

“And now to the rest of the trash...”

Representations of begging Roma and an ideal society
in two Nordic newspapers

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
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<p>Since begging East European Roma became a common view in the streets of larger Nordic cities, vivid discussions about their presence and activities have been carried out in the mass media. This thesis examines the public debates in Finland and Norway through a discursive analysis and comparison of press content from the two countries.</p> <p>The aim of the study is firstly to identify the prominent discourses which construct certain images of the beggars, as well as the elements and internal logics that these discourses are constructed around. But in addition to scrutinizing representations of the Roma, also an opposite perspective is applied. In accordance with the theoretical concept of ‘othering’, debates about ‘them’ are assumed to simultaneously reveal something significant about ‘us’. The second research question is thus what kind of images of the ideal Finnish and Norwegian societies are reflected in the data, and which societal values are salient in these images.</p> <p>The analysis comprises 79 texts printed in the main Finnish and Norwegian quality newspapers; Helsingin Sanomat and Aftenposten. The data consists of news articles, editorials, columns and letters to the editor from a three-month period in the summer of 2010. The analysis was carried out within the theoretical and methodological framework of critical discourse analysis as outlined by Norman Fairclough. A customized nine-step coding scheme was developed in order to reach the most central dimensions of the texts.</p> <p>Seven main discourses were identified; the Deprivation-solidarity, Human rights, Order, Crime, Space and majority reactions, Authority control, and Authority critique discourse. These were grouped into two competing normative stances on what an ideal society looks like; the exclusionary and the inclusionary stance. While the exclusionary stance places the begging Roma within a frame of crime, illegitimate use of public space and threat to the social order, the other advocates an attitude of solidarity and humanitarian values. The analysis points to a dominance of the former, although it is challenged by the latter.</p> <p>The Roma are “individualized” by quoting and/or presenting them by name in a fair part of the Finnish news articles. In Norway, the opposite is true; there the beggars are dominantly presented as anonymous and passive. Overall, the begging Roma are subjected to a double bind as they are faced with simultaneous expectations of activity and passivity. Theories relating to moral panics and ‘the good enemy’ provide for a deepened understanding of the intensity of the debates.</p>			
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Tiivistelmä – Referat – Abstract <p>Sedan tiggande östeuropeiska romer blev en vanlig syn på gatorna i större nordiska städer har livliga debatter om deras närvaro och verksamhet pågått i massmedierna. Denna avhandling granskar de offentliga debatterna i Finland och Norge genom en diskursiv analys och jämförelse av pressmaterial från de två länderna.</p> <p>Studiens syfte är för det första att identifiera de mest framträdande diskurserna som konstruerar vissa bilder av tiggarna, samt de element och interna logiker som diskurserna är konstruerade kring. Men förutom att syna representationer av romerna tillämpas även ett motsatt perspektiv. I enlighet med det teoretiska begreppet ‘andrafiering’ (othering) antas debatter om ‘dem’ samtidigt avslöja något meningsfullt om ‘oss’. Den andra forskningsfrågan är därmed vilka sorters uppfattningar om de ideala finländska och norska samhällena som reflekteras i materialet och vilka samhällseliga värden som framträder.</p> <p>Analysen omfattar 79 texter tryckta i Helsingin Sanomat och Aftenposten, de främsta kvalitetstidningarna i respektive land. Materialet innehåller nyhetsartiklar, ledare, kolumner och insändare från en period på tre månader under sommaren 2010. Analysen utfördes inom den teoretiska och metodologiska ramen kritisk diskursanalys, i enlighet med Norman Faircloughs approach. Ett skräddarsytt kodningsschema bestående av nio steg utarbetades för att nå texternas mest centrala dimensioner.</p> <p>Sju huvuddiskurser identifierades; diskursen om nöd och solidaritet, diskursen om mänskliga rättigheter, ordningsdiskursen, brottsdiskursen, diskursen om utrymme och majoritetens reaktioner, diskursen om auktoritetskontroll samt diskursen om auktoritetskritik. Dessa indelades i två tävlande uppfattningar om hur idealsamhället ser ut; den exkluderande och den inkluderande inställningen. Medan den exkluderande inställningen placerar de tiggande romerna inom en tolkningsram av kriminalitet, illegitim användning av det offentliga rummet och ett hot mot den sociala ordningen, förespråkar den andra solidaritet och humanitära värden. Analysen visar att den förstnämnda dominerar, fastän den utmanas av den senare.</p> <p>Romerna “individualiseras” genom direkta citat och/eller presentation vid namn i en rätt stor del av de finländska nyhetsartiklarna. I Norge gäller motsatsen; där presenteras tiggarna för det mesta som anonyma och passiva. På det hela taget utsätts de tiggande romerna för dubbla signaler då de samtidigt fordras vara passiva och aktiva. Teorier om moralpanik och ‘den goda fienden’ bidrar till en djupare förståelse för intensiteten i debatterna.</p>			
Avainsanat – Nyckelord – Keywords Östeuropeiska romer, tiggeri, media, tidningar, Helsingin Sanomat, Aftenposten, kritisk diskursanalys, Norman Fairclough, andrafiering, idealsamhälle, moralpanik, den goda fienden, dubbla signaler, Finland, Norge			

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Introduction

During the past four to five years, a novel issue has risen to public debate in Finland and Norway. The latest enlargement of the European Union – the inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria as member states of the Union on the first of January 2007 – led to more or less unforeseen developments in several European countries. Groups of Roma people, now holding EU citizenship, took advantage of the freedom of movement (European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38/EY) as they left Romania and Bulgaria in order to seek a living in other parts of Europe. Some of the East European Roma also arrived in the northern countries of Finland and Norway.

Heated national debates followed, especially focusing on the ways in which the Roma attempted to make a living. A large part of the newcomers namely took to street begging in order to gain an income. Witnessing people crouching in the streets, pleading for money, shook the inhabitants in the two welfare societies. The shock effect was stronger in Finland, as beggary was practically non-existent for several decades before the East European Roma arrived. In Norway, especially Oslo, Norwegian drug addicts begging for money had been a common sight from before. But also there public debate emerged; it was now about external groups who entered Norway with the purpose of begging and collecting money in other ways which had been uncommon in the Norwegian society.¹

In this master's thesis, I will examine the Finnish and Norwegian public debates on the begging Roma via media texts. By a systematic analysis of news articles and other newspaper texts, I will identify various ways in which the issue is treated. How are understandings of this phenomenon and the people involved constructed? This qualitative study uses *Critical Discourse Analysis* (CDA) methodology and aims at describing the dominant discourses present in the data. It is a comparative study, with textual data from

¹ Both in Finland and Norway, some of the East European Roma have other economic activities in addition to the main activity of begging. These include playing music in the streets, street peddling of for example flowers, and collecting return bottles. However, for the sake of simplicity and style, I often refer only to the activity of begging in the text; e.g. by using wordings such as 'the begging Roma'. The reader should take this as a generic denomination for the East European Roma who devote themselves to various street-level economic activities. In cases where a distinction between the different activities is relevant, these are singled out.

the main quality newspapers in Norway and Finland – *Aftenposten* (AP) and *Helsingin Sanomat* (HS).

In addition to identifying and describing various discourses about the Roma, I will also apply an inverted approach to my data. By this I refer to image(s) of the ideal Finnish and Norwegian societies emerging in the data. I am namely convinced that portrayals of this external group reveal something significant about those who do the portraying, and the society in which this takes place. When we speak about ‘them’, we simultaneously speak about ‘us’. It is not without reason that the phenomenon of begging has been received with such vivid debates in the two countries. Strong reactions indicate that some social norm or value is experienced as threatened. The begging issue has clearly struck a chord in the Finnish and Norwegian self-understandings. This is what makes this topic such a fruitful and inspiring one.

In the **first chapter**, I introduce the societal contexts within which the object of my study occurs. I start by outlining the Nordic welfare state system(s), as this is relevant for the overall comprehension and situating of this study. Then, I give an account of the situation of the Roma people in Europe. This way the reader will gain a deeper understanding of the circumstances leading to the mobile lifestyle of this ethnic group. A brief description of national Roma minorities in my two focus countries follows. The arrival of the East European Roma in Norway and Finland, and the subsequent responses by national and local authorities, is also described.

In **chapter 2**, I introduce the research topic and questions, as well as theoretical base for my study. The social constructionist tradition is the theoretical cornerstone; what is interesting is what kind of interpretations of the begging Roma is put forward by the media, instead of some objective truth about them. The power dimension intrinsic in language at large, and in discourses more specifically, is discussed. I also touch upon the role of the mass media in shaping public debate and constructing ‘social problems’, as well as the concept of ‘the other’ as a way to structure our understanding of the world.

My data, consisting of 79 newspaper texts from *Helsingin Sanomat* and *Aftenposten*, is presented in **chapter 3**. I describe the selection, collection and characteristics of the text

units. In addition, I explain how I have applied Norman Fairclough's critical discourse analytical apparatus on the data. I present the four stages in my analysis process, as well as the coding scheme which I used for reaching a deep understanding of the discursive dimensions that my data contains.

Then the actual analysis follows. The first part of **chapter 4** consists of detailed presentation of the seven main discourses which I identified in my data. The presentation of each discourse is initiated by quoting passages from the data which contain a central aspect of the discourse in question. This way the reader gets an instant idea of the nature of the discourse. In the latter part of the chapter, I discuss how the findings can be understood through the concepts of *moral panic* and *the good enemy*. I also present the result of my mirror approach, by describing the two opposing ideal pictures of society that emerge in my data. The *double bind*, entailing the next-to-impossible requirement that the beggars be simultaneously active and passive is also discussed.

The concluding remarks in the **fifth chapter** contain reflections on the wider social significance of the ways in which the media portrays the East European Roma. I also demonstrate how my results echo a long tradition of portraying Roma in a light which is all but flattering.

1 Background

1.1 The Nordic welfare state

The welfare state systems in Finland and Norway entail a rather unique societal setting in Europe as well as globally, and also bear implications for the begging East European Roma in these countries. 'The Nordic model' has become a standard term when referring to the specific economical and social models of the Nordic countries Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland and Finland (Christiansen and Markkola 2006). The core of the Nordic model is the idea of the welfare state, which is characterized by aims such as maximising employment, gender equality and a substantial redistribution of resources via relatively

high fiscal levels. The tradition of social democracy, which in very simplified terms can be seen as something a mixture between liberalism and socialism, forms the base of the welfare state systems.

From the 1930's, Sweden was singled out as the welfare state par excellence, soon accompanied by Norway and Denmark. Since the 1950's, Finland and Iceland were also included in the group of states having highly evolved welfare systems (Christiansen and Markkola 2006). Raija Julkunen (2006) questions the inclusion of Finland in this club, stating that the country has always lagged behind the other Nordic countries when it comes to the size of the public sector and the services provided. According to her, the Finnish model has been called "a cheap version of the Nordic model"² (Julkunen 2006, 31. My translation from Finnish³).

During the last two or three decades, the success of the welfare state has been called to question. Social benefits have been reduced and services earlier managed publicly privatized. 'The crisis of the welfare state' has been attributed to national economical crises⁴ as well as global economic transitions, most notably increased economic globalization and competitiveness. Also changes in the national political climates, such as the advancement of rightist parties at the expense of social democratic ones, is an important cause for the reassessment of the welfare models (Nordlund 2002). Demographic circumstances (mainly the ageing of the populations) and the advancement of a global neoliberal doctrine are other central factors. Researchers anyhow reject the idea that the welfare state has come to the end of its era, arguing that the models are changing but not perishing. In his doctoral thesis, Andreas Nordlund (2002) comes to the conclusion that no evidence is found for the existence of a general trend of dismantling the Nordic welfare states.

The strong welfare state plays an important role in the national self-apprehension of the Nordic peoples. Generally, it can be argued that the welfare system has the support of the populations. The trust in public responsibility for economic and social matters which in

² "[...] pohjoismaisen mallin halpaversioksi."

³ All original quotes from Finnish or Norwegian are found in a foot- or endnote.

⁴ Finland and Sweden in particular were faced with severe economic recessions in the early 1990's.

many other countries fall exclusively in the personal domain is one of the social (or social psychological, if you will) results of having a strong welfare state. Julkunen (2006, 30) polemically states (but later rejects) that “[t]he myth of the Nordic welfare state strips people of the responsibility for their own lives”⁵ (My translation from Finnish).

The arrival of the East European Roma put the values constituting the base of welfare ideology – universalism, equality and public responsibility – in a completely new light. Although universalism is arguably a core value of the welfare state, what is meant is self-evidently not universalism in the actual sense of the word. The welfare services apply only to citizens or people permanently residing in the territory of the state. The division between those included and excluded – ‘us’ and ‘them’ – has here clearly emerged. A paradoxical image emerges when, among the vulnerable groups in society, the one that is most visibly impoverished is not in a position to benefit from the system. Nevertheless, few advocate an inclusion of the East European Roma as full members of the national welfare society. Such a stance would challenge the entire idea of the nation-state.

As we shall see further on, categorization and classification play an important role in the maintenance of social structures. What is especially troubling for many Nordic citizens is that the begging Roma fall outside of as good as all pre-existing categories of immigration, which would enable predetermined labels and therewith reactions. For example, asylum seekers are often defined as a group in need of and entitled to protection because of the horrors they have encountered. An alternative view is that they often exaggerate their troubles in order to get asylum and benefit from the welfare state services. Labour migrants are on the one hand portrayed as having a spirit of enterprise, but on the other they are often accused of ‘stealing our jobs’. The begging Roma, however, do not fit any of these categories. They are neither entitled to or seeking public services. They are EU citizens and thus have complete right to be here, but they are deviant in the regard that they are not seeking to integrate into the official labour market and neither are they tourists. They are acting outside of the institutionalized societal structures. The fact that they are turning directly to individuals in the street with their pleadings conflicts severely with the idea of public responsibility for those who are worse

⁵“*Pohjoismaisen hyvinvointivaltion myytti ottaa ihmisiltä vastuun heidän elämästään.*”

off. Here we have an external group, evidently impoverished, who do not and cannot turn to the existing public services for help. They are also not paying any taxes for the income they do manage to collect, thus not contributing to maintaining the welfare system. The begging phenomenon consequently introduces a novel challenge for the common man and woman in the larger cities of the Nordic countries, and for these societies at large.

Another characteristic of the Nordic states with specific implications for the begging Roma is the Protestant religion. The diligence inherent in the Protestant work ideal was underlined already by Max Weber in his classical book *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1930/1978). Whereas for example in Catholic societies, giving alms has a clearer social and religious function, this is not the case in Protestant countries. The fact that the East European Roma are not seeking to enrol in official, paid work is thus seriously conflicting with the societal value of hard work inherited from the religious tradition.

1.2 The largest ethnic minority in Europe

“For seven centuries, East European Gypsies have languished at the bottom of social, economic, and political hierarchies.”

(Zoltan Barany 2002, 3)

There are several denominations for the Roma people, some of which are considered more correct than others. I use the term ‘Roma’, which is generally considered neutral. In Romani language, ‘rom’ stands for ‘human’ (Cederberg 2010, 14). Another common term for the group is ‘Gypsies’, but this is nowadays sometimes considered derogatory. The term is derived from ‘Egyptians’, as the Roma descend from Pharaonic peoples according to some legends (Barany 2002, 9). In Finnish, the politically correct term is ‘romani’, while the earlier used ‘mustalainen’ is now often considered outdated and rather rude. In Norwegian, ‘rom’ is the neutral term, while ‘sigøyner’ roughly equals ‘Gypsy’. Also the term ‘tater’ figures in Norway, referring to an older minority of Roma descent and is more correctly named ‘romani’ (Eide 2007, 72).

The Roma population arrived in Europe approximately seven centuries ago (Barany 2002, 8). The origin of this diverse people is traced back to the Punjab region in north-western India, from where they are thought to have left due to pressure from Islamic warriors. As they reached Europe, possibly as long as 200 years after leaving India, they arrived in the east-central parts of Europe. Their mobility did not cease after this, as many of them continued to move around in response to challenging political and economic circumstances. According to Zoltan Barany (2002), one of the most common still held misconceptions about the Roma people is that they have an intrinsic tendency for a nomadic lifestyle. In fact, the reasons for their mobility were (and still are) often external, such as attitudes by the majority communities, availability of land for cultivation and economic opportunities. The majority of the East European Roma do, however, lead sedentary lives since centuries back (Barany 2002, 11).

It needs to be pointed out that the Roma people is by no means a homogeneous group. There are several differentiating factors, such as lifestyle (peripatetic or sedentary), tribal affiliation, occupation, language, religion, as well as the obvious variable country of residence. Some general denominators of traditional Roma culture are strict purity codes, spirituality, rather hierarchical social structures and male domination. The degree to which these characteristics today affect the lives of different Roma groups vary. Adaptability to varying conditions is considered among the common traits; “They had to be able to exploit whatever opportunities offered themselves, to find the odd loophole and unoccupied niche in this or that social and economic environment [...]” (Barany 2002, 14).

Estimates of the size of the Roma population(s) in Europe vary considerably, but it is established that they constitute the largest ethnic minority in Europe (EC website⁶). I have come across numbers between 4.5 (Jenne 2000, 189) and 12 million (Cederberg 2010, 14). About three quarters live in former communist states in Eastern Europe (Guy 2009, 55). Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, Serbia, Montenegro and the Czech Republic have the largest Roma populations (Jenne 2000, 189). Confirming the number of Roma is challenging because of diverging national statistical practices. Another

⁶ Full references for online sources, including the website addresses, are found under *Internet sources* in the reference list.

complicating matter is that some Roma are not registered as belonging to this group, partly due to an unwillingness to be categorized as Roma out of fear for stigmatization. Some Roma also lack official documents and even birth certificates. As a result, official data and estimations made by NGOs often differ considerably (UNICEF 2007).

The Roma are at large regarded as being among the most marginalized groups in Europe (CoE website; Amnesty International website). They face serious socio-economic challenges for example in the areas of employment, health, education and housing. According to a 2003 report by the World Bank (referred to in UNICEF 2007, 20), the East European Roma are “almost entirely marginalized” and many “live in conditions below even the most minimal for survival”. Furthermore, it is not only the concrete economic circumstances that cause trouble, but also symbolic social exclusion. Prejudices against Roma communities and their customs are deeply rooted in many European societies. Members of the Roma population continue to be faced with stereotypes, suspicion and various forms of discrimination.

Unemployment and subsequent poverty are among the most pressing problems of the European Roma population since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. During the state-socialist period, the Roma were relatively well integrated into society. But as this stability ended, the majority of the Roma in Eastern Europe now live under the official poverty line (Barany 2002, 178–179). Barany (ibid.) reports for example that nearly 63 per cent of the Roma in Romania live below the minimum subsistence level (which is even lower than the ‘poverty line’). In Hungary and Romania, more than half of Roma households have no steady incomes. In Bulgaria, almost two thirds of the Roma of working age were reported to be unemployed in 2001, compared to a fifth of ‘ethnic Bulgarians’ (Tomova 2009, 71). According to UNICEF (2007, 44), almost 70 per cent of the Roma in former Yugoslavia face hunger. Amnesty International reports that despite constituting less than three per cent of the Czech population, the Roma stand for up to a third of all those registered as unemployed in the country (Amnesty International website). These unsystematically picked numbers illustrate how far-reaching and deep the poverty problem is among the Roma people in Eastern Europe.

As mentioned before, Roma communities have traditionally had a nomadic lifestyle, but most groups have been settled for generations now. Roma ghettos, separate areas reserved for the Roma, is a common phenomenon in several East European countries. These arrangements are found especially in Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and parts of former Yugoslavia. István Pogány (2004, 9) lists lack of running water, sewerage and basic health care among the severe challenges facing those who live in what he calls 'colonies'. UNICEF (2007, 29) reports that over half of the Roma homes in Eastern Europe lack an indoors toilet or bathroom and are not connected to a sewage system. Forced evictions are not uncommon, and reports tell that in those cases when the evicted are offered compensation by the authorities, the dwellings are often dangerous and even placed on toxic soil (Amnesty International website).

Education levels are alarmingly low among the East European Roma. In Romania, 90 per cent do not have elementary school education. It is thus not surprising that about half of the Romanian Roma were illiterate in 2001 (Migration Information website). Amnesty International reports that especially in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, Roma children are segregated into schools for children with mental disabilities. This highly discriminatory practice continues regardless of a 2007 European Court of Human Rights ruling deeming it as unlawful. In Slovakia, up to 80 per cent of pupils placed in special schools are Roma (Amnesty International website). Treating Roma children and youth as mentally challenged because of their ethnicity, thus denying them proper education, is one of the many factors in the reproduction of the vicious circle that this population is trapped in.

The Roma were subject to exclusionary policies practically from the point of their arrival in Europe. Barany (2002, 63) paints a depressing image, according to which the Roma have been "ostracized, persecuted, and stereotyped as lazy, uninhibited, deceitful, dirty, unreliable, and prone to theft and other criminal behaviour" throughout the centuries. Several hundred thousand Roma were killed during the Nazi regime⁷, and vigorous 'antiziganist' attitudes and movements still exist today – and have even been intensified

⁷ Irka Cederberg (2010, 81) quotes a letter written by Simon Wiesenthal, stating that the proportion of murdered Roma under the Nazi regime is similar to that of the Jews; about 80 per cent of those who lived in occupied areas.

in recent years. Reports on racist violence against Roma have been made in countries such as Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Italy (ERRC website A; Amnesty International website). Several murders with racist motives have occurred, especially in Hungary (Time magazine 01.05.2009). Neo-Nazi movements have been linked to many of the deeds (ERRC website A). But it is by no means only in Eastern Europe that these kinds of sentiments prevail. Irka Cederberg (2010, 71) notes that over 60 per cent of the German population holds negative attitudes towards Roma. Also the French mass deportations in the summer and fall of 2010 as well as the criticized Italian practice of fingerprinting Roma when entering the country show that strong negative attitudes exist also in Western Europe. Joanne Richardson (2005) has also criticized the ‘policing’ of Roma in Britain.

In sum, the legacy of spatial, socio-economic and educational exclusion, violent racism, and even genocide under the Nazi rule has left the Roma communities disadvantaged at the least. Unsurprisingly, the discriminatory practices have also lead to introverted tendencies among the Roma, who have been discouraged to seek integration with majority populations. It is against this historical backdrop that a fuller image of the current Roma mobility is obtained.

1.3 National Roma minorities in Finland and Norway

It needs to be underlined that the groups of East European Roma, whose media portrayals this thesis deals with, are in a significantly different position than the now relatively well-integrated national Roma minorities in Finland and Norway. But although the national Roma minorities are less discriminated against in the Nordic countries than in some other parts of Europe, our history shows a less flattering image. And still today, national Roma minorities in Finland and Norway do face some degree of stigmatization and discrimination. The current position of the Roma appears to be weaker in Norway, from where reports state that they are still today “considered a social problem, living more or less outside the society” (Simonsen 2011, 92).

Norway has a very small national Roma minority, consisting of only around 500 persons (EAEA website). There are two distinct groups; the 'romani' (also called 'taterne') and the 'rom' (also called 'sigøynere'). Both have faced severe negative stereotypization and discrimination throughout history. One important distinction between the two is that the romani arrived in Norway⁸ some five centuries earlier than the rom (Simonsen 2011, 92; Eide 2007, 72). The latter were much fewer in numbers and arrived in the 19th century, presumably as refugees from Romania. But denominations have been mixed over the decades, and the groups are now often treated as one.

The Norwegian authorities have historically been all but welcoming against the Roma. Official documents from the 16th century reveal that there were laws ordaining the expulsion and even execution of taterne (Eide 2007, 72). The 'Gypsy paragraph' denying Roma the right to permanently settle in Norway was suspended as late as 1956 (Simonsen 2011, 92). Later on, attempts to integrate the Norwegian Roma and grant them institutional representation have been made. There is for example a post responsible for Roma affairs in the Norwegian Ministry of Social Affairs (Pulma 2009, 121). There are also some Norwegian Roma organizations working in the field of culture, such as the National Organization for Roma people (*Landsorganisasjonen for Romanifolket*).

Finland has a significantly larger national Roma minority than Norway. There are approximately 10 000 Finnish Roma residing in Finland, as well as 3000 Roma of Finnish origin in Sweden (STM 2004, 3). The Finnish Roma are recognized as an official minority, but they do not have such linguistic rights as those of the Swedish-speaking population in Finland. They have strong institutional representation, with bodies such as the national and local Advisory Boards on Roma issues (*Romaniasaiain neuvottelukunnat*). The National Policy on Roma (*Romanipoliittinen ohjelma*) was adopted by the Council of State in 2009 (STM 2011). Although discrimination still occurs and the socio-economic status of the Roma minority is below the national average (STM 2004), it is uncontested that the level of Roma integration into Finnish society is among the highest in Europe.

⁸ At the time the kingdom of Denmark-Norway.

However, when groups of Roma first arrived in Finland in the 16th century, they were not especially well received. Also here, customized legislation was in place in order to hinder Roma from settling and thriving. The Swedish authorities⁹ employed special ‘Gypsy laws’ (*mustalaislait*), attempting to stop Roma from entering the country or to deport them, use them for forced labour or confine them to institutions (Häkkinen and Tervonen 2005, 17). In the 19th century, control measures were accompanied by assimilatory policies. These were eventually replaced by social policies in the 1960’s, as a result of international discrimination debates. Regardless of rigorous control attempts, the Roma became rooted in Finnish society, and occupied themselves with for example horse trade, seasonal farm work, healing sick animals, tin plating and fortune-telling (*ibid.*). Norwegian groups of Roma origin had much the same occupations (Eide 2007, 73). Beggary was also relatively common among both Finnish and Norwegian Roma at the turn of the 20th century (Häkkinen and Tervonen 2005; Eide 2007).

1.4 Authority response in Finland: Appeals for a national ban on begging

The arrival of foreign beggars in Finland stirred up a heated debate in the national media, beginning in 2006 and growing stronger in 2007. The phenomenon was experienced as completely new in Finnish society, which it in fact was not, as many Finns have taken to beggary in the past. According to Panu Pulma (2009, 75) begging was especially common in the 1860s (‘the hunger years’, the latest famine in Finland), in 1918 (the Finnish civil war) and in the 1930s (the Great Depression). There have, however, been rigorous attempts at limiting and eradicating beggary since the mid-1800s. Thus, the fact does remain that begging was not a part of *modern* Finnish society until the East European Roma arrived.

According to the Ministry of Interior, there were some East Europeans begging in Finland as early as the year 2000 (Intermin 2008, 9). There were also groups of East European Roma seeking asylum in Finland during 1999 and 2000 (Nordberg 2004). The media paid much attention to this ‘mass migration’, and used metaphors such as ‘large

⁹ What is currently the territory of Finland was part of the Swedish kingdom until 1809.

waves' and 'streams' of asylum-seekers. In July 1999, the number of applications peaked with over 800 appeals (Nordberg 2004, 718). In contrast, the groups of Roma currently in Finland have arrived as a result of the freedom of mobility within Europe. As EU citizens, they are allowed to stay in the country for 90 days without restrictions.

The presence of begging East European Roma in the larger Finnish cities rose to discussion in the summer of 2006¹⁰ and even more so in 2007 (HS 20.07.2006; Intermin 2008, 9). In addition to begging, their economic activities include street peddling, playing music in the streets and collecting deposit bottles. Begging has, anyhow, been subject to most of the attention. The majority of the Roma are reported to come from Romania, but there are also Moldavian and Bulgarian Roma. Four main groups of Romanian Roma have been identified among those who reside in Helsinki according to a report by the City of Helsinki (2011). Groups from Transylvania were the first to arrive. They are reported to have a passive begging style, while the group that arrived last (in 2008), and who are from the Teleorman County, are reported to act more aggressively. Roma from the Teleorman and Gorji areas are now in majority among the Roma in the city according to the report. These two groups are considered to have a more forceful style of begging and peddling than those from other areas (City of Helsinki 2011).

The Roma predominantly stay where the economic possibilities are strongest; in larger Finnish cities such as Helsinki, Vantaa, Espoo, Turku, Tampere and Oulu (Mäkinen and Pessi 2009, 9; Intermin 2008, 11). The estimates of the number of beggars in Helsinki have steadily grown. In 2008, there were estimated to be 40–50 beggars in the city (Intermin 2010a, 5), while the number rose to 150 in the summer of 2009 (Iltalehti 29.06.2009), and 220 in the summer of 2010 (Intermin 2010a, 5). Some estimates are higher, stating that there were up to 400 East European Roma in Helsinki in the summer of 2010 (City of Helsinki 2011).

As the public discussion in Finland escalated, the authorities found themselves in a hurry to agree on a common stance on beggary. In November 2007, the City Council of Helsinki asked the Council of State for directions on how to deal with the issue. The

¹⁰ That is even before Romania and Bulgaria were included as member states of the EU.

