THE CLIMATE CHANGE MOVEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTIES
SOCIAL MEDIA INTERACTION DURING THE ELECTORAL PERIOD 2019 IN FINLAND

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Master’s thesis
June 2020
This master’s thesis investigates the dynamics between the climate movement and Finnish political parties in 2019. The climate movement mobilization overlapped two elections in Finland: the parliamentary elections in April and the European parliamentary elections in May. The research focuses on developments in the relationship before, during and after the elections, which will be analysed using the contentious politics approach and electoral contention mechanisms by Tilly, McAdam and Tarrow.

This thesis uses a case study research design to examine the distinctive circumstances in which a global mobilization wave overlaps with two elections. The main set of data consists of all public tweets in Finnish twitter, which mention either ‘ilmastolakko’ (climate strike) or ‘#nytonpakko’ (#actnow) and were published in 2019. The tweets are collected using search engine technology and processed by extracting four datasets of tweets sent out by Finnish parliament members. The data is further investigated using various methods, such as network analysis. Statistics collected by the Finnish police force and survey data collected by researchers in climate protests are used to support the analysis.

The analysis showed that the dynamics of the interaction between the climate movement and the political parties in Finland changed throughout 2019. Before the parliamentary elections in April 2019, the climate movement formed mutually beneficial electoral alliances with the Green League and the Left Alliance. The political parties took distance from the movement after the elections. A responsive mobilization of the climate movement after the elections showed increasing criticism towards politicians. Other parties did not significantly change their position towards the movement after the elections, although the Finns Party slightly increased the amount of criticism and the other parties slightly decreased the amount of support shown towards the movement.

The developments in the movement-party relations were apparent in many ways: Indicators of the mechanisms of interaction were changes in the number of tweets published by MPs, the contents of the tweets, frequency and scale of climate protests and the support or criticism from the climate movement towards the political parties. The two waves of mobilization in Helsinki was supplemented by other types of mobilization, such as the launch of the ‘Korvaamaton’- campaign of development, climate and environmental organizations.

This thesis shows that social media is a venue of movement-party interactions in more open media systems, where political elites transcend to Twitter networks. The existence of virtual political elites can have implications for social movements and the collective ‘conflict and alliance’ structure of politics. Further research should be conducted on the other venues in which movement-party interactions may occur and on other case studies, where social movement mobilization and elections occur simultaneously.
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The social media data for this thesis was collected with the software tool Mohawk Analytics and generously provided by The Centre for Consumer Society Research (Kuluttajatutkimuskeskus). The contribution is sincerely appreciated as the project could not have been completed without it.
1 Introduction

Greta Thunberg inspired what would become a global ‘Fridays For Future’ climate movement on the 20th of August 2018, when she first sat down in front of the Swedish Parliament holding a sign that read: *Skolstrejk för klimatet* (School strike for the climate). Although Thunberg started the protest alone, it didn’t take long for other young people to join her. The protests started to spread quickly from Stockholm to other Swedish municipalities like Nacka, and cities such as Gothenburg, Malmö and Umeå. Soon after that, the mobilization started to spread not only within the Nordic countries, but globally. The mobilization wave of the climate movement hit the shores in Finland by the end of 2018.

On the 20th of October 2018 Thunberg was invited to speak along with politicians and activists in a Finnish ‘Climate March’, a protest jointly organized by various environmental organizations. Social media gives a timeline for the establishment of the movement in Finland: on the 13th of December 2018 the Finnish Facebook-page ‘Ilmastolakko’ (Climate Strike) was created, followed by an additional page ‘Fridaysforfuture Suomi’ (national page for Fridaysforfuture Finland), which was created only a few months later, on the 27th of February 2019. The first climate strike in Finland occurred on the 11th of January 2019. 300 protestors took part in the strike. By the 27th of September, the fourth global strike was organized in tens of Finnish cities and towns including Tampere, Oulu and Rovaniemi. The biggest strike in front of the Parliament House in Helsinki attracted more than 10,000 protestors throughout the day.

The climate movement inspired by Thunberg is a global one, yet its mobilization in Finland during 2019 occurred within a national political context in which 2 elections played part (the parliamentary elections in April and the European parliamentary elections in May). The 2019 elections were described by many observers to be the first climate elections. Indeed, the context of the 2019 parliamentary elections in April and the European parliamentary elections in May was marked by release of the IPCC’s influential report ‘*Global Warming of 1.5 Degrees*’ and widespread mobilization of the climate

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1 The estimates varied between 2,000 and 18,000 protestors
movement around the world. Climate change played an important role in the pre-election debates and the government taking power after the elections announced significant changes towards more ambitious climate change policy. The scale of the climate mobilization both nationally and globally, as well as its clear impact on the elections in Finland demands for research to investigate how the two themes of global climate mobilization and climate elections tied in together throughout 2019. The remarkable circumstances of the elections motivate a case study research.

This thesis will investigate and explain the developments and dynamics of the relationship between the climate movement and the Finnish political parties before, during and after the electoral period. More specifically, it will focus on the mechanisms of interaction between these two actors in Twitter throughout 2019. The research question is: *How did Finnish political parties and environmental movement organizations interact on Twitter with the climate change movement during the electoral period, and did interaction patterns change after the elections?*

Studying this case provides an example for examining the interaction of social movements and political parties around the issue of climate change. Furthermore, it contributes to existing research literature by focusing on the specific venues in which interaction between movements and parties take place and arguing that social media is an increasingly important venue for such interactions. Particularly the thesis aims to contribute to the contentious politics perspective.

The research is grounded on a strand of literature in the social movement scholarship, that explores the contexts in which social movements exist and function. The (national) political context is the centre of focus, although the impacts of cultural, economic and global contexts cannot be discarded. The analysis is set in a framework of the contentious politics approach. Contentious politics refers to the dynamic mechanisms of interaction that occur between actors in the political realm, and that impact the direction of future events. To be more specific, the research draws inspiration from the contributions of Charles Tilly, Doug McAdam and Sidney Tarrow on contentious politics and electoral contention. Electoral contention defines in detail the mechanisms of interaction that play part in the context of elections. The thesis will both apply and evaluate the electoral contention mechanisms of movement-party interactions.
The theoretical framework will additionally lean on a strand of literature that connects some aspects of the media and communications studies with the social movement scholarship. The opportunities in researching the interface of mass media, Internet and communications technologies (ICTs) and social movements has engaged a variety of scholars, disciplines and perspectives. Particularly the methodology of the research draws inspiration from the contributions in this field. The role of Twitter in Finnish politics has been researched from a number of perspectives (see for example Isotalus et al. 2018), but it would be optimistic to argue that the field of research is saturated.

The theoretical frameworks will be explored in depth in chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 first explores various definitions of social movements. It then introduces four impactful strands of literature, which investigate social movements and political parties. Significant contributions and previous research, as well as notable critiques are presented in detail. Focus will then be turned towards the contentious politics approach. Mechanisms of electoral contention will be specified and illustrated with examples. The mechanisms set out the structure for the analysis of the thesis.

Chapter 3 will turn focus towards media and communications studies and forms the second part of the theoretical framework. The chapter first discusses the interface of the media and communications and social movements scholarship. Then it will explore previous research that has been conducted in Finland on the social media (specifically Twitter) use of politicians. Unfolding and investigating the media system in which the social movement has mobilized in is important, because it cements the research results within a broader context. Thus, research conducted in similar media systems can be compared and contrasted with the results of this thesis.

Chapter 4 presents the history of the environmental movement and its organizational development in Finland. The chapter ties the together the current climate movement and the broader context of the environmental movement and investigates the current wave of the climate movement in detail. Drawing connections to the global waves of environmental mobilization enables a deeper understanding of the roots of the current climate mobilization.
Chapter 5 is concerned with the methodology of the research. It introduces the research design of the thesis and motivates it by leaning on literature on case study research. The general methodological standpoint, methods of data collection and phases of data processing are addressed in detail. Finally, ethical questions of Internet research and data collection are discussed and addressed.

Chapter 6 introduces the national political context in Finland and briefly describes the 2019 elections, which are a central theme of the research. It then moves on to a presentation and analysis of the research data. The analysis is structured around the mechanisms of electoral contention, which are specified in chapter 2. A detailed analysis is followed by a summary of research results and a discussion. Finally, chapter 7 concludes the research by presenting both main arguments and critical accounts of the research. The chapter also introduces various topics for further research.
2 Theoretical Framework and Previous Research

2.1 Defining Social Movements

Defining social movements sets a foundation for the theoretical framework of this thesis. The origin of the concept, as well as modern definitions will be introduced here. In the past decades countless attempts have been made to specify the definition of social movements, but at least a corresponding amount of criticism has emerged with each attempt. Some of the definitions along with critiques are presented here to illuminate the defining characteristics of social movements. The development of definitions reflects that of the scholarship, which motivates a chronological account.

The term “mouvement social” was first used in the eighteenth-century France in relation to major or fundamental changes within a society. In the nineteenth century the term expanded to describe groups that attempted to establish such change in societies. Initially, the term was used in relation to socialist groups. Although the term originally referred to a process of change, most of the modern definitions define social movements as collective actors with deliberate attempts to create or resist change. Despite the nineteenth century literature, the term is no longer restricted to describe any particular ideologies or groups of interest. Instead, the modern definitions highlight the nature and characteristics of social movements. (Rucht 2017, 40)

In 1977 McCarthy and Zald (1977, 1217-1218) offered a definition, that social movements are “A set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure - -”. This definition leans on the collective ideology of a social movement, but it is both slippery and too broad: it doesn’t specify any detailed criteria for the structures or action of social movements (Rucht 2017, 40). In fact, the definition could include almost any interest group from a political party to a charity campaign, because it doesn’t distinguish between social movements and other interest groups. An examination of the ties between social movements and political parties would be a challenging task, if it was based on this definition.
In 1984, Tilly distinguished powerholders from social movements, which was a central contribution for the emerge of the movement-party research field. Tilly defined social movements as

“A sustained series of interaction between power-holders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation, in the course of which these persons make publicly visible claims for changes in the distribution of the exercise of power, and back those demands with public demonstrations of support” (Tilly 1984, 306).

Although Tilly’s definition successfully introduces the criteria of action and to some extent the structural characteristics of the movement as an actor, it defines social movements through a separation from and interaction with powerholders (Rucht 2017, 41). Thus, the definition doesn’t consider the connections and overlaps between movements and institutionalized politics. Although the definition is concerned with the relations between powerholders and social movements or ‘challengers’, it doesn’t consider the variety of strategical interactions between political parties and movements. For example, the processes of institutionalization of movements into organizations or political parties are hard to grasp from this perspective.

In 1992, Diani presented a definition that articulates the informality of social movements, specifying Tilly’s viewpoint that emphasizes a lack of formal representation. Diani also acknowledges networks as a common characteristic of social movements. According to Diani, “[Social movements are] networks of informal interaction between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political and/or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity” (Diani 1992, 3). Diani’s definition – like other more contemporary definitions – highlights not only the informality of participants and the structures of a social movement, but also its nature, which is characterized by a conflict or struggle. As noted by Diani, the conflict may be either political and / or cultural. Paying attention to the setting of a conflict or a struggle draws attention to the embeddedness of social movements in the settings of a society.
It is increasingly recognized within the social movement scholarship, that movements may sometimes also side with powerholders. Rucht (2017) points out, that “powerholders may be sided by what is commonly understood as a social movement” (Rucht 2017, 42). A commonly used example is the Tea Party movement, which has a long-standing relationship with the Republican party in the United States (Williamson et al. 2011). At the very least, social movements interact with institutionalized political actors including political parties. The interactions may target either the opponents or allies of the movement.

In the same fashion, social movements can aspire to cause social change, but sometimes they take action to resist it, as stated in Rucht’s definition of social movements. Rucht defines social movements as “a network of individuals, groups and organizations that, based on a sense of collective identity, seek to bring about social change (or resist social change) primarily by means of collective public protest.” (Rucht 2017, 45). Although the collective public protest is emphasized in Rucht’s definition, social movements may also exist within different types of institutions where they go unseen by the public or employ other forms of mobilization than protest.

This thesis will lean on these definitions offered by Diani and Rucht. The definitions emphasize particularly the networks of social movements, engagement in a political or cultural conflict and shared collective identity. Furthermore, Diani highlights social movements embeddedness in the settings of a society and Rucht points out that social movements may have both allies and opponents. These definitions have thus created a space and offered tools for the research of interactions between social movements and political parties or policymakers.

Lastly, Snow et al (2019) have highlighted one further important characteristic for the conceptualization of social movements: temporal continuity. Social movements vary in courses of their existence, as some are isolated and individual, brief occurrences, whereas others persist for decades or possibly even past a century. Some degree of continuity is important for social movements that seek to bring about fundamental change within societies. The continuity of collective action is essential for social movements to make progress in achieving their goals, because it signals a substantial and persistent interest of citizens.
The aspect of temporal continuity is enlightening for the research of long-standing social movements such as the environmental movement, because it underscores the depth and intensity of the aspiration for change. For this thesis, the concept of temporal continuity as a defining characteristic of social movements is an important addition to the definitions by Diani and Rucht. The long history of the environmental movement and the persistence of the current climate mobilization ought to be considered carefully in research. (Snow et al. 2019)

2.2 Social Movements and Political Parties

The social movement scholarship is a diverse research field: it fosters a variety of different perspectives and strands of literature. However, McAdam and Tarrow have raised concerns about what they call the ‘movement-centric bias’ of the social movement studies (McAdam & Tarrow 2010; 2019, 32-33; McAdam & Boudet 2012). By this they mean that the social movement scholarship has moved towards producing a rather narrow research focus, in which the internal dynamics of movements have become increasingly accented. Research has emphasized research topics like movement organization, strategies, aims and mobilization (McAdam & Tarrow 2019). The profound importance of such central topics for the social movement scholarship is undeniable, but McAdam and Tarrow argue for the benefits of broadening the horizons of the research field.

