrants were women (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 24). The feminisation of migration refers also to the qualitative changes in migration as more women leave alone or independently instead of following their families. As explained in the theoretical framework, reasons for this are at least the changing labour markets and the new global division of labour, which still tend to follow gender lines. (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 2008.) The four women interviewed in this study are rather independent movers in that none of them was following their family. Yet two of them relied initially on the financial help of their families, which implies a sort of dependence on the family especially during the decision-making process.

The evidence on the empowering effects of migration is mixed. Gender inequalities may be reproduced at the global level, which in the Dominican migratory context is manifested in the presence of global care chains, trafficking and sex work (Gallardo Rivas 16.12.2009). For instance, Dominican women working in Hispanic-owned firms in New York City were found to have low wages, few benefits, and limited career

opportunities, reproducing their social disadvantages. By the contrary, in the Dominican village Miraflores, where two thirds of the families send members to Boston, women's roles changed for the better in both Boston and Miraflores. (HDR 2009, 51, 79). In this study, the women interviewed consider that having professional experience from abroad has widened the options they have. This suggests that the empowering effects of migration have to do with the socioeconomic background and educational level as well.

The Dominican Republic is mentioned by Castles and Miller (2009, 12) as one of the countries experiencing a *proliferation of migration transition*. This takes place when traditional emigration countries become countries of transit migration and immigration as well. So as over one million Dominicans live abroad, an estimated one million Haitians live in the Dominican Republic. Moderate Haitian migration started in the late 19th century, when seasonal workers were needed in sugar cane fields. (Haggerty 1989; Pena 2007.) The intense internal conflicts and disasters in Haiti make sure that Haitian migration towards the Dominican Republic is unlikely to slow down any time soon. In addition, a policy of open doors and loopholes in immigration regulations have made the Dominican Republic into a migrant transit country (INDH 2005, 131).

The *growing politicisation of migration* has a twofold meaning in the Dominican Republic. This politicisation signifies that domestic politics, relationships between countries, and national security politics of states are more and more influenced by international migration (Castles & Miller 2009, 12). On the one hand, the Dominican state has not come very far in formulating explicit policies towards the emigration of Dominicans. The politics of the Dominican state on migration continue to be reactive, rather short-term and discontinuous, lacking integrity and explicitness. (INDH 2005, 144.) On the other hand, immigration of Haitians to the Dominican Republic is very much politicised and remains a hot topic both nationally and internationally. Whether or not the Haitians in the country have their papers in order, their discrimination is internationally acknowledged, and demonstrated for instance in an Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruling against the Dominican state. The most notorious examples are illegal mass deportations and a growing problem of stateless persons born in the Dominican Republic, but not given a legal status. The Dominican state even seems to fan discrimination through migration legislation, which is blamed for its anti-Haitian design. (IPS 21.3.2007; UN News Centre 30.10.2007.)

The *young age of migrants* is the predominant trend in the Dominican Republic (Gallardo Rivas 16.12.2009; INDH 2005, 131). The interviewees had also left the country rather young, before the age of 30. The situation in life, the life course, impacts migration. The length of the period when mobility is desired varies culturally and there are different mobility points along the life-course. (Bjerén 1997, 231.) Economic and employment opportunities are important motivations to migrate, and insertion to a new labour market tends to be easier at a younger age. None of the interviewees were married by the time of migration, which also indicates that mobility is desired at this specific stage in life in the Dominican Republic. Even if the existence of transnational families is more and more recognised, local ties, such as location-specific forms of reproduction, may decrease the probability of migration (Faist 1997a, 155).

Direct migration is another trend present in the Dominican context (Gallardo Rivas 16.12.2009). Many Dominicans living in the rural areas move directly abroad instead of first moving to urban areas in the country (e.g. UN-INSTRAW 2006, 59). This would be contrary to the more traditional view of migration in steps (Castles & Miller 2009, 4). Direct migration cannot really be assessed in the interviews because eight of the interviewees come from the Dominican capital Santo Domingo and one from the second city of the country, Santiago. The only person coming from a smaller village had first moved to Santiago to study before moving abroad. Rather than direct migration, the origins of the interviewees highlight the fact that two thirds of Dominican migrants come from urban areas. The geographical origins of the interviewees are clearly partly due to my contacts in the country, but might indicate the geographical inequalities in wealth as well. The capital region and the region around the second city, Santiago, are the wealthiest regions of the country. The urban areas have sent the most migrants to the United States while the poorer South Western parts of the country have experienced large-scale female emigration towards Spain. (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 2010.)

6.2 Context of migration

...immigration policies in OECD countries tend to favor better-educated people, which may explain why the *educational composition* of total migration is skewed toward the better educated but cannot explain why so many skilled workers are willing to leave developing countries. Wage differentials may be part of the explanation, but this raises the question of what accounts for such differentials. Differences in the quality of life, educational opportunities for children and job security may also play

a role, as may the desire to interact with a broader group of similarly skilled colleagues. (Carrington & Detragiache 1999.)

As the above citation illustrates, the way in which determinants of migration at a large scale are related to people's perceptions and motivations is an entirely open question (Bjerén 1997, 238-239). The causes of migration are comprised of structural, community and individual factors that are all interrelated. Macro-structures form the necessary conditions for migration while meso-structures help to explain who actually moves (*ibid.*, 220). In this chapter, micro-structures, meaning individual factors and personal motivations to migrate, are discussed in the wider Dominican context of migration.

While reasons to migrate are multifaceted and complex, better future employment opportunities and the related income security stand out as among of the main motivations to move abroad for all the persons interviewed in this study. The economic push factors in the Dominican Republic are still very much the same as they were back in the 1960s, if not more intensified due to the economic crisis. The economic situation in the country for most people is still not very promising. (Wooding 15.12.2009.) The motivations of the interviewees are not directly linked to immediate survival, as is often the case in poorer segments of society (Castles & Miller 2009, 29; Robinson 2003, 271; UN-INSTRAW 2006). Rather, the idea of having better and more opportunities is important. José illustrates:

The positive above all is that my horizon, my opportunities were going to expand. Right now, I have a degree and, for instance, wherever I would go that I studied in INTEC [university] in the Dominican Republic, no one...It is, and then? But now I already have a degree that in any country of the world that I take it with me, and the people, I mean, any company, I mean I have a certain backing, academic at very least, and that opens horizons. (José, 28, re-migrated to Germany in 2006)

Like José, the interviewees migrate to have a more certain future in the labour market, either in the Dominican Republic or abroad. In general, finding a "decent livelihood" is an important motivation to migrate yet its definition varies according to who is looking. For a Southern professional, training abroad can give qualifications with high value at home, but also the potential for return to the training country. (Bjerén 1997, 239.) Contrary to what one might expect, unemployment does not really decrease with the level of education in the Dominican Republic. People with secondary education are the most affected by unemployment, followed by those with tertiary education. The educational, economic and labour market policies in the Dominican Republic do not

complement each other. The lack of employment opportunities and low wages are also problems for university graduates, as the Dominican economic model has favoured the growth of employment in the informal sector. (INDH 2010, 5-19; UN-INSTRAW 2006, 32.) This clearly shows in the interviews as well as in the educational composition of Dominican migration. For Daniel studying abroad presented clear advantages:

For a lawyer, it is very enriching, the fact of having France as a reference --- the light that France has on Dominican law, Dominican codes for the most part were literally adopted from French codes. And for me personally, for the academic challenge that my going to a developed country represented me, with a system of education of more... of the first world, obviously. --- Besides of the academic, besides a super tangible benefit, in France the educational system is free. The universities are subsidized by the state. And the money one pays is significantly less than a master's can cost in the United States, Spain, including England with already an equal competitive level. (Daniel, 27, returned from France in 2007)

Besides employment opportunities, educational level and intellectual motivations form another key reason to migrate among the interviewees. The interviewees believe in the advantages of getting more education, while contrary tendencies have been demonstrated in other studies concerning the Dominican Republic (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 58). Also globally, the impact of migration and remittances on education in the sending country is mixed (HDR 2009, 75). In the Dominican Republic, the low quality of education at all levels is widely acknowledged (INDH 2005, 172-181; INDH 2008, 170-189; PREAL & EDUCA 2006; Wooding 15.12.2009). Besides the quality of education, the limited choices of subjects at the university level in the Dominican Republic are mentioned by several respondents as a reason to migrate. Especially the offerings in social sciences and the arts are becoming more and more limited (Robert 16.12.2009). In addition, the cost of education is another important factor for most of the interviewees.

At a secondary or tertiary level in the academic area of universities and so on, it is understood and known, that it is better, that it is more complete, a university abroad. An experience of a master's abroad, it is a vital complement; it is a plus, either abroad or here. Really. Because you live abroad, you grow abroad and you have a base here, native, that you studied here, your Spanish language here, native, a master's there, it consolidates you already in the labour market the master's you did, that over there it is needed. And even more because of the bonus of Spanish, perfect. Then over there it is a success. But if you come back here, it is also valued. So, as I see it, that is around as I see it really, it has been something... It is good; I mean it is worth leaving. And there are thousands of reasons, all over, everywhere, everywhere. (Carolina, 30, returned from Spain in 2008)

As Carolina's quote illustrates, trying one's chances abroad is clearly lucrative. Especially at a younger age one can always look at return as a viable option in case the life abroad does not turn out as expected. Although finding a decent livelihood presents

an important motivation to migrate, mere facts about the socioeconomic situation are not enough to explain migratory decisions. Castles and Miller (2009, 221) argue that even if all international migration has an economic dimension, the increased ease of mobility is leading to more movement in search of new lifestyles, marriage or retirement. This notion is important, as societal and cultural motivations to migrate are clearly prevalent in the interviews besides economic motivations. Most interviewees highlight the wish to see and experience the life in the “first world” and to get to know other cultures. Cultural and societal perceptions and interpretations that people make about their surroundings and life elsewhere are critical (Bjerén 1997). In the Dominican middle class, studying abroad is perceived to be a strategy to have an international labour market, but at the same time migration can be explained by a sense of curiosity. The additional fact that the Dominican Republic is on an island means that travelling has a larger dimension. (Robert 16.12.2009.) Eduardo affirms:

The opportunity of being able to see another world, other ways of thinking of the people, get out of an island, which obviously has its implications to live on an island, that of being more isolated from the real world because it does not have the same facility to travel that you have here, in Europe. (Eduardo, 28, migrated to Spain in 2004)

The interviewees perceive that the first world countries are more developed and organised, and live according to another rhythm than the Dominican Republic. For them, the general chaos and disorder present in many aspects of daily life in the Dominican Republic is an important motivation to migrate. Descriptions of daily problems with electricity, insecurity, traffic jams, corruption and a general chaos are present in all the interviews. Even though the interviewees belong to the part of the Dominican society that is relatively better off, several of them state that an important reason to leave is being tired of living in the Dominican Republic and facing the daily problems. Clearly, a societal disorder has an impact on everyone. Thus, the pull factors in the Dominican context remain the same in the sense that people’s perceptions are that there will be more jobs, better jobs, better pay, and a better quality of life elsewhere, even though it may not be true in reality (Wooding 15.12.2009). A few of the interviewees even mention they had to leave for their own personal well-being, not merely physical, but also mental. Carmen tells:

I had a very good salary when I decided to leave and I had a privileged economic position. But unfortunately I had nothing more to do with my money. I mean to save it, I can save it but as a young person in the end I wanted to spend it and here was no way how. --- So, besides that, the monotony of the city and the ordinary problems that I get into my car, I have a traffic jam, people asking for

everything in the traffic lights, that if I crash into a public car⁶, that if the motorist went with a red light, this way the things get to a point where you go crazy. --- The same situation, the stress. I mean there is no order here. It drives me to despair as I'm not a person that needs extreme order, but a little bit of security, you see? (Carmen, 32, returned from Spain in 2005)

Social-relational motivations are importantly present in the motivations of the interviewees to migrate. The desire to gain more independence and to get rid of excessive family control is a reason that several of the interviewees express. Besides reinforcing exploitation of women, migration can help women from patriarchal societies to gain more control over their lives (Castles & Miller 2009, 39). This aspect is also reflected in the interviews and was first brought up by a couple of respondents without any direct questions on the subject. Later I included the role of the family in the topics to be covered in the interviews. Relations between individuals and groups are informed by culture-specific rules (Bjerén 1997, 220). Especially for young unmarried middle-class Dominican women, often the only acceptable way to leave the family home is to move abroad for studies or a good job. Carolina describes:

All the experience of how I rely on myself, how I will cook it now, how I will do, I have to go to the supermarket. It's an experience. Latin America, Dominican Republic, we are very attached to the family. And we, for instance, I'm 30 years old and I don't live alone. Me, 30 years, in the United States already I would have my life. Here no, here we are still very attached to the family. And that's why I tell you that experience of leaving, because I'm here and my mom still calls me "Carolina, Carolina, did you have breakfast?" It's something different. "Carolina, Carolina, be careful, the anaemia!" There no, there no one. I mean, you could arrive at the time you wanted. Finally everything depended on you. (Carolina, 30, returned from Spain in 2008)

Like Carolina, the women interviewed but also some of the men had the vision of being able to live more independently and to have more space, which suggests that over-protection of Dominican families is not exclusively linked to gender. The middle-class Dominican families seem to attempt to control their children, which illustrates that structural opportunities are at least partly mediated through families. Families indeed form part of the key meso-structures. At the same time, interviewees also use the larger opportunity structures provided by global economy to get rid of the control. José explains:

I also wanted to go a little further from my family to get to know other different things where I would not have my family even close, where it would help me... because my family, I mean the Dominican family tends to over help. I thought, well, if I am in some country where they cannot get involved.

