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Master's Thesis

**Somaliland's Model of State Building and the EU
Perceptions**

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CONTENTS

1- INTRODUCTION.....	4
1.1- Background and Political Context of Somalia	7
1.1.1- Somaliland Political Context and Background.....	9
1.2. The EU and Somalia.....	12
1.3. Conceptual Framework, Research Questions and Methodology.....	13
1.3.1. State-Formation.....	13
1.3.2. Research Questions.....	17
1.3.3. Research Methodology and Data Collection Techniques.....	18
2- CONSTRUCTING SOMALILAND.....	21
2.1. Military Regime, Ogaden War and the Rise of the Somali National Movement (SNM).....	23
2.1.1. Ogaden War and Its Consequences (1977-1978).....	24
2.1.2. The Rise of the Somali National Movement (SNM).....	28
2.1.3. Collapse of the Post-Colonial Somali State.....	32
2.2- DECLARATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE AND THE STATE-FORMATION PROCESS	34
2.2.1. Burao Grand Conference (1991).....	35
2.2.2. Borama Grand Conference (1993).....	39
2.2.3. President Egal’s Government (1993-2002).....	43
2.2.4. Hargeisa Grand Conference and Modernization of the State.....	47
2.2.5. New constitution and the beginning of multiparty system.....	49

2.2.5.1. Political Parties.....	51
2.2.6. Successive Popular Elections and Peaceful Transfer of Power.....	52
3- SOMALILAND’S STATE BUILDING: KEY ELEMENTS AND THE EU PERCEPTIONS.....	58
3.1. The Upper House (<i>Golaha Guurtida</i>).....	59
3.2. The Lower House or the House of Representatives (<i>Golaha Wakiilada</i>).....	61
3.3. Judiciary Branch.....	62
3.4. District Councils.....	63
3.5. The EU Perception on Somaliland’s Democratic Institutions.....	63
3.6. STATE-BUILDING ACTORS	65
3.6.1. Diaspora and Business People.....	65
3.6.2. Religious Leaders.....	67
3.6.3. The EU Perception on Somaliland State-Building Actors.....	68
3.7. STATE REFORM, RECOGNITION AND EMULATING THE MODEL	69
3.7.1. State Reform	69
3.7.2. Recognition.....	70
3.7.3. Emulating the Model.....	71
3.7.4. The EU Perception on State-Building Actors.....	73
4- CONCLUSION	74
BIBLIOGRAPHY	76

Abstract

The Somali Republic (as it were before 1991) became independent nation state in July 1960. This was a result of a union between former British Somaliland Protectorate in the north and the Italian Somaliland at the south. That unification has practically ended in 1991, which is when Somaliland elders unilaterally declared withdrawal from and nullifying the union between the two entities in 1960. At present however, former Italian Somaliland is in deep turmoil, while Somaliland has been relatively stable and peaceful since 1991. I will examine throughout my thesis the reason for that stabilization and its European perceptions. I will also analyze what I called Somaliland model of state-building and following Jhazbhay (2009), will argue that, Somaliland illustrates the efficacy of internally driven, culturally rooted, bottom-up approaches to post-war [state] building, reconciling indigenous cultures and traditions and modernity. Jhazbhay (2009) contrasts this with the assumption that there need be a strong, centralized, post-colonial state. As such, my argument in this thesis is based on this premise which will argue that, the political system in Somaliland is sustained because of the interplay between modernity and tradition. Further, the EU is the largest donor to Somalia including Somaliland, therefore, based on EU documents on Somalia, I will also present the EU Perceptions on Somaliland's state-building process. Under the EU perspective, Somaliland is perceived as a successful state building model in the Somali context that has something valuable to contribute. The EU's perceptions of Somaliland will have positive impact on other actors' image of Somaliland.

1- INTRODUCTION

This thesis investigates Somaliland's model of state-building and its European perceptions. Over the past three decades, Somalia has been practically without central government. Since 1991, Somalia, perhaps more than any other country, has come to epitomise a 'collapsed state', and a threat to global stability. As such, during the long period through which it has been without functioning central government, Somalia has been the subject of foreign interventions aimed at curbing the threat it is perceived to pose. Although, pre-colonial society in Somalia was famously stateless, yet, in the western governments, there was considerable anxiety among policy-makers because of the perceived danger that Somali state collapse has to pose to international security (Bradbury, 2008). That is the

reason which led the world to intervene militarily Somalia in 1992, by sending multi-national force, namely, UNOSOM, led by the US.

Many reconciliation conferences have been held in the neighbouring countries (i.e. Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti) and elsewhere to mediate warring and conflicting functions of Somalia to re-establish and restore the collapsed Somali government system. Despite all these efforts, Somalia is still practically (at the time of writing this thesis 2021) without central government.

The civil war and the break-up of Somalia challenges the assumption that common ethnicity and culture is a 'natural' basis for nationalism and a secure basis on which to construct a state. From its foundations, the state of Somalia, although shaped by local culture, was largely a foreign construct, sustained by foreign resources and subject to foreign strategic interests (Bradbury, 2008:23).

According to Lewis (2002: ix), Somalis sometimes speak about their diminished nationalism, as though Somalia had not collapsed, in a way that recalls patients whose limbs have been amputated but still 'feel' intact. Their phantom-limp view of their dismembered body politic, may I think, Lewis argues, result in part from confusion between Somali 'state' and 'nation', since while the former is highly problematic, in terms of shared culture and language the latter remains very real.

After nearly three decades of military intervention, diplomacy and imposing externally created and financed governments on Somalia, the world failed to reconstitute the Somali state back. The military and humanitarian operation helped to alleviate the famine, but it failed to reconstitute a functioning state in Somalia before withdrawing ignominiously in 1995. Since then, fourteen internationally sponsored peace conferences have also failed to resolve the political conflict and restore to Somalia a government whose authority is accepted throughout the territory (Bradbury, 2008:2).

After all, it is important to understand the nature of the collapsed state itself. What collapsed, as Bryden (2001:2) rightly puts it, was not a functional state, rather, it was a 'toxic state' where the government had become an instrument of oppression rather than protection (Quoted in Bradbury, 2008: 245). The state of Somalia only functioned for thirty years and analysts have questioned whether it has ever existed as a meaningful polity before it collapsed (Ibid).

Renders (2012) maintains same argument, 'postcolonial Somalia never had a chance to develop into a truly independent state with a capable representative government' (Renders, 2012: 46). Hence, many

Somalis did not miss their state at all. As all my four interviews consistently argue, most of Somalilanders are better off today than they were in Barre's regime.

My thesis is focusing on Somaliland in two different but complementary ways. First, I will explain an indigenous initiative for state building through which Somaliland has become what it is today. Secondly, based on the European Union documents, I will be analysing how the outside world, specifically the EU has perceived the key elements of Somaliland's state building model. External images and perceptions are helping us to understand the reality exists on the ground. In doing so, I will explore a number of the EU's statements on Somaliland. There are at least two reasons for which I selected the EU's perception on Somaliland's model: first, the EU is the largest donor to Somalia including Somaliland, and therefore it has been following closely Somalia's political crisis since the collapse of the Somali state. The second reason is the fact that, as one of the largest global actors the EU's perception on Somaliland's state building model could reflect not only western perceptions, but also the international communities' perceptions on Somaliland's cause. As such, analysing the EU documents to figure out how they perceived the Somaliland model is an essential part of my thesis. Under the EU perspective, Somaliland is perceived as a successful state building model in the Somali context that has something valuable to contribute. The EU's perceptions of Somaliland will have positive impact on other actors' image of Somaliland. However, it is still not possible to accurately predict how this would change Somaliland's relations with other international actors. Before that, it is necessary to outline the background and a context from which Somaliland has emerged in the first place.

After the state collapse in Somalia, there is interesting distinction between the south and the north. According to Bradbury (2008), while elite interests in the south appear to have invested in maintaining a situation of statelessness, it would seem that elite interests in Somaliland have been best served through state-building and investment in government, security and law. Indeed, as we will see in the following sections, Somaliland elites did invest the state-building project. That being said, Somaliland has not been an elite project at all, rather it was people's project. Furthermore, Somalia has received massive amounts of international funding in an effort to create a functioning state, yet has largely been unable to achieve this, whereas Somaliland has pursued its own path and achieved a significant degree of peace and stability (Walls, 2010).

After all, as Jhazbhay (2009) argues, Somaliland illustrates the efficacy of internally driven, culturally rooted, bottom-up approaches to post-war [state] building, reconciling indigenous cultures and traditions and modernity. Jhazbhay contrasts this with the assumption that there need be a strong, centralized, post-colonial state. Hence, my argument in this thesis is based on this premise which will argue that, the political system in Somaliland is sustained because of the interplay between modernity and tradition. In addition, as the largest donor to Somalia including Somaliland, the EU's perception on Somaliland's model is essential part of my thesis, because it enables me to look it from the perspective of the international actors.

The thesis will be organized as follows: Chapter 1 will provide a brief historical background and political context of the Somali agony in general and Somaliland issue in particular. It also presents briefly the EU relations with Somalia including Somaliland since the collapse of the Somali state, and the main historical and political events from which the Somali problem in general, and Somaliland complications in particular has originated. The chapter describes also the conceptual framework of the study, the research problem and the methodology; Chapter 2 will, in a chronological way, explore post-colonial Independence and the Union with the South, the evolution of Somaliland's state-formation model and the peace building process after the collapse of the Somali Republic; Chapter 3 will introduce the key elements of Somaliland's government system, the EU perception of the system, the actors contributed the state-building project and the EU's role and perception on them. The chapter will also briefly present Somaliland's lack of recognition, state reform, and how the model has been emulated in other parts of Somalia as well as the EU's perception of these issues; Chapter 4 will be the conclusion of the paper.

1.1. Background and Political Context of Somalis

The origin of the Somali people is a subject of a debate among scholars. Prior to colonisation, the Somali people lived in a stateless, largely nomadic pastoralist society that was organized politically around clan lineages with no centralised governing institutions (Lewis, 2002; Bradbury, 2008). While ethnically homogeneous, Somalis have traditionally been divided into groups who are linked to each other by having a common ancestor, traced through the male line. These groups are known as clans.

Groups of clans form a clan-family, based on having one ultimate ancestor from which the sub-groups descend (Africa watch, 1990).

Between 1827 and 1900, Britain, Italy, France and Abyssinia [Ethiopia] carved up the Somali-inhabited regions into five states: the British Somaliland Protectorate; Somalia Italiana; Cote Francais des Somaliens (Djibouti), the Northern Frontier District of Kenya, and Ogaden for the Abyssinian Empire of Menelik II (Bradbury, 2008). The impact of this division has been profound and long-lasting. First, the international borders between Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and Somalia cut through the pastoralists' rangelands, leaving Somali clans living in more than one state. Second, the aspirations of Somalis to re-unite in a greater Somalia have subsequently driven national politics and regional conflicts. The different Somali territories had inherited different political, economic and social cultures from their colonialist. Consequently, this affected negatively the kind of Somali post-colonial state established in 1960 (ibid). Because of the aim of this thesis, however, I will only explore and discuss further the British Somaliland Protectorate. However, the Somalia (the south) will come into the discussion again and again, this is because the two were united in 1960 and together created the Somali Republic. The other three parts have never become parts of the Somali Republic.

British Somaliland Protectorate was the first independent Somali territory. It became fully independent on 26 June 1960. Five days later, on 1 July, Italian Somaliland followed suit, and having previously concluded separate agreements with the British and Italian governments, the two territories united on the basis to which their leaders had agreed. The two legislatures met in joint session at Mogadishu and formally amalgamated to form the National Assembly of the Republic (Lewis, 2002).

As such, the independent Somali Republic, which came into existence in July 1st 1960, was a unification of former British and Italian Somali-lands, two of the five Somali populated territories under non-Somali jurisdictions. The star on the Somali flag stands for freedom and each Somali territory, the three Missing Territories and the two parts of the Somali Republic, is represented by one of the five-points of the star (Ismail, 2010). Pan-Somali or greater Somalia was one of the most significant visions for Somalis to secure during the post-colonial era. As such, when the pan-Somali

failed, those from British Somaliland had felt betrayed and as early as 1960s, they started a new agenda by which they wanted to withdraw from the union.

In Somali society, kinship is the principle of social organization and the key to understanding politics, organized violence, trade and conflict management. All Somalis are born into this social structure and because it defines a person's relationship to other Somalis and non-Somalis, kinship is a critical source of an individual's identity. Knowledge of person's clan can enable one to identify their elders, deduce where they reside and who they are likely to vote for in an election. Genealogies are not simply a family trees, and clans are not static forms of social organisation. King groups form alliances, divide and realign in response to internal and external events and processes (Lewis, 2002, Bradbury, 2008). Clans and genealogies are therefore dynamic social constructs that can be subject to different interpretations and are used to describe and validate changing social and political relationships (Bradbury, 2008).

After the unification of the two (Somalis call them north and the south, while north means British Somaliland, south means Italian Somaliland) on 1st July 1960, until the military coup in 1969, two democratically elected civilian governments had successively ruled the Republic. On 21 October 1969, Somali Army led by General Mohamed Siyad Barre overthrew the civilian government with bloodless coup d'état. After seven untroubled years of military rule, the Ogaden war between 1977 and 1978 with Ethiopia, had become another historical juncture for the Somali agony. Defeat in the Ogaden war, was a turning point for the Barre's regime and the beginning of its demise. The war was costly in lives and was a massive drain on national resources. Further, in the wake of the defeat, national unity began to dissipate as opposition groups took up arms against the regime (Bradbury, 2008:38-39). However, since 1969 until the collapse of the post-colonial Somali state in 1991, Siyad Barre was the ruler of a crumbling Somalia.

With that brief generic historical background in mind, I will now turn to my main topic of the thesis, which is about Somaliland State-formation Model and has everything to do with the abovementioned historical events. But first, I will briefly explore the specific political context from which Somaliland has emerged.

1.1.1. Somaliland Political Context and Background

Somaliland emerged in 1991 from the ruins of the collapsed Somali Republic, which for about two decades had been under the dictatorship of Siyad Barre. As a former British protectorate, Somaliland enjoyed brief independence for five days in 1960, before it entered into a union with the former Italian Somali Trust Territory. It was an unhappy union. Somaliland claims the borders of the former British Somaliland Protectorate. After the abolition of the Protectorate on the 26th of June 1960, Somaliland became an independent and sovereign state which five days later, on the 1st of July 1960 merged with the former Italian Somali colony. What happened [30] years later [that is 1991], Somaliland argues, is the revocation of that voluntary merger (Renders, 2012). In other words, for Somalilanders, it's a withdrawal from the 1960 union with the south, not a secession.

Besides, as Bradbury observed, the consequences of state collapse differed in different parts of Somalia. While famine and war gripped Somalia's southern regions in 1991, in the north [Somaliland] a decade of war was ended and a new political order was created (Bradbury, 2008). At this juncture, the south and the north's patterns of rebuilding the Somali state diverged, and Somaliland followed a different trajectory which I will explore throughout my thesis. Somaliland can be distinguished from Somalia by examining the role played by indigenous political institutions before and after the collapse of the Somali state.

The traditional clan leaders have made the difference after the collapse of the Somali Republic, without them, Somaliland would not have escaped the dire fate of southern Somalia (Renders, 2012). As we will see in the EU documents, Somaliland is promoted internally and externally as a case of successful post-war political reconstruction. In contrast to other places that were subject to a more or less pervasive international intervention.

The formation of Somaliland has involved a process of state reform or redesign. Three significant actors have been playing an important role as a main mediators on how Somaliland state-formation process has developed into what it is today. The first actor is a traditional elders and their role in the process since early 1980s to this date. The elders were also key in matters of peace, because their involvement allowed conflicting parties to approach one another as clans, rather than as competitors for state power. This lowered the stakes temporarily setting aside the allocation of state power as an aspect of the conflict (Renders, 2012: 87-88).

The second actor is the Somali National Movement (SNM), a guerrilla movement that stood up to defend the people in the north against atrocities committing by the military regime. The SNM was formed in 1981 by Somaliland diaspora. The third actor is the clan system itself. The Somali nation, although united through common descent and cultural characteristics, is divided into clan-families, which sub-divide into smaller kin-based groups of clans, sub-clans and primary lineages (Bradbury, 2008:10). Because of that division, the clans, sub-clans and clan families are the real authority or sources from which a guiding principles of Somali community derives from. In Somali political context, one could hardly separate tribes or clans' values from modern political activities. In that sense, Somaliland is prime example, but mutual respect amongst clans is may be the secret for their successful stability.

As a polity, Somaliland began as an agreement between the different clans and sub clans of the North in 1991. The largest clan in the north is called *Isaaq* (or Isaak), and the other main clans are *Dhulbahante*, *Warsangeli*, *Iise* and *Gadabursi*. In fact, these clans (specifically the Isaaqs) are the main political influencers in the past and present political evolution of Somaliland. There are other minorities in Somaliland, but they are underdog and they have the least or no influence in the politics.

After two spells of intra-Isaaq civil war and elder-brokered peace agreements, Somaliland remained peaceful and proceeded to introduce a modern political system, while holding on to a formal political role for its traditional leaders. Somaliland has issued its own currency, set up a national police force and collected taxes to provide its citizens with basic public services.