In addition to researching the internal dynamics of a social movement it is fruitful to develop and expand on the existing strand of literature, which explores the external dynamics and contexts of it. The strand is particularly relevant for this thesis, because it offers a framework for researching the interactions between social movements and political parties. This subchapter introduces the early development of the literature and discusses four influential perspectives that predominate the field today.

The social movement scholarship first began to devote attention to the contexts of movements in the 1950’s and 1960’s. Early examples of literature that considered the connections between social movements and the social and economic contexts they were embedded in, include Thompson’s ‘The Making of the English Working Class’ (1968), which describes the formation of the shared identity of the English working class during
the industrial revolution, and Tilly’s ‘The Vendée’ (1964), which was named after the counter-revolution it analysed.

Both works were influential contributions for the emergence of a new framework within the social movement scholarship in the 1970’s, which emphasized the broad political context of social movements. First to assess and convey the importance of the context approach was Lipsky (1970, 14). His claim was followed by Eisinger (1973), who advanced the approach by introducing the field to the concept of political opportunity structure in his research on the connections between institutional access and riot behaviour in the United States (McAdam & Tarrow 2019). His main argument was, that the success (or on the other hand, failure) of social movements is dependent of political opportunities (Eisinger 1973).

The emergence of the new strand of literature invited scholars to elaborate on the nature of the connection between movements and political contexts after the early contributions in the 1960’s and 1970’s established the existence of it. Since then, four impactful perspectives or approaches have emerged to explore these connections from different points of view (Hutter et al. 2019). These are 1) the political process approach, 2) the societal cleavages approach, 3) the agenda-setting power approach and lastly, 4) the contentious politics approach (Ibid., 324). The categorization of the four approaches provides a good basis for a discussion on the evolution and diversity of the discipline and is therefore explored further here in the order specified above. Moreover, the shortcomings and critiques of each of them will be compiled and discussed.

The Political Process Approach

The political process approach stems from the writings of Tilly in ‘From mobilization to revolution’, published in 1978, and McAdam in ‘Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970’, published in 1982. Tilly established the foundation for the approach by placing both social movements and political parties within a common, broad structure of politics. Tilly doesn’t specifically name the structure in his book, but Kriesi (2015, 667) has later on described it as the and ‘alliance and conflict structure’ of politics. The processes that take place within the structure are analysed through Tilly’s ‘polity model’ portrayed in figure 2.1 below. In line with his definition of social
movements, the polity model makes a strong distinction between the ‘challengers’ and the ‘polity members’ (Tilly 1978, 3-2).

Figure 2.1: The polity model (Tilly 1978, 3-2)

A polity member, as described by Tilly, is defined by a fluent access to resources, which are controlled by a government (Tilly 1978, 3-1). A challenger is a contender of the polity member, a social movement for instance. Tilly argues that the challengers (which are non-institutionalized in nature) seek access to the institutionalized political realm of polity members, by forming alliances with political parties (ibid, 3-4). Movements act as the ‘weapon of the weak’ in democracies, creating political opportunity for the political elites, that may use movement mobilizations to strengthen their own agendas. Thus, movements, according to the polity model are heavily impacted by the opportunities and alliances within the political context. This argument follows the lead of the political opportunity structure of Eisinger (1973).

McAdam (1982) employed the foundation that was previously set by Tilly, to conceptualize and actualize the political process approach. According to McAdam’s original formulation, political opportunity encourages movement emergence and fosters
movements’ success. In this regard, McAdam’s approach is on the same line with Eisinger and Tilly but doesn’t rely as much on the importance of political opportunity. McAdam added to the approach these concepts of ‘tactical interaction’ and ‘tactical innovation’. With the concepts, he recognizes the techniques and strategies ‘challengers’ might use in order to advance their position in the alliance and conflict structure, as well as the reactive counter tactics employed by the movement opponents. (McAdam 1983).

Although Tilly’s polity model and McAdam’s political process approach have been influential especially in the early days of the emerging research field, they have some pivotal limitations pointed out first by Goldstone and later on by Kriesi. Goldstone has argued that the distinction between the inside and outside of institutionalized politics isn’t as clear-cut, as the political process approach suggests (Goldstone 2003, 2). The approach doesn’t consider the fluctuations of the boundaries of the polity model or hybrids of polity members and challengers. Furthermore, the challengers can hide in the polity, as social movements can exist inside of any institutionalized organizations.

Kriesi (2015, 668-673) builds on this critique by paying further attention to the effect of variations in electoral models. Kriesi uses a categorization developed by Lijphart between consensus democracies and majoritarian democracies to argue that social movements are more likely to ally with parties in majoritarian democracies (characterized by two-party systems), where power is concentrated (Lijphart 1999; Kriesi 2015). Consensus democracies account a range of different opinions in decision making. They are characterized by multiparty systems and coalition governments. The division of institutional power among several political parties in consensus democracies allows for social movements to employ alternative strategies, such as pursuing a position as a political party. Interest groups in consensus democracies thus have a better opportunity to access the less-centralized institutional power, than interest groups in majoritarian democracies. (Kriesi 2015, 668-673; Hutter et al. 2019)

Interest groups in majoritarian democracies in turn have a better chance of accessing institutional power through an alliance with one of the existing political parties, because the successful establishment of a new political party is more difficult. Majoritarian and consensus democracies offer different kinds of opportunities for social movements and therefore the strategies that are more likely employed by the movements are different for
each system: consensus democracies welcome the establishment of new parties, whereas majoritarian democracies invite alliances with existing political parties. The political process approach, according to Kriesi, is then less descriptive of consensus democracies. The approach is better suited to social movement research in the context of majoritarian democracies, such as the United Kingdom or the United States, because the majoritarian democracies are less welcoming of the alternative strategies that may be adopted by social movements in consensus democracies. (Kriesi 2015, 668-673; Hutter et al. 2019)

Furthermore, McAdam along with Tarrow have later highlighted, acknowledging Kriesi’s critique on electoral systems, that the role of elections was somewhat neglected in the original formulation of the political process approach. The initial model fails to mention elections altogether (McAdam & Tarrow 2013, 327). They later on developed the approach in cooperation with Tilly in the “Dynamics of Contention”, published in 2001. The book was devoted to the review and contemplation of the tactical interactions and innovations, formulated as mechanisms of ‘contention’. McAdam and Tarrow have since introduced the fourth strand of literature presented here: the contentious politics approach (see for example McAdam & Tarrow 2010; 2013; 2019).

The Societal Cleavages Approach

The concept of ‘societal cleavages’ is essential to this second strand of literature. The concept suggest that the perspective is a wide one, framing the broad societal contexts of social movements (Hutter et al. 2019). Stemming from the political process approach, researchers of the second strand of literature accept, that there is “a simple, positive relationship between openings in the political structures and protest mobilization” (Meyer and Minkoff 2004, 1484). The ‘openings’ in the political structures constitute societal cleavages in which mobilization is likely to occur. Continuing from the critique presented against the political process approach, Kriesi and some others have presented a reciprocal relationship between social movements and the institutional realm of politics (see for example Hutter 2014; Kriesi 2015).

The approach has been influential in grasping long-term developments of the interplay between movements and global contexts. Two societal cleavages specifically have been emphasized: the first cleavage of ‘post-materialism and new social movements’
beginning in the 1960’s and the ‘integration-demarcation cleavage’ of Western Europe since the 1980’s (Grande 2012, 277-278). The second cleavage suggests a conflict between those who benefit from globalization, and those who feel threatened by it. The conflicting interests create a fertile ground for social movements. Some social movement scholars suggest, that the conflict manifests in the rise of nationalist and populist parties, opposed by the greens and other new parties on the left (Kriesi 2015, 673-678).

The second strand of literature offers a useful frame for research on broader and longer societal changes, as well as on transnational movements. However, movements and political contexts ought to also be observed more specifically and focusing on shorter timeframes to complement and enrich the broad picture. Not all social movements transcend over borders or nations. The societal cleavage approach can be complemented by other approaches that emphasize locally active social movements or movements with a shorter lifespan.

The Agenda-Setting Power Approach

The third strand of literature presents a view that emphasizes “the agenda setting power of social movements and protest activities” (Hutter et al. 2019, 326-327). The agenda-setting power approach highlights the value of issue attention. That is, the articulation of issues by social movements and protest activities in the public sphere. A clear research strategy emerges from this perspective: “If different actors, in our case movements and parties, emphasize an issue in sequential way, one can assume some kind of interdependence at play” (Hutter et al. 2019, 326). Therefore, movement-party relations can be analysed and compared over time and across state boundaries, by measuring the attention devoted to a given issue. The key thought is standardizing the measures of research.

The understanding of a protest as a signal to the political elites is similar to Tilly’s polity model but differs from it in its emphasis on the agenda-setting power of social movements. Central arguments are that protest mobilization showcases the importance of the issue at stake because the costs of participation to protest are high, that protest size is more important than frequency, and that the agenda-setting power is dependent on the issue at stake. Furthermore, parties in opposition are more responsive to movements and
the likelihood of a response by a party increases as competing parties respond. The responsiveness increases with the value of the opportunity offered by the social movement. (Hutter et al. 2019, 327)

However, the agenda-setting approach firstly ignores the resources held by incumbent political parties to repress social movements or protests and secondly underestimate the positive responses of the parties, that are not limited to agenda-setting and may cause transformation within parties or furthermore, policy changes. Further attention should be payed “to the ‘targets’ of protests and the mechanisms linking social movement activities and the reactions of (party) political decision-makers” (Hutter & al. 2019, 327). Moreover, the standardizing of the measure – the attention devoted to the issue – does not guarantee comparability over time or across states. The amount of attention is dependent of the prevailing media system at the time of events and in the national context. Although comparisons can be made between corresponding media systems, the standardization of the measure is not an adequate proceeding in itself.

The three strands of literature presented so far have introduced a variety of frameworks for the analysis of social movements in political contexts, but a critical assessment of the approaches is in order here. Two critical points emerge in particular. First, the approaches assume a narrow set of aims for social movements, by emphasizing the influence and leverage that movements seek to have within the institutional realm of politics. However, movements that aspire to cause a fundamental change within a society are likely to have goals outside of the world of institutions and policy. These aims cannot be discarded on the basis of researching the relationships between social movements and political parties, because the variety of aims of a movement affect the movement-party relationship as a broad entity. The political context of movements is not isolated from the cultural or economical contexts of movement. Therefore, the aims of the movement throughout the different contexts may be overlapping and interdependent.

Secondly, excluding the societal cleavage approach, the temporal continuity concept has hardly been considered adequately within the field. Social movements, that aspire change in the long term, count not only on the scale of their mobilization and other forms of action, but furthermore, the frequency of it. Although some movements only exist for a short period of time, not all movements can be considered brief occurrences. Movements
that persist for longer periods of time are complex networks, possibly existing on both sides of the boundary between institutionalized and non-institutionalized realms of politics. The relations between this type of movements and polity members, political parties or other political institutions should then be examined as dynamic, evolving relationships, rather than separable interactions.

*The Contentious Politics Approach*

Lastly, the fourth strand of literature identified by Hutter, Kriesi and Lorenzini is the contentious politics approach. First developed by Tilly, Tarrow and McAdam (2001) in *Dynamics of Contention* and later especially by the latter two (McAdam & Tarrow 2010; 2013; 2019), the approach shifts attention to the dynamics of interaction between movements, their targets and other actors within the political realm (McAdam & Tarrow 2010, 530). It has been influential in recent studies concerning relations between social movements and political parties, especially regarding elections.

In the original formulation of the approach, McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow defined contentious politics as: “episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants.” (McAdam et al. 2001, 5). The definition highlights firstly, the collective struggles within politics and secondly, the collective interaction, characterized as public and episodic, within the political field. The concept is used to research ‘episodes of contention’. That is, the dynamics and mechanisms of interactions between various actors or claimants that affect the direction of future events. (McAdam & Tarrow 2010, 530)

Drawing from the political process approach, the contentious politics approach then highlights the dynamic interactions between social movements and political parties, although the definition leaves room for the specification of the actors involved. However, unlike the policy process model, it is more attentive towards the fluid boundaries between institutionalized and non-institutionalized realms of politics and recognizes the reciprocity of movement-party interactions. The contentious politics approach is
additionally more acceptive – compared to the political process approach – to the variety of unconventional or innovative strategies that may be adopted by social movements, but nevertheless places more importance to the ‘institutionalized tactics’ of social movements, such as educational strategies, organizational structure, campaigning around elections and lobbying. The recognition of innovative tactics is similar to McAdam’s initial political process approach. (McAdam & Tarrow, 2013)

McAdam and Tarrow argue that in democracies, political conflict is manifested particularly in elections and social movements. This is a key development of the contentious politics approach. The relations between the two major forms of conflict have not been researched systematically, although the link between elections and movements is apparent. During elections, political parties 1) are aware of social movements as indicators or signals of the public interests and 2) may adjust or align their agendas and electoral strategies based on these indications, in order to appeal to larger crowds or gain stronger support for their existing agendas. (McAdam & Tarrow 2010)

McAdams and Tarrow view elections and movements as mutually constitutive forms of politics and thus criticize the stark division of research between the social movement scholarship and the electoral research field (McAdam & Tarrow 2013). They point out, that the first edition of the Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, a cornerstone of the bookshelf of many social movement scholars, only includes 2 listings in its index for ‘elections’ (McAdam & Tarrow 2013, 326). Even though the contentious politics approach to movements and elections has been successful in bringing forward the criticism towards the ‘movement-centric’ focus of social movement research, the interest towards elections and movements has not increased to the extent McAdams and Tarrow might have hoped for. The second edition of the Blackwell Companion to Social Movements has 4 listings for ‘elections’ in its index, although two chapters were devoted to the political context of movements and movement-party relationships. The electoral research field has done no better; modest attention is devoted to social networks, specifically movements.

