Wittgenstein on Aesthetic Normativity and Grammar

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Aesthetic Normativity and Grammar

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1. Philosophy and Aesthetics in the Tractatus

According to the notes of John King, taken in the academic year 1931–32, Wittgenstein described Kant’s method as “the right sort of approach” in philosophy (LWL, 73). At that time, Wittgenstein connects what he calls the Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy to the idea of a limit of language, manifest in the impossibility of describing the fact that corresponds to a sentence without repeating the sentence (MS 110 61, CV 13). There is a long tradition of reading the Tractatus as a Kantian work in this sense. According to this reading, both Kant and Wittgenstein identify our failure to distinguish between the transcendental and the empirical viewpoints as the source of philosophical illusion. The remedy for this illusion is the reflection of the transcendental, limiting conditions of experience or sense (CPR A 293–298; TLP 4.113–4.1212). For the early Wittgenstein, such a condition is logic.

In the Kantian reading of the Tractatus, “logic is transcendental” in a Kantian sense of the term (TLP 6.13). This means, first, that logic treats the necessary conditions for the possibility of sense (TLP 2.18). Second, logic is universal: the logical form shared by language and every imaginable world is given in the forms of the unalterable and subsistent objects, and it is known to the speaker a priori as the form constitutive of his thought (TLP 2.022–2.0272, 3.03, 5.4731). Third, logic is linked to the metaphysical subject by Wittgenstein’s characterization of both as the “limit of the world” (TLP 5.61, 5.632). In these respects, the Tractarian logic resembles Kant’s transcendental logic (CPR A57).

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1 We do not have Moore’s record of this, as he did not take notes in Wittgenstein’s classes during the Michaelmas Term 1931 and Lent Term 1932 (M, Editorial Introduction, 3c).
3 This methodological affinity between Kant and Wittgenstein is discussed by Moore in Moore & Sullivan 2003.
But it is not just logic that Wittgenstein characterizes as transcendental and ineffable. In the *Tractatus*, he writes: “It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)” (TLP 6.421.) I have argued elsewhere that Wittgenstein’s use of the term transcendental in relation to ethics-cum-aesthetics ought to be understood in the same threefold sense as the transcendentality of logic. In his early notes, Wittgenstein writes: “Ethics must be a condition of the world, like logic” (NB 77). He connects ethics with the metaphysical subject and does so even more explicitly than in the case of logic (NB 79). And like logic, which does not handle the empirical content of facts but only their form, ethics does not treat of the facts of the world, as they all reside on an evaluatively neutral level (TLP 6.1–6.12, 6.4–6.42). Instead, the essence of ethics is a form of a feeling: “To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole – a limited whole. Feeling the world as a limited whole – it is this that is mystical” (TLP 6.45). This is a form of a feeling, because the same perspective may be adopted, not just towards the world or life, but towards any given empirical thing: “As a thing among things, each thing is equally insignificant; as a world each one equally significant” (NB 83, see TLP 5.621, MS 109 28, CV 6).

If this sketch of the transcendentality of logic and ethics is plausible (as a view Wittgenstein actually endorsed or as a view he recommended to be abandoned as a compelling but ultimately incoherent philosophical confusion), then we find yet another Kantian notion at work in the *Tractatus*. This is the idea of two mutually exclusive but equally relevant viewpoints on the world, introduced by Kant in his *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. The first stems from determining judgments that subsume particulars under conceptual rules of understanding and yields empirical cognition. This viewpoint shows the world and its organisms as “mere aggregates” of facts, as something mechanical (CPJ 20: 217, cf. TLP 1.1). The second arises from the reflective use of the power of judgment and shows the same organisms and eventually the entire nature as unified organized systems, whose parts are conceived as “possible only through their relation to the whole” (CPJ 5: 373). Perceived as a whole, nature may be compared to art or better, given that it is self-organizing rather than organized by an external agent, to life itself (CPJ 5: 374, cf. TLP 5.621). However, since the formal purposiveness of organisms is based on a principle given by the power of judgment to itself, the reflective perspective gives us grounds merely for the description of

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5 Appelqvist 2013.

nature, not to its scientific explanation (CPJ 5: 417). For Kant, pure judgments of taste exemplify
the principle of the reflecting power of judgment in its purest form. This is because they rest on the
judging subject’s feeling in the contemplation of an object as a purposive whole, for which no
conceptually determinable purpose may be identified (CPJ 5: 194).

