

## **The double-edged sword: The political appropriation of the concept of populism**

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### **ABSTRACT**

The concept of populism has been in use in political debate for over a century. Because ‘populist’ is often used in a pejorative sense today, those to whom it is applied tend to reject it. However, a closer look at the history of the concept reveals that while its meaning may fluctuate and even be dismissed as irrelevant, its use can become a political tool. This study of the use of ‘populism’ refrains from making value judgments on the actual populist nature of certain parties or political tendencies. Instead, it analyses uses of the concept from a historical perspective. Special emphasis is placed on politicians who chose to define themselves as populist, or accept the label imposed by others, with particular focus on the Finns Party of Finland. Such self-identified populists draw their conceptions of populism from the ever-growing field of populism research, striving to appropriate and realize what scholars have only hypothetically described as a professed ideal. A closer look at the uses of populism as a political self-identity forces us to rethink its uses as a pejorative, or as an analytical, concept.

The concept of populism was originally imbued with a positive meaning, but its usage has become pejorative since the late 20th century. This semantic drift can be traced back to post-war debates within American historiography, as well as European reception in the 1980s. Populism scholar Margaret Canovan noted already in 1981 that scholars studying so-called populist parties in Europe have to balance between political self-definitions and pejoratives used by opponents<sup>1</sup>, but as historian Anton Jäger observes in 2016, many lack historical awareness of the concepts they employ.<sup>2</sup>

The concept of populism has two geographically separate lineages based on divergent historical experiences in Europe and the Americas. According to Argentine political theorist Ernesto

Laclau, a dismissal of populism is a dismissal of politics *tout court*.<sup>3</sup> In contrast, Frenchman Pierre Rosanvallon denounces populism as ‘a perverted inversion of the ideals of democracy’.<sup>4</sup> These contradictory definitions mirror the contradictory uses of the concept in political discourse. Concepts used by social scientists ‘tend to shape the very objects they propound to observe’.<sup>5</sup> Self-identified populists are usually aware of the negative connotations of the concept and decide to challenge them.

In political science and other fields of research where populism is used as an analytical concept, it is also often utilized in contradictory ways. Scholars may attempt to define universal elements of populism and compare this ideal model to the practices of existing parties.<sup>6</sup> In addition to its proposed ideological content, if any, populism may also be described as a style or a mode of communication.<sup>7</sup> Scholarly attempts to define populism have been criticized for potentially branding all rhetoric relating to ‘the people’ and critique of power as ‘populist’. Laclau warned that the pejorative sense of the concept is often maintained by researchers, who include and exclude features in an arbitrary way, making any rhetorical appeal to ‘the people’ potentially populist, but only designating as populists those parties who are newcomers to the political stage.<sup>8</sup> More recently, political scientists have straddled both the negative and the positive definitions.<sup>9</sup>

An organic definition of the people may be common to ideologies defined as populist, but it has been used by many other political movements to legitimize their claim for power. Therefore, this article explores populism appropriated as a concept of movement (*Bewegungsbegriff*) used and shaped by individuals and movements attempting to harness it for different purposes. Conceptual historian Reinhart Koselleck saw the coinage and use of isms in the modern era as justifications and even obligations for active participation in everyday political life.<sup>10</sup> Populism appears to be employed both as a warning against the ‘wrong’ kind of participatory politics, as well as an invitation to ‘correct’ ways of political participation, filled with the value of unfulfilled expectations, or temporal ‘compensatory concepts’.<sup>11</sup>

After a general overview of the reception of the concept of populism in Finland, I focus on the appropriation of the concept by politicians. Populism has been associated with two political parties in Finland, the Finnish Rural Party (Suomen maaseudun puolue, 1959–1995) and the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset, 1995–present; until 2011 the party was known in English as the ‘True Finns Party’, an approximate translation of its Finnish name. The rise of both the Finnish Rural Party and the Finns Party coincided with public debates on the post-war or post-Soviet ‘crisis of the welfare state’ in contrast to an imagined harmonious past.<sup>12</sup> The Finnish Rural Party was founded in 1959 by Veikko Vennamo, a charismatic politician and dissenter of the Centre Party. Although the Finnish Rural Party has been described as an anti-systemic party, it was actually participating in broad coalition governments in the 1980s. This may have led to voters’ disenchantment; after years of fading support, it was de facto dissolved consequent on bankruptcy in 1995. The Finns Party was founded by former members of the Finnish Rural Party in 1995, including former Finnish Rural Party secretary Timo Soini.<sup>13</sup> In early 2017, Soini announced that he would step down as party leader, but the ensuing leader elections led to a party split in June 2017. Soini remained leader of a splinter group remaining in government while the ‘rump’ party moved into opposition under the leadership of Jussi Halla-aho. The Finns Party has been described as ‘a populist radical right party’, but some scholars have been reluctant to describe its ideology as xenophobic to the same extent as other parties with this label.<sup>14</sup>

In the second half of the article, I show how the concept of populism has been used in political debates in Finland since the 1970s, with or without the participation of Finns Party politicians, and discuss the rise and fall of populism as a political identity, as it was discarded unceremoniously from party rhetoric after the successful 2011 elections. I argue that the Finns Party’s decision to appropriate the concept was unique in Europe and not the result of particularly favourable national conditions. The rhetorical use of the concept in the period of 1980–2015 is here traced through parliamentary protocols, while the dissemination of the concept in mainstream news media is gleaned from the

electronic archives of newspapers, including *Etelä-Suomen Sanomat*, *Länsi-Savo*, and *Helsingin Sanomat*.

### **Conceptual history of populism**

The use of populism as a positive self-designation by the Finns Party and its predecessor, the Finnish Rural Party, in late 20th and early 21st century Finland is unusual.<sup>15</sup> Nevertheless, there are some recent examples of uses of populism as a positive self-designation by European politicians. Some Dutch politicians have used ‘populist’ in a positive context, associating it with ‘the people’ and as antithetical to the ‘elite’.<sup>16</sup> Jörg Haider of the Freedom Party of Austria and Jean-Marie Le Pen of the National Front in France have on occasion claimed the term ‘populist’ for themselves.<sup>17</sup>

Historically, populism has had more positive connotations in the Americas. Former US president Jimmy Carter used the concept in to overcome old oppositions between the Democrats and the Republicans as recently as the 1970s.<sup>18</sup> The US example may have influenced European leaders during that decade. However, a stronger legacy of pejorative usage, as Anton Jäger argues, has dominated the debate since the post-war decades.<sup>19</sup>

Populism is semantically linked to ‘the people’, but this link is erased in the Fenno-Ugric Finnish language. *Populismi* is a foreign loanword, disconnected from its conceptual root in the Latin *populus*, Finnish *kansa*. *Kansa* was consciously used to generate a modern political vocabulary during the latter half of the 19th century, including such translated concepts as *kansanvalta* (democracy) and *kansakunta* (nation). Originally unrelated concepts were drawn into the *kansa* sphere, for example *kansalainen* (citizen).<sup>20</sup> As the equivalent to the German *Volk*, *kansa* linked concepts to cultural nationalism (*kansallisuus* = nationality), despite also being used to coin words connected to civic nationalism (*kansalaisuus* = citizenship).