Somaliland's political reconstruction was driven by indigenous initiative, indigenous capital and indigenous political leaders. Moreover, the success of political reconstruction in Somaliland is associated with the involvement of 'traditional' leaders and institutions. This is what sets Somaliland apart from the much less successful attempts at reconstruction in the south of Somalia. In Somaliland, using Renders' words, there has been no descent into chaos, no fierce competition between warlords and guerrilla commanders, no mindless fratricide, no scramble for economic assets, but instead allowing for the occasional setbacks, a careful, balanced process of peace-building and state-building which has led to a legitimate and accountable government (Renders, 2012).

Against that background, I will proceed to the remainder of the thesis to explore the peculiarities of this unrecognized emerging African state and see what it has to offer in terms of post-war recovery state-building process. But first, I am briefly presenting the EU's role, relations and contribution to stabilizing Somalia including Somaliland.

1.2. The EU and Somalia

The EU has long been following closely the Somali political crisis and trying to help Somalis to rebuild their collapsed state. However, it was in 2008 when the EU has activated its diplomatic mission and actively supported the political process, stabilization and security across the country. As indicated in previous research, the upsurge in pirate attacks on European vessels in the Gulf of Aden during 2008 brought the forgotten conflict of Somalia back onto the international political agenda. It soon became clear that no initiative off the Somali coast could be effective unless it was accompanied by efforts to relieve the root causes of piracy (Sanchez Barrueco, 2009).

According to Hogendoorn (2017), the EU has been involved in efforts to rebuild the Somali state since its inception in 1993. For more than two decades, the European Union (EU) and other donors have spent billions of euros in Somalia, and they plan to spend billions more. But that country remains a weak, if not 'failed state'. However, progress in rebuilding the Somali state is nowhere near commensurate with that support. The tremendous support to Somalia makes the EU, the largest donor to Somalia including Somaliland with an overall EUR 3,4 billion allocated from 2015-2020, by EU and member states. The EU Delegation to Somalia operates from the European Union Diplomatic Compound in Mogadishu. It has the status of a diplomatic mission and officially represents the European Union in Somalia including Somaliland. The EU strategy for developing Somalia public institutions is based on five important peace and state-building goals (PSGs) for the country (the five are: Building inclusive politics; Security; Justice; Economic foundations and Revenue and services). The main objective of the EU is supporting Somalia [including Somaliland] to become a peaceful, stable and democratic country and to take progressive ownership over its own national security. Relations in this area are guided by the Somali Compact, New Deal process and the National Indicative Programme (European External Action Service, 2016).

In respect of Somaliland, the EU opened a Field Office in Berbera in 1995 which relocated to Hargeisa in 1998. In fact, improved security in Somaliland has allowed the EU and other international actors, greater access for supporting Somaliland's state and peace building project including the presence of international staff technical and administrative support in the big cities (European External Action Service, 2014). For this long time involvement, among others, I selected the EU's perceptions on Somaliland's state building model as political indicators (i.e. measures of political participation, good governance and building democratic institutions) to the key elements of the model and how it has been perceived outside Somalia. As such, the EU's perception on Somaliland's state building model is propitious and it can represent the perceptions of most other international actors on the ground.

After all, as previous research indicates, a peaceful and stable Horn of Africa is in the EU's interest, given the risks of it becoming a breeding ground for Al Qaeda-like organizations and a source of immigration. Somalia could also become a test case for solving the problems of a failed state by peaceful means, and an example of the EU's willingness and ability to have an effective dialogue with the Islamic world. Success in Somalia would strengthen the EU as a regional player with Arab and Muslim countries (Raffaelli, 2007). Next, I will present the conceptual framework, research problem and methodology that I will employ for my master's thesis to draw acceptable academic conclusions.

1.3. Conceptual Framework, Research Questions and Methodology

1.3.1. State-Formation

Max Weber's classical definition of the statehood as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" and, accordingly, the control over the means of the violence is the central character of the modern state. The Weberian state has evolved from an analytical concept developed by an early 20th century sociologist to a normative concept used in 21st century politics (Renders, 2012).

Many decades after its introduction the concept of state can no longer be regarded as an imported institution. It has become localized, appropriated, adapted to circumstances and power struggles on the ground (Bayart 1993; quoted in Renders, 2012). As we are witnessing, there are an increasing number of failing or failed states in non-western regions in the world (e.g. Yemen, Libya, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, etc.). In the face of these increasing number of weakening and failing states,

questions have been raised once more regarding the modern state's legitimacy in Africa and other non-Western societies.

Some recent work on state- building suggests that state fragility and state failure are at least partially attributable to a lack of local legitimacy: "poor states are held back by administrative and political systems built separately from the societies they are meant to serve, thus rendering those systems illegitimate, ripe for exploitation and a major hindrance for democratization and development" (Kaplan 2008: 144). This can be overcome, it is argued, by taking into account indigenous, traditional institutions when devising policy for political and economic development (Kaplan 2008).

According to Renders (2012: 153), state-building is not and cannot be a straightforward technical endeavor. The misguided political interventions [in Somalia] of UNOSOM II are a case in point. Statehood is negotiated, not only between the obvious actors such as politicians and military commanders, but also with extra- state actors and institutions, such as clan elders and businessmen. Rather than a [modern] state, the outcome is a shifting hybrid political order. However, Renders argues, the political claim to attributes associated with [modern] states, such as control over the use of violence and a measure of administration and/or service provision, is vital in terms of political capital.

Now, Somaliland, which claims to have built a modern state on foundations of 'traditional' institutions and leadership, becomes a particularly alluring example (Renders, 2012). The view was clearly reflected in the 1996 World Bank report *Africa's Management in the 1990s and Beyond: Reconciling Indigenous and Transplanted Institutions* addressing Africa's "crisis of institutional capacity" rooted in the "disconnect between original and transplanted institutions" (Dia 1996; quoted in Renders, 2012). In contrast to the original informal institutions which enjoy wide legitimacy, the imported formal institutions do not, because they are not properly rooted in society. They are alien, imported, imposed and little understood. In fact, this is the reason why Somalia reconciliation conferences fail, while those held in Somaliland are successful, the former is externally imposed, the latter is homemade.

Traditional loyalties (e.g. to the family or the clan) clash with the imperatives of modern government and the notions of good governance. The key to resolving these problems is an "institutional

reconciliation” between original and transplanted institutions. By building on traditional institutions, modern imported ones can achieve the necessary legitimacy (Renders, 2012: 24). Consequently, whereas in early modernization theory and policy, indigenous traditional institutions [and actors associated with them] were regarded as anachronisms and obstacles to development, new modernization policy has incorporated them as potential opportunities or even tools in fostering state-building and what is called good governance (Ogbaharya 2008; quoted in Renders, 2012).

With that being said, we have to be careful in our words, as aptly demonstrated by historical research on Africa, colonizing powers have incorporated, modified or even invented traditional leadership and institutions in order to facilitate colonial rule (Geschiere 1993; Ranger 1993; quoted in Renders, 2012). The point here is that there are also some harmful and illegitimate traditional leadership and institutions, which may become destructive. But the fact is, the harmful traditional leaders are always fake ones, not originated from the community of which they are claiming to represent, they are from somewhere else. Internationally, Krohn-Hansen and Nustad (2005) have noted, the number of states have quadrupled since the Second World War, with the pace of new formations accelerating after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Somaliland is not a recognized country of international member states. However, it has successfully established a relatively stable and functioning political system in a northern part of the troubled Somalia. In so doing, Somalilanders have followed their own customary path by fusing their indigenous concepts and practices into modern state precepts. The outcome has very academic interest in terms of post-war state-building models. This is because, in my view, we can learn from it lessons which could help not only the other parts of Somalia, but also those who are in a post-conflict recovery process in Africa and elsewhere.

Accordingly, to study and examine the Somaliland’s state-formation model, I followed Krohn-Hansen and Nustad (2005) and will use tools of state-formation theory from anthropological perspective. To grasp forms of state formation, the authors explored links between cultural forms, institutional structures and regimes of power. For them, state formation is the outcome of complex sets of practices and processes. In their words, ‘state formation is the result of myriads of situations where social actors negotiate power and meaning. [This] invites the researcher to examine in detail how a

particular state is produced in everyday encounters at the local level-in those contexts where the state bodies' representatives and individuals and groups interact' (Krohn-Hansen and Nustad, 2005: 12).

Similarly, I will examine and analyze the regular incorporation of indigenous concepts and practices into contemporary modern state institutions that took place in Somaliland over the past three decades. Every modern state formation has a specific history. As such, applying with this broad conceptual framework, I will be able to illustrate how social actors involved in the state-building project in Somaliland have been interacting and negotiating by following not externally imposed state-formation templates, but their own customary pattern with habitual cultural values.

In terms of culture and state, which is my main point of departure, Krohn-Hansen and Nustad (2005: 8) observed that, increasingly, scholars of diverse disciplines are realizing that the production of cultural forms and meanings is what relationships of domination, politics, and forms of state-building in the contemporary world is all about. For them, state formations are outcomes of encounters and forms of interaction; they have been shaped through struggles over influence, resources and meanings. Any state formation that exists in reality has been produced through constant negotiation 'on the ground' (Ibid: 13).

Notwithstanding Somaliland's lack of international recognition, their model not only re-stored peace and stability that benefited the country's economic recovery, but also promoted clan-based road to state-building. In Somaliland, traditional elders, politicians, combatants, business people, religious leaders, and diaspora, together helped to bring into being and give form to the Republic of Somaliland as a functioning state. They did so by means of fusing indigenous concepts and practices into modern state structures. In fact, state-building means change, therefore, unlike the collapsed Somali state, the model has been built from the bottom as the grassroots level. As Krohn-Hansen and Nustad (2005: 117) argue, state-formation is a cultural process, it is shaped by, and it shapes, the myth of authority. However, these myth of authority, or these cultural forms, vary enormously from one part of the global system to another.

As Renders (2012) points out, political science, as a discipline, grapples with the content of these concepts: what is a state, and what is a traditional institution? How does one draw the line between

the so called formal and informal sphere? Hence, there are standards that we have in mind when differentiating states from non-state entities. States have professional militaries, their own currencies and institutionalized bureaucracies. They are members of intergovernmental organizations, make treaties, regulate trade, and confer national citizenship. It seems the distinction between states and non-states is obvious and tangible, requiring no further investigation. However, the contemporary politics of nationalism and sovereignty belie the seemingly stark contrast between the two types of actors. Ongoing controversies over the statuses of Kosovo, Somaliland, and Taiwan provide but a few examples of the many ambiguous state like actors in existence (Coggins, 2014). After all, I will be using the tools of the state-formation theory to analyze the Somaliland model, which as we will see, partially follows the standards' of modern state, but at the same time mixed with its own indigenous institutions. This broad conceptual framework will enable me to understand and present the political, social, historical and economic developments which have been occurring and evolving since the Somaliland's unilateral declaration of independence in 1991.

1.3.2. Research Question

By following their own path, based on traditional reconciliation conferences, with little support from the outside world, the Somaliland elders (*Guurti* in Somali) successfully formed stable and secure quasi-state entity in the horn of Africa. This has attracted some great scholars of history and political science to conduct thorough field research in terms of state-formation models. Building on those valuable academic works, I will study how Somalilanders have been solving their political problems, how they fused indigenous institutions into modern state political institutions, and how other parts of Somalia have been trying to emulate the model. I will also present the EU Perceptions on Somaliland's democratization process.

As such, the first and most important question that the thesis would address is: *how Somaliland's state-building model has started, constructed and developed since its unilateral independence declaration in 1991?* As a largest donor to Somalia, the EU has been engaged on re-building the collapsed Somali state for a long time. As such, from the international actor's vantage point, the second most important question would be; *what are the key elements of the Somaliland's state*

building and how are they being perceived outside Somalia based on European Union's statements on the country?

Somaliland is important in two respects, first; it is the most stable and peaceful area of former Somali Republic. Secondly, based on previous empirical academic research (i.e. Lewis, 2002; Bradbury, 2008; Renders, 2012), interviews I conducted with some of the key local individual actors, and the EU documents, Somaliland's state-formation model is applicable to and has been adopted in some parts of Somalia and has valuable takeaways elements that can be useful in similar situations. The aim of this master's thesis is to bring to light the Somaliland's model of state building and see if it can be used in elsewhere not only in Somalia, but also other parts of the developing world. This model as we will see in the following sections, comprises elements from modern state precepts and homemade indigenous concepts and practices. The interplay and combination of these elements are what made Somaliland different than the southern Somalia in my view. With that brief statehood and state formation theoretical framework in mind, the remainder of the paper will introduce the Somaliland model and how it has emerged from the long traditional locally invented and financed process. But first, brief explanation of methodology and data collection techniques.

1.3.3. Research Methodology and Data Collection Techniques

First, following Robert Bates (1998), I will be using 'analytic narratives approach'. According to Bates, et al. (1998), the method combines analytic tools that are commonly employed in economics and political science with the narrative form, which is more commonly employed in history. As Bates pointed out the approach is narrative; it pays close attention to stories, accounts, and context. In addition to that, it is analytic in that it extracts explicit and formal lines of reasoning, which according to Bates, facilitate both exposition and explanation. By reading previous academic works, interviewing and analyzing documents, I want to understand the secret of Somaliland's model of state building. In the case of Somaliland, the method will enable me to narrate and explain the principal actors (both indigenous and exogenous), their preferences and perceptions. In that sense, the method will go hand in hand with the qualitative content analysis method and helps me to identify and contextualize statements in the EU documents on Somaliland. In other words, the method enables me to present Somaliland political history in chronological, clear and coherent structure. After that, I will piece

together, (using Bates words), the story that accounts for the outcome of the interest. Therefore, the method will be the most appropriate one for literature review and historical narratives. In other words, I want to combine the theory with data all in textured and sequenced account. I will be using this method specifically when explaining Somalia's and Somaliland's political context and history.

The second method which I will be employing is a theory driven qualitative content analysis. I will use this method mostly for analyzing the EU documents. According to Schreier (2012: 2), qualitative content analysis (QCA) come into its own when you are dealing with meaning that is less obvious. When you engaged with qualitative research, your data will usually be of the type that requires some interpretation. Hence, to understand how the outside world perceived the key elements of state building model in Somaliland, the method will enable me to extract and analyze parts concerned and relevant to the EU's Perceptions on Somaliland from the documents. Additionally, the literature review and historical narrative serves to identify themes (i.e. Elections, government structure, the *Guurti* and the Parliament) I analyzed further in the qualitative content analysis of the EU documents, so the two methods are complementary in this sense.

Hence, I will be analyzing the contents of a number of EU documents (N=7) which are covering the EU's strategy, political, economic, security and development relations with Somalia including Somaliland. These EU documents are mostly documentary archive available at the European External Action Service (EEAS) internet pages. The EEAS is the EU's diplomatic service and it addresses Somalia as a one united country, that is to say the EU does not address Somaliland as an independent state, but as a stable and successful region of Somalia. Therefore, the QCA method will help me to extract the meaning attributed the EU's perceptions on Somaliland's model. Further, the Federal Republic of Somalia has repudiated the Somaliland Special Arrangement, but the EU deals with Somaliland directly through this separate trajectory. The Somaliland Special Arrangement is about a targeted support, which will be provided to Somaliland, based on their identified priorities and aligned with the EU strategic pillars. As a result, I selected the most comprehensive EU documents about Somalia in general and Somaliland in particular, because these EU documents are providing clear picture of the EU relations with Somalia and Somaliland. The documents are including among others: the Somali Compact; National Indicative Programme for Somalia (NIP); Report on EU strategy for the Horn of

Africa; EU Delegation to Somalia Strategy 2017-2020; Development Cooperation Strategy with Somalia 2017/20.

As Schreier (2012), puts it, in most general terms, the aim of QCA is to systematically describe the meaning of your material. By analyzing the contents of the EU documents, I will present the EU's role and Perception on Somaliland's democratization process, government system and structure, state-building actors, and emulating the success of the model to other parts of Somalia. Democratization is not only central to the image of Somaliland as a successful model, but it inevitably affects the perception of the applicability of the model elsewhere.

Initially, my intention was to travel to Somaliland to conduct face to face interviews with key actors of authorities, elders, politicians and scholars on the ground. Unfortunately, Coronavirus Pandemic made my trip 'mission impossible'. Eventually, I have conducted four telephone interviews with a former governor (Togdheer region), with one famous elder, one former minister and with a minister in current government. I will not name them, but I will address everyone in his title (e.g. former governor, elder, former minister and minister). The interviews were conducted in Somali, recorded and will be destroyed after completion of my thesis. All of the four are very active individual actors and well informed since the independence declaration to this date, and they provided me a consistent accounts of the peace and state-building process. I used the interviews to cross-check both the information in the secondary literature and each other. They also helped me to examine the sources and take confirmed accounts, they provided me with more insider information as well.

In terms of data collection techniques, there are three types of data that I used for the thesis. First type are previous academic works (i.e. books, articles, journals and documents) on Somali political history. For instance, the three academics that I cited the most in my thesis (Lewis, Bradbury and Renders) are great experts on Somali culture and politics, they have conducted decades of ethnographic research in Somalia, therefore their works are essential for any Somali political and economic study. Africa Watch report on Somalia in 1990 (namely, a government at war with its own people) has been also a very powerful and enlightening document. Second type of the data comprises seven comprehensive EU documents on Somalia from which I extracted parts indicating the EU Perceptions on Somaliland's state-building model. The third type of the data is I telephone interviews

I conducted with four high ranking figures involved in Somaliland's peace and state-building process. Finally, having born and raised in Somalia, I had the privilege of living and working in Somaliland during which I have gained valuable knowledge and experience in Somali politics which helped me to grasp both the discourse and the context.