⁶ Public cars are the most common way of public transport in bigger Dominican cities with a somewhat fixed route. They are privately owned with an anarchic operating style and almost always old and in bad shape. They stop anywhere to pick up or drop off passengers.

Then, they will help me when I really need help not when they want to. (José, 28, re-migrated to Germany in 2006)

Even though the interviewees come from a relatively unified socioeconomic group and they are around the same age, they are all individuals that have their own set of values, views on social change and strategy to act. At the same time, their personal motivations do reflect common macro- and meso-level factors. Better quality of education, wider employment opportunities, experiencing life in the first world, getting rid of the general chaos, and excessive family control form the key causes of migration. While some of the causes may be similar for all Dominicans, certain ones are specific to socioeconomic background. In poorer segments of the society, immediate survival is a more central motivation to migrate than it was for the interviewees. The quality of tertiary education is another specific reason for this group to leave the country. The interviews point towards the conclusion that socioeconomic background is an important defining feature in the Dominican context of migration.

Many studies confirm the fact that migrants do not usually come from the poorest segments of the society because the migration process itself requires both financial means and information (HDR 2009, 24-27; UN-INSTRAW 2006, 34). Besides the rather obvious impact that financial resources have, social and cultural capital affect the way individuals see employment and educational opportunities, cultural differences, social relations and the general situation of the country in comparison to other places. Of course, other factors besides socioeconomic background affect the reason people have to migrate. For instance, gender has been identified as a key defining feature of migration in certain rural areas of the Dominican Republic (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 34). The complexity of the causes of migration is clear, and therefore each spatially defined social and cultural context should be analysed in detail.

6.3 Decision-making – between stay and go alternatives

An absolute majority of people in the world do not migrate internationally. Even in important countries of emigration, such as the Dominican Republic, immobility prevails. There are different alternatives to international migration, although the majority of Dominicans have indicated their willingness to emigrate (New York Times 3.9.2007;

UN-INSTRAW 2006, 32). Large parts of the population in the South lack resources for both migration and changing the environment, so in reality there are severe structural constraints that affect migration (Faist 1997b, 262). Strategies and opportunities available to potential migrants are affected by larger opportunity structures, meso-level factors such as information and connections, and micro-level personal factors such as preferences and personality. As all interviewees of this study have overcome these constraints and migrated internationally, the way the migratory decision and process are constructed is interesting.

You start to look and there are Portugal, France, Spain giving scholarships that are wasted. There are many scholarships here that are lost because they are not advertised or because they are advertised for a day or because... You have to be the person that is interested, the one that must be behind it. There is no... The secretariat of... studies, the secretariat that is of education, it may not have the necessary support or instruction or the path clear in helping people who want to gain those scholarships or to qualify for those scholarships. (Carolina, 30, returned from Spain in 2008)

As Carolina explains, both information and overcoming certain local structural factors are central. The question of scholarships is important, because in general the Dominican middle-class and even upper middle-class are not able to pay for studies abroad (Robert 16.12.2009). Most of the respondents had first received some form of a scholarship to study abroad, and some of them stayed after the scholarship. Others had taken loans or saved money or continued to work abroad. Families also contributed, but this was the main form of financing migration in only two cases. Overall, the interviewees had been fairly thorough in acquiring information on the possibilities available online and through different contacts. As the interviewees had completed university level studies or were currently studying, visas did not come up as a problem. The use of the “academic gate” and the differential impact of state regulations on different groups of people are clearly apparent. José explains the importance of having specific cultural knowledge:

For me it would have been harder for example to get a scholarship to Spain because there are 500 people waiting for the scholarship. But nevertheless of that [scholarship] of Germany here, we were like 10 applying I think. And for me it was easy to get it because I knew already the system, I was familiar with; I knew what they were going to ask me, what they wanted. From that day when we were competing, they only gave it to me but... The others, because unfortunately they did not know, but it is not that it was difficult nor was it a big thing. What happens is that they want precise things and I knew what to talk them about. So, looking for that [kind of things]. So, make use of such advantages was how I chose the country. (José, 28, re-migrated to Germany in 2006)

Sometimes migration decisions are based more on perceptions and interpretations than on factual information (HDR 2009, 102-103). Not all migrants are successful, but

failures are often kept private, and consequently a few of the interviewees are of the opinion that not everybody knows what migration means in reality. Perceptions indeed play a role as illustrated by the images that interviewees have on life in other countries in the context of migration (see: chapter 6.2). Nevertheless, access to information, cultural and social capital depends on the socioeconomic background that people have (Faist 1997a). The middle class is more educated and has better access to information than the poor. Some interviewees had even been checking out different countries before the decision to migrate was made. Carmen tells:

Before that I had left but for months, not for years. I mean I had left as to try. I went to Milan; I went to the United States, to Miami. --- It was like I went to try, maybe I was going to stay, but I was not sure. Then, to buy my ticket with my return date and I filled it because really I went, I tried and I was not convinced by any of the places. (Carmen, 32, returned from Spain in 2005)

Wage differences between countries have been mentioned as an important reason to migrate (Massey et al. 1994). Even if the interviewees are aware of these differences, it is not the key, direct motivation to move abroad. Nevertheless, opportunities for finding a good job are considered important. Some of the interviewees consider the opportunities to be better abroad while others see return migration as a viable option. The importance of getting more money abroad is mentioned. Yet a couple of the interviewees even consider that due to the income differences in the Dominican Republic, the standard of living may actually be higher in their home country. The different fields of work of the respondents may be one reason for their differing opinions. Another important motivation has to do with working life and employment relations that differ between countries. The general view among the interviewees is that in order to stay in the Dominican Republic and secure one's future, you have to get rich. Cristian explains the differences in working conditions:

I think that in this country, as in Latin America, for one to succeed, one must be an entrepreneur and one has to know how to fight a lot, much more than in other countries. And I think that many of us have the capacity to do so but not everyone wants to do so. Some people want a job that is eight hours a day, that feels good, and to earn well, and not to complicate your life more than that. And that's what many people can achieve in developed countries, which here is not easy to achieve. Here if you do not have your own business, your own project, you are an employee of a company that really makes you work double the work in Europe, then work 16 hours and really... No, the conditions are not the same. Conditions are obviously what they're looking for. In the beginning, middle class is looking for training, university, experience... but later it is conditions, living conditions. (Cristian, 28, returned from Germany in 2005)

Several of the interviewees say there is almost an exigency in the Dominican Republic to study or work abroad to get good jobs later on. As underlined by the causes of

migration, studying or getting professional experience abroad presents a strategy for the interviewees to have wider employment opportunities in the evolving international labour market and enlarging future prospects. Superior professional experience, the possibility of later becoming an entrepreneur, as well as the possibility of staying abroad or migrating later in the future if needed, are the themes that arise over and over again in the interviews when considering the decision to migrate. In the case of Daniel, experience abroad gives a sense of security:

I have professional projects; I have projects that I intend to develop within all this. I hope that they will get on the way; I mean, achieve independence in my profession, to continue... I am a teacher in the university; I can develop further that career, to see if within, to see if in this new way to make a project one could, one could help. --- I'm not interested in politics as it is now. Because what it would do is to make me dirty, as if I got into a polluted river, I mean I would end up like that. But the confidence of having studied abroad, and having lived abroad, it gives me a peace of mind in that any extreme scenario that may happen in the country or in my personal life [makes the sound of a (place / plane?) leaving]. Because many people do not do so for the lack of security: "What will happen to me over there, what will..." So the experience abroad always gives you that... that strength. (Daniel, 27, returned from France in 2007)

Nevertheless, under the same structural circumstances, people end up with different strategies and decisions. Even high levels of migration do not necessarily lead to the exodus of all potential movers (Faist 1997a, 212). One level of explanation consists of the differing relational contexts interviewees had when making the decisions to migrate. Some of the families had supported the idea to move abroad from the beginning, while quite many families had been resistant at first. According to Castles and Miller (2009, 20), international migration is hardly ever an individual decision. The family is an arena where structures of power, ideological meanings, and sentiments are negotiated (Bjerén 1997, 233). The middle and upper-class Dominican families are often overprotective of their children, and especially of their daughters. In particular the women interviewed acknowledge that the resistance to their decision to migrate may have been due to their role as daughters. Later however, when the decision to migrate had been made, all the families were eventually supportive. Although negotiations inside the families took place, the interviews do not confirm the assumption that families would be the primary place for decision-making (Castles & Miller 2009, 28) because many of the interviewees had migrated against the original wish of their parents. The individuals clearly have to contemplate macro-structures through their family filter and other networks. Yet they may also be able to use the opportunities that larger frameworks provide without relying on networks. Carolina describes the reactions of her family:

It's been really... you are breaking a family scene. And more when you have two older brothers that never wanted to leave the country, they are not interested, they don't want to leave their mom and dad's because mom and dad do everything for them, they get everything for them, they bring everything for them. Then yes, there's resistance undoubtedly. --- Then my parents didn't understand: "But what are you lacking, why do you want to, WHY?" Simply I want, I understand that perhaps I was the most protected, the most taken care of, the most spoiled, the most restricted. It's the little girl, she can't go out at night, can't do this... Then, I had to find the way to break all of that. (Carolina, 30, returned from Spain in 2008)

Besides structural and relational contexts, the role of the personality is central in determining who actually migrates. As Gallardo Rivas (16.12.2009) underlines, migrants must be viewed as active subjects. Although moving abroad is relatively commonplace in the Dominican middle class, most people still stay in the Dominican Republic. Even siblings make different decisions. Some of the interviewees attribute this to their personality, stating that they are active persons, that adapt easily to new environments or that they always had an inquiring mind. The personal and cultural values and preferences of the individual are clearly important. A degree of contingency also played a role for Carolina:

The decision came by magic. What can I tell you, really I was already... I had left the country in 2000 to do an English course in Washington. I was away for 4 months and I always had the desire to leave, always, the way of being, my way of being [is] very active. So, I leave, I come back and I was left with the desire to leave again. Then in 2007, I am working for the general direction of [name of a company] and the management presents an opportunity for a scholarship for a master's in Spain of intermodal transportation and port management. Then they offer me, if I wanted to apply for this scholarship. I would have to fulfil 4 requirements and then, I said yes, of course. I applied [with] my requisites. I was selected among all. (Carolina, 30, returned from Spain in 2008)