The *-ismi* suffix is a marker of foreignness in the Finnish language. Concepts translated in the 19th century frequently took on a native suffix, *-laisuus* or *-aisuus*, to harmonize with the translation of the root: *kansallismielisyys* = nationalism (lit. ‘national-mindedness’). There has been a tendency to replace the *ism* with a vernacular suffix even in loanwords with a foreign-language root concept (e.g. *luterilaisuus* – Lutheranism; *marxilaisuus* – Marxism; etc.). However, many completely borrowed concepts lack a vernacular translation, such as *ateismi* – atheism, *anarkismi* – anarchism; etc. If a new *ism* is coined, it may take on the vernacular *-laisuus* or the borrowed *-ismi* suffix. Some examples that will be discussed here include *isms* coined on the basis of the names of the leaders of the two parties most strongly associated with populism in Finland, *vennamolaisuus* and *soinismi*. These particular *isms* are not completely equivalent, as the former refers to a political style, the latter to a rhetorical style.

The word ‘populism’ first appeared in Finnish-language newspapers in the 1890s, soon after it came into use in the United States.<sup>21</sup> In 1892, Southern Democrats were considering the possibility of joining the growing movement around the new ‘People’s Party’, and Democratic Senator Overmyer suggested the term ‘Populist’ as a moniker equal to ‘Republican’ and ‘Democrat’.<sup>22</sup> The concept began to be used pejoratively in Anglophone and Dutch press just a few years after the self-labelling of the Populist Party of America.<sup>23</sup> However, in Finnish newspapers, ‘populist’ was used as a neutral or positive description of political parties in either the United States, or the Russian Empire.<sup>24</sup> In some cases, a translation was provided to emphasize the positive connotation of populism as connected to the people, e.g. ‘the people’s party’ or ‘a party promoting the interests of the people’.<sup>25</sup>

Following these early apparitions, the word populism was rarely used in Finnish newspapers until after the Second World War, except in references to foreign political parties or movements.<sup>26</sup> References to foreign populists were generally neutral. The concept of populism was frequently utilized to explain any new political tendency in the United States, whether left-wing or right-wing.<sup>27</sup> The Polish trade union Solidarity was also considered a ‘populist’ movement, albeit supposedly a

rarity in the Socialist world.<sup>28</sup> Populism was also a cultural concept, including a French literary school called ‘populism’ prevalent in 1930-1950, and a tendency in architecture.<sup>29</sup> From the 1960s onwards, populism was mentioned with approval or distaste within specific professional groups concerned with ‘public taste’, such as writers, architects, or theatre critics.<sup>30</sup> These uses lay beyond the scope of this article, but should not be disregarded as irrelevant to the political usage of the concept, which for a long time was limited to experts and professionals.

Meanwhile, a post-war historiographical debate on populism had expanded into a ‘war’ between scholars in the United States. In 1965, historian Norman Pollack complained about the ‘unwarranted denigration of Populism’ during the previous decade and a half.<sup>31</sup> In his view, the historical Populists with a capital P had fallen victim to the contemporary debate’s search for a scapegoat – small-p populism. What had happened? Already in the 1930s and 1940s, US scholars had begun to use the concept of ‘populism’, well aware of its history in America, to describe the mechanisms of mass following behind Hitler and anti-Semitic persecutions in Europe.<sup>32</sup> In the McCarthy era, ‘an increasingly liberal use of the epithet “populistic” to denote dangerous forms of mass democracy’ could be identified in the works of social scientists.<sup>33</sup> Anton Jäger describes how these anti-populist scholars took a concept from its original, specific historical context and imbued it with a multitude of new meanings, including populism as a political style, populism as cultural politics, populism as a mass movement, and populism as a political tradition. All the while, its usage became pejorative as it was used to warn against Fascism, Communism, McCarthyism, and other threats to the delicate balance of post-war liberal pluralism.<sup>34</sup>

The echoes of this debate between US American scholars reverberated in Europe – even in the Finnish press. However, the echo came with a delay. The very first instances when populism was used to describe a Finnish political tendency occurred in scattered references in the 1950s and 1960s, pejoratively targeting established parties.<sup>35</sup> Even though the Finnish Rural Party appeared on the political scene during these years, it was rarely directly labelled ‘populist’; rather, the association was

established indirectly by posing the question whether the ‘Vennamoists’ (*vennamolaiset*) were representing Finnish populism.<sup>36</sup> In 1973, Finland had its own miniature version of an academic populism debate, as social scientist Risto Alapuro employed the concept in his study on extreme right movements in interwar Finland, though on a more limited scale of alacrity, because the concept was not widely seen as pejorative. It was even argued that Finnish historical populism had been safely channelled into established parties such as the Agrarian Union – later, the Centre Party – and Finland had thus avoided a Fascist mass movement.<sup>37</sup>

The Finnish Rural Party’s first successful elections in 1970 (gaining 18 of 200 MPs, up from one in 1966) generated scholarly attention for contemporary ‘populism’ for the first time in Finland, but the use of the concept remained limited to scholarly texts and editorials. As an analytical concept, it was employed in the 1970s and 1980s to explain historical phenomena such as the agrarian movement engendering the Centre Party of Finland and later movements mobilizing the discontent of the rural population – including the Finnish Rural Party. This usage was not pejorative and lacked the implication of deceit and irresponsibility in politics.

Anton Jäger, who has studied the reception of the pejorative concept of populism in Europe, calls it a latecomer to the academic scene. Drawing from French literature, mainly Pierre-André Taquieff’s works, he provides examples of references to Latin American populism in France already in the 1960s, but identifies the adoption of the concept in Europe as a ‘fully-fledged instrument of political abuse’ in the 1980s as an import from the previously described US American debate. While Taquieff adapted the concept to identify the politics of the National Front in France, German scholars from 1990 onwards applied it to Nazism and Neo-Nazism.<sup>38</sup> This tidal wave of pejorative use was also felt in Finland, but during the 1980s, Finnish media depicted the Finnish Rural Party as a relatively tame party that suffered from the same malaise as the other parties, and it was argued to have lost its populism, for better or for worse.<sup>39</sup> This decade saw the accusation of populism levelled at many other groups, including the new Green movement.<sup>40</sup> Populism as a problem was also

discussed within the Green movement, as reported by the newspapers.<sup>41</sup> Populism was either associated with apathy and lack of interest in politics among the general public, or the complete opposite, extreme moralism and civic activism, for example on behalf of human rights or environmental issues.<sup>42</sup> *Ihmisoikeuspopulismi* (human rights populism) became a short-lived catchphrase in the headlines when concerns were raised against a proposed boycotting of South Africa.<sup>43</sup>

Pekka Vennamo, succeeding his more charismatic father Veikko Vennamo as the party leader in 1979, used populism as a positive identification in a 1983 interview.<sup>44</sup> This early identification as a populist happened a year before Taguieff identified the National Front as ‘national-populist’. Compared to other voluntary populists among European party leaders, Pekka Vennamo was an early adopter. In what Anton Jäger describes as ‘a fascinating act of political re-appropriation’, National Front politicians, too, began to define themselves proudly as ‘national-populists’ in the late 1980s.<sup>45</sup> In 1991, Jean-Marie Le Pen declared himself a populist, defining it as someone respecting the opinion of the people.<sup>46</sup> This identification was only maintained paradiastolically: ‘If that is [the definition of populism], then yes, I am a populist.’<sup>47</sup> Pekka Vennamo also connected populism to the will of the people: ‘Yes, we are populists in the sense that our programme is determined by the will of the Finnish people. But Parliament is also elected to fulfil the people’s will and not for its own sake.’ Vennamo distanced himself and his party from ‘populists in the negative sense’ – the big parties that were making dishonest promises to attract the people.<sup>48</sup> Thus, the re-appropriation of the concept still contained the pejorative meaning as populism became its own counter-concept.

