The Problem of Evil and the Problem of Intelligibility

A Grammatical Metacritique of the Problem of Evil

Lauri Snellman

DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

To be presented for public discussion with the permission of the Faculty of Theology of the University of Helsinki, in the Porthania Lecture Hall P674,
on the 2nd of October 2020, at 1 o’clock
Doctoral supervisors:

Dr. Sami Pihlström
Professor of the Philosophy of Religion, Faculty of Theology, University of Helsinki

Dr. Olli-Pekka Vainio
Lecturer in Ecumenical Theology, Faculty of Theology, University of Helsinki

Preliminary examiners:

Dr. Mikael Stenmark
Professor in the Philosophy of Religion, Department of Theology, University of Uppsala

Dr. Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen
Professor, School of Business and Governance, Tallinn University of Technology

Opponent in the public examination:

Dr. Oliver Wiertz
Professor of Theology and Epistemology, Philosophisch-Theologische Hochschule Sankt Georgen

The Faculty of Theology uses the Urkund system (plagiarism recognition) to examine all doctoral dissertations.

ISBN 978-951-51-6517-6 (nid.)
ISBN 978-951-51-6518-3 (PDF)

Unigrafia
Helsinki 2020
Abstract: The Problem of Evil and the Problem of Intelligibility

The problem of evil is usually understood to concern the existence of God in a world, where there is evil. In fact, the problem of evil and the problem of intelligibility are closely linked together. The problem of evil is the question: does God exist and can there be intelligibility and meaning in the world that allows for moral action if there is evil? The problem of intelligibility is a family resemblance of questions concerning the relationship of rational thought and the world: is there a rational order in the world, how are concepts possible, and how do they link with the world?

The core of the work is to develop a philosophical grammar for examining the conceptual links between the problem of evil and the problem of meaning, and using the grammar of these links to dissolve the problem of evil with a grammatical metacritique. The investigation proceeds through four main research questions:

1. What are the general logic and the presuppositions of the problem of evil?
2. How can the problem of evil be called into question and how can one develop grammatical methods and philosophical tools to build a successful antitheodicy?
3. How can one develop a grammatical metacritique of the presuppositions of the problem through a philosophical grammar of the underlying language/world and being/meaning-links?
4. How can the grammatical approach to metaphysical questions and to the metacritique of the presuppositions of the problem of evil be used to analyse religious and worldview questions, and articulate ways of existential, humanistic and religious sense-making that overcome the problem?

The method used in the work is the systematic analysis of religious views and philosophical arguments. I develop a method of philosophical grammar or relational metacriticism to approach philosophical problems. Philosophical grammar involves investigating the meaning of an expression by locating it in relationships of use, and relational metacriticism develops an overview of a phenomenon by charting its underlying relationships.

The problem of evil is at bottom an existential one: how can the world have meaning and how is moral action possible, if there is pointless evil without morally sufficient reasons? The problem of evil is then associated with theodicism: God or the meaning of the world exists only, if all evils have (morally) sufficient reasons. The problem has four key presuppositions: the fact/meaning, fact/value and appearance/reality conceptual gaps and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The problem arises, when one tries to unify facts with meanings and values by appealing to God or some Arche that establishes a system of sufficient reasons. The appearances of evil present an anomaly or a problem to such attempts to locate meaningfulness and intelligibility in the world. The theodicy debate in the philosophy of religion is just a special case of the general problem, as J. L. Mackie’s, Alvin Plantinga’s and William Rowe’s classic articles work with the Leibnizian problematic of God’s metaphysically constrained choices for the best vs pointless evils.

Antitheodicies can be divided into moral and conceptual ones. A conceptual antitheodicy attempts to dissolve the conceptual presuppositions of the problem of evil. A moral antitheodicy extends the rejection of the world order to the activity of issuing reasons itself. I argue that moral antitheodicies cannot stand on their own and end up in question-begging and secularist moralism if they are not supported with other arguments, because the moral rejection of the practice of giving reasons for evil presupposes that there are no such reasons and ends up as groundless moralizing if there are. Therefore only conceptual antitheodicies can work. There are three traditions of conceptual antitheodicy: Kantian, Jamesian and Hamannian antitheodicies. Kantian antitheodicies argue that theodicism oversteps the limits of moral and theoretical human reason. Jamesian antitheodicies emphasize that God and the world order must be reinterpreted in terms of practical and moral action and from a pluralist perspective that can account for experience and moral effort. Hamannian antitheodicies hold that the dualisms and the rationalisms underlying theodicy debate are speculative metaphysics that can be overcome through philosophical grammar. I then argue that Hamannian antitheodicies can be used as metatheories for Kantian and Jamesian ones, because they allow for the critique of reason
as a critique of language and avoid the residual dualisms in Kant’s account, and the grammar of language use and religious stories allows for incorporating James’ appeal to practical meanings and to a God who defeats evil.

Philosophical grammar gives a ground for examining the presuppositions of theodicy. It examines the use of language by describing the rules of language-games and the relationships underlying them. It also describes the logic of our language by describing conceptual connections in language use and locates abstract concepts like the categories of being in linguistic and communicative relationships. The grammatical approach then investigates the necessary conditions of linguistic relationships to expose unfounded abstractions in metaphysics like dualisms. Language-games are categories in the metaphysical sense. They constitute the structure of uses of language for describing objects and thus give a foundation for ontological classifications and describing objects in terms of abstract concepts. The grammatical method of relational metacriticism then offers a ground for criticizing the metaphysical presuppositions of theodicy, because they cannot go against language use or its necessary conditions.

Facts and meanings cannot be separated, because states of affairs and objects are identified by interpreting them against the background of a language-game and its underlying system. The identification of objects requires both a grid of coordinates or a logical space for facts, and narrative principles of continuity that reveal its causal, social and other functional roles in its contexts. Then the narratively identified logic of functioning in a context or system is intertwined with the facts: the functions and stories are realized through the facts, and the facts get a role in the interaction of objects and contexts by having a role in functions and stories. Thus facts and meanings are intertwined, and facts are also seen-as objects by using narratives to identify objects in and through the facts.

The Principle of Sufficient Reason forms the link between the problems of evil and meaning. The problem of evil searches moral meaning in morally sufficient reasons or purposes and questions whether being = right or moral reason, as the metaphysical foundations debate questions whether being = reason by investigating the applicability of categories and the existence of rational grounds in reality. However, there is no need to account for the meaning of the world in terms of sufficient reasons for facts, because the fact/meaning split is itself groundless. Moreover, the Principle is inherently ambiguous. The concept of a reason makes sense only against the background of a language-game, and there are systems that have structures that do not amount to sufficient reasons. There are many kinds of sufficient reasons, like logical, moral and causal ones, and distinctions between them prevent running them all together by invoking the PSR. Moreover, the concept of being, and the various essences and logical spaces for being are located in language-games, their underlying systems and the language/world-encounter. Therefore one cannot identify reality itself with rational conceptual structures, because reality and encounter with it is prior to conceptual structures, and conceptual necessity depends on linguistic practices.

The concept of a virtue overcomes the fact/value gap. If the concept of good is associated with virtuous practices for moving from an evil present situation into a situation fulfilling the telos, then virtuous habits for realizing human nature intertwine facts and values. Virtues and other humanistic meanings are realized through actions in a context, and the actions are then shaped and chosen by reference to the virtues, human practices and the goods the virtues are used to pursue. Moreover, the world cannot be determined by Arches and sufficient reasons if the grammar of virtues is to work, because they collapse the distinction between the actual world and the possible telos. The grammar of salvation in religions of the sick soul is isomorphic to the grammar of virtues as well: God or the Way are said to be good, because they rescue from the evil situation into a state where the telos is reached. Moreover, such descriptions of religious stories and practices give the use of the word “God” and thus the categories for describing Him and his properties, like goodness and omnipotence. Then one can formulate a consistency proof by using the idea of God as a chessmaster. God is good because He wins when the world succeeds, and He is omnipotent because He has a winning strategy to defeat evil, and both can hold even if the world includes pointless and horrendous evils.

Keywords: theodicy; anti-theodicy; metacriticism; dualism; meaning; language-games; metaphysics; philosophy of language; philosophy of religion, facts and meanings; facts and values; principle of sufficient reason
Contents

The Problem of Evil and the Problem of Intelligibility ................................................................. 1

1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 10

2. Theodicism and the presuppositions of theodicy ........................................................................... 20
   2.1 Defining the problems of evil and theodicism ........................................................................... 20
   2.2. Evil and dualism in modern thought ......................................................................................... 23
      2.2.1 Footnotes to Plato: dualism and the background for the problem of evil................................. 23
      2.2.2 The problem of evil as a central problem of modern thought ............................................... 26
      2.2.3. The presuppositions of theodicy in the modern debate ..................................................... 29
      2.2.4 The dualisms behind the problem of evil .............................................................................. 32
      2.2.5 The general argument from evil ........................................................................................... 42
   2.3. Theism, atheism and the presuppositions of theodicy ............................................................... 48
      2.3.1 Leibnizian theism as a solution to the problem of intelligibility ............................................. 48
      2.3.2 Theodicism in contemporary philosophy of religion .............................................................. 53
      2.3.3 The neo-Leibnizian nature of the current debate ................................................................. 66

3. Metaphysics, grammar and evil: in search of a method .................................................................. 67
   3.1. The project of antitheodicy .......................................................................................................... 67
      3.1.1 Antitheodicies: conceptual, moral and moralistic ..................................................................... 68
      3.1.2 Antitheodicy and the critique of reason .................................................................................. 74
      3.1.3 Some preliminary arguments for Hamannian antitheodicism .................................................. 90
   3.2 Philosophical grammar and grammatical metacritique ............................................................... 96
      3.2.1 Insights from Wittgenstein .................................................................................................... 96
      3.2.2 Insights from Hamann .......................................................................................................... 104
      3.2.3 An overview of philosophical grammar .................................................................................. 114
   3.3 The metaphysical modelling debate in analytic philosophy ...................................................... 115
      3.3.1 Matter, form and metaphysics ............................................................................................... 116
      3.3.2 Metaphysics in the good company of science? ...................................................................... 120
      3.3.3 The antinomy of metaphysical realism ................................................................................. 127

4. Practical objectivity and the grammar of being .............................................................................. 132
   4.1. Language-games: a definition and examples ............................................................................ 133
   4.2 The practical objectivity of concepts and models ....................................................................... 150
6.2.1 Theological grammar and the logic of Scripture ............................................................. 300
6.2.2 Theological grammar, goodness and omnipotence ..................................................... 307
6.3.  Biblical grammar and the fallacies of theodicism................................................................. 313
   6.3.1 The Gospels and the redemptive sovereignty of God............................................. 316
   6.3.2 Metaphors in the Book of Job and the fallacies of theodicism................................. 322
6.4: A consistency proof........................................................................................................ 336
7.  Conclusions.......................................................................................................................... 343
Sources:.................................................................................................................................. 362
1. Introduction

“The question of the origin of evil amounts in the end to word-play and scholastic prattle.” – J. G. Hamann

“What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.” – Ludwig Wittgenstein

The problem of evil is usually understood to concern the existence of God in a world, where there is evil. In fact, the problem of evil and the problem of intelligibility are closely linked together. The problem of evil is the question: does God exist and can there be intelligibility and meaning in the world that allows for moral action, if there is evil? The problem of intelligibility is a family resemblance of questions concerning the relationship of rational thought and the world. It can be broken down into three constituent questions regarding the parts of the cognitive interface: the mind, the world and their interrelationship:

1. How is the ability to think possible? (The mind)
2. How can rational concepts of the mind be used of empirical objects in the world? (The interface)
3. Does the world itself have a rational order and meaning, which can be grasped? (The world)

Philosophers since Plato have often connected the concepts of being, reason, good and God. A key premise in these arguments has been the Principle of Sufficient Reason, or the claim that being itself is constituted by reason and its rational grounds or explanations. The question of sufficient reasons in the empirical world gives the question of the foundations of metaphysics: how can models for rational conceptual structures be used for describing the being of the empirical objects of science, or of the objects of faith in religious practices for that matter? The question of moral reasons for the empirical world then gives the question of purpose: does everything have a meaningful purpose, if there is evil in the world? The core of the work is to develop a philosophical grammar for examining these conceptual links and using them to dissolve the problem of evil with a grammatical metacritique. The focus of the work is on developing a grammar of our interface with

1 See Neiman 2015. For an attempted critique Neiman’s approach, see van Inwagen 2007, Ch. 1. For the different ways for conceiving the categories of being as either logical types or types of being, and either properties of the mind or the world, see the Introduction to Haaparanta & Koskinen 2012. I am grateful to Simo Knuuttila for helping me clarify the question of intelligibility. See also Putnam 1999.

2 See Heidegger 1997/1971 for the significance of the PSR in the philosophical tradition. For philosophy as a grammar, see PI, ZH 7, 158-173, Bayer 2002, Snellman 2018. The method of grammatical metacritique is developed in Ch. 3.2.
the world and a descriptive metaphysics of the rich and varied meanings of it. I also investigate the conceptual connections reason/being, reason/evil and reason/God. The results in the philosophy of religion are corollaries. The investigation proceeds through four main research questions:

1. What are the general logic and the presuppositions of the problem of evil?
2. How can the problem of evil be called into question and how can one develop grammatical methods and philosophical tools to build a successful antitheodicy?
3. How can one develop a grammatical metacritique of the presuppositions of the problem through a philosophical grammar of the underlying language/world and being/meaning-links?
4. How can the grammatical approach to metaphysical questions and to the metacritique of the presuppositions of the problem of evil be used to analyse religious and worldview questions, and articulate ways of existential, humanistic and religious sense-making that overcome the problem?

I develop an answer to question 1 in Ch. 2, to question 2 in Chs. 3-4.1, to question 3 in Chs. 3.3-5 and to question 5 in Chs. 5.4.3-6. There are two threads connecting my discussion. First, the link between metaphysics, ethics and religion is kept as a background through all chapters, even in technical discussions like the role of values in logical language-games or in attempts to make sense of systemic logics and meanings in terms inspired by discussions about consubstantiation and Real Presence in theology. Second, I develop a method of philosophical grammar through a dialogue with J. G. Hamann and Ludwig Wittgenstein in Ch. 3. I use the grammatical approach to develop a Hamannian conceptual antitheodicy, which exposes the presuppositions of the problem of evil to be conceptual confusions that rest on dualism and rationalist speculative metaphysics. It also describes human practices, religious stories and worldviews in order to develop alternatives to the models of sense-making presupposed by the discussions around the problem of evil and theodicy.

The goal of Chapter 2 is to define the problem of evil and to uncover its logic. I introduce standard definitions for the logical and evidential problems of evil, theodicies, defences and consistency proofs. I also use Susan Neiman, D. Z. Phillips and Yujin Nagasawa to introduce a distinction between general or existential problems of evil and theistic ones: the general or existential problem concerns the meaning of the world and the special or theistic problem concerns the existence of God in a world with evil. I also define the term “theodicism” that has been

---

3 For a recent attempt, see Peacocke 2006.
introduced by Sami Pihlström: theodicism is the assumption that God exists or the world is meaningful only, if all evils have a sufficient reason that gives them purpose. I then go on to develop an account of the logic of the problem of evil by developing a General Argument from Evil by building on Neiman’s work. I thus defend the Neiman Thesis that the problem of evil and the problem of intelligibility are linked together against Peter van Inwagen’s assertion that they aren’t. I analyse the fact/meaning, fact/value and appearance/reality conceptual gaps and the principle of sufficient reason, and then show how the problem of evil arises out of them. If facts are to be unified with meanings and values by appealing to God or some Arche that establishes a system of sufficient reasons, then the appearances of evil present an anomaly or a problem to the meaningfulness or intelligibility of the world. I then show, how the theodicy debate in the philosophy of religion is just a special case of the general problem by showing that J. L. Mackie’s, Alvin Plantinga’s and William Rowe’s framework-defining classic articles remain trapped in the Leibnizian and Humean fly-bottle of God’s metaphysically constrained choices for the best vs pointless evils.

The goal of Chapter 3 is to develop a way of doing antitheodicy by developing a metacritique of reason that exposes the background assumptions of the theodicy debate as speculative metaphysics. The main themes of the work arise straight out of the Hamann-Kant debate of the 1750s. When Hamann converted to evangelical Lutheran Christianity, Immanuel Kant approached him with theodicies to offer a religious alternative more in line with the Enlightenment project. Hamann then introduced Hume’s work to Kant in order to expose such speculative metaphysics. He also presented Kant with an argument that theodicies overstep the limits of reason and amount to flattering God. Kant then took up these themes in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Antitheodicy Essay*. The arguments of this thesis in many ways are a development of the themes that arise out of the Hamann-Kant debate in the context of discussions contemporary metaphysics and theodicy. I follow both in criticizing the problem of evil as speculative metaphysics. I follow Hamann with a metacritique of reason as a critique of language and the use of models for Divine Presence, language-games and systems of interaction to overcome conceptual gaps. I take from Kant the problem of the unity of reason, the problem of applying intelligible concepts of the sensuous world, the problem of realism in metaphysics and also the question of the relationships of facts and values, as well as facts and meanings.

5 The existence of evil has been presented as an anomaly by Alister McGrath (2004, 224-226) and by Alexander Pruss and Trent Dougherty in an article.


In doing so, my goal is not to take part in debates about interpretations of Hamann, Kant, Wittgenstein or other canonical philosophers. I tend to follow Oswald Bayer and Gwen Griffith-Dickson in Hamann interpretation. I interpret Kant eclectically taking ideas from Neiman, Pihlström, Hamann and mainline Kant interpreters like Howard Caygill and Henry Allison. My interpretation of Wittgenstein builds on my article “Hamann’s Influence on Wittgenstein”, Thomas Wallgren, Newton Garver and the Baker-Hacker school of Wittgenstein interpretation. My use of both Kantian and religiously informed pragmatist writers like Hamann perhaps closest resembles Hilary Putnam in the 1990s and the 2000s. Putnam uses William James, Hamannian thinkers like Soren Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein, Kantian problems about representation, Aristotelian ideas and his Jewish religious heritage to formulate a critique of the subject/object gap by using language-games, an Aristotle-style natural realism and a quest for making philosophical problems meaningful from a human point of view.8

I take up the methodological questions about the requirements of a good antitheodicy in Ch. 3.1 by building up on Toby Betenson’s distinction between conceptual and moral antitheodicies, my response to Betenson and our debate. A conceptual antitheodicy attempts to dissolve the conceptual presuppositions of the problem of evil, and a moral antitheodicy extends the rejection of the world order and its possible Architect to the activity of issuing reasons itself. I argue that moral antitheodicies cannot stand on their own and end up in question-begging and secularist moralism if they are not supported with other arguments, because rejecting the practice of giving reasons for evil on moral grounds presupposes that there are no such reasons and ends up as groundless moralizing if there are.9 Then only conceptual antitheodicies can work. I build on Pihlström’s work in Kantian Antitheodicy in classifying different ways of connecting anti-theodicy with the critique of reason and groundless metaphysics. There are Kantian, Jamesian and Hamannian antitheodicies. Kantian antitheodicies argue that theodicism oversteps the limits of moral and theoretical human reason. Jamesian antitheodicies emphasize that God and the world order must be reinterpreted in terms of practical and moral action and from a pluralist perspective that can account for experience and moral effort. Hamannian antitheodicies hold that the dualisms and the rationalisms underlying theodicy debate are speculative metaphysics that can be overcome through philosophical grammar. I then argue that Hamannian antitheodicies can be used as metatheories for Kantian and Jamesian ones, because they allow for the critique of reason as a critique of language and avoid the residual dualisms in Kant’s account, and the grammar of

9 Similar arguments have been made by van Inwagen (2007, Ch.4) and Robert Mark Simpson (2009).
language use and religious stories allows for incorporating James’ appeal to practical meanings and to a saving God who acts like a chessmaster to defeat evil.10

After my overview of the various traditions of conceptual antitheodicy, I take up directly the methodological questions that were raised by the Hamann-Kant debate. Ch. 3.2 forms the methodological heart of the work, as I introduce the grammatical approach for examining the question of intelligibility and exposing theodicist metaphysics there. I develop the method of relational grammar and relational conditions arguments for charting and interpreting relationships of language use and their necessary conditions. I introduce a system-theoretic approach to language-games and their underlying relationships. I also formulate the ideas that both idealist constructivism and Aristotelian natural realism are aspects of linguistic relationships, and that language-games are categories that form the ground for charting essences, like “is omnipotent”. I then take up the questions posed by the metacritique of reason, like the status of abstract concepts and the ground and nature of reason itself, by examining the metaphysical foundations debate in contemporary philosophy. The debate is eerily similar to the one between Hamann and Kant: Tuomas Tahko, Matteo Morganti and L. A. Paul offer good company arguments for scientific metaphysics from the theory of modelling and representation, and Tahko and Morganti build them by synthetizing James Ladyman’s positivism and E. J. Lowe’s rationalism. Putnam and Bas van Fraassen then question the metaphysical realist appeal to models for metaphysical problems like theodicy by examining the practical necessary conditions for modelling, the roots of abstract concepts in language and by arguing that metaphysical realism itself depends on the groundless realism/idealism-distinction that is overcome by the natural realism of language use. I use their discussions to formulate an antinomy of metaphysical realism, which lays the groundwork for a critique of the anti-linguistic metaphysical turn as based on a false dilemma of metaphysical realism vs constructivism. Putnam’s and van Fraassen’s metacritiques also highlight that the questions underlying the demarcation of speculative metaphysics are the ones raised by Hamann and Kant: the possibility of thought and the possibility of using abstract concepts of empirical and concrete objects – or the subjective and relational sides of the problem of intelligibility.11

I then take up these Kantian questions and articulate the Hamannian answer: the ability to think is constituted by linguistic concepts, and philosophical grammar charts the rules that give the rational grounds for metaphysics and for dismissing speculative metaphysics like the

problem of evil. I articulate and formalize the concept of a language-game in Ch. 4.1: how do language-games address the problems of intelligibility? I also attempt to give a technical definition (or an explication) for language-games, and also bring in very heavy technical tools like mathematical game and category theory to articulate the structuralism of language-games and their underlying relationships. The technical tools go into the territory of “Overcoming Theodicism through a Formal Theological Grammar of Language”, and can be skipped or used as a reference for the more technical parts of my arguments if needed. I build on the definition of language-games in Ch. 4.2 to argue that linguistic practices overcome the senses/reason and subject/object gaps and the antinomy of metaphysical realism: language is empirical and its empirical expressions are rational concepts, it includes its objects and connects them with words through use. The rules of language use are socially constructed conventions even though they are formed in response to reality and build on and symbolize its inherent necessities. Thus both social constructivism and Aristotelian natural realism holds and the antinomy of metaphysical realism is a confusion. Language then also gives grounds for a relational metacritique of metaphysics: since language-games are prior to their rules in Jaakko Hintikka’s sense, metaphysical description of our encounter with the world and the logical types of concepts and the types of objects in them cannot be detached from linguistic relationships or go against their necessary relational conditions.12

I then extend the linguistic description to cover categorizations of being by building on Newton Garver’s article “Language-Games as Categories”, and by introducing C.S. Peirce’s and Hintikka’s language-games of seeking and finding for the concept “there is”, or the concept of being. I argue that language-games give the grounds for categorization. They give the discourse possibilities for describing objects, pointing them out and locating them and their properties in identifying and logical spaces. They also give the narrative principles of causation and character that identify the functioning of objects in relationships and allow for their reidentification across time and possible situations. I then use the formal machinery of mathematical categories and games for locating abstractions and rules in language-games. Both abstract models for the concept of being like the Peirce-Hintikka game and Lowe’s categories as grounds for reidentification point out rules or structural types for encountering objects. I then develop a relational deduction for the objectivity of higher order abstract concepts and models. The structural abstract concepts and models are then objective by being embedded on language-games and establishing possibilities of comparison between different language-games, different logical types and different types of objects in them.

Thus the categories fundamentally concern ways for encountering reality, and are both logical types and types of objects by pointing out structural features of these encounters. My goal here is not to develop detailed categorizations, but to lay a ground for a Strawsonian descriptive metaphysics that overcomes the fact/meaning gap, and for a Wittgensteinian or Jamesian grammar of religious stories and practices that allows for an examination for God’s essential properties like goodness.13

The fifth chapter uses the grammatical methods for approaching metaphysics into a metacritique of the fact/meaning gap and the principle of sufficient reason. I develop a Strawsonian approach to facts and meanings that locates both in our encounters with reality and their underlying systems. To identify an object, one has both to locate an object in grids of coordinates of a system or relationship in order to point at it and its properties, and to reidentify it with principles that point to its role in relationships. Then facts correspond to points or coordinates in a logical space of a system, and the principles of continuity correspond to functional terms, Peircean would-bes, causal roles and characters of objects in the relationship. Facts and meanings are thus intertwined: systemic logics function through the facts and make them meaningful, and facts have their roles as states of systems and facts about objects through the world-lines, would-bes, functional terms and associated systemic roles. I use Hamann’s grammar of elements, rules and present meanings and generalize the associated theological results to make the argument, but it could also be made by reinterpreting Peirce’s categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness as facts, rules and meanings. The Aristotelian or Hamannian side of the argument also corresponds to a Kantian or Wittgensteinian one: empirical facts for encountering objects are seen-as structured objects that are located in relationships, when we apply the rules, institutions and practices for reidentifying objects to point out facts and their roles in relationships. It thus follows that it is a grammatical principle of the concept “there is” or being qua being that facts and meanings are intertwined. It directly follows from this that the fact/meaning split rests on a conceptual confusion and there is no need to try to account for loose, separate, meaningless and evil facts with the Principle of Sufficient Reason in order to make them meaningful. I then examine functional intertwinnings in physical causation, the biological interpretation of DNA, mental states, artistic values and Christian models of Divine Presence and thus show the generality and strength of the model.14

Chapters 5.3 and 5.4. take the relational analysis to the Principle of Sufficient Reason. I use two main sources: Alexander Pruss has given a strong defence of the Principle in recent

philosophy that distinguishes between different versions of the Principle and makes conceptual
links between the concepts of being, intelligibility, explanation and God. Martin Heidegger
explicitly links the Principle with the nature of being qua being and the foundations of metaphysics
by interpreting the PSR as being = rational ground, and locates the Principle in the connection of
language, intelligibility and the world. The exploration of the conceptual links that the Principle
makes ends up in an overview of the connections problem of evil of Ch. 2 and the metaphysical
foundations debate of Ch. 3.3–4 that greatly strengthens the Neiman Thesis. The problem of evil
searches moral meaning in ethical sufficient reasons or purposes and questions whether being =
right or moral reason, as the metaphysical foundations debate questions whether being = reason by
investigating the applicability of categories and the existence of rational grounds in reality. In Ch
5.4 I present a metacritique of the Principle that builds on the view of language-world links in Ch 4
and of the connection of facts and meanings in Ch. 5. First, I argue that the Principle is inherently
ambiguous. The concept of a reason makes sense only against the background of a language-game,
and there are systems that have institutions that do not amount to sufficient reasons. There are many
kinds of sufficient reasons, like logical, moral and causal ones, and distinctions between them
prevent running them all together by invoking the PSR. Moreover, the concept of being, and the
various essences and logical spaces for being are located in language-games, their underlying
systems and the language/world-encounter. Therefore one cannot identify reality itself with rational
conceptual structures, because reality and encounter with it is prior to conceptual structures, and
conceptual necessity depends on linguistic practices. In Ch. 5.4.3 I argue that detaching sufficient
reasons out of their contexts gives an antinomy of reason about God that is even deeper than
theodicism, and to overcome the antinomy one has to locate the Principle in prior ways of sense-
making in theology and science.15

Chapter 6 applies the results of Ch. 5 into worldview debates. The intelligibility of
facts, rules and meanings is brought back into the study of humanistic meaning and religious
practices and stories. I first discuss moral meaning through the grammar of virtues and its system of
facts, good practices and social contexts and show that if the approach of Ch.5 overcomes the
fact/meaning split, then virtues overcome the fact/value split as well. I then discuss the example of
artistic meaning in stories and music by discussing tragic meaning. I also defend a Jamesian
argument that the world cannot be metaphysically determined if the grammar of virtues is to work,
so strong metaphysical justifications that deny that there are better alternatives like the Leibnizian
best-world doctrine evacuate the terms “good” and “evil” of meaning. I then establish an

isomorphism between religions of the sick soul and virtue ethics. These links have the consequence that the religious problem of evil is confused, as it is the cosmic analogue of the Enlightenment problem of justifying morality. I next bring the theory of linguistic categories from Ch. 4 into the religious context of encountering the Holy in Ch. 6.2, and use it to develop a grammar of the Bible. I also use it as a metatheory for Phillips’, van Fraassen’s and Hamann’s antitheodicies by linking it with the critique of the PSR in Ch. 5.4. The metacritiques locate the meanings of terms like “good” and “omnipotent” in religious stories and practices, and show that attempts to define them with the PSR detach them from these practices. I then develop a grammar of God as a chessmaster through N.T. Wright’s anti-theodicist interpretation of the Gospels and Leo Perdue’s theological grammar of the metaphors for God in the Book of Job. I close the book by crystallizing a Jamesian consistency proof for the set \{God is good, God is omnipotent, There is evil\} by formulating the metaphor of the victory of God through game theory. God is good because He wins when the world succeeds, and He is omnipotent because He has a winning strategy to defeat evil, and both can hold even if some states of the world include pointless and horrendous evils. I also contrast this approach with theistic theodicies: if the evil has a good reason, then God has no need to defeat it.\(^1\)

The goals of my work are humanistic: the argument basically is a Christian humanist exploration of ways for making sense of the world and our place in it by using the tools of Helsinki logic and metaphysics.\(^1\) In many ways, it generalizes the Neiman thesis about the centrality of evil as a motivation for the discussions of intelligibility to cover Western metaphysics as a whole, because it links the entire history of Greek, Leibnizian, Kantian and positivist metaphysics with the PSR and the PSR with the problem of evil. It also connects the evil/rational intelligibility-link to the dialogue of Athens and Jerusalem. It highlights the grammatical links between the concept of reason, the concept of God and the concept of being and shows that the PSR is a deeply problematic metatheory for Christian theology or for any religion that descends from a biblical worldview. It also shows that the links between the problems of the applicability of categories, of meaning in the world and the shallowness of theodict responses to the question of meaningfulness were already exposed in the “two Königsbergs controversy”\(^1\). My own starting points to the problems have been to formulate an approach to the field of problems by synthetizing approaches from classical

---


\(^1\) Calling the Hamann-Kant debate the “Two Königsbergs controversy” is a reference to the two Cambridges capital controversy in economics.
Wisdom theology, Aristotelian natural realism, critical and metacritical approaches formulated in the Königsberg controversies, classical American pragmatism, post-Newtonian systems-theoretic science and classical and literary humanism. The work then can be read from many angles:

- A relational and grammatical approach into philosophical problems in metaphilosophy.
- A metacritical approach to metaphysics in general, although my goal is not to expose speculative metaphysics outside the question of theodicy or go into extracting a system of formal categories from language-games.
- An investigation into the models for deep connections between the concepts of God, meaning, being, reason and the problem of evil.
- A metacritique of modern metaphysics with its subject/object split, identification of reality with geometric mathematical structures (AKA the positivist version of the PSR) and the disenchantment of the world (AKA Max Weber’s and Ulrich Zwingli’s version of the fact/meaning split).
- An approach to humanistic meaningfulness in terms of seeing-as, grammars for stories and other systems of meaning, and the link between humanistic meaningfulness and the virtues.
- A contribution to theology or to the norms for using the word “God” correctly, especially in philosophical and doctrinal discussions about the nature of God’s properties and of reasons for divine action and the world.
- A religious apologetic or a metacritique of modern evil-based atheism, which is exposed as a mix of Platonist/Gnostic speculative metaphysics and moralistic blasphemies passed on as science.

My approach will doubtless prove controversial. Traditional metaphysicians will view it as too linguistic. To humanistic and historically-oriented philosophers like Neiman, the argument will be too technical. To technical analytic philosophers like van Inwagen, it will be too overarching and historical. More generally, the project will cross inter-disciplinary and inter-paradigm boundaries in philosophy, as it e.g. links discussions of linguistic hermeneutics with the structuralism of mathematical category theory, or the interpretation of religious stories with questions about the nature of reason. There are also confessional issues involved: for Calvinist or Roman Catholic philosophers, it can seem too Lutheran. Well, I’m willing to take the risk, see what comes out of it...

I wish to thank my advisors: Pihlström and Olli-Pekka Vainio. I also want to thank Aku Visala, Tuomas Tahko, Simo Knuuttila, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Riku Juti, Thomas Wallgren, Tarja Kallio, Gwen Griffith-Dickson, Susan Neiman, Nick Trakakis, Toby Betenson, Marja Kankaanrinta, Vadim Kulikov, Sofia Holopainen, David Huisjen, Panu-Matti Pöykkö, Alexander Garton, Therese Feiler and others for their valuable comments. I would also like to thank the Olvi Foundation, the University of Helsinki, the Tavastian Student Foundation and the Research Centre of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, whose grants have made this research possible.
2. Theodicism and the presuppositions of theodicy

The problem of evil is one of the big questions in the philosophy of religion, and an existential question that each of us humans have to face. The problem has often been formulated as a problem about whether a good and omnipotent God can exist, given that there is evil in the world?

Epicurus's old questions are yet unanswered. Is he (God) willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?19

The goal of this chapter is to present the logic of the problem of evil. I first define the various versions of the problem of evil and theodicism, which is its central presupposition. I then articulate the logic of the general or meaning-based problem of evil by first examining the modern discussion on evil to find its presuppositions, and then crystallizing them into a general argument from evil. I then show, how the theistic or religious problem of evil is a special case of the general problem by examining Leibniz’ answers to questions about intelligibility, and then showing that the contemporary discussion follows Leibniz’ approach to the questions of God, meaning and evil.

2.1 Defining the problems of evil and theodicism

One way of putting the theistic problem of evil is to ask, whether the set of sentences \{God is good, God is omnipotent, Evil exists\} is inconsistent.20 We can define this question as the special or theistic problem of evil. D. Z. Phillips, Susan Neiman and other philosophers writing on the problem of evil claim that the theistic problem of evil is just a special case of an existential problem of evil: how can the world be meaningful and worthy of our practical trust, if there is so much evil in the world? We can thus define a general problem of evil: are the world and life meaningful and trustworthy, given that there is evil in the world? One of the goals of this chapter is to determine the

20 I will base my overview on Michael Peterson’s, William Hasker’s, Bruce Reichenbach’s and David Basinger’s textbook Reason & Religious Belief (Peterson et al., 2003, 128-153). The presuppositions of forming the question in this way are taken up in Ch. 2.3.2.
logic of the general and existential problem of evil and show, how the theistic problem is just a special case of the general existential problem.\textsuperscript{21}

Both the theistic and existential problems can take a logical or an evidential form. The logical problem concerns, whether the existence of evil entails that God does not exist (the logical theistic problem) or that it entails that there is no meaning to life and the world (the logical general problem). The evidential problem concerns, whether the existence of evil is strong (probabilistic) evidence against the existence of God (the evidential theistic problem) or against the meaning of life and the world (the evidential general problem).\textsuperscript{22} The modern debate on evil has led to the separation of moral evil from natural evil. Moral evils like the Holocaust are evils that depend on the choices and character traits made by created moral agents, most often human beings\textsuperscript{23}. Natural evils are natural events that cause harm and suffering, like the Lisbon earthquake.\textsuperscript{24} The different problems of evil can be illustrated by using a fourfold map:

There are three ways of answering the different forms of the argument from evil: consistency proofs, defences and theodicies. A theistic consistency proof shows that the set \{God is good, God is omnipotent, Evil exists\} is consistent. I present such a proof in Ch. 6.4. A general consistency proof shows that the set \{Evil exists, The world is valuable and meaningful, Life is meaningful\} is consistent. Neiman argues that the general problem of evil and meaning is more fundamental than the theistic case. D. Z. Phillips (2005, xi) similarly distinguish the general existential problem of meaning and the theistic problem, and argues that the general problem is more fundamental. See also Nagasawa 2018.

\textsuperscript{21} See Neiman 2015, 1-13, 314-328. Neiman argues that the general problem of evil and meaning is more fundamental than the theistic case. D. Z. Phillips (2005, xi) similarly distinguish the general existential problem of meaning and the theistic problem, and argues that the general problem is more fundamental. See also Nagasawa 2018.

\textsuperscript{22} Peterson et al., 2003, 128-153, Neiman 2015, 1-13.

\textsuperscript{23} Alvin Plantinga raises the possibility that natural evil can be reduced to moral evil: natural evils could be the work of demons. See Plantinga 1974, Ch. 9.

\textsuperscript{24} Peterson et al., 2003, 128-153, Neiman 2015, 1-13.
consistent, or in a more existential way, how the existence of evil does not shatter the sense of meaning in life.25 Theodicies are one type of consistency proofs. A theodicy is a theory that shows God’s reason for allowing evil. More generally, we can talk of theodicies in the wider sense as theories showing, how evils contribute to the good.26 A defence establishes a conceptual or epistemic possibility that God could have sufficient reasons for permitting evil. The discussion has led to some advances, like the use of possible world semantics to clarify the issues.27

There are several famous theodicies and defences. Leibniz’ famous theodicy is discussed in Ch. 2.3.1. Another example is the Augustinian free will theodicy, which Alvin Plantinga uses as a defence. God created a good universe. Evil is a privation of good, and it came to the world through the abuse of human free will. Thus all evil contributes to the good, because it is either a byproduct of free will, or a punishment. The Irenaean theodicy developed by John Hick proposes that the world and its inhabitants are not ready-made. Evil is a condition for moral growth so, that human beings can display virtues in interacting with their communities and with nature. Even the apparent absence of God makes human souls stronger, because it strengthens faith. God’s goal is universal salvation, which takes place through moral maturation and might be achieved only in afterlife. The arguments from evil, theodicies and defences all have a common presupposition: “God (...) would not allow any evil unless it is necessary for a greater good. Meeting this criterion (...) is the only thing that would provide God with a morally sufficient reason to permit evil.”28

Antitheodicy is a critical reaction against this presupposition, which can be called theodicism. Sami Pihlström and Sari Kivistö define it: “By ‘theodicism’ we may refer to all those attempts to deal with the problem of evil that regard theodicy as a desideratum of an acceptable theistic position, irrespective of whether they end up defending theism or rejecting it.”29 One way of putting theodicism is to formulate it as two conditionals, which we will see to be equivalent The approach can also be extended to the general problem of evil:

\[ \Box (\text{God exists only, if all evil has an explanation that justifies it}). \]
\[ \Box (\text{God exists only, if all evils have a (morally) sufficient reason}). \]

25 For the existential problem as a problem of meaning, see Neiman 2015, 7, 1-13, Ch. 2.2, cf. Nagasawa 2018.
26 For a more general take on the theodicy tradition, see Neiman 2015, 14-112, 314-328, Pihlström 2013, 131.
27 Peterson et al., 2003, 128-153. For possible worlds semantics and their use in theodicy, see Garson 2018, Plantinga 1974. A proposition is epistemically possible for an agent p iff it’s true in some possible world consistent with the agent’s information. For epistemic logic, see Hintikka 1992. For theodicies and defences, see Plantinga 1974, 192.
28 Peterson et al. 148, 128-153. See also Plantinga 1974, Ch.9, van Woudenberg 2013.
29 Pihlström and Kivistö 2016. The quote is on Page 2, 5, Ch. 3.
Now that theodicism has been defined, my goal in this chapter is to examine its presuppositions. I first use the Kantian approach of Neiman and the Hamannian questions about dualisms to find out the presuppositions of the general problem of evil and formulate them in a Generalized Argument from Evil. I then use Leibniz’s account of the intelligibility of the world and contemporary discussions in analytic theodicy to show how the presuppositions and the general problem play out in contemporary debates about God and evil.

2.2. Evil and dualism in modern thought

Hamannian antitheodicies work on the assumption that philosophical problems often arise out of Gnostic dualisms and conceptual gaps. They are overcome by developing grammars of language, reason and theology that show these dualisms to be groundless. The goal of this section is to lay groundwork for a Hamannian antitheodicy by identifying how dualisms generate the problem of evil. I show the following. The problem first arises in Plato, who has a dualism of the empirical material world and an ideal order, and then gives a revisionary metaphysical definition for divine activity in terms of the ideal world. The problem then turned into a sceptical paradox, which motivated the epistemological research programs of the 17th century. 17th century thinkers developed epistemic theories to overcome the conceptual gaps of modern rationalism in order to find sense behind an evil and chaotic order of appearances. I then condense a Generalized Argument from Evil from these reflections by answering Peter van Inwagen’s criticisms of Neiman.

2.2.1 Footnotes to Plato: dualism and the background for the problem of evil

Plato is one of the main sources of dualism in the Western philosophical tradition. Neiman claims that Plato is also one of the background influences on the problem of evil. The goal of this subchapter is to show that the way the problem of evil has been treated in Western philosophy can be
traced to Plato’s dualism. Specifically, Plato used his two-tiered model of reality and the existence of evil to establish a metaphysical gap between God and the world. The Sceptics turned Plato’s view of the relationship of God and the world into a religious paradox.\textsuperscript{30}

The \textit{Republic}\textsuperscript{31} expresses Plato’s views on the nature of reality. Holger Thesleff interprets Plato as offering a two-tiered metaphysics.\textsuperscript{32} Plato’s metaphysics divides reality into two opposite levels.\textsuperscript{33} The lower level includes particulars, temporal events and a plurality of objects. The higher level contains universals or Forms, non-temporal permanence and unity. The distinction between the levels is expressed through binary oppositions like one/many, same/different, reason/senses, God/world, reality/appearance and particular/universal. The higher level is more real, because being is permanent and oriented to the good, and the higher level is more permanent and better. The higher level is therefore ontologically and conceptually prior to the lower level, which emulates and reflects the higher level. There also is a conceptual gap between the levels, because the higher level has been defined to be permanent, universal and rational in contrast to the changing lower-level world of sensuous particulars.

Plato’s doctrine of Forms and the Platonic view of God operate within the framework of his two-tier metaphysics.\textsuperscript{34} Plato aims to get “behind” phenomena and reach their invariances by explaining them. Explanation reveals the underlying rational order of things by logically deriving them from a hidden rational principle. Knowledge about the world is possible only if its objects are permanent and general. Similarly, predicates like “x is beautiful” can be meaningful only, if they name an object that is common to all beautiful things. Forms are the general and permanent objects that correspond to predicates. The ideal Forms are also the permanent object of rational knowledge. For example, real knowledge of dogs involves using the predicate “dog” to refer to the permanent properties of doghood and basing one’s knowledge of dogs on the grasp of the general property.\textsuperscript{35}

There are higher Forms like the Good and the Beautiful, and lower Forms like yellowness and doghood. The level of higher Forms is purer, simpler and more general. The level of lower Forms includes combinations of Forms and conceptual contrasts: for example, the Form of greenness is in

\textsuperscript{30} Neiman 2015, 10, Hickson 2013. Neiman also discusses Descartes’ Gnostic view of human knowledge as an answer to the problem of evil: what if an evil God deceives me? Then knowledge is only possible on the basis of autonomous reason. Hamann argued that Platonism, idealism, Gnosticism, mysticism and Schwärmerey are closely connected. They all take the world of contingent material particulars to be "too rough and material" (PI 120), and attempt to escape it to universality, necessity and the spiritual world. See N III, 285, Bayer 2002, 297-305.
\textsuperscript{31} Rep.
\textsuperscript{32} Thesleff expresses his views in English in the book \textit{Platonic Patterns} (Thesleff 2009). My summary of Platonism is based on Thesleff’s article in \textit{Filosofian historian kehityslinjoja} (Thesleff 1998).
\textsuperscript{34} The discussion on Plato’s doctrine of Ideas is based on Thesleff 1998, 42-51. See Thesleff 2009.
\textsuperscript{35} See Rep. 5: 478-480.
contrast with the Form of yellowness. Higher Forms relate to lower Forms like objects relate to images of them: $\frac{\text{higher Ideas}}{\text{lower Ideas}} = \frac{\text{objects}}{\text{images}}$. Evil as such does not exist, but it is just the privation of good. Dialectics is the science of grasping Forms through rational thought. Dialectics has two phases. The first one is a search for common features (or universal properties). These common parts are then defined through their constituent concepts.36

The doctrine of Forms forms the background to Plato’s theology.37 God or the divine belongs to the higher level of reality. The creator God also ordered the world rationally by combining the world of Forms with the sensuous and material world of particulars. The world therefore contains both of the members in pairs one/many, stasis/change and unity/difference. Since God is an ideal being and acts by realizing ideal Forms in matter, He can be said to act only if the situation or object is ideal (or divine, if one takes “divine” to refer to the Forms). Religious language and myths must therefore be purified of popular beliefs:

-I said to him, You and I, Adeimantus, at this moment are not poets, but founders of a State: now the founders of a State ought to know the general forms in which poets should cast their tales, and the limits which must be observed by them, but to make the tales is not their business.

-Very true, he said; but what are these forms of theology which you mean?
-Something of this kind, I replied: God is always to be represented as he truly is, whatever be the sort of poetry, epic, lyric or tragic, in which the representation is given. - Right.
And is he not truly good? and must he not be represented as such? - Certainly.
And no good thing is hurtful? - No, indeed.
And that which is not hurtful hurts not? - Certainly not.
And that which hurts not does no evil? - No.
And can that which does no evil be a cause of evil? - Impossible.
And the good is advantageous? - Yes.
And therefore the cause of well-being? - Yes.
It follows therefore that the good is not the cause of all things, but of the good only? - Assuredly.
Then God, if he be good, is not the author of all things, as the many assert, but he is the cause of a few things only, and not of most things that occur to men. For few are the goods of human life, and many are the evils, and the good is to be attributed to God alone; of the evils the causes are to be sought elsewhere, and not in him.38

36 See Rep. 6: 507-7:517. For the identification of Being and rational order, see Ch. 5.3, Heidegger 1996/1971.
38 Rep. 2: 379a-d. Quoted in http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.3.ii.html. The text has been lightly edited.
One should note two points. First, Plato is clearly arguing that God is not the cause of many things, because these things are evil. The premise of his argument is that if God is the cause of a thing, then the thing is good. One could almost rephrase the premise: God can only create x only if x is an ideal object, i.e. in accord with the order of reasons given by the Forms. The argument from evil is a repackaging of these ideas: since there is evil in the world, there is no God who is both the author of everything and wholly good. Second, the argument is a form of revisionary metaphysics. Plato is clearly aware that the Greek gods are not in accord with the principle that if a god does x, x is ideal. The Greek gods fight each other, cause accidents and wars, and take the guise of non-ideal mortals. Plato does not describe the use of language about God, but instead takes a metaphysical principle and imposes it on religious language from the outside. Plato thus takes a dualist opposition real/ideal and turns it into a theological problem by redefining God in terms of the ideal.

Although Plato’s line of reasoning turned out to be influential, he didn’t formulate it as an argument for atheism or the claim that the gods are distant. Michael Hickson discusses the Platonic and Sceptical background of the problem of evil and argues that the argument from evil first surfaced in the works of Sceptical philosophers. Although the problem is today associated with Epicurus, Epicurus held that the gods were ideal beings, so his version of the argument would be the same as Plato’s. Hickson proposes that Sceptical philosophers like Sextus Empiricus were the first to articulate the problem of evil as a religious paradox. The question was taken up 1700 years later, when a dualistic view about the relationship of the body and the mind revived sceptical doubts – which often took the form of fears that an evil God could be deceiving us.

2.2.2 The problem of evil as a central problem of modern thought

Dickson holds that the Enlightenment project was an attempt to answer problems concerning the relationship of the mind and the world from the starting point of a strong mind/body dualism. The fundamental starting point of the Enlightenment was to split the process of knowing into the knowing subject and the object of knowledge, which are defined to be separate and to stand against each other. According to Descartes, human beings could have the same sense-experiences and abilities to reason even if there were no world, and their experiences and abilities to reason would

40 Bayer 1991a, 201, Hickson 2013. Cf. Pl 116, 373, ZH 7, 169, Ch. 6.2.2.
41 Hickson 2013, Neiman 2015, 10.
42 Dickson 1995, 2-15, Meditations 1, see TLP 5.511.
be the products of an evil God that deceives them. The conceptual gap between subject and object then leads immediately into a problem of scepticism: how knowledge is possible, if the mental subject and the material world have been defined to be separate and opposite? Rationalism and empiricism gave two opposing answers, and their debate concerns the ground of objectivity. Empiricism locates objectivity in the senses, the objects of knowledge and sensuous appearances. Rationalism locates objectivity in the subject, reason and the ordering of mental contents according to reason. Both empiricism and rationalism work within the subject/object binary opposition and a view of language as a mirror of facts.

Neiman and Stephen Toulmin show that the modern epistemological project of certainty is motivated by the desire to make sense of chaotic and possibly deceptive appearances. The older medieval vision of the harmony of the physical, moral and social worlds had collapsed, so there was a need for a new foundation for knowledge and a new “cosmopolitical” vision unifying the physical, the moral and the social worlds. Descartes attempted to define a new rational method in order to find reasons behind appearances. When he was doing science, Descartes was more of a codebreaker than a foundationalist. A scientist deciphers experience and searches for meaning in it by crystallizing clear and distinct ideas that had been sent by God, and deriving certain knowledge of the natural order out of them mathematically. At the same time, scientists attempted to overcome religious disputes by founding science in empirical facts. They used book-keeping as a model how scientists should collect numerical facts on their balance sheets and then reach results by performing clear calculations on them. The question motivating the epistemological project was then: “Is there a rational and good order behind chaotic appearances?” Rationalists tended to argue that facts can be fit into a rational order, and empiricists tended to argue that experience is so fractured that one cannot find a good and rational order behind things. Neiman argues that “the worry that fueled debates about the differences between appearances and reality was not the fear that the world might not turn out to be the way it seems to us – but rather the fear that it would.”

Neiman argues that the problem of evil is one of the focal points of modern philosophy. The problem of evil arises immediately when one judges: “This should not have happened.” The problem is more general than just the debate about the relationship of God and the world. As we have seen, it concerns the relationship of the physical world and ideal entities in Plato. Neiman claims that God in fact acts as a middleman in the problem and one can pose the question

---

44 Neiman 2015, 11.
in secular terms: “not only is the real not identical with the rational; they aren’t even related.”45 Evil in the world threatens the rational meaningfulness of the world, so the problem concerns the intelligibility of the world as a whole. “The fact that the world contains neither justice nor meaning threatens our ability both to act in the world and to understand it.”46 In other words, the problem is at the same time theoretical and practical: “Is the world just? How can we make sense of it in light of evil? Can we trust it in order to act?”47 Neiman makes four claims about the Enlightenment debate on the problem of evil:

1. The problem of evil is a central problem in modern thought. It motivates questions about the relationship of appearances and reality, senses and reason and reason and the world.
2. The problem of evil fundamentally concerns the intelligibility of the world. It links metaphysical questions with ethical ones.
3. The distinction between moral evil and natural evil is a product of the modern debate.
4. The debates offer two kinds of solutions to the problem of evil. The optimist one attempts to make evil intelligible by furnishing reasons for it. The pessimist one holds that evil cannot be made intelligible. Both positions are motivated by moral reasons.48

Neiman’s definition of evil and the historical significance of her paradigm cases make it easier to take a broader view of the problem of evil. Neiman uses the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 and the extermination camps of Nazi Germany as paradigm cases for the modern problem of evil. She defines evil as something that cannot be accommodated into our system of action. We have a court system to put (private) murderers on trial and insurance system against house fires, so murders and fires are merely crimes or accidents, and not evils. “… A crime can be ordered, fit in some manner into the rest of our experience. To call an action evil is to suggest that it cannot – and it thereby threatens the trust in the world that we need to orient ourselves with it.”49 Although Neiman does not define evil, we can offer a Neimanian working definition: an act or event is evil if and only if it should not have occurred and it is so contrary to human well-being and the harmony of the world that it renders our models of sense-making and action in the world pointless. Another working definition could be: x is evil if and only if x cannot be fit into a cosmic order or practice that is

46 Neiman 2015, 7.
48 Neiman 2015, 7-8. Cf. the distinction between intelligibility and explanation in Ch. 5.2.
49 Neiman 2015, 8-9.
directed towards the good. Modern strategies work against the background of the dualisms that shape modern thought and give rise to the problem of evil in the first place. We have to take a look at Neiman’s account of the modern debate to expose the dualisms that lead to the problem of evil.

2.2.3. The presuppositions of theodicy in the modern debate

I shall now examine Neiman’s interpretation of three major philosophers in order to identify common themes in modern debates on evil. I then crystallize the themes of the debate into the presuppositions of the problem of evil. I have chosen David Hume, Immanuel Kant and G. W. F Hegel as representative philosophers, because these thinkers cover both the rationalist/empiricist and evil is intelligible/it is not-spectra. I’ll move from Hume to Kant and from Kant to Hegel, because Kant reacted to Hume and Hegel reacted to Kant.

David Hume is a leading empiricist philosopher who wrote a celebrated critique of natural theology. Neiman argues that Hume uses the problem of evil as a centrepiece of his critique of human reason. She follows Kant’s interpretation of Hume in claiming that Hume rejected realist theories of causation in order to deny rational human knowledge of God, free will and life after death. For Neiman, Hume is the stereotypical empiricist, who argues that experience is so chaotic and disparate that one cannot find a competent design or a rational order behind it.

Hume interprets arguments from design and cosmological arguments to depend on the concept of causation. The 18th century version of a teleological argument is a version of Intelligent Design: the order of nature is so complex that it could not have arisen randomly. The cosmological argument proceeds from the premise that every contingent event has a cause. He uses the argument from evil to criticize the Intelligent Design argument. Hume’s strategy is to pit appearances of order against appearances of disorder: the world has examples of order, but it looks disorderly at the same time. There are beautiful flowers and rotting carcasses. It appears that there are mistakes in the world that human designers could easily have avoided. Pain is used to spur animals into action, inflexible general laws cause misery in particular cases, nature is stingy and the margins of survival

---

50 This definition is quite strong: e.g. murders occur, while a society might be getting better. It is however in accord with the definitions in Ch. 6.4: evils prevent one from reaching the good and they must be defeated to reach the telos.
51 Neiman 2015, 11.
are small, and the world-machine as a whole is not finely adjusted. It nevertheless might be the case that a good God has designed the world, but this has to be established through revelation.\textsuperscript{53}

Hume uses his critique of causation to attack the arguments for the existence of God. According to Hume, there is nothing more to causation than the constant conjunction of the cause and the effect.\textsuperscript{54} Hume’s critique undermines the causal version of the principle of sufficient reason: the claim that all effects have a cause, or $\forall x (x \text{ is an event } \rightarrow \exists y \ (y \text{ causes } x))$. It immediately follows that the causal arguments for the existence for God collapse. Since God and the act of creation are unique, they cannot be causes of anything, because they cannot be constantly conjoined with anything. Moreover, since the physical universe is unique, it can’t be constantly conjoined with prior causes. Therefore it is false that all events have a cause, and there is no rational order linking nature with a God, who has no analogies.\textsuperscript{55}

Kant’s discussion of evil takes place against Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s attempt to relocate it in the human subject instead of the world of objects. Kant takes the rational mind/non-rational nature binary opposition as a starting point of his discussion of the problem of evil. The rational mind/non-rational nature binary opposition locates purposes to the human mind. Nature opposes human purposes, so nature and reason are therefore opposite. The nature/reason binary opposition makes “the problem of evil structurally irresolvable.”\textsuperscript{56} In Kant, the new version of the problem takes the form of the question: “Since natural evil and moral evil are separate, are they connected at all? Does happiness lead to virtue?” Nature is “is a matter of what is”, and it is a matter of theoretical reason. Reason is a “faculty of purposes”, and it “is a matter of what ought to be”.\textsuperscript{57} The distinction between happiness and virtue is a version of the is/ought dualism, or the fact/value distinction.

Kant attempts to answer this question with a theory of human reason and human action. Human reason presupposes the systematic connection of theoretical understanding and our attempts to change the world, or theoretical and practical reason. Human action depends on a unified human reason, and the unity of human reason presupposes the possibility of justice: “If there is perfect justice, the obstinately wicked are punished.”\textsuperscript{58} Human action then presupposes the principle of sufficient reason: is and ought coincide, or virtue and happiness coincide. Knowing that

\textsuperscript{53} Neiman 2015, 158, 160-167, Hume 2008, X-XII.
\textsuperscript{54} Hume 1949, chs. 4-7. See also Pruss’ (2006) discussions of Hume and Humeanism.
\textsuperscript{56} Neiman 2015, 60, 57-60.
\textsuperscript{57} Neiman 2015, 60, 61.
\textsuperscript{58} KrV A 73/B 99, quoted in Neiman 61. See also Neiman 61-62, 320-328.
virtue and happiness coincide would make morality a matter of practical expediency, but the principle of sufficient reason lies outside the sphere of theoretical reason. Kant proposes postulates of practical reason that together entail the principle of sufficient reason. Moral action has a point only, if we believe that God exists, the soul is immortal and that virtue is rewarded in the end.\(^{59}\)

Hegel’s discussion of the problem of evil is a theory of the rule of history by reason. He takes traditional providentialism to be just a guise for the belief that it is reason that manifests itself in the world, because Providence is just an infinitely powerful rational agent realizing His wise plan for the world. Hegel also identifies reason with *Nous*, or self-determination by thought. Hegel associates the question about Providence and evil with a deeper question: Does reason rule the world? Can we find a rational Arche that would explain the world and provide grounds for hope? The search for a rational ground for hope in the world goes deeper than theism.\(^{60}\)

Hegel redefines the problem of evil: it concerns the “absolute opposition of thought and being, rational and real.”\(^{61}\) Hegel argues that Kant’s is/ought and self/nature binary oppositions are wrong-headed. His goal is to eliminate contingency and thus show that the real and the rational are the same thing after all: Real=Rational.\(^{62}\) The reduction of the real to the rational eliminates the is/ought gap as well, because moral rationality is included in reason. Conversely, if there is contingency in the world, our best moral efforts could fail and the world is to some extent incomprehensible. Hegel and Karl Marx attempt to overcome the apparent gap between the real and the rational by appealing to history. Hegel argues that apparent chaos and suffering in history in fact shows sense, because history is a history of progress. Marx gives progressivism a sociological twist. History is a history of struggle between classes. The final stage of history is a conflict between the working class and the capitalists. The eventual victory of the working class will unleash human creative potential so that the *homo faber* can remake the world so that it conforms to reason.

The modern discussion on evil revolves around a handful of themes. Hume argues that it seems that the world contains so much bad design that one cannot find a hidden order behind the appearances. Moreover, not every event has a cause and causation is just constant conjunction, so there is no reason ruling the world. Kant argues that the reason/nature and is/ought gaps threaten the human attempt to find sense and act in the world. The human attempt to comprehend the world and act presuppose that everything has a sufficient reason, or that is and ought coincide. Hegel argues

\(^{59}\) Neiman 2015, 66-71.

\(^{60}\) Neiman 2015, 315-318.

\(^{61}\) Neiman 2015, 86.

\(^{62}\) Neiman 2015, 84-113.
that the problem concerns the relationship of being and reason. He straightforwardly identifies the real and the rational. The reduction real=rational also collapses the is/ought gap: the world has to be necessary in order to make sense at all, and sense-making is at the same time moral and theoretical. It is possible to crystallize four presuppositions of the general problem of evil from the discussion:

1. The appearances/reality dualism. Sensuous impressions point towards a chaotic and evil world, but reality could be ordered and good. This entails that appearances are distinct from their objects.
2. The fact/value dualism. Facts are what is the case. Values are, what should be the case. Facts and values are conceptually separate, because “It ought to be the case that p” does not entail “p”.
3. The fact/meaning dualism. Facts are singular and atomic states of affairs. Rational meaning consists in connections between facts. Facts and meaning are therefore conceptually separate.
4. The principle of sufficient reason. The PSR is usually stated as “Everything that exists has a sufficient reason.” The principle can however be rephrased: Being=Reason, or Real=Rational.

Let’s examine these presuppositions so that we can formulate a General Argument from Evil that lays bare the conceptual connections and gaps that give rise to the various versions of the problem.

2.2.4 The dualisms behind the problem of evil

The generalized version of the problem of evil in modern thought can be seen as a product of two distinct and opposite impulses. First, philosophers attempted to define new concepts of facts and factuality to separate the states of the subject and the world from values and meanings. These concepts of factuality are linked with the modern appearance/reality and mind/body split by defining appearances as private sensuous facts and the world as a collection of material facts. The modern concept of fact also undermines values and meanings, because the facts have been defined as atomic, and values and meanings depend on how the world hangs together. The second and opposite impulse was to unite facts with meanings and values and to overcome the mind/body split by appealing to the principle of sufficient reason. According to the principle of sufficient reason, all facts have a sufficient reason. To put the matters differently, all facts have a rational or conceptual explanation, or they have a purpose. We can see the dynamic of the problem of sensuous fact and the rational meaning of the world when we look closely at the modern concept of fact, its binary oppositions and the principle of sufficient reason as an attempt to reduce apparent facts to reason.
Alasdair MacIntyre captured the conceptual background and the social history of the fact when he claimed: “But facts, like telescopes and wigs for gentlemen, were a seventeenth-century invention.” This background explains the conceptual features of modern facts. I shall first take a look at the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* in order to give a philosophical overview of the modern concept of fact. My goal is not to get drawn into debates of *Tractatus* interpretation, but I build on Kantian tradition of *Tractatus* interpretation and the work of Erik Stenius, Hans-Johann Glock and Hanne Appelqvist. I then explore the background for the dualisms that have been built into the concept of the modern fact with Mary Poovey’s genealogy *A History of the Modern Fact*.

Contemporary analytic philosophers often describe facts as truth-makers. A fact that-P makes an atomic sentence p true if and only if, p is true if and only if that-P is the case. (To clarify the sentence formally, $\forall x \forall y (x \text{ makes } y \text{ true } \leftrightarrow (\text{True } (y) \leftrightarrow x \text{ holds})).$) The theory of facts is then a formal theory of representation. The theory of facts plays the role of a transcendental condition of representation in the *Tractatus*, which is a locus classicus for ontologies of facts. Language can depict the world only, if language and the world share a common logical form. The combination of names into sentences and simple phenomenal entities into facts constitute that form. Since only complexes of entities and their properties can have a logical form, such complexes are ontologically more significant than objects, or “The world is a totality of facts, not of things.”

In the system of the *Tractatus*, the facts make up the world. The combination of facts determines for all p, whether the state of affairs P holds or not, and thereby whether p or $\neg p$ is true. The facts are atomic: if that-P and that-Q are facts, they are completely independent and that-Q can perfectly well hold, whether that-P holds or not and vice versa. A fact is a composite of objects, properties and their structure. The objects of a fact relate with each other like “links in a

---

63 MacIntyre 1988, 357
64 TLP.
69 See Glock 1996, 115-120.
70 TLP 1.12, 1.21.
chain”. That is, the possibilities of combinations into facts are built into objects, and the essences or forms of objects are these possibilities. The possibilities of combination are the internal properties of an object, and they locate the objects in logical space.\footnote{TLP 2.03.}

The *Tractatus* theory that the form of an object is its possibility of combination into states of affairs in logical space resembles Kant’s theory that space and time are the forms of objects of experience. The analogy goes deeper than that, because the objects of the *Tractatus* are phenomenal objects.\footnote{TLP 2.01, 2.011, 2.0121, 2.013, 2.0141. For a similar concept of essences, see Plantinga 1974, Ch.5.} Wittgenstein gives a spot in visual space, a heard note and a touch as examples of objects. These phenomenal objects exist in a coordinate grid of relationships that identify it, and the objects can be viewed as structural features of experience. A spot has certain coordinates in the visual field. A note has a certain pitch, timbre, strength and timing. The touch has a timing and a qualitative feel. The theory of facts rests on a peculiar way of looking at experience. Wittgenstein later described it as a story of a “visual room”, where the furniture are objects of imagination located in a picture, and the owner of the room is the person imagining it. One has, so to speak, detach experience from its objects, locate it in the subject and objectify its qualitative features.\footnote{TLP 2.0131, PI 398-402, MacIntyre 1981, Ch.7. Cf. logical spaces in Ch. 4.3 and identification in Strawson 1959.}

The phenomenal objects then receive properties as arguments to logical predicates. The locations on the phenomenal coordinate systems like the visual space are the logical subjects, and the predicates are given by the possible phenomenal properties of these points. The visual spot could be red or blue, the pitch of the heard note could be C or D, and the touch might have a hard or soft qualitative feel.\footnote{TLP 2.0131. I am using Luciano Floridi’s description of observabilia as a background. See Floridi 2010, Ch. 2.} Together they combine to an state of affair of the form F(a): the spot is red, the note is a C and the touch is soft. We could also speak of material facts: a spatial point identified by the coordinate (x,y,z,t) contains an object or an event. For example, “A chair is at x,y,z,t” or “Jack and Jill went to the movies at 7 o’clock” are material facts.\footnote{TLP 2.0131. I am using Luciano Floridi’s description of observabilia as a background. See Floridi 2010, Ch. 2.}

These combinations of objects form alternative states of affairs, which make up the logical space. For example, the visual spot could connect with the colours green, blue and red. Jack, Jill and the location of the movie theatre could be combined to Jack and Jill going together, each going alone, only one of them going or there being no movies shown tonight. The objects (visual spots, the location of the movie theatre, Jack, Jill) make up the substance of the world, because they

\footnote{For space and time in Kant, see KrV A 19-49 , B 33-73. Appelqvist 2008, 36-38, Glock 1996, 269-277.}
can combine into the various possible facts or states of affairs. The objects contain both form and content. The forms of the objects are their logically fixed combinations, but their phenomenal configurations are their changing content.\textsuperscript{77} The logical space forms a “super-order of super-concepts” that defines how the facts of the world hang together.\textsuperscript{78}

We can now define a modern fact. A fact consists of basic particulars \(a_1, \ldots, a_n\) that are identified against the background of a coordinate system and property or relation \(P\) that the constituents jointly have. To be more technical, let \(A^n\) be a coordinate system and \(R = \bigcup_{k=1}^m \{ F_k \mid F_k \text{is a } k \text{-placed property or relation on } (A^n)^k\}\) A \(k\)-ary fact can then be defined as a member of the logical space \((A^n)^k \times R\).\textsuperscript{79} Facts are then the combination of coordinates (spots on the visual space) and their properties (colour red) into a (logically) ordered pair existing in a set of alternative combinations of alternative properties and alternative points.\textsuperscript{80}

Mary Poovey shows that the modern fact was invented in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century, when scientists like Robert Boyle used the technique of double-entry bookkeeping to re-describe their experimental results in an apparently neutral language.\textsuperscript{81} The scientists wanted to overcome the religious wars and doctrinal disputes of their time by to detaching experience from theory and interpretation. The modern concept of a fact differs from the old Aristotelian concept. For Aristotle, a fact was a general essence that had been appropriated through the senses. Aristotelian facts were general, commonplace and contained meanings, as they pointed to essences. Modern facts were decontextualized pieces of evidence that were prior to theory. Modern facts are therefore particular and logically distinct from theories. The senses/reason dualism turns into the fact/theory dualism on the modern theory of fact. We shall soon see that this leads to the fact/meaning dualism.\textsuperscript{82}

Merchants had adopted bookkeeping to emphasize their honesty. They constructed their balance sheets so that one could check through the senses that a particular business transaction had taken place, so sensuous knowledge of particular events was possible. More importantly, the merchants constructed their system to be transparent to a combination of observation and calculation. All property was also valued in money and monetary values could be added and subtracted according to the rules of bookkeeping. One had also rigorous rule-governed and formal processes of calculation to find out, whether a book is in order. The ledgers were in effect the first

\textsuperscript{77} TLP 2.0141, 2.023, 2.0231, 2.0251, 2.0261, 2.026-2.02711. See Glock 1997, 115-120.
\textsuperscript{78} See PI 97, TLP 5.511.
\textsuperscript{79} The background of this definition is TLP, Stenius 1960 (esp. pp. 88-142), Strawson 1959 and Floridi 2010.
\textsuperscript{80} The concepts of a fact and of a logical space of alternatives are taken up in Chs. 4.3 and 5.1.2.
\textsuperscript{81} Poovey 1998, esp. 8-11, 87-120.
\textsuperscript{82} Poovey 1998, 8-11, De An. II, 12. For facts and essences, see also Morganti & Tahko 2017.
ideal language system: they had a well-defined capitalist space of combination of particulars and properties (item, owner, value) that served as a foundation for checking property facts and calculating property values formally. The property space is a super-order of super-concepts that is based on social relationships and idealizations like estimated prices and property relationships.83

Scientists like Robert Boyle and the Royal Society attempted to use the rhetoric of merchants as a model for scientific credibility. Science must be based on facts, and scientists must report their observational facts like merchants report their property in their ledgers. The method of counting the facts together offers a way to guarantee the authority of science just like accounting offers a way of guaranteeing the honesty of merchants. Reports of facts and the scientific method together serve as the scientist’s way of keeping books of their research in a way that does not involve them in the religious and doctrinal disputes of the time. Because facts are not bound by theory and can be captured by numbers, the scientists can use words in a business-like and mathematical way and therefore have an ideal language at their disposal.84

The attempt to detach facts from experience however created a dilemma. Facts are either real occurrences, or sense data or other observabilia. If they are real events, they have to be interpreted in light of a theory. If they are observabilia that are logically prior and conceptually independent of all theory, they have been defined such that there is a conceptual gap between them and theoretical interpretations and other meanings. The dualism between observed facts and events, and facts and interpretations are in effect the appearance/reality and fact/meaning dualisms that are foundational for the problem of evil.85

2.2.4.2 Appearances, meanings, real facts and values

MacIntyre shows that the appearance/reality distinction follows directly from how modern facts are defined and socially constructed.86 Facts were defined as experiences that are logically independent and prior to all theory. Experience was then defined as phenomenal experiential objects, or simply different kinds of mental states. Hume defines experience as a species of mental perceptions. He first distinguishes the ideas of the mind into phenomenal impressions and thoughts that have been

---

84 Poovey 1998, 92-97, 115-119.
85 Poovey 1998, 8-11, 92-97, MacIntyre 1981, 76-78.
86 MacIntyre 1981, 76-78.
copied from them, and then identifies experience with the primary phenomenal impressions: “By the term *impression* (...) I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we see, or feel, of love, or hate, or desire, or will.” Experiences are thus located in the mind, and they are phenomenal states that function like the phenomenal facts of *Tractatus*. A sense-modality offers us a grid of reference, which gains a lively phenomenal content.

Describing experience in a phenomenal and non-theoretic framework detaches experience from both the world and experimentation. The appearance/reality dualism is an attempt to make the subject self-enclosed by defining perception in terms of private phenomenal experience. Such definitions automatically set up a conceptual gap between subjective experiences and their objects. We can define appearances in the modern epistemological paradigm: an appearance is an experience or a belief formed on the basis of experience. Experiences are taken to be phenomenal facts existing in the visual space of the subject. The world of objects is taken to be the material facts and their possible rational order that stand against the mental contents and faculties of the subject. The experiences stand against their objects and are therefore detached from the world, so there is a conceptual gap between phenomenal experience and the objective material world.

The definition and social construction of modern facts lead automatically into the fact/meaning and fact/value binary oppositions. The fact/value binary opposition is a special case of the fact/meaning opposition, because values are a special case of meanings. Facts have been defined to be logically atomic and independent of theoretical interpretations. The meaning of the world is the way its facts hang together, and we can perceive meaning by theoretical interpretations.

We can interpret the fact/meaning dualism by using music as an example. I use Appelqvist’s interpretation of Tractarian facts and William Poteat’s examination of the logic of music to illustrate different models of meaning. Poteat defines rationality as how things hang together and make sense for us, and logic as an attempt to articulate the ways things make sense. He offers different models for logic and sense-making. One is based on an eternal text, the second on a musical theme, the third on random music and the fourth on language use. Wittgenstein compared sense-making with music throughout his philosophical career, and developed two models

---

87 Hume 1949, 16.
88 Appelqvist (2008, 37) distinguishes empiricist sensations from Tractarian phenomenal facts: phenomenal facts have a logical structure. The distinction logically atomic particular vs complex fact is not important here.
89 See MacIntyre 1981, Ch. 7, Hume 1949, Ch. 12.
91 Poteat 1985. Poteat’s different models of necessity are discussed in Ch. 5.4.2.3.
for sense-making. The first is one of isomorphic correspondence. The different notes are facts in the space of musical writing, different sounds are facts in the space of the musical scale and the notes can stand in the same relation to each other as the sounds in the musical space. A musical score can correspond to a musical theme. The second one is expressive:

Understanding a sentence is much more akin to understanding a theme in music as one might think. (…) Why just this pattern of variation in loudness and tempo? (…) In order to “explain” I could only compare it with something else which has the same rhythm (I mean the same pattern).

It would be quite possible to imagine people who had something not quite like a language: a play of sounds, without vocabulary or grammar.

Musical themes and notes are meaningful by having a form that resembles the grammatical motives and structures of language. Themes and notes have a use in a melody or a context, so they are meaningful by embodying the rules and melodic forms of music. Having a use corresponds to Poteat’s model of necessity of a speech act. Single notes are the elements of music, and they become meaningful when a speaker uses them according to the institutions of musical communication. The institutions are absolutely contingent, because they are dependent on the speakers and their language-games. They nevertheless bind notes or words into motives through communicative use. Linguistic meanings thus form necessary connections between notes and other facts, but these necessary connections are themselves fundamentally contingent.

The musical correspondence metaphor for referential language presupposes the picture of logic taken from aleatory or random music as a background. A correspondence holds between linguistic sentences and modern facts. Modern facts have been defined to be atomic and independent of each other, so the world of facts closely resembles aleatory music, whose notes follow each other randomly. The necessity of musical themes is being subject to motives, so there can be no necessary relations within a piece aleatory music. On this model, the absolute contingency of facts rules out meaningful motives connecting them. The only notion of meaning

---

92 TLP 4.014.
93 PI 527-528.
94 Poteat 1985, 92-99, Bayer 2002, 351-361, 374-396. The speech-act model is central as an alternative to the false dilemma between the PSR and the theory of loose, separate and meaningless facts. See Ch. 4.1, 4.2.1, 5.
96 See TLP 2.061-2.062.
97 Poteat 1985, 80, 91-96.
open on the theory of modern facts is the correspondence view, where two states of affairs are connected by sharing the same structure. Therefore, no sense of necessary dependences can hold between modern facts of a system: the only concept of meaning left is the correspondence between facts of different systems. Wittgenstein takes this up by affirming Hume’s critique of causation:

In no way can an inference be made from the existence of one state of affairs to the existence of another entirely different from it. There is no causal nexus which justifies such an inference. The events of the future cannot be inferred from events of the present. Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus.98

The concept of a modern fact then calls the intelligibility of the world into question. It leads to conceptual gaps between facts and meanings, which can be defined with our musical examples. Modern facts are combinations of objects and properties. They are atomic and independent of each other. They are situated in logical space by their logical forms of combinations of objects, but the holding of facts is absolutely contingent in the terms of aleatory music, whereby contingency rules out motives. Facts are also logically independent and prior to theories. Meaning and its logic govern how the facts of the world hang together. The meaningful forms are motives like musical rules and causation. Motives are based on language- or music-like connections. The events of the world are held together by these motives, which are absolutely contingent but constitute necessary connections. Meaning is appropriated by sense-making and theoretical interpretation. Facts and meanings are therefore separate and opposite.

G.E. Moore expressed the fact-value gap by claiming that “good” is not definable in terms of factual terms.99 The gap is often formulated as a distinction between “is” and “ought”. “Is” involves a description of reality, but “ought” is connected with the motives and reasons of human action. The fact-value gap is often expressed as a claim that “is” does not entail “ought” or vice versa, or neither $Op \rightarrow p$ or $p \rightarrow Op$ is conceptually true. One can therefore ask: what is the relationship between “is” and “ought”? Do “oughts” express special facts, and how can “oughts” ground and motivate human action? It is easy to see that the fact/value gap a special case of the fact/meaning gap. Suppose that $Op \rightarrow p$ holds. Then the facts hang together in a certain way: the world is in harmony and maybe it is even the best of all possible worlds. The facts of the world then are subject to motives, which make them morally meaningful.

98 TLP 5.135-5.1361, Hume 1949, Ch. 7.
Hume was the first philosopher to clearly articulate the conceptual gap between “is” and “ought”. He argues that “ought or ought not, expresses some new relation (...) ’tis necessary that it should be (...) explain’d ; and (...) a reason should be given, for what seems quite inconceivable, how this new relation can be deduced from others, which are entirely different from it.”¹⁰⁰ MacIntyre locates the conceptual gap in the failed Enlightenment project of justifying morality.¹⁰¹ Modern philosophers tried to take facts as a premise for deriving moral rules. These moral rules however come from older Christian and classical moral systems that have teleological frameworks. The functioning of the human being establishes “ought” by determining the human telos. Virtues are practices or strategies for achieving human flourishing, and moral rules are strategic guidelines that are derived from the virtues.¹⁰² The factual human condition or human-nature-as-it-is is incomplete and its facts contradict both the telos and the virtues. Moreover, concepts like proper human functioning and the telos of a human life are defined by motive-bound tendencies and complexes of facts, but the modern concept of facts cannot support such notions. The modern concept of factuality can only recognize the state of human nature as it is. Therefore, the fact/meaning gap entails the fact/value gap. Facts concern human nature as it is, and the rules of morality are determined to oppose some of its tendencies, so they are separate and opposite.

As we have seen, the problem of evil concerns attempts to derive a rational and good cosmic order from modern experiential facts. It can therefore be seen as a cosmic version of the Enlightenment project of grounding morality. The goal is to show that real=rational, or is and ought coincide. These are formulations of the principle of sufficient reason, which we shall examine next.

2.2.4.3 The principle of sufficient reason

Neiman argues that the search for moral sense in the world is more fundamental than theism.¹⁰³ She holds that explaining the world with theoretical reason and trying to change it with practical reason are linked, and theoretical reason ultimately serves practical reason. Practical reason is motivated by the desire that is=ought, or existence and moral reasonableness coincide.¹⁰⁴ The claim that is and ought coincide is a version of the principle of sufficient reason: every event has a (morally)

¹⁰⁰ Hume 1978, 469.
¹⁰¹ MacIntyre 1981, 49-75. See Ch. 6.1 for a discussion, how facts and values, and moral meaningfulness of facts and the religious solutions to the problem of evil are interrelated.
¹⁰² My association of habits, strategies and virtues has a background in William James, C. S. Peirce and Jaakko Hintikka.
¹⁰³ Neiman 2015, 314-328. The PSR is discussed in Chs. 5.3 and 5.4.
¹⁰⁴ See Rossi 2010.
sufficient reason. Neiman makes the point that we have no problem of finding sufficient reasons for things when the good (values), the true (facts) and the beautiful (meanings) coincide. The need for metaphysical explanation arises, when they don’t. Neiman argues that the wish for metaphysical explanations is not totally childish. Practical reason establishes that p ought to be a case. If \( \neg p \), then we need to use theoretical reason to find the (sufficient) reason why p is not the case in order to change the reason and bring about p. Progress involves connecting fact and value, and it presupposes setting fact=value as a goal and using theoretical reason for finding out, what are the reasons, why evil occurs. Reason and human progress thus presuppose the principle of sufficient reason: both the hope that is=ought and that all events (even evils) have sufficient factual reasons.

We have seen that Hegel formulates the principle of sufficient reason as real=rational. Martin Heidegger offers a similar take on the principle in his Der Satz vom Grund.\(^{105}\) Heidegger claims that the principle “Nichts ist ohne Grund” (Nothing exists without reason) is the ground of language and of the intelligibility of the world. The principle concerns being qua being and is the supreme principle of making sense of the world. The principle tends to conflate causes, reasons and moral oughts. Suppose that the roof is wet because of the rain. Then the rain is a reason for the roof being wet, because the order of the world is rational. Similarly, suppose that practical reason prescribes that one should not hurt innocent people. Then it is also a feature of the world that innocence is a reason for not being hurt, because moral reason is a part of reason and reason=being. He distinguishes two readings: “Nothing exists without reason”, or all events have reasons, from “Nothing exists without reason”, or being qua being is groundedness in reason. “Understanding and Being are namely one and the same thing.”\(^{106}\)

Heidegger argues that the principle of sufficient reason in fact means that reason constitutes objectivity.\(^{107}\) Objectivity is associated with conceptual principles or Arches that constitute being qua being and the objectivity of the world. Heidegger distinguishes between ancient Greek and modern rationalist versions of the principle. Kant and G. W. Leibniz associate the principle with the rules of reason. To be objective is to be in accord with the laws and calculations of reason, which constitute the sufficient reasons for objects and states of affairs. The ancient Greeks understood objectivity differently. x is objective if and only if it comes into consciousness and remains present, or remains permanent and brings different objects and features

---

\(^{105}\) Heidegger 1971/1996. The principle of sufficient reason is linked with the foundations of metaphysics in Ch. 5.3.3.

\(^{106}\) Heidegger 1971, 127: “Das nämlich Selbe ist Vernehmen sowohl auch Sein.”

\(^{107}\) Heidegger 1971/1996.
of the world to the fore. Sufficient reasons and grounds then reveal common features and the natures of objects with predicates: they involve seeing one in the many. Being qua being is therefore constituted by conceptual first principles or Arches. Explanation is giving sufficient reasons by connecting an event with an Arche. The principle of sufficient reason can then be reformulated: there is a conceptual and rational principle that constitutes the objectivity of objects by giving grounds, from which they can be constituted. Since rational Arches like Kant’s reason and Plato’s Ideas have to account for practical as well as theoretical reason, the system of sufficient reasons unifies both factual and moral explanation under a single Arche.

The principle of sufficient reason is an attempt to unify the modern appearance/reality, fact/meaning and fact/value dualisms through rationalistic reductionism. The fundamental point of such a reduction is that being=reason, and the sensuous and material facts of the world are just expressions of a rational order. Because the facts of the world are real, they are connected with a rational Arche, and these connections (like causation, or creaturehood) constitute their sufficient reasons for existence as objects of the world. The apparent chaos and evil of appearances is overcome by finding sufficient explanations in a rational order of things that also grounds our moral activities. As we saw in Chapter 2.2.1, reductionist explanations still work within the dualist system of oppositions. PSR-based rationalist reductionism absolutizes reason (or meaning) at the expense of being (or facts), and thus leaves the gaps that have been built into the system of explanatory concepts unresolved. This leads to problems, when we encounter something that we cannot fit into our systems of moral or practical sense-making. Thus unintelligible or evil things immediately threaten the project of unifying being with reason and moral oughts by using the principle of sufficient reason. The modern concept of facts and the principle of sufficient reason thus turn evil and puzzling appearances into a threat to the intelligibility of life and the world.

2.2.5 The general argument from evil

At this point one might be tempted to remark: “Hey! Wait a minute! How did the problem of reconciling evil with the existence of God become a general problem about the intelligibility of the world?” Peter van Inwagen raises this objection to Neiman’s work. The goal of this section is to

---

108 For the metaphysics of presence in Heidegger, see Guignon 1995. See also Ch. 5.3.3.
109 Ch. 2.2.1, 2.2.4, Dickson 1995, Ch. 5.4.1.
110 van Inwagen 2008, 14-17. Neiman answers an Inwagenian view in her Preface (2015, 3-4) by locating different formulations of the problem in history.
answer such objections by putting forward a General Argument from Evil. I first discuss van Inwagen’s objection to Neiman’s generalization of the problem of evil. I then define explanations in terms of sources for sufficient reasons and present evils as anomalies to explanations that depend on sources for reasons. Then I take these reflections and formulate them as a Generalized Argument from Evil, of which the Platonist-atheist argument is a special case.111

Peter van Inwagen discusses Neiman’s work on evil in his 2003 Gifford lectures and finds her arguments close to incomprehensible.112 Van Inwagen holds “the problem of evil” to be a collection of family resemblant problems that the theistic worldview has to solve.113 At their heart is the question, how is the existence of God reconcilable with the existence of evil. Practical problems include how to cope with evil spiritually and how to counsel people suffering from evil. Theoretical problems include developing a theology of evil and answering to atheistic doubts that have the existence of evil as a premise. van Inwagen denies the existence of a general problem of evil, or a problem of evil that confronts both theists and atheists.114 van Inwagen takes Neiman’s arguments to simply confuse problems about God and evil with wider questions with meaning and value. He claims that as “only a simple-minded analytic philosopher”115 he cannot see how the problem of evil concerns the intelligibility of the world, because the problem concerns evil and the existence of God: “It is just obvious that Neiman’s attempt to identify an overarching problem of evil that is confronted in one way by Leibniz’s Theodicy and in another by Jenseits von Gut und Böse fails, and must fail, because there is no such problem.”116

One can easily see that van Inwagen simply begs the question against Neiman. He just asserts that there is no general problem of evil, just the theistic one. He describes his approach semi-jokingly as a simple-minded analytic approach, but maybe it suffers from a common vice to analytic philosophy: the tendency to ignore history and the big picture.117 I will answer van Inwagen with a detailed argument about the big picture. The outline of the argument is: in order to orient ourselves in the world, we need moral practices and paradigms, which are our strategies and maps for dealing with the world. Paradigms and moral practices are value-laden and they connect us with moral

---

111 One could speak in Hamannian style of “ein platonischer Beweis gegen Daseyn Gottes.” See N III, 45-47/ H 120.
112 van Inwagen 2008, 14-17. Van Inwagen says that “It is evident to me that any person who would say the sorts of things Neiman says has so different a mind from mine that if that person and I attempted, each with the best will in the world, to initiate a conversation about whether there was an overarching problem of evil, the only result would be two people talking past each other.” (2008, 16) I tried to discuss the problem of evil with van Inwagen when he was visiting Helsinki in September 2016, and this is exactly what happened.
113 van Inwagen 2008, 4-7.
114 van Inwagen 2008, 14-17.
115 van Inwagen 2008, 16.
sources. A worldview will have to account the place of moral sources in reality. One possibility is to link moral and intellectual explanations by arguing that the Arche of cognitive explanation is an order that is connected with moral sources. Moral sources and cognitive explanations are in any case interconnected, because our cognitive practices are value-laden.\textsuperscript{118} Evil automatically threatens attempts to locate moral sources in reality, because it seems that evil events cannot be accounted by moral sources (i.e. they do not have sufficient reasons in terms of a moral source functioning as an Arche.) This entails that evils call into question the paradigms and moral practices dependent on these sources, and thereby shatter our trust in the world that calls them into question.

Charles Taylor defines moral sources by orienting the person in moral space.\textsuperscript{119} Human action presupposes an orientation towards objects of respect, social roles and other things that are constitutive of a good life. A moral source \( M \) is a feature, entity or a pattern in reality that contact with and orientation towards it empowers our actions to be good. Humanists claim that human reason renders human actions good. Moral sources can be articulated with linguistic stories. The story of the Exodus empowers one to trust the Jewish or Christian God, and the Idea of Progress motivates secular humanists to be rational.

Moral sources constitute both moral action and cognitive practices. One way of looking at moral sources is to view them as sources of systems of moral laws. For example, Kant took reason to be a system of laws that constitute the sufficient reasons for objectivity and correct actions.\textsuperscript{120} The system of laws constitutes sufficient reasons for assigning value and acting in the world. Moreover, moral sources are also a basis for cognitive concepts and practices. Cognitive values like simplicity serve the goal of human cognitive Eudaimonia, as do cognitive conceptual schemes. For example, we prefer simple theories because the value of simplicity leads to good cognitive functioning. Moral actions in a practice that is based on a moral source is possible on this view only, if the moral source constitutes morally sufficient reasons that can be used as a guideline of judging and assigning value in situations \( w \) arising in the practice. For example, revolutionary Communism is only possible only, if there is a process that leads to revolution and makes activism reasonable. The conceptual schemes and cognitive values serve their goal only, if they put us in contact with the rational order \( O \) of things and their sufficient reasons for belief correspond to the

\textsuperscript{118} See Putnam 1981, Ch.6.
\textsuperscript{119} Taylor 1989, Part 1. Part 1. These definitions presuppose the virtue ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) and Aristotle (EN) as a background. See also von Rad 1998.
\textsuperscript{120} KrV x, Heidegger 1971.
rational order of things. For example, if the world were extremely complex, simplicity would be useless as a cognitive value.\textsuperscript{121}

The modern search for intelligibility and meaning looked for some order $O$ behind the facts of experience. The order $O$ was moreover a part of a vision that unifies the scientific and moral views of the world. The order $O$ makes the facts intelligible by supplying sufficient reasons for them, so the existence of the order $O$ guaranteed that Being=Reason. As we have seen from Heidegger’s discussion of modern rationalism and Greek thought, the order of sufficient reasons was based on a source $S$ that determines the sufficiency of reasons. Moreover, the sources $S$ ground both the rational order $O$ of the world and the moral sources $M$ of our practices. For example, Plato’s Idea of the Good grounds the rational order that constitutes the good life. For Nietzscheans, we can see the world as meaningful and intelligible by accepting it as it is, as an aesthetic experience. Theist systems hold that God is the ground of the natural laws, value and the good life. Kant argued that theoretical and practical reason form a single architectonic system. The debate therefore links both our moral sources $M$ and the order of reality $O$ into some source $S$ that holds them together and constitutes them. One could even say that $S$ is an Arche for $O$ and $M$, because it grounds and constitutes them. Moreover, $S$ serves as a foundation for overcoming the fact/value and fact/meaning gaps by ordering the facts of the world according to order $O$ of sufficient reasons that links the facts of the world with the moral order $M$ that is based on $S$.\textsuperscript{122}

The explanation of the world in terms of moral sources $M$, rational orders $O$ and grounds of sufficient reasons $S$ can face anomalies. Kuhn describes a paradigm as a matrix shaping the problems and problem-solving practices of a scientific community. Paradigms consist of four parts. The first are symbolic representations like natural laws. The second are background ontological commitments that govern the analogies that are used to apply laws and other symbolic representations. The third are the values that govern problem-solving. The fourth part of a paradigm are examples of problem-solving that can be extended by analogy to other cases and offer a way of seeing the new cases as similar to the old ones.\textsuperscript{123} For example, the model of an atom as a solar system can be used to see chemical reactions as electron transfers. Kuhn argues that a paradigm can enter a crisis, when it cannot solve a problem.\textsuperscript{124}

\textsuperscript{121} The examples are based on Putnam 1981.
\textsuperscript{122} The descriptions of different worldviews are based on Taylor (1989) and Neiman (2015).
\textsuperscript{124} Kuhn 1970, 52-76. For the problem of evil as an anomaly for theism, see McGrath 2004, 224-226, and an article by Alexander Pruss and Trent Dougherty.
The anomalies could be so severe that they render the practices depending on an order O and moral sources M pointless. The pointlessness of moral practices is a special case of the pointlessness of language-games. Language-games can become pointless if the realities, on which they depend, are not part of the game, i.e. they do not exist or cannot support the rules of the game. For example, weighing cheese and announcing the weight would become pointless if the pieces shrunk.\(^{125}\) A practice can become pointless, if it depends on an order O and O does not exist. The distance of the world w from a moral source M can be so great that our moral practices dependent on M become pointless. The distance of a world w depends on whether the facts of w have value in terms of the norms constituted by M, and whether they have a telos that is determined by M.\(^{126}\)

Evils threaten the intelligibility of the world by forming anomalies to our attempts to make sense of it, because they undermine the underlying foundation S of our moral sources M and the rational order of the world O. The fundamental claim of the problem of evil is that S constitutes the values M and meaning O of the situation w that our practices put us in contact with only, if S forms both the order of sufficient reasons O for making w intelligible and the moral sources M that give values and guidelines of acting in w. S forms the order of sufficient reasons for making w intelligible and the norms for w only, if there are no such evils that would collapse the order of reasons constituted by S. There are two cases. First, there might not be a rational order of sufficient reasons O that holds the facts of w together. For example, historical class struggle does not explain, why industrial capitalism did not collapse in a communist revolution. Second, the world w could be so distant and contrary to the moral sources and sufficient reasons M constituted by the source S, that the moral source M cannot constitute the meaning of the world. For example, reason or willing the reality as an aesthetic experience cannot find meaning in the Holocaust.

We can now see that Lisbon and Auschwitz are paradigmatic models of evil, because they are anomalies for modern strategies of making sense of the world.\(^{127}\) The Lisbon earthquake was an anomaly for early modern theism, because a centre of civilization was destroyed in a natural disaster and early modern theists thought that the ways of God are transparent to man. The Holocaust was an anomaly for three different modern theories of human agency, which were left

\(^{125}\) PI 142.

\(^{126}\) The definition builds on Taylor’s (1989, Ch.1) definitions: One can speak of a moral space, because one can speak of the distance of the person and his actions from a good constituting the good life or a life good, and of actions and practices being directed towards a life good. A person is in contact with a good if and only if he achieves the good with his actions. He is oriented towards a good if and only if his moral practices have contact with the good as a telos.

\(^{127}\) Neiman 2015, 3-4, 8-9, 204-281. For the theistic problem, see McGrath 224-226 and the paper “Evil and the Problem of Anomaly” by Pruss and Dougherty.
without conceptual resources to explain it. G. W. F. Hegel attempts to explain evil as a necessary stage of history, but survival in the death camps was purely a matter of luck. Nietzsche argues that we should simply ditch Platonic ideals and accept the world as it is, but what if the events are too atrocious? Modernity had tried to transfer the responsibility for evil to humans with evil intentions, but the evil of the Holocaust was often aided by ordinary Germans, collaborators and bureaucrats with no evil intentions. Both Lisbon and Auschwitz then shocked the world, because they shattered the ways of making sense of the world and acting in it by undermining their moral sources and conceptual resources. We can sum these discussions into the Generalized Argument from Evil:

1. Moral action is possible only, if it links us with moral sources M in the world.
2. Understanding is possible only, if paradigms link us with the rational order of reality O.
3. Practices that are guided by the moral sources M and that connect us with an order O are parts of human rational action in the world.
4. There is a general source S that unifies our rational practices by functioning as an Arche for the order O and the foundation of moral sources M that are used in our practices in situations w.
5. If S is an Arche for O, then O is a system of sufficient reasons for the facts of the world and S constitutes O.
6. If S is a ground for moral sources M of practices in w, then w is not so distant from the moral source M that M can assign norms and meaning for w.
7. If there is a source S constituting an order O of reasons for w, S unifies facts and meanings at w.
8. If there is a source S constituting moral sources M that are not distant from w, S unifies facts and values at w.
9. If there is chaotic evil (i.e. evil with no sufficient reason) in w, then there is no order O and moral sources M such that O is a system of sufficient reasons and M is close to w.
10. → If there is chaotic evil, there is no general source S that unifies our rational practices by functioning as an Arche for the order O and the foundation of moral sources M that are used in our practices in situations w.
11. → If there is chaotic evil in w, then moral action and understanding are not possible.

It is now possible to answer to van Inwagen. The theistic problem reduces to a special case of the general problem with a simple substitution: let M=S=God, O=a rational order of nature and w=the actual world. One needs only one extra assumption about God to guarantee that God can unify

---

128 van Inwagen argued for metaphysical rationalism by comparing metaphysics with mathematics in a lecture in Helsinki in September 2016. Both deduce results or contradictions from abstract conceptual principles.
facts with values and meanings. The assumption is the logical concept of omnipotence: for all states of affairs \( w \), or coherent descriptions \( p \), God can actualize \( w \) or bring about \( p \).\(^{129}\)

2.3. Theism, atheism and the presuppositions of theodicy

We have now established that the problem of evil is a family resemblance problem about the meaning and intelligibility of the world: how can the world be meaningful, when there is evil? The presuppositions of the problem are the principle of sufficient reason, the appearance/reality, the fact/value and the fact/meaning dualisms, and the problem can be reformulated: is making the world intelligible in terms of sufficient reasons and moral sources acting as Arches possible at all? The goal of this chapter is to identify the presuppositions of the theistic problem of evil. I first examine Leibnizian theism as an attempt to make the world intelligible and then show, how the special problem of evil arises within this model. Then I articulate the presuppositions of the contemporary discussion on God and evil by showing, how it follows the Leibnizian paradigm.

2.3.1 Leibnizian theism as a solution to the problem of intelligibility

Thomas Nagel discusses the “problem of the world” \((\text{Welträtsel})\) and the theist solution in \textit{Mind and Cosmos}\(^{130}\). Science presupposes that the world is intelligible, as it looks for a hidden intelligible order that has to be grasped by combining both perception and reason. This principle is a form of objective idealism, as it goes beyond empirical appearances to find an intelligible order behind them.\(^{131}\) Nagel takes this presupposition as his starting point. He identifies it as one form of the principle of sufficient reason: “that everything about the world can at some level be understood, and that if many things (…) initially seem arbitrary, that is because there are further things (…) which explain why they are not arbitrary at all.”\(^{132}\) Nagel explores theism in order to contrast it with materialism and his holistic teleological naturalism as accounts of consciousness.\(^{133}\)

\(^{129}\) See Phillips 2005, 3-21.

\(^{130}\) Nagel 2012.

\(^{131}\) Nagel 2012, 16-17. Neiman argues that optimistic theodiscists postulate an order behind appearances, and pessimistic or atheistic theodiscists deny it (2015, 8, 115). See also Ch. 5.3.1.

\(^{132}\) Nagel 2012, 17, 16-17.

\(^{133}\) Nagel 2012, Ch. 2. For a similar project, see Kaila 1951.
Nagel discusses that the theistic strategy for making the world intelligible. Materialism makes physical laws the fundamental explanation of reality and tries to derive mind out of them. Theism reverses this direction of explanation, as it makes mind the most fundamental explanation of everything: “theism makes physical law a consequence of mind.”

Explanation and the intelligibility of the world depend on God, who is the mental source of the world order at the outer edges of the physical world. The world and its intelligible order are explained by God’s intention. Although we do not fully know God’s plan, God knows it and thus has vicarious understanding of the world. Mental beings are miniature versions of God, and the intelligibility of the world reflects God’s choice and intellect. Since God is the end-point of explanation, His existence and properties are necessary. The necessity of God’s existence and properties are typically proven through an ontological argument in theist metaphysical systems.

This form of explanation is a creationist or a “Cartesian theistic one.” Matter is inert and dead and its physical and psychophysical laws have been decreed by God. God’s ability to create is subject to spaces of alternatives. The logical space of all metaphysically possible worlds is the most fundamental space, but the creation of living beings presupposes that DNA is in the chemical spaces of possible combinations of atoms. God then chooses one of these configurations of inert matter to realize conscious life. Possibilities together with God’s choice explains the existence of the world or of DNA the same way physical possibility and the design plans of an engineer explain the existence of telephones, airplanes and computers.

Leibniz articulates the theistic model of explanation and presents its connections with the background conditions of theodicism in his clear essay “On the Ultimate Origination of Things.”

God stands above the world in a much stronger sense than the soul stands above the body, because God is the builder and ruler of the world. Leibniz uses a cosmological argument to argue that God is the sufficient reason for the world. Natural sufficient reasons like natural laws are only conditional and dependent on earlier sufficient reasons. An infinite chain of conditional sufficient reasons does not add up to an absolutely sufficient reason, but the ultimate explanation of

---

135 Nagel 2012, 21-22. For the ontological argument, see Plantinga 1974, Ch. 10.
136 Nagel 2012, 31
137 Nagel 2012, 93-95. One should contrast Cartesian theism (or Zwinglianism, as it is known in theology) with the biblical view. On the biblical view, there is no strong split between spirit and matter. See Wright 1992, Ch. 6.3.1.
138 Leibniz 1989, 149-155. I shall base my summary on the Finnish translation, which has been edited by Tuomo Aho and Markku Roinila. The English quotes come from Roger Ariew’s and Daniel Garber’s translation in Philosophical Essays. The references are to the Ariew-Garber translation.
reality must be absolute. The absolutely sufficient reason must be necessary by its own nature and must be able to actualize the world, so the reason must be God\textsuperscript{139}:

1. There are entities.
2. All entities x have a sufficient reason y.
3. Assume for contradiction: If x is the sufficient reason of y, then there is a \( z \neq x, y \) such that z is the conditionally sufficient reason of x.
4. \( \Rightarrow \) There is an infinite chain \( C \) of sufficient reasons such that no \( x \in C \) is an alone sufficient reason.
5. If no \( x \in C \) is an alone sufficient reason, neither \( C \) or \( x \in C \) are sufficient reasons.
6. If neither \( C \) or \( x \in C \) are sufficient reasons, no entity has a sufficient reason
7. \( \Rightarrow \) Contradiction: not all entities x have a sufficient reason y.
8. \( \neg 3: \) There is an \( x \) that is the sufficient reason of some \( y \), but there is no \( z \neq x, y \) such that z is the conditionally sufficient reason of \( x \).
9. If some \( x \) is the unconditionally sufficient reason of some \( y \), \( x \) necessitates \( y \) by itself.
10. For all \( x \) and \( y \), \( x \) has the power of necessitating \( y \) by itself iff \( x \) is God.