Later decisions are affected by the first decision to move abroad. Movement is not a one-time event but rather a sequence of event across time (Faist 1997a, 193). If the first migration experience is successful it increases the later probability to migrate. All the interviewees are of the opinion that the first migration experience opened their eyes to other possibilities, and gave a certain confidence towards migration as an option for the future. Massey et al. (1994, 729) found that after a first migration experience, the probability to undertake subsequent trips depended entirely on the migration experiences of the individual and on the social connections to other migrants. Other factors such as a father with migrant experience, age, sex, education, and occupational status only had an effect on the first decision to migrate. Migration is an experience that changes a person's perceptions and aspirations, as well as giving valuable information. So, people who migrate once are quite likely to do so again (ibid., 733). Carmen illustrates the importance of having previous migratory experience and knowledge:

Obviously every two or three years I feel like leaving again. And it may be that I will do it again, but already a bit more prepared and knowing that I will not get a job easily, I mean I have to go already preparing myself for... if I want to go I have to put up my own business not to go through that effort I did [last time]. (Carmen, 32, returned from Spain in 2005)

Professional migration is increasing both in the Dominican Republic and worldwide (Beine et al. 2008, 631; Carrington & Detragiache 1999; HDR 2009, 27; INDH 2005, 131). My research material illustrates how this aggregate tendency is related to people's motivations, perceptions and strategies in the Dominican Republic. The interviews point towards the conclusion that future employment prospects are important when deciding between stay and go alternatives in the Dominican middle class. The role of wage differentials is more circumstantial; some think they would be better off at the home country, others abroad. Mere economic facts are clearly not enough to explain migration. Relational situations and personal characteristics do play a critical role, but there may still be a degree of contingency in determining who actually migrates. Macro-structures are filtered to the individual level through family and other networks, but individuals may also negotiate or get around restrictions posed, which gives indications about their different degrees of freedom. Obviously, the values and preferences of the migrant are pivotal. The first migration decision affects later ones, but it should be remembered that the decisions of migration and return are taken over and over again during the life course.

6.4 Return – success or failure

Return migration is a topic that catches increasing attention, but how many migrants actually do return remains unclear both globally and in the Dominican Republic. Current evidence shows that migrants from developing countries are likely to stay abroad (OECD 2008, 172), yet a recent estimate is that globally around half of skilled migrants return to their country of origin after approximately five years abroad (HDR 2009, 77). A Dominican survey showed that of all those who migrated between 1965 and 1969 almost 70 percent returned, while of those who migrated between 1990 and 1991 only 17 percent returned (Hoy 16.11.2005). One factor may be that people migrate according to their stage in life and return some years or even decades later. Another interpretation is that Dominicans tend to stay increasingly in the countries of destination.

There are no complete statistics on how many Dominicans have a tertiary degree and even less on how many of them live abroad or have returned. The most accurate figure known is that 204,000 Dominicans with a tertiary degree lived in OECD countries in 2007, which is estimated to equal 22-25 % of all Dominicans with a tertiary degree (Hoy 15.5.2010; ILO 2004, 20). One study estimates that 98 percent of those doing their master's degree abroad with the commitment of return do not fulfil this requirement (Listín Diario 4.6.2007). Another study made for UNESCO in 2003 found that 80 percent of Dominicans who do their master's or doctorate studies abroad, stay abroad. Yet according to the Dominican Secretary of Higher Education, Science and Technology only one of 4,000 students sent abroad through the institution has stayed abroad. (Listín Diario 3.6.2007.) Similarly, the interviewees in this study have differing views on how often the migrants return to the Dominican Republic. One respondent estimates that 70 percent return, while for instance most of Carmen's friends have not returned:

Now they leave to form their family there, not to here. That's completely true. I mean most of my friends, from my own experience, do not return. And if they return, it is because they had some problem and they had to return like me, but my original idea when I initially left was not to return. (Carmen, 32, returned from Spain in 2005)

As with all migratory decisions there are multiple factors that affect the decision to return, such as income and employment situation, personal independence, relationships, family situation and residence permits. Whether the goals of a migrant were fulfilled, whether a change in the preferences of a migrant has taken place, whether the return indicates a failure to achieve declared goals or further development of social ties to those left behind are questions to be asked (Faist 1997a, 214). On the one hand, the successful ones that have good prospects in either the home or the host country can more easily return (Castles & Miller 2010, 10). On the other hand, the ones that have some kind of trouble in the host country may be forced to return. These problems could be economic or related to relationships and family. An even more extreme yet increasingly important issue in the Dominican context is the question of deportations (INDH 2005, 144).

The interviewees that had returned have different combinations of reasons. Both employment and economic opportunities and social-relational factors are important. Residence permit issues are not mentioned, so they do not seem to be as relevant in the

educated middle-class (see: chapter 6.2). Among the interviewees, there are commitments of return with the workplace and university, which had helped to finance studies abroad. Officially people who get scholarships are supposed to return. In reality, one of the interviewees stayed abroad, arguing the institution did not mind, and another one explains the only limitation was to remain outside the receiving country for two years. Importantly, all but one of the returned respondents had wanted to stay abroad. A couple of the respondents had even received job offers abroad, but had to return due to the commitments made in the home country. Daniel explains his return as follows:

I could have stayed, but I did not stay in the short run because the help I received the second year was with the commitment of returning, to return, to give back in [giving] classes. However, in France I did get the offer from two law firms for internships, a practice for my level of Spanish and for my level of English --- There I had these two offers, but the link that I had here was... I could not break it. Then, I returned. (Daniel, 27, returned from France in 2007)

The views towards return are contradictory. Some respondents consider that basically the ones who run into trouble abroad return, while others argue that the reality of living abroad only materialises once there and consequently many wish to return. One respondent indeed had faced problems in recognising professional qualifications and another one had trouble finding an appropriate job. Discrimination and downskilling form the unfortunate reality of many migrants. Only 22 % of Dominicans in the category of professionals that had migrated to the United States and the European Union in 1990 were able to find a job that matched their qualifications (Listín Diario 3.6.2007). A survey on Dominicans working in domestic service in Spain found out that 17 percent had undertaken higher learning, and over 40 percent had a secondary education (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 26). The argument used in theories of new economics of labour about labour markets being segmented along ethnic groups has some explanatory power here (Castles & Miller 2009, 23-24; Massey et al. 1994, 715-722). Carmen describes her situation in the Spanish labour market as follows:

[I returned] because over there things went worse for me. Really, Spain is not, was not, the place I should have chosen to live in to get good work experience after studies because really we are very badly viewed there. I was received very well for my CV and my appearance, because I'm white and pretty, but at the moment I was asked where I come from, for the accent, I was told that the only thing they could offer me was cleaning or something like that. So, the people there... I felt humiliated because persons that do not even have the basic education tell to me that the only thing they could offer me is to clean apartments or wash plates, you see? Depressing. (Carmen, 32, returned from Spain in 2005)

The general rank of a country in geopolitics can strongly affect how the diaspora is received. Yet doing well can affect the status of the community in both the host country and the global system. (Levitt & Jaworsky 2007, 144.) Several of the interviewees consider that being of Dominican or of third world origin makes insertion to a developed country labour market more difficult. Differences in attitude towards Latin American migrants between receiving countries also come up in the interviews. Local assets clearly do not move evenly. Carmen's comment illustrates how a migrant's place-making ability is shaped by prior cultural intersections in any given place (ibid.):

[Miami] is full of immigrants. You are one more. But really I noticed that in most parts of the city I went and looked for a job, really, the Dominicans lead you, the Dominicans seem... The previous migrants took care of doing what is cleaning or taking care of the elders. It seems that the previous migrants took care of marking well the labour market. Well, the Dominicans in all parts of the world, you have just four options: one is to take care of the elderly people, two, to be a nanny, three, to be a waitress and four, I think is cleaning in general and washing plates. For an ordinary Dominican that has no connections it is really difficult. (Carmen, 32, returned from Spain in 2005)

At the same time, assets from the sending country can also be valuable. José tells about the daily problems with electricity, study equipment and traffic in the Dominican Republic, but assures the usefulness of these experiences:

These [problems] have nothing to do with your studies but they affect you in a strong way that people do not notice. We do not, I did not notice it because I'm used to [it]. But when you come to Europe, for example, when I came to Germany where I had, I mean there was everything, the computers worked, the internet worked, all programs were there. I had the scholarship in particular, but whatever, at the university for example, I could eat well and cheap with student prices, I had where to sleep with no problem, I mean at the university nobody came and parked a car with a loud music alongside. In other words, you learn here to live with problems and stress that in those countries one does not learn. So, there is an advantage, if I get to any office I am working and I have a lot of stress, for me the situation is normal, for her [my wife] not. (José, 28, re-migrated to Germany in 2006)

The change of initial plans during the migratory process has been widely documented and also shows in the interviews (Faist 1997a, 214-215; UN-INSTRAW 2006, 43-44). Migrants themselves change because of the experience of living in another country (Massey et al. 1994, 733). Studies point out that migrants may stay in the destination country because they have not yet fulfilled their set goals, have changes in their relationships or want to maintain a higher level of independence (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 43). Migrants may also settle in the destination country, but still indicate a wish to return (Faist 1997a, 215). Whether this so-called illusion of return will materialise in the future remains an empirical open question. José's story illustrates a change of plans and a comparison between different alternatives:

In theory, there are conditions that I should return to give classes in the university. And I had it also for... I wanted to do it after finishing. But two situations came up, first, here in this country [the Dominican Republic] there is no work that would pay me what I have studied. And the other situation is that well, I got a son and that and she [my wife] is still studying and until she finishes I can't come. I don't want to separate the family. but I think that...that in some time I will return. Like we are talking about two years, three years maximum and I will return. Because Germany and in general the European system allows me very little liberty. Like, I can find a good job, but being an employer is not easy there, it's not easy. I would like to be an employer here, create a company that would dedicate to work in that engineering. (José, 28, re-migrated to Germany in 2006)

Brain drain theories have often argued that countries of origin suffer from a loss of brains (Pellegrino 2001, 112). However, as José's comment suggests the picture is certainly more complex than this. At present, many of the educated migrants would not necessarily have had great opportunities to work in their field at home (OECD 2005, 133; Pellegrino 2001, 120-121). As some of the interviewees argue, their home country does not always provide them the possibility to use their skills. Putting the blame on individuals is hardly helpful, instead the underlying structural problems should be assessed (HDR 2009, 77). Daniel's comment shows that staying abroad may have its benefits:

How will a professional that is in the States, a professional, a Dominican, how will a Dominican of 34 years of age return, who has a permanent job in a developed country, to a country that malfunctions, having accumulated years of work, accumulating a pension, how will he return in that productive age here to a country where nothing is guaranteed to him. I mean the country has to offer to citizens, provide to the Dominican. So these tools to... Here, unfortunately, the Dominican who is staying plans on getting rich. But that getting rich I do not see it so much as greed. Getting rich is even sociologically, getting rich is the only way I guarantee my peace of mind, getting rich, not working and not helping. That wealth is like a fear, which is if I do not get rich, what will be of me. (Daniel, 27, returned from France in 2007)

Studying abroad may raise expectations, but there are many obstacles upon returning. Finding a job that would match the qualifications and experience acquired from abroad is difficult. The organisations in the Dominican Republic are not too well-functioning, studying abroad does not always show in the salary, and using and developing the things one has learned abroad can be difficult (Robert 16.12.2009). The interviewees recall that even if finding a good job abroad may not always be easy, at least recruiting abroad should base more on merit than personal contacts, unlike in their home country (see: chapter 6.7). While some of the respondents think their skills are better valued abroad, others consider they have better economic and employment opportunities at home. Like José, Cristian thinks that the Dominican Republic offers more freedom in certain aspects:

I think in your country, especially here, there are more opportunities for nationals than living abroad. First you get there and you see it is a totally different culture and therefore likewise they are countries that are handled in a very different way, there are light-years of development versus those countries, we need to invent many things here that there are invented. I mean, there is a greater freedom to innovate and create and implement one's own project than over there. So, over there it is not impossible but more difficult. (Cristian, 28, returned from Germany in 2005)

