

Hygiene as Ideology

A critical look into Hygiene as a tool of Oppression

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Tiivistelmä: Hygiene as a phenomenon is constantly present in our lives but it is rarely questioned. This thesis explores the concept of hygiene as a large-scale, social phenomenon and as a tool of oppression. My approach stems from the tradition of critical theory, and therefore in this thesis I define hygiene as form of ideology and employ ideology critique to criticise it.

I argue that hygiene is a form of abjection meaning that it is a tool to create boundaries between members of a certain group and others. Additionally, hygiene functions as a positive technology of power, since its practice is connected to striving towards the ideal of normalcy and it is enforced by individuals repeating hygienic practices. Hygiene creates hierarchies between different groups of people, because it categorizes some groups as cleaner or healthier than others. These categories have moral and political dimensions and therefore hygiene can create oppressive structures.

To define hygiene as a form of ideology, I explore the discussion concerning the different definitions of ideology. Within my framework of critical theory, ideology is always something pejorative. I divide the main challenges that one faces when defining ideology into two: the normative and the epistemic challenges. The normative challenge asks why we should be concerned with ideology from a normative point of view: How is it harmful for us? The epistemic challenge is concerned with the falsity of ideology and the possibility of gaining knowledge, if ideology is something that can cloud our epistemic judgement.

I argue that a solution to these challenges can be found in the definition of ideology formulated by Theodor W. Adorno. This definition claims that ideology is a form of identity thinking: A system where we falsely think that we are perceiving objects as they are. This is never the case, since our way of thinking is conceptual and therefore we always see things through concepts. Ideology as identity thinking creates concepts affected by our current economic structure. We falsely assume that they are accurately describing the world. This limits our view of what is and what could be. The solution to this is negative dialectics, a system of critique which contrasts the potential of concepts with how they are in the world. Through the negation of our conditions and their ideal concepts, we can see objects as constellations: as things constructed from pieces of history, societal and economic structures etc. From this perspective we can critique our current conditions.

The main conclusion of the thesis is that hygiene can be used as a tool of oppression because it is a form of ideology. Ideology as identity thinking describes hygiene successfully, because hygiene functions through identifying particulars under its concepts. This can be oppressive since some of its concepts, like unhealthy, dirty and so on, are derogatory and therefore create hierarchies between groups of people. Because hygiene is a form of ideology, i.e. a form of identity thinking, negative dialectics should be used to critique and change its oppressive forms.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Why study hygiene?

Hygiene is something that is constantly present in our lives and we rarely question it or its practices. Ideas of purity, cleanliness and dirt are however categories that often carry value judgements. The practice of labelling the foreign, the other not only as something scary but in many cases also as something dirty, filthy and impure is as ancient as time, and still present in many ways. Historically, hygiene in the form of eugenics has been a destructive tool that has been used to implement and justify horrible acts, and, unfortunately, some elements eugenics still remain. For example, in the U.S, as recently as in between 2006 and 2010, approximately 150 women inmates were sterilized, and possibly coerced into said procedure (Saini, 2019, p.84). So, we should not let hygiene get off the hook quite yet.

What is hygiene and what does it mean to practice hygiene on a societal level? And why should we study hygiene instead of capitalism or racism, which have also played big roles in oppressive practices like eugenics? I believe that hygiene in itself has a larger role in these practices than what is thought, and therefore looking into it is particularly important. Actually, the fact that hygiene as phenomenon is able to exist without much criticism or negative connotations is one of the reasons, that characterises it as a form of ideology. Ideology has the capability to seem like the best, most natural and, in many cases, only option, as we will discuss in this thesis.

This brings us to the second focal point of this thesis: ideology. I believe that the best way to analyse and criticise hygiene is through ideology critique, as is the common approach within the tradition of critical theory. Therefore, a major part of this thesis will discuss ideology, its definitions and contemporary approaches. I will argue that the most suitable definition of ideology is by Theodor W. Adorno: ideology as identity thinking. Let us mention here, that since I will be citing the works of Adorno very often, I will be using abbreviations: MM is the abbreviation for *Minima Moralia* (2006), ND for *Negative Dialectics* (2007) and CM for *Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords* (1998).

I will argue that on the most basic level, hygiene functions as a form of ideology, as identity thinking, and creates implicit values and assumptions of what a population and

its functional and acceptable members should be like, while excluding others from this definition.

Finally, I have a disclaimer regarding this subject matter: this text focuses mainly on the negative sides of hygiene, since I would classify my interest in hygiene as emancipatory. To change the oppressive tendencies that hygiene might have, we need to look at its negative effects. However, not all of hygiene and medicine or statistics connected to it are bad or oppressive. For example, hygiene on a personal level is rarely systematic or oppressive nor does it create hierarchies. So, therefore the individual level is not the focus in this text. All these fields are very useful in many areas, but it does not mean that they cannot be used to support oppressive structures under certain conditions. So, for the sake of the goal of this thesis, I will mainly focus on the negative effects of hygiene as a large-scale project that usually concerns populations.

1.2 Defining Hygiene

In the first part of my thesis I define hygiene and attempt to understand its oppressive characteristics. I define hygiene through three different approaches as a positive technology of power, which uses the process of abjection to create hierarchies between people in a possibly oppressive manner. This definition is crucial when moving towards my final goal: claiming that hygiene is a form of ideology. Defining hygiene as a population wide phenomenon is key, so that it can be separated from our day to day ideas and individual actions of hygiene. Since hygiene has not been defined this way to my knowledge, I will make my own definition by connecting hygiene to existing theories and traditions. I have done this through three different approaches: 1. approaching hygiene through Julia Kristeva's (1982) concept of abjection 2. approaching hygiene from a Foucauldian perspective and defining it as a positive technology of power (Foucault 2004, p.48), and 3. connecting hygiene to population control by analysing its definition in the works of Theodor W. Adorno (MM, p.232).

The first approach explains how categories like cleanliness, dirtiness and purity can be linked and used as tools of oppression. Abjection is something that separates us from the rest of the world, like dirt, vomit or other bodily fluids (Kristeva, 1982, p. 3). It is something that is between the subject and object, and therefore cannot really be pinned down (Kristeva, 1982, p.2). Through this border, an identity is being formulated, between ourselves and the world, or on a social level, between us and them. A good

example of hygiene being used as a method for oppression and as a tool of identity building is the construction of whiteness (Berthold, 2010). Racist tropes and ideas of blackness as dark, dirty or earthy (Fanon, 2008, p.147) are used as building blocks for a white identity by contrasting whiteness and its “virtues” against these tropes. Here hygiene is used as an oppressive tool, that is as a tool for labelling others with tropes and characteristics which establish unjust hierarchies.

After this I apply the second approach, a Foucauldian notion of hygiene as a positive technology of power combined with the idea of a normalising society. Hygiene does not rely only on ideas of cleanliness, but also on notions of normality, which are connected to the rise of statistics and eugenics in the 19th century. Normality became understood as a statistical average more consistently. Deviations from the normal or the average became the target of hygienic practices. Foucault writes about a normalising society, but also about the “rationalization” of the body, where the body becomes a part of the chain of production (Foucault, 2003, p.242). This illuminates how economic interests start affecting individual bodies and populations. This process of rationalization happens through positive technologies of power (Foucault 2004, p.48), and I argue that hygiene is such a technology. A positive technology of power is a form of power, which instead of excluding uses power through active measures and actions. Defining hygiene as a positive technology of power shows that it is about constant actions and repetition. It also connects hygiene to a capitalist mode of production.

The next section focuses on the connections and use of hygiene within the context of a population. It is hygiene practiced as a form of public health that is the focus of this thesis, and of course, not all of its forms are sinister. However, hygiene is also being used in ways which imply racist assumptions on what certain populations should look like, as my examples of immigration and dependency ratio show.

Adorno writes about the most extreme use of hygiene; the Nazi Germany, where hygiene was used as a tool for genocide (MM, p.232). Understanding how hygiene can be used in such an extreme case is very important since it gives a very strong normative claim that hygiene is, indeed, something pejorative, like ideology. Adorno describes how in a capitalist society, where the interest in individuals is mainly statistical and focused on efficiency, people become “an organic composition of capital” (MM, p.228-229). In this process, individuals lose their value, and entire groups of people (since

people are not individuals, but members of groups) can be wiped out, if they are seen as unwanted. This task of wiping out, or administering death, is turned to hygiene (MM, p.232). In this case, we can see the destructive power that hygiene as a tool of oppression can have in a totalitarian state, when the individuality of its citizens is lost.