Ministry of Interior Affairs created a working group to come up with instructions, the result of which was the 2008 report *Katukerjääminen ja viranomaisyhteistyö*, which translates into ‘Street begging and authority cooperation’ (Intermin 2008). The main messages of the report were the need for harmonization of different authorities’ activities and of special attention to children’s conditions. It further stated that no legislative amendments were needed, and that the challenges that the Roma were facing could only be solved in their home countries and on the EU level. Later, two more reports were produced by the working group, then changing course and eventually supporting a national ban on begging (see next page).

Begging is currently not forbidden in Finland. The third paragraph of the current Law on Public Order¹¹ (*järjestyslaki*) gives the police some authority to intervene if the begging is done in a recurrent, disturbing and aggressive way (Finlex 27.06.2003/612). But many deem the law to be an insufficient tool when dealing with the challenges that begging is experienced to pose to the public order (see e.g. Bill 330/2010). In 2009, Mayor of Helsinki Jussi Pajunen aired his interest to introduce a ban on begging. In a review on a pamphlet¹² published in *Helsingin Sanomat*, Pajunen states that “my own position on begging in our streets is clear. I do not want this kind of profession to establish itself here. It is not part of our culture”¹³ (HS 16.05.2009). Also Matti Vanhanen, Prime Minister at the time, positioned himself in the debate by discouraging the Finnish population from giving money to beggars: “It would not last many weeks until this phenomenon would seize in Finland. I appeal for people to act accordingly. All it requires is that everyone makes a decision: let’s not give any money”¹⁴ (HS 27.05.2010).

¹¹”Yleisen järjestyksen häiritseminen tai turvallisuuden vaarantaminen yleisellä paikalla on kielletty [...] toistuvilla uhkaavilla eleillä, hyökkäävillä liikkeillä, suullisesti esitetyillä uhkailuilla ja muulla vastaavalla, pelkoa herättävällä uhkaavalla käyttäytymisellä.”

English: “Disturbing the public order or endangering safety in a public place is prohibited [...] by recurrent threatening gestures, attacking movements, verbally mediated threats or with other comparable behaviour which is threatening and causes fear.”

¹² *Kerjäläisten valtakunta – Totuus kerjäävistä romaneista... ja muita valheita.* (English: *The Kingdom of Beggars – the Truth about the begging Roma... and other lies*). The author is Kimmo Oksanen, a *Helsingin Sanomat* journalist.

¹³”Oma kantani kerjäämiseen kaduillamme on selvä. En halua, että tällainen ammatti juurtuu meille. Se ei kuulu meidän kulttuuriimme.”

¹⁴”Ei kestäisi montaa viikkoa, niin tämä ilmiö loppuisi Suomessa. Vetoankin siihen, että näin toimittaisiin. Se vaatii jokaiselta vain päätöksen: ei anneta rahaa.”

In June 2008, the City of Helsinki initiated a three year project called *Rom po drom – Romanit tiellä* (Rom po drom – Roma on the road) with the Deaconesses' Institution (*Diakonissalaitos*), a foundation of public utility. According to the website of the project, it is part of the city's "strategic preparation" for the arrival of more beggars and, interestingly, for ameliorating the situation of the Roma in their home countries (*Diakonissalaitos* website). It remains unclear why a project so clearly on the local level would take ameliorating the conditions in other countries as its point of departure, thus externalizing the problems. The reasons for the presence of the Roma, the possibilities for their employment and their possible need for assistance were mapped within the project. The motivation behind the project was anyhow not only to map and assist the Roma. *Helsingin Sanomat* reports that there are hopes that the project would "motivate the beggars to return to their home countries"¹⁵ (HS 18.09.2008).

Since 2010, the process of banning (aggressive) begging in the national legislation has been underway. In April 2010, Member of Parliament Juha Hakola from the National Coalition Party, *Kokoomus*, put forward a bill to forbid begging (aggressive or not) by law (HS 26.05.2010). Fifty-one MPs signed the bill, suggesting adding the phrase "begging in a public place is prohibited"¹⁶ into the Finnish Law on Public Order. The argument is that beggary has brought with it increasing illegal phenomena, such as theft. The question is also framed as relating to the atmosphere in the city.

The working group of the Ministry of Interior (which in 2008 stated that no legislative changes were needed) published an interim report in 2010 suggesting that begging in a public space indeed should be banned. One of the main conclusions of the report is that "[a]s part of an ensemble of measures with the main aim of counteracting organized begging and the interlinked exploitation of beggars, it would be reasonable to introduce a ban on begging in public places, when the prospect is to provide for oneself, in the Law on Public Order"¹⁷ (Intermin 2010a, description page). In the final report later that year, the tone was more resolute; "Begging in a public place with the prospect of providing for

¹⁵ "Partion toivotaan myös motivoivan kerjäläisiä paluumuuttoon kotimaihinsa."

¹⁶ "Kerjääminen yleisellä paikalla on kielletty."

¹⁷ "Kerjääminen julkisella paikalla itseään elättääkseen olisi perusteltua kieltää järjestyslailla osana toimenpidetäydellisyyttä, jonka päätavoite on organisoidun kerjäämisen ja siihen liittyvän kerjäläisten hyväksikäytön torjunta."

oneself *shall* be banned in the Law on Public Order”¹⁸ (Intermin 2010b, description page. My emphasis). The Ministry of Justice, as well as the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, announced dissenting opinions to the report. According to them, the report was rushed and purpose-oriented. Also legal experts and the Minority Ombudsman have criticized the proposal (Statement of the Minority Ombudsman SM/2010/1084; Iltalehti 20.10.2010).

On the local level, the City of Helsinki formed what is colloquially called the ‘beggary working group’ (*kerjäläistyöryhmä*) in 2010. The group is lead by Jarmo Rähä from the Social Services Department, and its task is to deal with the local challenges posed by begging and illicit camping. Also this working group, along with the City Council of Helsinki, favoured a national ban on aggressive begging and illicit camping (City of Helsinki 2011).

The government eventually submitted a bill to the parliament (*Eduskunta*), which suggested introducing a national ban on aggressive beggary and illicit camping in the Finnish Law on Public Order (Bill 330/2010). The ban would apply to such begging which takes place in public space, and where verbal threats are used, clothes are pulled or people are pushed, or the traffic is disturbed. The punishment could be fining. A general ban on begging was in other words not proposed. Instead, activities disturbing the public order, safety or health were the focal point. But the parliament did not have time to treat the bill during the spring of 2011, as the electoral period ran out before the issue was resolved. In sum, no national ban is in place at present (September 2011), and municipal order-related rules as well as the current Law on Public Order are currently the sole relevant regulations.

In Helsinki, controversy has arisen in relation to unauthorized camps of the East European Roma. Instead of the begging itself, the camp sites of the beggars have been at the focus of police action in Helsinki. Unauthorized camps have repeatedly been emptied, and the police have been reported to use a ‘heavy hand’ when carrying out the actions (e.g. MTV3 News 08.06.2011). This stirred criticism among Finnish Roma organizations

¹⁸”*Kerjääminen julkisella paikalla itseään elättääkseen tulee kieltää järjestyslailla.*”

and other groups defending the rights of the Roma, such as *Vapaa Liikkuvuus* (No Borders Finland). According to the authorities, the Roma should resort to official chargeable campsites, such as the one in Rastila. One specific camp has been at the centre of attention, namely that which was raised in the yard of the ‘autonomic social centre’ Satama. The social centre was situated in the Kalasatama area, rather close to the city centre, from January 2009 to 2011. In 2009, the Youth Department of the City of Helsinki (*Nuorisoasiainkeskus*) agreed to rent an unused building to a group of squatters and activists after a series of squatting in the Helsinki area. The organization *Vapaa Katto ry* (Free Roof) was then founded, and a lease with the Youth Department was signed (City of Helsinki 2011).

Vapaa Katto, in collaboration with the Vapaa Liikkuvuus network, invited East European Roma to camp in the yard of the social centre in the fall of 2009, reportedly as an act of solidarity. There were 50–70 persons living in cars and mobile homes in the yard (City of Helsinki 2011). This was met by disapproval by the city authorities, who interpreted the rental agreement differently than Vapaa Katto did. The disagreement was over whether or not it was allowed to stay overnight in the yard (it was forbidden inside the building). Vapaa Katto and Vapaa Liikkuvuus put up a fight and argued that the unwillingness of the city to let the Roma camp in the yard was only an attempt to make life as unbearable as possible for this group, in order to motivate them to leave the country. The city, on the other hand, referred to unsafe and unsanitary conditions as a base for their stance, in addition to their interpretation of the lease. A lengthy process was initiated in the summer of 2010, whereby the ‘beggary working group’ started investigating the legal possibility to end the lease, and the Youth Affairs Committee (*Nuorisolautakunta*) tried to find agreement on whether or not this was the way to go. The lease was eventually terminated, and the Roma and activists were evicted on August 30, 2011 after several demonstrations and strong objections by the activists and East European Roma themselves, as well as Finnish Roma organizations and some politicians (Satama website).

1.5 Authority response in Norway: Introducing the ‘beggar register’

In Norway, the phenomenon of street begging was not as unprecedented as in Finland. Begging, mostly by drug addicts, was a part of the street view in Oslo before the East European Roma arrived. The number of beggars in the streets of Oslo started increasing in the 1990s. The ‘traditional’ Norwegian beggar is a drug addicted middle-aged male asking passers-by for money in order to “finance their lifestyle”¹⁹ (Kirkens Bymisjon 2007, 7).

In Norway, street begging was forbidden until the year of 2006. The Norwegian parliament (*Stortinget*) rescinded the ‘vagabond law’ (*løsgjengerloven*) on January 1, 2006 (Brattvåg 2007, 5). Since then, the number of foreign beggars has grown in Oslo and elsewhere in Norway. Like in Finland, it is reported that the begging Roma in Oslo come mainly from Romania (Kirkens Bymisjon 2007). The police in Oslo report that they have no figures of how many beggars there are in the city (AP 01.07.2010). Due to visa agreements with Romania and Bulgaria, the Roma do not need a visa in order to enter the country, and are allowed to stay for 90 days on a tourist status (Brattvåg 2007, 19).

According to a field study conducted by the Church City Mission (*Kirkens Bymisjon*) in 2007, the Roma reported getting 150 Norwegian crowns (approx. 20 euro) daily on the average. One can assume that this sum has decreased since, as the attitudes against the begging Roma have grown more negative over the years. The activities of the Roma do not, however, confine only to begging. Like in Finland, they also occupy themselves with selling flowers, playing music in the streets and collecting deposit bottles. The Roma are reported to sleep outside or in crowded apartments shared by several people, and eat at day centres and cafés providing free food for the disadvantaged. This is provided for example by the Salvation Army. Some of the Roma report to be sleeping in camps they have built in woods in the vicinity of central Oslo, while some sleep on park benches and the like (Brattvåg 2007).

Begging Roma have been perceived as problematic at least in Oslo, Drammen, Bergen, Trondheim, Asker and Bærum. A general prohibition on begging is not currently in place

¹⁹ “De tigger penger for å finansiere egen livsstil.”

in Norway, but control measures on the municipal level have been activated since the inhabitants started to experience the begging as disturbing. In Oslo, begging is forbidden if it is ‘continuously disturbing’. The City Council of Oslo adopted the following regulation on November 15, 2006: “In or in the immediate proximity of a public place, nobody is allowed to offer sexual services or to carry out begging or selling, which in a continuous way disturbs the public peace, order or traffic”²⁰ (Oslo kommune Byrådet Byrådssak 158/06 §2-4). Begging is thus forbidden if it disrupts the public order; a concept which is treated as self-explanatory although it arguably leaves much to interpretation.

The City of Bergen introduced a permit system for beggars and street musicians on the first of January 2010 – also called the ‘beggars register’ (*tiggerregister*) in Norwegian media. This was done by reactivating a dormant local police statute, demanding fundraisers and street musicians to register with the police before heading to the streets. Those who fail to do this run the risk of being fined. In June 2010, 57 beggars or street musicians had registered with the police in Bergen (Politi Forum website).

Oslo, along with other municipalities, has been interested in copying this model. It was framed by an academic expert as a means to “give the authorities a certain control over the beggars, without talking about a ban”²¹ (AP 15.06.2010). In the summer of 2010, the Oslo City Council asked relevant actors for comments on a suggestion to introduce such a system in Oslo. In their reply, the police deemed the proposal to be too problematic. There were concerns that such a measure would conflict with anti-discrimination laws and have the unwanted consequence of making other forms of fundraising illegal as well (AP 31.08.2010). The City Council anyhow continued with the process, but was eventually vetoed by the Police Directorate in July 2011. One of the reasons why the police did not approve of the registering system was that it would have applied only to begging instead of all forms of fundraising. According to the police, a regulation applied to one single group is discriminatory. The authorities were candid about their motivations; the idea was to prevent beggars from coming to Oslo. The Norwegian police

²⁰”På eller i umiddelbar nærhet av offentlig sted må ingen fremby seksuelle tjenester eller bedrive tigging eller salg som på en pågående måte forstyrrer den alminnelige ro, orden eller ferdsel.”

²¹”Det skaffer myndighetene en viss kontroll over tiggerne, uten at det er snakk om noe forbud.”

seem certain that the begging activity is organized, while Kirkens Bymisjon reports that their field work gives no reason to suspect that any of the Roma have arrived involuntarily (Brattvåg 2007, 18). The Norwegian public broadcasting service NRK quoted Stian Berger Røsland, Governing Mayor of Oslo, in July 2011; “We hope that there would be a bit of bureaucracy and hassle, so that those who organize foreign beggars might choose another city than ours”²² (NRK 13.07.2011). The latest development at the time of writing (August 2011) is that Røsland has asked the Ministry of Justice to take over the issue from the Police Directorate, in order for the proposal to have another chance.

Ideas of other control means have also been presented. A majority in the Bergen City Council supported the idea of “beggar free zones”²³ in the city centre in June 2010 (AP 11.06.2010). The idea is to clear central areas, characterized by shopping and tourism, from beggars – Norwegian and foreign alike. But this idea does not seem to have passed, as no information on such a decision is to be found online. *Høyre*, the Conservative Party of Norway, have expressed their support for a comprehensive national ban on begging (AP 24.08.2010). Furthermore, *Aftenposten* (01.07.2010) reports on interest by the Ministry of Justice to introduce a model inspired by Denmark. There, begging is forbidden for foreigners but not for Danish citizens. Begging foreigners can be punished with imprisonment of up to 6 months, or deportation from the country. None of these means have been implemented in Norway so far.

According to Hildegunn Brattvåg (2007) the ‘beggary debate’ in Norwegian media has gradually shifted from begging Norwegian drug addicts to Roma from Eastern Europe. Brattvåg describes the attitude both in media and in the streets as predominantly negative towards the begging Roma. According to her, the Roma get much less money than begging Norwegian drug addicts. She has identified depreciative ways to describe the East European Roma in Norwegian media, such as ‘mob’, ‘foreign beggary fraud’ and ‘waves of beggars’ (Brattvåg 2007, 5). These kinds of formulations appear also in my data, although those exact wordings do not occur.

²² “Vi ønsker at det skal bli litt byråkrati og plunder, slik at de som organiserer utenlandske tiggere kanskje velger en annen by enn vår.”

²³ “tiggerfrie soner”

Both Finland and Norway have a main locus for the debate on the Roma. While much of the public discussion on the begging Roma in Helsinki concerns their camps (especially Satama), the majority of the Norwegian beggary debate has revolved around the main street of Oslo, Karl Johans gate. The main loci of the concerns relating to the East European beggars are thus the Satama camp and Karl Johans gate. In the latter case, the symbolically significant main street is depicted as overtaken by unwanted groups, of which the begging Roma are one. Other disturbing elements, experienced as pushing aside ‘normal Oslo-dwellers’, are for example prostitutes and drug addicts.

In conclusion, the legislative and regulations-related situations are strikingly similar in Norway and Finland. Neither country has (yet) banned begging, although this has been debated. The Finnish authorities are moving more rapidly than the Norwegian in the direction of introducing a national ban – albeit not a general one, but one forbidding ‘aggressive’ and ‘disturbing’ begging. There are municipal regulations on general order forbidding disturbing behaviour, which can be applied to beggars, in both societies. Local measures to further control begging have been discussed and partly introduced.

Another similarity between the two societies is that they share the welfare state structure of ‘the Nordic model’, thus holding a tradition of strong public responsibility; a structure in which the begging Roma are not included. As I have shown, there are also differences in the societal contexts where the East European Roma arrived. Finland has a significantly larger national Roma minority, thus the Roma people are more familiar from before in Finland than in Norway. On the other hand, Norwegians (especially Oslo-dwellers) have had more prior experience of witnessing street begging. But both Finnish and Norwegian press have paid substantial attention to the arrival, presence and activities of the East European Roma – thus providing rich data for a comparative approach such as mine.

2 Research topic and theoretical framework

2.1 Research topic and questions

On its most general level, the topic of my research is the representation of the begging Roma²⁴ in Finnish and Norwegian press. I have devoted my analysis to news articles and other texts printed in the main Norwegian and Finnish newspapers, *Aftenposten* and *Helsingin Sanomat*. By a careful and systematic analysis of my data, I have sought to identify the various ways in which producers of press content interpret and portray the topic. I am in essence dealing with the construction of ‘the phenomenon of Roma beggars’. My *discourse analytic* approach allows me to categorize my data around dominant discourses, ‘groupings of statements’ (Mills 2004, 8). On this level, my research questions are: **Which discourses are prominent in press reporting and debate on the begging Roma? Which elements and internal logics are these discourses constructed around?**

On the manifest level, the media texts which I have analyzed deal specifically with the phenomenon of Roma devoting themselves to street-level economic activities. But there is also a latent level in the discussion, which does not concern the ‘external’ group of Roma, but quite the opposite. Representations and interpretations are always affected by the social and cultural context. Indeed, the heated debates stirred up by the arrival, presence and activities of the East European Roma in the receiving countries indicate that the phenomenon has struck a chord in the national self-understandings. The strength of the reactions shows that central social norms or values are experienced as threatened – either by activities by the Roma, or by the ways in which national and local authorities are dealing with the novel circumstances.

A central idea in this thesis is therefore that the debate about ‘them’ reveals something significant about ‘us’. By discussing what the East European Roma are doing, producers of press material simultaneously expose vital conceptions and ideas about the national society. By thus applying an inverted *mirror approach* to my material, I seek to answer

²⁴ To be precise; Roma who beg and devote themselves to other street-level activity.

the following research questions: **What kind of image(s) of the ideal Finnish and Norwegian societies are reflected in the reporting and debates on the begging Roma? What societal values are salient in the discussions?**

2.2 Social constructionism

The main theoretical basis for my research consists of social constructionism. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, in their reputed book *The Social Construction of Reality* (1966), depart from realist assumptions dominating certain strands of classical sociology. For example Karl Marx was convinced that the dominance of one class over another is not a matter of construction, but of material facts – the goal was for the exploited working class to overcome any illusions, realize the matter of facts, and overthrow the capitalist system. Berger and Luckmann, on the other hand, apply a relativist approach and focus on how our shared reality is socially constructed. From a nearly limitless range of ways to understand and interpret reality, some become salient. Because social constructs are just *versions* of reality, they need to be continuously re-affirmed in order to persist. Constructs are self-evidently not random but form coherent (and also competing) systems of meaning.

Berger and Luckmann's work relates to the 'sociology of knowledge'. Their interest in what passes for knowledge and facts in society, and especially in processes related to so called 'common-sense knowledge', is very much in line with my research interest. From all the potential ways to interpret the presence and activities of the East European Roma, certain representations have gained dominance in the public debate. There seems to be a psychological imperative to place new information and people (in this case the East European Roma) in a comprehensible category, thus including them in a pre-existing mental schema of the world (see e.g. Douglas 1966, 37). For me, as for Berger and Luckmann (1966, 33), what matters is interpretation; "Everyday life presents itself as a reality interpreted by men [sic] and subjectively meaningful to them as a coherent world. As sociologists we must take this reality as the object of our analyses".

Hence, what is relevant is not some objective truth about the begging Roma, but the meanings which are attributed to their presence and activities in the public debate. This also means that any personal opinions I might have on the subject are irrelevant. So although this study has its base within a critical tradition due to the use of critical discourse analysis, I try to avoid an excessively normative stance. I cannot, however, claim to possess a tabula rasa mind. But what is important is that I am consciously seeking to avoid ideological colouring of the text. I identify with the attitude towards 'truth' described by Sara Mills (2004) when discussing Michel Foucault's approach. She states that "Foucault is not claiming to speak from a position of 'truth', since he is aware of the fact that he himself as a subject can only speak within the limits imposed upon him by the discursive frameworks circulating at the time" (ibid., 29). Foucault instead speaks of discursive formations which sustain certain 'regimes of truth' (Foucault 1980).

Although positivist assumptions (that a reality existing outside of the subject can be pinpointed by scientific methods) are challenged within the constructionist and relativist tradition, this does not necessarily mean a rejection of the existence of an outer physical reality. I adhere to a moderate instead of 'strong' social constructionism, as I do not question the independent existence of a material world. But as already mentioned, for the aim of this study, 'objective' facts are to a large extent irrelevant. Instead the focus is on interpretations of reality, which are formed in a historically and culturally specific context. In the terms of John Searle (1995), I am interested in 'institutional facts' rather than 'brute facts'. According to Berger and Luckmann (1966), a sociologist of knowledge should leave ontological questions about material reality to philosophers.

The logic according to which reality is socially constructed is in its simplest form the following; certain concepts and roles become generally shared, institutionalized, through repeated social interaction between individuals and groups (Burr 2003). Meaning and 'knowledge' is embedded on different levels of society, from any random breakfast table to the President's desk. 'Reality' is thus created in social and linguistic interaction through communication, categorization and interpretation. This is how meanings and understandings are constructed, as well as de- and reconstructed. The 'Thomas theorem'

neatly summarizes the constructionist approach; “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas and Thomas 1928, 527).

2.3 Language and power

Words contain power, and power is inherent in language. Especially when language is used by societal actors with authority, one cannot avoid the power dimension. Media, for example, have considerable power when it comes to diffusing certain interpretations of societal phenomena. Collective meaning-making, mediated through linguistic as well as visual tools, positions social actors in relation to each other in hierarchical structures. These hierarchies have consequences; not only on symbolic, but often also material, levels. For example, if Roma are repeatedly portrayed as lazy and untrustworthy employees, this will have material consequences for this group as they will be discriminated against in the labour market. But one does not need to be part of a central societal institution in order for one’s words to weigh. Instead, even the most mundane conversation contains power. This is because it constructs and structures reality, at least one’s own reality – and that is not an insignificant thing.

Language does not only uphold existing conceptions and social relations, but it also alters and restructures them. Norman Fairclough (2001) points out the dual role of ‘sociolinguistic conventions’ as both incorporating power relations (thus reflecting them) and giving rise to particular power relations (thus constructing them). Sara Mills (2004, 10) expresses much the same when defining ‘discourses’ as “groupings of utterances or sentences, statements which are enacted within a social context, which are *determined by* that social context and which *contribute to* the way that social context continues its existence” (my emphasis).

The ideas of Norman Fairclough provide one of the bearing theoretical bases for my research, although I will be selective regarding which aspects of his wide-ranging theoretical and methodological framework to apply to my data (see section 3.2.2 for a description of my analysis of the data). Fairclough is among the leading scholars in the field of discourse analysis, as well as the founder of a specific approach to the study of

language and power, namely *Critical Discourse Analysis* (CDA).²⁵ What makes the analysis critical is its focus on social wrongs. Fairclough places CDA within a broader theoretical framework of critical social research, whose aim is “better understanding of how societies work and produce both beneficial and detrimental effects, and of how the detrimental effects can be mitigated if not eliminated” (Fairclough 2003, 202–203). He underlines the central role of language and linguistic practice in the construction of power hierarchies, and in social life at large. Language both produces, maintains and changes social relations of power. Linguistic phenomena are thus inescapably social phenomena, and social phenomena are often linguistic. Fairclough (2001) stresses that it is misleading to think of the relationship *between* language and society. Instead, language *is* society – or at least a very central component of it.

Fairclough’s critical stance is reflected in his recommendation to initiate a study not with the conventional research question, but with a focus on a social wrong (Fairclough 2003, 209). In my study, the social problem (as well as the personal motivation for me in choosing this topic) is the vulnerable position and deprivation of the East European Roma, of which unbalanced media portrayals are but one dimension. The general context is outlined in the first chapter of the thesis, where the background for this study is presented. According to Fairclough’s suggestion, I have proceeded to the specific research focus and questions only after having outlined the social wrong which constitutes the *raison d’être* of this study.

2.4 Discourse

‘Discourse’ is probably among the most ambiguous terms in social sciences and the humanities. The concept has been used in numerous disciplines; linguistics, sociology, philosophy, social psychology, etcetera. The variety of possible meanings and focuses, combined with the popularity of the concept, makes it a challenging task to quickly outline the definitions. Considering the space available and the limited advantages of

²⁵ In addition to the specific approach developed by Fairclough, the term *Critical Discourse Analysis* can also be used in a broader sense to encompass other similar approaches, such as the *Discourse-Historical Approach* by Ruth Wodak (see e.g. Reisigl and Wodak 2009; Fairclough and Wodak 1997).

giving a full account of the term, I will here present only a rough sketch of its various definitions, focusing on the way in which I understand and use the concept.

The roots of the term date back to the 13th century and the philosopher Thomas Aquinas, who is thought to be the first to use the word (Titscher et al. 2000, 25). Also other grand philosophers, such as Thomas Hobbes and Emmanuel Kant were concerned with the nature of discourse. The 19th century linguist Ferdinand de Saussure's insight that the relation between language and reality is arbitrary is a founding idea for all discourse analysis (Jørgensen and Phillips 2000, 16). It would not make sense to analyze discourse without the underlying understanding that language is not defined by the 'reality' to which it refers.

Elisa Vass has singled out eight different definitions of the term 'discourse' (referred to in Titscher et al. 2000, 25–26). They range from very general, like "speech, conversation, discussion" and "series of statements of utterances" to more precise formulations such as "rule-governed behaviour that leads to a chain or similarly interrelated system of statements (=forms of knowledge)" (ibid., 26). Barbara Johnstone (2008, 2) uses the broad definition of discourse as "actual instances of communicative action in the medium of language". In this sense, discourse is a mass noun – one would not speak of particular discourses, but of discourse in singular (such as 'music' or 'information'). Used in this way, one might for example state that 'discourse constructs reality'.

The way in which I use the concept is more influenced by the Foucaultian tradition. Michel Foucault (1926–1984) is one of the most influential theorists of the 20th century when it comes to the study of the relations between power, knowledge and discourses. He has considerably influenced later scholars in this field of study. For Foucault, discourse is not a mass noun, but a count noun. It is thus possible to distinguish between different discourses, which centre around different values and sets of interrelated ideas. This is exactly what I seek to do in my research, in relation to my specific topic. Another factor making Foucault's approach relevant for me is his assertion that discourses are irreversibly connected to power and involve ideological dimensions (see e.g. Foucault 1972; 1977). For him, knowledge and power are so interconnected that he uses the concept of 'power/knowledge' (Foucault 1980).

So what is focused on are patterns of belief and habitual action, instead of purely linguistic interests. Foucault is more interested in the rules and structures which produce particular utterances and texts than the utterances and texts themselves (Mills 2004). The focus on wider societal effects leads to a philosophical approach, which provides limited tools for how to *practically* approach discourses. Instead of engaging with detailed analysis of text, Foucault devoted himself to more abstract theories on the macro level. He focused on a kind of master discourses that dominate society in a certain era, later to be changed for other more or less hegemonic ones. His work on sexuality (e.g. 1976) and madness (1964) are examples of his focus on the historical evolution of dominating discourses. Foucault's level of philosophical sophistication makes it next to unthinkable to apply his approach directly to a thesis on the master level. Instead, Norman Fairclough's more practical approach is more suitable for this study. Fairclough certainly draws upon many of Foucault's ideas in his work, but has a more text-oriented touch.

I find the definition of 'discourse' provided by Norman Fairclough (2003, 124) useful; "I see discourses as ways of *representing aspects of the world* – the processes, relations and structures of the material world, the 'mental world' of thoughts, feelings, beliefs and so forth, and the social world" (my emphasis). A discourse is thus, in its simplest terms, a perspective on the world. Johnstone underlines the central point that discourses, while defining what is said, simultaneously establish what is *not* said – or even what *cannot* be said about a specific topic (Johnstone 2008, 12).