McAdam and Tarrow attempt to bridge the gap between movements, political parties and elections by introducing the concept of “electoral contention” (McAdam & Tarrow 2013, 326). The concept refers to recurring links between movements and elections that
showcase their reciprocal relationship. The contentious politics approach is based on mechanisms of contention, that combine into processes of contention. The mechanisms include, but are not limited to, transferable innovations, pro- and reactive electoral mobilization by social movements, and movement-induced party polarization (McAdam & Tarrow 2010, 533). The combination of the mechanisms provides insight into the reciprocal relationships between social movement actors and political parties in regard to elections and electoral campaigns.

Despite its many merits the contentious politics literature, in line with the three other approaches presented here, is somewhat inconsiderate of the variety of aims social movements may have under the umbrella goal of fundamental change. Aims of cultural change that cannot be discarded from affecting movement-party relationships. The approach is also relatively vague concerning the specific venues in which interaction between movements and parties take place, as well as the impact of the prevailing media system for the tactical use of various venues. This thesis argues that the social media is an increasingly important venue for these interactions in more open media systems. The impact of the Internet and communication technologies as well as social media for the social movements scholarship is discussed in chapter 3.

2.3 Mechanisms of Movement-Party Interactions

In this thesis, I employ the mechanisms of electoral contention to explore the relationship between the recently mobilized climate movement, political parties and elections in Finland. Studying this case provides sample material for examining interaction of social movements and political parties around the issue of climate change.

The ‘Dynamics of contention’ included an overwhelming set of more than twenty mechanisms of contention, along with almost as many case studies. However, McAdam and Tarrow (2010) specified a more coherent group of six mechanisms, that form a functional framework for research on movement-party relations during elections. Four out of the six mechanisms will be introduced in this thesis. While the ‘reactive electoral mobilization’ mechanism is useful in describing post-electoral mobilizations, it is better suited to research of non-democratic contexts, which motivate the reactive mobilizations
after elections (McAdam & Tarrow 2010, 534). The ‘oscillations of electoral regimes’ - mechanism focuses on long-term developments in movement mobilisation and demobilization, by linking them to shifts in electoral regimes (ibid.). Similar to the societal cleavages - approach, it is useful in outlining broad developments of movement-party relations. Although the mechanism is not applicable to research that investigates short-term developments, it brings in an important complementary perspective.

The remaining four mechanisms will be employed in this research to frame the analysis. They are introduced here, with relevant examples to showcase how they may be used in research. The mechanisms are:

- the electoral coalitions - mechanism
- the transferable innovations - mechanism
- the proactive mobilization - mechanism
- the polarization of parties - mechanism

(McAdam & Tarrow 2010, 533)

In the electoral coalitions - mechanism movements and parties seek to side with each other. The formation of movement-party alliances both provides access to institutionalized power for the movement and strengthens the agenda of the party. Political parties may also benefit from the alliances by increasing their appeal to the voters represented by the social movement in question. Furthermore, some movements take the option to participate in the elections to access institutionalized power directly in consensus democracies particularly. The electoral strategy has been successfully utilized in the rise of Green parties around Europe, for instance. More recently, the Feminist Party, founded in 2016 in Finland, has utilized a movement background in taking the electoral option. The party won one seat in the 2017 Finnish municipal elections in Helsinki but has yet to claim a seat in the parliament. (McAdam & Tarrow 2010, 533)

In the transferable innovations - mechanism political parties adopt ‘innovations’ presented by social movements. Unlike political parties, social movements are not constrained, or are constrained to a smaller extent, by institutional responsibilities or loyalties to various groups of voters. The lack of constraints allows for movements to
employ more innovative methods of action, compared to political parties. However, political parties may adopt the innovations that are tested successfully by social movements. Especially in the wake of elections, the innovative tools used by social movements may be used by political parties in their campaigns, which in turn might appeal to the voters that are represented by the social movements in question. For example, McAdam and Tarrow discuss the technological innovations developed by Moveon.org, utilized first by Howard Dean in the 2004 presidential election campaign in the United States, and later on by Barack Obama in the 2008 electoral campaign. (McAdam & Tarrow 2010)

In the proactive mobilization -mechanism movement mobilization is strategically timed to take place prior to elections or within the context of elections. The mobilization is motivated by an ‘opening’ of the institutionalized realm of politics. As argued in the political process approach by McAdam, movement actions and tactics are influenced by either opportunities and / or threats posed by elections. Social movements can become increasingly active throughout electoral campaigns, if the elections provide an opportunity for the movements to utilize the tactical mobilization or protest action. (Blee & Currier 2006). Some movements function predominantly before elections. For example, the ‘BlackVotersMatterFund’ is a movement project that attempts to increase voter registration and turnout in the United States, mobilizing specifically in the context of elections. (McAdam & Tarrow 2010)

Lastly, in the polarization of parties -mechanism the movements that have previously formed alliances with the victorious political parties prior to elections, may mobilize after the elections. The mobilization can indicate and furthermore, strengthen the support for the newly elected governing party in the society. However, it is also possible, that the mobilization results in increasing tensions between the demands of the movement and the agenda of the political party, which faces the challenge of transitioning from the electoral arena to policy making. The increasing tension may result in a conflict between the movement and the political party or alternatively, in a polarization within the party, depending on the closeness of the alliance. (McAdam & Tarrow 2010)
As observed by Zald and Berger in 1978, movements may also emerge within parties, resulting into polarization or even splits within the organization. A recent example in Finland has been the Finns Party, which suffered a division in 2017, resulting in the abandonment of the party by more than half of the party’s MPs. The division resulted in the establishment of the Blue Reform party. While the Blue Reform party is no longer active, the Finns Party has gained popularity, being the second largest party in the 2019 elections.

The mechanisms of electoral contention assess individually the different dynamics of movement-party relations. However, combined together they form a chain of occurrences, which reflect changes or shifts in movement-party relationships throughout elections. An analysis that applies a combination of the mechanisms outlines the evolution of the collective interaction that may affect the direction of future events in the political realm. This thesis uses the four electoral contention mechanisms in the above order to arrange the analysis systematically and to form a consistent structure for the analysis in chapter 6.
3 Social Movements and Media

3.1 The Global Media Technologies and Social Movements

The contentious politics approach does not specify in detail the specific venues in which interaction between movements and parties take place. The communications and media scholarship can offer some relevant contributions for this specification. This thesis investigates social media, particularly Twitter, as an increasingly important venue for these interactions in more open media systems. This chapter contextualises and discusses the role of social media and the Internet and communication technologies (ICTs) 1) for social movements and 2) in the Finnish media system. It also motivates the research methodology of this thesis by examining previous research on Finnish politicians and political elites in Twitter.

The initial technologies behind the Internet as we know it today were developed as early as the 1960’s, but the large-scale, global use of it began in the turn of the century. The popularity of the technology increased rapidly as it conquered and birthed new areas of the public realm. The first social media platforms were developed simultaneously with the fast spread of the Internet. The use of the ICTs has brought about a new area of research, along with differing perspectives concerning it. The research field has had to adjust to the accelerating speed of the ICT development, which accounts for the variety of perspectives that have emerged within a rather short timeframe.

Some social movement scholars were initially sceptic about the emerge of the new technologies and new forms of media in the beginning of the 21st century (Diani 2000; Tarrow 1998). To be specific, some scholars questioned the ability of movements to use the ICTs for mobilization through interpersonal recruitment. The social ties that were formed over the internet were perceived to lack depth. However, most of the critique was presented in the early days of the large-scale use of the Internet. Since then, social media platforms have developed enormously, especially in regard to the algorithms that are central for the social nature and the functionality of the platforms. (Earl 2019)
The recent collective actions, such as the #metoo movement and the Black Lives Matter movement indicate that the role of social and global mass media for social movements is significant. Especially the use of social media platforms for fast (and anonymous) organization and protest mobilization is a valuable tactic for social movements, as shown by the above examples. The development of the ICTs in the turn of the century has had a profound and undeniable implication for, among other things, social movements.

The contemporary research has shifted attention from general and ideological questions about the impact of ICTs to questions with more specific focuses (Earl 2019). Instead of researching the large-scale implications of internet usage the current research more often focuses in the ways in which we use ICTs or how it impacts our daily lives. Nevertheless, the sceptical accounts have merely changed directions. Some of the more recent concerns debate the effectiveness of online activism or the implications for the lowering costs of political participation, mobilization or the rising bar for what is considered an important signal of the public interest by polity members (Gray & al. 2014; Schulman 2009). The turbulent nature of many of the movements that exist online is highlighted in these concerns. Movements in social media come to exist rapidly, grow exponentially and burn out before long. Institutional and cultural changes take time, which undermines the impact of movements with short lifespans. However, it seems that the most successful social movements that employ online mobilization have a common nominator: temporal continuity is a defining character for them. The examples mentioned above, the #metoo movement and the Black Lives Matter movement both have persisted for a longer period of time. Perhaps the successfulness of the movement is not dependent on the platforms that it uses but rather the persistence and continuity in its actions.

Earl (2019) has argued that the social movement scholarship has missed a major opportunity in exploring the new research area to the extent that communications scholars, along with other interdisciplinary scholars already have. Comparing leading social movement journals and communications and interdisciplinary journals, Earl concluded that the former published significantly less articles concerning social movements and ICTs than the latter (Earl 2019, 292). The growing role of ICTs for social movements has opened a gap in the intersection of separate research fields, in which various research topics and further contributions are needed to accumulate a greater collaborative understanding of contemporary social movements. Earl has highlighted five
relevant and inspiring areas for future research. These are emergence of movements, micro-mobilization of movements, continuity and internal movement dynamics, external dynamics of movements and lastly, movement consequences. (Earl 2019)

Rohlinger and Corrigall-Brown have criticized the shortcomings of the existing literature on mass media and social movements. They introduce two criticisms in particular. Firstly, they point out the overemphasis of the research on outcomes. That is, the research focuses on measuring the tangible results of the media use of social movements, for instance news coverage and mobilization caused by it. The criticism is particularly applicable in the context of the agenda-setting approach of social movements. However, other motives and ways social movements use ICTs often go unnoticed by researchers. Secondly, researchers often fail to consider the context of their research. Both social movements and the media increasingly cross the boundaries of the nation state, yet research emphasizes the national context. Moreover, research that is framed in the global setting too often forgets that differing media systems decrease the comparability of the research, underscoring the importance for the development of research frameworks that are applicable for the global setting of social movements and media, as well as careful consideration of differing media contexts. (Corrigall-Brown & al. 2019)

Social movements use ICTs in varying ways. Some social movements exist in the context of ICTs, some employ it to innovate new ways of action and others simply adapt to the changes in media, incorporating the new technologies into their daily schedules. In other words, the use of ICTs has gone from being particular and exceptional, to what could be best described as mundane. Cammaerts (2015) has made a useful division between ICT-supported and ICT-based communicative practices to describe the use of ICTs by social movements.

A variety of tools are available for ICT-based movements. For instance, ‘hacktivists’ may use hacking, network flooding attacks (where a large group of activists visit a webpage simultaneously to overcrowd the server) or other techniques for civil disobedience (Jordan & al. 2004). ‘Slacktivists’ in turn participate in movement activities by signing petitions, sharing information or simply posting about the movement with a hashtag (Christensen 2012). Slacktivism often faces critical accounts on the effectiveness of the new ways of participation. Some movements use non-commercial open source software,
such as Reddit or 4Chain to coordinate their efforts without revealing their identities (Tufekci 2017, 170). For example, the Hong Kong protests starting in 2019 utilized a thread in Reddit to collect donations to purchase gas masks for protestors, to share videos of violent clashes with the police force and to share real-time maps for protestors. The Black Lives Matter mobilization in 2020 used several social media platforms to collect donations to ‘bail-out funds’ which were used to free arrested protestors and to spread images and videos of police misconduct. The examples highlight that social media platforms are used not only for protest organization and mobilization but for supportive action and informing the public.

3.2 The Finnish Media System and Strategic Use of Media Platforms

Rohlinger and Corrigall-Brown have argued that social movements use different forms of mass media tactically for different purposes. ICT-supported and ICT-based communicative practices utilize a variety of different platforms depending on their targets and goals. The strategies of media use are additionally impacted by the context of the movement, namely the openness or closedness of the media system for social movements’ agendas and claims. The strategical use of media to target audiences, such as political parties are particularly important for this thesis. (Corrigall-Brown & al. 2019; Earl 2019)

According to Rohlinger and Corrigall-Brown, activists employ a variety of different mass media for different audiences and purposes. For instance, the news media is best used to reach audiences as large as possible in short timeframes, while websites are best used to communicate to sympathetic audiences, who are already interested in the movement. Social media is particularly useful for targeted marketing, if the social movement is aware of the specific characteristics of its average supporter. In states, where the state has from little to no say in what is addressed in the media, movements have more opportunities to utilize various platforms of the mass media. In more closed media systems, where the state may exercise control over the media to some or to full extent, movements have access to fewer platforms, which complicates the use of the available platforms by increasing the risks of using any mass media. On the other hand, new ICTs have introduced new initiatives and platforms that movements in more closed media systems
may use for action (note specifically the previously mentioned open source software). (Corrigall-Brown & al. 2019)

The impact of the prevailing media system for the use of ICTs by social movements underscores the need to contextualise the Finnish media system for the purpose of this research. Finland has been recognised for “ideal conditions for press freedom” (Czepek et al. 2009). State-funded companies are accompanied by a strong presence of privately-owned media companies. Although some concerns in recent years have been raised about political interference in media as well as the high concentration of the Finnish media market, the Finnish media remains largely unregulated (Manninen 2016). The Finnish media system is categorized best as an open one, in which the use of various media platforms can be employed by social movements.