Through these three approaches I define hygiene as a positive technology of power that uses abjection as its tool to label and categorize people in a possibly derogatory or oppressive manner. When this system of labelling is used on a large scale, carrying the implicit values on what a population should look like (white, able-bodied and so on) it can be used to justify and implement different forms of oppression. Thus, it is an oppressive structure, not just a benign practice for well-being. This is why I believe that hygiene is a form of ideology and should be critiqued as such. But to be able to make this claim, I will also need to define ideology.

1.3 Defining Ideology

My main goal in this thesis is to argue within the tradition of critical theory that hygiene is a form of ideology, but to do this, we must understand what exactly is meant with ideology and what type of definition of ideology is the most functional. Within this framework, ideology is always pejorative and something that should be critiqued.

When defining ideology, there are issues that systematically rise. I have divided these issues into the normative and epistemic challenges. The epistemic challenge asks whether the definition requires for its recognition some “outsider” knowledge and how it can be acquired without epistemic authoritarianism. Another epistemic issue that the challenge poses is the falseness of ideology: must ideology be false and if yes, how to explain cases where it is not? The normative challenge questions the normative effects of ideology and its critique: why should we be concerned with ideology, if it for example is in some cases true? What are the normative implications of ideology?

The more traditional definitions of ideology run more often into the issue of epistemic authoritarianism, whereas more contemporary renditions have an issue with the normative sphere of ideology critique. As examples of contemporary definitions, I present the definitions by Robin Celikates (2006) and Sally Haslanger (2017). These issues will be presented through the discussion on whether ideology is cognitivist or non-cognitivist, meaning the question of whether ideology consists of more than just individual beliefs or not. I argue that both of these contemporary definitions pass the

epistemic challenge, but fail in a normative sense. This is because their definitions of ideology are too loose: they lose their ability to create a definition of ideology that would be context-transcending.

I argue that Adorno's definition of ideology as identity thinking combines successfully an epistemic and functional form of ideology critique that does not run into the same issues as the definitions mentioned earlier. Identity thinking is the priority of the concept over the particulars while thinking. Identity thinking is not in all cases ideology; it becomes such when it makes us believe that particulars are identical with their concepts. This homogenizes our worldview and creates the false illusion that constructed, arbitrary things are natural and unchangeable. This definition dodges the epistemic challenge by denying the existence of completely objective knowledge. It stays context-transcending since the approach of seeing things as constellations, as clusters of historically and socially constructed meanings and traces, can be applied in different situations. This definition both fits and explains hygiene as a phenomenon, where it can be useful on an individual level and detrimental on a larger scale.

1.4 Defining Hygiene as a form of Ideology

In the last chapter I answer to possible criticisms that might rise when combining critical theory and the works of Foucault. I argue that the differences between the Foucauldian tradition and ideology critique are not as wide as one might expect, because the Foucauldian critique often only applies to cognitivist definitions of ideology. Actually, Foucauldian genealogy and identity thinking have the same target: the picture perspective which creates concepts and our ideas of truth and falseness. Therefore, claiming that hygiene is both a positive technology of power and a form of ideology is not a conflict. Both Adorno and Foucault are concerned on the effects that our current economic system dominated by exchange value, has on bodies and capabilities.

I conclude this thesis by claiming that hygiene creates implicit values and ideals of what members of a population should be like and be able to do. Striving towards normalcy and efficiency are parts of hygiene, but to understand it on a larger scale, we must approach it as an ideology. Hygiene is usually able to escape criticism by seeming benign or even useful, but its ability to create necessary but false beliefs of what, for example, a "normal" Finnish citizen is like, supports the status quo. Hygiene as

ideology makes us unable to see that these beliefs are not only false, but create prejudicial and exclusionary.

The key to criticizing hygiene is negative dialectics. Identifying hygiene as ideology, as identity thinking, is already practising negative dialectics, since this being aware of the concept of hygiene is not equal with its particulars makes it possible to see how hygiene fails and how it can also be changed. The goal to understanding hygiene is to see it as a constellation: a socially structured entity, that carries within it historical baggage, implicit values, different practices and concepts that we usually take as given. Seeing hygiene as a constellation makes us able to critique it and, hopefully, also change some of its harmful forms

2. Defining hygiene

2.1 Introduction

Hygiene at a first glance seems benign and rather easy to define, whether it be in a scientific or everyday setting. It is something that is constantly present in our lives, but we rarely stop to think about what it actually means. We all wash our hands, wear masks and so forth, we all have an intuitive idea what hygiene is. Many medical or biological definitions have been offered as well: it is often argued that the need for hygiene is evolutionary and that we have been coded to feel disgust towards dirt and germs as a way of survival (for example, see Curtis, 2007). To some extent this is surely true. However, when we step back and examine hygiene as a systematic practice, implemented on a large, for example state level scale, through social policy and practice, its definition and purpose become increasingly more difficult to define. The history of hygiene does not make it any easier: hygiene is connected to a great number of both oppressive and non-oppressive structures. It is clear that on some level hygiene is useful and a key element of a healthy life, but some forms of hygiene can be used as a justification or as a tool to oppressive structures. The complex nature of hygiene being used as a tool of oppression is even more interesting and hard to pin down, when we look at all the different instances where ideas of cleanliness, dirt, purity and so on are used as a way to exclude or discriminate. Hygiene intersects with different forms of oppression; it is in some form present in racist, sexist and ableist structures, for example.

Hygiene is also a theme that recurs in many philosophical texts about eugenics, totalitarianism, medicalisation and normalization. However, it is never the focus of these texts, but rather a side note or a technical issue. Why is it then that hygiene is a common denominator with all these different issues? How can hygiene be defined, and does it contribute to the oppressive systems that are linked with movements like eugenics or totalitarianism?

While the historical connections with eugenics and hygiene are undeniable, it is not enough to point out that hygiene has its origins in something as terrifying as eugenics, since this would result in the genetic fallacy; A lot of things that have had very dubious starts are now institutions or phenomena that arguably have a mainly positive impact on

the society¹. My goal in this chapter is to define hygiene and identify what it is in hygiene that makes it so easy to use it as a justification to oppressive hierarchies. Understanding these characteristics of hygiene is a crucial step in making the main argument of my thesis: claiming that hygiene is a form of ideology.

I will define hygiene as a systematic, public practice or tool that has the power to label groups of individuals as being part of different categories connected to different ideas of cleanliness. These categories can be undesirable and putting individuals under such labels can cause them to be (further) oppressed. The power of hygiene is that it groups individuals together and labels them unfairly as dirty or unwanted, in one way or another, meaning that hygiene can be used as a form of exclusion and therefore as a tool of oppression.

Hygiene is a large concept, applied in many different instances, and not many philosophical texts define it or focus on it specifically (for example, see Foucault, 2003, p. 252). Therefore, I will define hygiene through its connections and similarities to other concepts and theories. Firstly, I will look into Julia Kristeva's theory of abjection and how it can be used to describe hygiene. Through this approach I will connect hygiene as a form of abjection to white supremacy and other racist structures. This will give us a definition of what hygiene is but will not necessarily explain how and when it is used as a tool for oppression. For this I will be using Michel Foucault's definition of a positive technology of power and Theodor W. Adorno's writings on hygiene as a tool to control populations and as a justification for genocide. These different approaches to the uses of hygiene offer us an explanation of why and when hygiene can be used to justify and even create different forms of unjust hierarchies by labelling and categorizing groups of individuals. The scope of hygiene does not end on simple questions of physical cleanliness: hygiene has been used to regulate who has the right to reproduce, work and, in some cases, even to live.

¹ For example, the founder of the Planned Parenthood organization, Margaret Sanger made in her time some disturbing statements in support of eugenics (Latson, 2016). I think we can still agree, that today Planned Parenthood represents a mainly positive element in the sexual health of the people in the U.S.

2.2 Hygiene, Cleanliness and Whiteness

2.2.1 Kristeva's theory of Abjection

What is hygiene and how can it be defined? Where does the need for hygiene stem from and what is the role of hygiene in creating hierarchies? One way to answer these questions is to look into the characteristics of hygiene, such as cleanliness and purity. In recent decades the connections of hygiene, cleanliness, purity and whiteness have been studied from many different angles, one of them being the theory of abjection by Julia Kristeva (1982). In this section I will present how Dana Berthold connects whiteness and hygiene together (2010), but to understand her point, we need to first understand Kristeva's concept of abjection.