In the same way, being close to the family is important for some of the respondents, while others consider that everything should not be sacrificed for the family. Even though the current technologies allow for daily communication, many economic, political, social or cultural assets are tied to certain places. Local ties and projects are assumed to diminish the likelihood of migration as education, vocational qualification and social ties are often difficult to transfer to other countries. Besides available opportunities, the question is ultimately which kind of ties and assets the person values the most. (Faist 1997b, 254-262.) Besides personal values, cultural values define migration and the length of the period when mobility is possible and desirable, as suggested by Carolina's story about her cousin who lives in the United States:

She has a job and all, a job in a hospital, all excellent, perfect; her life is the most organized. But nevertheless, what can I say, the family weighs a looot, a lot. And then she may tell me, Carolina, I'm desperate, because I mean she is coming now at Christmas. The feeling of being alone here at Christmas, no, I cannot stand it, I cannot stand it. So these are things that other people... The new generations, which are not growing so family-centered because of divorce, because parents are working hard. They do not have that attachment. They leave and it is not so, the impact is not so great. They go and stay and live there. As in the United States! You see, the United States, parents at age 18, I already at age 18 I would have left home. (Carolina, 30, returned from Spain in 2008)

The period of desired mobility is often different also for men and women (Bjerén 1997, 231). The interviewees are young adults at an economically active age, which is the most common case both in the Dominican migratory context and globally (Gallardo Rivas 16.12.2009; Hoy 19.3.2006). Moving abroad seems to be generally accepted in the Dominican Republic at this point in life, especially for professional reasons. Some of the interviewees' families were not happy when the decision to migrate was first made, but none of the interviewees reported real criticism towards their decision at later point in life. The interviewees moved abroad to study or get professional experience and at the time of migration none of them had a spouse or children. A couple of the female interviewees highlight that already closer to the age of 30 the decision to move was more difficult. This suggests that the period when mobility is desired in the Dominican middle class may be shorter for women than men. Both the women themselves and their families had expectations for them to settle down.

Clearly, my research material underlines the multiple aspects that affect return. Migration seems to be accepted in the Dominican Republic at early adulthood although the period and conditions may be more restricted for women. Most of the interviewees wanted to stay abroad, but had to return due to commitments made in the home country. Also, as is the case of one respondent, all the migrants do not succeed abroad and may end up returning. The respondents who live abroad do consider return as an option, but whether it will be materialised in the future remains an open question. Local assets and ties are often difficult to transfer, but sometimes they can also turn into an advantage in professional life. Both the opportunities and cultural and personal values of the migrants are crucial.

6.5 Middle-class transnationalism

It is very common in the Dominican middle class to have spent a year or more abroad (Robert 16.12.2009). The Dominican middle-class with education seem to send their children abroad for the university level, and especially for postgraduate work, whenever they can (Wooding 15.12.2009). The prevalence of migration is relevant, as interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants and nonmigrants play an important role in structuring migration decisions and in promoting and directing aggregate flows of migrants (Castles & Miller 2009: Faist 1997a, b; Massey et al. 1994).

Transnational families are clearly at work among the respondents even though they do not recognise it immediately. Indeed, Basch et al. (1994, 8) point out, that migrants do not deliberately recognise their identity to be transnational. However, when directly asked, all the interviewees have migrants among their closest family and had interpersonal ties to migrants and former migrants before making their decision to migrate. Sisters, brothers, cousins, aunts and uncles live abroad, and all but one of the respondents had at least one parent with previous migratory experience. Like the interviewees, most Dominicans have a relative abroad and consequently visions and thoughts are already very transnational even among those that stay (Robert 16.12.2009).

Chain migration is an increasingly recognised phenomenon both globally and in the Dominican context. Chain migration is defined in migration systems and networks

theory to be the informal *social networks* developed by migrants themselves, which are called either *the micro- or the meso-structures* of migration (Castles & Miller 2009, 28; Faist 1997a). Since the percentage of Dominican migrants is relatively high, the internal dynamics of migration are at play. However, the role of migrant networks and chain migration is a bit more mixed in the interviews than in many other studies. For one thing, the interviewees follow beaten paths with regard to the choice of destination. Also all the interviewees have some social ties to people that live or have lived abroad; friends, colleagues and family members. So the hypothesis that interpersonal ties increase the likelihood of emigration finds support (Massey et al. 1994, 728).

At the same time none of the interviewees followed a family member, but one visited a friend before the decision to migrate to the same place was made, and another one followed his girlfriend. However, most of the interviewees had no previous direct connections to the place of destination. Even those who had some connections maintained that these connections were not the main reason behind the decision. The interviewees had found out about the opportunities available rather independently, and considered aspects such as quality and price of education and language before making the decision. Thus, persons belonging to the educated Dominican middle class appear to be more independent than poorer segments of society in migratory decisions. Access to scholarships, loans and online information are clearly relevant in decision-making, underlining the role of the financial, social and cultural capital needed for migration.

There are differences between the interviewees with regard to their friend circles. Some have most of their friends living in the Dominican Republic, while others report that practically all of their friends have migrated. Friend circles do not seem to be the most decisive factor in migration decisions, but the comments of those with practically all friends abroad suggest that large-scale migration among friends has an effect. If everybody around has left or tries to leave, one might to start to question whether staying or returning to the home country is the best option. While most often used to compare migration from similar villages, threshold models of collective behaviour could have explanatory power even between friend circles or other communities of reference. These models complement the notion of chain migration, underlining that decisions on moving and staying are dependent on others who have made the decision before (Faist 1997a, 210).

While the parents of all the interviewees currently live in the Dominican Republic, all but one had at least one parent with migratory experience. Studies affirm that having a parent with migrant experience increases the likelihood of children to migrate (Massey et al. 1994, 729-733), which certainly seems to be the case among the interviewees. A difference between generations in migration experiences comes up in several interviews rather spontaneously. The interviewees seem to agree and perceive that the generation of their parents was more patriotic and had a different vision of the country, reflecting the importance of the historical context of migration. Many of the parents had lived abroad because they had to, but always had the vision of returning and changing the country. These experiences somewhat conform to the idea that there is often a gulf between migrant generations (Castles & Miller 2009, 40). However, while Castles and Miller (*ibid.*) talk more about the migrant generations in the receiving country, in the interviews of this study a gulf between generations appears in the sending country context. The decisions of previous generations impact the likelihood of following generations to migrate, underlining the dynamic nature of migratory processes. Yet Ana's story confirms that the reasons to migrate and migration experiences are historically embedded and different between generations.

Well, my dad actually studied abroad. He studied in Texas, in the United States. Yes, part of his degree, but it was not because he wanted to. He went because that was when the revolution was here, and my grandfather said, that better than taking a weapon and starting to fight against the people here, better I send him out. Then he was studying abroad, but I do not think he had that vision of what he was doing there, rather it was return, return, return. So it was something very temporary. And I think that maybe it is true that before they had this vision that what one had was to return. And now not, now people think that well, if I can stay I stay. If I cannot, I return. But there is always that... that openness of well, if I get a job if... If I get a way to stay in a place that I like I stay. That is the juvenile vision of today. (Ana, 29, returned from Costa Rica in 2008)

All in all, the roles of the family and other networks in migration vary between the interviewees. An individual is exposed to migration through family or other networks, which may give an incentive to consider and reconsider possibilities for migration. On the one hand, access to migration networks tends to be selective, and the value of networks to movers and stayers differs by the amount of human, financial, cultural and political capital available to participants (Faist 1997b, 207-208). Thus, the specific networks the interviewee is connected to form the meso-context of migration. This is confirmed in the multiple connections the interviewees have to current or previous migrants, and in the role of family and friends in migration decisions (see: chapters 6.2.

and 6.3). On the other hand, individuals with higher levels of human and financial capital have been found to rely less on networks than movers with lower levels of capital in other studies (Faist 1997b, 207-208). Therefore, the educated middle-class background and human, financial, cultural and political capital consequently available for the interviewees diminish their need to rely on networks, which is demonstrated in the relatively independent movement of these persons.

Most of the interviewees had lived abroad on more than one occasion, which points to the presence of the increasingly acknowledged *circular migration* or, in the case of skilled migrants, *brain circulation*. Circular migration is likely to be more available for those with financial means; however, new technologies of transport and communication make circular movement generally easier. Revealingly, all but one of the ten interviewees had lived outside the country on more than one occasion. Six out of ten interviewees had returned, and two of the four interviewees that currently reside outside the Dominican Republic plan on returning. However, all ten regard migration to be one of the future alternatives. This shows that neither initial migration nor return is a one time event that would end the migration process. Instead, there are multiple phases of migration.

Although transnationalism raises some controversy in theory, it is clear that new communication and information technologies have allowed for constant interaction across borders. Financial and social remittances are important elements in the formation of transnational spaces. Studies have indicated the relative strength of Dominican transnational households in terms of communication and visits to the home country. A call per week and a trip per year are more or less the average according to these studies. (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 41.) The material of this study points to similar conclusions, in that communication across borders is rather intense. Six of the interviewees communicate with a family member daily, two weekly and two others more seldom. There are obvious variations between families in the strength of communication. The daily communication is often with nuclear family members, but two interviewees also hold a daily contact with a cousin living abroad. Chats, e-mails and internet calls are the main form of communication, but phone is used as well. Among the interviewees, social ties are clearly maintained across borders. Carolina explains communication with her cousin in the United States:

What happens, for example, she speaks every day with my aunt. Every day for my aunt has a phone line, special one, as if she was there, on the Internet. So it's seven times a day they are talking, seven times a day, it doesn't matter. I call her on the cell phone, my way my girl, Facebook, e-mail, everyday, we are always connected. I mean anything that is, she is my little sister. As one says, my first sister, we grew up together. And whatever happens to me she has to know. And if I, with a phone saying to her "Look, you do not know what happened to me today..." (Carolina, 30, returned from Spain in 2008)

The remittances sent by Dominican migrants abroad have increased sharply over the last decades. The remittances account over a tenth of GDP and more than quadruple the amount of foreign direct investment. The Dominican Republic is third among the remittance receiving countries in Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of remittances per capita, and fourth in absolute terms. Somewhere between 10.2 percent of household and 38 percent of all adults living in the country are estimated to receive remittances regularly, but for a little less than half of the recipient household the remittances account for more than a fourth of the total income (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 28-30). This yields that for 5-10 percent of Dominican household remittances do constitute an important part of income, which assumedly decreases poverty.

The importance of remittances is known by all the interviewees, but they consider it to be more vital for the poorer families. None of the interviewees report continuous remittances that would currently sustain their family members in the Dominican Republic. Yet the money does flow circumstantially. Children bring money to their retired parents when visiting, parents send money to their children abroad and some of the families living in the Dominican Republic have had to rely on the help of migrant kinship temporarily. The results of this study would affirm that transnational economic activism varies by class (Levitt & Jaworsky 2007, 135). The material also suggests that a high-skilled composition of migration indeed would not mean higher flows of remittances (Faini 2003, 1). In the Dominican case there seems to be multiple categories of migrants that have different transnational activities. Juan explains the financial situation of his family, which is also related to scholarships:

We do not receive money from abroad like many Dominicans. Us, I mean it is work and... Well, independent work and the legacy of my father I mean my father died. And he left us in a comfortable position, but my siblings do not work right now abroad, they are only studying. My mother and I, we take care of that they are maintained, that the money that they need to live with is invested. My sister did get a scholarship and the scholarship arrives very delayed, the scholarship of the SECI, the Ministry of Education of the Dominican Republic. Every month handing over the money is delayed which makes us always having to find that money. (Juan, 33, returned temporarily from Brazil in 2009)

The development of social networks and other links between sending and receiving areas are globally taking more of a transnational character (e.g. Levitt & Jaworsky 2007). The life stories and connections the interviewees have confirm the existence of continuous social ties and communication across borders. Studying only the destination or sending area would miss the importance of these connections. The interviewees that currently live outside the Dominican Republic are especially active in transnational practices. The concept of the shadow household refers to this phenomenon of having people that are not present physically, but are present in some ways permanently (Faist 1997a, 212). Not all returned interviewees are engaged actively in these practices however, so having migratory experience does not automatically mean that the person leads a centrally transnational life for the rest of his or her life. The strength and the importance given to social ties to those in other countries seem to be the somewhat obvious decisive factors in determining the strength of transnational connections.