Pekka Vennamo’s 1983 statement had little effect on the media image of the party, which was increasingly presented as ‘normalized’, especially after joining a centre-left coalition government in 1983.<sup>49</sup> However, it may have inspired Timo Soini to contest different voices in public discourse that already defined populism in numerous and contradictory ways. Internationally, ‘populist’ was increasingly used as a pejorative after the mid-1980s.<sup>50</sup> Nevertheless, Soini chose to reintroduce it as



a positive self-definition in Finnish political discourse. An attractive rebellious identity for the Finnish Rural Party had to be regained in order to halt the fatal process of becoming an establishment party. In 1990, Soini contributed an opinion piece to *Helsingin Sanomat*, where he counted Václav Havel, the last president of Czechoslovakia, and Pope John Paul II among the populist leaders of the world.<sup>51</sup>

The Finnish Rural Party finally adopted the concept in its party programme in 1992. The decision was, perhaps, a case of too little, too late. After increasing losses, the Finnish Rural Party disbanded in the mid-1990s, and its successor, the Finns Party, did not initially show interest in populism as a concept. The Finns Party had been active for almost two decades when active experimentation with the concept was revived in 2005. This did not pass without debate in the party press. Some veterans of the Finnish Rural Party still felt that ‘populist’ was a slur, and one contributor protested the attempt to appropriate it.<sup>52</sup> However, in the election programme of 2011, populism was defined as the party’s ideology.<sup>53</sup> The Finns Party became the third largest party in the Finnish parliament in 2011: 39 of 200 MPs, up from five in 2007.

### **Pandering to the public, insincerely or honestly? The double edge of populism**

In Finnish usage of the concept throughout the 20th century, the accusation of populism in various fields—politics, law, culture, entertainment—is presented together with expressed doubt towards the ability of those outside the professional sphere to discern their own best interest. Some examples worth mentioning are debates in professional journals utilizing the concept. In *Lakimies*, a journal for experts in jurisprudence, debaters advocating or questioning the need for public approval of the legislation employed populism as a warning for excess.<sup>54</sup> Historians used the concept ‘populism’ in debates about the profession’s future, worrying about a slippery slope into popular history.<sup>55</sup>

Although the subject of this article is limited to the field of political discourse, the debates within the aforementioned academic professions show how the concept has acquired a tinge of unprofessionalism and sensationalism. This caused the concept to be employed to prove its opposite, especially in reverential obituaries and biographies.<sup>56</sup> The exact definition of populism changed from writer to writer, but they all shared a negative view of what they defined as populism in their professional field. Pandering to the public taste was dangerous – however, disrupting the norm might be perceived as entertainment and therefore dangerously populist, too.<sup>57</sup>

At this stage, two trends can be identified. As a description of a foreign, non-Finnish phenomenon regarding, for instance, American or Russian parties, populism is treated as a value-neutral concept. However, in internal debates, either within the professional field or in national politics, populism gains strong negative connotations that are to be avoided by all rhetorical means, even when that negativity has not been suggested by an opponent – a pre-emptive strike, in a sense. This applies regardless of whether the ‘populism’ in question is defined as pandering to the public, sincerely or not, or as attention-seeking behaviour through controversial statements and acts.

In the political field, ‘populism’ was initially used by political scientists to explain the success of the Finnish Rural Party. Immediately after the 1970 elections, an anthology of predictions and comments on the results was published with the provocative title *Shokkivaalit* (The shocker elections) and a pop-art style cover with a giant red pig in a suit looming over the parliament building.<sup>58</sup> Here, populism was deemed ‘probably the best definition’ of the Finnish Rural Party’s ideology. Patronizing treatment of the party and its voters was summarized with the counter-concept ‘elitism’. ‘Left populism’ of the young pacifist or environmentalist ‘radicals’ of the time was also compared with the ideology of the Finnish Rural Party. Arguably, both defended marginalized groups that the middle class either neglected or oppressed. However, populism did not become the main ism associated with the Finnish Rural Party. *Vennamolaisuus*, an ism based on the public image and leadership style of party leader Veikko Vennamo, was the focus of an anthology compiling the results

of an extensive interview study by political scientists at the University of Turku on the connections between the Finnish Rural Party and populist movements in general.<sup>59</sup> As a vernacularism, *vennamolaisuus* can hardly be described as a weaker concept than populism. It became the descriptor for the particular brand of populism of Veikko Vennamo, centred very strongly on his person, but less on his son and successor, Pekka Vennamo. Although Vennamo himself mentioned that his wife Sirkka Vennamo was an important mastermind behind the party's communication strategy, *vennamolaisuus* is still mainly associated with her husband's public persona.<sup>60</sup> The power of the concept is attested by the fact that news media and literature began to refer to other charismatic politicians as 'the Vennamo of . . .', in particular Mogens Glistrup of the Danish Progress Party.<sup>61</sup> The concept of populism in other contexts was sometimes explained as *vennamolaisuus*, implying that the latter word was better known.<sup>62</sup>

In the 1970s, the Finnish Rural Party claimed that it did not represent any ism at all, which compelled one political scientist to categorize them as 'a typical populist party' that would rather speak of issues than ideologies.<sup>63</sup> The desire to leave important decisions to a charismatic leader, and the demand for the right for 'the man in the street', the 'ordinary people', to make up their own mind, were mentioned as typical features of populism.<sup>64</sup> Populism was in this analysis a narrow 'sub-ism', similar to 'agrarism' and 'nationalism', distinguished by its appreciation of the 'common man'.<sup>65</sup> The dismissal of populism as the handmaiden of greater ideologies recalls later attempts to define populism as a 'thin ideology' that needs the support of other political ideas to become successful.<sup>66</sup>

Outside the work of political scientists and sociologists, the Finnish Rural Party was rarely associated with the literal concept of populism in the 1960s and 1970s. Its place was already taken by the vernacular *vennamolaisuus*. In the early 1980s, the concept started to appear in interviews and editorials to a greater extent. Coinciding with the retirement of Veikko Vennamo from the party leadership, *vennamolaisuus* also seemed to retire from public discourse. It became a concept referring to a specific historical period.