2.5 The role of the mass media

The central role of mass media when it comes to shaping public debate is rather uncontested in social research. Michael Schudson (2003, 13) argues that news reporting is "a dominant force in the public construction of common experience and a popular sense of what is *real* and *important*" (my emphasis). The media are essential for sustaining the 'public sphere'; a communicative platform where people are able to lead a dialogue over shared (often political) issues. In Jürgen Habermas' terms (1989), the public sphere is situated between individuals and the ruling authorities. Habermas mentions the emergence of print media as one of the factors facilitating the emergence of

such a sphere. Media thus have an important function in the democratic system; it is thought of as the ‘watchdog’ of the ruling powers. But Habermas also identifies modern mass media as problematic in relation to a constructive dialogue. He claims that commercialized mass media have passivated the public and turned its members from participants to spectators. The ‘signifying power’ of the media – the authority to represent things in a particular way and thus produce shared meaning – is even greater if we adhere to Habermas’ understanding of the public as now mainly receivers (instead of also producers) of mediated information.

Few contemporary scholars would argue that the media simply reflect reality. Instead, social constructionist scholars speak of how the media *represent* or *construct* certain aspects of reality while leaving out others. Thus, “metaphors of distorting lenses or selective filters [replace] those of reflection’s clear mirrors or translucent windows” (Macdonald 2003, 12). This also applies to news reporting (one of the main types of data in my study, in addition to letters to the editor), although journalists themselves tend to consider this type of media content more neutral than many other due to its orientation towards ‘facts’ (Kunelius 2003).

It is no easy task to pinpoint the effects that the media have on society, as the influence is seldom empirically visible (Schudson 2003). We simply cannot know what kinds of attitudes, stances and social constructs would dominate society without the presence of mass media. The latent nature of the mechanisms whereby the media influence people’s opinions and the public debate makes it difficult to unambiguously argue that the media have caused this or that, according to some simple causality. But this does not necessarily undermine the understanding that media hold a great deal of power – rather the contrary. The institutionalized status of mass media as producers and conveyers of ‘knowledge’ which is internalized in society only underlines their might.

This *ideological* dimension of mediated information has been the interest of scholars for several decades (see e.g. Stuart Hall 1977). Ideology can be claimed to provide the lens through which the world is seen and interpreted. Power and ideology are inseparable also for Fairclough, who refers to ideology as “meaning in the service of power” and defines ideologies as “propositions that generally figure as implicit assumptions in texts, which

contribute to producing or reproducing unequal relations of power, relations of domination” (Fairclough 1995, 14). He thus underlines how ideologies work on the implicit level, and become next to invisible as they take the shape of presuppositions, “taken for granted assumptions” (ibid.). Thus, a comprehensive analysis should include also what is *not* said even though it could be. With regard to my own study, it is apparent that the discourses which I have identified in the Finnish and Norwegian debates on the begging Roma do not all share the same ideological base. I have sought to pinpoint the various (often unpronounced) values and norms which the discourses centre around.

Risto Kunelius (2003, 142–143) points out how even when the media do not directly affect *how* people think about public matters, it does define *what* they think about. According to the *agenda setting*-theory, the power of the media actors stems from the fact that they choose which topics are brought to public attention. From an inexhaustible number of possible topics, only some can be prioritized. The presence and activities of the begging Roma is one such issue which has clearly gained priority in news reporting. The topic is brought to the attention of the entire Finnish and Norwegian societies via nation-wide media, although what is dealt with is local phenomena of only a couple of hundred individuals. The begging Roma have firmly been put on the agenda in Finland and Norway, and a ‘social problem’ has been constructed around them (see e.g. Thompson 1998).

One specific way in which certain distortion in the reporting happens is media actors’ routine usage of certain ‘legitimate’ sources of information such as authorities, politicians, scholars and other actors with a high social status. Who gets to speak is relevant also in my study, and I have identified the main speakers in the outlined discourses where this is possible (not all have clear main speakers). I have not, however, included this among the most central aspects of my analysis, as this would have required another kind of processing of the data.

Kunelius (2003) stresses the link between mass media, public opinion and political decision-making. Also Fairclough (1995) underlines the links between mass media and wider sociocultural change. This is what gives this thesis some of its relevance – the

media are thought to influence (although by no means dictate) political decisions regarding the begging Roma via the ‘middle-stage’ of public opinion.

According to many scholars, one of the most central social functions of media is to uphold a ‘we-spirit’ in society and to produce internal solidarity (Kunelius 2003, 184–189). Without common subjects for discussion, the feeling of unity and cohesion in society can falter. Consensus on matters publicly discussed is not crucial, but the discussion itself is. People come together over commonly debated issues, and a sense of unity is maintained. In this way, mass media also have implications for collective identities. Here, exclusion and inclusion are central mechanisms, constantly present in media reporting. By scrutinizing the out-group, we simultaneously consolidate understandings of the in-group. In the next section we turn to look at such practices, occurring both in the field of media and in other domains of society.

2.6 Inclusion, exclusion and ‘othering’

Nationalism and ethnicity have emerged as some of the most prominent foci in sociological and other social scientific research during the past couple of decades. Scholars such as Rogers Brubaker (see e.g. 1996), Ernest Gellner (e.g. 1997), Eric Hobsbawm (e.g. 1990), Benedict Anderson (e.g. 1983) and Craig Calhoun (e.g. 2001; 2007) have been concerned with the emergence, nature and persistence of the modern nation-state. Within the field of ethnicity studies, central scholars include Fredrik Barth (e.g. 1969) and Thomas Hylland Eriksen (e.g. 1993) – both coincidentally Norwegian – among many others. But I will not here give a detailed account of the nation, nationalism or ethnicity as theoretical concepts.

Within the vast research field of nationalism and ethnicity, my interest does not lie with the structuring of the world into nation-states or with political nationalist movements, but rather with intergroup relations and latent national self-understandings. Here, Benedict Anderson’s (1983) notion of nations as ‘imagined communities’ is worth noting. Anderson defines nations as imagined, because “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (ibid., 6). He underlines that this

does not imply that national communities are false or fabricated, but only that they are created through a common understanding of their existence.

Anderson further characterizes nations as limited, because they have boundaries. Here we approach a very relevant point in relation to my research frame. As I noted in the previous section, national mass media play a significant role in maintaining the notion of a nation by offering public matters for the community to discuss. Media structure and uphold national identities partly by differentiating those who are part ‘us’ (the Finnish and Norwegian peoples) – and those who are not (for example the begging Roma). Boundary-making is essentially about classification through *inclusion* and *exclusion*, which are among the most central concepts within the sociological field of nationalism and ethnicity. Understandings of the ‘self’ are consolidated in the process.

The roots of analyzing opposition pairs dates back to the 19th century and the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (Hall 1999, 81). Saussure argued that meaning is always created in relation to something else; the only way we can know what ‘night’ means is by contrasting it to ‘day’. The categorization of concepts into mutually exclusive opposition pairs, such as man/woman, white/black and culture/nature, form much of the base for our worldview. Edward W. Said has in his 1979 book *Orientalism* shown how the concept of West was formed in relation and opposition to the East. The Orient defines the West by appearing as “its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience” (Said 1979, 2). Much in the same way, national cultures gain their self-understanding by contrasting with other cultures. Identity (whether individual, collective or national) is thus formed in opposition to what we are *not* – ‘the Other’.

The practice whereby the Other is understood as a) significantly different and b) less worthy than the in-group has been named ‘othering’ in social scientific literature (Löytty 2005, 9). The term was first used by the Indian theorist Gayatri C. Spivak for explaining “the process whereby the [colonial] empire creates its *others*”²⁶ (Eide and Simonsen 2007, 9. My translation from Norwegian). An unequal power relation is always present in this mechanism; one is more valuable and/or morally superior to the other. So in addition

²⁶ “[...]prosessen der imperiet skaper sine andre”.

to being essentially different, the West is also superior to the Orient, men to women and natives to immigrants. Although the concept of othering has been used especially in post-colonial research, it can also be applied internally and thus be understood as something that happens *within* as well as *between* national societies. For example, in their 1965 book *The Established and the Outsiders*, Norbert Elias and John L. Scotson analyze the unequal power relations between original dwellers and newcomers in an English suburban area which they call Winston Parva. Although little distinguishes the two groups in the eyes of an outsider, both are well aware of the distinctions and power relations. Othering thus occurs on different levels; from post-colonial relations to local communities.

The reader will by now have gathered that the opposition pair in my study is the majority population (Finnish and Norwegian) versus the begging East European Roma. Understandings about our national culture(s) and society(ies) – ‘us’ – are revealed in press content dealing with this external group – ‘them’. By utilizing what I call a *mirror perspective*, my interest is directed simultaneously at the out-group and the in-group.²⁷ In sum, my study is based in a long tradition of theory and studies of inclusion, exclusion and othering. I apply these concepts to one of the most prominent Finnish and Norwegian public debates of the first decade of the 2000’s. In Stuart Hall’s (1997) terms, my research deals with ‘the Spectacle of the Other’.

²⁷ A similar approach has been applied for example by Karin Creutz-Kämppi in her master’s thesis *Schemas for Self-Identification in Boundary Defining Practice: The Construction of Subject Positions in the Caricature Controversy* (2010), dealing with Islam as ‘the Other’.

3 Data and analysis method

3.1 Data: Newspaper texts in focus

My research data consists of media texts from the main newspapers in Finland and Norway; Helsingin Sanomat and Aftenposten. These are the largest quality newspapers in the respective countries, and are thus highly relevant and legitimate actors in setting the agenda for public debate.

3.1.1 Helsingin Sanomat

The liberal broadsheet Helsingin Sanomat has been the leading newspaper in Finland for decades and is widely seen as holding substantial influence on the public opinion in the country. Already in the beginning of the 1980's, Pertti Klemola stated that "Helsingin Sanomat is the absolute number one paper for decision-makers and the ruling power"²⁸ (Klemola 1981, 10. My translation from Finnish). Since then, the monopoly of the paper has been strengthened even further as the competing conservative newspaper Uusi Suomi withered away in the late 1980's. Other research points in the same direction, establishing Helsingin Sanomat as the most successful print medium when it comes to reaching Finnish decision-makers (TNS Gallup website).

The scope of Helsingin Sanomat does not, however, limit itself to the ruling elite. The paper is most popular also among the larger public. With a circulation of 383 361 in 2010 and reader numbers of over 900 000, it is by far the largest daily newspaper in the country (Levikintarkastus websites A and B). In Finland, unlike in many other European countries, there is not a political division of readers when it comes to choice of newspaper (partly due to the lack of alternatives). Instead, the audience of Helsingin Sanomat comprises adherents from the entire spectrum of political positions. Klemola

²⁸ "Helsingin Sanomat on päättäjien ja vallankäyttäjien ehdoton ykköslehti."

notes that Helsingin Sanomat has an “amazingly stable monopoly position”²⁹ in Finland (Klemola 1981, 10. My translation from Finnish).

3.1.2 Aftenposten

In 2010, the Oslo-based Aftenposten retook its position as the leading Norwegian newspaper with regards to circulation from *Verdens Gang* (MBL website A). In 2005, the paper converted from broadsheet to compact format. In contrast to Helsingin Sanomat, Aftenposten has two editions. The morning edition is distributed nationally, while the evening edition is distributed only to the populous central-eastern part of Norway (the Oslo and Akershus counties). The morning edition of Aftenposten had a circulation of 239 831 in 2010, while the circulation of the evening edition was 105 012 (MBL website B). The reader numbers of the morning edition (Monday through Friday) reached 702 000 in the first half of 2011. The evening edition was read by less than half of this, 315 000 readers (MBL website C).

Aftenposten labels itself as ‘independent conservative’, and has traditionally been most closely aligned with the conservative party *Høyre* (Kulturdepartementet website). The paper uses a marginal written standard of the Norwegian language called *riksmål* (AP 15.01.2007). It resembles *bokmål*, the dominant written standard, used by 85–90 per cent of the population (Språkrådet website). (The remaining 10–15 per cent of the population use *nynorsk*). For those familiar with Norwegian language politics, the determination to use *riksmål* tells of conservative allegiances. There have been some controversies over the paper’s linguistic editorial policy, especially as material originally written following another standard, such as letters to the editor, are converted to *riksmål*.

²⁹ “Länsimaisen mittapuun mukaan Helsingin Sanomilla on omassa maassaan ällistyttävän vankka monopoliasema.”

Although, among the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland, *Hufvudstadsbladet* is the main newspaper.

3.1.3 My data

My data consists of 79 media texts (text units), of which 52 were published in Helsingin Sanomat and 27 in Aftenposten. These include news articles (published in the local, domestic and international sections), editorials, columns and commentaries, as well as letters to the editor.³⁰ Also one comprehensive feature article in the Sunday edition of Helsingin Sanomat is included. I am only analyzing texts and am thus not focusing on pictures accompanying these, although a visual analysis would doubtlessly be fruitful in further research.

The units are from a three-month period stretching from the beginning of June to the end of August 2010 (01.06–31.08.2010). I have included all texts deemed relevant (see selection criteria below) during this period, and my sample is in this regard a complete. During the summer months, as the beggars are more numerous due to the milder climate compared to the rough northern winters, the public debate on begging tends to escalate. I thus find it fruitful to concentrate my study on this period of the year. Regardless of the tendencies of the media to be somewhat less active than usual during the summer vacations, I have managed to collect a sizable data set.

In Finland, the debate on the tentative law amendment forbidding begging escalated during the fall of 2010 (see section 1.4). There was nonetheless a substantial amount of comments on the bill already during the selected period, and therefore the temporal delimitation has not ruled out this discussion – which indeed is very relevant in my study.

The topic of begging East European Roma has been more prominent in the Finnish press compared to the Norwegian. This has led to an unavoidable tilt towards Helsingin Sanomat in my data. The majority of the analyzed units, 65 per cent³¹, are from Finland. According to my understanding, the difference in the extent of media attention can partly be explained by distinct societal circumstances. Whereas begging was a new phenomenon in modern Finland, the Norwegian discussion on the begging Roma stationed itself as part of a pre-existing debate on street order which had previously

³⁰ See Figure 2 on page 40 for an overview of the division of the data according to newspaper sections.

³¹ With regard to the number of articles, not the length of the texts.

centred around drug addicts and prostitutes. It is anyhow to be noted that one cannot draw conclusions on the content of the debate or the attitudes towards the Roma based on the intensity of media attention.³²

3.1.4 Collection of the data

I collected the units using the digital editions and archives of *Aftenposten*³³ and *Helsingin Sanomat*³⁴, both subject to charge. After initially being faced with delays due to technical challenges suffered by the online services provided by *Aftenposten*, I was able to locate the relevant material in the two newspapers. The process was surprisingly time-consuming, as the technical prerequisites were challenging, especially in the case of *Aftenposten*. Even after the search function in their digital archives was repaired and was in principle working correctly, it remains ill-functioning and overly time-consuming to use.

Locating the relevant texts was done by searching for appropriate key words. In the Finnish case, these were *kerj**³⁵, *romani**³⁶, *mustalai**³⁷ and *Kalasadama**³⁸ (all truncated in order to allow for various inflections, such as plural and genitive forms). In the Norwegian case, I searched by *tigg**³⁹, *romfolk**⁴⁰, *sigøyner**⁴¹ and *Karl Johan**⁴².

³² I could have extended the data gathering period in the Norwegian case in order to balance the amount of data from the two papers, but have chosen not to do so. This is because I did not consider it just to ‘artificially correct’ the empirical fact that there was more relevant content in HS than AP during this period. The imbalance is in itself an interesting feature of my data.

³³ <http://eavis.aftenposten.no/aftenposten>

³⁴ <http://www.hs.fi/digilehti>

³⁵ *Kerj** produces matches such as *kerjääminen* (begging) and *kerjäläinen* (beggar), as well as solid compounds such as *kerjäläistilanne* (beggar situation), *kerjäläislaki* (law on beggary) and *kerjäläisilmiö* (beggar phenomenon).

³⁶ *Romani** produces matches such as *romani* (Roma person), *romanikerjäläinen* (Roma beggar) and *romanileiri* (Roma camp).

³⁷ *Mustalainen* is considered an outdated and sometimes derogatory term for a member of the Roma community. It is used mainly when referring to cultural products, such as music. (No articles were located by using only this search term.)

³⁸ *Kalasadama* is the name of the area in Helsinki where some of the East European Roma were camping during this period (see also section 1.4).

³⁹ *Tigg** produces matches such as *tigging* (begging) and *tigger* (beggar), as well as solid compounds such as *tiggeforbud* (prohibition on begging) and *tiggerstopp* (end to begging).

⁴⁰ *Romfolk* refers to Roma people and is considered more politically correct than *sigøyner*.

I only used those texts which had been printed in the paper version of the newspapers. Regardless of the growing number of readers using online media, I regard printed newspaper material as still having an especially established position with regards to the shared meaning-making in society. I thus arrived at using online tools to locate printed material and access it in a manageable form.

3.1.5 Selection criteria

As I was facing an abundance of data, I had to be relatively strict with the selection criteria in order to maintain a manageable sample size. Texts touching upon the Roma only in passing were dismissed. My guideline was that the title and/or a substantial part of the text had to relate to the issue of East European Roma present in other European countries on account of making an income by begging or comparable activities. In the majority of the cases, the relevance of the included units was apparent as they clearly relate to the phenomenon of begging Roma in the national framework.

Matches deemed not directly relevant, such as those referring to cultural products (e.g. reviews of books or theatre plays somehow relating to the East European Roma) were dismissed. I also chose to leave out texts which dealt with the mass deportations of Roma people taking place in France at the time, as their main focus was not a domestic one. Some of the units included do mention the events in France, but their focus is, in accordance to the set criteria, elsewhere. In the two cases where an article from the international news section was included, it deals either with the general situation of the Roma in the European context (e.g. relating to EU policies), or with neighbouring countries responses to the presence of the travelling Roma.

⁴¹ *Sigøyner* is a somewhat outdated term for a member of the Roma community, even though it seems less politically incorrect in Norway than its counterpart in Finland, *mustalainen*. It is mainly used when referring to cultural products, such as music.

⁴² Karl Johans gate (often referred to simply as Karl Johan), partly a pedestrian street, is the main street of Oslo. The presence of East European beggars has been experienced as especially problematic in this area. (No articles were located by using only this search term.)

The question arose whether to include news articles on property crime committed by Romanian citizens. During the period June through August 2010, Helsingin Sanomat published several news articles on thefts and burglaries committed by Romanians, as well as the theft of jewellery and a valuable icon from the Orthodox Uspenski Cathedral in Helsinki. Such articles where only the nationality was mentioned were not included, i.e. when the actor is identified as Romanian, but not Roma. (The Finnish police does generally not give out information on the ethnic origin of a suspect unless this is deemed relevant for solving a case.) Although was generally assumed that some of the suspects defined as Romanian citizens were indeed part of the Roma minority I considered it inconsistent to include these articles. The aspect of the Roma being represented as a group involved in criminal activity is anyhow not lost due to this data delimitation, as the theme is visible also in the included material.

3.1.6 Characteristics of the text units

The length of the analyzed texts varies between 44 words (HS 22.08.2010) and 1310 words (AP 25.08.2010). I have not posed a length limit to the texts, but included all those deemed relevant. Although the majority of the units are regular length, my material also includes short news items of only a few sentences. Conversely, some articles grow especially long as they consist of several smaller entities relating to the issue, divided by separate titles. My data also includes teasers on the front page, preambles, and summaries of facts as well as captions. In this type of text, the journalist summarizes the main points of the article itself and chooses a specific angle (see e.g. Hall 1999, 143–144, on the significance of captions in relation to images). They can thus be viewed as dense and fruitful data for analysis.

In the Norwegian material, the discussion on the begging Roma was quite even over the studied period, with 8 to 10 texts on the issue published per month. In Helsingin Sanomat, the activity of the discussion varied more, and peaked in July with 23 texts.

Figure 1: Spread of the analyzed units over the period June through August 2010





Figure 2: Spread of the analyzed units by newspaper section⁴³



⁴³ In the case of Aftenposten, those news articles printed in the locally distributed evening edition (*Aften*) were categorized as local news, and those printed in the nationally distributed morning edition (*Morgen*) as domestic news. The 'Other' category consists of a poll about the state of the city in a local supplement (*Osloplus*) in the case of Norway, while the two Helsingin Sanomat articles listed under 'Other' are I) an extensive feature article in a Sunday edition of the paper (11.07.2010), and II) a section quoting news from other papers (*Muut lehdet*, 05.07.2010).

In both Helsingin Sanomat and Aftenposten, a substantial part of the data is constituted by news articles. Aftenposten provided 13 news articles for my research, which equals roughly half of the Norwegian data. Equally in the Finnish case, the local and domestic news stands for a significant part of the data (roughly 35 per cent of the texts). One noticeable difference between the Finnish and Norwegian data is the significantly higher proportion of letters to the editor in the former. In Helsingin Sanomat, exactly half of the data (26 text units) consists of letters to the editor, while the share in the Norwegian case is under a fourth (6 text units). This shows the large interest in the topic, especially among the Finnish readers.

The urban focus of the topic in Finland is visible in the fact that within the category of news articles, 70 per cent belong to the section for Helsinki-based news (*Kaupunki*), while a third was found under the heading of domestic news (*Kotimaa*). Aftenposten does not have separate sections for local and national news. But when categorizing the texts according to which edition they were published in (the nation-wide morning edition or the Oslo-centred evening edition), this trend is also present here. Three quarters of the Norwegian data (that is 20 units) is from the evening edition, while a quarter (6 units) was printed in the national morning edition.⁴⁴

My texts represent several different *genres* of newspaper content, which entail different foci and functions. A letter to the editor is likely to be more provocative than a news article, while a feature article should provide a more in-depth view than a column. News articles generally have more credence than letters from the readers. Furthermore, the paper does not have the same kind of responsibility for the content of a letter to the editor as it does for edited material (although selecting which letters to print naturally entails some responsibility).

Although I acknowledge the differences between genres, I am not differentiating between the texts according to genre in my analysis. I believe this kind of differentiation is not necessary for answering my research questions, although it would have been interesting to identify variations between the genres. In order to maintain a reasonable scope for this

⁴⁴ The one adding up to a total of 27 units is from the local supplement *Osloplus*.

thesis, I have treated the data “as one”. I do not see this as a problem, because regardless of which section of the newspaper a text has been published in (and whether a journalist or a reader produced it), it still contributes to how the issue of the begging Roma has been constructed in the two newspapers.

3.2 Analysis method: The path to identifying the central discourses

While (critical) discourse analysis is on the one hand a theoretical approach (see chapter 2), on the other hand it also offers specific methodological tools. The method by which I analyze my data is strongly influenced by Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analytical approach. I apply certain aspects of Fairclough’s method on my data, focusing on those dimensions which are most relevant with regards to my research question, while always adhering to the basic principles of the method.

3.2.1 Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis

The specific approach to discourse analysis developed by Norman Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis* (CDA), rests upon the theoretical understandings outlined in the second chapter of this thesis. Fairclough argues that within the discourse analytic tradition, scholars have tended to focus either on a detailed linguistic analysis of texts or on social theoretical issues, unable to include both. He has attempted to bridge this gap between the micro and macro levels by developing an approach encompassing both text and theory (Fairclough 2003, 2–3). This is one of the factors making Fairclough’s approach so suitable for my research, as this type of research needs both closeness to the data and a sound theoretical base in order to be convincing.

Fairclough focuses on the interaction between three levels of analysis; a) social events, b) social practices and c) social structures (Fairclough 2003, 21–38). The relationship between these three levels is complex, and the analysis model is necessarily of ideal-type character. While *social structures* are abstract, macro level constructions such as languages, *social events* are concrete entities such as newspaper articles. These two levels are connected through the level of *social practices*, by which Fairclough (2003, 205)

means “relatively stabilized forms of social activity” such as medical consultation or, more relevantly for this study, news reporting. On this intermediate level, ‘orders of discourse’ are the object of analysis. An order of discourse is defined as “a network of social practices in its language aspect” (ibid., 24). In other words, it is on this level of social practices that the discursive practices, which are the focus of my study, are found.

Fairclough (2003) identifies genres, styles and discourses as the building blocks of social practice. *Genre* refers to ‘ways of acting’ such as everyday conversation or interviews. *Styles* are defined as ‘ways of being’ and are connected to certain identities (such as for example a journalist positioning him- or herself as a defender of human rights). A certain social practice may be centred around a specific style and identity. *Discourses* are ‘ways of representing’, and always includes positioning; “differently positioned social actors ‘see’ and represent social life in different ways, different discourses” (Fairclough 2003, 206). It is precisely here that the focus of this thesis lies; with the specific discourses which constitute parts of the social practice of newspaper reporting and debate.

Fairclough underlines that also non-discursive elements are relevant, such as persons and social relations. The different elements are in complex dialectical relationship with each other, and while there is an analytical distinction, they do also flow into one another in various ways. The theoretical viability of CDA rests much upon the logic of dialectic relations; “social relations *are* partly discursal in nature, discourse *is* partly social relations” (Fairclough 2003, 25). This orientation gives societal relevance to Fairclough’s approach, as what is focused on is not merely the discourses, but the effects that these have on the social world.

3.2.2 Application of CDA in my analysis

The versatility of the method, stemming from the wide range of possible focus points, is one of the strengths in Fairclough’s approach and simultaneously one of the reasons why I have chosen this as my methodological point of departure. In this study, the focus is on the intermediate level of social practices, which encompass discursive practices. It is beyond the scope of a master’s thesis to carry out a study which would stretch over all the levels of Fairclough’s theory and methodology. The full version of how CDA can ideally

be applied includes a wide range of analysis; from identifying obstacles for the tackling of social problems to presenting a solution to such obstacles. Fairclough's own research interest lies with the emergence of a new version of capitalism characterized by globalization, information society and consumer culture (Fairclough 2003). His work thus stretches up to a much higher macro level than mine does. It is beyond my scope to seek to identify and present guidelines for how media practices can be made more balanced or less repressing. But what I am able to provide in this thesis is a detailed analysis of a certain aspect of what Fairclough has termed social practices, namely the discourses present in specific media reporting in a specific social setting at a specific time. This knowledge can in turn serve the purpose of 'emancipatory change', in the terms of Fairclough (2003, 209).

Even though my focus is on the discursive aspect of social practice, the other levels of analysis are also present. The concrete *social events* consist of the text units which constitute the empirical data for this research. Through a systematic and detailed analysis (described below) of the discursive elements in the texts, the analysis is brought to the next level of *social practices*. This analysis is then contextualized and anchored on the more abstract *social structural* level through the use of relevant theoretical literature.⁴⁵

I approached my data with a rigorous attitude, and by processing the text units several times I categorized representations and arguments into logical discursive entities. I carried out the analytic work in four steps:

The **first** stage in my analysis consisted of reading through the texts with an open mind, in order to get an overall touch with the data at hand. I sought to avoid any pre-existing assumptions I might have had with regards to the content of the data. Simultaneously, I made rough notes on the bearing lines of argument and logic. An example of such a note

⁴⁵ Fairclough's version of CDA can also include detailed semantic and grammatical analyses, studying for example relations between clauses and sentences, or between morphemes in words. My study does not include such analysis, as it would require a linguistic competence which I do not hold, and I doubt that such an analysis would benefit my study significantly.

on a letter to the editor (HS 10.7) is *“Undemocratic procedure when threatening Satama with eviction. The Roma should be allowed to stay in the yard. The focus should be with ameliorating their situation. Current policies are short-sighted and inhumane”*.

Second, I made a two-page brainstorm list of possible analytic dimensions to focus on and questions to pose to my data. What I was doing at this point was starting to draw up my coding tool. By grouping together and categorizing the different tentative dimensions, I created my final nine-step coding scheme (Figure 3 below).

This marked the beginning of the time-consuming **third** work stage, when I scrutinized the texts and coded the content in each of the 79 units according to the scheme. Appendix 1 to this thesis contains an example of how I have applied my coding scheme to the same letter to the editor as mentioned above (HS 10.7). The approach I used when coding bears similarities with the method of close reading, outlined by Andrew DuBois (2003), as well as with content analysis (e.g. Holsti 1969). Both methods require a systematic and rigorous approach, but allow for situation-bound variation in application. Using procedures inspired by other methods is not problematic. Fairclough (2003, 211) points out that “while CDA does in a sense constitute a method of analysis, the methods employed in any specific piece of research which draws upon CDA are likely to be a combination of those of CDA and others”.

After having coded all my data, the **fourth** and last stage in my analysis consisted of outlining the discourses present in my data. By reading and re-reading my codings, the seven main discourses (and their sub-discourses) gradually emerged. I first drew up a scheme of tentative discourses, then returned to my codings and scrutinized the composition of the discourses. I was able to structure my data by colour coding relevant sections of the texts according to which discourse they represent. I maintained a comparative mindset throughout the analysis process, in order to spot the differences between the Finnish and Norwegian data.

When categorizing the data into separate discursive entities, the question of how to distinguish 'one discourse' arose. This is not a straightforward matter. All representations do not for example equal separate discourses. Fairclough (2003, 126) points to different levels of abstraction or generality, by which he refers to the multi-layered character of discourses. For example, one can talk of a discourse of Liberalism, but also identify separate discourses within Liberal ideology and politics.