Kristeva's theory of abjection is interesting for the case of hygiene, because Kristeva relates abjection closely to filth, defilement and exclusion. An abject differs from an object in that sense that it cannot be defined, it is simply something non-self (Kristeva, 1982, p. 1). We are opposed to both an object and an abject, but with an abject, it is not possible to put in words what one is opposed to. We cannot define or put a meaning onto an abject (Kristeva, 1982, pp. 1–2).

Abjection is something that is simultaneously horrifying and fascinating (Kristeva, 1982, p. 1). It scares us, because we cannot put it into words, but we are fascinated by it because we need abjection to define ourselves. This is because we define our own borders and identity through abjection (Kristeva, 1982, pp. 2–3). An abject is between the border of oneself and the rest of the world. It is dirt, vomit or other excretion, that is at one-point part of me but what I cast out (Kristeva, 1982, p. 3). For me to understand what I am, the borders of myself, I need to have a sense of an abject. This process of creating an identity for oneself by defining the borders of oneself through an abject is how "I give birth to myself" (Kristeva, 1982, p. 3). The abject helps us to understand where one ends, and the outside world begins.

Kristeva links abjection constantly with different bodily fluids and filths. However, it is important to note that abjection is not caused by just a lack of cleanliness or health, but it is caused by "what disturbs identity, system, order" (Kristeva, 1982, p. 4). Abjection is that ambiguous something that does not respect the rules that we have made. Bodily fluids are still a good example of abjection, because they are something that we cannot

completely control, and they are simultaneously a part of us but at the same time something outside of us (Kristeva, 1982, pp. 3–5). Another example that Kristeva gives is spitting out or vomiting (ibid.).

Abjection is very natural for people and identity formation, as is the need to control dirt. Kristeva goes on to write how purification rites serve in many “primitive” cultures as ways to divide the people into categories. This shows us how attempts to exclude filth create classification systems or structures (Kristeva, 1982, p. 65). Considering these structures, we can see how abjection works on a social level. It is not only our personal identity that is defined by abjection, nor are the borders and systems created through abjection. And similarly, we are also as a community disturbed by the things that we see as questioning our orders. It depends on the culture what we see as dirt or as an object, but the attempt to exclude it is something universal, according to Kristeva (1982, pp. 67–68).

2.2.2 Application of Kristeva’s Theory to Whiteness and Hygiene

In her article “Tidy Whiteness: A Genealogy of Race, Purity, and Hygiene” (2010) Dana Berthold combines Kristeva’s theory of abjection with the construction of a white identity. Berthold’s main argument in her article is that western culture, especially the U.S., is obsessed with what she calls “extreme hygiene”. She argues that the current obsession with hygiene is counterproductive, since we largely know that extreme hygiene is unhealthy and a certain amount of exposure to bacteria is good for people’s immune systems (Berthold, 2010, p. 2) . Berthold goes on to argue that the obsession with extreme hygiene is connected to racism, because there is no medical reason to practice it. Therefore, the reasoning behind it must be ideological (ibid.) since it cannot be explained as something useful. Thus, it is racist ideology that has driven us to be too hygienic and to practice “extreme hygiene”.

Berthold argues that the obsession with “extreme hygiene” is connected to a white identity, that sees whiteness as the ideal and superior way of being, and therefore is clearly racist (Berthold, 2010, p. 22), since it serves no medical or practical purpose. Berthold backs this argument up by connecting the obsession with cleanliness to the superiority of whiteness, explained with purity ideals. She quotes largely the work of María Lugones on these ideals (1994) . According to Lugones, purity ideals are oppressive structures that benefit the dominant groups and help to keep them in power

(Berthold, 2010, pp. 3–5; Lugones, 1994). The purpose of purity ideals is to paint an oppressed group as something dirty or contaminated. This dirt is both physical and mental because the implications of physical impurity often imply a level of moral impurity as well (Berthold, 2010, p. 5). Some examples of this are the history of ideas of racial purity and purity ideals concerning sexual purity (chastity, virginity etc.) (Berthold, 2010, p. 3).

This is where Berthold uses Kristeva's theory of abjection. Berthold argues that extreme hygiene and a racist ideology are deeply connected to a white sense of self. Whiteness is associated with cleanliness or purity ((Berthold, 2010, p. 3), whereas dirt is a negative and derivative term. The terms of whiteness, purity and cleanliness apply also to the moral character of whoever is described (Berthold, 2010, pp. 5–6). Berthold writes that purity is often used as a way to rationalize the aspect of rejecting the other. In this context of racism, Berthold argues that purity is a way of defining the white sense of self as something (morally) superior (Berthold, 2010, p. 13). But this white identity cannot exist prior to the abjection of elements of non-self. (Berthold, 2010, p. 9; Kristeva, 1982). These elements of non-self are seen as dirty or filthy, and therefore against purity and whiteness (ibid.). Here we can see how Kristeva's argument of purification creating a classification system (Kristeva, 1982, p. 65) is applied to a racist system, where white is seen as superior to non-white and this non-whiteness is what is disturbing the system, and therefore there is a need to exclude it. The existence of non-white bodies in this case is abjection, because whiteness cannot exist without it, it marks the borders of whiteness, but simultaneously whiteness also wants to exclude it.

This idea of combining things that are seen as unpleasant or scary to racialized people is not a new one. Franz Fanon (2008/1952) wrote decades before:

“Blackness, darkness, shadow, shades, night, the labyrinths of the earth, abysmal depths, blacken someone's reputation; and, on the other side, the bright look of innocence, the white dove of peace, magical, heavenly light” (Fanon, 2008, p. 147) .

Fanon illustrates with this point how the European identity is built on a dichotomy, where whiteness is good and pure, and blackness is evil and corrupt (Fanon, 2008, pp. 146–147). This supports Berthold's claim that purity can serve racist agendas, when it disguises implicit racism as an innocent want of cleanliness or as being hygienic

(Berthold, 2010, p. 22). Her main argument is that hygiene and cleanliness are not value-free, innocent concepts (ibid.). They are historically and socially constructed concepts that can carry the same racist tendencies as any other concepts can. Our way of valuing whiteness over nonwhiteness and connecting nonwhiteness with uncleanness is mostly unconscious, but it is still there (Berthold, 2010, p. 18). It is important to note that both Fanon and Berthold are writing about this in the context of Europe or the U.S. The history and culture of these Western countries are key elements in both of their analyses, and they do not, nor do they aim to, cover all racism that exists.

Fanon's account of the European connotations of blackness support Kristeva's theory of abjection as well. The characteristics of abjection fit perfectly to how Fanon describes blackness from a white perspective. It is simultaneously horrifying but necessary to contrast it with a white identity (Fanon, 2008, pp.3&84). The concept of abjection can perhaps explain why the racist trope of connection ethnic minorities with dirt exists²: it is a way to create a hierarchy and to differentiate the white sense of self from others. So, it is not the historical roots of hygiene that makes it racist in some cases, but rather how it is complicit in creating a sense of white superiority. I think that this is evidence that hygiene in itself has features that make it easy to use it as a tool for a racist classification system, as Kristeva would put it, and this is not only because of the historical roots of hygiene, but because dirt is so often used as a way to create abjection and to separate the other from myself or my group identity. In this sense hygiene as a form of abjection is a way to solidify the borders of a group and a way to include as well as exclude people from this group. In conclusion, I argue that hygiene is abjection that creates hierarchies between groups.

2.3 Hygiene and Normalization

How does hygiene's capability to create hierarchies manifest in the social and political sphere? How does it function as a tool of oppression? Hygiene hasn't always played a public role but with the rise of statistics, eugenics and the interest in the health of an entire population, hygiene became a systematic practice. With eugenics, I am referring to the eugenic movement of the 19th century that originated in the U.K and which was largely moulded by Francis Galton. This movement focused on "improving" the quality

² For example, the former president of the United States, Donald Trump, described the home town of the African American congressman Elijah Cummings as "infested" and called the congressman "a rat" (Pengelly & Helmore, 2019).

of the population and on stopping the “degeneration” of the white, bourgeoisie part of the society. (For example, see James, 2017). An important part of said pseudo-science was degeneration theory: the idea that humanity may have had common ancestry, but that different groups had degenerated differently and in varied ways through the ages. An example of this type of fear of degeneration was the concern of the upper classes that the poor would outbreed the rich, since poorer families usually had more children than the rich. Eugenics, then, became the number one tool to stop said degeneration (for example, see Hurley, 1990).