This thesis argues that social media is an increasingly important venue for the interactions between social movements and political parties in Finland, and that the networks of the movements and parties are detectable in Twitter. The investigation will focus on Twitter, because the platform has an image of a public and elitist social media platform, suitable for movement-party interactions. The political use of Twitter in Finland has been investigated in detail in a recent publication edited by Isotalus et al. (2018). Particularly two articles, written by Marttila and Ruoho & Kuusipalo in the piece illuminate the role of Twitter for Finnish politics and will be introduced briefly here.

Marttila investigated the ways in which Finnish politicians used Twitter in 2016. The research summarises a variety of important aspects about the Twitter use of politicians, namely members of the parliament. Some details are presented here, because they allow the contextualisation of some figures analysed in this research. The research by Marttila was conducted in March and April 2016. At the time, 161 MPs (out of 200 MPs in total) had a Twitter account and 39 did not (Marttila 2018, 69). In comparison, this research in 2020 established, that 250 MPs had a twitter user account and 36 did not, or it was not found (out of the total of 286 MPs in the 2015-2018 and 2019-parliaments). The platform is therefore popular among politicians, but the activity in the use of it is not evenly distributed among the MPs. An average MP published 12 tweets per month in 2016, but a small number of MPs tweeted most of the tweets in the investigation, while others tweeted more rarely (ibid., 70-72).
The use of the @mention-function was also investigated in the research. The MPs mentioned another user in 39.5% of the published tweets, although the tweets that mentioned another user were not dispersed evenly according to the total amount of tweets by a particular MP and some MPs used twitter for conversation much more actively than others (Marttila 2018, 73). Nevertheless, the study concluded, that Twitter was used – at least to some extent – by politicians or some politicians for online conversations (ibid. 77-79). The research draws a coherent and detailed picture of the MPs Twitter use, which seems to suggest that political discussions and interactions are a part of the MPs Twitter use. As noted by Marttila, further research is required to explore who the politicians discuss with in Twitter and what are the topics of discussion (ibid 78-79). This thesis aims to map out the discussions between climate movement organizations and activists and politicians in Twitter.

Another article in the same publication written by Ruoho and Kuusipalo researched the networks of politicians and political journalists in Twitter. They argued, that the networks of the political elites in Finland had been transmitted to Twitter after politicians adopted the use of the platform into their daily routines. The research looked at the networks between the politicians and journalists and concluded, that the actors had formed a ‘virtual elite’, which corresponded to the former structures of the political elites to some extent. This observation helps to establish the importance of researching the networks that are formed through social media interactions.

However, while the virtual elite maintained the logics of networking between politicians and journalists in Twitter, the transition to social media also developed and changed the networks by making them visible to the public. A key aspect of the research was the use of Twitter data in the investigation of the networking between politicians and journalists. The study suggests, that the tools of network analysis are particularly useful in researching the elite networks in social media. Most importantly the research shows, that the networks that were previously difficult for researchers to detect have now become publicly observable (Ruoho & Kuusipalo 2018).
4 The Environmental Movement in Finland

4.1 The History and Organizational Development of the Environmental Movement in Finland

The roots of the environmental movement are hard to place in a specific timeframe, but its first steps can be traced as far as the end of the 19th century. The development of the movement has been encouraged by the idea of nature conservation and supplemented by the slow and subtle development of the network of environmental organizations. The Finnish environmental movement’s mobilizations have been tied closely to the waves of global environmental mobilization. A brief history of the development of the environmental movement is in order, prior to a closer examination of the current climate-focused mobilization wave. This chapter aims to discuss the history of the environmental movement to contextualise the current climate mobilization, which is the point of focus in this thesis. Furthermore, the chapter introduces the organizational development of the movement, which shows the deep roots the movement has grown in Finnish soil.

The early signs of the environmental movement in Finland date back to the turn of the century, from the late 1800’s to the early 1900’s: the first environmental organization in Finland, ‘The Kuopio Nature Friends’ Association’, was founded in 1896. A few decades later, the association became a part of a national organization - the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation (Suomen Luonnonsuojeluliitto). In February 1923, the Finnish parliament passed the Nature Conservation Act, which abled the foundation of some national parks and nature reserves. The nature conservation idea was characterized by the need to protect specific areas of nature, while the idea of protecting the environment as an entity was still unfamiliar to most. Throughout the first half of the 20th century, the environmental ideology kept its focus on nature conservation. The most notable and important development of the time period was the growing interest towards nature conservation among the public, which laid the grounds for future developments. (Leikola 2008)
In 1943, the foundation of the Finnish Nature League marked a leap forward for environmental education in Finland. During the first half of the 20th century, many of the members of environmental organizations were scientists and the organizations emphasized education in a variety of forms. Among the most popular were organized excursions to the nature, first only to educated members, and later to the general public. First excursions were organized in the 1920’s by the Finnish Ornithological Association (Suomen Lintutieteellinen yhdistys). In 1975 environmental education reached the realm of mass media. Yle, Finland’s national public broadcasting company featured an educational radio programme called ‘Luontoilta’ (Nature evening) that brought environmental themes available to the large publics. Yle still produces the programme 45 years later, which showcases the value and importance given to environmental education in Finland. (Niemin 2008)

It was in the late 1960’s when the environmental ideology took its first steps towards becoming a movement: the year 1969 saw the foundation of ‘Ympäristökomitea 2000’ (environmental committee 2000), which rose against pollution and excessive consumption. The mobilization was supported by many, but not all environmentally conscious citizens. A division between more conservative and more radical supporters of the movement began to emerge. (Leikola 2008; Poutanen 2008)

After the environmental concerns took steps towards becoming a movement in 1960’s, the role of the environmental organizations changed: they were no longer private clubs for scientists but started to serve a broader ideological purpose on the national level, welcoming citizens as members. Other social movements were tied to the agenda of the environmental movement (Poutanen 2008). Environmental organizations plead a case for the institutionalization of environmental protection in Finland: suggestions were made for varying types or governance structures and policies towards environmental issues (Ruuhijärvi 2008).

Since then, the Finnish environmental movement has been characterized by waves of focus and mobilization, as new concerns arose with each decade. The development of the global perspective tied the Finnish mobilizations of the movement into the global political and environmental contexts. The 1970’s the mobilization were triggered particularly by
the global oil crisis, as well as concerns over nuclear power and energy politics. (Telkänranta 2008; Juuti 2018)

In the 1970’s, the understanding of environmental issues changed, and environmental organizations started to develop political agendas, or ‘statements’ regarding environmental issues. The year 1970 was also named a year of nature conservation. The parliament elections of the same year were referred to as the ‘protest elections’ or the ‘youth elections’, and ideas of nature conservation were added into some of the electoral programmes and campaigns. The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was organized in Stockholm in 1972, bringing attention to the global environmental concerns. (Telkänranta 2008)

The 1980’s was characterized by the increased attention that Finnish media payed towards a variety of environmental issues. Moreover, the concept of limited natural resources was introduced to the general public, although the interconnectedness of environmental issues was not yet recognized. Two significant developments occurred in the 1980’s for the institutionalization of the environmental movement. First, the Ministry of the Environment was founded in 1983, after more than a decade of work towards the establishment of the ministry. Second, the mobilizations for forest protection in Finland gave the initial spark for the foundation of the Green League, which was registered as a political party in 1988. (Telkänranta 2008; Savolainen et al. 2020)

Furthermore, in the 1980’s a division emerged among the Finnish environmental organizations: some, such as The Finnish Association for Nature Conservation distanced themselves from the daily politics and branded themselves as organizations for all environmentally conscious citizens. These organizations fell into the more conservative division of environmental organizations. Other organizations took a more radical stance - specifically the Green League and additionally some of the more protest-oriented organizations, such as Greenpeace Finland – embraced mobilization, protest activities and sought for political influence and leverage in various ways. (Poutanen 2008)
1990’s environmental movement focused on animal rights, taking strong influences from Western Europe, specifically from the United Kingdom. The young environmental activists of the 1990’s were influenced by the anarchist movement: many of them did not have connections to the more traditional environmental organizations. Instead, personal choices, such as consumption behaviour and diet were considered important. This highlights the shift in the dynamics of the environmental movement, as well as the change in the role of environmental organizations. (Stranius 2008, Konttinen & Peltokoski 2004)

Throughout the 1990’s, new environmental youth organizations, often linked to global environmental organization networks, were founded at a rapid pace. Examples include the ‘Friends of the Earth’ (Maan Ystävät) and ‘Dodo’. Older organizations took new directions. For example, WWF Finland, which was founded in 1972, started to combine two agendas: one of development aid and another of environmental protection. (Savolainen et al. 2020)

The climate has been the most prominent concern of the environmental movement throughout the 21st century and continues to characterize the current mobilization wave. The idea of the environment as an interconnected system is a central feature of today’s environmental movement, as opposed to the understanding of environmental issues as separate entities in the spirit of the early 20th century. The act on climate protection (Ilmansuojelulaki 67/1982) was passed in 1982, but its implementation was considered hardly successful (Reinikainen 2008). Organizations, first of which was WWF Finland, took some climate issues onto their agendas in the 1980’s. However, the Friends of the Earth (‘Maan Ystävät’), was behind the very first climate change campaign only a year after it’s foundation in Finland in 1997 (Savolainen et al. 2020).

In the 21st century, new organizations that specifically focus on climate issues, have joined the field of environmental organizations in Finland. Some examples include ‘Elokapina’ (the Extinction Rebellion), ‘Ilmastovanhemmat’ (Climate Parents Finland) and ‘Ilmastolakko’ (Climate strike; Fridays for future). The organizations of the environmental movement form a tight network of groups and activists, co-operating their efforts of mobilization, lobbying, education and other movement action. An example of a large-scale joint effort among not only environmental, but also development organizations has been the ‘Korvaamaton’ (Irreplaceable) – campaign in 2019. This thesis
categorizes the climate-focused mobilization as a sibling movement of the environmental movement. The climate movement can’t be separated entirely of the environmental movement, but for the purpose of the research, it’s important to specify its role as the prominent ’wave’ of the environmental movement.

4.2 The Climate Mobilization

The global ‘Fridays For Future’ climate movement started in August 2018 when Greta Thunberg (aged 15 at the time) sat down in front of the Swedish Parliament, holding a school strike for the climate. Only a year later, in September 2019, the climate movement held its third Global Climate Strike protest, inspired by the ‘Fridays For Future’ concept. 6000 protest events, with more than 7.6 million participants in 185 countries occurred simultaneously. The major wave of mobilization, characterized by a global concern is particularly interesting for the research of social movement, because it has occurred in the interface of the broader and national political contexts. The impact of neither can be dismissed.

An extensive report by de Moor et al. (2020) on the movement, particularly concerning the September protests, collectively studies the mobilization. The report combines survey data about the participants of the September protests from 15 states and 19 cities around the world. The data is compared to similar survey data collected in the Global Climate Strike of March 2019. Doing so, it highlights some key aspects about the current mobilization wave on a global level, which will be explored briefly here.

The new wave of mobilization in the frame of the climate movement emphasizes the role of youth and children not only as participants of the protests, but as initiators and organizers. The diversity of the age groups has increased since the early days of the movement. Adults were invited specifically to the September Climate Strike, which indicates, that deliberate attempts were made to increase the age diversity of the movement. Interpersonal recruitment, especially among friends, was a key aspect of the organization and mobilization of the protests. Out of the youth participants (25 years or under) more than 60 % were asked to participate and asked others to participate, and out
of the adults (26 years or older) more than 50 % were asked to participate or asked others to join (de Moor et al. 2020, 15-16).

In general, the report argues, that the climate movement is becoming increasingly well established with good prospects for continuing mobilizations. The role of Greta Thunberg as a central figure for the movement is decreasing with these developments. Most protestors were willing to engage in solution seeking, although some divisions were formed in the evaluation of possible solution models. (de Moor et al. 2020, 4-32)

The report includes a summary on the survey on the protest organized in Helsinki, Finland. The survey consisted of 340 interviews, that were randomly conducted at the protest on the 27th of September 2019. According to the statistics, 46 % of the protesters in Helsinki were 25 years or younger, and the slight majority of 54 % of protesters were 26 years or older. The September strike was successfully profiled as a strike for both youth and adults and additional effort – such as public invitations – were made to mobilize adults. This ties in with the suggestion of increasing age diversity and establishment of the movement. (Savolainen et al. 2020, 104-105)

In Helsinki, most protestors were individuals, that lacked formal ties to both environmental organizations and political parties, including party memberships or financial ties. Figure 4.1 shows that overwhelming majorities of protestors were not associated with either environmental organizations or political parties. Adults had expectedly more ties to political parties and environmental organizations, likely due to better financial possibilities and having had more time to be exposed for a number of opportunities for involvement. (Savolainen et al. 2020, 108-109)
The figures conclude that although the environmental movement is well-established and has a long history, the mobilization attracted both young and adult protestors that lacked ties to the movement organizations or political parties. The attractiveness of the protest combined with the variety of long-standing, environmental and climate organizations in the field shows that the environmental movement doesn’t lack in either temporal continuity in mobilization or relevancy and significance today.
5 Methodology and Data Collection

5.1 Research Design and Methodology

This thesis contributes towards a Nordic comparative study of the climate strikes. The research topic was partly formed, although not determined, so that it is comparable with other research simultaneously conducted in the other Nordic countries. However, the theoretical framework, research design, data and methodology were not given or fixed, but developed for this thesis specifically and separately.

Case study research design was used to investigate and explain the developments and dynamics of the relationship between the climate movement and the Finnish political parties before, during and after the electoral period. Yin (2014, 16) has defined a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the ‘case’) in depth and within its real-world context.” Following Yin (2009, 256-258), case study research design suited the research topic for two reasons. Firstly, the case covered a distinctive, if not unique set of events and circumstances: the mobilization of a global protest wave in the national context in which two elections were held within two months. Secondly, the thesis defines a theoretical framework that guided both the selection of the case and later the empirical analysis.