2- CONSTRUCTING SOMALILAND

This chapter covers the process on which Somaliland's state-building model has been constructed and developed since its unilateral independence declaration in 1991. In doing so, I will revisit some of the main historical events that changed Somalia in general and Somaliland in particular since the independence and beyond. Post-independence Somalia, the aim of successive governments was to turn a nation of nomads into a modern nation state. The logic behind this idea was that the advent of modern state presaged the passing of traditional society. In contrast to that assumption, in post-war Somaliland, in the absence of effective government, people drew on non-state customary institutions of lineage elders and customary law to manage social relations and to re-establish rules and systems of law and order (Bradbury, 2008:246). As Reno (2003) observes, these informal rule-based systems have remained more entrenched and stronger among northern pastoralist communities than in the southern Somalia (Quoted in Bradbury, 2008).

Before we go to the state-formation process and its different stages, let me go back to Somaliland's independence and its union with the south. British Somaliland gained independence in 1960 but joined Somalia Italiana, which became independent four days later in the general euphoria for Pan-Somalism. An act of union was not yet ready and could only be approved by Somalia's parliament a year later—therefore Somaliland today contests the validity of the union, since never approved by its then territorial legislature (Bradbury, 2008).

In 1957 the first Legislative Council of Somaliland was formed and Somalis began replace expatriate officials in government. In February 1960 elections were held for the Legislative Assembly and two months later Britain formally agreed to grant the Protectorate independence, a move approved by the Somaliland Council of Elders on 19 May 1960. On June 1960, after seventy-six years under colonial administration, Somaliland was formally granted independence by Britain. For the next five days Somaliland existed as an independent sovereign state until it united with the Italian-administered UN

Trust Territory of Somalia on 1 July 1960. If Somalilanders today repudiate the union with Somalia, in 1960 Somaliland's politicians pursued it with enthusiasm (Bradbury, 2008:32). Thus, the independent Somali Republic, which came into existence in July 1960, was a unification of former British and Italian Somali-lands, two of the five Somali populated territories under non-Somali jurisdictions (Ismail, 2010).

The aim and expectation for northerners was to bring all Somali speaking communities together within –greater Somalia. At least two factors precipitated the union: first, Somaliland was underdeveloped when compared to the south; second, in 1954 Britain controversially ceded the Haud and Reserve Area [both were parts of Somaliland] to Ethiopia. As a result, this boosted pan-Somali nationalist sentiments in Somaliland, which held that Somali control and grazing rights in the Haud and Reserve Area could only be achieved through unity and independence (Bradbury, 2008:32).

Pan-Somali or greater Somalia was one of the most compelling visions for Somalis to secure during the post-colonial era. As such, when the pan-Somali failed, those from Somaliland had felt betrayed and as early as 1960s, they started a new agenda by which they wanted to withdraw from the union. Already in 1961 the former British protectorate rejected a constitutional referendum, and British-trained junior officers even attempted a coup; a charge of treason was dismissed on the grounds that Somalia had no jurisdiction over Somaliland without an Act of Union (Bradbury, 2008). But according to Ahmed Samatar (1988:48), the leadership entered the post-colonial era with no agenda for addressing the scourges of underdevelopment and their 'blind faith' in the benefits of union meant no attention was given to the mechanics of integrating the two territories (Quoted in Bradbury, 2008:32).

Ismail (2010) has articulated several issues related to the difficulties of integration between the two parts of the Somali Republic after the union in 1960. Due to the dual colonial heritage, the two parts of the new republic were, from an institutional perspective, almost two separate countries: firstly, government officials from the North and the South were receiving unequal payment and were operating under different conditions of services; secondly, from the legal aspect, each part of the republic had a separate legal tradition inherited from its colonial authorities; thirdly, different procedures of accounting and fiscal systems, tariff systems, custom dues, patterns of trade etc. separated the South from the North; and fourthly, the affairs of the two parts were conducted in two

different languages, Italian in the South and English in the North. Physical communication between the two regions, especially the two main cities [Mogadishu and Hargeisa], was too poor and economic contacts between the two were virtually nonexistent (Ismail (2010: 62). However, one most important issue, which does not directly relate to the unification of the South and the North, was a politicized clan system that emerged under the colonial governance system. This was inherited by the postcolonial political system of the republic (Ibid).

In post-independence Somalia, kinship was used by the political elite as a mechanism to access state resources and other assets. Siyad Barre for instance, instrumentalised and manipulated genealogy to hold power. The civil war in 1990s was not 'traditional' war between nomadic clans, but one where 'clannism' was manipulated by elites and political entrepreneurs vying to control diminishing state resources. The kingship remains an important feature of Somali social, political and economic life, despite more than [sixty years] of state building, urbanization, industrialization, civil war and international migration. Thus, appreciation of this lineage-based form of social organization is essential for understanding many aspects of contemporary Somali society (Bradbury, 2008).

Consequently, shortly after the flush of patriotic enthusiasm which marked independence and union had abated, a certain disenchantment became apparent in the north. That the north should take the initiative in questioning the value of union requires little explanation. The north had sacrificed more than the south. The south, with the capital and National Assembly at Mogadishu, was still the hub of affairs. Even though many northern officials now held key positions in the government, northern pride found it hard to stomach this reduction in prestige. This dissatisfaction was also directly stimulated by the marked increase in unemployment which accompanied the withdrawal of expatriate officials and their families after independence (Lewis, 2002: 172). After all, for the northerners, the civilian governments between 1960 and 1969, was like a lost decade.

After nine years of successive civilian governments, on 15 October 1969, Somalia's President, Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, was killed by one of his security guards. Six days later, on 21 October, in the same year, as Parliament prepared to vote in his successor, the military took control of the state. Somalia's experiment with political democracy had lasted only nine years (Bradbury, 2008).

2.1. Military Regime, Ogaden War and the Rise of the Somali National Movement (SNM)

On taking power the military suspended the constitution, imprisoned leading politicians and banned all [political] parties. For the next twenty-one years the country was to be governed by the military regime, first in the guise of the Supreme Revolutionary Council and after 1976 as the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party, led by the army commander and new head of state, Major-General Mohamed Siyad Barre (Bradbury, 2008:36).

Although the revolution was bloodless and the most Somalis welcomed [including northerners], because of the corrupted civilian government, yet the revolution had produced one of the Africa's most repressive governments. In fact, as Bradbury puts it, it is in the context of this repressive state that claims for Somaliland's independence also need to be understood (Bradbury, 2008). In other words, it was the military regime who committed almost all the atrocities against civilian population in the north (Somaliland) since the early 1980s to the time the state collapsed in 1991. Although northerners had been bemoaning the lack of tribute they met in the south, yet, it was Siyad Barre's brutalities that has necessitated the declaration of the independence in 1991. That leads me to analyze the triggers of the Somali civil war. I will also elaborate some of the reasons precipitated Somaliland's break with the south in 1991. But first I will clarify the Ogaden war with Ethiopia and its social and political ramifications. The war would profoundly alter the course of political events in Somalia.

2.1.1. Ogaden War and Its Consequences (1977-1978)

To begin with, by the mid-1970s, with Soviet assistance, Somalia had built one of the most powerful armies in sub-Saharan Africa. In 1977, Barre took his country into a fateful war with Ethiopia over Ogaden. In Bradbury's words, tapping into a rich vein of Somali nationalism and taking advantage of the political turmoil in the Ethiopian state following the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974, Barre ordered a full scale offensive in support of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) to reclaim the Somali-inhabited Ogaden for Somalia.

Within a year Somali army was forced into a humiliating retreat after the Soviet Union switched its support to the new Marxist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia. Defeat in the Ogaden was a turning point for the Barre's regime and the beginning of its demise. The war was costly in lives and was a massive drain on national resources (Bradbury, 2008: 38-39; Africa Watch, 1990). Until the war

with Ethiopia over the Ogaden in 1977, there was no organized opposition. Somalia's defeat in the war in 1978, had profound economic, political and social consequences.

Consequently, in the wake of the defeat, national unity began to dissipate as opposition groups took up arms against the regime. A failed coup attempt in 1978 led to the creation of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), which launched a guerilla campaign in the central regions of Somalia. For the same token, in 1981 the SNM was formed and launched an insurgency in the north (Ibid: 39). In response to internal military threats, Barre abandoned any pretense of national unity and simply strengthened his monopoly on power by progressively restricting state patronage to his immediate and extended family.

In the face of mounting insecurity, government increasingly came to be dominated by Barre's Marrehan clan. After 1978, whole clans and economic groups associated with the insurgencies were targeted: first the Majeerteen from Mudug region, for supporting SSDF, and later the Isaaq in the north, from whom the SNM drew support (Bradbury, 2008: 43).

The pattern of abuses against Majeerteen civilians [now regional state of Puntland], concentrated mainly in north-eastern and central Somalia, was a bitter foretaste of what was in store for the Isaacs, extra-judicial executions, rape, the killing of the livestock and the destruction of reservoirs (Africa Watch, 1977:28-29). As Bradbury (2008:43) noted, the level of state violence went largely unreported and unchallenged outside of Somalia for much of Siyad Barre's tenure in power. Despite the west's championing of democracy and political civil rights, its strategic interests took priority.

More importantly, Ogaden war had a critical impact on the lives and attitudes of people in the north. There are several important reasons or triggers that caused the north to rise against the military regime as early as 1980s. First, after the defeat in Ogaden war, Barre decided not to bring back the defeated army near the capital, and he ordered them to stay in the north. Furthermore, hundreds of thousands of Somali Ethiopians who fled from the war, had been resettled in the north by the order of the president. Their presence created severe political and social tensions, because they were settled close to the main towns in the north. Those refugees, according to Africa Watch (1990), were the first trigger for the conflict in the north. The rights of the Isaacs in the region were given to Ogaden refugees, and the government was more concerned about their welfare than that of the

people who permanently lived in the area. Further, the international community provided hundreds of millions of dollars as humanitarian aid to the refugees. This generous aid, which was controlled by the government, enabled the refugees to have far better access to facilities than the local population, which bred resentment. Northerners were not allowed even to work in the refugee camps in their own areas (Africa Watch, 1990; Lewis, 2002; Renders; 2012).

Discrimination was obvious, jobs were given, as matter of priority, either to refugees or southerners. Northern businessmen were encouraged to pay money to help the refugees, otherwise, they faced the threat of arrest and having their business crippled. In the countryside, farmers were forced to hire refugees at their own expense. The aim was to drive Isaaqs off the land. After all, the refugees in the camps were better off than the local population, which was a great source of tension (Africa Watch, 1990:33). Moreover, the government created paramilitary groups among the refugees, as well as hiring and conscripting them into the national army. These militias with the government encouragement, committed atrocities against the Isaaq civilian population. Killings, rape and looting became common (Ibid).

Second, the arrest in December 1981 and the trial in February 1982 of the Hargeisa Group, thirty professionals including doctors, engineers, teachers, government employees, and economists who had organized a self-help scheme to improve local facilities, was one of the most important events that triggered the politically explosive situation in the northern regions. The trial and news of the sentences touched off mass protests in Hargeisa and throughout the north, particularly from the students.

According to Africa Watch, a reason for the government's nervous reaction to the activities of the group is that since the independence, an overwhelming majority of the educated Isaaqs, including businessmen and professionals, had migrated to Mogadishu in response to greater professional opportunities in the capital. Anyone who could leave left, either to remain in Mogadishu, to go to the Middle East to seek employment or to the West for advanced education. Now, for the first time, some of Hargeisa's most educated and promising residents had chosen to return, had openly challenged the government's policies with regard to the region and, in effort to encourage the local population towards self-reliance, launched new programs, including initiatives to repair public utilities (Africa

Watch, 1990:38). Additionally, the most senior Isaaq member of the armed forces was Brigadier General Ismail Ali Aboker, Speaker of the People's Assembly; the most senior civilian member of the government was Omer Arte Ghaleb, Somalia's Foreign Minister from October 1969 to 1976. Both had become critical of the president's policies. They were arrested on June 9, 1982, [and sentenced to death], many other prominent Isaacs were also arrested (ibid).

The third and most problematic trigger was the economic marginalization against the northern business people, where they were targeted systematically by the regime apparatus to sabotage and confiscate their business activities. In 1982 the confiscation of a shipment of goods worth over US\$50 million by the authorities at Berbera Port, was interpreted as a direct attack on Isaaq businesses. After that the confiscation of Isaaq property became a common occurrence (Bradbury, 2008: 59). This was also followed by a ban on Qaad (Kat or Khat) cultivation and burning its farms, which was also a big business amongst northerners. In this context, the only way the state was able to maintain its authority in the north was through coercion.

When the SNM was declared, the regime had imposed further restrictions against Isaacs in the north specifically. From 1982, special emergency regulations were put into effect and civilians were placed under the jurisdiction of military tribunals and the military police. As the abuses grew, resistance intensified and the response was increasingly violent (Africa Watch, 1990). The government introduced identity cards and requirements for travel permission to move between towns, both of which restricted economic activities. Thus, as Brons (2001: 193) aptly termed it, 'a mutually reinforcing dynamic developed, whereby 'the more state policies restricted economic activities in the north, the more SNM gained support within the northern communities' (Quoted in Bradbury, 2008: 60). Those tragic historical events are helping us to understand the reason why northerners are breaking the south, and why they are strongly against any kind of reunion with the south again.

Memories of this period are strong in Somaliland and remain a real obstacle to restoring relations with Somalia. Consequently, the departure from the army of Isaaq officers which had begun in 1979 continued throughout the eighties, as they joined the SNM in increasing numbers. As the government felt vulnerable, Isaaq military personnel were removed from positions of power. These and Barre's use of patronage clannism both in his party and in every single private or public institution in the country,

eventually led to the creation of the Somali National Movement (SNM), an Isaaq-based anti-government guerrilla organization in 1981.

2.1.2. The Rise of the Somali National Movement (SNM)

In April 1981 two groups from émigré Isaaq communities in Saudi Arabia and Britain met in London, announced the formation of the Somali National Movement [SNM] and declared war on the Barre's regime (Lewis, 2002; Bradbury, 2008). The Somali National Movement (SNM) and the role of the Isaaq clan in the political evolution is of great significance for the Somaliland's state-formation process. In fact, without exploring the history of the SNM and its legacy, one can hardly understand Somaliland's state-formation process or its political evolution either. Indeed, people see the SNM their liberators, and the restoration of stability in Somaliland owes much to the existence of the SNM and the history of its struggle.

In 1981 the SNM was formed in London by a group of Isaaq diaspora with the aim of ending the authoritarian rule of Mohamed Siyaad Barre. Over time, Barre's military regime, whose 1969 coup had initially been welcomed by many Somalis, had become increasingly brutal and repressive, and the Isaaq bore the brunt of many of its most extreme actions. With the formation of the SNM, the regime redoubled its campaign against the Isaaq in reprisal for their support for the rebel movement. Activities such as confiscation of property, arbitrary detention, torture and execution became frequent occurrences (Drysdale, 1994; quoted in Bradbury).

In 1982, the SNM established bases in Ethiopia, transforming their struggle into an armed one and enabling them to launch cross-border operations through the Isaaq-inhabited territories on the border with northern Somalia. The SNM's armed struggle was mainly confined to the Northern Regions where they were better able mobilize human and material resources from Isaaq clans who were sympathetic to their cause. The northern diaspora and business people also played a critical role, by providing the SNM with considerable material, moral and political support (APD, 2008). All the four interviewees for my thesis have consistently acknowledged the role of the diaspora and business people since early 1980s to this date.

Within a year of being formed, the SNM announced its military presence in the region. Between 1982 and May 1988, the SNM military campaign remained a small-scale revolt, comprising cross-border

raids on government installations and convoys. In fact, during that period, it consumed government resources, yet, it was little more than an irritant to the regime. Although it was a clan based response to the autocratic regime in Mogadishu, its political objectives, internal organization and source of financing distinguished from the opportunistic and predatory armed factions that emerged in the southern Somalia in the late 1980s. The practice of 'participatory democracy' in the SNM influenced the form of government that emerged in Somaliland (Bradbury, 2008: 61).

The threat of the SNM, combined with internal pressures of the refugees and declining foreign assistance, led Barre to sign a peace agreement with Ethiopia in 1988 in Djibouti. According to APD (2008) documents, the agreement included a commitment from the two dictators to end support for the guerrilla movements fighting each other's administration. For the SNM this meant loss of access to their bases in Ethiopian territory, as well as the end of weapons and ammunition supplied by Ethiopia. Consequently, in 1988, after the agreement between Barre and Mengistu of Ethiopia to expel army oppositions from both sides, SNM launched desperate attack to the Somali army in the north. The war broke out on May 27, 1988, when the SNM attacked Burao, one of the main towns in the north. On May 31, they attacked Hargeisa, the provincial capital of the region and the second largest city in Somalia (Africa watch, 1990:3).

In response to the attack, in every town, including Berbera, Borama, Sheikh and Erigavo which the SNM did not attack, Isaaq men who the government feared would assist the SNM attack, especially members of the armed forces, businessmen, civil servants and elders were arrested. Further, government forces retaliated with heavy artillery and aerial bombardment, targeting civilian residential areas in both cities. Thousands of civilians were killed or disabled and Hargeisa and Burao were largely destroyed. Hundreds of thousands of people, including many women and children, fled across the Ethiopian border to the Somali-inhabited areas as refugees. Others fled to territories in the northern regions where they had livestock and kinship links, and returned to a pastoralist lifestyle (APD, 2008; Africa Watch, 1990).