Even though the eugenic movement is mainly historical, it’s effects can still be seen today, even if we might want to deny this. For example, the IQ test, that is still in regular use, is a direct descendant of the eugenic movement (Reddy, 2008). It has been proven many times that the IQ test favours people that have been brought up in western countries, usually in white homes, not because people from these conditions are more intelligent, but because the test is made from their perspective (for example, see Suzuki, L., & Aronson, 2005). Still, the legitimacy of IQ tests is rarely questioned and it is widely used. The eugenic movement and its goal to “cultivate” populations and humanity at large made hygiene a statistical, systematic practice. In this section, hygiene’s connections to statistics and the Foucauldian concept of a technology of power will demonstrate how hygiene on this level still exists.

Lennard J. Davis (1995) writes how it is no coincidence that the same scientists who were interested in statistics were also very invested in the eugenic movement. Lennard argues that the industrial revolution combined with the birth of statistics as a science has created a construct of normalcy and the disabled body (Davis, 1995). What he means by this is that this newly found interest to collect data of the population and categorize it created also a will to modify said population. What became the ideal during this period, was *l’homme moyen*, the average man, the middle of the bell curve (Davis, 1995, p. 26). And thus, the term disability was created to describe the people who did not represent this ideal and somehow deviated from the statistical norm.

Normality and *l’homme moyen* are in themselves neutral categories. The concept of the normal, or the middle of the bell curve, does not mean anything else than that it is the statistical average of something. This in itself does not mean that average or normal is good or bad. However, as Ian Hacking writes in his book *The Taming of Chance* (2014),

normal has become a goal, an ideal. The origins of the use of the word “normal” are in medicine and biology, where during the 19th century, normal was contrasted with the pathological. For example, normality was the ideal state of an organ and an excess of the function of it would lead to a pathological organ and illness (Hacking, 2014, pp. 162, 165). According to Hacking it was August Comte, whose writings made normal a widely used term and something to strive towards (Hacking, 2014, p. 168). So, the statistical middle has become something to strive for; normality is not only the average, it is the ideal, it is how things should be. So, the fact that someone deviates from a statistical average is no longer only an observation: it implies that something is wrong. This idea of normality as the ideal state of things will help us understand why a society might strive towards it and therefore become a normalizing society.

Even though Davis’ main examples are people with disabilities, it is important to note that at the height of the eugenic movement everyone deviating from the average was seen in a similar light. As Davis points out, it was not uncommon to lump “together all allegedly ‘undesirable’ traits. So, for example, criminals, the poor, and people with disabilities might be mentioned in the same breath“ (Davis, 1995, p. 35). From this we can conclude, that the project concerning the population and its “quality” was aimed at many different groups of people who were seen to carry similar traits that were seen as “degenerative” (Rafter, 1988, p. 46). With statistical information of the population at hand, these groups became the target of a systematic project of hygiene, aimed at the amelioration of the population as a whole (Davis, 1995, p.26). For example, the institutionalization of people with cognitive disabilities in the U.S was largely due to the rise of popularity in “family studies”, or in the investigation of “degenerate” families, meaning families that had issues with poverty, alcoholism, criminality, disability and so on (Rafter, 1988, p. 43). So, the ideas of public health and hygiene as a nationwide project was born from a desire to examine the “deviations” from the statistical average and to bring the population as close to the idea of normal, the average man, as possible. The health of a population, and deviations from normality, became the issue of hygiene.

2.4 A Foucauldian Approach

Lennard J. Davis’ arguments about normalcy and the disabled body can be further backed up by Michel Foucault’s idea of a society that rationalizes the body. Foucault

(2003) describes how statistics and the act of harnessing the body to be a part of the means of production has led to the rationalization and economization of the body.

In “Society must be defended” (2003) Foucault describes a transition from one power to another, meaning that the power relations within a society are reorganized, and in this case also multiplied. This shift happened when society moved from the sovereign's right for life and death (mainly death) to the states right to “make” live and “let die” (Foucault, 2003, pp. 241, 247) . What this means is that previously the sovereign had the right to kill or not kill (killing meaning not only physical death but also political death, the exclusion of the individual from all forms of political power and influence (ibid.). Quite soon the concern about life itself became a question of political power and during the nineteenth century this concern developed into different mechanisms, techniques and technologies of power that centred on the body. These techniques were an attempt to increase the productivity of the body, or as Foucault puts it, to rationalize the body (Foucault, 2003, p. 242). The rationalization of the body means a “takeover” of the body, where the body becomes a part of a means of production. The body is “economized” and subjected to the same rationalities of efficacy and productivity as other parts of a chain of production (ibid.). So, the new interest in not only in the right to kill but also into the right to live, or life itself, meant that the political power centred on controlling and monitoring the body and its capabilities and characteristics. The nature of political life and its focus on the means of production meant applying the same rationalities, the rationality of economization, to the body.

This economization and rationalization can be used to describe an example often used in disability studies: how the rise of statistics and the invention of a work shift that was a certain number of hours was detrimental to the ability to participate in society for people with disabilities. In fact, the whole term disability was created during the 19th century, to describe people that statistics found somehow “abnormal”, deviating from the statistical norm. A workday that had to be, let’s say, 12 hours long, meant that people with different abilities couldn’t contribute in any way to the workforce. In more rural societies, it was easier for people with disabilities to work since there were different tasks available. The requirement of a 12-hour workday meant you either worked the full hours or not at all, and for people with disabilities it usually meant not at all (for example, see Davis, 1995). This demonstrates what happens when the body becomes a part of the same rationalities as other means of production. Normality is defined by the

average worker, and the abilities of their bodies, and so seeing the body through efficiency and economization means that bodies with less abilities are automatically seen as less valuable. This rationalization was achieved through a combination of medicine and hygiene, since they both combine scientific knowledge with the population and the body (Foucault, 2003, p. 252), and attempt to use this knowledge to create a body that is as economically efficient as possible

How exactly does hygiene rationalize the body? I argue that hygiene is something that Foucault would describe as a “positive technology of power” (Foucault, 2004, p. 48), meaning that it is a tool of this rationalization. To understand this term, we need to investigate Foucault’s genealogy of a normalizing society. This genealogy describes the same phenomenon of the statistical norm being not only an observation but also the ideal discussed earlier (Hacking, 2014, p. 162,165) . For Foucault this happens because of the changed practices of treating the ill and a rising interest in life itself, or the body (Foucault, 2003). This has created a society that targets everything that deviates from the current norm and tries to normalize it, to bring it as close to the ideal average as possible (ibid.).

Foucault (2004) writes how the difference between the treatment of leprosy and the plague demonstrate a shift towards a society of normalization. Foucault describes how the treatment of leprosy was mainly exclusion, whereas with plague it was inclusion. What this means is that people with leprosy were cast out from society, whereas with the plague epidemic people were treated with quarantine (Foucault, 2004, p. 43). Isolating through quarantine is still a form of inclusion, according Foucault, since the quarantined people are still members of the society. An important factor of their participation in society is the fact that the treatment of plague requires collecting knowledge on who is ill and how. This knowledge on “healthy/ill” members of society and the power structure that it creates are key components in Foucault’s description of a normalizing society (Foucault, 2004, p.45).

So, all this adds up to a shift from one grand gesture of purification (casting out) to a constant surveillance of health (Foucault, 2004, p. 46). In this moment of history with plague, we can see how political power extends itself to be concerned not only with the purification of an entire community of illness, but instead it attempts “to maximize the health, longevity, and strength of individuals” (Foucault, 2004, p. 46). The effects of

power are multiplied. Having a healthy society becomes more than just the lack of illness.

This description of a positive technology of power can be used to describe hygiene as well. Foucault separates medicine and hygiene from each other (Foucault, 2003, p. 244), meaning that hygiene is an independent tool from medicine. Indeed, Foucault argues that hygiene is a goal of medicine, not a part of it (ibid.). From this we can conclude that, like medicine, hygiene can be categorized as a technology of power (Foucault, 2003, p. 252)³. As an active practice that monitors the bodies of individuals, hygiene fits the definition of a positive technology of power, and this means that not only does hygiene aim for cleanliness, but it also aims for normalcy.