In my reading, these two perspectives on the world appear in the *Tractatus* as associated
with the domains of logic and ethics-cum-aesthetics respectively. Logical form is the essence of the
perspective which gives us the world as the totality of contingent and mutually independent facts
(TLP 1.1, 2.061, 4.26, 5.134). As such, the world may be depicted by means of propositions, natural
science being “the totality of true propositions” (TLP 4.001, 4.11). Interestingly, however,
Wittgenstein claims that philosophy itself “is not one of the natural sciences” (TLP 4.111), thereby
implying that even the totality of true propositions leaves out something. What language fails to
express is the logical form presupposed by propositions, just as it fails to express the mystical
feeling of the world as a limited and complete whole (TLP 4.121, 6.45). In its reflective capacity,
philosophy thus joins ethics and aesthetics.7 In the following, I argue that in spite of the dramatic
changes that occur in Wittgenstein’s thought in his so-called middle period, the conception of the
reflective perspective as shared by philosophy and ethics-cum-aesthetics carries over to
Wittgenstein’s lectures 1930–33 as recorded by G. E. Moore.

2. “Propaganda for a descriptive method, rather than an explanatory” (9:6)

The Kantian view of philosophy as an enterprise qualitatively different from the sciences,
advocated in the *Tractatus*, still figures in Moore’s lecture notes. According to these as well as other
notes taken in Wittgenstein’s lectures during his middle period, Wittgenstein emphasized the
“enormous difference between philosophy & sciences” (M 5:1, see LWL 9–10, AWL 3, 18).
Philosophy differs from the sciences in its generality, fundamentality for both ordinary life and
science, and independence from the specific results or hypotheses of the sciences (M 5:49). We
read: “In philosophy we know all we need to know at the start: we don’t need to know any new
facts” (M 5:30). A similar view is expressed even in the *Philosophical Investigations*. Alluding to
the *Tractatus*, against the background of which he wanted the *Philosophical Investigations* to be
read, Wittgenstein writes: “It was correct that out considerations must not be scientific ones … The

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7 On the connection between ethics, aesthetics, and philosophy, see also Richter 2016. Richter characterizes
the experiences relevant for ethics as “transcendent”. As explained, I locate the ground for such experiences
in the *transcendental*, limiting conditions of value judgments that do not evoke any reference to the
*transcendent* realm beyond those conditions.
problems are solved, not by coming up with new discoveries, but by assembling what we have long been familiar with” (PI § 109 & p.4). This mature remark echoes King’s record of Wittgenstein’s characterization of Kant’s method as the right sort of approach: “Hume, Descartes and others had tried to start with one proposition such a ‘Cogito ergo sum’ and work from it to others. Kant disagreed and started with what we know to be so and so, and went on to examine the validity of what we suppose we know.” (LWL 73–74.) Hence, pace some critics of the Kantian reading, Wittgenstein himself did not take Kant’s method to be foundationalist or dogmatic but one that builds on that which is already familiar to us.⁸

For Wittgenstein, the familiar starting point of philosophical investigation is language: “our investigations are about language, & about puzzles that arise from use of language” (M 8:71). By contrast to empirical discoveries and explanations stemming from them philosophical investigation, as Wittgenstein now conceives it, gravitates towards grammatical statements (M 5:32). Unlike empirical propositions, these are neither true nor false (M 6b:47). Nor do they stand in need of justification. Grammatical rules are exempt from the requirement of justification, because grammar itself is presupposed by the possibility of justification. Moore records: “The rules of translation from language into reality correspond to rules of grammar: & there is no possible justification for these: because any language by which we could try to justify would have to have a grammar itself: no description of world can justify rules of grammar” (M 5:54; see 4:31, 4:33, 4:42, 5:86).