My material suggests that the role of networks in migration differs by socio-economic background on the one hand, and by the specific connections each individual has to current and previous migrants on the other hand. Circular migration is increasingly available due to improvements in communication and transport technologies, but one can hypothesise that it would be more easily available for those with more capital. The material of this study also implies that transnational economic activism varies by class, while other studies have shown the same to be true for transnational political activities (Guarnizo et al. 2003). The maintenance of transnational ties varies between the interviewees, and the coming and going definition of a transmigrant (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 7) would match to the interviewees to different degrees. A more strict definition of a transmigrant as someone having transnationalism as a central part of one's life (Castles & Miller 2009, 32) would describe the life of a couple of the interviewees. Although the number of Dominicans who engage in constant transnational activities may not be very high, many more do engage in these activities occasionally. Summed up together and over time, these activities can alter the economies, values, and practices of entire regions (Levitt & Jaworsky 2007, 132).

6.6 Feedback effects of migration

Each act of migration adds to the social structure of a network which is necessary to sustain additional migration. Economies and societies are transformed when migrants integrate families and communities into global processes. The micro- and meso-levels of migration, including the causes, values and preferences of individual Dominican migrants and the importance of networks, are treated in previous chapters. In this chapter, more general changes related to migration in the Dominican Republic are analysed.

Migration has feedback effects on processes of economic, social, cultural and political change in the sending countries. The previous chapter showed that the importance of remittances is known among the interviewees, although they themselves do not belong to the part of population that regularly receives or sends them to the home country. One interviewee also takes up the potentially negative effect of remittances towards discouraging the receivers from seeking alternative sources of income, which has been demonstrated in other studies (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 61). In any case, remittances increase production through direct investments and through a multiplier effect in increases in consumption (INDH 2005, 135). Cristian underlines:

Well, the economic impact is important. It is important because the country is a developing country; it is a country which has a high percentage of poor people. Where a high percentage of those poor people live with what some people send them from abroad and that, the market mechanism means moving money around the world, really. So, although I do not depend on that, I do depend on customers who depend on money sent from abroad. Or I have clients who live outside and have insured property here, and then have to... I mean I indirectly depend on them, because it really is important economically. Here in fact one talks about the first screeds, after tourism, telecommunications, one speaks of remittances. (Marco, 28, returned from Germany in 2005)

The interviewees note other effects of migration besides economic ones in the Dominican Republic. These come about through social remittances, which mean ideas, behaviours, identities and social capital that flow between sending and receiving migrant communities (Castles & Miller 2009, 62). As with economic remittances, the impact of social remittances is both positive and negative. Ambivalence towards the changes that migration has brought in the Dominican Republic is present in the interviews and has also been documented in other studies (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 57; INDH 2005, 152). Besides personal experiences, the discussion in society and the media

affects the way people see the effects (Gallardo Rivas 16.12.2009). The interviewees mention the opening of eyes and other ways of thinking to be some of the positive changes migration has brought. People that live on an island often have another kind of vision of the world, which in the Dominican Republic can also be attributed to the poor quality of education. People go to school, but they do not really learn things. The returning migrants even have a saying “vuelvo al patio”⁷. (Robert 16.12.2009.)

Yet negative effects, such as deportations, cultural imperialism and breakdown of traditional family values are mentioned more often than the positive sides of migration in the interviews. Although the respondents do not belong to the category of people that are usually deported, the question of deportations comes constantly up in the interviews. Basically every flight that arrives with deportees is reported in the Dominican press,⁸ so there is a public discourse which also helps the interviewees to take up this aspect. Indeed, forced return and deportations have been on the increase in the Dominican Republic due to changes in the US migratory legislation and an increase in irregular migration (INDH 2005, 126). The interviewees connect rises in delinquency in the Dominican Republic to deportations, a connection that has been demonstrated in other Latin American countries (Castles & Miller 2009, 63; HDR 2009, 79). José explains increases in delinquency as follows:

That change is the result of emigration in a sense because you have spoken of those who return voluntarily but there are some that are sent back, deported. And those people bring a mentality that really is not... And they are many; one speaks about thousands or around. And that is expanding, I mean expanding, they create here groups and gangs and expand that culture here and they neither used to live the way they proclaim here that they used to live there, you see? But they want to come here to do whatever they feel like, and this country is more flexible, they have... they think otherwise already. They are, let's say sophisticated criminals. That has an impact on society. And really, that's also a product of emigration.

An expansion of consumerism that could be partly related to cultural imperialism has been documented in other case studies of Latin America and the Caribbean, including the Dominican Republic (Massey et al. 1994, 738). Several of the interviewees say that everything from abroad is considered good, and maintain that especially North American influence is strong. There is a link to the differences between generations (see:

⁷ I'm returning to the courtyard.

⁸ As an example see bibliography and articles collected from the Dominican newspaper Listín Diario during a couple of months in the summer of 2010. Similar numbers of articles are to be found all year round in many Dominican newspapers.

chapter 6.4) and to the expectations about lifestyles that have globalised in important ways, as this quote from Carolina suggests:

In the 70s, 60s, 70s there were a number of people, I can tell because of my dad --- who loved the Dominican Republic and did not want to see the gringos here, they did not want to see them. As in Cuba, as it happened in Cuba, it happened. They wanted to be Dominican and felt for the Dominican Republic, they did not think about, that I tell you, they did not think about anything but coming to live here and to fight for theirs. But as I come back and say, migration, you know that, I have, I know people who before had their plot, land, harvesting and selling what they grew. And this is no longer leaves [money]. And that was not, they had to face it and leave. And now they live there and send sneakers, send a mini component, then that is what is more important than anything. So it really does, the influences, is grown very large, people who have gone mainly to the United States. And that is reflected in the economy because they send their dollars; everyone believes that New York is the top, the best of the best. (Carolina, 30, returned from Spain in 2008)

While a couple of the interviewees do mention the breakdown of family values to be one of the negative consequences of migration, earlier studies have questioned the truthfulness of this claim. For instance, none of the interviewees' parents had separated because of migration, even though almost all of them have at least fathers that had previously been migrants. The reality is that Dominican men have been migrating for a long time and leaving their families behind, especially in the middle class. Also, in a more rural setting, Dominican women have traditionally left their communities to pursue domestic work in the cities. There is an official discourse that associates several societal problems with the breakdown of families due to migration. (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 57-60.) Migration of a family member may certainly cause distress, but many of the changes in family patterns cannot be solely attributed to migration.

At the end it made me stronger because I was very dependent and that was what made me... One thing that bothered me most here was to live with my family because here it is very improper for a young single woman to live alone. Well, I could not leave my house with the support of my mom, but if I went to Europe, no problem, but here in the city I could not have moved alone. And it really did help me a lot as a person, to be more independent, because I was not like that [before], I was depended on everything. I love my family and really when I came back, I wanted to return to the previous position and to be living within the family but unfortunately my mother has very strict rules, and she told me that when one decided to leave and be independent, that one could no longer return to the family. Then, when I returned, I moved alone. (Carmen, 32, returned from Spain in 2005)

At the same time, relations within the family are clearly renegotiated and redefined after migration, as the experience of Carmen shows. Carmen has mixed feelings towards the outcome, on the one hand she values the independence she achieved, and on the other hand she misses the possibility of living with her family. While men interviewed do not take up the gender aspect, the women say the migration experience made them stronger

and more independent. The reactions of their families are diverse. One affirms she now gets more respect from her family, while another one says she received criticism when migrating yet another time. Migration may induce both positive and negative changes in family responsibilities, and later changes in family roles and statuses. Changes in gender roles have been especially widely documented (Bjerén 1997; Castles & Miller 2009, 39; UN-INSTRAW 2006, 2008). The impacts of migration on gender relations vary according to migratory patterns, cultural gender ideologies, family characteristics and other factors. Studies indicate that women achieve higher levels of empowerment when they migrate alone, single and childless. (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 10.) The women interviewed in this study fulfil all these characteristics. Carolina describes:

You are looked upon in a different way. More mature. And they see you more turned up to a person that... Really, this little girl is not a little girl. She knows what she wants, she looks for what she wants, she goes after what she wants. And that also causes that people have respect on you, and admiration in all that. (Carolina, 30, returned from Spain in 2008)

In a study comprising five Latin American countries, the Dominican Republic was found to be least patriarchal in that consensual unions, divorces and separations were more common than in the other four countries. Also, Dominican women seemed to be more independent movers than women from more patriarchal societies such as Mexico. The Caribbean family system is sometimes called matrifocal, in the sense that children and mothers most often form the basic family unit while men come and go. Most women in the Dominican Republic do not live in a husband-wife household; around 30 percent of households are headed by women and female labour participation rate is 42 percent. (Massey et al. 2006, 69-86.)

At the same time, there are demonstrated cultural differences inside the Dominican Republic between regions and ethnicities. The women interviewed have a background that is historically more Hispanic than Afro-Caribbean. In general, the Dominican middle and upper classes tend to have a more Hispanic heritage, and two of the women also originally come from the more Hispanic region of Cibao. Traditional Hispanic values include patriarchal nuclear families, while Afro-Caribbean heritage includes more matrifocal family patterns (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 60). The interplay between gender, class, regional background and educational level is not well studied in the Dominican migratory context. On the one hand, the upper classes tend to have a more

Hispanic heritage. On the other hand, education presumably increases income, and both education and independent income have the potential to empower. Ana affirms:

I live here in Santo Domingo because of that. That is like a big luxury as well because if you leave for a big city, get a good job, it is like lightly accepted that you do it. But if it's not under those circumstances it's very difficult. For studying or for a good job, it's like that; there is a little licence for the woman to liberate herself a bit. (Ana, 29, returned from Costa Rica in 2008)

Interviews show some of the mixed impacts of migration in the Dominican Republic. Remittances have improved the quality of life for many Dominicans and result in increased consumption. Dominican migrants invest in the country of origin and return migration has the potential to bring new ideas and knowledge. Social remittances have provided new and sometimes empowering perspectives and ideas, but these changes do not come about without tensions, especially within families. The interviewees feel that deportations have increased crime in the Dominican Republic, and that especially the North American influence has made everything from abroad more desirable, which indicates that expectancies of lifestyles are globalising. In addition, other studies show that the children of Dominican households that receive remittances have higher levels of education, but due to employment problems the young people do not always value higher education as a way to achieve social mobility (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 32). Globally, studies made so far evidence that the impacts of migration on places of origin are complex, context-specific and change over time. The higher the share of people abroad, the stronger the impacts in the home country tend to be. (HDR 2009, 71.)

6.7 Cumulative causation and culture of migration

Cumulative causation refers to the tendency for migratory movements to become self-sustaining and perpetuate over time, regardless of the conditions that originally started them (Castles & Miller 2009; Faist 1997a, b; Massey et al. 1994; UN-INSTRAW 2006). The Dominican Republic certainly manifests the case; migration was at first politically motivated, but gradually turned to a more economic basis that has perpetuated for half a century up to date. Besides changes in income distribution, land tenure and network formation, studies indicate that the spread of migratory behaviour in sending areas may cause structural changes in local cultures in ways that promote additional migration (Massey et al. 1994, 733-741). The respondents do not point out that they would be affected by differences in income distribution due to migration in the Dominican

Republic, nor is the question of land tenure brought up as the interviewees primarily come from urban areas. Thus in this chapter, the impact of culture on migration is considered in more detail.