According to Bradbury (2008), in many respects the 1988 offensive was a military disaster for the SNM. Although it held parts of Hargeisa until August, it lost almost half of its fighting forces. With that being said, in retrospect, the SNM offensive in 1988, was a critical turning point for both the

government and the SNM. However, in my view, although the second largest city in Somalia (Hargeisa) and nearly all the northern cities and towns had been demolished to the ground during the civil war between the SNM and Barre's forces in 1988-91, the fact is that after three years since the start of the war in the north, the war spilled over throughout the country and Barre's regime in Mogadishu collapsed. As all of my interviewees agreed, from the SNM perspective the collapse of the regime and the state was their triumph.

As a result, in January 1991, as the USC amid a popular uprising ousted the regime from Mogadishu, the SNM overrun the remnants of the national army in the north (Bradbury, 2008: 63). Henceforth, new page of history has begun and with the help of traditional elders, the SNM took the lead of reconciliation conferences between Isaaq and non-Isaaq clans in the north.

According to Bradbury (2008), the SNM's political vision for post- Barre has impacted on the Somaliland state building model in many aspects. However, the decision of the clan elders and the SNM leadership to withdraw from the union with Somalia was not based on an established SNM policy, but was a response to events unfolding in Mogadishu and grievances felt by the people of Somaliland after a decade of war. First, as early as 1981 a political manifesto published by SNM articulated necessity for a return to a representative democracy that would guarantee human rights and the freedom of speech. The manifesto proposed a devolved form of government based on five administrative regions within a unitary rather than federal structure.

As Ahmed Samatar (1988: 142), pointed out, what was radical about the manifesto was the way it acknowledged that the clan system lay at the root of political stability, social cohesion and economic activity, and argued that government in Somalia should blend 'traditional Somali egalitarianism and the requirements of good central government' (Quoted in Bradbury, 2008: 63). This challenged the political orthodoxy in Somalia which, since before independence, had viewed clannism as divisive and antithetical to unity and progress, and had advocated its elimination. The manifesto therefore proposed, a new political system built upon Somali cultural values of cooperation rather than coercion; a system which elevated the Somali concept of *Heer* or inter-family social contract in which no man exercised political power over another except according to established law and custom, to the national level (Bradbury, 2008: 64). Amongst northerners, there has been always an obsession

with customary practices and concepts, as a basic principles for power-sharing and state-formation in Somali society.

Therefore, creation of a formal council of elders (the *Guurti*) became integral to the SNM's political and military strategy (Bradbury, 2008). As we will see in the following sections, the logic behind the Somaliland model is rooted to the very political strategy for SNM since its inception. Furthermore, beyond its reference to cultural values, the manifesto had no unifying ideology. Capitalism, Islam, democratic socialism, clannism all had their adherents in the SNM. The acceptance of pluralism and dissent reflected a pragmatic and realistic approach to politics within the movements (Ibid: 65). Between 1981 and 1990 the SNM held six popular Congresses to elect its leadership. As such, it was during the SNM's insurgency that the clan-based system of power sharing, which became the basis for government in Somaliland, took root (Bradbury, 2008: 66).

Although, according to its constitution, the SNM claimed to oppose any division of the country into regions or mini-states that are prejudicial to the unity of the country, yet it was self-evident amongst its fighters for what they were fighting for; the end to southern dominations of the north, and the liberation of their country under Somaliland or any other name (Bradbury, 2008). Its leadership, internal democracy and military organization all distinguish the SNM from the other armed Somali factions. In contrast to the latter, the SNM was not associated with one particular leader.

During the decade long insurgency the SNM had five chairmen who were selected at six popular congresses. In Bradbury's words, the peaceful rotation of leadership, demonstrated an adherence to democratic principles and consensus decision making that are rooted into the traditions of governance in this pastoral society. To this extent the ethos of the movement reflected society in which it was embedded. These democratic practices continued after the war in the peaceful transfer of power between governments in Somaliland (Bradbury, 2008: 67). In addition to that, in further contrast to most of the southern armed groups, the SNM was led by civilian politicians rather than military officers (Ibid).

In response to the mass mobilization that took place after May 1988, the SNM was obliged to incorporate the elders into the organization by constituting a council of elders (the *Guurti*) to act as an advisory body to the SNM central committee. The creation of the *Guurti*, which reflected the

objectives of the SNM's political manifesto to meld traditional and modern forms of political organization, transferred social control of the SNM forces from the SNM political and military command to clan elders, effectively giving them a say in how the war was fought. After the war the *Guurti* was reconstituted as the Upper House of a bicameral Parliament (Bradbury, 2008).

During the insurgency, the SNM sources of funds were almost entirely come from Isaaqs, both in the country and abroad. As Bradbury (2008) observed, the two largest sources of financial support were Isaaq diaspora in the Gulf States and Isaaq businesses. As such, the SNM's reliance on its people gave the movement an independence from foreign sponsors and obliged it to be accountable to its supporters. The civilian leadership, the democratic practices, the lack of external sponsors and formal role of elders meant that no warlords emerged from the ranks of the SNM. Great example is that, in 1991 when the warlords in the south were battling over the spoils of the state, the SNM leaders had begun a process of reconciliation with those who had opposed them (Bradbury, 2008: 72).

It is notable that Somaliland has benefited to a great extent from what might be seen as the unintended long-term consequence of a policy of the SNM, to integrate customary elders into their organizational structure. Intended as a pragmatic means of fostering unity amongst the Isaaq clans and mobilizing resources for the struggle against Siyad Barre, this move laid the foundation for future intervention by customary elders as a political grouping (Walls, 2010). Therefore, in many instances, Somaliland's state-formation model is inherently based on and originated from the SNM's vision of a future Somali state, but now confined to Somaliland.

The SNM took no active part in the battle for Mogadishu and the final overthrow of Barre on 29 January 1991, or the bloody civil war that ensued. However, in order to widen its struggle to topple the dictator, and with Ethiopian support, the SNM had helped General Mohamed Farah Aydiid to establish the armed wing of the United Somali Congress (USC) and to initiate military operations in the Hawiye-inhabited [Hawiye is a large Somali clan who inhabits Mogadishu and several central regions] regions of central Somalia. They had also supported the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), an Ogaden clan-based armed movement, led by Colonel Ahmed Omer Jees in the Ogaden-inhabited areas in the Lower Jubba region (Siilaanyo, 2007a; quoted in APD, 2008).

2.1.3. Collapse of the Post-Colonial Somali State

The state of Somalia was in many respects an external construct sustained by external resources, even if it was adapted and re-appropriated by the local political culture (Bradbury, 2008). There is consensus among historians and political scientists that the Somali National Army's invasion to Ethiopia and the defeat of the former between 1977 and 1978, had been the beginning of the end of the Pan-Somalia Project (Lewis, 2002; Bradbury, 2008; Ismail, 2010; Renders, 2012). At the same time, in retrospect, it was the beginning of the termination of the Somali Republic.

In fact, no single factor can adequately explain the cause of state collapse in Somalia. The legacy of European colonialism, the contradictions between the centralisation of state power and the traditionally un-centralised political culture of Somalis, Cold war politics, militarisation, autocratic government, oppression, and economic and social injustices all played a role (Bradbury, 2008).

Nonetheless, there are two dominating interpretations for the failure of the post-colonial state of Somalia. The first argument is a traditionalist view which was invented by the late Professor, I.M. Lewis of London School of Economics in the early 1950s. The bottom line of Lewis's and his proponents' argument is that, the segmented clan system remains the foundation of pastoral Somali society, and that clannishness, the primacy of clan interests, is its natural divisive reflection on the political level. In other words, states [governments] in the Somali context fail, because the kinship-based traditional political system inevitably corrupts them. The current civil war, therefore, is an extreme expression of this axiom, Somalis are doing what they have always done-only with greater access to more lethal weapons (Lewis, 2002; Ismail, 2010; Renders, 2012).

The second argument is instrumentalist view which was started by Professor Ahmed I. Samatar and others. The bottom line of the instrumentalist interpretations is that, it is not the Somali political system that has corrupted the state. It is the other way around. It is the state, imported by colonial powers and instrumentalised by postcolonial elites in an expanding global economy, which has corrupted the traditional kinship-based political system. In other words, according to the instrumentalist view, the Somali problem is not the clan reality and its culture, rather, the elite manipulation of the ruling class is the real virus of the Somali case (Ibid).

In my view, however, it is very hard to separate the logics of state-formation and clan-based power-sharing in every Somali polity. Power-sharing and clanship are inextricably interrelated in Somali

political context throughout the history. For instance, whenever new government is announced in any Somali territory, the first question that comes to one's mind is; well, how many ministers my specific clan has in that government, then one continues to calculate the number others have, and compares each other. That is how Somalis evaluate whether the power was shared justly or not.

In addition, it is the way in which people organize their lives and compete for resources of whatever, be they water sites, banana plantations or government jobs. Indeed, clanship in Somali context, is not a matter of simple elite manipulation, it is more than that. In our contemporary political contexts, it involves rulers and ruled, oppressors and oppressed, exploiters and exploited. Therefore, as Renders puts it, what we need to look at, is how people have developed and use clanship in different contexts (Renders, 2012). Both Siyad Barre's regime and the armed opposition factions have used the tools of clannism. As a result, after 21 years of dictatorship, Siyad Barre ran away from the capital city of Mogadishu and the Somali state collapsed.

2.2. DECLARATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE AND THE STATE-FORMATION PROCESS

Africa Watch has estimated the number of people killed in the north within nineteen months (1988-1990) around fifty to sixty thousand. In that period nearly half a million others have fled the country (Africa Watch, 1990:2). Since then, Somalilanders have further justified their actions by pointing to the existence of Somaliland as a political entity before 1960 and stating their belief that the union with Somalia was a failure. They trace this failure to several factors: the incomplete integration of the two polities that had developed under different colonial administrations; the unequal political and economic relationship between the territories; the failure of the union to unite all Somali territories in the horn of Africa; the oppressive authoritarianism of Siyad Barre's government; and increasing marginalization of the Isaaq within the state (Bradbury, 2008:22).

Regime change, however, in northern Somalia [now Somaliland] was of a very different nature. The SNM captured Berbera Port on 29 January and within a week had control of almost all cities and towns in the north. In fact, the SNM takeover was not entirely peaceful (Bradbury, 2008). However, instead of projecting the SNM's authority through force [outside Isaaq territories], which might have ignited new war, the SNM leadership consented to a reconciliation process initiated by elders. As a

result, less than two weeks after Barre was overthrown, delegation from all the northern clans met in Berbera and agreed a formal cessation of hostilities and a date for a regional conference (Ibid).

Stabilizing Somaliland occurred through two levels of reconciliation conferences: first was about local grassroots reconciliation process. In other words, it is a kind of reconciliation conference between two or more northern clans, but not a nationwide meeting. The second level of reconciliation method comprises Somaliland-wide, national inter-clan peace conferences. That is to say, all Somaliland member clan-families should be included the latter. As such, I will examine the nation-wide conferences from which the state has emerged. The three most important Somaliland-wide conferences are, Burao Conference in 1991, Borama Conference in 1993, and Hargeisa conference in 1997. All my interviewees had attended the three conferences and their accounts were almost as same as those in the literature I cited. Through these reconciliation conferences, we can understand the Somaliland's state-formation processes, approaches and the model itself. As such, in the following, I will look at each of these three conferences in turn.

2.2.1. Burao Grand Conference (1991)

The Isaaq elders took a major role in the struggle against Barre's regime. In 1991, after the collapse of Barre's regime, the SNM with the firm support of the Isaaq clan, was instrumental in ending hostilities with the other northern clans that had supported the Barre's regime. This was first achieved through series of meetings and reconciliation conferences conducted between and within clan-families and clans, employing locally initiated clan-based conflict resolution approaches. The first [main and Somaliland-wide] inter-clan conference on state-building and governance in the Northern Regions of former Somalia was held in Burao in May 1991. One of my interviewees was a governor of Burao at that time, and he confirmed me this account. Prior to the Burao reconciliation conference, the SNM leadership and other non-Isaaq northern clans had been upset by the declaration of an interim government in Mogadishu by Ali Mahdi's section of the USC, without consultation with the SNM, which broke the earlier agreement between the SNM, USC and SPM (Siilaanyo, 2007a; quoted in APD, 2008).

In May 1991, the senior traditional leaders from all the northern clans and the leadership of SNM converged on the town of Burao for the 'Grand Conference of the Northern peoples'. At the same

time there was another meeting of the SNM central committee in the town. They were joined by intellectuals, artists, militia commanders, religious leaders, delegates from the diaspora and business people who financed the event. The purpose of the conference was to consolidate the cessation of hostilities agreed in Berbera and to discuss the future of the north (Bradbury, 2008).

In addition to that, among the northern public, agitation to sever ties with Mogadishu was growing. Several factors contributed to this including, the widespread devastation uncovered by the SNM and civilian refugees as they returned to the northern cities, which deepened the grievances against the south. The pre-emptive move by a faction of the USC to form an interim government in Mogadishu without consulting the SNM caused many northerners to fear that maintaining a relationship with Mogadishu would lead to a repeat of the persecution they had suffered under the military government. Perhaps more than any other single factor, this was the catalyst for the SNM and the clans in the Northern Regions to declare the establishment of a separate government in the Northern Regions (Ibid). In addition, the unification of the Somali territories in 1960 had been predicated on nationalist aspiration to unite the Somali 'nation' within a 'Greater Somalia'. Subsequent events and experience of alienation felt by many northerners meant that a united Somalis was no longer seen attractive advantageous option (Bradbury, 2008).

The conference, meaning Burao conference, is now remembered as the venue where all the clans in the Northern Regions combined to declare the restoration of the sovereignty of the State of Somaliland. Representatives from all northern clans (Somaliland clans) including elders, politicians, religious leaders, women, and other respected elders without titles all attended the conference. It was also at the Burao conference that the first government of the new republic was established. With that being said, one of my interviewees (an elder) told me that the eastern non-Isaaq clans were very reluctant to agree the secession, but they had no choice, because the SNM was well armed and resentful at the time.

The elders' meeting covered a number of critical issues: the need to secure a lasting peace; to agree a system for the return of physical assets such as houses and vehicles that had been looted; and to identify an appropriate system under which the Northern Regions could be governed in the future. In addition, the elders discussed what advantage had been gained by the Northern Regions from its

union with the south in 1960? They concluded that only it had led to a huge loss of life and the destruction of their main cities. However, they also agreed that what had happened could not be attributed to any clan or clans (APD, 2008). Consequently, according to Siilaanyo (2007a), these deliberations reflected the strong popular feeling in favor of establishment of a separate administration based on the pre-independence borders of the British Somaliland Protectorate (Quoted in APD, 2008).

Elders in Burao agreed several resolutions and the most important one was that; the north would proceed separately from the south and that a government would be established in the north as quickly as possible. The signed resolution was then submitted to the Central Committee of the SNM for endorsement, so that they could publicly announce the decision (Ibid).

Accordingly, on 18th May 1991, the SNM Central Committee had a large open space prepared for a big gathering. All the participants at the Burao conference, including all the delegates to the conference and many others assembled. When the time came, the Chair of the SNM, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali 'Tuur', stood in front of the crowd and declared that, an independence from Somalia, initially proposed by the elders, is now adopted by the SNM Central Committee (APD, 2008).

With independence publicly declared, debate on state-formation and clan-based power-sharing followed in the next four weeks. As a result, a government system that will suit for the new state has been discussed, and finally presidential system of an executive president had been agreed. The SNM chairman was selected as an interim President for two years government with his vice-chairman as a new Vice-President. Council of Ministers reporting directly to the President was created, consisting of 18 ministers and 4 deputy-minsters. In addition to that, the SNM Central Committee itself was transformed into a Constituent Assembly, who would act as a parliament. Seats were added for representatives of the non-Isaaq clans; these new assembly members were to be selected by their clans in time to join the Assembly for its first meeting on 15th July 1991 (APD, 2008).

Certainly, for Somalilanders, Burao Grand Conference was watershed moment, and it was received with a great joy and cheer (at least amongst Isaacs, as one of my interviewees emphasized). However, the end of the conference was the beginning of a long and problematic way to go forward. It was the

beginning of the state-formation without resources and without experience. Indeed, the period between 1991 and 1993 was almost as chaotic as the southern part of the Somali Republic.

The SNM government's task was daunting including: establishing security; accommodating non-Isaaq communities within the government; building institutions; drafting constitution as a basis for the first democratic elections; reviving the economy; and restoring basic services. All this it had to accomplish within a brief two years. During its two-year tenure the SNM government failed to create any local administrative structures (Bradbury, 2008).

Given the condition of the territory and people, and the limited resources available, that this first administration failed to deliver on this, was hardly surprising. The SNM government failed to stabilize the country, not because they did not want to do so, but because they had no resources to demobilize the SNM militia nor to deliver any kind of social services. As a result, several inter-Isaaq civil wars broke out in the country between 1992 and 1993. Consequently, in the absence of functioning authorities, ad hoc councils of elders (*Guurti*) were formed that took on the functions of local quasi administrations, managing militias, mediating disputes, administering justice, interacting with international agencies and raising local revenue (Bradbury, 2008). All my four interviewees agreed this account with Bradbury.