That “grammar is unjustifiable by means of language” echoes the Tractarian account of logic as understood by the Kantian reading, namely, that logical form cannot be justified by language as it is the necessary condition for any possible symbolism (M 4:60, TLP 4.121). Indeed, in the Lent term 1930, Wittgenstein still discusses the relation between language and the world in terms still strikingly similar to the Tractatus. According to him, language represents the world not only by true and false propositions, but also by having its logical form in common with the world (M 4:18, see TLP 2.18). While all imaginable states of affairs may be expressed by propositions, there is no viewpoint external to grammar: “Language always expresses one fact as opposed to another: never expresses what could not be otherwise – never, therefore, what is essential to the world” (M 5:28; see 5:87, 8:76). Moreover, as in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein presents logical form as constitutive of thought: “What sort of harmony must there be between thoughts & the world? Only that the thought must have logical form; & without this it wouldn’t be a thought” (M 4:18, see 5:65 & TLP 3.02–3.032).

⁸ See, for example, Kuusela 2001 & 2008.
However, Wittgenstein’s conception of the essence of the world has changed. What language has in common with the world is not hidden underneath the conventions of everyday language as the Tractatus claimed, but is “contained in rules of grammar” (M 8:14, cf. TLP 4.002, PI § 371). In Moore’s lecture notes there is no mention of the unalterable objects which, in the Tractatus, gave language and the world its immutable essence. This essence crystallized in the general propositional form that every meaningful proposition was supposed to meet (TLP 2.024–2.0271, 5.471–5.4711). Indicative of the transition taking place in his thought, Wittgenstein singles out as a mistake his earlier idea of the logical analysis of language, which was supposed to uncover the logical form of propositions and end up at simple names standing for equally simple objects. This idea, Wittgenstein now claims, was a digression into thinking along the lines of natural science (M 5:30, 7:39, 7:88, 7:92). There is no need to posit a fixed substance of objects as the terminus of analysis. Instead, we read: “Thus we’re led to think the rules are responsible to something not a rule, whereas they’re only responsible to rules” (M 7:2).

In the lectures, Wittgenstein describes grammar in an increasingly contextual manner. Grammar may be looked at as an autonomous system of arbitrary rules, which is to look at it as a game (M 4:61). The contextuality of rules is underscored by Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the notion of a system, treated as the background against which words acquire their meaning: “We might say meaning of word is its place in grammar, just as meaning of a chessman is its place in system of rules” (M 8:72; see 5:20, 5:37). Wittgenstein even makes the same point about gestures – something one might take for a paradigm case of eliciting a mere natural response that counted as the understanding of a gesture. To be understood, Wittgenstein claims, a gesture “has to be understood as part of a system”, has to have “a kind of a grammar” (M 5:93). As the example of the grammar of a gesture shows, grammar in not unconnected from the concrete uses it has in the human realm. We read: “This rule is a rule of a game; & and its importance comes in from fact that we use it in our language” (M 5:87). While grammar figures as that upon which the use of language relies, we are free to abandon or change the rules provided we are willing to give up the use which they have made possible: “What I say of grammar (including inference) is always arbitrary rules: they needn’t be used, but if we change them, we can’t use them in this way” (M 5:88). In this respect, Wittgenstein’s developing view is fundamentally different from the Tractarian account (cf. TLP 3.2–3.21, 3.25, 4.002).

The difference between the empirical and the grammatical is particularly poignant in Wittgenstein’s remarks on understanding in the middle period. The understanding of language is not a mechanical process of symbols producing certain effects, for “in that case language would be on a level with drugs” (M 4:7). Understanding is more a matter of “applying a general rule to a special
case” (M 4:2, see PI § 292). As such, it is a normative issue: to use a symbol commits the user to follow the relevant rule, i.e. to use it in the future as she is using it now (M 5:37–5:38). Part of this commitment is the speaker’s ability to justify her application of the rule by giving reasons. However, a general rule will not determine its application to particular cases. Anticipating the regress argument of the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein notes: “We have abstracted from our experience, a rule pointing to the future, & not verifiable because it points to the future ad infinitum” (M 4:51, see M 5:40, 5:94, PI §§ 218, 201). While there are cases in which I can justify my application of a rule – “This is a square’ is a justification” (M 6:4) – I will soon run out of them. We read: “But the justification doesn’t go further: you can’t justify language; but only one language, by means of another” (M 6:4). In other words, “Every ‘reason’ is a reason only within a game”, and reasons come to an end (M 7:4; see PG 97 & PI §§ 326, 482, 485). This is because “we can’t give reasons for grammatical rules” (M 5:63). Interestingly, the point where the application of the rule cannot be further justified still lies, in Wittgenstein’s imagery, at the limit of language: “Philosophy may expect to arrive at fundamental propositions. But great event to which we come is the coming to the boundary of language: there we can’t ask anything further” (M 5:28).