\( \Rightarrow \) God exists and is the sufficient reason of all created beings.

God is then the sufficient reason for the actuality of the world, because God has the power to necessitate beings. On this account, divine power is understood as the necessitation of possible beings, so unlimited divine power means the free ability to choose among different possible beings. This is the logical concept of omnipotence: omnipotence means the ability to do whatever is logically possible, or the ability to choose among different logically possible worlds from the outside.\textsuperscript{140} God is not alone the sufficient reason for the world, as divine action itself must be explained by God’s choices.

Leibniz explains God’s choices in making the world by describing God’s choice among different essences. The perfection of an essence is its amount of reality, or greatness the world would have, if it were actualized. Essences and their combinations are therefore ranked or ordered according to their perfection. All essences strive towards actualization, and greater or better essences have a greater striving towards actuality. The essences are in turn real, because they exist in the mind of God. God is the sufficient reason for the world by actualizing essences, and Leibniz


\textsuperscript{140} See Phillips 2005, 3-11.
compares God’s choices with a game. In certain games the player has to fill the maximum number of squares according to certain rules. Similarly, God has to fill up the world by actualizing essences according to the rules of their combination, and He aims for the maximum result. “In practical affairs one always follows the decision rule in accordance with which (…) one prefers the maximum effect at the minimum cost, so to speak”.141

This is a version of the famous von Neumann min-max theorem. In a two-player zero-sum game, a player should minimize the gains of the opponent and thus maximize his own gain. God can be seen in actualizing essences in a vacuum, but all decision-making problems with one decision-maker can be reinterpreted as a two-player zero-sum game between the player and the bank.142 The best combination of essences then forms an optimal strategy for God, and therefore the possible combinations of essences striving for perfection and reality are the sufficient reason for the world. They form a sufficient reason for God’s choices among possibilities, because they determine the optimum amount of perfection in the world. The world has therefore a sufficient reason composed of two necessary parts. First, the combinations of essences are a sufficient reason for God’s will by determining God’s choices and the possible amount of greatness in the world. Second, God is the sufficient reason for the actuality of the world, because He is a necessary being, who can necessitate essences freely from the set of all possible combinations of essences.143

Leibniz draws the conclusion that the world is determined metaphysically, and the moral and the metaphysical are linked. The greatest amount of possibility is realized in the world. This makes the actual world the best possible world, because goodness is only the best possible order as perceived by minds. In the best possible order of minds, the minds live in a right relationship between each other and the world. The best possible order creates happiness in the minds when the minds perceive it.144 This leads to a view that God holds facts and values, as well as facts and meanings together. The world is therefore rationally intelligible, because God’s actualization of an order of essences is its sufficient reason. It is also good, because its intelligibility and rational relationships make minds happy and set them in a pre-established harmony. God is then the guarantor of an intelligible and morally good world by uniting facts with values and with an intelligible order. Leibniz’s unification of fact and value however encounters a familiar objection:

141 Leibniz 1989, 150.
142 Osborne & Rubinstein 1998, 21-24. The metaphor of God playing against Nature or the bank can give the impression that nature is not created. The point of the metaphor is to show, how God’s decision can be interpreted as a two-player zero-sum game. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-sum_game#Extensions, viewed 15.3.2017)
143 Leibniz 1989, 149-152. See also the discussion of Leibniz in Pruss 2006, 28-30.
144 Leibniz 1989, 152-155.
But, you ask, don’t we experience quite the opposite in the world? For the worst often happens to the best, and not only innocent beasts but also humans are injured and killed, even tortured. In the end, the world appears to be a certain confused chaos rather than a thing ordered by some supreme wisdom, especially if one takes note of the conduct of the human race.145

Leibniz admits that the world prima facie appears to include evil, and therefore it appears to be chaotic and without an intelligible order.146 This threatens to falsify Leibniz’s system. Leibniz insists that the world has to be a priori the best possible, and offers a few responses to this criticism. First, we have only partial knowledge of the world, which may form a perfect aesthetic harmony of good and evil.147 Second, the just order governs the whole and assigns happiness according to merit according to a pre-existing harmony, just like a just state respects individual rights when they are not in conflict with a collective common good. Third, evil is a path to progress and the perfection of the world. Evil actions lead to moral growth among the just, and evils are also a side-product of the free progress of the world.148 These problems and approaches have been taken up very faithfully by 20th century thinkers, as we shall soon see.

Neiman sums up the Cartesian theistic strategy in her comments on Leibniz.149 Leibniz’s theodicy is built on two presuppositions. God is constrained by possibilities, and all of God’s choices are for the best. This implies a picture of God shopping (transworldly depraved?) essences in a supermarket. Truth and possibility are contained in the forms, and God actualizes the best combination of them by minimizing costs and maximizing gains. God is in fact subordinate to sufficient reasons that have been given a priori, as He acts in a chain of sufficient reasons and an order of essences. This explanation redeems evil appearances by connecting them with the best possible order. All of the appearances of the world are good, because alternatives are even worse.

This summary can be used as a foundation of an analysis, how the basic presuppositions of theodicy play out in the theism vs atheism debate:

146 On the relationship between appearance and reality in the problem of evil, see Neiman 2015, 5-8, 21, 114-115.
147 Cf. Rowe 1979, 337-338.
1. Every object and state of affairs has a sufficient reason. The order of sufficient reasons unifies facts with meanings and facts with values. The intelligibility of the world is both moral and rational.

2. God is the sufficient reason for the actuality of the world. God is a necessary being who can choose to actualize a set of states of affairs and objects.

3. God’s power means the ability to choose essences and states of affairs to actualize, so omnipotence means an unlimited choice from the set of all logically possible alternatives.

4. The possible combinations of essences are the sufficient reason for God’s choice. Essences are combined according to logical rules. Combinations of essences are ranked according to greatness. The amount of greatness in a combination of essences is a sufficient reason for God’s choice.

5. God’s decision to create can be presented as a two-player zero-sum game. The players are God and Nature or the bank. The set of God’s moves is determined by the logical space of the combination of essences. God’s strategy aims at minimizing evil and thus maximising good.

6. Facts and meanings are unified by God and the principle of sufficient reason. God actualizes facts by instantiating an order of essences, which forms an intelligible sufficient reason for the facts.

7. Facts and values are unified by God and the principle of sufficient reason. God unites facts into the best possible world, which forms a morally sufficient reason by being better than the alternatives.

8. It seems that there is unjustified evil in the world, but reason reveals a pre-established harmony. Empirical appearances and rational reality are therefore distinct and opposite.

2.3.2 Theodicism in contemporary philosophy of religion

The problem of evil is one of the most discussed topics in the analytic philosophy of religion. The discussion about evil and the existence of God became a hot topic in the 1950s. Research and philosophical discussion on theodicies have become a cottage industry. The debate started with John L. Mackie’s “Evil and Omnipotence”150, which includes a logical argument from evil. William Rowe’s “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism”151 and Alvin Plantinga’s “God, Evil and the Metaphysics of Freedom”152 examine and clarify the presuppositions about omnipotence and divine goodness that underpin the debate. My thesis is that the contemporary discussion is based on neo-Leibnizian theodicism, and that this can be proven by examining the presuppositions of the contemporary debate.153

150 Mackie 1955.
151 Rowe 1979.
152 Plantinga 1974, Ch. 9.
153 Neiman makes a similar point (2015, 290).
Mackie argues that the problem of evil is a logical problem confronting theism.\textsuperscript{154} The problem is logical, because the set of sentences \{God is good, God is omnipotent, Evil exists\} is inconsistent. The set does not contain any sentence $p$ with its negation $\neg p$, or any sentences of the form $p \& \neg p$, so the contradiction must be an indirect one and be based on conceptual rules that govern terms “good”, “omnipotent” and “evil”. Mackie states a preliminary form of the argument:

These additional principles are that good is opposed to evil, in such a way that a good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can, and that there are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do. From these it follows that a good omnipotent thing eliminates evil completely, and then the propositions that a good omnipotent thing exists, and that evil exists, are incompatible.\textsuperscript{155}

The first premise concerns the opposition between good and evil. The thrust of Mackie’s argument implies that the opposition between good and evil is conceptual or logical: where good is present, evil cannot be present and vice versa. Mackie’s reasoning has in fact been better expressed by Aquinas. Since God cancels out all evil where He is present and God’s infinity entails the ability to cancel out all evil, evil contradicts the existence of God.

It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist.\textsuperscript{156}

This picture presupposes that good and evil exclude each other conceptually. This is a highly specific model of the opposition of good and evil, and it can be contrasted with strategic opposition and narrative opposition. In chess, the White and Black players are strategically opposed, because they are playing a zero-sum game. This presupposes that White and Black play the same game, so

\textsuperscript{154} Mackie 1955, 200-201. For an explicit refutation with a consistency proof, see Ch. 6.4.
\textsuperscript{155} Mackie 1955, 201.
\textsuperscript{156} ST I:2.3.
both are present. Similarly, White’s elimination of Black (or vice versa) takes place through the strategic exchanges of the game and not through a conceptual absent/present-relationship.157

Narrative opposition is the opposition of characters in a story. The story of the Red Riding Hood is a good example of narrative oppositions. The wolf is opposite to the Red Riding Hood, because the wolf eats Red Riding Hood. The woodcutter is opposite to the wolf, because he kills the wolf and frees Red Riding Hood. N. T. Wright has applied narrative opposition to the stories of the Bible and to theodicy.158 Wright uses a scheme from A. J. Greimas, where a sender offers an object to a receiver. An agent produces the object with the help of helpers, but he is opposed by an opponent. Wright uses Greimas’ scheme to interpret biblical narrative in a way that is directly relevant to theodicy. God sends the object of salvation to Israel and to mankind, but salvation is produced through Jesus’ agency with the aid of the Holy Spirit. Jesus’ opponent is the satan, so in the biblical story, there is a direct narrative opposition between Jesus and the satan, and an indirect one between God and the Holy Spirit on the one hand, and the satan on the other hand. This means that the Christian Trinity and the satan are opposite due to their roles in the story about divine communicative action, but both are present as characters in a story. Mackie’s model differs from these two kinds of opposition, as his opposition of good and evil means conceptual exclusion.

The other key assumption of Mackie’s argument is that omnipotence is unlimited power.159 It seems that Mackie is using “God wills that p” or “God chooses that p” as a de dicto sentential operator and then define omnipotence: if God wills that p, then the state of affair that p holds. This interpretation comes through from a number of textual passages. Mackie discusses higher order good defences by saying: “Saying that God cannot create good without simultaneously creating evil, (...) means either that God is not omnipotent or that there are some limits to what an omnipotent thing can do”. Mackie accepts that omnipotence presupposes some limits, as “omnipotence has never meant the power to do what is logically impossible, and on the present view the existence of good without evil would be a logical impossibility”160. Since the set of possible worlds and states of affairs is the set of logically possible states of affairs, we can only speak of a limitation in the case of propositions. The same idea of logical consistency as a limitation of omnipotence also arises in the writings of C. S. Lewis, who makes it clear that the matter is the (de dicto) consistency of propositions:

157 For an application of the strategic model into the problem of evil, see James 1979 and Ch. 6.4.
158 Wright 1996, 244-245, 461, 2006.
160 Mackie 1955, 203.
If you choose to say “God can give a creature free will and at the same time withhold free will from it”, you have not succeeded in saying anything about God: meaningless combinations of words do not suddenly acquire a meaning because we prefix to them the two other words “God can”. It remains that all things remain possible with God: the intrinsic impossibilities are not things but non-entities.\(^{161}\)

God’s omnipotence is then expressed by a sentential operator “God can” or “God wills that”, which is applied to consistent propositions p. Omnipotence means on this picture that \(W_{\text{God}}p \rightarrow p\) for all consistent p. God can then choose freely among possible worlds or sets of them by simply selecting p such that p defines the set of worlds God intends to create.\(^{162}\) This concept of omnipotence is therefore a version of the logical concept of omnipotence: an omnipotent being can choose from all logically possible states of affairs. Mackie’s argument can then be presented:

1. God is omnipotent and good.
2. God is omnipotent if and only if \(W_{\text{God}}p \rightarrow p\) for all consistent p.
3. God is good if and only if \(\forall x (x \text{ is evil})\).
4. If God is omnipotent and good, \(\forall x (x \text{ is evil})\).
5. \(\exists x (x \text{ is evil})\)
6. \(\Rightarrow\) God does not exist.

Mackie discusses several proposed theistic responses to the argument. He does not consider them to be valid, but he makes some substantive concessions to theism on the notion of divine goodness: “evil may contribute to the goodness of a whole in which it is found, so that the universe as a whole is better as it is, with some evil in it, than it would be if there were no evil.”\(^{163}\) A good God then could create a possible world w with evil in it if and only if w is better than any world w’ without evil. Mackie takes up the ideas of a pre-established harmony and soul-making.\(^{164}\) Both presuppose a distinction between first-order and second-order goods. First-order goods are things like pleasure, and pain is an example of first-order evil. Second-order goods are relationships and tendencies like aesthetic harmony in the world, or benevolence towards sufferers. God then creates a world where

\(^{161}\) C.S. Lewis in The Problem of Pain. Quoted in McGrath 1994, 223.
\(^{162}\) The formula \(\Phi\) defines a set of models M if and only if \(m \models \Phi\) if and only if m is a member of M. See Hodges 1997, 30-37.
\(^{163}\) Mackie 1955, 206.
\(^{164}\) Mackie 1955, 203-208.
there is the maximum amount of second-order goods, which outweigh first-order evils. Mackie argues that this solution fails, because there are second-order evils like callousness and disharmony.

Mackie also rejects the free will defence. He admits that taking freedom as an overriding third order good would solve the problem of evil, but he takes libertarian concepts of free will to be incoherent. The problem of luck is an objection to a libertarian concept of free will: for a state of world S(t) there are many possible actions a, a’, … left open for the agent. Since the mental states, decisions and character traits are among the efficient causes influencing the agent’s actions, they do not determine (in the sense of efficient causation) his future actions. The agent then cannot control his actions and therefore does not have free will. The problem goes back to Hume, who presents an argument against libertarian freewill. Human actions are constantly conjoined with motives and decisions and causation is constant conjunction, so human actions are necessitated by their motives and decisions. Conversely, a non-necessitated human action does not have any regular conjunction with prior motives and decisions, so it must be random. The alternatives are thus determinism and randomness, because all causation is efficient causation and efficient causation is (deterministic) constant conjunction. Mackie’s argument is a version of the problem of luck. Either human actions are determined by their character or they are random. If they are determined by human character, they are indirectly determined by God who made them. Mackie’s determinism then allows for God to create humans who always do the right thing, because it is logically possible that human beings always choose the good freely and God determines free human actions.

Mackie however argues that the concept of omnipotence is paradoxical. God cannot bind Himself or create anything He cannot control, because that would be a non-logical limit on divine power. This leads Mackie to discuss the ordained power of God. According to the doctrine of ordained power of God, God’s choices represent a garden of forking paths. When God wills that p, then p limits His future choices. This does not mean that the power of God is limited by external factors. Mackie however argues that the ordained power of God is impossible in a similar way as a fixed constitution is impossible in a Westminster-style system of Parliamentary sovereignty. This means that omnipotence needs further qualification. Either omnipotence has to be understood as the inherently self-limiting constituent power of the world, or alternatively an unlimited power that

---

166 See Mele 2014, Ch. 3.
167 Hume 1949, Ch.8, Pruss 2006, 142.
169 McGrath 1994, 224-225.
leaves no room for alternative centres of power in the universe. The paradoxes of omnipotence and higher-order good defences led Mackie to two admissions:

1. A good God can choose a world $w$ with evil over $w'$ without evil, if $w$ is better overall than $w'$.
2. The logical concept of omnipotence $W_{\text{God}} p \rightarrow p$ requires qualification due to logical limits to divine power and due to self-limitation (potentia ordinata) through the creation of free beings.

In the end, Mackie had to weaken his assumptions over divine goodness and omnipotence. As a result, the logical problem of evil collapses. Mackie’s two admissions have decisively shaped the analytic theodicy debate, as they focus on the conditions under which God could permit evil, and the interaction of divine power and creaturely freedom. Rowe’s classic article covers the first question, and Plantinga’s famous free will defence builds on the second admission.

2.3.2.2 William Rowe and divine goodness

The article “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism” is another classic in the analytic theodicy debate. In the article, William Rowe formulates a version of atheist theodicism, discusses how the theist could respond to the problem of evil and examines different atheist responses to theism. The article is of interest, because it helps to explore the concepts of divine goodness in the contemporary analytic debate. Rowe presents a form of the argument from evil:

1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
3. $\Rightarrow$ There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.

---

170 This is the consensus view. See Phillips 2005, 5.
171 Rowe 1979
172 Rowe 1979, 336.
The key premise in the argument is 2. An evil event or state of affairs could lead to a greater good and be justified, but it would still be evil. Rowe is interested in the necessary conditions, under which God could justifiably allow an evil act.\(^{173}\) Rowe includes both good consequences and fulfilment of principles of justice into possible greater goods, and does not limit greater goods into ones that follow the evil event in time. He also talks about God allowing evils from above. The picture that emerges from the discussion is a heavenly social worker or a police officer, who enforces existing moral laws and (paternalistically?) maximizes welfare under them. Such images and metaphors can be contrasted with e.g. the image of a Divine Warrior, who engages real and damaging evil in battle and defeats it.\(^{174}\) Rowe states the necessary condition he is looking for informally: if God permits a great evil like intense suffering, then a greater good would have been lost or an equally big or even bigger evil would otherwise have taken place. Rowe states the condition technically: for all evils \(s_1\) and good omniscient beings OG,

\[
\text{Either 1. there is some greater good, } G, \text{ such that } G \text{ is obtainable by OG only if OG permits } s_1, \\
\text{or 2. there is some greater good, } G, \text{ such that } G \text{ is obtainable by OG only if OG permits either } s_1 \text{ or some evil equally bad or worse,} \\
\text{or 3. } s_1 \text{ is such that it is preventable by OG only if OG permits some evil equally bad or worse.}^{175}
\]

Let’s unpack Rowe’s necessary condition. The first and second parts of the disjunction together state that there is a greater good \(G\) that would have been prevented without allowing some evil \(s’\), \(s \leq s’\). The third part states that if \(s\) is prevented, an evil \(s’\), \(s \leq s’\) is allowed. Since we are discussing the possibilities open to an omnipotent being, this entails that either it is not possible that the good \(G\) takes place without some equally great evil \(s’\) (\(\neg \emptyset (G \land \neg s’),\) for all \(s’ \geq s\)) or that for all possible worlds \(w\), if \(s\) does not occur in \(w\), there is a greater evil \(s’\) that occurs in \(w\) (\(\forall w (\neg s \in w \rightarrow \exists s’ \geq s, s’ \in w)\)). These conditions are together equivalent with a version of Rowe’s informal condition: if a world does not have the evil \(s\), it either loses the good \(G\) or has a greater evil \(s’\):

\[
\forall w (\neg s \in w \rightarrow \neg G \in w \lor \exists s’ \geq s (s’ \in w))
\]

\(^{173}\) Rowe 1979, 335-338.  
\(^{174}\) See Perdue 1991, Ch. 6.3.  
\(^{175}\) Rowe 1979, 336, 336-337.
Rowe claims that this principle (or principles equivalent with it) follow from basic moral principles that are common to both theists and atheists.\textsuperscript{176} In fact, it is loaded with a particular view of divine goodness. Rowe’s principle can be seen as a version of Leibniz’ min-max principle.\textsuperscript{177} If we presuppose the logical notion of omnipotence\textsuperscript{178}, God chooses between different possible worlds \(w \in W\), where \(W\) is the set of all possible worlds. God chooses a world \(w\) over alternative worlds \(w'\), because \(w'\) either misses the greater good \(G\) or contains a greater evil \(s'\). God thus maximizes the amount of good \(G\) while minimizing the amount of evil \(s\) in the world. For this reason, God’s choice \(w\) is also better than its alternatives \(w' \in W\). \(w\) therefore is the best possible world and evil \(s\) has a morally sufficient reason, because all the worlds \(w'\) not containing \(s\) are even worse.

Rowe then defines divine goodness in terms of the principle of sufficient reason. This can also been from his famous fawn example, and from his analysis of theistic responses to the argument.\textsuperscript{179} Rowe imagines a situation, where fawn is burnt in a forest fire and is left suffering for days, until it finally dies. “So far as we can see, the fawn’s intense suffering is pointless. For there does not appear to be any greater good such that the prevention of the fawn’s suffering would require either the loss of that good or the occurrence of an evil equally bad or worse.”\textsuperscript{180} Rowe is implicitly appealing to the principle of sufficient reason: if there is no greater good to be gained or a greater evil to be avoided, the evil is “pointless” i.e. lacks a reason that would be morally sufficient for allowing it.

PSR also comes up in Rowe’s argument that the best strategy for the theist is a Moorean one: the theist should infer from the existence of God to the proposition that all evil does have a purpose after all. The problem of evil can then be presented as an aporia: the set \{“God exists”, “if God exists, all evil has a purpose in preventing greater evils or as a precondition for good”, “Some evils do not have a purpose”\} is inconsistent.\textsuperscript{181} The theist accepts the existence of God and the conditional “God exists\(\rightarrow\)all evil has a purpose”, and uses them to infer that all evils have a purpose after all. The atheist accepts the conditional “God exists\(\rightarrow\)all evil has a purpose” and the existence of pointless evil, and infers that God does not exist. This is just to say that the

\textsuperscript{176} Rowe 1979, 337.
\textsuperscript{178} Rowe does not define omnipotence in his article. The argument is not in fact dependent on the notion of omnipotence, as the set of possible worlds \(w\) open to God can be limited. God then chooses the best world from \(w\).
\textsuperscript{179} Rowe’s Fawn is discussed on pp. 337-338. Rowe discusses theistic responses on pp. 337-339.
\textsuperscript{180} Rowe 1979, 337.
\textsuperscript{181} Roderick Chisholm presented philosophical problems as aporias: a set of plausible philosophical statements is inconsistent. See Sorensen 1995.
analytic theodicy debate is committed to the claim that the existence of a good God entails conceptually that all evils have a sufficient reason as a means of maximizing the greatness $G$ of the world and preventing greater evils $s$. To sum up, divine goodness is taken to mean that all evils have morally sufficient reasons.182

Rowe also takes up another Leibnizian binary opposition in his fawn example.183 We have just seen that it seems to us that the fawn’s suffering does not have a purpose, but we cannot prove it to be the case: “It must be acknowledged that the case of the fawn's apparently pointless suffering does not prove that (1) is true.”184 Because we are not omniscient, we cannot know if the suffering is connected to some greater goods. Such goods might even be totally unknown to us. Rowe however claims that our appearances render reasonable the belief that there is no such order of sufficient reasons.185 Rowe’s argument therefore presupposes the appearance/reality binary opposition as well: all the sensuous appearances and our prima facie beliefs about the power of an omnipotent God point to so much misery, that it is reasonable to believe that God does not exist. There might however be a rational order of sufficient reasons that connects evils with greater goods or the prevention of even greater evils. The dualism between the world of evil appearances and a (possibly) hidden rational order then surfaces in the contemporary debate as well.

2.3.2.3 Plantinga on omnipotence and freedom

Alvin Plantinga’s article “God, Evil and the Metaphysics of Freedom”186 is another classic in the contemporary theodicy debate. Plantinga presents his free-will defence as an argument against Mackie and Leibniz. He discusses Mackie’s work at length, but he does not refer directly to Leibniz. Instead, he bases his critique of Leibniz on a popular version, which obscures that Plantinga and Leibniz in fact follow a common strategy for answering the argument from evil. We have seen that Mackie admits that the logical concept of omnipotence is paradoxical, as God could limit Himself by committing to a world order with independent centres of causal power.187 Plantinga criticizes both Mackie and the popular Leibniz for “Leibniz’ Lapse”, or the position that God could have created any possible world. Plantinga takes up the theme of creaturely freedom and

---

182 Rowe 1979, 337-339.
183 Rowe 1979, 337-339.
184 Rowe 1979, 337.
186 Plantinga 1974, Ch. 10.
uses it to show that even if one accepts the logical concept of omnipotence, “the creation of a world containing moral good is a co-operative venture; it requires the uncoerced concurrence of significantly free creatures.” 188 A world can contain moral good only if significantly free beings make choices in situations that have been actualized by God, but then their choices are not determined by God. 189

Plantinga uses this insight to present a defence for the existence of God and the existence of evil. 190 Technically speaking, he is looking for a third statement p such that p and “God exists” together entail that “there is evil”, and the set {“God exists”, p} is consistent. Plantinga starts looking for p from the existence of significantly free creatures. A creature is significantly free if and only if he has multiple actions a1, …, an open to him at some possible world w, and he either ought to do or ought not to do some action ak. A significantly free agent then has libertarian free will at a world w, and can choose between right and wrong. Both natural and moral evil might be the result of wrong choices. Evil acts are the result of human choice, and great natural evils could be the result of Satan’s actions. 191 Plantinga develops this possibility by defining counterfactuals of freedom and trans-world depravity. He uses these concepts to show that even on the logical concept of omnipotence, “God is omnipotent and it was not within his power to create a world containing moral good but no moral evil.” 192

Plantinga examines God’s ability to actualize states of affairs t and a set of states of affairs T. God does not actualize necessary truths like 2+2=4. Freedom also limits God’s choices, as God cannot determine free actions. When these states of affairs 193 are excluded from the possible world w, one ends up with the set T of the states of affairs that God brings about. 194

Possible worlds are determined not only by their states of affairs, but also by their counterfactuals that determine the natural laws and the free choices of the world. Imagine the physical systems w and w’. Both have the same states of affairs: a ball is held on an inclined plane. In w it is the case that if the ball were released, then it would roll up the plane. If the ball were

188 Plantinga 1974, 190.
189 Plantinga 1974. For Leibniz’ Lapse, see Plantinga 1974, 168, 180-184
190 Plantinga 1974, 165-167.
192 Plantinga 1974, 184.
193 Plantinga seems to consider necessary truths like 2+2=4 to depend on states of affairs that are actual in all possible worlds. He defines broadly logical necessity to include metaphysical, conceptual and mathematical truths (1974, 3).
released in w’, it would roll down. w and w’ thus have the same states of affairs but different counterfactuals. Counterfactuals therefore constitute the possible worlds they are true in.195

Counterfactuals of freedom are the counterfactuals that determine free choices at a possible world. Let’s take the example of Curley the mayor.196 Curley makes decisions freely, but he is so corrupt that if he were offered $20 000 in bribes, he would take it. The counterfactual “If Curley were offered a $20 000 bribe, he would take it” is a counterfactual of freedom, because it describes the decisions he would take. Plantinga argues that counterfactuals of freedom are broadly necessary truths. He defines the essence E of an object x to be a database property that defines for all worlds w and all properties P, whether x exists at w and whether x has the property P at w.197

Since counterfactuals constitute the possible worlds w, individuals x have the following counterfactual properties at w: if a set of states of affairs T ⊆ w were the case, x would do the action A. Essences therefore determine counterfactual properties “x would do A at T” of objects x at all possible worlds w. For example, Curley’s essence includes the property that he would take the bribe, if he were offered one. These properties however limit God’s choices. If Curley chooses freely to take a bribe in T, then God can only actualize the states of affairs in T. He can’t determine Curley’s choice at T, because if He could, Curley wouldn’t be making his choice freely.198

This allows one to construct a proof that there are possible worlds that even a logically omnipotent God could not create. In the proof, A → B means that if A were the case, B would be the case (i.e. A counterfactually implies B). The proof can be stated as follows:199

Proposition: God cannot actualize w, for some w.

Proof: Since libertarian freedom is possible, we can choose w* s.t. a has libertarian freewill at w*. Let T be a set of states of affairs s.t. for all t God can actualize, t ∈ T or ¬ t ∈ T. Let T → A be the counterfactual “if the states of affairs in T held, a would choose A freely”. Since counterfactuals are constitutive of w*, w* ⊨ T → A or w* ⊨ T → ¬ A. Now let God actualize T.

1. Suppose that w* ⊨ T → A. Then a does the act A, and God cannot actualize w=T \{¬ A \}.
2. Suppose that w* ⊨ T → ¬ A. Then a does the act A, and God cannot actualize w=T \{ A \}.
Since w* ⊨ T → A or w* ⊨ T → ¬ A, there is a w s.t. God cannot actualize w. □

199 The proof is based on Plantinga 1974, 180-184.
Plantinga finishes his consistency proof by developing the notion of trans-world depravity. The counterfactuals of freedom approach leaves open the possibility that God creates persons with personal essences $P$ such that they do the right thing, whenever God actualizes a state of affairs $T$. In other words, one can define personal essences $P$ such that the persons do the right thing, no matter the situation. Plantinga uses the concept of transworld depravity to construct a scenario where this conceptual possibility does not hold. A personal essence $P$ is trans-worldly depraved if and only if for all worlds $w$ where $P$ does the right thing, there is a set of states of affairs $T$ such that

1. God actualizes $T$ and for all states of affairs $t$ actualized by God, $t \in T$, 
2. $A$ is a morally significant choice for $P$ at $w$, 
3. if God had actualized $T$, $P$ would have done the wrong choice regarding $A$.\(^{200}\)

Suppose that Curley is trans-worldly depraved with regard to the states of affairs $T$ where he is offered a bribe. Then he chooses to take the bribe freely, and God cannot actualize the world $w$ where he does not take the bribe. Since it is conceptually possible to have personal essences $P$ such that the person $P$ always does the right thing, one could argue that God might have actualized different people. Plantinga answers this argument by pointing out the possibility that all essences are trans-world depraved. God then chooses among the trans-world depraved essences and actualizes a set of states of affairs $T$ such that “every world that God could have actualized and that contains less (…) evil, contains less broadly moral good and a less favourable over-all balance of good and evil than the actual world”\(^{201}\).

The concept of trans-world depravity and the idea of an optimal balance between good and evil amount to the Leibnizian solution of the problem of evil, although Plantinga attempts to distance himself from Leibniz. God is constrained by the choice of trans-world depraved essences, and his choices aim to the best.\(^{202}\) Several other Leibnizian ideas are visible in Plantinga’s defence. Like Leibniz, Plantinga makes omnipotence into a matter of picking essences and states of affairs from a predetermined set of logical alternatives. Thus he pushes evil into the structure of logical space. God also maximizes the amount of good and minimizes the amount of evil, as He is aiming for a best possible balance of good and evil in the world. God’s decision to create can also be modelled with a game model. Although God does not straightforwardly actualize the world, God

---

\(^{200}\) Plantinga 1974, 186, 188, 184-189. 
\(^{201}\) Plantinga 1974, 194, 187-195. 
\(^{202}\) Plantinga 1974, 168, 180-184. See Neiman 2015, 21. See ch 5.4.3 for a discussion, how the theodicist theism/atheism debate ultimately concerns the structure of logical space and amounts to a metaphysical antinomy.
nevertheless actualizes a maximal set of states of affairs $T$ and essences $P_1, \ldots, P_n \in P$, and $P$ is the set of all possible essences. The essences $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ then define the counterfactuals of freedom for the persons their instantiation would create, so they determine what a person would do in a situation $T$.

Charles S. Peirce’s theory of habit offers an interesting angle into counterfactuals of freedom. According to Peirce, a habit is a “lasting state in which something would happen in case a certain condition should be fulfilled”. Peirce also describes a habit as a “would-be”, or a way of responding to reality under certain situations. Under Peirce’s terminology, counterfactuals of freedom are habits, because they establish “would-bes” that govern the actions of persons. Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen uses game theory to interpret C.S. Peirce’s concept of a would-be and a habit: habits and would-bes are strategies of game theory. A strategy for an agent $a$ determines the action $S_a(T)$ that $a$ takes for all situations $T$ to which $a$ responds. Counterfactuals of freedom are then essential strategies for responding to God’s and created agents’ choices. We can translate these would-bes into a game model:

1. God chooses a maximal state of affairs $T$ and the essences $P_1, \ldots, P_n$.
2. For all created players $k$, the essences determine the possible actions $A'_1, \ldots, A'_m$ in response to the game situation $(T, A_1, \ldots, A_n)$ (i.e. where God actualizes $T$ and $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ respond with $A_1, \ldots, A_n$).
3. The payoff of the outcome $(T, A_1, \ldots, A_n)$ is for God the sum of good and evil. The payoff for a creature $k$ is the amount of good it experiences in the world $(T, A_1, \ldots, A_n)$, if the counterfactual of freedom for $k$ determines $k$ to perform action $A_k$ in response to other actions $(T, A_1, \ldots, A_n)$. If $A_k$ is not in accord with $A'_k$, the action determined by the counterfactual, the payoff is $\text{payoff}(T, A_1, \ldots, A'_k, \ldots, A_n)-1$.

The model then implements Plantinga’s solution to the logical problem of evil. God aims at the optimum balance of good and evil (or plays a game to maximize good and minimize evil), because that scenario maximizes His payoff. He also chooses essences $P_1, \ldots, P_n$, which determine the counterfactuals of freedom for creatures $1, \ldots, n$. God also instantiates the maximal state of affairs $T$. The creatures $k$ respond to God’s choice $T$ and the actions of other creatures $A_n$ by choosing the strategy $A_k$ that is determined the counterfactual or “would-be” of freedom, because acting contrary to one’s nature would leave one even worse off. The Leibnizianism of the model is clear.

---

203 EP 2, 456. Pietarinen 2009. Pietarinen’s interpretation of would-bes and habits as strategies is a major background influence for this work.

204 For strategic games see Osborne & Rubinstein 1994, 11-21, Ch. 4.1.
Divine omnipotence is the ability to choose essences $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ and a set of states of affairs $T$ that includes all states of affairs that do not hold due to broadly logical necessity or due to the free choice of creatures. God is the sufficient reason for the existence of the world by actualizing $T$ and $P_1, \ldots, P_n$, and the structure of essences and counterfactuals are a sufficient reason for God’s choice.

2.3.3 The neo-Leibnizian nature of the current debate

The traditional problem of evil then concerns Cartesian theism, which was articulated by Leibniz. It is possible to sum up the neo-Leibnizian presuppositions of the contemporary debate:

1. If the possible world $w$ is created by God and an evil $s$ occurs, then it either permits a greater good $G$ or prevents a worse evil $s’$. Thus every object and state of affairs at $w$ has a sufficient reason.
2. God’s power means the ability to choose essences $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ and a maximum set $T$ of contingent state of affairs that are not determined by the choices of free beings. These choices are logically determined by the set of possible states of affairs and the set of possible essences $P$.
3. The possible combinations of states of affairs $T$ and essences $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ are the sufficient reason for God’s choice. The worlds $w$ created by actualizing states of affairs and essences have a balance of good $G$ and evil $s$. God actualizes the world with the best balance of good $G$ and evil $s$.
4. God is the sufficient reason for the actuality of the world. God is a necessary being who can choose to actualize a set of states of affairs $T$ and essences $P_1, \ldots, P_n$. God’s choice $T$ and the free actions of creatures determined by essences $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ jointly make up the world.
5. God’s decision to create can be presented as an $n+1$-player game. The players are God and persons $P_1, \ldots, P_n$. The set of God’s moves is determined by the logical space of the combination of essences. The sets of creaturely moves $A_n$ are determined by the creature’s essences. God’s strategy aims at achieving an optimal balance between good $G$ and evil $s$. The strategies of the creatures are determined by the counterfactuals of freedom that follow from their essence.
6. Facts and values are unified by God and the principle of sufficient reason. God unites facts into an order of reasons such that all evils $s$ either lead to a greater good $G$ or prevent a greater evil $s’$.
7. God has vicarious understanding of this system of sufficient reasons, so God and the reasons also unify facts and meanings. The order of reasons unifies facts with meanings and facts with values. The intelligibility of the world is thus both moral and rational.
8. It seems that there is pointless evil in the world: e.g. fawns are burnt to death in forest fires. These appearances make it reasonable to believe that there are no sufficient reasons for such evils. There might however be an order of reasons that connect such evils to greater and possibly unknown goods. Empirical appearances of evils and reality are therefore distinct and possibly opposite.
3. Metaphysics, grammar and evil: in search of a method

In the second chapter, we defined the problem of evil and theodicism. We then explored, how the dualisms fact/meaning, fact/value, appearance/reality and the Enlightenment foundations of knowledge project with its search of intelligibility in sufficient reasons produce a problem about the intelligibility and meaningfulness of the world. We also saw that the problem about God and evil is just a special case of the more general problem about meaning: one gets the atheist argument from the general problem by taking God to guarantee the order of sufficient reasons in the world.

The goal of this chapter is to develop methods for grammatical metacriticism and to explore the connections between philosophical grammar, the problem of evil and the foundations of metaphysics. I argue that antitheodicy should be construed a metacritique of theodicist speculative metaphysics, which is based on developing grammars of language and reason. I first examine different antitheodicies. My argument builds on Toby Betenson’s distinction between moral and conceptual antitheodicies. I first argue that moral antitheodicies fail. I then present Kantian, Jamesian and Hamannian conceptual antitheodicies and argue that a Hamannian grammatical antitheodicy can offer a metatheory for both Jamesian pragmatist and Kantian critical antitheodicies. Second, I use the philosophies of Ludwig Wittgenstein and J. G. Hamann to develop grammatical methods to assess philosophical problems. The goal of this section is to develop a critique of language that functions as a critique of reason and thus of theodicist metaphysics. Third, I approach the contemporary metaphysical methods debate through the arguments of Tuomas Tahko, L. A. Paul, Bas van Fraassen and Hilary Putnam to identify the key issues for a grammatical critique of metaphysics. I also explore the role of the senses/reason, matter/form and subject/object splits in the metaphysical foundations debate in order to sketch a connection between the methodological and theodicy debates.205

3.1. The project of antitheodicy

It is now time to define antitheodicy and antitheodicism by charting the different schools of antitheodicy. I first discuss moral antitheodicies through my debate with Toby Betenson. I argue

---

that moral antitheodicies fail, as they are either question-begging or moralistic. Therefore antitheodicies must expose the presuppositions of the problem of evil as conceptual confusions. I examine the Kantian, Jamesian and Hamannian approaches to conceptual antitheodicy. I then briefly sketch an argument for Hamannian antitheodicism. I show that the Hamannian approach can be used as a metatheory for Kantian and Jamesian approaches. I then deepen Hamannian antitheodicies by linking them with a grammatical approach to philosophical problems in order to assess the fact/meaning, fact/value and appearance/reality dualisms and the principle of sufficient reason. The presuppositions are all metaphysical, so the objective is to lay the groundwork for a grammatical critique of metaphysics. The connection of a grammatical critique of metaphysics and theology is well captured by Wittgenstein’s slogan: “Essence is expressed by grammar. (…) Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar.)”

3.1.1 Antitheodicies: conceptual, moral and moralistic

We have defined theodicism in the preceding chapter. Pihlström and Kivistö similarly define antitheodicism: “By antitheodicism we mean the rejection (…) of the very project of theodicy.” Antitheodicism on the Pihlström-Kivistö view means abandoning justifications for evil and searching grounds for religious beliefs somewhere else, for example in a Dostoyevskian radical acceptance of the world. Nick Trakakis similarly defines antitheodicy as a metaphilosophical view that the whole project of looking at the problem of evil in terms of finding justifications is a nonstarter for moral or conceptual reasons. Toby Betenson describes antitheodicy as a Wittgensteinian metacritique of the presuppositions of the problem in his article “Anti-Theodicy.” Antitheodicy goes deeper than objecting to particular theodicies and defences like the soul-making theodicy, as it questions the entire framework of discussing the justice of God in terms of offering justifications for evil. Betenson characterizes antitheodicy as arguing “that the ways in which the problem of evil is both presented and solved, and the foundational conceptual and moral assumptions in which such a discussion is grounded, are erroneous.”

The concept of anti-theodicy is however ambiguous. There are two ways of developing the idea that the foundational conceptual or moral assumptions of theodicy are wrong:

1. Dissolving the problem of evil by rejecting the framework of sufficient reasons.
2. Showing that theodicies or assignments of meaning to the world are to be rejected.

These approaches are in fact contradictory. The first approach will aim to dissolve the problem as presented in Ch. 2. This however requires a consistency proof or some even stronger rejection of the correctness or intelligibility of the whole problem. A consistency proof shows that God or meaning can exist in a world with chaotic evil. The second approach will on the contrary depend on the correctness of some version of the argument from evil. If it is not correct to even argue that there is meaning or a God due to the existence of evil, evil cannot be reconciled with meaning and God. Moreover, supporters of the first approach will inevitably see the second approach as working within the framework of the problem of evil, question-begging or even crypto-atheist. Proponents of the second approach claim that it is not necessary to dissolve the problem or that the consistency proofs of the first approach are in fact theodicies. The question “Which of the approaches is a real antitheodicy?” is mostly terminological, but most antitheodicists use both approaches in tandem. 

For example, Pihlström argues that it is immoral to assign meaning to first-person suffering, but the validity of this critique depends on the wider failure of the theodicist framework. My approach is to take the first approach as a matter of definition, but my critiques of Pihlström’s and Betenson’s antitheodicies underline that the second approach will either fail or collapse into atheist arguments from evil, unless it rests upon a more fundamental critique of reason and a critique of theodicist metaphysics that are used to dissolve the problem. My debate with Betenson can illustrate the issues involved in defining antitheodicy, and in assessing the ability of different antitheodicies to question either the problem of evil or the various theodicies or atheist approaches to it. My approach falls within the first definition, and Betenson’s within the second.208

Betenson distinguishes between moral and conceptual antitheodicies. Moral antitheodicies question either the moral premises of (both atheist and theist) theodicist arguments, or question the language-game of issuing justifications itself. Conceptual antitheodicies object to the theodist presuppositions about the nature and properties of God. Betenson includes religious antitheodist traditions under the conceptual challenge. Betenson describes the main point of moral antitheodicies and generalizes it into a main claim of antitheodicy in general: “Theodicies mediate a practice that sanctions evil.”209 He lists four types of moral objections against theodicies: theodicies trivialize evil; the attempt to give third-person explanations of evil does not take it morally.

---

208 The discussion of rejecting the problem vs rejecting the solutions is an answer to Mikael Stenmark and Pihlström. Snellman 2019, Betenson 2019. See Pihlström & Kivistö 2016, Ch. 3.1.2.
209 Betenson 2016, 64, 57. Betenson is quoting Nick Trakakis.
seriously; theodicies presuppose an instrumentalist consequentialism that takes sufferings to be means to an end; and the inherent Panglossianism of theodicies is a vicious practice that contributes to the evils of the world.210

Betenson elaborates on the claim that theodicies trivialize evil by contrasting horrendous evils like the Holocaust with everyday evils like going to the dentist. He then argues that the theodicist practice of weighing between the good and bad consequences of an evil presupposes that the evil is not horrendous. Horrendous evils are incommensurable with goods and therefore cannot be compensated or compared with good consequences. Betenson takes an example from D. Z. Phillips, who argues that comparison of the disaster of the Holocaust with the pain of going to the dentist is absurd, unless one has been to a Nazi dentist. Such comparisons are category-mistakes that are insensitive to the seriousness of horrendous evils.211

Betenson introduces another moral criticism of theodicy: taking a third-person point of view to suffering is inhuman. Theodicians have to assume a third-person God’s eye point of view in their practice of weighing goods and evils and explaining away suffering. One way of developing an antitheodicy is to argue that such a view of suffering detaches one from the suffering person and his suffering. The theodistic God and the theodist are thus detached from morally correct practices like empathizing with the sufferer, helping him or recognizing his point of view as correct.212

Betenson discusses a third moral criticism of theodicies. He argues that balancing goods with evils presupposes a consequentialist calculus for reasons that does not take personal dignity or subjective factors into account. He quotes Phillips who criticizes the soul-making theodicy: evils are supposed to build up character, but having a self-involved instrumental good like character development elevated into the telos of suffering is self-serving. Moreover, such hyper-consequentialism judges everything (including horrendous evils) as a means, so it cannot account for having human dignity as an end. Even theodicies involving compensation to the sufferer cannot evade this objection, because they are trapped in a consequentialist logic of compensation. Thus theodicies cannot account for moral reasons involving dignity and first-person meaningfulness, because they justify evil instrumentally.213

Betenson sums up these moral criticisms by pointing out the Panglossianism of theodistic practices. First, he argues that the moral criticisms show that constructing theodicies is

---

210 The list is a condensed version of Betenson’s list of moral antitheodicies (2016, 57-62). Cf. Pihlström & Kivistö 2016.
212 Betenson 2016, 58-60. See also Pihlström & Kivistö 2016, 263-264, and Ch. 3.1.2.1.
itself morally vicious and therefore contributes to the evils of the world. The second criticism involves the claim that explaining away evils is a way of evading responsibility for fighting them. The second objection goes back to secular writers like Karl Marx and Albert Camus. Neiman argues that Marx’s work is in fact an answer to the problem of evil: philosophers like Hegel have attempted to explain the evils of the world with theodicies, but the real goal of philosophy is to change it by addressing evil with human action. Camus takes up this theme in The Plague by contrasting the doctor Rieux with the priest Paneloux. Paneloux is a theodicist who gives sermons justifying the plague, which kills him in the end. Rieux is an atheist antitheodicist: he thinks that illnesses might have their benefits, but accepting them is either cowardly or dishonest. The priest does not (want to) see evil, but the doctor rather wants to fight the plague than prove its benefits. Camus is thus defending a Marxist and atheist form of moral antitheodicism: one can either believe in God and explain evil, or reject the belief in God who offers an explanation for evil in order to fight it and thus change the world for the better.214

The closeness of moral antitheodicies to 19th and 20th century existentialism and secular humanism raises a strong objection to moral antitheodicies. Are they antitheodicies or meta-theodicies that offer just more moralistic reasons for “condemning the architect”?215 It seems that they just offer moral objections to theodicies instead of questioning the framework of the problem of evil. Betenson briefly discusses the question when answering the claim that moral antitheodicies are question- begging. He admits that antitheodicy presupposes the moral claim that there are horrendous evils that cannot be justified.216 The moral case against theodicy could well be made in terms of Wittgenstein’s claim that language-games become pointless if the necessary conditions for their functional relationships do not hold.217 The language-games for constructing theodicies are morally pointless, because the process of weighing goods against horrendous evils from a third-person perspective cannot be morally justified.

However, if this is the case, then even God cannot justifiably weigh goods against evils in this way. Then He doesn’t have a morally valid sufficient reason for creating this kind of world. This is however consistent with atheistic theodicism: there are no first-order justifications for horrendous evils, and God does not exist because He would not have a justification for creating such a world. Thus moral antitheodicies do not dissolve the conceptual assumptions of the problem.

---

215 The phrase is Neiman’s characterization of modern atheist theodicism (2015, 113-202).
216 Betenson 2016, 60. In a response to my criticism (2019, 213), he admits that moral antitheodicies beg the question. The charge of question-begging is also made by Robert Mark Simpson (2009) and van Inwagen (2007, Ch. 4).
217 PI 142.
of evil. Alternatively, one can consider the case where God has sufficient reason for horrific evils like the Holocaust after all.\footnote{To avoid begging the question against moral antitheodicists, the world does not need to be morally possible (i.e. have the same moral truths). It is sufficient if it is logically or metaphysically possible to work as a thought-experiment.} The same moral arguments might still be made against the language-game of theodicy, even though theodicy would end up giving justifiable reasons with its own criteria that also happen to determine the real moral reasons and meanings for the evil events in the world. In such a case, moral antitheodicies would amount to moralism, as their moral reasons would be detached from the system of reasons that exists in the world in question.

Betenson answers to my criticisms of moral antitheodicies. He admits the main charges of my criticism: moral antitheodicies beg the question against theodicists and they do not dissolve the crossing of pictures between religion and metaphysics that was discussed in the previous chapter.\footnote{Betenson 2019, Ch. 2. For the crossing of pictures, see PI 191. For the concept of a Moorean shift, see Rowe 1979.} However, he argues that the moralism charge is unjustified. The rejection of theodicies on moral grounds is a legitimate modus tollens, because the moral reasons against theodicy like “the Holocaust was wrong” function as rules of moral language-games. Thus theodicies go against the necessary conditions for the use of moral concepts, and taking the justification of horrific evils as a real possibility shows that one has lost the mastery of moral concepts by stepping outside moral language-games. The rejection of theodicies is based on necessitated responses like Ivan Karamazov’s protest atheism. These responses like “remain(ing) with my unavenged suffering and unassuaged indignation, even if I am not right” are not moralistic, because they function as rules for the correctness of moral judgments and their functioning as rules is internal to the moral language-game: “I would reject the demand that a moral reaction can only be acceptable with a metaphysical foundation.”\footnote{Betenson 2019, 213. The moralistic Karamazov quote comes from n. 6. For the underlying epistemology, see OC.} Then responses like protest atheism are not moralistic even if they are wrong, because they constitute the rules for moral concepts.

This way of putting it may sound a bit polemical, but the debate has produced a consensus that moral antitheodicies end up begging the question if not supported by arguments about the necessary conditions of moral language-games, they easily amount to protest atheism and that they do not call theodicism itself into question. The first point arises, as Betenson himself defends moral antitheodicy against the moralism charge by pointing at the necessary conditions of moral language. More generally, the problem of evil concerns the interface of metaphysics, ethics and religion. Therefore any moral critique of the conceptual assumptions of theodicies must give an account of these links which shows, how moral claims can be used to criticize the other interrelated
topics.\textsuperscript{221} In my debate with Betenson, we have reached a situation where the modus ponens of one philosopher is the modus tollens of another. I will hold on to my position that moral anti-theodicies are philosophically unsatisfactory. To make my case, I point to the concept of moral sources and the pointlessness of language-games, and argue that a moral language-game loses its point if it is not oriented towards moral sources and not embedded in the forms of life of the human condition, which require us to recognize reality.\textsuperscript{222}

We defined the concept of a moral source in Ch. 2.2.5: a moral source $M$ is a feature, entity or a pattern in reality that contact with and orientation towards it empowers our actions to be good. Wittgenstein argues that the relational possibility conditions of language-games include their objects like towels, slabs and colour-models. He also argues that a language-game is possible only by trusting the realities that underlie it, so it presupposes encountering and recognizing these objects as a part of its linguistic practices. Language-games are therefore not self-enclosed, but they contain reality and are oriented towards it in the practices and forms of life through which we recognize reality and respond to practical problems.\textsuperscript{223} Now, moral language-games concern the human good and the good life, so they must include standards for orienting one’s actions and the relevant situations on the scale of good and evil. However, this can only be done by contrasting the activities and assessing them in relation to the moral sources $M$, which must be a part of the activities and relationships of the game. Moral language-games therefore involve the recognition of moral sources of the human condition as a necessary condition for the relationships of the game.\textsuperscript{224}

Now we can see why wholesale attempts to impeach the moral order as a whole, or to impeach God in a theistic world amount to extreme moralism. Moralism involves “a failure to recognize what moral thought requires (...) in the broad sense”\textsuperscript{225}. This is exactly what is going on in moral anti-theodicies, if “theism is true, and a theodicy is true”. As we have seen in Ch. 2.2.5, theodicism involves locating the moral sources in the order of sufficient reasons that God has created. Then if one presents a moral anti-theodicy in a theodicist world, or more generally remains in “unassuaged indignation, even if one is not right”, one is not recognizing the moral sources that are required to navigate in the moral space given by the human condition in such a situation. Thus

\textsuperscript{221} See Neiman 2015. Pihlström (2016, 263-264) presents a moral anti-theodicy and avoids question-begging by using a critique of reason to defend a Kantian humanist view about the interrelatedness of ethics, religion and metaphysics.

\textsuperscript{222} For the concept of a moral source, see Taylor 1989. See PI 142 for the concept of the pointlessness of a language-game. For language as a response to reality, see H 108-109, Dickson 1995, OC 509.

\textsuperscript{223} See Chs. 2.2.5, 4.1. This argument builds on PI 7, 16, 23 and OC 508-510. See Snellman 2018 and Hein 1983 for Wittgenstein as an epistemologist of recognition of reality through trust. For the background, see Dickson 1995.

\textsuperscript{224} For the concept of a moral source, see Taylor 1989. For the idea that recognizing orders is a necessary condition for moral practices, see von Rad 1988. See also H 115.

\textsuperscript{225} Julias Driver, quoted in Betenson 2019, 214. The Karamazov quote too comes from Betenson. See also Isa. 45:9-13.
one’s moral language-games lose their point. Moral antitheodicies are thus moralistic if theistic
theodicism is correct, and the question of the correctness of theodicies is logically prior.

3.1.2 Antitheodicy and the critique of reason

Moral antitheodicies are then deeply problematic, as they fail to dissolve the link between God,
meanings and sufficient reasons. At worst, they amount to a moralistic condemnation of theodicies
and God as well. It looks like a conceptual approach consisting of a metacritique of theodici
speculative metaphysics is required for a successful antitheodicy. One can redefine antitheodicism
as a conceptual antitheodicy that involves a negation of theodicism. The approach can also be
extended to the general problem by denying that meaning requires a sufficient reason for evil. The
varieties of theodicism, antitheodicy and their relationships can be clarified with a diagram, and a
definition can be given for antitheodicy with negations of theodicism:

◊ (God exists and there is unjustified evil, i.e some evil has no justifying explanation.)
◊ (The world is valuable and meaningful and there is evil with no justifying explanation.)

\[ T \vdash (\text{World is meaningful} \land \neg \text{PSR} \land \neg \text{Evil}) \]
\[ T \vdash (\text{God exists} \land \text{PSR} \land \neg \text{Evil}) \]

Consistency proof: \( T \vdash (\text{World is meaningful} \land \text{Evil}), \) or \( T \vdash (\text{God exists} \land \text{Evil}) \)
There are three ways of rejecting theodicism: Kantian, Jamesian and Hamannian approaches. The Kantian approach holds that theodicism runs against the limits of reason and the necessary conditions of morality. Jamesian antitheodicism holds that theodicism presupposes a monolithic or monist view of the world, which is at odds with the pluralist contents of experience and meliorist moral action to improve the world. Hamannian antitheodicy holds that theodicism rests on rationalism, dualism and metaphysical views of God. These views go against the grammar of reason and religious faith. Let’s take a closer look at these approaches.

3.1.2.1 Kantian antitheodicism

Immanuel Kant defines his critical philosophical project in the preface to the *The Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant attempts to answer the question: how is scientific metaphysics possible? Kant bases his answer on his doctrine of transcendental idealism: metaphysics is possible only, if objects conform to our concepts and forms of intuition, and not vice versa. External objects are things-in-themselves, and must be distinguished (at least perspectivally) from phenomenal objects of experience, which are constituted by sensations and concepts. Concepts are the framework of objective experience, and experience limits the applicability of a priori knowledge, or knowledge before experience. These distinctions allow the limitation of reason to experience and a distinction between the world and our representations of it. We thus have two perspectives to the world and our knowledge of it: the experienced world and things-in-themselves.

Kant’s motive for the separation of things-in-themselves and phenomena is to clear out metaphysical confusions and to make room for faith. Metaphysical antinomies about freedom, God and the immortal soul arise, when philosophers fail to distinguish between the phenomenal world and things-in-themselves. The principles of metaphysics point to a deterministic Newtonian world that does not leave room for God, freedom and immortality. These principles however only hold of the empirical world, and we are free to think that God exists, human beings have libertarian

---

226 Pihlström & Kivistö (2016, 10) distinguish between Wittgensteinian, pragmatist and Jewish post-Holocaust antitheodicism, and classify all as forms of Kantian antitheodicism. My Hamannian antitheodicism corresponds closely to Wittgensteinian antitheodicism, and my Jamesian antitheodicism corresponds closely to pragmatist antitheodicism. I separate Kantian antitheodicism from the three, although there are significant overlaps between Kantian, Hamannian and Jamesian approaches.

227 KrV. I shall use the German Meiner edition.


229 KrV xvi-xx. For the concept of a priori knowledge, see Casullo 1992.
free will and the soul is immortal. God, freedom and immortality are the presuppositions of moral reason and of moral action, so Kant aims to lay a groundwork for morality and practical faith.\textsuperscript{230}

Kant’s famous antitheodicy essay \textit{Über das Misslingen aller philosophische Versuche einer Theodicee}\textsuperscript{231} builds on Kant’s philosophical project. Kant attempts a wholesale refutation of theodicism by splitting the empirical world into the sphere of phenomena and divine wisdom into the sphere of things-in-themselves.\textsuperscript{232} Kant characterizes the problem in legal terms: God is in the dock of the court autonomous reason, charged with dysteleology or lack of purpose in the world.\textsuperscript{233} Kant defines God as an ideal being: a being that is holy, benevolent and just. Kant thus defines God in terms of the ideals of moral reason and thus moves God into the ideal world from the empirical world of appearances.\textsuperscript{234} God can be acquitted from the charge of purposelessness by showing that there either is no dysteleology, it is a necessary consequence of good or that it is not God’s deed, but instead arises from the actions of free beings. Kant defines evil as a breach of duty, pain or an unjust relationship between the two, i.e. the relationship of virtue and reward. Kant examines various theodicies, including the view that God’s ways are hidden to us, the soul-making theodicy and the free-will defence, and holds that all fail. Kant argues that the view that God’s ways are not ours simply entails that God is not a moral being, because He is not a part of our moral community. The free will defence and the argument that evil arises out of the limitations inherent to creatures argue that evil is a necessary by-product in creation. However, if evils are essential to creation, then creatures cannot be blamed for them and they are not evil after all. Moreover, arguments about soul-making and compensation in a future life depend on the idea of an afterlife, which oversteps the limits of reason and ends up in speculative metaphysics.\textsuperscript{235}

Kant does not draw an atheist conclusion from the failure of theodicies. He instead argues that both theodicies and atheistic theodicism are forms of speculative metaphysics.\textsuperscript{236} Reason cannot prove either atheism or any theodicy, because “our reason is absolutely incapable of insight into the relationship in which any world as we may ever become acquainted with through

\textsuperscript{230} KrV xvi-xxx, Caygill 1995, 192-195.
\textsuperscript{231} AA 8: 258-275.
\textsuperscript{232} Neiman (2015, 57-84) describes Kant’s project as “divided wisdom”. Pihlström and Kivistö interpret the book of Job and Kant’s reading on it (2016, 29-71).
\textsuperscript{233} AA 8, 256. The phrase “God in the dock” comes from C. S. Lewis. For Kant’s concept of reason and the centrality of juridical metaphors, see KrV A xii, Pihlström & Kivistö 2016, 35.
\textsuperscript{235} AA 8, 258-263. My summary of Kant’s critique of theodicies is based on Pihlström & Kivistö 2016, 30-35.
\textsuperscript{236} Pihlström & Kivistö 2016, 3-4 argue that both contemporary theists (e.g. Plantinga 1974) and atheists (e.g. Rowe 1979) are often theodicy-believing, because they argue over the strength of evidence that evil provides for atheism.
experience stands with respect to the highest wisdom. We can form an empirical concept P of the teleology of the physical world through the senses and a rational concept W of the supreme wisdom of the Creator through practical reason. However, no rational knowledge can establish their relationship R(P,W) between the two. The reason for the impossibility of rationally establishing R(P,W) is that P is physical and phenomenal, W is moral and rational, and there is a conceptual gap between the noumenal moral and phenomenal physical worlds. Theodicism thus attempts to form a link between moral rationality and the physical phenomena. Kant argues that another is a matter of experience and another is a matter of practical morality exactly to make room for faith!

Kant offers an authentic theodicy and distinguish it from dogmatic theodicies. Pihlström and Kivistö interpret it as an antitheodicy, which changes our view of the problem of evil from a speculative metaphysical standpoint to a practical moral standpoint. A dogmatic theodicy attempts to establish the relationship R of the world order P and divine will W R(P,W) through reason, and ends up in speculative metaphysics. An authentic theodicy involves God interpreting His will that has been revealed in creation. God declares His will through the “pronouncement of the same reason through which we form our concept of God—necessarily and prior to all experience—as a moral and wise being” i.e. practical and moral reason.

Kant interprets the Job narrative by emphasizing Job’s sincerity. Job’s friends attempt to explain Job’s fate with a priori explanations, but Job insists on his innocence courageously and honestly. Job’s courage and honesty stand in contrast with the intellectual dishonesty and cowardice of the theodicism of Job’s three friends, who theocratically interpret Job’s experience from above, overstep the limits of human reason and try to flatter God with their speculative justifications. In the end, God answers Job’s charges of injustice by showing the distance of the phenomenal order P and the moral order W. Things are purposive for themselves but counterpurposive for human beings. Job has been unwise to attempt to relate the phenomenal order with the moral one R(P,W). Since a conceptual explication of the relationship R(P,W) is not possible, the only form of correctness left is the correspondence of the expression and the subject, that is honesty. Job’s moral honesty is the best that one can achieve in the matters left to faith.

237 AA 8, 263. Quoted in Pihlström & Kivistö 2016, 33.
239 AA 8, 264, Pihlström & Kivistö 2016, 31, 34.
240 AA 8, 264, quoted in Pihlström & Kivistö 34. Oswald Bayer (1991b, 44-47) argues that Kant is in fact a mystical theologian. According to Augustine, Christ is the internal voice of God within man. Kant has only secularized this picture so that moral reason is the internal voice of God.
Pihlström and Kivistö build their book *Kantian Antitheodicy* by reinterpreting Kant’s transcendental style of antitheodicy and the Theodicy Essay in light of pragmatists like Hilary Putnam and Jewish post-Holocaust antitheodics like Emmanuel Levinas. They see Kantian antitheodicy as a metaphilosophical project. Theodicism is a corollary of evidentialism: if all rational beliefs can be given sufficient reasons for holding them and they can act as explanations, then belief in God is rational only, if one can give sufficient reasons for it and use it as a sufficient explanation for evil. Pihlström and Kivistö instead present transcendental arguments. A transcendental argument can be defined as to be an argument that explores the subjectively constituted necessary conditions, how some phenomenon X is possible. They ground the necessary conditions presupposed by the transcendental arguments in human moral practices and the moral point of view. Our points of view are piecemeal: ontology may depend on ethics, which may be dependent on human life and a commitment to honesty. Therefore transcendental arguments are always relative to a perspective.

Kivistö’s and Pihlström’s aim is to show that the human moral point of view is possible only, if theodicist explanations for suffering are rejected. The arguments of the Jewish antitheodicist tradition form the core of their project of reinterpreting transcendental antitheodicy. Jewish antitheodicism was a reaction to the destruction of human life and human values in the Holocaust, and in many ways it actually comes close to protest atheism. Post-Holocaust antitheodicists like Levinas take the core of morality to consist in responses to the suffering of others. The first-person appearance of suffering is by definition unjustified. Ingolf Dalférth rephrases the key Levinasian claim as follows: “Leiden ist als solches ganz und gar sinnlos und ohne jeden Sinn.” Since the attention to the suffering of others is constitutive to morality and the appearance of suffering by definition includes an appearance of the injustice and meaninglessness of the suffering, it is insensitive and inauthentic to justify suffering from a third-person perspective.

The rejection of third-person theodicies is also rooted in the Kantian tradition of transcendental idealism. Kant separated the empirical world order P from things-in-themselves and the rational world order W in order to make room for moral freedom. Pihlström’s and Kivistö’s antitheodicy similarly emphasizes freedom, treating others as ends and the human point of view. We cannot interpret human experience of suffering in terms of a Hegelian total theory of the world.

---

242 Pihlström & Kivistö 2016, esp. 1-10, 257-280.
243 Pihlström&Kivistö 2016, 6. Transcendental and other necessary-conditions arguments are compared in Ch. 3.1.2.3.
244 Pihlström builds on Putnam’s pragmatist interpretation of Kantian arguments (1981), and Putnam builds on James.
245 Pihlström & Kivistö 75, 87-96, 257-280.
246 For protesting atheism, see e.g. Dostoyevsky 1998, Part 2, books 4-5, Betenson 2016, 2019, Snellman 2019.
247 “Suffering as such is totally without any meaning.” *Leiden und Böses*, p. 111, quoted in Pihlström & Kivistö 2016, 94.
a world meaningful in terms of a transcendent source, a God’s eye point of view or a third-person objective perspective. Another necessary condition of the moral perspective is the demand to treat human beings as an end, not as a means. The moral perspective also presupposes the contingency of evil. Moral responsibility and action are possible only, if evil can be eliminated by human action and evil can be eliminated by human action only, if it is contingent.

The argument can be summed up: theodicies typically fail to recognize the first-person experience of the meaninglessness of suffering as correct. They often also call the honesty of the suffering person into question. Theodicies are also often instrumentalist, so they treat the suffering person as an end for achieving the greater good that is taken to justify their suffering. For these reasons, theodicies fail the moral duty of recognizing the suffering person. Theodicist use of moral language thus oversteps the limits of moral language-games, and therefore rejecting the project of constructing theodicies or atheist arguments from evil is thus a necessary condition of holding a moral point of view.

The starting points of Kantian antitheodicy can be summarized:

1. Transcendental arguments chart the necessary conditions for some phenomenon (morality, metaphysics) by referring to the subject and his activity.
2. Transcendental idealism separates the world of experience or the first-person human point of view from the things-in-themselves or a God’s eye point of view. The goal is to anchor the use of reason to the human point of view so that theodicist speculative metaphysics regarding the relationship of values to the world or a third-person explanation of evil is not possible.
3. There is a conceptual gap between facts and values, which is impossible to bridge. Kant argues that we cannot form a concept R of the relationship R(P,W), between the phenomenal physical world P and the world of values and divine wisdom W. Levinas holds that factual first-person experiences of evil cannot by definition be justified with third-person moral or metaphysical explanations.
4. Theodicism is rejected as overstepping human reason and the standards of morality. In Kant, the speculative attempts to establish R(P,W) are dishonest attempts to please God. In Pihlström and Kivistö, attempts to give third-person justifications fail to recognize first-person experience or the suffering person.

---

248 Hamann already charged Kant with atheism, because Kant holds that “God does not reveal himself in the world.” (TLP 6.432, Bayer 2002, 56-63)
249 Pihlström & Kivistö 2016, 1-10, 267-274.
250 Pihlström & Kivistö 2016, 1-10, 267-274. The transcendental arguments are crystallized on pp. 263-264.
3.1.2.2 Jamesian antitheodicism

William James develops a humanistic approach to philosophical problems in his *Pragmatism*.251 Pihlström and Kivistö highlight the moral motives of James’ philosophy of religion. James developed a melioristic attitude, according to which “we should try to make the world better, bravely fighting against evil, without having any guarantee that the good cause will win, but having the right, and even the duty, to hope that it might and to invest our best efforts to make sure it will.”252 James also redefines God as a “helper *primus inter pares*” and a chessmaster, who acts in a pluralistic world with evil in it, but has a strategy for defeating evil.253 James also attempts to overcome the theory/practice dichotomy so that the philosophical answer to evil is to fight it and not to argue over the argument from evil.

The foundation for James’ approach to theodicy is his version of pragmatism: the meaning of an expression or the content of a concept is entirely given by its practical consequences. Beliefs are rules of action, and the practical consequences of a rule of action are given by the experiences it will produce, the reactions of its objects that we must expect or the practical values it will fulfil.254 Abstract truths are meaningful to the extent that they lead to concrete experiential or value-laden consequences.255 James’ pragmatic theory of truth is also an attempt to bring truth “back to the rough ground”256 rather than a relativistic doctrine. Truth is an adequate practical relationship to experience “The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons.”257 James gives various successful scientific unifications like the discovery of radium as examples of pragmatist truth, so truth helps to connect our experiences and is able to successfully assimilate future experience. True propositions are made true (veri-fied) by being brought into contact with experience and into relationships with background beliefs. Truth is a virtue, because it helps us seek and find solutions to our practical needs. For example, the belief that a cow-path leads to a settlement is true, because taking the cow-path allows us to search and find help. James is in fact not very far from C. S. Peirce, who gave a game-theoretic explanation for the concept of truth in terms of seeking and finding.258 James does

252 Pihlström & Kivistö 2016, 200, Ch.5.
254 James 1975, 28-29.
256 PI 107.
257 James 1975, 42.
258 See Pietarinen & Snellman 2006, Ch. 4.1. The point of truth as a virtue comes from Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen.
James applies the pragmatic method to metaphysical problems in the third lecture of _Pragmatism_. Pihlström and Kivistö argue that the interests constituting practical consequences have the human condition and the human experience of evil as a background. A theory has to recognize the existence of evil to be intellectually honest, and to promise hope for suffering people in order to have an existential cash value. James argues that theism has a higher cash value than materialism. If we look at the history of the world up to this point, the two theories are pragmatically equivalent. They just predict the same empirical phenomena, and disagree over whether their Arche or ultimate explanation should be called “God” or “matter”. When we look at the future, the matter is completely different. If matter is the ground of the world, the world will end up in a heat death and all values will be destroyed. With God, “tragedy is only provisional and partial, and shipwreck and dissolution not the absolutely final things”, as God can guarantee the validity of moral laws and uphold them with different means or in a different place. Similarly, James argues that the concept of free will offers room for improvement in the universe. If determinism holds, there can be nothing new in the universe. Freedom on the contrary is a doctrine of hope, because it entails that human beings can choose the right thing.

In “The Dilemma of Determinism”, James connects the issues of freedom, necessity and God with the opposition of monism and pluralism. Monism holds that the world forms a unity and has a single Arche that offers sufficient reasons for all states of affairs. Pluralism holds that there is no single system of connections that determine the world’s constituents. World is a “joint-stock society”, because chance and freedom are real features of it. James has two objections against monism: it cannot account for the plurality of experience and apparent disconnectedness and conflict in the experienced world, and it cannot accommodate our moral perspective. The question of evil functions as a motivating meta-level question, because monism leads to a problem of evil and our moral perspective presupposes meliorism, or the possibility of making the world a better place through action.

---

260 James 1975, Ch. 3 (45-62).
261 Pihlström & Kivistö 2016, 190-197.
263 James 1979, 115-141.
264 James 1979, 121, 1975, Ch. 4 (63-79).
265 Pihlström & Kivistö 2016, 199-208.
James argues against monism in chapter 4 of Pragmatism. The unity of the world can take many forms. At the most basic level, we can talk of “the world” as a merological sum of all that exists, and note that all of the facts of the world form a single logical space, because they form a single universe of discourse. Space and time form a continuum, and relations connect objects standing in them into lines of influence. A causal unity is one type of relational unity: everything could be causally connected or have a single first cause. A common species forms a unity over its instances: it is a case of One over Many. The world could also have a single purpose, form one great story or there could be an Absolute Being that is a universal knower. James rejects both absolute monism and absolute pluralism, because the world is united only by definite and concrete connections between things. James objects to universal causal chains and universal networks of human relationships, because there are particular forms of human and causal relationships, like love and electricity. These particular relationships do not connect everything: electricity is blocked by insulators and relationships of love presuppose human acquaintances. There are many different relationships, so there is no absolute relationship and the connectedness of things is dependent on context. The stories of the world are told from the point of view of particular narrators, and we cannot add them up into a single story in a straightforward way. Last but not least, there is no unity of purpose in the world. Living beings and organizations pursue their own purposes, and these purposes are constantly modified, may come into conflict and interact in a complex way. The problem of evil prevents unifying all purposes into a harmonious whole: even if there were a higher purpose behind evil, that purpose would contradict and override the purposes of the beings suffering from the evil. A God allowing such evil for a greater good would be a monster, and not the God of everyday religious belief. James’ objections can be summed up: the search for a single Arche and the associated Principle of Sufficient Reason cannot account for the multiplicity of orders and relationships that are revealed by experience.

James also argues that monism is incompatible with moral practices. Since James holds that truth is a virtue that is partially constituted by human moral interests and practices, it

---

266 James 1979, Ch. 4. Wittgenstein defines a logical space in TLP 3.42: it is a logical framework that contains all states of affairs, the alternativeness relation between them and a possibility of combining them with logical operations. See Glock 1996, 220-223.
268 James’ argument is an empirical argument about the nature of relationships and not a transcendental one in the Kantian sense. It can however be interpreted as a Hamannian relational argument: experience establishes that there are certain kinds of relationships, and their necessary conditions and features entail that there is no universal relationship. James’ argument can be given a linguistic twist: searching for explanations in terms of sufficient reasons is a second-order language-game (see Hintikka 1986) that presupposes first-order language-games, which are family resemblant, count different things as “reasons” and respond to different kinds of realities. See PI 66-67, Ch. 5.4.2.1.
entails that monistic theodicism cannot be true in the pragmatic sense.\(^{269}\) James presents the problem by arguing that determinism ends up in a dilemma, whose both horns make morality impossible.\(^{270}\) He examines our moral feelings of regret and disapproval of a psychopathic murder. If the feelings were right, then the murder ought not have happened. Then it is possible that it did not happen. Determinism holds that the murder happened necessarily, because it had a physically sufficient cause. James argues that if determinism is true, then either evil is essential for the world, or the function of evil and error is to lead to the improvement of subjective human consciousness by learning and deepening one’s moral feelings. If one denies the possibility that the murder did not happen, one has to either justify it or adopt the stand-point of a spectator to the world.

Moral action therefore requires indeterminism, or the doctrine that there are future alternative possibilities.\(^{271}\) There can be no unifying Arche giving sufficient reasons for all states of affairs, because then possibility and actuality would coincide, or Possible=Actual. Indeterminism goes together with James’ meliorism and pluralism, which reorient religion to possibilities. The world can get better and can be saved, because it contains some of the sufficient conditions of salvation. Some of these conditions are up to us, so the realization of the world is a collaborative project. The world is vulnerable, because both good and evil are genuine possibilities. Moral seriousness requires that we recognize evil as a real feature of the world, so that overcoming it requires effort. James’ redefinition of God also goes with the meliorist view of the world. God is seen as a chessmaster. God has a goal in the creation of the world, and He knows the moves the other players can make. He can answer all possible moves and states of affairs with moves that lead to victory, no matter how the other players play.\(^{272}\) Thus the goal of the world is determined, but human moral agents get to collaborate in the creation of the world, and the realization of value depends on their actions. God is then a “helper primus inter pares”.\(^{273}\) The starting points of Jamesian antitheodicism can be summarized:

1. The meaning of an expression is determined by the experiences that are connected with it and the practical values one can fulfill with it through use. Truth is the practical adequacy of a conception in predicting and reaching experiences, unifying one’s conceptions and fulfilling practical values that are rooted in the human condition. This also holds for metaphysical views like theism.

\(^{269}\) For a similar argument, see Pihlström & Kivistö 2016, 203.
\(^{270}\) James 1979, 115-141.
\(^{271}\) Mele (2014, Ch.3.) discusses indeterminist theories of free will.
\(^{272}\) For the concept of a winning strategy in game theory, see Ch. 4.1 and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinacy#Basic_notions. The theme is taken up in Chs. 6.2 and 6.4.
2. Theodicism is associated with monism: the world has a single Arche and a single order that determines all of its states of affairs. Experience reveals a plurality of orders and relationships that have their limitations, partial overlaps and conflicts, so there is no single determining Arche.

3. Monist theodicism goes against the necessary conditions of morality. If all of our actions are determined, all evil is necessary and we must adopt the standpoint of a spectator. Morality is possible only, if we can change the world for the better with our actions. Monism cannot be true, because truth is constituted by moral interests, which presuppose that moral action is possible.

4. God is redefined as a helper and a chessmaster, who has a winning strategy to realize His goals.

3.1.2.3 Hamannian antitheodicism

Gwen Griffith Dickson explores Hamann’s metacritique of philosophy in her *Johann Georg Hamann’s Relational Metacriticism*. Dickson interprets Hamann as arguing for a relational approach to philosophical problems in favour of dualistic ones. Dickson uses the work of Panagiotis Kondylis to argue that the Western philosophical tradition has typically answered questions about the relationship between the senses and reason in a dualistic way. The philosophical tradition has wrestled its problems by defining the relationships between terms of binary oppositions like senses/intellect, actual/possible, body/soul, reason/feelings and world/God. Posing fundamental questions as binary oppositions presupposes that the terms have been defined to be opposite to each other. For example, the modern mind/body problem was generated, when the material world was defined in terms of spatiotemporal predicates. The mind was defined as a space of experience, which is not understood spatiotemporally, but in the terms of its phenomenal “feel”.

Kondylis and Dickson show that this way of defining the problems of philosophy makes philosophical problems irresolvable. First, the definitions create a conceptual gap between the terms. We can define: there is a conceptual gap between the terms A and B if and only if A has by definition properties that B does not have and vice versa. Second, the definitions and conceptual gaps make overcoming dualism impossible. An anti-dualist solution must explain the phenomenon in the terms of either only A or only B. The solution must therefore be reductionist, i.e. it must derive B from A or A from B. This is however impossible because of the conceptual gap: A is not B and B is not A by definition. Kondylis makes a related point: even if one attempts to overcome

---

274 Dickson 1995.
275 Dickson 1995, 12-15. For the problem of dualism as a background for the theodicy debate, see Ch. 2.2.
276 Nagel 2012, 35-37, 41. For the concept of a visual space, see PI 398-402.
dualism within the dualist conceptual framework, the “solution” only absolutizes one of the opposites and does not overcome the assumptions that gave rise to the dualism in the first place. These two problems entail that dualism can overcome only by theories like relationalism that do not absolutize different aspects into binary oppositions.278

Hamann’s strategy for overcoming the dualisms of the philosophical tradition is based on a critique of language. Helmut Hein279 compares Hamann’s metacritique with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s critique of Enlightenment philosophy. The typical dualisms of modern thought are constructed by detaching and abstracting expressions out of their language use, defining different aspects of a phenomenon to be opposite to each other and objectifying these concepts to opposite spheres of reality, thus taking “words for concepts and concepts for things themselves.”280 Hamann and Wittgenstein counter this tendency to objectify abstractions with a grammatical investigation of language. The point of the grammatical investigation is to show that the objectifications and principles go against the necessary conditions of linguistic relationships, or relational conditions.

The key to a grammatical metacritique of philosophy is an emphasis on language use, which Hamann investigates by using the metaphor of a sacrament. Language consists of elements like the word-sign “Let’s play a game of chess!” and institutions, like practices of playing chess. The institution of use connects the meaning of the words “let’s play a game of chess!” with the words themselves and with the object, like the rules of chess. The triadic relationship between signs, objects and meanings only takes place in relationships of action and communication, or forms of life: “The ‘combination’ and the ‘band’ of this triad is a living one only inside specific forms of language and life.”281 Wittgenstein takes up similar themes with his concept of a “language-game”. A language-game is “the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven”, and the “term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of a language is a part of an activity, or a form of life.”282 A language-game contains words, which are interwoven with the objects of language, and activities of language use. For example, the colour-models of a language-game are a part of the language. Language-games are dependent on more fundamental relationships of linguistic activity or “forms of life”.283 Forms of life rest on human nature and contain the realities the words signify. Language-games are also dependent on contexts:

278 Dickson 1995, 13.
280 ZH 5, 264.
282 PI 7, 23, 19.
the game of weighing cheese is dependent on the law of gravity and the causal powers of cheese that make the weight of pieces of cheese stable. If pieces of cheese shrank at random, then our activities of weighing cheese would be pointless. Linguistic concepts are thus located in language-games, which are intertwined with the objects of the world and their relationships. In short, “language ‘embodies’ reality, makes it present, contains it and is contained by it.”

The use of sacramental and game models gives the critique of language a dual focus. Since meaning is based on use, it situates concepts and phenomena in relationships of action, and it forms a foundation of philosophical investigations as grammatical investigations: philosophy is a grammar of our language, knowledge and their underlying relationships. Hamann also argues in the context of the quote about philosophical grammar that philosophical analysis and synthesis aim to clarify the relations underlying a phenomenon, because both function according to similar laws. Analysis must differentiate the interrelated parts (zerglieden) instead of breaking the phenomenon up (zerstören). Synthesis must not confuse things (vermischen), but instead set them together in the correct configuration (zusammensetzen). Philosophical grammar also concerns the necessary conditions of phenomena and language use. For example, language is “the leading necessary condition” for reason, because it is the Organon for knowledge of the true, the good and the beautiful. Hamannian philosophical grammar aims at gaining an overview of relationships underlying phenomena and our concepts. The necessary systemic conditions of these relationships can be investigated and their necessary conditions can be examined. One can define a relational conditions argument as follows:

1. One investigates a relationship R underlying a phenomenon P, and expresses its systematic relationships, constituent parts and functioning as a grammar G(R) of R.
2. One argues that according the grammar G(R), P is possible only, if condition C holds.

Hamannian grammars of language, theology, physical and human phenomena go against the dualistic tendency to define and postulate opposite entities. Hamann claims that “the communication of human and divine attributes is the constitution and master-key of our entire

---

285 PI, ZH 7, 169.
287 I wish to contrast relational arguments from transcendental arguments. Transcendental arguments depend on rational rules set by the subject. Relational arguments depend on the systemic conditions of relationships underlying a phenomenon. For transcendental arguments, see e.g. Taylor 1995, 20-33.
economy and the visible created order.”

288 The concept of communicatio idiomatum is opposite to the concept of a conceptual gap. Communicatio idiomatum is a form of functional intertwining: there is a functional interrelationship R(A,B) so that A functions through B and B functions through A, so that A gains the properties of B and B gains the properties of A. There are various ways for articulating this interdependence. One is to construct a straightforward isomorphism of relationships: whenever a∈A performs the function P, there is also f(a)∈B that performs the function P’ that is constitutive of a’s function P, and vice versa. Another approach would be to use the concept of adjoint functors in category theory: there are structure-preserving back-and-forth morphisms F and G between A and B, so that when R and R’ are relationships in B and S and S’ are relationships in B, f(a)RbR’b’ if and only if aSg(b)S’(b’). Then the “maps A → B are essentially the same thing as maps A → G(B)” or one has a limited isomorphism between the relational structures and whatever can be said of one relational structure can be said of the other as well. Then since R functions through S and vice versa, the relational structures are equivalent and the relationships R and S are two aspects of an underlying phenomenon. Relational arguments thus break down binary oppositions of A and B by highlighting functional relationships R intertwining A and B, and deriving the exchanges of properties between A and B from these interrelationships R.

Music is a case of functional intertwining in relationships.290 The notes (A) are the matter of its music, and the melodies and themes (B) are its meaning and form. The musical themes (B) consist of notes, and the notes (A) only constitute music by being arranged to themes (B). Thus music is a communicatio idiomatum: the matter of the notes is the form of its melodies and vice versa.

Hamann developed a grammatical critique of theodicy in his Antitheodicy Letter to Kant291 that was written in the end of 1759. Hamann’s letter to Kant can be seen as a historical starting point of Hamannian antitheodicy, and Fredrick Beiser shows that it foreshadows many of the themes of Kant’s 1791 Theodicy Essay.292 Hamann first criticizes Kant, who claims that the world is the best possible but not theologically determined. Hamann claims that the best possible world presupposes universal providence, so that all parts of the world are providentially ordered. God is also a proud being, who judges His plans without taking human opinions into account. If a mob of theodicists had attempted to flatter Him with proofs of the goodness of the world, He would

288 N III, 27. The theme of functional intertwining is taken up in Ch. 4.1. and 5.2.
290 Wittgenstein (TLP 4.014, PI 522-523) Poteat (1985) and Appelqvist (2008, 2013) use music as an example of sense-making and different conceptions of logic, see Ch. 2.2,4.2. It can also be used as a test case for functional intertwining (Dickson 1995,293).
291 ZH I, 450-453. The letter is a part of a larger series of letters (448-453).
292 AA 8, 255-275, Beiser 1987. For the lifelong controversy between Hamann and Kant, see Bayer 2002, 21-62.
have to rethink the words “Let there be light!” He makes the distinction of a vain God and a proud one. A vain God creates the world according to human values in order to please, but a proud God lowers Himself to the material world without seeking admirers. The theme of divine condescension is linked with the Christian conception of God and the theology of the Cross, and Hamann poses the theodicist’s problem as a dilemma.293 One can either try to prove that we live in the best possible world, or start with a theological grammar of a Christian conception of God. The first leads to an antitheodicy resembling Kant’s, and the second leads to an antitheodicy based on biblical grammar.

Hamann argues that it is impossible to prove that we live in the best possible world, because we do not have knowledge of the world as a whole – that is, a totalizing theory of the world. Moreover, one cannot appeal to a priori knowledge of God, because attempting to gain knowledge of the intentions and moral nature of God through a priori metaphysics is an extremely proud claim, as if a blind man could gain knowledge by staring at the sun. The claim to have a priori knowledge of God thus oversteps the limits of human reason.294 We cannot thus establish the relationship R(P, W) between the world P and divine wisdom W through metaphysics, because we do not have well-founded empirical concept P of the world or a well-founded a priori concept W of divine wisdom. Hamann thus argues that trying to establish R(P, W) is speculative metaphysics.

Hamann also discusses the theology of divine condescension, which is an explicit antitheodicy. Hamann discusses the presence of God in nature.295 God is present in nature, but He feels strangely absent. The world might feel so meaningless from a first-person point of view that one is either forced to deny the existence of God on moral grounds or become an animal by stepping outside moral language-games.296 This is the general dialect of God’s work, because God is present in natural states of affairs like He is present in the actions of Jesus. For Hamann, the cross of Jesus functions as an authentic antitheodicy, where the Creator interprets His naturally expressed will and reveals His presence in nature through states of affairs that have no morally sufficient reasons. Thus the grammar of biblical stories points to the presence of God in and through evil states of affairs, where divine glory and the evil world are functionally intertwined. To see that this is an antitheodicy and not a traditional theodicy, one has to distinguish between sufficient reasons and meanings. The crucifixion of Jesus certainly didn’t have a morally sufficient reason, because it was a typical political execution of a dissident. The Gospel story assigns Jesus’ death a use in Jesus’ messianic fight against evil, and God’s plan (or strategy) to defeat evil. Thus

---

293 For the theology of condescension in Hamann, see Bayer 2012, 78-81.
295 ZH I, 452, N II, 204/H 75, commented in Bayer 2012, 78-81.
296 See Pihlström & Kivistö 2016.
according to the Gospels, the death of Jesus is not meaningless, because it symbolizes the victory of
God by enacting and embodying divine action: “It was to become the symbol, because it would be
the means, of the victory of God.” Therefore biblical grammar has to distinguish divine action
and meaningfulness from sufficient reasons. These themes will be taken up in Ch. 6.

Perhaps the sharpest conceptual antitheodicy in recent philosophy has been written by
Bas van Fraassen. His antitheodicy is recognizably Hamannian, as he argues that theodicy
involves just a priori word games as it detaches the concept of God from religious use. He argues
that theodicy arises out of 17th century speculative metaphysics. Early modern philosophers defined
God to be omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent to make His activity transparent to reason.
In effect, God is made to be transparent to reason because He is taken to be an ideal agent who has
an unlimited power to choose states of affairs according to the principle of sufficient reason.
However, such a God has nothing to do with the biblical God of Isaac, Abraham and Jacob, and is
instead a metaphysically constructed idol. The theodicist God is a creation of speculative
metaphysics, which creates a shadowy ersatz reality and a series of insoluble and self-inflicted
puzzles with its abstract conceptual models that are not at all connected with the real world through
experience and definite linguistic practices. As we have seen, Hamann’s Antitheodicy Letter
contains a similar argument, whose outline can be put as the Hamann-van Fraassen dilemma:

1. The concept of God is fixed either through religious language use, or through metaphysics.
2. If the concept of God is fixed through religious language use, theodicism is false.
3. If the concept of God is fixed through metaphysics, it oversteps the limit of reason and language,
   and has no definite content.
4. Theodicism is either false, or it cannot be given a definite content, because it oversteps the limit of
   reason and language.

D. Z. Phillips develops another kind of Hamannian antitheodicy. He claims that Wittgenstein’s
Hamannian approach to philosophical problems has been neglected in the debate about evil, and
this has led to the separation of the more existential general problem from the theoretically

297 Wright 1996, 610, 592-611. The term symbol is here meant in the sense of Hamann’s view of divine action and also
in the sense of the derived concept of language-games and their symbolic and strategic actions. For the theme of
God’s battle with chaos, see Perdue 1991, James 1979. See Ch. 6.
298 van Fraassen 2002. Cf. ZH I, 450-453. The dilemma is taken up in Ch. 6.2.2.
formulated theological problem of evil. As a consequence, theodicism is conceptually confused, because it separates religious language from its use and its relational conditions. Phillips objects to three aspects of the problem: the logical concept of omnipotence, the instrumentalist justifications for evil and the principle of sufficient reason. The logical concept of omnipotence detaches the concept of divine action from language-games that are used to identify God. The justifications for evil fail for the reasons discussed in Ch. 3.1. Making God another agent among agents ties Him to anthropomorphism and the principle of sufficient reason. This does not do justice to religious language. God’s being is instead taken to be His active presence and faithfulness that “cannot (...) be subject to morally sufficient reasons that explain their presence on some occasions and their absence on others”300. Phillips offers an interpretation for religious language by using the mystical theology of Simone Weil. We can sum up the presuppositions of Hamannian antitheodicies:

1. Meaning is based on language use, when word-signs are connected with practices and objects through the institution of use in language-games. Expressions cannot be detached out of the relationships in which they are used and cannot go against their necessary conditions.
2. Language-games contain their objects and intertwine language use with the relationships of the world. The relationships of the world functionally intertwine their different aspects and underlie the phenomena that are investigated in philosophy.
3. Philosophy works by developing a grammar of the relationships underlying the phenomenon in question and then draws out the necessary conditions of these relationships with relational necessary-conditions arguments. Linguistic metacriticism locates our concepts in language-games and develops the grammar of these concepts. Grammars of religious scriptures and practices analyse the meaning of religious expressions by locating them in religious practices and scriptures.
4. The problem of evil is based on dualistic speculative metaphysics. It involves detaching the concept of God from religious practices and also constructing a conceptual gaps between different aspects of reality, e.g. between the world P and the divine will W. The abstraction of concepts and the resulting conceptual gaps go against the grammar of our language-games, theological grammar of religious practices and the grammar of phenomena, whose aspects are functionally intertwined.

3.1.3 Some preliminary arguments for Hamannian antitheodicism

Next I present an outline for an argument for Hamannian antitheodicism by making some comparisons of the different streams of antitheodicy. My main thesis is that Hamannian

300 Phillips 2005, 151.
antitheodicy can serve as a metatheory for Jamesian and Kantian antitheodicies. I argue that Kantian antitheodicism collapses either to Enlightenment theodicism or Hamannian antitheodicism, because it presupposes the fact/value conceptual gap and depends on a view of the nature of reason, which must be examined in the context of locating concepts in their language-games. I also argue that Hamannian antitheodicy can incorporate the key insights of Jamesian antitheodicism. My argument is fundamentally conditional: e.g. if reason is linguistic, then founding antitheodicism on moral rationality presupposes a linguistic critique of moral concepts, which is more fundamental than a moral or metaphilosophical approach to theodicy.

Both Jamesian and Kantian approaches to antitheodicy tend towards transcendental idealism. We have seen that transcendental idealism is a key presupposition of Kantian antitheodicy. Although James criticizes the rationalism implicit in Kant’s fixed categories, the human constitution of empirical reality is also a part of the background of James’ approach.301 James argues that meliorism and pluralism presuppose that the future and the (empirical) world are still in the making, but the human practices of categorization help constitute reality. Different ways of conceptualizing are thus a part of our moral action in the world, which is one of the grounds of a Jamesian antitheodicy. Hamannian antitheodicies instead tend to reject transcendental idealism: both idealism and realism are dependent on the subject/object split and a dualism of reality and language. According to transcendental idealism, language and consciousness are subjectively constituted representations of an objective world, and human concepts impose form and order on the matter of the world. Hamannian views instead intertwine the subject and the object as well as concepts, sensations and objects in language-games. Language mediates contact with an independent reality, but the mediated reality is also interpreted in our language.302 The objectivity of concepts will be discussed in Ch. 4.

Two points can be raised against Kantian antitheodicy. First, it presupposes an is/ought dualism of facts and values, as it places facts in empirical reality and values in a rational ideal world. If the is/ought dualism is a central presupposition of theodicism, then Kantian critiques of theodist arguments could collapse either to atheist phenomenalism or rationalist theodicies. Second, Kantian antitheodicy presupposes rational moral and metaphilosophical grounds. If reason

---

301 Pihlström 2013, 99-127, James 1975, 115-144 (Pragmatism 7-8).
is based on language, then Kantian antitheodicy must be based on a more fundamental investigation of religious and philosophical language use.\textsuperscript{303}

Kantian antitheodicies are composed out of three parts:

1. Transcendental idealism is used to theoretically distinguish the world of empirical phenomena P from the intellectual and moral world W.
2. The modern is/ought gap is reinterpreted in the terms of the conceptual dualism of empirical phenomena P and the intellectual world W.
3. The phenomenal world P and the moral-intellectual world have been constituted by the rational person, and the architectonic unity of reason holds them together and constitutes their limits.

Kant’s antitheodicy is thus based on reinterpreting the fact/value conceptual gap in terms of his transcendental idealism, which is a synthesis of Continental rationalism and sceptical empiricism. Kant therefore does not overcome the is/ought gap. He instead just assigns facts to the sensible and values to the intellectual world, and fixes their limits by appealing to the constitution of the moral subject and the resulting architectonic of reason. Hamann makes three important points about the synthesis: it tends to include both the sceptical-materialist and dogmatic-rationalist tendencies and principles as limited parts of an overall system. Second, Kant interprets the phenomenal world in Humean and materialist terms so that meaning and God are separated from the empirical world. Third, God and meaning are transferred into the ideal world by turning them into a limit of reason. Thus “God does not reveal himself in the world”, when their intertwining is key for overcoming the God/world dualism. Hamann even straightforwardly charges Kant of atheism.\textsuperscript{304}

The Neimanian and Hamannian points can be put as a dilemma. Sensible phenomena and the values of reason have been defined as separate. If Kantian antitheodicy bases its arguments against theodicism in principles derived from the senses, it ends up in a positivist-style phenomenalist atheism, because the meaning of the world and divine presence are not parts of the world of evil phenomena. Levinas and his followers end up following this horn of the dilemma:

\textsuperscript{303} See Neiman 2015, 57-84. Pihlström and Kivistö base Kantian antitheodicy on moral practices (2016).
there is no meaning in first-person suffering, so attempts to find meaning through e.g. theodicies or the grand narratives of the religions must be rejected.305

The other possible starting point for Kantian critiques of theodicism is the rational world: God reveals His will morally through Job’s honesty, and moral action is possible only if it is possible to believe that God exists and virtue is rewarded in the end. This horn of the dilemma is taken by Kant, and it leads right into rationalist theodicism.306 To offer room for faith in the Kantian system one has to show that we can think that God, freedom and immortality exist.307 Showing this possibility however requires that we can show how God and future justice are logically compatible with phenomenal evil. Thus the rationalist version of Kantian antitheodicy has to produce a defence showing, how future divine justice and phenomenal evil are compatible.

Kant’s approach to antitheodicy thus mirrors his approach to other antinomies of reason in the Transcendental Dialectics: certain principles are assigned to the empirical and others are assigned to the intellectual world, and they function as limited parts of the overall system.308 This means that Kantian antigod theicists will have to appeal to either atheist empiricist or speculative theistic principles in criticizing theodistic arguments, because the fact/value dualism has been built into Kant’s system. Moreover, the motivation for taking either approach is often moral: Kant attempts to create room for moral faith, and Levinas wants to recognize the suffering person.309 The primacy of ethics in metaphysics arises, because Kant limits contrasting but dualistic principles by drawing metaphilosophical principles from the unity of reason constituted by the moral subject.310

Kant’s antitheodicy is thus dependent on moral and metaphilosophical principles like the ethics of recognition and transcendental idealism. Manfred Kuehn interprets Hamann’s metacritique of Kant’s moral philosophy.311 Hamann took Kant’s moral philosophy to be just another form of Continental rationalism, and his critiques of Moses Mendelssohn also extend to Kant. Hamann’s fundamental idea is to extend the linguistic critique of reason to cover practical reason as well. Hamann rejects the concept of “good will” as a pseudo-concept like “pure reason”: “Pure reason and good will are still nothing but words for me, and I can’t form a concept of them

---

305 See Pihlström & Kivistö 2016.
306 Pihlström and Kivistö (2016, 47-48) discuss similar views that have been presented by Johannes Brachtendorff. Brachtendorff claims that Kant attempts to ground theodicism in practical reason.
307 KrV B XXVI-XXX.
309 See Neiman 2015, 3-4.
310 For the centrality of the unity of reason and the moral subject in Kantian antitheodicy, see Rossi 2010.
through my senses, and have no implicit faith in philosophy”.\textsuperscript{312} He argues that these concepts just continue Kant’s abstraction of rational concepts into the realm of ethics. They detach expressions from ordinary moral language, which is the foundation of our moral concepts and moral reason. Moral philosophy should instead aim at a grammar of moral language-games and relationships: “Thinking means the construction of concepts, and morality is nothing but a syntax.”\textsuperscript{313}

Hamann emphasizes the correct use of language in ethics, and language use is correct by being faithful. Kuehn argues that this leads Hamann straight into fideism, but the Hamannian concept of faith is fundamentally a recognition of others in relationships. We can e.g. recognize the suffering of others, the presence of God, legitimate social institutions or the rationality of the natural order, and these have ethical implications.\textsuperscript{314} The emphasis on faithful responses in fact locates Hamann in the tradition of biblical virtue ethics, where a good act proceeds from a practice or habit that is a good response to the orders of creation and the human situation. Hamann criticizes Kant’s dualisms of empirical acts and rational maxims from this perspective. Acts are fundamental ethical judgments, because a particular act belongs to an ethical institution constituted by a practice. The practice is then a response to the relationships of the human condition, and is correct to the extent it can recognize reality.\textsuperscript{315} Moral language and norms are then based on these language-games of virtues, and cannot be abstracted from them.

Hamann’s critique of language also gives a ground for a pragmatic critique of metaphysics. Hamann argues that abstract general ideas are in the end particular and concrete ones, because the meaning of an expression consists of the connection of a word-sign to concrete and practical cases through use.\textsuperscript{316} James’ pragmatic maxim defines the meaning of a word in terms of the experiences, possible reactions we can expect from an object and practical values we can fulfil. We can define the pragmatic maxim and practical consequences of a word in terms of Hamann’s use theory of language. Practical consequences are thus embedded in the relationships of language use and make sense against their background. There are some differences, as Hamann is not a verificationist. He connects senses and language by holding that our language-games are experientially mediated instead of focusing on experiential cash-values.\textsuperscript{317}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{312} ZH 5, 434, Bayer 2002, 47-52.
\item \textsuperscript{313} ZH 5, 51.
\item \textsuperscript{315} Hamann derives moral norms out of the Christian tradition by defining enlightened self-interest to include the love of God and the love of neighbor: “God and my neighbour are therefore a part of my self-knowledge, my self-love.” N I, 302, quoted in Dickson 1995, 340.
\item \textsuperscript{316} N III, 283/ H 205, Bayer 2002, 216-225.
\item \textsuperscript{317} The creditives of language are experience, tradition and use: N III, 284/ H 205, Bayer 2002, 264-279.
\end{itemize}
Bayer discusses Hamann’s view in terms of the semantic triangle of sign, object and meaning (or sign, object and interpretant). The meaning is constituted when the sign is connected with intuitions of the object, which are sensuously mediated practices taking place in forms of life. We can then define e.g. the triad (“Blue”, the concept of blue, looking at blue objects and picking them out by their colour). We can then define the practical consequences of a term: they are the experiences, concrete objects and the responses of reality, with which the term is connected through correct, objective use. The set of possible experiences and reactions can then be defined in terms of the practical intuitions in Hamann’s version of the semantic triangle. More technically, we can take the third term, or the intuitions and forms of life that intertwine the words x with reality, and define the set of practical consequences y from them: \( \text{Practical consequences (x)} = \{ y | \exists z (z \text{ is a sensuous practice containing } y & z \text{ connects } x \text{ with } y) \} \).