This definition of hygiene as a positive technology of power gives us a better idea of what hygiene actually is. Through this lens hygiene is an active form of power that includes monitoring individuals and enforcing certain behaviour that individuals conduct themselves. Hygiene is an extension of this interest in the maximization of health. As a part of a normalizing society, it also attempts to bring people as close to the ideal average, *l'homme moyen*, as possible. Defining hygiene as a positive technology of power is useful also because the Foucauldian approach to the examination of power structures requires narrowing down the subject of examination to a single tool of power and understanding the specific logic and rationalizations that are being used in that specific context (Foucault, 1982, p. 329). Through understanding these power relations, we can also “investigate the forms of resistance and attempts made to dissociate these relations” (ibid.).

So, hygiene being a technology of power, means that it has its own rationality, even if its rationality is connected to the larger picture of a normalizing society⁴. Similar sentiment can be found in Foucault’s text “The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century” (2014) . This rationality of hygiene can be used in many instances to label certain conditions or groups as lesser than, since they deviate from the norm. Not only is hygiene a tool of a normalizing society, it also has its connections to the economization of the body. This means that hygiene is a part of the same rationality of economy, where

³ Similar sentiment can be found in Foucault’s text “The politics of health in the eighteenth century” (2014).

⁴ Foucault implies that hygiene is a part of a system of normalization (2003, p.244) but it is not explicit. Still, this should not be overlooked.

the efficiency of bodies is a key goal. These ideas of normalization and economization combined with hygiene can have a detrimental effect when they are applied as a nation-wide project, as the next section will prove. By understanding the function of hygiene on this level, we can see how it contributes to oppressive structures and by this analysis we can gain insight on how to defy these structures.

2.5 Hygiene and Population

Population and hygiene as concepts are very tightly entangled. Even historically, the use of the word population replaced the word race in a thinly veiled attempt to separate medicine and hygiene from its eugenic past (Saini, 2019, p. 95). Population thus became a key element when discussing large -scale hygienic practices with its connections to statistics and eugenics. The systematic use of hygiene as a way to “enhance” or control a population was in most of the cases first and foremost a national project (Davis, 1995, p. 36). Hygiene on a systematic scale could not exist without a national population, since its main target is a population as a whole and populations are usually defined through national borders. In this section I will present the connections that a state, public health and hygiene have with a population within a nation state and its control.

Since a systematic level of public health requires data on a large amount of people, we can conclude that hygiene as a public health measurement requires a society that sees its members at least at some level as a unified mass. An example of hygiene being used on a national level is national authorities encouraging only certain people to reproduce. Usually this stems from a concern towards the dependency ratio: a want to keep the birth rates at a certain level so that the society still has enough people in the workforce to be able to take care of the people who are not (Liimatainen, 2017).

As this example of the dependency ratio highlights, sexual hygiene and concerns over public health are connected. It is not uncommon for politicians to discuss the problems of an ageing society (Liimatainen, 2017) . Clearly, birth rates are a political issue that concerns the population of a nation. Most of the issues of an ageing nation could be solved through immigration: an ageing society is on a global scale a rarity. Why then, is the age dependency ratio still an issue in countries like Finland? This is because there are still goals towards an ideal population. Hygiene in this reproductive sense is control and ideology that is being practised when some people are encouraged to reproduce, and others are not, or they are not even let into the country in the first place.

Collecting data and making statistics of a national population is not necessarily problematic or oppressive, but there are instances where it can be. The example of sexual hygiene is one of them, since states simultaneously close their borders from others and encourage the existing population to reproduce. There are clearly some racist assumptions at play here of what the population of the nation should look like, particularly when immigration could solve issues with the age dependency ratio. Another issue with this type of discourse is also the sexist treatment of the bodies that give birth, where their bodily autonomy is not seen as important as the state's well-being. The connecting element between the racist assumptions of what a Finnish population should be like and with the instrumental treatment of child-bearing bodies is hygiene: the implicit value in both of these is the "purity" or "cleanliness" of the population, meaning that the population should be and look a certain way.

Theodor W. Adorno (2006) writes how particularly in totalitarian states hygiene can be used as a way to wipe out the individuality of its population. He writes how wage labour has created the masses of the modern epoch, because when the masses of workers become a key element of economy, they become "organic composition of capital" (MM, p. 229) , which in is in many ways reminiscent of the Foucauldian analysis of the economization of the body: bodies are put under the same logic of economy as other means of production. Adorno's idea of bodies seen as the organic composition of capital in capitalistic society means that the growth of this mass means the growth of production, and workers become only agents of the law of value. The more workers you have, the more profit you can make. As the technical requirements of production increase, so do the technical requirements for the masses (ibid.). However, these masses are not instantly turned into mechanical pieces, they need constant "influence" to function in this way, and still, sometimes people don't act as pieces of this mechanic. Adorno calls these instances where people fail to be functional pieces of mechanics as "deformations" (MM, p. 229). This deformation is, however, not a characteristic of any individual, since the state sees its population as a large unit or mass (ibid.). These deformations are a societal issue, since efficiency and ability to work are as well. In the same spirit, this issue of deformed groups cannot be solved by focusing on individuals, but instead by getting rid of the entire group.

This non-existent individuality applies to this group of "deformed" people as well, meaning that the trait that makes them unwanted cannot be an individual characteristic

(MM, p.229). Lack of individuality means that the deformation has to be hereditary and it has to apply to everyone in the group that is defined through having a similar position in a society in one way or another (ibid.). This similar position can be economic class, ethnicity and so forth. When a state starts to label groups of people to be deformed, it is paving the way for hygiene being used as a way to administer death to this group of people (ibid.). We will return to this soon.

But how exactly does individuality disappear with this mechanical, profit oriented thinking of the masses and what does it have to do with hygiene? Adorno argues that in a totalitarian state, everybody is replaceable. There are always new workers ready to take the place of a lost one. Therefore, death has become more or less irrelevant (MM, pp. 231–232). Death is only an exit from a social field, but it does not leave any kind of void; it is debased (MM, p. 232), since the void is filled as soon as it appears. Therefore, replaceable nature of bodies as mass for the workforce wipes out their individuality.

Adorno writes:

“So the experience of death is turned into that of the exchange of functionaries, and anything in the natural relationship to death that is not wholly absorbed into the social one is turned over to hygiene” (MM, p. 232).

In conclusion, all the dirty work of death is turned over to hygiene. Things that are not beneficial to the industrial production or profit and deal with death, become issues of hygiene. Adorno continues to write how, paradoxically, the disappearance of death in a public sense, in the sense that everybody is replaceable, brings us closer to our individual deaths (MM, pp. 232– 233). This is because once a society is indifferent towards an individual’s death, it is capable of inflicting death administratively to its members (ibid.). This sort of administrative infliction of death would be an issue that would be “turned over to hygiene”. Individual death does not matter, because hygiene can be used to justify the administrative killing of the kind of people that are seen as deformed. Adorno does not say it explicitly in the section of quoted earlier, but quite clearly, he is attempting to explain here how the holocaust used hygiene as an ideology and justification to execute the genocide of Europe’s Jewish population. Even if this is an extreme example of hygiene, it is important to note how hygiene can be used in a context of both a capitalistic and totalitarian state, to understand its pejorative nature.

To sum up, here we can see that particularly in totalitarian states, hygiene can be used as a way to weed out the unwanted parts of its population. This is due to the fact that a totalitarian state is incapable of seeing its members as individuals, at least partly because industrialization and capitalism have turned workers into a part of the system of profit. In an industrialized, capitalistic society most workers are replaceable, which leads to the disappearance of value of individuals. Therefore, it will also be tempting to see, not the individuals, but some parts of a population as “deformed”. This also leads to the situation where individual lives do not matter, and therefore it becomes easier to justify hygienic measures that will get rid of these deformed parts of the population.

My earlier example of the current usage of sexual hygiene obviously cannot be compared to a genocide, but it does stem from the same combination of capitalism, nationalism and implicit values of the “purity” of a nation that Adorno describes: people are clearly seen as an extension of a capitalistic economy within a state, where their value is measured in their capability to be a part of a workforce. In this example the increased amount of people also means an increased amount of production and is therefore desirable. Similarly, other people are not valuable to the society because of some characteristic they bear and therefore they are not given the possibility to be a part of the population in the first place. In the case of immigration laws, I would argue that it is a case of hygiene, even if indirectly, since it is an action that is concerned with (the preservation of) certain characteristics of a population. The key difference here is of course the lack of totalitarianism: the way which hygiene is used as a tool to administrate death is in Adorno’s text a part of a not only a capitalistic, but also a totalitarian state (MM, p. 229).

