

# Epilogue

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The general objective of this anthology has been to discuss the role of non-state actors in the military supply systems in the early modern Swedish Realm. This includes entrepreneurial officers in the army, burghers in the towns, and peasants in the countryside. Officers are here included with non-state actors alongside burghers and peasants because during the 16th and 17th centuries they more closely resembled private entrepreneurs than public servants. The two main questions are: in what ways did the Swedish government engage civilians in supply operations, and what kind of special supply challenges did the northern, vast and sparsely populated realm have compared to other European powers?

This is not the first book to argue that civilians had an important role to play in military supply systems. However, most of the studies on military history in Sweden and Finland have focused on wartime operations, especially on the challenges the armies encountered when trying to acquire the victuals or the horse

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fodder they needed from the local population. Moreover, plenty of attention has been paid to conscriptions and recruitments, which were arguably the biggest military burdens for civil society. The purpose of this collection is to complement the overall picture by bringing to the discussion new actors, such as small-town burghers, and by also including peacetime operations to the analysis. In this way, the book seeks to enhance our understanding of the total costs and benefits of the militarisation of the early modern Swedish Realm.

According to Charles Tilly's well-known theory, early modern governments had three ways to mobilise private resources: coercion, markets or a combination of the two. As regards coercion, Tilly refers principally to taxation and conscriptions, but coercive methods were also used in actual supply operations. As shown in the chapters of this anthology, the Swedish crown utilised all three of these models, with varying effects and results.

The production of saltpetre is a good example of coercion. The saltpetre factories were owned by the state, but the acquisition of raw materials (dung, ash, firewood, straw etc.) was based on forced deliveries. As Mirkka Lappalainen writes in her chapter, the crown forced peasants to give up an important part of their life-saving manure to feed the endless demands of warfare. The oppressive nature of the system made it susceptible to insubordination, disobedience and loitering. The same conclusion applies to the billeting of soldiers, as the burghers did not house garrison soldiers because it was profitable but because it was their duty. According to Sofia Gustafsson, the billeting obligation was a constant source of complaints and tensions in Helsinki during the 1750s, when local burghers had to share their houses with hundreds of soldiers from all over the country.

Inland, the peasants were forced to maintain bridges and roads for the use of the troops of the crown, as well as to provide them and their horses with shelter and nutrition, as Anu Lahtinen discusses in her chapter. For some of the peasants, the troop movements also offered opportunities to make small profits by selling spirits to the soldiers, but the overall burden grew constantly at

the turn of the 17th century, increasing tax arrears. The crown also resorted to coercion-based resource mobilisation during the Great Northern War, when it tried to press the peasants to buy crown farms against their own intention, and in the early phases of the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743, when peasants and burghers had to bake bread for the army because there were not enough crown bakeries in Finland.

At first sight, the use of coercion might create an image of a strong state, capable of forcing its subjects to serve their ruler's military ambitions. To some extent, this conception might be true, but there was another side to this coin. The Swedish crown resorted to forcing not just because of its superior administrative capabilities but because it did not have any other option. Towns were small in Finland, resources were limited, and the infrastructure was underdeveloped. It is revealing that during the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743 the crown had to buy bread from the baker's guild of Stockholm, as the bakers in Finland did not have enough ovens. Likewise, there was almost no one to sell bricks and lime in Finland, when the crown began to construct bakeries during the early phases of the campaign, and consequently the construction materials had to be transported from Stockholm.

Both the proponents and opponents of the military revolution theory have presented the Swedish Realm as a model case of an effective bureaucratic state – the former treating it as a European norm, the latter as a European anomaly. However, as several chapters in this anthology suggest, its effectiveness had its limits. The administration excelled in its core tasks like collecting taxes for the king or rounding up men for the wars but was often in trouble in front of more complex or unexpected missions when there was a lack of reliable information.