Once migratory movements are underway general changes to values and preferences can be expected among both those who stay and those who migrate. Changes in values and preferences are a reaction to opportunity structures that may become more favourable to migration either in the host or in the home country. (Faist 1997b, 266.) Assessing the value changes of individual migrants is difficult in a single interview, but the interviewees themselves consider that migration did change them as persons and made them see new possibilities. Value and preference changes also show for example in the changes of their initial plans (see: chapter 6.4).

In addition, most of the respondents are of the opinion that the preferences and values they have are different from previous generations. The generation of the respondents' parents had the vision of living in the Dominican Republic and changing the country. Their own generation however is more open to the possibility of living elsewhere, and rather sceptical towards the possibility of changing the Dominican Republic, as I will argue further below. The value and preference changes between generations may stem from the fact that in the Dominican Republic the economic push factors are still very much the same as decades ago, if not intensified, (Wooding 15.12.2009) and thus may have become even more favourable to migration. Gallardo Rivas (16.12.2009) also argues that Dominican emigration depends more on the politics of the receiving countries than on Dominican politics. As the receiving country policies favour more educated migrants, the changes in the composition of Dominican migrants follows similar lines, accommodating to changes in the pull factors. Daniel explains the difference in vision between generations:

My mom studied abroad as well, she was a university student in the 70s. At best in the decade of the 80s historically a certain change could have come about, wow, this is going to change. But no. Politically this society has entered into a vicious circle and one notes that it is just the same. There is as one says no hope. Including you see guys that say since the second course at the university, I already want to finish my studies, to clear out, yes, to leave. And never to return. (Daniel, 27, returned from France in 2007)

Preference changes are initiated and spurred by macro-conditions, but take place within collectives and networks (Faist 1997b, 266). Macro-level push factors are favourable to

migration from the Dominican Republic in general, and macro-level pull factors favour educated migrants in particular. At the meso-level, information received through personal contacts and media is central, and the expanding Dominican chains of migration, new technologies of communication, and media make the information more available for potential migrants. The basic idea of preference change is that frustration increases faster than actual opportunities for migration, leading to relative deprivation related to either income or ways of life (ibid.). Among the interviewees the senses of relative deprivation and rising expectations relate to the ways of life and income people are assumed to have in the first world. Carolina explains:

My generation, you can say someone who is 33 years old or less, so 33, 18, 20, 30. It is a generation that has been very influenced by countries, the United States or whatever, and it is very awake. So what does it want? It wants to get to know of what we spoken, we have a lot of bombardment in the internet, in television. It listens to a lot of English, and the requirement today to have good jobs is English and it is that, how you're leaving, not only... If you have the minimal economic opportunity, and you make an effort, hey, you're going to make it, you want to get out of here, you want to get to know, you want to grow, and you want to see everything that you see on television, everything you see on the Internet, all that, your mind is doing you that. We are more liberal, more independent. We are experiencing a change that maybe the United States experienced in the 50s, 60s. Well, those changes are coming here and that is what we want to live now. We want to have experience, we want to get to know, we want to say "Well, look, when we went to, when I went to the United States, look, listen, precious!" (Carolina, 30, returned from Spain in 2008)

So, a sense of curiosity, but also the wish to experience lifestyles elsewhere is important. In addition, having professional or educational experience from abroad is considered as an advantage and something people tend to look up to. The interviewees do not mention a sense of relative deprivation in comparison to families receiving remittances, which in some theories is assumed to be an important motivation to migrate at all socioeconomic levels (e.g. Massey et al. 1994, 713-714). This may be because the families of the interviewees do not receive regular remittances, nor did it seem to be commonplace in their community of reference. Even though the households that are relatively better off economically receive a higher percentage of remittances in the Dominican Republic, the incidence of remittances is higher in poorer households (INDH 2005, 137).

It all depends on the person and on the family. It all depends on if the person has a lot of money, he will leave. If not, he will stay.

Me: And the family?

Yes, but to visit. It's like; there is not much to look for here. Like if you want to be someone, you cannot stay here to become really big, because for instance the musicians, they cannot stay here, nor the people that like arts. Because here, it is not worth it. (Vanessa, 20, migrated to the US in 2008)

As the comment of Vanessa illustrates, the cultural and social norms of potential migrants may evolve towards a way that promotes international movement, forming a culture of migration (Faist 1997a, 210). Although the interviewees spot many negative changes that migration has brought in the Dominican Republic, they see migration all in all as something normal, usual, and generally accepted and even fashionable. In this kind of culture, migration is understood as an accepted and desirable means to social and economic mobility, more income or a lifestyle that would be difficult to achieve by relying on local resources only (Faist 1997b, 272). Besides material attractiveness, international migration becomes integrated into the structures, values, and expectations, and young people expect to migrate in the normal course of events (Massey et al. 1994, 738). The interviewees do not perceive criticism towards migrants; some even think there is a sense of admiration. Even though there is a sense of relative deprivation with regard to lifestyles elsewhere, migration is considered to be a normal way of exploiting the opportunities one has in life, “they deserve that opportunity”. The fact that most Dominicans want leave the country (e.g. New York Times 3.9.2007; INDH 2005, 143; UN-INSTRAW 2006, 32) has made migration socially acceptable or even desirable.

In general all migrants, already speaking of the people in general, are well liked because they are people who dared to leave their country to seek an opportunity. And generally they are doing well. And I think that yes, I mean you have to do it if you do not have a good chance in your country you have to look for it. (Juan, 33, returned temporarily from Brazil in 2009)

The interviewees consider that there are differences in the causes of migration depending on socioeconomic background. While in the Dominican middle class migration is in fashion or “not a big jump”, several of the interviewees think that many or most Dominicans leave because they have to, because they can “no longer stand it” in the Dominican Republic. In the country, the benefits of migration have become an essential tool in counteracting inefficient or passive government policies (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 57). Two of the interviewees however do somewhat blame the educated migrants for being selfish if staying abroad. Nevertheless, most of the respondents consider that the large scale emigration of the middle class is just as worrying, as the middle class constitutes an important potential for a change. The upper class is not interested in changing the country; for them it is suitable that it stays the way it is. For the rich, everything is possible; they can make the most of advantages both in the Dominican Republic and abroad (Robert 16.12.2009). Thus, while the middle class has more possibilities than the poorest to use the opportunities that

globalisation provides, the middle class is still more dependent on local structures than the upper class. At the same time the middle class also has more power to change the local structures than the poorest. As José puts it:

I get the slight impression that there will be no positive changes. There will be a lot of noise, there will be new things, there will be modern things, but... The country will go on disabling itself, and the class, let's say the motor class that has always been the country's motor class is leaving the country. Always, always the few changes, I mean, that have happened in this country; they have happened thanks to the middle class. --- The middle class is leaving the country. (José, 28, re-migrated to Germany in 2006)

The impacts of migration in the community or country of origin may evolve into a wider virtuous or vicious cycle. A virtuous cycle ideally eases the pressure on land and labour, while remittances enable economic development and the political voice of residents strengthens. A vicious cycle is formed if migration works against economic and political co-operation in a community and increases social disorganisation. (Faist 1997a, 213-214.) Policy measures can affect the formation of these cycles either way. Daniel, like most of the interviewees, is rather sceptical about the future of the Dominican Republic and argues that most young Dominicans who migrate are tempted to stay abroad:

In my generation, let's say young people between 22 and 35 years, to believe, and this is very sad because we are the inventors and we are the ones that in 20 years, we will take the yields in the country, to believe that this has no solution. Then within that diatribe of demotivation, any boy or girl who sees himself abroad, who manages to insert himself, as it happened to me, I could say that well, I am fine here with a job offer, he is moderately seduced to stay. Yes, without any trouble. So, there is no, I do not see any Dominican that leaves, well, of any kind, of lower class who is going to work to make the CDs, to wash dishes in New York, or be from the middle class or even upper class, to work... with a commitment to return to the [home] country. I do not see it as "I have to go back, there I have..." No. (Daniel, 27, returned from France in 2007)

The presence of a wider culture of migration is demonstrated by the fact that two-thirds of Dominicans still residing in the Dominican Republic express their willingness to leave the country (New York Times 3.9.2007). Most Dominicans perceive that there are no possibilities in the Dominican Republic and there is a general desire to migrate (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 58; INDH 2005, 143). This is partly because of the country's actual economic and employment situation, but it also has to do with the particularities of Dominican culture. A widespread pessimism has led to "externality", the perception that it is not possible to exercise control over one's own life and one's own destiny. Dominicans tend to devalue their own culture for being backward and uncivilised. (INDH 2005, 153-157.)

From the Haitian occupation to the two North American occupations of the past century, from the economic dependency first of Europe and later of the United States, from the necessity of emigrate to this last country and to Europe, the Dominican history is impregnated of a sense of externality that still today has a strong presence in the collective conscience (INDH 2005, 156).⁹

This pessimism comes up in many different ways in the interviews: the media is bought, scholarships are distributed according to political conjunctures, police kill innocent people, the new constitution is unbelievable and recruiting processes are corrupted. Recruiting is perceived to be based on favouritism and clientelism, while in other countries it is thought to be based on the merits of the applicants. Widely spread corruption and clientelism are generally acknowledged in the Dominican Republic (INDH 2005), so their presence in the recruitment processes seems plausible. Indeed, in an article in the Dominican newspaper *Listín Diario* (3.6.2007), the ambiguous processes of selection are said to be one of the motives for the professionals to move abroad. The pessimism and scepticism among the interviewees is especially strong towards the Dominican state and politicians. The politicians are regarded to be completely corrupt and clientelistic, interested only in their personal benefit and getting money. Corruption is identified by the interviewees to be one of the most important problems of the country.

It is a slight chaos they take advantage of. And they will go on, because [one is] in a political office not for the benefit of the society but for personal gain. Then, they want to get into a political office because they know they have a period of 4 years and they want to grab as much money as possible or take advantage of their position and make the most in 4 years without thinking about society. So they have a position, then they have a salary but they abuse. --- So the majority is doing it so. Then the one who wants to do it good cannot do so. Among them, they are not prosecuted or not brought to trial; they are not taken to jail. In other words, I do what I have to do, I steal, I give something to you, and eventually you and I, we did nothing. And that's what happens; there is a kind of immunity among them. We got to this position, we are not going to persecute each other, we will steal everything, and that's it. (Juan, 33, returned temporarily from Brazil in 2009)

Some of the interviewees think the Dominican state does not even want the educated migrants back, for there are not enough jobs for them. Rather the state is perceived to treat migration as a way of getting money and easing the pressure in the country. The export of persons with an emphasis on getting back benefits is indeed analysed as an important component of the new economic model in the Dominican Republic, to resolve the failure of providing a dignified life for large part of the population (INDH 2005, 127). However, with the educated migrants the situation has an additional controversial component. The Dominican state offers scholarships to study abroad but at the same

⁹ Translation from Spanish to English by the author.

time does not have a systematic view on what do with the university graduates (Robert 16.12.2009). Neither does the state make use of remittances as much as it could, which indicates the lack of a structured policy on migration (Gallardo Rivas 16.12.2009; Wooding 15.12.2009).

The country is having problems, or, if people who live abroad had stayed here, we're talking about two million Dominicans, the country had already suffered great social transformations because it's like, when these people leave the country, the pressure is released a little in the middle, you see? Then there are coming behind younger people that still need to get to the point of understanding what these people understood at the time they left. And, that is, I do not think there is a vision of the government to stop that, to offer something for us to stay here. The government even sends many people with scholarships knowing that they will stay, because when they come back here, as I say, they do not find a job that will pay what they have done, or cannot find a job... That also encourages them to go on, go on... They stay abroad. And the government knows that they will stay abroad, but they do not care, it is actually better that they have another place and do not cause problems here when they return. (José, 28, re-migrated to Germany in 2006)

Besides the economic conditions, the empowerment of Dominicans is affected by sustained social structures and models that strengthen authoritarianism, paternalism and “asistencialismo”¹⁰. The legacy of the dictatorship of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, followed by the governments of Joaquín Balaguer and others, have maintained the centrality of the executive, especially of the president, at the cost of weak institutions, centralized decision-making and the logic of “power for the power”, and practices of clientelistic corruption. The access to public goods has been considered as a “privilege”, which is accessed thanks to the “loyalty” of political leaders. (INDH 2005, 72, 112; UN-INSTRAW 2010, 11.) Descriptively, the Dominican Republic ranks number 101 of 178 countries in the Corruptions Perceptions Index 2010 by Transparency International (2010).