A similar thought can be found in Foucault’s “Society must be defended” (2003), which was mentioned in the section 2.4. Foucault describes how the transformation of power from exclusion to inclusion is divided into two categories: the body-organism-discipline and the statist set or bioregulation by the state (Foucault, 2003, p. 250). So, there are two levels of this power, one concerned with the individual bodies and another interested in all the people as representatives of humanity. First there is a seizure of power over the (individual) body followed by a power over the masses, over to the “man-as-species” (Foucault, 2003, p.243), or over people as parts of humanity. This latter form is also called “biopolitics” of the human race. Like Adorno, Foucault argues that the population must be seen as a mass to be able to practice biopolitics over it.

However, unlike Adorno, Foucault does not think that individuality diminishes or vanishes in this process (Foucault, 1982, p. 331). The individual and population exist simultaneously and the individual's surveillance over oneself supports the control over the entire population. So, individualization supports the totalization of seeing the sum of individuals as a whole, as a population.

It is clear that hygiene, when used in a eugenic way, as Adorno describes, requires that the individuals of the society are seen as one, unified mass. This is not necessarily a bad thing: most things that use statistical information require this in one way or another. But in some cases, like in Adorno's account of a totalitarian state, this way of treating a population as one big mass combined with hygiene, can result in catastrophic acts and the decrease of the value of individual lives. Whether the complete erasure of individuality is required or not for these kinds of acts, is debatable, as Foucault offers a point of view, where individuality is not opposed to, but actually supports the massifying of a population. The difference here can perhaps be explained with the fact that Adorno is describing a totalitarian state, and Foucault is not. Still, the connection between hygiene and the justification of seeing a group of people as carrying the same trait, supports the fact that in this context, hygiene is a part of erasing the individuality of the members of this group. This is especially true in a totalitarian state, where this trait can become the only defining trait of said group. But even with these differences, we can see that hygiene has the power to control people's bodies and create ideals and hierarchies. The difference seems to depend on what is the driving force behind each society: capitalism and its pursuit for efficiency has different uses for hygiene than a totalitarian state that constitutes its legitimacy on racial purity. Nonetheless, hygiene plays a key role in population control.

Finally, it is possible to argue that these hierarchies and hygienic practices are a thing of the past, but unfortunately the eugenic undertone still lingers on. A contemporary example of mental hygiene in the context of populations still being looked into can be found in genetics, particularly genetics considering group differences (Saini, 2019, p. 122) The idea of intelligence being genetic is still popular with some researchers and there is a sentiment that population wide intelligence research should be more mainstream (Saini, 2019, pp. 123–124) It comes as little surprise that these studies usually end up benefiting people with European ancestry (*ibid.*). And even if this difference would be explained through culture instead of biology, the idea of cultural

superiority is not very far from believing that some populations have innate capacities that make them superior to others (Saini, 2019, p. 25), which brings us right back to eugenics.

2.6. Summary of the Chapter

In the beginning of this chapter I defined hygiene as a form of abjection and as a tool to enforce the boundaries of both the self and group members. After this, I examined the connections that hygiene has to the ideas of normalcy and characterised it as a positive technology of power. The dangers and misuse of hygiene became apparent through the examining hygiene through the writings of Adorno, who highlighted the possibility of using hygiene as a tool and justification for genocide, particularly in the context of a totalitarian state.

Even through all these angles to hygiene, it is clear that hygiene is a complicated concept, because it is connected both historically and presently to so many different structures, both oppressive and non-oppressive. Hygiene exists both on a very public sphere, but it is also something personal and intimate. My goal has been to show how hygiene as abjection works both on a personal level, as a way to understand the boundaries of self, and how this same process creates the same boundaries on a larger scale, between groups. Moving on from this definition to the birth of a positive technology of power, we can see how hygiene can function not just as a form of exclusion but more as inclusion and monitoring, as repeated actions of hygiene. This approach also shows us the connections that hygiene has to normality and how it is a part of the other statistical ideals that define a normalizing society.

Hygiene at its worst is when it is used to control an entire population. Especially Adorno's account of hygiene used in a totalitarian state in section 2.5 explains well the possible dangers of applying hygiene to large masses, particularly in state that relies on discriminatory politics, and how it can be used to administer death, when the individuality of the members of the groups labelled as dirty or otherwise unwanted disappear. The Foucauldian approach where individuality does not disappear, but instead exists and supports the massifying of individuals, is perhaps more suitable for an analysis on hygiene in a state that is not totalitarian and isn't using hygiene to justify the killings of people, but that is more focused on monitoring and enhancing the existing populace.

A Foucauldian approach can help us locate the places where hygiene is used as a tool of oppression in our current society. Understanding the inner logic of hygiene as a positive technology of power, and when it is being used in an oppressive manner, can help us find effective places of resistance.

Hygiene in all of these different approaches and scales describe the potential that hygiene has to be used by national institutions to label a certain group of people dirty, deformed or otherwise undesirable. The Foucauldian approach offers a way to see how exploitative capitalism, where people are valued by their ability to work, and hygiene can support each other. Foucault's concept of the rationalization (or economization) of the body is an analysis of how bodies can be turned into means of production. Adorno's take on hygiene echoes a similar sentiment: an important step towards using hygiene as a part of a genocide is seeing people as "organic composition of capital" (MM, p. 229). The attitude where people's value is defined by their participation in the workforce, is one of the reasons that leads to the want to control people's bodies and label them through hygiene as less capable or less valuable.

What is important to remember is that hygiene is not a value free concept. The purity ideals that Lugones writes about and Fanon describes are the same phenomenon where cleanliness and dirtiness are connected to morality. The connotations of blackness, dirt, darkness, and so on are not just descriptive. As Berthold and Fanon point out, there is a connection between physical dirtiness and moral dirtiness, and therefore hygiene can be used not only to describe, but to also discriminate. Instances where racist claims are being backed up by claims of ethnic minorities being somehow dirty are still relevant. Amid the corona virus outbreak, the media was filled with stories of people of Asian descent being labelled as dirty or infested. Kristeva's and Berthold's texts highlight the fact that there is nothing that is outside the scope of our own prejudices and societal norms, and even something as beneficial as hygiene can be used as a tool to discriminate.

So, hygiene is a system of labelling bodies as dirty or clean. This in itself is not bad, but since there are values that are attached to cleanliness and dirtiness, hygiene also becomes a system of valuing and labelling people. When this system that is hygiene is implemented on a larger scale, it becomes entangled to other implicit values that are attached to the ideal image of a population, like normalcy, efficiency, whiteness or able-

bodiedness. It is this type of hygiene that can be used to justify different types of discrimination and even genocide. When hygiene is implemented on this scale, it's implicit values and the false sense of it being something "natural", or at least benign is what makes it a form of ideology.

3. Defining Ideology

3.1 Introduction

Ideology critique, the systematic practice of critiquing existing social conditions, beliefs and attitudes that uphold unjust social structures, is a powerful tool when analysing existing social phenomena. I believe that applying this to hygiene is beneficial if we want to see beyond its benign face value and understand the harmful side it has. My goal is to define hygiene as a form of ideology to tell apart the times when hygiene is useful or the least neutral, and the occasions of when it is used to justify unjust hierarchies and oppression. It is these latter cases that are *ideological*, and therefore harmful and in need of criticism. But to do this, we must first define ideology.

Ideology as a concept is very contested and therefore before ideology can be conclusively defined it is important to look into the tradition of ideology and ideology critique. In this chapter I will first present the more traditional, epistemic, definition of ideology as a false consciousness (Geuss, 1981, p.14). However, this definition has prompted two major challenges that all definitions of ideology face: *the epistemic* and *the normative* challenges. These challenges will be presented in section 3.3. The epistemic challenge is concerned with the epistemic nature of ideology and its truth value. Is outsider knowledge needed, and if yes, how to avoid epistemic authoritarianism? The normative challenge asks us what the normative effects of ideology and ideology critique are: why exactly should ideology be critiqued? What makes it pejorative? The normative challenge also asks the question whether ideology critique is able to make any normative claims or not, and if not, why would it matter?