I argue that that although Kantian and Hamannian antitheodicies have roots in the Antitheodicy Letter, the grammatical critique of dualisms and the detachment of concepts from their context of use goes deeper than Kant’s approach. Hamannian antitheodicy can also incorporate key insights from Jamesian antitheodicies. Therefore Hamannian antitheodicy can be used as a metatheory for Kantian and Jamesian approaches. We have seen that Hamannian antitheodicy incorporates elements from James’ pragmatic critique of metaphysics as well as his views of values as a ground of habits that arise from the human condition. The Hamannian grammatical approach can also accommodate a pluralism about different reasons, relationships and a pluralist concept of God, if grammatical investigations reveal a plurality of relationships, reasons and the view of God as a chessmaster or a victorious warrior. These themes will be taken up in the chapters on the Principle of Sufficient Reason and on theological grammar. Hamannian antitheodicy can only be assessed by examining the presuppositions of theodicism and assessing them in light of the grammar of reason, the grammar of being qua being and the grammar of religious practices:

Metaphysics has the language of its scholasticism and its courts; I am suspicious of both and cannot either understand them or work with them. I almost suspect that our entire philosophy consists more of language than of reason, as the misunderstanding of countless words, the objectification of arbitrary abstractions, the dualisms of Gnostic so-called knowledge and even common metaphors of the sensus

319 PI 33-35.
320 For the Antitheodicy Letter, see ZH 1, 450-453, Beiser 1987. For Hamann as a radicalizer of the Enlightenment critique of reason, see Bayer 2012.
321 I am indebted to Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (2009) for the centrality of the concept of habit in pragmati(ci)sm.
communis have produced a world of questions, whose answers are just as groundless as the questions themselves. We still lack a grammar of reason that could function like the grammar of Scripture, by revealing how its common elements intertwine harmoniously like the strings of the Psalter.\textsuperscript{323}

3.2 Philosophical grammar and grammatical metacritique

The methods of grammatical metacritique can be developed by incorporating insights about philosophical grammar from Wittgenstein and Hamann. These insights can then be formalized and sharpened by using formal tools like mathematical game theory and category theory. The philosophical insights and formal tools can then be used to map the relationships underlying language use and phenomena in reality, and to highlight their necessary conditions. Grammatical investigation into the background assumptions of the problem of evil can then be turned into a Wittgensteinian or Hamannian metacritique of theodicism.

3.2.1 Insights from Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein discusses, how philosophical confusions arise and how they are in the end confusions about grammar:

A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words.—Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexion'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases.

The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things. (Is this a 'Weltanschauung'?\textsuperscript{324})

Three concepts are key for understanding Wittgenstein’s view that philosophical problems arise when we lack a clear Übersicht (overview) of our grammar: the concepts of a language-game, grammar and Übersicht. I will interpret the concept of grammar and link it with the concept of a

\textsuperscript{323} ZH 5, 272.
language-game by using Glock’s dictionary article and Newton Garver’s interpretation that Wittgenstein generalizes the grammatical description of linguistic expressions to cover entire language-games and their concepts.325

Wittgenstein uses the word “grammar” to mean the rules of language use and the investigation of language use and its rules. The concept of a linguistic rule is connected with the concept of a language-game, because languages and games are both guided by rules. A language-game is “the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven”326. The most important point of comparing languages with games is that language use intertwines linguistic expressions, activities and the world. Language-games are embedded in forms of life, or practices like battle reports, questions, descriptions, jokes and acting. Since language-games intertwine words with their objects and practices, grammar describes the intertwining of language and the world.327

Grammar also functions as a logic of our language, because logical rules are based on language use and logic concerns the use of our words: “Am I not getting closer and closer to saying that in the end logic cannot be described? You must look at the practice of language, then you will see it.”328 We can formulate grammars for linguistic expressions like words and sentences, but also for states like pain and processes like thinking and perception. Grammatical rules describe the use of an expression, which then fixes the meaning of the word. Grammatical rules also relate the expression with other expressions, giving it a place in a linguistic system and thus determining its logical relationships. Language use and its grammar then give the logica utens, or the logical rules that are used in the practice of our language.329

The concepts of a rule and of a language-game do not entail that language has fixed rules hidden in the use of words. The distinction between rules and other propositions is instead functional: rules are expressions that are used as standards of sense-making in communicative practices. In PI 81-88, Wittgenstein discusses F. P. Ramsey’s and Peirce’s view of logic as a normative science. He criticizes the idea that there is one final analysis of concepts and the idea that an ideal order inside language gives the conditions for the sufficiency of analysis. There is no system of sufficient grounds (one could almost say: sufficient reasons)330 for analysis, because a

---

325 Glock 1996, 150-155, Garver 1994, 217-234. The point of introducing Wittgenstein is to develop methods for grammatical metacriticism, and my approach can seem eclectic from the point of view of Wittgenstein studies.
326 PI 7. The concept of language-game was already presented in the overview of Hamannian antitheodicism, and it will be investigated more thoroughly in Ch. 4.1.
327 PI 7, 19, 23, Baker 2004, 62-64, Glock 1996, 150-155, 193-198. See also Ch. 3.1.2.3.
328 OC 501. The same point arises in Luther and Hamann: see Metzke 1948, Bayer 2002, 313-382, N III, 286/H 211.
330 Ideal languages can indeed be seen as an application of PSR into language: language has a hidden order of rules of reason that constitute its meaning. Therefore language is reducible to reason and representation. Both ideas were of
Cartesian sceptic can always ask for more clarification. The ideal language theorist’s presupposition of an order of sufficient linguistic reasons thus leads to an infinite regress. Wittgenstein compares a rule with a sign-post and with criteria of precision. A sign-post need not convince a Cartesian sceptic, but it functions well if it can be used as a guide in normal situations. Similarly, the standards of precision are relative to their purpose. Linguistic rules and explanations are similarly used to remove misunderstandings, and their precision is constituted by their goal of removing communicative misunderstandings. The normativity of linguistic rules is thus communicative.331

Philosophical grammar is the description of our language use and its rules for philosophical purposes. Wittgenstein once responded to Moore that his concept of grammar expands the everyday and scientific concept of grammar.332 Linguistic grammar describes the use of signs in a language and is particular to the language in question. One can also speak of grammar in general linguistics or philosophical grammar, but linguistic categories are always relative to particular languages and depend on them.333 Therefore linguistics is a science of grammars and the rules of linguistics determine how to construct and compare grammars of particular languages.

Garver describes how linguistics studies the phonology or sound patterns of language use. A phoneme is a sound of language, and they can be considered to be among the signs or elements of language.334 The elements and their significance are dependent on the institutions of language, or its use. For example, a Westerner can easily distinguish between the words “Pepsi” and “Bepsi”, because Indo-European languages distinguish between B and P. This is not true of Arabic, which treats B and P as equivalent. The signs of language are not reducible to their material make-up, because identifying them requires distinguishing between different uses of material constituent parts in a system. Thus differences among different expressions and other elements are constituted by the institutions of language use and rules of language, which determine their place in a system. We can then almost speak of a system of differences or a space of linguistic elements, whose structure of differences and thus their identities has been constituted by their institution or use in the system of language.335

course pioneered by G. W. Leibniz, who defined both language and the world in terms of a calculation. The world is a divine calculation and the ideal language is a calculus ratiocinator. See Heidegger 1971, 167-170/1996, Ch. 9.
332 Garver 1994, 221-224.
333 Hamann claims the same of metaphysical categories: see ZH 7, 169, Betz 2009, 242-248, see also Ch. 4.
335 The background for elements-identified-by-system and their use are the discussion of modern facts in Ch. 2.2.4.1, Floridi 2010 and Hamann’s first draft of the Metacritique (Bayer 2002, 155-175). See Ch. 5.1.
Grammar also operates at different levels of elements. One can chart the institutions and uses of phonemes or sound-signs, words, sentences and speech acts. Expressions at each level are not just collections of expressions at the lower levels, but are instead determined and constituted by the form of communicative use. Grammar then describes the construction of expressions by a structure of contrasts, physical arrangements and transformations, and their meaning by revealing their uses, conceptual contrasts and inclusions. Garver argues that Wittgenstein just expands the grammatical description of language to the level of speech acts and entire language-games. Philosophical grammar thus describes language at the level of the use of our words in our practices, just like linguistic grammar describes their syntax. Philosophical grammar is general, because language-games have similarities due to human nature and facts about the world. Glock makes a similar point: surface grammar studies the structures of expressions, but philosophical depth grammar explores the logical relationships and possible combination of moves in language-games to establish a map of uses for philosophical purposes.

PI 122 argues that an overview of grammar maps the connection between concepts and the uses of words. Baker notes that Wittgenstein links the concept of overview or Übersicht with the concepts of a form of representation and of seeing connections and intermediate cases. Baker argues that the “bird’s eye view” of übersichtlich representations as either clearly presented sets of grammatical rules or their accessible models does not capture Wittgenstein’s view. The goal of übersichtlich representations is to highlight relationships of meaning and use by contrasting them with alternatives or by forming simple forms of language that can be embedded into more complex uses. Wittgenstein takes the one over many problem as an example. The sentence “The rose is red” can either be juxtaposed with \( \text{rose} \in \text{red} \) and \( \text{rose} = \text{red} \). Comparing the sentence “The rose is red” with sentences from two invented language-games offers two different ways of interpreting the sentence and thus offer two alternative aspects of the grammar of the sentence, or ways of looking at it. This makes it possible to draw distinctions between different uses of “is” and helps to dissolve or at least understand the problem of one over many. Drawing comparisons with different language-games also presupposes that one can invent new languages and compare the concepts in different languages. The invented new forms of language can be embedded on more

339 For Tarski’s model-theoretic concept of truth, see Hodges 1997, 24, 30. The equivalent game-theoretic concept is discussed in Ch. 4.1. For theories as maps, see Ziman 2000, 126-132.
340 Hintikka (1986) claims that Wittgenstein and the German hermeneutic tradition are committed to the view that one cannot speak about the meanings of a language, since one cannot get outside one’s language to compare it with reality or with other languages. For a refutation of Hintikka’s interpretation, see Ch. 4.2.4. See also PI 130, ZH 7, 158.
complex language-games, or contrasted with them. The language-game (2) of PI 2 is isomorphic to fragments or subsystems of more complex language-games as long as the more complex games include reference, so it can be embedded onto referential language-games.341

The simple language-games are thus the primitive forms of language, and linguistic morphology draws distinctions and points out similarities between structures of language use. These language-games are then individual elements in a space of alternatives, and similarities and differences among the elements of the grammar of language-games are constituted by their uses and structural relationships. Isomorphisms, other mappings of structural similarity, and differences of structures of use are then the comparisons between different forms of languages. The comparisons become übersichtlich when they are used to draw analogies and to point out differences in order to achieve clarity regarding the relationships of our language use. The clarity of grammatical representations is communicative, and each new comparison opens a new aspect or new way of looking at things by highlighting certain features of our language use.342

Wittgenstein also contrasts the search for the essence of language by gaining an overview of use with the metaphysical use of words. An overview attempts to read the structure of language off language use, but speculative metaphysics attempts to find an order hidden behind the communicative use of language. Thomas Wallgren identifies Wittgenstein’s target as a philosophy that aims at an access to a Platonic ideal foundation for our language that gives us certain and universal knowledge.343 Wittgenstein uses the Tractatus as an example of the metaphysical use of language, which is in fact based on misunderstanding of figures of speech and analogies between linguistic forms.344 The Tractatus offers an order of meanings, possibilities and essences that are hidden in language. He diagnoses the fundamental mistake of the Tractatus: “We predicate of the thing what lies in the method of representing it. Impressed by the possibility of a comparison, we think we are perceiving a state of affairs of the highest generality.”345 Wittgenstein uses the word “thing” to mean reality, “the method of representation” to mean language and “state of affairs of highest generality” to mean the form of logical picturing. This involves two mistakes. First, words like “knowledge”, “self”, “proposition” and “name” are objectified to a “super-order of super-concepts”, which must correspond to the world so that the correspondence between language and the world is possible. Second, language itself is reduced to an order of formal super-concepts. Thus,
philosophers “take words for concepts and concepts for things”\textsuperscript{346} and attempt to construct an ideal language from the ideal conceptual order. This linguistic confusion is based on detaching expressions from the language-games in which they are used.\textsuperscript{347}

Wittgenstein argues that philosophy should instead get an overview of ordinary language and see, how ordinary language reveals essences. Garver argues that Wittgenstein’s method of language-games is a continuation of Aristotle’s metaphysical category theory.\textsuperscript{348} Like Aristotle, Wittgenstein is doing linguistic and conceptual cartography by classifying concepts according to their connections in language use, and basing the study of metaphysical concepts on the grammar of language use. Aristotelian categories are composed of grammatical distinctions just like systems of sound-signs are: they include an array of possible speech acts that are differentiated by their location and relationships in language-games. Thus an Aristotelian category includes elements or objects of linguistic acts and signs differentiated by their roles in language, and institutions or possible transformations of speech acts that are given by language use and its rules. Garver takes the language-game of predication as a special case of linguistic categories. Making truth-claims about individual objects is a subclass of speech acts or language-games, and in fact it corresponds to the language-game of PI 2 that can be embedded into more complex language-games. These simple truth-claims about objects are just one type of language use, and they can be contrasted with other uses like orders, plays, songs, jokes and curses, which are not reducible to making truth-claims at all.\textsuperscript{349}

Aristotle’s categories are types of predication-acts that are differentiated according to their discourse possibilities, or possibilities of using the speech act to answer certain kinds of questions, draw certain kinds of inferences, offer certain kinds of definitions or generally capabilities to being put to a given type of use U in the speech-situation s. For example, the category of substance consists of those terms that cannot be said to depend on some other subject, cannot be predicated of other subjects and are the ultimate bearers of predicates.\textsuperscript{350} Garver classifies categories as types of possible answers to questions. For example, substance does not allow for degrees, so it is not possible to ask or answer the question “Is Viiru more of a cat than Tassu?” because Viiru and Tassu are both cats and “cat” belongs to the category of substance. Then a category C is defined in terms of the questions Q it allows or disallows in a speech situation s.\textsuperscript{351}

\textsuperscript{346} ZH 5, 254.
\textsuperscript{347} PI 95, 116. See also N III, 289/ Haynes 2007, 217, Bayer 2002, 342-350.
\textsuperscript{348} Garver 1994, 61-72, PI 92, 371-373. The idea of language-games as metaphysical categories is developed in Ch. 4.3.
\textsuperscript{349} PI 2, Baker 2004, 22-12. See PI 23.
\textsuperscript{350} Cat., 9-14.
\textsuperscript{351} Garver 1994, pp. 62-66.
Wittgenstein does not use the term “category” except in a few places, but language-games function as systems of discourse possibilities and as a ground for ontological classifications. The list of language-games is open-ended, and talk about games as categories emphasizes that the discourse possibilities are rooted in action. As we have seen, grammar is the description of language-games and their discourse possibilities. Grammar also grounds metaphysics, because discourse possibilities classify terms and the objects that are intertwined with them and grammar gives an overview of discourse possibilities. Garver quotes PI 304 that grammar determines the use-conditions for terms “something” and “nothing” – i.e. the quantifiers “some” (∃) and “all” (∀)352:

"And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a nothing."—Not at all. It is not a something, but not a nothing either! The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here."353

Wittgenstein’s notes are connected with the private language argument, which is a relational argument for the claim that identification of logically private entities is not possible, because logically private entities cannot be parts of linguistic relationships that are based on communicative and hence in principle non-private use.354 Since private sensations cannot be identified, they cannot be values of quantifiers “there is” and “all” and quantifying over them is a category mistake. Therefore identification, the interpretation of the terms “there is” and “all”, and the categories of ontological classification are rooted in language-games and expressed by their grammar.

Garver uses emotions as an example of how types of entities and processes can be classified and described by describing the grammatical rules of language-games in which they are a part of and in which we refer to them.355 Emotions have a duration, a course and they are not located in bodily parts or in relation to our surroundings. They are associated with expressions, but do not give information about the world. For example, a feeling of joy can be either momentary and very strong, or a lasting state of everyday ordinary happiness. Another example of a grammatical rule that characterizes a type of entity is the rule that all pains have a place in the body. For example, a toothache is located in a rotten tooth. This stands in contrast to the dualist view that the categories of body and mind are disjoint and opposite, so that there is a conceptual gap between them. These linguistic connections instead point to links between bodily states and sensations, so

352 Garver 1994, 68-72, PI 371-373. For language-games for “some” and “all”, see Hintikka 1973, Ch. 4.1.
353 PI 304.
354 Norman Malcolm (1986) offers a similar interpretation of the Private Language Argument by emphasizing communicative use.
355 Garver 1994, 70-72. See Descartes (Meditations)
that one must talk about bodily sensations. These classifications, their conceptual links, possibilities of comparing states and the spaces of metaphysical possibilities are constituted by the structure of speech acts, justifications and comparisons in our language-games and express their structure as categories. Wittgenstein describes essence in terms of grammar:

*Essence* is expressed by grammar.

Consider: "The only correlate in language to an intrinsic necessity is an arbitrary rule. It is the only thing which one can milk out of this intrinsic necessity into a proposition."

Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar.) \(^{356}\)

Garver’s and Wittgenstein’s examples shed light to what grammatical essences are. In metaphysics, essences are taken to be the permanent conditions, features, structures and habits that constitute its permanence in time and identity across alternative possibilities. \(^{357}\) Essences thus consist of links between different states of objects, its properties in different possible situations and the collection of facts in which the object stands. An essence must determine the state-description of an object \(O\) in the situation \(s\) by specifying the connection of facts in which \(O\) stands in \(s\). It also must establish a world-line or a function \(f\) for identifying and constituting the object \(O\) across possible situations \(s\). \(^{358}\) Essential conditions allow us to identify and reidentify objects, so appeal to the essence of \(X\) is an answer to the question “What is \(X\)?” Wittgenstein locates these conditions in the grammar and the discourse possibilities related to \(X\). Therefore grammatical discourse and identification possibilities ground metaphysics, and the exploration of essences is the exploration of grammatical connections. For example, grammatical sentences point out the different qualities a mental state could simultaneously have (vividness, phenomenal feel, …) by identifying their relevant discourse possibilities. They also point out possible principles of continuity by referring to the duration of an emotion and its possible course. Moreover, empirical investigations of \(X\) presuppose the grammar of \(X\), because one has to identify \(X\) in order to experience or gather and interpret data about it. \(^{359}\)

Wittgenstein argues in PI 372 that grammatical rules reflect intrinsic necessities, while they are arbitrary and autonomous at the same time. One way of putting this is that a grammatical rule that connects the expressions “\(A\)” and “\(B\)”, "\(A\) → "\(B\)" can in principle have use-mediated

---

356 PI 371-373. Cf. ZH 7, 169. For an account of categories, see Ch. 4.3. For a development of the idea of categorization of objects in terms of identification, see Ch. 5.1.


358 The background for this characterization is Strawson (1959), Floridi (2010), Plantinga (1974) and Hintikka (1969).

similarities of structure or even isomorphisms between the grammatical structures "A" → "B" and a real connection \( A \rightarrow B \) (e.g. a causal power) connecting the entities, events or states of affairs \( A \) and \( B \) that are intertwined with “A” and “B” through use. The grammatical rule can then be seen to symbolize some real connection that is a part of our language-games.\(^{360}\) Garver raises a number of problems about the relationship between grammar and metaphysics that are related to the simultaneous autonomy and determinacy of grammar. First, how can grammatical rules be both natural and transcendental at the same time? This would entail that they are at the same time linguistically necessary but absolutely contingent. Second, how can arbitrary and normative rules of grammar be parts of the empirical world? Grammar is dependent on language-games that are primary over their rules, so taking some facts about social life or language use to be rules involves seeing them as a part of a practice or in its context. Third, language use already presupposes a world, so grammatical description could be laden with metaphysical theory.\(^{361}\) Hamann discusses the intertwining of signs and the world, receptivity and autonomy, transcendental ideality and empirical reality and of necessity and contingency in the relationships of language use. We must now turn to examine Hamann’s metacritical philosophy to gain an overview of these issues.

3.2.2 Insights from Hamann

Hamann motivates his grammatical approach to philosophy by pointing out the priority of language over reason: “I have given up these investigations (of reason) due to their difficulty, and concentrate now on the visible element, its Organon and Criterion – that is, language. No word, no reason – no world. This is the source of creation and providence.”\(^{362}\) Hamann here alludes to his view that reality is a divine Word, but he uses the analogy with divine communication through creatures to imply that reason is fundamentally linguistic. The claim that language is the Organon of reason means that reason cannot operate without language, because language is a necessary condition for

\(^{360}\) The idea will be formalized and made precise in Ch. 4.2.3 by using category theory. My proposed interpretation goes against the standard Baker/Hacker interpretation (e.g. Glock 1996, Baker & Hacker 1985) that claims that there is a binary opposition grammar/world in Wittgenstein. Thomas Wallgren (2006, 391-399) rightly criticizes the interpretation by pointing out that PI 371 does not reduce essences to grammar. He also points out that the question of conventionalism reduces to the question, whether the rules of language-games can be explained with or reduced to a combination of constitutive facts of nature and the purposes or final causes of language-games. We can also assess our conventions by appealing to values. The debate looks like a false dilemma: language is conventional and objective at the same time. See N III, 287-288/H, 213-214, Bayer 2002, 351-361, 381-387.

\(^{361}\) Garver 1994, 217-235.

\(^{362}\) ZH 5, 95.
conceptual relationships. The claim that language is the Criterion of reason means that reason cannot become articulate or make coherent sense without language, because comparing concepts and judging with them takes place in language.\(^{363}\) Language is thus not a tool of pre-linguistic reason, but instead its necessary relational condition. Hamann discusses the role of linguistic signs as necessary conditions of reason in his first draft of the \textit{Metakritik}\(^{364}\).

\begin{quote}

\textit{Reason without experience} seems to be just so impossible as \textit{reason} without \textit{language}.

\textit{Tradition} and \textit{language} are the true elements of reason. \textit{Phonemes and letters} are the necessary condition of all relationships, where concepts can be intuited, grasped and compared. (They have empirical but not absolute reality, instead they have a transcendental ideality = 0.)

All spoken and written signs have an empirical reality with regard to their matter; but they have a transcendental ideality with regard to their form or meaning, and their universality as well as necessity depends on tradition, as does its contingent limitation from arbitrary use.\(^{365}\)
\end{quote}

Hamann is here examining the necessary conditions of relationships for concepts in order to criticize Kant’s transcendental idealism. We have defined a relational conditions argument to investigate the relationship R underlying a phenomenon P and then drawing a conclusion C about the necessary conditions of the relationship. Here Hamann argues that phonemes and letters are a necessary condition of concepts (conclusion C), because traditions and arbitrary use (relationship R) constitute the concepts that are their meanings (phenomenon P). Moreover, language and experience are necessary conditions of reason (conclusion C’), because phonemes and letters (phenomenon P’) are experiential signs that are identified and meaningful through language use (relationship R). The argument thus establishes that language is the Organon of reason.\(^{366}\)

The relational argument establishes both the claim that language is as the Criterion of reason. The role of language as a Criterion of reason also entails that it is language that allows for conceptual elucidation, comparison and criticism. “Intuition” or grasping of concepts here means comparison of concepts and applying them of objects. Language is the necessary condition for comparing concepts and making sense (conclusion C’’), because linguistic expressions and their use

\(^{363}\) Dickson 1995, 284, Bayer 2002, 264-279. Cf PI 329: “When I think in language, there aren’t ‘meanings’ going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought.”

\(^{364}\) Hamann’s draft \textit{A} is published in Bayer 2002, 157-158.


(relationship $R''$) offer discourse possibilities for applying and comparing concepts (phenomenon $P''$). These arguments are examples of how philosophical grammar first charts the relationships of language use and the phenomena with which they are intertwined, and then draws the necessary conditions of these relationships. Since reason is linguistic, examination of the concepts of reason becomes grammatical exploration of language use and its necessary conditions.\textsuperscript{367}

Hamann links the topics of the intertwining of different aspects of language and reality, philosophical grammar, the status of abstract concepts and the problem of realism in a pair of letters to Jacobi written around the Easter of 1787.\textsuperscript{368} These letters provide good material for interpreting Hamann’s philosophy, as they are not written in a deliberately cryptic style and emphasize Hamann’s main points in a dialogue with Jacobi. Hamann criticizes Jacobi’s tendency to found his philosophy on objectified abstractions like being in itself, to split different aspects of human knowledge like the senses and reason, interpretative belief-systems and arguments, and realism and idealism from activities, and also to treat these activities as opposite types of knowledge or even objectify them into faculties.\textsuperscript{369} Hamann takes up the concept of being in itself and asks, if “real existence without things, properties and relationships is possible or thinkable?”\textsuperscript{370} Hamann offers the grammatical method in philosophy as an antidote to “words without concepts and concepts without real objects”:

My dear Pollux, do you understand my principle that reason is linguistic and that like Luther I turn my entire philosophy into a grammar, to a textbook of our knowledge, to an algebra that makes constructions on equations and abstract signs, which mean nothing by themselves and everything possible and actual by analogy?\textsuperscript{371}

Hamann emphasizes his grammatical method in order to uncover the foundations of Jacobi’s abstractions by locating them in language use. Hamann compares philosophical grammar with algebra. He uses another but related metaphor for philosophical grammar in his text on French word order: the theory of commercial exchanges explains language use, as language and money have a

\textsuperscript{367} Bayer 2002, 264-279. Discourse possibilities were discussed in the previous section and in Garver 1994, 61-72.
\textsuperscript{368} ZH 7, 154-160, 161-181. Hamann in fact admits that his writings are often incomprehensible piles of rubbish. The grammatical critique of abstractions takes a dialectical form in the letters, and this bears a striking resemblance to the Philosophical Investigations.
\textsuperscript{370} ZH 7, 165.
\textsuperscript{371} ZH 7, 169.
common foundation. One can make three points. First, grammar is a reinterpretable system that resembles much Hintikka’s view of language as a calculus, but avoids the formalism implicit in it. Hamann explicitly states that grammars are formal systems that can be interpreted on different possible cases, or the actual case. Thus the interpretation of grammars can be changed to compare different uses of language, and Hamann in fact argues that we should develop new languages to correctly symbolize and recreate relationships: “Our concepts of things can be modified with a new language and new signs, which make new relationships present or even reconstruct the oldest, original and true ones.” The difference between Hamannian grammar and Hintikka’s ideal language project is that grammar does not try to detach logical constants from experience, tradition and use in language-games that are prior to the rules for logical constants.372

Second, grammar has a number of basic elements and a system of relationships that corresponds to the functions or morphisms between algebraic elements. Grammar also has rules for performing constructions on the elements and their relationships, so that different more abstract constructions are grounded in grammar and its relationships of language use. The relationships between elements are also constituted by use, just like monetary transactions are constituted by use. One can then use a combination of a theory of monetary exchanges and an abstract algebra of the highest generality to chart language use. Such a combination will then shed light on the games and categories of language use by highlighting the relationships of language use as a system.373 Whereas the rules for the expressions give logica utens or logic in use, these higher-order formal representations of grammar can function as a formal or philosophical logic, or logica docens.374 Hamann continues his exposition of philosophical grammar to discuss philosophical analysis and synthesis, and gives a system-theoretic view of it375:

Analysis and synthesis must take place according to similar laws. Analysis must not destroy, but instead distinguish between the parts. Synthesis must not confuse them, but instead put them together. Both must follow the markers and the laws of nature and its generation, whose imitation and makeup must be the standard of science.376

372 N II, 129/ Haynes 2007, 22. Hintikka 1997. See PI 120. The quote comes from ZH 7, 156. Language has a role in upholding the relationships of creation in wisdom theology: see Perdue 1991. The primacy of language-games over their rules is discussed in Ch. 4.2.4.
373 See Ch. 4.1 for connecting language-game theory and mathematical category theory. The connection of language-games and categories arises in a metaphysical setting in Garver (1994, 61-72).
374 The distinction of used and formal logic comes from Peirce (EP 2, 524). Here I’m answering Pietarinen’s criticisms.
376 ZH 7, 169-170.
Hamann argues elsewhere that a unity should underlie our concepts, and distinctions like realism and idealism exist only for the purposes of definition.\(^{377}\) Thus analysis must identify the elements or functional parts of a system of relationships through their interactions in their context. It must not set up conceptual gaps between them by defining them as opposite, because that would destroy the natural relationships between things. Similarly, synthesis must locate the elements or parts in the relationships and institutions of the system, which constitute the ways of functioning of the elements. The relationships are systematic properties, relationships and ways of acting in the context of the system. Synthesis must not collapse entities or their relationships into each other, so a reductionism that first establishes conceptual gaps and then reduces one of the aspects of the relational system to the other is confused. For example, creating an opposition between a perfect God and an evil world and then reducing the imperfect world to the perfect God by appealing to the principle of sufficient reason is a case of metaphysical confusion. Both analysis and synthesis must take into account natural laws, causal powers, divine ideas and other powers that act in the system through the elements and interact in the context of its rules like laws of nature.\(^{378}\)

Third, Hamannian philosophical grammar is theory-laden, as it is system-theoretic and accounting for a system requires interpreting it. Here Hamann differs from Wittgenstein, who distinguishes grammar from theory. Wittgenstein seems to argue that philosophical grammar just describes language in a deflationary manner that reminds of the Enlightenment dream of encountering reality through a non-theoretic interpretation: “And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place.”\(^{379}\) Garver rightly notes that this position is problematic. Grammar must take theoretical interpretations into account, because grammatical relationships include and presuppose the world. Hamann instead argues that philosophical grammar must take the scientists’ grammar of nature, historians’ grammar of human action and a theological grammar of Scripture into account and to interpret these scientific and hermeneutical interpretations. Physics describes the elements and laws of nature, history describes the elements of

---

\(^ {377}\) ZH 7, 165.

\(^ {378}\) This presentation of philosophical grammar has a background in Hamann’s sacramental view of language, and divine action as speech to creatures through creatures. An object or a fact is an element, it has a context of relationships and interactions, and it makes a divine idea or a causal power present. See Bayer 2002, 322-324, 374-396. Another background is the formal machinery if strategies and interactions in game theory, and relational arrows between things in category theory. See Chs. 4.1 and 5.1.2 for an explication.

human acts and social institutions, and theology interprets them in religious terms. Thus the elements on the one hand, and the laws, institutions and actions on the other hand, must be identified and interpreted in a theory- and paradigm-laden metalanguage.\textsuperscript{380}

Hamann also takes up the theme that linguistic use is empirically real and transcendentally ideal, and that conceptual necessity is contingent at the same time. He uses the Christological concept of communicatio idiomatum to articulate the intertwining of the empirical and the transcendental, necessity and contingency, matter and form, the body and the mind, reason and the senses and God and the world.\textsuperscript{381} Haynes gives the definition of the theological concept of communicatio idiomatum: although the divine and human natures of Christ are (at least conceptually) separate, their union in the person of Jesus Christ gives a ground for predicating everything that holds from the divine nature from the human nature, and vice versa.\textsuperscript{382} The concept of communicatio idiomatum can be generalized into holding of systems of relationships by defining it as a kind of functional intertwining: the system S can be partitioned into A and B, the relational structures P in A and Q in B are essentially the same in the sense of structural isomorphism, and the relationships P of A function through Q in B and vice versa in virtue of the systematic relationships of S. Then A has all the relevant structural and functional properties of B, and vice versa.

Hamann argues that the communication of attributes is the leading motive of his critique both of natural religion and of Kant’s transcendental philosophy.\textsuperscript{383} Hamann defines his alternative to both the modern subject/object binary opposition and the resulting problem of realism, and other binary oppositions like the mind/body, mind/senses, material/spiritual and also fact/meaning and fact/value. He calls it “verbalism” or “nominalism-verbalism” in order to emphasize the communication of attributes, language use and the analogy of language use with divine communication that are main ideas of his work: “Abstract and concrete amount to the same thing. Verbalism or Figurism! The same transmission of functions and communicatio idiomatum of spirit and matter, the spatial and the mental, the body and thoughts.”\textsuperscript{384} He also argues that “\textit{relationality} is the true principle of language and reason, through which sensations and

\textsuperscript{381} Bayer 2002, 170-175, 351-361. For a development of the theme of functional intertwining, see Chs. 4.1 and 5.2.2.
\textsuperscript{382} N III, 27/Haynes 2007, 99: “This \textit{communicatio} of divine and human \textit{idiomatum} is a fundamental law and the master-key of all our knowledge and of the whole visible economy.”
\textsuperscript{383} ZH 7, 156, Bayer 2002, 26-35.
\textsuperscript{384} ZH 7, 158.
conceptions are modified”, since the process of knowing depends on both receiving information from objects through the senses, and interpreting them through autonomous concepts.\(^{385}\)

Hamann applies the concept of communicatio idiomatum to the relationship of empirically real linguistic expressions and transcendentally ideal concepts in his Draft.\(^{386}\) Empirical words are used in certain ways and thus function as meaningful concepts through use, and rational concepts function as empirical words when they are applied to objects and compared through use. Thus the relationship of use intertwines empirical expressions and rational concepts. Hamann thus uses the use theory of meaning to reinterpret Kant’s concepts and to point out that linguistic concepts are nothing in themselves, but have a value only through communicative use. He writes to Jacobi of “the postulation of existence in itself – the most abstract relationship, which does not deserve to be counted among things, not to speak to take for a particular thing”. These terms must not be detached from language use, as language intertwines them with senses and the objects that are accessed through the senses and bodily practices. Neither senses nor reason can then be pure or autonomous, as these relationships of functional intertwining determine both reciprocally.

The intertwining of natural and empirically real expressions with transcendentally ideal concepts and their necessity in language use thus helps to solve Garver’s paradoxes.\(^{387}\) Because expressions and their real connection with the empirical objects of the natural world are intertwined with the ideals of reason, our linguistic practices and their conceptual rules are both empirically real (or natural) and transcendentally ideal at the same time. The connection between expression and its meaning or form is not necessary at all. Thus the necessity of concepts is also a posteriori and absolutely contingent, as it is based on autonomous and arbitrary language use. This requires a different concept of necessity than those found in the philosophical tradition, e.g. in Kant. Such a concept of tradition-based necessity could be formulated as functions determined by tradition. If a traditionally constituted language-game has a rule f such that the situation x must be connected with the situation f(x), then the connection x \(\rightarrow\) f (x) is necessary. For example, the use of the expression “bachelor” is connected with the expression “unmarried” through linguistic rules. This necessity is however based on the autonomous and arbitrary use of words. Hamann also defines matter and form in terms of uses in a communicative system. The matter of a linguistic system is its elements like linguistic signs and speech acts. The form of a system like language is the relationships that constitute its functioning, like language use, meaning and the rules of

\(^{385}\) ZH 7, 174, Dickson 1995, 339-347.

\(^{386}\) Bayer 2002, 156-157, 167-173. The argument is taken up in Ch. 4.2.1.

linguistic action. Moreover, matter and form are functionally intertwined in the system of a language-game, which is logically prior to its rules. Hamann captures all of these aspects with the metaphor of “sacrament of language, the letter of its elements, the spirit of its institution.”

The theme of the communicative form of language and its determination by tradition and arbitrary use opens the problem of conventionalism, as it does in Wittgenstein. We have seen that in Wittgenstein the question hinges upon, whether we can determine the rules of our language-games by appealing to facts of nature and the purposes and final causes of our language-games. The point of the autonomy of grammar is that there is no extra-linguistic ground of sufficient reasons like Platonic Ideas or prelinguistic transcendental concepts that would wholly determine language. It is thus an argument against ideal languages and sufficient reasons for language, not for Kant-style conceptual idealism or a strong language/world dualism. In fact, the problem of conventionalism can be formulated: What is the ground of the rules of our-language-games? Does it connect with reality sufficiently so that language ends up so intertwined with the world that its concepts are receptive or empirical, and spontaneous or arbitrary at the same time? Hamann answers the question implicitly in his view that “the entire faculty of thought is founded on language.” His thesis about the linguistic nature of reason is to be interpreted against its theological background. Nature itself is a linguistic creation of the Word of God, and the human language-games are answers to the address of creation. Both human and divine speech and the relationship of the exchange of words contain their objects and symbolize relationships that are part of language:

Adam was therefore God’s, and God himself brought the first-begotten and oldest of our race as the feudal tenant and heir of the world set in order by the word of his mouth (…) – Every phenomenon of nature was a word, - the sign, symbol and pledge of a new, secret, inexpressible but all the more fervent union, fellowship and communion of divine energies and ideas. All that man heard at the beginning, saw with his eyes, looked upon and his hands handled was a living word, for God was the word. With this word in his mouth and his heart the origin of language was as natural, as close and easy as a child’s game.

---

388 N III, 289/ H 216-217. The theme of sacramental metaphors for linguistic rule-following was already mentioned in Ch. 3.1.2.3 and will be taken up in Ch 4.2.1 to explore the objectivity of concepts. For a concept of necessity that is based on speech-acts, see Poteat 1985, 93-103. The theme of necessity will be taken up in Ch. 5.4.2.3.


Hamann thus solves the problem of conventionalism by claiming that the conventional rules of language-games are dependent on activities that are an answer to reality, contain its objects and their dynamic relationships and make reality present. Then it does not matter that one can only give norms for language use by describing the game itself, because the reality revealed by the game is already a part of it. For example, it does not matter that God’s speech and Adam’s invention of language are a part of the divine language-game and cannot be given any reasons that are external to the game, because the relationship, its natural objects and divine ideas can be accessed through the game. Moreover, the correspondence of God’s and Adam’s actions in the relationships can still be a part of and judged correct in terms of the game itself, because human nature, divine nature and the goods typical for the relationship are contained by the game. Thus the autonomy of grammar becomes a claim that the goods typical to language-games are internal in MacIntyre’s sense, i.e. they can only be described in the context of the game itself. Moreover, the autonomy of grammar becomes a problem of relativism only, if there is a binary opposition reality/language (or realism/idealism). Then reality is not linguistic or a part of language, so language is possible only if it describes reality from the outside. Language can describe reality from the outside only, if its form of representation portrays the structures of the world in terms set by the general conditions of objectivity. Thus the subject/object split is an underlying premise of relativism: if language and the world are opposite, then correct description of the world is possible only, if grammar is not autonomous and some system of pure reason uncontaminated by experience, tradition and language is possible after all.392

Hamann takes up the realism/idealism split as an example of unfounded abstractions, and attempts to bring abstractions like being in itself to the rough ground. He argues that “Being, faith and reason are only relationships and cannot be taken as absolute. They are not things but scholastic concepts and signs for the understanding”. He also compares the role of abstract concepts like being in itself (or being qua being) with revelation: they point out to relationships in the same way as nature reveals God. Hamann is thus making two claims. First, abstract relationships are not objects but relationships and structures of relationships. Second, they function in communicative practices and relationships like language-games and their orders of discourse possibilities.393

Betz points out Hamann’s argument that abstract terms cannot be detached from language or taken to be transcendentally pure without abusing language. He refers to James O’Flaherty’s view that objectifying abstractions is based on confusions about relational terms. O’Flaherty holds that Hamann argues that first-order relationships between objects are real, but

---

393 ZH 7, 165-169. The quote is on p. 173. The idea is developed in Ch. 4.3. by using language-games as categories.
higher order relationships between abstractions are not.\textsuperscript{394} Thus when \(aRb, cRd, a'R'b', c'R'd'\), we can identify and point out (i.e. objectify or even quantify over) universal relationships \(R\) and \(R'\) between objects, but not of the super-relationship \(R\) such that \(R \; R'\). Hamann’s point is more Aristotelian: one cannot have “things without relationships, relationships without things”, and at times he even hints that abstract concepts like existence have some kind of reality. Although abstract ideal relationships are not objects, they must be taken on faith and are thus parts of the reality we must recognize: “Is being or being in itself a real object? No, it’s the most general relationship, whose existence and properties must be taken on faith.”\textsuperscript{395}

Hamann interprets the concept of being in itself (or being qua being) in terms of his relational method and ontology. He argues that things exist and have their properties through relationships. Existence is a property by being a relationship, and it is the second-order property of instantiating properties: “P. 79: Being is not a property?! – isn’t the power to instantiate properties itself a property?”\textsuperscript{396} Hamann can here be compared with the Frege-Russell-Quine quantificational view of existence. According to Frege, Russell and Quine, existence is a second-order predicate: \(x\) exists if and only if it is a member in the domain of quantification and can thereby instantiate predicates.\textsuperscript{397} Hamann also argues that existence is a second-order concept concerning instantiation of properties. Existence is a second-order relationship: \(x\) exists if and only if \(x\) has a power of instantiating properties through first-order relationships. For Hamann, to be is to be a node in a network of relationships. However, the ideal relationship \(R\) of existence abstracts away from particular relationships \(R\), because the power \(R\) of instantiating relationships \(R\) is determined in terms of its function on relationships \(R\), irrespectively of what the particular relationships \(R\) are.\textsuperscript{398}

Abstraction automatically creates a problem about the objectivity of concepts: how can the ideal relationships be objective, if they do not consist in any particular relationship? Hamann locates their objectivity in communicative practices by comparing the relationship of ideal concepts and real experience to the relationship of revealed God and revealing nature: “God, nature and reason are as closely related as light, the eye, and all that the eye reveals about the light, (…) or

\textsuperscript{394} Betz 2009, 242-248.
\textsuperscript{395} ZH 7, 174. For Hamann’s critique of abstraction as stripping away determining features of language-use, see Bayer 2002, 296-312. Hamann often contrasts his Aristotelianism with the Platonic tendencies in German philosophy. See Dickson 1995, e.g. 193. The discussion of Hamann’s concept of being has been taken from my MTh thesis.
\textsuperscript{396} ZH 7, 168-169.
\textsuperscript{397} See Quine 1953a, Nelson 2012. See also the Peirce- Hintikka language-game of seeking and finding in Ch. 4.1.
\textsuperscript{398} Cf. the concept of a modern fact in Ch. 2.2.4.1. The idea here is just a generalization of the idea that isomorphism (over some property) preserves structure, because it maps particular and concrete entities and relationships on corresponding objects and relationships. Thus it preserves abstract properties and relationships, but forgets concrete objects and relationships. The definition of abstract relationships also builds on the idea of universal properties in category theory: for all relationships \(R\) there is an uniquely defined ideal relationship. See Leinster 2014, Ch. 5.
like the author, the book and the reader. Hamann is talking about a communicative process or a measuring process, which can both be interpreted by contrasting it with Claude Shannon’s theory of communication. Shannon analyses information in terms of choices made over possible messages that are transmitted through a communicative system. A communicative system consists of (information source, encoding system, transmission channel, decoding system, receiver), where the transmission channel can suffer from noise.

Hamann seems to be thinking along the lines of (source, means, receiver): God, light and an author are sources of a communicative signal by acting in certain determinate ways and determining a choice among alternatives with their actions. A book, nature and the eye are a means of transferring and interpreting the signal, or a transmission channel together with an encoding system. An eye is a light detector, a book has a meaning and nature is a Word according to Hamann. Hamann characterizes the receiver as a system of concepts, experiences and pictures of the world formed by the eye, and as a reader, so the receiver gets the structure of choices (words, created objects and relationships or experiential pictures) that is mediated by the channel and internalized into the mind of the receiver. When Hamann compares an abstract word with divine revelation in nature, he is arguing that the word and its relationship is a transmission channel for communicatively pointing out relationships between things and structural relationships of relationships between things in language use. Thus abstract words are like Aristotle’s categories: they are a way of pointing out at relationships and discourse possibilities in language-games.

3.2.3 An overview of philosophical grammar

Here is a summary of the points that emerge from Wittgenstein’s and Hamann’s discussions of philosophical grammar:

1. Philosophical grammar examines the use of language by describing the rules of language-games and the relationships underlying them.
2. Philosophical grammar is more general than linguistic grammar. Linguistic grammar focuses on letters and phonemes, words and sentences. Philosophical grammar studies speech acts and language-games.

399 ZH 5, 272.
400 See Floridi 2004, Davies & Gregersen 2010.
3. Language is the Organon and Criterion of reason, because concepts are based on language use, which is required to articulate and assess conceptual connections. Philosophical grammar functions as the logic of our language by describing conceptual connections in language use.

4. Philosophical grammar develops an overview of the relationships R underlying a phenomenon or concept P, and then derives conclusions C by pointing out the necessary conditions of the relationship R. This form of argument is called a relational conditions argument.

5. Philosophical grammar locates abstract concepts in linguistic and communicative relationships, and uses their relational conditions to expose unfounded abstractions like dualisms and objectifications.

6. Philosophical grammar examines language-games and their underlying relationships from a system-theoretic point of view. It identifies the elements or the interrelated parts of a system, and the institutions or functioning of the system in their context of interaction and according to the laws of the system. Grammar highlights the functional intertwining of different aspects of the system and the dependence of laws on their systemic context. Systemic grammatical description is theory-laden, and it interprets physical, historical and theological facts and interpretations.

7. Philosophical grammar offers an overview of language use by highlighting discourse possibilities, offering contrasting language-games with differing conceptual alternatives and highlighting, how language-games can be embedded or isomorphic to each other.

8. Language-games are categories in the metaphysical sense. They constitute the structure of discourse possibilities or uses of language for describing objects and thus give a foundation for ontological classifications and describing objects in terms of abstract concepts.

9. Essence is shown in grammatical connections. The answer to the question “What is X?” depends on the discourse possibilities related to the term “X”. The principles of identification are thus given by structures of linguistic activities that determine the connections and the possibility space related to the term “X”. The concepts of metaphysics are thus located and objective only in language use.

10. The opposition between realism and idealism (or conventionalism) is misguided. Language-games are a response to reality, contain real objects and relationships between things and phenomena, and symbolize them through use. The norms of language are dependent on responding to reality in language-games, and cannot be described independently of the game or detached from it.

3.3 The metaphysical modelling debate in analytic philosophy

We have now established that a successful antitheodicy must function as a grammatical metacritique that examines the use of the word “God” and the background assumptions of the problem of evil. The background assumptions are the principle of sufficient reason and the fact/meaning, fact/value and appearance/reality dualisms. The task of grammatical or metacritical antitheodicy is then to locate the abstract terms of the theodicy debate in language use and to overcome the presupposed dualisms by locating the opposite phenomena as different parts of an underlying relationship. Since the presuppositions of the problem are metaphysical, the use of
grammatical methods to criticize the problem of evil requires a grammatical critique of metaphysics. Next I examine the contemporary debate over the methodology of metaphysics in order to identify the key questions for using grammatical methods for a critique of metaphysics, and to point out links between the problems of evil and of the objectivity of metaphysical concepts.

3.3.1 Matter, form and metaphysics

Metaphysics is the science of being qua being, which means the characteristics of being as such or being in itself: metaphysics is a “science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature.” Peter Simons overviews the different definitions of metaphysics. Aristotle alternatively described metaphysics as a science of first principles and types of principal causes, a science of being in itself and its characteristics, and a categorization of different types of being. Metaphysics thus investigates the general principles of thought, basic types of causation and the nature of being in general. Aristotle took metaphysics to investigate actual being, but Duns Scotus expanded the scope of metaphysics to cover possible being as well.

We developed a grammatical method for discussing philosophical problems in the previous chapter. It can also be applied to cover metaphysical themes. Hamann defined philosophical grammar to be a calculus of relationships covering everything possible and actual through reinterpretation, and characterized being qua being in terms of elements, institutions and relationships. Similarly, Wittgensteinian language-games were seen to give a ground for making conceptual categorizations and ontological descriptions of the objects of our language-games. Being qua being is thus redefined in terms of relationships, and described through linguistic categories. We also mentioned formal tools like game theory and category theory to point out the structural properties of the relationships of linguistic interaction. Both the search for relational conditions in systems of elements, institutions and practices, and the formal tools can be used highlight the interplay of matter and form. The elements and institutions are the matter and forms of the relationships underlying the language-games that function as metaphysical categories.

---

405 Hamann knew the Scotist concept of being as the most general concept from the German rationalist tradition. He gives it a critical twist in his letters to Jacobi (ZH 7, 154-181): general concepts are not absolute, and certainly not objects. Wittgenstein’s ideal language argument (PI 81-136) can also be seen as a critique of Scotist metaphysics. The search for a general order of possibilities underlying things is a search for chimeras.
The methods of philosophical grammar, relational conditions, systems of elements and institutions and language-games as categories can then be used to highlight the most central problems of metaphysics. Riku Juti argues that the problem of matter and form is the most fundamental problem of metaphysics, and it also lies at the center of questions about the methods and possibility of metaphysics. The matter/form split is also related to the fact/meaning split. Juti argues that the central question concerning the objectivity of metaphysics concerns the interplay of the matter/form and senses/reason binary oppositions. Being in itself must be general, rational and intelligible, as it concerns the form of entities. It must be sensuous, particular and concrete at the same time, because the entities are themselves sensuous and particular. Thus Aristotle and classical Aristotelian metaphysics defined substances as “individuals as forms” so that a substance is both a particular individual grounding predication and its rational and general definition. Kant’s critical philosophy is also an attempt to answer the question, how can the formal conditions of possibility and intelligibility of the world be simultaneously empirical and rational at the time?

Duns Scotus’ metaphysics and his interpretation of being qua being are the background to the whole tradition of modern metaphysics. Juti argues that Scotus reacted against Aristotle’s category theory by defining being as a transcendental concept: being is the most universal concept, as there is one unique concept of being that transcends the Aristotelian categories. Being and its characteristics are presupposed by particular types of being, because being is the most general concept and the first principle of thought. It underlies both the infinite being of God and the categorially defined finite ways of being. The conceptual characteristics of being qua being constitute the possibility and intelligibility of being, and being qua being can be seen as the most general order of conceptual possibilities. Being qua being is thus a modal concept: it concerns the orders of possibility and necessity typical of beings and defines the space of metaphysical possibility. Metaphysics is thus the science that analyzes the first principles of being and understanding that explain the intelligibility of being and its possibilities.

The Scotist concept of being has been reappropriated in the 1970s by metaphysical foundational projects. In contemporary philosophy, questions about privileged and immediate access to reality are often approached with metaphysical arguments. The controversy between

\[\text{Juti 2001, esp. 51-52.}\]
\[\text{Juti 2001, 51, cf. Met. 1017:20: a substance has two senses: it is the ultimate subject of predication, and the definition or essential form of a particular thing.}\]
\[\text{KrV, especially the transcendental deduction (A 84-130/B 116-169).}\]
\[\text{My discussion is based on Juti (2001, 20-21) and Peter King’s article “Scotus on Metaphysics” (2003).}\]
\[\text{This approach has recently been taken by Lowe (1998), and the Tractatus (TLP) is its locus classicus in analytic philosophy.}\]
realists and antirealists has its background in the collapse of the positivist foundational project in the 1950s-60s: analytical hermeneuticians and metacritics like Wittgenstein, Taylor and Kuhn showed that reason, representation and scientific methods are not pure, as scientific methods are constituted by paradigms, social traditions of research and linguistic practices of interpretation.\footnote{Morganti’s and Tahko’s answer to van Fraassen (2017) brings the point of the impurity of reason into metaphysics: metaphysics offers starting-points and worldviews for building scientific theories. However, then metaphysics cannot offer an ideal foundation for knowledge that bypasses the process of hermeneutical interpretation altogether.}

The collapse of the attempt to purify the scientific method from experience, tradition and language did not however challenge the subject/object scheme, so attempts to locate scientific reasoning in linguistic and social traditions and reference in linguistic practices of interpretation were interpreted as emphasizing the subjective aspects of science and thus threatening to end up in subjectivism. Metaphysics was then seen as a way to safeguard objective knowledge, because it allows for direct or causal reference to the properties and individuals, and to the pre-existing make-up of the world that is the structure of being qua being and its possibilities.\footnote{The paragraph builds strongly on Juti and discussions with Wallgren and Tahko. For 20th century metacritiques, see Polanyi 1958, Kuhn 1970, Taylor 1985, 1995, OC and PI. For the metaphysical reaction, see e.g. Kripke 1981. See also Ladyman & Ross 2007, 92-93 who argue that scientific realism and the theory of reference are the “patient zero” of speculative metaphysics. The idea of purification of reason comes from the Metakritik (N III, 284/Haynes 207-208).}

Olli-Pekka Vainio shows that the question of metaphysical realism and metaphysical foundationalism is also one of the problems in the debate about the relationship of theology and metaphysics.\footnote{Vainio 2013, 90-106.}

Vainio notes that the conceptual gaps of the Western philosophical tradition and the rise of nominalism, social individualism, positivism and postmodernism have made metaphysics problematic and question the relationship of theological signs to their objects, just as in the foundations of science debates. One of the approaches of the debate is classical evidentialist natural theology, which was seen in Ch. 3.1.2.1 to be closely linked to theodicism. The goal of the metaphysical arguments of natural theology is to show the presence (or in atheistic theodicism, the absence) of the object of religious signs like God, and moreover guarantee immediate access to this reality. It should be noted that metaphysical theologies like Swinburne’s\footnote{Swinburne 1996. The same dialectic arises in Leibniz’s paradigmatic Cartesian theist system, as we saw in Ch. 2.3.1.} are dependent on finding a successful theodicy, as otherwise evil would provide counter-evidence to the metaphysical theist scheme. The Enlightenment tradition of atheism is even more dependent on theodicist foundational projects, as it presupposes evidentialism and “the history of late-twentieth-century philosophy of religion strongly suggests that it is the argument from evil that is the only truly interesting positive argument against the existence of God”.\footnote{Pruss 2006, 14-15.}

\footnote{411 Morganti’s and Tahko’s answer to van Fraassen (2017) brings the point of the impurity of reason into metaphysics: metaphysics offers starting-points and worldviews for building scientific theories. However, then metaphysics cannot offer an ideal foundation for knowledge that bypasses the process of hermeneutical interpretation altogether.
412 The paragraph builds strongly on Juti and discussions with Wallgren and Tahko. For 20th century metacritiques, see Polanyi 1958, Kuhn 1970, Taylor 1985, 1995, OC and PI. For the metaphysical reaction, see e.g. Kripke 1981. See also Ladyman & Ross 2007, 92-93 who argue that scientific realism and the theory of reference are the “patient zero” of speculative metaphysics. The idea of purification of reason comes from the Metakritik (N III, 284/Haynes 207-208).
413 Vainio 2013, 90-106.
414 Swinburne 1996. The same dialectic arises in Leibniz’s paradigmatic Cartesian theist system, as we saw in Ch. 2.3.1.
415 Pruss 2006, 14-15.}
The links between speculative metaphysical foundationalism and theodicism go in fact very deep. The identification of being qua being with the underlying conceptual forms and the interplay of the senses/reason and matter/form conceptual gaps are both closely linked to the background conditions of the problem of evil that were discussed in Ch. 2. Heidegger defined the principle of sufficient reason as being=reason.\textsuperscript{416} If the characteristics that ground being qua being are rational conceptual principles that underlie particular beings, then some version of the principle of sufficient reason will hold. In Scotism, being qua being is identified with the conceptual order of possibilities, and Heidegger takes the Scotist ontologies of Leibniz and Kant as reformulating the principle by identifying being in itself with a conceptual order and calculations based in the order of possibilities given by (divine or human) reason. Thus the question, whether an order of rational concepts defines and grounds being qua being is connected with the principle of sufficient reason.

Second, we have shown that the problem of evil rests upon the dualisms of facts and meanings, facts and values, appearances and reality and the principle of sufficient reason. These principles were discussed in Ch. 2.2.4, and it became clear that all of them are metaphysical principles concerning the intelligibility of the world. Therefore these conceptual and abstract dualisms can be objective only, if they can be located both in the world of reason and intelligibility, and in the world of objects and the senses. This is however inherently problematic, as the dualisms split sensuous, material and objective facts from rationally intelligible meanings and values. Moreover, the search for meaning and a rational foundation for it in the debate about evil, the meaning of the world and the existence of God takes place against the background of strong subject/object and senses/reason dualisms.\textsuperscript{417} We however saw in Ch. 3.1.2.3 that strong subject/object and reason/senses dualisms make it impossible to find a principle of unity for senses and reason that is not reductionistic, thus calling the objectivity of the background assumptions themselves into question. The objectivity of metaphysical concepts and models has recently been problematized in analytic metaphysics. The discussion is immediately relevant for assessing the neo-Leibnizian analytic theodicy debate that was discussed in Ch. 2.3, and which is a typical case of analytic metaphysics. Bas van Fraassen, one of the leading participants in the metaphysical methodology debate, in fact uses the theistic problem of evil as a paradigm case of what is wrong in contemporary analytic metaphysics.\textsuperscript{418}

\textsuperscript{416} Heidegger 1971/1996. This topic is taken up in Ch. 5.3.3.
\textsuperscript{417} Dickson 1995, 1-15, Neiman 2015.
\textsuperscript{418} van Fraassen 2002, 1, 29-30. The connections and a critique of PSR are taken up in Chs. 5.3.3 and 5.4.2.
3.3.2 Metaphysics in the good company of science?

Matteo Morganti, Tuomas Tahko, and L. A. Paul have recently developed a project for scientifically-minded analytic metaphysics. Their main line of argument is a good company argument: metaphysics is like the hard natural sciences, because both build models in the model-theoretic sense and justify them by appealing to best explanations in terms of theoretical virtues.419

Tahko’s and Paul’s justification of metaphysics has its background in the tradition of modern science and its scientistic interpretations. One key influence on the debate is V. W. O. Quine’s article “On What There Is.”420 Quine describes ontology as an exposition of the most basic commitments of our system of concepts, or conceptual scheme. He wants to avoid commitments to either unactualized possibilities like possible worlds, and also to non-existent entities like Pegasus. The means for avoiding commitments to universals, possibilia and non-existent entities is to paraphrase expressions by using the existential quantifier ∃, or “there is”. Thus “Pegasus does not exist” becomes ¬∃x(x = Pegasus). Quine argues that the individuals functioning as the values of quantification form the ontology of a theory. Moreover, he argues that one should choose the simplest ontology that can account for scientific theories and the raw experience they explain.

Building a rationally justified metaphysics then has two parts421:

1. Choose a theory that includes and accounts for our scientific theories in the simplest way.
2. Describe, which entities the theory is committed to by pointing out the values of quantifiers in the models of the theory.

Quine’s methodology of metaphysics is one of the scientistic background presuppositions of the current modelling debate. Another key assumption coming from the scientific tradition is the mathematization of nature.422 E. A. Burtt contrasts the concept of nature in modern science with the Aristotelian concept. Aristotelian science had explained nature by using logical terms like form, essence, predicate and property. Modern science instead mathematizes nature by describing it with spatio-temporal, algebraic and geometric terms. Putnam argues that this leads directly into

---

419 The term ”good company” comes from Kant’s Prolegomena (A 35, quoted in Bayer 2002, 299). For discussions of inferences to the best explanation, see Fumerton 1992.
421 Heikki J. Koskinen, Pihlström and others have presented similar interpretations in lectures in Helsinki.
representationalism. The old Aristotelian picture of knowledge as taking in forms through the senses was rejected and replaced with the view that we form mental ideas and sense data due to external efficient causes. Aristotelian science emphasized sensuous qualities and other everyday predicatable properties, but modern science locates these properties in the mind as secondary qualities and objectifies the abstract mathematical structures of matter that are described by physical theory into real primary qualities.

These tendencies form two sorts of questions for analytic metaphysics. First, metaphysics and science are understood as building mental representations of reality. This entails the subject/object gap right away. Second, metaphysics necessarily operates at a high level of abstraction, and scientific metaphysics could follow the tendency to objectify abstractions into real primary qualities. This leads to two kinds of problems: the relationship of abstract models with experience can become problematic, and the abstract relationships of metaphysical models could be objectified right away into features of reality.

Tahko, Morganti and Paul offer a program of moderately naturalistic metaphysical model-building to answer these difficulties. Tahko and Morganti identify two dichotomies involved in relating metaphysics with science. Metaphysics and science might differ either in terms of their methods or in terms of their subject matter. They use E. J. Lowe’s rationalism as an example of a view where metaphysics and science have different methods and different subject matter, and James Ladyman’s “neo-positivistic” empiricism as a view where metaphysics and science have overlapping methods and subjects. Tahko and Morganti use Lowe’s rationalism and Ladyman’s empiricism to formulate a synthesis of rationalism and empiricism in meta-metaphysics. The empiricist element emphasizes that the essences of empirically known objects are too known empirically, and the rationalist element allows for an a priori access to the order of possibilities that constitutes being qua being. Reason and the senses are held together in metaphysics, because metaphysics is involved in interpreting empirical results in terms of rational concepts and vice versa by offering starting points for science.

Tahko and Morganti discuss Lowe’s rationalism. Lowe argues that metaphysics explores the space of metaphysical possibility by a priori methods, and metaphysical possibility depends on the real essences of objects. Science explores actual reality by empirical means and thus

---

424 See Lowe 1998, Ch.1.
425 The term is used by Ladyman and Don Ross themselves (2007, 303-310).
426 Morganti & Tahko 2017.
establishes which possibilities are realized. Metaphysics has direct a priori access to essences that constitute metaphysical possibility. Metaphysical knowledge of an essence is simply the ability to answer the question “What is X?” through the understanding. Tahko and Morganti raise two objections to Lowe’s rationalism. First, we only become acquainted with essences in everyday life and science through experience and a posteriori theories. For example, we can grasp the essences of the transuranic elements by using the periodic table only, when we have formed the table through chemical research. Secondly, the claim that essences are known through the understanding leads to a dilemma. Do we understand words, or do we have an a priori grasp of essences with our concepts? If the understanding grasps words, the result is a purely linguistic concept of essence. If the grasp of the concept and essence of X is purely a priori, it is not clear at all how the intellectual grasp of the concept of X grants us access to non-mental reality. The problem described by Juti thus appears again in Lowe’s metaphysics: how is it possible to locate the essences both as natures of sensible objects and as concepts grasped by reason?

Tahko and Morganti discuss Ladyman’s empiricism. Ladyman attempts to ground metaphysics in a physicalistic unity of science project: the task of metaphysics is to explain, why a system of unified science that is based on physics explains more than physics or the other (“special”) sciences do on their own. Tahko and Morganti accept that Ladyman raises valid points about the problem of connecting “neo-Scholastic” a priori metaphysics with reality, but argue that he builds a straw man out of the methods metaphysicians use. Ladyman and Ross accuse metaphysicians of using obsolete scientific theories like the solar system model of the atom and relying too much on intuitions that might turn out to be false. It is also interesting that Bas van Fraassen, another empiricist critic of metaphysics, raises similar criticisms of theodicism: theodiscists completely ignore the religious and theological concept of the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, because they operate with the concept of God that has been defined in terms of the principle of sufficient reason and the logical concept of omnipotence. Tahko and Morganti argue that such charges amount to a caricature, as metaphysicians often simplify their examples, and fallibility as well as implicit assumptions are in any case a feature of human knowledge.

427 We saw in Ch. 3.2.1 that Baker and Hacker attribute such a thesis to Wittgenstein, but the thesis does not do full justice to grammatical critiques of metaphysics. See also Ch. 4.3.2, Pihlström 2012.
428 Juti 2001, 51-52, see Ch. 3.3.1.
429 Morganti & Tahko 2017. Ladyman’s project is described in Ladyman & Ross 2007, Ch. 2.
430 This is a synthesis of the “Principle of Naturalistic Closure” (metaphysics explains the success of unified science) and “the Primacy of Physics Constraint” (unified science is physicalist). See Ladyman & Ross 2007, 27-45, quoted in Tahko 2016, 219. Philip Clayton describes the physicalist tradition in a paper printed in Davies & Gregersen 2010.
431 Ladyman & Ross 2007, 7-27.
432 van Fraassen 2002, 1, 29-30.
Morganti’s and Tahko’s account also builds on L.A. Paul’s view of metaphysical models in her article “Metaphysics as Modelling: The Handmaiden’s Tale.” Paul describes the different subject matter of science and metaphysics by highlighting that metaphysics is fundamentally concerned with ontological category theory. Ontological category theory specifies the most general division of existent and possible entities. Paul argues that metaphysical categories are conceptually prior to scientific concepts. For example, physics might take fields to be fundamental, but metaphysics analyzes fields in terms of its categories substance-attribute (a field is an enduring object with properties) or a bundle of property-instances in space (the field is a set of instantiations of forces in points of space and time). Moreover, these metaphysical concepts are presupposed by science, because science requires a pre-theoretical grasp of laws of nature, properties, entities, causes and effects in order to pose its questions and to interpret experience.

Metaphysics then analyzes the nature of these natures to answer questions “What is a substance?”, “What is a cause?” and “What is a property?” Answering these questions helps to understand, how these concepts are exemplified in the empirical world and how to make sense of empirical theories that use the metaphysical concepts in question.

Paul claims that this conceptual priority entails ontological priority straight away. For example, if biology refers to causes, then it presupposes the ontologically prior and more general concept of causation, which is instantiated in the biological cases. Tahko and Morganti criticize this move from concepts to the reality of higher order metaphysical categories. They hold that although all explanations include metaphysical assumptions, there are many possible scientific theories and many different metaphysical interpretations for these theories. To point out the correct metaphysical theory one needs both a semantic account for describing, how the metaphysical concepts “latch onto” reality and an epistemological account for assessing the different metaphysical interpretations. Paul connects the choice of metaphysical theory with making sense of and organizing experience. She notes the similarities of her approach with Kant, but wants to defend the view that metaphysics describes the fundamental structure of reality. Her views in fact come close to Scotus and Aristotle: metaphysical concepts are caused by experience, and metaphysics describes

433 Paul 2012, Morganti & Tahko 2017. Paul’s metaphysical category theory differs from the approach of using language-games as categories and then using mathematical category theory to point out the structural features of our linguistic relationships that underlie higher order abstract concepts. Metaphysical category theories attempt to access the structure of the world directly, but the theories of linguistic categories attempt to locate abstract concepts (like types of being) in language-games.
434 Morganti & Tahko 2017, Paul 2012.
the underlying order of being and the structure of its possibilities. For example, metaphysics could show that all objects have their origins essentially.\textsuperscript{435}

Paul bases her good company argument on the role of modelling in science and the role of inference to the best explanation in justifying models. Paul, Tahko and Morganti in fact argue that metaphysical realism is a straightforward case of scientific realism. Paul uses the model-theoretic view of scientific theories to build a parallelism between science and metaphysics. Metaphysics builds a model \((D,I)\) in the sense of the Peirce-Hintikka game described in Ch 4.1, where \(D\) is the set of objects that give the value of quantifier “There is” \((\exists)\) in the model, and \(I\) assigns each \(n\)-placed predicate \(P\) an subset of the Cartesian product \(D^n\), and a subset of \(D\) for one-place predicates.\textsuperscript{436} The metaphysical theory then describes the structures where it holds, and it is true if and only if it is true in the sense of Tarski’s definition of truth, or equivalently having a winning strategy in the Peirce-Hintikka game, in some model \(M\) that is isomorphic to situations, systems or parts of the actual world. Tahko does not accept model theory straightforwardly, and instead takes scientific interpretative practice as a paradigm for modelling. John Ziman discusses the role of models of science and identifies them with metaphors. The topic of metaphorical language in science and metaphysics will be taken up in Ch. 4.2.2 and 4.3.3.\textsuperscript{437}

Morganti, Tahko and Paul argue that metaphysical models describe ideal relationships: some relationships in actual and empirical situations might be abstracted away without losing the isomorphism with reality, and in any case metaphysical models describe the general categorial and modal concepts that must be presupposed by empirical scientific description. Paul argues that we can straightforwardly objectify these ideal relationships: for example, a metaphysical model can describe the relationship \(c \rightarrow e\) between the cause \(c\) and the effect \(e\) as a relation of counterfactual dependence: \(R(c,e)\), where \(R\) is a relation in the model and \(c\) and \(e\) are its objects. Similarly, a model for the composition of living beings is a set of models for the ideal part-whole relationship \(R\) such that the parts \(x\) compose to an \(y\), or \(xRy\) iff the functioning of \(x\)’s adds up to the life of the composite being \(y\).\textsuperscript{438} Thus metaphysics models objective ideal relationships just like e.g. mathematical physics models physical systems.

\textsuperscript{435} Paul 2012. The Scotist background of modern metaphysics was discussed in Ch. 3.3.1. Aristotle argues that human cognition is objective, because the mind takes up the form or essence of the perceived object (De An, III,1).


\textsuperscript{437} Tahko, in an email in December 2017. Ziman 2000, 147-151.

\textsuperscript{438} Paul 2012, Morganti & Tahko 2017.
Paul’s good company argument depends on an analogy between assessing scientific and metaphysical models. Metaphysics and science both rely on experience, but metaphysics can use everyday experience, as it studies more general relationships. Scientific experience must too be taken into account in metaphysical modelling, as science informs metaphysics and metaphysics reciprocally offers a way of assessing the metaphysical presuppositions of scientific theories. The metaphysical theories and their models M are related to experience by testing them. They are applied on empirical results and thought-experiments and then assessed in light of theoretical virtues like simplicity, explanatory power, beauty and fertility for new applications. Metaphysical inference to the best explanation differs from scientific explanation only, by allowing for a larger range of live options that have not been straightforwardly falsified by experience. Tahko and Morganti raise two objections to Paul’s account. First, they concede a claim made by empiricist critics of metaphysics: the values of theory-choice must be based in the practice of interpreting experience. They argue that metaphysical theories offer starting points for scientific theorizing and for interpreting experience. Second, abstraction in metaphysics takes place against a fixed background of facts that must hold in all of the situations described in the abstract model. For example, determining the essence of copper requires that we pick out certain (possibly chemical) facts about it as constitutive, and build a model of the essence of copper by keeping these chemical facts fixed in all possible worlds of the model and thus letting them determine the essence of copper. Since metaphysics is looking for essences and essences are known at least partly through experience, metaphysics must then identify the background of its abstractions by using experience as material for identifying essences, as we saw in the case of transuranium elements.

To sum up, Tahko and Morganti modify Paul’s good company argument to accommodate for the empiricist criticism of metaphysics by locating metaphysical representations in the process of interpreting experience. Metaphysics and science both model their objects, but metaphysics deals with more general and conceptually prior relationships. Thus both science and metaphysics attempt to explain and examine the world, but they use differing methods, because metaphysics uses a priori concepts and science uses a posteriori theories and observations. The objectivity of metaphysical explanations is guaranteed by their practical usefulness in interpreting scientific theories. For example, metaphysics studies a priori categories and concepts like the concept of an object, the concept of identity and the concept of causation. It also offers different a priori possibilities for empirically interpreting the category of an object and the concept of identity.

440 Tahko discusses the role of constitutive empirical facts in metaphysical abstractions (2015, Ch. 7, esp. 155-163).
These concepts only get a concrete empirical content and relevance when they are used to interpret experience: for example, only application into experience determines exactly which general, abstract and a priori concept has an application of which exact empirically known real objects. The use of metaphysical models in science offers starting points for science and also anchors the models of metaphysics into empirical practices.441

Morganti’s and Tahko’s a reinterpretation is interestingly parallel to Kant’s reinterpretation of the Scotist metaphysical tradition, after Hamann transmitted Hume’s critique of metaphysics to him.442 Like Kant, Paul, Morganti and Tahko take Scotus’ view as their starting point: metaphysics describes the nature of being as such and the structure of its essences and possibilities, and the nature of being as such is presupposed by science and other forms of enquiry due to its generality. Like Kant they are confronted by a radical empiricist critique of metaphysics that questions the connection between metaphysical theory and experience. Kant, Morganti, Tahko and Paul all confront the challenge of assigning the most general features of being qua being both to the world of rational concepts and structures, and to the world of empirical objects studied by the sciences. Kant, Morganti, Tahko and Paul all offer various versions of the good company argument that build on a theory of representation. Kant’s transcendental deduction is an argument for the claim that being qua being consists in the principles of objective representation that are used to synthetize experience and construct its objects. Morganti, Tahko and Paul argue that the isomorphism of metaphysical models with the world, the assessment of metaphysical explanation in light of theoretical values and application of metaphysical concepts to interpret experience, identify essences and offer starting points for scientific interpretations link the study of being qua being with theoretical science and thus bring it into the good company of science:

1. Metaphysics builds models of metaphysical categories and essences that characterize being in itself and are conceptually more fundamental than commonsense or scientific concepts.
2. The models of metaphysical theory can capture the metaphysical ideal relationships of the world or its situations, because they can be isomorphic to the metaphysical ideal relationships holding in the world or its situations in the model-theoretic sense.

442 The discussion of Kant and the Scotism of his rationalist background is based on Juti 2001, 22-25. For Hamann’s introduction of Hume to Kant, see Betz 2009, 63-82. For interpretation of the picture theory in the Tractatus as neo-Kantianism, see Stenius 1960. Fredrick Beiser (1987) discusses how Reinhold attempts to base Kant’s system on a theory of representation. For Kant’s categories as principles of synthetizing experience, see van Cleve 1992.
3. Metaphysical theories are brought in contact with experience by using them to interpret experience, offer starting points for scientific theories, to identify essences and build essential knowledge out of the empirical data.

4. Metaphysical models are justified by appealing to theoretical values like simplicity, elegance, beauty and explanatory power. These values are based in the practices of using metaphysics to interpret experience.

5. Metaphysics stands in the good company of science, as it models abstract relationships and justifies its models by inferring the best explanations in light of theoretical values just like science does.

3.3.3 The antinomy of metaphysical realism

Metaphysical realism has several strong critics in the contemporary debate. I will focus on two “anti-metaphysicians” who criticize the project of analytic metaphysics from a Wittgensteinian perspective. These critics are Putnam and van Fraassen. van Fraassen uses theodicism as an example of speculative metaphysics and issues sharp questions about scientistic good company arguments that call metaphysical realism into serious question. Putnam uses Wittgenstein to question the representationalism that is presupposed by realism and to offer an alternative to both metaphysical realism and deflationary empiricism. Their critiques of metaphysics help to point out problems in the project of analytic metaphysics more generally, and raise issues that allow anchoring a Hamannian antitheodicy in a general grammatical critique of metaphysics.

van Fraassen opens his critique of metaphysics with his criticism of theodicism discussed in Ch. 3.1.4: the God of theodicism is dead, because He is a creature of metaphysics. van Fraassen moreover makes the point that Kant’s critique of the limits of human reason did not finish off speculative metaphysics, but he continues with a fundamentally Hamannian critique of contemporary analytic metaphysics. Metaphysics takes the expressions of everyday language and of science like “Does the world exist?” and “Does God exist?”, but replaces the empirical and practical everyday meanings of these terms with speculative conceptual puzzles. For example, theodicism replaces the question about the God of the Christian tradition with the puzzle about evil, and the debate about the existence of the mereological totality of everything there is detaches the meaning

---

443 The expression comes from van Inwagen (2009), who criticizes Putnam’s and van Fraassen’s views.
444 van Fraassen 2002, 1-30. See Ch. 3.1.2.3 for van Fraassen’s Hamannian antitheodicy. Morganti and Tahko (2017) recognize the force of his objections and emphasize the practices of interpretation in response to him.
446 Hamann similarly argues that rationalist theologies tend to construct idols (N III, 225, Betz 2009, 197-215).
van Fraassen points out that analytic ontology often justifies itself with good company arguments like Morganti’s, Tahko’s and Paul’s, as the discipline goes back to Quine’s article “On What There Is”. We have seen that the good company arguments depend on two key claims. First, metaphysical models are isomorphic to the world and its systems just like scientific models are. Second, theoretical values like simplicity can be used to judge metaphysical models. van Fraassen argues that the metaphysical use of language detaches both pictorial isomorphisms and theoretical values from their relational conditions. He argues that theoretical values like simplicity have a practical component: they are rooted in the practical use of scientific results like building new technology and have consequences for human well-being. Thus theoretical values cannot be detached from the language-games of applying scientific knowledge to practical aims and communication in them, but metaphysics presupposes that metaphysical truth and value can be assessed from a God’s eye point of view. Similar reasons prevent calling metaphysical representations and models isomorphic with the world. van Fraassen argues that metaphysical questions like “Does the world exist?” are detached from language use, thus removing the context where isomorphisms can be defined. A set-theoretic isomorphism is one-to-one correspondence that preserves structural relationships, but the metaphysical use of language abstracts from the language-games that specify the structural relationships in question. Thus describing metaphysical models as isomorphic with the world does not even get off the ground.\(^{449}\)

van Fraassen returns to the theme of the metaphysical use of words by defining the metaphysical words “spart”, “sworld” and then presenting the mereological problem of the existence of the world as a puzzle. The metaphysical use of words then presents the metaphysician with a dilemma: how are these words related to our everyday use of language? One can make them meaningful by defining them in terms of the ordinary use of language, thus deflating them. The alternative is to take their metaphysical meaning to reveal the real structure of the world, which is then taken to be foundational to everyday use. The question of metaphysical use of words thus raises what Putnam calls “the antinomy of realism”\(^{450}\). Putnam argues that realism has become

---

\(^{448}\) Haynes 210/ N III, 286.
problematic in recent philosophy, as debates rage between between relativist and constructivist antirealists criticizing “logocentrism” and old-fashioned realists defending objective knowledge by appealing to metaphysics. Putnam offers a definition of metaphysical realism: all possible entities, properties and their possibility space is independent of human cognition and has been determined a priori, meanings are fixed by these Platonic forms and possibilities, and language and thought are objective through an isomorphism with the possible or actual combinations of entities and forms. As we have seen, the questions of metaphysical realism and foundationalism are also interesting from the point of view of theodicism. We have seen that van Fraassen argues that the God of theodicism is defined in terms of the metaphysical tradition, and Putnam’s definition of metaphysical realism allows us to clarify this link. We saw in Ch.2.3 that the Leibnizian theodicy debate presupposes the logical concept of omnipotence: omnipotence means that God is free to pick any possible world and shop for the essences exhibiting the maximal amount of greatness. This however presupposes that the space of logical alternatives and the set of possible essences is already determined by the nature of being itself. Thus theodicism presupposes metaphysical realism, because it understands creation as a choice over metaphysically possible worlds whose character is independent of all knowing agents, including God.

Putnam points out that the background of the realism and foundationalism debates is the representationalist view of language and perception: the subject forms mental representations of objects, or S – representation – O. This presupposes the subject/object dualism: the subject and object stand against each other, and either controls the process of knowledge. The antinomy of realism can thus be stated: if knowledge is a subjective representation of an objective reality, then it either has a metaphysical foundation in the form of the objective world or it reduces to subjective features like historical experience, social paradigms or language use. Putnam uses 20th century metacritics like James, Austin and Wittgenstein to discuss the antinomy of realism and to expose its presuppositions. He discusses the antinomy of realism by referring to deflationist theories of truth and Michael Dummett’s verificationism. The Dummettian antirealist claims that if truth does not reduce to epistemically constituted verification, then it lies outside our subjective grasp. The metaphysical realist then answers by appealing to Tarski’s theory of truth and the objectivity of the

452 The picture emerges often in analytic metaphysics: see eg. Paul 2012. The definition is also similar to Putnam’s (1981) earlier attempts to define a “God’s Eye point of view”.
453 van Fraassen 2002, 1-30. Phillips (2004, 5-33) argues that the logical concept of omnipotence is not defined, because it presupposes that the set of logical space is determined by a “super-order of super-concepts” (Pl 97). Pihlström (2020) argues that theodicism presupposes metaphysical realism: theodicism presupposes the ability to objectify and justify God, suffering and the other person from a third-person God’s eye point. However, if the God’s eye point of view is rejected in favour of an ethical approach to suffering, metaphysical realism must also be rejected.
past by pointing out that for all sentences talking about the past, either \( p \) or \( \neg p \) is true. The realist argues that if truth is not a realistic and substantive property and meaning is just verification, then we might well have \( True(p \lor \neg p) \) without having \( True(p) \) or \( True(\neg p) \). The sentence about the past (and past itself) will be left indeterminate, because verification does not distribute over the disjunction. Thus the only way to avoid the indeterminacy of the past and to guarantee the functioning of the concept of truth is thus to interpret truth itself as a metaphysically substantive property that constitutes the cognitive interface with the world. The same argumentative scheme arises again with respect to mathematical truth: either mathematical truth is constituted by something besides our practices of doing mathematics, or alternatively it reduces to nothing but the social practice of mathematics. The problem also lies behind the antirealism debate: either there is a metaphysical access to reality or metaphysical language deflates first to empirical language, which then deflates to our social activities.\(^{455}\) The antinomy can be presented as an argument. The premises 4 and 6 spell out the terms “objective” and “subjective”:

1. Linguistic signs are determined by their assertion-conditions in socially and historically formed language use, and they are connected with reality.
2. \( 1 \rightarrow \) Linguistic signs are determined by their assertion-conditions in socially and historically formed language use, or they are connected with reality.
3. If linguistic signs are connected with reality, they are objective.
4. Linguistic signs are objective if and only if (df.) they refer to reality in a way that is not determined by subjective factors, correspond to the structure of objects and properties, and the objects, structures and reference are constituted by the metaphysical make-up of the world.
5. The assertion-conditions in socially and historically formed language use are subjective.
6. Linguistic signs are subjective if and only if (df.) they stand for nothing but subjective representations and social activities that are not connected with objective reality.
7. \( \rightarrow \) Either linguistic signs refer to reality in a way that is not determined by subjective factors, correspond to the structure of objects and properties, and the objects, structures and reference are constituted by the metaphysical make-up of the world, or they stand for nothing but subjective representations and social activities that are not connected with objective reality.

Putnam discusses the antinomy of realism by describing his own philosophical development. He describes his own transition from a view of language use as linking words and representations causally with the external world to a language-game view, and takes up the deep question behind the antinomy of realism: how is a cognitive relationship and access to the world possible? Putnam develops a grammatical answer by using Wittgenstein's view of language-games. He compares the

grammar of language-games with the anti-realism of Michael Dummett, who argues that understanding depends on epistemic verification that is constituted by subjective conditions. On the language-game view, the expression “I see a table” depends on a relationship with the table, as the use and epistemic conditions constituting its meaning have to be understood in reference to the world, and presuppose abilities of interacting with the objects. Thus it is the technique of use that makes the words “I see the table” meaningful, and not some metaphysical ideal relationship or subjective condition. Then uses, cognitive access to reality and epistemic conditions cannot be defined in the terms of the subject or the object, but in terms of their relationships.456

The metaphysical modelling debate thus raises a number of important questions. It implicitly calls the presuppositions of theodicism into question, because defining God in terms of metaphysical concepts or defining the intelligibility of the world in terms of a metaphysical order of sufficient reasons requires a very strong concept of metaphysical realism and an ability to connect the abstract concepts of metaphysics and the dualist starting points of theodicism with ordinary concepts, ordinary objects and the objective empirical world. The debate revolves around four questions. The first and second questions are subsumed under the third one in the debate, and the third question boils down to the fourth in the end:

1. How can the abstract higher-order concepts of metaphysics refer to the world and ordinary objects?
2. How can the abstract higher-order concepts of metaphysics link with experience and practices?
3. How are logical picturing and theoretical values possible?
4. How is cognitive access to the world and the ability to think itself possible?

These questions are huge, and answers to them will give means for assessing the background assumptions of theodicism. However, on closer examination they turn out to be Kant’s and Hamann’s old main questions. Can the categories of reason be used of empirical objects to produce knowledge? How is the ability to think itself possible?457 The grammatical tradition has an answer at hand with its concepts of language-games and rule-following. Just like Putnam proposes, they offer a good point for overcoming the dualisms of senses, reasons, meanings and empirical objects.

457 KrV A XVI-XVII, Haynes 211/N III, 286.
4. Practical objectivity and the grammar of being

The discussions of the metaphysical modelling debate show that the questions Hamann and Kant debated in the 1750s and 1780s are still on the philosophical agenda. The debate involves the questions about the nature of metaphysical categories, the problem of realism and the question of the sensuous justification of the terms of metaphysics. The search for general concepts that can be applied to understand experience touch upon a larger question: how is the world itself intelligible? We have seen that the problem of evil also concerns the link between the moral and theoretical intelligibility of the world. Both of the interrelated questions of intelligibility, the objectivity of abstract concepts and the problem of evil, feature in the Hamann-Kant debates and come together when developing a conceptual antitheodicy. We have also seen that these debates allow us to identify the questions that a metacritique of speculative metaphysics like the problem of evil must address.458

The objective of this chapter is to discuss these questions head on. Chapter 4.2 concerns the questions of senses/reason and subject/object, and the role of language-games as a necessary condition for concepts. In Chapter 4.1., I develop the discussions of language-games in Ch. 3.1.4 and 3.2 into a technical definition and a characterization of language-games as a background for making sense of the world. I then discuss the objectivity of concepts and models in Ch. 4.2. Ch. 4.2.1 concerns the sensuous applicability of concepts and Ch. 4.2.2 discusses how models function as metaphors of the systems they describe. Ch. 4.2.3 then discusses the subject/object split and the problem of realism, especially in metaphysics. Chapter 4.2.4 defends the claim that language-games are prior to their rules. Chapter 4.3 then takes up the question of categories and the possibilities for modelling them. Ch. 4.3.1 uses the language-games of seeking and finding to locate the concept of existence or being in language. Ch. 4.3.2 show, how these language-games give us the discourse possibilities for categorizing objects, and thus function as metaphysical categories. Ch. 4.3.3 then takes up the role of abstract models of language-games by using the logical machinery as an example of an abstract characterization of metaphysical categories. The threads then come together in Ch. 4.4, where the discussions crystallize into a relational argument that resembles Kant’s deduction.459

458 For the debate between Hamann and Kant, see Bayer 2002, 21-26. For the problem of intelligibility as a key question, see Nagel 2012. Neiman 2015. For the metaphysical modelling debate, see Morganti & Tahko 2017.
459 For language-games, see PI. For the Hamannian background, see Bayer 2002, Dickson 1995, Hein 1983, Snellman 2018. For language-games as a background, see Taylor 1995, 61-78, Glock 1996, 193-198. For language-games as
4.1. Language-games: a definition and examples

The concept of a language-game was introduced in the overview of Hamannian antitheodicies in Ch. 3.1.2.3 and in the description of philosophical grammar. These chapters also included a general overview of the concept. Now we can use the points from these two chapters to make two connections: between language-games and the practices and world/language-encounter that underlies intelligibility, or the Lichtung, and of language-games and formal tools like game theory and category theory. These connections then lead to a characterization of language-games, which underlies the methodological discussions of the senses/reason and subject/object splits and the role of language-games as categories in the rest of chapter 4.

Glock discusses Wittgenstein’s concept of a language-game. In the 1930s, Wittgenstein started comparing language with chess. The background for the shift from logical picturing to comparisons with games was Piero Sraffa’s critique of the picture theory and Wittgenstein’s encounter with Hamann’s view of divine language of elements and institutions in the early 1930s. According to the chess metaphor of PI 108 and 197, expressions have the same role in language as chess-pieces have in chess, because both have a role in the game by functioning according to the rules of the game. A chess-game consists of pieces and rules, and a language-game consists of expressions and discourse possibilities, which form the elements and institutions of the game. The discourse possibilities or the possible uses of words then resemble the possible moves of a chess-piece. A language-game has both defining and strategic rules: the defining rules determine the discourse possibilities of the game and thus define, which expressions make sense. The strategic rules are guidelines for pursuing goals in the language-game.460

Wittgenstein emphasizes that the point of the game analogy is to highlight that language is intertwined with human actions and the world: “I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the ‘language-game’”461. Wittgenstein gives an example of the various kinds of actions underlying language in PI 23: giving and obeying orders, measuring and describing objects, drawing from instructions, speculating and telling about events, forming hypotheses and then matching the data to them, making up stories, riddles and jokes,

categories, see Garver 1994, 61-72. For the antinomy of realism, see Putnam 1999. For the language-games of seeking and finding, see Hintikka 1973. My argument in Ch. 4 throughout builds on Ch. 3. For Kant’s deduction, see KrV A 84-130/B 116-169, and for language-use as Hamann’s alternative answer, Bayer 2002, 358-360.


461 PI 7. It was quoted in the discussion of Hamannian antitheodicism in Ch. 3.1.2.3. The discussion of language-games expands on the discussion of the methods of Hamannian antitheodicy.
solving math problems, play-acting, translations and “asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying”. Again, “the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.” Ordering, measuring, telling and cursing are the forms of life or the linguistic practices that include and underlie the use of words, but are more fundamental. These activities also intertwine expressions and the world: action taking place in the world like telling and cursing are dependent on the use of words, but these words depend on their use to be meaningful. Language-games and their underlying activities or forms of life depend on human nature and human tendencies to respond to reality and the human condition.

Charles Taylor takes up the theme of forms of life as a background for intelligibility in his article “Lichtung und Lebensform”464. Taylor uses Heidegger’s concept of Lichtung or clearing to highlight the question of the intelligibility of the world: how can being appear to us, and how are understanding and knowledge possible? The problem of intelligibility was briefly defined in the Introduction, and can be given a background by investigating the questions at the beginning of Categories of Being together with Hamann’s and Putnam’s critique of the subject/object split and representationalism. Are fundamental concepts the underlying logical types of thought, or are they the fundamental types of the being of objects? Do the concepts of intelligibility concern the world, or only our thought of it? The possibility of understanding is then understood either in terms of the world or the mind, and the relationship of understanding concerns the applicability of logical types. The process of knowing and understanding can also be described as the interaction of subject and object. Then the problem of intelligibility can be posed as three family resemblance questions that focus on parts of the cognitive interface: the mind, the world and their interrelationship:

1. How is the ability to think possible? (The mind)
2. How can rational concepts of the mind be used of empirical objects in the world? (The interface)
3. Does the world itself have a rational order and meaning, which can be grasped? (The world)465

Taylor presents Heidegger’s characterization of the classical and modern answers, which Heidegger discusses in his work on the principle of sufficient reason.466 Ancient philosophy had located

463 Cf. H 22-23/ N II, 125: “The wealth of all human knowledge consists in the exchange of words.”
464 Taylor 1995, 61-78. See Heidegger 1996/1971, Dickson 1995. I thank Simo Knuuttila for pointing out the question whether intelligibility is located the mind or the world. See also Ch. 5.3.3 and 5.4.2.
intelligibility in the world in the Platonic Ideas or Aristotelian essential forms of substances: we can understand the world, because it is structured by the Ideas or the substantial forms that also function as rational definitions of objects. Modern philosophy locates intelligibility in the subject: the rules of reason define an order of logical possibilities and the transcendental conditions of objects, and the world can be understood because it is thus structured. Taylor interprets Heidegger as arguing that the *Lichtung* or locus of intelligibility arises out of human practices in the human condition, but these practices are already a response to “something that is not us”. Intelligibility then arises out of the relationship between the person and the world. He contrasts this approach with Wittgenstein’s concept of a form of life. I argue that Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s views have an overlap, which can be used to locate intelligibility in practices that form the language-world interface and that are a response to reality.

We have seen that forms of life are practices that include and underlie language use, which can be analysed into pieces or elements and rules or institutions. Now we can locate all the three aspects of the semantic triangle sign/object/meaning in language-games and their underlying forms of life. The expressions of language are already a part of the language-game, and hence the form of life. The objects of an activity are a part of its relationships. Wittgenstein argues that the building-stones of builders and colour-models acting as samples in simple language-games of building are a part of linguistic communication, and thus a part of the form of life. The meaning of an expression is also a part of the game, as it arises out of the rule-governed use of expressions: “For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” Thus the triad of words, objects and meanings is located within language-games and their forms of life: “The ‘combination’ and the ‘band’ of this triad is a living one only inside specific forms of language and life.”

Wittgenstein also argues that the practices and relationships underlying language or the forms of life also depend on and include general facts of nature. In PI 142, he argues that if pieces of cheese shrank at random, then the practice of weighing them would be pointless. Thus the practice of weighing cheese includes the fact or would-be that if one put cheese on the scales, then gravity would produce a result that reflects its initial mass. The underlying relationship between cheese and scales is then a part of the game, and it consists of objects, possible facts of the game that involve them, and the general facts or would-bes. It can then be seen as a game in its own right,

---

by taking the objects as players, the facts or results as positions in the game, and the general facts or would-bes as rules. It can also be viewed as a system (Objects, Facts, Would-bes) of system theory, by taking the possible facts as states of the system or relationship, and the general facts or would-bes as fixing the laws for the functions of the system.\textsuperscript{469} Since the linguistic relationship or form of life contains both its objects and also general facts, “language ‘embodies’ reality, makes it present, contains it and is contained by it.”\textsuperscript{470}

Wittgenstein takes language to be a response to reality. Human beings respond to certain situations and certain general facts in certain ways, and build language-games and worldviews on these responses. Moreover, Wittgenstein argues that language-games are based on a direct trust of realities that we encounter through the forms of life. “I really want to say that a language-game is only possible if one trusts something (I did not say "can trust something").” He compares trusting reality with grabbing a towel: in both cases we recognize something present and take hold of it in our practices: “If I say "Of course I know that that's a towel" I am making an utterance. (…) It is just like directly taking hold of something, as I take hold of my towel without having doubts. And yet this direct taking-hold corresponds to a sureness, not to a knowing.”\textsuperscript{471}

Wittgenstein’s view of language as an instinctive response that takes hold of a reality through the practices and forms of life of language-games can be contrasted with Hamann’s view of knowledge through faith: faith involves recognizing realities that are present in the sensuously mediated relationships of language by trusting the senses and the information they mediate.\textsuperscript{472} As we have seen in Ch. 3.2.2, Hamann has a very strong theological concept of linguistic responses to the world: “To speak is to translate – from an angelic language to a human language (…) thoughts into words – things into names – images into signs.”\textsuperscript{473} Bayer argues that such interpretative activity is like playing a role in a play, which in any case resembles being a player in a language-game. The person encounters the speech sensuously by trusting the senses to reveal objects and ideas, and then answers by acting and forming judgments autonomously, thus interpreting the address. One can similarly locate language-games in the communicative space (world \(\rightarrow\) encountered facts \(\rightarrow\) language-games), where we encounter the world through our forms of life, and thus form language-games. Then if concepts are at the bottom linguistic or language-games function as categories, the

\textsuperscript{469} For underlying relationships as games or systems, see ZH 7, 169-170, Ch. 3.2.3., Maizner 2004, Ch. 5.1.2. The argument about general facts is taken up and continued in Ch. 4.2.3 to undermine the problem of realism.


\textsuperscript{471} OC 509-511.

\textsuperscript{472} Hein 1983, Dickson 1995, 68-75, ZH 7, 163.

\textsuperscript{473} H 66/ N II, 198. See also ZH 5, 272. For the theological concepts of encounter and recognition of reality that Hamann and Wittgenstein generalize, see Veijola 1991 and von Rad 1988.
Lichtung or the locus of intelligibility is located in linguistic practices for encountering objects and the world.⁴⁷⁴

Linguistic encounters are also value-laden, because they are relationships that involve recognizing reality and include human nature and the nature of the encountered realities. Putnam discusses the role of values in practices that involve encountering facts and describing the social world.⁴⁷⁵ He gives two examples: the Matrixists of Sydney and the Benthamites of Australia. In the Matrix example, the guru Morpheus has persuaded the citizens of Sydney that they are living in the Matrix. If someone asks them: “How do you know?”, they answer “Morpheus just knows.” Similarly, the Benthamites of Australia follow the maxim “Maximum happiness to the maximum number!” even if it involves having bureaucrats calculate the happiness values of everyday actions, putting depressed people to death or lying about unpleasant facts to hide them. Putnam argues that these language-games and their underlying forms of life are sick. The Matrix example cannot meet objections like “Well, if that is the case, then even Morpheus does not know”. It is not simple as it presupposes a world outside the Matrix, and it cannot explain, how Morpheus would know that we are in the Matrix. Thus the language-game is deficient with regard to values like simplicity that constitute good human functioning or cognitive Eudaimonia. The Benthamite example is sick, because the bureaucratized form of life changes the meaning of moral terms so that one cannot recognize social reality with it. Calculating happiness values while destroying practices that are based on dignity like caring for depressed people and then spreading propaganda shows that such bureaucratism lacks the means to describe the practices of caring in other terms than wasting resources, and the truth as just a means to the end of pleasure. Thus a practice can be sick, if it does not measure up to the values that arise out of the functioning of human nature in practices, or is unable to recognize a reality that is a part of these practices. The values of a language-game are then a part of the context of the encounter, and can be described through virtue ethics: a practice is a good response to reality, if it allows one to recognize the realities and realize the good functioning of human nature in relationships.

The location of values in the context of a language-game raise the problem of the autonomy of grammar. In Ch. 3.2.2 we have seen that the question of the values and virtues of

⁴⁷⁴ See Bayer 2002, 9-17. The argument is taken up in Ch. 4.4. For a recent attempt to characterize physical systems into informational would-bes and sources of yes/no-choices, facts produced in measurements and other interactions, and scientific results and interpretations, see Wheeler 1990 and Zeilinger 1999. See also Davies & Gregersen 2010.
language-games are related to the question of the autonomy of grammar.\textsuperscript{476} Wittgenstein states that autonomy means that the values and virtues of a language-game can only be described by describing the game as a whole: “The rules of grammar may be called "arbitrary", if that is to mean that the aim of the grammar is nothing but that of the language.”\textsuperscript{477} The autonomy of grammar can then be characterized with MacIntyre’s distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic goods. A good is intrinsic, if it can be characterized only by giving an account of the practice it is a part of: for example, being good at chess openings can only be accounted for in the context of chess. This differs from external goods like money and power, which can be defined outside of the context of an activity.\textsuperscript{478} Hamann also describes the autonomy of grammar by arguing that abstract concepts are dependent on language use and are thus arbitrary: “An abstract word is like an empty wineskin: it changes every moment.”\textsuperscript{479} Bayer moreover interprets Hamann as characterizing the encounter with reality as playing a role in a play: one encounters a situation and is embedded in a relationships through one’s role. The speaker then makes a choice and responds with an action or a speech act, so the encounter and response are dependent on choices. The autonomy of grammar is then compatible with forms of life being responses to reality: a practice can be a good response in relationships, but its goodness is intrinsic and dependent on human nature, reality, their relationships and free choices.

Wittgenstein’s comparison of language with chess opens up another comparison: mathematical game theory, a branch of applied mathematics that was developed by John von Neumann, Oskar Morgenstern and John Nash in the 1940s and 1950s. Game theory studies decision-making in situations where the players’ choices and their outcomes depend on the actions of other players, so game theory is a mathematical model of strategic interaction. Game theory started from studies of games like poker and chess. Philosophers like Hintikka and Michael Dummett have used game-theoretic concepts in investigating language use, and Hintikka argues strongly that Wittgenstein’s language-games can be examined through formal game theory.\textsuperscript{480} Strategic games involve choosing strategies independently of others in a one-off situation. Extended games feature players making moves in turns, and the game lasts for more than one move (because otherwise it could be modelled as a strategic game). An extended game can be defined as follows:

\textsuperscript{477} PI 497. On roles, see Bayer 2002, 1-18.
\textsuperscript{478} MacIntyre 1981, Ch. 14. Wittgenstein seems to argue that the goal of a language-game is extrinsic to it (PI 499), but concepts and other representations are intrinsic to it, so the goal of language is not to express prelinguistic thoughts.
\textsuperscript{479} ZH 7, 172 I use O’Flaherty’s translation (quoted in Gray 2012) as a background. See also Hamann’s description of freedom as a ground for linguistic forms of life, which draws from Aristotelian and biblical sources (H 113-117).
Definition\textsuperscript{481}: A n-player extended game $G$ (of perfect information) consists of
- a set of players $N$, for all players $i, i \in N$
- a set of histories $H$ such that if $(a_1, ..., a_n)$ is a possible play with moves $a_k$, then $(a_1, ..., a_n) \in H$.
- the turn function $t$ determining the player $i$ to move in the situation $(a_1, ..., a_n)$: $t(a_1, ..., a_n) = i, i \in N$
- a set of strategies $S_i$ for the player $i$ that assign a move $s_i$ as a response to the situation $(a_1, ..., a_n)$ where $i$ moves: if $t(a_1, ..., a_n) = i$, $S_i(a_1, ..., a_n) = s_i$, and $(a_1, ..., a_n, s_i) \in H$.
- the outcome function $O$ assigns an end-point history of the play $(a_1, ..., a_n)$ that is reached when players play the strategies $(s_1, ..., s_n): O(s_1, ..., s_n) = (a_1, ..., a_n)$.
- A payoff function $f((a_1, ..., a_n), i)$ that determines the gains of the player $i$ in the outcome $(a_1, ..., a_n)$.

Extensive games have two different solution concepts.\textsuperscript{482} One is the ordinary Nash equilibrium: a strategy $s_i$ gives better outcomes $O(s_1, ..., s_i, ..., s_n)$ than its alternatives $s'_i$. Game theorists often hold that the strategies will have to work in all subgames: if a player is maneuvered into a following situation where his Nash equilibrium strategy will leave him worse off, the strategy cannot be used. Such considerations motivate the second subgame equilibrium concept: the strategy must give better results than its alternatives in all subgames of the original game. Another important concept is a zero-sum game, or a game where the winner wins the amount the others lose:

Definition: The selection of strategies $(s_1, ..., s_n)$ is a Nash equilibrium in the extended game $G$ if and only if for all players $i \in N$ and alternative strategies $s'_i$, $f((s_1, ..., s'_i, ..., s_n), i) \leq f((s_1, ..., s_i, ..., s_n), i)$.