Hence, elders were not only resumed their traditional conflict management activities, but also they took a leading role in the absence of effective central authority. As Bradbury pointed out, most elders recognized that government administration was not their responsibility, but they brought to the task a moral authority invested in them by communities. As such, the SNM government in Hargeisa, lacking both authority and resources to fulfil its administrative role throughout Somaliland, did nothing either to support or to challenge these local processes (Bradbury, 2008).

In 1992, there were infightings amongst Isaacs in Burao and Berbera. These bloody conflicts damaged public confidence in the new Somaliland, and brought to the fore the role of elders who eventually mediated the conflict. When the situation deteriorated, the traditional elders took the lead and made several inter-Isaaq reconciliation conferences. The conference in Sheekh (small town between Berbera and Burao) culminated in convincing the SNM government to hold another Somaliland-wide

grand conference. The government accepted the proposal and organized the second most important conference for the Somaliland history, which was Borama Conference.

2.2.2. Borama Grand Conference (1993)

Somaliland does not have the same heterogeneity of clans and social organizations that prevails in southern Somalia. The Isaaq, Gadabursi, Ise, Dhulbahante, and Warsengeli (names of the main clans in Somaliland), have a long history of intermarriage and relations and therefore mediated by a common *Heer* (social contract). Furthermore, as Bradbury (2008) maintains, the limited retribution the SNM militia against non-Isaaq prevented a cycle of revenge between the clans. The fact that the SNM was able to convene meetings in Berbera and Burao between clans who had been on opposing sides on the war also attests to the existence of some common values and trust between northern clans.

In that sense, elders' active involvement in every stage has been the key stabilizer of the early days of the peace-building in Somaliland. In so doing, the elders re-asserted social control, re-stored cultural values and employed customary mechanisms to create conducive environment on which they can build on their desired form of nation state. They did not wait external intervention and they did not invite any foreign agents either, rather, in Bradbury's words, in the absence of state capable of managing social conflicts, these social institutions, despite all their complexities, were able to craft a new political order in Somaliland.

According to Bradbury (2008), the Somaliland-wide conferences were concerned primarily with constitutional issues. That is agreeing a framework for power sharing among Somaliland's clans, creating mechanisms for the participation of clan elders in government, structuring the institutions of government, and establishing acceptable measures for maintaining security.

The Borama conference was another watershed event in Somaliland. As a Gadabursi [one of the non-Isaaq clans in Somaliland] town, Borama provided a neutral and secure setting and gave non-Isaaqs a role in determining the future of Somaliland (Lewis, 2002; Bradbury, 2008; Renders, 2012). The conference was scheduled to last a month (it started in January), but did not end until May 1993. This extended run ensured broad public participation and adequate time for contentious and substantive issues to be exhaustively debated in order to reach consensus.

The Borama conference was chaired by Sheikh Ibrahim Sheikh Yusuf Sheikh Madar, of the prominent religious family of Hargeisa. The official voting delegates were 150 Somaliland elders (Somaliland National *Guurti*) from all clans in Somaliland. They were accompanied by a further 150 official observers and advisers. During the five months an estimated 2,000 people attended, including many participants from the diaspora. According to Bradbury, the conference was almost entirely managed and financed by the communities in Somaliland, who thus determined the agenda (Bradbury, 2008: 98). The agenda prioritized reconciliation, security and state formation, and three significant outcomes were achieved. First, Borama established a framework for managing security. Second, it advanced the vision of an independent Somaliland, by defining the political architecture for government. And third, it oversaw the peaceful transfer of power from the SNM government to civilian government (Bradbury, 2008). All my four interviewees were present at the conference and confirmed this account entirely.

In addition, a national charter had been produced at end of the conference. The charter elaborated a code of conduct for the people of Somaliland, in accordance with their Islamic principles. It required every community to take 'a solemn oath not to attack another community', and gave elders the responsibility for settling disputes and mediating conflicts (Ibid). A charter thus acted as social contract, restoring inter-clan relationships and establishing the basis for law and order. It outlined a national security framework by detailing mechanisms for the registration and storage of weapons, demobilization, the formation of local police forces and the securing of the roads.

Furthermore, the charter also created judicial institutions that drew on customary and secular law (Bradbury, 2008: 99). More importantly, the discussions on government and state building produced a Transitional National Charter, which reaffirmed the sovereign independence of Somaliland and defined the political and institutional structures through which the country would be governed for two years, until a constitution could be drafted and ratified (Bradbury, 2008). So, the charter was trust building mechanism and it was intended to consolidate peace agreements between Somaliland clans. The charter was also an updated architecture of Somaliland's state-formation project. Elder's main task was to reconcile customary institutions and modern political institutions.

As Bradbury and all my interviewees observed, a key challenge for those assembled at Borama was to fashion a form of government that accommodated the clan system within a modern structure of government, despite the divisive issues of political representation and power sharing arising from this. The solution was to establish what came to be referred to as *beel* system (clan system) of government, which incorporated clans and leadership in the system of governance. This clan, or community-based system has been described as a ‘dynamic hybrid of Western form and traditional substance’ (Bradbury, 2008).

As such, the National Charter defined three branches of government: (1) an executive branch (*Golaha Xukuumda*) comprising a President, Vice-President and Council of Ministers; (2) legislative branch, a bicameral Parliament consisting of an Upper House of Elders (*Golaha Guurtida*) and a Lower House of Representatives (*Golaha Wakiilada*); (3) and an independent Judiciary branch. Further, the Charter also provided for an independent Auditor General, a Central Bank, and regional governors and mayors to be appointed by the government (Bradbury, 2008: 99).

Interestingly, this kind of state-formation model, or clan system of government recognized kingship to be a fundamental principle of social organization in Somali society. In Bradbury’s words, government took the form of ‘consociational’ parliamentary democracy. So, as Brons aptly termed it “Society-rooted process towards state formation” (Brons: 2001: 250; quoted in Bradbury, 2008: 97).

In essence a power-sharing coalitions of Somaliland’s main clans, based on principles of proportional representation, pluralism and autonomy (Ibid). In retrospect, it was successful mechanism (in contemporary Somali political context) for state-formation by fusing indigenous institutions with modern political institutions. This is exactly what I mean Somaliland model throughout the thesis.

Seats in the both Houses were proportionally allocated to clans. Thus, the National Charter gave lineage elders a formal role in government, by incorporating them into the Upper House of the new legislature, where they provided a check on the executive and the representatives. The Charter gave them responsibility for selecting the President and Vice-President, ensuring state security, demobilizing the militia, and maintaining religious and moral values. Thus, their role as peacemakers was institutionalized and defined in the Charter (Bradbury, 1994a: 74: quoted in Bradbury, 2008). One problem was that, due to traditional substance of the system, there were no women in the first

parliament. When I asked my interviewees why women were absent from the parliament, they all responded that; in that time it was power sharing between clans, and each clan selected a man for their position.

Accordingly, in June 1993, the 150 elder members selected Mohamed Ibrahim Egal as Somaliland's second President, with Colonel Abdirahman Aw Ali as his Vice President. The Borama government enjoyed a high degree of popular legitimacy. Selection of Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal (Somaliland's 1960 first and Somalia's last Prime Minister in 1969) as the new President in succession to Abdirahman Tuur, who had held this position since Somaliland's declaration of independence in 1991, had been received joyfully across the country. Although, as we will see, serious conflicts within the Isaaq clans later threatened this promising beginning to Somaliland's restoration of independence, the general picture was very different from the chaos in the south. Thus, indigenous non-state approaches wielded by non-state actors were employed in Somaliland to manage conflicts amongst its people.

The clan system of government was intended as a transitional arrangement for two years only, until a full constitution could be drafted and ratified, it lasted a decade (Bradbury, 2008). Despite efforts to modernize Somalia after the independence, we have witnessed that in Somaliland the traditional and indigenous system of governance remained strong and usable. After all, Borama was unquestionably the centerpiece of a hybrid state-formation process, taking Somaliland out of the initial failure of the first two 'wasted years'.

Particularly striking was Somaliland's success with low-cost, local clan-based peace initiatives in contrast to the high-profile, internationally sponsored and highly unsuccessful conferences which came to dominate what was optimistically called the 'peace process' in southern Somalia. Such high-profile 'peace conferences' were destined to become a major local industry in southern Somali politics for over a decade. As the Kenyan President Moi, who played an important role here, was to put it, 'peace conferences became milch camels for the factions to milk' (Ibid). After all, the Borama conference selected a well-respected politician as Somaliland's president who will lead the country for the next nine years. In the following, I will briefly explore Egal's tenure and his achievements in terms of cementing the government institutions.

2.2.3. President Egal's Government (1993-2002)

Egal was elected as the president of the state and then according to Renders (2012) after the Borama and Erigavo conferences in 1993 Somaliland emerged as a hybrid, negotiated state, a collection of national and local governance arrangements that were to different degrees connected and which had evolved at different speeds. The new president, elected at the 1993 Borama Conference, was perfectly at ease in Somaliland's hybrid political space. An old Somali politician, a former prime minister and diplomat, Mohammed Ibrahim Egal dealt as easily with clan elders as with international officials and government leaders (Renders, 2012: 117).

Egal was a former Somali Prime-Minister between 1967 and 1969, before the military overthrew his government. Egal's transitional government made a rapid progress in two fronts: improving security and creating state institutions. However, the political consensus crafted at Borama was damaged by two years of civil war between 1994 and 1996. Egal gained a second chance when he was re-selected as President in 1997, from then until his death in 2002, Somaliland advanced steadily: government authority and bureaucracy was expanded; a constitution was finalized and approved by referendum, opening the way for multi-party politics; and the country experienced considerable economic development. The two 'transitional' administrations of President Egal, lasting some nine years, were therefore critically important in consolidating and shaping Somaliland State as it exists today (Bradbury, 2008).

According to Bradbury (2008), the public's trust in Egal soon appeared well placed. Agreement on a political system and institutions of governance, a mechanism for demobilization, the creation of a revenue system and the provision of a secure environment for economic recovery were early and substantial achievements. During the first years of Egal's administration, government ministries were revitalized, offices were refurbished, morning and afternoon work hours were instituted, and a civil service commission were created.

Besides, ministerial and civil service staff received regular salaries, as did MPs, the police and the army. A government controlled Central Bank was created, and a new Somaliland currency introduced. The government even introduced a minimum wage. Professional police officers were organized and

equipped in the main cities and towns, and a judicial system of regional and district courts was put in place, utilizing the 1960 penal code (Lewis, 2002; Bradbury, 2008; Renders, 2012).

Customs offices were established and revenue collected. In November 1994 Somaliland's first annual budget was agreed: some 50 percent was allocated to the security services, with education and health combined receiving 17 percent (Bradbury, 2008: 111). In addition, regular coordination meetings were established between the Ministry of Planning and international NGOs and UN agencies (Ibid). Besides, Hargeisa municipality as well as municipalities in other main cities, supported by UN-Habitat, embarked on a program of town planning and civil engineering, including government offices and hotels (ibid). The government's main source of revenue would come from import and export tariffs levied at the port of Berbera and customs and excise facilities at the border crossing to Djibouti.

Livestock has been always the backbone of Somali economy. As such, Egal's government benefited particularly from the revival of the livestock export trade when the Saudi Arabian market was reopened to Somali meat. Further, the open Somaliland-Ethiopia border and the regular movements of refugees across the border had created also a new market in Ethiopia for Somaliland's traders (ibid).

Bradbury (2008) noted that, in the mid-1990s some 60 percent of livestock exported through Berbera port, originated in Ethiopia and central Somalia. At the same time, some 65 percent of imports through Berbera were destined for Ethiopia. Berbera, like Assab in Eritrea, began to challenge Djibouti as the main port for eastern Ethiopia in terms of volume of trade. In addition to lower customs duties, Berbera provided a non-bureaucratic and well-run facility. Berbera also benefited the closure of the southern ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo. The revival of trade through Berbera benefited Somaliland's wealthiest merchant families, and Egal's relationship with them was crucial to his ability to re-establish government institutions. These business people provided finance for almost all national and local conferences held in Somaliland since 1991. In addition, these business people provided the Egal's government with a loan of millions of dollars and provided food for the army and police. The loan will be repaid through tax exemptions (Bradbury, 2008: 112).

The Borama conference had made demobilization and disarmament a priority for the Egal's government. Therefore, the administration started large scale operations of disarmament with the

help of elders and business people. Besides, most of the militia groups in the main cities had voluntarily and peacefully taken part in the disarmament process.

Thousands of the SNM fighters and militias were assembled in cantonment sites where they would be retrained and absorbed into Somaliland's new security forces or given skills for civilian life. As such, the demobilization of fighters and peace agreements enabled economic recovery for the country. It is also worth mentioning that UNOSOM, which had international mandate, and a substantial budget to support demobilization in whole Somalia contributed nothing at all to Somaliland's peacemaking processes (Bradbury, 2008; Lewis, 2002; and Renders, 2012).

Somaliland, therefore, was left largely to its own devices in orchestrating the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. Yet this lack of assistance helped Somaliland to avoid the pitfalls of many externally funded demobilization, disarmament and reintegration programs that commonly become a source of revenue for military leaders (Bradbury, 2008).

In 1994, a ceremony was held in Hargeisa football stadium where clan elders with their militias, publicly handed their heavy weapons to the government. The demobilization of the SNM in 1993 succeeded in improving security and the ceremony to hand over heavy weapons to the government was an important symbolic event in the process of consolidating the Somaliland state (Bradbury, 2008: 114). Accordingly, these courageous steps by the new civilian government, with the help of traditional elders, had removed the guns from the streets of the main cities and signaled the commitment to the idea of a modern government, which have a monopoly over security of the country.

However, while most of Somalilanders were happy with the Borama conference results and to some extent the power was transferred peacefully, yet the former president's clan (namely, Garhajis and they are sub-clan family of Isaaq) delegates were bitter at having lost the presidency without gaining, in their eyes, compensatory positions. They left Borama disgruntled, and Egal's government quickly recognized the need to placate them. Egal assembled a group of some 120 delegates to travel to Burao for talks, but this initiative was unsuccessful. The Garhajis organized two conferences of their own and from those meetings, they issued a declaration stating that they did not recognize the Egal administration as legitimate (Bradbury, 2008; Renders, 2012).

The state formation process in Somaliland has not been without trouble. Despite the progress made in establishing the institutions of government and creating a secure environment for economic recovery, the new state remained politically fragile and vulnerable to ambitions of the politicians and international interference. Abdirahman 'Tuur' (former president) travelled with several of his supporters to Mogadishu to join the government in the south, having been enticed by the UN to participate in another internationally sponsored conference there. It was not long after this that armed conflict flared between the Garhajis and the Egal's government in 1994 at Hargeisa and in 1995 at Buroa. For all the successes of the Borama conference, then, it was not wholly successful in establishing a sustainable peace in Somaliland. That task would not be completed until the 1997 Hargeisa conference, at which a constitution was agreed (APD, 2008: 55).

Egal's statesmanship and charisma commanded greater authority than his predecessor, however, the effectiveness of his administrations relied on the revenues generated by Berbera port and the political support of some Somaliland clans, not all of them. As such, during the demobilization period, between 1994 and 1996 a civil war broke out in Hargeisa and Buroa. The war damaged the economy, caused currency devaluation, inflation and retraction of international assistance programs. The most damaging effect was the loss of public confidence in the political leadership and the viability of Somaliland (Bradbury, 2008: 116).

According to Bryden (1994a), the main factors that precipitated a war in 1994 were similar to those that had triggered the conflict in Berbera in 1992 (control of port revenue), and in 1994 control of Hargeisa airport revenue was the spark. But both disputes were a manifestation of other tensions related to the process of state-building (Quoted in Bradbury, 2008: 116: got same version from former minster, former governor and the minster).

These now concerned the government's attempt to extend its authority beyond Hargeisa, unresolved issues of power-sharing, historical divisions within the SNM, competition over Somaliland's resources, the ambitions of the political elite, the influence of the external parties in the south, and the international community's diplomatic engagement in Somalia (ibid). The economic recovery was crucial for Somaliland's survival and Egal's ability to re-establish government institutions.

The civil war had endangered the stability and the dream of Somalilanders, but not destroyed it. In fact, as Bradbury (2008) puts it, although the war had threatened to foreshorten Somaliland's existence, in the end it served to consolidate public support for the territory's independence and to strengthen central government. After direct negotiations between the Isaaq clans, and then with the government, the Somaliland's civil war ended with peace agreements in 1996. Particularly interesting here is that, the *Guurti* (the Upper House) had played no role in these reconciliations. The reason is that one part of the conflict (Garhajis, the opposition), saw the *Guurti* as a part of the government, so that they cannot be a non-aligned mediator. As one of my interviewees (former minister) emphasized, this is one of the persisting negative repercussions that the institutionalizing the *Guurti* has left. In other words, not only Garhajis, but also many Somalilanders see the *Guurti* as a partisan political institution, because they have become part of the government, while in the old days they were independent traditional elders, and that is no longer the case.

However, after the inter-Isaaq peace agreement, the Somaliland state was further consolidated through a third national conference, held in Hargeisa. According to all my interviewees and Bradbury (2008: 124), the war was formally ended by another national reconciliation conference, held in Hargeisa between October 1996 and February 1997. The Hargeisa conference was the fifth Somaliland-wide conference held since 1991, and proved to be the last. Like the previous ones in Berbera, Burao, Sheikh and Borama, the Hargeisa conference was managed and largely financed without foreign support.