## **Populism as defined by the Finnish Rural Party and the Finns Party – a counterhegemonic method?**

The scholarly debate on populism has never been hermetically sealed off from the political field. Timo Soini, leader of the Finns Party from 1997 until 2017, has flaunted his master's thesis in political science, which differentiated between populism as a political ideology and populism as an invective.<sup>67</sup> Soini accepted Peter Wiles' definition of populism as the presupposition that virtue is defined by simple, ordinary human beings, the majority of the people, and their collective traditions: *Vox populi, vox Dei*.<sup>68</sup> During his early years as a Finnish Rural Party activist, Soini observed how Veikko Vennamo used slurs and rhetoric attacks to his advantage by turning them into proof of the authenticity of the party.<sup>69</sup> Such weapons ought to be revived, he reasoned.

In his thesis, Soini builds on Margaret Canovan's analysis of populism as 'radical democracy'.<sup>70</sup> According to Soini's interpretation, populism is not an attempt to educate or enlighten the citizens. It is an 'open' ideology that merely channels the wishes of the people. However, if a small vanguard wants to use populism to its advantage, it must utilize easily recognizable slogans and demands that allow flexibility in political decision-making. Soini suggests that if the Finnish Rural Party wants to become successful again, it must return to its 'radical populist roots'. Success came in those elections where the party managed to control the agenda and launch the most popular ideas and concepts.<sup>71</sup>

In 1989, Soini wrote a letter to the editor of *Helsingin Sanomat* to defend Carl I. Hagen, the leader for the Norwegian Progress Party, against what he perceived to be polemical attacks. Hagen's party had been labelled a 'protest party' as well as 'populist'. Soini's letter dealt with the negative implications of the concept: 'Randomly labelling something as "populism" is pure political propaganda and an abuse of power by the establishment.' Here, Soini identified his party's imagined

enemy, the establishment or the elite. However, populism was not just a derogatory label: ‘This phenomenon, which has proven its vitality, finally ought to be studied without prejudice’.<sup>72</sup>

Soini went on to promote his own positive definition as the political ideology of the Finnish Rural Party in a 1990 article in the same newspaper: ‘Populism is to listen to the voice of the people and to realize the basic principle that virtue inhabits the ordinary citizens and their collective traditions,’ Soini stated, reiterating Peter Wiles’ definition of populist political beliefs.<sup>73</sup> While deploring the abuse of ‘populism’ as a pejorative term, Soini implied that he possessed the key to its true meaning: ‘. . . few are able to define the word or concept itself, and political speculators and commentators avoid doing this, purposefully or not.’ In reality, according to Soini, populism was ‘an international ideology and movement’ including such luminaries as Václav Havel and Pope John Paul II. What all these populists around Europe had in common was a ‘strong emphasis on nationality, morals, and the family’. Soini hoped for a ‘factual and dispassionate review of the ideological content of populism in public discourse,’ but finished with the suggestion that the subject might be too ‘attractive and dangerous’ and that there might be an attempt to ‘silence it to death’. For the ‘unprejudiced seeker’, populism would be an interesting field to till.

Soini’s descriptions of populism as a dangerous attraction raises questions about the connections between Soini’s conversion to Catholicism, a minority religion in Finland, and his interest in controversial political ideologies.<sup>74</sup> In the case of his predecessor Veikko Vennamo, it has also been attested that his rhetorical output was religiously inspired and apparently appealed to voters in regions with a tradition of charismatic religious movements.<sup>75</sup>

The Finnish Rural Party finally adopted the populism concept in its programme in 1992.<sup>76</sup> The programme defined a populist movement as ‘an issue-oriented movement that listens to the people’s will, neither right-wing nor left-wing’. The populist movement was said to consist of ‘common sense thinking rising from the everyday life of the people.’ Its goal was ‘to secure the individual’s own power and his/her resources for the use and benefit of our nation’ on the basis of specific values:

‘pure and genuine Finnish-national thinking and Nordic democracy’.<sup>77</sup> This attempt at appropriation of the concept of populism did not have the desired consequences. In the 1995 elections, the party lost all its parliamentary seats but one, and went bankrupt. When the Finns Party was founded by former Finnish Rural Party members, populism was not mentioned in the party programme.<sup>78</sup> Timo Soini was elected chairman of the new party in 1997. According to a newspaper report, the debates during the election meeting used *vennamolaisuus* as a commendatory as well as a derogatory label.<sup>79</sup>

### **The Finns Party and the reappropriation of populism 2003-2011**

In 2003, Timo Soini, formerly party secretary of the Finnish Rural Party in 1992–1994, had entered parliament for the Finns Party. Almost immediately he attempted to control the conceptual use of populism by providing his own definition and connecting it to his party: ‘Populism is a baseline (*peruslinja*, cf. *Perussuomalaiset*) in the defence of the people.’<sup>80</sup> In the mid-2000s, the then-chairman of the Finns Party Youth, Vesa-Matti Saarakkala, began to publish articles on populism in the party newsletter, based on his studies in political science, and acted as chairman of the work group that created the election programme of 2011.<sup>81</sup> Saarakkala connected the Finnish Rural Party’s populism with resistance to ‘Finlandization’ during the Cold War.<sup>82</sup> The culture of consensus in Finland is often mentioned as an example of the elite’s use of the national interest to quench criticism. Finlandization was a symptom of such a culture of silence. Saarakkala’s version of populism had a clear counter-concept: elitism. Therefore, populism meant ‘to act in a position of trust as your voters would act’, while ‘elitist politicians don’t call a spade a spade, but speak in a roundabout way, and can never be held accountable . . . they can always claim that they were misunderstood’.<sup>83</sup> Saarakkala personally marketed T-shirts printed with the words ‘Populist’ and ‘Politically incorrect’ in the party newsletter.<sup>84</sup>

Soini’s and Saarakkala’s version of populism could be described as containing its own counter-concept, a double-edged sword uniting against an external enemy, as Soini managed both to

denounce those who would use ‘the foreign word’ as an insult against his party, and announce his own support for populism, ‘the defence of the people’.<sup>85</sup> Opponents of the Finns Party were on occasion called ‘false populists’, which implied that there were also some ‘true’ ones.<sup>86</sup> The rhetoric echoes Isaiah Berlin’s 1968 distinction between ‘false populism’ and ‘populism proper’.<sup>87</sup> ‘False populism’ may be summarized as the mobilization of certain populist sentiments for creating an elitist regime, while ‘populism proper’ supposedly has a democratic egalitarian impulse.<sup>88</sup> This distinction was already addressed by the Finnish Rural Party’s Pekka Vennamo in 1983.<sup>89</sup>

The concept was used in a variety of positive meanings that made it more palatable to veterans of the Finnish Rural Party, who were used to hearing the concept as a pejorative. Soini defined populism as a passion for direct democracy, or the will to bring up problems that the old parties had ignored, while other Finns Party members defined populism as the way of speaking comprehensibly, like the common people.<sup>90</sup> Saarakkala connected populist honesty to political incorrectness, implying that characterizing certain speech acts as offensive was a part of the elite’s attempt at silencing the people.