What then qualifies as separate discourses? Fairclough answers this question by pointing to two requirements. First, there naturally has to be commonality and continuity in the ways to represent the world (or a specific issue). The second point has to do with the dialectics between discursive and non-discursive elements. Separate discourses have separate social significances and effects on non-discursive aspects of life (such as social relations). With these guidelines in mind, I have sought to identify separate logical wholes which to the best of my understanding qualify as separate discourses. Some of the discourses contain clearly separable sub-levels, which centre around specific aspects, but are bound together by an over-arching logic. I have treated these as sub-discourses. One example is the Order discourse (see section 4.1.3), which is composed of three sub-discourses focusing on separate aspects of order – cleanliness, rules and regulations, and safety. I recognize that my categorization, just as any other, is one among several possible.

I now want to return to the coding scheme and the process of coding, as this is perhaps the most essential part of my analysis. With the aid of the scheme, I believe I was able to access relevant aspects of my data. Surely there are many other elements which could have been included, but I believe I have taken into account those aspects which are most relevant for answering my research questions. As Fairclough points out (2003, 14–15), one cannot avoid selectivity and a certain limitedness in textual analysis. The researcher chooses to pose certain questions about social events, and has to leave others out. The research frame and questions have guided my selection of suitable questions.

Figure 3: Coding Scheme

1) What are the Roma called?
2) Who are a) the relevant actors, and b) the main speakers?
3) Are the Roma dominantly active or passive (even victimization)?
4) What concrete themes arise?
5) What power relations are present in the text?
De facto (Which power relations are visible or taken for granted?)
Called for (Who should have more control over whom/what?)
Criticized (Who is exercising illegitimate power?)
6) How is 'the problem' constructed?
Definition (What is the problem/issue?)
Location (Who is it a problem for?)
Justification (Why is it a problem?)
Solution (How can/should the problem be solved?)
7) Ideal society: What values are present in the text?
8) Other (e.g. wordings, rhetoric tools)
9) Begging is / the East European Roma are... (Summary of the main position/s)

The coding scheme encompasses questions on many different levels of abstraction. While some have to do with the characteristics of the text itself (e.g. question one) and are rather straightforward, others are more concerned with logics and arguments which are not always spelled out. The questions on power relations, the construction of the problem and dominant values (questions 5–7) require inference, as the answers are seldom pronounced in the text. These questions are thus examples of such where my analytical capacities were put to the test. As the coding was done in the same electronic document as the text unit itself, I always had the first-hand data at hand and could easily return to it when needed. I also kept an analysis diary throughout the working process in order to keep a record of the various questions and insights that emerged throughout the process.

Some of the questions which I have posed to the data are more central for the analysis than others, which are more of supporting nature. For example, I have not as such included the first question on what the Roma are called in my analysis, as the data did not

enable linking certain denominations to specific discourses. The seventh question which concerns values, on the other hand, has emerged as a central one in my final analysis. Fairclough (2003, 124) underlines that discourses do not only represent the world as it is, but often also contain representations of imaginary *possible* worlds. In such visions, values and other understandings of what is 'good' play a central role. This is the essence of question 7.

Some of the questions are more 'discourse analytical' than others. The fifth question on power relations touches upon one of the most central aspects of critical discourse analysis as a theoretical position, and could be included in many other studies without modification. Questions such as the third and seventh, on the other hand, are more customized to fit this specific research. But also there, I maintain the basic orientation of CDA. For example, my third question is linked to Fairclough's division of social actors into 'Actors' and 'Affected/Beneficiaries'. One of the elements whereby a social actor is represented in a certain way concerns whether she or he is "the one who does things and makes things happen" or rather "the one affected by processes" (Fairclough 2003, 145).

Questions sometimes overlap, but this is not a problem for the analysis. On the contrary, I decided to make the coding scheme rather detailed in order to reach all the central aspects of my data. Some questions might also seem overly detailed or simple-minded at first glance. I have for example sought to atomize how a certain problem is constructed by separating the dimensions of definition, location, justification and solution. When identifying the problem as for example 'beggars often pickpocket people in the street', it might seem unnecessary and repetitive to underline that 'this is a problem for those who get pickpocketed' or that 'this is a problem because one should be able to move in the streets without being at risk of theft'. Although I do not report my results according to this layout, I believe I have been able to reach a clearer and more structured understanding of the logics present in the data by spelling out the various building-blocks for myself. This is true also for the coding scheme at large. It would not make sense to report on my findings according to the nine-question-structure. Instead, I used the scheme as a tool to structure my own understanding of the data. The analysis chapter includes the most central and relevant aspects that the coding revealed about my data.

4 Analysis

4.1 Seven main discourses⁴⁶

4.1.1 Deprivation-solidarity discourse

*"The fate of the Roma people is a foreseen catastrophe, a quickly escalating tragedy."*ⁱ
(Aftenposten 26 August 2010, editorial)

*"The Roma from Eastern Europe do not drift to Finland and elsewhere in Europe seeking an easy life and western social benefits. They are the most discriminated people in Europe. A nomad life is their only chance."*ⁱⁱⁱ (Helsingin Sanomat 27 July 2010, letter to the editor)

At the core of the Deprivation-solidarity discourse is the articulation of a concern for the well-being of the Roma. The East European Roma present in Finland and Norway are portrayed as suffering a difficult situation resulting from discrimination, poverty, racism and social deprivation. They are seen as unable to or hindered from living a good-quality life. According to this discourse, a lack of material and social resources, mainly due to discrimination by authorities and majority populations, are the reasons for the hardships of the East European Roma. The conclusion within the main strand of the discourse is that the receiving societies should have solidarity with this marginalized group, and that 'we' have a moral responsibility to assist in alleviating their suffering. The core values are humanity, solidarity with those worse off, as well as equality more generally.

Begging is here something that the Roma are doing out of necessity. It is a last resort, instead of for example a result of unwillingness to work or of incompetence. They would lead 'normal' lives with schooling and employment would they only be given the chance. Also their nomad lifestyle is portrayed as involuntary, as a means to survive. In a Helsingin Sanomat editorial (HS 20.8), the executive manager of the Finnish section of Amnesty International puts it the following way; "When your home is at a landfill and

⁴⁶ Excerpts in the original language are placed as endnotes.

your schoolgoing is interrupted because of racism, then nomadism and beggary are rather understandable options”ⁱⁱⁱ.

The basis of the Deprivation-solidarity discourse is thus the view that the Roma are victims of hardships for which they themselves are not to be blamed. They are dominantly portrayed as a unified mass, with a passive victim-position as one of their collective attributes. The degree to which the perpetrator is identified varies. Sometimes the offender of the Roma’s rights is clearly pointed out, while in other cases it is simply stated that this group is in need.

The governments in the East European countries of origin are often pointed out as the guilty ones, as exemplified by the headline of a letter to the editor; “EU-Romania should be punished for neglecting the Roma”^{iv} (HS 28.6). Also Finnish and Norwegian authorities are blamed for maltreating the Roma, or at least warned not to adopt discriminatory control measures. The Deprivation-solidarity discourse is most often used to argue for refraining from banning beggary (especially in HS, but also in AP). In three cases (HS 7.6; 25.6; 9.7), criminalizing beggary is even equalled to criminalizing poverty. Other concrete measures argued for within this discourse include providing service camps, supporting the Satama social centre in Helsinki in their efforts to assist the Roma, and generally adopting a more tolerant attitude. The majority population in the two countries are at times blamed for not having solidarity with the Roma when refusing to give money, or generally holding negative attitudes to the group (e.g. media labelling them as criminals).

Although many of the text passages representing the Deprivation-solidarity discourse argue generally for humane attitudes and policies (especially refraining from banning begging), concrete measures for inclusion in society is also a theme which is reoccurring. The begging Roma are at times portrayed as in need of the *active* support of the Finnish (and to a lesser degree Norwegian) state, not only as a group which should not be prevented from making their living by begging in the streets. The authorities are in turn positioned as having a moral obligation to help this vulnerable group. Clear references to societal inclusion, e.g. to providing camps or housing, employment possibilities and access to education, are made by some commentators. The national self-image and ideal

of a strong and inclusive welfare system is present. It is much more pronounced in the Finnish case than in Norway. The relations between the visiting Roma and the national welfare state systems will be returned to in section 4.1.7 dealing with the Authority critique discourse.

In contexts where the national authorities in Norway and Finland are warned against adopting discriminatory policies against the begging Roma, references to history are present in several texts. It is presented as essential not to repeat mistakes from the past. Anyhow, no specific events are mentioned. The Nazi regime is not mentioned at all in my data, but possible implicit references such as the following do occur; "Criminalizing begging would in practice apply to [only] one group: the Roma. There is lots of healthy reading about this kind of laws which apply to one specific ethnic group – and about [the makers of the laws] – in European school books"^v (HS 24.6).

On the other hand, the Deprivation-solidarity discourse is in a couple of Finnish cases (HS 1.6 and 28.7) also activated in order to argue *against* the right to beg. According to a Member of Parliament, begging is "not a way to make a living which is fit for human dignity"^{vi} (HS 28.7), and it should thus not be allowed. As in the main strand of the discourse, the well-being of the Roma is the main focus – at least on the level of rhetoric. But the conclusions drawn regarding the desired policy measures are the opposite.

The Deprivation-solidarity discourse encompasses a variety of geographical frames. At times it is stressed that the Roma are facing discrimination all over Europe and that this is a challenge for the EU as a whole. A Helsingin Sanomat editorial by an invited writer urges not to shove the responsibility over to someone else; "The begging Roma are showing a harsh but true image of the inequality in our continent. In the European Union we cannot simply state that someone should help them in their home countries"^{vii} (HS 8.8). On the other hand, several texts have a local focus, not making explicit transnational connections, but instead portraying the concrete shortages that the group is facing in Norway or Finland; "We in Norway can give the gypsies that come here better sanitary conditions by providing drinking water and bathrooms"^{viii} (AP 19.8).

Both in Norway and in Finland, the public discussion about the Roma is by some commentators experienced as so distorted that the human worth of the Roma needs to be stressed. An editorial in *Aftenposten* takes it to the most basic level, stating that “[t]he Roma are human beings. Even when they sleep outside, and if they beg or steal”^{ix} (AP 26.8). Whereas it would hardly seem relevant to proclaim, for example, that ‘bus drivers are also human beings’, with regards to the Roma it does. The fact that this kind of statements make sense shows that the attitudes of the majority against the East European Roma are perceived as *dehumanizing*.

I would argue that a suitable definition for dehumanization is ‘extreme othering’. It is a social psychological mechanism, defined by Nick Haslam as “the denial of full humanness to others” (2006, 252). This can manifest as for example the likening of people to animals (e.g. Africans to apes), or to children; lacking rationality, shame and sophistication. Typical reactions towards a dehumanized group are contempt and fear, sentiments which are present also in my data. The concept has been used in many research domains, among others in research on gender, medicine and technology. Race and ethnicity is the research area where it has been most frequently applied, often in relation to immigration and genocide (Haslam 2006). Dehumanization (along with other forms of delegitimizing; see Bar-Tal 2000) serves to “explaining the conflict, justifying the in-group’s aggression, and providing it with a sense of superiority” (Haslam 2006, 254). The paralleling of beggars with trash or dirt (see Order discourse, section 4.1.3) is an example of dehumanizing language use found in my data. Huub van Baar (forthcoming) has applied the concept to the Roma population in Europe, arguing that Roma are subject to dehumanizing mechanisms and policies in East Central Europe.

In my data, the discussion is at times broadened to include other vulnerable groups in society. In a letter to the editor (HS 18.7), alcoholics are brought in to the discussion, stressing that “also those people who smell of spirits and dwell in parks are actually human beings. The worst thing is when they lose their human value in the eyes of the so called ordinary citizens”^x. One could thus add alcohol and drug abuse to the list of research domains where dehumanization is a relevant concept.

The earlier quoted excerpts reminding about the humanness of the Roma serve as examples of a rhetoric aiming at activating feelings of empathy, which is often used within the Deprivation-solidarity discourse. My data also contains narratives about personal experience of hunger and other type of need, stressing how the writer can relate to what the Roma are going through. These kinds of approaches, together with the listing of concrete things that the Roma are lacking, stress the physical needs that are believed not to be met. Aspects such as lack of food, clean drinking water, toilets and a place to live are underlined as the concrete shortages suffered by the East European Roma. Bringing the discussion to this tangible level is more sentimentally touching than talking in more analytical terms of ‘discrimination’ or ‘human rights violations’. Proclaiming approaches, for example stating that the moral conscience of the writer cannot allow that the authorities are stigmatizing poor people instead of helping them (HS 7.6), are also present in the data. The earlier mentioned statements that criminalizing begging de facto means criminalizing poverty are along the same, more promulgating, argumentation lines.

A special kind of rhetoric style is seen in some Helsingin Sanomat columns written by Kimmo Oksanen, a journalist who seems to have adopted a special cause in defending the begging Roma. During my data gathering period, two such columns were published. Here the tone is unsentimental and non-preaching, but the function of the text is still to make an emotional impact on the reader. The journalist describes the lives of the Roma in a matter-of-fact tone. In one of the columns, the geographical scene is Helsinki and in the other Romania. Especially the one on Romania, depicting hunger and poverty by describing the death of a young boy, is rather powerful. The rhetoric is not in any way pleading, but rather dejected. The journalist starts his story as follows: “Six-year-old Claudiu Horvath died last weekend in Haranglab in Transylvania, Romania after having eaten a poisonous mushroom. He ate the mushroom because he was hungry, and he did not know it was poisonous. His mother Ergie Horvath was not there watching her son, because she was in the close-by town Tarnaveni gathering food from dumpsters”^{xi} (HS 2.8). The facts are left to speak for themselves, and the “cold” tone makes the impact even stronger. Also the fact that the people in the story have names gives them more of a human shape, with which it is possible for the reader to identify. The narrative gets under

the skin of the reader, so to speak, as one is faced with such individual tragedies – without the frills.

The majority of the text passages using the Deprivation-solidarity discourse are found in letters to the editor arguing for the right to beg, for the state to provide services for the Roma and/or for more tolerant attitudes against the visiting Roma in general. There are in addition a couple of editorials adhering to the discourse, portraying the Roma as victims of discrimination and other hardships (AP 26.8; HS 8.8 and 20.8). The discourse is also recurring in news articles, but almost exclusively in a constellation where two conflicting stances are presented – one advocating for stricter control measures on the presence and/or activities of the begging Roma, and the other proclaiming solidarity with them. A typical example of such a domestic news article is one in *Aftenposten* whose main narrative is that Roma and other groups are pickpocketing people in the main street of Oslo and generally disturbing the order and security in the area (AP 8.7). A journalist for a street magazine⁴⁷ is then positioned as the defender of the Roma, saying that vulnerable groups should be offered a way out instead of demonizing them. He is quoted as characterizing the current Norwegian public debate as a “witch hunt”^{xii}, and clearly employs the Deprivation-solidarity discourse. In addition to letters to the editor, the discourse is articulated in Finnish news articles by actors such as the representatives of a Roma organization, the Youth department of the City of Helsinki and the Finnish No Borders network (*Vapaa Liikkuvuus*). In Norway, the discourse is in news articles articulated by representatives of the Social democratic party (*Arbeiderpartiet*), the Church City Mission (*Kirkens Bymisjon*), as well as a person driving Roma around to various festivals in order for them to beg there.

⁴⁷ = *Oslo*, a magazine sold by and benefitting homeless and disadvantaged people. (Comparable to *The Big Issue*.)

4.1.2 Human rights discourse

“Everyone has to be treated equally if we want to avoid a conflict with the discrimination legislation.”^{xiii} (Aftenposten 31 August 2010, local news)

”A significant problem regarding criminalizing begging is that it is in contrast to the principle of equality in the sixth paragraph of the constitution.”^{xiv} (Helsingin Sanomat 5 June 2010, letter to the editor)

At times, arguments drawing on human rights are used as an argumentative element to support the above described Deprivation-solidarity discourse. In addition to this, I have identified a related but distinct discourse. This Human rights discourse focuses on human rights principles and treaties, and the relationship between factual and/or proposed policies or control means to these. No ‘sentimental’ approaches are present in this discourse. Instead, the focus is on the national constitution as well as on international agreements which bind the states that have signed them.

Much as in the Deprivation-solidarity discourse, the East European Roma are portrayed as victims of human rights violations, or as possible victims of future policies violating human rights. They are seen as being in a vulnerable position, their established rights threatened by how they are treated in their Eastern European home countries as well as in Western European states (especially France). Proposed control means in Norway and Finland also constitute a specific concern. The Roma are, within this discourse, portrayed as a group of people equally entitled to human rights as any other human beings. Universalism is in other words the leading principle. Although the Roma are spoken about as a collective, one could argue that this discourse is more anchored on the level of the individual than the Deprivation-solidarity discourse. This is because human rights consist of individual, not collective, rights. In essence, it is the *person* of Roma origin who is faced with or at risk of human rights violations, not the Roma people as a group.

Even though my data is in principle delimited not to include articles from the foreign news sections, there are still references to international events to be found. Accusations of de facto human rights violations emerge especially in relation to the actions of France

in deporting groups of Roma, a development which was an international media event at the time of data gathering. Also Eastern European home countries of the Roma are identified as violating international agreements on human rights. No clear reference is made to Finnish or Norwegian authorities violating agreements with *current* actions, although one commentator does say that the stance in Norway “resembles Romanian and Italian policies to a frightening extent”^{xv} (AP 8.7).

Although accusations of human rights violations in Eastern Europe and France is one issue treated within the discourse, the main focus is on *proposed* control means in the national context. The most prominent concrete issue is the relation between the proposed banning of begging in Finland and relevant human rights principles and treaties.

The Human rights discourse is next to absent in the Norwegian data; in fact the quotation at the beginning of this section is the sole clear reference to human rights principles in legally binding documents. In the Finnish data, on the other hand, there is a fair amount of text passages converging with the discourse. As legal amendments (banning begging) were actively discussed in Finland at the time of data collection, it is perhaps unsurprising that relevant treaties come up to discussion.

In my data, there are two opposing stances on how banning begging goes together with human rights, appearing in a political-philosophical debate carried out on the pages of Helsingin Sanomat in June and July 2010. According to one position, it would be against human rights principles and treaties to ban begging, because the target of the proposed ban is clearly the Roma.⁴⁸ This is argued to make the entire law proposal discriminatory and thus incompatible with international treaties and the national constitution. The debate was initialized by a letter to the editor written by Ari Hirvonen, Docent in legal philosophy and legal theory at the University of Helsinki. In his view, it is of no importance that the ban would be formulated to apply to everybody, as it is still motivated by a discriminatory intention; “Even if the letter of the law is neutral, its spirit and purpose are against the constitution and agreement on human rights”^{xvi} (HS 5.6).

⁴⁸ Very few people of other origin than Roma were begging in the streets of Helsinki at this time. (This is true also at the time of writing; August 2011).

The opposing stance then asks how this law proposal is different from any other. In a letter to the editor (10.6), it is claimed that no criminalization is neutral; “Criminalizing prostitution «discriminates» only against prostitutes, and [banning] stealing only [«discriminates» against] thieves [...]”^{xvii} (ibid.). Helsingin Sanomat treats the matter in the same vein in an editorial (HS 7.8) – using a wording that leaves some doubt as to whether it was completely thought through. The editorial refers to the discussion by stating that some legal experts think that the proposed ban is discriminatory, but that it at the same time is “difficult to argue that some offence or crime should be allowed because it is committed by a specific group”^{xviii}. The journalist does not straightforwardly say that begging is (or should be) an offence or crime, instead the quoted principle is formulated in general terms. But the important point is that the reader will still get the picture of begging as an ‘offence or crime’ which legal experts want to ‘allow’. Thus, implicitly labelling begging as an ‘offence or crime’ ex ante, in an editorial commenting on a debate about whether the activity de facto should be criminalized or not, contains a rather powerful message.

At the core of the outlined debate we thus find the question of whether making a law that in practice applies to only one group is legitimate and in line with non-discrimination acts and principles. A relevant question in this debate – one which is overseen by the debaters – is whether the Roma could choose to earn their living in another way than by begging. If begging is seen as just one option among many (as for example a prostitute can be argued to have the choice to support her- or himself by other means), then the view that a ban on begging is equal to any other ban can be seen as plausible. But if begging is interpreted as an expression of utmost need and a last resort, then human rights principles are indeed a heavy argument against the ban.

An extensive feature article published in a Sunday supplement of Helsingin Sanomat contains some of my data’s most clear-cut human rights arguments. The article as a whole takes a clear stance against criminalizing begging, and conveys a strong message to the readers. It is given visibility with a front-page teaser, headed “Jurists slate ban on begging”^{xix} (HS 11.7). The headline of the main article is “Every man’s right”^{xx}. In the front-page teaser to the article, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights Martin

Scheinin adheres to the same view as Hirvonen above: "It [banning begging] would be profiling on basis on ethnic origin, which offends the European Convention on Human Rights and the Finnish Constitution"^{xxi} (ibid.). The reason given for why ethnic profiling is condemnable is not that it would be, for example, discriminating and thus morally reprehensible; instead, the convention and the constitution speak for themselves.

It anyhow needs to be pointed out that moral values inherent in the concept of human rights and inscribed in these treaties – such as equality, justice and solidarity – can with good reason be assumed to function as the *implicit* justifications within the Human rights discourse. But the decisive matter, distinguishing the Deprivation-solidarity discourse from the Human rights discourse, is that in the latter these values not articulated on the discursive level.

Thus, no specific justifications are used in order to legitimize human rights principles and related documents. Instead the value and relevance of these are treated as self-explanatory. The highest authority is here with legal agreements. Taking the above mentioned Helsingin Sanomat feature article as an example again, the structure of the text with regards to the placing of certain sentences is telling. On two instances (in the front-page teaser and a short preamble to the article), the paragraph ends with the simple statement that banning begging would be against the Finnish constitution. This shows the paramount importance of this legal document; a conflict with the constitution is an insurmountable obstacle, an 'end of story' argumentative element. The constitution holds a cardinal position in society – both as the base of the entire legal system and as an eminent national symbol.

The Human rights discourse is in parts of my data connected to a specific national self-image; the one of Finnish society as 'civilized'. One line of argument is that a ban on begging contrasts the idea of a 'civilized state'; "Begging [...] is anyhow an inalienable basic right for the individual and the last legal way to make a living in a situation where no other possibilities exist. This right should be held on to in a civilized state"^{xxii} (HS 7.6). There are also voices stating the contrary; that begging does not go together with the idea of a civilized state (e.g. HS 28.6). But as these text passages do not refer to human rights, they will not be dealt with here.

At times, the mechanism of othering is activated. The writer of a letter to the editor (HS 27.7) states that “as long as the home countries of the Roma do not respect human rights and international treaties, it is necessary for our more civilized nations to make sure the Roma are treated in a humane way”^{xxiii}. The contrast between ‘us’ as civilized and ‘them’ as human rights violating, rather barbaric states, is striking. ‘We’ are here allowed to bask in the radiance of our superior level of civilization. While in this latter example ‘civilization’ is highlighted by the contrast to other ‘less civilized’ states, the quotation in the paragraph above contains a more internal contrast. There, the need to defend ‘civilization’ is activated by nationally proposed control means experienced as morally condemnable. Forces representing ‘uncivilized’ actors or ideas are thus identified on different levels; within the national framework (internal) as well as in international comparisons (external).

The Human rights discourse is in my data used mainly by writers of letters to the editor. In news articles, the actors who employ this discourse are dominantly legal experts (such as the earlier mentioned Scheinin and Hirvonen). There are also two editorials by invited writers that actively utilize rights-based arguments (HS 8.8; 20.8). In both of these, as well as in the majority of the other cases where the Human rights discourse is employed, the Deprivation-solidarity discourse is also present in the text. When the two discourses are used together, it often makes for a strong case against banning begging. Combining principles of universal human rights and related treaties with morally and emotionally pleading wordings seems to be the main argumentative strategy of actors arguing against specific control measures or for providing services and/or generally more tolerant attitudes against the Roma.

4.1.3 Order discourse

“As we have such great green lungs, we cannot allow that others come and take over, with all the soiling it entails. They are also relieving themselves in the parks, and it smells bad in the area.”^{xxiv} (Aftenposten 24 June 2010, local news)

“According to the warning, the yard has been untidy, there have been dangerous electrical apparatuses, and one is not allowed to camp there.”^{xxv} (Helsingin Sanomat 7 July 2010, local news)

Within the Order discourse, the activities of the East European Roma in Finland and Norway are presented as threatening the order in the city or society at large. References in general terms to begging, beggars and/or their camps as menacing the ‘public order’ are quite frequent (e.g. HS 25.6 and 7.8; AP 29.6 and 23.7). In a Helsingin Sanomat editorial (HS 7.8) for example, the attempts of EU member states to supervise the public order more efficiently are linked to stricter control over begging and making it easier to deport EU citizens (here: Roma).

Sometimes the mere presence of the Roma is specified as harmful for the public order in my data. The same tendency is noted by van Baar (2011, 206–207) in relation to French and Italian policies against Roma. According to him, a policy in place in Italy since 2007 defines the presence of Roma in the public space as a security risk and allows Italian authorities to intervene. A comparable example from my Norwegian data is when the national Chief of Police Ingelin Killengreen is reported to have warned local police about Roma beggars; “In the letter to the local police commissioners she writes that beggars who reside in public places can in themselves «create unrest and be a basis for unfortunate order-related situations»”^{xxvi} (AP 23.7). Although the wording ‘reside’ can refer to either ‘being present’ or ‘having one’s home’, in the context the meaning is rather clearly the former. The policemen and -women are urged to pay special attention to members of the Roma community, who are labelled as a hazard to the desired order in the streets.

In addition to public order on a general level, there are also more specific issues present in the data. I have within the Order discourse identified three sub-discourses, which centre around different order-related themes. These themes – at the same time societal values – are 1) cleanliness, 2) rules and regulations, and 3) safety.

Cleanliness

Cleanliness is a theme that arises frequently both in the Norwegian and in the Finnish data. In the Finnish context, the topic appears especially in news articles reporting on the Roma camp in the yard of the Satama social centre. A central concern of the City of Helsinki officials with regards to the camp, and one of the reasons given for why the camp should be evicted, was the perceived untidiness. Richardson (2005) has noted the same in Britain, and describes how Roma camps are facing authority accusations of creating a mess also there. In my data, no parties in the debate challenge the importance of cleanliness, instead there seems to be consensus over its relevance. A Roma man living in the camp is quoted as following: “See for yourself, we are tidying up and the area is clean”^{xxvii} (HS 7.7). Also a representative of the No Borders network defends the camp by saying that the waste disposal has been improved, thus confirming the validity of the cleanliness argument.

The camps of the Roma are treated within the cleanliness framework also in Norway. *Rusken*, an organization originally established in order to counteract littering, got involved in ‘the Roma issue’ as they went “hunting for tent camps in the woods”^{xxviii} (AP 24.6) together with the police and Jøran Kallmyr, responsible for the environment and transport in the Oslo City Council. Jan Hauger, the leading figure of *Rusken*, is in the news article portraying the Roma as a threat to the clean Norwegian environment; “As we have such great green lungs, we cannot allow that others come and take over, with all the soiling it entails. They are also relieving themselves in the parks, and it smells bad in the area”^{xxix} (ibid.). The contrast between the Roma as a filthy, soiling group, and Norway as a clean and orderly country is obvious. The image of the Roma as uncivilized people, even relieving themselves in park areas and disturbing the surroundings with the smells they cause, underlines how undesirable their presence is.

An illustrative rhetoric is at times used in the sub-discourse of cleanliness. Conveying visual images in writing is an effective way to get the message across to the reader and anchor it in people's minds. Both Helsingin Sanomat and Aftenposten use this technique, describing how “[i]mprovised tents and laundry hanged in trees were shoved away”^{xxx} (HS 10.8) and how Roma have “stacked their plastic bags full of empty bottles, boxes and clothes” while a “tired Romanian is airing his socks on a bundle of bags”^{xxxi} (AP 29.6). The Roma are strongly associated with disorderliness – something which certainly is not included in the ideal image of the Norwegian and Finnish societies.

In two Norwegian texts, the Roma themselves are even equalled to garbage or dirt. The writer of a letter to the editor states that Norwegian politicians should learn from the Spanish town Fuengirola how to be more efficient in maintaining clean streets. His main point has nothing to do with the Roma, but he ends his letter with a controversial formulation; “And now to the rest of the trash: Let us take care of our own poor, but forbid begging and prostitution [...]”^{xxxii} (AP 8.7). In addition to holding an exclusionary stance on the welfare system, he in a way dehumanizes the beggars and prostitutes – strips them of their human dignity – by straightforwardly calling them garbage.