After this, this chapter will present two contemporary accounts of ideology which try to avoid the issues raised by the epistemic and normative challenges. The definitions by Sally Haslanger's (2017) and Robin Celikates' (2006) attempt to actively avoid these issues in their definitions. Both of these approaches are functional, meaning that they are defined as ideological through their function, mostly because they want to avoid the authoritative nature of ideology as a false consciousness, where only a chosen elite is able to see beyond it.

Both Haslanger and Celikates suggest functional approaches in defining ideology, but unfortunately, these approaches only seem to postpone the task of defining ideology, as

well as losing a context-transcendent quality of the definition, that is needed for successful ideology critique. This will lead us to the fourth chapter where I present a definition of ideology that I believe can tackle all the challenges mentioned above.

3.2 Ideology– definitions and contemporary criticism

Ideology and its critique are a key parts of the tradition of critical theory. The idea often presented in critical social theory is that true, lasting social change is possible by unmasking ideology, since ideology is most often seen as something at least partially subconscious or unintentional. By unmasking ideology, we can see that our actions, thought patterns, social structures etc. are indeed ideological and after this we can question and critique this ideology that we are now aware of.

However, the task of defining ideology has proven to be quite tricky. In this chapter I will discuss the different definitions of ideology, focusing on the definition of pejorative ideology, since that is the approach of critical theory and ideology critique, and it is the most suitable approach for the project of critiquing hygiene. I will also present the more contemporary criticism towards pejorative definitions of ideology and the possible solutions for the issues that the criticism raises.

Raymond Geuss (1981) has categorized ideology into three distinct categories: descriptive, pejorative and positive. Within the context of critical theory ideology is most often seen as the pejorative kind. To understand why this is the case, we need to look into all the different categories. Descriptive ideology, or anthropological ideology as Geuss also calls it, is simply put an attempt to look at ideology as objectively as possible (Geuss, 1981, p. 5) . With this type of approach ideology becomes the sociocultural field that is unique to and shared within a certain group of people (ibid). So, in this case ideology is a cultural phenomenon that should be researched objectively without any value judgements.

The positive view of ideology does not see ideology only as something good, but even as a necessary aspect for people to be able to live satisfying lives (Geuss, 1981, p. 22). From this point of view, ideology is something that a community intentionally constructs to make its life meaningful and give it direction (Geuss, 1981, pp. 22–23), so the members of society are very well aware of their ideology. One example that Geuss offers about a positive ideology is religion: Religions have been constructed to cater to fundamental human needs, like goals, ideals and values, and to answer to existential

questions about life, death and so on (Geuss, 1981, p. 22). However, the positivist view might be too optimistic: it seems impossible that a community or society would be able to simply look at its participants and decide what type of ideology would work the best and then implement it, especially when human interests, needs and goals vary greatly within all societies (Geuss, 1981).

Lastly, there is the pejorative definition of ideology. This is the most common form of definition for ideology within the context of critical theory and it will be the focus on this thesis as well. The pejorative approach sees ideology as something negative, as something that is detrimental for a society (Geuss, 1981, p. 12). Geuss lists three reasons why the effects of an ideology can be defined as negative:

1. Epistemic – a form of consciousness is false, and therefore ideological, because it creates false beliefs that deceive or fools the masses.
2. Functional – a form of consciousness is ideologically false because of it functions in a way that creates a false sense of consciousness, for example, it functions in a way that creates injustice but it goes unnoticed or is deemed acceptable.
3. Genetic – a form of consciousness is ideologically false, because its origins are false or the motivations for people to adapt this form of consciousness are. (Geuss, 1981, p. 13).

The issue with the genetic critique, the genetic fallacy, was briefly mentioned in the previous chapter: hygiene, in this case, cannot be categorized as being harmful only because its roots are in the eugenic movement. This is because there are plenty of cases where something has had its start in something awful, but the end result might still be good or useful. Most of us would agree that many hygienic practices are extremely useful and should not be discarded, even though they stem from the extremely unjust legacy of eugenics. So, an ideology, like hygiene, cannot be labelled harmful *only* because of its origins.

Epistemic critique of ideology is perhaps the more traditional one when it comes to critical theory. Terry Eagleton writes how a central lineage of the epistemic critique starts from Hegel and Marx and leads to a multitude of Marxist thinkers, like many critical theorists (Eagleton, 1991, p. 3). What characterizes epistemic critique is the

claim that ideology creates situations where the epistemic status of different things is wrongly identified, meaning for example that a social phenomenon is identified as a natural occurrence (Geuss, 1981, p. 14). The goal of this approach is to critique ideology and show the members of the society why and how they are being deceived (Geuss, 1981, p. 12). When seeing this deception, the masses should aim for change. In this context ideology has been often described as a “false consciousness” (for example, see Marcuse, 2007, p. 14), as a delusion that needs to be broken.

This type of epistemic critique of ideology is not very viable today. This is partially due to the pragmatic turn in social theory (Celikates, 2006, p. 1). The pejorative view of ideology before the pragmatic turn leans on the assumption that it is possible to gain objective, scientific knowledge outside of the ideology and stemming from this knowledge, critique the ideology itself (Celikates, 2006, pp. 1, 26). This assumption implies that most people are not able to completely grasp this type of knowledge. Due to their social position, the majority of people cannot be “outside of the ideology” and therefore they are unaware of their ideological bias. It is only the social scientist, philosopher or other highly educated individual that can unmask the “hidden truth” and see beyond the ideology (Celikates, 2006, p. 26).

This assumption of superior un-ideological, scientific knowledge is the major criticism towards the epistemic definition of ideology. It is authoritarian and goes against our everyday notion that most of the time, we are aware of what we are doing and why (Celikates, 2006, p. 32). For example, even if someone has to work in a multinational clothing store, that produces their products in sweatshops, it does not mean that the people working there are unaware of the ideology or system that they are participating in. It is rarely an active choice to work in these types of companies, it is simply that there are no other options. Unmasking the exploitative ideology, that seems to excuse the practices of this company, will probably not make people quit their jobs. It does not change the situation where people have no other options than to participate in an exploitative system to get by.

Another issue is the claim that some type of “outsider” knowledge is required to find ideology as it is (for example, see Marcuse, 2007, p. 19). There are two issues here: firstly, ideology is often described, in these texts that practice epistemic ideology critique, as hegemonic (Celikates, 2006, p. 28). This claim makes us question how and

why exactly are philosophers or social scientists not affected by this hegemony that seemingly affects everybody else? And if ideology then isn't all encompassing, since some outsider knowledge is possible, how is it then fooling the majority of people? And once again, this implies that most agents are somehow unaware at least of some of their motivations, which is not coherent of how most people view themselves and their critical capacities (Celikates, 2006, p. 32).

Finally, the problem of the epistemic critique of ideology boils down to its authoritative nature: claiming that only a small, highly educated minority, is able to gain rational knowledge is ethically questionable. This type of epistemic authoritarianism "fail to respect the ethical intuition that the freedom of human beings consists in important measure in the freedom to pursue their conceptions of the good on the basis of reasons that they are able to call their own" (Cooke, 2006, p. 4). This ethical intuition is at the core of most of our ethical beliefs and coincides with the argument that the pragmatic turn makes: The pragmatic claim is that people are aware of their motivations and actions, supports the ethical intuition that people have the right (to a certain extent) to pursue these actions, that they believe will make their lives better and more fulfilling.

Since agents are clearly aware of their own motivations and the issues within their own social environments (i.e. the workers at the unethical, sweatshop using clothing company), why is ideology critique as a systematic practice needed? The pragmatic turn suggests that since there is no way to objectively gain knowledge of ideology, there is actually no need for ideology critique (Celikates, 2006, pp. 27–28). Perhaps ideology isn't a bad thing, but simply a humane way to interpret the social world? It is plausible that some outcomes from an ideology, like some hygienic practices for example, are beneficial, as discussed earlier. But viewing ideology in this manner, and admitting that there is no possible way to critique it, implies the same as the epistemic approach to ideology: that critique requires knowledge outside of ideology (Celikates, 2006, p. 29).