However, neither Soini nor Saarakkala imagined populism as a vehicle for anything else than conservative nationalism. In his thesis, Soini claimed that populism was ‘always national and must be interpreted through its national preconditions’.<sup>91</sup> Saarakkala explained that all nations could be courted with the same ideas, and one of the most appealing qualities according to the Finnish people was ‘honesty’.<sup>92</sup> Therefore, the main characteristic of Finnish populists was honesty, making the aforementioned unaccountable ‘elitists’ decidedly un-Finnish. Through these rhetorical performances, Soini and Saarakkala attempted to cleanse populism from its recurring negative associations with dishonesty, fickleness and unreliability in general use, and connect it to specific political ideas. In the 2011 election programme, the Finns Party restated that populism reflected national identity and therefore took a different shape in every nation. The programme claimed that the unique qualities of the Finnish nation guaranteed solidarity within its members as well as success

in international competition.<sup>93</sup> This version of populism proved attractive to nationalists and xenophobes. The 2011 programme built on the assumption that cultural homogeneity protected even the weakest citizens, unlike ‘supra-national politics that force individuals to cross borders’.<sup>94</sup> The ebbs and flows of migration were, according to this view, not only a threat to the imagined homogeneous national identity; they shook the foundations of populism itself—and might bring other populists to power, better equipped to convey the voice of the changing population. In effect, increased migration promised a change in the electorate that would one day spell the end of the Finns Party.

The PS variety of populism promised salvation through one party alone—probably a comforting promise to many undecided voters. According to Canovan, ‘the democratic dilemma’ means that increasing possibilities for civic participation make democracy less transparent as the decision-making process became increasingly complex.<sup>95</sup> The 2011 programme turned this observation on its head and blamed the complexity of the system for the diminished possibilities for political action. It offered to simplify the process with the help of one concept: ‘In populism, the citizen can identify power-holders on different levels and hold them responsible’.<sup>96</sup> After such a complete appropriation, it became more difficult to use ‘populist’ as a derogatory label, because it was based on the presumption that the audience shared a negative view on populism. This was observed in the 2011 media debate. The caricature image associated with the ‘populist’ could be interpreted as a positive reinforcement of a self-image, contrary to the intentions of the critic.<sup>97</sup>

The 2011 parliamentary elections, the fourth for the party, were a huge success. The Finns Party gained a record number of seats and emerged as one of the four big parties. Before the elections, the party had five MPs and one member of European Parliament, but already over four hundred municipal delegates.<sup>98</sup> Similarly to the ‘shocker elections’ of 1970, the Finns Party victory engendered scholarly interest and public debate. Populism again became the focus of anthologies by researchers<sup>99</sup> or pamphlets by journalists.<sup>100</sup> The party’s appropriation of populism was less discussed than its usage



as an invective in the press.<sup>101</sup> The conceptual appropriation was quietly accepted by most political commentators.

The impact of the 1992 party programme on public debate seems to have been limited, but the appropriation of populism coincided with a general increase of interest in populism, and the 2011 election victory left a clear stamp, as reflected by archives of the most influential newspaper in Finland, *Helsingin Sanomat*. Talking about populism and introducing new meanings seems to have been easier in the press than in parliamentary debates. The question remains, did the appropriation of the concept increase interest in the party, or would the 2011 victory have happened anyway? Scholarly and journalistic works on the Finns Party during this period did not contest the party's self-identification as populists, even while conveying a bleak image of it.

The use of the concept has generally become more frequent in news media. A search in the digital archives of *Helsingin Sanomat* on terms containing the root *\*populi\** (including all possible prefixes and suffixes), shows a steady increase in usage during the last two and a half decades (1990s: 1265 mentions, 2000s: 1801, and in the last five years alone: 1088). Successes for politicians and parties labelled as populists abroad make a bigger impact on the figures. Of a total of 4154 references, 1576 were in the 'foreign news' section; however, one must consider that the local news is spread out over several sections, the most hits being found in the sections *Kotimaa* (Homeland, 654), *Mielipide* (Opinion, 553) and *Kulttuuri* (Culture, 517). A previous rise of interest in populism occurred in the early 1980s, while the 1970 elections mobilized populism researchers but did not leave much of a trace in the press.

The Finns Party appropriation of the concept undoubtedly contributed to the rise in its popularity in the media, but the actual contents of Finns Party policies did not alter its meaning. A closer look at the 2011 programme shows that the concept of populism, while claiming to represent any will of the people, was narrowed down to include specific political ideas that have not been abandoned as the party eventually stopped using the ism. When party strategists discuss populism

and argue whether the party is populist, this does not necessarily mean that populism as a concept has been raised to a level where it serves political mobilization. The mobilizing content of the 2011 programme came from other sources, a specific ideological content: essentialist cultural nationalism.

Potential Finns Party voters were told that trust in society was not built on constitutional law, but ethnic similarity and cultural essence. According to the available English-language summaries of the 2011 programme, ‘citizenship must be a reward’<sup>102</sup>, or even ‘a reward and honor (sic)’.<sup>103</sup> Solidarity, defined as the will to pay taxes, was supposedly possible only in a culturally homogeneous society, while ‘multiculturalism’ would lead to mistrust in the welfare state, serving the interests of those who profit from privatization.<sup>104</sup> The story of immigration as an exception in the history of Finland strengthened faith in homogeneity as the normal or even ideal state. This narrative is not original to the Finns Party. Even some scholarly works for a general audience state that Finland’s progressive social policies have been possible because of a lack of serious ethnic or national conflicts.<sup>105</sup> Such theories ignore the hard-earned efforts of generations to overcome the ingrained distrust after the 1918 civil war and other violent conflicts.<sup>106</sup>

The relaunch of populism within the Finns Party involved individuals who also participated in the increased efforts to rally a xenophobic tendency in the party. A ‘populism conference’ was organized by the Finns Party Youth in 2010, with Saarakkala and provocative blogger Jussi Halla-aho among the speakers; the conference report in the party newspaper focused on the ‘problems of immigration’ that were discussed there.<sup>107</sup> At the conference, a xenophobic manifesto was presented and signed by 13 MP candidates who promised to promote its contents in office. Many who signed were elected. This can be seen as an attempt at influencing the public debate under the guise of a trendy concept, as the manifesto was included in the 2011 election programme.<sup>108</sup>

From the Finnish Rural Party’s defence of the ‘forgotten people’, which could be used inclusively to defend the rights of oppressed groups, the Finns Party seems to have followed the ideological shift towards a chiefly ethno-linguistic definition of the people in the Nordic ‘populist’

parties in the late 1990s.<sup>109</sup> Consequently, populism as a self-label was discarded when the ethno-nationalist content of the programme was deemed to have become acceptable to the public in the 2015 elections.

Despite the attempted appropriation, populism has not acquired a new meaning in public discourse. The established derogatory definitions of the concept have endured. The public image of the Finns Party has done little to contradict the stereotypical image of the populist politician. In the following section, we shall explore how populism was used in political debates in parliament since 1979 until the rise of the Finns Party in 1995.