As introduced in the theoretical framework, the thesis focuses on the electoral contention mechanisms throughout 2019. Twitter was used to produce quantitative data of movement-party relationships. Although the movement-party relationships undoubtedly extend further than Twitter, social media can give indications of the dynamics and evolution of the relationship.

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These specifications defined the research question as: *How did Finnish political parties and environmental movement organizations interact on Twitter with the climate change movement during the electoral period, and did interaction patterns change after the elections?*

The main source of data for this study was Twitter. Twitter is the social media platform often associated with political elite communication, which makes it suitable for analysing the interaction between this elite and social movements (Ruoho & Kuusipalo 2018). The twitter data was analysed using mainly descriptive statistical analyses and tools of social network analysis. However, qualitative analysis of Tweets was incorporated where necessary to bring more detail into the analysis. The use of network analysis was inspired by Tremayne, who has studied Twitter networks of the Occupy Wall Street -movement. Tremayne has combined social movement literature and network centrality measures to draw a picture of internal movement networks in the digital era (Tremayne 2013). As discussed before, Ruoho and Kuusipalo (2018) have also researched Finnish political networks in Twitter by employing methods of network analysis. This thesis takes example of both contributions. The tools of network analysis were used to explore parts of the external, political networks of social movements, specifically relations to MPs.

According to Yin, “*the case study method is not limited to any single type of evidence or data*” (Yin 2009, 261). Case studies can and should use different types of data from various sources to reduce the possibility of a bias caused by a single data collection method and data type. Several types and sources of data were used in this thesis. Additional data on the numbers of climate protests, which was collected and provided by the Finnish Police Force was used to investigate ups and downs in the wave of mobilisation of the climate change movement. Furthermore, responses of the survey conducted in the September Climate Strike in Helsinki and observations about the nature of the protests were used to support the empirical analysis and to showcase the changing attitudes of climate protestors after the elections.
5.2 Data Collection from Social Media

Data from social media is hard – or in large scales, impossible – to collect manually. Data mining is possible to some extent from some platforms, such as Twitter. However, limitations apply to this approach too due to the interest of companies behind the platforms to prevent large-scale data collection. For example, Twitter only allows for one individual to collect up to 1,500 posts. Depending on the data set, this might constitute only a fraction of the data that exists. The most extensive data sets can be collected by commercial data importing software.

A browser-based software service, Mohawk Analytics was used to collect the data for this thesis. Mohawk uses search engine technology to collect big data from all areas of social media. It is essentially, an archive of every public post in various platforms of Finnish social media since 2015. The data is country-specific, as determined either by the use of the Finnish language or a Finnish media platform, such as the comment field of a Finnish newspaper. Any data, that does not satisfy either of the criteria may be excluded. Furthermore, only publicly available data is collected. Any data that is published in private accounts, groups or platforms is inaccessible.

Mohawk Analytics’ search tool allows to search extensive data sets with multiple search criteria. The simplest search consists of a single search word: the tool will find all public posts mentioning that word since 2015. For example, searching with the word ‘Ilmastolakko’ (Climate strike) will result 57,676 posts since 2015. The search can be specified by adding additional words to the search, excluding posts that mention certain words, selecting specific social media platforms as sources or cutting certain ones out. Particular user accounts or domains can be included into or separated from the data. Finally, the search can be limited into certain timeframes. The tool allows test searches, which show a summary of the data set, allowing the researcher to explore and adjust the search before downloading the data. Various different test searches were conducted to define a sufficient dataset.
The social media data for this study was searched using the words “Ilmastolakko” (Climate strike) OR “#Nytonpakko” (a Finnish version for #actnow). The choice of search words was carefully considered by making numerous test searches, in which summaries of data sets were evaluated, but no data was downloaded or otherwise saved or documented. The search words were the two key words used in relation to the climate movement in social media. However, the choice of the two search words might have excluded some relevant, thematic discussions from the data: for example, discussions between policy makers and climate activists on climate policies in Twitter might not be included in the data, unless the posts mentioned either of the search words. Furthermore, tweets that mentioned climate issues in relation to protests, but did not specifically mention the search words, are excluded from the data.

The timeframe was set from the 1st January 2019 to 31st December 2019. The timeframe was set to be a year, because a central goal of the research was to explore the development of movement-party interactions both before and after elections. The amount of data was extensive with the timeframe of a year: the sources for the posts initially included Twitter, Facebook, Internet forums, Instagram, news comments, blogs, Youtube and Google+ and the search produced 88,076 posts.

5.3 Processing and Analysing the Data

For this thesis, the data from Twitter was analysed, as it is the main platform for public political discussion about the climate strikes in Finland, as shown in Figure 5.1. In 2019, 78,887 tweets contained one or both of the search words, ‘Ilmastolakko’ or ‘#nytonpakko’, while only 3,471 Facebook with the search words were found. All other platforms had less than 2,000 posts with the search words published in 2019. The limitation to only analysing the data from Twitter was reasoned with it being clearly more significant for political discussion, than the other platforms, as shown in the numbers of posts published. The other social media platforms produced a combined total of less than 10,000 posts, while the number of posts in Twitter alone was close to 80,000.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Number of posts published between 1.1.-31.12.2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Twitter</td>
<td>78887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facebook</td>
<td>3471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet forums</td>
<td>2629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instagram</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News comments</td>
<td>532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blogs</td>
<td>531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youtube</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Google+</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>88076</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additionally, limiting the data to one type of post increased the coherence and comparability of the data. The initial investigation of the collected data revealed, that the data from other platforms had a variety of issues decreasing its comparability to the data from Twitter. Facebook has a lot of private users and groups that may hide large parts of the discussions and networks. Internet forums foster mostly anonymous discussions, which are unusable for network analysis. Furthermore, the anonymity allows for one user to produce a significant number of posts, which would distort the data. The same issues applied to parts of the news comments data.

Other platforms were excluded, because they were not text-based. Instagram is a photo-based platform, where the analysis of only the captions of the photos would be insufficient, because the images form the main part of the posts. A similar issue concerned Youtube, which is a video-based platform. Blogs, although an important platform for political discussions and text-based, would be analysed more accurately with qualitative research methods. Moreover, blogs are not very interactive: although most blogs include commentary sections, blog posts are one-sided in nature.
The data was first entered into Excel. The data set for each post included the contents of the post in full, the time of publication and the writer (shown as the Twitter username handle) of each post. The data was then processed by filtering it and separating four data sets accordingly.

1) Posts published by parliament members in 2019
2) Posts published by parliament members before and during the parliamentary elections in 2019
3) Posts published by parliament members after parliamentary elections in 2019
4) Posts in 2019 published by parliament members, that mention another user.

First, a list of parliament members in 2019 was collected. This included all the MPs from the 2015-2019 electoral period and those elected in the 2019 elections. The list consisted of 286 MPs. Next, the MPs twitter handles were searched using Twitter’s searches, Google searches and the websites of the MPs. As stated before, 250 MPs had a twitter user account and 36 did not or it was not found. After creating a list of all the MPs Twitter handles, the advanced filter -function in excel was used to find and extract all tweets sent out by MPs, which created data set 1. Data set 1 consisted of 891 tweets. A column for the name and the political party of each MP was added next to the posts that they had published.

For data sets 2 and 3, data set 1 was divided based on the time of publication of the Tweet. The timeframe for data set 2 was before and during elections (1.1.-14.4.2019) and for data set 3 after elections (15.4.-31.12.2019). These data sets were then categorized based on the political parties of the writers. Data set 1 was later on investigated further by filtering it once more, to separate tweets that also mention ‘vaalit’ (elections). The additional process formed a supplementary subset of the data set 1.

For data set 4, the original data set 2 was filtered again, by applying a text filter on the posts published by PMs. The Excel text filter allows to only display the data that meets set criteria. The data set was filtered with the function “CONTAINS” and the search word “*@”, to set the criteria that the post contained the @-symbol, that indicates mentioning another user in Twitter. This resulted in 70 tweets. Next, all the usernames and hashtags that were mentioned by each MP in those 70 tweets, were extracted and added into
columns next to the posts, writers and political parties of the writers. I entered the information (who was mentioned by whom) in NODEXL, a software program for social network analysis to form a network graph of the mentions.

In this thesis, the data collected from social media was analysed in the framework of electoral contention mechanisms by McAdams and Tarrow. The analysis was structured around the mechanisms and later summarised, evaluated and discussed in more general terms.

5.4 Ethics of Social Media Research

The Association of Internet Researchers (AoIR) has produced three reports, that offer ethical guidelines and recommendations for research on and about the Internet. The internet is a research realm often impacted by commercial logics and a variety – as well as lack – of public policy. As the internet offers new and extraordinary opportunities for research of many fields, it is increasingly important to discuss the ethics of Internet research. AoIR Ethical Guidelines 3.0 is the most recent publication of the association, concerning the ethics of Internet research. The report discusses the ongoing technological development of ICTs, which has raised new concerns about research ethics. Particularly relevant for this thesis are the new ethical questions concerning big data and data mining.

In the first phase of the research, the acquirement of the research data should be planned according to the principle of ‘data-minimization’. According to the principle, researchers should only acquire the data, that is essential for the research, and minimize the collection of ‘surplus data’ (Ess & al. 2019, 180). By following the principle, the research data is connected to the reasoned purpose of the research, which simplifies the necessary ethical considerations. In this thesis, the amount of data was limited by selecting a relevant timeframe – as well as search words - for the research. The search engine automatically ensured the country-specificness of the data. The data was acquired after the relevant data was selected and minimized. This research uses only publicly available data.
In the analysis-phase of the research the ethics of data processing become central. When big data is used in research, the informed consent of research subjects may pose a serious ethical dilemma, as such consent is impossible to obtain from all research subjects. However, there is a number of ways, in which researchers can ensure the professional and ethical processing of the data. Reducing the risk against research subjects is central (Franzke et al., 2020). Data collected from social media sites should be stored securely to ensure the privacy of research subjects. The data collected for this research was password-protected in two ways. Firstly, the data was downloaded on one password protected device. Furthermore, the excel-sheet, which was used to process the data, was also password-protected.

Data anonymization is a way of processing the published data to unable research subjects to be personally identified (Franzke et al., 2020). In this research, MPs are identifiable by names in some sections, or categorized by their political parties in others, where the information was necessary for the research. Furthermore, highly identifiable information (such as citations from tweets by citizens or activists) was excluded from the dataset. The activists and individuals in the data are not named. Particular attention was paid to the protection of activists’ identities, because the role of youth and children has been significant in the recent climate mobilization. Two exceptions were made. Greta Thunberg and Atte Ahokas were named in the data, because of their role as central and significant, public figures for the climate movement. After closing the research project, all data and related materials were deleted from the device used for data processing, as recommended in the ‘AoIR Ethical Guidelines’ (Franzke et al., 2020). Additionally, the data is no longer accessible to download through Mohawk Analytics.
6 Mechanisms Linking the Climate Movement and Electoral Party Politics

6.1 The Finnish Political Context and the 2019 Elections

Currently there are eighteen registered political parties in Finland. Out of the eighteen, eleven parties have had at least one MP in the parliament since 2015. The parties are the Centre party, the Left Alliance, the Social Democratic party, the Green League, the National Coalition party, the Swedish people’s party, the Finns party, the Blue Reform party, the Seven Star Movement, Movement Now and the Christian Democrats. The Blue Reform party and the Seven Star Movement lost their position in the parliament, due to winning no seats in the 2019 elections. Both parties were registered during the 2015-2018 electoral term by MPs, who separated from their initial parties: The Blue Reform party was registered in 2017 and the Seven Star Movement was registered in 2018. The other parties remained in the parliament.

Figure 6.1 shows the seats of each party, that is, the numbers of MPs in the 2015-2018 parliament and in the 2019- parliament, as well as the MEPs (Members of the European Parliament) in the 2014-2018 European parliament and in the 2019- European parliament (Eduskunta 2019; 2020; Oikeusministeriö 2019; 2014). The figure shows the division of seats at the end of the electoral term 2015-2018, because the research is focused on the politicians, who served as MPs in 2019, as well as the position of the political parties during that time.
Figure 6.1: Numbers of MPs and MEPs by political parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of MPs, 2015-2018</th>
<th>Number of MPs, 2019-2021</th>
<th>Number of MEPs, 2014-2018</th>
<th>Number of MEPs, 2019-2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centre party</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National coalition party</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic party</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Reform party</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finns party</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green League</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Alliance</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish People’s party</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democrats</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement Now</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven Star Movement</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2019 saw two elections in Finland: the parliamentary elections on the 14th of April and the European parliamentary elections on the 26th of May. The analysis will investigate the movement-party interactions in the context of these elections.

The parliamentary elections were characterised by a growing representation of young politicians and female MPs. The elections resulted in the loss of the Centre party, which was curiously the only party to remain in the government. Figure 6.1 shows the compositions of the coalition governments of the two electoral terms. The parties, which formed the government in each electoral term are highlighted as blue. The 2015-2018 government was formed by three parties in the centre-right coalition: The Centre party, the Finns party and the National Coalition party. In 2019, the government was formed by a centre-left coalition: The Social Democratic Party, the Centre party, the Green League, the Left Alliance and the Swedish People’s party. The National Coalition party and the Finns Party joined the opposition. Similarly, in the European parliamentary elections, the Centre Party lost a seat, which was gained by the Green League.
6.2 Electoral Coalitions

In electoral coalitions, movements and parties seek to side with each other for mutual benefits. The alliance provides an opportunity for the movement to access institutionalized power and the parties may increase their appeal to the voters represented by the movement. Two political parties formed a close alliance with the climate movement during their electoral campaigns in 2019. The Green League was the most obvious ally for the movement, due to its background embedded in the environmental movement. The Left Alliance also distinguished from the other parties by showing strong support for the movement. This subchapter discusses the electoral coalitions formed by the climate movement by analysing tweets published by MPs before the 2019 parliamentary elections.