I would like to connect this great event of reaching the boundary of language at which justifications given by explicit formulations of a rule will inevitably run out to Wittgenstein’s discussion of aesthetics in May 1933. In my reading, the two discussions – one about philosophy, the other about aesthetics – are closely connected. Moreover, the connection arises from the reflective perspective that shows its object as a whole and its parts as possible only in relation to the whole. As mentioned, in the *Tractatus*, we can find a contrast between the factual perspective of sciences and the perspective on an object as a limited whole. Now, in Moore’s notes, we find Wittgenstein distinguishing explicitly between two ways of looking at meaning. The first, “discursive” perspective approaches meaning as the place a word has in a calculus that can be taught to another. The second, “intuitive” perspective “takes something in as a whole at a glance” (M 8:58). It “overlooks” a system, has a synoptic view of the grammar of a word (M 9:38, fn. 453). Wittgenstein notes that this “immediate recognition” of a whole gives us “immediate pleasure”. Such pleasure never arises out of grasping a scientific hypothesis, he says, for hypotheses do not satisfy an “aesthetic craving” (M 9:37). Thus described, the synoptic view, which Wittgenstein puts at the center of philosophical investigation, is something we know from the realm of aesthetics. And

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9 Put thus, Wittgenstein’s problem has a Kantian ring (see CPR A 133). On the affinity between Kant and Wittgenstein on applying a rule, see Glock 1996, 326; Haugeland 1998, fn 4; Kukla 2006, 10; McDowell 2009, 110. On Kant’s account of beauty as providing the answer to the problem, see Allison 2001, 154–155 and Bell 1987.
not just any aesthetics, but aesthetics as understood in the Kantian tradition, namely, as the *locus classicus* of reflective judgment.

3. “Aesthetics is ‘descriptive’ in sense I said” (9:23)

In Wittgenstein’s early view, the sameness of ethics and aesthetics stems from the sameness of the reflective perspective. In Moore’s notes, Wittgenstein still treats aesthetics and ethics in unison: “Practically everything I say of ‘beautiful’ applies in a slightly different way to ‘good’” (M 9:18). And he still has more to say about aesthetics than ethics ordinarily understood. But just like his developing account on language, Wittgenstein’s remarks on aesthetics differ from his earlier view in their self-proclaimed approach of looking at how people actually use aesthetic words.

It is interesting to note that while (often seemingly isolated) remarks on aesthetics and the arts may be found in Wittgenstein’s writings throughout the course of his philosophical work, the most systematic discussions on aesthetics are from his middle period (M 9:1–9:46, LC, see also BB 165–167, 177-178). The editors of *Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1930–1933* mention that in discussing aesthetics Wittgenstein probably had in mind two symposia of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association in July 1932 (M fn. 425). The second of these symposia treated aesthetics, featuring talks by L. A. Reid, Helen Knight, and C. E. M. Joad. Wittgenstein mentions Knight explicitly, criticizing her way of treating aesthetics in causal, mechanistic terms (M 9:28–29, fn. 447). He also questions the idea of beauty as an indefinable quality, which was the view advocated by Reid (M 9:12, see Reid, Knight & Joad, 172). But the difference between Wittgenstein’s conception of aesthetics and the one exemplified by the symposium lies deeper than these disagreements, no matter how indicative they are.

The symposium discusses the relevance of psychology for aesthetics. Knight takes the affective effects caused by works of art to be the proper subject matter of aesthetics, whereas Reid and Joad argue against the view. Yet, despite their differences, all three come together in other respects. First, they all locate an aesthetic object, typically a work of art, at the center of the discussion. Second, the aesthetic object is understood as the bearer of “the differentiating property of aesthetic objects”, such as beauty or aesthetic value. This property is, in turn, understood in either objectivist (Reid & Joad) or subjectivist (Knight) sense (Reid, Knight & Joad 1932, 209). For Reid, beauty corresponds to the value-laden content of the work of art; for Joad, it is a Platonic form graspable by the cultivated mind; whereas Knight takes the aesthetic value of works of art to emerge from the effects they induce in the audience (ibid., 172, 180, 211, 196). Nevertheless, third,
all three come together in their quest for a uniform standard for aesthetic value that in turn dictates the proper function of art. For all three, this standard lies somewhere beyond the medium of art itself.