Definition: The selection of strategies $(s_1, ..., s_n)$ is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the extended game $G$ if and only if for all histories $(a_1, ..., a_n) \in H$, the strategies are a Nash equilibrium in the subgame $G(k)$, whose histories are $(a_k, ..., a_n) \in H$ and the turns, payoffs, outcomes and players the same as in $G$.

Definition: A game $G$ is a zero-sum game if and only if the player $i \in N$ wins the amount that the other players $i', i'', ..., \in N$ lose in total, i.e. for all strategy profiles $(A_i)$, the sum for the payoffs $f((A_1, ..., A_n), i)$ amounts to zero.\textsuperscript{483}

These formal concepts of games can immediately be combined with the concept of a language-game. Baker and Hacker describe Wittgenstein’s concept of language-games in detail, and the

\textsuperscript{481} The definition is adapted from Osborne & Rubinstein 1994, 89-97, see also Bicchieri 2004.

\textsuperscript{482} Osborne & Rubinstein 1994, Ch.6.

\textsuperscript{483} Osborne & Rubinstein 1994, chs. 2, 6. In a zero-sum game there are always clear winners and losers, or the game ends up in a draw.
A formal model of games can be combined with their analysis of the concept of language-games. A language-game consists of the following:\textsuperscript{484}:

1. **Word-signs**: Word-signs like “Slab!” are empirical objects. They are combined into speech acts and sentences according to the rules of the game. Word-signs are among the elements of the game.

2. **Objects**: Empirical and material objects like slabs are part of the language-game, if they have a role in the activities of the game. The objects of language-games also include tools like colour-models and measuring devices. The word-signs and objects are elements of a speech act, and hence of language. Signs and objects are the basic elements of the game, and correspond to chess-pieces.

3. **Speech acts**: Speech acts are symbolic *Handlungen* in Hamann’s sense. A speech act consists of uttering a word-sign together with performing a symbolic act, or uttering a word-sign together with performing a sensuously mediated act that involves an object of the game. The speech acts thus establish connections word-sign/action and word-sign/action+object. For example, the act of bringing a slab when the word-sign “Slab!” has been shouted connects the word-sign “Slab!” with slabs. The sensuously mediated symbolic actions that are connected with objects are the basic intuitions of the game.

   Speech acts correspond to the moves of chess, and the moves $a_n$ of a formal game.

4. **Uses, purposes and functions of acts**: Speech acts serve a purpose and a function in a language-game, as they are connected with objects, activities, rules and the player’s role in the game.

   A speech act functions as a part of a language-game by conforming to the rules of the game. The rules of a language-game arise out of the discourse possibilities of the game. In terms of game theory, the discourse possibilities and rules of the game determine the possible histories $H$.

   Making a speech act involves playing a role in the drama of the language-game. Speech acts are also responses to the situation of the game, its context and the moves of other players in the game. In the terms of game theory, the speech act $a_n$ is a part of the player’s strategy $S_n$. $S_n$ codifies the acts of his role in the game and his response to the game situation and the acts of other players.

   The discourse possibilities arising out of $H$ and strategic uses arising out of $S$ correspond to the moves and strategic capabilities of a chess-piece.

5. **The communicative and strategic meaning of expressions and speech acts**: Strategies and rules constitute speech acts, because speech acts become meaningful in by relating to the context of the game, receiving a communicative role and pursuing their purpose in it.

   Speech acts $a_n$ are communicative, as they are responses to the actions $a_k$ of other players. A response $a_n$ is a part of the strategic role $S_n$, which codifies the activities of the player $n$ with the activities of other players $S_k$ in reaching their goals in the context of the game. For example, the strategies of the language-game of $\text{PI 2}$ coordinate building a house.

\textsuperscript{484} The analysis is based on Baker & Hacker 1980, 91-98 and Bayer 2002, but it also includes comments about how language contains its objects, powers and forms of life (Dickson 1995, PI 7, 16, 19, 23, 142 Baker 2004, 52-72), the sacramental models of rule-following (PI 197, 431-432, N III, 289/Haynes 2007, 216-217, Bayer 2002), the role of tradition (PI 242) and the concept of strategic meaning in Hintikka (cf. Bayer 2002, 9-17).
Linguistic expressions, objects and speech acts are the matter of linguistic communication, as they conform to the discourse possibilities and rules, and have a strategic use in the game. They have a communicative form, as they embody a role in the game and thus embody and present values and concepts for interpretation in the activities of the game. Strategies and uses give a use to the speech acts as well as their word-signs and objects. An act is connected with pursuing the ends and activities of a game, and embodying rules, concepts and values in its communicative activities and relationships. Communication is constituted by the symbolic interaction of players in pursuing the goals of the game.

6. The activities and contexts of the game: a language-game takes place against the context of a type of communicative activity, or a form of life. For example, building a house and issuing orders and battle reports have different materials, goals, structures of cooperation and possibilities of action. The context determines the values and virtues of the game, the natures and roles of the players and the objects and general facts related to them. The roles and associated natures of the players are part of a language-game. A role in language-game includes the values of a player, and the types of interactions and relationships that are possible for him. The values of a player are formally represented by his payoffs, and possible types of interactions and relationships are given by the possible histories and actions. A language-game also includes general facts about its objects. The general facts constitute the game by contributing to its causal structure and thus the possible moves taken by the players and by its elements. For example, weighing cheese would not be possible without gravity.

7. Learning and tradition: taking part in a language-game locates the player in a tradition. A player builds on the earlier actions of others by answering to their speech acts and strategic roles. Answering others involves coordinating one’s activities within the pre-existing situation and making judgments by doing speech acts. A language-game is often learned by participating in it, and meaningful participation requires learning customary responses and an overlap of judgments.

The long and technical characterization and definition of a language-game can also be used to link language-games with mathematical categories. Category theory is a branch of abstract algebra that investigates structures of structures and relationships between them. Saunders Mac Lane and Samuel Eilenberg developed it in the 1940s to examine structure-preserving transformations on mathematical constructions. They chose the terms “category” and “functor” because they saw themselves as mathematizing Aristotle’s, Kant’s and Peirce’s concepts of categories as higher-order types of structural concepts and Rudolf Carnap’s concept of a functor. Category theory is thus built to function as a mathematical analogue to philosophical category theories, and it gives a tool for coping with increasing levels of abstraction in mathematics and logical analysis. Category

485 See Garver 1994, 61-72, Ch. 3.2.1. I will base my treatment of category theory on Smith 2016, Leinster 2014, Marquis 2014 and Wikipedia articles.
theory uses the concept of a category and a functor to characterize structure. A category consists of objects and arrows between them. The arrows include identities and can be composed:

Definition A category \( C \) consists of the following:

1. Objects \( C, D, \ldots \) The set of objects is \( \text{Ob}(C) \).
2. Arrows \( f, g, \ldots \) between objects. Each arrow has an object \( A \) as its source (or domain) and \( B \) as its target. An arrow \( f \) with the source \( A \) and target \( B \) can be written as \( f: A \rightarrow B \).
3. Composition: If \( f: A \rightarrow B \) and \( g: B \rightarrow C \) are arrows, so is \( h=f \circ g: A \rightarrow C \).
4. Association: \( (f \circ g) \circ h = f \circ (g \circ h) \).
5. Identities: For all objects \( A \in \text{Ob}(C) \) there is an identity arrow \( 1_A: A \rightarrow A \) s.t. \( 1_A \circ f = f \circ 1_A \).

The arrows of category theory differ somewhat from set-theoretic functions and isomorphisms. They do not need to be injective, bijective or even functional. They can instead be thought as generalized relationships between structured objects. Consequently, isomorphisms function differently in category theory. In category theory, an arrow \( f \) is an isomorphism if and only if it has an inverse \( g \) such that \( g \circ f = f \circ g = 1 \). The internal structure of an object can also be described by its arrows to itself, which reflect its structure. Categories can also be represented as graphs, where the marked nodes stand for the objects, and pictures of arrows connecting them stand for arrows.

Categories can be used to model language-games. The actions are speech acts of bringing about a state of affairs by acting, uttering word-signs and connecting the two. They thus have an internal structure and self-identity. They are also meaningful only in the context of the discourse possibilities and strategic uses of the game, so they are linked together by relationships of structures that can be modelled with arrows. Therefore we can speak of speech acts as structures and use them as objects in structures of structures, i.e. language-games. The only problematic requirement is association. However, if the history \( A_1 \rightarrow A_2 \rightarrow A_3 \) is in the game, \( A_1 \rightarrow A_2 \) is also a history and \( A_2 \rightarrow A_3 \) is a history in a subgame, so \( (A_1 \rightarrow A_2) \rightarrow A_3 \) and \( A_1 \circ (A_2 \rightarrow A_3) \) are both possible paths in the game and they amount to the same path. The same holds for strategies, because a strategy is a possible history that is limited to the turns where a player has to move. Thus Garver’s idea of language-games as categories can be given a precise mathematical expression. We can

---

486 Adapted from Leinster 2014, 10 and Smith 2016, 4-5.
also define dynamic isomorphisms between fragments of language-games by defining functors, which are kinds of structure-preserving morphisms between categories:

Definition 489: Let \( C \) and \( D \) be categories. A functor \( F: C \rightarrow D \) is a map from \( C \) to \( D \) such that

1. If \( A \) is in \( C \), \( F(A) \) is in \( D \) i.e. \( F \) assigns all objects in \( C \) an image in \( D \),
2. If \( f: A \rightarrow B \) is in \( C \), \( Ff: FA \rightarrow FB \) is in \( D \), i.e. \( F \) assigns all arrows in \( C \) an image in \( D \),
3. \( F(1_A) = 1_{F(A)} \) and \( F(f \circ g) = Ff \circ Fg \), i.e. \( F \) preserves the structure of arrows across categories.

Functors can then be used to describe the mappings of primitive language-games onto fragments of more complex ones, because they are structure-preserving maps across categories. The mathematical point of functors is to help describing structural relationships like the sameness of abstract structure and back-and-forth inverse operations. The concept of the sameness of abstract structure can be used to explicate, how intrinsic necessities in underlying systems can be milked into the rules of language-games. If \( A \rightarrow B \) is a tendency (if cheese were put on scales, it would be pulled down), its manifestation (cheese is put on scales \( \rightarrow \) it is pulled down), as well as the rule (put cheese on scales \( \rightarrow \) it is pulled down) can be practically and empirically isomorphic.\(^{490}\)

One way of formalizing abstract structures and processes is describing, which constructions and processes preserve the structure. This situation arises in philosophical category theory: for example, substance preserves its essence or ontological structure over time, and property universals preserve their characteristics over instantiation in different objects. The same holds in mathematical category theory: the concept of natural transformation was developed to compare different functorial constructions \( F \) and \( G \) and see, whether they preserve the same structure:

Definition 491: Let \( F, G \) be functors from \( C \) to \( D \). A sequence of arrows (or relationships) \( (\alpha_A, \alpha_B, ...) \) in \( D \) is a natural transformation between \( F \) and \( G \) iff for all \( A, B, ... \) in \( C \) the following naturality square commutes, or the paths along \( G(f)^\circ \alpha_A \) and \( \alpha_B^\circ F(f) \) end up the same, or \( G(f)^\circ \alpha_A = \alpha_B^\circ F(f) \):

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
F(A) & \xrightarrow{F(f)} & F(B) \\
\downarrow_{\alpha_A} & & \downarrow_{\alpha_B} \\
G(A) & \xrightarrow{G(f)} & G(B)
\end{array}
\]

\(^{489}\) Smith 2016, 120-121.

\(^{490}\) See Baker 2004, 22-52, Marquis 2014, PI 242, 372, Leinster 2014, Ch. 3.1.2.3.

A natural transformation that is made of isomorphisms is a natural isomorphism.

Adjoint functors are used in mathematics to do constructions with ideal relationships. Adjoint functors can be seen as conceptual inverses: if there is a structure-preserving construction for turning an A into B, and B into A, then the constructions are almost certainly adjoint. This can be used to characterize functional intertwinings in philosophy: the relationships R of A are manifested through the relationships S of B, and vice versa, so there is a back-and-forth system establishing connections f and g between the relationships R and S: faSb if and only if aRgb. Then “maps F(A) → B are essentially the same thing as maps A → G(B)”492. Here’s the definition:

Definition493: Let C and D be categories, and F: C → D and G: D → C be functors. Then F is the left adjoint to G, or G is the right adjoint to F, iff the sets D(F(A),B) and C(A,G(B)) are naturally isomorphic. That is, for all relationships g and p in D and g corresponds naturally to $\bar{g}$, if $F(A) \xrightarrow{g} B \xrightarrow{p} B'$, there is a corresponding $A \xrightarrow{\bar{g}} G(B) \xrightarrow{G(p)} G(B')$. Also for all relationships f and q in C, and f corresponds naturally to $\bar{f}$, $A \xrightarrow{q} A \xrightarrow{f} G(B)$ there is a corresponding $F(A) \xrightarrow{F(q)} F(A) \xrightarrow{\bar{f}} B$.

Hamann describes his basic conviction about functional intertwinings with the slogan: “The communicatio (…) idiomatium is a fundamental law and the master-key of all our knowledge and the whole visible economy.”494 Hamann is thus claiming that functional interdependences network all of reality so that when there is a higher-level relationship $H_1 \rightarrow H_2 \rightarrow H_3$, it functions through the lower-level relationship $L_1 \rightarrow L_2 \rightarrow L_3$ and vice versa through networks of elements, institutions and higher-order functional presences in systems S. Moreover, these relationships commute over correlations that can be drawn between the higher/lower-level objects $H_n \rightarrow L_n$ and vice versa, or $H_1 \rightarrow H_2 \rightarrow L_2= H_1 \rightarrow L_1 \rightarrow L_2$. These functional interdependences allow one to show that what can be said of the higher-level relationships $H_1 \rightarrow H_2 \rightarrow H_3$ can also be said of the lower level relationships $L_1 \rightarrow L_2 \rightarrow L_3$ and vice versa, due to the back-and-forth relationships and isomorphisms between the relational structures that arise out of the functional intertwining.

---

492 Leinster 2014, 41, Ch. 2, Smith 2016, chs. 24-27, Marquis 2014, Ch. 3.1.2.3, Ch. 3.2.2.
493 Leinster 2014, 41-42.
494 H 99/N III, 27. The comparison of levels of reality taken as categories comes from Ellis 2008 and Meditations.
First, there is a back-and-forth system between the higher category $H$ and the lower category $L$ (e.g. the mind and the material world) in the sense of Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé language-games of structural comparison. In EF games, the Utterer and Interpreter take turns in choosing objects from models that are being compared for local isomorphisms: e.g. if the Interpreter chooses an object $H$ from the category $H$, then the Utterer chooses one from the category $L$ and vice versa. The histories of the game give sequences $(H_1, \ldots)$ and $(L_1, \ldots)$, and the Utterer wins the game and the Interpreter loses if and only if the structures constructed out of the sequences by including all the individuals and their relationships are isomorphic. The commutations between the relationships of a higher-level state $H$ and its support $L$ in the relationship allow for a construction of such isomorphic comparisons. If the Interpreter chooses $H$ in $H$, then the Utterer can choose its support $L = F(H)$ in $L$ with the partial strategy $F$ that takes objects in $H$ to their supports $L$, and similarly he can choose $H = G(L)$ in $H$ if the Interpreter chooses $L$. Then the strategy of using $F$ and $G$ as back-and-forth moves between objects gives an outright isomorphism of objects, because the object-correlations between $H_1 \rightarrow H_2 \rightarrow H_3$ and $L_1 \rightarrow L_2 \rightarrow L_3$ automatically guarantee object-wise partial isomorphisms between their relational structures. This entails that all relational predicates true of $H$ also have corresponding predicates true of $L$ as well, as attempts to prove them non-isomorphic fail.

The isomorphisms can also be extended to cover relationships as well, in the sense of adjoint functors in category theory. EF games contrast individuals and the isomorphisms of their relationships, but adjoints use the back-and-forth structures $FH \rightarrow L$ and $H \rightarrow GL$ to construct isomorphisms between the relationships $\rightarrow$ themselves. Isomorphic here means one-to-one correspondence between the sets $(FH \rightarrow L)$ and $(H \rightarrow GL)$, which preserves relational structure: $FH \rightarrow L \rightarrow L'$ iff $H \rightarrow GL \rightarrow GL'$. To get these relational isomorphisms, one can extend the back-and-forth comparisons to functors by having $F$ take a higher-level state $H$ to its constituted lower-level-state $L$, and the relationship $\rightarrow$ between $H$ to the relationship $\rightarrow$ in $L$ through which it functions. $G$ similarly takes a lower-level state $L$ to its embodied higher-level state $H$, and the lower-level relationship $\rightarrow$ to the relationship in $H$ by which it is constituted. Because relationships in $H$ function through relationships in $L$ and thus give correspondences between $H_1 \rightarrow H_2 \rightarrow H_3$ and $L_1 \rightarrow L_2 \rightarrow L_3$ as a matter of the grammar of $S$, the arrows in $L$, $F(A) \rightarrow B$, are “essentially the same as” arrows $A \rightarrow G (B)$ in $H$, i.e. $F(H) \rightarrow L \rightarrow L'$ also corresponds to $H \rightarrow G (L) \rightarrow G(L')$. These arguments can now be summed up thus:

496 Saunders Mac Lane famously noted that “Adjoint functors arise everywhere” (quoted in Leinster 2014, Ch.2). Cf. Hamann’s claim that functional intertwining is a key feature of reality (H 99/N III, 27).
1. If the higher-level relationship $H$ and lower-level relationship $L$ are functionally interdependent, then there are back-and-forth comparisons $F$ and $G$ pointing to objects $H$ and $L$ a structurally corresponding $F(H)$ and $G(L)$, establishing a back-and-forth system between $L$ and $H$.

2. The comparisons can be expanded to adjoint functors $F$ and $G$, which establish an isomorphism between relationships. Then $F: H \to L$ corresponds to the relationship $H \to GL$ and the structures $F: H \to L \to L'$ also correspond to $H \to GL \to GL'$ isomorphically.

3. Since there is a relational back-and-forth-system between $H$ and $L$, then whatever predicate $P$ can be said of the relational category or nature $H$ can also be said of $L$ and vice versa. Since there is an isomorphic correspondence between $F: H \to L$ and $H \to GL$ because one functions through the other, the grammar of the relationships establishes a strong essential dependence between the objects and relationships $F: H \to L$ and $H \to GL$ against the background of $S$.

Then whatever can be said of the essences and systemic logic of higher-level relationships $H$ can be said of the lower level of facts and rules $L$, and vice versa because of the grammatically given and essential back-and-forth isomorphisms between functions at different levels.\textsuperscript{497} Now that we have defined a language-game and discussed the abstract nonsense of structural interrelationships, we can introduce some key language-games. Wittgenstein uses the language-games of the builders in PI 2 as an example. Hamann’s idea of divine language can also be formalized. Peirce and Hintikka also introduce games for the concept of existence. The language-game of PI 2 Wittgenstein’s prototype for a referential language-game:

1. The players are $A$ and $B$.
2. The objects of the game are slabs, girders, pillars and cubes.
3. The word-signs of the game are “Slab!”, “Girder!”, “Pillar!” and “Cube!”.
4. The context of the game is building a house. Therefore $A$ wins iff $B$ wins iff $B$ brings the material that $A$ calls for, e.g. a slab for “Slab!” and the end-point is e.g. (“Slab!”, Slab, “Pillar!”, Pillar…).
5. The actions $c_n$ of the game are the speech acts of shouting the word-signs and bringing materials.
6. $A$ plays at the start of the game, and when $B$ has delivered a building-block. The actions $a_n$ of $A$ are shouting the word-signs of the game.
7. $B$ plays when $A$ has shouted a word-sign. The actions $b_n$ of $B$ are bringing building-blocks to $A$.

\textsuperscript{497} For the concept of communication of attributes in theology, see McGrath 2014, 291-294.
A few notes about the language-game of PI 2 are required. First, the game is a coordination game, where A and B both win by choosing corresponding actions. The strategies for winning the game produce a connection or isomorphic correspondence between the word-object pairs (“Slab!”, slab), (“Pillar!”, pillar), (“Girder!”, girder), (“Cube!”, cube), but this “reiterated bond” arises in the strategic language use of the game and against the background of the form of life of building a house. This connection is a constitutive background for the relation of reference, but the language-game does not include truth and falsity. Therefore strategic coordination in language use against the background of a practice is logically prior to reference. The last point is that the values of coordination and cooperation are embedded in the game through its winning conditions, and the winning conditions are determined by the practice of building houses. One could not build a house, if the actions of the builders were uncoordinated. Thus the values (one could say: virtues) in the game arise out of the suitability of different strategies to the background. This entails that the autonomy of grammar cannot be as strong as Baker and Hacker claim. There is no conceptual gap between the values of the game and its background, because the values of the game depend on its purpose and activities. The game can moreover be embedded onto other language-games.

These points can be highlighted by studying the Adamic language-game of divine world-creation and human response. In the Genesis, God first calls an X into existence and then constitutes an order that consists of the powers, relationships and laws: "Then God said, “Let there be light”; and there was light." And God saw that the light was good; and God separated the light from the darkness." Hamann discusses these ideas in his London Diaries: “God created to make. Matter and form. Existence and its determination, or He calls into existence the things that do not exist and determines them to be whatever He wants.” He also describes language as a response:

1. The players are God, Nature and Adam.
2. The elements of the game are word-signs “X”, natural phenomena R: X→Y and objects (X, xRy).
3. The context of the game is God creating an ordered, fertile, law-governed and beautiful world, and relating to Adam and his human life through it. Thus the world wins iff it is ordered according to God’s words, Adam wins iff he does not eat from the tree of knowledge, responds to the objects

---

(X, A→B…) through his senses and grasps the divine ideas A→B and God wins iff the world and Adam win.

4. The actions are as follows:
   - God can do nothing, call “Let there be X!”, or if X and Y exist, “Let xRy!”
   - Nature can either produce chaos, produce X or relate R: X→Y such that if R: X→Y is in play and X is produced, then Nature constructs a connection xRy.
   - Adam can take a look at objects (X, xRy), and use “X” to marvel and enjoy X, do nothing, eat from the tree of good and evil, or formulate the grammatical rule “X→Y” to formulate a divine idea. Adam relates to God iff he marvels and enjoys the objects, and internalizes their ideas.

5. The game starts from the position of chaos in nature. God moves first. If Adam has not been created, then God moves first, followed by Nature. If Adam has been created, then the order is God, Nature, Adam.

The game is built to implement some Hamannian ontology and biblical creation theology into a toy model. We can make some preliminary points, which will be taken up later. First, objects (X, A→B) consist of an element and institution. The element X can be thought of as the object itself, or the spatio-temporal facts of its location. The relationships R: A→B are the institutions of the object, and they are constituted by the strategic actions of Nature: Nature wins the game only, if it responds to the object X either by (causally) producing the object Y, or relating them in xRy if Y already exists. We can then speak of a natural connection or causal power that produces Y or xRy from X, and the natural connection is understood in terms of strategies of the game. The objects of the game can then be described words in the Hamannian sense, or informational objects in Floridi’s sense, because they consist of elements X and institutions R: A→B that presuppose and function against the background of the whole game and its strategic interactions. We can moreover call the element X the matter of the object, because it is either a concrete object or a set of concrete spatiotemporal facts. The strategic tendencies or would-bes, and relationships R: A→B are its form, because they determine the nature and functioning of the object, as well as its role in a communicative relationship. Adam also responds to this speech by enjoying the world through his senses and creating language as a way of relating to God via a practice. Adam can marvel at X by uttering “X”, or appropriate the connection R: A→B by setting up the grammatical rule “A→B”. Thus Adam’s calling of X an “X” is not primitive, but takes place against the background

502 See Chs. 4 and 5.
of practical communication. We can also describe metaphysical truth as a correspondence of responses to the divine speech and its institutions: if R: A→B is an institution, then Nature must produce the states of affairs F(A→B) with its strategy, and Adam must produce the grammatical rule G(A→B). The rule is then correct in the context of the game and its activities, because one can utter “A” in order to marvel at A, “B” to marvel at B and these linguistic connections point out the structural connections between states of affairs F(A→B) and grammatical rule G(A→B).504

The language-game of PI 2 can be modified into language-games for first-order logic. Peirce and Hintikka have developed a game-theoretic definition for truth for first-order logic505:

1. The players are the Utterer and the Interpreter.
2. The objects are the objects of the model M and their relationships (M, I).
3. The game G(φ) in the model M begins with the sentence φ and the interpretation {}.
4. If φ = ¬ψ, the Utterer and the Interpreter exchange turns and winning conditions, and the game continues from ψ.
5. If φ = ψ ∧ χ, the Interpreter chooses ψ or χ, and the game continues from the chosen subformula.
6. If φ = ψ ∨ χ, the Utterer chooses ψ or χ, and the game continues from the chosen subformula.
7. If φ = ∃x_nψx_n and the interpretation is s, the Utterer chooses a∈M, and the game continues from ψx_n and the assignment sU {(x_n, a)}.
8. If φ = ∀x_nψx_n and the interpretation is s, the Interpreter chooses a∈M, and the game continues from ψx_n and the assignment sU {(x_n, a)}.
9. If φ is atomic and the assignment is s, the utterer wins iff the interpreter loses iff φ is true in M on the assignment s.

The game is a zero-sum game, and Utterer can always win the game if and only if he can seek and find the witness individuals that make the sentence true. We can now define truth as correspondence with the aid of the Peirce-Hintikka semantic games. A sentence φ is true if and only if the Utterer has a winning strategy in the game G(φ). A strategy s is a winning strategy if and only if a player wins by using s, no matter how the opponent plays. Again, referential and semantic relationships like truth are defined in terms of activities in a game. They arise in a strategic interaction where the

---


Utterer is trying to show that his claim is true by seeking and finding the correct witness individuals, and the Interpreter is trying to falsify the claim by pointing out counterexamples.\textsuperscript{506}

One can also note that in the game, concepts like “there is” and “true” are ideal relationships that point out to the structure of the game. Hintikka has strongly criticized Frege’s idea that the quantifiers $\exists$ and $\forall$ are concepts of concepts that describe, how first-order concepts have instances.\textsuperscript{507} One can still describe them as concepts of formulas and sentences that describe what kinds of operations of seeking and finding will go through on them in a given situation. Thus one can describe quantifiers as second-order concepts that describe the world and the functioning of first-order words and concepts in a language-game, and thus the structural properties of expressions and the world in the relationships of the game. Seeking and finding is an abstract relationship, and one must interpret these abstract language-games by finding corresponding structures in everyday practices. For example, “Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exist, etc. etc.,—they learn to fetch books, sit in armchairs, etc. etc.”\textsuperscript{508} Interpreting abstract operations of seeking and finding involves bringing the expressions onto the “rough ground” of everyday language use, where we make practical sense of expressions like “there is” and “all”\textsuperscript{509}

4.2 The practical objectivity of concepts and models

Language-games also give answers to the foundational questions for the grammatical critique of metaphysics. Wittgenstein’s argument about rule-following is an answer to the question: how is the ability to think and form logical representations possible in the first place? The argument was in fact first formulated by Hamann as an alternative to Kant’s answer to the question about the possibility of using rational concepts to describe empirical objects. Wittgenstein then offered it as a critique of his earlier Scotist ontology of the Tractatus, where the a priori logical form of the world and the combinations of its empirically known facts constitute meaning. The argument about the linguistic nature of conceptual rules moreover gives a ground for uniting senses and reason, as it shows that language use functionally intertwines rational concepts with sensuous word-signs and objects. It also locates both concepts and objects in language-games, which intertwine linguistic social

\textsuperscript{507} Hintikka 2000.
\textsuperscript{508} OC 476.
constructs with the world of objects and general facts, thus guaranteeing the practical objectivity of the rules of language-games. The argument also establishes that language-games are genealogically prior to their rules and their conceptual principles, thus making it possible to criticize metaphysical abstractions by pointing out the necessary relational conditions of concepts. I will present the argument as an application of the first principles of grammatical metacritique that were presented in Ch. 3.2.3 and the definition and exposition of the concept of a language-game in Ch. 4.1.510

4.2.1 Language-games, rules and the possibility of representation

We have seen that the questions that surface in the metaphysical methodology debates ultimately depend on the question, how logical representations are possible at all. Wittgenstein and Hamann answer this question by analyzing the role of concepts and logical rules in language use. I will present a version of their argument building on the grammar of the concept of a language-game.511

We have seen in Ch. 3.2 that philosophical grammar analyzes language-games into elements and institutions. Expressions, objects and speech acts are the elements of language, because they are constituents of a language-game. Regular use, patterns of discourse possibilities and communicative practices are the institutions of language, because they are the characteristic patterns of functioning and interrelationships that constitute a language-game. This analysis of language-games into the elements of signs, objects and speech acts and the institution of communicative practices in a context was also seen to be a case of a more general approach to relational systems. A relational system consists of elements, institutions and realities that are part of the language-game through the relationships constituted by its characteristic functioning. One thus gets a triadic relationship out of the analysis of a system: (Element, Institution, Present reality).512

These triadic relationships resemble and can be contrasted with Peirce’s triadic philosophy. Peirce offers three interrelated triadisms. His philosophical category theory includes the categories of Firstness or independent existence, Secondness or necessitated reaction, and Thirdness, or lawful mediation. He also introduces the semantic triangle of a sign, object and an interpretant, or meaning. Combining categories with types of signs yields causally determined

512 The chapter builds on Ch. 3.2 and its sources (especially Bayer 2002, Dickson 1995, Hein 1983 and Garver 1994).
indices, qualitatively determined icons and symbols that determine their interpreants in a conventional but lawful way.\textsuperscript{513} Cross-linking Hamann’s and Wittgenstein’s scheme of elements, institutions and present reality with Peirce’s scheme of signs, objects and interpreants helps to clarify the problem of the basis of conceptual rules\textsuperscript{514}:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Element</th>
<th>1. Sign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Institution</td>
<td>2. Object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Present meaning</td>
<td>3. Interpretant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Word-signs and objects were defined to be the basic elements of language in the definition of language-games and speech acts that was presented in Ch. 4.1. Thus signs and objects together correspond to elements of language. The interpretant also corresponds to the meaning that is produced and made present in the game. It also presupposes and includes aspects of the institutions of language, because institutions are the linguistic functions and interrelationships that take place according to the laws of the language-game. The role of an interpretant is to highlight that the meaning of an expression is connected with the institutional relationships of the game.\textsuperscript{515}

We can now build a functional definition of the institutions of language from the definition in Ch. 4.1. Speech acts are a part of the institution of language-games. A speech act connects a sign with an object, as it is composed of uttering a word-sign together with the performance of a sensuously mediated act that involves the object. A speech act thus mediates the relation (word-sign, intuition+object), and thus helps constitute the institution of language. However, a speech act can constitute the institutions of a language only, if the mediated connection is supported well enough by the relationships and functions of the game to form a relational structure that supports law-like regularities of practice. Otherwise, the connection is not fixed enough to produce a meaning or interpretant. That is, the speech act itself forms a regular relational connection of (word-sign, intuition+object) only, if it stands in the context of the game and receives a role in its relationships.

The definition of language-games in Ch. 4.1 connects speech acts with the structures of a language-game in three ways. A speech act (word-sign, intuition+object) becomes meaningful

\textsuperscript{513} My summary of Peirce’s triadicism and theory of signs are based on the article “The New Elements” and Peirce’s letters to James (EP 2, 160-178, 300-325, 492-502).

\textsuperscript{514} See Bayer 2002, 381-384.

\textsuperscript{515} For an interpretation of Peirce’s proof that meaning is use, see Pietarinen & Snellman 2006.
by being an element of discourse possibilities, the strategic roles and responses of the players of the
language-game. The discourse possibilities form the institution of defining rules of the language-
game. The roles and responses of players in a language-game connect the speech acts with the
symbolic forms of communication, answering and interpreting the actions and others and with
pursuing the goals of the game. They thus form strategic rules and communicative action. Together
the institutions of discourse possibilities, communicative practices and their symbolic forms, and
the strategic pursuit of the goals of the game form the institutions that embed the speech act and its
connection (word-sign, intuition+object) in the relationships and functions of the language-game.516

The institutions of language are thus constituted by the connection of a word-sign with
a sensuously mediated practice that gives its object in a speech act, and the embeddings of speech
acts in the discourse possibilities, goal-directed strategic activities and symbolic forms of
interpretation of the game. These all institutions are constituted by the practices of language use.
Discourse possibilities were defined in Ch. 3.2.1 to be capabilities to being put to a use U in a
speech situation s. Similarly, playing a role in a language-game, interpreting and answering others
and pursuing the point of the activities of the game with speech acts an were seen to involve using
language according to a communicative form Sn to respond to others and the situation of the game.

Now we can easily see that language use constitutes both the extension and the
intension of the word-signs of language. Language use constitutes the extension of a word, e.g.
“chess”517, because it connects the word-sign with games of chess in speech acts (“chess”, games of
chess) that take place according to the discourse possibilities, activities and forms of communicative
action of the language-games. They thus determine the objects that are connected with the word
“chess” via regular use in the practices of playing chess, and hence its extension. Language use also
constitutes the intension of the word “chess”, because the intension of a word consists in its
conceptual rules and its role in communication. The communicative role of a word like “chess” was
seen to be fixed by its role in answering others and pursuing the activity of a language-game, and
the conceptual rules of a word depend on its discourse possibilities. Both communicative roles and
conceptual rules depend on use, so the intension of a word depends on use as well. Wittgenstein
summarizes the point well: “And hence also ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice.”518

Concepts and the ability to form representations through the rules of language-games
are thus located in language use. Hamann also notes that this entails the collapse of the
senses/reason-distinction. Words are both empirical word-signs and rational concepts in the

516 Hintikka often uses the distinction of defining/strategic rules for language-games. See also Glock 1996, 193-198.
517 The example comes from Wittgenstein (PI 197).
518 PI 202. Both Hamann and Wittgenstein present a version of the argument as something self-evident (see e.g. N III,
283/H 206, PI 92, 116, 197). This way of presenting it builds it on a detailed grammar of language-games.
practices of language use. The senses/reason binary opposition is closely related to the opposition facts/meanings, as the conceptual system of modern philosophy associates facts either with configurations of private sense data or sensible material objects, and meanings with an order of reasons that determine how the facts hang together. Thus undermining the senses/reason dualism by appealing to the relational conditions of the objectivity of concepts will necessarily offer a counter-model to the dualisms underlying theodicism and call their objectivity into question. In fact, Hamann’s motivation for his meta-metaphysics and the rule-following argument was explicitly antitheodicist. Hamann works with the analogy that language use and linguistic communication bring rational and abstract concepts back to “the rough ground” just like God is not trapped in a Platonic heaven of ideal objects and sufficient reasons, but became flesh and blood and suffered in Jesus Christ. Consequently, Hamann uses the theological concept of communicatio idiomatum to describe the intertwining of reason and senses in language-games.

The concept of communicatio idiomatum is defined in theology as an exchange of predicates or properties: although the divine and human natures of Christ are (at least conceptually) separate, their union in the person of Jesus Christ gives a ground for predicking everything that holds of the divine nature of the human nature too, and vice versa. It was generalized in chapters 3.1.2.3, 3.2.2 and 4.1 to a concept of functional intertwining. To establish functional intertwining between the aspects A and B in a system S, it is sufficient to show that whenever \( a \in A \) has a property or relationship \( R \) in A, a has it by functioning through \( f(a) \in B \) and its relationship \( R' \), and whenever \( b \in B \) has a property or relationship \( T \) in B, it has it by functioning through \( g(b) \in A \) and its relationship \( T' \) in virtue of the systematic relationships of S.

The concept of functional intertwining can be applied to language-games and linguistic relationships. It can be used to show that rational concepts are sensuous and objective, and empirical expressions are meaningful concepts. Thus rational and abstract concepts can be used of objects, and there is no dualism of rational meanings/empirical facts in language. To summarize the argument: language-games are relational systems G that can be partitioned into sensible word-signs and objects S and rational concepts and rules C. Then word-signs and objects function as a part of the language-game by being used according to the rules of the game, so empirical word-signs and rational objects function through conceptual and rational rules. Similarly, rational and

\[519\] N III, 288/H 215-216. The collapse of senses/reason dualism in Hamann has been noted by Hein (1983), Dickson (1995) and Bayer (2002).
\[520\] See Ch. 2.2.
\[521\] PI 107.
\[523\] H 99, n. 16. See Chs. 4.1. and 5.2.3. See also McGrath 1994, 291-293.
conceptual rules are discourse possibilities and forms of symbolic communication in activities, which are patterns in the activities of language use. These rules are followed and manifested in speech acts that are composed of empirical actions involving empirical word-signs and objects. Hence, rational concepts and rules receive the properties of objectivity, concreteness and empirical grounding, and sensible expressions receive the properties of meaningfulness and rationality.524

Let’s go through the argument step by step, as it is important to go through the proof in a thorough way and the proof also offers a paradigm-case for using relational grammar to attack unfounded abstractions. First, the properties of sensibility and rationality can be abstracted from the relational system G of a language-game, and then objectified into the senses S and reason R. The abstraction of senses is an abstraction downwards, as senses are taken to be a lower level in Platonic schemes. Similarly, reason is abstracted upwards. Reason and the senses can then be characterized via their typical properties525:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Senses S</th>
<th>Reason R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediates experience and objects</td>
<td>Forms logical rules and concepts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particular</td>
<td>Universal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingent</td>
<td>Necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concrete</td>
<td>Abstract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Meaningful</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relational system of a language-game then includes sensuous words w, like “chess” and empirical objects o like games of chess, which belong to the sensuous realm S. It also contains concepts M(w) like the meaning of the word “chess” and rules for concepts of objects like the rules for a game of chess, which are part of the rational world R. Let’s take the word-sign “chess”. By the argument about the relational conditions of conceptual rules, the word “chess” is combined with a game of chess, in the speech acts in the play of chess, and the uses of the speech acts in the practices of chess that are defined by its rules. Thus we have the connection word \( \text{use} \rightarrow \text{Obj (rules)} \).

However, the meaning of the word “chess” is constituted by its association with its object in speech acts word \( \text{use} \rightarrow \text{Obj (rules)} \), and the speech act’s connections with discourse possibilities, strategic roles in activities and communicative forms of the game. The discourse

524 This is a Wittgensteinian rephrasing of Hamann’s argument (N III, 287-289, 213-216). See also Bayer 2002, 351-361, 374-396, Dickson 1995, 310-318.

525 The process of generating conceptual gaps by abstracting words from their contexts was described in Ch. 2.2 and Dickson 1995. Dickson (1995, 300) and Bayer (2002, 378) give similar figures.
possibilities, communicative activities and strategic guidelines for pursuing the point of a game in a
certain role make up the rules of the game. These discourse possibilities and communicative roles
therefore help constitute the meaning of the word, e.g. “chess”. The network of uses of speech acts
thus connects the meaning M(w) with the conceptual rules that define the object (rules), e.g. the
meaning of the word “chess” with the rules defining a game of chess, i.e. the rules of chess. Hence
we have the connection Meaning(word) \rightarrow \text{Rules of chess}.

Then the connections word \rightarrow \text{Object (Rules) and Meaning(word)} \rightarrow \text{Rules are}
intertwined through the relationships of use such that if the linguistic relationship word \rightarrow \text{object is}
a part of the empirical world S, it functions through the connections of meaning Meaning(word)
\rightarrow \text{Rules in the rational world R. The converse holds as well, as the connection of meanings
M(w) \rightarrow \text{Rules in the rational world R is a structure of discourse possibilities of language use, which
is realized through the connection word use \rightarrow \text{Object (rules) in the empirical world S.}}^{526}

Now we have a functional intertwining between the sensuous aspects S and rational
aspects R of a language-game G. A word w has a functional role in the language-game through its
meaning in use M(w), so its empirical properties as an expression of language P like sensuousness
must play a part in language-games by functioning together with its meanings M(w) and their
conceptual properties P', like rationality. Similarly a meaning M(w) and its conceptual properties
P', like its abstract conceptual connections, are dependent on the use of the word w and its
properties P of functioning as an empirical expression. Then due to the functional intertwining, all
linguistic functional properties of the senses S can be predicated of reason R, and vice versa.$^{527}$

We have thus located concepts in language use: use connects expressions with their
objects and gives linguistic acts meaning by embedding them in communicative forms, activities
and conceptual rules. Logical representations are thus based on language use. The connection of
expressions, objects and meanings also intertwine abstract rational concepts with the empirical
expressions and objects in the game, so concepts become empirical and sensuous objects are
connected with abstract rules and meanings. Abstract concepts thus have empirical content.

---

$^{526}$ The example comes from Wittgenstein (PI 197). The logic of the argument was already discussed in Ch. 4.1.
$^{527}$ The theorems are in Ch. 4.1. See also Ch. 5.2.2 for functional intertwinings in various systems.
4.2.2 Modelling, morphisms and hermeneutics

We have seen that van Fraassen locates scientific models in empirical practices. John Ziman elaborates the link of empirical interpretation and theoretical modelling. He argues that the concept of model and modelling is central in science. Modelling is not a formal concept, but depends on use in the scientific community and on its interests of building theories. Theories are maps that classify and structure phenomena, and their pictorial and representative form depends on use in the scientific community. Theories and maps form a picture to point out relationships and aspects of phenomena, and are then interpreted via intersubjective practices. Theories thus point out connections between phenomena. The concept of a theory is closely related to the concept of a model, which Ziman defines: a model is an abstract system that represents a real one. Logical pictorial models can be approached via model theory, and dynamic models for the changes of states in a system can be approached via category theory. A model has parts that stand in a one-to-one correspondence to the system it models, and the parts of a model stand to each other in relationships so that the model corresponds to some aspect of the functioning of the modelled real system. This correspondence between the dynamic relationships of the model and the functioning of the system then points out the mechanisms and dynamics of the system by juxtaposing the model with the system. Models combine theory with experience: a theoretical simulation or the functioning of a model can be watched and compared with the modelled system. Models also explain the workings of a system in terms of concepts taken from the model: DNA is explained with the concepts of codes, the mind is explained with the concepts of a computer, social systems are explained with the concepts of games and the atom is explained with the concept of a solar system.

Models are thus dependent on functional analogies, which make them metaphoric. Max Black argues that metaphors reorganize the view of their principal objects or tenors by describing them with concepts derived from their subsidiary objects or vehicles. The metaphoric description of the object then changes the concepts used, attitudes to it and possible inferences by importing descriptions and attitudes that are associated with the subsidiary through common knowledge. Ziman argues that the correspondence between parts of the model and the system, and correspondences between their functional relationships establishes a link that allows the description of an unfamiliar system in terms of the concepts taken from a familiar model. The

---

529 See Ch. 4.2.3 for discussion of models of phlogiston, calculation and empirical correspondences with mechanisms.
correspondence between the parts of a model and the parts of a system on the one hand, and the functioning of the model and the dynamic behavior and powers of the system on the other hand, also corresponds to the concept of a functor in category theory and the concept of a (partial) isomorphism between models. Isomorphisms preserve truth in logic, and functors preserve the structure of dynamic arrows in category theory. Thus both preserve descriptions of functional relationships and powers.\textsuperscript{531} Moreover, the relationship between a model and its object is established via interpretative practices. Thus the functional isomorphisms that are established by interpretative practices allow us to describe and explain the unknown system in terms of the known model: genes are like codes, because they function in a similar way and the similarities of function allow us to describe the unknown genes in terms of known codes.\textsuperscript{532} Models are thus metaphors that allow the description of their objects by drawing functional comparisons with known systems.

The isomorphic and functorial comparisons given by models and their interpretative practices offer a basis for seeing the objects as something and thus highlight their aspects. For example, the metaphor of gene as a code allows one to see DNA molecules as codes. Paul Ricoeur highlights the connection of metaphors and seeing-as by taking up themes that arise in Wittgenstein and Hamann.\textsuperscript{533} Metaphors associate an expression with images and feelings by linking sensuous expressions with meanings through the practice of drawing analogies. The poetic expression “Time is a beggar” draws a comparison between time and beggars through the use of the expression. Thus the metaphor allows us to see time as a beggar through the internal relationship that has been established through the metaphoric use of the expression. The intertwining of words and sensuous images in metaphorical use then offers a case of the intertwining of senses and reason in symbolic practices. The intertwining is formed by pointing out systemic relationships by drawing comparisons and pointing out functional similarities through practices of interpretation. Models then allow seeing a system A as B via metaphoric comparisons, which establish structural and dynamic correlations F to establish internal relationships in interpretative practices. The practices of pointing out functional correspondences between models and their objects then reinterpret experience through the metaphoric interpretations and their internal relationships.

\textsuperscript{531} For the concept of a functor, see Smith 2016, Ch. 13. For morphisms in model theory, see Hodges 1997, 5.
\textsuperscript{532} Ziman 2000, 147-151. For models, see Hodges 1997, Ch. 4.1. For functors, see Smith 2016, Ch. 13 and the use of functorial comparisons between Hintikka’s game models and language in Ch. 4.3.
The themes of sensuous reason, the embeddedness of objects in internal relationships and the practices of interpretation as ways of pointing out objects all come together in Wittgenstein’s discussion of seeing-as and aspect phenomena. Wittgenstein discusses three interrelated problems. First, how is seeing different aspect-pictures of e.g. ducks and rabbits possible, when the physical picture-object like the duck-rabbit stays the same and there are no private objects? Second, how does aspect-perception relate to senses and reason? Third: how are seeing aspects, identifying objects in the pictures and the internal relationships of systems and practices interrelated? These problems are key to understanding modelling in metaphysics, as they bring together metaphorical models, interpretation of internal relationships, and the practices of seeking and finding objects, e.g. in puzzle-pictures.

Wittgenstein takes up the first question by giving examples of different categories of seen object. One can say “I see this” and then draw a picture, or a picture-object. Alternatively, one can say: “I see a similarity between the faces”, and seeing the similarity changes the way faces are perceived. Glock interprets the categorial difference as one between picture-signs and aspects. The picture-object stays the same, but the perception of it changes aspects as one sees it both as a duck and as a rabbit at different times. Wittgenstein distinguishes the categories of a visual picture “this” that can be expressed by drawing it, and of a likeness that can be pointed out by comparing faces. He offers a grammar of the different categories of seeing by referring to their roles in relationships. Seeing as is a relationship to the picture: we can see figures as something in the same way that we regard a painting on the wall as its object, i.e. depicting its object. These interpretative relationships are dependent on the relationships that the picture stands to other pictures and the world. Juxtaposing a duck-rabbit with ducks draws out a comparison with ducks and the relationship of comparison leads to seeing it as a duck, and vice versa with rabbits. The interpretative relationship has to be described by describing behavior: for example, describing different ways of interpreting the double-cross figure must refer to different ways of tracing and other practices that underlie interpretation. Different interpretations are thus different techniques.

Seeing-as depends on mastering sensuous practices of interpretation, drawing comparisons and placing the picture in internal relations.\textsuperscript{539}

Wittgenstein’s comparison of aspects with pictures and their meanings points to his view of “sensuous reason”\textsuperscript{540}: seeing-as is not either reason or perception, but both at the same time: “‘The echo of a thought in sight’ – one would like to say”\textsuperscript{541}. He argues that seeing-as is not perception, because the physical object of the perception stays unchanged and one cannot characterize aspects by objectifying them as private sense data. It is not thinking either, as one can apply both the concept of a duck and of a rabbit of the duck-rabbit, but the aspect-perception allows only one of them. It is instead both at the same time, as one sees an object and then interprets it through the seeing of an aspect. Wittgenstein’s views of picturing offer a clue to the relationship of reason and the senses in aspect-perception. He argues at length against the view that pictures can interpret themselves. For example, a picture of a man standing on an inclined plane could show the man sliding down the plane or climbing up. The pictures are interpreted through a practice.\textsuperscript{542}

One can then identify the grammar of the intertwining of senses and reason in aspect-perception: one has a picture (e.g. a duck-rabbit or a logical model), and it stands in a system of differences and comparisons. The picture is then interpreted by relating to it through a sensuous practice, like tracing its crosses or drawing comparisons with its context. The interpretative practice then points out its internal relationships and organization in the system, and the interpretation mediates a thought in and through the sensuous practice.\textsuperscript{543} The aspect-perception can then be analyzed with the grammatical approach to relationships from Ch. 3.2.3: the perceived object is an element in a system S of different comparisons and relationships.\textsuperscript{544} The sensuous practice of interpretation is an institution that traces the relationship of the system S. The practice then allows one to grasp and point out the internal relationships of the system S via comparisons and seeing the aspects of organization, e.g. by models or metaphors.

Seeing aspects via pointing out the structures and organization of the relationships of perceived objects also organizes the practices of perception to form new kinds of operations of seeking and finding. New aspects correspond to new ways of pointing out different forms and

\textsuperscript{539} PI part II, 204-208.
\textsuperscript{540} Hein 1983.
\textsuperscript{541} PI part II, 213. See also Ch. 4.2.1.
\textsuperscript{542} PI 139-141, Glock 1996, 36-40. The intertwining of senses and reason is discussed in Ch. 4.2.1.
\textsuperscript{543} PI part II, 195-212. Wittgenstein’s approach is used to overcome the fact/meaning split in Ch. 5.2.1, by exploring how we see facts as objects in systems: facts embody systemic logics and we trace objects with reidentifications.
\textsuperscript{544} See Hamann’s description of philosophical grammar in Ch. 3.3.2, ZH 7, 169. See also Ch. 4.2.1.
organizations of objects in their relational context, and to reordering sensuous practices into new relationships of seeking and finding.\textsuperscript{545} Wittgenstein takes the example of seeing the branches of a tree forming the outlines of a man in a puzzle-picture.\textsuperscript{546} The different ways of seeing-as correspond to two different ways of ordering sensuous practices. One way of looking at the picture is looking at the colour of the branches and tracing their outlines, which involves pointing out the branches and seeing the picture as a tree. Another way traces the outline of the branches, which allows one to seek and find a man from the shapes of the picture and thus see the picture as a picture of a man. The different ways of seeing-as thus resemble concepts, because both organize basic intuitions into ways of pointing out objects and their forms against the background of a relationship.\textsuperscript{547} Seeing-as also corresponds to logical embeddings of pictures onto mathematical models, and the possibility of mathematical constructions. Wittgenstein discusses the drawing of a convex step on p. 203\textsuperscript{548}:

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{c|c}
| Convex & Concave |
|---------|--------|
| ![Convex Step](image1.png) & ![Concave Hinge](image2.png) |
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

The step is used in mathematical proofs, so its purpose is to point out internal relationships in mathematical structures to construct a mathematical model that can be embedded onto different situations, where mathematical results are used. The same shape can however be seen-as a concave hinge where the line goes through both of the sides. The picture can then be embedded onto two different mathematical models and different objects can be pointed from it, depending on the practice of interpretation and the internal relationships of model-theoretic embedding that arise from the practices of comparison. The following theses about modelling arise out of the discussion:

1. Models are abstract systems representing a concrete one. They represent modelled systems by corresponding to them hermeneutically. The parts of the model correspond to those of the system, and the functioning of a model corresponds to aspects of the relations and dynamics of the system.

2. Models are metaphoric. The functional correspondences and morphisms between the model and the system are established through interpretative practices and practices of comparison that draw isomorphic and functorial parallels between the relationships of a system.

\textsuperscript{545} See Chs. 4.1 and 4.3. for a description of existence and categories in terms of practices of seeking and finding.

\textsuperscript{546} PI part II, 197.

\textsuperscript{547} Cf. PI part 2, 208-212. For basic intuitions and seeking and finding, see N III, 286/H 211-212, Ch. 4.3.

\textsuperscript{548} The picture is from the Past Masters edition of PI part II, 203.
3. Models and metaphors enable the aspect-perception of the system in terms of the model: the system is seen as the model. The practice of drawing comparisons with metaphors and models highlight the functional and systemic relationships of the system and thus establish new concepts and new ways of arranging sensuous practices to point out its objects and functional relationships. The new ways of arranging sensuous practices leads to a new way of seeing the system or perceiving a new aspect. Models thus unify senses with reason, theoretical concepts with observation and empirical facts of the system with the logics and meanings pointed out in the system via metaphoric comparisons.

4. The systemic comparisons form a background for forming new ways of seeking and finding objects, and embedding models to the relationships of a system. The practices of seeking and finding are defined by reorganizing the sensuous practices through the analogies of the model.

4.2.3 Realism, idealism and the “practical matter-of-factness” of language

Language-games thus answer the question about the possibility of representation and collapse the reason/senses binary opposition. We saw in Ch. 3.2 that a philosophical grammar locates both idealism and realism as aspects of linguistic activities. Thus it helps to solve the antinomy of metaphysical realism by dissolving the subject/object dualism and showing, how the objective and subjective aspects of language use are interrelated. I intend to show the following claims: 1. Both objects and general facts, ideas and causal powers are a part of language use. 2. Grammatical rules are arbitrary and constructed in human activities. 3. The rules of language-games symbolize general facts of the world and correspond dynamically to them, giving linguistic rules a “practical matter-of-factness”. 4. The correspondence of rules with general facts constitutes essential knowledge in interpretative activities, which are formed as a response to reality. 5. The nature of rules as simultaneously arbitrary social constructions and symbols of general facts present in language means that both Aristotelian natural realism and social constructionism are true of language at the same time. My motto in this sub-chapter is PI 372: “Consider: ‘The only correlate in language to an intrinsic necessity is an arbitrary rule. It is the only thing which one can milk out of this intrinsic necessity into a proposition.’”

The objects of a language-game are a part of its linguistic relationships by definition. A language-game contains its objects and instruments as well as its expressions and word-signs. For example, the language-game of PI 2 contains slabs, cubes, pillars and girders. These objects become

---

549 My approach here is based on Hamann (ZH 7, 161-180) and Putnam (1999). See also PI 371-373.
550 PI 372. Lars Hertzberg discusses the dependence of language-games on facts in the context of the problem of scepticism (Hertzberg 1976).
a part of the language-game by being a part of the speech acts and activities of the game. For example, a cube is a part of the language-game of PI 2, because the connection (“Cube!”, cube) is constituted in the communication between A and B in the context of building a house. Similarly natural phenomena and natural objects are a part of the language-game of God and Adam, because God calls them into being and orders them, and Adam can take a look at them and take in the divine ideas into grammatical rules. Thus any object that has a role in the communicative practices and relationships of a game is a part of the game.551

A language-game was also defined to include facts about its objects. Wittgenstein gives the example of the weighing of cheese: if pieces of cheese shrunk at random, then the practice of weighing of cheese would not be possible.552 In the example, the context of the language-game and the nature of cheese, the nature of gravity and the functioning of scales guarantee that there is a correspondence between the causal process of (cheese on scales → result on the meter), and the rule of (seeing cheese on the scales → empirical measurement of weight). The facts about the behavior of cheese, scales and gravity are necessary relational conditions of a language-game, because without them the rule of (seeing cheese on the scales → empirical measurement of weight) would not be connected with the causal process of (cheese on scales → result on the meter). Thus a language-game contains general facts related with its objects, and its rules can reflect or symbolize these facts and thus reveal the essence of the objects of the game.553 Two points stand out. First, the general facts of nature function like causal powers, divine ideas and other essences. Second, the arbitrary rules can nevertheless symbolize essences and ideas, as the relationships of the game mediate a dynamic connection and correspondence between general facts and rules.554 The concepts of causal powers and divine ideas are briefly introduced in this chapter, and will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 5 in the context of the fact/meaning dualism.

The realistic aspect of language-games can be approached by characterizing the role of general facts in structuring the relationships of a language-game and their connection with rules. The question of the nature of general facts is connected with the nature of causation. General facts were seen in the above example to constitute the causal and rule structures of the language-games. One should however note that these facts are a part of the forms of life and relationships of the

551 The definition of language-game is in Ch. 4.1. PI 2, Baker & Hacker 1980, 26-28. Cf PI 16.
552 PI 142.
553 PI 372. For the question of the basis for essential knowledge, see Morganti & Tahko 2017.
554 For the concepts of a causal power and a divine idea, see Bhaskar 2008, Feser 2014, 42-72, N II, 199, N III, 37/H 66, 108, Dickson 1995, 91, Moustakas 2013. The dynamic symbolizing relationship of language and reality is discussed in Ch. 3.2.2 and Dickson 1995, 335.
game, and are independent of the concept of causation that is internal to the game. For example, the language-game of PI 2 does not have a concept of causation, but it depends on the abilities of the builders and the properties of the materials in building houses.

There are two ways of understanding general facts: Humeanism and realism. Humeanism takes general facts to be just regular connections between types of events. For example, a general fact about cheese would be that events of putting cheese on scales is constantly conjoined with events of being pulled down and events of weight not changing. Wittgenstein seems to endorse Humeanism when he argues that events conform to rules and are exceptional depending on their relative frequencies. The realist view of general facts holds that when A and B are linked in a general fact, then the process A → B tends towards B from A. There are different ways of describing this connection. Peirce speaks of “would-bes”: if A would happen, it would also determine B to happen. Bhaskar, Anjum and Mumford present causal powers as vectors in the space of possible states of affairs: the causal mechanism → is activated by the state of affairs A and tends towards producing B. Thus A → B means that A tends to producing B and will lead to B, unless there is an intervening cause that checks or redirects the causal process → tending to B. Feser describes the relationship between the cause A and effect B in terms of Scholastic realism: if A → B, A is the efficient cause of B if and only if B is the final cause of A, since A starts the causal process that has B as its goal. Hamann’s concept of divine ideas also moves in a similar terrain, as it is associated with Francis Bacon’s attempts to redefine formal and final causes, and also with Hamann’s own view of the divine Word as elements, institutions and ideas. We can operationalize it by taking Hamann’s system-theoretical idea of the grammar of language, nature and theology from Ch. 3.3.2: ideas can be defined as the realities that are part of and communicated in a system S through its institutions or internal relationships. The question of general facts then turns to be a case of the wider question of the relationship between facts and meanings. We have seen in Ch. 2.2 that the fact/meaning split is a fundamental presupposition of theodicism, and that Humeanism follows directly from the fact/meaning split. If realistic general facts, causal powers and divine ideas exist, they interweave facts into processes governed according to their own logic and thus render them intelligible. Hume even uses his critique of causation to argue for atheistic theodicism.

555 See PI 2, Ch. 3.3.1.
556 Hume 1949, Ch.7, PI 142.
558 See Chs. 2.2.3 and 2.2.4. For the intertwining of facts and meanings, see Ch. 5.2.
The general facts of nature should be interpreted as “real generals”, or tendencies and ideas. The issue of causation will be discussed more thoroughly in Ch. 5 in the context of the fact/meaning split. One could try to follow Wittgenstein and Hume to interpret the general fact \( A \rightarrow B \) as a regular conjunction between particular facts of the type \( A \) and of the type \( B \). There are reasons in the theory of language-games to reject Humeanism in favor of realism, even though the grammar of general facts will have to build on the grammar of causation and arguments about its nature more generally. The general facts \( A \rightarrow B \) help form the causal structure of the language-game, and hence determine the actions and powers of the objects in the game, and the possibilities of players to respond to them. For example, the general fact that cheese is pulled down by gravity makes it impossible to let pieces of cheese float in the air to detect zero gravity, and it also makes measuring possible. Hence general facts determine the ways objects react to the situations of the language-game and the ways the human players of the game can pursue the objects of the game by responding to acts.

Reacting to the situations of the language-game and determining the best responses within games are however would-bes, tendencies or strategic actions in the game. The general fact \( A \rightarrow B \) must determine that if the object \( O \) involved in the general fact \( A \rightarrow B \) were to put in the position \( A \) of the language-game, it would produce the result \( B \) in the game. This however means that the general fact \( A \rightarrow B \) is a would-be determining which ways the histories \( H \) of the game would develop based on the nature of the object \( O \). These would-bes play the logical role of strategies. They determine the action \( O \) takes at \( A \) and its outcome \( S_O(A) = B \) barring the influence of causal factors \( S_O' \) associated with the objects \( O' \). Their manifestation is determined through the interactions of the game and the equilibria of its activities, because they are ways of acting that determine the responses \( S_n \) of other players and objects, and the general fact or would-be of the object \( O \) \( S_O \) are manifested and hence determined in the context of the interactions of the game.

These formalisms are just a way of pointing out that general facts have to act like realistic causes in language-games if they are to form the structures of the game. Otherwise the would-bes would not have the counterfactual power of producing results and states of affairs in the plays of the game. They also could not contribute to purpose-driven activities, because they would

---

559 See e.g. PI 142.
561 The concept of general facts as causal tendencies, divine ideas or strategies supports a very strong concept of top-down causation (see Ellis 2008): powers, ideas and their manifestations are determined against their contexts and not just their triggering efficient causes. Hence structures of interaction can function as structuring top-down causes, and their activities and outcomes can function as final top-down causes. See Ch. 5.1.2. for a discussion of systems.
not point towards their results. This points to the undermining of the fact/meaning opposition, as causal processes are ideas that have their own logic that cannot be captured by constant connections of “loose and separate” Humean facts. These themes will be taken up in Ch. 5.

We have described the role of objects and general facts in language-games, which make up their realistic aspect. The social practices of language use make up its constructivist aspect. Concepts and rational rules depend on contingent and arbitrary social traditions and uses of language, because the meaning of an expression is fixed by its communicative use. Therefore logical representation, the norms of representation, conceptual rules and necessities, and the connection of expressions with their objects are constituted by interpretations of experience, historically mediated traditions and social activities of language use. The rules of language-games and hence the norms of representation are autonomous and arbitrary, because they are not straightforwardly constituted by general facts, like natural or metaphysical necessities. They are instead constituted by our communicative practices and their discourse possibilities. In Ch 3.2.2 it was seen that the norms of language-games are internal in MacIntyre’s sense. They can only be described in the context of the language-game, because they are norms, virtues and discourse possibilities in the relationships of the entire game. Therefore they can only be described by describing the entire game, its activities and values. Conceptual rules and their norms of representation do not then reduce to pre-linguistic norms of representation that have a metaphysical foundation in the form of the world.

We have seen that Wittgenstein brings together intrinsic necessities and arbitrary rules. Hamann similarly connects realism with receiving information of objects through the senses, and idealism with using constructed conceptual rules. He even quotes Aquinas’ realist comment that there is nothing in the intellect that hasn’t been in the senses. Putnam points out that Wittgenstein too follows an approach that in fact amounts to an Aristotle-style direct realism. We have shown that a language-game depends on general facts and powers that structure it, and these dependences take the form of dynamic correspondences between rules of language-games like (seeing cheese on the scales → empirical measurement of weight) and the causal process of (cheese lying on scales → result on the meter). There are three correspondences in play here:

---

563 Hume 1949, Ch.7, section II.
564 PI 42, N III, 288/H 216, Chs. 3.2.2, 4.2.1.
565 N III, 284/ H 207-208.
566 See Ch.3.2.2, N III, 289/H 218, Z 320, Wallgren 2006, 391-399. The antinomy of realism is described in Ch. 3.3.3.
1. Seeing cheese on the scales and cheese lying on the scales: the correspondence is between two empirical states of affairs. The first consists of the player looking at the scales and seeing the cheese. The second consists of cheese lying on the scales. The correspondence (Look, Cheese) is mediated by light relaying information and the senses of the player.

2. Empirical measurement of weight and a result on the meter: the correspondence is between an empirical act of looking at the meter and reading its result, and the empirical event of the scales being pulled down and turning the meter with the corresponding force. The correspondence (Weight, result) is mediated by the scales being pulled down, the reading on the dial and the senses of the player.

3. The relationship between (seeing cheese on the scales $\rightarrow$ empirical measurement of weight) and the causal process of (cheese lying on scales $\rightarrow$ result on the meter) consists in the correspondence of the gravity of the cheese pulling down the scales and producing a reading, with the rule that in a weighing one should first look at the scales to identify the cheese and then read its weight. The correspondence is thus between the histories or processes Cheese $\rightarrow$ Weight and Look $\rightarrow$ Measurement. The correspondence consists of the cheese pulling the scales down and producing a reading in such a way that identifying the cheese by looking at it and then following the rule to look at and read the scales produces the same reading as the weight.

The correspondence between the weighing then has three parts: empirically correlated states of affairs (Cheese on scales, Identifying the cheese), the parallel production of Weight from Cheese through the functioning of gravity and Result from Look by following the rule, and the fact that the processes Cheese $\rightarrow$ Weight and Look $\rightarrow$ Result produce empirically correlated states of affairs (Weight, Result). The processes can thus be seen as producing the same result: a cheese has a weight through the power of gravity, which is then measured by the rule of using scales. The production of the same results can then be seen as the dynamic correspondence between the rule (seeing cheese on the scales $\rightarrow$ empirical measurement of weight) and the causal process of (cheese lying on scales $\rightarrow$ result on the meter). We can even say that the process Cheese $\rightarrow$ Weight gives the same information as Look $\rightarrow$ Result, as they point to the same weight from the choice of alternative states of affairs, and Cheese $\rightarrow$ Weight $\rightarrow$ Result and Cheese $\rightarrow$ Look $\rightarrow$ Result yield the same empirical state of affairs as a result.

We have described language-games as categories of discourse possibilities and described causal powers, ideas and tendencies as a part of these games. The above correspondences between arbitrary rules and intrinsic necessities are also rooted in the sensuously mediated relational structure of the game. Mathematical category theory can be used to describe the structural aspects of these correspondences and help to define these dynamic equivalences better. A causal
power or tendency is a structure of causal action, which can be seen as a would-be linking a state A to future states: A → B.\(^{568}\) For example, a cheese near the ground will be pulled down and will accelerate to the earth. The general fact or causal tendency can be manifested in different situations, like in the history of weighing the cheese. We can then define manifestation M, which takes:

1. The cheese to its situation in the game, M(cheese) = (cheese on the scales)
2. The power of its gravity to its action in pushing the scales down and producing a reading, \( G \)
3. The result of the gravity to the effect of producing a reading in the game, M(effect) = (Weight).

The manifestation can be simply defined by taking the states of affairs, the powers and their general facts of an object in a situation, which are in any case a part of the object’s powers and possible relationships. We can similarly define the rules of measurement that measure gravity, i.e. identify an object on the scales and then check the readings on the scales. We can similarly define the measuring rule R, which takes:

1. The cheese to a word-sign or speech act involving it, R(cheese) = (“That cheese”)
2. The power of its gravity to the practice or habit of reading the scales, R(→) = \( \rightarrow \)
3. The result of the gravity to getting a reading by looking at the reading, R(effect) = (Result).

The dynamic correspondence between the rule of measuring and the power of gravity in the language-game of weighing cheese can also be characterized with the tendency of the processes to the same result. The tendency is mediated by the rules, powers and empirical objects of the game. In the language of category theory, the manifestation of the causal tendencies M and the rules R have a natural transformation via the empirical practices of the game, as the following square commutes:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
M(\text{cheese}) = (\text{cheese on the scales}) \\
\downarrow \text{Sight, speech – act} \\
R(\text{cheese}) = (“That cheese”) \\
\end{array}
\xrightarrow{G}
\begin{array}{c}
M(\text{effect}) = (\text{Weight}) \\
\downarrow \text{Sight, speech – act} \\
R(\text{effect}) = (\text{Result}) \\
\end{array}
\]

The same model can also be used for empirical modelling as well as for everyday practices. For example, scientists can feed values and state-descriptions into their models and then use the rules embedded in the model for connecting the initial state to future states. They can also produce these states in some system and let the functions, powers and tendencies produce results. The model is

---

\(^{568}\) See Susskind & Hrabovsky 2013, Ch.1, Maizner 2004 and Smolin 2015.
correct, if the rules match the functioning of the system, i.e. one gets the same results either by setting up the system and observing its functioning, or by running a model defined by the rules and calculating the values. In both cases, the functioning of a system and the rules establishing its norms of description tend towards the same results, and their equivalence is mediated by empirical practices in the language-game of building and checking models.569

Hamann’s creation story and the game model that was constructed out of it can be used as another example of dynamic correspondences between language and reality. The model may seem too theological to be useful as a metaphysical example, but the theological traditions behind Hamann’s work can sharpen the points about essential knowledge and natural realism about it. In biblical traditions, God creates and constitutes the natural laws and other essential facts by his command, so the game offers a way of taking a look at essential connections in a theological setting. Hamann’s Lutheran tradition also connects nominalism about concepts with a theological natural realism.570 In the game, God creates an object X and the rules constituting its behavior in a system X→Y. The object can then be understood as a combination (X, X→Y), where X is the element of an object or its facts, and X→Y the rules and institutions that determine how it would act in certain situations and thus establish the “would-bes” of its action. They thus help determine its essence and modal properties, because they determine its activity in the context of the situations of the game, and thus offer a ground for identification and reidentification. The rules or institutions then help constitute the essences and intrinsic necessities that are reflected in linguistic activities.571

Let’s take the example that God creates a tree and orders it to bear fruit. Adam then sees the tree, utters the word “Fruit-tree!”", goes and takes a fruit and utters “A tasty fruit.” Then the tree has the power $\text{Tree growing} \rightarrow \text{Fruit}$, and Adam forms the practice or rule of "$\text{Fruit – tree!} \rightarrow \text{Tasty fruit.}\$". The play of the game then includes a manifestation M of the tendency tree→fruit, M(tree→fruit) and the rule R that Adam builds by responding to it, R(tree→fruit). The practices of looking at the tree and tasting a fruit mediate empirical correspondences so that the following square commutes in a dynamic correspondence:

$$\begin{align*}
\text{M(Tree)} = \text{(Tree growing)} & \quad \text{produce fruit} \quad \text{M(Fruit)} = \text{(Fruit)} \\
\text{Sight, speech – act} \downarrow & \quad \downarrow \text{Taste, speech – act} \\
\text{R(Tree)} = \text{("Fruit – tree")} & \quad \text{Rule: eat fruit} \quad \text{R(Fruit)} = \text{("Tasty fruit!")}
\end{align*}$$

569 For scientific models, see Ziman 2000, 147-151, Ladyman & Ross 2007, 111-118. For the question of models in metaphysics, see Paul 2012. For systems, see Maizner 2004, Ch. 5.1.2. See Smith 2016, chs. 13-16.

570 Mannermaa 2005. Luther’s view of language is discussed in Työrinoja 1987. For the theology of creation, see Perdue 1991. Wittgenstein discusses immediate certainty in OC 510. The game is in Ch. 4.1.

571 The game is discussed in Ch. 4.1. The discussion of the example uses chapter 3.2 as a background.
The practices and rules of eating fruit ground essential knowledge. We saw that the power $\rightarrow$ of producing fruits is a part of the formal and final causes or rules constituting the tree. The power is also a part of the linguistically mediated essence of the tree, because the tree is identified in part in reference to the corresponding rule. Then the rule corresponds naturally with powers, forms and final causes that make up the essence of the object, and thus symbolizes its essence in the game. The rules of language-games can then be seen as codifying essential knowledge. Tahko and Morganti have raised the question: how can we identify the constitutive or essential facts that have to be taken as a constant, when making metaphysical abstractions? The discussion shows that the rules of a language-game fix both a basis for abstraction, and for modal descriptions. Rules correspond to general facts and are expressed in grammatical propositions, so they establish a basis for abstractions and ground the basis by corresponding with and symbolizing the nature of things in empirically mediated activities. They also fix the factual basis for modal descriptions, as they fix the space of discourse possibilities that determine the properties, relationships and processes that can be predicated of an object in a possible situation. They thus fix the properties it could have in different possible worlds. To take an example from Garver and Z 498: it is nonsense to say that a pain does not have a localization in the body, as all pains are felt and thus identified as pains of some part of a body. Therefore it is the case that $\forall x (x \text{ is a pain} \rightarrow \exists y (x \text{ is located in } y))$. The theological descriptions of essential knowledge might be a bit far-fetched. The history of science shows that correspondences between norms of representation, laws and other grammatical features of language and reality arise through interpretative practices. Morganti and Tahko argue that metaphysics offers science possible starting points for interpretation. Here different scientific interpretations lead to different norms of description and hence different metaphysics. However, the example points out the interdependence and mutual exchange of science and metaphysics, as metaphysical views about the nature of matter help to assess scientific models. The competing oxidization and phlogiston theories offer two different interpretations of

572 See Ch. 4.1 for a discussion of the game. The institutions $A \rightarrow B$ were seen to be the forms of the object, and thus help constitute its essence. Dickson (1995, 137) argues that Hamann's nominalism would prevent him from talking about essential knowledge. Hamann however can talk about divine ideas, formal and final causes that amount to the same thing. See N III, 37/ H 108, Dickson 1995, 79, 335.

573 For the question of the empirical basis of essential knowledge, see Morganti & Tahko 2017. For discourse possibilities as establishing essential knowledge, see Garver 1994, 61-72, 217-235, Z 498. The de re necessity operator underlines that the grammatical rule concerns the essence of pain.

574 Cf. Morganti and Tahko (2017) argue that metaphysics offers science possible starting-points for interpretation (see also Bhaskar 2008, 185-199, Kuhn 1970). The grammatical examples I discuss here show the interrelatedness of metaphysics and experience. Experience is interpreted by setting up grammatical rules and norms of description, which then ground metaphysical descriptions. However, the interpretations hinge upon abstract metaphysical claims.
the burning process. They are both interpretative strategies, as they involve seeing chemical processes as something by using interpretative models according to rules to interpret the burning process. The interpretations are oxidization $\text{Mass} \rightarrow \text{Oxide}$ and de-phlogistionization $\text{Mass} \rightarrow \phi \text{Dephlog}$. The two cases can be tested against the process of putting magnesium on a Bunsen burner and then burning it: $\text{Mg} \xrightarrow{\text{Burn}} \text{burnt Mg}$. It now turns out that burnt magnesium weighs more than magnesium. This entails problems for the rule of seeing burning as dephlogistionization, because one can establish an empirical correspondence between (Burnt Mg, Dephlog) only by weighing the masses and then interpreting the increase of mass as the escape of the negative mass of the phlogiston! Thus the paths $\text{Mg} \xrightarrow{\text{Burn}} \text{burnt Mg} \xrightarrow{\text{Weigh}} \text{Dephlog}$ and $\text{Mg} \xrightarrow{\text{Weigh}} \text{Mass} \rightarrow \phi \text{Dephlog}$ will only yield the same results on the supposition that the rule $\text{Mass} \rightarrow \phi \text{Dephlog}$ gives a negative mass for the phlogiston. This contradicts higher-level grammatical and metaphysical assumptions about the nature of matter, which make the strategy of interpretation $\text{Mass} \rightarrow \phi \text{Oxide}$ work better and thus yield better results.\textsuperscript{575} Thus norms of representation symbolize chemical reactions in the context of interpretative practices that form rules and linguistic categories, and are assessed empirically in practices. The metaphysical necessity of rules is thus based on practices of empirical interpretation.\textsuperscript{576}

To sum up: linguistic activities and relationships have an “objective” side of containing objects, their powers and symbolizing their natures in activities. They also have a subjective side, as their rules are autonomous and arbitrary. They thus overcome the antinomy of metaphysical realism due to their “practical matter-of-factness”\textsuperscript{577}. The rules are autonomous and arbitrary, because they are constituted by linguistic practices and can only be described within their context. Objects, ideas and causal powers are part of the game. There is also a natural correspondence between objects and empirical speech acts, as the objects are at hand in the sensuous practices and speech acts of the game. Ideas and causal powers can also dynamically and naturally correspond to the rules of the game, as they tend toward states of affairs that empirically correspond to the results of the rules of the game. The presence of objects and tendencies as well as the dynamic symbolization of the tendencies in rules combines the social constructivism of arbitrary rules together with an almost Aristotelian realism about objects that are directly present through the

\textsuperscript{575} Kuhn 1970. For seeing-as as a practice of interpretation, see PI part 2, xi, Glock 1996, 36-40, Ziman 2000, 147-151.
\textsuperscript{576} Putnam (1994) argues that the facts fixing essences are partially determined by epistemic interests. See Ch. 5.4.2.3.
\textsuperscript{577} “die Biderkeit der Sprache”: N III, 285/H 210.
senses and about rules that symbolize the ideas, tendencies and other causal forms of the objects of the game.\textsuperscript{578} We have established the two theses:

1. Aristotelian realism: Objects, their tendencies and relationships are part of language-games. They are accessed through sensuously mediated practices and speech acts. They help constitute the causal structures of the game and dynamically inform the rules of the game that symbolize them.

2. Sociological constructivism: the rules of language-games and of logical representation are established by arbitrary use that is mediated by interpretations, social practices and traditions. The rules of language-games are arbitrary in the sense that they must be understood against the context of the game itself.

My argument has strongly tended to base representation and rules in language-games, answering the question about the possibility of thought by appealing to linguistic practices. The argument has then proceeded to point out the interrelatedness of senses and reason to locate rational conceptual rules in language use that gives empirical access to objects. Similar arguments about the relationships between the subjective and objective aspects of linguistic relationships question the dualisms that make up the antinomy of metaphysical realism, and also some of the assumptions of theodicism.

4.2.4 The genealogical priority of language-games

One can ask however: Does this place too much weight on the context of the game? Aren’t some prior objectivist norms of description possible e.g. by describing logical rules and then constructing linguistic relationships and language-games out of them? Hintikka has raised the issue by problematizing the primacy of language-games over their rules.\textsuperscript{579} He connects the primacy of language-games with metacritiques of logical positivism, and with the conviction that a purely formal description of the links between language and the world is not possible from the outside.\textsuperscript{580}

\textsuperscript{578} The background for my arguments is in Wittgenstein’s and Hamann’s criticism of the subject/object (or realism/idealism) dualism. PI 371-380 is key for Wittgenstein’s metametaphysics. The point that language-games must include general facts and depend on them is in PI 142, and the argument that they also include their objects is in PI 2. Hamann’s arguments about the presence of divine ideas in language-games offer another influence (N II, 197-200/ H 65-67, N III, 37/H 108-109, also the creation game in Ch 3.3.1). On Hamann’s way of overcoming the opposition of idealism and realism, see Dickson 1995, 312-313, Snellman 2015. The background to Hamann’s approach is Luther’s tendency to mix nominalism with Platonic or Aristotelian realism, see Työrinoja 1987. These ideas are then read through ideas about theories of linguistic structures in Ch 4.1.


\textsuperscript{580} For Hintikka’s defence of positivism, see Hintikka 2000, 40-50: the metacritique of logical positivism depends on weak logical tools and a Spectator Theory of science. Therefore stronger formal tools combined with a methodological
Hintikka makes his case against the primacy of language-games by defining two conceptions of language: the universalist view and the calculus view. According to the universalist view, there is only one system of language uses and language-world relationships. One cannot therefore change the interpretation of one’s language or step outside these links to compare language with reality. Hintikka compares this position with Kant’s view of the unknowability of things-in-themselves: all knowledge is mediated by the senses, so we cannot compare our representations with reality. Hintikka argues that the unknowability of things-in-themselves and of our apparatus of knowledge go together, because if we can describe our apparatus of knowledge, we can in principle factor it out of the knowing process. Hintikka attempts to develop an alternative, according to which conceptual relationships are both formal and describable. According to the calculus view, language is a system of formal rules that is in principle reinterpretable. One can devise new interpretations and discuss the links of these interpretations with the world by developing metalanguages. Stepping outside one’s linguistic practices allows one to see language as an instrument, characterize conceptual knowledge by describing the language-world relationship and eventually factorize the subjective and objective aspects of language to reach a better understanding of the objects themselves.

The relationship of language-games and their rules is crucial to both the project of relational arguments, and for Hintikka’s foundational project. Hintikka’s foundational project presupposes formalism: language can be described from the outside by logical rules and other formal categories, without taking the logical matter of expressions and mediating social activities into account. If language-games are prior to their rules, then the necessary conditions of the linguistic relationships are also the necessary conditions of the meaningful, objective and true use of concepts. Then if language-games are prior, necessary-conditions arguments from the grammar of linguistic relationships, or relational arguments are valid. Also, if relational arguments are valid, then logical rules and formal categories are dependent on mediating practices and their material

---

581 The primacy of senses also arises in Hamann, see ZH 7, 166. Hintikka and Hamann both view Kant’s transcendentalist idealism as a failure, and Hamann even endorses the infamous Feder-Garve review accusing Kant of straight-out empirical idealism (see Hintikka 1973, 1989, Bayer 2002, 181, n. 9). The conclusions they draw are diametrically opposite. Hintikka argues that Kant has not purified reason far enough: Kant’s fundamental mistake is to claim that the senses give access to objects, so talk about things-not-subject-to-sensation can be objectified. The correct answer is to logicize the forms of intuition by claiming that we gain access to objects through purely formal operations of seeking and finding. Hamann on the other hand claims that Kant has formalized the categories out of their linguistic contexts and thus cannot connect them with empirical reality otherwise than projecting them on sense-data and ending up in projectivism. (See Dickson 1995, 291-292). Hintikka wants to logicize the senses by viewing intuitions in logical terms, and Hamann wants to sensualize reason by connecting it with linguistic mediation. See Hein 1983.

582 See Hintikka 1997. For Hintikka on transcendental knowledge, see Hintikka 1989.
elements, and this goes for meta- as well as object languages. On the other hand, if rules are not
dependent on their context, then one cannot chart the necessary conditions for the application of
conceptual rules by pointing out the features of their underlying relationships. Hintikka’s program
and relational arguments thus stand or fall with the primacy of language-games.

Hintikka has two arguments for the primacy of rules: the logical form of the
operations of seeking and finding can be separated from the logical matter of speech acts, sensuous
mediation and social practices, and one can specify practices by presenting their rules in a logically
independent metalanguage. Wallgren even argues that Hintikka takes the logical form of
language to explain and thus constitute language use. Such a position amounts to an ideal language
theory for language-games: language-games are constituted by their prior formal rules, which can
be detached from the matter of social and sensuous speech acts. Hintikka in fact claims that the IF
logic he has developed is indeed an ideal language and that this vindicates positivism: “Somewhat
surprisingly, there turns out not to be anything intrinsically impossible about Carnap’s dream of a
universal language in which even its own semantics could be formulated.”

Hintikka associates Wittgenstein’s concept of language-games with the universalistic
view. Hintikka argues that Wittgenstein’s holism commits him to universalism: the concept of a
rule must be described against the background of a language-game, and a language-game forms an
ineffable whole. Thus Wittgenstein is committed to the Kantian position that one cannot step
outside language to describe its relationship to the world. Moreover, Wittgenstein’s key relational
arguments like the private language argument depend on the primacy of language-games over their
rules. If language-games are primary then private rules are not possible, because they stand outside
the communicative relationships of a language. On the other hand, if rules can be understood
independently of language-games, then one can describe the private rules of a private language. Hintikka argues correctly that the rule-following argument of PI 143-242 and of Ch. 4.2.1 shows
that rules only function in the activity of a game. Wittgenstein is trying to show that rules are not
mental representations or explicit formulae, but instead have to be understood in terms of the

---

583 See Ch. 3.2.2 for Hamann’s view on the possibility of metalanguages and changing interpretations.
584 Hintikka 1973, 54-56, 59-61: the logical operations of seeking and finding can be separated from the senses. One
arrives to know individuals through seeking and finding and the senses just supply material for a visual field just like
one first arrives to New York by plane and then gets a bus from the airport. Practices are independent from word-
signs, because one could have the practice of thanking without the word-sign “Thanks!” Hintikka 1997, Preface: rules
are prior, because one can design a language-game by listing its rules in a metalanguage. One could add arguments
from Peirce: signs are universals that do not depend on their instantiations, and they are representational, as they
have the universe of discourse as their final cause. See EP 2, 300-325.
a Yes! as Jack and Jill at the altar, presumably because he has dreamed that the universal character of a philosophical
language, hitherto sought, is already found.”
language-games and the activities that embody rules. The criteria for following a rule can only be given against the background of a language-game. Hintikka quotes PI 197 as a paradigm case, what the primacy of language-games mean: the connection between the meaning of “let’s play a game of chess” and the rules of the game is constituted by playing the game.\textsuperscript{587}

There are two issues in play in Hintikka’s discussion: the possibility of building new languages and representations of language-world links, and the relationship of language-games to their rules. The first concerns the possibility of new languages and metalinguages. It is clear that it is possible to develop new languages, as “new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten.”\textsuperscript{588} The question about the possibility of metalinguages depends on the second question: there are rules for describing the relationships of language and the world if and only if metalinguages are possible. Metalanguages presuppose rule-following, and metalinguistic rules are also sufficient to specify speech acts that make reference to language-world links possible. The second question concerns the relationship of matter and form in language-games: rules are the form of language-games, and the word-signs, objects and speech acts are its matter. The rule-following argument was seen in Ch. 4.2.1 to show that both the matter of the elements of language and the form of rules and institutions constitute language-games, and they are in fact interdependent in the game. It is telling that Hintikka quotes PI 197 as evidence of the primacy of language-games in Wittgenstein: the citation divides language into elements like the word-sign “let’s play a game of chess!”, institutions like the practice of playing chess and the rules of chess, and the meaning that is a part of language and connected with objects through the institutional practice of playing chess. Wittgenstein thus argues that language-games are prior to rules, because he is using Hamann’s model of sacramental language.\textsuperscript{589} Hamann in fact argues explicitly for the priority of language-games over their rules and logic:

If then a chief question indeed still remains – how is the faculty of thought itself possible? the faculty to think left and right, before and without, with and beyond experience? – then no deduction is needed to demonstrate the genealogical priority of language, and its heraldry, over the seven holy functions of logical propositions and inferences. Not only is the entire faculty of thought founded on language…\textsuperscript{590}

The genealogical priority of language-games follows directly from the nature of language-games as relational systems that are composed out of elements, institutions and realities that are part of the

\textsuperscript{587} Hintikka & Hintikka 1986, 196-199, 1997 Preface.
\textsuperscript{588} PI 23. Both Hamann (ZH 7, 156) and Wittgenstein (PI 23) explicitly state that forming new languages is possible.
\textsuperscript{589} For the matter and form of language in Hamann, see Bayer 2002, 374-396, 413-422. For Wittgenstein’s use of this model, see Snellman 2018.
\textsuperscript{590} N III, 286/H 211. Hamann applies this model to mathematics as well (Bayer 2002, 296-312).
relationships in and through the systemic functioning of the relationship. Therefore it holds of metalinguistic games and the games of formal logic like the Peirce-Hintikka game as well.\textsuperscript{591} Moreover, Hintikka misidentifies the dialectical context of the rule-following argument. It is not an argument against metalanguages, but against the tradition of formalistic ideal language theories ranging from Leibniz to Hintikka and the Vienna Circle. There can be no purely formal (or purely material) language, as material elements, formal institutions and communicative and conceptual meanings only function through their mutual relationships in use.\textsuperscript{592} Three arguments show the primacy of language-games over rules: institutions only function in virtue of their relationships, the form of rules is only realized if it is realized in the matter of speech acts, and pragmatist psychology of language shows that word-signs are not detachable from concepts.

We have seen in the definition of a language-game that the institutions of a language include its discourse possibilities, the strategies for pursuing the point of the game, and the communicative role of the players. For example, the discourse possibilities of the Peirce-Hintikka game describe the possible uses of terms like “there is”, “some” and “all”. The roles of the game are the Utterer and the Interpreter, and the point of the game is to either find an example supporting the utterance or to find a falsifying counterexample. The communication of the game consists in Utterer and Interpreter uttering sentences to indicate the sentence they are trying to verify or falsify, and producing individuals to further their aims.\textsuperscript{593} Thus the rules of the game only function by being connected with practices like pointing at objects, with communication like stating sentences and coordinating one’s play in response to the activities of the other player, and with communicative roles like trying to produce a counterexample or trying to verify a sentence. Thus the rules function only by being connected with the symbolic and communicative form of the activity of the game. To put the point more generally: the fact that institutions and rules constitute meaning requires that there is a connection of institution\textrightarrow{}meaning in the use of word-signs. The connection links two members of the triad (element, institution, meaning), and takes place through the elements of word-signs and objects. Thus any of the parts of the triadic system presuppose the other two, and their interrelationships.\textsuperscript{594}

\textsuperscript{591} Hamann in fact uses mathematical expressions as an example of the meaning of ideal concepts in empirical use, and contrasts them with metaphysical use that takes ideal concepts to be formally constituted. See N III, 285/ H 209-211, Bayer 2002, 296-312. The Peirce-Hintikka game can be sought and found in Ch. 4.1.
\textsuperscript{592} For the purification of language from Leibniz to the Vienna Circle, see Bayer 2002, 1-4. For the place of Hintikka in the tradition of ideal language theory, see the already quoted section in Hintikka 1997, xvii. For Hamann as a critic of Continental rationalism and his emphasis of the unity of form and matter in language, see Betz 2009, 230-233.
\textsuperscript{593} Thus logical games are dependent on communication, as the players have to coordinate their actions to answer the moves of the other players. See Ch. 4.1.
\textsuperscript{594} This is a key point of PI 197 and its analogues in Hamann (N III, 289/H 217-218). See Bayer 2002, 374-396, 413-422.
There is another way to argue that rules function in their contexts. One can see from the discussion of PI 2 that the correlations between the word “Slab!” and slabs is formed in language use.\(^{595}\) However, the connection is not referential, because the expressions cannot be true and false. Now suppose that the builders have only a limited amount of slabs and pillars at the building site. If the slabs and pillars run out, B can go look for slabs and pillars at a nearby warehouse. Now suppose that if A shouts “There is slab” to signal B to go look for a slab in the warehouse. Thus the rule “If A shouts ‘there is-slab’, B will go to search and find slabs at the warehouse” is a part of the game and it also roughly corresponds to the rule that when \(\exists x(\text{Slab}(x))\) is in play, the Utterer will choose and point out a slab from the universe of discourse in the warehouse. These two rules do not have the same semantical function, because the connections between the rules of the games of seeking and finding make the game referential and give it a concept of truth, but the rules of the game of PI 2 do not. Thus the rules of the game function through their connections with other rules as well, and cannot be detached from the context of the game that is given by listing the rules in a metalanguage. This also shows that simply the possibility of describing a language-game in a metalanguage does not entail the primacy of rules over it.

There is a third argument for the interdependence of rules and social practices. The rules of language-games are its form, and the word-signs, speech acts and objects are its matter. The discussion on rule-following was seen to be a question of matter and form in language. The key premise is that the forms of rules are realized only, if they are instantiated through the use of word-signs, speech acts and social practices. Thus language-games are prior to rules, because rules are only instantiated through use in social practices and empirical signs. The rule-following argument thus turns on an Aristotelian understanding of the relationship of matter and form in language use: no rule-following without instantiation in use! The alternative would be Platonism, which detaches rules from their social and material embodiment, and thus leads to private and ideal languages.\(^{596}\)

There is still one strong argument for the priority of language-games over their rules, and it comes from pragmatist psychology. Hamann quotes the work of Samuel Heinicke, who emphasized the interrelatedness of thought and language. Lev Vygotsky has presented similar arguments in the 20th century by studying concept-formation. Non-human apes can develop practices of problem-solving with tools that they can see, and can communicate emotions with expressions. However, they lack the ability to use concepts to coordinate and generalize their problem-solving practices beyond objects in their immediate grasp, because they lack the

\(^{595}\) Ch. 4.1, PI 2, 10, Hintikka 1973, Baker & Hacker 1980.

\(^{596}\) Appelqvist (2010) presents a similar argument about rules in Wittgenstein. Hamann was an avowed anti-Platonist, see Bayer 2002 297-298. The inspiration behind this argument is a Platonic interpretation of Peirce’s theory of signs (EP 2, 300-325).
connection of expressions and word-signs with the basic intuitions of solving problems with tools in their grasp. Humans differ from other apes, because they can connect expressions with their practices of problem-solving, thus forming concepts. The connection of thought (or the basic intuitions of empirical problem-solving) and language (word-signs) is formed by first learning the grammar of expressions from the speech of others, and then internalizing the logical relationships mediated by grammar into conceptual rules. Vygotsky’s results support the claim that language-games are prior to their rules, because word-signs and their communicative grammar are necessary in the formation of concepts for coordinating activities of problem-solving like seeking and finding, and in learning the logical forms of these concepts and practices.\(^\text{597}\)

Language-games are thus genealogically prior to their rules. This entails straight away that rules can be followed and concepts can be objective only against the background of linguistic relationships and their necessary conditions. Then relational arguments offer a strong tool to criticize speculative metaphysics, including the presuppositions of theodicism. One can make a list of different aspects of language-games and some of their necessary relational conditions:\(^\text{598}\):

1. **Elements.** Empirical word-signs and objects are the elements of language, and form its necessary conditions. Reference is possible only, if objects are a part of the game. Thus there is no subject/object dualism. Meaning is possible only, if word-signs help constitute them. Therefore there can be no ideal languages transporting pre-linguistic concepts. Conceptual rules are objective only, if they are realized in empirical speech acts through use.

2. **Institutions:** communicative forms, strategic roles and possibilities of use form the institutions of language. Following an institutional rule is possible only, if the rule is connected with communicative exchanges between players. Hence there can be no private languages. A concept has a definite content through having empirically and practically determined rules of use. Hence abstracting from the context of use or transforming it changes the meaning of the concept, or evacuates it altogether.

3. **Context:** the reality included in the game, the nature of players and the goals and virtues of their activities form the context of the game. Having virtue in an activity is possible only, if the agent can make moral choices. The reality that we encounter empirically in our activities is made out of many overlapping relationships. Hence there is no Arche determining everything. Rules can coordinate our activities in reality only, if they dynamically correspond to its powers. Hence they make essential knowledge possible.


\(^{598}\) Most of the examples are from PI and James 1975, but some of them are from the presuppositions of theodicism.
4.3 Language-games and categories for being qua being

The arguments about rule-following and objects in language-games then solve the antinomy of metaphysical realism and the problems about the possibility of forming logical representations and of applying rational concepts empirically. Models are located in practices of empirical interpretation that intertwine senses and reason as well as facts and meanings. However, Paul and Tahko argue that metaphysical concepts and categories are higher-level abstract concepts standing for prior higher-level relationships (or ideal relationships, as Hamann would call them). This introduces another level of difficulty: how can abstractions or ideal concepts of metaphysics be rooted in language-games? The problem can be approached by paying attention to language-games for expressions like “to be”, “there is”, and their functioning as categories.\(^{599}\) The main thesis of this chapter is that categories of being are not ideal relationships or “high classes”\(^{600}\) behind language use. They are instead types of functioning of objects in relationships and language-games, which depend on categorial types of language-games and their operations of seeking and finding that typologize objects in their relationships and states of affairs. This allows a new interpretation of the categories that corresponds to the overcoming of the problem of metaphysical realism. Aristotelian categories are objective as types of objects, and Kantian categories are subjective as types of representing objects. The relational approach locates categories as types of encountering objects in linguistic relationships, and as types of objects in relationships underlying language use.\(^{601}\)

4.3.1 Language-games for the concept of being

We discussed Peirce-Hintikka games for first-order logic in Ch. 4.1. Their main idea was to define quantifier expressions like “there is”, “for all”, “some” and others in terms of activities of seeking and finding, and then defining truth (or logical representation) as the existence of a winning strategy for the Utterer, who attempts to find witness individuals to construct a true example of the sentence.

\(^{599}\) My approach builds on Wittgenstein’s and Garver’s linguistic ground for metaphysical category theory (Garver 1994, 61-72, 217-235, cf. Hintikka 1987), Peirce-Hintikka games (Ch. 4.1, Hintikka 1973), the idea of ideal concepts as types of communicative use that can be embedded on language-games (Ch. 3.2, Baker 2004) and metaphysics that builds on the identification of entities in communicative contexts (Strawson 1959). See also Paul 2012.

\(^{600}\) Paul 2012.

Hintikka argues in his article “Language-Games for Quantifiers” that these language-games give a meaning for quantifying expressions “some” and “all” in natural language.\textsuperscript{602}

Hintikka starts from Wittgenstein’s dictum that “For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.”\textsuperscript{603} He then looks for an environment of practices that must be mastered and understood in order to understand the words “there is”, “exists” and “to be”, and thus form its “logical home”. The framework of surrounding activities or forms of life then gives the meaning for the words “be”, “exist” and “there is”. Hintikka then notes that verbs express activities and goes on to point out that the expressions “there is” and “for all” are most often associated with verbs like “seek”, “find” and “look for”. He gives examples of languages like Swedish and Arabic, where “there is” can be literally translated as “to be found there”, as in “det finns”. Seeking and finding thus give the activities underlying quantifying expressions like “there is”, “exists” and “to be” in natural languages. Hintikka explores various cases. One can take “There are craters on the moon” as a special case. One could paraphrase it as “You can see craters on the moon”, as one can sensuously encounter craters by looking at the moon. Other examples are more complicated: “There are transuranium elements” has to be paraphrased as “One can produce transuranium elements”, because transuranium elements must be produced, e.g. in a nuclear reactor. Producing transuranium elements and looking at the moon are however logically similar, as both involve pointing out and searching for entities, and taking the search to be successful when one has encountered one. The game can in principle be extended to seeking and finding predicates and properties as well. Strawson defends the move from “Betty is witty” to “There is something (i.e. some kind) Betty is”, which would involve interpreting second-order quantifiers by pointing out common characters via comparisons. The encounter “There is one!” however takes place through interpretatively, sensuously and socially mediated practices.\textsuperscript{604}

Hintikka takes another example from ordinary language: “Wenn du hingehst, gibt’s Unglück”. The German phrase makes a prediction of a course of action: if you go there, it’ll give you misfortune. The connection between the outcomes of courses of action and the activities of seeking and finding is captured by developing a formal prototype for these language-games in the form of the Peirce-Hintikka game that was introduced in Ch. 4.1. The connection between courses

\textsuperscript{602} Hintikka 1973, 53-82.
\textsuperscript{603} PI 43. For forms of life as underlying and more fundamental practices, see PI 19, Baker & Hacker 1980, 136-137, Ch. 3.2. One should note that the logical priority of forms of life entails the genealogical priority of activities over rules straight away. See N III, 286/H 211.
\textsuperscript{604} Hintikka 1973, 53-56, 57-61. For sensuous encounters as a basis for knowledge and understanding, see N II, 197-199/ 65-66, ZH 5, 265. Glock discusses Strawson’s views on predicates and second order quantifiers (2012).
of action in language-games and the theory and logic of formal games makes it possible to view quantification, seeking and finding as a formal game of game theory. The players of the game are the Utterer and the Interpreter. The goal of the Utterer is to make a quantificational sentence true by making moves associated with the expressions “there is” (∃) and “or” (∨) by pointing out an individual for ∃, and choosing a sentence among the disjoints for ∨. The goal of the Interpreter is correspondingly to produce a counterexample by making moves associated with the expressions “for all” (∀) and “and” (∧). The word “not” (¬) switches the roles of the players. We saw that the truth of the sentence is defined in terms of the outcome of the activities of seeking and finding: the sentence is true if and only if the Utterer has a strategy for producing examples to verify the sentence, no matter how the Interpreter tries to construct a counterexample. Thus the formal game of seeking and finding offers an übersichtlich representation of the logical grammar for words like “some” and “all”.

Hintikka gives two presuppositions for the language-games of seeking and finding. The first is that the field of search must be defined. The second is that there must be clear criteria for making the claim: “I have found one!” These two conditions can be used to frame and answer two different problems: the question of the meaning of the words “to exist” and the question of identity criteria for objects, which give a classification of objects into categories right away.

The first is that using Peirce-Hintikka games as an ideal model for the concept of existence commits one to a version of Quineanism, where the meaning of the concept of existence is given by appealing to practices that underlie quantifiers. There is also another reason for seeing the problems of quantificational reading of existence as problems for a relational ontology: Hamann takes existence to be the most general second-order relationship of being able to instantiate properties in a relationship. Thus the existence of an X means that some entity is able to instantiate the property X and thus to satisfy the predicate “X” in the context of a relationship. The relational and language-game approach to being thus brings together the concept of existence, quantifiers, practices of seeking and finding, and relational systems. This raises the question, whether the quantificational view of existence is right in the first place. The question can be answered by distinguishing different uses of the word “be” by comparing different domains of quantification.