The general desire to migrate, the prevalence of migration as a popular strategy, and the emergence of a culture of migration with particular Dominican features that has persisted and reformulated over generations can be seen in the interviews. The agency of migrants is always important. Yet the case of the Dominican Republic demonstrates that intervention in macro-structures is indispensable. There are multiple possibilities that globalisation opens up, which can be used to affect the local, but the local cannot change systemic or structural deficiencies (UN-INSTRAW 2008, 28). As the line of

¹⁰ A direct translation would be helpism or asistencialism meaning merely individual aid, helping individuals instead of dealing with the root problems.

reasoning of Juan shows, people make their own judgements about their possibilities and act accordingly:

So I do not see that there is... a discipline, especially now. And the country, you can see in the country, in a short time I have seen a difference in behaviour, especially in transit. Now there is no real authority. One is afraid of the police, afraid of any criminal; there is a lot of crime. --- People are not, I mean, not interested in education because they do not earn enough to have that interest. So if you're hungry, you are not going to be interested in education, what you are looking for is food. So basically education is something that is deficient in my country and politicians do not want to help. And that's what bothers me. So for this reason I want to go somewhere to a place where they value my effort. And that's what I think most people... I mean everybody would do. The one who is able to does it. (Juan, 33, returned temporarily from Brazil in 2009)

6.8 Future and change

In previous chapters, the idea was to develop a picture of Dominican migration, and migration of the middle class in particular, from the micro-level to the macro-level. In this final chapter of the analysis, the aim is to find out how the interviewees see the future, what would they want to change in the Dominican Republic, and to reflect upon the future prospects of Dominican migration. The way individuals see and interpret their future possibilities is interesting, because their interpretations reflect and concretise the structures. Crucially, individuals act in response to perceived opportunities, but at the same time their acts mould the structures.

States may fail to meet the demands of citizens, who may express their dissatisfaction with geographical exit, possibly accompanied with political action in the home or the host country (Faist 1997b, 261-262). Dominican migrants have traditionally been politically active in the home country politics from abroad. Lately they have successfully campaigned for the dual citizenship and political rights of emigrants (Gonzalez-Acosta 2007). Despite the political success, migrant group development initiatives or collective remittances have had a very limited development impact in the Dominican Republic (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 2010). The distrust towards the state makes it hard to find ways to contribute. In general, the civil society is weak in the country, even though some new mobilisations of young people may be arising for instance against ecological damage or police violence¹¹. (Robert 16.12.2009.) Reflecting these tendencies, several of the interviewees declare that they would like to do something to

¹¹ The campaign "Police, don't kill me, I will stop in the light" against police violence started in the social media and has been very visible in the Dominican media during the year 2010

change the country, but at the same time think it is difficult. Only one of the respondents is actively involved in planning a development project:

I would like to do this project, I would like to contribute, because here, there is a problem in the area of human rights, really heavy problems and virtually no one is working on that. There is no education about it, no culture of human rights. Like the situation is so heavy here, and it is not that heavy that people would complain but it is as a medium... [Me: Medium serious?] Exactly. Then I would like, with all the experience I have and what I have studied, to do something, something good. (Ana, 29, returned from Costa Rica in 2008)

At the same time, other respondents are very pessimistic towards the possibility of changing the Dominican Republic for the better. Respondents generally consider that young people are not interested in politics as it is now. While most say the lack of education is an important reason behind the general chaos in the country, few blame the Dominican people in general. Although José later admits that for his personal security he would like the country to change, his quote illustrates a fairly general attitude in the country and possibly even a historical change in societal values. One side of the coin is selfishness, other some sort of despondence.

If you ask me, fuck them all because they have searched for it, you know? So, I understand that the problems that exist in the country are not government's fault, or the fault of the one that was before or the one that comes after. Instead it is the fault of the people who support it, you see? However, my mom and dad did not think so, rather they thought there was an oppressive government, and that they had to do something to help the people out of that, but the people did not let itself to be helped. That's my view now, you know, there is a contrast and that to me really, I have little interest in what happens here in this regard. On the contrary, while it is still happening I see more opportunities for me. It sounds bad, it sounds ugly, but what can I say. But what can I say; I mean we have now elections on 16th May. They just adopted a constitution that no one in this country agrees with. They just approved a national budget, approved I think yesterday afternoon, which is a threat. In other words, it is nonsense. However, I have not heard until this turn of the game any negative comments about it, the media have said whatever they feel like, the majority is bought. And here is the entire world like nothing has happened! That is, if nobody cares, why would I?

According to a renowned Dominican sociologist Tahira Vargas (in Hoy 2.10.2009), there is even a popular expression in the middle and upper classes of Dominican society calling the Dominicans “vago”, lazy, which stigmatises the poor and legitimises poverty. There is a link to the Dominican pessimism, externality and authoritarianism. Pessimism does not allow for self-estimation and leads to the conclusion of not being able to control one's life, which in turn has justified authoritarian politics. For the ruling class, the best way to advance the country was by force, for the people were “backward” for being mixed race, “restless” for being undisciplined, and “inclined to disorder”. (INDH 2005, 153.) Fortunately many of the interviewees are also worried about the

ethics in the Dominican Republic even though the possibility of changing the structures seems difficult:

Then, also all this lack of ethics and professionalism and human sense that is passed to all areas, health, painting... And the street really is not like before. So the Dominican feels, I mean you cannot walk in tranquillity in the street because you can get trapped, I mean they wander around like crazy driving. So that is a lack of consideration, a person walking on foot, that is instead of thinking that it is a person who is walking, they think that if he walks on foot it is because he has no money. Then he does not deserve, he is not worthy of respect because he is rubbish, it is nastiness. So that mindset is making my country look ugly. And that must be changed, then I try to do what I can to combat that trend but I know it will take so long that I'd rather take the easy way out. And that is, growing abroad and periodically return to my country. (Juan, 33, returned temporarily from Brazil in 2009)

When asked what the respondents would choose to change in the Dominican Republic, almost all the interviewees consider the key to be education. Education is seen as a precondition for other important changes needed in the country. The quality of education is, in the experience of the respondents, low compared to other countries. The level and quality of education is identified both as a development obstacle for the country, and one of the main reasons for studying abroad, forming an extra push factor in the Dominican Republic. This corresponds to studies underlining the poor quality of education as well as the low completion rate of even secondary school in the Dominican Republic (PREAL & EDUCA 2006, 5-10; INDH 2008, 170-189). Several argue along the lines of Ana that without education there will be no vision of the future in the country:

There is not that true emphasis on education or on the quality of education. So yes, there is certain accessibility, there is virtually no level of quality. Education here is super bad. I teach at university and it's horrible, I mean horrible. The level of large universities here, of many awards, allegedly wow, the level of education is very bad. The teachers are very bad, very ill-prepared. And I identify that there would be the number one problem that I would change here. [Me: The quality of education.] Yes, the quality of education, accessibility obviously... But yes, to have a real change you have to have people with vision. And there is no vision. There are no visions generated. (Ana, 29, returned from Costa Rica in 2008)

Corruption is another clear worry for basically all the interviewees, and they all hope the Dominican Republic would change for the better, albeit for different reasons. The interviewees are worried about increasing insecurity in the country, which they relate to politics and corruption. Disorder is another related negative feature of their home country. Several of them think that there might be some social chock that will come; the situation cannot last as it is. As Daniel illustrates:

A failed state. A state where you to have an education you have to pay for it because in a public school - nothing. In your house, you have to have a water cistern because you do not get water every day. You have to have a generator because you do not have electricity 24 hours [a day]. Then, the first thing you are going to buy yourself as a commodity is a car because there is no transport system that

would transport you. --- You fall ill and what happens to you. If you do not have insurance, if you do not have money, the hospital is a slaughterhouse; there is no health system that would guarantee you in an efficient way that service. For instance, you have a person with lot of money; you have to have a watchman because the police do not guarantee you the security. Then, I am a ruler of my house, I administer my own state. I am the minister of energy, the minister of water, minister of education --- And even sadder, you work, you contribute for in the end not having a social compensation at the age of 60, 70, 75, what is there left for me if I have no kids - nothing. (Daniel, 27, returned from France in 2007)

Many of the interviewees fear that unless the political system starts working better, social and security problems will grow to intolerable levels. While Cristian and other interviewees see the economic future of the Dominican Republic being full of possibilities, the dysfunction of the political institutions may become a larger problem:

If politicians, like I just told you, do not care anything at all, nothing but money, some things can get out of their control like the issue of crime. And we may become one of those countries where people are even afraid to go and that obviously would hurt us much, because as you know this is a tourist country, that we are recognized internationally as a tourist one. And, when countries which have the same problems than us, like Mexico, are investing in the safety of tourists. I mean they are countries that have reached a level of crime so high they have to have the police, and reinforced security in tourist spots. So I think to get there [to security] it is better control the crime base. But I think that crime is a problem which if you do not pay attention can get out of control. And worsen the situation. (Cristian, 28, returned from Spain in 2005)

The concerns of the respondents are echoed in their personal plans for future. Several maintain that they do like the Dominican Republic, but none of them is 100 percent sure they would want to stay in their current location. The ones living abroad are clearly considering ways to return, while those living in the Dominican Republic thought they might move abroad again if an opportunity or necessity comes up. Six out of ten interviewees had returned and two of the four interviewees that currently reside outside the Dominican Republic planned on returning. However, only one of the interviewees was quite sure he would stay in the Dominican Republic, while the others regarded leaving as one of the options. The probability to migrate clearly seems to increase after the first migratory experience. Some of the respondents even expect a future of comings and goings, indicating a transnational way of life.

So that's what I do, I intend to move to Brazil, where I feel there is more support for education and personal growth and growth of firms that are "pro", of the society and of... I mean you can rest relaxed in the sense that they will not try to cheat on you. So the idea is this, I mean living in Brazil and keeping some projects here in the Dominican Republic because the truth is that I really like my country. What bothers me is the time it takes me to do something that in other countries is so easy and here it becomes complicated by the corrupt people who want money for work they are already paid for. --- So that bothers me because you lose too much time, too much time to grow. (Juan, 33, returned temporarily from Brazil in 2009)

The challenges the Dominican Republic faces, namely corruption, lack of education, disorder, and increasing physical, social and economic insecurity are expressed in the interviews in many different ways. The Dominican Republic manifests the case that mere economic growth is simply not enough to bring human development. There are few countries that have done economically as well during the last 50 years. At the same time, the economic inequalities in the Dominican Republic have increased dramatically. There is not sufficient social spending towards things that could improve the quality of life of people (Wooding 15.12.2009). Despite sustained economic growth and migration in the Dominican Republic, the human development score of the country is hardly increasing. This would confirm the observation by Massey et al. (1998, 291) that in most cases over-reliance on labour exports cannot replace a wider development policy. Carolina describes the change during the past decade:

If the politics, if the parties, if the government, if the state were focused on improving living standards, improving and contributing more to hospitals, education... And you see that concern in the standard of life, the basic is to improve it, because the middle class is disappearing, you are poor; you are rich, the middle class already 10 years ago [disappearing]. And in my house three carts of sweets was bought in December because it was Christmas. Now nothing is purchased and be careful, you are noticing that the economic situation is different. So that makes you think that in another country, there are better, more possibilities. (Carolina, 30, returned from Spain in 2008)

By no means should migration be seen in negative ways only. The flows of people are a normal process and a constant in human history, which may enrich and contribute to positive results in both sending and receiving countries (INDH 2005, 144). In reality, Dominican society is already a migratory society that has been transformed profoundly through migration (Gallardo Rivas 16.12.2009; INDH 2005, 144). Importantly, most of the interviewees were rather surprised when I mentioned the percentage of people that have left. So even if there are articles on migration in newspapers and people in general know about “Dominican York”, the real magnitude of the phenomenon seems most often unknown. Indeed, the incorporation of the Dominican diaspora to the Dominican nation has not been unproblematic. On the one hand, people recognise the important economic role the diaspora plays. On the other hand, Dominicans have very questionable stereotypes of Dominican migrants, such as being drug traffickers, criminal, opportunists, or unpatriotic. The hybridisation of Dominican culture is largely rejected on the part of island residents. (INDH 2005, 164.)