The second text containing an equalling of Roma to dirt does this in a slightly more subtle, but perhaps more disturbing, way. The topic of the article is a special operation by the police in Oslo to curb the activities of beggars, unauthorized street peddlers and prostitutes in the main street of Oslo, Karl Johans gate. Already the fact that the operation is called an “offensive”^{xxxiii} (AP 4.8) makes it clear that they are dealing with elements they markedly want to get rid of. The antipathy against the unwanted groups becomes even more pronounced when the police is quoted as calling their operation “the summer cleaning”^{xxxiv} (ibid.). The wording conveys a drastic image of the police cleaning away dirt – such as beggars and prostitutes – from the streets, in order to restore a condition worthy for the main street of the city. The human dignity of the Roma is again completely absent. Anne Hege Simonsen (2011) who has made a small-scale frame analysis of 14 Norwegian news articles from 2009 studying how the begging Roma are portrayed, has identified similar tendencies in her data. Her data contains the following statement by a Chief of Police paralleling Roma to dirt or dust; “We constantly have

cases against [the Romanians]. But just like vacuum cleaning at home – next week you’re at it again. The problem is «free mobility» in Europe” (Simonsen 2011, 89).

In both of the above cases (AP 8.7 and 4.8), also other groups such as prostitutes and unauthorized street peddlers are included in the discussion. The lumping together of unwanted groups to a mass of rejected elements is a conspicuous feature of the news reporting in *Aftenposten*. In addition to begging Roma, street peddlers (often identified as Roma) and prostitutes (often identified as African), also thieves (sometimes identified as Roma) and drug abusers and dealers (not identified as Roma) are flagged as disturbing the order in Karl Johans gate. These groups are stripped of all legitimacy to carry out their activities in the street. They should essentially neither do what they do nor be where they are. Because the texts concerning Karl Johans gate often refer to all of these groups and treat them as a unified mass, I have termed this grouping of unwanted people ‘the composite’. No such tendency is present in the Finnish data.

Rules and regulations

Adhering to rules and regulations is the core value of the second order-related sub-discourse. In Finland, the context where the topic of rules and regulations most often appears is again the controversy relating to the Roma camp in the yard of the Satama social centre (e.g. HS 7.7; 10.7; 6.8; 31.8). In addition to the above mentioned untidiness, unauthorized camping was the second of the reasons that the city’s authorities gave for seeking to terminate the rental agreement with the Vapaa Katto organization. The Roma were camping in the yard with the permission of Vapaa Katto, but there was disagreement between the organization and the authorities over whether the lease forbids staying overnight in the yard, as it does regarding the building itself (see section 1.4). An officer at the Youth Department of the City of Helsinki, who in a news article otherwise takes the side of Vapaa Katto, states that “camping of course demands the permission of the land owner”^{xxxv} (HS 6.8). She refers to the situation as a question of human rights, but ends her argument by stating the above. The consent of the land owner appears as an overriding principle in case of conflict with human rights (although this might not have been the message that the officer intended to convey).

Unauthorized camping was also brought up in other cases than in relation to Satama. In a Helsingin Sanomat news article (HS 10.8), camping is treated in a more general framework; “Helsinki has zero tolerance for unauthorized camping”^{xxxvi}. It is reported that the police has started evicting camps in areas where it is not allowed to put up tents. The local authorities are presented as a powerful actor in position to determine how the city space is used. It appears as needless to debate whether measures need to be taken against activities defined as illicit. Rules and regulations have a value in themselves, and it is enough to mention that a camp is ‘unauthorized’ in order to legitimize why the Roma need to be evicted from that area.

Finland is within this sub-discourse depicted as a society where the majority population follows the rules, and where acting in contrast to regulations is with good reason interpreted as a threat to the public order. The Roma are portrayed as disturbing an otherwise well-functioning system with their neglect of rules regarding how one is allowed to utilize the city space (among other things). The belief in the regulative system is reflected in a letter to the editor; “The only way to be included in society is to function according to its rules”^{xxxvii} (HS 30.7). The sentence appears in a context where it is argued that the Roma need to be helped in their home countries instead of in Finland, and integrated into society there. The image that the reader is left with is one of the Roma as a problematic group refusing to play by the rules.

Much the same tendencies are present in the Norwegian data. Roma and other unwanted groups are called “lawless cowboys”^{xxxviii} (AP 4.8). The (exaggerated) statement “Karl Johan is a self-governing area” (Norwegian: *fristad*, Finnish: *vapaakaupunki*) is one of the subheadings in a news article painting an image of how anything goes and no rules are followed in the main street. Karl Johans gate is said to have turned “from main street to pariah street”^{xxxix} (AP 29.6), which is not a flattering portrayal. Again, negligence of rules is interpreted as a serious problem and threat to desirable societal structures.

Unauthorized camping is an issue present also in the Norwegian data. The joint operation by Rusken and the police (earlier mentioned in the section on cleanliness) is labelled as an action against “illicit tents”^{xl} (AP 24.6). The military-like term ‘action’ in combination to ‘illicit tents’, defined as the target, gives a somewhat disproportional (almost comical)

impression. It is in any case clear that tents which have been put up in woods without the permission of Norwegian authorities is interpreted as a major problem, which cannot be left unattended. The same article contains an objecting commentary by Kirkens Bymisjon, critical of what they interpret as discriminatory means. But also the representative of this organization underlines the significance of following rules; “I understand stepping in when people don’t follow laws and rules, but one has gone astray when starting to pursue a specific group”^{xli} (AP 24.6).

Safety

The third element of which the Order discourse is composed is safety. Unsurprisingly, the activities and camps of begging Roma are portrayed as incompatible with safe environments. In Finland, the sub-discourse centres around the Roma camp in the yard of the Satama social centre, while the *feeling* of insecurity is the main issue in the Norwegian data.

The paramount concern relating to safety in the Norwegian data is that people should feel safe in public places. This feeling of safety is disturbed by aggressive beggars (among other unwanted groups). Only on one occasion is de facto safety referred to, while all other instances refer to people being scared and/or having the right to feel safe. It is thus the subjective experience which is at the core of the sub-discourse in the Norwegian case, as exemplified by the description of the situation in Karl Johans gate as “unpleasant and frightening”^{xlii} (AP 5.7). In a news article, the head of security at an Oslo trade organization describes the unease of employees in the Karl Johan area; “People who work in the area have an enormously straining everyday life. Many feel unsafe and report threats [...] or other scary experiences”^{xliii} (AP 29.6). It is also reported that a significant amount of money is invested in making the police more visible in the streets of Oslo. The reason for this is that the Minister of Justice Knut Storberget wants the city’s tourists to ‘feel safe’ in Karl Johans gate (AP 30.6). It here needs to be noted that the safety issue does not relate only to begging Roma, but also to other groups experienced as disturbing the order, such as drug dealers, pickpockets and prostitutes. The ‘composite’ of unwanted groups is seen as having turned Karl Johans gate into a “horrible slum”^{xliv} (AP 28.7).

Also in Finland, the Roma are connected to the concept of ‘slum’ – an image of a space where cleanliness, rules and safety are practically absent. In a Helsingin Sanomat news article (31.7) the chairperson of the Roma working group appointed by the City of Helsinki, Jarmo Räihä, labels the Roma camp in the yard of Satama as a slum. Although the reference is made only once in both papers, it is still remarkable that this linkage is made. Talking about slums in the Finnish and Norwegian contexts, where no actual shantytowns exist, is a very powerful rhetoric act. The speakers link the presence of the East European Roma to a phenomenon which can be understood as the antithesis of the welfare state ideal and the societal self-image of Norway and Finland as orderly and safe societies.

In the Finnish debate on the Roma camp, all three components of the Order discourse are essential. As the Helsingin Sanomat quote under the heading on page 60 demonstrates, the three values – cleanliness, rules & regulations and safety – have been the cornerstones of the reasons given by the local authorities for why they were attempting to terminate the Satama rental agreement. It is the electric wires leading from the Satama building to the caravans of the Roma which are portrayed as the main safety problem, with the argument that they are defective. Although one would think that it would be appealing for the authorities to use a rhetoric underlining the Roma’s own safety in order to legitimize their policies, no such articulations are made. Instead it is simply stated that the electric wires are ‘dangerous’, leaving the interpretation regarding *who* they are dangerous for to the reader. There is only one clear reference illuminating who is exposed to a security threat because of the camp, and this is people living in the vicinity of the camp; “According to the working group, there are significant shortcomings in the safety of the camps of the beggars, and they can endanger the public order and the safety in neighbouring areas”^{xlv} (HS 25.6).

The main speakers in the Order discourse are authorities, quoted and referred to in news articles. In Finland these include mainly the City of Helsinki and officers representing the city, while the police is the main Norwegian authority active in this discourse. Also established organizations such as Rusken and a trade organization made their concerns related to cleanliness and safety heard in Norway. In both countries, journalists use order-arguments when reporting and commenting on the East European Roma (note: not only when reporting on speech by sources), thus contributing to the image of Roma as a problematic group when it comes to maintaining the public order. This is also done by writers of letters to the editor.

As opposed to the passive role of the East European Roma in the Deprivation-solidarity and Human rights discourses, they are portrayed as active actors in the Order discourse. In the Cleanliness sub-discourse they are soiling environments and spreading disorder. In the Rules and regulations sub-discourse they are camping in areas where it is forbidden, and turning the main street in Oslo into an area of mayhem. In the Safety sub-discourse, they are compromising their own and other people's safety by dangerous electric wires and making people feel unsafe by their aggressive begging. What is conveyed is far from the image of the downtrodden beggar sitting quietly in the street. Within the Order discourse, the Roma are active – but in a way which is utterly wrong and incompatible with the societal ideals of cleanliness, abiding to rules and safety.

One can anyhow argue that the European tendency of *securitization* of the Roma issue (van Baar 2011) has not gone as far in Norway and Finland as in many other countries – at least not yet. Compared to for example France, where the government is claimed to consider the Roma as a straight-out threat to public or social security (van Baar 2011, 206), the discourse is remarkably less intense in the Nordic countries. An excerpt from my data reflects this, as a Finnish legal expert expresses an undramatic attitude; “It is very hard to imagine that a couple of hundred Romanian beggars would be a very remarkable security risk for the Finnish society. [...] What is behind this report [which suggests a ban on begging] is polishing the street view”^{xlvi} (HS 11.7). I would anyhow not be as optimistic as to claim that the Nordic societies are more tolerant. It can rather be assumed that the much smaller number of East European Roma in Finland and Norway

account for much of the difference in the public discussions compared to e.g. France. Not to forget that, judging from my analysis, the media in these two countries do foster a considerable Order discourse when treating ‘the Roma issue’.

There are clear parallels between the thoughts of anthropologist Mary Douglas and the positions present in the Order discourse. In her classical book *Purity and Danger* (1966), Douglas presents her theory on how rules on cleanliness are a way to maintain social order. This order is to a large extent based on schemes of classification and organized patterns. She argues that there is no objective definition of dirt. Instead, what is considered as dirt is context-bound. For example, food is not dirt in itself, but becomes it when spilled on clothes. For Douglas (1966, 36), dirt is “matter out of place” (drawing upon William James), and essentially equals disorder.

With the concepts provided by Douglas, it is possible to gain a deeper understanding of why the begging Roma are experienced as a challenge to public order. It is not only that they are seen as physically soiling surroundings and rendering them unsafe, but they in a way *embody* the concept of dirt by their presence. They have entered a space which they are not entitled to, and are thus essentially ‘out of place’. This endangers pre-existing categories. Central areas of capital cities are ideally reserved for “presentable” elements such as business and high culture. This image is soiled by untidily dressed persons attempting to make money in a way which is not seen as respectable.

4.1.4 Crime discourse

“It also looks like several theft raids throughout the country have been committed by representatives of the Roma people. Also old people have lately been assaulted in their homes by people that are claimed to be Roma.”^{xlvi} (Aftenposten 26 August 2010, editorial)

“According to the working group at the Ministry of Interior, there has been an evident increase especially in crime against property committed by Romanians and Bulgarians last year. And the police has suspected that there might even be human trafficking underlying begging.”^{xlvi} (Helsingin Sanomat 11 July 2010, Sunday supplement)

Crime is one of the most recurring themes in my data. It is especially prominent in the case of Norway, where over half of the texts contain references to criminal action. The proportion of texts containing crime-talk in my Finnish data is roughly a fifth. There are two sub-discourses present; one where the Roma are depicted as criminals, guilty of thefts and other crime against property, and another one where the Roma are portrayed as victims of trafficking and exploitation. There is also a (less significant) stance questioning the degree of truth in claims of trafficking, as well as criticizing the dominance of the crime topic in the debate. But, as in the case of the Human rights discourse, no specific justifications are used in order to legitimize the importance of abiding to the law. Instead it is treated as self-explanatory that refraining from violating legislative statutes is a value in itself.

Within the Crime discourse, the dominant image is one of the East European Roma as committing crime against property. In Norway, the locus of the crime-talk is Karl Johans gate, where pickpocketing done by Roma and some other groups is reported on. The thieves are often, but not always, identified as Roma and there is a tendency of labelling the East European Roma as unwanted and criminal. For example, a street musician in Oslo identifies beggars as a group to pay special attention to; “We have to pay attention so that the beggars don’t steal from the audience listening to us”^{xlix} (AP 29.6).

The need for being cautious in relation to Roma appears in the Norwegian data, as the above citation exemplifies. The same article describes how the Norwegian Hospitality Association (*Reiseliv*), a service industry organization, warned passers-by in Karl Johans gate about pickpockets: “Beware! There are active pickpockets in the city. [...] It can happen to anyone, but you are particularly exposed if you are inattentive and incautious”^l (AP 8.7). It is also reported that the police is ‘wondering’ whether beggars at festivals only collect bottles or whether they also commit thefts. Although the police themselves are unsure of whether any crime is de facto occurring, a policeman promotes the need for guardedness; “there is in any case reason to be at one’s guard since a group of beggars was stopped earlier this summer on their way east – with stolen property from the Hove festival in the baggage. -Festivals are profitable places to engage in stealing at, he remarks”^{li} (AP 23.7). His message to the readers is thus that the fact that a group of

beggars was once caught with stolen property from a festival – in combination with the fact that festivals are generally fruitful places for pickpocketing – makes a strong case for suspecting beggars in general of attempting to steal one’s property. This kind of generalizing message from an authority efficiently labels all begging Roma as thieves.

In my Finnish data, there are on the one hand general references to Roma committing property crime, and on the other hand short news items reporting on thefts made by Roma. An interesting fact is that according to the communications handbook of the Finnish police, the police should not give out information on the ethnic origin of a suspect unless this is highly relevant for the advancement of an investigation (Suomen poliisi website). Mentioning the ethnicity of a suspect thus requires careful consideration on the part of the police. The application of this rule seems to be selective concerning the East European Roma, as for example a Helsingin Sanomat (1.8) news item states that “peddlers, also suspected of property crime”^{lii} have been spotted in connection to a music festival, and the police defines the perpetrators as ‘Roma from Romania’. Another short news item shares the story of how a stolen caravan turned up in a Roma camp. The light-hearted tone of the policeman describing the discovery is striking; “He [the owner of the caravan] drove past the place and thought: Well, that’s a familiar-looking caravan”^{liii} (HS 22.8). The fact that the caravan was retrieved in an area occupied by Roma is portrayed as fully unsurprising. There can thus be argued to be an unuttered presupposition that Roma are prone to stealing other people’s property. The news article anyhow ends with the statement that it remains unclear who it is that lies behind the theft. In any case, no doubt remains as to whom the reader will ascribe the theft to.

When the Roma are portrayed as victims of crime, the central narrative is that organized criminal groups bring the Roma to Norway and Finland, where they beg for money which they then have to deliver to the criminal groups. The victimized and exploited position of the Roma is underlined, as in an Aftenposten editorial: “in some cases there is hardly any doubt that criminal groupings, not least in Romania, gather poor people, bring them to Norway and make money by making them beg. The traffickers seize a large part of what the beggars manage to collect”^{liv} (AP 15.6). At times, the Roma are portrayed as being treated almost as merchandise that is “freighted”^{lv} up north (AP 1.7). The term ‘human

trafficking' is used twice in the Finnish data, while four Norwegian texts contain the term. Sometimes it is accompanied by formulations stressing how reprehensible the phenomenon is, such as "cynical human trafficking"^{lvi} (AP 10.6).

In some contexts, the interpretation that the East European Roma present in Norway and Finland are victims of trafficking is used as a means to argue for the need to support this group. What is advocated is refraining from using police control against the beggars or banning begging. It is experienced as twisted that the victims of crime should be harassed; "Victims of human trafficking and other criminality should be helped, not rejected and criminalized themselves"^{lvii} (AP 29.6).

But the trafficking argument is much more often used to argue for stricter authority control – on begging. Interestingly, it is not suggested that the police and border control authorities should invest more in spotting cases of exploitation. Instead, the focus lies on what could be seen as the symptom of the alleged abuse (the begging) while there is less interest in what would be the root of the problem (the alleged trafficking). This is perhaps not very surprising, as it is easier to target policies against the visible activity of begging. What is then suggested is not always a straightforward ban on begging, but the main point is that this kind of exploitation cannot be allowed. It is seen as the responsibility of the authorities to make sure that this system of exploitation is made as difficult as possible. In Norway, a system where beggars register with the police is one of the concrete suggestions (see section 1.5). A rhetoric stressing the need to 'face the facts' is often present, perceivable in wording such as "we cannot blink the fact that it is traffickers who are making money"^{lviii} and that "it would be naïve"^{lix} (AP 24.6) not to accept that the Roma are victims of trafficking. Failing to constrain begging is interpreted as an irresponsible stance, and immoral both regarding the victims of trafficking and the society "hosting" this illegal activity.

The conviction that the beggars are trafficked does not, however, automatically free them from responsibility for their own situation. In an Aftenposten news article, Oslo City Council Member Jøran Kallmyr is quoted as follows: "This is an organized system where people get a free ride by traffickers, and the culture makes powerful commanding or controlling of people possible"^{lx} (AP 24.6). At the same time as the speaker defines the

system as trafficking, he sees it as relevant to stress that the Rom are getting a 'free ride'. It is implied that they are in a way benefitting from being trafficked, as they do not have to pay for their trip here. In addition, the Roma culture is defined as a factor enabling trafficking. According to Kallmyr's logic, the Roma are partly to be blamed for their own exploitation, because their culture provides such a fruitful setting for controlling its members. This actor thus paints an image where the trafficked people bear some of the responsibility and benefits of being trafficked – an interpretation which is in stark contrast to official definitions and interpretations of the international human trafficking business.

A similar positioning is found in an *Aftenposten* news article with the heading "Beggars go on tour around Norway"^{lxix} (AP 23.7). The manager of a jazz festival in the Norwegian town of Molde is used as a source of information on how the Roma are arranging their begging. "There is little doubt that the activity is organized to some degree. They have been driven here through Europe by chauffeurs who, according to what we have observed, do not beg themselves. These «tour guides» drive beggars and peddlers to the centre of town in the morning, are in contact with the beggars throughout the day and pick them up again in the afternoon"^{lxxii} (ibid.). Instead of being portrayed as exploited by organizers/traffickers, the Roma are depicted almost as a group of tourists being driven around and served by service-minded private drivers. Here, the Roma hold a position far from being victims.

An interesting finding is that in several cases, victim and offender positions are used as good as simultaneously. For example, in an *Aftenposten* article (AP 24.6), the same actor speaks of the need to curb begging and crimes committed by visiting Romanians, and of Roma as victims of human trafficking, all in the same paragraph. A *Helsingin Sanomat* news article contains two consecutive paragraphs talking first about forced begging and abuse, and then stating that "based on information gathered in different countries, it seems that there is a clear connection between the increase of begging and the increase of reports to the police and crime"^{lxxiii} (HS 25.6). When, in a letter to the editor, it is stated that many of the foreign beggars in the city are part of foreign criminal networks and in

the following sentence the beggars are said to be victims of trafficking, a rather paradoxical image appears (AP 8.6).

In neither of the above cases does the journalist comment upon or analyze the inconsistency in that the Roma are simultaneously portrayed as trafficked victims and criminals. Of course it may well be that a trafficked person commits property crimes, in that there is no contradiction. But the contradiction arises from the fact that the implications of the two roles are the same. If the problem is that people are trafficked, then one would assume that the *traffickers* would be targeted. If again the problem is that someone is stealing other people's property, then a logical consequence would be that the police would invest in counteracting *theft*. Interestingly enough, though, both the claim that the Roma are trafficked and that they are thieves are utilized to argue for the need to forbid specifically the act of begging (or by other means control it). What is targeted is the livelihood of the East European Roma, and via that their presence. In sum, according to the rationality present in the Crime discourse, banning begging would be an efficient mean to hinder both trafficking (it would not make sense to force people to beg if the police would interfere immediately) and thievery (assuming that beggars often also are thieves, forbidding begging would automatically decrease the crime rate as these persons would probably leave the country).

My data also contains a fair amount of crime-related formulations, which are so general that it is impossible for the reader to get an understanding of what is meant. These diffuse wordings further conceal and/or mix the roles of victim and perpetrator. In a Helsingin Sanomat editorial (7.8), it is stated that Finland is now faced with the challenge of "hindering organized begging and criminality which is connected to it"^{lxiv}. It is in no way defined who is organizing the begging and what kind of criminality the Finnish authorities will need to curb. It might be that the criminals are traffickers abusing Roma, but it might also be that Roma are organizing their own begging and committing property crime while in Finland or Norway. One fact that the journalist anyhow considers relevant to point out in the sentence following the above quoted is that the majority of the beggars are Roma from Romania. This gives the impression that it is the beggars themselves which are behind the organization and the crimes, as no other actors (such as traffickers

for example) are mentioned in the context. Other examples of inexact wordings are ‘organized begging’, ‘criminal networks’ and ‘organized criminal groups from Eastern Europe’. As there is no definition of the actor or crime, all interpretation is up to the reader.

The message conveyed by the media is much affected both when fusing the roles of victim and offender, and when leaving out information on what concrete crime and actor is meant. What the reader is left with is a general association between ‘Roma’ and ‘crime’. This in turn affects the general attitude against this group. When people mentally link a specific group to a socially repulsed phenomenon, the aversion against the phenomenon (here crime as a general category) will be transferred to the group. Kenneth Thompson (1998, 19–20) refers to a ‘significational spiral’ (discussed also by Hall et al. 1978) when explaining how two issues become interconnected in the public’s mind. The spiral arises when two separate themes are repeatedly treated together, leading to implicit or explicit parallels between the two. This mechanism casts some light on how ‘Roma’ and ‘crime’ have become a self-evident pair. Because the roles of victim and offender have been so obscured in several of the media texts, the spiral becomes even stronger. As the media have such a strong associative impact on the reader, the journalists could be demanded to specify the facts in a more professional way than in the excerpts I have referred to above.

However, the image of East European Roma as victims of crime and as offenders does not go completely unchallenged in my data. There is a counter-discourse against the positioning of Roma as victims of trafficking. This stance is present in three texts printed in Helsingin Sanomat, and the main point is that there is no organized crime, at least in the sense that Roma would be brought to beg in Finland and abused by traffickers. One of the speakers articulating this is a high-level authority, namely the Romanian ambassador Lucian Fatu. He states that if any trafficking occurs, it does not regard the Roma begging in the streets (HS 3.6). In another case, a journalist states that the begging Roma are neither victims of organized crime or part of it, rather the majority of the begging Roma are “ordinary poor rural Europeans”^{lxv} (HS 24.6).

Lastly, there is a contradictory tendency in the Norwegian data to indirectly frame a news article about Roma as being related to crime, but then inserting an opposing note. For example, the subheading in a news article quotes the national Chief of Police Killengreen linking East European Roma to crime; “Killengreen: Many itinerants [Roma] commit crime against property”^{lxvi} (AP 23.7). What is striking is the sentence ending the section above the subheading, referring to local police in areas where Roma are reported to beg during festivals; “The police in Molde and the police in Ålesund inform that they do not suspect the groups [of Roma beggars] of having done anything criminal during the period when they visited the towns”^{lxvii} (ibid.). The tone in the article at large is suspicious against the genuine background and intentions of the Roma. This is then accompanied by a single sentence affirming that the local police does not suspect this group of any mischief, which contradicts the overall impression given in the article. There is a double message of the Roma being and not being suspected of property crime, but the stance that they are indeed criminal gets more visibility and is in line with the general tone of the text. If the journalist wanted to guard against labelling all begging Roma as thieves (or against being accused of doing so), it is questionable how well this was accomplished.

Crime is a dominant topic also in Simonsen’s analysis of Norwegian news reporting on the ‘beggar tourists’. Out of the 14 articles analyzed, 10 framed the Roma as connected to crime, thus constituting the most dominating frame of interpretation (Simonsen 2011). Based on the text excerpts that she presents in her article, it seems that other newspapers such as *Verdens Gang* (VG) do not hesitate to use more provocative wordings than my *Aftenposten* data contains. A VG journalist is quoted using rather straightforward formulations: “They are multi criminals [...] They peep over your shoulder to see your pin code. They steal, yes, if necessary, they knock you down to take your wallet. They empty your bank account before you even notice that your credit card is gone” (Simonsen 2011, 96). My data does not contain formulations quite as hostile as the above.

4.1.5 Space and majority reactions discourse

“If ordinary law-abiding people start using this space, then the unpleasant elements will withdraw.”^{lxviii} (Aftenposten 30 June 2010, local news)

“Nowadays there is always someone intruding in your personal territory, wanting something from you.”^{lxix} (Helsingin Sanomat 8 June 2010, commentary)

The legitimacy to define how the public space in the city is to be used, and by whom, is at the core of the Space and majority reactions discourse. The issue is on the one hand a struggle over the shared, public space, and on the other hand about personal space and reactions by the majority population on the presence and activities of the Roma. Another topic discussed within this discourse is how the beggars affect the image that visiting tourists get of the city. The over-arching theme is the primacy of the majority’s interest, as well as a conceived power struggle over concrete and symbolic city space.

The struggle over city space is one of the most prominent issues in my Norwegian data overall. From the end of June to the beginning of August 2010, there were several news articles in Aftenposten discussing the state of Karl Johans gate, many of them using a sensation-seeking tone. The main message conveyed to the readers is that begging Roma, prostitutes and thieves are *taking over* the main street in Oslo. The situation is described as a struggle between ‘normal’ Oslo-dwellers and ‘the composite’. The latter is portrayed as a mass of unpleasant groupings, which should be cleared away from the street which holds such a central symbolic position in the city and the country at large.

The wordings are often provocative; the composite is portrayed as ‘occupying’, ‘overtaking’ and ‘dominating’ the streets of Oslo. The interpretation of these groups as a threat to Oslo-dwellers, and of the situation in Karl Johans gate as a power struggle, are undeniable facts. Sometimes, analogies to natural phenomena are used, such as “Karl Johan is flooded by prostitutes and beggars”^{lxx} (AP 29.6). Metaphors from natural powers give the impression of a forceful and above all threatening situation. This kind of rhetoric has been identified in many studies on how the media portray immigration (e.g.

Simonsen 2011, 94). The imagery of uncontrollable natural forces is frequently mobilized for example when talking about asylum seekers (see e.g. Eide 2002, 214–215).

Also wordings borrowed from the realm of state authority occur; beggars and others “*rule* the lower part of Karl Johan”^{lxxi} (AP 30.6), and the area is described as “*occupied* by beggars, drug addicts and prostitutes”^{lxxii} (AP 5.7) (my emphasis in both citations). Among the most striking wordings are the following, from a commentary article; “The dark powers have overtaken this part of Norway [Karl Johans gate] a long time ago. This is where it takes place – prostitutes, procurers, beggars, criminals, thieves, trash, drug traffickers, wrecks, nuisance”^{lxxiii} (AP 28.7). Naming these groups as representing ‘dark powers’ entails an innate duality and opposition to the ‘light’ and positive groups – in this context the Norwegian people and tourists. The national self-image of an orderly, law-abiding and clean national collective emerges. The journalist continues by complaining about how these “dubious creatures can be permitted to unfold in the middle of Oslo and overtake central areas which could function so much better than they do today”^{lxxiv} (ibid.). On the other hand, a couple of letters to the editor take the side of the Roma. One reader wants to welcome Roma musicians to play in trams and courtyards (HS 16.7), while another proclaims that nobody should be denied the right to reside in the public city space (HS 18.7). This anyhow comes with the addition ‘if the law permits’, establishing the paramountcy of the legislation (cf. the Human rights and Crime discourses, where legal agreements and laws are also treated as next to unquestionable).