---

605 On formal models as übersichtlich representations of grammar and points of comparison for seeing-as, see Baker 2004, 21-52. For business exchanges as a model for language-use, see N II, 129/H 22-23.
606 Hintikka 1973, 63-66, Ch. 4.1. For the concept of Übersicht, see Ch. 3.2.1, Baker 2004, 21-52.
608 Tahko 2015, Ch.3. Quine 1953a, Ch.3.2.2, ZH 7, 168-169, Hintikka 1973, 52-82.
The second problem concerns the identity criteria of entities. One can only claim “I have found one!” only if one can answer, what counts as seeking and finding an object and to identify the found object. This leads right into questions concerning identification and associated questions about the essences and categories of objects. We have seen that the question “What is an X?” has to be answered in order that one can point out an X, so essences and quantification are two sides of the same coin.\textsuperscript{609} The answers to the questions about the essence of an X are based on the grammar of X. We can establish the grammatical norms of description for the categorization of objects by paying attention to the discourse possibilities and speech acts of everyday language-games containing fragments that are isomorphic to Peirce-Hintikka games. One can then answer the question “What is an X?” by pointing out to the possible situations where one can say “I have found one!” and the question, when one can say “I have found one!” by pointing to the discourse possibilities of the everyday language-games of seeking and finding. The grammatical norms then give a ground for categorization of the objects of language-games and for characterizing their being, which has been taken up in Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics.\textsuperscript{610}

Tahko raises two issues with the Quinean understanding of the concept of existence.\textsuperscript{611} The first is the univocity of being: all meanings of “to be” and “to exist” are captured by the quantifier “there is”, now interpreted as “to be found there”. One can however ask: is existence univocal, or are there other senses of “exist”? The question is made sharper by the question of second-order quantification over properties. The second issue concerns the ontological commitments of the quantifier “there is”: does it automatically commit to actual existence? Tahko quotes logicians like Tim Crane and Graham Priest giving examples like “Some characters of the Bible existed and some did not” to offer counterexamples to the identification of the quantifier “some” with real existence. Tahko follows the second issue by pointing at a suggestion made by Kit Fine: one can always choose one’s universe of discourse to fix the existential quantifier as one wants, but the philosophically substantive question concerns, what is real. Thus it is reality and not existence that offers the philosophically interesting questions.

My defence of the uses of quantification rests on the flexibility of language-games: one can stipulate one’s universe of discourse by e.g. introducing language-games of telling fiction, so the plurality of language-games leads to a plurality of domains and operations of seeking and finding. The multiple meanings of the word “exist” can then be reconciled with a quantificational

\textsuperscript{609} Hamann makes the same point: ZH 7, 161, 175.
\textsuperscript{611} Tahko 2015, Ch.3 (39-63). See Glock 2012.
metaontology. The term functions via seeking and finding when used in language about a fixed domain or a universe of discourse in a language-game. It can alternatively function as a predicate meaning “actual”, “real” or “ontologically significant in the actual world” in language-games with domains that include non-actual objects. The terms “actual” or “real” however have to be understood in terms of “exists in the actual world” or “is fundamental in the actual world”, which must be understood in terms of seeking and finding actual objects.612

Tahko introduces the view that the existential quantifier is univocal by quoting van Inwagen, who denies that existence includes various genera: although the concept of a colour includes different genera or sub-types like red and green, the concept of existence does not similarly divide into different ways of being in the different categories like universals and particulars. Being red and being green are different ways of being coloured, but being a material or a mental object aren’t different ways of existing, because there is just one concept of existence. The analogy between different ways of existing and different ways of being coloured are misleading, because existence is not an activity or a way of being like being coloured is. Here van Inwagen is just reformulating Scotus’ old position: being is a transcendental concept, or it works the same way across metaphysical categories and across the God/creature distinction.613

The question involving the univocity of the existential quantifier is a tricky one, because there is one sense in which the existential quantifier is univocal, and another sense in which it depends on the linguistic and ontological categories where it is used. We will establish in the next chapter that the operations of seeking and finding take place in and through speech acts and discourse possibilities in language-games, which also ground categorization.614 Thus the concept of existence is bound to a category of a language-game, and different language-games have different way of pointing out objects. Moral language-games point out values, scientific language-games point out electrons, descriptions of colours point out properties, everyday language-games point out chairs and religious language-games involve encountering the Holy. These activities of seeking and finding take place through different practices that involve encountering different types of objects and include different objects as their domains of quantification, so the concept of existence is not

---

612 For the plurality of language-games, see PI 23.
614 Ch 4.2.3, Garver 1994. 61-72.
univocal in an important sense. There are many ways for making operations of seeking and finding in different linguistic categories, so each category has its own way of making sense of “there is”.  

There is also another important sense, in which the existential quantifier is univocal (or at least a family resemblance term). Various uses of existential quantification have the same logical form, and higher-order quantifiers resemble first-order ones by pointing out realities (although they point out sets and properties rather than objects). The meaning of logical forms and other ideal terms is investigated in the next chapter, but the main idea is that Peirce-Hintikka games can be isomorphically projected onto other more complex language-games, and this possibility of projection shows that the concept of existence is logically the same in both of the games. The Peirce-Hintikka games thus give a concept of existence that is the same across the categories of language-games, and thus the concept of existence can be called logically univocal across categories. The issue is again one of matter and form: even though different categories of language-games have different logical matter in terms of speech acts, their objects and basic intuitions, they have a similar form of linguistic activities that supports logically similar operations. Logical forms are a special case of ideal concepts, and speech acts and their constituents make up the logical matter of language-games. In chapter 4.2.1 we saw that conceptual structures and sensuous speech acts and intuitions are functionally intertwined. Thus the concept of existence can be said to be univocal in one sense and not univocal in another significant sense.

The second issue in the metametaphysics of quantificational language-games concerns the existential weight of the existential quantifier, which has been questioned by logicians like Priest. Priest gives possible counterexamples like “I thought of something that I would like to give to you as a Christmas present, but I could not get it for you because it does not exist.” He also offers a history of logic where the existential quantifier was for a long time meant to range over a universe of discourse, but not commit one to the existence of objects in the real or the actual world. The quantifier only became loaded with the Frege-Russell revolution of formal logic, when Russell stipulated it to mean existence in the actual world. As a consequence, the logic of quantification cannot be the logic of existence, because it cannot handle cases like “Some characters in the Bible

---

615 The idea of categories as types of seeking and finding is in Hintikka (1986b). I combine it with anti-formalism: the operations of seeking and finding are intertwined with concrete speech-acts and their basic intuitions. See Ch. 4.2.3 for the critique of Hintikka and Ch. 4.3.2 for an account for the basic intuitions.

616 For family resemblances, see Pi 66-67.

617 See Ch. 4.1 for the Peirce-Hintikka game and Ch. 4.2.1 for functional intertwining. See Baker 2004, 22-52 for ideals and Ch. 4.3.2 for the dependence of seeking and finding on speech-acts and basic intuitions.

618 Priest in the book Towards Non-Being, quoted in Tahko 2015, 45. It is interesting that the logic of real existence is approached by taking entia rationis as examples. Well, we’re doing metaphysics (N III, 287/H 210).
existed, and some did not.” Kit Fine builds on similar lines of argument to claim that the key question in metaontology is not the question of quantification, but the question of a real and metaphysically fundamental existence that has to be introduced as a predicate.619

The approach of Peirce-Hintikka games is flexible enough to meet this objection. The games are played over a model M and its domain, and the domain of quantification can then be changed by changing the model and interpretation of the game. We have seen very clearly that this is something that can be done in language-games.620 When we take a look at the different sentences where the concept of existence is used over non-existent entities, we note that the domain of quantification has first been reinterpreted to include entities that do not exist actually and then the term “to exist” has been interpreted to mean “exists in the actual world”. Let’s look at the examples “Some characters in the Bible existed, and some did not”, and “I thought of something that I would like to give to you as a Christmas present, but I could not get it for you because it does not exist.”621

The first sentence involves interpreting the domain of discourse dom(M) to include all biblical characters, as the quantifying range is defined as “some biblical characters”. The logical form of the sentence then becomes $\exists x (x \text{ existed}) \land \exists y (\neg y \text{ existed})$. Then existence can be used as a predicate, but the predicate works more as an actuality operator or the reality operator Fine is proposing.622 Both involve metaphysically significant existence in the actual world, but this surely entails that one could have pointed the characters out or encountered them in the ancient Middle East.623 Thus the term “some” is reinterpreted by giving it the set of all biblical characters as a range. The term “exists” then becomes a predicate that means real existence in terms of seeking and finding in the actual world, much like $R(x) = \exists y (\text{Actual}(y) \land y = x)$. The second sentence is technically more complicated, as it involves thinking and other modal notions. When one takes modal IF logic into account, it could be paraphrased as “I was planning to give you a Christmas present. In my plans, I had one particular thing in mind. I could not get it, because it does not exist in the actual world.” Here the word “something” then refers to pointing out or picking in the plan (or in planned scenarios), with their different universes of discourse. Moreover, the present must be the same in all of the planned scenarios (i.e. independent

619 See Tahko 2015, 45-49. It is significant that Peirce speaks of an universe of discourse (EP 2, 300-325), even though he is one of the founders of modern predicate logic. Hintikka’s distinction of one fixed actual universe of discourse vs many universes of discourse (1997) might describe the situation here. Hintikka claims that both Frege and Russell were committed to the universality of logic, but Peirce was not.

620 PI 23, ZH 7, 169, Hintikka 1997, Ch. 4.2.4.

621 These examples come from Tim Crane and Graham Priest, and have been quoted in Tahko 2015, Ch.3.

622 See Tahko 2015, 57-63.

623 See Ex. 3, Veijola 1990 and Ch. 6.2.1 for the grammar of existence when applied to God.
of the situation.) The expressions “I could not get it because it does not exist” refers to the actual world, where existence is connected with possibilities of getting, or seeking and finding. The logical form of the sentence is $\text{Plan} \exists x/\text{Plan} (\text{Present}(x) \land \neg \text{Exist}(x))$.624

We can now sum up the discussion about domain variance and its use in qualifying the thesis that the existential quantifier is the conceptual device for expressing being. The existential quantifier introduces individuals via seeking and finding and points to their roles of functioning in relationships. It can be extended analogously to properties. The word “to exist” however functions in various logically linked ways, as the quantifiers can be reinterpreted. The reinterpretation of quantifiers over fictional domains of discourse also allow us to introduce a Meinongian existence predicate “x exists actually”, but it then has to be understood in reference to a more Quinean sense of seeking and finding in actual situations. The concept of existence also has one (primary) logical core of pointing out realities, but it nevertheless has many interrelated and family semblant meanings. The formal language-games give logical forms, as they can be embedded onto language-games with different kinds of objects and speech acts that yield different categories of being and different uses for the concept “to exist.”

4.3.2 Discourse possibilities for seeking and finding

Peirce-Hintikka games then give ideal models for the concept of existence. These formal models however pose questions of interpretation, which are a special case of Paul’s, Morganti’s and Tahko’s question of the objectivity of models in metaphysics. We have seen that Hintikka gives a formalist ideal language interpretation for language-games, detaching the operations of seeking and finding from the practices and relationships like looking at the moon or making transuranium elements that constitute them. Such logical foundational projects raise similar problems as metaphysical ones regarding the relationship of formal principles and categories to sensuous practices and language use: “Metaphysics, however, abuses our empirical language and knowledge by attempting to evacuate them of their vital, particular and concrete content; attempting to convert them into the ‘lukewarm hieroglyphs’ of ‘mysticism’.”625

624 For seeking and finding with modal expressions, see Hintikka 1969. The expression of logical independence $\exists x/\text{Plan}$ means that the chosen present x must be the same in all the planned cases. For IF logic, see Hintikka 1997.
625 Dickson 1995, 291. For mysticism and foundational projects, see Bayer 1991b, 104, n.92.
The concept of an übersichtlich representation offers a point of departure to bringing formal representations of concepts like the Peirce-Hintikka game and the general concept of being to the “rough ground”\textsuperscript{626}. Hamann argues that general concepts like being are the most general relationships. General concepts have their value by serving as abstract types of communicative relationships and their objects, as they point to structures of the object-containing relationships in everyday practices of communication and language use. They are thus structural relationships of relationships that are realized in language use, and function like linguistic categories by pointing out relationships, discourse possibilities and corresponding roles of objects. Thus ideal concepts are objective by being realized in and embedded onto speech acts of ordinary language.\textsuperscript{627}

Wittgenstein makes a similar point by discussing ideals in PI 130: the point of simplified or formal language-games is to offer points of comparison to clarify the grammar of language. Baker and Hacker argue that Wittgenstein’s point is to compare ideal calculi and simple language-games with geometry, which offers conceptual tools for clarifying certain aspects of relationships by constructing an abstract model of them, while abstracting other aspects away in the process. The simplified language-games and abstract calculi like the Peirce-Hintikka-game can then be isomorphically projected to parts of more complex practices of language use, and the comparison offers a hermeneutical key for seeing the more complex languages in terms of the games of seeking and finding and their logical forms of quantification.\textsuperscript{628}

In Chs. 3.2 and 4.1 we saw that language-games can be seen as categories, both in the Aristotelian and the mathematical sense. Mathematical category theory has the concept of a functor: a functor is an isomorphism-like functional morphism between categories that preserves structures of structures. Then functors can be used to highlight and give an Übersicht of relationships between ideals and the first-order structures of ordinary language use. They are also an example of the isomorphisms between abstract structural models of metaphysics and empirical reality.\textsuperscript{629} A key point that emerges from the comparison is that the logical forms and comparisons with an ideal presuppose a structure of speech acts, objects, communication and use in the relationships of the target or object language. Otherwise the morphism onto the target language-game and its objects could not be defined. The structure of the target language is the structure of discourse possibilities.

\textsuperscript{626} PI 107.
\textsuperscript{627} See Ch. 3.2.2, ZH 7, 161-181.
\textsuperscript{628} PI 130, Baker & Hacker 1980, 554-555, Baker 2004, 31-46. Cf Bayer 2002, 296-312: ideal languages misconstrue language-use by abstracting the structures of language and then taking them for “hieroglyphs”, i.e. reinterpretable calculi, when the conventions that are needed to interpret calculi are dependent on communicative use.
\textsuperscript{629} For the question of isomorphisms between the models of metaphysics and reality, see Paul 2012, Morganti & Tahko 2017, Chs. 4.1, 4.2.2 and van Fraassen 2002, 1-30.
and uses that is fixed by the activities of the game, the roles of the players, communicative use and other more complex features of the underlying form of life.

4.3.2.1 Logical forms and the categories of language use

Wittgenstein’s example helps illustrate the dependence of logical form and other grammatical principles on the discourse possibilities, communicative forms and the social practices of use:

Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exist, etc. etc.,—they learn to fetch books, sit in armchairs, etc. etc.

Later, questions about the existence of things do of course arise. "Is there such a thing as a unicorn?" and so on. But such a question is possible only because as a rule no corresponding question presents itself. For how does one know how to set about satisfying oneself of the existence of unicorns? How did one learn the method for determining whether something exists or not?630

OC 476 shows that Wittgenstein gave an interpretation of the concept of existence in terms of practices of seeking and finding, just like Hintikka does. The concept of existence is constituted by everyday practices for pointing out, using and interacting with objects, and these practices of interaction then determine, whether an object exists or satisfies us of its existence.631 Wittgenstein’s example raises two kinds of points: the operations of seeking and finding are mediated by sensuous actions in speech acts that were seen to be the basic intuitions of a language-game, and the speech acts are structured into discourse possibilities and other institutions of communicative use that constitute the connections that ground the logical form of the activities of e.g. sitting in armchairs.

We can define a formal Peirce-Hintikka game: the sentences are $\exists x (Chair(x))$, $\exists y (Milk(y))$, $\exists z (Book(z))$, the universe of discourse of $M=\{\text{armchair}, \text{a litre of milk}, \text{a book}\}$ and the possible moves are $\exists x Chair(x), \rightarrow Chair(a) \exists x Book(x), \rightarrow Book(b)$ and $\exists x Milk(x), \rightarrow Milk(c)$, for all $a,b,c \in M$. Now imagine a child Tom talking to her mother Mary. Tom wants to

630 PI 476. The concept of a functor comes from Smith 2016, Ch. 13. For the concept of Übersicht in Wittgenstein, see PI 122, 130, Baker 2004, 22-52.
make his mother happy by knowing what the words mean, so he is trying to pick objects according to the rules of everyday English. Tom uses the expressions “There’s a chair”, “There’s some milk” and “Here’s a book”. Mary interprets Tom’s activity by using the rules of everyday language use: “There’s a chair”\(\mapsto\) Tom sits in the chair and says “This is a chair!”, “There’s some milk”\(\mapsto\) Tom drinks the milk and says “That’s milk!” and “There’s a book”\(\mapsto\) Tom fetches the book and says “Here’s a book!” The English-language speech acts taking place in the conversation between Mary and Tom are thus uttering the sentences “There’s a chair”, “There’s some milk” and “There’s a book”, and performing the acts of drinking the milk and saying “That’s milk!”, sitting in the chair and saying “This is a chair!” and fetching the book and saying “Here’s a book!” Now we can use the Peirce-Hintikka games for the sentences \(\exists x(Chair(x))\), \(\exists y(Milk(y))\), \(\exists z(Book(z))\), as a point of comparison for the isomorphic fragment of English that Tom and Mary use. A functor \(F\) lets us see the conversation as a first-order predicative language-game:

1. Let \(F(\exists x(Chair(x))) = \text{“There's a chair”}\), \(F(\exists y(Milk(y))) = \text{“That’s milk!”}\), and
   \(F(\exists z(Book(z))) = \text{“Here’s a book”}\).

Let \(F(Chair(a)) = \text{Tom sits in a and says “This is a chair!”}\), \(F(Books(b)) = \text{Tom fetches b and says “Here’s a book!”}\) and \(F(Milk(c)) = \text{Tom drinks c and says “That’s milk!”}\)

2. \(F(\exists xChair(x), \mapsto Chair(a)) = \text{“There’s a chair”}\), \(F(\exists xMilk(x), \mapsto Milk(c)) = \text{“There’s some milk”}\), \(F(\exists xBook(x), \mapsto Book(b)) = \text{“There’s a book”}\).

Then the functor \(F\) establishes a comparison\(^{632}\) between the Peirce-Hintikka games for formal sentences and a form of life that grounds a fragment of ordinary language English. The functor \(F\) then points out the logical form of the fragment of English in the conversation, because it offers a mathematical point of comparison for the relationships of language use. Garver argues that the connection of seeing-as and grammar add to a “radical amalgamation of structuralism and hermeneutics.”\(^{633}\) The amalgamation includes logic as well, as the functor \(F\) offers a mapping or an interpretative framework for a way, strategy or a practice of seeing the English fragment as a first-order quantificational language-game. The logical forms of “there is” and the associated ontological

---

\(^{632}\) For isomorphisms and adjoints in category theory, see Ch. 4.1, Smith 2016, Leinster 2014.

\(^{633}\) Garver 1994, 234. The same holds for models in general, see Ch. 4.2.2.
principles are thus hermeneutical. They are located in language-games, which embody logical forms and other second-order structures of structures. These structures of relationships are pointed out and modelled via functors and other isomorphisms that embody the possibility of interpretative comparison of structures of language use. For example, some language-games have fragments whose rules are isomorphic to the games of formal logic, and linguistic relationships and their objects can be compared via morphisms to the objects and rules of other language-games.634

The possibilities of isomorphic comparison that underlie logical forms and other abstract concepts are rooted in the structures of speech acts and discourse possibilities of the larger target game.635 Take the example of the conversation between Tom and Mary. Here the functor F and the corresponding comparison between formal seeking and finding and sitting in chairs, drinking milk and fetching books presupposes the structure of speech acts and communication in the language-game of Tom and Mary. Isomorphisms and the functors of category theory take objects in the source to objects in the target, and rules in the object to rules in the target. The comparison via an isomorphism or a functor F thus highlights the structure of the target language by using the simple or formal source language-game as a point of comparison. This however presupposes that the relational structure of the target language is defined through use.

Take the definition of the comparison between the Peirce-Hintikka games and the conversation between Tom and Mary earlier in this chapter. It was made by establishing a correspondence F or a morphism between their relational structures. The relational structure of the conversation is however established through language use involving the elements of its expressions, speech acts, sensuous basic intuitions and objects, and the institutions of its discourse possibilities, communicative roles and activities. The rules of the discussion between Tom and Mary are interpretative and communicative, as Mary is trying to interpret Tom’s expressions in terms of the rules of the game. They are also linked to the activity of the game, as Tom is trying to make Mary happy by showing that he knows how to use the words. The speech acts of uttering sentences like “There’s a chair!” and then “This is a chair” while sitting in a chair are moreover a part of the language-game, as they are included in its discourse possibilities. Logical forms and the concept of existence thus fulfill Hamann’s condition: they are second-order structures of communicative use, and are constituted through their links with descriptions of objects through use in first-order

634 This example again strengthens the case that language-games are prior to the rules of formal logic (see N III, 286/H 211). Category-theoretical treatments of logic tend to be syntactical or algebraic (see Smith 2016, 231-232, Baez & Stay 2011, Marquis 2014). The method of language-games as categories thus offers new ways of combining semantical approaches to logic with mathematical categories.

635 For the concept of a functor and concept of sameness of structure in category theory, see Smith 2016 and Ch.3.3.2.
language games. The use of descriptions therefore links the abstract forms and concepts like existence with objects themselves. The same also holds for metaphysical concepts that are associated with the concept of existence. This can be seen by taking a look at the speech acts, basic intuitions and discourse possibilities of quantificational practices in ordinary language.636

4.3.2.2 Categories as types of encountering objects

Wittgenstein’s example also raises another point: speech acts and their sensuous practices implement the operations of seeking and finding. Tom establishes the existence of milk by drinking milk and saying “This is milk!”, so the speech act composed of the utterance “This is milk!” and the bodily and sensuously mediated practice of drinking milk also functions as the basic intuition that implements the logical operation of seeking and finding. Hintikka’s attempt to logicise the forms of intuition thus has to be turned around: it is sensuous bodily practices that mediate the logical activities of seeking and finding. The view of bodily and sensuous practices as basic intuitions is built into the definition of a language-game in Ch. 4.1, and it also arises in Hamann and Wittgenstein. Hamann argues that the oldest languages of painting and music give rise to Kantian forms of intuition, as the visual forms of painting and the rhythm of music give rise to a geometry of space and the measurement of time. Since the forms of intuition are forms of bodily and symbolic practices, then the intuitions themselves are bodily and sensuous symbolic practices of language use. Similarly Wittgenstein makes distinctions between different sensuous practices of pointing out entities and establishing their properties. He points out the difference between looking at the blue colour of an object, and tracing its shape. Looking at the colour involves selecting a bodily practice like staring that allows one to perceive the colour blue, to focus on it and locate it in the space of colours e.g. by comparing it with the sky. Looking at the shape involves selecting a bodily practice like tracing that allows one to follow the form and leave the colour aside. These acts however reach objects and properties of a particular type or in a particular space of possibilities like

636 The example builds on OC 476, the definition of a language-game in Ch. 4.1 and uses the concept of functors in category theory (Smith 2016) to clarify Wittgenstein’s ideas that ideals are points of comparison that have been reached by abstracting some aspects of a phenomenon, and that simple language-games can be isomorphic with fragments of more complex ones (Ch 3.2.1, Baker 2004, 22-52). It also builds on Hamann’s ideas that abstract concepts are second-order relationships that are only objective through communicative use (Ch 3.2.2, ZH 7, 161-181).
colours and shapes by being connected to words, questions and other expressions that constitute the discourse possibilities that characterize and categorize these types of objects.637

The different types of basic intuitions and their connection with word-signs also help to constitute essences of objects. The essence of an X is given by the answers to the question “What is an X?” Answering the question “What is an X?” will include answers, how one can point out an X, distinguish it from other objects and identify it. The pointing out and identification of an object however involves seeking and finding it, and distinguishing it in the context of the activities of seeking and finding. However, the types of activities of seeking and finding were found to be the various basic intuitions. We saw in Ch. 4.2.1 that the concept of an X is formed by associating the word “X” with basic intuitions or sensuous bodily practices that include the object X in the activities of language use, so the basic intuitions connected with the word “X” are the ones involved in seeking and finding an X. Therefore the essence of X is partially constituted by the types of basic intuitions and discourse possibilities that are part of the speech acts and language uses that connect the word “X” to its objects and help form the concept of an X. This also entails that the essence of an X can be categorized by pointing out the basic intuitions and discourse possibilities that are involved in seeking and finding X’s (i.e. establishing the truth of \( \exists yX(y) \)).638 Thus the words “to be” and “to exist” operate through the bodily and sensuous basic intuitions of language-games, and the types of objects and the types of seeking and finding associated with the basic intuitions can be categorized by discourse possibilities. Discourse possibilities associated with the basic intuitions and speech acts implementing the operations of seeking and finding thus categorize and ontologically characterize the logical types and linguistically mediated essences of beings by giving their grids of possibility and reidentification.639 Garver and Wittgenstein give good examples:

Continuation of the classification of psychological concepts.

Emotions. Common to them: genuine duration, a course. (Rage flares up, abates and vanishes, and likewise joy, depression and fear.)

Distinction from sensations: they are not localized (nor yet diffuse!) (…)

637 N III, 286/H 211-212. PI 33-37, Bayer 2002, 329-336, Garver 1994, 61-72. Hintikka (1986b) also attempts to describe Aristotelian categories as domains for seeking and finding, but does not classify them according to types of intuitions, their associated possibility spaces and discourse possibilities. See also Strawson 1959, Glock 2012.


Consider the following question: Can a pain be thought of, say, with the quality of rheumatic pain, but unlocalized? Can one imagine this?

If you begin to think this over, you see how much you would like to change the knowledge of the place of pain into a characteristic of what is felt, into a characteristic of a sense datum, of the private object I have before my mind.\footnote{Z 488, 498, quoted in Garver 1994, 70-71.}

Wittgenstein is here categorizing mental states according to their discourse possibilities. A mental state can have various strengths, durations and phenomenal feels. These different types of properties correspond to different questions that introduce discourse possibilities: expressing the phenomenal feel (and thus pointing to it) in public conversation answers the question “How do you feel?”, and expressing the strength of the sadness is an answer to the question “How sad are you?” There is thus a correspondence between answers to questions and values of a type of a property: a pain belongs to the set of alternatives \{not in pain, hurts a little, hurts somewhat, hurts bad, unbearable\}. Similarly, in an expanded version of the language-game of PI 2 one can ask: “How much does the slab weigh?” and get an answer from the set of alternative weights for a slab, e.g. \{2kg, 5kg\}. Each question that establishes a set of discourse possibilities also corresponds to types of basic intuitions. The question “How do you feel?” is answered by a speech act of feeling one’s happiness and saying “I’m happy”, which brings the happy feeling to a public space via the words and thus establishes the connection (“I’m happy”, feeling happy) as a part of the public practice of searching one’s feelings. Similarly, the question “How much does the slab weigh?” is answered by a basic intuition of weighing the slab, establishing the connection (“Slab!”, weighing the slab) in a speech act.\footnote{The discussion builds on Garver’s description of language-games as categories (1994, 61-72, 217-235), Strawson’s discussions of grids of reference to identify an object (1959, 15-30), Hintikka’s discussion of seeking and finding (1973, 52-82) and Wittgenstein’s and Hamann’s arguments on rule-following (PI 197, N III, 288-289/H 215-217, Ch. 4.2.1.).}

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Question} & \text{Sensuous basic intuitions} & \text{Space of alternatives} \\
\hline
\text{Discourse possibilities} & \text{Possible values for aspect picked out} & \text{States of affairs} \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

The connection of different sorts of basic intuitions with the word “X” also establishes connections between different types of properties and helps point out functional intertwinings between them. The discourse possibilities for “X” also categorize X by pointing out its characteristic properties, which then form a value in the coordinate system of the possible states of an entity X. Take the
example of a pain. The pain has both a qualitative feel, strength and a place in the body, so the expression “Pain!” is associated both with having a burning feeling, feeling it strongly and with pointing at its location in the leg. The coordinate system of the pain thus includes (Burning, Strong, Leg), and each of these coordinates are associated with different intuitions: e.g. feeling the burning sensation, assessing its strength e.g. by trying to ignore it, and noting that it is felt in the leg.642

Thus the pain has both mental and physical properties, which are also functionally intertwined: when one has the qualitative feeling of a pain, one feels it in a part of the body and not as a part of some sense data or qualia. The pain thus functions through the physical body, because a basic intuition helps to seek and find it in the body. The bodily location also functions through the qualitative feeling of a pain, because when a body-part is in pain, we sense the part of the body by feeling the pain and locating the pain in the part of the body. Thus the qualitative feelings of pain are physical and the physical location experiences pain. This contrasts with Descartes’ description of the categories and discourse possibilities of beings. Descartes claims that objects in the category of mind have only mental properties, and objects in the category of matter have only spatiotemporal properties. Classifying the basic intuitions and discourse possibilities associated with pains thus helps to classify the typical properties of pains and the system of property coordinates a pain has, to overcome conceptual gaps by establishing functional intertwinnings between types of its properties, and thus categorize what type of an entity it is.643

Wittgenstein also discusses how rages and other mental states also have a duration as well as qualitative features, strength, expressions and an object. Therefore the mental states can be described by giving its coordinates (Feeling, Expressions, Strength, Object) at a time t. The state of the pain can then alternatively be given in terms of its development in time Pain(t)=(Feeling at t, Expressions at t, Strength at t, Object at t). Mental states and other objects can then develop in time, which presupposes the possibility of reidentifying them: how is the pain at t the same pain as at t’? There are thus discourse possibilities and intuitions that can be used to point the principles of continuity for objects. Strawson argues that identifying and reidentifying objects involves locating stories of them in a framework that relates them to other objects and to our knowledge. The theme of stories and frameworks also arises in Hamann’s description of the concept of existence: existence

---

642 The idea of a coordinate system is inspired by Floridi 2010, the concept of modern facts in Ch. 2.2.4 and Wittgenstein’s idea of space, time and colour as forms of an object (TLP 2.0251).
643 Garver 1994, 70-71, Meditations 6 Nagel 2012, 35-37, Burtt 2016, PI 371-373. The concept of functional intertwining is discussed and used in anti-dualist arguments in Chs. 4.1, 4.2.1 and 5.2.
is the most general relationship of exemplifying properties in relationships. Describing the place of an object in the network of relationships locates it in a framework, and description of its role in relationships over time involves telling a story. Thus the concept of the existence of an X (∃yX(y)) can only be characterized by describing the relationships where X functions, and the functions and interactions of relationships must be described by telling a story about them.

One can point out different questions that are connected with discourse possibilities for reidentification. The physicist Lee Smolin similarly argues that merely describing the properties of an object or events associated with it does not tell what a physical object is like. Instead, physical objects are defined in terms of their causal roles, which guarantee their fixity and are described by stories. Thus questions like “Where did the builder take the slab?” “Why are you sad? You were happy yesterday” determine the locations and other property coordinates of objects like slabs and mental states like sorrows at an earlier time t, and locate them in causal processes that link them with states at other times t’ in a way that yield a causally coherent narrative: “Who did what to whom, and when, and why, is interesting because of what we know about the consequences of actions and events.” Alasdair MacIntyre argues similarly that the concept of a person involves roles that we have in our social relationships, and the roles have to be identified by reference to stories about actions that are intelligible as a part of goal-directed practices. Moral agency and roles in a play are identified in terms of giving an account of their actions, so the questions about past acts and their motives like “Why did you take the bus to work yesterday?” are central to identifying the person through his acts at an earlier time t.

The same narrative approach holds in theology as well. Martin Kusch explains Luther’s idea of theological grammar by pointing out that a grammar of religious activities shows how religious practices work, the properties of God, the acts of God towards the believer and the acts of the believer towards God. Thus theological grammar shows how “God ‘deals’ with the person in the word, and the person ‘deals’ with God in faith.” Narrative theology expands the same approach to the grammar of the word “God” in religious texts: the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament tell a story of God by telling about His activities in history. This approach is also fruitful to anti-theodicy, as the point of Hebrew Bible is to “tell the story of what God has done, is doing,

---

644 Strawson 1959, 38, ZH 7, 165-170, Garver 1994, 61-72. The theme of reidentification is taken up in Ch. 5.1.
645 Smolin 201, 49-65. Cf. the linking of the concept of histories and strategies in game theory, and how they offer the institutions that give a meaning and context for the elements of states of affairs that make up single moves (Ch. 4.1.).
646 Smolin 2015, 50-51.
647 MacIntyre 1981, Ch. 15. Cf. Hamann’s concept of playing a role (Bayer 2002, 9-17) and the linking of acts into histories and strategies of interpretative action in goal-directed activities in Ch. 4.1.
and will do about evil.”649 The discourse possibilities for identifying God and the Holy then become questions about the real presence of the Holy in religious language-games and keeping a track of the activity of God and religious stories: “How does one realize that Brahman=Atman?”, “How can I (seek and) find a merciful God?”, “What did God do with Israel at Sinai?” All of these types of questions allow us to locate the characteristic properties and coordinates with the discourse possibilities of language-games and the linked basic intuitions of our activities, and connect them with the present by drawing connections through roles in causal and social relationships, as well as religious practices.650

This approach to categories can be criticized as too linguistic. To take up the distinctions in the Categories of Being, categories can be either logical types or types of objects, and hold either of the Being of the world or of our cognition. Realist metaphysicians like Lowe criticize linguistic approaches as self-referentially incoherent: it is contradictory to claim that our concepts can only reach our representations and not the world, because our conceptual schemes are part of the world. Such criticisms however miss the point against relational approaches: language-games are encounters with reality that include and reveal it, so they do not screen it off.651 In fact, the categories to which the essentialist tradition appeals are logical types in language. To see this, one has to examine the dependence of Kripke’s and Lowe’s essentialisms on the categories.

Kripke defends essentialism by appealing to rigid designators: names that refer directly to the same individual in all possible worlds. Then if $A=B$ and $◊A=C$, $□B=C$.652 He gives two arguments for essential properties: the Queen of Britain could not possibly be identical with the daughter of Harry Truman, because the Queen is the daughter of George VI and nobody is identical to both the daughter of George VI and Harry Truman. Similarly, my desk could not be made of ice, because my desk is identical to a piece of wood and nothing is identical both to a piece of wood and to ice. These appeals to essential namings however point out objects only, if the conceptual role of the terms “table” and “Elizabeth II” has been given: “This material object is a table.”, “See her? She’s the Queen. That lady on the throne.” Then the terms “material object” and “lady” give the logical types or categorial terms of identification that the ostensive namings depend on. These terms

650 For the roles of an essence in determining the state-description of an object and for giving grounds for reidentification, see Ch. 3.2, Strawson 1959, Floridi 2010.
651 Lowe 1998, Ch. 1, Dickson 1995, 136-138. Kantian pragmatists can make similar points about the interrelatedness of subjective concepts and objective structures in linguistic categories: see Pihlström 2012.
652 These claims follow from rigidity and S5: B is C at w’, so $□B=C$, A is B at w, so $□A=B$ and these give $□A=C$. 

196
then assign continuity principles across possible worlds: material objects are identified in terms of their parts, and human persons are identified by referring to their life.653

E. J. Lowe makes this connection explicit. 654 He argues that categories give a priori types for distinguishing between changes of substance and phase changes within substances. For example, uranium → lead is a change of substance, because the chemical element and the atomic number of the parts both change. The changes tadpole → frog and caterpillar → butterfly are phase changes, because the life, the DNA and the life functions of the organism stay the same. He then argues that the difference between substance and lifecycle change are given by the categorial existence- and identity-conditions of objects. However, the existence and identity conditions were just shown to be linguistic rules that offer both ways for seeking and finding objects, pointing out their functional continuities and drawing distinctions between different properties and discourse possibilities. Take the abstract rule larva → adult, or “All animal larvae turn into adult animals.” The game starts from the Interpreter picking out an animal, like a frog or a butterfly. The game then continues from Larva (Frog) → Adult (frog), and the Utterer can verify that only either by appealing to the real continuity tadpole → frog by tracing the development of the frog, or showing that the pointed object is not a frog larva (i.e. a tadpole) at all. The same holds for butterflies too.

Thus one gets the connection Bfly(larva → adult) = caterpillar → butterfly by following the rules of identification in games of seeking and finding. Then one can point out the real continuities Bfly(larva → adult) = caterpillar → butterfly and Frog (larva → adult) = tadpole → frog by following the rule larva → adult in particular cases of seeking and finding. Moreover, the question “What kind of larva is this?” gives a ground for comparison between the different larvae or tadpoles and caterpillars, and similarly “What animal is this?” contrasts frogs and butterflies. Then the conceptual contrasts given by the categorization of animals are natural or given by commutation over the natural structure of DNA change: the conceptual contrast over life change caterpillar → butterfly → frog amounts to the same as caterpillar → tadpole → frog. Then the abstract rule larva → adult is given by the categorial term “animal”, following it in activities of seeking and finding Bfly(larva → adult) and Frog (larva → adult) points out both the real and essential continuities of objects, and also the natural possibilities of comparison tadpole/caterpillar and frog/butterfly. These examples show that abstract concepts for reidentification like “animal” are objective through the practices of rule-following like Bfly and Frog, as the abstract concepts point

653 Kripke 1981, PI 26-30. Nathan Salmon has similarly argued that Kripke’s arguments depend on essentialism.
out continuities of objects through them and establish logical similarities for concepts through their natural possibilities of comparison. Categories then point out types of objects and are also logical types of concepts through conceptual rule-following practices in the activities of reidentification.655

The basis for categorizing objects is thus located in the practices of linguistic use. Categorizations presuppose both the connection of word-signs with basic intuitions and the classification of basic intuitions with questions to establish the typical properties of objects. Categorizations also depend on reidentifying objects by building narratives of their activity in relationships and therefore on structures of questions and comparisons that characterize their roles within relationships and stories describing them. Categorizations are then based on structural features of language-games, discourse possibilities and the functioning of the objects of the language-games, which were seen in Ch. 4.2.3 to be a necessary condition for language-games. Therefore categorizations cannot be detached from language use.

4.3.3 Categories, being and the models of metaphysics

We have now characterized the categories of metaphysics by locating them in language-games. It is now possible to examine the objectivity and relational conditions of metaphysical modelling. Tahko, Morganti and Paul point to models in an attempt to bring metaphysical concepts to the “rough ground”656: models unify abstract theoretical features with empirical systems. The metaphoric view of modelling has however to be combined with the result of the preceding chapter: formal rules of logical games, the categories of metaphysics and other ideal relationships are structures and types of interpretative practices and their underlying relationships. They relate to the world by typologizing: they point out relational structures and the roles of objects in relationships that underlie operations of seeking and finding and the associated concept of being. In the preceding chapter, we built formal models of language-games and their associated categories. In these discussions, the links between objects and models, like formal rules and grammatical sentences, function through interpretative comparisons of models with linguistic practices where we pick out

and classify objects. We can then develop an account of modelling by using formal games and grammatical rules for categories from Ch. 4.3 as an example.\footnote{The chapter builds on the results of the entire chapter, and the account of modelling in Morganti & Tahko 2017.}

The first task of logical and metaphysical grammars is descriptive analysis: they describe how some system of concepts and grammatical rules for logic and metaphysics functions. These rules can be derived from an interpretation of our language-games and their underlying relationships, be offered as an alternative interpretation for being qua being or be invented to offer a point of comparison to existing language-games. The description of the functioning of the language-games and their underlying relationships and objects is roughly comparable to Tahko’s and Morganti’s description of how metaphysics resembles pure mathematics or the exploration of possibilities about the fundamental level of physical composition (atomism, relationalism, gunkism…).\footnote{For descriptive analysis, see Glock 2012, Strawson 1959. Morganti & Tahko 2017, Ch.5.} All take a system of formal or abstract concepts and draw out conclusions about their applicability and the systems they depict.

The grammatical rules of metaphysics and logic can be represented with models. In the exploration of categories, we discussed the formal rules of the Peirce-Hintikka games and the grammar rules for the mental state of pain. These rules can be formally represented by models, e.g. by having a state description vector Pain(t)=(Feeling at t, Expressions at t, Strength at t, Object at t) as a placeholder for a pain, or with diagrams of Peirce-Hintikka games. Thus we can talk of formal models of abstract concepts like Tahko, but this raises the question of their objectivity.\footnote{The section continues the debate with Paul (2012), Morganti and Tahko (2017) on formal models.}

The role of models as metaphors and as a ground of seeing-as answers the question about the objectivity of metaphysical models. The abstract structural features of the model point out corresponding functional relationships in the system that is being modelled, i.e. the language-games involving the word “exist” and their underlying relationships. Take the example of Tom’s and Mary’s conversation.\footnote{The chapter is based on arguments of Ch. 4.3.2. and the argument about the objectivity of metaphysical rules.} Formalizations were seen to correspond with English sentences, and the rules of the Peirce-Hintikka game were seen to correspond functorially and isomorphically with the conversation. Similarly, the state-vector (Feeling, Expression, Strength, Object) can be used as a place-holder for a pain in a model for grammatical sentences like “All pains have a duration”. The relationship between the abstract model M and pains in the language-games where we seek and find objects is moreover established by interpretative practices like drawing comparisons between the model M, encountered pains and practices of pointing out their duration. Lowe’s example of frogs and butterflies shows, how the abstract model or rule larva → adult points out the continuity of objects through the activities of rule-following Frog and Bfly, and thereby point out the essential

\footnote{The chapter builds on the results of the entire chapter, and the account of modelling in Morganti & Tahko 2017.}
\footnote{For descriptive analysis, see Glock 2012, Strawson 1959. Morganti & Tahko 2017, Ch.5.}
\footnote{The section continues the debate with Paul (2012), Morganti and Tahko (2017) on formal models.}
\footnote{The chapter is based on arguments of Ch. 4.3.2. and the argument about the objectivity of metaphysical rules.}
principles of continuity and natural ways of drawing comparisons. The relationship between language-games and the Peirce-Hintikka formal model is formed by applying the logical model as a point of comparison to interpret language use. In these cases, the practice of metaphoric comparison and interpretative highlighting of linguistic relationships and properties typical of objects in encounters establishes a functional correlation or a metaphorizing between structural placeholders and the properties and functionings of linguistic communication and its objects. Models thus point out the functioning of the concept of existence in activities of seeking and finding and categorize the essences of objects by pointing to the structures of language-games and their objects.661

The metaphorical character of models also guarantees the empirical content of abstract models. In modelling, the modelled system is seen-as in terms of the model. Moreover, seeing-as is analogous to the application of concepts, because it involves having the institution of a sensuous practice to interpret the elements of objects and states of affairs by locating them in a system of relationships. Modelling thus interprets the abstract concepts empirically, and the concepts point out the systemic logic of phenomena. Moreover, metaphorical modelling allows one to develop new sensuous ways to point out objects, and thus leads to new forms of basic intuitions for seeking and finding. This holds especially for the models of metaphysics: the categories of metaphysics explicitly point out ways of seeking and finding objects via different empirically mediated practices, and the properties and narrative principles of continuity that are relevant to encountering them. Thus metaphysical and logical grammars for the concept of being can be used to develop new ways of encountering objects. Developing new encounters leads to new basic intuitions, and thus yields new experiments and new ways of looking at the world. They lead to new concepts when worlds are associated with new ways of pointing out objects and their relationships. All of these interpretations can then be put to use in developing new scientific paradigms, new readings of history and of social activity, or in developing theological grammars and stories of God.662

---

661 The chapter builds on the definition of models as metaphors (Ziman 2000, 147-151, Ch.4.2.4) and combines it with the examples of metaphysical categorization in Ch 4.3.2. It is also a response to Tahko’s and Morganti’s (2017) claim that metaphysical models are second-order models of types of entities in scientific models.
662 The interpretation is a parallel to Morganti’s and Tahko’s (2017) view that metaphysical models allow for new scientific theories. My claim looks stronger: it allows for new ontologies, new experiments and thus new paradigms. See Kuhn 1970, Bhaskar 2008, 185-199, for paradigms. The section builds on the account of categories as types of relationships of seeking and finding, and the corresponding classification of objects, as well as on the theme of interpretation of models and the resulting new ontologies (Ch.4.2.2). For the themes of science, history and theology in Hamann, see Bayer 2002, 322-324. For the theme of new languages for interpretation, see Hintikka 1997, ZH 7, 156.
I will now sum up the discussion about the discourse possibilities of seeking and finding and of language-games as categories of the chapter. The categories of being are located in encounters with the object, which include the typical functioning and properties of an object. Language-games for encountering objects then allow an Aristotelian categorization of objects, as the location and functioning of objects in relationships can be pointed out via discourse possibilities for seeking and finding them.663 The discourse possibilities give the properties of a category of an object, as they point out the basic intuitions for pointing the object. The object’s role in different systems and the discourse possibilities of describing and telling stories determine the possibilities of reidentifying the object. The grammatical rules for identifying an object then describe the essences of an object and determine its possibilities relative to a story or system. These rules are dependent on the language use of seeking and finding. They are thus dependent on the relational conditions of language-games.

These results give an answer to Kant’s question: How can the rules concerning categories be objective?664 The answer builds on the Aristotelian and constructivist overcoming of the paradox of metaphysical realism in Ch. 4.2.2, and the rule-following arguments of 4.2.1 and 4.3.2. The rules of language-games for encountering objects empirically via basic intuitions can capture the categorial properties, functional intertwinnings, causal powers, dramatic roles and other essential features. First, the stories S that have been derived from an essence of an object and the manifestation M of an essence of an object O can naturally correspond via empirical basic intuitions. The story that goes from e.g. “a coffee cup falling to the floor” → “coffee cup being broken on the floor” can then be compared with reality by looking at (i.e. seeking and finding) the smashed pieces of a coffee cup on the floor “coffee cup being broken on the floor” → pieces of coffee cup. The comparison then goes “a coffee cup falling to the floor” → “coffee cup being broken on the floor” → pieces of coffee cup. The process “a coffee cup falling to the floor” → a coffee cup falling to the floor → pieces of coffee cup also yields the same results, and it also

663 Taylor (1995, 61-78) argues that Heidegger locates the intelligibility of objects in the encounter of the subject and the object. This is certainly Hamann’s view, see Ch. 3.2.2. For Aristotle’s categories as both linguistic and concerning objects, see Garver 1994, 61-72, Thomasson 2018.

664 See KrV A XVI-XVII, Ch 4.1.3.
involves essential facts about the coffee cup’s causal powers (fragility) as well as its functional continuity (a broken coffee cup cannot function as a cup). Thus the story S and its rules about storytelling (a falling coffee cup can or will break) will naturally correspond to a manifestation M of the essence and essential facts about the cup (if a coffee cup falls, it will break and cease to exist).

Second, rules associated with abstract categorial concepts like “All larvae grow into adult animals”, or larva → animal, point out the features of objects through the practices of rule-following. The abstract rule larva → animal can be used as a point of comparison for the activities of rule-following Bfly and Frog, which then point out essential continuities Bfly(larva → animal) = caterpillar → butterfly and Frog(larva → animal ) = tadpole → frog and also point out natural ways of contrasting their growth and lifecycle continuities with categorially given comparisons. Both isomorphisms and contrasts depend on discourse possibilities, basic intuitions and continuity principles characterizing objects by locating them in the coordinates of a relationship and their typical function in it. To sum up:

1. Concepts are constituted by the connection of a word-sign with sensuous intuitions of an object in a language-game.
2. If concepts are constituted by the connection of a word-sign with sensuous intuitions of an object in a language-game, then concepts are objective and empirical only against the background of a language-game.
3. If concepts are constituted by combining word-signs and sensuous intuitions including their objects, then objects are part of a language-game.
4. If concepts are formed by rule-governed language use and general facts about the role of objects in relationships constitute language-games, then general facts can correspond naturally to rules.
5. Objects are part of a language-game, and general facts can correspond naturally to rules.
6. If ideal games for logical existence point to the concept of existence by being embeddable to everyday language-games, then the logical concept of existence functions through basic intuitions.
7. If the logical concept of existence functions through basic intuitions, rule-following for metaphysical categories locates the abstract categorical concepts in the relationships of first-order language-games. They are fixed in reference to types of seeking and finding, discourse possibilities associated with types of basic intuitions, and with reidentifications in a system.
8. The rules and relationships for metaphysical categories are followed through in first-order language-games. They are fixed in reference to types of seeking and finding, discourse possibilities associated with types of basic intuitions, and with reidentifications in a system.
9. The rules for metaphysical categories can correspond naturally to general facts and point out the continuities and contrasts about their objects within linguistic relationships. The higher-order
concepts are objective and empirical only against the background of a language-game, its underlying systems and its necessary conditions.

We also developed a hermeneutic and practice-based account of models and modelling in Ch. 4.2.2. Modelling is metaphoric and it intertwines observation and theory. Moreover, it is the use of the models in interpretative practices in pointing out the given structure of the object system S that constitutes their objectivity. The objects of a system are compared to a model via the institutions of empirical interpretative practices. These comparisons then reveal and highlight the systemic functioning of the system S by establishing a morphism (functor or isomorphism F) from the model M onto the system S. Modelling thus intertwines reason and the senses, and reveals the functional logic of the system as well as the meanings of its facts. This account of modelling was applied in Ch. 4.3.3 to the formal models for language-games for seeking and finding, and categorizing models that can be derived from them. Thus we have a solution to van Fraassen’s and Tahko’s problem:

1. The Peirce-Hintikka games and structures of grammatical rules for categorical description are models. They represent structural relationships that are realized in first-order relationships.
2. Models are metaphors: they are abstract representations that point out relationships in language-games and the realities they contain. They are mapped onto the modelled systems hermeneutically, through analogies, interpretative practices and seeing the system as the model. The mapping can be characterized by functors, isomorphisms and other structural morphisms.
3. The Peirce-Hintikka games, models for categorical descriptions and other models of being are mapped onto the modelled systems hermeneutically, through analogies, interpretative practices and seeing the system as the model. The maps can be characterized via structural morphisms.
4. Language-games are genealogically prior to their rules.
5. If language-games are genealogically prior to their rules, the modelled realities and relationships are realized in the relationships of a language-game, and cannot go against its necessary conditions.
6. The concept of being and associated metaphysical concepts (like categories) are realized in linguistic practices, and the models for these structural relationships metaphorize linguistic practices and their underlying realities.
7. Metaphysical concepts are objective and models of them depict their objects only, if the concepts and models do not violate the necessary relational conditions of language-games.

8. Types and classifications of the activities of seeking and finding give a basis to metaphysical categories, which are both types of encountering objects, and the corresponding types of objects.

9. The categories of metaphysics are not ideal relationships, and models of them can be objective only if the models interpret language use and the real relationships with which it is intertwined.

We started the chapter with the observation that the question about the objectivity of metaphysics is a Kantian and Hamannian thematic. It is fitting that the arguments given in this chapter resemble Kant’s deduction. However, we have however seen that answering questions about the objectivity of concepts and models requires the overcoming of the antinomy of metaphysical realism and the senses/reason dualism via a natural realism that points to the interrelatedness of senses, reason, representations and the world in practices. Knowledge does not then have an objective foundation or is not reduced to mere subjective perspectives, but instead builds on relationships and encounters with objects. These language-games can then be interpreted as categories of relationships and their objects, as they include discourse possibilities and practices for encountering objects, pointing them out and characterizing the objects in the encounter. Metaphysics then involves describing the functional identities and identifications in encounters and language-games.

Relational grammar resembles Kant’s deduction in another crucial manner. The grammars and grammatical models of being describe relationships of being and are dependent on their relational conditions. Therefore metaphysics cannot go against the relational conditions of language-games for encountering objects. We have seen that the relational grammar of being and its categories also refutes straightforward metaphysical realism and the senses/reason dualisms that are presuppositions of theodicism. We can now turn to investigate more closely the facts/meanings and facts/values dualisms and the principle of sufficient reason. Do they describe the relationships of language use and encountering objects? Or do they instead go against the necessary relational conditions of linguistic relationships? How do they measure as grammatical principles of everyday language, scientific practices, historical and social interpretation or religious language-games? These presuppositions of theodicism prove to be groundless speculative metaphysics as well.

666 Pihlström was afraid that the text would end up as a rewriting of Kant’s Critique (KrV). Well, look what happened...
5. The grammar of reasons and the intelligibility of facts

The question of facts and meanings has been taken up within analytic philosophy in reactions to positivism. Quine’s critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction and Putnam’s arguments against the fact/values/interpretations split have undermined the dualism. Wittgenstein too presents similar arguments. The distinction between meaning-establishing grammar rules and factual claims is context-dependent. His rule-following argument follows Hamann’s arguments against the concept/object and senses/reason dualisms. I build on Hamann’s and Wittgenstein’s arguments about functional intertwining, but locate them in a context of meanings in practices in the world.

My argument builds on the characterizations of linguistic categories as types for encountering objects as well as the synthesis of Aristotelianism and constructivism. Glock charts four types of metaphysics in recent analytic philosophy: Quine’s description of the quantificational consequences of physics, Strawson’s conceptual description, Kripke’s and Putnam’s essentialism and truthmaker theory. My approach can be seen as using descriptive metaphysics as a metatheory for both truthmakers or facts and for Aristotelian essences, and the descriptions locate them within the relational conditions and categories of quantification. I use systems and games to describe the relationships with which language-games are intertwined in order to expand functional-intertwining relational arguments to the world of objects as well. My goal is to characterize objects as nodes for facts and powers, and locate them in the wider interaction of a game or a system that has an inherent logic. Then both of the levels can be viewed through the prism of elements and institutions: facts are elements and rules for action function as institutions within the context of an object, and the object is an element in the relationships or institutions of a context and manifests its systemic logic. The goal of systemic description is then to locate facts, objects and different levels as intertwined aspects of relationships, and thus to overcome the fact/meaning dualism in the world as well.

5.1 Identification and grammar

In Ch. 4.3, we discussed the role of language-games as categories, which give the essences of objects. The view of language-games as categories of objects, and metaphysical categories as abstract types of principles of continuity builds on Wittgenstein’s remark in PI 371-373: “Essence is
expressed by grammar. (...) Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar.) Grammar gives the possible properties that can be predicated of an object through discourse possibilities, and rules and principles for reidentifying it through stories that describe its action across time, or in alternative situations. The grammatical rules for discourse possibilities and reidentifications then reveal the essences of the objects.

Wittgenstein and Garver give feelings as an example. Suppose that Tim says “I feel so happy!” One could ask: “Why?”, and Tim would answer “I got a pay raise”. Similarly one could ask “Why have you been smiling all day?”, Tim would say “I’m happy because I got a raise.” One could then ask “Since when have you been happy?”, and Tim would answer “Since I met my boss in the morning”, and so on. The types of questions and answers then give the grid of (Feeling, Expressions, Strength, Object) at a time t for identifying the feeling of happiness, and telling a story about its causes, the development of the feeling and its physical expressions in social relationships. The questions and stories also make it possible to describe the essence of the feeling with grammatical rules like “All feelings have a duration”, or “Physical gestures can express feelings.”

The role of language-games as categories arises out of their role as a Lichtung or a locus of intelligibility, as we encounter objects and seek and find them in language-games. Intelligibility is then not located in either subjective conditions like reason or the structure of reality, but an encounter between the subject and the object. Hintikka’s model of seeking and finding also builds on encountering objects in language-games. He argues that the language-games involving seeking and finding presuppose that we can point out, when we can say that we have found an X or can say: “There is one!” Hintikka gives examples of cloud-chamber pictures and clicks of Geiger counters, Moore showing his hand and other cases. In these cases, we have criteria for encountering objects through basic intuitions of our activities and thus have a concept of existence for the objects in question. Hamann takes up the theme of encountering God in theology as a paradigm case for being and ontological analysis. Hamann talks of encountering God in nature and history in terms of “speech to creatures through creatures” as revelation is an encounter with God that takes place through exchanges of words and actions between man and God in religious activities and the biblical stories.

670 Garver 1994, 70-72, 228-231, Z 488-504, Ch. 4.3.
671 Hintikka 1973. For a comparison of Lichtung and language-games as locating intelligibility in the language/world interface, see Taylor 1995, Dickson 1995, Ch. 4.1. See also Putnam 1999. For theological grammar in Hamann, see ZH 7, 173, Bayer 2002, 18-20, Chs. 3.2.2, 6.2.1. See also Veijola 1991.
672 N II, 198-199/ H 63-67, see Dickson 1995, 90-91, 145-149
Wittgenstein’s quote that grammar gives the ground for metaphysics by linguistically revealing essences can then be seen as a generalization of Hamann’s approach. The grammar for encountering beings covers Hintikka’s examples concerning the practices of seeking and finding physical objects like hands and electrons, Strawson’s concerning identifying perceivable objects like physical objects and sounds, and Hamann’s example concerning encountering God. All of these are examples of grammatical investigation of essences of an X by giving the grammar of encountering an X. The concept of existence of an X (and thus the essence of an X) is located in practices of encountering an X and presupposes criteria for the encounter. The existence of and X and its essence can then be understood and described in terms of a grammatical description of encountering X’s and the function of X’s in activities and relationships involving them.673

5.1.1 The logic of identification and categories

Strawson builds a logic of identification in his book *Individuals*.674 We have already discussed discourse possibilities for identification and reidentification in Ch 4.3.2. Strawson’s theory helps locate these ideas within a wider framework of describing encounters with objects in relationships. Strawson builds on two important ideas. An encounter is possible only in a non-solipsistic world, and encountering objects presupposes both principles for reidentification and a common grid of reference. Encountering here corresponds to the activities of seeking and finding, a grid of reference corresponds to a coordinate-system for intuitions and discourse possibilities and reidentification takes place against the background of a story.

Strawson introduces the concept of a non-solipsistic world to describe a domain of objects that can be distinguished from the observer. The difference between the self and the world may seem like another version of the Enlightenment subject/object binary opposition, but it is not. One can distinguish subjective states (e.g. pains, dreams and after-images) from oneself, as one can e.g. remember or describe them incorrectly.675 Strawson’s distinction is between different participants of the encounter: one can respond to the world by acting, perceive it and frame descriptions of it. This kind of responding to the world is not possible, if one cannot distinguish

---

673 Hamann denies that there is a distinction between essence and existence: ZH 7, 161. The discussion again recaps Ch. 4.3, Hintikka 1973 and builds on Strawson 1959. See PI 373, Garver 1994, 61-72.
674 Strawson 1959, see also Ch. 4.3.
675 See MacIntyre 1981, Ch. 7. For the Enlightenment oppositions, see Ch. 2.2.4.
between oneself and the world. One cannot distinguish oneself and the world, if Berkeley’s dictum esse=percipi holds. If esse=percipi, then one cannot say that one is responding to an Other or a knowledge-partner with one’s actions, and one’s descriptions and perceptions of it cannot be wrong. Thus if esse=percipi, the distinction between the knower and the world collapses and encountering the world is not possible at all.676

Strawson argues that we must be able to locate an object in a common grid of reference and reidentify objects, in order to be able to encounter objects and refer to them. A similar case was made in Ch 4.3.2: pointing out objects is only possible through basic intuitions and their discourse possibilities, and describing the actions and relationships of an object is possible only if we are able to reidentify it against the background of a story. Strawson builds a different case, concentrating on the relational conditions of naming and reference.677 He gives an example of A and B: A mentions an object O, and B has to interpret the mention. This kind of introduction of objects O is possible only, if A and B can fit their stories into a common coordinate system. In the language of Ch 4.3.2., since the language of A and B must be a public language, both A and B must have basic intuitions for locating O with the grid of discourse possibilities that is given by the structure of the activities of seeking and finding. B must then be able to point at O, and uniquely specify O in terms of some common system of coordinates so that it can be distinguished from everything else. Strawson rephrases Hintikka’s point about the end-points of seeking and finding by saying that to talk about an object O presupposes that it can be distinguished from other objects O’.

Strawson uses the spatiotemporal system (x,y,z,t) as a paradigm case. One can describe it as a physical frame of reference, in which the observer stands in the center (0,0,0,0) and can make measurements comparing the position and time of objects to his own position and to each other according to the information one can measure from the objects. For example, pointing out that my coffee cup 15 cm in front of me and 30 cm to the right of me locates it in public space of discourse and reference, as all can find it in the place given by these coordinates. The grid of measurement depends on causal processes like light beams transmitting information, the relative movement of objects and other causal processes that make up the measurement.678

---

677 Strawson 1959, 15-30 concerns the identification of individuals. See also Hintikka 1973, 52-53.
Strawson describes the role of a fundamental and unique coordinate system by contrasting basic identifications in terms of it with different models of relative identification. One model of relative identification is to identify an object P in terms of Q: in these cases P is identified and P stands in relationship R to Q. This establishes a dependence of Q on P, and if this holds for all P, then the category of Qs is dependent on the category P. There are several interesting aspects of categorial dependence: if the question “What is Q?” has to be answered in terms of P, then the essence of Q has to be defined in terms of P, and Q is essentially dependent on P.\(^{679}\) Strawson also introduces another way of relative identification: reports and descriptions. He argues that identification in terms of reports, stories and other descriptions does not identify an object uniquely, because there could be an isomorphic copy of the events satisfying the report and its descriptions. On the other hand, if one can relate directly to an object O or fact by pointing it out via some relational system of reference R, then the other objects O’ of the description can be identified relatively. Therefore, one needs to be able to relate and point out objects with basic intuitions, and also to relate everything else to these pointed objects in order to identify uniquely. There thus has to be some universal system of relationships R that establishes coordinates that allow one to sensuously locate and point out an object O uniquely, i.e. to seek and find via basic intuitions. Moreover, if there is a system of coordinates uniquely determining the objects that are located in it, then it offers a sufficient ground for baptizing and referring to objects.\(^{680}\)

Strawson also argues that being able to reidentify objects is a necessary condition for having a framework of identification in the first place. Suppose that we could not relate an object, e.g. a coffee mug in the morning with the coffee mug in the evening, even though it were in the same place, the same colour, and the same shape as before. Then there would be no way of contrasting or relocating the mug in the evening with the mug in the morning, and therefore no single scheme of reference.\(^{681}\) Therefore a single scheme of reference is possible only, if there are ways of pointing out the same object again and grammatical principles for the reidentification. A similar result was argued in Ch. 4.3.2 by pointing out that objects function in relationships, and we can pick them out only if we can trace their roles and properties in relationships over time. Hintikka and David Kaplan discuss such transworld identifications with the concept of a world-line.\(^{682}\) A world-line for the individual a is a function \(f_a\) for locating the individual \(f_a(w)\) in the possible world.

---

\(^{679}\) For types of metaphysical dependence, see Tahko 2015, 93-119.

\(^{680}\) Strawson 1959, 22-30.

\(^{681}\) Strawson 1959, 31-38.

\(^{682}\) Hintikka 1969, Kaplan 1979. One can easily develop a Peirce-Hintikka semantics for modal logics by replacing choices over individuals by choices over world-lines or essences.
(or situation) w. For example, a world-line for identifying my coffee cup would involve telling a story where the cup was during different times of the day and how it was used. Reidentifying individuals then requires using their world-lines to point out the location of an object in a possible world, which is a system of facts. The world-lines thus determine the facts associated with an individual in a situation, so identifying individuals connects facts about them into a coherent whole.

Hintikka and Kaplan give differing accounts of the roles of world-lines.\textsuperscript{683} Hintikka associates them with epistemic principles of continuity that resemble senses or individual concepts: for example, “the Morning Star” and “the Evening Star” correspond to different ways of pointing out facts and identifying stars in the night sky.\textsuperscript{684} Hintikka argues that the principles of identity are constructed concepts for facilitating our encounters with reality by pointing out objects from the facts. Kaplan argues that the world-lines point out essences of objects. These different ways of looking at the principles of reidentification in fact correspond to the difference of telling a story of an object to build a model of its action in relationships, and with the essences of objects that are constituted by their functions in relationship, which were charted in Ch. 4. Constructing concepts and grammatical principles corresponds to the constructivist aspect of language-games: we tell stories of objects to trace their continuities in encounters with them and make autonomous rules for identifying objects. Interpreting principles of reidentification as essences of objects corresponds to the realist side of encounters with them, as they are the powers and roles of relationships of an object. In both cases, the principles of reidentification locate facts and objects in stories, encounters and a network of powers and ideas. They thereby undermine the fact/meaning dualism.

Strawson contrasts two types of identification based on their sense-modalities: spatio-temporal and audial systems. He examines, whether both offer a way of both giving a grid of coordinates and a system of reidentification that allows for distinguishing the objects of their sensuous worlds from the subject of experience. Strawson’s attempt to interpret the concept of being by defining operations of seeking and finding on different sense-modalities resembles Kant’s attempts to locate forms of intuition as forms of sensibility, and Poteat’s attempt to interpret different concepts of logic and necessity by drawing different models from seeing and hearing.\textsuperscript{685}

Strawson’s first system of identification is the spatio-temporal system. The coordinates for identification are the system of spatial coordinates $(x,y,z,t)$. Objects are encountered

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{683} Hintikka 1969, Kaplan 1979.
\item \textsuperscript{684} Hintikka refers to Frege’s paradox of identity (1969, 105-108).
\item \textsuperscript{685} Strawson 1959, 59-86, KrV, Poteat 1985.
\end{itemize}
through seeing and touching in their physical presence, which makes the claim “I have found one!” true. Strawson gives fairly rudimentary criteria for continuity. The first is qualitative continuity: if we encounter an object O at t and a similar object O’ at t’, we have to conclude that O is the same as O’ and thus there is no sharp contrast between spatiotemporal identification and reidentification. The principles of reidentification for physical objects are spatio-temporal continuity in the sense of Einstein’s world-lines: the continuity would be a continuous function f that establishes the position f(t)=(x,y,z) at t. Then if the objects O is at (x,y,z) at t and (x’,y’,z’) at t’, then it must have formed a continuous line in travelling from (x,y,z,t) to (x’,y’,z’,t’). 686 Another more general and finer-grained way of identifying spatiotemporal objects is a causal continuity that defines the object’s role in a relationship and thus establishes a pattern of action that picks out its states of affairs in different situations, including the actual one. 687

Strawson also introduces another scheme of identification by discussing an audial world. In an audial world, the objects are located in a system of coordinates (loudness, timbre, pitch, t), or (L,T,P,t). The objects are encountered by hearing, and the criterion for “I have found one!” is comparison to a master-sound that signals a presence of a particular sound source. Examples of master-sounds for an aural presence are the characteristic whine of a radio when one is listening to a particular station, or the characteristic voice of a speaker in a dialogue. The context of audial reidentification is the presence of multiple streams of sound in the space of coordinates (L,T,P,t). Each sound (L,T,P,t) is at all times t related to an identifying master-sound or a definite distance from a common master-sound, so that the sounds S_{A,t}=(L,T,P,t) can be associated with a voice or speaker A speaking at t. The different speakers A, B… also reciprocally influence each other through their voices, and therefore the context of an audial identification becomes a language-game. The different sounds S_{A,t}=(L,P,T,t) are speech acts, and the mutual interaction and dialogue of the players then set up an activity of dialogue and strategic interaction between them. 688

Strawson proposes reidentifying physical objects via spatial continuity and audial objects by continuing master-sounds. One can generalize his analysis in two ways. First, one can take any category as a starting point for grids of reference and reidentifications: the paradigm case was Wittgenstein’s development of pains and feelings over time (Feeling, Expressions, Strength, Object) at a time t. Another example could be Luciano Floridi’s system of a logical space of data as

687 Strawson discusses the spatio-temporal system of identification in 1959, 15-58. Glock (2012) argues that Strawson also has a causal-continuity account of reidentification. See also Smolin 2015, 49-65.
688 Strawson 1959, 59-86. See also Poteat 1985, 104-131.
differences: one can distinguish objects in logical space by pointing out their differences relative to some feature. The grids of facts are then given by the basic intuitions of a category. Second, one can develop finer-grained reidentifications and a method for establishing grammar rules for reidentification by focusing on the stories, rules and discourse possibilities that point out the functioning of objects in relationships over time and in alternative situations. 689

We can take Smolin’s characterization of physical processes via stories to reinterpret the spatial case. 690 Smolin argues that causation holds disparate facts together in networks of physical interaction. Causal networks are composed of events $S$ or states of affairs, and of causal relationships $S_n \rightarrow S_{n+1}$ between events or states of affairs. As the universe is a causal system, one can describe its processes with stories like $(S\text{ue serves in tennis}) \rightarrow (S\text{am returns}) \rightarrow (M\text{arlo returns}) \rightarrow (S\text{ue hits it back})$. It is the connection of events or states involving objects through relationships like causation that allows us to describe the world as something else than a “blooming, buzzing confusion” and to thus reidentify objects. The tennis game offers two metaphors for these processes. First: tennis is a game, so the players’ actions $A$ can be taken as moves in a game, and their positioning, use of tennis skills etc. can be understood as their strategic response $S(A')$ to some earlier moves $A'$. Smolin also offers another metaphor: computation. Each event $A$ is transmitted via the arrows of causal relationships. Then a response or a new event $f(A)$ is produced via a computation on $A$, and then $f(A)$ is sent onward through new arrows. Smolin argues that Einstein’s theory of relativity entails that causation is mediated via communication through light waves or other signals, so cause-effect relationships resemble calculations or information transfer. Physical objects are then reidentified via causal roles against the background of interaction.

William Poteat’s discussion of the logic of speech acts also offers a perspective on audial discussion. Poteat argues that words are actions in a space of communication, and they gain their force from a speaker. Speech acts are absolutely contingent as they depend on their speakers and their language-games, but they are nevertheless subject to the motives of the rules, strategies and the activities of the speaker in the language-game. To use the account of language-games in Ch. 4.1, speech acts like “Slab!” are elements that consist of a relationship between an expression and an act, and are located in a grid of contrasting acts. They get a meaning by being responses to other speakers and included in the activities of the game by being a part of the strategy $S$ of a speaker, and the possible histories $H$ of the game. Then we have both elements in a grid of possibilities like

689 See Ch. 4.3, Garver 1994, 61-72, 217-235. For data/facts as differentia de re, see Floridi 2010, Ch. 15.
690 Smolin 2015, 49-65. Cf. Susskind & Hrabovsky 2013, Ch. 1. For the role of stories in identification, see Ch. 4.3.
“Slab!” and “Girder!”, and the institution of practices S that characterize the players in the game. The speech act then takes place in a communicative system (speaker → speech act → hearer), and speakers are identified in terms of their activities in the game. Persons are then reidentified through narratives of their activities. Religious stories too identify God by telling stories of His activities.691

All of these principles of reidentification then involve functional concepts: the calculation f(A)=B taking the physical state A onto B, and the role or strategy S of a player in a tennis game or the language-games of audial conversations. These generalizations to any category of identification then involves taking the grid of coordinates in the category, and defining reidentification in terms of rules that express the functions, powers, tendencies, strategic roles or characters in stories. The connection of characterizing objects with functional terms and rules for functioning in relationships is key for overcoming the fact/meaning split. The logic of functional identification can be seen as an answer to Juti’s question in Ch. 3.3: How can individuals be simultaneously sensible particulars and the objects of rational thought? This is however a special case of the question: How can the facts of the world be meaningful?692

To sum up, categories of description like the spatio-temporal and the audial systems, and the category of feelings function by locating individuals in a grid of coordinates. These grids offer a way of pointing out individuals and locating them in the activities of seeking and finding, so they are coordinate grids that have been derived from the basic intuitions and their discourse possibilities. They also form a grid of logically ordered differences that constitute a basis for a system of states of affairs: (x,y,z,t), (L,P,T,t) can get different values and the objects they locate can get different properties, thus forming a basis for the relationships between coordinates that constitute modern facts. These systems of coordinates are then systems of differences that are structured by the basic intuitions of the game, determine its possible states of affairs and locate individuals in the space of identification in activities of seeking and finding.693

Reidentification is associated with an activity in relationships and discourse possibilities that describe and point out the activities and roles in interaction. The discourse

---

691 PI 2, Poteat 1985. See chs. 4.1 and 4.3.2. For MacIntyre’s narrative account of the person, see McIntyre 1981, Ch. 15. For narrative theology and evil, see McGrath 1994, 170-174, Wright 2006.
692 See Juti 2001, Ch. 1., Ch. 3.2. Aristotle famously described substances as both logical subjects of predication and the (biological?) functional character F in sentences like F(a), e.g. “Socrates is human” (Cat.). My argument builds on the Aristotelian aspects of Strawson’s metaphysics (see Glock 2012), but it gives them a Hamannian twist by locating functional reidentification in relationships that overcome the senses/reason and matter/form splits by undermining the underlying dualism of sensible facts and rational meanings (see Dickson 1995). See also Pietarinen 2009.
693 See Ch. 2.2.4 and TLP for the concept of a fact. Hintikka 1973, 52-82, Strawson 1959, Floridi 2010.
possibilities point out the role of the object A in a system of interaction and thus locate the object in different situations. These activities are moreover associated with functions that describe the changes of an object, its causal roles and its role in the activities of the relationship. In the spatio-temporal case, the functions are either world-lines \( f(t) = (x,y,z,t) \) describing A’s movement, or functions \( S_A \) describing the causal powers that determine the location and activity of the object A in the context of a relationship. In the audial case, the functions \( S_A(t) = (L,P,T,t) \) describing the activity of the audial object or voice at t are determined by the voice’s speech acts and roles \( S_A \) in responding to others in the dialogue or the activity of the language-game. Such a discursive role- or strategy-based reidentification requires MacIntyre-style narrative identity against the background of the activities of the game. Thus the identification of an object A both in the spatio-temporal and the audial cases depends on functions \( S_A \) that describe the actions of the object A and are determined against the background of the relationship. These functions then locate A in the grid of differences for the states of affairs: world-lines and causal powers determine A’s place \((x,y,z,t)\), and the communicative role in a dialogue determine the sound \((L,P,T,t)\).\(^{694}\) Thus criteria require two parts:

1. A logical space of coordinates that have been derived from basic intuitions of objects.
2. Rules for pointing out the location, actions and properties of an individual along these coordinates that are based on the roles and actions of the individual in the interaction of a relationship.

5.1.2 Functions, systems, elements and institutions for identification

The reidentification of objects then depends on their functional role in a system of relationships. Functional terms and properties have recently been brought to the fore of philosophical discussion by recent advances in Aristotelian philosophy. My account of reidentification in terms of stories that establish the causal and functional roles of an object builds on the Aristotelian aspects of Strawson’s view of individuals. I will reinterpret the functional roles of objects in terms of relational systems. Explicating the concept of a functional role and the concept of a system will then

\(^{694}\) This section builds on the concept of world-lines in physics and logic (see Hintikka 1969), the discussions on reidentification (see MacIntyre 1981, Smolin 2017, 49-65), the concept of a modern fact and Floridi’s emphasis on differences (TLP, Floridi 2010), habits as strategies (Pietarinen 2009, Hintikka 2000) Poteat’s speech-act model (Poteat 1985) and Strawson’s discussion of voices (1959, 53-86), and Hamann’s verbalism (ZH 7, 173, Bayer 2002, 389-393).
aid in locating modern facts given by the grid of reidentification and meanings given by functional roles and stories in relationships.695

The Aristotelian discussions about realistic causation in terms of causal powers and act and potency more generally build on the logic of functional terms.696 Take a functional term, like the functions F of a brain that underlie consciousness. The functioning F of the brain is teleological towards a result Φ: brain functions tend towards producing consciousness. Functional terms also allow to make the act/potency distinction. The brain could well have the capacity F but not exercise it to produce consciousness Φ, as the person is asleep. Then the person is asleep and potentially conscious, because his brain has the functions F, but they are not actually operating. Functional terms are also contextual, as the exercise of functions F produce their results Φ only under certain conditions, in networks of causes and within a context. Then many of the central features of the Aristotelian worldview, like contextualism, teleology and potentiality in the form of “real would-bes” can be derived from a realistic view of functions.697

The discussion about causal powers highlights both the role of functional terms, and how they overcome the fact/meaning split in a key case. As we have seen in Ch. 2.4.2, the concept of “loose and separate” facts entails that there can be no necessary causal connections between events, because such connections would be connected with a meaningful systemic logic. One is just left with constant conjunctions, either in the actual world (if A, then B) or in possible situations resembling it (if A would happen, B would happen).698 The causal-powers theory builds on the insight that causation is a functional concept. The distinction with Humeanism can be sharpened by using Hintikka’s Skolemization of natural laws. The law $\forall x(F(x) \rightarrow \exists yG(x, y))$ is equivalent to the sentence $\exists f \forall x \left( F(x) \rightarrow G(x, f(x)) \right)$. Thus natural laws often embody causally necessitating functional dependences. We can now ask: what is the metaphysical role of the function f? Is it metaphysically substantive? If one deflates it with e.g. constant conjunctions, one ends up with a causal version of ostrich nominalism: the term is law-like but does not commit ontologically. On the other hand, if the term f is to be interpreted in a committing way, one needs metaphysically substantive functional terms. In Bhaskar’s terms, one can distinguish between the mechanism M,

---

695 For functional terms in recent Aristotelian philosophy, see MacIntyre 1981, Ch. 5, Haldane 2018. For Aristotelian aspects in Individuals (Strawson 1959), see Glock 2012. The essays in the collections edited by Davies and Gregersen (2010) and Floridi (2004) form part of the background for my discussions.


697 For causal networks, see Smolin 2015, 49-65. For contextualism, see Ellis 2008, Polkinghorne 2002. The terms “real would-bes” comes from Peirce’s defence of scholastic realism (see EP 2, Pietarinen 2009), upon which I build.

698 See Ch. 2.2.4. Hume 1949, Ch. 7, Paul 2012, Mumford & Anjum 2012.
the activating efficient cause $E_c$ and the effect $E_e$. The mechanism is then defined by its role in a causal process: $M: E_c \rightarrow E_e$ can be viewed as a tendency or a would be-like response to $E_c$, which produces a process that tends to $E_e$. In addition to directionality or teleology, causes are also contextual. Feser discusses the examples of finks and masks. Suppose that there is a live wire, but a fink cuts the power the moment one tries to draw electricity from it. Then the wire has a function of transmitting electricity, but this function $F$ does not yield its result $\Phi$ of transmitting electricity due to opposite causes in the context. Similarly, suppose that Matt takes poison that would kill him, but then the doctors give him an antidote that changes his body functioning so that the poison is made harmless. Then the function $F$ of the poison does not produce the effect $\Phi$ of killing Matt due to the context in which the poison functions. Then the powers view of causation fulfills the conditions of a functional term: they establish a teleological connection through a process or a tendency, and these processes produce results only against the background of a system.\(^{699}\)

Hamann takes a systemic view of the relationships underlying language-games when writing to Jacobi: it is the job of analysis to identify the parts of a system, and the job of synthesis to chart their interrelationships so that the laws governing the system are respected. The analysis then identifies the elements or interrelated parts of a system, and synthesis then identifies the institutions and functional roles that make up the laws and relationships of a system. I take the elements of a system to be either objects $O$ or facts $a$. The functions $F$ of an object $O$ or a fact $a$ are its uses and roles in a relationship $R$, which are given by the institutions. The institutions thus act as rules: how would $O$ function in $R$? The analysis of systems can then shed light on identification of objects. Facts are the elements of an object $O$, and functional rules for individual roles and stories are $O$’s institution in relationships that underlie linguistic categories. The objects $O$ and the facts $a$ that are connected by the institutions of $R$ moreover mediate the actors $M$ and systemic logics $H$, when they are governed by the institutions that are given by $R$. The institutions or rules governing the objects $O$ and the facts $a$ are moreover dependent on the relationship $R$ and are thus contingent.\(^{700}\)

Hamann’s approach to systems and their functional roles as elements and institutions builds on Luther’s synthesis of nominalism and realism, and holds together both functional terms $F$ and the contingency of their inherent necessities.\(^{701}\) It is therefore more flexible than Aristotelianism, which locates functional terms in substances and tends to give them metaphysical


\(^{700}\) See ZH 7, 169-170, Ch. 3.2.2., Poteat 1985, Bayer 2002, Garver 1994, 217-235.

necessity. The view is also built into the conclusions of the arguments in the past chapters: objects O and functional terms F are constituted by and located in relationships, as they are identified in terms of roles in relationships and grids for identification. The necessary or meaning-shaping connections of institutions or rules are contingent: Luther’s examples of institutions are divine commands, and Hamann’s concept of institutions are cases of interrelatedness that are governed by laws and rules typical to the system. The Adamic language-game in Ch. 4.1 is an example of both cases: God establishes a relationship R: X \rightarrow Y between natural phenomena by command that determines the functioning of the associated object O in the language-game between God, nature and Adam. In all cases, institutions establish meanings and structure the facts and relationships between objects, so the connection of institutions is both meaningful and contingent at the same time. Being and functioning are not logically non-related substances, but relational terms: being is the second-order relationship of instantiating properties in relationships, and functioning too becomes a matter of having a role in relationships and thus instantiating properties. Hence Hamann poses the rhetorical question “Is there a conceivable distinction between essence and existence?”

The Adamic game example suggests immediately one possible metaphor for relationships and their embedded objects and functions. A game consists of players A_n, possible moves a_n and possible strategies S_n. The possible moves a_n in a given situation and their combinations into game histories H are given by the rules of the game, so the moves determine the position at a given moment of the game. The possible strategies S_n are each functions giving responses to a given situation a_n and they correspond to a strategic rule how the player would act in a situation. This suggests a comparison: the states of affairs E functioning as elements of the system can be viewed as situations of the game, or moves a_n. The functions F can then be viewed as (partial) strategic rules S_n determining, how an object would act.

Moreover, the strategies of game theory capture well the contextualism of functional terms. The solution concept of game theory is the Nash equilibrium: each player picks the strategy S_n that is the best response to the strategies S_k of the other players k. The functioning of objects is similarly heavily dependent on their contexts: George F. R. Ellis argues that the context not only structures the interactions of a system, but also “top-down causation changes the natures of the
lower elements.” Then the rules for possible interactions are determined by the context, and the functions $F$ of objects are also determined as a response to the situation. The interaction can then be seen to function at two levels. The choices of strategy $S$ determine the functions $F$ and the strategic rules or would-bes $M$ that are associated with an object in a situation. The outcomes of a game are then histories or paths through the space of possible states that are given by the interactions between would-bes aiming at certain end-points. The complex interactions of objects and the ensuing paths through possibilities give another metaphor for relationships: systems theory.

Systems theory has developed recently as a way of investigating networks of relationships that are composed of parts and their interactions on various levels, and the laws and structures that are a part of their functioning. Klaus Maizner and George F. R. Ellis describe the various concepts and levels of causation in complex systems in their articles “System: An Introduction into Systems Science”, and “On the Nature of Causation in Complex Systems.”

Maizner argues that the goal of systems theory is to explain the laws of nature in complexes of interaction, or complex systems. A system is made up of its entities, a set of states and its dynamical laws that describe its evolution in time: (objects, states of affairs, changes). The dynamics of a system, or the change of states over time, is typically described by differential equations in systems theory. A similar picture also arises out of Leonard Susskind’s introduction into classical physics. Susskind describes a system as being composed of a set of states $S_n$, and of dynamical laws that describe the changes over time: $S_n \rightarrow S_{n+1}$. The states include a complete description of a system at any one time. The laws then determine a path through possible states of affairs $S_n \rightarrow S_{n+1} \rightarrow S_{n+2} \rightarrow \ldots$ The states of affairs can then be described as elements or objects $S_n$, and the changes between states as institutions or arrows $\rightarrow$, and the system as (objects, SoA, $\rightarrow$).

Maizner discusses the different types of systems and levels of description of systems. He notes that systems theory generalizes the methods of description that are used in statistical physics. Systems can be described at both the micro-level and the macro-level: local states involve terms like the place and movement of gas molecules, and global states involve terms like temperature and pressure. A control parameter like temperature can change the higher-level order...

---

705 Ellis 2008, Pruss (2006, 162-164) uses an EPR experiment as an example of a situation where even the properties and would-bes of a particle are not ready-made, but formed in the interactions of an experimental situation.

706 Osborne & Rubinstein 1994, Bicchieri 2004, Appendix. I got the idea of games as a model for Peirce’s Scholastic account of “would-bes” and functional terms like laws from Pietarinen (2009) and Hintikka (2000). The two-level account of strategies as functionings $F$ and histories as paths through states is motivated by Bhaskar (2008), Austin (2018) and the comparisons with systems theory.


George F. R. Ellis discusses the nature of causation and the role of different levels in complex systems. He distinguishes between the levels of the familiar hierarchy of composition: physics, biology and sociology. Physics uses least action principles to describe its systems. These principles define paths through the space of possibilities. Take the example of classical physics: since energy is conserved, whenever potential energy is lost, kinetic energy is gained and vice versa. Then the sum of changes between them must be 0, and hence the sum $\int \text{Kinetic energy} - \text{Potential energy} \, dt$ must be minimized. In biology, information, evolution and goal-direction are used to explain cells, organisms and populations. In social sciences and psychology, communication and symbolic action are key explanatory principles. Reality is then organized among many levels, and Ellis claims that all causation does not reduce to the bottom level. There are instead many levels of causation, and Ellis refers to Aristotle’s four causes.

Ellis discusses top-down causation by distinguishing between higher-level concepts and terms $H$, and lower-level concepts and terms $L$ of a system $S$. The terms are typically in whole-part relationships, but they can be between any levels of abstraction or description. A system consists of functional modules $M$ and the network of relationships or causal diagrams between them. Moreover, this element/institution structure $L$ must be described at the irreducibly higher-

---

710 For the problem of dualism, see Ch. 2.2.1, Rep. For elements and institutions, see Ch. 5.1.2. The distinction between function and fact is inspired by Bhaskar (2008). The higher/lower-distinction comes from Ellis (2008).
711 Ellis 2008. Chs. 4.1 and 5.2.3 examine functional intertwining in different levels of reality.
712 See Susskind & Hrabovsky 2013. They want to deny that the principles are teleological. I want to note that the integral involves choosing entire paths across the space of possible situations.
713 See Met. V. I do not want to defend Aristotle’s four causes here.
714 For levels of abstraction, see Floridi 2010, Ch. 3. Ellis (2001) refers to object-oriented programming, which is used as a paradigm for objects of type $(\text{SoA, rules}) = (\text{element, institutions})$ in Floridi, Ch. 15, and the next section.
level language of connections between modules and network functions $H$ that function through it. The thread running through my argument is to locate objects as modules $M$, their discourse possibilities and facts as level $L$, and the systemic logics that arise from their interrelationships as descriptions at level $H$. The descriptions of lower $L$ and higher levels $H$ can be taken as two different levels of abstraction, or categories of linguistic description of Ch. 4.3. For example, one can measure and describe the functioning of a computer’s processor, or describe the program that is being run on it. Ellis also describes two different relationships between the lower-level $L$ and higher-level concepts $H$: coarse-grained and irreducible. Coarse-grained variables $H$ are averages over concepts at $L$ and thus reducible. Irreducible higher-level variables $H$ refer to functional terms or meaningful information, so they cannot be analyzed or reduced to lower levels $L$.

Ellis then defines both top-down and bottom-up causation.\textsuperscript{715} Bottom-up causation involves parts $L$ influencing the whole $H$: for example, the running of an engine moves a car. Top-down causation involves functions and structure of the whole $H$ providing contexts for the parts $L$. He also distinguishes between causal efficacy or the ability to function as an efficient cause, and causal role or the ability to influence the outcome of processes. Top-down causes have causal roles without being efficient causes: for example, the shape of the forest influences how a fire spreads, but it cannot start the fire or ignite any particular tree. Top-down causes then function by determining the context of efficient causes, and by determining the causal power of the parts: if the top-down cause $H$ is different, then the efficient causes $L$ are different. The top-down action of the level $H$ is dependent on an equivalence class $L, L', L''$ so that the states $L, L', L''$ implement the same higher-level states $H$ as both $H$ and $L$ change concurrently. In categorial terms, the following diagrams must all commute (i.e. $L_1 \star \rightarrow H_1 \rightarrow H_2 = L_1 \star \rightarrow L_\star \rightarrow H_2$ for all $\star$):

$$
\begin{array}{c}
L_1 \\
H_1 \\
L_2 \\
H_2
\end{array}
$$

Source: Ellis 2008.

$H$ is then realized by the various $L$‘s. It also helps determine their functioning and structure, because changes in $H$ bring about changes in $L$. The higher-level structure of causes also closely corresponds to the causal arrows at the lower level: the structure $H_1 \rightarrow H_2 \rightarrow H_3$ has the corresponding structure $L_1 \rightarrow L_2 \rightarrow L_3$ at the lower level.\textsuperscript{716} Ellis argues that the physical level and

\textsuperscript{715} Ellis 2001, 2008.

\textsuperscript{716} Cf. functional interdependences (Ch. 4.1) as isomorphism-style back-and-forth systems on relationships.
other lower levels offer possibilities, and top-down influences then determine the events that take place. To put it in a slogan: bottom-up causes enable action, same-level efficient causes bring it about, and top-down causes structure and determine it.\textsuperscript{717}

Maizner argues that there is a close analogy between systems (object, SoA, →) and computer systems. The states of affairs A can be taken as data, and the arrows or dynamic laws can be connected with calculations or programs f so that f takes the state A as an input, and produces the state f(A) as a result. According this informational metaphor, information flow is correlations between data or states of affairs.\textsuperscript{718} The concepts of elements/institutions, moves/strategies, data/calculations and states/processes and even matter/form can be contrasted and found to be connected by family resemblances. John Baez and Michael Stay have charted the connections between some of these concepts in their article “Physics, Topology, Logic and Computation: A Rosetta Stone”\textsuperscript{719}. Baez and Stay take the distinction of object/arrow in category theory as their starting point, and then use it as a starting point for “a general science of systems and processes”. Physics has states and causal processes, logic has propositions and proofs, and computer science has data types and programs. They can be modelled with objects and morphisms, and together they can all be thought of as aspects of a universal theory of systems and processes. They offer the following Rosetta Stone for translating between the basic concepts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Physics</th>
<th>Logic</th>
<th>Computation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituents</td>
<td>Object</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>Proposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process</td>
<td>Arrow</td>
<td>Process</td>
<td>Proof</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We can now write an analogous chart for element/institution, moves/strategies in games, SoAs/processes in systems, and data/programs in computation. Elements are defined as the interrelated parts of some system, and institutions are functionally determined relationships within it. Moves are choices or states of affairs in a game. The defining rules of a game give the possible moves in a situation A, and the strategic rules S\textsubscript{P} determine the response of player P to a situation A, S\textsubscript{P}(A)=B for some move B of player P. A program f takes some data A as an input, and calculates then the output f(A). In all cases, there is a material part, event or a point in the space of

\textsuperscript{717} Ellis 2008. He also draws a direct analogy with Aristotle’s material, efficient and final causes.

\textsuperscript{718} Smolin 2015, 49-65, Maizner 2004, 36-38. The Humeanism of correlations should make one wary of attempts to construct “the world out of data”, as the result will inevitably be the loss of the substance of the world: objects are reduced to causal patterns and causal patterns are reduced to metaphysically non-substantive constant conjunctions, so in the end one is left with nothing at all. This is the price of having elements (like SoAs) without institutions with metaphysical constituting power (see Ladyman 2007, esp. Ch.6, Cf. Bayer 2002, 78-80).

\textsuperscript{719} Baez and Stay 2011.
given alternatives (an element) and a functional dependence or a dynamically given possible course of events over time (institution). Moreover, the rules and functions determine the possible paths and thus give the logical structure of the interrelationships, and the parts are also part of the inputs or possible triggers for the rules and functions, and thus help to reciprocally define them:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Systems</th>
<th>Communication</th>
<th>Games</th>
<th>Computation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituents</td>
<td>Object</td>
<td>States</td>
<td>Element</td>
<td>Moves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process</td>
<td>Arrow</td>
<td>Dynamics</td>
<td>Institution</td>
<td>Def. /Strat. Rule</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Games have their logic of positions and strategies, and systems then have their logic of states and processes. They then offer the grids of states and functional roles for reidentification, which are required to identify objects in language-games. The logic of grids of states and functional roles and stories moreover fits Hamann’s analysis of systems into elements, institutions and systemic logics:

1. Elements: The elements of a system S are its states. The elements of a game are its moves.
2. Institution: The institution of a system S are its dynamic laws. The institution of a game are its defining and strategic rules.
3. Systemic logic: The elements of facts/moves and the institutions of strategic rules and the associated dynamic laws are determined by the functional would-bes F given by the interaction of objects O and the systemic logics H of S. The facts then manifest functions F and logics H.

5.1.3 The location of individuals in relationships and identification

We have now established language-games as a basis for categorizing objects. The discourse possibilities involving objects give the grids of possibility for the objects, and the stories that are told about objects establish the functions for reidentifying these objects. The language-games presuppose an underlying relational system that can be analyzed as systems or games with elements and institutions. Moreover, the system functions at many levels of description, and the arrows or rules of transformations have to be understood in terms of real tendencies or functions in relationships. The intertwining of a language-game and a background system of relationships, and the location of states and individuals in relationships allows us to overcome the fact/meaning gap.
An object is a node M in the relationship, the facts about objects are the elements, and their rules are institutions at level L. The object is also located in a relationship, whose systemic logics are described at H. Then the logics or meanings of the object at H are embodied through the facts or elements, and the rules for functioning or institution of the object M.

The discourse possibilities for identification in language-games and the states of a system give a basis for modern facts. Modern facts were discussed in Ch. 2.2.4.1: they involve both an individual identified via its location in logical space, and then some properties or relationships that hold between the individuals. In a phenomenal grid, phenomena in spaces of experiences are the logical subjects, and predicates describe the experience. The visual spot could be red or blue, the pitch of the heard note could be C or D, and the touch might have a hard or soft qualitative feel.720 The states of affairs are of the form F(a): the spot is red, the note is a C and the touch is soft. Another grid of identification is Strawson’s physical identification: a spatial point identified by the coordinate (x,y,z,t) contains an object. For example, “A chair is at x,y,z,t” or “Jack and Jill went to the movies at 7 o’clock” are material facts.721

As we have seen in Ch. 5.1, the picture of identifying individuals by locating them in a grid, e.g. (x,y,z,t) and then ascribing them properties F and relationships R against the background of a system S is exactly what happens in language-games. In Ch. 4.3 we saw that the pair questions/discourse possibilities corresponds to the distinction state of affair/logical space. The discourse possibilities then arise out of pointing out the objects of an underlying system, locating the objects in a common grid for referring to them and identifying them, and ascribing properties to them. The practices for identifying an object via discourse possibilities and its location then locate it in a grid of states of affairs of an underlying system. These states of affairs also include properties for the object, and their values can locate objects in (external) relationships. States and speech acts are both located in grids of alternatives giving the structure of logical space, and they serve as means for encountering objects. They thus offer fixed points for making truth-claims about objects. Then these states and their combinations under the description of the language-games are the facts of the game and its underlying relationship. Thus modern facts are constituted by the possible speech acts in language-games and the states of their underlying systems, which are the elements of

720 TLP 2.0131. I am using Luciano Floridi’s description of observabilia as a background. See Floridi 2010, Ch. 2.
721 See Strawson 1959, Ch. 2.2.4.1.
language-games and their underlying relationships. This hints that the modern concept of a “loose and separate” fact has been abstracted from language-games and their underlying relationships.

Facts are then located within practices of identification and description of objects, and the relationships underlying logical space. We have also seen that the reidentification of objects takes place in language-games and against the background of relationships as well. The stories about tennis matches, physical causation, the story of Hamlet and religious stories of God all define roles within the story. The roles locate objects within relationships and interactions of a system. These stories and roles then form functions \( f_a \) for locating the object \( a \) within a given situation. These rules for reidentification then correspond to descriptions of function \( F \) in the relationships \( R \) of a system \( S \). The tendencies \( M \) and functions \( F \) constitute the actions and objects \( O \) in the relationships. Physical objects \( O \) function in causal networks and are embedded in higher-level contexts \( H \). The roles of Hamlet \( O \) reveal their characters \( M \) and are thus embedded in their interactions \( R \) in a play. In the religious stories, God too is a character.

These interactions then give institutions, rules or laws for charting the development path for events through a space of possibilities. In the physical case, causation and functional roles are the key relationships or institutions determining the structure of the events and changes in the system. In narratives and religious stories, the actions of the characters are key in determining the institutions that weave the plot-points and facts together. Thus the tendencies of objects and their functional contexts give arrows or rules for development in the space of possibilities and establish storylines, which in turn make it possible to track the objects and to identify them via stories. The functions and stories for reidentification then presuppose systemic logics for processes and interactions in relationships, which constitute the connection of the facts into coherent and meaningful narratives.

The connection of the elements and institutions of reidentifications in a system can now be done by first characterizing objects and complex systems via object-oriented programming, and then showing the functional intertwining of facts and systemic logics or meanings. Maizner

---

722 For identification, see Ch. 5.1.1, Strawson 1959. For language-games as categories, see Ch. 4.3, Garver 1994, 61-72. For the concept of a modern fact, see TLP, Floridi 2010, Ch. 2. The same point could also be made by appealing to the language-game of Pi 2: states of affairs like bringing a slab and the distinctions between slabs and cubes presuppose the language-game and the activity of building as a background. See Baker & Hacker 1980, 26-28, Ch. 4.1.

723 Hamlet. This chapter connects narrative identification in Ch. 4.3 with systemic reidentification in Ch. 5.1.

724 The text summarizes much of the argument in Ch. 5.1. For reidentification, see Strawson 1959, Hintikka 1969, Kaplan 1979. For the systemic background, see Maizner 2004, Ellis 2008. For reidentification and tendencies, see Smolin 2015, Ch. 5.1.
compares systems with computer programs, and the metaphor of programming works best to characterize objects in terms of their elements and institutions. This informational metaphor interprets the system as data processing on the lines of input → calculation → output: (past SoA → program/arrow → future SoA). Ellis compares the different levels of a system with modular programming: the system consists of functional modules and their interrelationships, which yields an element/institution structure of modular objects and their interrelationships.

Floridi similarly uses the conceptual structure of object-oriented programming to define an object as a cluster of data and the rules for manipulating it. He defines data as differences \( x \neq y \) in some regard \( R \), and introduces the related concept of a typed variable as an observable \( x \) that picks out a definite property \( P \) and has definite values \( (x,a) \). For example, a black dot differs from its white background and it is located in the set of differences (or alternatives) colour → \{black, white\}. The data then correspond to modern facts: they are located in a grid of differences, and determine a property of an object located within the differences. The data will then be states of affairs. The rules will in turn be the institutions for transforming these data into new states of affairs, which correspond to the actions and functions of the object in a given history. Then an object will be defined as (SoA, Rules), the facts involving the object – especially its location in the grid of identification – are its element, and the rules – especially strategic rules that are given by its roles, tendencies and powers – are its institution.

Floridi uses the example of a chess piece for an OOP object, or an object that is determined by its role in a relational system. The choice is interesting: Wittgenstein compares words to chess-pieces, and the underlying logic of elements, institutions and meanings connect all of the cases. A chess-piece is determined by its location on a number of grids: e.g. its colour (black/white), its type (e.g. a knight), its location on the board (e.g. f3). These give important facts about it: it is a white knight and it is in f3. The institutions or rules are then the associated rules of chess: a knight can hop over pieces and it can move two squares in any direction and the one square in a perpendicular direction as long as there is room on the board. The connection between pieces, expressions and objects (SoA, Rules), and language-games, systems and games then allow to give a characterization of objects that are categorized via language-games and embedded in relationships:

---

726 Floridi 2010, Ch. 15. Floridi’s objects are database objects or structures, but here the locations in the grids or reidentification serve to locate the object in the world and give it concrete (e.g. physical) qualities.
727 Cf. the discourse possibilities: “What colour is this spot?” “It is black!” “It is white!” See Ch. 4.3, Garver 1994, 61-72.
729 One can easily use Hamann’s definition of form as use to get the matter/form-distinction. See Bayer 2002, 173.
1. Facts: Facts are the elements of an object. They involve a point in the grids of alternatives and locate the object along them. They also involve a property P or relation R of the object. Eg. Nf3.

2. Rules: Rules are the institutions of an object. They correspond to arrows, laws determining it, moves of an object or possible courses of events involving it. They are given by the powers, roles, functions, interactions R of objects O, higher level functional roles H and the possible histories of a relationship S. E.g. a knight can hop over pieces.

3. Objects: An object in a system is determined by its elements and institutions, or (Facts, Rules), and can be seen as a module M of the system S. The facts correspond to discourse possibilities for descriptions, and are given by the actions of an object in the situation. The rules determine possible activities and characteristics that can be told in a story, and arise out of the role of the object O in S, and its tendencies F. E.g. a chess knight.

4. The logic of states of affairs at level L: The states of affairs at level L are attached to an object O = (SoA, rules). They are connected through a network of institutions or rules L → L’ that are determined by the powers F of the objects O, and by the system’s higher-level relationships R. The possible states of affairs L and rules → arising out of F correspond to the possible locations and moves of a chess-piece.