This is not to say, however, that supply markets were non-existent. Quite the contrary. The chapters of this book suggest that, in certain situations, markets had an important albeit relatively unexplored role in wartime and peacetime operations. The merchants were often more flexible than the public administration in organising the supply, and also better connected to the European

finance markets. During the Great Northern War (1700–1721), the burghers of Nyen provided the army with victuals and other necessities, and in the spring of 1713 the supply of the army and navy units in Finland was practically privatised to one person, Johan Henrik Frisius. A single merchant – and a refugee from his destroyed hometown, for that matter – had better credit standing on international markets than the Swedish crown itself.

The Ingrian War (1609–1617) is another interesting example. According to Jaakko Björklund, the Swedish crown would probably have lost the campaign without the private credit offered by several high-ranking officers. The commanders used their personal connections and resources to pay soldiers' salaries and to buy victuals and clothes for them, and they acted as necessary intermediaries by raising funds from the private sector to the ruler they served at any given time.

Some cases even indicate that Swedish decision makers, at times, relied too much on the possibility of utilising markets and civilian actors in supply. The construction period of sea fortress Sveaborg is a prime example of this. When the construction began in 1748, the army came to Helsinki with the intention of outsourcing both the maintenance of the construction site and the accommodation of the workers and soldiers to the local burghers. However, the burghers were too few in numbers and too afraid of the loss of their autonomy to take full advantage of all the possibilities, and the army had to resort to its own production. The soldier billeting system faced similar problems, as the burghers were unable to lodge the soldiers along the official accommodation prescripts and the crown had to both bend the regulations and resort to barrack-building.

Overall, David Parrott is probably right when arguing that the officers, burghers and other civilians engaged in supply operations extended the central government's administrative power, and for that reason the outsourcing was an efficient means of mobilising military resources. However, the use of markets was possible only if there were profits to be made. Otherwise, the cooperation began to resemble coercion.

The case of Nyen is illustrative in that respect. As Kasper Kepsu writes in his chapter, the crown had difficulties getting credit from wealthy merchants in Swedish cities during the Great Northern War because normal trade yielded a much greater profit than the government was able to offer. The situation was different in Finland, near the operational area. The small-town burghers were willing to do business with the army and navy, because they did not have better alternatives. Military operations disrupted normal trade, and consequently it was better for the merchants to use their connections to provision the troops than to fall into poverty.

As regards the 17th-century officers, also they were motivated by prospective profits. The high-ranking officers were willing to finance the Ingrian War from their own pockets because they were confident that their king would reward them sometime in the future – if not in money, then in land grants or high positions in the crown administration. Had the king not done so, he would have risked the loyalty of his officers. Moreover, military campaigns offered always other sources of revenues than just earned income such as supply trade or looting. Officers who allowed their units to disintegrate would lose these revenues.

According to Jaakko Björklund, the Swedish crown was highly dependent on the services of foreign aristocrats during the Ingrian War. Some of them joined the war to gain experience in command, and they were not willing to use their own funding to wage the war. However, there were also military migrants who wanted to make a career in the Swedish army, and they were more eager to invest their own resources. These cases affirm Jan Glete's argument that private actors preferred to cooperate with strong rulers capable of actually ruling their territories, although Glete did not develop his theory to analyse military enterprising. He was more interested in foreign trade and state–merchant relationships.

The Swedish kings preferred to acquire the maintenance for their army from civilians, either by coercion or cooperation, but the preconditions of their northern realm set serious limits on their attempts to act like their counterparts in Western and Central Europe. Although the privatised maintenance was in many

cases surprisingly effective, the crown could never fully count on it. The Ingrian War of 1610–1617 and the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743 offer a fruitful parallel: in the former, private entrepreneurs turned the war into a military victory, whereas in the latter the lack of private entrepreneurs turned the war into a military disaster. This uncertainty forced the Swedish Realm to maintain a strong governmental machine. The stronger the state, the better chances it had of using private resources in military supply.