A specific topic debated within the Space and majority reactions discourse is the image that tourists get when visiting Oslo and Helsinki. This can be understood as a struggle over symbolic power, as the ‘city brand’ is interpreted as threatened by the presence of unrepresentable elements. Fairclough (2003, 33) mentions growing promotional interests as one of the aspects of ‘new capitalism’; “within new capitalism, individual towns and cities need to promote themselves [...]”. In my data, worries are aired about how the presence of begging Roma are affecting tourists’ experiences, but there are also those criticizing “debating social challenges under the headline of «aesthetics»”^{lxxv} (AP 1.7). The opposing stance then wonders whether “this is the image we want to give them [tourists], and the kind of image we want to spread around the world”^{lxxvi} (HS 9.7). The

respondent to an *Aftenposten* inquiry about what is the best and worst in Oslo at the moment is concerned about the attractiveness of the street scene; “The worst are the beggars. They destroy the nice Oslo cityscape in summer”^{lxxvii} (AP 13.7). The power struggle over public space in the city is thus closely linked to this perceived struggle over the image that visitors get of the city. The begging Roma are, in the main strand of the discourse, portrayed as a stain on the polished surface and image of the two capitals. This does anyhow not go unchallenged, as for example a Norwegian Member of Parliament is reported to interpret police efforts in Karl Johans gate as “a game for the tourist gallery”^{lxxviii} (AP 4.8).

The opposition between groups who are attributed legitimacy to use the city space for their purposes and those who are not is often underlined within this discourse. Governing Mayor of Oslo Stian Berger Røsland is in an article quoted as saying that “ordinary Oslo-dwellers need to take back the main street”^{lxxix} (AP 30.6). He continues by portraying the usage of the street space as something resembling a zero-sum game; “If ordinary law-abiding people start using this space then the unpleasant elements will withdraw”^{lxxx} (ibid.). The sharp dividing line drawn between the two groups makes it appear unthinkable that all could coexist peacefully. The majority who rightfully should ‘rule’ the streets is pushed aside by a minority, meaning that the wrong group is excluded.

In Finland, the above described stance is as good as absent. Instead, the space-related debate focuses on *personal space* of people moving about in the streets of central Helsinki. Contrary to what might be expected, only two texts contain complaints about how disturbing approaches made by street beggars are. Instead, fingers point to another kind of activity, labelled as comparable to begging, and experienced as violating personal space in the streets. Face-to-face recruiters working for non-governmental organizations are namely brought up as very irritating; “In the city centre, the face-to-face recruiters stop you many times even in a very short stretch. [...] Importuners for money, stand along the sides of the squares. [...] Stopping people is disturbing beggary, is that not already forbidden by law?”^{lxxxi} (HS 17.6). The texts do not lose their relevance although some of their focus is not on the begging Roma. On the contrary, it is telling that another group experienced as violating the personal space and peace of people in the street emerges in

the debate. In three cases (two letters to the editor and one commentary), it is even stated that the face-to-face recruiters are more annoying than the beggars, which are portrayed as quite harmless in comparison; “The passive activity by the Roma is anyhow less disturbing than the aggressive marketing of face-to-face recruiters”^{lxxxii} (HS 27.7). The annoyance over intrusions into the personal space is thus not essentially linked to what group the ‘intruder’ represents. What is essential is to “respect the turf of the city-dwellers”^{lxxxiii}, as a Helsingin Sanomat column headline reads (HS 8.6).

The need to respect the personal space and peace of others – or rather to secure one’s own personal space and peace – is at the base of the described stance. This principle is not compromised by the fact that what is discussed happens in the public space, as is illustrated by the following quote: “I think that the fundraising activity of organizations is comparable to begging in the streets, and it should be forbidden as it violates one’s privacy”^{lxxxiv} (HS 27.7). Although Finnish society is generally perceived as one where personal space and undisturbedness is much respected, the interpretation of fundraising and begging as activities violating the *privacy* of the passers-by is a rather drastic one. After all, physical contact is in general not taken either by beggars or face-to-face recruiters. It is also interesting to note that no debate on the private space exists in my Norwegian data.

An extension to the above described topic of personal space and negative reactions when this space is experienced as threatened, is the majority people’s *reactions* to begging as a phenomena (even when not faced with beggars personally). How the receiving community experiences the presence of begging Roma receives notable interest both in my Finnish and Norwegian data. ‘The will of the people’ legitimizes measures taken by the authorities; “This is a clear signal to the government that beggary is experienced as a bigger problem than before. The time has come to reintroduce the ban on begging, says Stian Berger Røslund, Governing Mayor of Oslo”^{lxxxv} (AP 1.7).

Both newspapers report on polls among the citizen regarding their stance towards begging. Aftenposten headlines with “2 out of 3 want to forbid begging”^{lxxxvi} and reports on a poll carried out by the paper, saying that 68 per cent of the people living in Oslo want to forbid begging (AP 1.7). My Finnish data contains three articles referring to a

poll jointly made by six local newspapers, which shows that 57 per cent of the Finns favour a ban on begging. Information on how the attitudes vary according to for example income, place of residence and political opinion is provided. The opinions and attitudes of the Finnish and Norwegian people are thus at the centre of attention. What is relevant is how ‘we’ feel about ‘them’ being here. References to feelings are made in both Helsingin Sanomat and Aftenposten. Finns are reported to have “had enough” of the beggars who have evoked “irritation and even fear in the citizens”^{lxxxvii} (HS 5.7). Norwegians are said to “feel provoked and experience begging as unpleasant”^{lxxxviii} (AP 1.7). On the other hand, it also has news value when the Roma are *not* experienced as disturbing, as the sub-title of a Helsingin Sanomat news article reads “The Roma do not bother the boaters in Verkkosaari”^{lxxxix} (HS 10.7). Hence, the presupposition is that the majority is annoyed by their presence.

Attention is directed inwards, towards the sentiments of the in-group. The same is reflected in the formulation ‘disturbing begging’, which is currently forbidden by municipal ordinance in Oslo and Helsinki. The main problem here is thus that the majority people are annoyed and disturbed by the pleading for money. This is in stark contrast to for example the Deprivation-solidarity discourse, where the concern is with the well-being of the out-group (i.e. the Roma). Anyhow, there are also a couple of voices reminding that the Roma are the ones suffering most, not those who have to witness their vulnerability; “It might feel like the Roma are a plague, and they are treated accordingly. But they are human beings”^{xc} (AP 26.8). In some contributions to the discussion, a noticeable self-reflexivity is present. Some speakers display analytic contemplation of the reactions amongst the majority; “Yes, we are bothered. Because it [beggary, drug abuse and prostitution] is unpleasant and frightening. Maybe we deny the distress when it gets too close to us?”^{xc1} (AP 5.7).

Again, dissecting what ‘we’ feel is most interesting. This collective tendency to turn the focus to oneself when discussing something external is one of the bearing motivations for this thesis. When we talk about ‘them’, we simultaneously talk about ‘us’. In some cases this is done more subtly, while in others – like the above depicted – the interest in oneself is more pronounced.

4.1.6 Authority control discourse

“Like the influx of asylum seekers is reduced when one tightens the policies, the same will happen with the Romanian beggars. We have zero tolerance for these camps.”^{xcii} (Aftenposten 24 June 2010, local news)

“The social centre Satama will be given the boot”^{xciii} (Helsingin Sanomat 31 August 2010, local news)

Within this discourse, means to control the begging Roma are at the centre of attention. The texts representing this discourse convey a strong conviction of the powers of the authorities. It is striking how the authorities are depicted as having next to complete control over what happens in society, thus portraying a clear unbalance of power. No concern for the objects of power is expressed; instead the sole focus is how the activities of the East European Roma (and other unwanted groups) can be curbed. The Roma are portrayed as mere objects of the exercising of power.

Examples of headlines of articles representing this discourse are “Kallmyr promises a stop to beggars in 2012”^{xciv} (AP 24.6), “The Social centre Satama will be given the boot”^{xcv} (HS 31.8), and “Clearing the main street”^{xcvi} (AP 4.8). It is obvious who holds the decision-making power – the objects have no voice here. Beggars are ‘evicted’, ‘arrested’ and ‘driven off’. The authorities, on the other hand, are reported amongst other things to have ‘zero tolerance for camps’ and planning for ‘beggar free zones’. Within this discourse the role of the authorities is to plan how to restrict begging; it is giving out warnings, introducing new control means and so forth. The begging Roma themselves are practically absent.

One of the more condescending wordings are found in Helsingin Sanomat, where it is reported that the City of Helsinki “will not put up with a camp in the area any longer”^{xcvii} (HS 31.8). Jarmo Rähä, chairperson of the City’s Roma working group, utilizes a tone which could be interpreted as arrogant as he advises the social centre to dismantle the camp; “It would be well advised for Vapaa Katto ry to radically cut down the size of the crowd in the yard. If unauthorized camping is still occurring in August, then we will have

to think again”^{xcviii} (HS 7.7). In another article, the same representative for the local authorities again appears with self-assurance and supremacy; “It is now time for the Roma to go home”^{xcix} (HS 6.8).

Sometimes, a cool technocratic tone is used. The activity of begging is then treated as a simple matter of rational decision-making. This instrumental tone is present both in my Norwegian and Finnish data. Interestingly enough, introducing means to curb begging is compared to asylum seeking in both countries. A representative of the local authorities in Oslo is quoted as follows; “Like the influx of asylum seekers is reduced when one tightens the policies, the same will happen with the Romanian beggars”^c (AP 24.6). The stance of a Helsingin Sanomat editorial is strikingly similar; “The possibility to affect the problem was proven when the benefits given to asylum seekers from EU countries were cut in the beginning of July. The number of asylum applications by Bulgarian Roma decreased fast”^{ci} (HS 7.8). The *problem* here is that there are too many asylum seekers; not for example that some people are in such distress that they take to fleeing their home countries. There is hence no interest in the legitimacy of the asylum applications. What is important is to have the legal possibility to decline these applications. The concern with the national self-interest appears as paramount.

Also ordinary city-dwellers are asked to join in curbing begging and related phenomena. The public appeal by former Prime Minister Vanhanen not to give money to the beggars attracted a fair amount of attention in the public debate. Also in Norway, the public is asked for help, as the leading figure of Rusken “calls upon the public to contact the Rusken patrol with tips”^{cii} about unauthorized camps (AP 24.6). Counteracting begging and the camps of beggars is portrayed as a common project unifying the people and the authorities – in the name of the public good.

Even when the tone is softer, the point of departure is still that the authorities are in power. When discussing introducing a registering plight for the beggars instead of banning begging altogether, it is concluded that “[i]t would give the authorities a certain control over the beggars, without talking about a ban”^{ciii} (AP 15.6). It is at the discretion of the authorities what degree of power should be exercised. The power remains with the authorities also in the Finnish case, although it is reported that “the City of Helsinki is not

for the time being going to evict the Roma from the social centre Satama in Verkkosaari”^{civ} (HS 31.7). The city still appears as able to do so whenever they please.

But powerful discourses seldom go unchallenged. This holds true also with regards to the Authority control discourse, which is the one with the most pronounced power dimension among the discourses in my data. It is for example stated that “regardless of the warning, the squatters will not strike the Roma camp”^{cv} (HS 7.7). The squatters are thus here exercising what can be called counter-power. In Norway, colourful formulations are used to express a critique against the control measures by the authorities; “This summer Norwegian police have rod chased visiting Roma [...]. People who sleep on paper bags under a motorway bridge are being chased like rats”^{cv} (AP 26.8). The measures are experienced as oversized and misdirected.

4.1.7 Authority critique discourse

“In the next elections, the inhabitants in this city must voice up to make sure we give a crystal clear signal that we have had enough of misunderstood political kindness and weakness by governing authorities.”^{cvi} (Aftenposten 17 June 2010, letter to the editor)

“It is surely no coincidence that warnings of evictions are delivered when the committee and city council are on vacation. Now [...] the political bodies have no chance of interfering with what Pajunen’s group is doing, and the group can steamroller over democratic bodies with their decisions.”^{cvi} (Helsingin Sanomat 10 July 2010, letter to the editor)

The last and seventh discourse which I have identified in the data centres around a critique of how authorities have handled issues related to the presence and activities of East European Roma. Democratic principles in political decision-making processes is one of the topics in Finland, while the failure of authorities to bear the responsibility attributed to them is discussed in Norway. The debate is also extended to a general discussion about the state of the welfare system, as well as elitism in society. The main speakers in this discourse are writers of letters to the editor, mainly in Helsingin Sanomat.

Democracy

The discussion regarding how political decisions are made is anchored in two specific cases, both in Finland. The first is the bill proposing to ban begging, and the second is the attempts by the City of Helsinki to evict the Satama social centre. As described in section 1.4, a bill on banning begging was put forward in April 2010. A working group was formed to elucidate the effects of the proposed ban, and they delivered a report which was put together rather quickly. There was criticism even among the authorities themselves regarding the rushed schedule. A representative from the Ministry of Justice puts it the following way; “The timetable has been terribly hasty. [...] When some act is criminalized, this act should be precisely defined. There has not been enough time to contemplate what kind of begging would be forbidden”^{cxix} (HS 25.6). The background investigations were deemed careless and a threat to just decision-making.

The second case concerns the attempts by the local authorities to terminate the lease with the Vapaa Katto organization. The City argued that the contract had been broken since the area has not been kept tidy and because people (Roma) were camping in the yard. Mayor Pajunen is here criticized for evading proper political decision-making on the matter and instead taking too much control himself. “Mayor Pajunen has wanted to keep the Roma issues tightly in the hands of his bureaucrats, and elected officials have not been able to partake in handling things”^{cx} (HS 27.7). Doubts about the honesty of the authorities are aired, with reference to the timing of the actions; “It is surely no coincidence that warnings of evictions are delivered when the committee [City Council Youth Committee] and city council are on vacation. Now that that the council and the committee are on summer vacations, the political bodies have no chance of interfering with what Pajunen’s group is doing, and the group can steamroller over democratic bodies with their decisions”^{cxii} (HS 10.7). The actions by the mayor are interpreted as autocratic. The strong reactions tell about a concern for by-the-book democratic decision-making processes. The reflected ideal society is one where democratic principles are adhered to. Note that this line of argumentation is present only in my Finnish data.

In Norway, another kind of concern related to democratic principles is expressed. If the concern in Finland was that authorities were taking too fast and too high-handed action, the contrary is true in the Norwegian case. There, the inability of authorities to take action in relation to the begging Roma is criticized; “Those responsible cannot do anything. Everyone blames everyone. Everyone talks, but little happens”^{cxii} (AP 28.7). A call for stricter measures is combined with forthright formulations as the local authorities are blamed for being ‘weak’ and merely ‘full of words’ (AP 17.6 and 28.7). The authorities are said to evade their responsibility; “[...] Røsland disclaims a responsibility delegated to him by society”^{cxiii} (AP 29.7). The population is let down by incapable authorities, unwilling to exercise the powers invested in them in the democratic system. This can be interpreted as a threat to societal structures.

Eroding of the welfare system

The discussion about the begging Roma has spurred a separate discussion especially in Finland, namely that of the state of the welfare system. In four Helsingin Sanomat letters to the editor, a concern about the erosion of the welfare state structures are expressed. The beggars are seen as revealing hidden truths about the Finnish society; “Romanian beggars [...] appear as criminals, because they have the nerve to enter the field of vision of the decision-makers and disturb their illusion of a welfare state, which they impudently claim to defend”^{cxiv} (HS 31.7). The vulnerable situation of the Roma thus functions as a wake-up call for the decision-makers. The discourse centres around a general crisis of the welfare state, and the Roma are not as such in focus on the debate. The message is that there are also very poor Finnish people, but that their fate is not visible in the same way as that of the begging Roma. The prospect that Finnish people will soon be begging in the streets is demonstrated; “Finnish people driven into a hopeless situation, amongst others many single parents, are already on the verge of beggary”^{cxv} (HS 29.7). People are *driven* into poverty by failed policies, and the fault is ascribed to the politicians. Decision-makers are accused of hypocrisy, and of ignoring the most vulnerable members of

society. Growing poverty amongst Finns is illustrated by the breadlines⁴⁹, which are mentioned several times in my Finnish data.

But the concern is not only with Finnish poor. The Roma are at least indirectly included in the collectivity which the welfare services should encompass; “My conscience does not allow me to sit back and watch, and pay my taxes to a society which does not confirm to its most important task which is taking care of its most vulnerable, but on the contrary labels poor people as criminal”^{cxvi} (HS 7.6). Here, the Roma are positioned as part of ‘us’, of the in-group, as indicated by the wording *heikoimmistaan* [= its most vulnerable members]. It is experienced as highly disturbing that little support is available for those who need it the most – may it be poor Finns or poor Roma.

A counter-discourse is also in place, employed both in Finland and Norway. This stance advocates a more exclusionary approach; defending the welfare state system, but reserving its benefits only for national citizens. Member of Parliament Ben Zyskowitz (National Coalition Party, *Kokoomus*) represents this stance; “Valuable work has been done in Finland for decades so that nobody has to take to beggary. It is unfounded that we should allow for foreigners to come here in order to earn their keep in this unfamiliar way”^{cxvii} (HS 28.7). He continues by writing that the problems that the Roma are facing can be solved only in their home countries, thus signalling that the Finnish state should not take any responsibility for their situation.

What those promoting inclusion and exclusion have in common is a pronounced appreciation for the national welfare system. A Norwegian writer of a letter to the editor expresses a strong pride over her country; “We who are born with the winning ticket; oil resources and incorrupt authorities that have given us the best welfare state system in the world. Show respect to the people who have not been as fortunate!”^{cxviii} (AP 10.6).

⁴⁹ Finnish: *leipäjono*. Non-governmental actors such as the Salvation Army, and in Helsinki most notably the Hursti family, distribute free food to those in need. The number of people in the lines has been on the rise during the past years.

Anti-elitism

The third strand of the authority critique touches upon the alienation of decision-makers from the everyday lives of the citizens, especially poor citizens. In a Helsingin Sanomat news article, it is reported that an aid organization had sent a letter to the Romanian president Traian Băsescu, asking him to “descend from the top of the Romanian society to its bottom in Haranglab for one day”^{cxxix} (HS 2.8). Matti Vanhanen is also pointed out as speaking about things he has no understanding of; “I have been following comments on begging and beggars with interest. The most drastic attitude was demonstrated by the former Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen, who surely knows nothing about poverty or a total feeling of hunger”^{cxxx} (HS 9.8). This comment relates to Vanhanen’s appeal for the people not to give money to the beggars.

Politicians and political parties are also accused of hypocrisy when condemning begging while at the same time “begging” for money from different institutions themselves; “Vanhanen’s own party and other parties have managed to gather significantly larger sums with more secret and modern forms of beggary than traditional beggars [...]”^{cxxxi} (HS 2.6).⁵⁰ What emerges here is an aversion to elitist tendencies by authorities and decision-makers, who are portrayed as having no contact with or understanding of the challenges that the worse off groups in society are faced with. This “trimming the weed so that the rich do not have to see it”^{cxxii} (HS 9.7) is experienced as unjust and morally reprehensible.

⁵⁰ What is referred to is a much debated controversy, starting in the spring of 2008, regarding the funding of election campaigns for the 2007 parliament elections. This debate can be labelled as the first corruption scandal in Finnish politics. Some politicians, among them Vanhanen, were accused of having concealed some of their funding and subsequent possible hidden links to interest organizations and trade unions. This scandal left its mark on the Finnish self-perception as having one of the most transparent political systems in the world.

4.2 Ruptures in the image of ideal society

4.2.1 Folk devils and good enemies

Interpreting the contemporary Finnish and Norwegian debates about the begging Roma within the frame of *moral panics* helps to better understand the intensity of the discussions. The concept of moral panic was developed by British sociologists in the 1970's with Stanley Cohen's book *Folk Devils & Moral Panics* (1972) as a pioneer work. Cohen studied social reactions to deviant behaviour by focusing on public responses to the clash between the British subcultures Mods and Rockers in the 1960's. These two youth groups were turned into so-called 'folk devils' through a process fuelled by the media and other powerful societal actors.

Cohen argues that a phenomenon can only generate public outcry if it threatens central societal values and interests. This is very much in line with my approach, as I interpret the heated debate about the begging Roma as evidence of that "something held sacred by or fundamental to the society" (Thompson 1998, 8) is experienced as being at stake. The Roma have within some of the discourses been ascribed the role of folk devils, as they are portrayed as deviant outsiders causing social problems and threatening the social order. But although there are clear parallels to moral panic here, I wish to underline that I do not argue that the panic is full-fledged. Some of the discourses I have identified, such as the Deprivation-solidarity and Human rights discourses, provide counter-powers against the portrayal of the begging Roma as folk devils.

However, the fact does remain that nearly all of the characteristics named as central to defining moral panics are found in some of the discourses constituting the public debate on the begging Roma in Finland and Norway. Kenneth Thompson (1998) lists two factors as fundamental. Firstly, there has to be considerable *concern* over the behaviour of a certain group. Secondly, increased levels of *hostility* against this group need to be recorded in order for reactions to be defined as moral panics. It is clear that these two criteria are fulfilled in my case. The sheer volume of newspaper content about the begging Roma serves as evidence of the strong concern about the phenomenon. There is collective mobilization around the issue; the former Finnish Prime Minister urging people

to join in the fight against begging by not giving them money, and Rusken calling the public to help with hints about Roma camps in the woods around Oslo. As I have demonstrated when describing the discourses, some of them indeed display considerable hostility against the Roma. Examples include paralleling Roma to garbage and the proclaimed 'zero tolerance' for the camps of the Roma.

Thompson (1998) adds a third characteristic of moral panic; *disproportionality*. There is anyhow some disagreement among scholars on whether a moral panic necessarily entails an irrational or inflated concern over the phenomenon at hand. But whether it is necessary or not, it can be argued applicable in my case. I want to be careful not to make too forceful arguments about the proportionality of the public reactions. But I can let the data speak for itself. Voices underlining the perceived disproportionality of control measures include the Norwegian commentator defining authorities' actions against the Roma as a 'witch hunt' and the Finnish legal expert stating that a couple of hundred Romanian beggars hardly constitute a security risk for Finnish society. An example where exaggeration is undoubtedly present is when the Roma camps are defined as 'slums'. In the Nordic context, drawing parallels to shantytowns cannot be argued to be proportional.

Thompson (1998) argues that moral panics take the form of campaigns or crusades; they have to do with a perceived threat to the social order; politicians and media are involved in addressing the issue; and moral guidelines are unclear. Having already touched upon the first two aspects, I will now comment upon the last two in relation to my findings.

Cohen ascribes the media a strong "ideological role in shaping and reflecting a consensual view of the world" and defines mass media as "the major promoters of moral panics" (1972, xxiii). This does not mean that the media necessarily consciously set out to create moral panics. It is hard to make judgements about the motives of the journalists; it may well be that they genuinely believe what they write (Thompson 1998, 9). Nonetheless, Cohen stresses three dimensions of the central role of the media; I) exaggeration and distortion, II) prediction, III) symbolization. These mechanisms are present in my data, but not only with regards to the media. Also other actors, such as the authorities, have been faced with allegations such as the above three. Firstly, the media – but even more so the authorities and the police – have been criticized for overreacting on

the phenomenon. The dimension of prediction is also clearly present, as the data contains prognoses of growing numbers of East European Roma and increasing problems associated with them. Thirdly, the Roma are locked in a limited number of narrow and stereotypical roles by the media. What the roles entail (e.g. whether it is a victim or offender role) depends on which discourse is dominating in the context. But all discourses can be claimed to present one-dimensional and simplifying images of the members of the group.

Also Thompson's point about unclear moral guidelines applies to my data, as an ambiguity over the correct way to encounter beggars is found. The Helsingin Sanomat editorial headline asking "Is it right to give money to a beggar?"^{cxxiii} (HS 8.8) exemplifies the uncertainty. The writer leaves her question unanswered and contends with noting that "we cannot escape reflecting over humanity and humaneness, which is a good thing"^{cxxiv} (ibid.). Interestingly, she even poses the question whether giving or not giving a coin to beggars displays a stronger attitude of solidarity.

Unsurprisingly, the different discourses which I have identified provide different answers to the question on moral guidelines. Within the Deprivation-solidarity discourse the right answer is to give the beggars money and in other ways support their struggle for a better life, while for example in the Authority control discourse the opposite is true. Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda (1994) include *consensus* as a core factor of moral panic. Although the concern does not necessarily have to be nationwide, there must be widespread acceptance that the group in question poses a real threat to society. This is true in my case, as the discourses supporting the moral panic over the begging Roma are so strong. But these stances are faced with counter-discourses that interpret the threat in a different way. In the discourses focusing on deprivation and solidarity, human rights and partly authority critique, the problem is by no means the Roma, but the responses by the authorities. It is their disloyal, undemocratic and elitist attitudes that cause concern. Nevertheless, the fact does remain that the discourses fortifying moral panic – the Order, Crime and Space and majority reactions discourses – have considerable impetus. Their cogency have managed to establish the begging Roma as "a threat to the social order

itself or an idealized ('ideological[']') conception of some part of it" (Thompson 1998, 8) in the eyes of the wide public.

One of the characteristics mentioned by scholars who have published on moral panics has not yet been mentioned; namely *volatility* (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994; Thompson 1998). What is meant here is that moral panics are likely to appear suddenly and also be short-lived. They tend to disappear as quickly as they appeared, when public interest and the media turn their interest to some new topic. Interestingly enough, this characteristic does not fit my case. The begging Roma have not been quickly forgotten and buried in the archives. On the contrary, the topic has proved to be long-lived in the Finnish and Norwegian media debates. The issue is still debated today, some four years after it first appeared in the headlines. The resilience of the topic can be argued to serve as proof of how severely the begging Roma are seen as threatening core societal values. Also the fact that it is easy for the media to continue deriving news from the group might contribute to the ongoing interest. In Finland, several processes relating to the Roma continue providing journalists with substance for stories. These processes include the aspirations to introduce a national ban on begging and to evict the Roma from their camp in the yard of the social centre Satama. While the former has not (yet) been realized, the latter was carried out in August 2011.

Another approach which seeks to understand the portrayal of certain societal phenomena as especially disturbing – thus establishing them as 'social problems' – is presented by Nils Christie and Kjetil Bruun (1985). In their study on Nordic drug policy, they put forward their concept of 'the good enemy'. The use of narcotics has been framed as a paramount social problem (enemy) because it enables a collective mobilization over an issue which does not shake the power structures of society. A good enemy is one who appears strong, but who in fact is weak. Underlying problems (such as rising socio-economic inequalities and failed social policies) are obscured, and the status of the majority population is in no way threatened. Reactions against deviance consolidate social unity; "The fight against drugs thus contributes to gluing together society"⁵¹ (Christie and Bruun 1985, 187. My translation from Swedish). This argument has its

⁵¹ "*Kampen mot narkotika bidrar på så sätt till att limma ihop samhället.*"

roots in Émile Durkheim's functionalist perspective. In his 1895 manifesto for the sociological discipline, *Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique* (The Rules of Sociological Method), Durkheim puts forward his ideas of social deviance as necessary for the maintenance of society. Collective indignation over deviance reinforces solidarity and unity in a community because it reaffirms social norms and values.

Returning to Christie and Bruun (1985), they observe that an enemy is especially 'good' if it can be blamed for other societal problems, in their case for example youth unemployment. As I have showed, the begging Roma are often linked to crime. They are thus used to explain for example rising feelings of insecurity in society and could even be claimed to serve as scapegoats in this regard.

Here, the concept of 'risk society' comes into play. The term was introduced by Ulrich Beck, but Anthony Giddens has also published on this theme. According to Beck (1992), advanced modern societies produce more risks than previous ones. The production of risks is in a way inherent to the process of modernization; environmental degradation serves as an apt example. Giddens (1999) underlines the increased *consciousness* of risk as one of the fundamental aspects of modern society. According to him, the amount of hazards has not necessarily increased. Instead, a risk society is one that is "increasingly preoccupied with the future (and also with safety), which generates the notion of risk" (Giddens 1999, 3). This also serves to explain some of the outcry over the begging Roma. The role of the media in creating something of a moral panic over the perceived threats posed by this group cannot be overemphasized. It can be argued that the forceful imagery of threat and an alarming situation (present in some, but not all, of the discourses I have identified) is more defining for how the public experiences the situation than the threat itself. This assumption is backed by research showing that the extent of fear of crime correlates more strongly with the amount of news about crime than with the actual crime rates (Thompson 1998, 23).

4.2.2 Two competing pictures

Let us return to the values and ideals perceived as threatened by the presence and activities of the begging Roma. These have already been touched upon when describing the seven discourses. But these core social values which I have identified in my analysis, and which echo an ideal image of the national self, deserve a closer examination. In several aspects, the values and ideals emerging in the data from Finland and Norway coincide. But there are some features differentiating the debates in the two Nordic countries, at least judging from the results from my analysis.