5. The logic of objects: An object consists of (SoA, rules) = (Elements, institutions). The object is embedded in relationships R with other objects and has higher-level functional roles H in the situation S. The roles H give the functional logic of the relationship R. The relationships R constitute the powers F, the states of affairs L and determine the rules and institutions of O. Then the states of affairs L and rules are connected with higher level functional logic H and the relationships R between objects O. The functions of objects correspond to the strategic capabilities of a chess-piece. E.g. since a knight can hop over pieces, it can do a smothered mate from f7.730

5.2. The intertwining of facts and meanings

We have seen that identifying an object requires pointing its location in a space of modern facts, and having stories and related rules for functioning in relationships to fix the principles of reidentification. The states of affairs and the functionally determined arrows then are the elements and institutions of objects. One can then characterize an object as (SoA, Rules), and a system as the objects and their states of affairs, and the interrelationships and the rules and laws that determine

730 This definition is an attempt to define objects as element/institution-complexes against a background. It takes together the standard definition of a system (Maizner 2004, Ellis 2008), the dimension of mechanisms constituting connections (Bhaskar 2008), the analogue with game theory and strategies (Ch. 5.1.2), and also defines facts, objects and different levels of reality relative to the system (ZH 7, 169, Floridi 2010, Ch. 15, Ellis 2001, see also articles in Floridi 2004 (ed.)). See also Ch. 4.1 for an analogical definition of language-games.
their interaction. The link between states of affairs and functions, or elements and institutions, ultimately undermines the fact/meaning distinction. Objects and events can only be identified by pointing out their facts and locating them in relationships via telling stories. These stories however presuppose principles of continuity that are given by the roles, powers and activities in the stories. The roles of objects in stories then determine the facts linked to an object by situating facts in causal and other relationships that involve the object and that are described by the stories. Similarly, the relationships determining the object are realized through facts, and the story that locates the object in these relationships must be told by referring to the facts and pointing them out. Thus facts and relationships are functionally intertwined, and the activities of relationships and their continuity principles make facts meaningful. Moreover, the facts are seen-as objects, events and meaningful stories and relationships via the interpretative practices of reidentification. I will first present the linguistic categorial side of the argument, and then an argument about objects and systems.

5.2.1 Seeing facts as meaningful in language-games

Wittgenstein and Hamann develop accounts of “sensuous reason”, or the intertwining of rational meanings and sensuous facts in perception. These accounts phenomenologically undermine the splits senses/reason and facts/meanings, which are key presuppositions for the problem of evil. If facts are typically seen-as objects or seen-as meaningful in their context, the fact/meaning distinction loses all of its empirical plausibility. I develop the argument for the intertwining of facts and meanings in everyday experience by building on and sharpening Wittgenstein’s arguments about aspect-perception, which were discussed in Ch. 4.2.2. I will present a different interpretation than Glock. Glock focuses on the differences of ordinary seeing and seeing-as, and argues that ordinary seeing involves objects but seeing-as involves facts and interpretations. I turn Glock’s approach around to argue that ordinary perceptual activities of seeking and finding involve seeing facts as objects. I will focus on the connections between meanings, aspects, practices, contexts and habits for seeking and finding.731

Seeing-as involves the connections between facts and meanings, and senses and reason. Wittgenstein makes the distinction between the physical picture and its aspect: a picture of a duck-rabbit must be distinguished from its aspect, which we would simply express with “I see a

731 The expression “sensuous reason” comes from Hein (1983). See Ch. 2.2.4 for the fact/meaning, fact/value and senses/reason splits. For the key discussion of seeing-as, see PI II, xi. See Ch. 4.2.2, Glock 1996, 36-40.
duck” and “I see a rabbit”. The distinction between a physical picture and its organizational aspect is similar to the distinction between a number-expression like “0” and a number, like 0.

Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology and philosophy of mathematics both depend on the use theory of language: thus Wittgenstein is contrasting the picture or a duck-rabbit with the aspectual impression, which depends on the use of the picture like 0 depends on mathematical language use. We can now distinguish aspect-perception into pictorial objects and their uses. These objects and uses are then elements and institutions in a language-game. Aspect perception involves thought and meanings, because it is “half visual experience, half thought.” Moreover, meaning-blindness resembles aspect-blindness, because seeing aspects is closely connected to seeing the meaning of a word. Thus the aspect or impression involves seeing meaning in and through the picture. Aspect perception consists of the element of a phenomenon, the institution of its use, and the perception of an object or meaning like a rabbit that is achieved through the relationship with the picture.\(^{732}\)

Wittgenstein also connects aspect perception with the sensuous practices of seeking and finding, which are the uses or institutions of aspect perception. The connection between aspects and seeking and finding arises in the double-cross and tree-picture examples.\(^{733}\) One can see a puzzle-picture of a face in a tree as a face, or as tree-branches. Seeing it as a tree involves tracing the organization of a trunk and the branches of the tree. Seeing it as a face involves recognizing its organization by tracing the outline and features of the face by pointing the face-like structure of the branches. Similarly, a double-cross has two aspects: seeing the black cross on a white background and vice versa. Wittgenstein clearly states that “Those two aspects of the double cross (…) might be reported simply by pointing alternately to an isolated white and an isolated black cross.”\(^{734}\) There are then two different ways of sensuously finding crosses, which correspond to the two aspects.

Wittgenstein makes explicit the connection between aspects and seeking and finding in his example of spotting a duck-rabbit among lines, and first identifying it as a rabbit, and then as a duck: “you search in a figure (1) for another figure (2), and then find it, you see (1) in a new way. Not only can you give a new kind of description of it, but noticing the second figure was a new visual experience.”\(^{735}\) The different meaning-aspects are then connected with practices of seeking and finding. The practices of seeking and finding are then institutions that constitute seeing meaning in aspects, because such techniques of seeking and finding underlie aspect-experiences.

\(^{732}\) See PI II, 194-198, 212-214. For the connections between language-use, mathematics and psychology in Wittgenstein, see Snellman 2018, Baker & Hacker 1985, 8-22. See also Ch. 3.2.2 for the element/institution theme.

\(^{733}\) Tree-picture: PI II, 196, double-cross: PI II, 207-212. The interpretation of the tree-picture comes from Ch. 4.2.2.

\(^{734}\) PI II, 207.

\(^{735}\) PI II, 199.
The practices also account for the connection of senses and reason, because concepts are formed by associating expressions with basic intuitions, or sensuous practices of seeking and finding.736

Wittgenstein also associates aspectual identification with context in two different examples: the duck/rabbit contextual example and an example about imagining different stories about the letter H.737 He argues that a duck-rabbit is seen as a duck when it is surrounded with pictures of ducks, and a rabbit when it is surrounded by pictures of rabbits. Similarly, the aspect of the letter H depends on the context of a story: one could see it as badly written by imagining that it is written shoddily, see it as childish by telling a story of child drawing it, or see it as legalese by telling a story of lawyers writing it. Thus it is the context that determines the picture of seeing-as, and the context is determined by systems of relationships and stories.

These examples and points deepen those made in Ch. 4.2.2: seeing-as depends on the element of a picture, the institution of a practice of seeking and finding in its contexts and stories, and the meaningful perception that is constituted by the relationship.738 Now we can simply apply the picture of seeing-as to the identification of objects and system-based meanings in language-games that function as categories for the concept of being. Identification locates the individual in the facts of a grid of reference, and also tracks its actions and relationships in its context through pointing them out via rules and functions that are given by its roles in a story:

2. Institutions: The practice of seeking and finding individuals by pointing at the facts, and tracing the actions and relationships of the individual through stories and associated rules that depend on its role in relationships.
3. Meaning: The facts related to the individual are seen-as meaningful, as they are seen to embody the individual, its roles and relationships. The meanings and systemic roles are then seen through the facts, as perceptions of an object and thoughts interpreting its role are two intertwined sides of the perceptual relationship.

Facts are thus meaningful in the context of language-games that function as categories for identifying objects. Moreover, these language-games for seeking and finding objects give the grammar and categories for the concept of being. Then it is a rule of grammar for the concept of

736 For practices of encountering objects as basic intuitions, see H 216-218/N III, 289, Ch. 4.3, Bayer 2002, 329-336.
738 This chapter depends on Chs. 4.3, 5.1.1. See Ch. 4.2.2. Hintikka 1973, Strawson 1959, PI II, xi.
being that the facts associated to objects and their relationships are meaningful, because they reveal the functioning of an object in a system of relationships and the logic of these relationships.

5.2.2 Facts, meanings and objects in their systemic context

The language-game side of the argument concentrates on the grammar of seeking and finding objects. It depends on exploring, how pointing out objects according to stories and identification rules necessarily involves seeing facts as object-involving and embodying relationships, and thus seeing them as meaningful. The argument might seem somewhat Kantian, or involve only the practices of seeking and finding in language-games and not their background in relationships. However, language-games are intertwined with their underlying relationships. The institutions of seeing-as depend on locating individuals in relationships R, and the language-games for reidentification would become pointless without these relationships. Consider for example Smolin’s discussion of a world, where houses and furniture would just appear and disappear with no underlying logic whatsoever. In such a world, there would be no functional continuities for objects and reidentification would be just as impossible as weighing a shrinking piece of cheese reliably.739

We have characterized objects O in terms of (facts, rules) within some system S of relationships R. The facts or SoAs of an object are its elements. The rules for the behaviour or the arrows of an object O are its institutions: how it would act in the context of a relationship R. These arrows and institutions are then constituted by the powers or roles F in the system, which arise out of the strategic interactions and functioning in relationships. The higher-level properties H of a system also help constitute the facts and rules of an object, as the properties H relate to the functions and roles F of the objects O in relationships R.740

Take the example of an airplane. The plane involves facts: it is flying over the Atlantic and is made out of aluminium. It has a number of rules associated with it: it acts according to Newtonian physics, its flight path takes it from Paris to New York and its airspeed does not exceed Mach 1. These rules are then determined by its powers: the ability to generate lift and thrust. These powers are then determined by its role in interactions: the aircraft has to fly against the wind and its tanks have been filled by the ground crew. The aircraft also has a higher-level function: it is on a transatlantic flight from Paris to New York. Then the facts SoA about its place and rules → about

739 Hintikka (1969) interprets reidentification in Kantian terms. Smolin 2015, 51, PI 142. See Ch. 3.3.2.
740 See Ch. 5.1.3.
its speed and place depend on its powers F like the capabilities of its engines given by its context of flying against the wind and fueling. It also performs a functional role at a higher lever of description H for air traffic. Now we can prove the functional intertwining of the (facts, rules) of an object with its powers and roles F, and the higher-order systemic logics H with the lower-level states of affairs L. The elements and institutions can then be written:

1. Element: The elements of an object are its facts. The elements of a higher-order property H are the objects O and their associated lower-level states L.
2. Institution: The institution of an object are its associated rules that are constituted by its roles, functions and powers F in its relationships. The institutions of a higher-level property H are the relationships R holding between objects O, and the lower-level rules that connect states at L and are constituted by H and the systemic relationships S that form the background for H.
3. Present logic: The functions and powers F are expressed through the states of affairs, and the rules or laws for causal processes of the object O. The higher-order property H is realized through the relationships R of O, and the states and rules for functional processes of O at L.

Suppose that an object O has the power F, e.g. an aircraft is capable to fly. Then the power M gives the would-bes or rules associated with its behaviour in a given situation. For example, the power of thrust M gives the would-be: if one were to switch on the engines, they would produce thrust. The powers M include responses to facts Ec in the functioning of a system, like turning the engines on. They then produce the effects Ee=M(Ec): producing thrust. Thus the powers M function through the elements of the facts E, and the institution of the would-bes or rules. The powers and relational roles M of an object O = (SoA, Rule) are then manifested through the elements of facts about O and the institutions or rules that give the behaviour of O in a situation S. On the other hand, the facts E and their associated functional would-bes embody the function or role M.

A similar argument can be given for higher-order properties H of a system S. These higher-level properties typically involve functional relationships F at the level H of S, which must be realized via its objects O = (SoA, Rule). These higher-level properties H within relationships of the system R and the histories arising from their functioning H₁ → H₂ → H₃ are realized by lower-level states L₁ → L₂ → L₃ involving the objects O. Then a higher-level functional state H in the

741 The airplane example is inspired by Ellis (2008).
742 For the concept of functional intertwining, see Ch 3.22., 4.1. Facts are discussed in Chs. 2.4 and 5.1.2. The system of identification is characterized in Ch. 5.1. The functions and powers (see. e.g. Bhaskar 2008, Mumford 2012, EP 2) are understood in terms of would-bes, rules or strategies as in Ch. 5.1.2. I use here the letters M and E from Bhaskar.
relationship $R$ is realized by its objects $O = (SoA, Rule)$, and the element/institution network $L_1 \rightarrow L_2 \rightarrow L_3$. Then the higher-level functional property $H$ functions through the facts $L_n$ and the institutions of the rules $\rightarrow$, which have been partially constituted by them. Then the element of the facts $L_1, L_2, L_3$ together with their institutions or rules $\rightarrow$ making up the objects $O$ embody the relationships $R$ and their functional logic $H$. For example, the $H$-level rational connection: the meaning of “Chess!” $\rightarrow$ rules of chess functions through the $L$-level practically mediated connection: “Chess!” $\rightarrow$ game of chess. The sensible and objective relationships $L$ then become meaningful by embodying the connections between rational meanings and rules $H$, which are then connected with objects at $L$. Then the element/institution complexes $L_1 \rightarrow L_2 \rightarrow L_3$ associated with objects $O$ become meaningful in their context $S$.\(^{743}\)

The meaningfulness of facts is then dependent on a functional intertwining. The roles and functions $F$ in relationships and the associated properties $H$ of functional and contextual logic $S$ are relationships of objects $(SoA, Rule)$. Since the roles of objects $O$ in relationships $R$ are realized through the facts and the rules $\rightarrow$ associated with $O, M$ and $H$ thus function through the facts $L$ and their rules $\rightarrow$. The facts $L$ and their rules $\rightarrow$ also involve the properties of an object $O$ and its functioning in relationships $R$, so they are determined by and realize the functional logics $H$ and roles $M$ of $O$ in relationships $R$. The facts $L$ and rules $\rightarrow$ then embody the systemic logics $H$ of $R$ and the roles $M$ of $O$ in $R$.\(^{744}\)

Functional intertwinings also constitute the essences of objects and properties in their systemic context $R$. Since essences are expressed by the rules of grammar, the functional intertwinings are also expressed in grammatical rules. Garver and Wittgenstein give the example of a pain. Wittgenstein argues that one cannot imagine pains without a localization, so it is a rule of grammar that all pains have a localization. This rule expresses a part of the essence of pain: the feeling of a pain $H$ functions through a lower-level bodily state $L$. This contradicts Descartes’ metaphysical category theory, which splits reality into two conceptually opposite categories of mind $H$ and matter $L$. Since the connection is constitutive and grammatical, we are also dealing with an essential dependence within the context $S$: the higher-level pain $H$ depends on the lower-level

\(^{743}\) This argument builds on the characterization of objects, powers and higher-level properties in Ch. 5.1. See also Ch. 4.1 for functional intertwining. Ellis 2001, 2008, Floridi 2010, Ch. 15.

\(^{744}\) For functional intertwinings, see Chs. 3.2.2, 4.1, Bayer 2002, 351-361.
locational property \(L\) and the lower-level locational property \(L\) is determined by its role in producing the pain \(H\) in virtue of the grammatical rules concerning the essence of pain.\(^{745}\)

Tahko discusses various notions of essential dependence, but the main idea is that the essence of an object is its real definition, and \(x\) is essentially dependent on \(y\) if and only if the identity conditions of \(x\) that arise out of the real definition of \(x\) establish a connection between \(x\) and \(y\). The dependence established by functional intertwinnings corresponds closest to Tahko’s concept of identity-dependence: \(x\) depends for its identity on \(y\) iff there is a predicate \(F\) such that it is the part of the essence of \(x\) such that \(x F y\). Once we replace real definitions by grammar rules, allow for symmetric interdependence and locate it in a system of relationships, then we can characterize functional intertwining as an essential dependence. \(x\) is functionally intertwined with \(y\) iff there is a grammar rule establishing a back-and-forth connection between the relationships \(R\) of \(x\) and the relationships \(S\) of \(y\), such that the relationship \(R\) functions through \(S\) and \(S\) functions through \(R\). Moreover, we have shown in Ch 4.1 that if the relationships \(H_1 \rightarrow H_2 \rightarrow H_3\) function through the lower-level relationship \(L_1 \rightarrow L_2 \rightarrow L_3\) and vice versa, then the essences of entities and processes at \(H\) is constituted by its links with \(L\) and vice versa, and whatever predicate \(P\) predicated of the structure (or “nature”) \(H\) has a corresponding and essentially (grammatically) linked one \(P'\) of \(L\) and vice versa. Then whatever can be said of the essences and systemic logic of higher-level relationships \(H\) can be said of the lower level of facts and rules \(L\), and vice versa because of the grammatically given back-and-forth isomorphisms between functions at different levels.\(^{746}\)

These intertwinnings embed both facts and powers in the context of an object, and the object and its relationships in the functional logic of a system. The facts of an object in its grid of identification are its element, and the rules are its institution. They then manifest the natures and roles of an object against its background relationships of a system, and thus make its facts meaningful by connecting them with the functioning of the object. Similarly, the objects have their facts and rules against the background of a system, whose relationships of interaction and systemic

---

\(^{745}\) See Garver 1994, 61-72, Ch. 4.3, Ch. 3.3.2, ZH 7, 169, Bayer 2002, 351-361. The example of grammatical essences is both constructivist in the Kantian sense and realist in the Aristotelian sense, as rules are freely constructed and capture function (see ZH 7, 161-178, Ch. 4.2.3.).

\(^{746}\) Ch. 4.1. See Garver 1994, 61-72, Ch. 4.3, Tahko 2015, 101 and Ch. 5. The discussion of functional dependences builds on Ch. 3.3.2 and adjoint functors in category theory (see Leinster 2004, Ch.2.) It also builds upon Hamann’s generalization of Christian theology: e.g. in John 14: 9-11, the acts and relationships of God function through the corresponding acts and relationships of Jesus, and vice versa. See H 99, n.16, McGrath 1994, 291-293, Ch. 3.2.2.
logic are then revealed in the functioning of objects. The logic of the system and meaningfulness in terms of its functions is then manifested through the objects.747

5.2.3 Some examples and a summary

Enough abstract nonsense! Now the theorization about facts, meanings and their intertwining must be put to use, so that its worth can be assessed.748 Hamann’s and Wittgenstein’s argument about the interrelatedness of meaning and language use in Ch. 4.2.1 is a clear example of reasoning that connects sensuous and object-involving social practices of use with rational linguistic meanings and rules by appeal to their functional intertwining.749 We can explore functional intertwining through other cases as well: causation in billiard-ball collisions, the informational content of DNA, the expressions of feelings in a friendly smile, the beauty of a painting and the theological doctrine of the communication of attributes.750

Colliding billiard balls was Hume’s favourite example of causation.751 Suppose that David and Immanuel are playing a round of billiards. David first hits the cue ball, which starts moving upon impact. The cue-ball then rolls along the table and then hits the 8-ball. The 8-ball then starts moving, hits the edge of the table and then rebounds. Next Immanuel hits the cue ball, which then impacts with a coloured ball. The coloured ball then falls into the pocket. The game can then be characterized by the events and its connections, which is given by the story: (David hits cue) → (Cue starts rolling) → (Cue hits 8-ball) → (8-ball starts rolling) → (8-ball hits the edge) → (8-ball changes direction) → (8-ball stops) → (Immanuel hits the cue) → (Cue starts rolling) → (Cue hits coloured ball) → (coloured ball starts rolling) → (coloured ball falls into the pocket).752 Now suppose that David says: “There are no causes and effects here. All we see is a conjunction of facts.” Immanuel could reply: “No, there are rules of cause and effect A → B connecting the sequence. They allow us to identify objects, but we can’t say anything of how the objects are in themselves.” What should we make of this?

747 The section builds on the concept of functional intertwining from Ch. 4.1, Strawson’s audial picture of identification (1959, 59-86) and Hamann’s ontology of elements, institutions and present realities (Bayer 2002, 375-396, Ch. 3.2).
748 See Mt. 7:12 and Ochs’ discussion (2004) in Ch. 6.2.1. See also H 106-107/N III, 31.
749 See PI 197, H 217-218/N III, 289, Bayer 2002, Ch. 4.2.1.
750 Polkinghorne (2002) compares the intertwining of different levels of reality with sacraments in a Hamannian spirit. Cf. Hamann’s characterization of rule-following as “the sacrament of language” (H 217-218/N III, 289) and Luther’s criticism of Zwingli’s attempt to introduce Cartesian dualism into theology (LW 37). See also Bayer 2002, 413-422.
751 Hume 1949, Ch. 7:1. The example also builds on Kant (KrV) and Bhaskar (2008).
752 Smolin presents a similar story about a tennis match and causation (2015, 49-65).
The story has then a structure of interactions. The states of affairs in the game can be described by using Newtonian physics: the states of affairs for each ball in the system is (Place, Momentum).\textsuperscript{753} These state descriptions however have to be complemented by an account of the tendencies M of the billiard balls. The tendencies M are a necessary condition for the game, because they determine their strategic capabilities as pieces in the game. For example, the players have to take into account that if a ball would be hit with a cue, it would start moving along a straight line that goes directly from the impact point to its centre. Now these powers function through the events and their relationships: suppose that the situation is (David hits cue). Then the cue has a certain way of acting M, which produces then the result (Cue starts rolling). The next event (Cue hits 8-ball) is then produced by the location of the 8-ball and the tendencies $M'$ of the cue e.g. to keep moving.

Moreover, the Newtonian laws of movement for the balls are also given by their tendencies.\textsuperscript{754} The change of momentum at a particular moment is given by the forces in play, or $F = ma = \frac{\Delta \text{Momentum}}{\Delta t}$. Mass and force refer to these tendencies and capabilities of billiard balls. The forces correspond to vectors in the state space (Place, Momentum), which increase or decrease the momentum, and the mass of an object is related to its susceptibility to forces. The tendencies can then be put into rules that determine the changes of states in the system. Newtonian physics fixes the laws for a system by least-action principles: $\int \text{Kinetic energy} - \text{Potential energy} \, dt = 0$ for closed systems. The law then determines a path through possibilities, kinetic energy is then given by the momentum, and the potential energy by the forces and the place. The rules or laws for the system then depend on terms that refer to tendencies for changes in the space of states or facts.\textsuperscript{755} The game is not a “blooming, buzzing confusion”, because the collisions are seen-as movements of billiard balls in the light of our everyday experience of physical laws. Now we can write:

1. Elements: The billiard balls, the events of their collisions and the changes in place and momentum.
2. Institutions: The Newtonian laws that govern their action in the game.
3. Powers and tendencies: The powers $M$ of the billiard-balls are expressed by the events of the game, their behaviour in collisions and the laws that weave the collisions into a coherent series of events.

\textsuperscript{753} For Newtonian physics, see Susskind & Hrabovsky 2013.
\textsuperscript{754} Tim Crane (2018) discusses this interpretation of Newton’s laws.
\textsuperscript{755} The example depends on Hume (1949, Ch. 7.), Bhaskar’s view of causation (2008), Feser’s claim that there are powers and real tendencies and leaves to science to reveal them (2014, 42-43), and Mumford’s vector model (2012).
Polkinghorne gives DNA reading in cells as an example of the logic of contextuality.\textsuperscript{756} James Shapiro gives the example of a bacteria choosing between maltose and lactose sugars to show how DNA functions in response to the environment. He highlights that the information-processing systems in cells and living beings are key in the functioning and evolution of living beings. There is no Cartesian dualism between information processing and other functions, but information processing is functionally intertwined with operations of molecules that have other functions as well. The environment is a source of signals, and proteins form a channel for transmitting them to DNA reading. Shapiro even compares the connection between the environment and genome interpretation as linguistic, as there is no straight chemical connection but a connection of use. The proteins then form functional networks for cooperatively determining how DNA is read. The DNA reading then determines, which proteins are built and affects the behaviour of the cell. We can then say that there is a language-game with the information channel (environment $\rightarrow$ proteins $\rightarrow$ DNA reading). Moreover, scientists see the process as data transfer, as the actions of proteins are interpreted in the light of rules for the functioning of the cell in its environment and the comparison with language:

2. Institution: The proteins have a role in the communication channel (environment $\rightarrow$ proteins $\rightarrow$ DNA reading). The roles correspond to the use of expressions and their rules are determined by the relationships of cell functioning.
3. Information transfer: The functional networks of proteins L transfer information H from the environment to DNA reading. Then all processes of information transfer H function via ordinary proteins, which gives the proteins and their networks at L a meaning in use.

Wittgenstein’s private language argument involves the functional intertwining of mental states and their expressions.\textsuperscript{757} Wittgenstein argues that mental states like pain are identified through their physical expressions: if a mental state is private in the Cartesian sense, then one cannot distinguish between being in that state and not being in it in communicative language-games, and therefore it is not possible to refer to such states. Then it is a rule of grammar that a mental state H can (in principle, as a matter of metaphysical necessity) be realized through physical states and

\textsuperscript{756} See Polkinghorne 2002. Tim Labron uses Wittgenstein’s theory of language-games in genetics. J. Maynard Smith argues that DNA codifies and offers informational choices for strategies in an article printed in Davies & Gregersen 2010. See also Shapiro 2011, 8-11. For information theory, see Floridi 2004, Cf. ZH 5, 272.

\textsuperscript{757} See Ch. 3.2.1, 4.3.2 and Malcolm 1986. For Wittgenstein’s categorization of mental states, see Garver 1994, 61-72.
relationships L. Moreover, the categories for mental states include a grid $\text{Happiness}(t) = (\text{Feeling at } t, \text{Expressions at } t, \text{Strength at } t, \text{Object at } t)$. Now suppose that you meet an old friend. He feels happy and smiles at you. Then his feeling of friendliness and the associated feeling qualia $H$ develop: (A friend recognizes you) $\rightarrow$ (A friend feels happy for meeting you). These feelings are then expressed by actions at the physical level $L$: (The friend looks at you) $\rightarrow$ (He smiles at you). In this case, the friend’s actions are formed by his feelings of friendship and happiness and reveal them. Both recognize the smile as meaningful in virtue of commonly held social norms and underlying human nature. The friendship then functions in the public space through them:

1. Elements: The expression of the friend’s face.
2. Institution: Smiling is a typical human way to show friendship, and is interpreted in its situation according to cultural norms.
3. Expression: The smile expresses happiness and friendship against the background of human nature and its social context.

Functional intertwining arises in aesthetics and other value-laden practices as well. Wittgenstein gives the example of paintings: “I should like to say ‘What the picture tells me is itself.’ That is, its telling me something consists in its own structure, in its own lines and colours.” Then a picture is composed of colours and lines, the colours and lines have a use through their ability to please in the dialogue (painter $\rightarrow$ painting $\rightarrow$ spectator) and the rules of painting. The spectator can then recognize the meaning of the picture by tracing its lines and colours, and seeing them in the light of the expressive rules of painting. Then the painting becomes meaningful:

1. Elements: The colours and lines of a painting.
2. Institution: The rules of painting and the possibilities of expression they give in the relationship (painter $\rightarrow$ painting $\rightarrow$ spectator).
3. Aesthetic values: The painting raises a feeling or impression in the spectator and expresses beauty, when the combination works well according to the rules of painting. Then the painting expresses value by communicating in accordance with rules, and it thus is made meaningful.

---

Hamann took the theme of communicatio idiomatum out from the theology of Luther and the Church Fathers. The council of Chalcedon sought to interpret the human and the divine in a way that the human does not reduce to the divine, but there is no conceptual gap between them either.\textsuperscript{759} The rule that anything predicated of humanity in Jesus can also be predicated of divinity and vice versa builds on the the Gospel narratives discussed in Ch. 6.3.1, which interpret Jesus as God’s right-hand man in dealing with evil: “Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me? The words that I say to you I do not speak on my own; but the Father who dwells in me does his works.”\textsuperscript{760} Then God’s plan for fighting evil functions through Jesus’ actions. Take a Gospel story of Jesus confronting evil: one has the story (Jesus’ vocation) → (Jesus’ exorcisms) → (Jesus’ pronouncement that sins are forgiven), which embodies (God’s plans for confronting evil) → (God’s healing actions) → (God’s salvation). Moreover, the practice of Christian faith allows one to see the actions of Jesus as the actions of God. Then according to the Gospels the relationships of God’s action towards the world are essentially the same as and revealed in and through the actions of Jesus towards people, and the divine and human are functionally intertwined in Jesus’ activities:

1. Element: Jesus and his prophetic actions function as elements.
2. Institution: the (strategic) rules of Jesus’ vocation and God’s plan for dealing with evil are the institution of the Gospel stories.
3. Divine presence: Jesus’ actions embody God’s actions to save in the space of communication of (God → nature and history → human beings).

Now we can sum up the discussion of facts and meanings in their contexts:

1. Reidentifying objects involves locating them in a grid of individuation, and telling stories that establish their functioning F and roles in relationships R.
2. The grids for identifying and characterizing objects O, and associated discourse possibilities yield facts and their logical space in the language-game and the relationship R underlying the game.
3. The stories for reidentifying objects O and locating their roles in relationships yield functional terms and powers F and functional roles H in the relationship R.

\textsuperscript{759} This is a philosophical rendering of the slogan “unconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chalcedonian_Definition). The Fathers were reacting against Plato’s God/world-dualism, which was seen in Ch. 2.2.1 to be the background for the special problem of evil.
\textsuperscript{760} Jn. 14:10. See also Ch. 6.3.1. For the significance of healings in the Gospels, see Mt. 12:28.
4. The relationships R are analysed into elements, institutions and systemic logics, and viewed as
games of game theory or systems of systems theory. Facts function as elements of an object O in
the context of a relationship R. The institutions of an object O are the rules → corresponding to the
functions F of objects O in the relationship R. The structure of institutions → depends on the
functions and systemic roles F of the objects O in R, and the higher-level systemic properties H of
R.
5. → The powers and roles F function through the facts SoA and the institutions → of objects O. The
higher-order properties H function through the relationships R of objects O and the elements of
lower-level facts L and the institutions → associated with O.
6. → Functions, powers and roles F, and higher-order properties H are intertwined with the facts and
elements at L. The facts become meaningful, as they embody the meanings and logic of the
relationship R. The meanings and logics of R are realized through them.
7. → Functional interdependence concerns the identification of objects, facts and meanings.
8. → Functional interrelatedness is revealed by grammar rules. It establishes grammatical
connections and essential dependences between the levels of relationship R.
9. → It is a grammatical principle that facts and meanings are intertwined and mutually constitutive
in language-games and their underlying relationships.

5.3. The Principle of Reason and the question of intelligibility

We have now connected facts and meanings by showing, how facts are inevitably seen as
meaningful in the interpretative activities of language-games and how they are intertwined in the
relationships underlying language-games. This undermines one of the main assumptions of
theodicy: the fact/meaning split. In Chapter 2.2 we have seen that the problem of evil arises when
one tries to connect facts, meanings and values with the principle of sufficient reason. Theodicism
itself is a theological version of this strategy of seeing meaning in the world: God exists only, if
everything has a (morally) sufficient reason. Then the question inevitably arises: What should we
think of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, when meaningfulness and intelligibility is already given
by language-games and their relational contexts?761

761 See Chs. 2.2, 2.3, 5.1, 5.2. For the centrality of PSR for the problem of evil, see Neiman 2015, 314-328. For
theodicism, see Pihlström & Kivistö 2016, Peterson et al. 2003, 148, 128-153. My discussion of PSR is based on
The Principle of Sufficient Reason is one of the oldest principles of metaphysics and philosophy. Alexander Pruss shows that the Presocratics used it in their arguments, and Terence Irwin’s overview of Greek thought shows that the Principle of Reason motivated the Presocratic search for natural laws and ultimate principles for explanation. For example, Democritus’ arguments for atoms can be read as the claim that there has to be a ground for material causes, and Aristotelian arguments for the existence of God depend on the idea that there is a ground for efficient, final and formal causes. Martin Heidegger defines the principle in his lectures in *The Principle of Reason* as “Nihil est sine ratione”, or “Everything has a reason”, or “everything has a cause”. Pruss formulates it in *The Principle of Sufficient Reason* the terms of explanation: “Every contingent fact has a good explanation”.

When the Principle of Reason is put that way, it may seem trivial or self-evident. Pruss argues for its self-evidence: we use it in our everyday search of explanations, and the man on the Clapham Omnibus would undoubtedly accept it. Pruss claims that PSR is often denied because it is taken to have unacceptable consequences, like the existence of God or universal metaphysical determinism. However, he reports that when he discusses the cosmological argument in class, even atheist students are more inclined to accept the necessity of the universe than to deny the Principle. Pruss moreover makes a strong case that the standard Humean doubts about it are metaphysical nonsense. Heidegger discusses the strong hold of the Principle on our consciousness: it is the nature of the human mind to search for reasons to get to the bottom of things, and a phenomenon or an object is a well-founded object of consciousness only if we can supply reasons or explanations for it. Neiman applies this Kantian insight to the grounds of the problem of evil by arguing that evil events require an existentially satisfying explanation: “Why did this happen? It should not have.”

The Principle of Reason is nevertheless open to criticism due to its ambiguity. Heidegger argues that the Principle does not specify, what counts as a reason and could conflate different kinds of reasons like logical consequences and cause-effect relationships. The Principle involves three overlapping intelligibility claims, ordered from the weakest to the strongest: the Principle of Intelligibility, the Principle of Good Explanation and the Principle of Rational Grounding:

---

762 See Pruss 2006, 20-28, Irwin 1989, 49-50, ST I:2, Ch. 2.3.
763 Heidegger 1996/1971, the quote is on p. 3.
764 Pruss 2006, esp. 16-19.
1. (PI) Reality as a whole is intelligible.
2. (PGE) Every (contingent) fact has an illuminating explanation. (Nothing is without reason.)
3. (PRG) Being qua being is constituted by rational grounding. (Nothing is without reason.)

The Principle of Intelligibility is the weakest of the three, as it is entailed by the Principle of Good Explanation: if every contingent fact has a good explanation, then all of contingent reality is intelligible. The converse requires two extra assumptions: intelligibility reduces to explanation and intelligibility is distributive. To put it more formally, if a proposition or system is intelligible, all its constituent parts or truth-making facts are. For example, if \( p \lor q \) is intelligible, then either \( p \) or \( q \) is. Then since reality as a whole is intelligible, it can be explained and since reality can be explained, all of its (contingent) facts and features can be explained. On the other hand, having intelligibility without explanation entails that the totality of things can be intelligible but some aspects of reality will not be explainable, and having an explainable universe with some brute facts will also break the conceptual connection between intelligibility and the explanation of all contingent facts. These two assumptions are thus both necessary and sufficient to derive the existence of good explanations for contingent facts from the general intelligibility of the universe.

The Principle of Rational Grounding is stronger than the Principle of Good Explanation. Heidegger defines the Principle of Grounding as the claim that reason and rational principles constitute objects by determining their rational grounds. Tahko defines grounding as metaphysical explanation and links it with the essences of entities. Metaphysical grounding involves ontological dependence, and is constituted by the identity-conditions and essences of an object. One could propose the definition that \( x \) grounds \( y \) if and only if the existence of \( y \) depends on \( x \) and it is a part of \( y \)’s essence \( Y \) that \( xRy \).

The link between object-constitution according to the principles of reason, metaphysical explanation and explanation in general can then be clarified. If reason, rational concepts and derived essences explain \( X \) by fixing the answers to the question “What is an \( X \)?”,

\[ \text{767} \] The three formulations of the various principles of rational intelligibility are based on the different formulations of the Principle of Reason in Heidegger (1971/1996), Pruss (2006) and Nagel (2012, 17)

\[ \text{768} \] Pruss discusses the issues of good explanation, intelligibility and distributivity (2006, 126-170). His position amounts to defending distributivity by arguing that explanations of conjuncts are logically prior to explanations of their conjunctions, and that explanation just means making facts intelligible.

\[ \text{769} \] Heidegger 1996/1971, Tahko 2015, ch, 5 (93-119). The sketch of a definition is based on Tahko. Pruss (2006, 211) points out that all types grounding, like causation, explanation or justification, entail logical priority. See Ch. 5.3.3.
then all possible entities and facts have a rational metaphysical explanation, as they all have
metaphysically constituting reasons. Moreover, these reasons also serve as a foundation for
empirical explanations by fixing the space of possible explanations and constitute the being of
possible empirical explanations as well. This can be seen from Heidegger’s two historical examples
of the Principle of Reason. Kant argues that the principles and concepts for physical explanation lie
already in us in the categories of understanding, and we then use them to constitute objects out of
empirical sense data and to furnish good explanations for phenomena. Aristotelian essentialism also
aims at explaining physical processes with the essences of objects: explanations of changes involve
the natures of objects X, so the metaphysical explanation of the essence of X grounds scientific
explanations right away. Then if being qua being is constituted by reason, all events have
metaphysical explanations and these metaphysical explanations yield at least the possibility of
scientific explanations as well. To get the converse, one needs the assumption that all explanation
involves giving grounds for beings through rational concepts and principles. Unless this claim
holds, there can be empirical explanations of objects or facts that are not constituted by reason.
These topics will be taken up in the following chapter.770

Pruss also discusses the structure of explanation that is entailed by the two Principles
of Reason, the PGE and the PRG. He argues that the concepts of explanation, justification and
grounding involved in the Principle yield the familiar picture of a strict linear order of reasons
terminating in a First Cause.771 He claims that explanation holds between facts or true propositions,
and is constituted by the removal of puzzlement: it might be puzzling that I am not hungry, but if
the fact that I ate porridge in the morning removes the puzzlement, then it explains the fact that I am
not hungry. No fact A explains A, i.e. itself, so explanation is irreflexive. Removal of mystery is
dependent on a chain of explanations, and this entails transitivity. Suppose that the fact that I ate
porridge is left a mystery. Then it does not completely remove the mystery why I am not hungry.
Now suppose that my choice renders my eating porridge not mysterious. Then it also makes the fact
that I am not hungry not mysterious precisely by removing the puzzlement why I ate porridge. Then
if A explains B and B explains C, A also helps explain C and explanation is transitive. Explanation
then yields chains of contingent events and establishes a strict priority of sense-making among
them, so the regress must end up in some necessarily holding or self-evident facts that serve as first
causes. Pruss also argues that the Principle is compatible with many types of explanations: physical
explanation involves natural laws and personalistic explanation involves the intentional states of

Greek philosophy. For essences as explanations in Aristotelianism, see Met. V:1, Williams & Charles 2013.
persons. He also makes the presupposition that causation is not Humean constant conjunction: as we have seen in Ch. 2.2.4, one must assume anti-Humeanism to get the PSR off the ground.\textsuperscript{772}

Pruss also motivates the Principle(s) of Reason by making another comparison between their different versions of it. Our contrast between PI, PGE and PRG involved the strength of the concepts of intelligibility, whereas Pruss contrasts versions of the Principle by scope. He distinguishes between the Ex Nihilo Nihil Principle, the Causal Principle and the full PSR:

1. ENNF: Nothing comes to existence out of nothing, or if some $x$ exists at $t$, some $y$ exists at all $t'<t$.
2. CP: Everything has a cause, or $\forall x (x \text{ is contingent } \rightarrow \exists y (y \text{ causes } x))$.
3. PSR: Every contingent fact has an explanation.\textsuperscript{773}

Pruss argues that the same considerations regarding causal continuity and the persistence of objects underlie all of these principles.\textsuperscript{774} He first points out that ENNF would be violated by a rock appearing out of nothing. The second contrasting case would be a rock exists up to $t$, it disappears at $t$ and a blue billiard ball pops up at $t$ and exists from there on. Such a scenario would be equally absurd, as the rock would disappear and the billiard ball would appear out of nothing at $t$. Thus the violation of CP by a rock disappearing and a billiard ball appearing would be a violation of ENNF as well, because the non-caused ball and its non-caused properties would arise out of nothing. Pruss also argues that the same would hold of property change without underlying substances. Suppose that a blue ball would turn red at $t$. If there were no underlying ball enduring the change, then there would be nothing that can ground the possibility of the causally continuous change from a blue ball to a red one. Thus changes without an underlying substance would be without causal continuity and would thus involve getting something out of nothing.

Pruss argues that both ENNP and CP are limited versions of the PSR by claiming that ENNP limits CP to objects coming into being, and CP limits PSR into the causal chains of objects. He proves that one can get the full PSR from CP by appealing to the Axiom of Choice: since all causal chains can be ordered into sets of effects $E_y=\{x|y \text{ causes } x\}$, the chain of causes yields a chain of sets of effects. Moreover, because all chains of causes have themselves prior causes, the chain of effect sets are bounded from above. Then by the Axiom of Choice, there is a least upper

\textsuperscript{772} See Ch. 2.2.4 and Hume 1949, Ch. 7 for Hume’s critique of causation.
\textsuperscript{773} Pruss 2006, 58-62.
bound of the sets of effects, \( E_z = \{ x | \text{z causes } x \} \). However, this is just to say that z is the first cause of the chain, because its effect set is the least set containing all the effects in the chain and z causes them all.\(^{775}\) Then the first cause explains all the events in the chain, and CP entails PSR.

Pruss then argues that the ENNP in fact entails CP and the CP entails the PSR by appealing to principles of causal continuity.\(^{776}\) A closer examination reveals these principles of continuity to be principles of being qua being: Pruss presents the arguments of Greek metaphysics that characterize objects through their persistence and presence, and being by causal continuity. I will first discuss Pruss’s arguments for and against the Principle, and show how they depend on philosophical connections between the nature of objects, the nature of metaphysical possibility and intelligibility. Then I connect Heidegger’s reading of the history of metaphysics in the light of the Principle with contemporary debates to overview the connection of metaphysics, grounds and evil.

5.3.2 Reasons for and against the Principle of Reason

Pruss discusses four types of arguments against the Principle: Humean arguments from the nature of logical space, contingency-based arguments that the PSR entails universal logical determinism, indeterminist arguments and the argument that the reduplication of possible worlds entails the failure of the PSR. He then offers three types of arguments for it: Aristotelian arguments from the causation of substances and the nature of logical space, broadly ontological arguments from the nature of causal explanation, and a defence of the self-evidence of the Principle.\(^{777}\)

Humean critiques of the PSR depend on the presupposition that if p can be imagined, then p is possible. Hume’s imaginability principle in fact gives a view of possibility and logical space that is isomorphic to Poteat’s picture of aleatory music: music is composed of the arbitrary combinations of facts, because notes follow each other at random. On the imaginability principle, any combination of ideas is similarly possible.\(^{778}\) Hume’s imaginability principle then also allows for excisions: if w is possible and the situation \( w^- = w / \{ p \} \) can be constructed by imagining w without p, then the collection of states of affairs \( w^- \) is possible. Hume’s principle conflicts with the Principle of Reason in two ways: first, the Principle of Reason is taken to entail the existence of a

\(^{775}\) Pruss 2006, 50-62.
\(^{776}\) Pruss 2006, Heidegger 1996/1971. Cf. the reidentification conditions of Chs. 4.3. and 5.1.
necessary First Cause. Second, one can imagine or construct logical models $M=(D,I)$ where it is not true that all contingent events have a cause.

Pruss presents a very sharp critique of Hume’s imaginability principle, and gives arguments that are similar to those presented against “loose and separate” facts in Ch. 5.2. He first notes that Hume’s excision arguments lead to anti-contextualism. On a Humean view, it would be possible for bricks to exist even if everything else were removed, they popped out of nothing or outside causal chains, or even if nobody ever used them to build anything. He then argues that such anti-contextualism of “loose and separate” facts goes against the ordinary uses of “can”, “is possible”, “must” and “necessary”, which are either causal or epistemic. Thus the imaginability criterion has been abstracted out of language use. Then the grounds for a Humean case against the PSR collapse. Even though we can imagine a model $M$ with effects with no causes or a world $w$ without a necessary being, this does not establish that they are genuine possibilities. The model where CP fails won’t necessarily be isomorphic with actual causal chains simply because it is imaginable or logically possible, because causation in the actual world could function differently. Moreover, a necessary being could be broadly logically necessary in Plantinga’s sense.779

The second objection to the Principle involves logical determinism. van Inwagen argues that PSR requires explaining the conjunct $p = \land p_k$ of all contingent propositions $p_k$ with a necessary proposition $q$. This would however entail that all facts hold necessarily. More technically:

\begin{quote}
Claim: Not all contingent $p$ have explanations.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Proof attempt: Suppose for contradiction that all contingent $p$ have explanations. Let $p = \land p_k$, where $p_1, \ldots, p_n$ are all the contingent propositions. Then since $p$ is contingent, $p$ is explained by $q$. Either $\square q$ or $\neg \square q$. If $\square q$, $\square p$, because $q$ explains $p$. If $\neg \square q$, $q = p_n$ for some $n$. Then either $\square p$ or some conjunct $p_n$ of $p$ explains $p$. Since $p$ is contingent by assumption and no contingent $p_n$ is self-explanatory, not all contingent $p_k$ have explanations.780
\end{quote}

Pruss approaches the problem by arguing that libertarian free choices are contingent but self-explaining facts, and by questioning the premiss that if $q$ explains $p$ and $q$ is necessary, $p$ is also necessary. There are two different considerations in favour of necessitating explanations. The first

---

is the Leibnizian assumption that sufficient explanation is deductive. This immediately entails the necessity of explanation: \( \Box(p \rightarrow q) \) entails logically \( \Box p \rightarrow \Box q \). The second is that if a necessary proposition \( q \) explains the contingent proposition \( p \), then their connection would be left open because \( q \) would be true and \( p \) false at some world \( w \). Pruss however gives some examples where a necessary \( q \) explains a contingent \( p \). For example, \( q \) could be physically necessary natural laws that explain \( p \), but \( p \) does not hold in some physically possible world \( w' \) due to contrary causes. \( q \) could also be God’s necessary design specifics for the possible world He wants to create and they favour \( p \), even though \( p \) is false in some designed worlds \( w' \). Pruss argues that both of these cases are explanatory, so he is liberalizing the link between explanation, deduction and necessity. The claim that (libertarian) free choices are self-explanatory too widens the possibility of explanation so that there is room left for non-necessitating explanations and sufficient reasons.781

Pruss’s liberalization of the Principle and the concept of explanation is at the centre of his answers to indeterminist critiques of PSR.782 The possibility of libertarian free will is sometimes used to criticize the Principle, as is the inherent indeterminism of quantum mechanics. The failure of Leibniz’s Law is also offered as an argument: a world with the process (ABABAB…) could be turned into a world (AB), (AB), (AB) by splitting the process. Then there would be no sufficient reason for distinguishing the possible worlds, as they are indiscernible. Pruss instead argues that propositions of the type “\( S \) chose \( A \) for the reason \( R \)” and “\( S \) chose \( A \) for no reason” are both self-explanatory. He defends the reasonless-choice model against the criticism that the choices are not explanatory.783 If the choices are not explanatory, they are brute facts and thus random. He counters the problem of randomness and the associated problem of luck. The agent could be directing himself without determining external reasons, or in a Buridan’s ass type of situation, making a choice between equally strong reasons. Pruss then infers the existence of explanations from non-randomness of choices. Pruss also applies the model to indeterministic causation in quantum mechanics. He discusses the EPR experiment, which shows that the laws of quantum mechanics are probabilistic and a particle does not even have a certain property before a physical interaction takes place to measure it. Pruss argues that an event that is randomly caused under physical laws is similar to free choices. Moreover, indiscernible worlds and objects can be distinguished due to

781 Pruss 2006, 97-125. For an overview of quantum mechanics and its challenges to the modern worldview, see Polkinghorne 2012 and Kallio 2008. James argues that a strong form of the Principle of Reason forms a dilemma for determinists: a determinist cannot hold on to a moral point of view, because the necessitation of human action makes moral action impossible (see 1979). Pruss instead argues that free choices are an Arche. See Ch. 6.1.2.

782 Pruss 2006, 126-183.

783 For Hume’s problem of luck, see Ch. 2.3.2.1, Hume 1949, Ch. 8, Mele 2014, Pruss 2006, 142.
God’s will or other indeterminist causes. In effect, agency, contexts for free choices and indeterministic laws for random causation give the outcomes sufficient context to explain them.

Pruss’s answers to the indeterminism objections then liberalize the notion of explanation. He in fact argues that any boundary condition that confers intelligibility is a sufficient explanation. Causation is distributive, because causal explanations of disjuncts are prior to explaining the disjunction. If an indeterministic process like spinning a roulette wheel ends with a result 5, then the explanation for the result 5 is prior to the explanation for getting a 5 or a 6. He quotes Anscombe’s view that causation does not necessitate the effects or even guarantee them a high probability, but establishes a boundary condition that makes them possible. Similarly, he argues that a boundary condition \( q \) is sufficient to explain \( p \) even, if \( P(p|q) \) is very small: he even argues that God’s choice of a world \( w \in W \) from an infinite set \( W \) of a cardinality \( |w| = \kappa \) is sufficient to explain them. In the end, Pruss defines the Principle of Reason to be the PGE, and any intelligibility-conveying causal context or boundary condition is a good explanation.

Pruss then offers arguments for the Principle. His arguments are in many ways metaphysical. The Principle follows from a neo-Aristotelian metaphysics of substances and possibility. He also compares arguments from the nature of explanation with ontological arguments for the existence of God, as both start with some weak and limited possibility claims and then entail strong claims about actuality due to the structure of the space of possibilities. Pruss’s strongest arguments however are broadly Wittgensteinian or Hamannian ones concerning the everyday use of the words “possible” and “necessary”. He first argues that ordinary language involves using “possible” and “necessary” for causal or epistemic possibilities. He then connects causal possibilities with an Aristotelian theory of real possibility, and uses ordinary language-use to criticize claims that PSR cannot be self-evident because many philosophers do not accept the PSR. A claim \( p \) is self-evident if and only if, if \( s \) understands \( p \) he then sees it to be true. Philosophers like Hume however seem to understand and reject the PSR. Pruss answers that philosophers can easily slip into nonsense by detaching words from their ordinary use. Then if the philosophers who criticize the Principle have taken words out of their ordinary contexts, they do not understand the concepts at all. Pruss’s case for self-evidence closely resembles the case for the conceptual

---

785 For Pruss’ overviews of his arguments, see Pruss 2007, 2006, 321-322. See also Plantinga 1974, Ch.10.
connection of facts and meanings that was made in Chs. 5.1 and 5.2, and deserves close study. To understand it better, one has to examine Pruss’s Aristotelian arguments.\(^{786}\)

Pruss offers two types of Aristotelian arguments: the Thomistic distinction between being and essence and an Aristotelian view of possibility as potentiality entail the Principle. The Thomistic arguments can be clarified with Feser’s account of the act/potency-distinction, and the connection of the distinction with the logic of functional terms as well. The essence of an X is an answer to the question “What is an X?”, and the existence of an X means that the essence of X is instantiated, or \(\exists x Xx\). The essence is then a potential that can be realized, and the existence of an X actualizes this potential. Thomistic metaphysics then takes every object x as an actualization of a potential X, and holds that this composite of an actual being and potential essence must be somehow grounded. This however gives the Principle of Reason straight away: all actualization of beings or realization of essences X must be caused by something actual. The Aristotelian argument for the Principle then seems to build on the logic of functional terms discussed in Ch. 5.1.2. The realization or existence of an X is then taken to be an outcome of a functional term F, and thus it is realized by some condition that triggers F and thus gives a sufficient cause for X’s existence.\(^{787}\)

Pruss’ second Aristotelian argument involves the nature of possibility. Aristotelianism interprets possibility as potentiality: \(\Diamond p\) if and only if there is a substance x with the causal power F so that x can bring about p by exercising F. The Aristotelian theory of potentiality entails the Principle right away: if p, p is possible and if p is possible, then p is caused and can be explained by some substance x and its power F. Pruss also points out that the Aristotelian theory of potentiality entails the modal axiom S5. \(\Diamond p\) entails that some substances can bring about \(\Diamond p\) and thus \(\Diamond \Diamond p\) holds, and if \(\Diamond p\), then in any case the substances could have brought about that \(\Diamond p\) holds. Then the accessibility relation is both transitive (\(\Box p \rightarrow \Box \Box p\)) and symmetric (\(\Diamond p \rightarrow \Box \Diamond p\)), so it is an equivalence relation and S5 holds. The Aristotelian view of modality can also explain modal knowledge, because modality depends on causal powers and our knowledge of causal powers is empirical. The Aristotelian arguments then depend on strong links between being, functional terms and causal possibility, the essences of substances, metaphysical possibility and the structure of logical space, and explanation.\(^{788}\)

\(^{786}\) Pruss 2006, 189-208, PI 116. Cf. Chs 5.1, 5.2. Knuuttila comments on the text that Pruss is anachronistic for two reasons. First, Aristotle holds that sufficient reasons work on the level of formal and final causation but are imperfectly realized in matter. Second, Aristotle didn’t have possible worlds semantics or iterated modal operators.

\(^{787}\) Pruss 2006, 209-229, Feser 2014, 36-38, Met. VII 7-8, Putnam 2004, Ch. 5.1.2. The arguments are Scholastic.

\(^{788}\) Pruss 2006, 299-320. Juti (2001, 295-296) characterizes potentiality by appealing to causal possibility. Aristotle does not have a theory of possible worlds (as Knuuttila points out), so the argument is neo-Aristotelian.
Pruss also offers modal-style arguments from the nature of explanation and possibility. He argues that the Hume-Lewis counterfactual definition of causation “If C would not have happened, then E would not have happened” together with the assumption that if E happened, then it is possible that it had a cause entails the CP. This type of reasoning is explicitly modal: it moves from the possibility of CP into CP. Other modal strengthening arguments involve moving from everyday uses of the Principle in causal and inductive reasoning to the full version of the Principle by appealing to the modalities involved in the laws of nature and probabilistic reasoning. The counterfactual argument can be given as a proof:

Proposition: Suppose that if C is the cause of E, then if C would not have happened, then E would not have happened. Then if it is possible that E has a cause, then it has a cause.

Proof: Suppose for contradiction that E has no cause but E could have had a cause C at w. Then there is a possible world w’, w’ is accessible from w, wRw’, s.t. C causes E at w’. Now it is true in w’ that if C would not have happened, E would not have happened. Since accessibility R is symmetric, at w it is true that if C does not happen, E does not happen. By the assumption of bruteness, E happened but C did not, a contradiction.789

Pruss’s modal argument looks like a reductio of Humeanism. He also offers three arguments from the everyday use of the PSR into the full PSR. The first is the “dog that did not bark” objection. Suppose that we list all of the ordinarily sufficient causes for a dog barking: someone was in the stables, the visitor was a stranger and the dog has been trained to guard the stables. Then we have a set of conditions q₁, …, qₙ that together explain p. Then if p is not present, we can explain its absence by claiming that some of the causes qₖ were not present: the visitor was not a stranger. Pruss argues that if p was possible even without the conditions q₁, …, qₙ, then the missing cause explanation does not work. This would entail that p requires the causes q₁, …, qₙ, so negative explanation presupposes the PSR. Pruss raises the objection that one can use a limited PSR.790

Pruss then goes on to argue that limited versions of the PSR end up in presupposing the full version, due to the wildcard nature of possible brute facts. If there are brute facts, they are like random notes in Poteat’s music metaphor: they have no motives and context of intelligibility. They then end up breaking up the natural laws and objective probabilities that any explanation

depends on. Pruss makes the case for natural laws by pointing out that natural laws are ceteris paribus. To use Bhaskar’s terms, laws are normic: they express the tendency of F’s to yield the function or result G. Then they only give constant conjunctions $\forall x(F(x) \rightarrow G(x))$ when contrary causes are absent. Now if PSR is false, then brute facts are possible and one could have $F(a) \& \neg G(a)$ brutally, as a result of a brute contrary cause. Moreover, brute facts are not governed by contexts of intelligibility that would yield them objective probabilities. Pruss then concludes that all probabilistic and law-explanations presuppose the Principle of Reason.\(^{791}\)

Pruss’s defence of the Principle of Reason can be viewed as a synthesis of neo-Aristotelianism and a liberalized form of Leibnizianism.\(^{792}\) His argument is an attempt to make strong connections between the concepts of being, substance, possibility, intelligibility and God. The world is composed of chains of causes, with God as the ultimate Explanation just like in the Leibnizian cosmological arguments discussed in Ch. 2.3. The Aristotelianism uses contemporary ideas like possible worlds, and unlike Aristotle it holds that it is sufficient to appeal to formal and final causes to establish the PSR. The Leibnizianism is liberalized, because “a sufficient reason” does not mean “a logically sufficient condition”, but “a good explanation.” Moreover, any explanation that establishes boundary-conditions that render a fact intelligible is a good one. Explanation and being qua being are ultimately connected, because logical space and the possibilities of being are ultimately grounded in God’s choices and the causal powers of Aristotelian substances.

Heidegger’s view of the Principle of Reason receives strong support from Pruss’s arguments for the PSR and regarding continuity and presence in the ENNF, CP and PSR. Heidegger argues that the Principle of Rational Ground is logically prior, because objectivity and being consist in the persistence and presence of substances, a logical space that ties together possibility and the possibility of explanation, causal chains of explanation that terminate in God’s free choices and explanation as the removal of puzzlement in the intellect. Heidegger even argues that the Principle depends on a certain view of the connection of object-constitution and the language-world-relationship, and it empowers the rest of the rational principles. These connections can now be examined by drawing links between the Principle and the founding questions of metaphysics.\(^ {793}\)

\(^{791}\) This section is based on Pruss’ summary (2007, 297-299). See also 2006, 254-299. Poteat 1985, 91.
\(^{792}\) Pruss presents his conclusions in 2006, 321-332.
5.3.3. The Principle of the Ground of metaphysics and the problem of evil

Heidegger argues that the Principle of Reason is in fact the foundational grounding principle of metaphysical theorizing. It underlies metaphysical principles, like the Principle of Identity: $\forall x (x = x)$. Take for example the parts, properties, set elements or other constituents A, B, C. Then there is a reason R why they make up one object A+B+C=D. Tahko gives an example of such object-constitution when he discusses metaphysical grounding: the atoms H, O, H make up a water molecule H₂O due to their ability to form molecules. Then the Principle of Reason is fundamentally a consequence of elevating reason to the system of laws and predicates that defines object-constitution. Hamann shows that Kant’s definition of reason as a system of laws for objective cognition via a detachment from experience, tradition and language is a “more general, sharper and purer distinction which allows reason to ground all objects, sources and kinds of knowledge.”

Whereas Neiman writes the history of the problem of evil as reactions to the Principle of Reason and the unity of reason, values and facts in modern thought, Heidegger reads the history of the whole Western metaphysical tradition as a story of how the Principle either reveals or conceals Being by connecting the concept of being qua being with different types of reasons in different historical eras. He discusses ancient Greek metaphysics, Leibnizian rationalism, Kant’s critical philosophy and the apotheosis of the Principle in modern scientism.

Heidegger discusses the Principle in Greek metaphysics by commenting on Aristotle and the Parmenides fragment that is also quoted in Pruss: “what there is to be thought of and what there is are the same thing.” Heidegger argues that the Greek concept of Logos, or being as reason, involves seeing one in the many. He interprets Aristotle as arguing that the senses accrue natural facts and information from the world. The sensuous material reveals the emergence of natural phenomena, and the emerging phenomena reveal the being or persistent presence of things. Heidegger then continues to discuss the Greek concepts of being and logos. Being is taken to consist of persistent presence through time, and Logos is taken to involve a gathering-together that orders or organizes the collected whole. Logos as a saying then brings to the fore or highlights the presence of an order R or a feature F that organizes the whole. Logos then involves “seeing one

---

796 Quoted in Pruss 2006, 22. Cf. my translation in Ch. 2.2.4.3 from Heidegger 1971, 127: “Understanding and Being are namely one and the same thing.”
in the many”, or organizing sensuous materials with predicates R and F that highlight the order typical of a being, highlight its persistence and brings forth its presence to the mind.798

Aristotle’s concept of a substance and the Aristotelian concept of metaphysical grounding embody this view of being and the connection of being and reason.799 A substance like Socrates is at the same time both the sensible individual that underlies predication, it has essential properties and predicates like “being a human” or “being a rational animal”, and it is able to change through time: one could well say “Socrates stands now and five minutes ago he was sitting”. Then Socrates is a substance, because he is both the sensible subject of predication and an essence that answers the question “What is Socrates?”, i.e. a human. Then Socrates as a subject of predication and as an object of sensation is present and endures change, and his being human is also a form or “thisness” that he has in common with other people and that explains his typical features. Tahko’s concept of grounding highlights that essences constitute objects on the Aristotelian reading of the relationship between being and reason. To revisit the example of water molecules: the atoms H, O and H only make up a water molecule due to a reason R: their tendency to form the chemical structure H₂O. Then the essence of water is given by the chemical structure H₂O, which is an order R or a form that organizes the whole. The atoms H, O and H are then a part of the ground of the molecule, because they are constituents of the order R that defines the molecule. Then the structure R constitutes the molecule and the truth of metaphysical explanations by giving its form or definition, and the atoms H, O and H are the matter that are constituted into H₂O. Being is then linked with rational explanations, as the ground of objects is constituted by essences or definitions.

Modern metaphysics works with a different view of being qua being and object-constitution.800 Heidegger discusses Kant and Leibniz, who both build on the legacy of Scotist metaphysics. In this tradition, the Principle takes the form that the laws of reason and an order of rational concepts constitute the order of possibility. The order is logically prior to the actual world, and grounds it by establishing the conditions of possibility for the world and the objectivity of its objects. The tradition runs from Scotus through Leibniz and Kant to the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein sums up the basic approach by commenting on his earlier views:

---

798 Heidegger 1996, 105-110/1971, 175-186. “Seeing one in the many” is a key feature that Leibniz’s version of PSR shares with the classical one: see *Monadology.*


Thought is surrounded by a halo.—Its essence, logic, presents an order, in fact the a priori order of the world: that is, the order of possibilities, which must be common to both world and thought. But this order, it seems, must be utterly simple. It is prior to all experience, must run through all experience; no empirical cloudiness or uncertainty can be allowed to affect it (…)

We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound, essential, in our investigation, resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language. That is, the order existing between the concepts of proposition, word, proof, truth, experience, and so on. This order is a super-order between—so to speak—super-concepts.801

Heidegger describes Leibniz’s views with the slogan: “When God calculated, the world came to be.”802 This slogan is a restatement of Leibniz’s solution to the problem of evil that was discussed in Ch. 2.3: God’s choices for the world are constrained by a logically prior order of essences and God then calculates the best choice amongst them. The essences have been constituted by the rules of reason, and they are database properties. For example, the essence of Leibniz himself includes the property “used the PSR as a ground for his metaphysics”, and therefore the essence is a sufficient ground for truths about Leibniz’s work as a philosopher. The order of rational essences thus guarantees that all particular truths about individuals have a ground, but they do not sufficiently explain and ground the existence of these individuals. The actual world then requires God as a First Cause for its sufficient reason, and all of the facts hold because God calculated the reasons for the world. Then both being qua being and the world are grounded by reason: the essences are constituted by the rules of reason, and the world is God’s calculation.

Heidegger also discusses the transcendental rules of reason in Kantian metaphysics: like Hamann, Heidegger notes that Kant holds reason and its subjective conditions to be the grounds of all knowledge of objects and even the objectivity of objects itself. For Kant, reason is a system of laws that determines the conditions of possibility for objectivity, and thus constitutes its objects. Something is an object of cognition, and a cognition is objective insofar as it lies inside the bounds that are given by reason. The unity of reason is reflected out the conditions of objectivity in general, or the conditions for being something=x.803

803 Heidegger 1996/1971, chs. 9-10, H 210, KrV. Kant distinguishes understanding (the ability to use concepts) and reason (the ability to make inferences) (Caygill 1992, 346-350). I use “reason” for both here.
Kant’s famous deduction straightforwardly applies the view of reason as a ground for objective representation into the constitution of empirical objects and the justification of the categories or metaphysics. A cognition is objective only, if it is logically ordered and makes logical sense. A logically ordered cognition makes logical sense by being formed according to the logical forms of true or false propositions. Using logical forms to interpret experience requires that rational rules form a unity that governs the representation of objects=X. Moreover, the use of logical forms to interpret experience orders the experienced objects according to logical rules, and each logical form or rule of interpretation corresponds to an abstract concept of metaphysics. For example, the logical form A → B corresponds to the concept of causation. Then the abstract concepts of metaphysics are applicable, because the objects of experience have been constituted according to the rules of reason that concern the use of logic to interpret experience. An interesting parallel arises between Leibniz and Kant. For Leibniz, the world is grounded in reason because God orders the world by choosing the best among different orders of essences that are given by the rules of reason. For Kant, the empirical objects of cognition are grounded in reason because the mind orders experience by applying abstract metaphysical concepts that are grounded in logic.804

The Heideggerian historical overview suggests some connecting threads between different versions of the Principle, and also connections between the metaphysical methods debate and the problem of evil. In Greek metaphysics, the Principle arises because being is taken to be persistence among phenomena, which are constituted by a form that involves seeing one in a many, i.e. an essential predicative definition. Heidegger argues that according to Aristotle one has empirical phenomena, abstracts an essential concept F for their persistence out of them, and identifies being with F: phenomena → concept F=being. In modern metaphysics, reason is not an essential real definition, but a system of conceptual laws that clears a logical space for facts and objects and thus rationally constitutes them. Dickson characterizes the Kantian process of abstraction as first replacing expressions with concepts, and then identifying these concepts with the structure of reality: expressions → concepts = reality.805 Burtt and Bayer describe modern positivistic metaphysics: one has scientific phenomena, abstracts a mathematical structure M out of them and then identifies the structure M with being: phenomena → mathematical laws=being.806 However, in all of the cases being qua being is understood via an abstraction: phenomena → form R = being. In all the cases form is taken to be logically prior and constitutive of being, and then it is

806 See Bayer 2002, 312, Moustakas 2013, Burtt 2015, esp. 64-95. For a contemporary example, see Ladyman 2007.
understood in terms of concepts of the intellect, either ordering predicates R or laws of rational constitution for possibilities.  

The connections between the principle of reason, the problem of evil and the foundations of metaphysics have all been made in a preliminary form in Ch. 2.2.4 on the PSR, 2.2.5 on the general argument, and in Ch. 3.3 on the problem of metaphysical foundations. The Principle of Reason is a key presupposition of the problem of evil: how can the world be meaningful and how can our values be a guide for action, if there is so much evil? The problem of evil arises when one holds that facts are connected with values and meanings only, if they can be located in a rational order through an explanation with an Arche that connects them. We have also seen in Ch. 3.3. that PSR (as PRG) is a key principle in the metaphysical methods debate as well. The debate concerns Kant’s and Hamann’s old questions: how can abstract and rationally given concepts be used of empirical reality? How is the ability to think possible? If being qua being can be identified with conceptually defined essences or a rationally constituted order of possibility underlying phenomena, then the general concepts of being constitute objects and objectivity, and the Principle of Ground holds.

These questions can be put as aporias following the General Argument and Juti’s characterization of the question at the core of metaphysics. The conceptual gaps senses/reason, facts/meanings and facts/values stand behind the problem of evil, and the dualisms senses/reason, concepts/objects and matter/form stand behind the problem of the empirical objectivity of metaphysics. How can one close the senses/reason, fact/meaning, fact/value, concept/object, matter/form and general/particular conceptual gaps? The question is made even more difficult, because a conceptual gap arises when A and B are defined to be separate and opposite to each other, so a reduction will end up in problems as A is not B and B is not A by definition. The Principle of Sufficient Reason then answers these questions with a rationalistic reductionism. Reason, a rationally constituted order of Being and possibilities or an order of explanations that terminates in an Arche serves as a foundation, a reductive explanation or analysis for being, meaning and values. Then the sensible world is intelligible by being ordered and defined via concepts and orders that are given by reason. These concepts and orders also constitute objecthood and the order of being, they characterize the possible forms and structures of objects, and connect facts, meanings and values.

---

807 The chapter builds links between Neiman 2015 and Heidegger 1971/1996.
808 This section synthetizes Chs. 2.2.4.3 (PSR as rationalistic reductionism), 2.2.5 (the General Argument), 3.3.1 (rational ground and the problem of metaphysics), and builds on Juti 2001, Heidegger 1996/1971, and Neiman 2015.
809 This discussion builds on Dickson’s and Kondylis’ comments on conceptual gaps in Dickson 1995, 1-14, Ch. 3.1.2.3, Juti’s characterization of the interplay of matter/form and senses/reason-dualisms as a fundamental problem of metaphysics (2001, 20-25, 51-52), Heidegger’s interpretation of the Principle (1996/1971) and Neiman 2015.
Heidegger finishes his book on the Principle by comparing being and play, and at a
different point of his book he argues that the Principle stands or falls on “the ground of the essence
of language”.

We have established that it is language-games that are the Lichtung, and that the
concept of being, its categories and identification-principles function in language use and in the
relationships that are intertwined with them. Then the arguments about language-games as
categories, the location of functional concepts for reidentification and rules of reason in language-games can all be brought to the examination of the Principle. Heidegger also argues that “the nature of play is determined as (...) the dialectic of freedom and necessity within the horizon of
ground/reason, of rules, of rules of play, of calculus.”

Then the characterization of the rules of
language-games and their underlying relationships with elements, institutions and contexts also
determines, what connections between being, intelligibility, explanation and reason hold. These
connections also extend to theological grammar: we have already introduced the language-game of
God and Adam as a test-case for Hamannian ontology, and Heidegger indeed compares being with
a child who institutes reason by playing and shifting pawns. This picture bears a striking
resemblance to the picture of God’s Wisdom in Proverbs as “playing in (God’s) inhabited world
and delighting in the sons of men.”

Heidegger even remarks that “Perhaps one might have more
appropriately translated the Leibnizian sentence Cum Deus calculat fit mundus with: When God
plays, the world comes to be.”

Then the grammar of being, the question of evil, the grammar of
the word “God” and the nature of reason all come together at a very deep level.

5.4 Practical and relational intelligibility as a critique of the PSR

Developing a critique of the Principle of Reason might seem to be difficult or even foolish. After
all, we have seen that it is a principle that we rely on in everyday life, and both Heidegger and Pruss
have made strong cases for its self-evidence. Moreover, the PSR is often taken to be a demand for
explanation. It is also often taken to be equivalent with a denial of brute facts, which has been
argued for by Pruss, in Chs. 5.1 and 5.2, and in a different way by Kant too. However, in Ch. 4 we
have shown that the abstract concepts for essences and the structure of logical space are based on

810 Heidegger 1996, 18, 111-113/1971, 39, 185-188.
812 Prov. 8:31, translated in von Rad 1988, 150.
814 See Heidegger 1996/1971, Ch. 13. PI 371-373, ZH 7, 169. See Ch. 4 and 5.1, 5.2, Bayer 2002, H 96-110, 205-218/ N
ordinary language-games, which intertwine both senses and reason, and the use of expressions with objects in the relationships of the game. In Ch. 5 we have seen that the logic of elements, institutions and contexts in language-games for encountering objects and their underlying systems overcomes the fact/meaning split, and thus gives intelligibility for free once we can identify objects or use the concept of being. These insights can be used to locate concepts like “essence”, “reason” and “ground” in language-games, and functions and other underlying structures in relationships that constitute them. Moreover, these relationships are contingent. We have already noted that the Principle is systematically ambiguous, as it does not sufficiently distinguish between types of reasons. This insight can be taken as a lead for developing a non-Humean critique of the PSR.815

5.4.1 The ambiguity of the Principle and the plurality of reasons

We have seen that the Principle of Reason has many different forms and many different strengths. The Principle can be read as the Principle of Intelligibility, of Good Explanation or of Rational Ground on the depth of the Principle, or of how strong the links between being and reason are. It can also be read as having a different breadth, as the Principles of Ex Nihilo Nihil, Causation and Reason assign a different scope to the connection between being and explanation. Heidegger in fact points out that such ambiguity is inherently built into the Principle, because it links being, facts, explanation and rational grounding by relying on a prior concept of reason: “The principle (...) speaks about beings (...) on the basis of having a view of something like ‘reason’. Yet what the essence of reason amounts to is not defined in this principle. That is presupposed by this principle as an obvious idea.”816 He takes the comparison of causal reasons and logical reasons as an example of this further ambiguity of the Principle. An axiom or a logical proof offers logical reasons that are different kinds of reasons than causal relationships, like rain causing a roof to be wet.817 In addition to causal and logical reasons, one has to consider moral reasons as well. In the theodicy debate, free will is often taken to be a sufficient moral reason for God to allow evil.818

815 See Ch. 5.3, Pruss 2006, Heidegger 1996/1971. For Kant as a critic of atomistic sense-data, see Taylor 1995, Ch.2. For language-games as categories of being, see Garver 1994, 61-72. See also Dickson 1995, Bayer 2002.
817 Heidegger 1996, 21/1971, 44.
818 For the free will defence, see Ch. 2.3.2.3, Plantinga 1974, Ch. 9.
The Principle is then ambiguous on three different conceptual axes: depth, scope and the nature of reason.819 Such ambiguity might not be a problem for a piecemeal defence of the Principle, but Leibnizian and theodicist views have a tendency to run all the types of explanations together. This follows from the role of the Principle in theodicism and the General Argument. The PSR is used to overcome the fact/meaning and fact/value gaps by reducing facts to a system of reasons and an Arche guaranteeing it, which presupposes that moral sources and the meaningful order of facts are ultimately connected as two sides of the cosmic order. Neiman even argues that “behind the principle of sufficient reason itself is the assumption that the is and the ought should coincide.”820 Theodicism then presupposes a strong view of the unity of reason, or that moral, logical and causal reasonings and explanations are all connected. This assumption is problematic.821

Hume and Heidegger show the conceptual distinction between logical and causal reasons. It is logically possible that one billiard balls hits another but that ball does not move. In model-theoretic terms, we could have $D=\{\text{Ball}_1, \text{Ball}_2\}$, $I(x \text{ hits } y)=\{\text{Ball}_1, \text{Ball}_2\}$, $I(x \text{ moves})=\{\text{Ball}_1\}$. Then the sentence $\exists x \exists y (x \text{ hits } y \land \neg y \text{ moves})$ has a model and thus does not contain a contradiction. However, the situation Hume imagined is not causally possible and the model built on it is not embeddable on real-life causal systems, because if two billiard balls were to collide, the one hit would start moving. Causal and logical explanation are thus conceptually separate.822

Causal reasons are moreover separate from moral reasons. Suppose that Stan gets drunk and attempts to drive home from the bar, but there is slippery ice on the road and the car crashes. Then the crash had no morally sufficient reason, because drunk driving is a moral evil and a car crash due to slippery ice is a natural evil. However, the crash was causally necessary, because drinking too much caused Stan to ignore the ice and the ice caused the tyres to lose friction and the car to get out of control. Moreover, the separateness of moral and causal necessity in the case of Stan is a case of Hume’s is/ought separation: it ought to be that there was no crash, but the crash in fact happened due to physical necessity because it had a cause. Moral reasons are separate from logical reasons as well. Consider the case that Stan considered calling a taxi when he was leaving the bar, and chose to call a taxi to take him home. Then he had morally good reasons to decide to call the taxi, but his choice to call the taxi was not logically necessary. There is no logical

---

819 Yitzhak Melamed and Daniel Lin argue that PSR is in fact a family of principles (2016). A.C. Grayling (1998) mentions that Schopenhauer noted the confusion between logical reasons and causes, and distinguished between moral, mathematical, causal and logical reasons. Heidegger (1996) then took up these themes, and I follow in this tradition.

820 Neiman 2015, 322.


822 See Hume 1949, Ch. 7, Pruss 2006, 31-36, 75-81, Ch. 2.2.4.
contradiction in the example that he tried to drive home, as the set \{“Stan got drunk at the bar”, “Stan attempts to drive home”, “Stan’s car slips on ice and crashes”\} is consistent. However, it ought to be the case that if Stan drinks, he does not drive, and also that if he drives home, his car does not slip on ice and crash. More generally, the best or morally permissible worlds are not logically necessary: \(\text{Op} \rightarrow \Box \text{p}\) does not hold. Such a condition would in fact be even stronger than the principle \(\text{Op} \rightarrow \text{p}\), or that one can get an is from ought. Moral and logical reasons are then distinct, much for the same reasons as causal and moral reasons are.\(^{823}\)

Moral, logical and causal reasons are all conceptually distinct. Moreover, these distinctions can be shown by arguments that resemble the discussions of conceptual gaps in Ch. 2.2.4. The distinction between causal and logical explanation on the one hand, and moral explanation on the other, is related to the is/ought distinction. The distinction between causal and logical explanation is related to Hume’s critique of causation and the fact/meaning gap. Then the conceptual gaps underlying the problem of evil arise in the context of the Principle of Reason itself as ambiguities about the nature of reason. This is however something to be expected: Dickson and Kondylis show that attempts to close conceptual gaps by reducing one of the terms to the other only end up presupposing the conceptual opposition as a starting point.\(^{824}\) The reappearance of the conceptual gaps in theodicism strongly suggests that theodicism puts expressions like “reason”, “ground” and “cause” to metaphysical use. If there are many different kinds of reasons, then there are many different moral, scientific, theological, logical and other language-games for assessing reasons, and a metaphysical account that uses the concept of reason in a grand unification has detached the concept of reason out of its contexts.\(^{825}\)

The ambiguity concerning the depth or strength of the Principle poses more difficulties for the stronger versions of the Principle, which are needed to formulate theodicism. The key transition here is the move from the Principle of Intelligibility to the Principle of Good Explanations. In Ch. 5.3.1 we saw that such strengthening presupposes two extra assumptions: the distributivity of intelligibility, and the claim that intelligibility entails explanation. Pruss straightforwardly assumes that the second holds by definition: sufficient explanations always give sufficient reasons, and explanation is the removal of mystery. He also explicitly defends the first: an explanation of \(p \lor q\) either explains \(p\) or explains \(q\), and the explanation of the disjunct \(d \in \{p, q\}\) is logically prior. We can give counterexamples to both claims from the logic of relationships and

---

\(^{823}\) See Ch. 2.2.4 and Sayre-McCord 1995 for the is/ought gap.

\(^{824}\) See Ch. 2.2.4, 3.1.3, Dickson 1994, 1-15.

\(^{825}\) For metaphysical use of the concept of reason, see H 210/N III, 285, PI 116.
their elements, institutions and present realities. One can show that a whole can be intelligible in terms of rules and institutions even though every fact about it is not, and that such intelligibility can hold even if one cannot speak of directionality towards the outcome.826

The problems with the claim that intelligibility entails distributive explanation can be highlighted by taking examples of rules that hold of entire systems, but are not strong enough to fix all the facts about them. For example, a neighbourhood association has a board with 5 members. Gender equality rules demand that the board has 2 men and 2 women. Nevertheless, the institution does not fix which seats are held by men or women. Thus it holds of the board as a whole, not of particular seats or office-holders.827 We can similarly describe a language-game where white and black balls are drawn out of a bag. A small bag contains 5 balls, 3 of which are white and 2 of which are black. The player takes a ball out of the bag and does not return it. If the ball is white, he writes down “W” in a row, and if it is black, he writes down “B”. The game continues until all of the balls have been drawn. Suppose that Sue plays the game and gets the sequence BWWBW. Then the rules of the game make the sequence as a whole intelligible, but they do not shed light on the question, why the second ball was white. The problem of distributivity also arises in quantum mechanical explanation. Pruss gives the example of an EPR experiment, which demonstrates quantum entanglement. In such situations, the properties of particles are not given independently of measurements and other interactions, and the laws or rules concern probabilities for patterns of events. Radioactive decay too is an example of the failure of the distributivity of intelligibility. Half of uranium-238 atoms decay in 4.5 billion years, but one cannot say which atoms will decay in a particular sample. Then the decay of one gram of uranium can be explained with the laws concerning decay, but they do not explain why some particular atoms decayed.828

The claim of the distributivity of intelligibility is in fact a strong reductionistic claim. It denies that there can be intelligibility that consists in the patterns or institutions that function at the level of whole systems or relationships. This might seem to be in tension with the fact that patterns or institutions function through particular facts and thus make them meaningful. However, what makes the sequence of the facts intelligible are the rules and the relationships between the facts embodying them. The sequence BWWBW embodies the rule that 2 balls are black and 3 are white, and thus it is made intelligible by the rule. The same however holds of the sequence

826 Ch. 5.3.1, Pruss 2006, esp. 184-186.
827 The example is inspired by an example Taneli Huuskonen once used in set theory class.
WBBWW. Then the sequence is made meaningful by embodying a rule that regulates its relationships, and the fact that the second ball is white is made meaningful by its relationships in the sequence and the rules that regulate these relationships. These rules do not sufficiently explain the fact, as the rules of the sequence allow for the second ball to be black.\textsuperscript{829}

The problem with distributive explanation can also be raised with probabilistic intelligibility in cases, which follow the Principle of Insufficient Reason.\textsuperscript{830} PISR is the claim that if there are n possibilities, then the probability of each is $\frac{1}{n}$, so there is no causal directedness towards any of the outcomes. Take the example of drawing cards: there are 52 cards in the deck, and 4 are aces. The deck is then shuffled and a card is drawn, so the chance of getting an ace is $\frac{4}{52}$. Now suppose that Liz shuffles the pack, lifts a card and picks the ace of spades. The probability for doing so is $\frac{1}{52}$, so the process and its rules cannot be directed towards the outcome like causal functions are. Then drawing rules do not explain that Liz got an ace of spades, although the outcome of the draw is perfectly intelligible as the rules of the game allow it. Then the intelligibility of games that are composed of facts as moves and rules as institutions yield intelligibility that does not amount to good explanations.

We can conclude the arguments about the ambiguities in the Principle of Reason. The logic of elements, institutions and relationships of contextual intelligibility allow for cases where the relationships of a game or the facts of a play are intelligible even, if all features of them do not have good explanations. Thus the logic of elements and institutions make them intelligible even, though they have no sufficient reasons. Moreover, the concept of intelligibility of elements and institutions allows a reply to Pruss’s defence of the PSR. Pruss’s strongest arguments for the Principle resemble those given for the intelligibility of facts in Ch. 5.2: Humeanism detaches necessity and possibility from their contexts, and a neo-Aristotelian account of causal powers and individuals connects being and intelligibility. However, Pruss defines “x explains y” in terms of “x makes y intelligible”. Then Pruss’s arguments can be reread as offering reasons for the Principle of Intelligibility, not the Principle of Reason.\textsuperscript{831}

The concept “sufficient reason” is moreover systematically ambiguous, as the Principle does not specify what a reason is and one can talk of different types of reasons in different circumstances.

\textsuperscript{829} See Ch. 5.2 for functional intertwinings, and Ellis 2008 for multiple realizability.


\textsuperscript{831} See Chs 5.1, 5.2., Pruss 2006.
language-games. The plurality of reasons also suggests that “sufficient reason” is a family resemblance term that is used in many different language-games and contexts, so an attempt to define a Principle of Reason once and for all will put the concepts of “reason”, “ground” and “cause” into metaphysical use by detaching them from their language-games. This anyway is the case in the theodicist appeals to the Principle, as they attempt to reduce facts to a rational order in a way that builds the fact/value and fact/meaning gaps into the Principle itself as ambiguities about the nature of reason. We must next investigate the context for terms like “ground”, “reason”, “essence” and “possibility” in language-games to get to the (rough) ground.

5.4.2 The location of reasons in language-games and relationships

The Principle of Reason then stands or falls on the question: “How are sufficient reasons like essences and spaces of possibility themselves possible?” In Ch. 4.1, we have seen that language-games are categories of being by forming the Lichtung for encountering reality and for the use of the concept of being. Both the logical space for the description and identification of objects, and the functional terms for reidentification are located in language-games. Moreover, language-games and their rules depend on underlying relationships R, and their activities are a part of the encounter: (source → SoAs → concepts). Heidegger argues that the Principle of Rational Ground is the fundamental version of the Principle of Reason, which holds of the ground of language. The Principle will have to hold of the answers “What is an X?” and the possibilities given by language-games as categories of description, and due to the connection of language-games with their underlying relationships. Language-games and their relationships function as games or relational systems that are composed of elements and institutions. Then the Principle leads to conceptual confusions and ambiguity, because it goes against the relational conditions of language.

5.4.2.1 The ground of “reasons” and “grounds” in language-games

Hamann points out that making reason the ground of objects and types of knowledge is dependent on detaching it from experience, tradition and language. Then the concept of “reasons” loses its

---

833 Cf. H 211/N III, 286: “If then a chief question indeed still remains – how is the faculty of thought possible?”
834 Chs. 4.1, 4.3, 5.2.2, 5.3, 5.4.1, Pl 373, Heidegger 1996/1971.
intelligibility, and the Principle of Rational Ground thus goes against the relational conditions of reasons and leads into metaphysical confusions. Moreover, he argues that language use relates reason to experience and tradition by functioning as a response to reality in the *Lichtung* (source → SoA → language-games), which he describes as the encounter (God → nature → reason). Thus existence and the encountered Other is prior to reason and its conceptual relationships: “Not *Cogito; ergo sum*, but vice versa, and more Hebraic, *est; ergo cogito*.” Wittgenstein develops similar arguments in *On Certainty* by locating the concepts of “reasons”, “knowledge” and “rational grounds” in language use, which is based on trust in realities. Wittgenstein puts the matter well in a slogan: “Am Anfang war die Tat.”

Wittgenstein’s arguments in *On Certainty* examine the uses of the expression “rational grounds”. He notes that the expression “I know…” presupposes rational grounds and thus involves giving sufficient reasons for the known fact, but the assessment of reasons takes place against the background of a language-game and its rules: “I know’ often means: I have the proper grounds for my statement. So if the other person is acquainted with the language-game, he would admit that I know. The other, if he is acquainted with the language-game, must be able to imagine how one may know something of the kind.” Language-games however presuppose an underlying agreement not just on definitions and practices, but on judgments about facts that must hold if the language-game is to have a point. Then sentences like “This is a hand” must be presupposed if the practice of seeking and finding material objects is to get off the ground, and therefore they must also be used as rules for assessing reasons for claims. Then the assessment of reasons requires not just a practice, but also a whole network of sentences that are constitutive of its logical activities and logical arguments. This network then amounts to an entire worldview that is embodied in the practice of encountering reality and assessing sufficient reasons for claims.

The rules of language-games then determine what is a “sufficient reason” or a “ground”. These rules are however located in language use: it was shown in Ch. 4.2 that the rules of a language are the institutional aspect of their use, so sufficient reasons depend on the institutions of language-games. Moreover, Wittgenstein argues that language-games are more fundamental than rational grounds: describing the Earth as a ball might be a good picture, as the “game proves its

---

835 ZH 5, 448, quoted in Dickson 1995, 318. ZH 5, 254, H 206-208/N III, 283-284, See also Hamann’s letters to Jacobi in 1787 (ZH 7, 161-178). Dickson 1995, 281-283, Bayer 2002, Ch. 3.3.2.
837 OC 18.
838 OC 92-105, PI 242, Hintikka 1973, Hertzberg 1978, Ch. 4.2.4.
worth. That may be the cause of its being played, but it is not the ground.” Moreover, communication and encountering reality are the foundation of language-games. Wittgenstein gives the example of uttering “This is a towel!” and the utterance takes hold of the towel just like grabbing it does. Then taking hold of reality is prior to giving reasons. Such a taking hold of reality however resembles Hamann’s concept of faith as recognition: one recognizes the towel by trusting one’s senses and the practices of using it. Wittgenstein even claims: “It is always by favour of Nature that one knows something.” Recognition of reality in communicative practices then also gives the grounds for objects: in OC 475-476 Wittgenstein argues that primitive communication in response to reality is sufficient for language. He then applies this insight into the language-games for seeking and finding: and one first learns to fetch books and sit in armchairs, and only then learns the more abstract concept of existence. One can follow Hintikka in drawing a distinction between first- and second-order language-games: first-order language-games involve seeking and finding, and second-order games involve explanations and giving grounds. Then the encounters with reality and first-order language-games for existence are logically prior to language-games for reasons.

One can sum up the Wittgensteinian location of the concept of “reasons” in language-games. It is linguistic practices for the recognition of reality, their associated belief-systems and institutions that give the grounding rules for seeking and finding objects in our language-games. Reasons and grounds are then dependent on the institutions of language, and also on prior activities of encountering reality and seeking and finding objects. Then linguistic action, the existence of reality itself, the rules for the concept of existence and associated games of seeking and finding that function as categories are prior to sufficient reasons for the cognition of objects and explanations. Thus, being itself cannot be identified with a structure of rational concepts or explanations.

5.4.2.2. The grounds for logical spaces and essences

In Ch. 5.3.3 we saw Heidegger argue that modern metaphysics starts with the assumption that rational laws ground the conditions of possibility for objects. Kant argues that the unity of the logical rules of representation determine objectivity in general = X. Wittgenstein sums up this approach as the view that the essence of language consists of an order of super-concepts like

---

839 PI 197, OC 145-146, 474-475.
841 For primary and secondary language-games, see Hintikka 1986. See also Ch. 4.3, Hetzberg 1978.
“truth”, “language” and “the world” that hold together language and the world by establishing an a priori order of possibilities. Both Hamann and Wittgenstein criticize this starting point as a metaphysical abuse of language. Hamann argues that metaphysical attempts to construct the general rational condition of objecthood detach terms like “being” and “possibility” from their empirically fixed and practical use, and thus turns the practically given matter-of-factness of language “into such a meaningless, (...) unstable, indefinite something = X”\textsuperscript{842}. Wittgenstein similarly criticizes the quest for a super-order for concepts constituting rational representation and possibility that have been abstracted from use: “These concepts: proposition, language, thought, world, stand in line one behind the other, each equivalent to each. (But what are these words to be used for now? The language-game in which they are to be applied is missing.)”\textsuperscript{843}

We have seen in Ch 4.3. that language-games are categories of being by being ways for encountering objects, and the being of these objects can then be sorted into types and characterized by the rules of these games and the abstract conceptual structures they embody. This holds both of logical spaces and of essences. Take the example of a rage from Wittgenstein and Ch. 4.3: Sadness(t)=(Feeling at t, Expressions at t, Strength at t, Object at t). Then the questions correspond to types of practices for encountering it, as the practices for answering “How strong is it?” and “How does it feel?” involve pointing to different properties of the objects. Different answers to the questions like “I’m feeling a bit sad.” then offer discourse possibilities, which form a grid for all the possible properties an entity might take. The space of possible metaphysical descriptions is then located in the possible encounters with objects in language-games, and for the structure of possible descriptions for them in the encounter.\textsuperscript{844}

The question of essences and essential terms has been discussed from Chapters 4.3 to 5.2. An essence gives the answer to the question “What is an X?” by giving X:s typical properties and principles of reidentification. Essences typically involve functional terms: a brain tends to produce consciousness under certain conditions. These functional terms are then associated with rules or tendencies: they produce the function f(x) in the situation x. Moreover, these functional terms can characterize the essence or help answer the question “What is an X?” by describing the principles of continuity that are used to reidentify objects in their functionings in relationships. For example, a physical object like a coffee-mug is identified by telling a story of its causal roles: it was on my desk yesterday, I am drinking coffee from it and if it fell to the ground, it could break

\textsuperscript{843} PI 96. See also PI 116: “What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.”
\textsuperscript{844} See Ch. 4.3, Garver 1994, 61-72, 217-235, Ch. 5.1.
because it is fragile. Moreover, the functional terms and the rules for reidentification function through pointing out empirical facts and activities in language-games.\textsuperscript{845}

The Principle of Reason then is the principle that being itself can be identified with formal features, which are then identified with abstract conceptual structures: logical spaces in modern metaphysics, real definitions that point out presence in Greek metaphysics. However, if the conceptual structures for logical spaces are understood in terms of discourse possibilities and the conceptual structures of essences and principles of reidentification are located in language-games and their underlying relationships, then these identifications do not hold. The fact/meaning split includes the matter/form split as a special case, but facts and meanings are intertwined. Moreover, the abstract conceptual structures can only be objective in concrete and sensuous language-games. The correspondence between rules of language-games for discourse possibilities and reidentifications on the one hand, and intrinsic necessities in relationships on the other, is mediated by sensuous responses to reality. Then the existence of reality and its relationships are prior to conceptual structures.\textsuperscript{846}

The argument against the senses/reason and fact/meaning dualisms have been made in Ch. 4.2 and 5.2. Language-games and their underlying systems can be analysed into elements like an expression “Knight”, a speech act “Check!”, facts like Nf3 and objects like a black knight, and institutions like the rules of chess and the practice of using the word “knight” in practices involving a black knight. Then the rational concept of a knight functions through the practices of saying the word “knight!” in practices that associate it with a black knight, and the speech act linking the word with a black knight is in accord with the rule. Similarly, Nf3 is a position in the game, as it is a possibility for using the black knight that arises from the rules of chess. Then the elements and institutions in their context together constitute the objects and the expressions: wooden pieces become meaningful chess-pieces by having a role in the institutions of the game, and the concepts are also realized and constituted through these practices. Then formal or conceptual structures and meanings are a part of the game and embodied in its moves and objects. Moreover, the abstract conceptual rules concerning being are second-order principles that can be embedded onto the games: for example, the principle “Every chess move has a strategic reason” describes the use of pieces in games that are governed by the rules of chess. Then the Principle of Reason puts the cart

\textsuperscript{845} For reidentification, see 5.1. For functional terms, see Ch. 5.2. For essences, see PI 371-373, Met. V:8, Tahko 2015.
\textsuperscript{846} These arguments bring together the critique of metaphysical categories (Ch. 4.3, 5.1 Hintikka 1973, Garver 1994, 61-72, Strawson 1959), the objectivity of language-games as a \textit{Lichtung} (Chs. 3.2., 4.1, 4.2, PI 371-373, Garver 1994, 217-235, ZH 7, 161-178) and the Principle of Reason (Pruss 2006, Heidegger 1996/1971, see also Bayer 2002, 312).
before the horse: the relational structures of elements and institutions constitute objects, and their
being is not given by or reducible to formal structures of concepts and reason.847

Abstract rational concepts then do not constitute objects: the element/institution-
networks in language-games and their underlying relationships do. Another argument against the
Principle can be given from language-games as responses to reality and its relationships, and how
essential rules are objective only in the context of sensuous responses to reality. In Ch. 4.2 the
category theoretic concept of a natural transformation was used to develop Wittgenstein’s idea that
intrinsic necessities are reflected by arbitrary rules. The tendency or power for hydrogen to burn is
manifested by the process $H + O + H^{Burn} \rightarrow H_2O$, and the intrinsic necessity is captured by the
chemical rule $2H+O\rightarrow H_2O$. Then if one first checks that the formula $2H+O$ holds of a gas $H+O+H$,
and then burns it, $H + O + H^{Burn} \rightarrow H_2O$, one gets the same watery result $H_2O$ by first doing the
calculation $2H+O\rightarrow H_2O$ and then verifying the result by measuring the vapour. Then the rules for
functional terms can be said to capture intrinsic necessities, and the rules for discourse possibilities
can also be said to correspond to intrinsic possibilities in relationships.848

The rule of calculation is then related to the real definition of water “$H_2O$”, because it
is found to capture an intrinsic necessity through observation. Aristotelianism builds an empiricist
view of the Principle of Reason through a similar theory of perception. The sense organs take in the
form of water and the intellect forms the real definition “$H_2O$” out of it, and the form and
conceptual real definition are one and the same thing. However, the Aristotelian account ends up
cutting corners with its identification of essential rules and the functional rules for objects. There
are two problems with the identification. First, language is a response to reality, and second, our
linguistic responses to reality are free and autonomous.849

In the example, the researcher observes water and then forms a language-game with
the norm of description $2H+O\rightarrow H_2O$ in a response to the empirical phenomenon of burning. Then
the burning process and the rule-formulation are two opposite but related parts of the linguistic
interaction, which can be also put as (Burning $\rightarrow$ facts $\rightarrow$ rule). Thus, the roles of the causal process
and the rule differ in the language-games and relationships of linguistic interaction, as the rule is a
part of a game that is a response to the phenomenon and its underlying powers. The same is made

847 The example builds on H 216-218/N 288-289, PI 197, Bayer 2002, Chs. 4.2, 5.2, Floridi 2010, Ch. 15, Heidegger
848 See Ch. 4.2.3.
849 See De an. III, Feser 2014, 137-146 for a neo-Aristotelian account of concepts and PSR. For the themes of language
as a response to reality and the autonomy of grammar, see Ch. 3.3.2.
even more explicit in the Adamic language-game: God first plays rules like tree $\rightarrow$ fruit, and Adam forms the rule “tree $\rightarrow$ fruit” by appropriating it sensuously. Then the would-be tree $\rightarrow$ fruit and Adam’s rule have different roles in the communicative space (God $\rightarrow$ nature $\rightarrow$ reason), as the phenomena and their institutions exist prior to the rules and constitute their objectivity communicatively and through sensuous practices. One should note that the distinct roles for rules and functions of objects lead to the problem of identity of form in Aristotelianism: how can the same form H$_2$O be in the mind and also in water molecules? It seems that practically mediated isomorphism of function is a better concept to understand the natural correspondence.\(^{850}\)

A second problem with the straightforward identification of either rules for functional terms with intrinsic necessities or of rules for discourse possibilities with the structures of intrinsic possibilities in relationships is the autonomy of grammar. Language is a free response: the values for forming language-games are derived from the relationship with the world, and human nature and action are a part of these relationships. Then the conceptual rules giving intrinsic necessities and associated sufficient reasons depend on human values and choices in a way that the being of objects and their tendencies does not usually do. Putnam discusses this problem in his article “Aristotle after Wittgenstein”.\(^{851}\) Form is given by functional organization: the form of Putnam’s dog Shlomit is the structure of its biological functions. However, this structure has to be identified with a theory: the question “Is it a part of Shlomit’s essence that he is descended from wolves?” will get the answer “Yes!” from an evolutionary biologist and “No!” from a geneticist. The theories for assigning essences for Shlomit are however different responses to the situation and depend on different values. Thus the rules for concepts of real definitions and different discourse possibilities depend on interactions and values, and cannot be identified with the ground of objects.

5.4.2.3 The contingency of necessity

The location of concepts and rules for essences and logical spaces in language-games then entails the priority of being over thought: “Our reason must wait and hope – and want to be the servant of Nature, instead of its legislator.”\(^{852}\) The logical spaces and essential concepts are structures and rules of language-games, and thus relate to objects only in use. Then they are not logically

\(^{850}\) For natural correspondences, see Ch. 4.2.3. For language-games as a Lichtung, see Chs. 4.1, 5.1. For language as a response, see Ch. 3.2.2, 4.1, H 108-109/N III,32. For the related Adamic game, see Ch. 4.1. See Putnam 1999, 22-24.

\(^{851}\) Putnam 1994. For the autonomy of grammar, see Ch. 4.1, PI 497, ZH 7, 164-173. Cf. Glock 1996, 45-50.

\(^{852}\) ZH 5, 265. For the contingency of necessity in Hamann, see Ch. 3.3.2, Bayer 2002, 156-175. See Garver 1994, 232.
constitutive of the reality that is encountered in our language-games, and live only in use. The priority of existence over rational rules also entails the contingency of necessity. Both logical spaces and essences are ultimately rooted in relationships and are thus contingent upon them.

Locating contingency and necessity in relationships allows us to connect both with the systems view of these underlying relationships that was developed in Ch. 5.1.2. The relationship R can be viewed as a game that is formed out of the interaction of many actors, or as a complex system of objects, their states and the laws that govern the interaction of a system. Hamann has a related view about philosophical activity: philosophical analysis identifies the objects and states of the system, and synthesis explains its functioning and points out the realities that are present in it by throwing light on the interrelationships and its institutions. These systems can moreover be analysed into elements, institutions and the relational features that are present in interactions. The elements of a game are its possible moves, and its institutions are its rules. The elements of a system are its possible states, and the institutions are its dynamic laws.853

One can now redefine necessity and possibility relative to a game or a system. One can note that the objects in our language-games could be parts of completely different systems with counterfactual possibilities. One can e.g. speculate how physical particles functioned if the laws of nature were different, or how a person would act in a fictional situation that put pressure on his character. In order to ground such discussions on the language-games that function as categories of being, widening the spaces of possibility to cover traditional metaphysical possibility must relate to practices for encountering objects. The practices for reidentification can function in counterfactual situations with different functional terms or physical laws, if the grammar rules for trans-world reidentification depend on general facts that remain fixed. For example, the characters of Hamlet could exist in a world with different physical laws as their roles in the play would stay the same, but water could not be XYZ because the chemical property H₂O is used to pick it out in our practices of identification.854 However, the institutions or rules of language-games and their underlying systems give two concepts of necessity and possibility:

1. If all of the situations w that are allowed by the rule R of S are F, then F is necessary.
2. If the rules R allow the situation F, then F is possible.