Although the Green League and the climate movement both have roots in the environmental movement, they are here separated as two distinct actors in the political field. The interactions with the Green league will not be regarded as ‘internal’ relations of the climate movement, but as an alliance formed by a political party and social movement. The two actors are both embedded in the environmental movement, but since the Green League has been a long-standing and well-established political party with routine access to institutional power, it has a different position in the political realm compared to a movement. It’s also important to note here, that only 3 % of both youth and adults in the September Climate Strike in Helsinki were active members of a political party and only 3 % of youth and 11 % of adults were passive members or financial supporters of a political party, as shown later in chapter 4.2. Thus, the climate movement has a distinct interest group outside of the institutionalized political field and furthermore, outside of the organizational network of the environmental movement.

During the 2019 electoral campaign period, the Green League, the Left Alliance and the climate movement had well-aligned agendas as a part of their electoral alliance. The alignment of agendas with a political party provides some degree of access for the movement to institutionalized power if the parties emerge victorious in the elections, because the agendas translate into the subsequent government programme. On the other hand, the movement mobilization and action serve as a signal of interest in the public realm, which could increase the leverage of the ally parties to promote the agendas more
strongly. The alignment of agendas in the electoral alliances in this particular case was apparent in two ways and directions. First, the ally parties interacted with and promoted the climate movement in social media. Second, the climate movement showed public support for the ally parties. These observations will be introduced and discussed next.

Firstly, the use of the two search words in tweets shows that MPs tweeted in relation to the movement: the MPs either mentioned the movement itself or used the hashtag ‘#nytonpakko’ which was initially used by the movement activists. The use of the hashtag by MPs abled the tweet to be easily found by activists, because the hashtags groups together all the tweets concerning the movement. Furthermore, the use of the search words in itself indicates that a tweet concerns the climate movement. The MPs who mentioned the search words therefore promoted the climate movement to their audiences in Twitter. Alternatively, the use of the search words could indicate public criticism towards the movement, but this is unlikely in the case of the Green League and the Left Alliance, due to their environmental agendas and voter bases that generally consist of young and environmentally conscious voters.

The promotion of the climate strike and the hashtag ‘#nytonpakko’ by both the Green League and the Left Alliance demonstrates that the two parties supported the agendas of the climate movement particularly during electoral campaigns. Figure 6.2 showcases dataset 2: the number of tweets published by parliament members of each party prior to parliamentary elections in 2019, mentioning “Ilmastolakko” (Climate Strike) or #nytonpakko (#actnow).

Members of four parties (Movement Now, Seven Star Movement, the Blue Reform and Christian Democrats) are excluded from the figure, because the MPs of the parties did not tweet with the key words during the timeframe. It should be noted that three of these parties have few seats in the parliament, which can partly explain the lack of tweets concerning the movement. The Christian democrats had five seats, Movement Now had two seats and the Seven Star Movement had only one seat. The Blue Reform had 17 seats and do mention some environmental issues in the party’s agenda. However, the party remained reserved about environmental issues prior to the elections.
Figure 6.2: Number of tweets published by the MPs of each party before parliamentary elections in 2019, that mention either ‘Ilmastolakko’ or ‘#nytonpakko’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of tweets between 1.1.-14.4.2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Green League</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Alliance</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre Party</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Coalition Party</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish People’s Party</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finns Party</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The MPs of the Green League were the most active in mentioning ‘Ilmastolakko’ or using the ‘#nytonpakko’. Between the timeframe 1.1.-14.4.2019 the MPs published 349 tweets (59.8 % of all tweets) with the key words. The MPs of the Left Alliance were less active with 112 tweets (19.2 % of all tweets), but nevertheless more active than the MPs of the remaining parties collectively publishing less than 40 tweets each with the key words. Together, the MPs of the Green League and the Left Alliance published 78.9 % of all tweets by MPs that mention either ‘Ilmastolakko’ or ‘#nytonpakko’. To summarize, the MPs of the Green League and the Left Alliance interacted with the climate movement and promoted it by using the two key words significantly more as compared to all other political parties.

Secondly, the ally parties received support for their electoral campaigns from the movement. For instance, a joint ‘Korvaamaton’ (Irreplaceable) -campaign of environmental, climate and development organizations published a report ranking the well-established political parties. The report ranked the commitment of the parties to the suggestions of the organizations towards the government programme. The ranking was done by giving the political party a score, where the maximum score of 30 points indicated strong support for the suggestions of the organizations. The Green League was awarded 29/30 points and the Left Alliance received 24/30 points, while other parties
scored between 0-15 points each. The results of the report were published by various organizations, such as WWF Finland, during the electoral period (Korvaamaton 2019a). The purpose of the campaign was to inform voters about the environmental agendas of political parties. As a by-product however, it pinpoints that the agenda of the Green League was almost perfectly aligned with that of the organizations. Furthermore, the agenda of the Left Alliance reflected the interests of the organizations notably well. Thus, the report showed that the climate movement supported the electoral campaigns of the ally parties, because they are aligned with the interests of the organizations.

The Green League furthered their alliance with the climate movement by interacting with climate activists and the interest group members of the movement in Twitter. Figure 6.3 shows data set 4: MPs tweets with mentions of other users, with the words “Ilmastolakko” (Climate Strike) or #nytonpakko (#actnow) in 2019 as a network graph. The arrows in the graph point from the MP to whom or which hashtag they mentioned in their tweet. MP’s are presented as triangles and are colour coded based on their parties. Darker green presents the Green League, pink presents the Left Alliance, light green the Centre party, red the Social Democrats, light blue the National Coalition party and yellow the Finns party. The mentioned users and hashtags are presented as orange squares, if they are activists or as circles (colour coded if other politicians, grey if private individuals and black if hashtags). Organizational accounts are labelled, along with four of the most used hashtags.
As seen from figure 6.3, the MPs of the Green League were the most interactive in mentioning other users in their posts concerning the climate movement. While the communication with activists wasn’t extensive in Twitter, it showed signs of other relations: for example, a MP of the Green league had presented an invite to one of the activists of the climate strike movement in Finland to visit the parliament house. Only three MPs of the Left Alliance used the mention function in their tweets, although the
number of tweets concerning the climate movement was high. The MPs of other parties included some mentions in their tweets, but the number of mentions remained low along with the total number of tweets concerning the movement.

Previous research has shown, that party leaders have used the @-mention function of Twitter more frequently in recent elections, compared to before (Larsson 2017). Enli and Skogerbø (2013) have highlighted that Twitter is characterized by consistent dialogue between politicians and citizens during elections. In line with these findings, Twitter has hosted fruitful interactions between MPs (particularly those of ally parties) and the climate movement prior to the elections. The Green League’s MPs used Twitter to engage with the climate strike movement in Finland and to promote climate issues in the frames of the movement during the electoral campaigning period. The Left Alliance’s MPs used Twitter before the elections to promote the climate movement or to discuss it but did not extensively engage with it. As noted by Marttila (2018), the distribution of the tweets that use the @mention-function, is not evenly distributed. In this case, as shown in the graph, some MPs used the function extensively, while others did not use it at all. Only 23 MPs used the function in tweets that related to the movement.

The electoral alliances formed by two parties and the climate movement were reflected in the ways in which the MPs used Twitter and in the alignment of agendas as evaluated by a report published by the ‘Korvaamaton’ (Irreplaceable) -campaign. Furthermore, the alliances transcended over the boundaries of social media: some MPs participated in climate protests prior to elections. Although a systematic and empirical evaluation of the participation of politicians cannot be conducted, individual MPs tweeted about participating in the protests.

The Climate March, organized just eight days prior to the elections, was especially attractive to political parties: both the Green League and the Left Alliance had a ‘block’ in the march, encouraging both politicians and other members or supporters of the party to take part in the march. The parties’ youth organizations were involved with local Climate March events: in Kainuu, for example, the march was organized by the local youth division of the Left Alliance.
Other political parties adopted some aspects of the climate movement agendas in order to appeal to the large crowd of supporters of the movement. Although the relations between these parties and the movement cannot be considered electoral alliances, some mutually beneficial interaction occurred. The parties, that were the most consistently responsive to the demands of the movement also took part in the Climate March during the final stretch of their parliamentary election campaigns.

The three parties, that adopted some parts of the climate movement’s agenda, were the Social Democratic Party, the National Coalition Party and the Centre Party. While the Social Democratic party took a positive stand towards the climate issues, the MPs didn’t extensively participate in the public discussion on Twitter. Additionally, the Social Democrats participated in the Climate march, advertising it as an opportunity to meet their MPs as a part of their election campaign. The National Coalition party took a rational approach to the discussion focusing on proposing or discussing possible policies in regard to climate issues. Interestingly, the party also extended their environmental program for the 2019 elections. The Centre party seemed to be the most polarized in their position toward the movement. The response towards the demands of the movement varied depending on the MP in question. The Centre party did not participate in the Climate March, but individual MPs were among the participants.

**6.3 Transferable Innovations**

Elections provide a variety of political opportunities for both social movements and political parties (McAdam & Tarrow, 2013: 327). Movements and especially protests are visible signals of the demands of interest groups, which may be used by political parties. The electoral campaigns for the 2019 parliamentary elections in Finland show signs of adopting innovations both for the ally parties of the climate strikes and the opposing parties. Here, the adoption of the ‘#nytonpakko’ is used as an example for a transferable innovation in the context of Twitter. Two tweets by the MPs of the Finns party are incorporated to the analysis here in full to show, that the hashtag was used not only in relation to climate issues, but to promote other political agendas.
MPs of most major parties adopted the use of the ‘#nytonpakko’, regardless of their position towards the demands of the climate movement. The hashtag was initially used by the climate movement both globally (the international version being #actnow) and nationally. Consequently, it was detached from its original context and used to promote various agendas. While the Green League and the Left Alliance used the hashtag in connection to climate issues like the climate movement, the Finns Party used it mainly to critique the climate movement’s demands or by attaching the hashtag to other, non-climate related political issues. For example, the MPs of the Finns party mentioned the hashtag in relation to a proposed change to the incitement to racial or ethnic hatred -clause and in relation to a political scandal concerning a politician of the Social Democrat party, as shown below3.

(@maripsrantanen 2019)
"The Finns party propose a change the incitement to racial or ethnic hatred -clause. With this change, the protection of both the quoters of the bible and the best comics in the nation will be ensured. The parliament will discuss the matter next Wednesday. The matter is urgent before the start of witch fires. #nytonpakko #whythefinns"

(@sebastiantyne 2019)
"Husu [Social Democrat politician] lied about the taxi story. al-taee [Social Democrat politician] lied to journalists and voters to get to the parliament and succeeded. al-taee did’t get any punishment last summer. It says something about the gallup-panic of the SDP, that Husu was suspended from his group for 1/2 years.
#solidarity #nytonpakko"

3 The tweets have originally been published in Finnish. For the purpose of this thesis, they were translated by the author. The original tweets in Finnish can be found in the Appendix 1.
Detaching the hashtag from its initial context in this way loosens the meaning that holds for the climate movement, because the hashtag becomes associated with various political claims. The Green League and the Left Alliance perceived the hashtag to be a fruitful way to raise discussions about climate issues in a way, which appeals to their voters and shows the loyalties of the parties towards voters who support the climate movement.

In general, parties were active in adopting the climate movement’s hashtag ‘#nytonpakko’ specifically in the context of electoral campaigning. Figure 6.4 shows a comparison between data sets 2 and 3: prior to the elections, tweeting with the keywords ‘Ilmastolakko’ and ‘#nytonpakko’ was much more active than after the elections. This shows, that the more time and energy was used for the interaction between the movement and the parties prior to elections by MPs. It should be noted, that the timeframe prior to elections is only 15 weeks, while the timeframe after the elections extends to 37 weeks. Therefore, the average amount of tweets sent each day suffered a significant decrease.

Figure 6.4: Number of tweets by MP’s before and after parliamentary elections mentioning ‘Ilmastolakko’ or ‘#nytonpakko’ in 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Number of tweets</th>
<th>Weekly average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1.-14.4.2019</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>38,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.4.-31.12.2019</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>8,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, a subset of the data set 2 shows, that 35.4 % of the tweets posted by MPs prior to elections, contained the word ‘vaalit’ (elections), as specified in figure 6.5.
Figure 6.5: Number and percentage of tweets by MP’s before parliamentary elections, mentioning ‘elections’ and ‘Ilmastolakko or ‘#nytonpakko’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of tweets mentioning ‘elections’</th>
<th>% of tweets prior to elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Green League</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Alliance</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic party</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre party</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National coalition party</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish people’s party</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finns party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>207</strong></td>
<td><strong>35.4</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

The figure indicates, that taking part in the discussion about the climate movement was oftentimes related straightforwardly to elections or electoral campaigns; in line with the specification that transferable innovations are employed in the context of elections. The MPs of the Green League and the Left Alliance were the most active in mentioning elections: MPs of the Green League mentioned elections in 38.4 % of all the tweets prior to elections. The MPs of the Left Alliance mentioned elections in 33.9 % of all the tweets before the elections. The high percentages demonstrate the importance of the hashtag as a transferable innovation to particularly the allying political parties of the climate movement.