### **Populism in parliament—Themes and counter-concepts**

The parliament of Finland provides electronic access to protocols from plenary sessions from the year 2000 onward; other legislative documents are available from earlier dates. Some volumes of the printed versions of 1980s and 1990s parliamentary debates are searchable online and enable the researcher to find some relevant references for a qualitative study. Based on these references, which are by no means exhaustive, I will provide an overview of the use of populism-derived concepts in parliamentary debates after 1979.

During the Veikko Vennamo era of the Finnish Rural Party, populism was associated with rowdy and undisciplined behaviour in parliament. Unorthodox actions of Vennamo and other Finnish Rural Party MPs caused disruptions in parliamentary protocol in the 1970s, as evidenced in a note by the parliamentary ombudsman from 1979, stating:

. . . [I]t is incomparably more important that the whole machinery of the parliament—indeed, our whole political system—functions and is efficient, than that individual members of parliament are able to use its various phases for populist or even personal propagandist ends.<sup>110</sup>

Veikko Vennamo was notorious for producing numerous propositions and disciplinary measures. The Finnish Rural Party members had been frequently excluded from parliament for brief periods, which they interpreted as political persecution. In May 1974, Vennamo's feud with the vice speaker of parliament escalated until he was physically removed from the plenary hall.<sup>111</sup>

Populism was also used as an invective in itself, without specifying what was wrong with it. However, accusations of populism were not frequent in the 1980s, and when the Finnish Rural Party was accused of populism 'over the extreme limits', the accusation implied that there might exist an acceptable amount of populism.<sup>112</sup> Despite the scholarly association between the Finnish Rural Party and populism in the early 1970s, the parliamentary protocols of the 1980s and 1990s reveal that the invective 'populist' was frequently used polemically between other parties. The left, for instance, used it against employers' interest organizations and other ideological enemies.<sup>113</sup> 'Populist' was also used as a counter-concept or a rhetorical expression for any extreme counter-position when MPs strove to depict their own proposals as a 'golden mean' in policy questions.<sup>114</sup> Populism, when not a self-definition, was always linked to dangerous excess.<sup>115</sup>

A way to deal with a derogatory concept is to turn it against its users. Outside the field of politics, debaters may frequently accuse each other of 'populism' when defending their own field of expertise, as seen from the previously mentioned examples from professional journals of historians and law scholars. Similarly, the accusation of populism or populist behaviour often appeared when an MP was accusing colleagues of unprofessional behaviour. Questioning the use of the concept as 'unfair' in certain cases also implied that there was a 'fair' use of it towards those who deserved it.<sup>116</sup> In such discourse, populism appeared as something embarrassing or silly that a serious politician should avoid. The Finnish Rural Party's independent MP Sulo Aittoniemi responded to accusations of populism by turning the tables and taking the initiative to label other colleagues, parties and even the sitting government 'populist'.<sup>117</sup>

In the crisis years of the 1990s, politicians often accused each other of populism when being questioned on policy decisions. An opposition MP, who had demanded surveillance of the use of subsidies for the faltering Finnish banks, was challenged by a government supporter for his ‘vivid but unfortunately populist’ speech.<sup>118</sup> A similar case was the dialogue initiated through the interrogatory on the unemployment situation by two opposition MPs to the Minister of Finance in 1992, who accused the questioners of ‘showing insinuating populism in a serious matter’.<sup>119</sup> In these cases, populism was used to dismiss the proposals of the opposition in a situation of economic crisis when the government insisted on its authority and the appropriateness of its economic policies.

As Finland emerged from the crisis years towards the mid-1990s and the Finnish Rural Party disappeared from the political field, the concept of populism stayed in use. As before, its targets were often members of the newly formed Left Alliance or the Social Democratic Party.<sup>120</sup> The rhetorical practices of Aittoniemi, who had by now transferred to the Centre Party, revealed an ability both to bemoan inappropriate usage of the concept of populism and, by using the pejorative populism label himself, even to accuse a Social Democratic MP of ‘indecent populism’.<sup>121</sup> The accused defended herself by connecting populism to irresponsibility: ‘It is truly strange to be accused of populism when trying to improve the situation of pensioners . . . I don’t think it is [populism]. I truly strive to work hard here.’ A male Left Alliance MP reacted chivalrously to the gender asymmetry of the debate: ‘. . . big men are beating a small woman on the left on the head with their words as swords. But I find the sword rather dull; why speak of indecency and populism, when we are speaking about a genuine attempt at improvement . . .’.<sup>122</sup>

Aittoniemi bestowed the populism label also on right-wing male MPs, who reacted with similar defensive arguments, emphasizing their work morale and ‘firm judgment’.<sup>123</sup> The pattern repeated itself. The attacked MP firmly denied populism but maintained that the question was ‘very serious’, reflecting the implied accusation of frivolity back on Aittoniemi himself.

Besides Aittoniemi, independent MP Pertti Virtanen stood for the majority of populism references in parliament during the 1990s.<sup>124</sup> In his notoriously meandering and eccentric speeches, populism was unconditionally negative and often connected to moral conservatism, social control, or fascism. After failing to get a seat independently in two consecutive elections, Virtanen joined the Finns Party ticket in the 2007 parliamentary elections, apparently unfazed by the revival of populism as a positive concept within the party. Virtanen's and Aittoniemi's examples show how a few individuals could lay claim to a concept and attempt to monopolize its usage and meaning. As Timo Soini had shown in the very title of his master's thesis, "Populism – Politics and branding-iron", the iron could easily be wielded by so-called populists themselves.

At least one attempt at the re-evaluation of the concept of populism occurred before the adoption of the concept by the Finns Party. In 1998, a Left Alliance MP, who had already wrangled with Aittoniemi about the concept, responded to accusations of 'unacceptable' or 'ugly populism,' because he had suggested a nominal cut in MP salaries, arguing that 'populism can be a swearword, or not necessarily so. To take into account people's minds and their thinking . . . is also decent work in this parliament'.<sup>125</sup> Aittoniemi admitted a few days later that the proposal was 'good, of course, but it is populist as so many others of us are'. An MP from the split-off Left Group supported his former comrade with the paradoxical claim: if there was a wide opinion supporting the proposal, there was no way it could be called 'populist'.<sup>126</sup> The discussion returned to the level of contested pejoratives.

There were other attempts to make light of the offensive concept. In yet another debate with accusations of populism hurled back and forth, an MP parodied a popular advertisement slogan: 'Indeed, inside every one of us lives a small populist.' From parliament, an unidentified MP responded: 'A big populist!'<sup>127</sup> The use of populism as a convenient pejorative when attacking unfavourable policy proposals tempted the promoters of such proposals to adopt the concept for themselves. If supporting popular causes or questions of interest to one's own electorate was judged to be populist, then let it be populism. As a pejorative it was not very effective, and certainly its

pejorative usage did not result in the abandonment of supposedly ‘populist’ causes or rhetoric in parliament.