854 See Ch. 4.2.3 for grammatical principles and general facts in the process of identification. The examples come from Hamlet and Putnam 1975. For the debate about metaphysical possibilities, see Morganti & Tahko 2017. Note also that different models, metaphysical metaphors and practices of reidentification lead to different views of essences.
3. If there is a rule R that attaches to x with the response f(x), then the connection \( x \to f(x) \) is necessary.

4. If the connection \( x \to g(x) \) is allowed by the rules, then the connection is possible.

The rules R are determined by the game, and they can be either strategic or defining rules. The contextualization of necessity into relationships can again be illustrated with the example of chess.\(^{855}\) A black king is in e8. Then the rules allow its move to d8, so both the position Kd8 and the connection Ke8 \( \to \) Kd8, or the move Ke8-d8 are possible. Suppose that a white rook is checking it from e1. Then the situation where there is an open file between e1 and e8, and the king is still in e8, is not possible as it would leave the black king in check. Similarly, the move Ke7 (or connection Ke8 \( \to \) Ke7) is not possible, because it would leave the king in check. Then suppose that White has made a blunder and left the rook to be captured by a black bishop. Then Black’s strategy dictates him to take the rook, so Bxe1 is a necessary outcome of the situation according to Black’s strategic rules. These rules only hold against the context of the game and the practice of playing.\(^{856}\)

These grammatical notes about relational necessity due to game rules and dynamic laws can be contrasted with Poteat’s different models for terms like “logic”, “necessary” and “form”. Like Strawson, he associates different models for concepts of being with different sense modalities. One can distinguish between a static visual space, melodic music, random music and speech acts. These models of necessity have implications for the Principle of Reason, because the Principle identifies the being qua being with a form that can be reduced to the structure of reason. Then if necessity is not identifiable with a rational structure, but can be compared with the motives or rules of speech acts in language-games, the Principle of Reason cannot hold.\(^{857}\)

The statistic theory of necessity and contingency is based on co-presence in the visual field. The picture involves having a God’s Eye point of view of all the actual facts of the world: as if all the true propositions P(a), Q(b) etc. were written up as a giant book or text and then held before the eyes. Another good metaphor is to say that as if one were looking at a fresco of the elementary diagram of all the true atomic sentences of the world.\(^{858}\) The connection A\( \to \)B is necessary if and only if A is always followed by B, or A\( \to \)B always hold. The traditional Greek statistic theory of necessity was based on the visual picture: \( \Box (A \to B) \) if and only if A\( \to \)B always

\(^{855}\) See PI 108, Floridi 2010, Ch. 15.

\(^{856}\) See PI 197-202. For modality and games, see Garson 2018.

\(^{857}\) See Poteat 1985, Strawson 1959, Ch. 5.1.

\(^{858}\) An elementary diagram is the set of all the true atomic sentences and substitution-instances of a model. See Hodges 1997, 48-49.
The theory is plausible once one accepts the Greek version of the PSR: \( A \rightarrow B \) is a principle of Being or a real definition if it can gather the different perceptions \( A, B, A, B \ldots \) and give them a permanence. The statistic theory can also be used by positivists to deflate the concept of necessity: e.g. \( A \) leads to \( B \) with causal necessity if and only if \( A \) is always constantly conjoined with \( B \). Both connect necessity with correlations of actual facts, viewed from a God’s Eye point of view.\(^859\)

Poteat offers the picture of melodic music as an alternative to the visual picture. A melody passes in time in accord with a motive, and its notes tend to the next note. For example, if \( B-A-C-H \) is a musical motive, then the \( B \) tends towards \( A \) through the temporal relationships between these notes. The necessity of motive music is the necessity of motives: \( B \) is necessarily followed first by \( A \), then by \( C \) and at last by \( H \), because the notes follow each other according to the rules \( x \rightarrow f(x) \) of the theme. The notion of contingency is interpreted through the musical scale: the notes \( C, D, E, F, G, A, H, C \) and their different lengths give the different possible sounds. The concept of necessity is then interpreted in terms of connections according to rules, and the concept of possibility in terms of rules offering a set of possibilities. In other words, necessity is interpreted via temporal consequences via functional terms, and contingency in terms of a set of possibilities. A metaphysics that allows for both a set of possibilities, and then a set of functional essences will work according to this picture. Essences give metaphysical necessity, but they are the functional terms of science as well. They are however located in a space of possible worlds that allow for contingency, either in the application of a priori concepts or in the choice of essences.\(^860\)

The random music picture allows for another concept of necessity: that of loose and separate facts. Random music arises when one presses the keys of a piano at random, and notes of random pitch and duration follow each other. Then the sounds arise completely outside a framework of meaning, and all musical facts are brute, because there are no connections between the randomly generated notes. Musical facts are absolutely contingent, as they just happen outside the framework of meaning. Moreover, no musical fact holds necessarily. The fact/meaning split underlying theodicism presupposes this picture of logical connections. Facts are separate and opposite to meanings and values, because facts are atomic and no motives connect them. To use the language of rules, they are subject to a rule that establishes a space of possibility, but not to one that

\(^{859}\) Poteat 1985, 78-81. The term “statistic theory” comes from Knuuttila, see Juti 2001, 255-257. For the Greek version of the PSR, see Heidegger 1996/1971, Ch.10. For positivist statistic theories of modality, see Hume 1949, Ch.7, Ladyman & Ross 2007, Ch.6.

\(^{860}\) See Poteat 1985, 82-88. The theory of possible worlds and functional essences, or abstract super-concepts and scientific essences is motivated by Pruss (2006), Tahko (2015) and Leibniz (1989). Wittgenstein subverts this picture in PI 527-528: the logic of music functions like the logic of language. Then the logical spaces and functional terms must be set in a context resembling a language-game or function according to the logic of speech-acts. See Ch. 5.4.2.2.
estimates motives. We have seen that this picture underlies the *Tractatus* view of logically atomic facts and Hume’s imaginability criterion of possibility: facts hold independently of each other, and it is sufficient to imagine any arbitrary combination of them holding to establish its possibility.\textsuperscript{861}

Poteat discusses a fourth picture for the concept of necessity: that of speech acts and language-games. A speech act is both necessary and absolutely contingent. It is necessary, as it is subject to the rules and motives of a language-game. It is contingent, as it is dependent on a speaker and the relationships of the game to function. Then the necessity of the speech act is constituted by the rules of a game, and the contingency of the language-game is its dependence on the speaker and the relationships of the game. Speech acts are then dependent on language use that underlies meaning, and the priority of action and relationships establish the contingency of the speech acts. Poteat locates the speech acts in a relationship, as they presuppose a space of communication or an underlying linguistic practice. He also discusses (God $\rightarrow$ salvation history $\rightarrow$ Israel) as his basic biblical model. Strawson also offers a similar model with his everyday example of audial identification of speakers: every speaker has a master-sound or a voice in the dialogue, and influence other speakers by making speech acts in the dialogue (Speaker with master-sound $\rightarrow$ Speech act $\rightarrow$ Responding to other speakers). Then speech acts are absolutely dependent on speakers, but subject to the rules of communicative use. The logical relationships of use are rooted in communication, as they are its motives. The possibilities are not limited with a priori rules, but are related to speakers and their communicative relationships (source $\rightarrow$ SoA $\rightarrow$ receiver). The speakers or players in the relationship help constitute it, so logic is contingent on them.\textsuperscript{862}

The picture of language-games and speech acts can be usefully juxtaposed with the interpretation of relationships and games and the necessity inherent in them. Speech acts are moves in language-games, so they are subject both to the defining and strategic rules. The defining rules establish discourse possibilities and the bounds of sense, and the strategic rules establish the motives and functional patterns of use in conversation. The necessity of rules then holds of speech acts and moves in games. The rules are however the institutions of the game, and they only function within the element/institution/context-complex of the relationship. Then it is the relationship and its interaction that is prior, so the speech acts are contingent on the relationship. Moreover, the necessity of game rules depends on the players as well, as if they did not play the game, then the rules would not hold either. Take the case when Garry and Magnus can choose whether to play a game of chess or a game of draughts. If they choose to play chess, then the rules of draughts are not

\textsuperscript{861} Poteat 1985, 91-92. See Ch. 2.2.4.2, 5.3.2, TLP, esp. 1.21, Hume 1949.

\textsuperscript{862} Poteat 1985, 93-132, Strawson 1959, 59-86.
being followed, as the players are not engaging in the underlying practice. Then the necessity of rules and motives is contingent on the underlying relationships R, and the players.863

The location of rules in the relationships of language-games and the dependence of necessity on rules then entails that necessity is dependent on language-games and their underlying relationships R. Then it is contingent on the relationship R, the rules of games and the interaction of its players. This entails that the necessity that is based on language-games and their systems cannot consist of conceptual relationships, or prior forms. The form of the language-games and their underlying relationships is rule-governed activity, and not a prior conceptual structure. The forms of reason moreover do not constitute the underlying relationships R, as the rules are relative to the game and do not give a rationally constituted or conceptual ground for it. Then the contingency of necessity entails that the Principle of Reason cannot hold: the model of necessity presupposed by the Principle first abstracts the rules from their contexts and then identifies Being with them, taking “words for concepts and concepts for things themselves.”864

5.4.3 The question of reason and the question of God865

Poteat takes God to be an example of an ideal agent in his discussion of the model of necessity inherent to language-games. The same model of necessity and sufficient reasons is however embedded in two examples that have been inspired by biblical traditions: the Adamic language-game of Ch. 4.1 and the Solomonic succession narrative. These examples give a reinterpretation of theodist terms in terms of religious metaphors that could give them a content, and lead into how confusions about sufficient reasons and intelligibility end up as an antinomy about God.866

In the Adamic language-game, God can play either facts X or connections X→Y. Adam then senses the facts and objects X and forms grammar rules “X→Y”. Then the objects and intrinsic necessities X→Y are constituted by God’s choices in the exchange of the game and depend on the interactions of the players. The objects and essences are thus contingent on God, and Adam then formulates essential functional concepts “X→Y” by appropriating the structures sensuously. The role of X→Y in the game then grounds its necessity, and the conceptual real definition or rule

863 See Ch. 5.1.2. The dependence of games on responses is an aspect of the autonomy of language (Ch. 4.1.).
864 ZH 5, 264-265, see Dickson 1995, 304-318.
“X→Y” is dependent on it in the communication of the game. Similarly, both states of affairs X and Adam’s grid of possible metaphysical descriptions “X” depend on the interactions of the game: what God plays, how Nature responds and how Adam appropriates the term “X”. Then the metaphysical terms are located in a divine language-game, whose necessity is contingent on God, Nature and Adam, and their interactions.867

The Succession Narrative similarly relativizes the Causal Principle. In the narrative, King David, his sons and court advisers act to reveal their character and further their “counsel”, or strategic plans, in a variety of political situations. These scenes then form sub-games, and their connection into one sequence of events forms the narrative of David’s sin, the struggle for power among his sons, Absalom’s putsch and eventually Solomon’s rise. However, God had chosen Solomon. He determines the outcomes of the plans in every situation, and their connections into one big power-game and political history. Then it is God who determines both the setting and the various possible states of the scenes, and the possible outcomes of interactions or the institutional structures that give the outcomes according to the law of retribution. Then the Causal Principle holds: every political event has a corresponding cause, and God acts as a “cause of causes” or a reason of reasons by supplying the institutions of the game and thus determining the outcomes.868

These relativizations help to highlight and to bring into view that the connection of God with an unrestricted and decontextualized version of the Principle of Reason leads to an antinomy of reason about theism and atheism. Both Heidegger and Pruss hold that the existence of God and the Principle of Reason are equivalent. If every contingent thing has a sufficient reason, then the universe will itself have a necessarily existing efficient cause, and only something like God will be both necessary and causally effective. On the other hand, God will explain all contingent things, because He is the First Cause. This entails the theist side of the antinomy right away: PSR → God. To get the atheist side, one must note that God → PSR is a statement of theodicism. Then one can plausibly argue that there is no God, because there is evil without sufficient reasons.869

The problem is made even worse, because if God ↔ PSR holds, then the existence of evil is a middleman in atheistic arguments, just like God is a middleman in theodicism. One can get atheism right away by arguing against the PSR, and evil is just one argument against it. We have seen in Ch. 2.3. that Leibnizian theodicy pushes evil back into the structure of logical space: there is a reason for evil, because God chose the best combination of essences. Similarly, one can argue for

867 See Ch. 4.1.
atheism simply by claiming that PSR and the associated necessary being are impossible, e.g. by appealing to the imaginability criterion of possibility. Then the connection of both theism and atheism with the Principle of Reason makes both positions metaphysical theses about the nature of logical space, and they thus end up as two sides of a metaphysical antinomy.\textsuperscript{870}

Relativized versions of the Principle however do real work in the search for intelligibility. Heidegger and Pruss argue convincingly that our everyday search for causes and the scientific search for explanations presuppose at least some versions of it. Nagel argues that the search for explanations in science and the search for a unified and explanatory worldview depend on the explanatory intelligibility of phenomena.\textsuperscript{871} The role and possible uses of the PSR can be brought to the fore by pointing to Kant’s and Hamann’s arguments regarding the antinomies of reason. Kant argues that the Causal Principle is true of the phenomenal world, as we order phenomena into causal chains. One cannot however speak of an infinite regress or a First Cause, because such arguments would take us beyond experience. Applying PSR beyond experience turns it into a regulative principle: it guides our search for explanations, but does not hold necessarily of objects. Hamann argues that language is “the ground of all the paralogisms and antinomies of which reason is accused”.\textsuperscript{872} The search for reasons must then be located in language-games and their intelligibility. We can then take the cosmological argument as an example of such a relocation.

C. Stephen Evans argues that the cosmological argument depends on a sense of wonder at the contingency and intelligibility of the creation. Then the argument can be formed as an aporia or puzzlement over: \{The world is intelligible, The world is contingent, ¬God exists\}. However, the intelligibility of the world and the move to God do not need to take the form of a full PSR. One could make the connection with something like Peirce’s humble argument: simply thinking about the world, its manifold orders and the connections between them point to the reality of a Necessary Being connecting them. Another approach would be the biblical Wisdom theology presupposed in the Solomon narrative: God has put a meaningful order into creation, and this order calls man to a dialogue so that man could find knowledge, relate to God and live a good life.\textsuperscript{873}

A version of the argument can be made from the idea of an essentially ordered series. A series is essentially ordered if and only if A constitutes the power of B and B constitutes the power of C. The grammar of elements, institutions and contexts forms an essentially ordered series:

\textsuperscript{871} See Pruss 2006, Heidegger 1996/1971, Ch. 5.3.2, Nagel 2012, 16-17.
if s has a role in S, and S is embedded in a larger system S’, then s is located in the larger system S’ and the rules and institutions of S’ locate s both in the immediate context S and the wider relationships of S’. In short, contextualism entails a regress of constituents: if A is a constitutive context for B and B is a constitutive context for C, A is a constitutive context for C. To take a theological example: in the Solomon story, David prays to God to foil the plans of Achitophel, Absalom’s clever advisor. Then Hushai the advisor comes to David and goes back to the court on his instructions to offer bad advice. Now Hushai’s actions have a role in his support of David, but his mission is also a part of God’s plan to defeat the putsch. Then the action of going to David is embedded in Hushai’s practice, which is then constituted by the wider context of God’s plan.874

The regress of systemic embeddings S, S’… must then end somewhere: there has to be a universal relationship R. Such an argument can be based both on the musement over the contingency of the universe, and on the scientific search for wider contexts and causal relationships that hold in them. A nesting of contexts underlies the search for causes for systems and unification in science: scientists discuss, how their phenomena relate to phenomena in other sciences and how these phenomena could be unified. They can also ask, what are the causes for the systems that they are studying. The search for a unifying ground and the causes for systems are themselves involve the PSR, so it can be given a context in the search for unifications, links and causes.875

Moreover, the search for contexts of intelligibility and context-relative reasons can be applied to the world as a whole in the practices of musement or religious interpretation. In the religious case, one can give either Spinozist or theistic answers. If the relationships of Nature are the most general, then they constitute necessity and one cannot claim that the world could have been radically different. The rules of Nature are the most fundamental, and the systemic functioning of the world is comparable with a computer. On the other hand, if the relationship is one holding between God and the world, then one gets “speech to creatures through creatures”, and both the necessity and the contingency of the orders hold as in the Adamic game. Then the cosmological argument can be made on weaker premises than the full PSR, by interpreting it with religious practices. However, the religious metaphors and practices are necessary to give the terms of the argument a determinate interpretation and an experiential and spiritual cash value.876

875 For the PSR and the search for an ultimate unification, see Tahko 2015, Ch. 7, Nagel 2012, 16-17, and for physicalistic scientism as an unification of loosely linked special sciences via reduction, Ziman 2000, 321-326.
876 For necessary-world Spinozism and creation theology, see Bayer 1991a, 1-8. For the computer metaphor, see Maizner 2004, and it is also discussed by Feser. For cash values of religious terms, see Paulsen 1999.
The example of biblical Wisdom theology highlights, how different religious traditions can give a practical meaning to the terms involved in metaphysical theology in a way that could avoid theodicism. They do so by developing views of the intelligibility and value in the world by practical responses to it. This includes offering practical ways for coping with evil. Different worldviews can make different contributions to the human search for intelligibility, and grammatical anti-theodicy can contribute by describing and comparing them. Biblical Wisdom theology can answer theodicism with its metaphors for God’s actions. Taoism offers another interesting take on the problem. It teaches that the Tao, or the fundamental order of the world, is ineffable and mysterious. Therefore, it cannot be reduced into a conceptual order and the Principle of Reason does not hold. Similarly, literary humanism holds that meaningfulness and intelligibility is to be found in art and moral action, which cannot be true or false and thus not subject to strictly logical reasons. Then an examination into different religions and worldviews can deepen the ways of understanding our ways of coping with evil. The examination of religious thought can also lead to a questioning of the special problem as well.877 We can sum up the discussion:

1. The Principle of Sufficient Reason is a family of principles connecting being, reason and explanation. The most fundamental is the Principle of Ground: being qua being is rational ground.
2. Facts and meanings are intertwined in contexts of elements, institutions and contexts. If the PSR is correct, then it is a second-order principle referring to these contexts.
3. There are systems with elements and institutions that do not yield good explanations for all of the contingent facts. Examples include systems with PISR and system-level institutions.
4. “Reason” is an ambiguous term, as there are moral, logical and causal reasons. The PSR does not determine a language-game for determining reasons. The theodicist version instead conflates them due to its attempt to close the fact/meaning and fact/value gaps by reducing being to reason.
5. “Reason” has a use only in language-games. Encountering reality and seeking and finding objects are logically prior to explanation and conceptual rules. Being thus cannot be reduced to reasons.
6. Logical spaces and essences are located in language-games and their underlying relationships. The identification phenomena → rational form = reality does not hold as rules for essences and discourse possibilities are formed in responding to reality.
7. Necessity is due to rules in a context. The necessity of language-games is dependent on the Lichtung of relationships, and not on a priori conceptual rules.
8. The use of the PSR as a regulative principle in science or as a principle of order in creation theology depends on models for sense-making in worldviews and language-games.

---

877 Snellman 2019. For Taoism, see Smart 1998, 110-119. For humanistic meaning, see Appelqvist 2008 and Neiman 2015, 224-227. For biblical critiques of the special problem, see Perdue 1991 and Wright 2006.
6. The Grammar of Worldviews and the Fallacies of Theodicism

The problem of evil rests upon the fact/meaning dualism and the principle of sufficient reason, as the general problem and the general argument arise from the model of sense-making that attempts to build a synthesis of facts and meanings by appealing to the principle of sufficient reason. We have seen in the preceding chapter that this model of sense-making rests upon conceptual confusions. This entails right away that the general problem of evil does not get off the ground: since facts and meanings are not separate, then there is no need to try to unify them by appealing to the principle of sufficient reason. Therefore chaotic evil does not by itself threaten meaning.878

To summarize the arguments, both facts and meanings are intertwined against the background of a system.879 Facts are the values of a coordinate in logical space, but these coordinates function against the background of a language-game and the functional relationships that underlie it. The facts are thus among the elements of a language-game and its underlying systemic relationships. The facts are located in processes, powers and characters that are the typical ways of action and functioning of objects in the context of relationships. The objects and the causal, character-given, institutional and other types of functioning in relationships are the institutions of the system. The functions and roles of the objects in relationships are identified with the aid of stories. The relationships forming the system are the background for both the facts that compose its elements and the characters, causal powers and other institutions. Together they then make the facts meaningful in their systemic context, as the facts embody powers, roles and other systemic properties and the powers, roles and other values are realized through the facts:

1. Elements: The facts of a system, which is a part of a language-game functioning as a category.
2. Institutions: The underlying causal powers, social institutions and roles, characters and ways of interacting in relationships. The corresponding principles for pointing out and identifying the functioning of objects with stories.
3. Context: The underlying relationships of a language-game that include the facts, the dynamic principles of functioning and continuity, and the objects of the game. The language-game that includes expressions, rules and meanings.880

---

878 See Chs 2, 3.1.2.3, 5 and also ZH 7, 169-170.
879 See Ch. 3.2.2, ch 5 and ZH 7, 169.
880 See Chs. 3.2.2 and 5.
This system-theoretic view of language-games and their underlying relationships then overcomes the fact/meaning dualism. Facts embody characters, powers and other systemic roles. The roles are pointed out by stories and models that are used to identify objects in our language use. The logic of language-games also interprets logical concepts like possibility, necessity, logical entailment and is required for making sense of the world. The rules of the language-games then constitute conceptual possibility and necessity, and are moreover autonomous and contingent. Language-games are therefore prior to giving reasons and explanations, and one does not need to appeal to the principle of sufficient reason to make facts meaningful.\footnote{See Ch. 5, Poteat 1985.}

The principle of sufficient reason moreover encounters other difficulties as well. We have seen that the claim “Everything has a sufficient reason” does not by itself identify any reasons or what counts as a reason. Therefore the principle of reason is dependent on a prior logic of sense-making, and it can only succeed by describing first-level ways of sense-making. However, we have seen that the logic of elements, institutions and systems goes against the principle of sufficient reason. There can be systems where the context makes a random event intelligible, like drawing an ace when playing cards. Moreover, the principle identifies being with reason and explanation, so it presupposes that the language-games for being are ones involving deducing reasons and giving conceptual explanations. However, we have seen that the language-games for being are based on encountering objects and seeking and finding them, rather than giving explanations or conceptual reasons.\footnote{See Ch. 5.4, Heidegger 1971/1996, Pruss 2006.} Thus the key presuppositions of the general problem are conceptual confusions.

The confusions regarding the relationship of facts and meanings and the connection of meaningfulness with sufficient reasons have an important influence in debates surrounding different worldviews. A grammar of worldviews offers a key to the problem of evil, because worldviews can be seen as practices for coping with evil. We have seen in Ch. 2.4 that the fact/value split is a version of the fact/meaning split: since value is one sort of meaning and facts and values are separate, then facts and meanings are separate. Therefore the intertwining of facts and meanings holds for facts and values as well. I describe the grammar of values and virtues by taking Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of virtue ethics, and then interpret it through the intertwining of facts and meanings and link it with Jamesian antitheodicy. I also build on Putnamian arguments that language-games presuppose values and intertwine them with facts.\footnote{See MacIntyre 1981, James 1979, 1985, Putnam 1981, chs. 4.1, 5. For biblical virtue ethics, see von Rad 1988.} I then use Wittgenstein and Neiman’s account of Nietzsche to show how Classical and non-Enlightenment versions of
humanism can overcome the fact-meaning gap in situations that involve tragic evil. I also highlight a conceptual similarity between virtue ethics and the religious concept of salvation. Both involve a move from state-as-it-is to a state-to-come, and the virtues and paths of salvation are ways of overcoming evil. The isomorphism of grammars of virtues and religious stories suggests that the special problem about the existence of God in a world containing evil is confused as well.

Theological grammar does give good grounds for questioning the special problem. I present overviews of Buddhist thought and investigate Christian biblical theology in my discussion of the problem of evil in religions. My goal is to examine these two “religions of the sick soul” in order to develop grammatical remarks for the purpose of antitheodicy. Thus the purpose of an overview of different religions is to offer materials for philosophical reflection. Although I approach biblical stories from a Christian angle, the investigation into the historical meaning (or plain sense) of the Book of Job in Ch. 6.3.2 can also be appropriated within Judaism.

As we have seen in Ch.2, the atheist argument from evil is just a special case of the general problem. God is taken to connect facts with values and meanings by making an omnipotent choice from the set of all possible worlds so that all facts have sufficient reasons. Thus the existence of chaotic evil, or evil without sufficient reasons, calls the existence of God into question. Theological grammar however locates the word “God” with the language-games of religious practices and telling stories about God. The word “God”, questions about divine nature, and the associated concepts of divine omnipotence and goodness are then interpreted against religious stories and their principles for identifying God. This immediately calls the theodicist definition of divine goodness and the logical concept of omnipotence into serious question. The logical concept of omnipotence collapses, because the expressions “God can…” and “God cannot” are only used in the context of a language-game, and divine action is also identified through stories describing God’s involvement with the world. Identifying divine choices with the principle of sufficient reason presupposes that the reasons for divine action can be identified a priori. This is however problematic, because the principle of sufficient reason is dependent on prior ways for assessing reasons and leads theology straight into speculative metaphysics.

These problems can be sharpened by examining the grammar of biblical stories. I will focus on N.T. Wright’s narrative antitheodicy *Evil and the Justice of God*, and Leo Perdue’s very

---

886 See Phillips 2005, ZH 1, 450-453 Ch. 3.1.2., Ch.5.
sharp commentary on the Book of Job, *Wisdom in Revolt.* Both Perdue and Wright argue that the justice of God does not entail the existence of a static system of sufficient reasons, but instead involves the commitment of God to act in the world and to defeat evil within it. Perdue also argues that the point of the Book of Job is to function as a grammatical critique of the metaphors and forms of language that are used of God: “the book aims at speaking correctly about God, as Job, his servant, has done. The entire movement of the book is theological (...) the articulation of language about God.” Perdue presents various mythical and narrative models for identifying divine activity and discusses, how Job and his friends take religious language off gear. I then build upon Perdue’s description of the Book of Job to build analogies between the Book of Job and the positions taken in contemporary discussions on theodicy.890

I conclude my discussion of the special problem of evil by presenting a formal consistency proof. I use Perdue’s mythical models and Wright’s description of the grand narrative of the Bible in Christianity to build a consistency proof that builds on the theme of God’s victory over evil. Both Perdue and Wright argue that biblical antitheodicy involves rejecting the picture of God offering sufficient reasons in favour of a God who fights evil and defeats it. Similarly, William James has compared God’s power with the play of a chessmaster who has a strategy to defeat novices in a chess game.891 These ideas can be formalized into a game, in which God acts to defeat chaotic evil so that the sentences {God is good, God is all-powerful, Chaotic evil exists} are true at the same time. The consistency proof will then dissolves the special problem as well.

6.1 Narratives, virtues and worldviews

We have already touched briefly on the identification of personality through narratives and actions performed in a worldview. We also saw in Ch. 5 that a system of identification locates facts like acts of a person within larger institutions and strategies, like plans for an activity in a context and social institutions. It is now time to investigate, how narrative identification plays out in the context...
of personal identity. We will also investigate, how the narrative concept of identity allows us to overcome the fact/value gap by defining the concept of virtues.892

6.1.1 Facts, virtues and narrative identification

MacIntyre argues forcefully that the atomistic conception of actions as decontextualized modern facts fails to give enough context to make the actions of a person intelligible or allow for the identification of persons. Events and facts only make up the actions of a person when they are embedded in histories, and the histories can only be told by telling stories. These theses can be clarified and defended by applying the narrative forms of identification examined in Ch. 5.1 to personal identity. Persons are identified by telling stories about their acts. This presupposes that the identity of a person is the identity of his character or roles in stories. The characters, strategies and habits of a person thus constitute the identity of a person and identify the facts about his action. The narrative identifications take place against the background of the story of a whole, the interaction of characters and various narrative settings. Then the concept of narrative identification gives a way of overcoming the dualism of facts and meanings in the case of human (dramatic) action.893

Facts and actions function as plot elements in the narrative sense, and as moves in the game sense. They are the elements of human action. MacIntyre examines the concept of a decontextualized event involving human action by giving the example of Samuel Johnson’s notes: “Five soldiers.”, “Women” etc. These decontextualized descriptions of events resemble the descriptions of modern facts: they specify the place and time of an event, and who was there.894 These descriptions have however been detached from a narrative that makes them intelligible. Moreover, MacIntyre argues that one experiences life as a series of meaningless decontextualized facts only, when one’s plans for life and practices for achieving one’s goals have broken down and one is contemplating suicide. MacIntyre’s note about the breakdown of intelligibility connects with Neiman’s definition of evil as an event that makes our practices for pursuing good pointless. The

892 See Chs 4.2.4 and Ch. 5.
893 MacIntyre 1981, Ch. 15, Bayer 2002, 9-17, see Ch. 5.2.
894 MacIntyre 1981, Ch. 15. Modern facts are discussed in Ch. 2.4 and 5.2.
resulting experience is then the one described by Levinas, Pihlström and Kivistö: evil represents a breakdown of meaning that cannot be fixed by appealing to third-person justifications.895

Facts and actions are thus meaningful only, if they can be fitted into a practice. These practices are the institutions underlying narrative intelligibility. MacIntyre takes up examples related to the question “What is he doing?” in order to describe the discourse possibilities for actions and their identification.896 If a man is digging a hole in his backyard, we might say that “He’s digging”, “He’s taking care of the garden”, “He’s preparing for winter” or “He’s trying to make his wife happy”. The fact (A man is digging in the backyard) can then be related to different activities that aim at different kinds of goals and embody different intentions. If a man is writing, one might say that “He’s writing a sentence”, “He’s writing a book”, “He’s writing a book on action theory” or “He’s trying to become a professor at a university”. The act of writing is then related to many different goals and many activities or strategies that aim at these goals. Moreover, the aim of becoming a professor orders the lower-level goal of writing a book and the goal of writing a book similarly organizes the lower-level goal of writing a sentence. Acts are then embedded in practices that are related to goals, and the causal effects and ordering of actions in temporal sequences are constitutive of the acts themselves.

MacIntyre builds on the embeddedness of actions with practices for pursuing goals by arguing that the concept of intelligible action is logically prior to the concept of action. He argues that a series of acts like breaking eggs in a bowl and then mixing them, or saying the Latin name of a bird, are only intelligible in a social setting like baking bread or having a conversation. Thus a sequence of actions relates to goals only against the background of a setting. MacIntyre’s views on the primacy of intelligibility of actions and of actions, goal-directed sequences and settings have a striking resemblance to Hamann’s view of interpretative action. Bayer argues that Hamann views language and other forms of symbolic activities as a mathesis universalis, as language-games allow for self-expression, interpreting others and acting. Hamann uses drama as a model for language use: the practices of language use form a setting, and speech acts and physical actions function as acts in a play. Each speech act becomes intelligible by expressing a role in the linguistic exchange, and linguistic acts are always responses to the situation. One encounters a situation in the setting, and then one responds by acting or speaking according to one’s goals and one’s role in the game.

895 See Neiman 2015, 7-8, Pihlström & Kivistö 2016, Ch. 2.2.4, 3.1.2.1. MacIntyre’s point that narratives of pointlessness (see e.g. Pihlström & Kivistö 2016) reflect a suicidal person’s take on life calls into question the claim that offering third-person justifications is unethical. Offering a sense of purpose with a theodicy could well save the sufferer’s life if he is able to use it to experience his life as meaningful from the first-person perspective. (Aku Visala has made a similar point about Viktor Frankl’s experience in concentration camps. See Frankl 2000.)
896 MacIntyre 1981, Ch. 15. For discourse possibilities as a ground for categorization, see Garver 1994, 52-64, Ch. 4.3.
Moreover, all speech acts or physical actions are judgments that interpret the setting of the act. Hamann argues that “every action can have many figurative, formal, tropical and typological meanings in addition to their original material, natural and mechanical descriptions.”

Hamann’s reference to the material and formal aspects of actions is to be understood against his communicative view of matter and form. The matter of an act is the physical event or fact performing it. The form of an act is the use that the act gets in a play, or the role that the action has in a practice used to pursue goals. One could also use the analogy with language-games from Ch. 4.1 to use the language of formal game theory: the facts of an action are a move in a play, and the goal-directed sequences of activities are strategies. Both acts and practices for pursuing goals take place against settings that are social institutions that give the backgrounds for action. We can then use Hamann’s scheme of elements and institutions to show that facts and their meanings in pursuing goals are intertwined:

1. **Element**: The physical fact of performing an action, like writing a sentence
2. **Institution**: A practice or strategy for pursuing goals in a social setting, like writing a book on action theory or a plan to become a professor.
3. **Context**: An institution of social relationships that forms a setting for pursuing goals, like the institution of philosophical argumentation and debate, or the academic world.

The actions then express roles in settings and strategies for responding to situations, so the roles and activities have meanings that function through the material facts. Similarly, the material facts constitute the actions of a person only, by being a functional part of an activity that responds to a setting. The physical facts and meanings of symbolic forms of responding to situations in a setting are then functionally intertwined.

The concept of a virtue offers a means to overcome the fact/value gap, which is a central presupposition of the problem of evil. The concept of virtues describes habits or strategies for realizing correct human functioning or answering to reality and the good present in it. The concept allows one to show, why the modern concept of a fact necessarily leads to grammatical confusions related to the term “good”, both when applied to human beings and to God as well. In Ch. 4.1 we have seen that language-games and their practices constitute virtues in terms of good or

---

898 See Bayer 2002, 158-170, ZH 5, 25. For game metaphors, see Ch. 4.1 and Osborne & Rubinstein 1994.
bad cognitive functioning and good or bad responses to the world. Since we can only recognize and describe the facts of the world through linguistic practices, all recognition of fact presupposes the intertwining of social and physical facts and values in the virtues of language-games. The concept of a virtue also allows one to formulate a Jamesian antitheodicy, why a monism based on the principle of sufficient reason ends up destroying self-control and the ability to realize or even define the good, and thereby goes against the relational conditions of truth and moral language.  

We have seen in Ch. 2.2 that the fact/value gap is a special case of the fact/meaning gap, because values are a type of meanings. We have also just seen that actions become intelligible by being related to practices and strategies of pursuing goals in a social context, and thus giving the histories of the actions of a character or person. We can then get a working definition for the concept of virtue: a virtue is a correct way of acting and responding to one’s situation against the background of a setting of human nature and the possibilities for cooperation in the drama of life. MacIntyre discusses the concept of virtues by searching for explanations for modern moral philosophy’s failure to close the is/ought gap. The modern concept of fact cannot recognize functional or relational concepts of human well-being as factual. Facts have been defined as atomic occurrences against the background of some coordinate grid, like space-time or visual space. Proper function and right relationships concern how such facts hang together in correct human social relationships and the correct expression of human potential and other powers. Thus the modern concept of a fact leads to grammatical confusions regarding the term “good”, because goodness has either to be reduced to material or phenomenal facts or one has to presuppose a special type of normative facts to account for them. MacIntyre argues that classical Aristotelian and theistic worldviews work with a system of virtue ethics that distinguishes between the different parts:  

1. Human nature as it is: The states and tendencies of man that happen to exist in fact. They may contain evil states, defects and bad habits.

2. Virtues: Practices for moving from human nature as it is into human nature if its telos were realized. The virtues are primarily habits and practices, but they also embody moral maxims and laws that are guidelines for action and self-control in pursuing the telos.

---

899 For facts and virtues in language-games, see Ch. 4.1 and Putnam 1981, chs 6 and 9.
900 This definition is based on MacIntyre 1981 and von Rad 1988. The concept of virtue does not reduce to game-theoretic concepts, as some equilibria, like those in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, are not conducive to human welfare.
901 J. L. Mackie argues against the existence of values on these lines: see Joyce 2015. Mackie seems to explicitly deny the existence of natural teleology, which entails the denial of functional concepts. See also Sayre-McCord 1995.
902 The idea of virtue as a habit or a strategy comes from Peirce and James via Hintikka and Pietarinen.
3. Human nature if its telos were fulfilled: The correct functioning of a human being in relationships according to the nature of the relationships and human nature.

MacIntyre argues that Enlightenment ethics works with a broken conceptual scheme, because it has embraced the modern concept of facts. Because the modern concept of facts can recognize only human-nature-as-it-is, ethics is grounded in the real world only if it can derived from the world as it stands. Human-nature-as-it-is is however defined opposite to virtues and the realization of the human telos, so a conceptual gap appears between the facts as they are and the values arising out of virtues and the human telos. Overcoming this gap requires rejecting the fact/meaning gap.903

MacIntyre argues that virtue ethics presupposes that the concept of a human is a functional concept: human beings have certain powers and social roles, and a good human being is one who functions well in them. Aristotle argues that the grammar of the words “human” and “good human” is analogous to the grammar of “musician” and “good musician”, because in both cases the goodness consists of functioning well: “For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the ‘well’ is thought to reside in that function (…) if he has a function.”904 Human beings can then be said to pursue their telos well or badly, if they have typical activities and powers and their actual acts follow from practices that embody or aim at functioning well as human beings. Moreover, such a functionalist view of the good entails that ethics is based on facts. If “X is good” means “X functions well”, then the goodness of an X depends on the functioning of X, which is based on facts in a broad (but not modern) sense of the word.905

MacIntyre also discusses monotheistic contributions to the tradition of virtue ethics. He argues that the theistic religions have given the tradition a concept of divine law, which sets absolute obligations in addition to defining virtues. Gerhard von Rad however argues that biblical wisdom theology includes virtue ethics.906 The key principles of the ethics of wisdom literature are: respect God, reject evil and choose the good. The biblical wisdom tradition thus differs from the classical tradition by having a different conception of the good.907 The classical tradition views the good as proper functioning, while the wisdom tradition views it as a force that is oriented towards man and offers an opportunity to get good results in one’s life and as a member of a community.

903 MacIntyre 1981, Ch. 5. The topic is already covered in Ch. 2.4.
905 MacIntyre 1981, Ch. 5. For the Aristotelian concept of a fact, see Poovey 1998 and Ch. 2.4.
906 von Rad 1988, esp. chs 5 (74-96) and 7 (115-137). This summary is based on Ch. 5.
907 von Rad 1988, Ch. 5.
The good is thus a collection of powers or tendencies in reality that interact with man and allow man to get good practical results in terms of communal well-being, social status or success in life. The good person is thus one who responds well to the inter-subjective and external tendency of the good, and forms his or her practices to further the good. These practices then correspond to virtues, as they are proficiencies in answering to the order in creation. The conception of virtue as a skilled response to the good moreover goes along with a divine order within phenomena. God has established orders within creation, and men establish and further good by acting according to these orders. Responding to the good in natural and social orders thus means dealing with God, as God speaks to men through natural and social orders and events. This creaturely mediated communication proceeds God → orders → man, and biblical virtue ethics thus operates with a picture of nature as “speech to creatures through creatures.”

The concept of virtue also allows us to discuss the role of values in the underlying relationships of language-games. In Ch. 4.1. we have seen that language-games are a response to the world, and thus can be a good or bad response to the underlying relationships and the human condition. Putnam argues that language-games can contribute to the good functioning of human cognitive capacities, or cognitive Eudaimonia. However, the concept of good response is a strategic concept and cognitive Eudaimonia is a functional concept, so the values underlying language-games must be understood in strategic and functional terms. Then concepts like truth as adequacy of the mind to reality, epistemic justification, conceptual intelligibility and reason are located in language-games, whose forms of life are described with the grammar of virtues and virtue ethics.

Once we have defined virtue ethics, it is time to see why the facts/values gap fails. Take the example of Matt giving a donation to a foundation that helps the homeless. Matt’s action is based on the virtue of compassion: he has a tendency or practice for recognizing the situation that homeless persons are in, and then responding to it by acting through social institutions to help them. We then have a fact: Matt puts money in a collection pot. Matt’s action however arises from a habit or institution of taking homeless people into account, and helping them when a suitable opportunity arises. The practice is embedded in the social settings of charitable NGOs, the social relationships between Matt, the NGOs and the homeless, and the fact about human nature that helping out the homeless improves the well-being of both the homeless and the helper. We can now analyse Matt’s act into facts about his conduct, habits and settings:

---

908 H 65/ N II, 197. Timo Veijola connects Hamann’s view of speech to creatures with von Rad’s work (1999). The communication channel God → orders → man also corresponds to Hamann’s view of God → Nature → Reason as a communication channel. See Ch. 3.3.2, ZH 5, 272, Floridi 2004.

909 See Ch. 4.1, Putnam 1981.
1. Elements: The fact of Matt putting money in the pot.
2. Institution: Matt’s virtuous practice of recognizing the homeless and helping them.
3. Context: The social relationships between Matt, NGOs and the homeless, the general fact about human nature that helping the homeless improves the life of both.

The fact of Matt’s putting money in the pot and the values underlying the virtuous habit are then intertwined. Matt’s act functions in its social context by arising out of Matt’s practice, and thus it embodies the values of Matt’s virtuous practices. Similarly, Matt’s maxims and virtuous dispositions are habits and strategic rules of self-control, which lead Matt to choose the action involving the fact of putting money in the pot. Matt’s virtues and principles thus function through the act of putting money in the pot, and the act of putting money in the pot functions in its social setting by embodying the virtues and norms of charitable giving in its social context. Facts and values are thus functionally intertwined, and the fact/value gap is a conceptual confusion.910

6.1.2 Humanistic meaningfulness: moral responsibility, virtue and tragedy

The concept of a virtue allows non-Enlightenment humanistic worldviews to overcome the fact/value and fact/meaning gaps. With the concepts of virtue and narrative one can find meaning in humanistic moral sources as human action and human responsibility.911 By locating facts about human action in stories that are humanely meaningful and where the characters show virtue, the facts are woven into meaningful and value-laden stories. The genre of tragedy includes stories, where the hero displays virtue but is defeated by external factors. Humanistic narratives can then give meaning to events that include tragic evil, and thus have no moral purpose.912 Moreover, James persuasively argues that the human (and divine) responsibility for the world presupposes the falsity of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: if we are moral beings, we have a responsibility to fight evil. It is possible to fight evil only, if the evil is not a necessary evil decreed by some order of sufficient

---

910 For functional intertwining, see Chs. 4.1, 5.2.
911 For the concept of a moral source, see Taylor 1989.
reasons. Humanism then has its own anti-theodicist concepts of meaningfulness that arise from the moral sources of human dignity, which also theists and other worldviews have to recognize.913

Nietzsche’s view of narrative intelligibility and tragedies offers a humanistic way of seeing meaning in human actions. Neiman holds Nietzsche to argue that the intelligibility of plays and tragedies offers the possibility of seeing human life as meaningful. She shows that such a view involves rejecting models of meaningfulness based on the principle of sufficient reason and looking at the meanings of music instead.914 The logic of music however brings us to familiar Wittgensteinian ground. Hanne Appelqvist shows that Wittgenstein views musical meaning as rule-governed portrayal of themes. Musical meaning is constituted by the institutions of musical rules. Rules do not answer to an a priori order of sufficient reasons, because they are autonomous. The meaning of music, quality pictures and other artistic signs is self-contained: ‘‘What the picture tells me is itself.’ That is, its telling me something consists in its own structure, its lines and colours.’915 Moreover, music intertwines its matter and form, as its melodic matter is its musical form and vice versa. The logic of music and tragedies is thus inherently anti-theodicist.916

We can use Hamlet as an example for the narrative meaningfulness of tragic virtue and tragic action.917 The story of Hamlet is well-known in the Anglo-American world. Hamlet is a Danish prince, whose father has been assassinated by his uncle Claudius. Hamlet’s father appears to Hamlet and exposes the plot. Hamlet decides to get revenge and starts to feign insanity by reflecting on mortality and the human condition. Claudius decides to have Hamlet executed by sending him to England as an ambassador together with a death warrant for his accreditation. Hamlet gets his chance to kill Claudius when Claudius is praying, but waits until Claudius has repented in order to send him straight to hell. Hamlet confronts his mother and kills Polonius, a nobleman who is spying on their conversation. Claudius and Laertes, Polonius’ son hatch a plot to poison Hamlet in a duel, after Hamlet was not killed on his mission to England. Then a messenger brings Laertes the message that Ophelia has committed suicide out of grief for his father. Hamlet then meets the gravediggers, and they reflect together over human mortality. In the final scene, Hamlet confronts Claudius and Laertes in the duel. He wins the duel with Laertes, while his mother the Queen drinks

---

913 See James 1979, Pihlström & Kivistö 2016. For the idea that human dignity and responsibility has to be recognized by theists, see Gen. 1:27. The order/Arche description of the PSR comes from Ch. 2.2.5.
914 Neiman 2015, 224-227. For a logic based on music and principles of audial identification, see Poteat 1985, Strawson 1959, Ch. 5.4.2.3.
915 PI 523, PI 522-523, 527.
917 Hamlet.
poisoned wine. Laertes then tells that Claudius hatched a plot to poison Hamlet, and that both will die because the weapons were poisoned. Hamlet then accepts his fate and shows great bravery by killing Claudius by wounding him with a poisoned blade and giving him poison to drink. He is then given a state funeral because he was able to act like a real king, and he came to grips with the human condition as well. Hamlet was able to come to terms with mortality and act courageously in the tragic situation where he had lost his family and was about to die.

The story Hamlet is as grim as *1984* and other books that Pihlström and Kivistö quote as stories about the collapse of meaningfulness.

Hamlet has many dark themes: the human condition is one of mortality, and the treachery and corruption of court politics leads to broken family and human relationships. In such a condition, one does not have many good ways of responding to the situation: the story includes the responses of insanity, suicide and fortitude. The events of the story and Hamlet’s actions are not meaningless, however. Take his action of contemplating “To be or not to be?” as an example. It is a fact (or a line in the play) that Hamlet utters the line. The line is however a plot element: it is a part of Hamlet’s role of feigning insanity and reflecting on his situation. Hamlet’s role and activities in the play form the institutions holding the character and his actions together, and the plot and setting of the play offers a dramatic context or Hamlet’s actions. Thus we can assign the plot points of Hamlet pondering on the meaning of life as elements, and Hamlet’s role and character as institutions. The artistic meaning of Hamlet’s actions then arises out of their role in the setting and plot of the play:

1. Elements: The fact of Hamlet stabbing Claudius and giving him poisoned wine.
2. Institution: Hamlet’s role includes the decision to take revenge on Claudius for murdering him and his father. The act expresses great resolve and courage in getting justice even when one has been mortally wounded.

The meanings and plot points are then intertwined: the plot and its aesthetic meaning proceeds through lines and plot-points like “To be or not to be?”. The plot-points like the words “To be or not to be?” function in the play by having a meaning in the plot. Moreover, Hamlet’s actions are then literally meaningful and show the virtue of courage, even though the events in the plot and in the setting of the play do not have morally sufficient reasons. The Hamlet case then shows that a

---

918 Pihlström & Kivistö 2016. The interpretation of the *Hamlet* example is inspired by Neiman 2015, 224-227.
literary humanism has the resources of seeing human actions as meaningful and as displaying moral virtues even, though the context includes relationships that have been broken by chaotic evil like betrayals and political corruption.

Virtue ethics also gives conceptual tools for formulating an anti-theodicist argument due to James and Pihlström.\textsuperscript{919} Pihlström argues that for James, both the recognition of evil and the possibility of fighting it are necessary conditions for a moral standpoint in the world.\textsuperscript{920} Taking the existence of evil and fighting it as a starting point has its consequences in theology as well: James redefines God as a chief helper and a “cosmic fighter” against evil. The Jamesian view of God actually comes close to the biblical view of God as a divine warrior, who has a plan to fight and defeat evil.\textsuperscript{921} James’ arguments about determinism and the necessary relational condition of moral choice and action however form a powerful critique of the principle of sufficient reason, which is a key presupposition of the general problem as well.

James discusses the moral consequences of the principle of sufficient reason in “The Dilemma of Determinism”\textsuperscript{922}. James argues that the difference between determinism and indeterminism runs deeper than the issue of free will.\textsuperscript{923} Determinism holds that there is no genuine potentiality or unrealized possibilities in the world, because the state of the world is determined by one total causal chain and its Arches. He argues that indeterminism on the other hand allows for unrealized possibilities, and there are alternative possibilities open until the facts become settled. He claims that indeterminism entails that the world is made up of many disparate collections of facts and many centres of causal power, since the facts of the world are determined only as they come to pass and there is no single system of sufficient reasons determining them. James thus links the debate over determinism with the problem of monism and pluralism: is the world a single system of facts with a causal structure connecting everything, or is it more of a “joint-stock company” of many facts and many local connections and structures?\textsuperscript{924}

\textsuperscript{919} Jamesian anti-theodicism is discussed in Ch. 3.1.2.2. The argument builds mainly on James’ “The Dilemma of Determinism” (1979) and Pihlström & Kivistö 2016, 194-209.
\textsuperscript{920} Pihlström (2016, 206) formulates the argument as a Kant-style transcendental argument, but I would like to present it as a relational necessary conditions argument about the possibility of virtuous practices.
\textsuperscript{921} See Ch. 5.3 and 5.4, Paulsen 1999, Perdue 1991, Wright 2006. See also e.g. Ex. 15.
\textsuperscript{922} James 1979.
\textsuperscript{923} For the dialectic around freedom of the will, determinism and alternative possibilities, see Mele 2014.
\textsuperscript{924} For monism vs pluralism, see Pragmatism 4. For the idea of a single Arche determining the unification of facts and values in theodicism, see Ch. 2.2, 2.3.2.1, Mackie 1955. The argument might not work against a liberalized PSR with many independent centers of explanation (see Pruss 2006). However, it does work against the claim that all evil is necessary, because then the distance between the good and actual collapses.
James argues that the choice between monist determinism and pluralist indeterminism is made on their different presuppositions. He argues that science deals with the facts and not the structure of logical space, and in any case it has to explain phenomena only after they have been encountered. The motive for determinism is the fear of chance, or the existence of facts that cannot be explained from an Arche. It is clear that the motivation for determinism is then the principle of sufficient reason, or that everything can be explained in terms of an Arche. If there are open alternative possibilities, then nothing presently actual explains why one of them will hold.

James then goes on to explore the moral consequences of PSR-based monism. He claims that it goes against the relational conditions of morality. He takes the example of a psychopathic murder, which causes morally healthy people to recoil in horror: “This should not have happened.” However, if determinism holds, then one cannot say that the murder was bad, because it was metaphysically determined. If there is a system of sufficient reasons determining the murder, then a metaphysical Arche determines the murder. However, if a metaphysical Arche determines the murder, then the evil proceeds from the essence of the world and could not have been otherwise, in the strong sense of metaphysical necessity. If the murder could not have been otherwise metaphysically, then it is not possible to fight evil or even regret it. James formulates the objection in terms of different alternatives open to the determinist: he might offer a theodicy to justify it, or alternatively to view it as a part of a necessary educational (soul-making?) process. In any case, James argues that the determinist has to view the universe itself as essentially and irredeemably evil, because he has committed himself to the Principle of Sufficient Reason and consequently has to face a problem that is analogous to the general problem of evil.

The general problem of evil then leads James to support meliorism. If determinism is true, then there are no alternatives to the-world-as-it-is, and developing practices for fighting evil and moving it closer to the good are pointless. Moral action then presupposes that there are many possibilities in the world, and it is possible to further the good through moral action. Moreover, his

---

925 James 1979.
926 See Pruss 2006, Heidegger 1971, Ch. 5. The monistic version of PSR is stronger than Pruss’s. The monist version of the PSR posits a single Arche and takes sufficient reasons to be logically sufficient. However, the PSR and the General Argument presuppose a single centre of explanation: if PSR holds and there are many independent centres of explanation, one has to have a super-explanation explaining how they hold together, and that would amount to a universal explanation.
927 James 1979, Pihlström & Kivistö 2016, 194-209.
928 Neiman 2015, 5.
929 See Neiman 2015, 314-328, Pihlström & Kivistö 2016, 194-206. For the general problem, see Ch. 2.2.
The indeterminist position leads away from the view of God as an Arche of the world to a view of God as a chessmaster who inevitably manages to realize His plans.\footnote{Pihlström & Kivistö 2016, 194-206. Paulsen 1999, Wright 2006. See also Nagasawa 2018. Cf. Pruss 2006.}

These points can easily be recast in terms of virtue ethics as a relational argument about the necessary conditions for the relationships of virtuous action that underlie the grammar of the term “good”.\footnote{The virtue ethical reading of the Jamesian argument uses the conceptual scheme from MacIntyre 1981.} If determinism is true, then the world-as-it-is is necessary. Alternatively, if all evil has a sufficient reason, the distance between actuality and the good collapses. It is not then possible to reach any other telos than the actual (dys)functioning of the world. It is in fact not even possible to differentiate between the-world-as-it-is and the-world-if-things-were-right, because objects and relationships can only function as they do or they function well. Then the whole relational network underlying virtues and the use of the term “good” breaks down, as it is not possible to develop virtuous ways of life to reach the telos or to develop strategies for fighting evil. The point is not so much that morality requires free will, but that the machinery of virtues and means of reaching goals presupposes a conceptual distance between the telos and the existing facts, and that reaching the telos is not frustrated metaphysically. Otherwise practices of reaching the good through virtues lose their point. In a world that contains evil and has no alternatives, neither condition holds. Then determinisms and theodicisms based on the principle of sufficient reason go against the relational conditions for the use of the term “good”, and evacuate it of meaning:

1. The use of the term “good” makes sense and its grammatical relationships function only, if it is possible to fight evil.
2. It is possible to fight evil only, if one can form practices and strategies for moving from the-situation-as-it-is to the-world-if-its-telos-were-fulfilled.
3. One can form practices and strategies for moving from the situation to the telos only, if it is functionally and relationally possible to distinguish between these two.
4. One can form practices and strategies for moving from the situation to the telos only, if there are alternative choices to exercise self-control over and alternative strategies, some of which can in principle fail to conform to proper functioning or realize the telos.
5. If there is an overarching system of sufficient reasons, then there are no alternative possibilities and the situation-as-it-is is either the best possible or is metaphysically determined.
6. If the situation-as-it-is is the best possible or metaphysically determined, then one cannot determine between functionally and relationally correct situations from others (because only the actual is possible and there are no alternatives to rank as correct or not).
7. If there are no alternative possibilities, there are no alternative choices to exercise self-control over and no alternative strategies, some of which can in principle fail to conform to proper functioning or the telos (because every fact and the-world-as-it-is holds essentially or is the best possible).

8. If there is an overarching system of sufficient reasons, it is not possible to fight evil.

9. If there is an overarching system of sufficient reasons, the use of the term “good” makes no sense and its grammatical relationships do not function.

Theodicism is thus an incoherent doctrine. It involves using terms like “good” to assess the world as a whole, or God. However, it goes against the relational conditions of moral language use and practices. In a necessary world, the language-games upon which terms like “God is good”, “There is evil” and “The world is good” lose their point. James’ metaphors of fighting evil and of God as a chessmaster point to an alternative worldview option that has a way of making these terms meaningful. We have already seen that stories about virtues can make the world meaningful for humanism. James’ chessmaster metaphor points to an analogy between speaking about virtues and speaking about God. This analogy can be used to lay the groundwork for an antitheodicy that builds on the resources of narrative theology: God is the Divine Warrior or Chessmaster who defeats evil.

6.1.3 Virtues and the religious concept of salvation

 Religious practices use the concept of holiness and salvation to assign meaning to life. They are also practical means for responding to evil and coping with it. James characterizes religious practices in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, and these characterizations can be used to build a grammar for the expressions “holy” and “salvation.932 James defines religion as all the feelings, acts, and experiences towards the divine. James has to expand the concept of the divine to include pantheistic religions like American Transcendentalism, and atheist religions like Buddhism. He then defines the divine as the ultimate realities that are taken to be present and to which the believer responds. The religious attitude regards the divine in a serious manner and as something sublime and worthy of solemnity. The religious attitude leads to an acceptance of the Universe: the world is seen as enchanted and worthy of active consent, because evil can be defeated.

We can now define the Holy: the Holy is taken to be the realities encountered in religious practices, the realities are a matter of ultimate concern and encountering them gives

932 James 1985, Ch.2.
religious meaning to life. The religious concept of salvation concerns religious liberation from the evil of the human condition. Salvation can then be defined: x is saved if and only if x is rescued from evil by the Holy. The concept of salvation in fact works analogously to the ethical concept of virtues: both presuppose the existence of the-world-as-it-is, salvation is the liberation from the-world-as-it-is into the-world-if-its-telos-were-realized, and the Holy is taken to be good because it “set us free from the present evil age”\(^{933}\). I will take up Buddhism and the Book of Deuteronomy as examples of this conceptual structure.

Buddhism was formed as a solution to the existential problem of evil. Buddhism was formed by the Buddha or Enlightened one, Siddhartha Gautama, in India in the 6th century BC.\(^ {934} \) The Buddha argues that all things in the stream of life are fleeting and impermanent, so evil and suffering are a part of the human condition. Buddha’s teaching then seeks ways for liberation from the evil of the human condition, and the stream of life and death that makes up the cosmos. The Buddhist way of salvation is available through the Buddha, Buddhist doctrine or Dharma, and the Buddhist monastic form of life, or the Sangha:

One who has gone for refuge to the Buddha, the Dhamma, and the Sangha, penetrates with wisdom the Four Noble Truths – suffering, the cause of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the Noble Eightfold Path leading to the cessation of suffering.

This, indeed, is the safe refuge, the refuge supreme. Having gone to such a refuge, one is released from all suffering.\(^ {935} \)

The Buddha, Buddhist teaching and Buddhist monasteries then save, because they make the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Path available to the seeker of salvation. The Noble Truths allow one to realize the human condition of suffering and to find the Eightfold Path that leads to liberation. The first teaching is that human life is full of suffering, because everything is changing and impermanent: “All conditioned things are unsatisfactory’ - when one sees this with wisdom one turns away from suffering.”\(^ {936} \) The second teaching is that the cause of suffering is a craving for existence and an attachment to the world: “From craving springs grief, from craving springs fear.

\(^{933}\) Gal. 1:4. The concepts of holiness and salvation are mainly based on William James’ *Varieties of Religious Experience* (1985), and the following comparison between Deuteronomy and Buddhism.

\(^{934}\) My general interpretation of Buddhism is based on Smart 1998, 57-68, the *Dhammapada*, and on Bhikkhu Bodhi’s introduction to it.

\(^{935}\) *Dhammapada* 190-192.

\(^{936}\) *Dhammapada* 278.
For one who is completely free from craving there is no grief, whence the fear?" The third teaching is that overcoming the craving for existence and the attachment to the world leads to the end of suffering. The fourth teaching is that one overcomes craving through the Noble Eightfold Path. The practices of the Eightfold Path divide into three types. Right ethics includes correct speech, correct actions and a righteous profession. Right wisdom includes having the correct Buddhist beliefs and attitudes. Right meditation involves effort, concentration and meditation.

Buddhism emphasizes character development via meditation. Bhikkhu Bodhi argues that the centrality of mind and meditation corresponds to the centrality of the account of creation in theistic religions. The Bible starts with the creation story, and the Dhammapada starts with an account of the mind as the source of all thoughts, and as being in need of practice:

Mind precedes all mental states. Mind is their chief; they are all mind-wrought. If with a pure mind a person speaks or acts, happiness follows him like his never-departing shadow.

Just as an arrow-maker straightens an arrow-shaft, so the discerning person straightens his mind – so fickle and unsteady, so difficult to control.

Although he recites few sacred texts, if he puts the Dhamma into practice, forsaking lust, hatred and delusion, with true wisdom, clinging to nothing in this or any other world – he, indeed, partakes in the blessings of a holy life.

We can now see that Buddhism offers liberation from the evil of the world by developing the mind out of the habit of clinging to existence. The mind is educated with Buddhist doctrines, meditation and other virtues of the Eightfold Path. The telos of this practice is Nirvana or the detachment and liberation from the changing stream of life. The Buddhist path then corresponds to virtue ethics:

1. The world-as-it-is: Human life is suffering, because everything is changing and human beings seek happiness by attaching themselves to changing enjoyments.
2. Salvation: Following the Noble Eightfold Path liberates one from suffering and attachment to the changing world. One can follow the Path by educating the mind and following virtues like meditation.

\[937\] Dhammapada 216.
3. The world-if-its-telos-were-realized: Human beings reach Nirvana, or are liberated from suffering and the changing stream of life.

Buddhism is an Eastern, non-theistic religion. Its concept of salvation concerns liberation from the impermanence of the world. However, the view of salvation in Deuteronomistic Judaism has the same conceptual structure, although Deuteronomic Judaism is monotheistic and this-worldly. We can examine the Deuteronomic concept of salvation through one of Deuteronomy’s confessions:

“A wandering Aramean was my ancestor; he went down into Egypt and lived there as an alien, few in number, and there he became a great nation, mighty and populous. When the Egyptians treated us harshly and afflicted us, by imposing hard labor on us, we cried to the LORD, the God of our ancestors; the LORD heard our voice and saw our affliction, our toil, and our oppression. The LORD brought us out of Egypt with a mighty hand and an outstretched arm, with a terrifying display of power, and with signs and wonders; and he brought us into this place and gave us this land, a land flowing with milk and honey. So now I bring the first of the fruit of the ground that you, O LORD, have given me.”

The story of the Exodus is one of the basic stories of Judaism. It is also central in the grand narrative of the Bible, which N. T. Wright claims to be “a story about what God has done, is doing and will do about evil.” The story starts when the Israelites are enslaved in Egypt. They call upon God to help them. God then hears their cry and liberates them from slavery, which shows His justice and faithfulness. He judges the oppressors of Israel and punishes them with the disasters surrounding the exodus, which show His power. He then leads the Israelites into a prosperous and fruitful land, where they can live. The story can be similarly analysed as having the same structure as virtue ethics or Buddhism:

1. The-world-as-it-is: Israelites are enslaved in Egypt and oppressed by the Pharaoh.
2. Salvation: God hears the Israelites and liberates them from Egypt.

---

940 Dtn. 26: 5-10. See also Ex. 1-15. For the evolution of Judaism(s) across the ages, see Smart 1998. In short, one must distinguish between the religion of Ancient Israel and Judah, which eventually developed into a monotheist religion, the Judaism of the Second Temple era, and post-70 Rabbinic Judaism. The Judaism practised today developed from classical Rabbinic Judaism, whereas Christianity developed out of a messianic movement in the Second Temple era. With “Deuteronomic Judaism” I mean the crystallizing monotheism that was codified into the book of Deuteronomy.
941 Wright 2006, 45, 55-56.
3. The-world-if-its-telos-were-fulfilled: Israelites live prosperously in the Holy Land and deliver the fruits of their work to God.

The story moreover concerns the goodness and power of God. In the Exodus story, God is the object of ultimate concern who is encountered in the events of the story, so He is said to be holy. He is said to be good because He listens to the Israelites and decides to free them out of faithfulness to them. He is said to be omnipotent because the liberation from Egypt is accompanied by great acts of power that defeat the Pharaoh, like plagues and drowning Egyptian chariots. Thus God is said to be good and powerful, because He delivers Israel-in-Egypt to the telos of Israel-in-the-Promised-Land. Calling God good and powerful because He defeats evil and takes Israel to the telos is in fact analogous to calling the Buddhist Eightfold Path noble, because it takes one from the situation of impermanence and suffering into the telos of nirvana. We can make a table of the isomorphisms:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Virtues</th>
<th>Religions</th>
<th>Buddhism</th>
<th>Deuteronomy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human-as-is</td>
<td>World-as-is</td>
<td>Suffering</td>
<td>Israel in Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virtues</td>
<td>Salvation</td>
<td>Noble 8-fold path</td>
<td>Liberation by God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human telos</td>
<td>World telos</td>
<td>Nirvana</td>
<td>Israel in the Land</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We have already shown that the presuppositions of the general problem of evil do not hold. The arguments above show that the special atheistic problem is in deep trouble for much the same reasons. The isomorphisms between virtue ethics and religious worldviews show that both biblical monotheist and Eastern religions have the conceptual resources to see the world as meaningful even when there is evil in the world. This contrasts with the modern tradition of natural theology. I remarked in Ch. 2.4 that the problem of evil resembles the failure of the Enlightenment foundations of morality project. Both Bayer and Diogenes Allen show that Enlightenment natural theologies typically take their views of God from the moral ideals of reason and take the state of the world-as-it-is in order to prove the existence of God by linking the two. This however is the cosmic analogue of attempting to derive morality out of human-nature-as-it-is, as moral rules correspond to Divine Presence and the world-as-is to man-as-is. Thus the standard Leibnizian theodicist approach to the special problem of evil rests upon conceptual confusions.942 The links between virtues, salvation and religious views of the Holy can be formulated in an anti-theodicist argument:

942 See MacIntyre 1981, Bayer 2012. I quote Allen through Hinlicky 2015. Mikael Stenmark points to the possibility that atheists could reinterpret terms like “good” and “omnipotent” through a secular language-game. However, any of these interpretations can be answered with arguments similar to those presented here. These grammars will also fail as dialectical examinations (see MacIntyre 1988) of religious beliefs. Moreover, these games will be pointless in a
1. If the term “good” can be given a meaning in terms of fighting evil and realizing the good in situations that include evil, then we can define it by distinguishing between the situation containing evil, strategies for fighting evil and realizing the good, and the situation where the good is realized.

2. The religious stories of salvation contain a description of an evil human condition, the Holy encountered through religious practices, and the situation where the evil is defeated by the Holy.

3. (Situation-with-evil, strategies fighting evil and realizing good, good realized) is conceptually isomorphic to (evil human condition, the Holy, the Holy defeats evil and realizes good).

4. If the term “good” can be given a meaning in terms of fighting evil and realizing the good in situations that include evil, then we can use them of the Holy in situations where the Holy liberates human beings from the evil of the human condition and realizes human good.

6.2 Theological grammar, divine goodness and omnipotence

Religious practices and stories then have a way of calling the Holy (e.g. God) “good” even in situations in which there is evil. This can be seen from the Exodus story, which gives the discourse possibilities for expressions like “God is good” and “God is powerful”. We have seen in Chs. 3.2 and 4.3 that the questions about the essence of an X are answered by charting the discourse possibilities relating to X. Moreover, Hamann and Wittgenstein introduced the view of categorizing essences through investigating language-games and their underlying relationships as a generalization of the investigation of the term “God” in biblical stories. We can now move on to develop the themes introduced in the Exodus story and James’ chessmaster analogy into an explicit refutation of the special problem by building a grammar of biblical narratives on God and evil.943

The view of language-games as categories then offers a way of charting the essences of objects in language-games. Theological grammar locates religious language in religious practices. These practices give discourse possibilities, as they include ways for encountering the Holy. They also allow for reidentifications, as they interpret reality against the backgrounds of stories and guidelines in the Scriptures. I discuss biblical grammar in Christianity and Judaism, but Ninian Smart’s contrast of theistic and non-theistic religions allow us to show the generality of the grammatical approach. Theistic religions include practices that aim at encountering an Other with

world where some kind of salvation takes place, just like Betenson’s (1999) attempts to reject theodicies are pointless in a world where God has a reason for evil after all. See Ch. 3.1.

943 See Chs. 3.2, 4.3. For philosophical grammar as a generalization of theological grammar, see ZH 7, 169, PI 373, Snellman 2018. For language-games as categories of discourse possibilities, see Garver 1994.
dialogues like prayer, and their scriptures offer stories of God’s actions in nature and history. Non-
theistic religions aim at encountering the Holy too: e.g. Buddhism aims at reaching the inner calm of Nirvana via practices like meditation. Scriptures then include guidelines for achieving Nirvana and stories of practitioners like the Buddha who have achieved it. The grammars are structurally similar, although the Holy is understood differently and these religions use different scriptures.944

In the theodicy debate, goodness and omnipotence are taken to be essential properties of God. As we have seen in Ch. 2.3, goodness is taken to mean that God does not create a world where there are no sufficient reasons for an evil. van Fraassen argues that the theodist God was defined thus to make His activity transparent to reason, as He makes an unlimited choice according to reason. These positions have a key presupposition. Both divine goodness and divine power are defined independently of religious language-games and stories of divine activity, and then God is defined by appealing to these logically prior concepts. These presuppositions can be questioned by applying the grammatical methods of Chapter 3.2 to religious practices and stories about God.945

6.2.1 Theological grammar and the logic of Scripture

Hamann explicitly notes that his grammatical method of philosophy is a generalization of Luther’s theological method: “like Luther I turn my entire philosophy into a grammar.”946 From the 1970s onwards, Christian theologians like Hans Frei and Jewish thinkers like Peter Ochs have been developing a view of theology as a grammar or logic of biblical narrative. Ochs systematizes recent views of theology as a grammar of the Bible.947 He takes the Rabbinical Jewish theological method to interpret the Scriptures, and then compares the method with Peirce’s pragmatism. He then builds a theory of biblical grammar that encompasses Jewish pragmatist interpreters like Max Kadushin, and Frei’s Christian school of grammatical theology. These schools of biblical interpretation emphasize that rules are internal to theological discourse and shape the life of a religious community. This approach is often criticized as relativistic: the question of truth does not arise. However, Ochs locates the articulation of biblical rules and laws in a dialogue with God to overcome suffering. Thus the account of the articulation of rules internal to a faith community must

944 Smart 1998, 214-215. James’ definition of religion (1985, Ch.2) and pragmatist account of the Holy (Paulsen 1999) for the background for the comparison along with Ch. 3.2, 4.3 and For Buddhism, see Dhammapada and Ch. 6.1.3.
945 For the theodist view of God, see Ch. 2.3, Mackie 1955, Plantinga 1974, Rowe 1979. The description of the basic assumptions is based on van Fraassen (2002, 1-30) and Phillips (2004).
946 ZH 7, 169, quoted in H xiii, n.6. Wittgenstein is aware that PI 373 goes back to Luther: Snellman 2018.
be complemented with a metalanguage that describes language-games for encountering God. I use Hamann’s and Veijola’s views of revelation to formulate such descriptions.\footnote{For the solipsism charge, see McGrath 1994, 174. The descriptions of dealing with the Holy can be non-confessional descriptions of religious practices and beliefs in a Jamesian spirit: see Kusch 2011, James 1985, Smart 1998.}

Ochs develops theological grammars by taking the interpretative methods of Rabbinic Judaism, which forms the background for contemporary Judaism. Ochs then develops the rabbinic method by referring to the work of Max Kadushin. Rabbinism considers both Scripture (the written Torah of the Pentateuch) and tradition (the oral Torah of rabbinic interpretations) authoritative, but requires that traditional interpretations are included in the literal sense. The rabbis interpret the Bible by first focusing on the plain sense of the biblical text, and then highlight any contradictions and ambiguities that arise from the text. Biblical interpretation searches for an interpreted sense in the passages that clarifies the text and removes its ambiguities and contradictions. The search takes place in a tradition of Jewish theology, which gives it the goal of contributing to the religious community and the paradigm of interpretative problem-solving via the Talmud. The goal of the search is to find a practical meaning that can be used to repair and correct the practices of the Jewish religious community and remove difficulties in its traditions.\footnote{Ochs (2004) discusses rabbinic interpretation on pp. 5-10 and Kadushin on pp. 300-305.}

Ochs argues that Peirce’s pragmatism is also a method for clarifying ideas by removing ambiguity and contradictions by developing rules for pragmatic logic, which can then give definite meaning to the terms by fixing the conduct of the research community in the context of its received common-sense beliefs.\footnote{For Ochs’s interpretation of pragmatism, see 2004, 251-259.} Specifically, he attempts to clarify the relationship between a critical correction, the final opinion and the practical task of correcting reasonings.\footnote{Ochs 2004, 246-285. To put Ochs’ formulation technically: The relationships $C(x,y)$: $x$ corrects $y$, and $F(y,p)$: the reading $p$ is the final interpretant for the vague text $y$, are both constituted by their interrelatedness in the practice of enquiry. Reasonings at the level $B^n$ can be corrected at the level of corrective metalanguage $B^{n+1}$. There is an ongoing process of enquiry, where arguments $B^n$ and their corrections $B^{n+1}$ resolve to the process $\bigcup_{n=1}^{\infty} B^n$ that contain final interpreters at some $B^{n+k}$. The interrelationships and the ongoing, non-terminating process of enquiry are then necessary to understand enquiry correctly. The process of enquiry contains for each level of argumentation $B_k$ the level $B_{k+n}$ such that arguments on $k+n$ correct $k$ and offers the final interpretant for fixing practices.} The criteria for a correct critical correction involve the practice $y$ that is being repaired by the correction $x$: a higher-level argument is $x$ valid only, if it helps to repair practices $y$ on the lower level. For example, the rules of the philosophy of mathematics are correct only, if they can serve as a guide in mathematical practices. Ochs refers to Peirce’s way of formulating pragmatism by quoting Jesus,
Rabbi Hillel and Moses: “By their fruit you will recognize them. Do people pick grapes from thornbushes, or figs from thistles?”

Ochs then defines pragmatism as a method to repair the beliefs of a community in response to practical problems. He then applies his model to religious practices: theological logic concerns describing the beliefs of a faith community and devising repairs to religious practices. Ochs develops a grammar of Scripture by applying the model to the prophets’ dialogues with God. Every suffering is a vague sign that God will redeem it. The prophets then enter into dialogues with God, who repairs suffering. These dialogues and interpretations presuppose faith in an Other who redeems suffering, and compassion with God and with the suffering person. The prophetic dialogues then terminate in God commanding the prophet to institute corrective activities in order to take care of suffering people. The suffering x is then connected to the correction or redemption y, but this relationship is subject to confusions. The task of the prophet is to clarify the relationship between the suffering x and God’s repairing redemption y, and issue corrections to the practices of caring for sufferers. The prophet then offers an account of God’s action of repairing suffering, which connects the suffering x to the divine act p that is its interpretant. At the same time, prophets clarify the relationship of God’s revelation and corrections of the world.

Ochs then presents a summary of biblical grammar. The purpose of the grammar is to give the term “God” a practical meaning by describing, how God overcomes suffering and by offering corrections to suffering in the biblical texts and interpretative traditions. Jewish and Christian theologies offer re-readings of God’s actions building on their respective religious sources for their communities. They use different sources in their interpretations: Christians use the New Testament and tradition, as Jews use rabbinical interpretations and the descriptions of God’s virtues. The repairs moreover bring sufferers into a dialogue with God. The dialogues do not impose a cure, but they modify the religious practices of a community. The different readings are context-dependent and mutually enriching, so there is no single correct interpretation.

Ochs’s theological grammar then involves developing a description of the term “God” by identifying God’s actions correcting suffering against the background of language-games of encountering God. Therefore Ochs’ grammars require a description of language-games for encountering God in religious practices. Timo Veijola argues in “Offenbarung als Begegnung” that the basic structure of the Hebrew Bible consists of language-games of dialogues between God on

---

952 Mt. 7:16, Ochs 2004, 246-285. Cf. Hamann’s comments on modern philosophy: “Our philosophers talk like alchemists about the treasures of productivity, though to judge by their fields and vineyards, they do not know to tell (...) grapes from thorns, or figs from thistles” (H 106).
954 Ochs 2004, 290-315.
the one hand, and human beings, Israel and the world on the other. Veijola describes the biblical stories of encountering God by referring to the First Commandment: “I am the LORD your God.” The commandments start with an address, so they set up and build upon a relationship between the believer and God. More generally, language about God is not abstract at all, but describes divine action towards man, Israel and the world in a space of conversation. Language about God and practical access to God then takes place in practices of interaction and language-game-like exchanges between man and God. When using the word “dialogue”, one must notice two things. First, God both initiates the dialogue and has the last word in it. Thus God is free to both create and call, and both the existence of these language-games and their eventual outcome depends on God. Second, for all participants in the dialogue, both words and actions are moves or Handlungen in the language-games. Revelation is then understood as the words and events that constitute God’s moves in the dialogue, so it is not a set of dogmas. Veijola discusses prophetic dialogues, and uses stories about Moses and Jeremiah as examples:

-Moses!

-Yes, who is it? I’m here.

-Nice to meet you! I’m the god of your ancestors. My people Israel called. They’ve complained that the Pharaoh is oppressing them. Go liberate them from slavery.

-How can I do it? The Pharaoh will throw me in jail, or worse.

-I’ll be with you and you’ll have my full support.

-This is unbelievable. What god? Who are you? How can I introduce you to Israelites?

-I am who I am. Just call me Yahweh.

Veijola develops grammatical remarks about the Moses story. The divine name leaves the question about God’s being open so that God maintains His freedom. Thus God’s response upholds

---

955 Veijola 1991. I am referring to the Finnish version of the essay. Veijola has cooperated with Bayer, and reads the Bible against the background of Luther’s grammar that “God ‘deals’ with the person in the word, and the person ‘deals’ with God in faith.” (Bayer 2012, 164) Ochs’s rabbinic pragmatism (2004) explicitly affirms that prophetic dialogues with God underlie issuing interpretative corrections to the religious life of a community.
956 Ex. 20:2.
957 Veijola 1991. Ch. 4.1 includes a sketch of a language-game between God, Adam and the world. For the theme of God’s freedom in divine address and the contingency of language-games, see H 65, Bayer 2012, 72-78, Poteat 1985.
958 Ex. 3.
a distance between God and Moses. God’s response and self-description however locates God in relationships. God’s being who He is refers to divine action in relationships, so God both remains transcendent and commits Himself to relationships by promising to remain present by actions, e.g. by actions and strategies to repair suffering. Biblical laws and rules of conduct also gain their validity from relationships. The laws and commandments determine the right way of answering divine address: “First comes salvation, then comes legislation”. Thus it is God’s action that offers a ground for morals by first establishing a relationship and then determining virtuous practices by establishing correct ways of responding. Veijola also interprets the prophetic books by arguing that in the Bible, revelation is not confined to the Laws of Moses but remains a dynamic word that functions in prophetic dialogues with God. The prophet is called to God to be a messenger like Moses was, and in general revelation calls its recipients to action. The words of God are again an address: they are independent of the prophet, but they address particular people in particular situations and establish responses and relationships.

Veijola then argues that the theme of revelation as an encounter with God offers a suitable category to capture the structure of the Hebrew Bible, and other traditions as well. Biblical grammar describes the linguistic categories of encountering God, and builds categories of these relationships to clarify religious beliefs and to act as descriptions of and second-order norms in religious practices. He also argues that both Christian stories of Jesus encountering people and Jewish traditions of rabbinic interpretation affirm that biblical religion is based on encountering God. Veijola’s theme of encounter both locates revelation in dialogues of religious language-games and raises the Hamannian theme of divine speech. Hamann’s emphasis on the sensuous and practical character of revelation gives another angle for building descriptions of categories for encountering God and thus locating the practical meaning of the word “God”.  

Hamann famously offers a statement of the Christian doctrine of creation and revelation when he argues that “creation (...) is a speech to creatures through creatures”.

Hamann refers to Psalm 19, so he draws on the worldview of Wisdom literature: God establishes natural orders, and man then responds to them. Elsewhere Hamann sketches the communication-theoretic view of God → nature → reason, where nature is a communication channel transmitting God’s speech. Bayer interprets Hamann’s slogan as offering a means of understanding both the freedom

---


961 H 65 / N II, 198.

and the relatedness of God. The phrase “to creatures” implies that God is free to speak and that He is an Other who is not reducible to the state of nature. Bayer interprets “through creatures” Christologically, but Hamann clearly refers to creation as whole. Hamann argues that natural facts can be elements in the language-games of divine-human relationships by embodying the institutions of divine speech and action. I take an example from Wittgenstein to illustrate Hamann’s view of divine language:

1. Elements: A phenomenon of nature, e.g. trees bowing to a saint.
2. Institution: God uses the phenomenon as a symbolic gesture of validating the words of the saint.
3. Symbolizing divine ideas: The trees symbolize the divine idea of validating the saint, because the phenomena are used as a gesture in communication between the saint, the hearers and God.

Thus dialogues between man and God as well as God and nature can be viewed as language-games, where God is an Other, and words and events function in a dialogue by embodying the actions of God and of creatures. Hamann’s view of creation then corresponds to Veijola’s biblical grammar, but it expands the grammar to cover all experience and allows one to emphasize the sensuous character of theological language-games. Dickson argues that Hamann’s Aesthetica is a doctrine of experience and the creative reinterpretation of sense-experience. Hamann’s starting point is that there is no dualistic conceptual gap between the world and God. Therefore empirical knowledge reveals God, as all creation is a revelation of God. Hamann in fact connects the concepts of revelation and of experience, as he speaks of nature as “the sensory revelation of his majesty” and refers to empirical results in the sciences as revelations: “the revelations of Niwentyt, Newton and Buffon”, as well as “the revelations of a Galileo, Kepler, Newton”. Revelation then is experiential, and experience becomes an empirical result or divine revelation when it is located in a practice of interpretation that involves its object and recognizes its presence.

Ochs’s Jewish pragmatism together with Veijola’s and Hamann’s Christian pragmatism offer perspectives on theological grammar. Theological grammar describes how a

---

965 H 60-95.
966 H 64, H 77, H 101.
particular religious tradition understands God to act, especially to repair suffering. These descriptions then give the essence of God, and serve as criteria for religious beliefs and activities within that tradition. Thus these descriptions chart the belief system in question. Martin Kusch too characterizes Luther’s theological grammar as a description of religious practices: “Theology is a grammar of the ways in which the religious believer speaks and thinks about God, and the actions he thinks possible vis-à-vis God, and of the properties he attributes to God.” These descriptions are Jamesian in a broad sense, as they involve describing what it would be like to take part in the practice of encountering the Holy. The descriptions function against the background of practices for encountering God, which form the relationships $R$ that underlie the concepts $P$ that are used of God. The practices for encounters are language-games that involve the words and actions of both the believer or the community, and the encountered Holy. These religious language-games are moreover the primary context in which the word “God” is used. The words and actions of the language-games are mediated by the sensuous practices and events of the world. Moreover, the dialogues with the Holy form a history for tracking and identifying the activities of God.

Theological grammar charts the activities that locate talk about God and His properties in practical relationships. David Paulsen argues that James’ critique of religious language aims at determining the practical meaning of the word “God” by locating it in practices. In Ch. 3.1.2.2 we have seen that James defines practical meaning as the empirically mediated states of affairs that we encounter in seeking and finding solutions to our practical needs. James defends the view of God as personal, limited and related to us with relational arguments that locate the practical meaning of the word “God” in encountering God in religious practices. Language about God is practically meaningful only, if God can be encountered in religious practices and empower moral practices. God can be encountered in religious practices and empower moral practices only, if He is personal and understood in terms of relationships with men and the world.

James’ arguments then offer ways of deepening points about grammar by reinterpretting them through the pragmatic theory of meaning. A concept is practically meaningful only, if it is embedded in sensuously mediated practices of seeking and finding. Religious practices in sensuously mediated language-games allow one to locate the pragmatic meaning of the word “God”, as these practices are ways of interpreting and encountering God’s activity and responses to

---

969 Kusch 2011. Kusch is commenting on a passage from Luther that stands behind PI 373 and ZH 7, 169.
971 See Ch. 3.1.2.2, 3.1.3, James 1975, chs. 2 and 6. Peirce understands practical meaning as the practice itself: see Pietarinen & Snellman 2005. The view I develop may be closer to Peirce, as I interpret religious practices as sensuously mediated activities of seeking and finding God and the Holy.
suffering. Then these sensuous practices give the discourse possibilities for the word “God”. The possible moves in religious language-games of encountering the Holy give the discourse possibilities and sensuous practices of encountering God, and the stories told of the encounters give the character and principles of identity for God. These language-games are then categories for identifying God, as they locate the possibilities of discourse and action regarding God, and make it possible to identify and reidentify God by telling stories about His activity. Religious language-games then establish the practices of use and practical meanings for terms used to characterize the essence of God.

1. Language-games are categories that characterize essences: they answer the question “What is an X?” by identifying basic intuitions for seeking and finding X in encounters with reality, and give the criteria of identification that are typical for X.

2. If language-games are categories characterizing their objects, then the word “God” has practical consequences and God is identified via religious language-games for encountering God.

3. Theology is a grammar: It describes and regulates religious practices and uses of language in religious language-games, which are used for encountering the Holy.

4. → The second-order terms of theological grammar describe the essence of God only, if theological terms are connected to first-order practices of encountering God in language-games.

5. → Theological terms describe God only, if these language-games are connected with encountering the Holy and relating to it via practices functioning as basic intuitions.

6. The principles for identifying an X help determine the essence of an X by locating it in a narrative that describes its typical actions and character.

7. In biblical traditions, biblical stories are used to identify God: The Old and New Testaments in Christianity, the Hebrew Bible and the Talmudic tradition of interpretation in Judaism.

8. → Theological grammar characterizes the essence of God and His essential properties like “good” and “omnipotent” by pointing out the practices of responding to God that give discourse possibilities and basic intuitions, and by giving criteria of reidentification via biblical narratives.

6.2.2 Theological grammar, goodness and omnipotence

Philosophical grammar then offers a way to contrast the concept of God in religious practices with the logical concept of omnipotence and the principle of sufficient reason. Paulsen interprets James’

---

972 See Ch. 3.2 for a description of grammar, Ch. 4.1 for language-games and 4.3 for categories and criteria for identity.

pragmatic critique of theological terms. James contrasts the socially related God of practical life and of biblical traditions with the abstractly defined God of metaphysical theism and Transcendentalism. God makes a positive difference to the practices of day-to-day life, as He responds to calls of help and calls us to a moral life. Then God is present and related to the world, as He can be related to via prayers. Similarly, God is limited, because He is related to human beings and the world. If God is related to man and the world, then we can draw the distinction (but not construct a conceptual gap) between God and the world. Similarly, if the relationships between man and God are genuine moral relationships, then God has to work in a world with many independent centres of causal power, and does not determine everything. James contrasts the pragmatic picture that arises from encountering God with metaphysical theism, which defines God as an unlimited Being as such. God is taken as a limit concept of being qua being e.g. by defining Him as the Perfect Being or the ultimate sufficient reason of the universe. James argues that this conception is devoid of practical meaning, as defining God as a limit of reason and something completely different from us and the world cuts Him off from relationships. Having such a God does not call for any particular kind of practice, so it does not have practical meaning.

James’ pragmatic critique of religion can be recast as Hamann’s and van Fraassen’s dilemma, which was discussed in Ch. 3. God is either understood in terms of metaphysics as the God of philosophers, or of revelation as the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Understanding God in terms of metaphysics leads to the conceptual confusion of speculative metaphysics, including theodical word games. Understanding God as revealed gives a fixed meaning to the word “God” through religious language-games, but the approach to evil is not theodical. This can be clearly seen with the concepts of goodness and omnipotence.

Phillips argues at length against the logical concept of omnipotence. He rephrases the Hamann-van Fraassen dilemma: is the talk about omnipotence related to an a priori concept of logical space, or is it interpreted in the language-games where we put the word “God” to its ordinary use? If we ground the logical concept of omnipotence in an a priori order of possibility, then we detach the meaning of “omnipotent” from its relational conditions, because the order of

974 Paulsen 1999.
975 For monism in the theodicy debate, see Mackie 1955.
976 Hamann makes a similar criticism of Kant: see Bayer 2002, 56-62.
977 Paulsen 1999. James is maybe too harsh: views like Transcendentalism and Thomism are ways of looking at the world, and Scholasticism views God as a limit that is reached by applying a particular empirical interpretation of causation. See Burtt 2016. Paulsen admits that James’ argument must be assessed piecemeal.
978 See Ch. 3.1.2.3. ZH I, 450-453, Beiser 1987.
possibility is determined only against the background of the rules and underlying relationships of some language-game. Then the logical concept of omnipotence fails to get off the ground. On the other hand, if the concept of omnipotence is defined within religious language-games, then the logical concept of omnipotence fails as a grammatical principle.

The key idea of Phillips’s argument that the logical concept of omnipotence presupposes that logical space is given a priori and the concept of omnipotence is logically prior to that of divine activity. In Ch. 2.3 we have seen that Mackie defines omnipotence as follows: for all logically possible p, if God wills that p, then p: (\(W_{\text{God}} p \rightarrow p\)). Phillips quotes a similar definition from Swinburne: “An omnipotent being is one who can do anything possible, anything, that is, the description of which does not involve a contradiction.” The concept of omnipotence then presupposes the Scotist picture of the rules underlying logical space that was discussed in Ch. 3.3: w is possible if and only if w does not contain contradictions. In fact, Scotus developed possible worlds semantics to articulate a view of divine power that admits divine choice.

Phillips’s arguments against the logical concept of omnipotence build on Wittgenstein’s ideal language argument, which is based on the Hamannian relational arguments of Ch. 4.2.1. Logical possibility is based on the logical rules of language. The logical rules of language are then the institutions that concern its logical aspects. These institutions however function in the context of language-games, where language use establishes the meaning of logical and mathematical symbols. Conceptual possibility is then not given a priori, but is located in language-games. Also, talk about the logically possible depends on the different discourse possibilities in language-games and possibilities given by their underlying relationships. An attempt to detach the concept of possibility from language-games and its rules and underlying relationships then removes it from its relational conditions, because language use and the relationships underlying the linguistic rules are the necessary conditions for logical and conceptual possibility. Then the a priori concept of logical possibility does not get off the ground at all.

Another way of understanding the concept of “omnipotence” is to refer to what is possible for God, or what God can be said to do. These descriptions of possibility however presuppose ways of describing God, so the context of using the word “God” is then taken to be the relational context for the concept of omnipotence. Such a linking of the concept of omnipotence with religious language-games however embeds the concept in the grammar of these language-

981 See Chs. 4.1.1, 4.2.1. Knuuttila 1996.
games, as we have seen in the previous chapter. Then the concept “is omnipotent” is subject to the discourse possibilities of what God can be said to do, and the stories of reidentifying God. The grammatical possibilities however offer a different picture of omnipotence than the logical picture. Phillips argues that “God cannot ride a bicycle” or “God cannot eat a cone of good ice cream” are part of the grammar of divine action. Theologians often argue e.g. that God cannot do evil, or He cannot watch suffering callously and instead aims to repair it. Then the concept of omnipotence depends on the grammar of divine action, which controls what p God can be said to do. Such a concept however is narrower than the logical concept of omnipotence, because God cannot be said to do actions contrary to the totality of discourse possibilities about Him, and the stories for identifying Him.

The logical concept of omnipotence then fails, as it detaches the concept of omnipotence from the language-games for identifying divine activity. The concept of divine goodness also faces a similar problem. We have seen that Rowe defines divine goodness: God is good if and only if every evil s either makes possible a greater good G or prevents a greater evil s’. Otherwise God would not have a sufficient reason to permit the evil s: “God (…) would not allow any evil unless it is necessary for a greater good. Meeting this criterion (…) is the only thing that would provide God with a morally sufficient reason to permit evil.” When the logical concept of omnipotence connects omnipotence with an a priori logical space, the theodicist definition of divine goodness connects goodness with the principle of sufficient reason. Both of these connections take concepts of God into metaphysical use from their everyday use.

We have seen in Ch. 5 that the principle of sufficient reason is an abstract principle. Heidegger defines it as the principle that “Being qua being is constituted by reason”, and Pruss defines it as the principle that “Everything has an explanation.” Such principles do not define, what is reason or an explanation. Heidegger argues that Plato’s theory of Forms and Kant’s transcendental deduction offer two competing ways for grounding being in reason. Similarly, simply arguing that everything has an explanation does not determine, what counts as an explanation, which explanations are good ones and which explanation is true in any particular case. We have seen in Ch. 4.3 that the principle of reason and other metaphysical principles are second-

---

983 The point arises from Ochs 2004, 288.
984 Phillips 2004, 5-20, Ch. 6.2.1. Phillips thus makes the possibilities attributed to God to depend on the religious language-games. However, the dependence of attributions of metaphysical necessity on language-use is a special case for the simultaneous contingency and necessity of grammar. See Chs. 3.2, 4.2.3, 5.4.2, Garver 1994, 231-235.
986 PI 116. Phillips (2004) too argues that the concept of divine goodness as sufficient reasons fails. My line of argument is different, and closer to van Fraassen’s (2000) and James’ (Paulsen 1999) critiques of metaphysics.
order principles that need interpretation in terms of first-order systems and language-games for assessing moral and logical reasons. These language-games and their underlying systems function on the logic of elements, institutions and systemic contexts. On its own, the principle of reason fails to specify any specific reasons or what counts as a sufficient reason, as reasons are relative to systems and language-games. However, defining divine goodness in terms of sufficient reasons detaches the descriptions of God from the language-games that are used to identify and evaluate divine activity, as the principle is taken to be logically prior to the concept of God.987

This insight seems to stand behind Hamann’s critique of Leibnizian theodicism in the Antitheodicy Letter.988 Hamann here poses the dilemma: are we using an a priori concept of divine justice, or are we appealing to revelation? Hamann argues that it is vanity to claim a priori knowledge of God’s intentions and total knowledge of the world, both of which are necessary to show that the world is the best possible and give a theodicist proof of divine justice. He instead claims that trying to get a priori knowledge of God’s character is like a blind man looking at the sun, and sceptical philosophers are right that the more they try to discern divine reasons, the less they know. A blind man simply does not have the means to identify the Sun or to be in visual contact with it. We can then put the argument in terms of identification conditions: we can talk of divine goodness and justice only, if we have practices for identifying and encountering the Holy.

Hamann appeals to Christian revelation, but his argument can be made in terms of the grammatical remarks of the previous chapter. Working with the language-games of a religious tradition ends up in a similar situation as appeals to revelation: both religious language-games and revelation are dependent on practices of encountering God and the Holy. These practices then lay a groundwork for theological grammar, which gives ways for describing the justice of God by describing His properties via ways of seeking and finding Him, and His action by telling stories. Then theological grammar establishes the ways for speaking about divine justice, because they determine both the discourse possibilities and the narratives that determine the practical consequences underlying the claim “God is good”.989 For example, Hamann’s example of Christian faith has the confession: “for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist.”990 The confession specifies practices for encountering God in the Christian tradition. Early Christians held that Jesus is God’s chief agent who realizes His plans to repair suffering, so God can

987 Ch. 2.2.4.3, 4.3, 5.3, 5.4, Heidegger 1971, Pruss 2006.
988 ZH I, 450-453, Beiser 1987, Ch. 3.1.2.3.
989 ZH 1, 450-453, see Ch. 6.2.1. Cf. Rowe 1979.
990 1 Cor. 8:6. See Hurtado 2015, Dt. 6:4.
be encountered through Jesus. Early Christians then devised language-games for worshipping Jesus. Moreover, the confession links the identity of the Christian God with the story of the Hebrew Bible, as they quote the Jewish confessions that Israel has only one God. The Christian confession then defines basic intuitions for encountering and a story for reidentifying the Christian God, and also practices and definite reasons for calling Him good. The same does not hold of the theodicist claims “There is a God, because all evils are for a greater good or prevent a greater evil” and “There is no God, because some evils are not for a greater good and do not prevent a greater evil.”

We can see this on the basis of the survey of the theodicy debate in Ch. 2.3. Plantinga argues that free will is a greater good that gives God sufficient reasons for letting Curley extort bribes. Mackie claims that libertarian free will does not constitute a greater good, because the libertarian concept of free will is incoherent. Since compatibilism is the right way to understand moral responsibility, Curley can well be a morally autonomous free person and an automaton who is the puppet of blind physical forces. Rowe claims that it is so horrible that Bambi died in the forest fire, so there can be no sufficient reasons for such callousness. Plantinga claims that freedom is a good reason to let environmental hooligans or Lucifer play with matches, burning down the entire forest. All of the disputants accept theodicism, or the claim that if God exists, then all evils have morally sufficient reasons. What they disagree on is whether a given possible situation w is such that God has a sufficient reason for allowing w. The structure of the debate tends to increase the ambiguity, as the cottage industry of defences depends on offering epistemically possible reasons for allowing worlds. Then the theodicy debate, the principle of sufficient reason or theodicism are not sufficient (do not offer sufficient reasons?) for determining the set of worlds $P_G = \{ w | w \text{ is a possible world } \& \exists x \text{ x is a sufficient reason for God to permit w} \}$. More specifically, they conceptually fail to establish whether the actual world $w \in P_G$. Then the principle of sufficient reason and other assumptions have not fixed at all the practical consequences for the claims “God exists”, “God is good”, “God does not exist”, “God is not good”. We can now sum up the critique of the theodicist metaphysical uses of the terms “good” and “omnipotent”:

1. The expressions “God is good” and “God is omnipotent” either gain their meaning from religious language-games, or they are defined in terms of the logical concept of omnipotence and the principle of sufficient reason.

---

991 Mackie 1955, Rowe 1979, Plantinga 1974. The idea that the debate about theodicy is fit for parodies comes from Dickson’ aptly named essay “Wortspiel und Schulgeschwätz” (2005).
992 The concept of practical consequences comes from James (1975) and from Chs. 3.1.2.2 and 3.1.3.
2. If the expressions “God is good” and “God is omnipotent” gain their meaning from religious language-games, divine goodness and omnipotence are understood in terms of the grammar of religious practices.

3. If divine goodness and omnipotence are understood in terms of the grammar of religious practices, then the PSR and logical omnipotence do not fix their meaning.

4. The logical concept of omnipotence and PSR detach the expressions “God is good” and “God is omnipotent” from their contexts and relational conditions for their use.

5. If the logical concept of omnipotence and PSR detach the expressions “God is good” and “God is omnipotent” from their contexts and relational conditions for their use, then the PSR and logical omnipotence do not fix their meaning.

6. → The PSR and logical omnipotence do not fix meanings for “God is good” and “God is omnipotent”.993

6.3. Biblical grammar and the fallacies of theodicism

Focusing on religious practices and stories then can help bring back the word “God” from its metaphysical use into its ordinary use. My approach to anti-theodicy builds on James’ and van Fraassen’s critiques of metaphysical theism. I build a grammar for the terms “omnipotent” and “good” in biblical traditions, which form the religious background for their metaphysical use.994

My approach will focus on Christianity, as I read the Gospels in light of Hamann’s and Wright’s antitheodicies and use my reading to motivate the use of William James. I build on N. T. Wright’s *Evil and the Justice of God* to describe anti-theodicy in the Gospels, while using Gerd Theissen’s *In the Shadow of the Galilean* as a background. I will then investigate the Book of Job by using Leo Perdue’s *Wisdom in Revolt* to develop an anti-theodicist grammar of metaphors of God in the Hebrew Bible. The same Jamesian points arise within the investigation of the original context and the plain sense of the Book of Job as well. The core of my argument is to combine Perdue’s plain-sense reading of the encounter of God, Job and evil with James’ pragmatist interpretation of divine attributes in everyday religious practices and encounters with the Holy. My approach could also offer resources for Jewish anti-theodicies. Christianity and Judaism both use the metaphors of the Book of Job through their respective traditions of interpretation, and Tyron Goldschmidt has shown that most theodicies and antitheodicies arising in Christian traditions have

corresponding rabbinic versions. Moreover, Jon Levenson has also given a Jewish antitheodicist reading of the Book of Job that in some ways parallels Perdue’s reading.\textsuperscript{995}

The importance of stories in biblical grammar can be approached via examining stories that are familiar from the Christian Gospels. In *The Shadow of the Galilean*\textsuperscript{996}, Gerd Theissen locates Jesus in the tradition of ancient Jewish story-telling. Jesus’ agrarian parables tell about a God who is completely different from our preconceptions, like the idea that God must be on the side of the powerful or the principle of sufficient reason. The stories tell about the relationship between God and man, and thus help to identify God’s actions towards man and possible human responses. Since one cannot make a picture of God, He can be described only by giving an account of events or telling a story. The events then form plot points or God’s actions, and the story as a whole reveals His character or strategy. The parables build on the conviction that God can only be sought and found by reorienting one’s life, as they aim at changing the hearer’s life and relationship with the Holy. The stories of the Hebrew Bible locate God’s action in the world by telling about the history of Israel, and Jesus’ parables aim at reorienting one’s way of looking at the world by telling about the presence of God in everyday life. The stories tell about a God who seeks human beings to return to Him and has great forbearance towards them.\textsuperscript{997} These stories then help chart God’s actions, as they are metaphors in the sense of Ch. 4.2.2: they represent possible situations and relationships of God’s action via literary creations.