Wittgenstein’s approach is different in all three respects. By contrast to taking a certain domain of objects as his subject matter, Wittgenstein focuses on the use of aesthetic language. He asks: “If you want to know how ‘beautiful’ is used: ask what sort of discussion you could have as to whether a thing is so” (M 9:12, cf. LC I: 8). Rather than consulting philosophers about the nature of aesthetic enquiry, we ought to look at “how e.g. musicians use ‘beautiful’, if they use it at all, in a discussion” (M 9:18). Insofar as the arts are concerned, Wittgenstein does not primarily discuss works of art. He is more interested in “aesthetic systems”, such as those we find in sculpture, architecture, poetry, and music, perhaps the most systemic of all arts (M 9:40–9:41). As systems, these fields of art are structured by their respective sets of “rules” or “laws” (M 9:27, 9:32, see LC I: 15). In this respect, they resemble Wittgenstein’s main interest, grammar. Wittgenstein does not limit his stock of examples to the arts either, but the phenomena open to aesthetic investigation include natural beauty, human faces, and even the “choosing [of] a suitable wall-paper” (M 9:20, see 9:16). In his 1938 lectures on aesthetics, Wittgenstein adds to this corpus of examples clothing and furniture (LC I: 12–13, 19–22). These are the kinds of examples that Kant uses in his Third Critique, and has been ridiculed for doing so, most notably for his use of wall-paper as an example of free beauty (CPJ 5: 212, 5:229). But if the starting point of investigation is the aesthetic judgment rather than its object, then there is nothing odd about such examples. If anything, they serve to underscore the focus of investigation. This focus, I would argue, Kant and Wittgenstein share. True, the term “aesthetic judgment” does not appear in Moore’s notes. Still, the central themes of Wittgenstein’s discussion, namely, aesthetic understanding, aesthetic investigation, aesthetics puzzles and their answers, and the reasons given for them, are fairly characterized in terms of the notion. And indeed, in the 1938 lectures on aesthetics, the term aesthetic judgment occurs repeatedly in connection with remarks that bear close resemblance to those we find in Moore’s notes (LC I:8, I:15, I:17, I:25).

Second, Wittgenstein rejects the notion of beauty as a uniform property at the core of aesthetic investigation: “It is not true that ‘beautiful’ means what’s common to all the things we call so: we use it in a hundred different games” (M 9:13, see LC I: 1–5). Often we do not talk about beauty at all, but use more specific expressions, like “top-heavy” of a door as part of an architectural design or “correct”, “right”, or “wrong” in relation to an accompaniment written for a song (M 9:18–9:19). Wittgenstein also readily dismisses the subjectivist account of aesthetic value as the effect the aesthetic object produces. By “beautiful” we do not mean “giving me stomach-
ache/pleasure”, for if we did, aesthetics would be a merely experiential matter of producing certain effects (M 9:18). He states: “If ever we come to this: I like this; I don’t, there is an end of Aesthetics; & then comes psychology” (M 9:27). Like language, which should not be likened to a drug mechanically producing certain effects, the aesthetically relevant is not reducible to feelings of pleasure (M 4:7, 9:29, see BB 178). Pleasure is not necessary for an aesthetic judgment, for “what harmony allows isn’t always agreeable: sometimes it’s terrific, sometimes boring etc..” (M 9:15).

Insofar as pleasure is relevant, then the pleasure ought to be intrinsically connected with what is aesthetically appreciated (M 9:19). Wittgenstein illustrates the argument as follows: “Suppose you find a bass too heavy – that it moves too much; you aren’t saying: If it moves less, it will be more agreeable to me. That it should be quieter is an end in itself, not a means to an end.” (M 9:20, see LC I:19.) This reductio of reducing aesthetics to pleasurable effects thus leads to the Kantian conclusion that the aesthetically relevant is an end in itself (CPJ 5:305–306). Such a conclusion lies in stark contrast to any view that explains the aesthetic by reference to a realm (affective, cognitive, or moral) beyond itself.