The role of the Dominican state in managing migration is not visible according to both the experts and the interviewees (Gallardo Rivas 16.12.2009; Robert 16.12.2009; Wooding 15.12.2009). The Dominican state is still lacking clear views on how to deal with migration. The policies of the Dominican state towards migration are reactive rather than proactive, short-term rather than preventive, and discontinuous rather than continuous and systematic (INDH 2005, 143-144). This reflects the more general need to create a functioning institutional and administrative system to better fight corruption in the country (Winter 16.12.2009). The attitude of the Dominican state towards emigration is pretty *laissez-faire*, and it has been less proactive than for example Mexico. Neither does the Dominican state make use of remittances as much as it could. What is exceptional in the case of the Dominican Republic is the relative mistrust of people towards the state, forcing them to use other channels than the state for instance to organise collective remittances. (Gallardo Rivas 16.12.2009; Wooding 15.12.2009.)

Nevertheless, the experts interviewed do say that the Dominican state is slowly starting initiatives to manage migration better (Gallardo Rivas 16.12.2009; Robert 16.12.2009; Wooding 15.12.2009). The Dominican government interest in the diaspora grows with the increasing economic significance of the diaspora's contribution to the country (UN-INSTRAW 2006, 68). Until 1996 there had been no official program or governmental agency to address Dominicans abroad (Gonzalez-Acosta 2007). The state is now at least interested in getting votes from abroad, and there are incentives such as the National Council for Dominicans abroad and a programme of the Global Foundation for Democracy and Development directed towards Dominicans living abroad. In the Dominican Republic transnationalism seems to be of a migrant-led nature, defined as transnationalism from below (Popkin 2004, 1). Recent developments on the part of the Dominican state are basically catching up to already existing transnational practices and identities of the Dominican *imagined community* (Gonzalez-Acosta 2007).

The concept of a "deterritorialized" state as presented by Basch et al. (1994, 8) increasingly matches the reality in the Dominican Republic. According to Basch et al. this conception of a nation-state includes those physically living in other countries, but who are socially, culturally, politically and often economically bound to the nation-state of their ancestors as citizens. Simultaneously though, Haitians living in the country are often denied citizenship, which is also related to widespread racial discrimination in the

Dominican Republic. Due to the fact that Dominican migration is so much a part of everyday life, the Dominican state slowly is starting to have a more tolerant attitude towards Haitians in the country. Opinion polls also show that Dominicans with migratory experience have more open views about Haitian immigrants (Wooding 15.12.2009), which shows the entrance of new ideas through migration.

Migration presents many challenges in the Dominican Republic, but the positive opportunities must be seen as well. At the macro-level, the migratory process should be restructured. If structural deficiencies are not tackled, migration can convert more and more into a continuous process where phenomena such as replacement migration, circular migration or dependency on remittances show the incapacity to promote an authentic process of development (UN-INSTRAW 2008, 28). Initiatives and actions should be oriented to the creation of opportunities and reduction of inequalities, exclusions and deprivations as an alternative to emigration. Projects and incentives should also be produced to strengthen the links and forms of inclusion of the Dominicans that have emigrated or decide to emigrate in the future. (INDH 2005, 144.) The basic idea is to give people options and viable alternatives. Juan concludes by saying:

I think that yes, there will be an advance in the Dominican Republic that could be faster if the politicians corrected themselves, in other words, stopped this corruption and tried to benefit the society. But in 10 years the Dominican Republic, 10 years is a good time, I think it will be more advanced but not as much as it could be. I do, I get very angry thinking that I'm not going to be part of that, but indirectly, I will also be part of it because I plan on coming back frequently, just that... That is it; I do not want to stay because of that. (Juan, 33, returned temporarily from Brazil in 2009)

7 CONCLUSIONS

The world has become more interdependent during the last decades, causing a need for the revision of established theoretical concepts (e.g. Castles & Miller 1998, 2009; Levitt & Jaworsky 2007; Massey et al. 1994, 1998.). As all parts of the world are experiencing increasing flows of people, new frameworks are essential to explain the many sides of migration. Detailed analyses are needed to create better theories. The goal of this thesis was to analyse the interaction between global processes and local strategies. In particular, the aim was to present detailed descriptive knowledge on how migration from a micro-perspective is linked to global processes. At the same time, this thesis should increase understanding on the differences and similarities between diverse cases, as local experiences may be representative of broader trends.

The case of the Dominican Republic shows that there is a diversity of local responses to the world system, as Dominicans have produced their own unique historical responses to global changes. My original hypothesis was that Dominican migration is importantly conditioned by socioeconomic and educational background, which proved to hold fast. This thesis aimed at a comprehensive understanding of migration of educated Dominicans in light of regional and worldwide developments. Through a detailed analysis of the migratory context in the Dominican Republic, this thesis presented elements that affect migration on the one hand, and structures that are influenced by migration on the other hand. While the migrants' stories do not allow for generalising interpretations as such, they provide a rich picture of the way young educated Dominicans see possibilities today, and underline the subjective factors in the dynamics of migration.

The central argument of this thesis maintains that most Dominicans consider migration to be an acceptable or even desirable way to achieve social and economic mobility and security, more income and different lifestyles. There is nothing evident in the way this culture of migration has formed in the Dominican Republic. Migration is affected by cultural, historical, and a range of structural factors as well as agency and networks, and therefore depends on the specific context. The way in which the agents interpret their future possibilities and frame their actions is of utmost importance. The significance of

popular perceptions about migration to the framing of future possibilities has in this study proved to be a key to explaining the phenomenon. The thesis describes how the agency of migrants is connected to structures of the world economy and global politics. Migrants form part of the push-pull dynamic, and play their role in the capitalist world market. At the same time migrants use global opportunities, which are mediated through local macro- and meso-structures.

My research shows that perceived economic opportunities are clearly important in making migration decisions. At the same time, expectations about lifestyles seem to have globalised in important ways, which is demonstrated in relative deprivation the interviewees experience in comparison to lifestyles elsewhere. Migration is a relatively common strategy to cope with global developments in the Dominican Republic, but there are important differences in migratory tendencies and experiences that follow the lines of educational level, class and gender. My findings suggest that migration is more accessible for the educated middle class, because of the availability of better resources. Class and educational level often determine the financial, social and cultural resources a migrant can use to overcome the structural constraints of migration, which shows in the use of the “academic gate” and scholarships.

Under similar macro-structures, people end up with different strategies. The meso-structures are of crucial importance in migration as macro-structures are not usually mediated to the micro-level in the same way. My results support the argument that the value of networks in migration seems to be less important for the educated, who often have more financial, cultural and social capital available. At the same time, the role of family, friends and other social networks is central. The different decisions taken by individuals inside the same group can be partly explained by differences in social relations. The interviews suggest that the prevalence of migrants in family and friend circles impacts the decision to migrate and to return. The culturally defined desirable periods for migration show in the expectations of the respondents and their families. Both gaining independence and being close to the family proved important in this study. Thus, the crucial micro-level of decision-making is constituted in the degrees of freedom that individuals have in relation to the meso-structures on the one hand, and the personal and cultural values they have on the other.

The transnational framework of analysis grasps the continuous flows of economic resources, social ties and communication that increasingly cross borders. Transnational activities are shaped by class among other factors, which shows in the differing role of remittances for different groups of people. In the increasingly globalised world, new technologies of communication allow individuals to keep in constant touch across borders, while simultaneously people get to know about lifestyles and opportunities elsewhere. The life stories of the respondents in this thesis exemplify the presence of circular migration, which underlines the dynamic nature of migratory processes. Rather than being a one time event, migration consists of multiple phases. Assumedly, circular migration is more easily available for people with more financial, cultural and social resources. Thus, transnational activities vary in content and density, but taken together and over time these activities have the potential to shape individuals and societies.

Migratory movements are embedded in specific historical contexts. The actual economic, political and social circumstances have led many Dominicans to believe that there are better opportunities elsewhere. Importantly, my study of the Dominican case shows that each generation has differential views on migration, politics, society and change, which in turn affects their actions. The globalisation of certain expectations on the one hand, and the development of the specifically Dominican feeling of 'externalism' on the other, have for their part given rise to the Dominican culture of migration. Whereas migration is changing through shifting structural opportunities, migration also affects the transformation of structures. The purpose of this study is to reconstruct a bottom-up perspective of educated Dominican migration to better understand the role of migration in the everyday life of Dominicans and its prevalence as a popular strategy. Migration affects economic, political, social and cultural fields in sending and receiving areas in both positive and negative ways. The transnational practices and transcultural identities migration has brought about are stretching the conceptualisations of nation, citizenship and identity in the Dominican Republic. Importantly, cultural changes in the Dominican Republic due to historically embedded political, economic and social developments have resulted in the formulation of a veritable culture of migration.

Despite some recent changes in the legislation and rhetoric that is used by the Dominican state to accommodate the Dominican diaspora, no serious efforts to counter structural incentives to migrate are put in place. The current Dominican development

model does not create decent opportunities in the labour market. To curb the tendencies of brain drain, educational policies need to be matched with the right economic and labour market policies to create a virtuous circle of increasing productivity, availability of a qualified labour force, social cohesion and development. Migration cannot be analysed or "solved" in isolation, but instead must be considered together with other policies to bring about sustainable development in both sending and receiving societies.

The results of this thesis give suggestions about where to successfully direct one's attention in similar studies on large-scale emigration. An important issue is to explore in more detail the formation of a culture of migration, and the possible differences between those who stay and those who migrate. Second, more knowledge is needed about under what context migration has positive or negative consequences, and for whom. Overall, standard migration analysis has not properly addressed the meaning of socioeconomic class in contemporary migratory movements. More attention should be devoted to the role of class in migration and possible changes in class formation and identity. Class and educational background profoundly shape migratory experiences. In future analyses, the increasingly high levels of educated migrants and the differential impact the socioeconomic composition of migration has for home and host countries need to be taken into account.

In this study, the Dominican Republic has proved to be an inspiring example of large-scale migration in general and migration of the educated middle-class in particular. Migration and the impacts it has are always dependent on the specific context. The Dominican Republic has a certain location in the geopolitical order, which importantly affects the possibilities available for Dominicans both in the home country and abroad. At the same time, this thesis demonstrates that local structures are pivotal in determining how global processes are materialised in a specific place. Migration from the Dominican Republic started historically as a political safety valve, but today the export of people has become a key strategy for the Dominican state to compensate for the lack of opportunities for its citizens. Migration can play a highly significant role in society as the case of the Dominican Republic suggests, yet migration does not automatically lead to development. I believe that studying migration from the micro-level to the macro-level in the Dominican Republic can provide important lessons about the role migration plays in the future of Central America and the Caribbean.

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APPENDIX

1 Map of the Caribbean region



Source: Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Central_america_%28cia%29.png

2 Map of the Dominican Republic



Source: Wikipedia, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Dominican-republic.jpg>

3 Thematic interviews

1. Background information of the interviewee
 - Name, age, education, home town, migration history
2. Decision to migrate – principal motivations
3. Positive and negative sides of migrating
4. Return – main reasons
5. Transnational links and practices
6. Why Dominicans migrate in general
7. How Dominicans see migrants in general
8. Generations
9. Changes in the DR due to migration
10. The role of Dominican state in migration
11. Personal future
12. Future of the DR