### **The return of the populists or the populist turn?**

The Finns Party entered parliament with one MP in 1999. Despite the association between the Finnish Rural Party and populism in the early 1970s, the subsequent parliamentary debates did not tar the Finns Party in particular with the populism brush; centre-right MPs might as well use it against Christian Democrats as other centre-right MPs protest against it. The left could also accuse the right of populism ‘when one promises everything to everyone!’<sup>128</sup> This is an accusation typically levelled against the left, too. A peculiar subspecies of populism, *pöyhöpopulismi* (twit populism), was mostly associated with MPs of the left (29 individual mentions in the plenary session protocols from 1992 to 2016). Apparently introduced by political scientist Osmo Soininvaara in the debate within the Green movement in 1983,<sup>129</sup> it made a handful of appearances on the pages of *Helsingin Sanomat* (1990-1999: five mentions; 2000-2009: seven; 2010-2015: four). Even this especially derogatory variation was rarely attached to the few PS MPs during these years.

In the early 2000s, the Finns Party was maturing towards change. Timo Soini set his mark on the parliamentary debate by appeal to authority:

Now that this populism term has been thrown around, I, as a populism expert and researcher, absolve you all of guilt. Neither the Left Alliance nor the Coalition Party are populist movements...Populism is a baseline in the defence of the people. It is represented by the Basic Finns (*Perussuomalaiset*, PS). Make a note of that, to the left, and also to the right. The question is this, that rhetoric is rhetoric and politics is politics and populism is populism, and we can take care of that, don't you worry about it.<sup>130</sup>

Soini's characteristic way of lining up short and snappy sentences with quotable catchphrases was taking shape. The concept *soinismi* spread in the media as a descriptor of his particular rhetorical style.<sup>131</sup> Even before Soini's 2003 intervention, populism functioned as a trigger or 'fighting word' in parliamentary debates, forcing some MPs into a defensive position with its 'sticky' qualities (indecent, irresponsibility, silliness) and giving others an opportunity to voice their opinions and possibly even tweak the concept according to their own needs. By all appearances, it continues to be used in this way. Recently, even Vesa-Matti Saarakkala has used the pejorative variant *pöhlöpopulismi* in parliament.<sup>132</sup>

In 2013, the Finns Party Youth introduced new concepts with a call for a 'national-liberal' critique of the welfare state.<sup>133</sup> Soini, too, had begun to argue for austerity in social policies.<sup>134</sup> The Finns Party's adoption of 'justifications based on economic efficiency' has been suggested to be 'a typically Finnish manifestation of right-wing populism',<sup>135</sup> but it has also coincided with the gradual abandonment of the concept of populism by the party. Populism-derived concepts were conspicuously missing from the 2015 parliamentary election programmes. The only ism proper (excluding non-political concepts, e.g. tourism) was mentioned twice in the immigration policy programme: *uskonnollinen radikalismi*, religious radicalism.<sup>136</sup>

This change correlates with the side-lining of Vesa-Matti Saarakkala, previously styled as Soini's possible successor. Saarakkala had especially criticized the decision to join a coalition government with the Centre Party and the National Coalition Party after the 2015 elections.<sup>137</sup> Saarakkala's phrasing is still recognizable in the description of the party's values on its official website.<sup>138</sup> In the 2015 elections, the Finns Party confirmed its predicted position as one of the three big parties. The party's acceptance of the coalition's economic austerity programme seems to indicate that 'national-liberal' welfare state criticism was at least accepted as a price to pay for a government position. However, this resulted in a tangible loss of support in the polls.<sup>139</sup>



## Populism as a failed concept of movement

Since the popular mass movements of the early 20th century, actors in the Finnish public sphere have struggled with the idea of a political rhetoric with mass appeal.<sup>140</sup> The key for many political actors, including entire parties, in the modern republic, has been to find a polite way of appealing to the masses, without appearing as a disturbing agitator either to the elite in control of public media, or the elite in control of the legal system. A self-controlled *habitus* has been crucial to many political careers. A sense of the right time and place to break the rules—to advance counter-hegemonic change—has also been an important asset.<sup>141</sup> We can see attempts of such pushes in the political performances of Finnish Rural Party and Finns Party leaders reclaiming derogatory concepts.

For further research, a closer look at the practices of other parties is in order. Based on a cursory review of the parliamentary records, it is clear that various invectives and labels are a useful way of forcing a political opponent into a corner, but getting insulted can also be a fruitful opportunity for righteous indignation. But why is populism such an offensive concept? The emotional, irrational and indecent aspects of public power—including vying for the support of the masses, playing special interests against each other, using one's fame and dazzling personality to impress the voters, shouting and behaving badly in parliament—are only partially regulated in a liberal democracy, but considered to be 'bad form' or at least 'bad taste' by the educated elite. These practices were already shocking at the dawn of Finnish democracy and deserve their own *longue durée* historiography to reveal, criticize and dismantle cherished stereotypes of statesmanship.

The Finnish changes in the usage of populism both seem to follow and contradict international trends. The negative turn in Europe against populism in the late 1980s and 1990s manifested everywhere except in the texts produced by the Finnish Rural Party and the Finns Party. This does not necessarily mean that populism as a concept has been raised to a level where it serves political mobilization. Despite the attempt of the Finns Party, the concept has not acquired a new meaning in common discourse.

The populism experiment of the Finns Party shows how a previously particular concept is used by a particular group in an exclusive claim of generality thereby evoking numerous counter-concepts excluding those who do not fit into the group: elitists, environmentalists, communists, feminists, velocipedists, etc. As Koselleck notes, mutual recognition becomes impossible.<sup>142</sup> Trusting the appeal of cultural nationalism, which it has effectively colonized, the Finns Party shed its 'populism' once it had gained its great victory in 2011. A search on the party's website in 2016 only produces two references to the concept. Both blades of the double-edged sword have finally grown blunt.

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<sup>1</sup> M. Canovan, *Populism* (London: Junction Books, 1981), p. 295f.

<sup>2</sup> A. Jäger, 'The Semantic Drift: Images of Populism in Post-War American Historiography and their Relevance for (European) Political Science', *POPULISMUS Working Papers*, 3 (July 2016), p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> E. Laclau, *On Populist Reason* (London – New York: Verso, 2005), p. ii.

<sup>4</sup> P. Rosanvallon, *La contre-démocratie. La politique à l'âge de la défiance* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2006), p. 269f.

<sup>5</sup> Jäger, 'The Semantic Drift', *op. cit.*, Ref. 2., p. 13.

<sup>6</sup> I. Ruostetsaari, 'Populistiset piirteet vennamolais-soinilaisen puolueen ohjelmissa', in M. Wiberg (Ed) *Populismi: kriittinen arvio* (Helsinki: Edita, 2011), p. 108.

<sup>7</sup> J. Jagers and S. Walgrave, 'Populism as Political Communication Style: An Empirical Study of Political Parties' Discourse in Belgium', *European Journal of Political Research*, 46 (2007), pp. 319-345.

<sup>8</sup> Laclau, *On Populist Reason*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 3, pp. 3, 7.