Wittgenstein seems to agree with Reid and Joad on the irrelevance of psychology for aesthetics (M 9:30–9:42). However, to make his point, Wittgenstein appeals to a distinction which is missing from the talks given in the symposium and which is as good as unintelligible from an Empiricist perspective. This is the characteristically Kantian distinction between the beautiful and the agreeable (M 9:18–9:29). Kant begins his Third Critique by arguing that while judgments of the agreeable and of beauty are both aesthetic judgments in the sense of pertaining to sensibility, judgments of beauty are offered as valid for everyone. When I judge something to be beautiful I demand that others agree with me in spite of the principled impossibility to give my judgment

10 In his lectures on aesthetics in 1938, the distinction between the beautiful and the agreeable is not mentioned explicitly. However, Wittgenstein still stresses the contrast between aesthetic judgments and judgments about smells and tastes (LC II: 3).
conceptual justifications, Kant argues. I believe that this is the crux of Wittgenstein’s discussion as well.

Characterizing the agreeable, in line with Kant, as that which pertains to smells, tastes, and causally induced feelings of liking, Wittgenstein states: “If this were all, Aesthetics would be a matter of taste” (M 9:26, see LC II:2–3). So is not aesthetics a matter of taste, then? For the British Empiricists, aesthetics was first and foremost a matter of taste, of our natural if cultivable ability to respond to aesthetic objects by proper sentiments. Wittgenstein’s remark becomes understandable if it is read against the background of Kant’s account as represented by the above quote. If judgments of beauty were merely a matter of subjective liking, then there would be no difference between the agreeable and the beautiful. However, like Kant who started from what he took to be self-evident, namely, that the language of beauty is inherently normative, so too Wittgenstein describes aesthetic language as normative.11 We read: “When I say ‘This bass moves too much’ I don’t merely mean ‘It gives me such & such an impression’, because If I did I should have to be content with the answer ‘It doesn’t give me that impression’” (M 9:28). But we are not content with that. While we do not generally ask people to justify their preferences for smells or tastes of, say, roast-beef or coffee, in aesthetics we ask for reasons (M 9:20, LC II: 2).

The understanding of language is more than mere mechanical reaction, because it commits the speaker to using her words consistently. The same applies to aesthetics. We hold the speaker accountable for her aesthetic judgments. Now, aesthetic words, like any words, are used within a context. The immediate context suggested by Wittgenstein’s discussion is the context provided by an “aesthetic system” within which an “aesthetic puzzle” arises. These puzzles are like puzzles about language: “why do we have this word in this place rather than that; this musical phrase rather than that” (M 9:30, see 8:71)? Why is this chord “correct”, “right”, or even “necessary” (M 9:19, 9:21, 9:30)? So how do we acquire understanding of that then? The question is closely related to another: “What sort of thing is not understanding a church mode? & therefore ‘understanding’” (M 9:41, cf. PI § 535)? Where is the standard of correctness that differentiates a mere reaction from understanding? As in the case of language where the meaning of a word is its role in the grammatical system, Wittgenstein directs the attention to the aesthetic system: “I was looking for utterances inside an aesthetic system” (M 9:40).

I claimed above that as systems, also aesthetic systems are structured by their own sets of rules that look as arbitrary as the rules of grammar, as they are not responsible to anything but rules. This is more poignant in the case of music than anywhere else. In Moore’s notes we find numerous

11 On Kant’s argument as an argument from linguistic usage, see Allison 2001, 103–104.
references to the rules of harmony and rhythm as criteria of correctness: “In a book of harmony, you find no trace of psychology. It says: you mustn’t make this transition, etc.” (M 9:14). Wittgenstein even mentions an aesthetic puzzle with a possible answer, familiar to every student of counterpoint: “‘Why is this note absolutely necessary?’ Explanation would look like this: If you wrote out the tune in chords, you would see to which chord the note belongs. I.e. it hints at placing side by side with the tune a certain chorale.” (M 9:39.) Such explanations do not appeal to a realm over and above music itself any more than grammar stands in need of justification by reference to something not grammar. They are, as Wittgenstein says, in nature of further descriptions within the system (M 9:31). We read: “I say all Aesthetics is of nature of giving a paraphrase” (M 9:37). In this respect, they meet Wittgenstein’s characterization of the Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy as manifesting the limit of language (MS 110: 61, CV 13).