2.2.4. Hargeisa Grand Conference and Modernization of the State

As Bradbury (2008: 125) noted and all my interviewees agreed with his account, the Hargeisa conference proved to be another watershed political event in Somaliland. Nearly five months of deliberations produced a formal cessation of hostilities. Opposition grievances were partially addressed by increasing their seats in the two Houses of Parliament. Consideration was given to the rights of minority communities in Somaliland, who gained a representation in Parliament for the first time. An interim constitution was adopted by amalgamating two drafts drawn up by the Executive and Parliament. Superseding the Borama charters, it set Somaliland on the road to constitutional

government, laying out the steps for the legalization of political parties and the holding of multi-party elections.

On 23 February 1997, Egal was re-elected as President of Somaliland for a further five years. Egal's re-election was not welcomed in all quarters, but the peaceful conclusion of the conference was greeted with great relief. After all, in many respects Egal's first term in office had been a failure. This is because he did not fulfil most of promises made during the Borama conference. His government failed to introduce constitution, to move towards the democratic form of government envisaged in 1991 and to achieve international recognition. Nevertheless, despite the social and physical damage caused by the civil war, this period ended, by and large, with a stronger government and a more integrated country than had existed in 1993. With a new peace deal and power-sharing formula agreed, Egal's second term was to prove more productive (Bradbury, 2008: 127).

As a result, Hargeisa 1997 conference ushered in decades of uninterrupted stability, during which time Somaliland developed into high levels of economic growth and state consolidation. The Somaliland diaspora, encouraged by the political settlement, began to invest in Somaliland again, particularly in housing construction. According to Bradbury (2008), by the 2000, the government had repaid the loan it had taken from the businessmen in 1993, thus freeing surplus revenue for investment in development projects and the extension of the administration to the east of the territory.

Interestingly, as Bradbury (2008) maintained, in the late 1990s, after peacekeeping forces had withdrawn from Somalia, the international aid donors adopted what they called a 'peace dividend' approach to providing assistance. The intention was to use aid as a political tool for conflict resolution, by making its provision conditional on a secure environment and good governance. Thus, the UN Somalia Country Team stated that 'the most important work of the UN is to invest in the rehabilitation and development of the social and economic fabric of relatively peaceful areas. In theory, Bradbury argues, this policy favored the more political stable areas of Somaliland and Puntland. Internationally, Somaliland's star appeared to be on the rise. The manner in which Somaliland had ended its own war contrasted with the continuing failure of international efforts to facilitate a political resolution in Somalia.

Although this did not release funds directly to the government, there was growing pragmatic acceptance of Somaliland (Bradbury, 2008: 128). Consequently, more international aid agencies moved their operations in Somaliland. After all, in Bradbury's words, the Hargeisa conference had set Somaliland on the road to constitutional government by adopting a draft interim constitution.

2.2.5. New Constitution and the Beginning of Multiparty System

The process that evolved in developing a constitution is a further example of the locally constructed nature of Somaliland's political system. President Egal had been tasked on taking office in 1993 with drawing up a constitution to replace the interim National Charter, but it was not until 1997 that agreement was reached on an interim constitution, amalgamating two versions drafted separately by the President and Parliament. The slow process of constitutional drafting arose, in part, from a protracted debate over the respective powers of the legislature and executive (Bradbury, 2008: 132).

In other words, the lengthy process of developing a constitution meant that it was subjected to a degree of public debate and underwent several revisions (ibid). In Somaliland the clan-system of power-sharing government established at Borama, while essential for peace making, had come to be viewed as an impediment to effective government. The manipulation of the Hargeisa conference by some politicians and elders had also underlined the weaknesses of the clan-based conferences as a mechanism for political change (Bradbury, 2008).

After all, four years after the Hargeisa conference, mutually accepted draft of constitution was put for referendum. The constitutional referendum took place on 31 May 2001. The Somaliland government reported that 1.18 million people voted in the plebiscite, with 97.9 percent approving the constitution. According to Bradbury (2008: 133), although the constitution was clearly endorsed by the majority of the public, the official figure for the turn-out is very dubious. I utterly agree with Bradbury, because at least in most of the eastern regions no votes were casted at all, so the turnout had been exaggerated, former governor and the elder told me during the interviews.

After all, the constitution has been adopted and it provides a legal framework for the political system of Somaliland, based on a plural democracy. The first article establishes Somaliland's independent and sovereign status. And a reversal of that policy could only be effected through another referendum. As such, through the referendum, the public endorsed a restricted form of multi-party democracy in

which the head of state, the legislature and district councils were to be elected by a secret public ballot, rather than selected by an electoral college of elders. Further, the referendum legalized the formation of political parties (ibid).

The constitution established an alternative system for managing political competition and popular representation, moving responsibility for selecting a government from an electoral college of elders to individual citizens. Political representation is amongst most contentious issues in Somali society. That is to say, Somali clans always want to have their representatives both in the cabinet and in the parliament in every government. As such according to Bradbury, the *beel* system (clan system) provides one [one significant solution] establishing a form of consociational arrangement that gives all communities a stake in the state (Bradbury, 2008: 212-14).

As a result, the then incumbent President (Egal) had first announced his political organization, namely, UDUB, which would develop into political party. Five more political organizations had been also registered for the district council elections. Three out of all registered political organizations will become official political parties. In December 2001, an independent Somaliland National Electoral Commission was inaugurated to oversee the electoral process (Bradbury, 2008; Renders, 2012). The EU has been the first international actor who supported the Electoral Commission.

Unfortunately, President Egal did not live to contest the elections. On 3 May 2002, Egal died unexpectedly while undergoing surgery in South Africa. In Bradbury's words, respected as an elder statesman and for having steered Somaliland through several difficult years, his funeral in Berbera was attended by his opponents as well as his supporters. All my interviewees have acknowledged Egal's achievements. In fact, Egal's death was severe test of the robustness of the constitution and political system that he left behind. In line with the constitution, both houses of Parliament approved Vice-President Dahir Riyale Kahen as his successor. The peaceful manner in which the power was transferred proved that the state was now stronger than one individual (Bradbury, 2008: 136). When Riyale became the President, we showed the world that we can be an independent nation state (all my four interviewees bragged the peaceful transfer of power).

President Riyale Kahen is from non-Isaaq clan, and his election gave credence to the claim that Somaliland is a multi-clan polity. He ruled the country next nine years, which is until 2010.

Furthermore, President Riyale had completed the democratization efforts left by his predecessor and held three popular elections during his tenure. More importantly, it was Riyale's time when the EU and other International actors started to support Somaliland's democratization process and state building. In the following, I will briefly examine all the popular elections that took place in Somaliland since its inception. As we will see, with the EU and member state contributions, voter registration and census were seen as an essential, not only for holding elections but as part of state-building process of defining and counting the citizens of the country. But first, I will discuss the nature of Somaliland political parties.

2.2.5.1. Political Parties

In Somaliland there is a constitutional ceiling on the number of national political parties. After district council elections, where every political organization can take part the elections, the only first three political organizations with the largest popular votes could become national political parties. Hence, there are always legally only three official political parties in the country. The idea behind this limitation is based on a past experience in early 1960s when more than sixty clan-based organizations run for the parliamentary elections in Somalia. Therefore, the objective is to limit clan based parties. However, according to Bradbury (2008: 217), Somaliland's political parties are weak institutions that have shown little life outside of the election campaigns and largely appear to be vehicles for the ambitions of their leaders, I agree with Bradbury, said each of my interviewees except one, a current minister does not agree with them.

Kinship has historically been a base for political organization amongst Somalis. As such, Somalis have little experience of organizing along political party lines. The first Somali parties, both in the south and the north, were driven by Somali nationalism during the colonial era, but after independence this dissipated into more parochial clan concerns. Under the military regime political parties were banned. After all, in Somaliland the parties are now under public pressure for reform and many people are urging them to review their policies, make changes to their structures and political agendas, so that leaders will be accountable for the party members. I also conducted an observation in the social media and found that, there is a continuing debate in Somaliland on the validity of a three party system in a pluralist democracy.

After all, as Bradbury (2008) maintained, the experience of the elections has given rise to calls for a constitutional review to address a number of issues. One is to open a debate on the three-party political system. Some Somalilanders favor the restriction on parties, judging it to be sensible approach in a society where lineage ties shape political competition. Others argue that the restriction on the number of parties contradicts the right to free association. At the time of writing, there are three political parties in Somaliland, namely, KULMIYE, UCID and WADANI.

2.2.6. Successive Popular Elections and Peaceful Transfer of Power

Apparently, the elections are means to an end, the end being a functioning democratic state. As such, Somaliland faces many challenges when putting democracy into practice. The elections were locally managed and adapted to local culture. Thus, the elections were also part of ongoing process of building state institutions and were another expression of people's desire and ability to manage their own affairs (Bradbury, 2008).

With the holding of six multi-party elections [between 2002 and 2017], people in Somaliland have demonstrated a capacity for self-government and non-violent politics. Democratization of the political system is an ongoing process. The gradual institutionalization of government not only reinforces Somaliland's political separation from Somalia but also strengthens its claim to be treated as *de facto* state (Lewis, 2002; Bradbury, 2008; Renders, 2012).

The SNM government (1991-1993) ruled the country for two demanding years, and it transferred the power peacefully during the Borama conference in 1993. With that being said, the SNM President changed his mind and turned against the state he was leading for two years by supporting the united Somalia and moved to Mogadishu. As we have seen in the previous section, President Egal had been selected in 1993 to head a two year transitional government. According to Bradbury, by the time of his death in 2002, Egal had been Somaliland's head of state for nine years and the country appeared stuck in a seemingly endless political transition (Bradbury, 2008). No popular elections were held during Egal's tenure. However, it was Egal who set all the rules and regulations for the elections that would have taken place after his death. All my interviewees told me that they see Egal as the founding father of Somaliland.

Bradbury (2008) observed, the [first part] transformation of Somaliland's political institutions from a system of selected representation to elected representation occurred over three years, with district council elections in December 2002, presidential elections in April 2003, and Parliamentary elections two years later in September 2005. These were the first multi-party democratic elections held in Somaliland and the first in the Somalia since 1969. As we will see, the second part of the popular elections took place between 2010 and 2017. As such, I will shortly explore each of these elections in turn.

In line with the constitution, the democratization of Somaliland's political system began with the election of district and municipal councils. The constitutional rationale for holding district elections first was to determine which political organization could contest the presidential and parliamentary elections (Bradbury, 2008: 185). The constitution restricts the political parties only to three and proscribes any party based on religion, regionalism or kinship. Therefore, the three official political parties must be elected first through district council elections. After the election, the three successful political parties would contest next parliamentary and presidential elections.

According to Bradbury (2008), the road to Somaliland's first election was full of risks. The National Electoral Commission (NEC) consisted of seven members, none of them had experience of managing election. Furthermore, the political organizations had no experience of running election campaigns, and both the public and media lacked experience of following and covering elections.

Another challenge to implementing the election was the absence of an electoral register, which could not be drawn on without a census. The Somaliland constitution gives all its citizens over sixteen years of age the legal right to vote. Citizenship is defined in the constitution, as open to anyone who is descendant of a person resident in the territory of Somaliland before the union in 1960. According to Jama (2000), this potentially enfranchises many people in Ethiopia and Djibouti and in the diaspora, while it disenfranchises migrants from elsewhere in Somalia. It also effectively gives citizenship rights to people born abroad who have never been to Somaliland (Quoted in Bradbury, 2008: 187). Interestingly, voter eligibility was to be corroborated on polling day by a local elder, and indelible ink was used to prevent double voting. The political organizations placed observers in every polling station and each vote was counted in front of them (Bradbury, 2008). Hence, the district council

election was held without voter registration, instead they used indelible ink and a local elder who presumably recognize all the residents in the area.

According to Bradbury (2008), the election attracted the first substantive support from the EU and international donors for political activities in Somaliland (the contributing governments were Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Britain). Foreign observers were also present at each of the elections, their numbers increased and their participation became more formalized. However, the UN again maintained a distance from the whole electoral process and did not support the election. Unlike the UN, the EU has been substantially supporting all the election process since the first municipal elections in 2002. I will present the EU's role and Perception on Somaliland's democratization process in the following sections.

The first election was held in 2002, six political organizations (namely, ASAD, Hormuud, Kulmiye, SAHAN, UCID, and UDUB) contested the election for twenty-three district councils. To become an accredited national political party, an organization had to win 20 percent of the votes in four of Somaliland's six regions. If this threshold was not achieved the three organizations with the largest popular vote would qualify to become parties (Bradbury, 2008; Renders, 2012).

On 23 December in 2002, the NEC declared that UDUB, Kulmiye and UCID had won the right to form political parties and to contest presidential and parliamentary elections. International observers concluded that the election was carried out in a manner that was transparent, free from intimidation and, by and large, in line with internationally recognized electoral norms (Bradbury, 2008: 189).

Presidential election followed and took place on 14 April 2003 throughout Somaliland, with the exception of several districts in Sanaag and Sool regions (eastern regions). As in the district elections, the poll passed off peacefully. The turnout was 10 percent more than the previous one. International and domestic observers again gave a generally favorable report on the manner of which the polling was conducted. However, the result of the election was a harsh test for this aspiring democracy. The preliminary results, announced by the NEC on 19 April, gave UDUB a narrow victory over Kulmiye by a margin of only eighty votes. The result confounded the popular expectation of a Kulmiye party victory and triggered small protests in some cities, raising concerns that the situation could turn violent

(Bradbury, 2008). As the district election, the 2003 presidential election was held without voter registration and it followed previous mechanisms for checking the voter rights.

According to Bradbury, given UDUB's marginal lead, Kulmiye had every right to question the result. However, the Kulmiye chairman (Ahmed Silanyo) demonstrated considerable political responsibility by resisting pressure within his party to form alternative government. Silanyo stated that he had no intention of taking Somaliland down the path of Mogadishu, where two rival presidents (General Aided and Ali Mahdi) had been the cause of so much death and destruction. Now, the elders played a great role to persuade Kulmiye to concede defeat. Finally, Kulmiye's presidential candidate, Silanyo accepted the results. UDUB's chairman Dahir Riyale was sworn in on 16 May 2003, as the first directly elected President of Somaliland, with a five-year term of office.

After the presidential election the three parts engaged in some constructive dialogue and produced an agreement on how to deal with some controversial issues (i.e. freedom of the media, release of political prisoners and a timetable for parliamentary elections). However, the key concern was the change that direct elections would bring to the representation of the smaller clans in Parliament.

The problem was that, a majoritarian electoral system would favor larger clans, as already indicated by the municipal elections. As such, while the clan system guaranteed representation for the smaller clans, this new electoral system of direct elections would dismantle their presence in the lower house. After all, through mediation efforts by elders, diaspora and foreign countries, it was agreed that eighty-two parliamentary seats, allocated on a regional basis according to a formula used for selecting members in Somaliland's last Assembly in 1960, when Somaliland briefly received international recognition as an independent state would be employed for the parliamentary elections.

The parliamentary elections took place on 29 September 2005 and passed off peacefully, like the previous two elections. However, as it was the interest of the parties to have candidates who could deliver the votes of their constituencies, the clan leadership played a key role in selecting the candidates for the parties and in financing their campaigns. Interestingly, the parliamentary elections were mostly about establishing clan representation in government, for which the parties were the vehicle (Bradbury, 2008: 205-6). For the same reasons, the 2005 parliamentary elections was held without voter registration.

All in the three elections, certain pattern had been prevailing; increasing the prestige and political relevance of the clan was the most significant motivation, so the deciding factor for the party to accept a candidate to run in its name, is a clan affiliation of the candidate. Further, better access to government resources, jobs, and better services were also important motivations. The candidates and their clan were therefore the driving forces in the campaign, not the parties from whom they received very little financial support. Clan politics may have overridden issue-based politics. This is also one of the cultural forms that Somali politics have been practically adhering since the independence in 1960.

After all, the international team that monitored the election concluded; despite the some obvious problems, conditions were such to allow for a reasonably free and fair election process. According to Bradbury, this [parliamentary elections won by the opposition parties] ended UDUB's monopoly over Somaliland's political institutions and uniquely in Africa, meaning that the ruling party in Somaliland does not control the legislature (Bradbury, 2008). In other words, Riyale's government became minority government in the parliament, which is unknown in African countries.

In addition to that, in 2010 another peaceful presidential election was held. In 2012, another district council election happened and in 2017, another peaceful presidential election was held. Although they adopted international electoral norms, they also reflected the unique social and political context in which a Somaliland's state formation model has followed.

After the three previous unusual elections (I mean without voter registration), the second part of elections started in 2010, with voter registration. In 2010 presidential election, the then incumbent President (Dahir Riyale Kahin from UDUB party) lost his post to Silanyo from opposition party, and instantly conceded the defeat. Many people saw Silanyo's victory as a reward for his concession in 2003 presidential election, in which he lost with only eighty votes.

In 2010, power was transferred peacefully in well-organized ceremony, attended by international dignitaries. The new president is well-respected politician and the longest serving of the SNM chairmen. Silanyo, the new president, continued democratization process and in 2012, a second municipality elections was held. Again seven political organizations contested to win district councils and to transcend one of the three emerging national political parties. As a result, three political parties emerged, namely, Kulmiye, UCID and WADANI. Surprisingly, the oldest and strongest part in

Somaliland, namely, UDUB had failed to become one of the three. Both UCID and WADANI is led by Finnish citizen, which is an indicator of the diaspora's political role in the country.