Take the example of the Prodigal Son. A father has two sons. One turns his back on his father by demanding his inheritance and then proceeds to waste it. When he is ruined, he returns home and asks his father for forgiveness. The father readmits the son to the family and organizes a party because the son is back. The form of the story is (abandon father → come back). The story can be reinterpreted: the father is God, and the lost son can be interpreted to be a tax collector or a prostitute, e.g. Matthew Levi or Mary of Magdalene, who gave up on sinful ways to follow Jesus. Then there are narrative isomorphisms between the relationship of the story and relationships, where God calls these people back through Jesus’ activities. Then the story opens new ways of seeing Jesus’ socializing with sinners as God’s actions by looking at them from a new angle, and thus recognizing (or identifying) them as God’s presence. It also gives criteria for identifying God’s activity in different possible situations by pointing out functional similarities between the compared

\textsuperscript{996} Theissen 1994, Ch.14. Cf. Wright 1996. I use Theissen’s account to highlight points about grammar and categories.
\textsuperscript{997} For identification through stories, see Ch. 6.1.1. For theology as a grammar, see Ch. 6.2.
situations. One can compare the cases of Matthew and Mary, and the comparisons give similarities and isomorphisms between the cases that function as identity criteria for divine activity.\textsuperscript{998}

James’ approach to the meanings of expressions for divine properties like “omnipotent” and “good” offers a starting point to bring these terms “to the rough ground.”\textsuperscript{999} James defines these expressions as follows: “God's holiness, for example: being holy, God can will nothing but the good. Being omnipotent, he can secure its triumph. (…) Being loving, he can pardon too. Being unalterable, we can count on him securely.”\textsuperscript{1000} Paulsen argues that James is thus redefining the traditional properties of God in order to take them out of metaphysical use and to reconnect them with religious practices and narratives. God’s holiness and goodness are then redefined as willing the good and preferring to act so that it triumphs. God’s omnipotence is redefined as the ability to act so that good eventually triumphs. James also introduces the famous chessmaster example to describe this sense of the sovereignty of God. In “The Dilemma of Determinism” James argues that God can guarantee His purposes in a world where there are many independently acting agents, some of which are opposed to His will. James makes the argument by appealing to the concept of a winning strategy in game theory.\textsuperscript{1001} He first distinguishes between a Providence that necessitates the world and a Providence that builds a contingency plan for responding to possible situations with some fixed points, or actual states of affairs that count as objectives. He then offers the analogy of God as a chessmaster, who is playing against a novice:

> An analogy will make the meaning of this clear. Suppose two men before a chessboard—the one a novice, the other an expert player of the game. The expert intends to beat. But he cannot fore-see exactly what any one actual move of his adversary may be. He knows, however, all the possible moves of the latter; and he knows in advance how to meet each of them by a move of his own which leads in the direction of victory. And the victory infallibly arrives, after no matter how devious a course, in the one predestined form of check-mate to the novice's king.\textsuperscript{1002}

\textsuperscript{998} Lk. 15:11-32, Dt. 21: 18-21. See Theissen 1994, Ch. 14, Wright 1996. The topic of metaphors and dynamic models is discussed in Ch. 4.2.2 and Ziman 2000. For faith as a recognition of presence, see Hein 1983.  
\textsuperscript{999} Paulsen 1999, PI 107.  
\textsuperscript{1000} James 1985, 353.  
\textsuperscript{1001} James 1979. For the concept of a winning strategy, see Ch. 4.1.  
\textsuperscript{1002} James 1979, 138-139.
Thus God can achieve His aims in a world where there are many independent agents, and there is evil in the world. Paulsen calls this concept of divine power “redemptive sovereignty”: God aims at the good, and for all situations that can arise in the history of the world, He can either block them or He can act in them so that good will eventually triumph.  

Thus God’s plan of redemption or ensuring the victory of good over evil gives the practical meaning to the claim “God is good”: tragedy is only partial, but God can defeat evil and ensure the triumph of the good.

6.3.1 The Gospels and the redemptive sovereignty of God

This is the picture of God and evil we find in the biblical narratives. I will examine N. T. Wright’s interpretation of the Gospel stories and biblical worldviews in *Evil and the Justice of God*. Wright’s book is an explicit antitheodicy, as he argues that the philosophical problem of evil is based on conceptual confusions. He builds his case on a popularization of his research on Paul, Jesus and first-century Judaism. I will also use Gerd Theissen’s *The Shadow of the Galilean* as a background, as Theissen has a richer view of the social context.

The key for Wright’s reading is the view that the Bible tells “a story about what God has done, is doing and will do about evil.”

Wright describes the beliefs of Second Temple Judaism of Jesus’ day as a background of Christianity. There is only one God who created the world, and that God has entered into a covenant with Israel. This belief was not an attempt to characterize God metaphysically, but it was instead a slogan against paganism: only the God of Israel is real. It emphasizes that this God is the Creator by rejecting polytheist or pantheist identification of God with natural forces, and Gnostic and Deist views that hold that God is not actively involved in the material world. The doctrine then implies that “the present world (…) was made by the one true god, that evil, though important, is

---

1003 Rowe’s (1979) theodicism is a misreading of this principle: it detaches blocking evils and guaranteeing the good from its narrative and strategic context, and links it with paternalistic consequentialism and logical omnipotence.

1004 See Paulson 1999.

1005 Wright 2006, cf. 1992, 1996. Theissen 1994. Wright is doing a religious history of worldviews and symbols that is embedded in a political history of the development of different religious agendas. Theissen is doing social history and locates religious practices in day-to-day life, and is more sympathetic to Judaism. In many respects their approaches are similar. They locate Jesus in the context of an expectation that God radically changes things by defeating evil. They reject conspiracy exegetics through a focus on the social and political situation in first-century Israel and a scientific realism that focuses on the structure of practices and mindsets. Both have a criterion of historicity that is aimed at locating Jesus in the joint of Second Temple Judaism and Christianity by emphasizing continuity-by-difference.

1006 Wright 2006, 45.
not a necessary constituent part of it, and that the one god remains sovereign over it.”

God was also seen as acting both through natural and “supernatural” events. He was then taken to be both the creator of the world and active within it, leading to a view of divine activity as “speech to creatures through creatures.”

This worldview involves then a rejection of dualism: conceptual gaps like spirit/matter, matter/form, God/world and fact/meaning are illegitimate, as God is present in the world. However, one has to make a distinction between God and the world, good and evil and the-world-as-it-is and the-world-if-its-telos-were-fulfilled in order to account for God’s creative actions and His plans to defeat evil. The belief that God has called Israel offers the framework for discussions of the problem of evil. God has called Israel in order to repair suffering, and thus committed Himself to acting in history to defeat evil. The problem of evil then becomes “dynamic and relational”, and the story of the Hebrew Bible becomes key for approaching it.

Wright develops his account of evil in the Hebrew Bible by focusing on the call of Abraham. The narratives of the flood, the Tower of Babel and the Fall form the background for the call of Abraham. In each case, human hubris and evil challenges God: humans aspire to “be like God”, act in evil ways and do much violence or to build a great tower to be omnipotent. Then God judges them: He expels Adam and Eve from the garden, engineers a great flood and confuses their languages. After God’s judgment thwarts evil, God blesses the world: He gives Adam and Eve the means to live from here on and continue the human race, gives the world a new beginning by calling Noah, and finally He calls Abraham so that the blessing on his family will benefit all mankind. These stories have a common structure: God is committed to working within the world and to securing the triumph of good at all costs. He contains evil and judges it in order to block it from frustrating the goals of creation, and then offers new and unexpected ways to reach these goals and to ensure “that tragedy is always provisional and partial, and shipwreck and dissolution are not the absolutely final things”.

This can also be seen in the story of the Exodus as well. The Israelites are enslaved in Egypt, and the Pharaoh oppresses them. God hears the cry of the Israelites in Egypt, and out of compassion is moved to liberate them from slavery. God judges the Pharaoh and Egypt through a
series of natural disasters and by drowning the Egyptian chariots, and then lets the Israelites escape and leads them to the Promised Land. The call of Israel however creates new problems: the Israelites do not trust their calling and make golden calves that they worship right after God had given them a set of constitutional laws for the nation. Wright argues that setting up the institutions of biblical Israel and Judah simply sharpens the problems: the monarchy does not function as expected, and the question of how God’s plans against evil will be fulfilled is left open.\textsuperscript{1013}

Wright develops a grammar of three figures he takes to be key in the prophets’ charting of options of how God might act: the Servant of Deutero-Isaiah, the Son of Man in Daniel and the figure of Job.\textsuperscript{1014} Deutero-Isaiah argues that despite the disaster of the exile, God is still the creator and is committed to the covenant with Israel, and therefore God will take Israel out of exile and repair the suffering in creation. God then aims at realizing His plans for creation, and His justice saves, repairs suffering and heals instead of being a static order of sufficient reasons. Wright highlights the character of the Servant, which personifies the calling of Israel in the biblical narratives. Wright also discusses the battle and judgment scenes in the Book of Daniel. A series of beasts represents a procession of empires assaulting the human figure representing God’s people, but God then issues a judgment in favour of the human person (Israel?, “the Son of Man”) against the beastly empires and the violent and corrupt chaos they produce. God’s judgment then overthrows evil and shows that the faithful are in the right.

The theme of God and the moral order comes up in the Book of Job, where Job was hit by disasters even though he was innocent. Wright interprets the book by focusing on the theology of creation as a ground for answering the problem of evil: an answer to the problem of evil involves God the Creator establishing justice, so it is not a matter of static sufficient reasons. Wright moreover sees the book as a contest between Job and Satan, and draws analogies between Job and the Servant. Moreover, he draws some points about God and evil in the Hebrew Bible. Human beings are responsible for evil, and Satan is not an important character. Human and natural evil are intertwined. Moreover, God’s justice is not a matter of sufficient reasons, but involves a plan for putting the world to rights: He acts in the world-as-it-is, through the pattern of evil $\rightarrow$ judgment $\rightarrow$ new creation that operates in a pluralistic universe of many agents.\textsuperscript{1015}

\textsuperscript{1013} See Ex., 1 Sam.-2 Kings, Ochs 2004. Wright (2006, 60-62) also mentions the Psalms.
\textsuperscript{1014} Wright 2006, 62-74. Isa. 40-55, Dan. One must note that Wright is writing a Christian grammar of the Hebrew Bible, as Isa. 53 and Dan. 7 form the background for Jesus’ actions. See Paulsen 1999, Ch. 6.1.3.
Wright interprets the stories of the Hebrew Bible as a background for the story of the Christian Gospels. Wright characterizes the stories of God and evil in the Gospels: evil hits Jesus with full force, and God defeats it through Jesus. The gospel stories talk of Jesus as a healer, and a builder of new kinds of community: “a prophet mighty in deed and word”. In the Gospels, the healings are understood as demonstrating the victory of God over evil: “But if it is by the Spirit of God that I cast out demons, then the kingdom of God has come to you.” Jesus also invited sinners, poor people and other social outcasts to meals, as his aim was to integrate them into God’s community and presence. Jesus claimed divine authority for his teachings, offered a way of having one’s sins forgiven and of encountering God by joining Jesus’ movement, as well as liberalized different laws concerning Jewish identity. He organized his followers into communities, where everyone is fed, suffering is repaired and everyone can equally enjoy the dignity and attitudes of the well-to-do. The practices of these communities then institute new ways of being faithful to God, and are built on a universalization and radicalization of Jewish ethical and social teachings.

Jesus was executed on a political charge, because his messianic claims and the message of the kingdom of God were a threat to the ruling Establishment. “The Messiah” was usually understood as the revolutionary king of Israel, and Theissen paraphrased “kingdom of God” to mean that God would soon launch an all-out revolt on the established authorities and their corrupt politics. Wright argues that the protest against the Temple, the institutions of the Lord’s Supper and the crucifixion all help reveal Jesus’ agenda. The Messiah was supposed to defeat national enemies, restore the Temple and other institutions, and restore the Jewish laws. Jesus acted on the vocation of confronting evil, prophesied of a new Temple and instituted Jewish ethics and social mores through his communities. The protest against the Temple was meant as a judgment on it. Jesus acted as if by joining his fellowship and movement one could find forgiveness and the presence of God, so he was offering an alternative to the Temple even before the protest. The cleansing of the Temple signalled that the present regime was going to fall: social abuses connected to the Temple had gotten so badly out of hand that God would destroy it within a generation. Wright argues that the Lord’s Supper was a prophetic speech act explaining Jesus’ death: the death will conclude the new covenant. It will consolidate and institutionalize Jesus’ work in building new forms of life, bringing the presence of God and establishing the ethics Jesus taught to his communities into the hearts and minds of

1017 Mt. 12:28.
people. Jesus then intended to die a martyr in order to force a confrontation between God and evil, and he makes a Messianic claim that gets him killed.\textsuperscript{1018}

Theissen argues that the toxic combination of economic exploitation, identity politics, racism, corruption, religious fundamentalism and old-fashioned Establishment authoritarianism had produced a war of all against all. The Sanhedrin, the Jewish ruling council, had thrown Jesus to the wolves in order to prevent a revolt. Jesus also formed a threat to the Jewish establishment, as their power was based on building an Establishment cartel around the laws and the Temple. Pilate was afraid of messianic movements. The relationship between the Jews and the Romans was extremely bad, as most Roman leaders and soldiers were anti-Semitic and Jewish fundamentalism had become a way for defending one’s status amid economic uncertainty and dispossession. In such a situation, anybody who made Messianic claims or talked about the kingdom of God was seen as a revolutionary threat. The relationship between peasants and city-dwellers was bad as well, and the merchants and tradesmen in Jerusalem saw a prophet from Galilee denouncing the Temple and demanding social reform as a threat to their jobs. Wright argues that the Gospel story then tells of supra-personal and structural evil spinning out of control: structural social evil led to a war of all against all, and structural natural evil led to the power of death and the death of Jesus. In the end Jesus was killed, and death and decay are natural evils that end life and ruin the vitality and beauty of nature. Wright argues that these structural moral and natural evils are a destructive power that is greater than simply the sum total of all evils. Traditional Christian theology talks of sin, death and the devil in this context.\textsuperscript{1019}

Wright argues that in the Gospel narratives, the death of Jesus is seen as a conclusive confrontation between God and evil. Jesus was more of a prophet and community organizer than a revolutionary king, but he had chosen to make the messianic claim that led to him being executed to play the role of Isaiah’s Servant and thus embody God’s plans for confronting evil: “Jesus on the cross towers over the whole scene as Israel in person, as YHWH in person, as the point where evil of the world does all that it can and where the Creator of the world does all that he can.”\textsuperscript{1020} The conflict ends in the victory of God, as Jesus’ death is followed by his resurrection. The stories link

\textsuperscript{1018} The interpretation of the Kingdom of God as a great change instituted by God comes from Theissen 1994, Ch. 14. focus on the Temple protest, Eucharist and crucifixion come from Wright (1996, 2006, 88-94.) Both argue that Jesus offered an alternative to the Temple and prophesied of a new one. The theme of judgment comes from Wright.
\textsuperscript{1019} The description of structural causes leading to Jesus’ death comes mostly from Theissen 1994, esp. chs. 17-18. See also Wright 1996, 2006, 78-94. The ideas of downward spiral of evils and the combination of natural and social evils into demonic tendencies comes from Wright (2006, 78-94). The idea of a war of all against all comes from Theissen (1994, Ch. 18). These evils are all too familiar in our times too, and plague the human condition (cf. 1 Cor. 15:3). For the theme of victory of God over sin, death and the devil, see McGrath 1994, 341-345.
\textsuperscript{1020} Wright 2006, 92. See Ch. 5.2.3.
resurrection with a new creation: Wright interprets the resurrection story as meaning the establishment of a new creation, where the power of death is broken and the downward spiral of systemic evil is halted. Theissen links it with central features of Jewish monotheism: God creates anew and He takes the side of the weak. The resurrection is a new creation that happened, because God had taken the side of Jesus who was destroyed as an innocent victim of systemic evils at all levels. The confrontation between Jesus and evil then ended in the defeat of evil, and a new creation where destructive systemic evil can do no more damage.\textsuperscript{1021}

We can now make some grammatical remarks about evil and the redemptive sovereignty of God in the Christian story. Divine action is defined in terms of God’s plan, which is described by reinterpreting the Old Testament through the Gospels. These narratives of a divine plan underlie the criteria for calling God “good” and “omnipotent”, and give these expressions practical meaning. God is said to be good, because He is committed to His creation and to securing the triumph of good by acting within it. Since God’s justice is a project to heal and repair suffering, it does not involve a static order of sufficient reasons. God is said to be omnipotent, because He is the Creator and His plan of acting in history through Jesus and the Jewish history secures a victory over evil in the end. Jesus’ role in the story as God’s right-hand man in defeating evil entails that there is no Platonic conceptual gap between God and the world, as God achieves His plans through Jesus’ actions. To put it in the systemic language of Ch. 3.2 and 5, the prophet from Nazareth is the element, the institution is God’s strategy or plan for fighting evil, and the plan functions in the system of encounters between God, Israel and the world.\textsuperscript{1022} The Jamesian concept of redemptive sovereignty fits the Gospel accounts, as divine goodness means pursuing the good in relationships and omnipotence means having a plan or strategy to defeat evil and secure the good in the end. The relationship of God and evil is then not one of conceptual exclusion as in Mackie, but of narrative and strategic opposition. God and evil are antagonistic characters within the story, so they are locked in a zero-sum game. However, it is not the case that where God is present, evil cannot be present and vice versa.\textsuperscript{1023}

The Gospel stories then offer materials for a Hamannian and Jamesian antitheodicy. The antitheodicy is Hamannian, as God is present and makes His plans manifest in Jesus’ crucifixion, which is caused by chaotic evil forces and thus has no morally sufficient reasons. The

\textsuperscript{1021} Wright 2006, 86-100, Theissen 1994, Ch. 18.
\textsuperscript{1022} This feature of biblical narratives later led to the concept of communicatio idiomatum, which lies in the background of the Hamannian attack on conceptual gaps (see. Ch. 3.2.2, 5.) Luther intended the grammar of elements and institutions to fit the Christian doctrine of Jesus: see Metzke 1948.
antitheodicy is Jamesian, because it operates on the logic of God’s winning strategies and gives a practical meaning to terms like “God is good” and “God is omnipotent.” Wright however notes that the story itself depends on creation theology and themes like God becoming king (“kingdom of God”) and the defeat of chaotic evil. These same metaphors are used in the classical biblical antitheodicy in the Book of Job, and Leo Perdue argues that the Book of Job is a grammar of these metaphors. Investigating these themes in the Book of Job allows to uncover how these metaphors and figures of speech function, and elaborate on the critique of theodist fallacies and confusions. Moreover, an investigation into the plain sense of the Book of Job can also be a starting point for Jewish anti-theodicies as well.\footnote{Wright 2006, Bayer 2012, 67-86, Perdue 1991, Ochs 2004. Neiman 2019 gives a Kantian and Jewish reading of Job.}

6.3.2 Metaphors in the Book of Job and the fallacies of theodicism

Leo Perdue argues that the Book of Job concerns the right way to use language about God: “the book aims at \textit{speaking correctly} about God, as Job, his servant, has done. The entire movement of the book is theological, that is, the articulation of language about and to God.”\footnote{Perdue 1991, 75. Cf. Kusch 2011: “Theology is a grammar of the ways in which the religious believer speaks and thinks about God, and the actions he thinks possible vis-à-vis God, and of the properties he attributes to God.”} Perdue’s approach can then be located in the broad framework of theological grammar. Perdue also interprets wisdom theology by comparing ancient Near Eastern religions, situating it into a social history and analysing its narratives. Perdue’s interpretation bears some similarities to von Rad’s interpretation of the Book of Job: the witness of creation and God’s speech show that God is present in Job’s sufferings. They relate Job to God and correct the confusion that God’s trustworthiness is based on sufficient reasons. Perdue interprets Job as a rebel against God who argues that since there are no sufficient reasons for evil, God is untrustworthy and man must take God’s place.\footnote{Perdue 1991, 2007, von Rad 1988. Ch. Pihlström & Kivistö 2016, Ch. 2. von Rad argues that the book concerns the dialogue of God and Job. Job’s friends were religious dogmatists who could not participate in the dialogue with Job, as their appeals to the view that sin gives a reason for all evils made them unable to recognize Job’s point of view. Job had then challenged God to reveal Himself, as the trustworthiness of God had seemed suspect. God then answers Job. Perdue’s reading of Job’s arguments also resembles 20th century secularism and protest atheism (see Snellman 2019).}

Perdue investigates the key metaphors for God’s activity and for the human condition. He insists that theological language is metaphoric, and works with the same theory of metaphor as in 4.2.2: metaphors establishes interpretative connections for seeing-as, as they establish an interpretative isomorphism between the model and the system for pointing out similarities of
functioning, and thus establish a way of pointing out the properties and functioning of the target system. Perdue identifies the four key metaphors for God’s activity: fertility, word, artistry and the struggle against chaos. He also points out that there are three metaphors for the human condition: kingship, slavery and revolt. He argues that religious dogmatism easily turns these metaphors into dead metaphors that are disconnected from the interpretation of experience. I use Perdue’s readings of the arguments of Job and his “friends” as a test case of how various theodicist positions fail and abuse theological language, and his reading of God’s speeches as laying the foundation of a Jamesian consistency proof.\textsuperscript{1027}

6.3.2.1 Metaphors for God and man in the Book of Job

Perdue argues that in the ancient Near East, the gods were taken to guide the birth, growth and fertility of the land. In Israel, Yahweh was taken to be the father of the king and the nation. The metaphor of fatherhood means that God supports and raises the king and Israel, whom He has called. God is portrayed as a mother, who cares for Her offspring. God has given birth to Wisdom, and Israel is His spouse. Lady Wisdom tries to attract followers. The point of these metaphors is not to sexualize God, but to draw a picture of Him guiding processes that maintain life.\textsuperscript{1028}

Perdue also examines the metaphor of artistry. God designs and builds an ordered world like a craftsman does. House-builders and nation-building kings were seen to appropriate the wisdom of God, as building houses, temples and kingdoms orders the world. The Temple of Jerusalem was believed to be the dwelling-place of God. Lady Wisdom had built a house for herself and her followers. Pottery was used as a metaphor for the creation of man in the image of God. These metaphors articulate the view of creation as a beautiful and aesthetic whole. The work of builders and craftsmen also means in participating in God’s creation.\textsuperscript{1029}

Perdue identifies four different terms for the divine word in the Hebrew Bible: speech, wisdom, command and breath. Similar metaphors are found across the Ancient Near East: for example, the Egyptian god Ptah created by expressing his thoughts, and Mesopotamian religion believed that the world is a state and the gods make laws in a parliament. In Israel, the word of Yahweh was believed to create and order reality. In Genesis, God calls things into being through

\textsuperscript{1027} Perdue 1991, 28-31. See Ch. 6.4.
\textsuperscript{1028} Perdue 1991, 32-38.
\textsuperscript{1029} Perdue 1991, 38-42.
words and orders them through names. God’s commandments order nature, the stars, weather and the chaotic sea. Wisdom is God’s power to order the world and human society, and to lead human beings to know God. Wise human speech creates just social institutions and ways for interpreting the world as a rational and beautiful whole. The point of the word metaphor is to claim that the language of creation reveals God, so God is present and the world is not chaotic and arbitrary.1030

Perdue examines the fourth mythic structure: the struggle against chaos. In the struggle myth, the creator god defeats primeval chaos, which is personified as a sea or a dragon. The structure of the myth is struggle against chaos → the victory of god → god crowned as king → creation via word or construction → judgment. The myth is known from Egypt, Babylonia, pre-Israel Canaan and Ancient Israel. The Babylonian religion believed that Marduk had defeated the chaos monster Tiamat, and was then declared king and given absolute power to rule by decree. In Israel, Yahweh was taken to be the victor over monstrous chaos, e.g. the Leviathan or Behemoth. God first defeats chaos, creates the world and maintains the world order that threatens to slip back into chaos. The day of the Lord meant a historical event, when God defeats His enemies and chaos in nature. For example, Psalm 74 sings of God defeating chaos at the beginning, and then defeating the Pharaoh at the Red Sea. Therefore God has been able to order day and night and enter into a covenant with Israel. The Psalmist then expects God to defeat enemies who had razed Jerusalem.1031

Perdue discusses three wisdom metaphors for the human condition: kingship, slavery and revolt. The Genesis creation story uses the term “image of God” to compare all human beings to kings. In both Egypt and ancient Israel, the term “image of God” referred first to kings who were taken to be the viceroy of gods, but was then democratized to include all human beings. The role of human beings as the image of God means that humans can build social relationships and rule their environment through wisdom. Human nature is then (potentially) good, and wise ways of acting are available to everyone. The human calling to be the vice-regent of God includes the creation of beauty and order like God, as well as procreation. On the other hand, authoritarianism and the plundering of nature lead the natural and social orders to chaos.1032

Perdue overviews Babylonian wisdom literature to chart the metaphor of human being as a slave. In Babylonian religion man simply had to obey divine law, which was not rooted in covenants or any other human-divine relationships. The legalist slavery to the divine will appears meaningless in the Dialogue of Pessimism, so the best way out was suicide. In the Bible, the books

1032 Perdue 1991, 61-66. One needs just look at the situation in the world today... (See Altemeyer 2006.)
of Job and Ecclesiastes express similar ideas about the human condition: it is pointless toil. Creation is then not seen as good, but meaningless and without value. God is a tyrant and a slave-holder, because He has put human beings in this position. This train of thought easily leads to a rebellion against the divine order, and Job ends up in rebelling against God.1033

Perdue also locates the myth of rebellion in Babylonian texts, but argues that biblical texts offer important variations. In the Babylonian texts, the lower gods rebel against the higher ones, so the gods must create humans to get labour. Then humans too rebel and are almost destroyed. A friendly deity however prevents the destruction of mankind. The structure of the myth is predestination into slavery → slavery → revolt → destruction and salvation. The biblical model of rebellion involves a megalomaniac king demanding the position of God for himself, and this leads to his destruction. The king of Tyre wants to be God and abuse the position and wisdom God has given him to amass money and power. In the end Tyre is destroyed and the king is killed. The mythic structure is hubris → revolt → destruction.1034

Perdue analyses the mythic structures in the Book of Job by showing that the book’s outer narrative of God, Leviathan and Job functions according to the logic of the battle metaphor, and the inner story of Job disputing with his friends and God on the logic of the slavery and rebellion metaphors. The result of the battle is then a newly defined world of faith. The metaphors for divine activity are detached from the theodicist view that if God is just, then all evils are result of a sin. They are then reinterpreted according to the battle metaphor of God defeating evil.1035

Perdue interprets the internal narrative of Job’s debate with his friends and God by using the metaphor of revolt against the gods. I read his interpretation through the discussion of sufficient reasons and theodicism in Ch. 2. God lets Satan test Job with a series of disasters (predestination into slavery). Job argues that he is innocent, so God does not have a sufficient reason to judge him. Because his suffering does not have a sin or other reason to justify it, human life is meaningless slavery, God is a warrior waging war on humans, and it would be better that Job had not been born and that chaos destroyed the world order that had been established by God’s word (Slavery). Then Job’s friends demand that Job appeals to God and claim that Job’s sins give God a sufficient reason to allow the disasters. They also warn that Job is starting a hubristic revolt.

1034 Perdue 1991, 70-72, Ez. 28.
against God. Job’s appeal to God is based on hubris: present your reasons for my suffering, let’s see who is right! Job thus challenges God and demands to be like Him (Hubris, revolt).1036

Perdue locates the narrative of Job’s debate with his friends and God within an external narrative that uses the four metaphors of divine activity. God invokes artistry, word and fertility in the debate with Job, after Job had subverted them and questioned the worldview of their usual application: reality as an aesthetic and harmonic whole and “the fear of the Lord” as recognizing this order and appropriating it with wise practices that bring beauty and order to human life. The Book of Job emphasizes the metaphor of battle: the world is not static but contains chaotic and pointless evil that threatens the created order. The existence of evil does not threaten or contradict divine power, as God fights against chaos. God and human beings then uphold order in the world by fighting for justice. The conclusion can be put in Jamesian terms. God is good, as He secures the triumph of good by defeating chaotic evil, and is omnipotent, as He can defeat chaotic evil. Evil is chaotic and pointless, because it threatens the created order and thus cannot lead to greater goods or cannot be a consequence of a sin according to a system of retribution.1037

The battle metaphor starts with God’s bet with Satan. Job then reacts by cursing the created order and demands to be like God (The world slides to chaos.) God answers Job by pointing out that the world is wisely built, fertile and ordered according to laws. The created order is based on God’s ability to defeat chaos and to limit it. Job cannot claim a divine role for himself, because he cannot order the natural world or establish justice in the human world (Struggle against chaos). Job admits that he has spoken nonsense and admits that God is the victor over chaotic evil and the Creator of a rational and beautiful order. (Destruction, Victory, God crowned as king). God then creates an alternative metaphoric world, where the creation of a good order and the defeat of chaos take place against a larger picture. Chaos is confined within the boundaries of a beautifully ordered creation, and chaotic evil is not a result of sin or other sufficient reasons. (Creation of a new metaphoric world). In the end, God declares Job to have been in the right. Job had demanded justice by criticizing God’s questionable actions at the beginning of the story, given up his challenge to God and admitted that the claim that all evils are due to sin or other reasons is false. In the end, God restores Job’s good life (Judgment, Salvation).1038

The Book of Job starts with a scene in the divine council. Perdue describes the scene by drawing parallels with Babylonian religion. Yahweh functions as a chairman of the council, and his commands recreate the world. The case of Job comes up on the agenda: he has been an exemplary servant/slave of Yahweh, as he respected Yahweh and avoided evil. Satan, the Chief of the Secret Police, then raises the question about Job’s loyalty: if something happens, Job will curse Yahweh outright. Yahweh allows Satan to produce a series of disasters hitting Job. The scene raises the questions of the book: Is God a paranoid dictator? Is God’s word an arbitrary decision? Is Satan the god of this world? Are human beings slaves to gods? Job then answers by rebelling against God in a way I claim to have parallels with the modern tradition of atheist theodicism. First Job claims that humans are slaves to God, as God has attacked him without sufficient reasons. Then he claims to be a king who has been unjustly treated by God and therefore can claim the position of God.

Perdue interprets Job’s speeches as a curse on creation. In Genesis, God creates in seven days. He orders the chaotic sea: first day and night, then light, and created birth and sexuality to keep up life. Job curses the order of day and night, his birth, sexual procreation and calls upon the chaotic monster Leviathan to eat up the world order. Job then sides with chaos against God and the world, as he curses the world order established by God’s word and wishes for life to end. By cursing creation and declaring it worthless, he is claiming that it cannot be understood as a word, a building, as fertile or the result of battles with chaos.

Job directly accuses God in his subsequent speeches, and Perdue argues that Job reinterprets the myths of battle, word, fertility and artistry in terms of human slavery. God is a warrior who has shot him with the arrows of His justice and crushed Him like the chaos monster: “Without cause or explanation the Divine Warrior has assaulted him with full fury, as if he were the chaos monster rivalling divine rule and threatening to destroy creation.” Job cannot appeal to God’s commandments because it is God who is fighting against him even though Job has not sinned and God has no sufficient reason to attack him. Job similarly argues that God is tyrannically abusing nature and history, just like He has condemned the innocent Job without sufficient reasons. God has defeated chaos and thus has absolute power, but He has created man and the world just to

---

1042 Perdue 1991, 123.
destroy them arbitrarily. He is the parent who kills his children. His actions in history destroys the empires built by kings, who rule stupidly due to God’s actions. God thus destroys nature, history and the social order. After God has fought Job, He has decreed human beings to be slaves, who live just for a fleeting moment and then die as a wage for their efforts. He has no hope of getting rights from his cruel master and cannot obtain a good life. Moreover, God does not answer him, after his life has collapsed into meaningless slavery. Job parodies Psalm 8: man has not been made a king but a slave. God does not forgive him, and watches over him like the Stasi and the NSA. Human life is then meaningless drudgery, and only death will set him free.1043

One can make some grammatical remarks about Job’s speeches and Perdue’s interpretations. Job reinterprets the battle myth through the theme of slavery: God’s struggle against man and the created order → God’s victory over man and creation → destruction of man and the created order → judgment of man into slavery and reality into meaninglessness. Job’s arguments are then a case of the grammatical confusion of crossing pictures. Metaphors like “God is a warrior” do not have a meaning outside the contexts and religious practices in which they are used. Job detaches the battle myth from the context of the creation of an ordered and beautiful reality, and reinterprets it in the context of slavery. Then the reinterpretation will not yield nonsense only, if the new practice does not go against the relational conditions of religious practices, like experience or values. Job moreover justifies this new interpretation by appealing to the theory of retribution: since God operates according to laws and an order within creation, all evils are a punishment for sin. This view is however a version of the theodicism discussed in Ch. 2.3: if God is just, then all evils occur for a sufficient reason. Otherwise God tyrannizes the world, and both the world and life are worthless. Thus it is theodicism that gives Job the reason to detach victory over chaos (or divine omnipotence) from the creation of a world with meaning and value. One can formulate Job’s charges against God in an argument in which the key premises are similar to Rowe’s version of the atheist argument and to the general argument of Ch. 2.31044:

1. If Job suffers and Job has not sinned, then there is suffering, which is not a punishment for sin and does not have any sufficient reasons.
2. Job suffers and he has not sinned.
3. → There is suffering, which is not a punishment for sin and does not have any sufficient reasons.

4. If there is suffering, which is not a punishment for a sin and does not have any sufficient reasons, then after his victory over chaos God has arbitrarily judged sufferers with his word, destroys the world He has built, kills His offspring and fights against sufferers and the world.

5. → After his victory over chaos God has arbitrarily judged Job with His word, destroys the world He has built, kills His offspring and fights against Job and the world.

6. If God has arbitrarily judged Job and fights against Job and the world, then God has judged Job to slavery and his life and the world are meaningless.

7. → God has judged Job to slavery and his life and the world are meaningless.

Perdue interprets Job’s speeches as moving towards revolt. The slavery myth proceeds predestination into slavery → slavery → revolt → destruction and salvation, and in the end a friendly deity saves humanity by appealing to the gods. Job investigates, whether he could find anyone to appeal against Yahweh’s decisions in the divine council. Is there a resurrection that would restore his dignity? After Job’s friends accuse him of hubris, Job decides to launch an all-out revolt against God according to the mythic structure hubris → revolt → destruction. Job describes, how earlier he was a prince acting justly and righteously – like God. He gave leaders wisdom, helped the orphans and destroyed the evil-doers. God has therefore destroyed him, so God is acting unjustly. Now Job is God’s slave, but God has instituted a natural law of justice, as injustice corrupts society and pollutes nature. Since the natural law is based on natural order, justice towards nature and slaves binds God as well. Job therefore challenges God: God has unjustly judged Job, but Job has ruled justly. Job then claims that he is a king like God and demands that God presses charges against him so that one could see, who is ruling justly. Job’s argument can be presented as a secular humanist variant of the atheist argument: since there is evil, human action must replace God:

1. If there is a moral law in nature, then God violates it if and only if there is evil that is not a punishment for a sin and does not have other sufficient reasons.

2. There is a moral law in nature.

3. → God violates the moral law if and only if there is evil that is not a punishment to a sin and does not have other sufficient reasons.

4. If Job is a king who has ruled like God and something evil happens to him, then there is evil that is not a punishment to a sin and does not have other sufficient reasons.

1045 Perdue 1991, 182-195,
1046 See Snellman 2019 for secularist critiques of theodicies and protest atheism. Neiman 2015, 103-113 for Marxist antitheodicy. The title Wisdom in Revolt is a reference to the Communist song Internationale: “reason in revolt.”
5. Job is a king who has ruled like God and something evil has happened to him.
6. → There is evil that is not a punishment to a sin and does not have other sufficient reasons.
7. → God violates the moral law.
8. If God violates the moral law, Job should challenge God’s right to rule and try to replace God.
9. → Job should challenge God’s right to rule and try to replace God.

Job’s challenge to God then takes a form resembling the atheistic theodicism and moralistic anti-theodicies that were discussed in Chs. 2.3 and 3.1.1. The main premise behind Job’s revolt is that if God is just, then all evils are due to sin or have other sufficient reasons. Otherwise, God has used his omnipotent power to defeat chaos to defeat and destroy Job and the world. The myth of a struggle against chaos is then detached from the context of the establishment of an ordered world. It is then crossed with the picture of humanity as a slave, who has been condemned to a meaningless life. Man must then not attempt to explain evil, but must take God’s place. Theodicism forms the premise of Job’s friends too, as we shall see.

6.3.2.3 The speeches of Job’s “friends” and theistic theodicism

The speeches of Job’s “friends” offer an approach to the problem of evil that resemble various theistic approaches to the problem of evil, including the theistic thodicism that was discussed in Ch. 2.3. Eliphaz argues that evil always has a sufficient reason in previous sins. Bildad presents an argument that resembles divine command theories: both God’s right to command and Job’s duty to obey are based on God’s absolute and despotic power.

Eliphaz’s speeches can be read as a traditional theodicy. Perdue points out that Eliphaz’s arguments are versions of wisdom theology’s law of cause and effect, which resembles the Deuteronomistic theory of retribution: the righteous succeed, while the godless fail. Then a person suffers if and only if he sins. It is easy to see that this is a version of theodicism: if a person is suffering, then he has sinned and the suffering has a sufficient reason. The doctrine of retribution is then a religious version of the principle of reason. Perdue argues that Eliphaz attempts to justify the doctrine by appeals to nature, human nature and patterns of divine action. However, Eliphaz ends up in a dogmatism that detaches religious language use from experience and tradition.1047

Perdue argues that Eliphaz is using battle as his basic metaphor, when he calls upon Job to remember, whenever has a righteous person perished. The talk about remembrance refers to the structure of the Psalms, where God’s acts of salvation are referred to and brought to mind, and then God is called upon to bring justice. Eliphaz however interprets remembrance of God’s acts of salvation through the doctrine of retribution: “Think now, who that was innocent ever perished? Or where were the upright cut off?” He also reads God’s justice towards the created order similarly: God is an avenger who breaks the teeth of lions. Creation theology contradicts such crass theodicism: God is the Creator of animals as well. Eliphaz has thus reinterpreted the battle myth: battle → victory → kingship → God institutes laws that all evil is a punishment → evil is a judgment against evil humans and animals. Eliphaz’ position can be presented as an argument:

1. If God is a warrior who has defeated chaos, then He can build the world and order it with his word.
2. If God can build the world and order it with his word, then evil occurs if and only if the victim has sinned or is otherwise evil.
3. → Evil occurs if and only if the victim has sinned or is otherwise evil.

Premise 2 is the principle of theodicism itself expressed in terms of biblical creation theology: if God creates the world, then all evils have sufficient reasons. Perdue shows that it is based on a serious abuse of theological language. The principle involves cherry-picking experiences, as only the cases where the righteous prosper and sinners fail are taken into account. Moreover, the concept of nature is anthropocentric: God is expected to destroy animals according to human views of reward and punishment instead of caring for them as the Creator.

Perdue’s criticism can be recast as a relational conditions argument for theological language, resembling the arguments in Ch. 3.2, 4.2.4 and 6.2. When theodiscists interpret metaphors for creation through the principles of retribution, they are using the Principle of Reason to cherry-pick theological experience and thus fix the interpretation with a super-principle that is not itself based on experience. Then the interpretation of religious metaphors is not based on experiences in religious practices, but logically prior a priori principles start to exclude both available experiences and potential ways of interpreting religious traditions. The principle is then detached from religious traditions and from empirical practices for theological interpretation, which form the basic

---

intuitions for divine-human encounters. Moreover, the picture of God as a warrior presupposes the values of fighting against evil, repairing suffering and divine compassion for sufferers, whereas theodicism attempts to justify evil. The metaphor then goes against the values that guide the practices where it is applied.\textsuperscript{1050}

Eliphaz is further mired in anthropological conceptual confusions. He argues that human nature is inherently evil. Thus everybody, including Job, have sinned. Perdue argues that the view of universal sinfulness commits Eliphaz to the slave metaphor: God watches over His servants and is not happy with their work. In his later speeches, Eliphaz doubles down on the claim that Job has sinned and charges Job with revolt and hubris. Job is rebelling against God, because he challenges divine justice and the created order with his speeches. Perdue refers to the theme of Primeval Man: Job is not the Primeval Man and he has not attended God’s council. Job’s speeches fit the model hubris → revolt → destruction, because questioning God oversteps the bounds of Job’s knowledge. Perdue’s interpretation of Eliphaz’ speeches comes close to sceptical theism, which claims that the question whether God has sufficient reasons to allow evil goes beyond the scope of human reason\textsuperscript{1051}:

1. If man has not been in the divine council, then he does not have God’s wisdom.
2. If man does not have God’s wisdom, then he cannot say whether God’s punishments have sufficient reasons due to the limits of human knowledge.
3. → Man cannot say whether God’s punishments have sufficient reasons due to the limits of human knowledge.
4. If man cannot say whether God’s punishments have sufficient reasons due to the limits of human knowledge and he criticizes God, he is hubristically demanding a divine status.
5. Job is hubristically demanding a divine status (and God’s punishment has a sufficient reason).

Bildad offers a position that resembles divine command theories. Divine command theories hold that moral norms are dependent on God’s decision, which are not anchored in prior moral reasons due to divine omnipotence.\textsuperscript{1052} Perdue argues that Bildad reinterprets the battle myth through the idea of divine despotism: God has ordered the chaotic sea and defeated the chaos monster Rahab, so “Dominion and fear are with God; he makes peace in his high heaven.”\textsuperscript{1053} Job is wrong to rebel

\textsuperscript{1051} Perdue 1991, 110-120, 163-196, Job 4-5, 15. For sceptical theism, see Dougherty 2014.
\textsuperscript{1052} See Murphy 2012.
against God, because God’s power is absolute. Man is just a “maggot”, so human nature is corrupt
and under divine judgment due to its low status. Bildad’s argument can be presented thus:

1. If God is a warrior who has defeated chaos, then His power is absolute and He rules through terror,
   irrespectively of creatures or the world order.
2. If God’s power is absolute and He rules through terror, then He is above good and evil, and Job’s
duty to obey is based on God’s absolute power.
3. If God is above good and evil, and Job’s duty to obey is based on God’s absolute power, then Job’s
questions about justice are unfounded rebelliousness.
4. God is a warrior who has defeated chaos.
5. → Job’s questions about justice are unfounded rebelliousness.

Both Job and Bildad then interpret the battle myth through the theme of slavery and divine
despotism. Job argues that the existence of pointless evil means that God has decreed humans to be
His slaves, and Bildad founds the divine-human relationship on absolute divine power. These
solutions abuse religious language in various ways. First, they involve a crossing of pictures, where
concepts are taken from relationships giving them meaning and transplant them into new contexts
where the relational conditions for their meaningfulness do not hold. The myth of a struggle against
chaos presupposes that the process ends up in the creation of an ordered, beautiful and wise world.
The reinterpretation detaches divine action from wisdom and world order, so that in the
reinterpretations the chaotic sea and its monsters has simply been replaced by Yahweh as the ruling
chaos monster and the talk about victory over chaos does not make sense. Moreover, the terms
referring to God will lose their ordinary meanings, as they are located in religious practices of
trusting God and such practices will lose their point if God is despotic. Similarly, religious
language-games are governed by the norms of compassion and justice, so developing a view of God
as a tyrant also goes against their relational conditions. One can furthermore make a Phillipsian
point about omnipotence. Interpreting God’s victory as just establishing absolute power makes it
impossible to identify God’s actions. If the storyline does not determine, how God acts and what
kinds of orders He will establish, then His actions cannot be identified. Identifying the defeat of
chaos and omnipotence in terms of unlimited power and capriciousness thus detaches the battle
myth from practical consequences for divine action. This problem is just an example of the problem
of logical omnipotence: if God is defined as absolute power, then the divine essence is not given by religious practices and stories for God’s activities, and the terms become meaningless.  

6.3.2.4 The speech of God and a new grammar for “God”

Eventually God answers Job by appearing to him in a whirlwind. The encounter between Job and God falsifies the doctrine of retribution, which was seen to be the biblical analogue to theodicism. Perdue argues that the divine speech opens a new world of metaphors for the development of an anti-theodicist religious grammar. The theo- and anthropological metaphors form the core of the argument.  

God answers Job in his first speech by challenging his demands to be like God: “Who the hell is playing against the strategies of the Divine Chessmaster by speaking metaphysical nonsense? Play your move, if you gonna play the game, boy, then you’ve gotta learn to play it right!” Job had cursed the created order and driven it into chaos with his speeches. He had also challenged God and demanded that he take God’s place. Now God has to defeat Job’s challenge. Perdue argues that God’s answer focuses on the metaphors of divine activity: fertility, artistry, word and battle. God asks Job, whether he has the wisdom to build the structure of the world that God had established. God had similarly nursed the chaotic sea, but His word sets limits to it and prevents it from threatening the world. God’s word orders light and darkness, which serve justice by exposing evil deeds. God has made natural laws for heavenly bodies and built canals for rain. He also rules over animals that man cannot tame: He feeds the ferocious lions and ravens, supports the birth of goats and deer that are hiding from man, He gives freedom to stubborn donkeys and oxen, makes horses and ostriches too unpredictable to tame and gives wisdom to falcons and eagles. Thus it is God who is the Lord of creatures. Perdue argues that the metaphors for creation and divine activity are upheld, but are detached from anthropocentrism and the doctrine of retribution.  

God’s second speech continues with the contrast between divine rule and Job’s claims, as well as the contrast between the struggle against chaos and an order of sufficient reasons. Perdue argues that God directly challenges Job: “If I’m a despotic judge, why don’t you do better?  

---

Start with the racism, authoritarianism and corruption of the mighty and then overturn the trend to a heat death of the universe by the way! Job had challenged God by appealing to the doctrine of retribution and the principle of reason: Job is right if and only if sin does not offer a reason for Job’s sufferings if and only if God is wrong. God on the other hand refers to the myth of battle by singing about Leviathan, the monster personifying primal chaos that God had created and only He can defeat. God had also said in His first speech that He had nursed and established bounds for the primeval sea. The motifs of God as a nurse of the sea and the creator of Leviathan point out that there are chaotic forces and pointless evil, whose actions God limits and thus keeps the world in order.

Battle then forms a main metaphor for divine activity in the Book of Job: God’s struggle against chaos orders the world and is necessary for upholding justice. Perdue points out that “justice is not a static principle inherent in the structure of creation, but a dynamic force that must be continuously established and aggressively maintained by means of victory over evil.” The myth of the struggle against chaos then allows for a Jamesian definition of both divine goodness and power in terms of God’s redemptive sovereignty in defeating chaos. God is omnipotent, because He is a warrior who can defeat chaos. God is good, because He fights evil and secures the triumph of good by building a fertile and beautiful world according to His word. There is however chaotic evil left in the world, which must be fought by God and humans. Then the activities and power of God are interpreted much like in James’ chessmaster metaphor: the created order, human beings and various chaotic tendencies are independent actors, and God can secure the good by having a strategy to defeat evil through the strategic interactions of the storyline struggle → the victory of god → god crowned as king → creation via word or construction → judgment. Moreover, the opposition of God and evil (e.g. Leviathan) in such storylines is narrative and strategic, not conceptual, because God contends with chaotic evil that has no sufficient reasons.

Perdue argues that God calls Job to a new world of metaphors, where divine justice is no longer dependent on the doctrine of retribution. He offers a picture or metaphorical model where divine goodness or the creation of an ordered world, divine omnipotence or the power to defeat evil and the existence of chaotic evil all hold. To put this in the language of consistency proofs, God offers a model M such that all the sentences in the sets {Evil exists, God is good, God

1058 Job 40: 6-14. The phrase “racism, authoritarianism and corruption” comes from an anti-Trump pamphlet (www.indivisible.org)
1061 James 1979, Paulsen 1999, cf. Mackie 1955, Ch. 2.3.2.1.
is omnipotent} and \{Evil exists, The world is valuable and meaningful\} are true in M and the sets are thus consistent. In the end, Job puts his hand over his mouth, and one could say that his paradigm for interpreting divine activity collapses. He pleads guilty to God’s charges. He had cursed God’s wise creation, thus denying divine goodness. He had challenged God’s rule, thus denying divine omnipotence. After the second divine speech Job admits that God is good and omnipotent, and that he had spoken metaphysical nonsense: “I know that you can do all things, and that no purpose of yours can be thwarted. ‘Who is this that hides counsel without knowledge?’ Therefore I have uttered what I did not understand.” Job then admits that God’s creation is wonderful, so there is a beautiful and rational order underlying them. He no longer demands that all evils are punishments for sins or have other sufficient reasons. One could say that he forms a new paradigm or language-game for overcoming the pitfalls of theodicism.

Perdue then interprets the ending by pointing to the theme of God’s judgment. God had defeated Job’s attempt to claim divine status like He had defeated the attempt to build the Tower of Babel. God must now liberate Job and restore his happiness, so that the new world of metaphors of the battle against chaos and the establishment of just orders will be realized in Job’s case too. After winning the battle with Job, God establishes a just order by judging that Job had spoken rightly of him. Job had adapted religious language to his own human condition and asked for justice. He also admitted that the principle of retribution is metaphysical nonsense. In the end, God shows himself to be just by restoring Job’s happiness, thus acting in accordance with the battle metaphor.

6.4: A consistency proof

The Book of Job then offers a grammar for terms like “the kingdom of God” and “God defeats evil”, which underlie stories like the Exodus story of God defeating the Pharaoh and the Gospel story of Jesus’ death. The discussion on the grammar of “goodness”, “omnipotence” and “evil” in the Book of Job and the Gospels can be condensed into five grammatical remarks, or rules of interpretation:

---

1. “God is good” means that God is committed to the world, healing it and repairing suffering so that the world reaches its telos.
2. “God is omnipotent” means that God can achieve His plans and defeat evil.
3. There is chaotic evil in the world: evil events do not have morally sufficient reasons, as they proceed from the actions of chaotic forces that are opposed to God’s plans and the world order.
4. The opposition of God and evil is narrative and strategic, and not conceptual. “God exists” and “evil exists” are not contradictories, as God and evil are opposite characters in a story, which can be presented as a zero-sum game.
5. The stories give Jamesian and Hamannian antitheodicies. God is said to be good and omnipotent, because He can defeat chaotic evil. God is also present and acts amidst states of affairs with no morally sufficient reasons.

Time for some game theory! James’ chess-master analogy can be formalized by treating the biblical dialogues between God, human beings and the world as games. We can e.g. take the storyline of the Book of Job as a basis for a game model $G$ like the one formalizing Hamann’s creation myth:

1. The players of the Justice-of-God game $G$ are God, Job and Leviathan.
2. God wins if and only if Job wins if and only if Job reaches the telos of a happy life and there is no undefeated evil left in the world. Leviathan wins if and only if God and Job lose.
3. God plays first. He can either (question Job) or ($\neg$question Job). If God does not question Job in the council, Leviathan is left undefeated and God and Job lose.
4. If the situation is (question Job), Leviathan moves. He can play either (disaster) or ($\neg$disaster). If L plays ($\neg$disaster), then God and Job win as Job lives well and L does not challenge God. If Leviathan plays (disaster), Job is hit by disasters and the evil (disaster) is put into play.
5. If the situation is (question Job, disaster), then Job moves. He can either play (question God) or ($\neg$question God). If Job plays ($\neg$question God), he loses as he does not seek justice for the evil (disaster). If Job plays (question), he curses creation and attempts to be like God, putting the evil (challenge) into play.
6. If the situation is (question Job, disaster, question God), then God moves. He can either play (Answer to Job) or ($\neg$answer to Job), i.e. answer Job and defeat Job’s challenge, or leave Job suffering, Job’s challenge unanswered and the creation to collapse. If God plays ($\neg$answer to Job), God and Job lose, as the evils (disaster) and (challenge) leave Job suffering and the creation into meaninglessness and collapse.
7. If the situation is (question Job, disaster, question God, Answer), Job moves. He can either play (Recognize God without PSR), or ($\neg$Recognize God without PSR), i.e. recognize that God can

---

reach His goals of repairing suffering and the claim that God must be rejected for evil without reasons is false. If Job plays (¬Recognize God without PSR), Job and God lose. If Job plays (recognize God), the evil (challenge) is taken out of play.

8. If the situation is (question Job, disaster, question God, Answer, Recognize God), God moves. He can play either (vindicate Job) or (¬vindicate Job). If God plays (¬vindicate Job), God and Job lose as Job is left suffering. If God plays (vindicate Job), the evil (disaster) is defeated and God and Job win as Leviathan is defeated, there are no undefeated challenges and Job lives a happy life.

We can now give game-theoretical analogues for the grammatical principles concerning “goodness” and “omnipotence” for the justice-of-God game G. Note that goodness holds by definition:

1. “God is good” is true at game history w if and only if God wins G if and only if Job wins G if and only if Job reaches the telos of a good life and evil is defeated.
2. “God is omnipotent” is true at game history w if and only if God has a winning strategy in the justice-of-God game G.

One can make a few clarifying remarks about the structure of the game. The form of the game is relatively simple: it’s an ordinary extended-form perfect information game. The goal is here not to go deeply into technical details, but to construct an übersichtlich representation for the theological grammar of biblical stories and to highlight the uses of terms like “good” and “omnipotent” in them. The game or model can then be used as a simplified fragment that can be projected onto, contrasted with and used to interpret biblical stories. The point of this clarification is to highlight the grammar of the divine properties “good” and “omnipotent” within the logic of the struggle myth, and to get the consistency of {God is good, God is omnipotent, There is chaotic evil} as in the Book of Job. The argument needs two assumptions. First, the games between God, humans and creation are genuine dialogues. The players answer each other and thus have to take turns in making moves and participating in them. Then the game of Job and the struggle against chaos is in extended form to represent the sequence of the debate, and its resolution gives the drama of the fight against chaos. Second, the properties of God like “omnipotent” and “good” are defined against the background of Job’s encounter with God and the struggle against chaos. This redefinition builds on both James’ reinterpretation of the properties of God in terms of religious practices, and also of Job’s new world of faith in the encounter. Job’s encounter with God and the struggle against chaos
are modelled in the game, so such properties of God as “good” and “omnipotent” are then internal to the game.1066

We can now pose the question of chaotic evil in the game, and investigate how it relates to the Neimanian definition of evil in Ch. 2.2: evil is something that cannot be fit into our schemes of pursuing the good or making sense of it.1067 Neiman’s definition has two readings:

1. Chaotic evil: an evil s has no sufficient reason in the context G, because s either defeats the good if left unchecked, or it arises from a tendency S that is strategically opposed to the good in G.
2. Breakdown of all contexts: s renders a practice P for pursuing the good and viewing the world pointless, and there is no history H in G s.t. the good is achieved.

There are significant differences between the two meanings. The first definition is sufficient to capture the concept of pointless evil: an evil without a sufficient reason. For a refutation of theodicism, it is sufficient to show that either meaning or God exists, and there is pointless evil without sufficient reasons. The first meaning must be contrasted with the second, which captures the Levinasian concept of absolute meaninglessness: s cannot be given an interpretation at all, since there is no larger context of meaning for embedding s. These two meanings correspond to the different understandings of “anti-theodicy” in Ch. 3.1.1068 Although the first meaning is weaker than the second, a consistency proof with chaotic evil does not amount to a PSR-based theodicy. If one distinguishes between sufficient reasons and systemic contexts as in Ch. 5., one cannot infer meaningless systems from pointless evils or evils with reasons from meaningful systems.1069

The justice-of-God game G includes a sense of tragic and pointless evil: Leviathan’s evil (disaster) arises out of a strategy that aims at defeating God’s plan of justice and Job’s happiness. Job’s evil (challenge) is tragic, as his quest for justice ends up challenging creation as a whole. Both Leviathan’s and Job’s evils then are opposed to the good, and capture the first

1066 I highlight the role of the model as a übersichtlich representation (see Ch. 3.2.) and clarify its assumptions to answer Pietarinen’s criticisms. The game codifies the points about biblical grammar and the book of Job in Chs. 6.2 and 6.3. Other anti-theodicists note the challenge to traditional omnipotence in the Book of Job: see Levenson 1988. 1067 Neiman 2015, 8, Ch. 2.2, 3.1.1. For Levinasian views on evil, see Pihlström & Kivistö 2016. 1068 For the book of Job, see Ch 6.3.2, Perdue 1991. For Levinasian antitheodicy, see Pihlström & Kivistö 2016. 1069 I use the distinction to try to answer Pihlström’s and Panu-Matti Pöykkö’s doubts that biblical-style antitheodicy could end up collapsing to theodicies, as a framework of meaning is retained. See also Pihlström & Kivistö 2016.
meaning. Wright’s definition of evil as an anti-good, anti-God and anti-creation force also captures the first meaning.\footnote{See Wright 2006.} The existence of pointless evil, or evil without reason, can be defined:

“There is pointless evil” is true at game history \( w \) if and only if there is an evil \( s \) is at play in \( w \), and either 1. if \( s \) is in play at the end of the game, God and Job lose, or 2. there is an agent \( A \) s.t. \( s \) arises out of \( A \)'s strategy and \( A \) wins iff God and Job lose.

The existence of evil without reasons in the game can also be contrasted with the biblically informed and sophisticated theodicies of Plantinga and van Inwagen. These theodicies take the biblical ideas of God’s plan of salvation and God’s victory over evil, but then use PSR-based theodicism as a metatheory for the Christian worldview. In effect, they follow the religious theodicist approach described by René van Woudenberg: biblical stories act as constraint on acceptable theodicies, but God is taken to allow evils only, if they aim at a greater good. van Inwagen gives an extended free will, soul-making and regularity defence. The fine-tuning of natural laws suggests that the laws of life-sustaining worlds are very tightly constrained. Then any laws that allow for the evolution of life will necessarily allow for animal suffering. Moral and natural evils hitting humans could be the result of the abuse of free will: Adam and Eve have sinned, and evil is “God’s megaphone” to pressure human beings into accepting His salvation. Even horrendous evils cannot be evidence against the existence of God, because if God can allow \( n \) horrendous evils, He can allow for \( n+1 \) horrendous evils, because He can get His plan through in spite of them. Plantinga argues that God first decided to be the victor over evil and then allowed humans to sin in order to carry through with the plan. A world of happy creatures is a great good for the world \( w \), but the existence of God in \( w \) is incomparably greater. Similarly, the Incarnation is an even immeasurably greater good for \( w \). Then the Incarnation and the Gospel stories discussed in Ch. 6.3.1 are God’s sufficient reason for creating a fallen world: the world contains evil so that it could be redeemed.\footnote{van Woudenberg 2013, van Inwagen 2007, Plantinga 2004.}

These examples illustrate, how deeply the ideal of sufficient reasons has become a pair of glasses (or a coloured glass?) for seeing the theological issues involving God and evil. The same issue also arises in the context of debates over atonement. When Gustaf Aulén tried to switch the debate from sufficient legal reasons for penal substitution into the narrative and dramatic structure of the victory of God discussed in Ch. 6.3.1, he encountered a familiar response: “It
offered no rational justification for the manner in which the forces of evil are defeated in the cross of Christ. Why the cross? Why not some other manner? The use of PSR-based theodicism as a metatheory for Christianity encounters similar objections as theodicism in the Book of Job. First, using the PSR as a metatheory makes it a super-principle that controls the narrative logics of biblical stories, rather than using the Biblical stories to identify God and to give the grammar for the words “God”, “good” and “omnipotent”. This leads to confusions, as sufficient reasons for divine action must be independently determined on this model. Second, the use of God’s plans and the victory of God as a justification involves a crossing of pictures: if the evils can be justified, then God does not have to defeat them in the first place. One has then to distinguish between narrative and strategic grammatical descriptions of the stories about the victory of God, and with metatheories that appeal to sufficient reasons. The consistency proof builds on logical description of the narrative opposition, but falsifies attempts to use the PSR as a super-principle. Now we can prove God’s goodness and omnipotence in the justice-of-God game G:

Proposition: “God is good” and “God is omnipotent” are true in all histories of G.

Proof: “God is good”: By definition, God wins iff Leviathan loses, no evils are left and Job is happy.

“God is omnipotent”: Let $S_{god} = \{0 \rightarrow \text{Question Job), (Question Job, disaster, question God), }$
\{challenge, disaster\}$\rightarrow \text{answer to Job), (Question Job, disaster, question God, answer to Job, recognize God), \{disaster\}} \rightarrow \text{ (vindicate Job)}\}$. Now it is sufficient to show that $S_{god}$ is a winning strategy for G. We can prove it with backwards induction.

In (Question Job, disaster, question God, answer to Job, recognize God, \{disaster\}), (vindicate Job) wins outright by restoring Job’s happiness and removing \{disaster\}.

In (Question Job, disaster, question God), (answer Job) wins the game. (answer Job) wins the subgame from (Question God) iff, Job wins the subgame from (Answer Job) by playing (recognize God) iff God wins from (recognize God) by playing (vindicate Job). Since God wins by playing (vindicate Job), He wins with (answer Job) too.

In the beginning 0, (Question Job) wins the game. Since Leviathan loses if he does not cause a disaster, (Question Job) wins the game iff God or Job can win the subgame from (Question Job, disaster). Now Job will win in (Question Job, disaster) iff God can win from (question Job, disaster, question God). However God wins from (Question Job, disaster, question God). Thus $S_{god}$ is a winning strategy.

Thus “God is good” and “God is omnipotent” are true at all histories w of the game G. □

1072 McGrath 1994, 348, 345-349, Pi 103, LW 36, 337.
We have now proven that the claims “God is good” and “God is omnipotent” are true in all of the situations w of God’s and Job’s encounter in the justice-of-God game G. They thus are theologically necessary in all the relationships of God, man and the world that are analogous to the game. Moreover, they capture the essence of God in the stories, as they function as grammatical descriptions of the interactions and plots of the story. Now we can build the consistency proof: \[1074\]

Proposition: There is a possible world w of the relational system G s.t. \( G,w \models \text{“God is good”}, G,w \models \text{“God is omnipotent”}, G,w \models \text{“There is pointless evil”}. \]

Proof: Let \( w = ((\text{Question Job, disaster}), \{\text{disaster}\}) \). Then the evil s = (Disaster) proceeds from Leviathan’s strategy \( L = \{(\text{question Job}) \rightarrow (\text{disaster})\} \), and L wins if and only if Job and God lose and Job is ruined. Thus “There is pointless evil” is true in \( w = (\text{Question Job, disaster}) \). By the previous proposition, “God is good” and “God is omnipotent” are true in \( w = (\text{Question Job, disaster}) \) as well.

Corollary: The set \{“God is good”, “God is omnipotent”, “There is pointless evil”\} is consistent.

Proof: \( G,w \models \text{“God is good”}, G,w \models \text{“God is omnipotent”}, G,w \models \text{“There is pointless evil”}. \]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1074}} \text{If a set of sentences has a model, then it is consistent. For model theory, see Hodges 1997.} \]
7. Conclusions

“Oh for a muse like a refiner’s fire, and like a fuller’s soap! – She will dare to purify the natural use of the senses from the unnatural use of abstractions, by which our concepts of things are as maimed as the name of the Creator is suppressed and blasphemed.” – J. G. Hamann

“The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of our language.” – Ludwig Wittgenstein

The problem of evil has been shown to be a deep problem in Wittgenstein’s sense. The existence of evil faces us with a practical problem: how to find meaning, act in and respond to a world that has evil? Can we trust the world or our responses to it? The question then becomes a search for sufficient reasons, if meaning is sought in a just order in the world of Forms or in the world. The general problem concerns both the roots of understanding in language, and also the practical problem of how to come to terms with the world when evil hits us. The existential meaning of the theistic problem of evil can similarly be posed as a question of the trustworthiness of God: how can one trust God, if there is so much evil in the world? Might there be an order of purposes and reasons underlying everything? N.T. Wright alternatively poses the question of theodicy as the problem of God’s faithfulness: how can God act so that justice is eventually done? Again, the question is the same: “What can I rely on?” The problem of evil then builds on the practical problems of the human condition, and spins a network of metaphysical problems and antinomies by a misunderstanding how worldviews offer practical perspectives for coping with the world. The confusions arise out of appeals to sufficient reasons for intelligibility and for moral justification. An alternative to this approach is to study the quest for meaning in our everyday, religious, scientific, artistic and other practices, and the study of meaning of the world and of different worldviews’ approaches to it is at the bottom humanistic. Both the existential answers to evil and the critique of theodicy are then humanistic projects at heart.

The first question concerns the general logic of the problem of evil. The problems of evil in philosophy and their logical and evidential versions can be defined and mapped:

1075 OC 508.
The problem of evil can be solved or dissolved with consistency proofs, defences and theodicies. All theodicies are defences and all defences are consistency proofs. The difference between a theodicy and a defence is that a theodicy points out actual reasons, a defence points out possible reasons and a consistency proof does not necessarily depend on theodicism. Theodicism can be defined as the claim that God or meaning exist only, if all evils are justified by sufficient reasons. Anti-theodicy can then be defined to mean the rejection of theodicism. There is an alternative definition that defines anti-theodicy as a rejection of theodicies and consistency proofs. I take the first approach as a matter of definition, but I also argue that rejections of theodicies and consistency proofs do not amount to a critique of the framework of the problem of evil unless they build on a logically prior critique of theodicism. Theodicies, defences and consistency proofs can similarly be mapped with a diagram:

- **General problem**
  - General logical problem: \( \neg \phi (\text{World is meaningful } \land \text{Evil}) \)
  - General evidential problem: \( P(\text{World is meaningful}|\text{Evil}) \) is small

- **Theistic problem**
  - Theistic logical problem: \( \neg \phi (\text{God exists } \land \text{Evil}) \)
  - Theistic evidential problem: \( P(\text{God exists}|\text{Evil}) \) is small

---

### Theodicy

- **Theodism**: God → PSR, Meaning → PSR
  - **Theodicy**:
    - \( T \vdash (\text{World is meaningful } \land \text{PSR} \land \text{Evil}) \)
    - \( T \vdash (\text{God exists } \land \text{PSR} \land \text{Evil}) \)

- **Defence**:
  - \( T \vdash \phi (\text{World is meaningful } \land \text{PSR} \land \text{Evil}) \)
  - \( T \vdash \phi (\text{God exists } \land \text{PSR} \land \text{Evil}) \)

### Antitheodicy

- **Antitheodicy**:
  - \( T \vdash \phi (\text{World is meaningful } \land \neg \text{PSR}) \)
  - \( T \vdash \phi (\text{God exists } \land \neg \text{PSR}) \)

### Consistency proof:

- \( T \vdash \phi (\text{World is meaningful } \land \text{Evil}), \text{ or } T \vdash \phi (\text{God exists } \land \text{Evil}) \)
The problem of evil can be traced back to Plato in the history of Western philosophy. In Plato, it arises when he attempts to purify the use of the word “God” from popular myths and to define it in terms of just reasons that appeal to the perfection of the Forms. The problem also arises in the Book of Job, when Job and his friends take God’s justice to be a static system of reasons that assign happiness and disasters in proportion to living justly and sinning. The problem of evil became acute in modern philosophy, when new conceptions of facts, rational methods, the mechanistic worldview and the subject’s position outside the world led to the question, how to unify the apparently chaotic and evil facts of the world into a cohesive order that holds together the physical, moral, social, political, cosmic and religious worlds. The problem of evil works on four central assumptions:

1. **The appearances/reality dualism.** Sensuous impressions point towards a chaotic and evil world, but reality could be ordered and good. This entails that appearances are distinct from their objects.
2. **The fact/value dualism.** Facts are what is the case. Values are, what should be the case. Facts and values are conceptually separate, because “It ought to be the case that p” does not entail “p”.
3. **The fact/meaning dualism.** Facts are singular and atomic states of affairs. Rational meaning consists in connections between facts. Facts and meaning are therefore conceptually separate.
4. **The principle of sufficient reason.** The PSR is usually stated as “Everything that exists has a sufficient reason.” The principle can however be rephrased: Being=Reason, or Real=Rational.

These assumptions together yield the logic of the general problem of evil: intelligibility and moral actions are possible only, if there is an Arche that unifies facts, values and meanings into an overarching world order that assigns sufficient reasons to the facts. However, appearances of chaotic evil are an anomaly to such a unification and call the existence of a good and rational world order into question:

1. **Moral action is possible only, if it links us with moral sources M in the world.**
2. **Understanding is possible only, if paradigms link us with the rational order of reality O.**
3. **Practices that are guided by the moral sources M and that connect us with an order O are parts of human rational action in the world.**
4. **There is a general source S that unifies our rational practices by functioning as an Arche for the order O and the foundation of moral sources M that are used in our practices in situations w.**
5. **If S is an Arche for O, then O is a system of sufficient reasons for the facts of the world and S constitutes O.**
6. If S is a ground for moral sources M of practices in w, then w is not so distant from the moral source M that M can assign norms and meaning for w.

7. If there is a source S constituting an order O of reasons for w, S unifies facts and meanings at w.

8. If there is a source S constituting moral sources M that are not distant from w, S unifies facts and values at w.

9. If there is chaotic evil (i.e. evil with no sufficient reason) in w, then there is no order O and moral sources M such that O is a system of sufficient reasons and M is close to w.

10. → If there is chaotic evil, there is no general source S that unifies our rational practices by functioning as an Arche for the order O and the foundation of moral sources M that are used in our practices in situations w.

11. → If there is chaotic evil in w, then moral action and understanding are not possible.

The debate about evil and the existence of God in the philosophy of religion is a special case of the general logic of the problem of evil laid out above. Simply let M=S=God and O=the world order. Leibniz made this unification in his texts on the origin and sufficient reasons of the world order: God is taken to be the guarantor of the sufficient reasons of the world order. There is evil because He chooses from a limited choice of essences, and all of His choices aim for the best. The late 20th century and early 21st century debate that builds on the classic articles of J.L. Mackie, Alvin Plantinga and William Rowe has inherited this approach. Mackie poses the logical special problem of evil, but in the end he has to make room for free agency, the ordained power of God, and God allowing for evils for a reason. Plantinga argues that God has a reason to allow free choices and cannot then help if someone sins, and He acts by choosing from a pre-existing set of essences that determine free personal actions. Rowe argues that all of God’s choices must have sufficient reasons either by allowing greater goods or blocking greater evils. The assumptions of the debate work within the logic of the general problem, because they are neo-Leibnizian:

1. If the possible world w is created by God and an evil s occurs, then it either permits a greater good G or prevents a worse evil s’. Thus every object and state of affairs at w has a sufficient reason.

2. God’s power means the ability to choose essences P₁,…,Pₙ and a maximum set T of contingent state of affairs that are not determined by the choices of free beings. These choices are logically determined by the set of possible states of affairs and the set of possible essences P.

3. The possible combinations of states of affairs T and essences P₁,…,Pₙ are the sufficient reason for God’s choice. The worlds w created by actualizing states of affairs and essences have a balance of good G and evil s. God actualizes the world with the best balance of good G and evil s.
4. God is the sufficient reason for the actuality of the world. God is a necessary being who can choose to actualize a set of states of affairs $T$ and essences $P_1, \ldots, P_n$. God’s choice $T$ and the free actions of creatures determined by essences $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ jointly make up the world.

5. God’s decision to create can be presented as an $n+1$-player game. The players are God and persons $P_1, \ldots, P_n$. The set of God’s moves is determined by the logical space of the combination of essences. The sets of creaturely moves $A_n$ are determined by the creature’s essences. God’s strategy aims at achieving an optimal balance between good $G$ and evil $s$. The strategies of the creatures are determined by the counterfactuals of freedom that follow from their essence.

6. Facts and values are unified by God and the principle of sufficient reason. God unites facts into an order of reasons such that all evils $s$ either lead to a greater good $G$ or prevent a greater evil $s’$.

7. God has vicarious understanding of this system of sufficient reasons, so God and the reasons also unify facts and meanings. The order of reasons unifies facts with meanings and facts with values. The intelligibility of the world is thus both moral and rational.

8. It seems that there is pointless evil in the world: e.g. fawns are burnt to death in forest fires. These appearances make it reasonable to believe that there are no sufficient reasons for such evils. There might however be an order of reasons that connect such evils to greater and possibly unknown goods. Empirical appearances of evils and reality are therefore distinct and possibly opposite.

The second question concerns the different ways in which the problem of evil can be questioned. Conceptual anti-theodicies present metacritiques of either the conceptual assumptions of the problem of evil and theodicy, and moral anti-theodicies morally condemn the practice of devising explanations for evil. Moral anti-theodicies fail to dissolve problem of evil. They instead present arguments, why the practice of building theodicies trivializes evil: theodicies do not take the suffering person into account, they work on a crude calculus of consequences and amount to Panglossianism in the end. These arguments do not touch on the key conceptual assumption of theodicism. Indeed, moral condemnation of theodicies could well fail because these theodicies are after all true and God’s reasons are the right ones, or they could succeed because there are no such reasons and God would be vicious as well if He chose to create the world by reasoning along these lines. Then moral anti-theodicies end up begging the question: they are correct only in situations where there are no reasons for evil in the first place. They are also compatible with theodicism, because they cannot rule out the above atheistic theodicy situation. They may in the end even amount to just a version of moralistic protest atheism, because if God exists, then moral denunciation of theodicies amounts to “returning one’s ticket to Heaven” on moral grounds, and these moral grounds go against the ones that in fact hold in the world. In any case, the problem of evil concerns the link of ethics, metaphysics and religion, and defending a particular anti-theodicy
requires one to take a position on the nature of these links and the correct methods for reasoning over the ethics/metaphysics/intelligibility-links.

The tradition of conceptual anti-theodicy goes back at least to the Book of Job, but the anti-theodicy debate started in Western philosophy in the debate between J. G. Hamann and Immanuel Kant in the 1750s. The Hamann-Kant debate links together many of the big themes of antitheodicy: the limits and grounds of reason and the critique of speculative metaphysics, the intelligibility of the world and the ethics/metaphysics-link. There are three schools of modern anti-theodicy that approach the topic as a critique of theodicism through the critique of reason. They are Kantian, Hamannian and Jamesian antitheodicy:

**Kantian antitheodicy:**

1. Transcendental arguments chart the necessary conditions for some phenomenon (morality, metaphysics) by referring to the subject and his activity.
2. Transcendental idealism separates the world of experience or the first-person human point of view from the things-in-themselves or a God’s eye point of view. The goal is to anchor the use of reason to the human point of view so that theodicist speculative metaphysics regarding the relationship of values to the world or a third-person explanation of evil is not possible.
3. There is a conceptual gap between facts and values, which is impossible to bridge. Kant argues that we cannot form a concept R of the relationship R(P,W), between the phenomenal physical world P and the world of values and divine wisdom W. Levinas holds that factual first-person experiences of evil cannot by definition be justified with third-person moral or metaphysical explanations.
4. Theodicism is rejected as overstepping human reason and the standards of morality. In Kant, the speculative attempts to establish R(P,W) are dishonest attempts to please God. In Pihlström and Kivistö, attempts to give third-person justifications fail to recognize first-person experience or the suffering person.

**Jamesian antitheodicy:**

1. The meaning of an expression is determined by the experiences that are connected with it and the practical values one can fulfill with it through use. Truth is the practical adequacy of a conception in predicting and reaching experiences, unifying one’s conceptions and fulfilling practical values that are rooted in the human condition. This also holds for metaphysical views like theism.
2. Theodicism is associated with monism: the world has a single Arche and a single order that determines all of its states of affairs. Experience reveals a plurality of orders and relationships that have their limitations, partial overlaps and conflicts, so there is no single determining Arche.

3. Monist theodicism goes against the necessary conditions of morality. If all of our actions are determined, all evil is necessary and we must adopt the standpoint of a spectator. Morality is possible only, if we can change the world for the better with our actions. Monism cannot be true, because truth is constituted by moral interests, which presuppose that moral action is possible.

4. God is redefined as a helper and a chessmaster, who has a winning strategy to realize His goals.

Hamannian antitheodicy:

1. Meaning is based on language use, when word-signs are connected with practices and objects through the institution of use in language-games. Expressions cannot be detached out of the relationships in which they are used and cannot go against their necessary conditions.

2. Language-games contain their objects and intertwine language use with the relationships of the world. The relationships of the world functionally intertwine their different aspects and underlie the phenomena that are investigated in philosophy.

3. Philosophy works by developing a grammar of the relationships underlying the phenomenon in question and then draws out the necessary conditions of these relationships with relational necessary-conditions arguments. Linguistic metacriticism locates our concepts in language-games and develops the grammar of these concepts. Grammars of religious scriptures and practices analyse the meaning of religious expressions by locating them in religious practices and scriptures.

4. The problem of evil is based on dualistic speculative metaphysics. It involves detaching the concept of God from religious practices and also constructing conceptual gaps between different aspects of reality, e.g. between the world P and the divine will W. The abstraction of concepts and the resulting conceptual gaps go against the grammar of our language-games, theological grammar of religious practices and the grammar of phenomena, whose aspects are functionally intertwined.

One can then use Hamannian anti-theodicy as a metatheory for the Kantian and Jamesian approaches. Kantian anti-theodicy builds on the critique of theoretical and moral reason, but has inherited the dualism of a rationally known ideal divine will and the empirically known world of facts that contains evil. Jamesian anti-theodicies build on a use theory of meaning, pluralism of observed phenomena, the idea of divine omnipotence as analogous to winning strategies in chess-games and the possibility of moral action. Hamannian anti-theodicies can accommodate pluralism and freedom in the grammars of science and moral action, and the idea of God as the victor over evil in biblical grammar. It also builds on a use theory of meaning in language-games, and uses it to develop a metacritique of both moral and practical reason that overcomes the reason/senses split.
and thus the residual dualism of the sensible and rational worlds in Kantian anti-theodicies.

Developing such a metacritique answers the third question: How can one develop a grammatical metacritique of the presuppositions of the problem through a philosophical grammar of the underlying language/world and being/meaning-links?

Grammatical metacritique offers an approach to the problem of evil that has been developed by Hamann, Bas van Fraassen, D. Z. Phillips and others. The grammatical approach to philosophical problems and the problem of evil can be described with the following ideas:

1. Philosophical grammar examines the use of language by describing the rules of language-games and the relationships underlying them.

2. Philosophical grammar is more general than linguistic grammar. Linguistic grammar focuses on letters and phonemes, words and sentences. Philosophical grammar studies speech acts and language-games.

3. Language is the Organon and Criterion of reason, because concepts are based on language use, which is required to articulate and assess conceptual connections. Philosophical grammar functions as the logic of our language by describing conceptual connections in language use.

4. Philosophical grammar develops an overview of the relationships R underlying a phenomenon or concept P, and then derives conclusions C by pointing out the necessary conditions of the relationship R. This form of argument is called a relational conditions argument.

5. Philosophical grammar locates abstract concepts in linguistic and communicative relationships, and uses their relational conditions to expose unfounded abstractions like dualisms and objectifications.

6. Philosophical grammar examines language-games and their underlying relationships from a system-theoretic point of view. It identifies the elements or the interrelated parts of a system, and the institutions or functioning of the system in their context of interaction and according to the laws of the system. Grammar highlights the functional intertwining of different aspects of the system and the dependence of laws on their systemic context. Systemic grammatical description is theory-laden, and it interprets physical, historical and theological facts and interpretations.

7. Philosophical grammar offers an overview of language use by highlighting discourse possibilities, offering contrasting language-games with differing conceptual alternatives and highlighting, how language-games can be embedded or isomorphic to each other.

8. Language-games are categories in the metaphysical sense. They constitute the structure of discourse possibilities or uses of language for describing objects and thus give a foundation for ontological classifications and describing objects in terms of abstract concepts.

9. Essence is shown in grammatical connections. The answer to the question “What is X?” depends on the discourse possibilities related to the term “X”. The principles of identification are thus given by structures of linguistic activities that determine the connections and the possibility space related to the term “X”. The concepts of metaphysics are thus located and objective only in language use.
10. The opposition between realism and idealism (or conventionalism) is misguided. Language-games are a response to reality, contain real objects and relationships between things and phenomena, and symbolize them through use. The norms of language are dependent on responding to reality in language-games, and cannot be described independently of the game or detached from it.

The contemporary debate about the possibility of rationally justified metaphysics can be fruitfully approached with the methods of philosophical grammar, because the questions underlying the possibility of metaphysics already arose in the debates between Hamann and Kant: How can rational categorical concepts be used of empirical objects? How is the ability to think possible? These questions underlie any approach to the possibility of metaphysics, because they are the subjective and relational parts of the problem of intelligibility.

Language-games were seen to form the *Lichtung* or locus of intelligibility and they involve encountering the world and its objects. They include the elements of empirical speech acts that connect word-signs with objects. The objects, expressions and speech acts are the elements of language, and have a meaning when used according to the institution of rule-governed and regular practices. The defining rules of language-games give the discourse possibilities or the speech acts that make sense in a given situation, and the strategic rules give them a communicative use for pursuing goals in the language-game. Then linguistic communicative relationships include meanings that are given through the empirical elements of expressions, objects and speech acts, and the institution of rule-governed and communicative use. The relationships of language-games or the forms of life include the communicative community of players and their characters, the objects and their natures, and are learned by being socialized into a tradition and responding to other members of the community.

Language-games give then answers to the question of the relationship of abstract rational concepts and concrete empirical objects. Empirical words and objects are intertwined with rational concepts, because a concept is formed through use that connects an expression with its object. Then meanings and rational connections of concepts and rules function through empirical connections of use of a concrete and empirical expression with a concrete and empirical object. Then reason and the senses or subject and the object cannot be separated from each other. This entails that the antinomy of metaphysical realism is a confusion. There can be neither meaningful language that is purely subjective and shut off from the world nor a metaphysical way of gaining objective knowledge by bypassing linguistic mediation. An examination of the role of rules as
essential knowledge shows that there can be empirically mediated correspondences between rules for the use of concepts and inherent necessities that arise out of the functioning of objects in the relationships of language-games. Both objects and general facts, ideas and causal powers are a part of language use. Grammatical rules are arbitrary and constructed in human activities. The rules of language-games symbolize general facts of the world and correspond dynamically to them, giving linguistic rules a “practical matter-of-factness”. The correspondences of rules with general facts constitute essential knowledge in interpretative activities, which are formed as a response to reality. The nature of rules as simultaneously arbitrary social constructions and symbols of general facts present in language mean that both Aristotelian natural realism and social constructionism are true of language at the same time.

Language-games also offer a way for approaching the categories of being and models for them. Language-games as categories are ways for encountering objects, and as such they give both logical types for concepts and the associated types of functioning of objects in relationships. Logical language-games for seeking and finding have been developed by C. S. Peirce and Jaakko Hintikka, and they can be used to describe the concept “there is” or being qua being. These formal games also offer an abstract model or a type of comparison for our everyday language use and relate to it by symbolizing it via functors and other dynamical isomorphisms. Similarly, the categorical conditions of reidentification developed by E. J. Lowe are rules for the types for continuity of objects in language-games that are embedded onto language use in activities of rule-following, and the rule-governed comparisons of objects and concepts can be modelled with mathematical category theory. Abstractions like games for the concept of being and abstract rules for categories are rules and points of comparison that can be embedded onto linguistic encounters with the objects. The location of abstractions for being qua being in language-games points out that language-games are the ground of categorization. Language-games give both discourse possibilities for locating objects, pointing at them and answering questions about their properties, and also the principles for reidentification of objects through stories according to their causal roles, characters, relational roles and other functional terms describing their action in relationships.

The location of the categories in language use also allows one to criticize models as speculative metaphysics, if they go against the relational conditions of language-games. Models are abstract systems representing concrete ones, and the representational relationship is metaphoric. It is constituted by practices of hermeneutical comparisons that constitute the isomorphisms and functors between the model and the modelled system. The concept of being and associated metaphysical concepts like categories are then realized in linguistic practices, and the models for
these second-order structural relationships metaphorize linguistic practices and their underlying realities. Since the represented realities and relationships are realized in language-games, the models cannot go against the necessary conditions of language-games. However, language-games are prior to their rules in Hintikka’s sense. Rules structure language-games in communicative use, and practices of communication are nothing less than the game itself. Moreover, the rules are materialized in an Aristotelian way only in use and do not exist in some Platonic heaven, because all parts of the element/institution/meaning-triad presuppose each other. Third, the practical significance of a rule for the structure of a language-game depends on its connections to other rules: games are more than the sum of their rules taken separately. Thus metaphysical abstractions cannot be detached from the necessary relational conditions of their underlying language-games. To sum up, types and classifications of the activities of seeking and finding give a basis to metaphysical categories, which are logical types of encountering objects and also types of objects that are located, identified and contrasted with their continuity-principles and spaces of possible facts that the concepts point out. The categories of metaphysics are not ideal relationships, and models of them can be objective only if the models interpret language use and the real relationships with which it is intertwined.

These answers to the problems of intelligibility lay the groundwork for a Strawsonian descriptive metaphysics that examines the fact/meaning split by giving a grammar for reidentification. The grammar locates facts and objects in systems and other relationships, where they embody systemic logics and other meanings. Identifying objects involves seeing facts as objects by using principles of reidentification that point to their functions against the background of a system, and facts and objects then embody the logic of the relationships in which they are embedded. The Wittgensteinian or Kantian “subjective” side of the argument can be given:

2. Institutions: The practice of seeking and finding individuals by pointing at the facts, and tracing the actions and relationships of the individual through stories and associated rules that depend on its role in relationships.
3. Meaning: The facts related to the individual are seen-as meaningful, as they are seen to embody the individual, its roles and relationships. The meanings and systemic roles are then seen through the facts, as perceptions of an object and thoughts interpreting its role are two intertwined sides of the perceptual relationship.
One can also give an Aristotelian or Hamannian “objective” argument:

1. Reidentifying objects involves locating them in a grid of individuation, and telling stories that establish their functioning F and roles in relationships R.
2. The grids for identifying and characterizing objects O, and associated discourse possibilities yield facts and their logical space in the language-game and the relationship R underlying the game.
3. The stories for reidentifying objects O and locating their roles in relationships yield functional terms and powers F and functional roles H in the relationship R.
4. The relationships R are analysed into elements, institutions and systemic logics, and viewed as games of game theory or systems of systems theory. Facts function as elements of an object O in the context of a relationship R. The institutions of an object O are the rules → corresponding to the functions F of objects O in the relationship R. The structure of institutions → depends on the functions and systemic roles F of the objects O in R, and the higher-level systemic properties H of R.
5. → The powers and roles F function through the facts SoA and the institutions → of objects O. The higher-order properties H function through the relationships R of objects O and the elements of lower-level facts L and the institutions → associated with O.
6. → Functions, powers and roles F, and higher-order properties H are intertwined with the facts and elements at L. The facts become meaningful, as they embody the meanings and logic of the relationship R. The meanings and logics of R are realized through them.
7. → Functional interdependence concerns the identification of objects, facts and meanings.
8. → Functional interrelatedness is revealed by grammar rules. It establishes grammatical connections and essential dependences between the levels of relationship R.
9. → It is a grammatical principle that facts and meanings are intertwined and mutually constitutive in language-games and their underlying relationships.

Grammatical metacritique examines the root of intelligibility in the linguistic encounters of the world, upon which the Principle of Sufficient Reson stands or falls. The PSR is the link between the problem of intelligibility and the problem of evil. The problem of evil questions the moral meaning of the world: is being = right or moral reason? The metaphysical foundations debate approaches the question whether being = reason by investigating, how reality can be rationally grounded and how the categories can be used of empirical objects. The PSR is then the link between the problem of evil and the problem of intelligibility. The grammatical investigation to the language/intelligibility-links leads to a metacritique of the PSR as well:
1. The Principle of Sufficient Reason is a family of principles connecting being, reason and explanation. The most fundamental is the Principle of Ground: being qua being is rational ground.

2. Facts and meanings are intertwined in contexts of elements, institutions and contexts. If the PSR is correct, then it is a second-order principle referring to these contexts.

3. There are systems with elements and institutions that do not yield good explanations for all of the contingent facts. Examples include systems with PISR and system-level institutions.

4. “Reason” is an ambiguous term, as there are moral, logical and causal reasons. The PSR does not determine a language-game for determining reasons. The theodicist version instead conflates them due to its attempt to close the fact/meaning and fact/value gaps by reducing being to reason.

5. “Reason” has a use only in language-games. Encountering reality and seeking and finding objects are logically prior to explanation and conceptual rules. Being thus cannot be reduced to reasons.

6. Logical spaces and essences are located in language-games and their underlying relationships. The identification phenomena → rational form = reality does not hold as rules for essences and discourse possibilities are formed in responding to reality.

7. Necessity is due to rules in a context. The necessity of language-games is dependent on the Lichtung of relationships, and not on a priori conceptual rules.

8. The use of the PSR as a regulative principle in science or as a principle of order in creation theology depends on models for sense-making in worldviews and language-games.

The grammatical method, the metacritique of reason, locating categories and sufficient reasons in language use, overcoming the fact/meaning split can all be used to develop corresponding metacritiques of the theistic and associated existential problems as well. These metacritiques answer our fourth question: How can the grammatical approach to metaphysical questions and to the critique of dualism be used to analyse religious and worldview questions, and articulate ways of existential, humanistic and religious sense-making that overcome the problem of evil?

The grammar of virtues overcomes the fact/value split. Virtues build upon the narrative intelligibility of personal action: acts are embedded into practices, strategies and ways of acting in social contexts, and the habit makes an act intelligible as a way of acting in the context:

1. Element: The physical fact of performing an action, like writing a sentence
2. Institution: A practice or strategy for pursuing goals in a social setting, like writing a book on action theory or a plan to become a professor.
3. Context: An institution of social relationships that forms a setting for pursuing goals, like the institution of philosophical argumentation and debate, or the academic world.
Virtue ethics then give the grammar of good and evil in terms of practices, habits and strategies for realizing the good and realizing the goods proper to human life in a situation:

1. Human nature as it is: The states and tendencies of man that happen to exist in fact. They may contain evil states, defects and bad habits.
2. Virtues: Practices for moving from human nature as it is into human nature if its telos were realized. The virtues are primarily habits and practices, but they also embody moral maxims and laws that are guidelines for action and self-control in pursuing the telos.
3. Human nature if its telos were fulfilled: The correct functioning of a human being in relationships according to the nature of the relationships and human nature.

The virtues then overcome the fact/value gap. Virtuous habits for realizing human nature intertwine facts and meanings, because the virtues are realized through actions in a context and the actions then are shaped and chosen by reference to the virtues and the goods they are used to pursue:

1. Elements: The fact of Matt putting money in the pot.
2. Institution: Matt’s virtuous practice of recognizing the homeless and helping them.
3. Context: The social relationships between Matt, NGOs and the homeless, the general fact about human nature that helping the homeless improves the life of both.

The grammar of narratives and virtues allow for accounts of humanistic meaningfulness in stories: Hamlet’s tragic actions are plot points, and then they become meaningful in the context of the setting of the plot. Thus even tragic events can be meaningful from a human point of view:

1. Elements: The fact of Hamlet stabbing Claudius and giving him poisoned wine.
2. Institution: Hamlet’s role includes the decision to take revenge on Claudius for murdering him and his father. The act expresses great resolve and courage in getting justice even when one has been mortally wounded.

---

1076 The idea of virtue as a habit or a strategy comes from Peirce and James via Hintikka and Pietarinen.
The grammar of virtues offers another Jamesian argument against theodicism from the possibility of moral action. Forms of theodicism that do not rely on the free will defence often assume monism, or that there is a single Arche determining that the world is the best possible. If this is the case, then the distance between the telos and the actual collapses and terms like “good” and “evil” are evacuated of their meaning:

1. The use of the term “good” makes sense and its grammatical relationships function only, if it is possible to fight evil.
2. It is possible to fight evil only, if one can form practices and strategies for moving from the situation-as-it-is to the-world-if-its-telos-were-fulfilled.
3. One can form practices and strategies for moving from the situation to the telos only, if it is functionally and relationally possible to distinguish between these two.
4. One can form practices and strategies for moving from the situation to the telos only, if there are alternative choices to exercise self-control over and alternative strategies, some of which can in principle fail to conform to proper functioning or realize the telos.
5. If there is an overarching system of sufficient reasons, then there are no alternative possibilities and the situation-as-it-is is either the best possible or is metaphysically determined.
6. → If the situation-as-it-is is the best possible or metaphysically determined, then one cannot determine between functionally and relationally correct situations from others (because only the actual is possible and there are no alternatives to rank as correct or not).
7. If there are no alternative possibilities, there are no alternative choices to exercise self-control over and no alternative strategies, some of which can in principle fail to conform to proper functioning or the telos (because every fact and the-world-as-it-is holds essentially or is the best possible)
8. → If there is an overarching system of sufficient reasons, it is not possible to fight evil.
9. If there is an overarching system of sufficient reasons, the use of the term “good” makes no sense and its grammatical relationships do not function.

There is also a link between the grammar of “good” in the virtues and the use of terms like “good” and “omnipotent” in religions of the sick soul. Religions of the sick soul like Buddhism and Christianity operate on the logic of salvation, which is isomorphic to the grammar of virtues. It thus follows that the problem of evil closely resembles the Enlightenment project of justifying morality: justifying the world-as-it-is encounters similar problems as deriving the practices of correct action from human-nature-as-it-is. The isomorphisms for Buddhism and the Book of Deuteronomy can be given with the following table:
The theistic problem of evil depends on the logic of the terms “good” and “omnipotent”. The logic of these terms can be investigated by developing a grammar of religious stories and religious practices by using the method of using language-games as a basis for categorizations in descriptive metaphysics, and then developing a description of the Holy that is the object of faith:

1. Language-games are categories that characterize essences: they answer the question “What is an X?” by identifying basic intuitions for seeking and finding X in encounters with reality, and give the criteria of identification that are typical for X.
2. If language-games are categories characterizing their objects, then the word “God” has practical consequences and God is identified via religious language-games for encountering God.
3. Theology is a grammar: It describes and regulates religious practices and uses of language in religious language-games, which are used for encountering the Holy.
4. →The second-order terms of theological grammar describe the essence of God only, if theological terms are connected to first-order practices of encountering God in language-games.
5. →Theological terms describe God only, if these language-games are connected with encountering the Holy and relating to it via practices functioning as basic intuitions.
6. The principles for identifying an X help determine the essence of an X by locating it in a narrative that describes its typical actions and character.
7. In biblical traditions, biblical stories are used to identify God: The Old and New Testaments in Christianity, the Hebrew Bible and the Talmudic tradition of interpretation in Judaism.
8. →Theological grammar characterizes the essence of God and His essential properties like “good” and “omnipotent” by pointing out the practices of responding to God that give discourse possibilities and basic intuitions, and by giving criteria of reidentification via biblical narratives.

Theological grammar then can be used to question the use of “good” and “omnipotent” in both atheist arguments from evil and theistic theodicies and defences. In general, these arguments use the Principle of Sufficient Reason and an a priori given logical space as a de-contextualized super-principles for assigning meaning to the terms “good” and “omnipotent”. However, the de-contextualized use of the PSR creates antinomies of reason: if God ↔ PSR holds, then the debate
about God and evil concerns the metaphysical nature of logical space. The PSR entails theism via the cosmological argument, and both the impossibility of a necessary being and the possibility of a better world will falsify theism. These antinomies arise out of the fact that the nature of sufficient reasons and logical space themselves have to be fixed through language use and do not in themselves fix the meaning of the terms “good” and “omnipotent”. This has been pointed out by Hamann, D.Z. Phillips and van Fraassen:

1. The expressions “God is good” and “God is omnipotent” either gain their meaning from religious language-games, or they are defined in terms of the logical concept of omnipotence and the principle of sufficient reason.
2. If the expressions “God is good” and “God is omnipotent” gain their meaning from religious language-games, divine goodness and omnipotence are understood in terms of the grammar of religious practices.
3. If divine goodness and omnipotence are understood in terms of the grammar of religious practices, then the PSR and logical omnipotence do not fix their meaning.
4. The logical concept of omnipotence and PSR detach the expressions “God is good” and “God is omnipotent” from their contexts and relational conditions for their use.
5. If the logical concept of omnipotence and PSR detach the expressions “God is good” and “God is omnipotent” from their contexts and relational conditions for their use, then the PSR and logical omnipotence do not fix their meaning.
6. → The PSR and logical omnipotence do not fix meanings for “God is good” and “God is omnipotent”.

Theological grammar also helps in charting the use of the terms “good” and “omnipotent” in the books of Hebrew Bible like the Book of Job, and New Testament writings like the Gospels. In the Book of Job and the Gospels, these terms are interpreted in terms of God’s fight against chaos and the struggle for justice. The structure of the struggle against chaos myth is struggle against chaos → the victory of god → god crowned as king → creation via word or construction → judgment. The myth gives the following grammar rules for the terms “good” and “omnipotent” in the Bible:

1. “God is good” means that God is committed to the world, healing it and repairing suffering so that the world reaches its telos.
2. “God is omnipotent” means that God can achieve His plans and defeat evil.
3. There is chaotic evil in the world: evil events do not have morally sufficient reasons, as they proceed from the actions of chaotic forces that are opposed to God’s plans and the world order.
4. The opposition of God and evil is narrative and strategic, and not conceptual. “God exists” and “evil exists” are not contradictories, as God and evil are opposite characters in a story, which can be presented as a zero-sum game.

5. The stories give Jamesian and Hamannian antitheodicies. God is said to be good and omnipotent, because He can defeat chaotic evil. God is also present and acts amidst states of affairs with no morally sufficient reasons.

The study of grammar of goodness and omnipotence can be crystallized into a Jamesian anti-theodicist consistency proof. God, Job and Leviathan are locked in a game or exchange of words. God can defeat evil a win the game, so He is omnipotent. God wants to give Job a happy life and uphold the creation, so He is good. There is chaotic evil, because both Job and Leviathan cause chaos that threatens to ruin Job’s life and the meaningful world order. The game itself is a relational system, the grammatical descriptions of the game give rules for the essence of God, and the situations of the game are possible worlds. The proof differs from the use of the motives for the victory of God and God getting His plans through in theodicist writers like Plantinga and van Inwagen, because it does not use the PSR as a metatheory. The evil in the game is chaotic evil, because it aims at defeating the good and will defeat it if left unchecked. Then the evil cannot be justified, because otherwise God would not have to defeat it in the first place. The game G gives the following consistency result, as there is a situation w with pointless evil in it:

Corollary: The set {“God is good”, “God is omnipotent”, “There is pointless evil”} is consistent.

Proof: $G,w \models “God is good”, G,w \models “God is omnipotent”, G,w \models “There is pointless evil”. □$

Now that the problem of evil has been exposed as a conceptual confusion, the way is clear for a Jamesian science of religions and worldviews. The methods of grammatical description can be extended to the practices and ways of sense-making in different worldviews: how they give meaning to moral practices and how do they approach the intelligibility of the world? What practical responses do they have for coping with evil? For example, the grammar of seeing-as for models and metaphors can be applied to the metaphors in the Hebrew Bible for God’s activity to understand what it is to see the world as God’s creation. The grammar of virtues can be used to describe Buddhist practices and explore, how these approaches contribute to the human good. Similar approaches can be taken to secular worldviews as well. These descriptions can then be used
to assess the worldviews through dialogical encounters between them. However, one thing should be clear. There is no point in devaluing the world by arguing for the meaninglessness of life or atheism on the basis of evil, or in giving justifications for evils that can stand in the way of divine or human meliorist projects of fighting for justice. To paraphrase the judgment of the Divine Judge in the Book of Job, such approaches are not even wrong.
Sources:

The Bible quotes are from the New Revised Standard Version unless indicated in the note. I have translated the references to Hamann’s letters myself by using Dickson, Betz, O’Flaherty and Gray as a background, unless indicated in the note.


Dickson, Gwen Griffith: “Wortspiel und Schulgeschwätz”, in Gajek, Bernhard (ed.) Akten des achten internationalen Hamann-Kolloquiums an der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg. Frankfurt am Main, 2005.


Garver, Newton: This Complicated Form of Life. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1994.


James, William: *The Varieties of Religious Experience* in The Works of William James, vol. 15. Cambridge, MA:


Kallio, Tarja: Reality Revisited. VDM Verlag, Berlin, 2008


Rossi, Philip J.: “Kant’s Metaphysics of Permanent Rupture”, in Anderson-Gold, Sharon and Muchnik, Pablo (eds.) 


Shakespeare, William: *Hamlet*. Edited by David Bevington. (http://internetshakespeare.uvic.ca/Library/Texts/Ham/).