<sup>9</sup> C. Mudde and C. Rovira Kaltwasser, 'Populism: Corrective and Threat to Democracy', in C. Mudde and C. Rovira Kaltwasser (Eds.) *Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective to Democracy?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 205f.

<sup>10</sup> R. Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), pp. 78, 259-262.

<sup>11</sup> Koselleck, *ibid.*, p. 260.

<sup>12</sup> K. Jokinen and K. Saaristo, *Suomalainen yhteiskunta* (Helsinki: Sanoma Pro Oy, 2006), p. 126f.

<sup>13</sup> A.-C. Jungar and A. R. Jupskås, 'Pohjolan populistinen puolueperhe', in B. Sundell et al. (Eds.) *Liikkeitä laidasta laitaan. Populismien nousu Euroopassa* (Helsinki: Ajatuspaja, 2011), p. 29f.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. D. Arter, 'The breakthrough of another West European populist radical right party? The case of the True Finns', *Government and Opposition*, 45 (2010), pp. 484-504.

<sup>15</sup> M. K. Niemi, 'Timo Soini perussuomalaisen identiteetin isäntänä', in V. Pernaa and E. Railo (Eds.) *Jytky – Eduskuntavaalien 2011 mediajulkisuus* (Turku: Kirja Aurora, 2012). See also A. Elmgren, 'The Nordic Ideal: Openness and Populism According to the Finns Party', in N. Götz and

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C. Marklund (Eds.) *The Paradox of Openness – Transparency and Participation in Nordic Cultures of Consensus* (Leiden: Brill, 2015).

<sup>16</sup> T. Houwen, 'The non-European roots of the concept of populism' (Brighton: Sussex European Institute, 2011), p. 32.

<sup>17</sup> C. Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 35; A. Worm, *Ein Streitgespräch mit Jörg Haider* (Wien: Ueberreuter, 2005), p. 9.

<sup>18</sup> Houwen, 'The non-European roots', *op. cit.*, Ref. 16, pp. 25-26.

<sup>19</sup> Houwen, *ibid.*, p. 21f.

<sup>20</sup> H. Stenius, 'The Finnish Citizen: How a Translation Emasculated the Concept', *Redescriptions*, 8 (2004), pp. 172-188.

<sup>21</sup> Houwen, 'The non-European roots', *op. cit.*, Ref. 16, pp. 9-10.

<sup>22</sup> Jäger, 'The Semantic Drift', *op. cit.*, Ref. 2., p. 2.

<sup>23</sup> Houwen, 'The non-European roots', *op. cit.*, Ref. 15, p. 11.

<sup>24</sup> *Uusi Suometar*, 24 November 1900, p. 6; *Helsingin Kaiku*, 12 January 1907, p. 17.

<sup>25</sup> *Uusi Kuvalehti*, 21 (1896), p. 262; *Työmiehen Illanvietto*, 14 (1905), p. 11; *Uusi Suometar*, 11 December 1902, p. 5.

<sup>26</sup> Anonymous, 'Uusi hallitus Kreikassa', *Etelä-Suomen Sanomat*, 5 November 1946, p. 1; 'Tsaldaris muodostanut Kreikan uuden hallituksen', *Etelä-Suomen Sanomat*, 31 August 1947, p. 2.

<sup>27</sup> K. Möttölä, 'Kenestä Nixonin vastustaja', *Helsingin Sanomat*, 9 April 1972, p. 19; S. Määttänen, 'James Earl Carter aloittaa näiltä jalanjäljiltä', *Helsingin Sanomat*, 16 January 1977, p. 16. See also S. Määttänen's article series 'Tähtilipun hulmutessa', part 2 and 3, *Helsingin Sanomat*, 2 April 1978, p. 11, and 9 April 1978, p. 18.

<sup>28</sup> M. Paasilehto, 'Solidaarisuus loppusuoralla', *Etelä-Suomen Sanomat*, 20 September 1981, p. 13.

<sup>29</sup> M. Kurjensaari, 'Pariisissa on 17 kirjallista koulukuntaa', *Helsingin Sanomat*, 25 May 1949, p. 4; Anonymous, 'Goncourt-palkinto Bernard Clavelille', *Etelä-Suomen Sanomat*, 20 November 1968, p. 8.

<sup>30</sup> S. Pasanen, 'Muut pilkuttelevat vastaa Spede . . .', *Helsingin Sanomat*, 14 March 1971, p. 16; E. Pennanen, 'Mitä on kulttuuripopulismi?', *Helsingin Sanomat*, 4 April 1980, p. 34.

<sup>31</sup> Jäger, 'The Semantic Drift', *op. cit.*, Ref. 2., p. 3.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 10, 13.

<sup>35</sup> J. Ikonen, 'Miksi porvarilliset erillään vaaleihin?', *Etelä-Suomen Sanomat*, 4 October 1953, p. 9; Anonymous, 'Muut lehdet – Linnamon teknokratiaa', *Länsi-Savo*, 2 February 1969, p. 4.

<sup>36</sup> Anonymous, 'Viisi ismiä suomalaisittain', *Helsingin Sanomat*, 13 November 1969, p. 37.

<sup>37</sup> R. Alapuro, 'Miksi Suomi välttyi diktatuurilta?' *Helsingin Sanomat*, 4. August 1973, p. 4; P. Tarkka, 'Ylioppilaat ja kansa vastaan vuorineuvokset', *Helsingin Sanomat*, 11 November 1973, p. 30.

<sup>38</sup> Jäger, 'The Semantic Drift', *op. cit.*, Ref. 2., pp. 18-19.

<sup>39</sup> A. Astikainen, 'Pekka Vennamo mittauttaa puolueensa hallitushalut', *Helsingin Sanomat*, 23 December 1984, p. 7; E. Silvasti, 'Loikkaukset', *Helsingin Sanomat*, 25 September 1985, p. 17; Anonymous, 'Lasse Lehtisen kahtiajako populismiseminaarissa: Suomalaiset ovat demareita tai sitten vennamolaisia', *Helsingin Sanomat*, 30 November 1985, p. 15; K. Laine, "'Kansanedustajuuksu vaatii hehkua'", *Etelä-Suomen Sanomat*, 22 December 1985, p. 15; Pääkirjoitus, 'Paineet purkautuvat hallituksessa', *Helsingin Sanomat*, 26 March 1986, p. 2; K. Peltola, 'Politiikan tutkija Sakari Hänninen: Poliittinen käyttäytyminen on nyt näyttäytymistä', *Helsingin Sanomat*, 5 July 1986, p. 9; Anonymous, 'Muut lehdet, Koivisto antaa kehuja SMP:lle', *Helsingin Sanomat*, 14 January 1988, p. 9; Anonymous, 'Muut lehdet, Vaisu SMP', *Helsingin Sanomat*, 10 August 1988, p. 12; Anonymous, 'Muut lehdet: Hämärä imago', *Helsingin Sanomat*, 13 February 1989, p. 11; J. Tervo, 'Rötösherrajahti siisti tavat mutta rötöstelyä se ei lopettanut', *Helsingin Sanomat*, 31

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December 1989, p. 24.

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