The last election held in Somaliland was a third presidential election in 2017. Siilanyo the then incumbent president, announced that he will not run for the presidency in his next term, and he endorsed Muse Bihi as the Kulmiye's candidate for the presidential election. The election was held in November 2017, and passed off peacefully. Muse Bihi won the elections and became Somaliland's fifth president. Although there were complaints from one opposition party, the power was transferred peacefully. All the elections were peaceful and power was transferred peacefully. That being said, the 2017 presidential election was contested by the main opposition party, however, the public made clear its opposition to violence as a way of dealing with the issue. Hence, the opposition accepted the results.

I was in Somaliland when this last presidential election was held. Although in my view, this election was the closest to the modern democratic election norms, because there were proper voter registration and the list of the voters were available in every polling station, yet the clannism factor has been prevalent throughout the election campaign, they have a power to endorse one candidate and clansmen will obey their endorsement.

The Somaliland model of state-building, in the above mentioned context might look ordinary, but in fact, it is different from how we organize political institutions, share-power or run elections here in the west. It is different in a way that several unconventional factors and actors are in action through the whole process, from the state-building to the state running. First, the role of the traditional elders in the process is almost indispensable in Somaliland model. In other words, from the first national reconciliation conference in early 1990s, to the last presidential election held in the country in 2017, elders were directly involved in almost all the political aspects of the state-building and running. Elders are involved from selecting candidates to the final day of the campaign. Although it is clear that the electoral system of direct elections adopted in Somaliland is superior mechanism to clan-based method of selection, yet, without including the elders into the process, Somaliland politicians could hardly build or run the country. Neither peace nor mutual trust amongst nation could be materialized without the elders, diaspora and to some extent religious leaders.

Elders, here are not the Upper House, rather they are clan leaders who are not members of the houses, but they are well respected among their clans. In the election time, diaspora communities are also actively involved in the campaign by financially supporting their next of kin to win the election. For instance, during the presidential elections in 2010 and 2017, millions of dollars had been transferred from the abroad to fund the campaigns. This is a common knowledge among the Somalis, because large tribes organize fundraising ceremonies in the Western and Arabian Gulf cities with a live stream videos.

In conclusion, the above explained process of melding traditional and modern forms of political organizations is how Somaliland's model has been constructed and developed since its unilateral declaration of independence in 1991. In many instances, Somaliland's state-formation model is inherently based on and originated from the SNM's vision of a future Somali state, but now confined to Somaliland. In the following chapter, I will explore the key pillars of the Somaliland system and the EU's perception of it.

3- SOMALILAND'S STATE BUILDING: KEY ELEMENTS AND THE EU PERCEPTIONS

This chapter addresses the key elements of the Somaliland's state building and how are they being perceived outside Somalia based on European Union's statements on the country. It is worth mentioning that the EU has been supporting in multiple faces to all Somaliland public institutions since 2002. According to the European External Action Service (2014: 58), the EU has been following "a common effort to ensure development partner funds build and strengthen Somaliland capacity and institutions in line with Somaliland's Public Sector Reform strategy and PFM Road Map".

Somaliland's structure of government fuses a US-style executive President with a British-style bicameral Parliament. This structure of government, comprises three branches: an executive President who nominates a cabinet of ministers, who are subject to parliamentary approval; a legislature with a bicameral Parliament consisting of an Upper House of Elders and a Lower House of Representatives; and Judiciary [see figure 1] (Bradbury, 2008: 221).

According to the constitution, the President is the head of state, directly elected every five years, for a maximum of two terms. However, there are unwritten rules of which the President must abide including to prioritize the clan balance of the cabinet. According to all my four interviewees, it is

unwritten mandatory that every large clan should have at least a representative minister in the cabinet, even if the whole clan members were in the opposition party. I will explain each of these branches in turn.




Figure1:

Structure of Somaliland's Government (Adopted from Bradbury, 2008: 221)

3.1. The Upper House (*Golaha Guurtida*)

Somaliland traditional elders are the idols of the state-formation project. The term *Guurti* literally means a wise elder, and at the same time it has several other connotations including, a man in his forties or older and from well-known family, not necessarily from rich family nor has educational background. The Somaliland's Upper House (the *Guurti*) is the most academically interesting component of its political system in at least three aspects. First, the *Guurti* have been organizers, mediators and stabilizers in Somaliland political evolution since the insurgency against Barre's regime in early 1980s. Second, it has been domestically trusted body and their role has been indispensable. Thirdly, it is what made Somaliland's model a 'hybrid' and unique, because the *Guurti* has been institutionalized into the government system and they are now the Upper House.

According to Bradbury (2008), people in Somaliland have demonstrated, in their own way and on their own terms, an alternative path to building a state and a system of government that is consistent with their own culture. Not a one that external actors imported as a fixed state-building project template, as happened in the south. In so doing, they have demonstrated that Somalis are not less capable of governing themselves than any other people. As such, if it is possible in Somaliland, then it can be feasible elsewhere in the Somali territories.

The legislature comprises two houses and the members of each house consists of 82 MPs, together they make 164 MPs. According to Bradbury (2008: 223), Somaliland's Upper House of Elders (*Golaha Guurtida*) is a unique government institution in Africa. Comprising elders of Somaliland clans, it blends modern political institutions with traditional forms of political organization. Its origins lie in the SNM's war against Siyad Barre, when the *Guurti* was established to mobilize the Isaaq people for the struggle. As Bradbury noted, the *Guurti's* mediation in 1992 brought Somaliland back from the brink of civil war and since it was formalized in the 1993 Borama Charter as a legislative Upper House, it has emerged as the supreme moral authority in Somaliland, providing a check on the power of the Executive and the Lower House. The integration of traditional authorities in the post-war administration of the state was intended to guard against the re-emergence of authoritarian rule (Ibid).

That being said, in my observation and with the help of my interviewees, I found that although the public recognizes the role *Guurti* played in the old days of the war against Barre, and in shepherding Somaliland through the mine-fields of post-war politics (in the words of Bradbury) and state-building, the *Guurti*, at present has the least support in the public. This is because, almost all the *Guurti* members in 1990s and early 2000s had passed away or are pensioners. As a result, their sons have inherited the posts without election or selection. In addition, the *Guurti's* public reputation was tarnished its failure to mediate in the 1994-96 civil war. Since then, their role has been diminishing. Furthermore, when the first well-respected chairman of the *Guurti* died in 2004, the veteran politician was selected as a new chairman, this also raised questions and undermined the neutrality of the Upper House. The *Guurti* members in the Upper House are the only unelected legislative institution in Somaliland, and the constitution leaves open for debate the question of the basis and method by which the *Guurti* should be selected or elected in the future.

The constitutional responsibilities of the *Guurti* also need clarification. However, as Bradbury puts it, there are many sources of legitimacy and authority in societies, and while the authority of the *Guurti* is not based on a popular vote, its authority is no less legitimate for that (Bradbury, 2008). The tenure of the *Guurti* has been extended many times since their institutionalization in 1993 to the time of writing this thesis. As such, we have no idea how long they will remain in the Upper House without election or selection. Selection means here that their clan will nominate each of them to be their representative in the House.

Consequently, there will be a challenge to maintaining and incorporating attributes of *home-made democracy*, consensus building, mediation, and arbitration within the system of government. As Bradbury (2008) states, the *Guurti* has been at the heart of the clan-based power-sharing and consensual politics that has sustained stability in Somaliland. After all, it seems that that is no longer the case. Nevertheless, the way the old *Guurti* has fused modern political institutions with traditional political organizations indicates the peculiarities of Somaliland's state-formation model. Hence, it also reflects, to some extent, the original vision of the SNM for governance in Somali society.

After all, there are more politically active elders in Somaliland at present, but they do not have constitutional role and they are not members of the *Guurti House*. However, those elders, namely, *Sultans*, *Garads* and *Boqors*, among others, have been playing an important role in nominating clan representatives in the political parties, helping security forces during the conflicts and mediating clans. They also play significant role during the election campaigns by guiding their fellow tribespeople to whom they have to vote for.

3.2. The Lower House or the House of Representatives (*Golaha Wakiilada*)

Somaliland's Lower House was established in 1993 at the Borama conference. According to Bradbury, the Somaliland constitution identifies the Lower House of Representatives as the main legislative chamber, similar to the British House of Commons, with the authority to initiate, amend, reject, and approve legislation submitted by the Council of Ministers; to approve or reject ministerial appointments; to impeach the President; and to propose a vote of no confidence in the Council of Ministers. One of its main functions is to act as a check on the power of the executive (Bradbury, 2008: 226).

The first parliament in 1993, after several extensions, stayed power until 2005 when new members of Parliament were elected in popular vote. Interestingly, many of the new MPs are from the EU countries. The elected Parliament in 2005 are still holding their posts. This is because, since 2005, although two presidential elections and one district council election were held, yet no Parliamentary election was held in Somaliland. Apparently, the parliament has less political influence than the *Guurti* and even than the non-*Guurti* elders.

3.3. Judiciary Branch

The third section of Somaliland's government is the Judiciary branch. The constitution stresses the independence of judiciary. Establishing the public institutions of law has been important in the process of state-building in Somaliland. However, Somaliland's legal system is based on the civil system inherited from pre-war Somalia. There are three levels of courts, with a Supreme Court which has jurisdiction over the whole of Somaliland and acting as a Constitutional Court (Bradbury, 2008). In addition, the law defines the functions of the Office of Attorney General, and those of a ten member Judicial Commission to oversee the whole system (ibid). However, the legal system needs clarification, because it has been a hybrid of secular and religious laws derived from different and often contradictory legal traditions. There are no administrative courts at all in Somaliland, not to mention special courts (i.e. market courts, labor courts and insurance courts).

According to Bradbury (2008), this confusing legal system, combined with allegations of corruption, incompetence and interference by the President, have undermined public confidence in the Judiciary. Furthermore, the system lacks experienced and qualified personnel, with some judges trained in civil law and others in Islamic Sharia law. Remuneration is poor and corruption is reportedly endemic (ibid). However, there has been increase of salary lately, which in turn caused decrease of corruption in the courts.

Although the structure of Somaliland's legal system is another indicator of a hybrid model of political system, yet, it seems that the judiciary branch of the government is the least successful in the whole system. This is because of the fact that the Ministry of Justice administers the courts, salaries and budgets. In addition, the President has the constitutional authority to appoint judges to the Supreme Court and to dismiss them (ibid).

3.4. District Councils

In addition to the abovementioned government branches in Somaliland, there are also elected district councils in most of the country. The current structure of local government was formalized in 2002 with the adoption of Regions and District Law, approved in advance of the district elections. Since that time [to the time of writing in 2021] functional local government structures with elected mayors have been existing with responsibilities for revenue collection and municipal administration. The presence in the council of an executive secretary appointed by the Ministry of Interior formally ties local government to central government (Bradbury, 2008).

Bradbury (2008) observed that as councils are dependent on central government subsidies, the extent to which local authorities are policy-makers or just implementers of central policy is unclear. In my observations with the help of my interviewees, this ambiguous relation between the central and local government persists until today. Furthermore, both district council elections in 2002 and 2012, have produced councils that are generally representative of the major clans. As a result, minorities and women are not represented. For the most part, councilors are not loyal to their parties or to the central government, rather they are loyal to their clans. This is another indication on how the system is deeply clan-based, but using a modern political institutions as a camouflage in elections. After all, the election of local councilors, reportedly reduced disputes over land which was a greatest source of local violence.

3.5. The EU Perception on Somaliland's Political Institutions

The EU Perception on both Legislative and Justice Branches is impressive. There are at least two reasons for this admiration; first, the EU has been supporting Somaliland elections since the first municipal elections in 2002, therefore, this success is the outcome of the EU support. For instance, the EC delegation report on Somaliland local elections held on 15 December 2002, states; "It is a commendable success to the project team and the Electoral Commission that the local elections passed off without incident (possibly one of the most peaceful elections in Africa for the past 20 years)" (Report on Somaliland Local Elections 2002). The word 'the most peaceful elections in Africa' is a very strong word which is indicating the EU's approval of both the democratization process and the outcome which is functioning political institutions.

The second reason is that for the EU, Somaliland's stabilization pattern could be transferable to other parts of Somalia. Based on democratic principles, the EU works with Somaliland institutions at all levels to support the strengthening of effective governance and macro-economic structures. The EU supports institution building and capacity development with an emphasis on public finance management and civil service reform, constitutional and democratization processes, free, fair and transparent elections, and local governance structures, among others.

As the largest international donor to Somaliland, the EU's Perception on the Upper House (the *Guurti*) and other institutions is broadly outlined in the EU statements by commending Somaliland for its success; "Somaliland's unique development trajectory has evolved out of a process of more than 20 years of grassroots peacebuilding and state-building, forged in relative isolation from other development contexts characterizing the region" (European External Action Service, 2014). So the role of the *Guurti* and the executive branch have been strongly acknowledged, emphasized and approved in the EU statements. Besides, the EU has consistently admitted that a complex and resilient institutional structure has taken shape in which modern institutions, traditional and religious authorities, the private sector and civil society work together in order to effectively ensure peace, stability, freedom against piracy and terrorism, economic growth, the delivery of basic services, the protection of livelihoods and social development (ibid). As such, we can infer from the EU documents the positive perception on efforts and collaborations between different segments of the society to build up stable and functional political institutions.

In my view, the EU Perception over Somaliland's current legislative system (i.e. Upper House and the Lower House) is both realistic and pragmatic. It is realistic because the EU recognizes the deep rooted traditional principles which enabled Somaliland to survive for decades. Unlike the southern parts of Somalia, according to the EU statements, Somaliland's traditional leaders have played significant role and have shown maturity during the difficult times. It is pragmatic because the EU is practically supporting Somaliland to upgrade the standard of the electoral systems, stability and the legitimacy for the legislative structures. As a result, two key priorities have been identified to help achieve the strategic objective: First, Strengthen electoral processes and practices by reforming the electoral system in key areas, including addressing gaps in representation, such as those faced by women and marginalized communities; conducting voter registration; and developing mechanisms for judicial and

public oversight. Second, increase parliamentary accountability and responsiveness to the public by developing mechanisms that promote strategic communications, transparency, constituent outreach, coalition development and accountability to party platforms (European External Action Service, 2013: 22).

In Judiciary sector, according to the European External Action Service (2013), as with most institutions, the justice sector has suffered immense destruction, in terms of physical structures and human capital. While some progress has been made towards rebuilding the justice system, there remain challenges to the establishment of a fair, transparent, efficient and credible system. To improve the justice system three key priorities have been identified: Priority 1: Strengthen the capacity of the courts through extensive training and the provision of required equipment to ensure that they can carry out their core functions. Priority 2: Clarify the roles and responsibilities of law making bodies and strengthen their institutional capacity including the capacity to prioritize and draft legislation that is harmonized with the existing body of laws. Priority 3: Promote a more responsive and accessible justice system that protects the human rights of all.

Therefore, in Somaliland, the EU has provided the bulk of support to the establishment of a reliable and acceptable voter register, which [has been] decisive for an inclusive and acceptable election process in 2017 (European External Action Service, 2017). Indeed, as all my interviewees acknowledged, it is highly unlikely that the elections would have been achieved without EU support and technical assistance. According to one of my interviewees (the minister), “although the EU does not theoretically recognize Somaliland as a nation state, yet, practically they deal with us as a one, and we appreciate that”. Hence, the overall EU’s perception of the government system is realistic and pragmatic which led the EU to double down its support to Somaliland financially and technically. As a result, the EU’s multifaceted support to Somaliland is an indicator that the EU acknowledges the key elements of Somaliland’s state building model as functional and applicable to other parts of Somalia, and the EU is committed to supporting it.

3.6- STATE-BUILDING ACTORS

3.6.1. Diaspora and Business People

In addition to the traditional elders, most of Somalilanders who live abroad (diaspora), business people and religious leaders, all have played crucial role in building the state, I will briefly point out each of these actors' performance in turn. Bradbury (2008: 174), called Somaliland a 'transnational state'. The reason why he calls it is simple; as long as Somaliland's state-formation model is concerned, diaspora has been actively involved in whole the process as same as the elders. Their role of the state-building project has been extremely important. Somaliland's diaspora community have played a crucial economic and political role in the formation of Somaliland and have been an important pillar of the state-building project.

Somalis have long history of migration, whether travelling overseas to trade or in search of employment and education. As early as the beginning of twentieth century small communities of northern Somali men who had been recruited into the British merchant fleet and the Royal Navy were established in the dockland enclaves of several British cities. Others travelled to the Gulf States and even to America. Somali immigration to Britain increased during the two world wars, when more Somalis were recruited into the navy and army (Bradbury, 2008: 174-176).

The largest wave of overseas migration, however, took place over a decade in the 1980s and 1990s, following the outbreak of civil war in the north and the massive displacements of populations that took place as the war spread (Hansen, 2004.; quoted in Bradbury, 2008). These communities have been and continue to be important 'drivers' for political, economic and social change in Somaliland. Indeed, as Bradbury (2008) rightly puts it, the participation of the diaspora in Somaliland is sufficiently influential to challenge traditional definitions of a state as sovereign system of government within a delimited territory. In many aspects, Bradbury argues, Somaliland resembles a 'transnational state', with its capital in Hargeisa but many of its citizens outside Somaliland or in transit, and much of its economy generated from outside the country. One great example is that two out of the current three official political parties in Somaliland, their chairmen are Finnish citizens and their families live in Finland. The importance of the diaspora is acknowledged in Somaliland's citizenship law, which recognizes people's right to hold more than one citizenship.