### 6.4 Proactive Mobilization

Movements may time mobilizations strategically to occur prior to elections. Electoral campaigns increase the activity of social movements, because they provide political opportunity to utilize the ‘openings’ of institutionalized politics. The proactive mobilization mechanism includes but is not limited to protesting. Other types of increased activity by a movement such as petitioning and campaigning can be regarded as proactive mobilization as well. This subchapter discusses waves of climate protesting in 2019 in Helsinki by using data collected by the Finnish Police Force. Furthermore, the
‘Korvaamaton’-campaign, which was launched prior to and acted within the context of elections to highlight climate issues is introduced here as an example of proactive mobilization of the climate movement.

Protesting was the most prominent way in which the climate movement mobilized proactively. There was a significant increase in protests prior to elections. As stated earlier, two elections occurred in Finland in 2019. First, the parliamentary elections on the 14th of April, and second, the European parliament elections on the 26th of May. Prior and during the elections, the climate movement mobilized through various organizations. Figure 6.6 shows the climate protests that occurred in Helsinki, Finland during 2019 based on statistics provided by the Finnish Police Force. The statistics show all climate-themed protests in Helsinki that the police were informed of throughout 2019 by a notification of a public meeting. Additional climate protests likely occurred outside of the national capital, but no data is collected nationally about the protests. Furthermore, the police may not have been informed of all protests. However, the statistics provided by the police are corresponding to news coverage on protests throughout the year.

Figure 6.6: Climate protests in Helsinki, during 2019 by month

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of climate protests</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The electoral period in March, April and May saw an increase in the frequency of climate mobilizations. May is the most active month with 20 protests, but it should be noted, that the number of protests includes two climate campaigns by Greenpeace, consisting of 10 protests in total. However, the timing of the protest campaigns is nevertheless considered strategic according to proactive mobilization. Additionally, the numbers do not include the weekly ‘Fridays with Greta’, which were organized 52 times in 2019, with approximately 5-20 participants per protest. A second wave of mobilization occurred in September, but with lower frequency of protests. The data corresponds to the proactive mobilization mechanism, showing that the climate movement mobilized prior to elections in greater frequency than after elections. The data also shows, that the climate movement mobilized continuously by organizing a school strike weekly. The continuity of the
mobilization suggests, that the movement is well-established and persistent with its claims.

The electoral period of the year saw not only more frequent protesting, but more large-scale mobilizations of protest, compared to the post-election period. Three large-scale protests were organized in April, all occurring prior to the elections on the 14th of April. The second wave of mobilization in September and October included one large-scale protest. Figure 6.7 shows the climate protests with more than 50 participants, as estimated by the Finnish Police Force.

*Figure 6.7: Climate protests with more than 50 participants in Helsinki, during 2019 by month*

<table>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of large-scale climate protests</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The climate movement mobilized in larger scale prior to elections. It is possible, that the protests were more attractive to the general public prior to elections or that more resources were used to encourage the mobilization prior to elections. Both explanations support the claim, that protesting was viewed as more effective prior to elections, because more people were willing to pay the costs of participating and recruiting others to participate. In summary, the opening of the institutionalized politics in the electoral period provoked opportunity for mobilization and especially climate protesting, and increased interest of citizens to take part.

In addition to protesting the climate movement organizations mobilized strategically in the context of the elections. The ‘Korvaamaton’ -campaign highlighted climate issues in connection to the parliamentary elections. The campaign stressed the importance of the 2019 parliamentary elections for the climate. The front page of the campaign website states that “The spring 2019 elections resolve whether Finland commits to climate politics in accordance with the 1.5 °C goal. Our campaign, along with citizens, aims to remind politicians about what is irreplaceable to us Finns. This is how we will help future MPs
to make priorities”4 (Korvaamaton 2019b). Thus, the campaign is aiming to mobilize through organizations and encourage citizen involvement to express and underscore climate issues and concerns to politicians. The future MPs are mentioned in particular as a target of the campaign. Therefore, the campaign is an example of proactive mobilization, which occurs prior to elections and aims to grasp the political opportunity offered by the opening of institutionalized politics.

6.5 Polarization of Parties

The polarization of parties -mechanism spans over multiple interlinked and reactive events, describing possible paths of consequences that stem from the functions of the mechanisms prior to the elections. First of all, movements that have allied with the parties that emerge victorious in elections, may mobilize after the election. Possible consequences of this include the strengthening of the agenda of the governing party or increasing tensions either within the party or between the ally party or parties and the movement. A conflict between the movement and the party is a possible implication of the mobilization. This subchapter analyses the second wave of mobilization from this perspective, mapping a variety of developments in movement-party relations after the elections.

Throughout September, October and November in 2019, a total of 8 protests - one of which exceeded 50 participants - were organized by the climate movement. The most notable one was the Global Climate Strike on the 27th of September. Although the timing of the strike was determined by a global strand of the climate strike movement, the attractiveness of the strike to participants (estimates varied between 2,000 and 18,000 protestors), along with the 7 other protests during the three months in question indicate that the second wave of mobilization was nationally significant. The second protest wave differed from the first one: the post-election period showed clear signs of increasing tensions between the movement and the governing parties, especially the Green League, as predicted by the polarization of parties -mechanism. Two indications of the mechanism

4 The quote has originally been published in Finnish. For the purpose of this thesis, it translated by the author. The original quote in Finnish can be found in the Appendix 2.
can be found: first, the distancing of the parties from the climate movement by themselves and second, the reactive mobilization wave.

The ally parties of the climate movement, the Green League and the Left Alliance emerged victorious in the elections. The Green League increased the number of seats in the parliament from 15 to 20 seats and the Left Alliance increased the number of seats from 12 to 16 seats. Both parties made their way from the opposition to the government along with the Social Democratic Party, the Swedish People’s Party and the Centre Party. Joining a coalition government compels political parties to adjust and compromise their agendas to find a common ground with the coalition. However, the strong position of environmental and climate issues in the government programme suggests that the parties in government agreed to prioritize climate issues.

Although the government programme was characterized by a strong environmental stance, the Green League and the Left Alliance took distance from the climate movement after the elections. The ally parties of the climate movement possibly loosened their ties to the movement due to the challenge of transitioning from the electoral arena to policy making in the institutionalized political realm. The changing role of the individual politicians from electoral candidates to MPs may also account for a change in the use of Twitter. A detailed comparison between the data sets 2 and 3 demonstrates how the movement-party relations changed after the electoral period.

Figure 6.8 shows that the parties that formed the government in the 2019 elections (blue in the fourth and fifth column) tweeted less about the movement after the elections, compared to the number of tweets published before the elections. For example, the MPs of the Green League published an average of 99.7 tweets in a month mentioning ‘Ilmastolakko’ or ‘#nytonpakko’ prior to the elections, whereas after the elections the number of tweets dropped drastically, to only 16.6 per month. Similarly, the number of tweets posted by the MPs of the Left Alliance dropped from 32 tweets per month to only 4.4 tweets per month.

The Centre Party was the only party to remain in the government. However, the party lost 18 seats in the parliament. The MPs of the Centre party tweeted slightly less after the elections even if the loss of seats is considered: The monthly average of tweets per MP
decreases from 0.21 to 0.13 tweets. The Centre Party seems then to follow a similar logic to the other parties, which joined the government, although the party isn’t characterized as an ally party of the climate movement.

Curiously, the MPs of the Finns Party slightly increased the number of tweets about the climate movement after the elections. The increase in the number of tweets could be an implication of transitioning from the government to the opposition and result to increase in criticism towards the climate movement and strong climate politics driven by the government. Alternatively, the increase in tweets could be a result of adaptation to the climate movements agendas in order to appeal to new voter bases. However, based on the tweets by the MPs of the Finns Party presented in the section 6.3, the former is likely true for the Finns Party, that is ideologically distant from the climate movement. Although the number of tweets published by the MPs of the Finns Party increased after the elections, the average number of tweets remained less than two tweets published monthly. Thus, the increase was notable statistically, but the total amount of criticism remained insignificant.

Figure 6.8: Numbers of tweets by MPs mentioning ‘Ilmastolakko’ or ‘#nytonpakko’ before and after elections in 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of tweets before elections</th>
<th>Monthly average</th>
<th>Number of tweets after elections</th>
<th>Monthly average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Green League</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>99.7</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Alliance</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre Party</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Coalition Party</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish People's Party</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finns Party</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>166.9</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For the National Coalition Party, a closer look of the tweets indicates that the party remained supportive towards the climate movement after the elections. The monthly average of tweets decreased slightly but the MPs of the party sustained their positive stand towards the climate movement. For example, the chairperson of the party, Petteri Orpo tweeted on the 27th of September the following:\textsuperscript{5}

“I don’t think there is a reason for suspicion over the motives of children and youth. By far, the biggest reason to participate in #climatestrike is the concern towards the future of the earth. Solutions require political decisions in Finland but particularly globally. Full support to stricter climate politics.”

(@petteriorpo 2019)

The National Coalition party and the Finns party took different approaches towards the climate movement after the elections. While the MPs of the Finns Party tweeted more mentioning ‘Ilmastolakko’ or ‘#nytonpakko’, the MPs of the National Coalition decreased the number of tweets slightly. Nevertheless, both parties remained a similar stance towards climate issues before and after the elections. The Finns Party remained critical towards climate issues and climate politics, whereas the National Coalition remained rationally supportive in tone.

To summarize, the post-electoral period saw a variety of developments in the movement-party relations. MPs of the parties that formed the coalition government after the elections tweeted less about the movement after elections. The trend was particularly apparent with the ally parties: The Green League and the Left Alliance. The parties that joined the opposition didn’t change positions: while the Finns Party underscored their sceptical stance, the National Coalition Party tweeted moderately in support of climate issues.

The climate movement did not react with an immediate response after the elections. However, the mobilization of the September climate strike – along with other protests throughout the second wave - showed a rising criticism towards the governing parties.

\textsuperscript{5} The tweet was originally published in Finnish. For the purpose of this thesis, they were translated by the author. The original tweets can be found in the Appendix 3.
For example, politicians were forbidden to talk in the protest, unlike in many of the spring protests, where politicians were scheduled to speak to the protestors. Before the elections politicians participated in the protests actively: political parties had ‘blocks’ in the climate march and held speeches in the climate strikes. This indicates that the climate mobilization was inclusive towards the electoral candidates, particularly of the ally parties.

The second mobilization wave showed that the political parties and the climate movement were on opposite sides. MPs were criticized for participating in protests, excluding them from the mobilization. Furthermore, the protestors were critical towards politicians and the government in their slogans, which included, for example “Että ne kehtaa!” (“How dare you!”) and “Edustajat esille” (“Bring out the representatives!”) (Siren et al. 2019). The growing tension characterized by the September climate strike showed an increasing distance between the demands of the movement and the agendas of the governing, former ally parties.

Responses of the survey conducted in the September Climate Strike in Helsinki indicate that the demands of the protestors for the government concerned stricter policies on climate issues (Savolainen et al. 2020). The protestors evaluated statements regarding solutions for climate change. The first statement was “Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs” and the second was “The governments should act on what climate scientists say even if the majority of people are opposed”. Figures 6.9 and 6.10 show, that a majority of protestors agreed with the statements, demanding priorization of climate issues above other political matters from the government. Only a small minority disagreed with the statements or did not have an opinion. In general, the youth was more hesitant about the statements than adults, but more than 80 % of both youth and adults agreed or strongly agreed with the statements.
Figure 6.9: 1st statement: “Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs”

![Helsinki 27 September 2019 (N=340)](image)

- Youths:
  - Strongly agree: 39%
  - Agree: 42%
  - Neither disagree nor agree: 13%
  - Disagree: 6%
  - Strongly disagree: 1%

- Adults:
  - Strongly agree: 49%
  - Agree: 44%
  - Neither disagree nor agree: 5%
  - Disagree: 11%

The government must act on what climate scientists say even if the majority of people are opposed.

Figure 6.10: 2nd statement: “The governments should act on what climate scientists say even if the majority of people are opposed”

![Helsinki 27 September 2019 (N=340)](image)

- Youths:
  - Strongly agree: 53%
  - Agree: 30%
  - Neither disagree nor agree: 13%
  - Disagree: 3%

- Adults:
  - Strongly agree: 72%
  - Agree: 25%
  - Neither disagree nor agree: 3%

Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs.
The responses combined with a more critical and exclusive attitude towards politicians further support the claim that the protest was characterized by the movement demanding an even stronger position from the government towards climate issues. In summary, the response of the movement was characterised by protests and critique towards the government. Although the government imposed a strong environmental stance in the government programme, the ally parties took some distance from the climate movement. Possible explanations include the transition from the electoral period to policy making and the changing roles of the electoral candidates to MPs. The reaction of the movement to the change in movement-party relations after elections, in line with the polarization of parties-mechanism, was an implication of the increasing distance between the demands of the movement and the agendas of the governing alliance parties.

6.6 Discussing the Mechanisms of Movement-Party Interaction in the Finnish Political Context

To conclude the analysis, this subchapter summarizes and discusses the mechanisms of movement-party interaction in the Finnish political context. The developments and dynamics of the movement-party relations were analysed in the framework of electoral contention: four mechanisms of movement-party interaction were used to explore and to explain the interactions in the context of elections. Although each of the mechanisms individually maps out interesting and significant developments in the movement-party interactions, they must be discussed as a compilation of intersecting and mutually dependent shifts and responses, to draw out a coherent image of the relationship between the climate movement and political parties in Finland. The recent climate movement mobilization has been a global phenomenon, but it has created turmoil in the national political realm. The climate movement mobilization overlapped with two national elections, creating unique circumstances for a case study research.

The impact of the two elections, especially the parliamentary elections for the developments and dynamics of the movement-party relations was undeniable, based on the data. Prior to the elections, the climate movement formed two electoral alliances with the Green League and the Left Alliance. The ally parties are popular among the youth and have previously raised climate issues on to their agendas, making them natural allies for
the movement. Particularly the Green League’s alliance was not surprising, given its roots in the environmental movement.