What the Finnish and Norwegian sets of data have in common is that two competing ideal images of society emerge. The first one is anchored in the Deprivation-solidarity and Human rights discourses, as well as parts of the Authority critique discourse. It has an inclusive stance towards the East European Roma and other vulnerable groups in society. The second one is more exclusionary, and it emerges in the Order, Crime, Space and majority discourses, as well as the Authority control discourse and parts of the Authority critique discourse. It should be noted that the two ideal pictures of society are necessarily of ideal-type character, as grey shades also exist in the debates. But there is a general tendency towards polarization of the debate. Consequently, two very different images of ideal society emerge, built on diverging societal values.

The inclusionary stance

The inclusionary stance is based on values of solidarity, universal human rights and democracy. In this ideal world, vulnerable groups (either national or not) are helped and supported both by the local and national authorities. But the call for solidarity does not end at the moral obligations of the establishment. Instead, also the man (and woman) in the street should share their resources with those less fortunate. A national self-image of a 'civilized' society, adhering to humanitarian values, emerges. The three discourses which this stance encompasses are the Deprivation-solidarity discourse, the Human rights discourse, and a part of the Authority critique discourse.

The Norwegian scholar Elisabeth Eide (2002) has in her study on the representation of non-European immigrant groups in Norwegian newspaper feature stories identified two

discourses which resemble this inclusionary stance. The research design is similar to mine, as she seeks to identify ways in which a 'we/them' divide is mobilized in Norwegian media. Although the groups we are interested in differ, as she focuses on 'the non-European Other', some of her findings do have relevance for me. One of the discourses that she recognizes in her data coincides largely with the inclusionary ideal image of society, namely one which she calls *Majority ('we') as problem*. According to this discourse, the majority community is treating the minorities unjust by employing discriminatory policies and attitudes. The core of the inclusionary stance is a struggle against this kind of perceived injustice. Eide also recognizes another discourse which is in line with the inclusionary stance; *The Other as victim*. Here, the minorities are in need of help from the Norwegian majority community. The othering process is here hierarchical, as the majority representatives "are allowed to play the hero's role" (Eide 2002, 222) when assisting immigrants in some way. Also Simonsen (2011) notes that pity is often the base for discourses defending the vulnerable.

This brings us to the first difference between my Finnish and Norwegian data. The image of a society of affluence is stronger in the Norwegian case than in the Finnish. My Norwegian data contains more praise for the own society, with wordings such as 'we are born with the winning [lottery] ticket' and 'we have the best welfare state system in the world' (AP 10.6). The message is that the Norwegians can certainly afford to support 'those who have not been as fortunate' (ibid.). An image of asymmetry emerges, where the Norwegian 'we' is superior and thus in a position to give of their resources to the impoverished 'them'. A constellation of hero - victim emerges, as in Eide's study (2002).

In the Finnish case, on the other hand, the point of departure is not as overwhelmingly one of asymmetry. Also here, there are many voices stating that the inequality in economic resources entails a moral obligation to help the begging Roma. But also another image is present; one where the solidarity is partly based on shared economic concerns. The issue of an eroding welfare system is something which comes up only in the Finnish data. The ruling authorities are criticized for elitism and running down social services. Also many Finns are 'driven into a hopeless situation' and will end up 'on the verge of beggary' (HS 29.7). Thus, one can argue that the Finnish solidarity with the

beggars is to an extent based on a shared economic uncertainty. The idea that the Roma could be given some social assistance emerges. Ideas of somehow including the begging Roma in the welfare system are next to absent in the Norwegian data. There, the voices advocating support speak almost only of personal contributions.

The exclusionary stance

The competing ideal image of society does not at all advocate the need to assist those in need. On the contrary, the interest lies solely in what is defined as beneficial for the national societies. One can thus here draw parallels to nationalist ideals. Core values are social order composed of cleanliness, rules & regulations and safety (Order discourse), combating crime (Crime discourse), the reservation of public space for legitimate actors (Space and majority reactions discourse), the power of authorities over unwanted elements in the cityscape (Authority control discourse), as well as the need to reserve social benefits for citizens (Authority critique discourse). The begging Roma are positioned as a threat to all of the above – and in the words of a Finnish writer of a letter to the editor, to the understanding of this society as a small, safe and protected “*lintukoto*” (HS 1.6).⁵²

The host societies are entitled to reject the East European Roma because these are external and ‘out of place’ in Mary Douglas’ terms (1966). In this stance, the best scenario would be that authorities would regain control over these ‘dark powers’ (AP 28.7) and that the Roma would return to where they came from (or at least leave the country for another one). Returning to Eide’s study on the portrayal of immigrants in Norwegian press (2002), one of the discourses she has identified echoes this to a substantial degree. *The Other as a threat and/or problem* frames immigrants as either criminal or too numerous. Also here, a power hierarchy emerges, as the Other is seen as representing negative values such as cultural backwardness.

The concern over crime is especially pronounced in the Norwegian data, as is also verified by the analysis done by Simonsen (2011). She identified the crime frame as the

⁵² No direct translation is available, but the concept roughly translates into ‘bird home’. It refers to a paradise-like place where birds migrate every winter according to a Finnish folk tale.

dominant one in her study on Norwegian newspaper reporting on ‘beggar tourists’. While roughly a fifth of my Finnish data contains references to crime, the proportion is over half in the Norwegian case. The locus of the crime-talk is Karl Johans gate, which is experienced as ‘flooded’ (AP 29.6) and ‘occupied’ (AP 5.7) by what I have termed ‘the composite’. The problem is not only framed as one of criminal activities, but also about usage of space. One main concern in the Norwegian case is that unwanted groups are occupying this nationally and locally significant main street, and pushing aside those who should rightfully be in control of the space.

It is interesting that the above kind of discourse focusing on a battle over central urban areas does not exist in my Finnish data. Instead, what emerges in the case of Helsinki is the theme of *personal* space. Rather than disturbing the cityscape and scaring the tourists, the beggars are seen as intruding on the privacy of passers-by. But, interestingly enough, beggars are here paralleled by other types of fundraisers. In several cases, it is pointed out that the beggars are in fact less disturbing than for example face-to-face recruiters of non-governmental organizations. In sum, what is central to note is that a concern for personal space as well as peace and quiet also in public places is a prominent theme in the Finnish data, while the Norwegians seem to be more concerned with crime, the visual cityscape and a struggle over who is entitled to use central areas in the city.

4.2.3 The double bind

In the debates, a paradoxical message is heard with regards to the desired level of activity of the East European Roma. It is namely experienced as suspect if the Roma are ‘too’ active when seeking to make a living. It is treated as news – and as proof of that something dubious is going on – if the Roma are organizing their money collecting activities in some way. In an *Aftenposten* news article (AP 23.7), it is reported that beggars were “*caught* with maps of Norway, with festivals marked and ranked according to how kind – or strict – they are with regards to beggars”^{cxv} (my emphasis. NB: not caught by the police, but caught in the meaning of ‘uncovered’). Whereas it in general is not considered the least suspect that someone has a map with their destination marked on it, this does not apply to the begging Roma. In order for them to be considered as

legitimate beggars, they need to be passive and display a general helplessness. Pleading to the generosity of others and at the same time showing a spirit of undertaking and enterprise do not go together. Only a passive and defenceless person seems to match the criteria of someone eligible for handouts.

The same tendency is identified by Simonsen (2011). Begging Roma are consciously or unconsciously violating the idea of 'respectable' poverty, as they put their deprivation on display and use it as a "financial comparative advantage" (Simonsen 2011, 100). The same idea is brought up by Angus Erskine and Ian McIntosh (1999), who touch upon the conflicting roles that a beggar employs. On the one hand, the beggars are presenting themselves as passive victims of circumstances they cannot affect. But on the other hand, they are actively creating situations of social interaction, where the passers-by have to make a conscious choice whether or not to donate money.

But it is not only the act of begging itself that necessarily encompasses both passivity and activity. The same is true also regarding the expectations and attitudes of potential donors. The beggar is namely subject to mixed messages; "If a person is 'genuinely' poor they are not expected to be active. Yet, paradoxically, someone who is 'genuinely' poor is expected to do something about it – to be active" (Erskine and McIntosh 1999, 27).

I have in my data found reactions against failures to successfully walk this tightrope. It is apparent that the beggars are perceived as having crossed some invisible border and gone too far when for example going on 'tour around Norway' (AP 23.7) in order to seek economic opportunities at musical festivals. The reactions against the Roma's maps with festivals marked on them (and ranged according to how receptive they are to begging) shows that this level – and kind – of activity is not accepted. One might argue that a successful balance between activity and passivity is next to impossible to obtain, and that the act of begging will always be dominantly rejected.

One striking difference between the Norwegian and Finnish data concerns the ways in which individual Roma figuring in news articles are presented. In the Finnish case, the Roma are more often personalized and individualized than in the Norwegian. Helsingin Sanomat gives the East European Roma a voice by quoting them in print much more often than Aftenposten. In fact, my Norwegian data contains only one case where

someone affiliated with the Roma is directly quoted. Even then it is not a begging Roma but an unnamed person driving beggars from one music festival to another. One can thus claim that in *Aftenposten*, the Roma are silenced and thus passivated.

Furthermore, in the case of *Aftenposten*, no East European Roma is presented by name. In *Helsingin Sanomat*, this is done several times in connection to a direct quote or a photo. In this way, the Roma appear as individual human beings with personal stories and opinions. They are thus presented as actors, not only passive victims or “faceless” criminals. Norman Fairclough (2003, 145–146) points out the dimensions of *personal/impersonal* and *named/classified* as central in the representation of social actors. When an actor is mentioned by name, she or he becomes a real person. If, again, someone is portrayed only as part of a mass, his or her humanness becomes obscured.

Although a visual analysis is not included as such in my study, I did note that photos in *Helsingin Sanomat* portrayed the Roma more in the foreground and close-up than those in *Aftenposten*. There, pictures dominantly showed the Roma at a distance. The visual fore- or backgrounding of a person or a group of persons is another factor which affects how ‘human’ they appear. The quoting, naming and visual depiction of East European Roma all contribute to the symbolic closeness or distance between the reader and the person(s) portrayed. If a person or group is represented as an impersonal mass, it is much easier to stereotype them, as well as adopt strict and exclusionary attitudes and policies towards them.

But the fact that *Helsingin Sanomat* “gives” the Roma a voice, name and close visual portrayal in contrast to *Aftenposten* does not say much about whether they give the group *sufficient* power for self-portrayal – which I spontaneously would argue they do not. The topic of who gets to speak, how much and in which way is a prominent one in media studies; especially in research focusing on minority representation (see e.g. Haavisto 2011). Indeed, the Norwegian anthropologist Thomas Hylland Eriksen defines the right to conceptualize reality as among the most important cultural battles of our times (Eriksen 1994). I have chosen not to focus substantially on who the dominant speakers are, partly due to lack of space. As a general note, it does appear that an observation made by

Elisabeth Eide is true also in my data; that in relation to news about Roma, the police and other authorities have historically gotten the first and last word (Eide 2007, 73–74).

This brings me to an ethical consideration concerning my thesis. I acknowledge that I could be accused of the same thing as mainstream media often is; namely talking *about* minority members instead of *with* them. I have asked myself whether it is correct to use a research design which only focuses on how mainstream media is portraying the Roma, instead of giving this group a voice of their own. Have I, for my part, contributed to silencing those without a voice?

I could have approached the ‘Roma issue’ in a different way, using for example interviews with the begging Roma in Helsinki and Oslo. Regardless of apparent practical issues concerning language barriers, flight costs and time resources, this could have been a rewarding approach and above all one empowering the Roma themselves. But had I done this, the research would not have resembled the current one – it would have been a completely different study. It is obvious that for a study on how the media portrays and constructs a phenomenon, only media material can be used. Furthermore, I do feel that I am contributing to a critical, and even emancipatory, project. If academic research does not scrutinize the powerful mainstream media, its possibly discriminatory mechanisms cannot be challenged. In this light (and although I am not making very strong claims about discriminatory media practices or misrepresentation), I hope I am able to convey a convincing argument for my choice to “listen only to the powerful”.

With regards to future research relating to the begging East European Roma, approaches underlining the experiences of the Roma themselves would be recommendable. One could gain deep insight into how the Roma understand their situation for example with narrative methodology. If one wanted to continue studying press reporting and debate, visual analysis would be a welcome supplement. Complementing qualitative methodology with quantitative would also be fruitful. Statistical analyses would give a more exact picture of the frequency of different discourses in different contexts and of the interaction between different discourses. Regardless of which research design one would apply, a longitudinal approach would bring significant added value.

5 Concluding remarks

The presence of begging East European Roma in the streets of the Finnish and Norwegian cities can be seen as a result of two factors – maintained or growing socio-economic inequalities within Europe combined with lowered institutional barriers against mobility. People are increasingly mobile in today's globalized world, but not all move on the same terms. Zygmunt Bauman has dealt with global class distinctions in terms of the 'tourist' as opposed to the 'vagabond' (1998). While the former "move because they find the world within their (global) reach irresistibly attractive", the latter "move because they find the world within their (local) reach unbearably inhospitable" (ibid., 94). No doubt should remain regarding which type the East European Roma represent.

The reception in societies where the Roma arrive is much affected by the way in which their arrival and presence is portrayed in national media. The media contribute to constructing issues for collective debate, of which some can turn into 'social problems' or even cause moral panics. My data contains clear tendencies towards portraying the Roma in terms of hazard, crime and threat to the social as well as physical order. In four of the discourses, the main stance is that the begging Roma are troublesome and unwelcome.

Other research on media portrayals of Roma point in the same direction. In Eide's and Simonsen's study on Norwegian media portrayals of Roma people over a period of 100 years, "C-stuff"⁵³ dominates – referring to conflict, crime and culture (Eide 2007, 75). The interpretation frame of Roma as cultural contributors has practically vanished, while the crime-frame remains strong. I cannot comment upon the culture-aspect in relation to my results, as I have delimited my data not to include references to cultural products. However, our results match with regards to the other two C:s. Eide and Simonsen report on continued portrayal of Roma in a negative light, whereas other groups which have historically been discriminated against (such as Sámi and Jews) have gradually undergone a process of 'normalization' (Eide and Simonsen 2007). Here one should note that their period of data gathering ended in 2002, before the controversy over the begging East European Roma began. However, the negative tone has hardly softened since.

⁵³ Norwegian: *k-stoff* (the k comes from *konflikt*=conflict, *kriminalitet*=criminality and *kultur*=culture)

Comparing to their research in fact makes my results all the more interesting, as one sees that they echo a long rooted tendency of portraying Roma in a frame of threat and crime.

But stances challenging the image of the begging Roma as threatening and unwanted do provide a significant counter-power to the above mentioned. There is an ongoing struggle between two contrasting tendencies; this is true both regarding my data and in society at large. On the one hand, many voices are raised against the treatment of the Roma, especially among human rights activists and leftist political actors. Some political will does exist to counteract Roma exclusion and discrimination, as exemplified by bodies established on the national as well as European level (e.g. the European Roma Rights Centre). On the other hand, anti-Roma sentiments remain strong, as demonstrated for example by continued evictions of Roma in Italy and France (ERRC website B).

As I have argued, mass media play a significant role in shaping public opinion on the East European Roma. Public opinion in turn affects the political decisions that are made (at least in democratic states). The way in which the begging Roma are represented in national press thus contributes to what kind of political and social circumstances this group faces as they continue to seek a living outside of their home countries.

While portraying the begging Roma in a certain way, the media texts simultaneously function as a symbolic mirror, reflecting certain social values which emerge as central in the national self-understandings. The societal ideal-image promoted by the inclusionary stance is based on values of solidarity and other ideals classically placed to the left in the political spectrum. Actors utilizing discourses which endorse the exclusionary stance perceive of the ideal society as one where national benefits are prioritized. These values can be understood as representing more conservative political orientations.

In conclusion, the way in which the public debate on the begging East European Roma develops in the future plays a significant role not only for the Roma, but also for the Finnish and Norwegian societies at large. Attitudes towards the 'other' are in dialectic relationship with understandings of the 'self' and therefore affect wider societal development. Journalists and other debaters thus need to recognize what is at stake. It all boils down to one of the most basic sociological and philosophical questions – what kind of society do we want to live in?

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- ⁱ*Romfolkets skjebne er en varslet katastrofe, en hurtig eskalerende tragedie.* (AP morgen 26.8, editorial)
- ⁱⁱ*Itä-Euroopan romanit eivät ajaudu Suomeen ja muualle Eurooppaan helpon elämän ja länsimaisen sosiaalituenperässä. He ovat Euroopan syrjityin kansa. Kiertolaisuus on heille ainoa mahdollisuus.* (HS 27.7, letter to the editor)
- ⁱⁱⁱ*Kun koti on kaatopaikalla ja koulunkäynti keskeytyy rasmin takia, kiertolaisuus ja kerjääminen ovat ihan ymmärrettäviä vaihtoehtoja.* (HS 20.8, editorial by invited writer)
- ^{iv}*EU-Romaniaa olisi rangaistava romanien laiminlyönnistä.* (HS 28.6, letter to the editor)
- ^v*Kerjäämisen kriminalisointi koskisi käytännössä yhtä kansanryhmää: romaneja. Tällaisista yhtä tiettyä emistä ryhmää koskevista laeista - ja niiden laatijoista - eurooppalaisissa koulukirjoissa on paljon terveellistä luettavaa.* (HS 24.6, local news/column)
- ^{vi}*Kerjääminen ei ole ihmisarvoinen tapa hankkia elantoa.* (HS 28.7, letter to the editor)
- ^{vii}*Kerjäävät romanit kertovat karua mutta aitoa kieltä maanosamme eriarvoisuudesta. Euroopan unionissa emme voi vain todeta, että jonkun pitäisi auttaa heitä kotimaassaan.* (HS 8.8, editor by invited writer)
- ^{viii}*Vi i Norge kan gi sigøynerne som kommer hit bedre hygieniske forhold ved å sørge for drikkevann og toaletter.* (AP morgen 19.8, letter to the editor)
- ^{ix}*Romfolket er mennesker. Også når de sover ute, og om de tigger eller stjeler.* (AP morgen 26.8, editorial)
- ^x*[M]yös viinalta haisevat ja puistoissa oleskelevat ihmiset ovat oikeasti ihmisiä. Pahinta on se, kun he menettävät ihmisarvonsa niin sanottujen rivikansalaisten silmissä.* (HS 18.7, letter to the editor)
- ^{xi}*Kuusivuotias Claudiu Horvath kuoli viime viikonloppuna Haranglabissa Romanian Transilvaniassa syötyään myrkkysienen. Hän söi sienen, sillä hänellä oli nälkä, eikä hän tiennyt sen olevan myrkyllinen. Äiti Ergie Horvath ei ollut vahtimassa poikaansa, sillä hän oli läheisessä Tarnavenin kaupungissa keräämässä ruokaa roskiksista.* (HS 2.8, local news/column)
- ^{xii}*heksejakt* (AP aften 8.7, local news)
- ^{xiii}*Hvis vi ikke skal komme i konflikt med diskrimineringsloven, må alle behandles likt.* (AP aften 31.8, local news)
- ^{xiv}*Olenainen hankaluus kerjäämisen kriminalisoinnissa on se, että se on perustuslain 6 pykälän yhdenvertaisuusperiaatteen vastainen.* (HS 5.6, letter to the editor)
- ^{xv}*Dagens holding minner skremmende mye om politikk fra Romania og Italia [...].* (AP aften 8.7, local news)
- ^{xvi}*Vaikka lain kirjain olisi neutraali, sen henki ja tarkoitus ovat perustuslain ja ihmisoikeussopimuksen vastaisia.* (HS 5.6, letter to the editor)
- ^{xvii}*Prostituution kriminalisointi "syrjii" vain prostituoituja, ja varastaminen vain varkaita [...].* (HS 10.6, letter to the editor)
- ^{xviii}*Kääntäen on kuitenkin vaikea argumentoida, että jokin rike tai rikos pitäisi sallia, koska sitä harjoittaa yksittäinen väestöryhmä.* (HS 7.8, editorial)
- ^{xix}*Lainoppineet tyrmäävät kerjuukiellon.* (HS 11.7, front page)
- ^{xx}*Jokamiehen oikeus.* (HS 11.7, Sunday supplement)
- ^{xxi}*Kyse olisi profiloinnista etnisen alkuperän perusteella, mikä rikkoo Euroopan ihmisoikeussopimusta ja Suomen perustuslakia.* (HS 11.7, front page)
- ^{xxii}*Kerjääminen [...] on kuitenkin yksilön kannalta luovuttamaton perusoikeus ja viimeinen laillinen keino hankkia elanto siinä tilanteessa, jossa mitään muuta mahdollisuutta ei ole. Tästä oikeudesta on sivistysvaltiossa pidettävä kiinni.* (HS 7.6, letter to the editor)
- ^{xxiii}*Niin kauan kuin romanien kotimaat eivät kunnioita ihmisoikeuksia ja kansainvälisiä sopimuksia, meidän sivistyneempien kansakuntien pitää huolehtia romanien inhimillisestä kohtelusta.* (HS 27.7, letter to the editor)
- ^{xxiv}*Når vi har så flotte grønne lunger, kan vi ikke tillate at det kommer andre og tar over, med all forsøplingen det innebærer. De gjør også fra seg i parkene, og det lukter vondt i området, sier Hauger.* (AP aften 24.6, local news)
- ^{xxv}*Varoituksen mukaan talon piha on ollut siivoton, siellä on ollut vaarallisia sähkölaitteita eikä siellä saisi leiriytyä.* (HS 7.7, local news)
- ^{xxvi}*I brevet til politimestrene skriver hun at tiggere som tar tilhold på offentlige steder, i sig selv kan «skape uro og være grunnlag for uheldige ordensmessige situasjoner».* (AP morgen 23.7, domestic news)

- ^{xxvii}”Katso itse, me siivoamme täällä ja alue on puhdas”, sanoo romanialainen Sorin Paul ja kohottelee käsiään. (HS 7.7)
- ^{xxviii}[...]jakter [...] på teltleirer i skogen. (AP aften 24.6, local news)
- ^{xxix}Når vi har så flotte grønne lunger, kan vi ikke tillate at det kommer andre og tar over, med all forsøplingen det innebærer. De gjør også fra seg i parkene, og det lukter vondt i området, sier Hauger. (AP aften 24.6, local news)
- ^{xxx}Telttaviritelmät ja puihin ripustetut pyykit saivat kyytiä [...]. (HS 10.8, local news)
- ^{xxxi}[...]har de stabled sine plastposer fulle av tomflasker, bokser og klær. På en bylt med poser lufter en sliten rumener sokkene sine. (AP aften 29.6, local news)
- ^{xxxii}Så til resten av søppelet. La oss ta vare på våre egne fattige, men forby tiggning og prostitusjon [...] (AP aften 8.7, letter to the editor)
- ^{xxxiii}offensiv (AP aften 4.8, local news)
- ^{xxxiv}sommerrengjøringen (AP aften 4.8, local news)
- ^{xxxv}Leirityminen vaatii tietysti maanomistajan luvan. (HS 6.8, local news)
- ^{xxxvi}Helsingillä on nollatoleranssi luvattomaan leiritymiseen. (HS 10.8, local news)
- ^{xxxvii}Ainoa tapa päästä osalliseksi yhteiskuntaan on toimia sen sääntöjen mukaan. (HS 30.7, letter to the editor)
- ^{xxxviii}lovløse cowboyer. (AP aften, 4.8, local news)
- ^{xxxix}Fra paradegate til pariagate. (AP 29.6 aften, local news)
- ^{xl}Politi og Rusken aksjonerer mot ulovlige telt (AP 24.6 aften, local news)
- ^{xli}Jeg har forståelse for å slå ned når folk ikke følger lover og regler, men dersom man går etter en bestemt gruppe, er vi på ville veier [...]. (AP aften 24.6, local news)
- ^{xlii}[...] ubehagelig og skremmende. (AP morgen 5.7, commentary)
- ^{xliiii}Folk som arbeider i området har en veldig belastende hverdag. Mange føler sig utrygge og rapporterer om trusler [...] eller andre skremmende opplevelser. (AP aften 29.6, local news)
- ^{xliiv}Den horrible slummen. (AP aften 28.7, commentary)
- ^{xliiv}Työryhmän mukaan kerjäläisten leirien turvallisuudessa on merkittäviä puutteita ja ne voivat vaarantaa yleistä järjestystä ja turvallisuutta lähialueilla. (HS 25.6, local news)
- ^{xliiv}”On hyvin vaikea kuvitella, että parisataa romanialaista kerjäläistä olisi kovin merkittävä turvallisuusriski suomalaiselle yhteiskunnalle. [...] Kyllä tämän raportin taustalla on vain katukivan kiillottaminen”, Ojanen sanoo. (HS 11.7, Sunday supplement)
- ^{xliiv}Samtidig ser det ut til at flere tyveriraid landet rundt er begått av representanter for romfolket. I den siste tiden har også eldre mennesker blitt overfalt i sine hjem, av mennesker som skal være rom. (AP morgen 26.8, editorial)
- ^{xliiv}Sisäministeriön työryhmän mukaan etenkin romanialaisten ja bulgarialaisten tekemien omaisuusrikosten määrä on kasvanut viime vuonna selvästi. Poliisi taas on epäillyt, että kerjäämisen taustalla voi jopa olla ihmiskauppaa. (HS 11.7, Sunday supplement)
- ^{xlix}Vi må følge med så ikke tiggerne stjeler fra publikum som hører på oss. (AP aften 29.6, local news)
- ^l»Vær på vakt! Det er aktive lommetyver i byen.[...] Alle kan rammes, men du er ekstra utsatt hvis du er uoppmerksom og uforsiktig». (AP aften 8.7, local news)
- ^{li}[...]Jdet i alle fall er grunn til å være på vakt etter at en gruppe tiggere tidligere i sommer ble stoppet på vei østover – med tjuvgods fra Hovefestivalen i bagasjen. – Festivaler er et takknemlig sted å holde på med stjeling, påpeker han. (AP morgen 23.7, domestic news)
- ^{lii}[...] kaupustelijoita, joita epäillään myös omaisuusrikoksista. (HS 1.8, domestic news)
- ^{lii}«Mies ajoi paikan ohitse ja huomasi, että onpa tutun näköinen vaunu», kertoo päivystävä komisario Tom Packalén. (HS 22.8, local news)
- ^{liiv}Men i en del tilfeller er det neppe tvil om at kriminelle grupperinger, ikke minst i Romania, samler sammen fattige mennesker, bringer dem til Norge og tjener penger på p sette dem til å tigge. Bakmennene beslaglegger en stor del av hva tiggerne klarer å samle inn. (AP aften 15.6, editorial)
- ^{liv}[...] frakte mennesker hit for å tigge (AP aften 1.7, nyheter)
- ^{lvj}kynisk menneskehandel (AP aften 10.6, letter to the editor)
- ^{lvj}Ofre for menneskehandel og annen kriminalitet skal hjelpes, ikke støtes ut og selv bli kriminalisert. (AP aften 29.6, commentary)
- ^{lviii}Vi kan ikke lukke øyene for at det er bakmenn her som tjener penger på å frakte mennesker hit for å tigge, sier Lønseth. (AP aften 1.7, local news)