To compare grammar with aesthetics brings to surface an additional feature that I have up to now brushed aside, namely, the “immediate pleasure” that may arise from seeing the synoptic view that satisfies our “aesthetic craving” (M 9:38–9:39). Recall the distinction between the agreeable and the beautiful which, I have argued, Wittgenstein adopts from Kantian aesthetics. Pure judgments of taste differ from judgments of the agreeable in their normative force. But the two types of judgments have something in common too. This is because they both rest upon the subject’s reaction to a sensible particular and cannot thus be made by imitating others or by simply subsuming the particular under a given conceptual rule to be found in a manual. Also this feature of aesthetic judgments surfaces in Wittgenstein’s discussion. While the (limited) availability of reasons differentiates aesthetic investigation from a psychological investigation, you may not be satisfied by the reasons I offer for my judgment (M 9:30–9:31, 9:39). You may not see the connections that I see within the system, you may not feel the ending of a church mode as an ending. And while I can always reformulate my original reason, point to new connections within the aesthetic system, and evoke further comparisons, in the end you must make the judgment for yourself. “A solution must speak for itself. If when I’ve made you see what I see, it doesn’t appeal to you, there is an end” (M 9:31, see MS 137 17a, CV 79).

It might be tempting to read Wittgenstein’s reference to feelings of satisfaction as falling back on explaining aesthetics by appealing to an external source, like psychology, prescribing the aesthetic from outside the aesthetic system (M 9:38). But we read: “I don’t think ‘appeals to you’ stands for any single state of mind. The reasons have nothing to do with psychology.” (M 9:31–

12 In 1933 Wittgenstein refers to pleasure and satisfaction thus echoing Kant’s analysis of a judgment of beauty, whereas in 1938 Wittgenstein focuses on reactions of discontent and discomfort (LC II: 10). On displeasure and negative judgments of taste in Kant’s account, see Allison 2001, 116–117.
The feeling of satisfaction Wittgenstein has in mind is not a “feeling of warmth”, or “feeling like a butterfly with a pin through me”, or being reminded on one’s grandmother when listening to a piece of music. Rather, the satisfaction arises from the recognition of the system as an organized whole, from the “clicking” of the pieces of the puzzle when they fall into place (M 9:34, 9:40, LC III: 1–5). In this respect too it resembles Kant’s account of pure judgments of taste (CPJ 5:221). This is to say that while the rules of an aesthetic system still have an important role in aesthetic explanations, the aesthetic judgment itself cannot be explained exhaustively by appeal to rules. In this respect, it may be seen as preserving a role for the human person, emphasized in Alois Pichler’s as “the other side of the story” Wittgenstein wants to tell.13

According to Wittgenstein, the kinds of reasons given in aesthetics are also given in philosophy in response to puzzles that arise with language (M 9:32, 8:71). The relevant similarity, I have suggested, lies in the nature of the perspective we may adopt when we have exhausted available justifications. Wittgenstein says: “Essential thing is: If a symbolism is given sense, & I read it, then symbol for rule only adds to signs I am reading: & hence I can’t prescribe use of symbolism. I can prescribe use of a particular symbol, by adding signs to it. Symbolism as a whole being complete, I can’t prescribe it.” (M 5:59) The meanings of individual words may be explained by describing their place in a system of language by reference to rules that apply to them, just like the meaning of a note may be explained by calling it the dominant, but such explanations run out at the boundary of the system: “when whole is reached there can be no further explanation or misunderstanding” (M 5:62). But this just means that, despite the differences we find between Wittgenstein’s early position and the developing one presented in Moore’s notes, Wittgenstein still adheres to the view that philosophy and aesthetics come together in the reflective perspective they adopt.14

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13 Pichler 2016. I agree with Pichler on there being two distinct notions on understanding evoked in Wittgenstein’s middle period, the discursive or “transitive” notion of understanding and the synoptic “intransitive” notion. However, instead of seeing the two perspectives as voices standing in contradiction, I see them as notions that together “make up [our] concept of understanding”, as Wittgenstein later puts it (PI §§ 531–532). Also Pichler notes that “intransitive understanding is at work in any understanding, including transitive understanding”. Interestingly, a similar claim about the relevance of reflective judgment for the possibility of discursive cognition has been made by some Kant scholars (see Allison 2001, Bell 1987, Longuenesse 1998. See also Bell 1987, 239–244 and Cavell 1967).

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