The diaspora has contributed to the creation and development of Somaliland in several ways. First, the SNM was founded by Isaaq émigrés and it depended on diaspora communities to fund the

insurgency. Second, the northerners (particularly Isaaq who migrated from the late 1980s) have done much since 1991 to develop a sense of long-distance nationalism and promote the concept of an independent Somaliland in foreign capitals. They have also actively engaged in inter-communal politics within Somaliland, supporting their communities during periods of conflict or acting as mediators [and advisors by helping the elders] and peace advocates (Bradbury, 2012; Renders, 2012). Diaspora have supported the development of Somaliland's political institutions, and they have been influential in the emergence of the multi-party system. Diaspora entrepreneurs have been key innovators, bringing in new technologies like telecommunications, initiating new forms of animal husbandry, and transfer of skills and knowledge as well as establishment of social welfare organizations (Lewis, 2002; Renders, 2012).

Business people are also one of the most respected contributors in terms of peace making and state-formation process. Their role both in the SNM insurgency and the state-building project has been invaluable. They financed the struggle against Barre's regime, and they funded all Somaliland reconciliation conferences. Further, they give loans to the government and take it back as tax exemption. Indeed, without the invaluable support of diaspora and business people, the elders would not have gained the constructive power that they employed during the conferences.

After all, the economic role of diaspora has been crucial in the remittance economy, and the tens of thousands of people from the diaspora visiting Somaliland every year, particularly in the European school holidays season, have also generated a tourism economy (Bradbury, 2008).

3.6.2. Religious Leaders

The past three decades have witnessed a revival of Islamic learning and practice in Somaliland and Somalia. As a result, Somaliland religious scholars have been involved in peace-building process, but they are not as active as elders or as diaspora in terms of state-formation and building political institutions. According to Bradbury (2008: 181), in Somaliland the influence of political Islam and reformist Islamist groups has, to date, been very limited. In part this is due to the strength of the traditional leadership and the presence of a government since 1991 which, despite its relative weakness, averted the development of power vacuum. Unlike the south, in Somaliland since 1991,

there has been always a functioning administration, so religious extremism has no place in the community.

As such, the Islamic extremism plagued in the south does not have roots in Somaliland. With that being said, in 2003 and 2004, several foreign aid workers had been killed in terrorist attacks, and it was 2008, when three coordinated car bombs with suicide drivers, attacked the Somaliland Presidential Place, the Ethiopian Trade Office and the UNDP office in Hargeisa. More than twenty people were killed in the incident and many others were injured. Hence, although since 2008 no terrorist attacks happened in Somaliland, it seems to me, that it is not immune to what is happening in other parts of Somalia. After all, there are well-respected moderate religious leaders in Somaliland, who also have contributed the state-formation project.

3.6.3. The EU Perception on Somaliland State-Building Actors

Beyond the geostrategic interest of the west, Somalia in general and Somaliland in particular has significant national security issues for some EU member states. Hundreds of thousands of Somali ethnic citizens live in the West. These Somali origin citizens travel regularly from the west to Somalia back and forth. As such, there is a real threat that al-Qaida linked Somali terrorist organization (Al-Shabab) members could take advantage the root and travel to the west to carry out terrorist attacks. Therefore, the EU's interest is to help Somalia to stand on its foot again and to become secure, stable and responsible member of international community. As such, according to the EU documents on Somalia, the main objective of the EU development cooperation with Somalia is to rebuild the state, improve security and stability and reduce poverty. The EU and its member states have been leading actors in supporting Somalia's recovery and stabilisation (European Parliament, 2021). Moreover, the Somali diaspora living in the EU plays key role the development cooperation carried out by INGOs and LNGOs funded by the EU.

As the largest international actor who contributes to the Somaliland state-building process, the EU Perception on these actors is favourable and very positive. However, the EU documents are not addressing state building actors specifically, rather, the EU member states are encouraging and hiring many Somali diaspora experts to go back and take part the state-building and development projects (e.g. here in Finland, MIDA FINNSOM: 'A Decade of Rebuilding Somalia with the Diaspora' is an

example). However, it was the EU and the UK who first supported capacity building programs for Somaliland institutions, by sending and funding highly educated Somaliland diaspora members to work on the ground. These timely supportive and successful projects enabled Somaliland to strengthen their governmental apparatuses in terms of good governance. The reason why the EU and the UK did so is because of the conducive environment to monitor the projects. According to the European External Action Service (2014), to reduce security risks, the EU encourages that the majority of actions be located in areas of relative peace and stability [i.e. Somaliland], while the use of diaspora experts may allow skilled individuals to access more difficult areas. Further, the EU provides development assistance in different areas through a large number of local NGO's run by diaspora. Somaliland is the most favourable destination for Somali experts because it is the most peaceful and stable entity in Somalia.

In terms of religious actors, the EU does not intervene religious affairs directly, but welcomes moderate religious scholars, so that they could prevent extreme versions of Islam in the region and elsewhere. In the private sector, efforts to improve the country's ability to trade are complemented by the Somali Compact. The Compact's key objective of building strong economic foundations calls for improvements in the productivity of high-priority sectors like agriculture, along with the rehabilitation and expansion of infrastructure crucial to trade (European External Action Service, 2016).

3.7- STATE REFORM, RECOGNITION AND EMULATING THE MODEL

3.7.1. State Reform

Since the broke with Somalia in 1991, there has been significant degree of state reform, including the decentralization of authority, the emergence of competing political parties and privatization of some public properties. Government's role in development of the country is very limited. This is partly because of limited public revenue and partly because of limited international aid.

According to Bradbury (2008), although the SNM manifesto in early 1980s, sketched out a vision for post-Barre governance that embraced political pluralism, free enterprise, and a decentralized form of government built on Somali cultural values and traditional Somali egalitarianism, yet, there is no realistic and articulated political program through which the government can take the lead of development in Somaliland. In Bradbury's words, with up to 70 percent [that is before 2008] of the

national budget spent on the maintenance of peace and stability and very little allocated for social spending, the government's role as a development actor has been decidedly weak.

Political order in Somaliland is not maintained by subscription to a single ideology, rather, by a discourse on clan and lineage politics, mixed with concepts of multi-party democracy, human rights, civil society and free market (Bradbury, 2008: 241). After all, the post-war political system that has emerged in Somaliland has been largely a local creation. In fact, its architecture of government evolved from series of mass public consultations and clan conferences that endowed the political system with a high degree of legitimacy.

3.7.2. Recognition

When does an entity qualify to be called a state? Looking at common interpretations of International Customary Law, the answer to this question looks straightforward enough. Despite its anomalies and shortcomings, the classical definition of an entity that may be regarded as a sovereign state was set by the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States. A claim to statehood requires a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Somaliland officials have argued that measured against these criteria, Somaliland most certainly qualifies (Lewis, 2002; Renders, 2012; Bradbury, 2008).

However, there is a counter argument which says, Somaliland is legally part of a previously recognized state, namely, Somalia. Under these circumstances the Montevideo criteria cannot be considered in the abstract. Therefore, recognizing Somaliland would imply taking apart Somalia. With that being said, according to the International Crisis Group analysts, this makes for an apparently paradoxical situation; Somaliland meets the Montevideo criteria, yet, it remains unrecognized. Somalia, the larger country in which Somaliland is still legally embedded, in many ways does not meet the criteria but it remains a recognized entity (quoted in Renders, 2012, ICG 2006: 11). Twenty-nine years after breaking with Somalia, Somaliland remains unrecognized. Western governments consider that the issue of recognition is a matter first for Somalis to agree upon, and secondly for Africans. On the one hand, for the majority of people in Somalia [meaning the south], and certainly their political leadership, the unity of Somalia is non-negotiable. On the other hand, over the past three decades, the Somaliland nationalism has grown vastly. This is apparent in the remembrance days and

independence celebrations, not only in the country, but also most in the western capitals where a large diaspora lives. The 2020 and 2021, both 26th June and 18th May celebrations were canceled because of the Coronavirus Pandemic.

A generation of people after 1988 have no experience of a united Somalia and see Somaliland as their homeland. That being said, according to all my interviewees, among many non-Isaaq clans in Somaliland (i.e. Gadabursi and Harti), their attachment to Somaliland is not strong. It is worth mentioning, that Somaliland has never attended or participated any Somalia-wide reconciliations conference and it is not a member of Somali Federal States. However, since 2012 Somalia and Somaliland have been holding talks about their future relations, but ended without any results and stopped in 2015. Although there is no diplomatic relations between Hargeisa and Mogadishu, yet there are growing social and economic integration through trade, transport and communication between the two.

Despite the lack of recognition, Somaliland has interred cooperation agreements with Ethiopia, Djibouti, Taiwan and the UAE. It has its own passport with which people can travel to Ethiopia and Djibouti, for instance. Further, the EU, the UK and the UN agencies have all offices in Somaliland to manage their aid programs. Somaliland has also entered agreements with foreign companies, including Ethiopian Airline and DP World which is now investing and expanding the Berbera Port. After all, I can safely conclude that Bradbury (2008) is right when he states that, at the end of the day, a resolution of Somaliland's status is likely to be influenced 'realpolitik' and 'real-economic' rather than legal arguments in an international court. Indeed, the actual recognition of a state is a political decision, not a legal one.

3.7.3. Emulating the Model

After the failure of more than a dozen reconciliation conferences to restore Somali government, Somalis are now trying to learn from Somaliland. As a result, several autonomous entities (regional Somali states) have been established in the south. However, Somaliland's experiences of post-war recovery and state reconstruction are not easily transferable to southern Somalia. Nevertheless, the experiences from Somaliland's peace-making and reconciliation model, the demobilisation of militia, restoration of law and order, constitutional development and the creation of parliamentary

democracy, the management of deregulated economy and the role of the diaspora, do provide insights for people in Somalia and in other countries emerging from war (Lewis, 2002; Bradbury, 2008; Renders, 2012).

To some degree, similarities existed between the Somaliland model and a series of locally sponsored conferences of clan elders in north-east Somalia that led to the creation of Puntland State of Somalia in 1998. However, Puntland and four more local administrations in southern Somalia have been partially or entirely financed by the International Community. After all, Puntland state of Somalia was the first entity in Somalia that according to my studies emulated and successfully followed the Somaliland model. Puntland is also the only Somali autonomous region that practically exists. As Lewis (2002) noted, in 1998, Puntland State of Somalia was established in north-east Somalia as a non-secessionist, autonomous self-governing state, with veteran SSDF leader Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf as its head of state. In a manner not dissimilar to Somaliland, a series of locally sponsored and inclusive regional meetings formulated a political charter for the governance of the region, which was adopted at the Garowe (regional state capital) constitutional conference of August 1998.

Unlike the Somaliland Charter, however, the Puntland Charter affirms the unity of Somalia. As a non-secessionist state, Puntland came to epitomize a potential 'building block' for a federal Somali state. As a result, it received external support for this political experiment from the international community which, having failed to re-establish a central authority through national reconciliation, began to encourage the development of regional and transregional political authorities as precursors to a reconstituted state (Bradbury, 2008: 129). So, Puntland State of Somalia is well functioning autonomous region of Somalia that followed the Somaliland model.

The other autonomous states are; (1)-Jubaland (the most southern regions of Somalia) which is supported by the Kenyan National Army. The strategic port city of Kismayo is the center of the Jubaland administration. (2)- Southwest regions' state, supported by Ethiopian forces, with the Baidao as a central city. (3)- Hirshabelle with Jowhar as central city. And (4) - and Galmudug.

All of the four are not practically functioning autonomous states, but in name they exist and according to my observations they did not follow Somaliland model properly. Rather, they were created by the neighboring countries or selected and nominated by the Somalia Federal Government.

3.7.4. The EU Perception on Somaliland Success

In terms of state reform and applying the Somaliland model into the other parts of Somalia, the EU Parliament underlines the very positive example of Somaliland, which has demonstrated its capacity to develop and consolidate its democratic, economic and administrative structures over more than twenty years and create a sustainable democratic process; notes that Somaliland has so far been very successful in consolidating security and stability on its territory and in cooperating in the fight against piracy and terrorism; expresses concern, however, that should Al-Shabaab regroup in its mountainous border regions, Somaliland may become vulnerable; stresses, therefore, that it is essential to support Somaliland in the fight against terrorism, including such measures as promoting economic diversification and building capacity for youth employment in order to curtail recruitment amongst the young; points out the importance for Somaliland of promoting economic and social development in the region as a way to counter the radicalization of areas of instability on its territory; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to support Somaliland in enhancing its development prospects and promoting its economic and social stability; stresses that in the quest for a solution for the long-term stability and security of Somalia it is important to evaluate the positive example of Somaliland's stability (European Parliament, 2012).

Although EU has shown some sort of sympathy with Somaliland's cause, specifically when it comes to territory's stability, yet, it seems that they are rather general statements of diplomatic activities between the EU and Somaliland. In fact, the EU reaffirms its support for Somalia's sovereignty and territorial integrity in several occasions. Thus, the EU recognizes Somaliland not as an independent state, but as a successful peace building model from which other parts of Somalia can learn and follow. Nevertheless, the EU does not recognize Somaliland as an independent country, but it is strongly committed to continue supporting the state-building, reforming and democratization process. From the citizen-state relations standpoint, the EU Perception is encouraging and advice. Popular ownership of government-led development initiatives are derived primarily from established democratic processes, such as elections, which provide mechanisms for promoting legitimacy, accountability, responsiveness and popular representation within Somaliland's governing institutions.

At the same time, grassroots development approaches, in line with Somaliland's traditional community-based governance structures, will be promoted in all planning, implementation, joint coordination and monitoring processes to ensure effective participation, accountability, transparency and responsiveness by all citizens on a daily basis (European External Action Service, 2014: 24). Additionally, the EU is helping and encouraging other Somali regional states to learn from Somaliland model and try to follow it accordingly. Finally, the key elements of Somaliland's state building are reconciling indigenous cultures and modernity by creating democratically elected (i.e. Parliament and Municipal Counselors) institutions and hybrid ones (the *Guurti*). The EU's perception of these institutions is positive and the EU is helping Somaliland to improve and develop its democratization process. Despite the EU's favorable perceptions, Somaliland's diplomatic relations with the world is very limited. However, these positive external images and perceptions are helping Somaliland to market its aspirations to become an independent nation state.

4- CONCLUSION

Two main questions have been addressed throughout the thesis. First, I explained how Somaliland's state-building model has been constructed and developed since its independence declaration. Secondly, I discussed some of the key elements of Somaliland's state-building and how they are being perceived outside Somalia based on EU's statements on the country. Modern state is a new way of ordering social and economic relations. Somaliland's model of state-formation has to offer some insights that is of relevance not only to Somalia, but also to other countries emerging from civil war. Therefore, in Bradbury's words, rather than rejecting as irrational or impractical, the aspirations of people in Somaliland for self-government, the task perhaps should be to understand the place on its own terms, to consider ways to support it, and to reflect on what it can tell us about a state building in post-war recovery processes.

After three decades of independence, Somali post-colonial state had collapsed. Since then, after another three decades, Somalia with the help of International community, has yet to reconstitute its political system. However, Somaliland has emerged as a political system built upon Somali cultural values of cooperation rather than coercion. The Somaliland's model of state formation is thus, a kind of state-formation model with a clan system of government, which recognizes kingship to be a

fundamental principle of social organization in Somali society. A bottom-up approach, locally financed, clan-based political system, based on principles of proportional representation, pluralism and autonomy. In so doing, Somaliland traditional leaders with the help of local intellectuals fused indigenous institutions with the modern political institutions. As a result, the outcome has been a 'hybrid political organization', which is stable, democratic and sustained now three decades.

Additionally, in my view, the Somaliland model is full of perceptive insights into post-war recovery and state-building process. The model offers some fresh insights into the importance of culture, tradition and local customary institutions during the post-war recovery procedures. However, I also argue that, the role of the elders in Somaliland has been diminishing over the past several years. This is because they became part of the modern state political institutions, they developed into parliamentarians, and they became professional politicians, so they no longer enjoy the trust of the people. With that been said, traditional elders are indispensable to the conflict management in every single aspect of Somaliland political activities. But, the most respected elders in the country at present are not the members of the Upper House, but they are titled (e.g. Sultans and Garads) or untitled but locally trusted elders. Unlike Somalia's top-down approaches to state-building, the Somaliland model focuses on fostering local engagement, through locally trusted traditional elders and through culturally rooted political institutions. As such, these key elements of the successful model, might be used as a mechanism for resolving other conflicts in the region and elsewhere. Despite of the lack of recognition, Somaliland has diplomatic relations with several countries. Its model is applicable to other parts of Somalia and some of them has already adopted it (i.e. Puntland State of Somalia).

Finally, as the largest donor to Somalia including Somaliland, the EU's Perception on Somaliland's stabilization and democratization model is impressive. From this vantage point, Somaliland is seen as a stable, democratic, secure and more importantly a successful example for other parts of Somalia. As a result, the EU is committed to doubling down its multiple generous support throughout the institutional building and democratization process in Somaliland, and it recommends to other parts of Somalia to learn from it and follow the model. The EU's financial and technical support is an expression and acknowledgment of the successful model in Somaliland. At the same time, the EU acknowledges that Somaliland has long way to go to before it can become a prime example of democratic entity in the Horn of Africa. However, the EU has made clear its support for Somalia's

sovereignty and territorial integrity in several occasions. Nevertheless, for the EU, Somaliland is the major success story of the EU engagement in Somalia.

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