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- ^{lix} *Det foregår menneskehandel, noe annet er naivt å tro, mener Kallmyr.* (AP aften 24.6, local news)
- ^{lx} *Dette er et organisert system der folk får gratistur av bakmenn, og kulturen åpner for sterk beordring eller styring av mennesker.* (AP aften 24.6, local news)
- ^{lxi} *Tiggere drar på norgesturné* (AP morgen 23.7, domestic news)
- ^{lxii} *Det er liten tvil om at virksomheten til en viss grad er organisert. De har kjørt gjennom Europa for å komme hit av sjåfører som, etter det vi har observert, ikke tigger selv. Disse «turlederne» kjører tiggerne og selgerne inn til bysentrum om morgenen, er i kontakt med tiggerne gjennom dagene og plukker dem opp igjen ut på ettermiddagen.* (AP morgen 23.7, domestic news)
- ^{lxiii} *[...] Jeri maista kerätyn tiedon perusteella näyttää siltä, että kerjäämisen lisääntymisellä on selkeä byhteys rikosilmoitusten ja rikosten määrän kasvuun.* (HS 25.6, local news)
- ^{lxiv} *Seuraavana ja vaikeampana päätöksenä ovat edessä toimet, joilla Suomessa hillittäisiin järjestäytynyttä kerjäämistä ja siihen liittyvää rikollisuutta.* (HS 7.8, editorial)
- ^{lxv} *Todellisuudessa suurin osa romaneista on tavallisia maalaisia köyhiä eurooppalaisia.* (HS 24.6, local news/column)
- ^{lxvi} *Killengreen: Mange omreisende er vinningskriminelle* (AP morgen 23.7, domestic news)
- ^{lxvii} *Politiet i Molde og politiet i Ålesund opplyser at de ikke mistenker gruppene for å ha gjort noe kriminelt i perioden disse har besøkt byene.* (AP morgen 23.7, domestic news)
- ^{lxviii} *Hvis vanlige lovlydige mennesker begynner å bruke dette området, vil de utvnlige elementene trekke bort.* (AP aften 30.6, local news)
- ^{lxix} *Nykyään joku on koko ajan tunkemassa henkilökohtaiselle reviirille haluten jotain.* (HS 8.6, commentary)
- ^{lxx} *Karl Johan oversvømmes av prostituerte og tiggere.* (AP aften 29.6, local news)
- ^{lxxi} *Tyver, tiggere og prostituerte rår på nedre del av Karl Johan.* (AP aften 30.6, local news)
- ^{lxxii} *Karl Johans gate fra Jernbanetorget og noen kvartaler oppover er okkupert av tiggere, narkomane og prostituerte.* (AP morgen 5.7, commentary)
- ^{lxxiii} *Mørkrets krefter har for lengst overtatt denne delen av Norge. Det er der det foregår – prostituerte, halliker, tiggere, kriminelle, tyver, søppel, dopselgere, vrak, faenskap.* (AP aften 28.7, commentary)
- ^{lxxiv} *Lett å bli provosert og rasende over att så mange tvilsomme vesener kan få lov til å utfolde seg midt i Oslo, og overta sentrumsområder som kunne ha fungert så mye bedre enn i dag.* (AP aften 28.7, commentary)
- ^{lxxv} *Jeg er veldig på vakt mot å debattere sosiale utfordringer under overskriften «estetikk».* (AP Osloplus 1.7, Best og verst i Oslo)
- ^{lxxvi} *Tällaisen kuvanko haluamme heille [turisteille]antaa, tällaista imagoa levittää ympäri maailma?* (HS 9.7, letter to the editor)
- ^{lxxvii} *Det verste er tiggerne. De forstyrrer det fine bybildet av Oslo om sommeren.* (AP Osloplus 13.7, Best og verst i Oslo)
- ^{lxxviii} *[...] synlig politi i gatene er spill for turistgalleriet.* (AP aften 4.8, local news)
- ^{lxxix} *Vanlige oslofolk må ta tilbake byens paradegate.* (AP aften 30.6, local news)
- ^{lxxx} *Hvis vanlige lovlydige mennesker begynner å bruke dette området, vil de utvnlige elementene trekke bort.* (AP aften 30.6, local news)
- ^{lxxxii} *Kaupungin keskustassa feissarit pysäyttelevät lyhyelläkin matkalla monta kertaa. [...] Rahan ruinaajat, seisokaa aukoiden reunoilla. [...] Pysäyttely on häiritsevää kerjäämistä, eikä se olekin jo laissa kielletty?* (HS 17.6, letter to the editor)
- ^{lxxxii} *Romanien passiivinen toiminta on kuitenkin vähemmän häiritsevää verrattuna feissareiden aggressiiviseen toimintaan.* (HS 27.7, letter to the editor)
- ^{lxxxiii} *Kaupunkilaisten reviiri kunniaan.* (HS 8.6, commentary)
- ^{lxxxiv} *Mielestäni järjestöjen rahankeräystoiminta on verrattavissa kadulla kerjäämiseen, joka tulisi kieltää yksityisyyttä loukkaavana toimintana.* (HS 27.7, letter to the editor)
- ^{lxxxv} *Dette er et tydelig signal til Regjeringen om at tigging oppleves som et større problem enn tidligere. Tiden er inne for å gjeninnføre tiggeforbudet, sier byrådsleder Stian Berger Røsland (H).* (AP aften 1.7, local news)
- ^{lxxxvi} *2 av 3 vil forby tigging* (AP aften 1.7, local news)
- ^{lxxxvii} *Savon Sanomien mukaan suomalaiset ovat saaneet tarpeekseen kerjäläisistä [...] kerjäläiset ovat herättäneet kansalaisissa ärtymystä ja jopa pelkoa.* (HS 5.7, editorial)

- ^{lxxxviii} *Folk føler seg provosert og opplever tiggingen som ubehagelig, sier Hansen.* (AP aften 1.7, local news)
- ^{lxxxix} *Romanit eivät häiritse Verkkosaaren veneilijöitä.* (HS 10.7, local news)
- ^{xc} *Det kan føles som om romfolket er en pest og en plage, og slik blir de behandlet. Men de er mennesker.* (AP morgen 26.8, editorial)
- ^{xcⁱ} *Ja, vi plages. Fordi det [tigging, dopmisbruk, prostitusjon] er ubehagelig og skremmende. Kanskje er det slik at vi fornekter nøden når den kommer så tett innpå oss?* (AP morgen 5.7, commentary)
- ^{xcⁱⁱ} *Slik asylanttilstrømmingen reduseres når man strammer inn politikken, vil det samme skje med de rumenske tiggerne. Vi har nulltoleranse mot disse leirene, sier Kallmyr.* (AP aften 24.6, local news)
- ^{xcⁱⁱⁱ} *Sosiaalikeskus Satamalle tulossa lähtöpassit* (HS 31.8, local news)
- ^{xc^{iv}} *Kallmyr lover tiggerstopp i 2012* (AP aften 24.6, local news)
- ^{xc^v} *Sosiaalikeskus Satamalle tulossa lähtöpassit* (HS 31.8, local news)
- ^{xc^{vi}} *Rydder paradegaten* (AP aften 4.8, local news)
- ^{xc^{vii}} *Kaupunki ei leiriä alueella enää katsele.* (HS 31.8, local news)
- ^{xc^{viii}} *«Vapaa Katto ry:n olisi järkevää vähentää porukkaa pihasta radikaalilla tavalla. Jos luvaton leiriytymistä elokuussa vielä ilmenee, on meillä harkinnan paikka.»* (HS 7.7, local news)
- ^{xc^{ix}} *»Romanien olisi nyt syytä lähteä kotiin.»* (HS 6.8, local news)
- ^c *Slik asylanttilstrømmingen reduseres når man strammer inn politikken, vil det samme skje med de rumenske tiggerne.* (AP aften 24.6, local news)
- ^{ci} *Mahdollisuudesta vaikuttaa ongelmaan saatiin näyttöä, kun EU-maista tulevien turvapaikanhakijoiden etuusia rajoitettiin heinäkuun alussa. Bulgarianlaisten romanien turvapaikkahakemusten määrä väheni nopeasti.* (HS 7.8, editorial)
- ^{cⁱⁱ} *Ruskengeneral Hauger [...] oppfordrer publikum til å kontakte Rusken- patruljen med tips.* (AP aften 24.6, local news)
- ^{cⁱⁱⁱ} *Der skaffer myndighetene en viss kontroll over tiggerne, uten at det er snakk om noe forbud.* (AP aften 15.6, editorial)
- ^{c^{iv}} *Helsingin kaupunki ei toistaiseksi aio häätää romaneja sosiaalikeskus Satamasta Verkkosaaresta.* (HS 31.7, local news)
- ^{c^v} *Varoituksesta huolimatta talonvaltaajat eivät aio purkaa romanileiriä.* (HS 7.7, local news)
- ^{c^{vi}} *I sommer har norsk politi kjeppjaget besøkende rom [...]. Mennesker som sover på pappkasser under en motorveibro, jages som rotter.* (AP 26.8 morgen, editorial)
- ^{c^{vii}} *Ved neste valg må borgere i denne byen via sin stemme sørge for å gi et klokkeklart signal på at vi har fått nok av misforstått politisk snillisme og unnfalldenhet fra de styrende myndigheter.* (AP aften 17.6, letter to the editor)
- ^{c^{viii}} *Ei ole varmastikaan sattuma, että häätövaroituksia jaellaan silloin, kun[nuoriso]lautakunta ja kaupunginvaltuusto ovat lomilla. Nyt kun valtuusto ja lautakunta ovat kesälomilla, ei poliittisilla elimillä ole mahdollisuutta puuttua Pajusen ryhmän toimintaan, ja ryhmä voi jyrätä päätöksillään demokraattisten toimielimien yli.* (HS 10.7, letter to the editor)
- ^{c^{ix}} *Aikataulu on ollut hirveän nopea. [...] Kun joku teko kriminalisoidaan, teon pitäisi olla tarkkarajaisesti määritelty. Ei ole ehditty tarpeeksi pohtia, millainen kerjääminen sitten olisi kiellettyä.* (HS 25.6, local news)
- ^{c^x} *Kaupunginjohtaja Jussi Pajunen on halunnut pitää romaniasiat tiukasti byrokraattiansa käsissä, eivätkä vaaleilla valitut luottamushenkilöt ole voineet osallistua asioiden hoitoon.* (HS 27.7, letter to the editor)
- ^{c^{xi}} *Ei ole varmastikaan sattuma, että häätövaroituksia jaellaan silloin, kun[nuoriso]lautakunta ja kaupunginvaltuusto ovat lomilla. Nyt kun valtuusto ja lautakunta ovat kesälomilla, ei poliittisilla elimillä ole mahdollisuutta puuttua Pajusen ryhmän toimintaan, ja ryhmä voi jyrätä päätöksillään demokraattisten toimielimien yli.* (HS 10.7, letter to the editor)
- ^{c^{xii}} *De ansvarlige kan intet gjøre. Alle skylder på alle. Alle snakker, men lite skjer.* (AP aften 28.7, commentary)
- ^{c^{xiii}} *Dermed fraskriver Røsland seg et ansvar som han har fått delegert av fellesskapet.* (AP aften 29.7, letter to the editor)
- ^{c^{xiv}} *Romanialaiset kerjäläiset sen sijaan näyttäytyvät rikollisina, koska kehtaavat tulla päättäjiänsä silmiin ja häiritä heidän illuusiotaan hyvinvointiyhteiskunnasta, jota he härskisti väittävät puolustavansa.* (HS 31.7, letter to the editor)

^{cxy} *Näköalattomaan tilanteeseen ajatut suomalaiset, muun muassa monet yksinhuoltajat, ovat jo kerjäämisen porteilla. (HS 29.7, letter to the editor)*

^{cxvi} *Omatuntoni ei salli minun katsovan sivusta ja maksavan verojani yhteiskunnalle, joka ei täytä sen kaikkein tärkeintä tehtävää eli heikoimmistaan huolehtimista, vaan päinvastoin lyö köyhän otsaan rikollisen leiman. (HS 7.6, letter to the editor)*

^{cxvii} *Suomessa on vuosikymmeniä tehty arvokasta työtä, jotta kukaan ei joudu kerjäämään. On perusteetonta, että sallisimme ulkomaalaisten tulla tänne hankkimaan elantonsa tällä vieraalla tavalla. (HS 28.7, letter to the editor)*

^{cxviii} *Vi som er født med vinnerloddet; oljeressurser og ikke-korruperte styresmakter, som i sum har gitt oss verdens beste velferdssystem. Vis respekt for de menneskene som ikke har vært like heldige! (AP aften 10.6, letter to the editor)*

^{cxix} *Avustusjärjestö on lähettänyt Romanian presidentille Traian Basesculle kirjeen. Siinä toivotaan, että presidentti laskeutuisi Romanian yhteiskunnan huipulta yhden päivän ajaksi sen pohjalle Haranglabiin. (HS 2.8, local news/column)*

^{cxix} *Olen mielenkiinnolla seurannut kannanottoja, jotka koskevat kerjäämistä ja kerjäläisiä. Eniten jyrkkää asennetta osoitti entinen pääministeri Matti Vanhanen, joka ei varmasti tiedä köyhyydestä eikä totaalisesta näläntunteesta mitään. (HS 9.8, letter to the editor)*

^{cxxi} *Kun Vanhasen oma puolue ja muut puolueet ovat onnistuneet salaisemmilla ja modernimmilla kerjäysmuodoilla kerjäämään huomattavasti suurempia summia kuin perinteiset kerjäläiset [...]. (HS 2.6, letter to the editor)*

^{cxix}^{cxii} *[...]poistetaan rikat rikkaiden silmistä [...] (HS 9.7, letter to the editor)*

^{cxii} *[...]Javslørt tiggere med norgeskart, der festivalene er plottet inn på kartet og rangert etter hvor snille – eller strenge – de er mot tiggere. (AP morgen 23.7, domestic news)*

^{cxii} *Onko oikein antaa rahaa kerjäläiselle? (HS 8.8, editorial)*

^{cxii} *Emme pääse pakoon inhimillisyyden ja ihmisyyden pohdintaa, ja hyvä niin. (HS 8.8, editorial)*

Appendix 1 : Coding example

HS - Mieliipide - 10.7.2010 - 1795 merkkiä - 1. painos

Romanien karkottaminen on lyhytnäköistä

Kaupunginjohtajamme toiminta romanien karkottamiseksi sosiaalikeskus Sataman ulkoalueelta on **omavaltaista**. Ei ole varmastikaan sattuma, että häätövaroituksia jaellaan silloin, kun lautakunta sekä kaupunginvaltuusto ovat lomilla. Nyt kun valtuusto ja lautakunta ovat kesälomilla, ei poliittisilla elimillä ole mahdollisuutta puuttua Pajusen ryhmän toimintaan, ja ryhmä voi **jyrätä päätöksillään demokraattisten toimielimien yli**.

Kesäkuussa kaupunginhallitus päätti vastoin Pajusen esitystä hankkia sosiaalikeskus Sataman pihaan saniteettitilat koko kesäksi, jotta romaneilla olisi **inhimillisemmät olot**. Nyt näyttää siltä, että kaupunginhallituksen päätöksen yli on **häikäilemättömästi jyrätty**.

Pajusen ryhmän toiminta romanien **savustamiseksi** Helsingistä on **lyhytnäköistä ja epäinhimillistä** politiikkaa. Kaupunginjohtajan tulisikin perua nuorisotoimenjohtajan kautta **pakottamansa** päätös romanien karkottamisesta Kalasataman sosiaalikeskuksen pihalta.

Pajusen tulisi ennemminkin keskittää voimansa sen selvittämiseen, kuinka näille ihmisille löydetään paremmat asuinolosuhteet ja kuinka heille saadaan koulutusta ja työtä tarjottavaksi.

Kerjäyskielto ja tilapäiset karkotukset ovat vain ihmisten ja ongelmien siirtämistä muualle. Tämänkaltainen lyhytnäköinen politiikka kostautuu tulevaisuudessa **eriarvoisuuden sekä turvattomuuden kasvaessa**. Romanit ovat varmasti haaste kaupungillemme, mutta meidän on uskallettava ottaa haaste vastaan, jotta voimme rakentaa kaupunkia, joka on **mahdollisimman hyvä kaikille**.

Sosiaalikeskus Sataman toimijoita ei pidä mielestäni uhata varoituksilla. Heitä on päinvastoin tuettava yrityksissään tarjota ihmisille **mahdollisuus parempaan elämään**.

RIKU AHOLA HELSINGIN NUORISOLAUTAKUNNAN JÄSEN (VAS)

1) What are the Roma called?

romanit (NB not beggars)

2) Who are a) the relevant actors, and b) the main speakers?

a) Mayor Pajunen (presented as the motor behind the eviction plans), bodies of municipal decision-making (disregarded because the errand has been presented during vacation times), social center Satama (supported)

b) not relevant (no speakers as in news articles)

3) Are the Roma dominantly active or passive (even victimization)?

semi-passive (objects for possible eviction and/or measures to offer education and work)

4) What themes arise?

Eviction of camp from Satama's yard, political games (avoiding democratic decision-making), ameliorating practical circumstances in the camp, forbidding begging, inequality, insecurity, solidarity with weaker, inclusion

5) What power relations are visible in the text? (de facto – called for – criticized)

- **De facto**
Mayor Pajunen and "his group" over A. Roma and B. municipal decision-making bodies
- **Called for**
A. Municipal decision-making bodies to regain power which belongs to them
- **Criticized**
Mayor Pajunen and "his group" over A. Roma and B. municipal decision-making bodies

6) How is 'the problem' constructed? (definition – location – justification – solution)

- **Definition**
The problem is A. the plans to evict the Roma from Satama's yard and the unwillingness to offer any long-sighted support. B. The fact that "Pajunen's group" is doing this in vacation times.

- **Location**
A. For the Roma. B. for the democratic system
- **Justification**
Because A. eviction doesn't solve anything, it's just avoiding to deal with the issue and it is short-sighted. B. Pajunen's group is trying to evade democratic decision-making by putting the errand forward during the vacations.
- **Solution**
A. Do not evict Satama, the city should invest in inclusionary policies: housing, education, work. B. Make this a political decision where democratic procedure is followed.

7) Ideal society: What values are present in the text?

SOLIDARITY with less fortunate groups. SOCIETAL INCLUSION (housing, education, work)

LONG-SIGHTED; REAL SOLUTIONS BY THE CITY OF HELSINKI : City active and including in solving social problems (opposite now: short-sighted, avoiding dealing with the issue → inequality and insecurity)

DEMOCRACY. By-the-book decision-making processes

8) Other

Wordings:

"...ja ryhmä voi jyrätä päätöksillään demokraattisten toimielimien yli."

"...jotta voimme rakentaa kaupunkia, joka on mahdollisimman hyvä kaikille."

NB Not about begging, but about need of the Roma: *"Pajusen tulisi ennemminkin keskittää voimansa sen selvittämiseen, kuinka näille ihmisille löydetään paremmat asuinolosuhteet ja kuinka heille saadaan koulutusta ja työtä tarjottavaksi."*

9) The East European Roma are... a challenge for the city, which should attempted to genuinely solve with the long term in mind. Entitled to 'humane' circumstances and inclusion in society (housing, education, work).

Appendix 2: Helsingin Sanomat articles

- 1) *Kenenkään ei pitäisi hankkia elantoaan maassa kyyhöttäen*
(Nobody should make their living by crouching on the ground)
1.6.2010 - Letter to the editor
- 2) *Saahan keskustakin kerjätä*
(The Centre Party is allowed to beg too)
2.6.2010 - Letter to the editor
- 3) *"En ole erityisen innoissani tästä aiheesta"*
(“I am not especially enthusiastic about this topic”)
3.6.2010 - Local news
- 4) *Eduskunta otti tiukan linjan romanien turvapaikkahakemuksiin*
(The parliament chose a strict line regarding asylum applications by the Roma)
5.6.2010 - Domestic news
- 5) *Kerjäämisen kriminalisointi olisi perustuslain vastaista*
(Criminalizing begging would be against the constitution)
5.6.2010 - Letter to the editor
- 6) *Kerjäläiselämää omin silmin*
(Beggary life with own eyes)
7.6.2010 - Local news
- 7) *Köyhyys ei voi olla rikos*
(Poverty cannot be a crime)
7.6.2010 - Letter to the editor
- 8) *Kerjäämisen kriminalisointi tuskin poistaisi ongelman syitä*
(Criminalizing begging would hardly eliminate the causes of the problem)
7.6.2010 - Letter to the editor
- 9) *Kaupunkilaisten reviiri kunniaan*
(Respect the turf of the city-dwellers)
8.6.2010 - Column

- 10) *Kriminalisointi tuskin on neutraalia*
(Criminalization is hardly neutral)
10.6.2010 - Letter to the editor
- 11) *Kerjäämiskielto voimaan koko laajuudessaan*
(Introduce a ban on begging in its full extent)
16.6.2010 - Letter to the editor
- 12) *Rahan ruinaajat, älkää pysäytelkö ihmisiä*
(Importuners for money, do not intercept people)
17.6.2010 - Letter to the editor
- 13) *Suomen romanit vastustavat kerjäämisen kieltä*
(The Roma of Finland object to a ban on begging)
22.6.2010 - Domestic news
- 14) *Ovatko kerjäläiset todella rikollisia?*
(Are the beggars really criminal?)
24.6.2010 - Column
- 15) *Työryhmä esittää kerjäämisen kieltämistä*
(Working group putting forward a ban on begging)
25.6.2010 - Local news
- 16) *EU-Romaniaa olisi rangaistava romanien laiminlyönnistä*
(EU-Romania should be punished for neglecting the Roma)
28.6.2010 - Letter to the editor
- 17) *Maakuntalehdet: Suurin osa kieltäisi kerjäämisen*
(The provincial newspapers: The majority would ban begging)
4.7.2010 - Domestic news
- 18) *Pääministerin palkan pitää vastata vastuuta*
(The salary of the Prime Minister should equal the responsibility)
5.7.2010 – "Other newspapers"
- 19) *Häätö uhkaa romaneja ja aktivisteja*
(Roma and activists facing threat of eviction)
7.7.2010 - Local news
- 20) *Rikat vain pois rikkaiden silmistä*
(Just trim the weed so that the rich do not have to see it)
9.7.2010 - Letter to the editor

- 21) *Tukholmassa ei kerjääjiä näkynyt*
(No beggars to be seen in Stockholm)
9.7.2010 - Letter to the editor
- 22) *Romanien karkottaminen on lyhytnäköistä*
(Deporting the Roma is short-sighted)
10.7.2010 - Letter to the editor
- 23) *Jos häätö tulee, romaneille vallataan uusi paikka*
(If evicted, a new spot will be squatted for the Roma)
10.7.2010 - Local news
- 24) *Jokamiehen oikeus*
(Every man's right)
11.7.2010 - Sunday supplement
- 25) *Romanijärjestöt paheksuvat häätöuhkaa*
(The Roma organizations disapprove of the eviction threat)
12.7.2010 - Local news
- 26) *Tukholmassa on kerjäläisiä*
(There are beggars in Stockholm)
14.7.2010 - Letter to the editor
- 27) *Helsinki siivottava ensin puliukoista*
(Helsinki should first be cleaned of winos)
15.7.2010 - Letter to the editor
- 28) *Helsinkiä ei pidä ”puhdistaa” puliukoista*
(Helsinki should not be “cleansed” of winos)
18.7.2010 - Letter to the editor
- 29) *Romanisoittajat, tervetuloa piholle ja ratikoihin!*
(Roma musicians, welcome to the yards and trams!)
18.7.2010 - Letter to the editor
- 30) *Zyskowicz vertaa kerjäämistä naisten ympärileikkaukseen*
(Zyskowicz compares begging to female circumcision)
24.7.2010 - Domestic news
- 31) *Feissareiden toiminnan voi rinnastaa kerjäämiseen*
(The actions of the face-to-face recruiters can be paralleled to begging)
27.7.2010 - Letter to the editor

- 32) *Romaneille on perustettava leiri palveluineen*
(A camp with service should be established for the Roma)
27.7.2010 - Letter to the editor
- 33) *Kerjääminen voidaan ja pitää kieltää*
(Begging can and shall be banned)
28.7.2010 - Letter to the editor
- 34) *Leivän jonotus ei ole ihmisarvoista*
(Queuing for bread is not fit for human dignity)
29.7.2010 - Letter to the editor
- 35) *Romaneja ei auteta palveluleirein*
(The Roma cannot be helped with service camps)
30.7.2010 - Letter to the editor
- 36) *Helsinki ei häädäkään Verkkosaaren romaneja*
(Helsinki not evicting the Roma in Verkkosaari after all)
31.7.2010 - Local news
- 37) *Kerjäämiskieltoa perustellaan Suomi-myytillä*
(Ban on begging justified by a myth about Finland)
31.7.2010 - Letter to the editor
- 38) *Poissa silmistä, poissa mielestä*
(Out of sight, out of mind)
31.7.2010 - Letter to the editor
- 39) *Ruotsi käännäyttää romanikerjäläisiä*
(Sweden turning back Roma beggars)
31.7.2010 - Foreign news
- 40) *Kaupustelijoita epäillään varastelusta festivaalialueilla*
(Peddlers suspected of stealing in a festival area)
1.8.2010 - Domestic news
- 41) *Yksin myrkkysieni ei tappanut Claudiuta*
(The poisonous mushroom alone did not kill Claudiu)
2.8.2010 - Column
- 42) *Romaneille järjestetään tuki-ilta Kalliossa*
(Event in benefit of the Roma organized in Kallio)
5.8.2010 - Local news

- 43) *Romanien häätö siirtyy ainakin syyskuulle*
(Eviction of the Roma postponed until September at earliest)
6.8.2010 - Local news
- 44) *Kerjäyskiellosta ei saa pikavoittoja*
(No quick gains to be found in a ban on begging)
7.8.2010 - Editorial
- 45) *Onko oikein antaa rahaa kerjäläiselle?*
(Is it right to give money to a beggar?)
8.8.2010 - Editorial
- 46) *Hyväntekeväisyys voi olla joko ikävää tai hauskaa*
(Charity can be either dull or fun)
9.8.2010 - Letter to the editor
- 47) *Minusta ei ollut kerjääjäksi, hankin ruokaa varastamalla*
(I did not have it in me to beg, got food by stealing)
9.8.2010 - Letter to the editor
- 48) *Poliisi on alkanut jakaa häätöilmoituksia romanileireille*
(The police has started to hand out notifications of eviction)
10.8.2010 - Local news
- 49) *EU:ssa perusoikeudet kuuluvat romaneillekin*
(The basic rights belong also to the Roma in the EU)
20.8.2010 - Editorial
- 50) *Anastettu asuntovaunu löytyi romanileiristä*
(Stolen caravan found in Roma camp)
22.8.2010 - Local news
- 51) *EU-rahasto auttaa myös romaneja*
(The EU fund helps also Roma)
26.8.2010 - Letter to the editor
- 52) *Sosiaalikeskus Satamalle tulossa lähtöpssit*
(The Social centre Satama will be given the boot)
31.8.2010 - Local news

Appendix 3: Aftenposten articles

- 1) *Styrk kampen mot kriminalitet*
(Strengthen the fight against criminality)
8.6.2010 - Evening edition - Letter to the editor
- 2) *Vis respekt for tiggere*
(Show respect to beggars)
10.6.2010 - Evening edition - Letter to the editor
- 3) *Bergen vil ha tiggerfrie soner*
(Bergen wants beggar free zones)
11.6.2010 - Morning edition - Domestic news
- 4) *Begrensning av tiggingen*
(Limiting the begging)
15.6.2010 - Evening edition - Editorial
- 5) *Misforstått politisk snillisme*
(Misunderstood political kindness)
17.6.2010 - Evening edition - Letter to the editor
- 6) *Kallmyr lover tiggerstopp i 2012*
(Kallmyr promises a stop to beggars in 2012)
24.6.2010 - Evening edition - Local news
- 7) *”Tigger-Rusken”*
(“Beggar-Rusken”)
29.6.2010 - Evening edition - Commentary
- 8) *Fra paradegate til pariagate*
(From main street to pariah street)
29.6.2010 - Evening edition - Local news
- 9) *Slik kan vi ikke ha det*
(We cannot have it like this)
30.6.2010 - Evening edition - Local news

- 10) *Skyggene på Karl Johan*
(The shadows on Karl Johan)
1.7.2010 - Evening edition - Commentary
- 11) *Ingen tiggere o se i Stockholm*
(No beggars to be seen in Stockholm)
1.7.2010 - Evening edition - Letter to the editor
- 12) *Let etter en god ting i dag*
(Search for a good thing today)
1.7.2010 - Osloplus supplement
- Kroneisen selger alltid best*
(The Kroneise always sells best)
13.7.2010 - Osloplus supplement
- I slottet tasser den onde hunden*
(The evil dog sneaks around in the castle)
3.8.2010 - Osloplus supplement
- 13) *2 av 3 vil forby tigging*
(2 out of 3 want to forbid begging)
1.7.2010 - Evening edition - Local news
- 14) *Plagsom paradegate*
(Troublesome main street)
5.7.2010 - Morning edition - Commentary
- 15) *Etterlyser varige endringer*
(Demands for permanent changes)
8.7.2010 - Evening edition - Local news
- 16) *"Tigger-Rusken"*
(“Beggar-Rusken”)
8.7.2010 - Evening edition - Letter to the editor
- 17) *Tiggere turnerer landet rundt*
(Beggars touring the country)
23.7.2010 - Morning edition - Domestic news

- 18) *Den horrible slummen*
(The horrible slum)
28.7.2010 - Evening edition - Commentary
- 19) *Tigging er ikke politiets problem*
(Begging is not a problem for the police)
29.7.2010 - Evening edition - Letter to the editor
- 20) *Rydder paradegaten*
(Clearing the main street)
4.8.2010 - Evening edition - Local news
- 21) *Pågrep flaskeplukker*
(Bottle collector arrested)
5.8.2010 - Evening edition - Local news
- 22) *Beleilige syndebukker*
(Convenient scapegoats)
19.8.2010 - Morning edition - Column
- 23) *Høyre-topp vil forby all tigging*
(Lead of Høyre wants to ban all begging)
24.8.2010 - Evening edition - Local news
- 24) *Millioner ingen vil ha*
(Millions unwanted by anyone)
25.8.2010 - Morning edition - Foreign news
- 25) *Når univers kolliderer*
(When the universe collides)
26.8.2010 - Morning edition - Editorial
- 26) *Byens tilstand er go*
(The state of the city is good)
26.8.2010 - Evening edition - Local news
- 27) *Nei til tiggerlisens*
(No to beggar license)
31.8.2010 - Evening edition - Local news