The tight ties between the allied were characterized by mutually beneficial activities: the parties received support for their agendas from the movement during the electoral campaigns and the parties promoted climate issues, specifically in the frameworks of the climate movement in social media. Additionally, the ally parties participated in the Climate March prior to elections, protesting alongside with the climate movement. The network analysis of the twitter conversations showed, that the MPs of the Green League discussed climate issues with activists and other individuals in the context of the movement and used the movement’s hashtag in their tweets. Mutual promotion of climate issues and well-aligned agendas were valuable to both actors.

Most other parties, such as the Social Democrat Party and the National Coalition Party adjusted parts of their electoral campaign agendas by committing to some climate policies. The MPs of these parties used Twitter to interact with the movement but did not form alliances with it. The moderate public support shown by the Social Democrat Party and the National Coalition Party was likely an attempt to appeal to new voters in the upcoming elections. The global and the national scale and frequency of the mobilization allowed the climate movement to effectively indicate the demand of the public for stricter climate policies. In general, the climate movement enjoyed strong or moderate support from most major parties, excluding the Finns Party. Some MPs of the Finns Party used Twitter to criticize the climate movement. However, extensive criticism towards the climate movement was not voiced by any political party during electoral campaigning.

All major parties picked up a transferable innovation of the climate movement (the use of the ‘#nytonpakko’) in Twitter prior to elections, regardless of their stance towards the climate movement. The parties that showed either strong or moderate support for the climate movement used the hashtag in connection to climate issues, in line with its initial meaning. The adoption of the hashtag can be viewed as an extension of the support shown by the parties to the movement. Furthermore, the use of the hashtag allowed for politicians to voice the importance that they placed on climate issues in the context of their electoral campaigns. The tweets concerning the climate movement often referred to elections or electoral campaigns directly by mentioning ‘elections’, which is a further indication that
the innovations were employed in the context of elections, as electoral contention suggests.

The MPs of the Finns Party took a different approach to the use of the hashtag. The MPs detached the hashtag from its original connection and used it ignorantly or possibly even sarcastically to promote other political agendas. The detachment of the hashtag from its original context suggests some degree of underlying conflict between the party and the climate movement, because the hashtag was adapted to criticize political parties that had showed support towards the climate movement. Attaching the hashtag to discussions about other political agendas decreases the possibility of the climate movement to keep using it for the promotion of climate issues or for effective mobilization.

The proactive mobilization mechanism pays attention to strategically timed mobilization of movements in the context of elections. The climate movement mobilized not only more frequently, but in larger scale prior to the elections in 2019. Out of the nine protests that were organized in April, three had more than 50 participants. Interestingly, all the large-scale protests occurred within the first half of the month, before the elections on the 14th. Other forms of mobilization included the cooperative ‘Korvaamaton’ -campaign, which acted specifically in the context of elections and further demonstrated the alignment of the agendas of the ally parties and the climate movement. The opportunity for effective and strategically timed mobilization was seized by the climate movement. It can be claimed, that the timing of the mobilization was determined by the waves of the global mobilization, especially in regard to climate protesting. However, the success of the mobilization – that is, the interest of citizens to take part specifically prior to the elections shows that the national political context and electoral campaigns encouraged the mobilization. It is also likely, that climate organizations used more resources to encourage mobilization prior to elections. However, this should be considered further evidence on the strategic nature of the mobilization.

The electoral coalition mechanism, the transferable innovations mechanism and the proactive mobilization mechanisms combined draw a coherent image of the relationships between the climate movement and the political parties before the elections. The opening of the institutional realm of politics allowed both the movement and the parties to strategically show mutual support for climate agendas. For the movement, the benefits
included a possibility to impact climate policies in the institutional realm of politics through an alignment of agendas with political parties. The ally parties gained a possibility to strengthen their climate agendas and to attract voters through the movement. The parties that showed moderate support were able to attract new voters and to position the party to side rather than to oppose the movement, in the fear of repelling voters. The lack of clearly articulated, extensive criticism towards the climate movement from political parties demonstrates that opposing the movement was deemed difficult. The effectiveness of the climate movement mobilization prior to the elections is demonstrated – if not by the electoral results – the strong position and commitment of the government programme towards strict climate policies.

The second mobilization wave occurred between September and November and was well characterized by the polarization of parties -mechanism, although the name of the mechanism wasn’t the most descriptive in this particular case. Nevertheless, the mechanism offers a useful framework for explaining the developments of the movement-party relations in the post-electoral period. The first observable development was the distancing of the ally parties from the climate movement, at least in Twitter. A possible motivation could have been a need to balance between a more diverse set of agendas. However, it is also possible that the ally parties and the MPs merely transitioned from the electoral period to policy making and from the role of electoral candidates to MPs. Further research investigating changes in the Twitter use of MPs before and after the elections could shed more light on the underlying explanation for the decrease in the number of tweets after the elections. It’s possible that the MPs tweet less altogether, compared to electoral candidates, which could – at least to some extent – serve as a further explanation for the changes in Twitter use in this context. Alternatively, MPs in the government might tweet less compared to MPs in the opposition. However, in this case the decrease in tweeting was so significant for the ally parties that it appeared to at least cause distancing from the movement if it was not a result of it.

Although this research argues that the Green League and the Left Alliance took distance from close electoral alliance with the climate movement it has not looked at how the electoral campaigns were translated to the government programme. The 2019 – government has announced significant changes towards more ambitious climate change
policy, which indicates that perhaps the agendas of the climate movement have indeed impacted the realm of institutionalized politics through the electoral alliances.

The MPs of all other parties in the 2019-parliament tweeted less about the movement after the elections, excluding the Finns Party. The MPs of the Finns Party slightly increased their tweeting, establishing a clearer critical stance. It is possible, that the climate movement or criticism towards climate policies were used by the Finns Party as a tool of opposition politics. It should be noted however, that the National Coalition remained rationally and moderately supportive of the climate movement despite joining the opposition, although the MPs of the party tweeted slightly less in support of the climate movement after the elections. The changes in interactions with the climate movement could be dependent on the nature of the relationship prior to the elections rather than on the results of the elections. All parties that showed strong or moderate support to the climate movement showed a shift to more modest public support. The Finns Party was the only party to take a critical stance towards the movement prior to the elections and the only one to stiffen the position after the elections.

The second observable development of the polarization of parties-mechanism was the responsive mobilization of the climate movement. The mobilization was not immediate: it occurred between October and November 2019. The timeline was possibly impacted by the global mobilization that set the date for the September climate strike, but again the attractiveness of the protest to the citizens shows the significance of the mobilization in the national context. The mobilization was different in nature, when compared to the earlier wave of mobilization: it was characterized by criticism towards politicians unlike the protests prior to the elections. Notably, politicians were forbidden to speak in the former, but invited to do so in the latter.

The closeness of the electoral coalition compared to the growing distance between the movement and the political parties indicates that the political parties either purposely distanced themselves from the movement or retreated to the institutional realm of policy making and consequently loosed the ties to the movement. Furthermore, the distance between the demands of the movement and the agendas of the governing alliance parties increased after the elections, resulting in tensions in the relationship. While the political parties in parliament are constrained by the institutional structure, the climate movement
is a social movement that lacks constraints posed by any political structures. Therefore, the climate movement was possibly able to demand stricter climate policies during the second mobilization wave. During the electoral period the movement’s agendas were strategically aligned with the political parties, as demonstrated by the ‘Korvaamaton’-campaign. The inability of the MPs in government to respond to the increasing demands of the movement, as compared to the ability of the electoral candidates to respond to the interests of the movement is a possible explanation for the emerging criticism from the movement towards the politicians. Perhaps the alliances the climate movement formed prior to the elections with campaigning political parties, shifted towards a conflicting relationship with government parties facing restrictions imposed by the institutional structure of the parliament.
7 Conclusion

This final chapter concludes the thesis and presents main arguments and critical accounts of the research. The chapter also introduces various topics for further research. The research question for this thesis was “How did Finnish political parties and environmental movement organizations interact on Twitter with the climate change movement during the electoral period, and did interaction patterns change after the elections?”

In order to answer the question, the research has investigated the development and dynamics of the relationship between the climate movement and the political parties during the electoral period in Finland. For this purpose, data was collected using a timeframe of a year, which enabled a fruitful investigation of the research topic. The research focused on the mechanisms of interaction of these two actors in Twitter throughout 2019. The theoretical framework of electoral contention offered a good framework for the investigation of the movement-party relationships in this case. The four mechanisms that were used in the analysis successfully explored, categorized and explained the dynamics of the interactions between the climate movement and political parties in Finland, highlighting the undeniable impact of elections.

In summary, the data shows, that 1) The Green League and the Left Alliance formed tight and mutually beneficial ties with the environmental movement prior to the elections, 2) The environmental movement mobilized more frequently and in larger scale prior to the elections in 2019 than after the elections, 3) the alliance formed by the Green League, the Left Alliance and the environmental movement took steps back after the elections, as the parties took distance from the movement and the movement in turn, criticized the parties now in government. The climate movement received either strong or moderate support from all political parties, excluding the Finns Party. While other parties emphasized their supportive stance before the elections, the Finns Party stiffened their critical stance only after the electoral period.
The interaction between the climate movement and MPs in Twitter was reflective of these developments. Indicators, that showcased the mechanisms of interaction included changes, particularly decreases in the numbers of tweets, the contents of the tweets and the discussions attended by MPs in the context of the climate movement in Twitter. The waves of mobilization in Helsinki gave further indications of the nature and development of the relationship. Protesting was supplemented by the cooperative ‘Korvaamaton’-campaign.

The framework of mechanisms was shown to be useful for the research of movement-party interactions and accurately described its dynamics. However, the contentious politics literature could benefit from additional consideration of the variety of aims social movements may have. The climate movement is deep rooted and well-established, with persistent and major claims of interest. It is clear that although the climate movement aims to affect political decision making on different levels and in various ways, it is somewhat pessimistic about the impact it may have in the realm of politics. The movement has consequently emphasized the impact of both individuals and large-scale cultural change as a solution to climate change. The motivations of the movement outside of the institutional political realm impacts the nature of its mobilizations. The set of goals of the movement are inevitably linked to each other, which creates challenges for the separate investigation of the aims. Linking the mechanisms not only to the political context, but the cultural – and global - contexts of mobilization could provide an even clearer image of the strategies employed by the climate movement. Although researching the political ambition of the climate movement is a part of the puzzle, other pieces of the image remain hidden.

Moreover, the electoral contention approach is somewhat vague in considering the specific venues in which interaction between movements and parties take place. This thesis has shown, that social media can be researched as a venue of these interactions in more open media systems. It is important to recognize that movements use a variety of social media platforms tactically, depending on their targets and goals. However, previous research has shown, that Finnish politicians use twitter for building ‘virtual elites’ and for communication with citizens. The finding is in line with this thesis. The public social media discussion concerning the climate movement was the most active in Twitter: the search words ‘Ilmastolakko’ and ‘#nytonpakko’ produced close to 80,000
tweets, compared to less than 10,000 posts that were published in the other major social media platforms altogether. The ability of social movements to target policy makers in Twitter can allow social movements to build ‘virtual elites’ with politicians. The blurring boundaries between interacting and building networks and relationships can have implications for the role of social movements and their position in the collective ‘conflict and alliance’ structure of politics.

Further research should be conducted on various realms of movement-party relations. The relationships between the climate movement and policy makers are likely to have deep roots under the public blanket of Twitter. A more traditional network analysis would complement the one conducted in this thesis. The research could also benefit from analysis framed by the three other strands of literature explored in chapter 3. Especially the employment of the agenda-setting power of approach to research the possible access of climate organizations to institutionalized power through the agendas of political parties would be a welcomed future contribution.

Studying this case has produced sample material for examining the interaction of social movements and political parties around the issue of climate change and in the interface of global and national political contexts. Furthermore, it has added to the inspiring strand of research in communication studies, that looks into the political use of social media in Finland. In pursuing these results, it has accepted both challenges and directions from various strands of literature and aimed to combine inspiring perspectives to grasp the connections between social movements and political parties in social media. The research of the field offers major opportunities, which will hopefully be seized by a growing number of other researchers in the future.
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Appendix

1 Tweets by @maripsrantanen and @sebastianthyne

@maripsrantanen
Perussuomalaiset esittävät muutosta kiihottaminen kansanryhmää vastaan-pykälään. Tällä muutoksella suojataan niin raamatun siteeraajia kuin maan parhaita koomikoita. Eduskunta keskustelee asiasta ensi kesväällä. Asialla on kiire ennen rovioiden alkamista. #nytonpakko #siksips

@sebastianthyne
Husu valehteli taksitarinan. al-Tae valehteli toimittajille & äänestäjille päästämään eduskuntaan ja onnistui. al-Tae ei saanut viime kesänä mitään rangaistusta. Jotain SDP:n Gallup-paniikista kertoo se, että Husu erotettiin 1/2 vuodeksi ryhmästä. #solidaarisuus #NytOnPakko

2 ‘Korvaamaton’-campaign website

‘Korvaamaton’-campaign
“Kevään 2019 vaaleissa ratkaistaan se, tekeekö Suomi ilmastopoliittikaa, joka on 1,5 asteen tavoitteen mukaista. Kampanjamme tavoitteena on yhdessä kansalaisten kanssa muistuttaa poliitikkoja siitä, mikä on meille suomalaisille korvaamatonta. Tällä tavalla autamme tulevia kansanedustajia panemaan asiat tärkeysjärjestykseen.”

3 Tweet by @petteriorpo

@petteriorpo
Minusta lasten ja nuorten motiveja ei ole syytä epäillä. Ylivoimaisesti suurin syy osallistua #ilmastolakko'on on huoli maapallon tulevaisuudesta. Ratkaisuun tarvitaan poliittisia päätöksiä Suomessa, mutta erityisesti maailmalla. Täysi tuki tiukemmalle ilmastopoliittikalle.