To sum up, the pragmatic turn questions the possibility of objective knowledge that seems to be a prerequisite for ideology critique, since the knowledge gained in especially social sciences is so deeply rooted in the "agent's perspective and her self-understanding over the standpoint of science and theory that claims the privilege of detachment" (Celikates, 2006, p. 1). It seems that gaining completely objective knowledge is an impossible task, and were it to be possible, this type of knowledge

would not be very useful for social sciences, since it overlooks the perhaps the most important aspect: the agent. So, can there be ideology critique without objective, outsider knowledge? This question and issue is one part of a the epistemic challenge (Haslanger, 2017, p. 4), which will be discussed in the next section.

3.3 The Epistemic and Normative challenges

There are two similar issues that rise up in most texts regarding ideology: the challenges concerning the epistemic and normative aspects of ideology, and particularly combining the two. The name given to this issue differs between different philosophers, but the main points remain similar. I will be using the terms epistemic and normative challenge when talking about these issues. These terms are originally from the work of Sally Haslanger (2017), but my definition of the challenges differs slightly. We will return to Haslanger's usage of the terms later. Similar categories can be found in the works of both Geuss (1981) and Jaeggi (2009).

Let's start with the epistemic challenge since its issues have already been discussed in the previous section of this chapter. The question leading to the epistemic challenge is the question of defining ideology and its truth value. The epistemic challenge can be roughly divided into two main questions:

- a.) does ideology require "outsider" knowledge or knowledge that is separate from the experiences of agents, and if yes, how is it possible to acquire such knowledge and simultaneously avoid epistemic authoritarianism?
- b.) is ideology necessary false? If yes (like in most theories defining ideology as a "false consciousness"), how do we explain the situations where ideology isn't false? If we say that that it isn't always false, how do we recognize ideology if not by its falsity?

The first question, namely the issue of "outsider" knowledge, was discussed in the previous chapter and as stated there, the pragmatic turn of social sciences and the emphasis on the experiences of the agents makes this claim unreasonable in today's standards (Celikates, 2006, p. 29). But is ideology always false? Not necessarily. Ideologies construct our lived realities, and therefore the claims that ideologies make are often true (Geuss, 1981, p. 18). A good example of this is the hygienic practices that are accurate and actually beneficial, like for example the free contraception offered to

everyone under 25 in Helsinki. The benefits of this system are not false, and as a practice it makes people's lives safer and easier. There is an implication of sexual hygiene here: this practice is implemented clearly as a way to encourage some people (an age group in this case) to not reproduce. So, how can we identify hygiene as ideology if its claims on sexual health in this case are not false or harmful?

Haslanger offers another good example of a situation where ideology is at least to a certain extent true: most caregivers are women; that is a fact in most places (Haslanger, 2017, p. 4). But this fact has been constructed by ideological beliefs and systems. The argument that women would carry some inherent quality that makes them better or more willing to be caregivers is in today's standards a bad, and frankly misogynistic, argument. Therefore, the fact that women are more often caregivers, carries an ideological component, while simultaneously being true. So, this situation is ideological and, at least partially, true. Again, how can we then identify ideology if not by its falseness?

The normative challenge is the question of the normative implications of ideology. If ideology can be sometimes true and even a part of a larger system (like hygiene) that has some positive effects on society, why should we practice ideology critique in the first place? Why is ideology bad and what are the normative effects of defining it as such? Jaeggi formulates her normative paradox as follows:

“To merely observe that the status quo is “constructed,” open to questions and generally changeable, does not by itself generate any criteria for deciding whether and why certain institutions and certain understandings of social reality are wrong and should, therefore, be changed” (Jaeggi, 2009, p. 72).

So, just by making an epistemic claim that ideology is constructed, does not automatically make it an issue. In this example of women as caregivers, the issue is not women working as caregivers, even if this situation is somewhat ideological, and “constructed”, as Jaeggi puts it. The issue is that careers predominantly chosen by women are underappreciated and underpaid. Just by defining a phenomenon as ideological and revealing something as constructed does not mean that it's automatically bad nor is it enough to make it a subject of ideology critique. Women shouldn't stop working as caregivers if they do not want to. But what aspect should, then, be critiqued here? And what normative claims can such ideology critique make?

What are the connections between ideology critique, like stating that caregivers are underpaid, and normative claims? Just stating that caregivers are underpaid is not enough to strive social change, so what kind of normative claims can ideology critique make, and if it can't make such claims, can it actually lead to social any type of change? (Haslanger, 2017, p. 4; Jaeggi, 2009, p. 71.)

The real issue seems to be, however, connecting the two challenges. It seems that quite often a definition of ideology that is able to avoid the issues of the epistemic challenges, fails within the category of the normative challenge and vice versa. So, often a theory of ideology successfully explains to us why an ideology misleads us *or* why it is wrong, but rarely both. This stems from the issue if ideology critique needing to be simultaneously normative and non-normative (Jaeggi, 2009, p. 63). This means that an ideology critique needs to be able to make normative claims as well as have a context-transcending quality, meaning that it needs to have a vantage point that is beyond a specific context (Cooke, 2006, p. 6). This vantage point is needed for the critique to be able to make claims of ideologies distorting or deceiving qualities as well as to be able to define ideology in a non-relative way (*ibid.*).

The issue of answering successfully to both the epistemic and normative challenges can be divided into three requirements for ideology:

- a.) to be able to define an ideology as something detrimental or pejorative, we must be able to make normative claims, such as claiming that a form of power is oppressive (Cooke, 2006, p. 6).
- b.) to do such claims, we must be able to distinguish normative structures from another and make evaluative claims like form of power x is more oppressive than form of power y (*ibid.*).
- c.) the reasoning behind the distinction in b. needs to be context-transcending (*ibid.*) or in other words non-normative, because if we want to claim that ideology has pejorative normative effects on society, because it is somehow distorting, false or misleading, we cannot base these claims on solely normative basis, since this basis stems from said misleading ideology.

These challenges and goals are crucial when it comes to defining hygiene as a form of ideology, because hygiene is sometimes true, in the sense that it does coincide with how

things are in the world. To return to our previous example: a planned pregnancy in a more stable state in one's life is most likely an easier option than teen pregnancy. In this case we can also see that hygiene is also not oppressive in all of its forms, so the definition of ideology must be loose enough to take this into account epistemologically, but clear enough to facilitate normative claims and evaluations while still being context-transcendent.

In the next section I will present two attempts to answer both the epistemic and normative challenges. Both of these approaches are functional, meaning that ideology is defined by its functional properties. They demonstrate to us the possibilities of a definition of ideology that does not rely on solely epistemic critique and therefore is not authoritarian. Unfortunately, this commitment to a functionalist approach runs into the issues mentioned above: it fails to combine the epistemic task of defining ideology, while successfully justifying the normative reach that ideology critique needs to have.

3.4 Functionalist definitions of Ideology

How can ideology critique be practised when it seems that the requirement of outsider knowledge cannot and perhaps, should not, be met? How can we approach hygiene in a way that can explain the cases where its claims aren't false? This leads us to the functional approach to ideology: a form of consciousness is deemed ideological by its functional properties, for example for stabilizing or legitimizing social institutions and practices (Geuss, 1981, p. 13,15). These two different approaches, epistemic and functional, can be described as two differentiating lineages of ideology critique: the former originates from the Marxist tradition that is focused on ideology as an illusion or as a false cognition, whereas the functional approach is more focused on the social sphere and social relations (Eagleton, 1991, p. 3). Both of these definitions are still pejorative in nature and see ideology as something that has negative effects on society and should be critiqued.

The functional critique of ideology and its focus on the social elements differs from the epistemic critique by often centring the agent and their experiences as the starting point of critique. This is often a direct counter-argument to the epistemic critique, that tends to overlook the experiences of agents. This is the case with both the approaches by Robin Celikates (2006) and Sally Haslanger (2017). Both Haslanger and Celikates opt for a functional definition of ideology, but there are significant differences between the

two. Next, I will present both of their definitions and see how they are able to answer to the epistemic and normative challenges.

Let's begin with Haslanger's account: her definition of ideology is formulated as a counter-argument against a *cognitivist* view of ideology, cognitivist view of ideology meaning here that ideology is seen as shared, commonly held beliefs or judgements of individuals (Haslanger, 2017, p. 8). Secondly, it is an attempt to answer to both the epistemic and normative challenges of ideology, although Haslanger's definition of the normative challenge is more straightforward: the normative challenge is an issue in debates or arguments: two opposing sides are most likely using such different frameworks that neither will be convincing to the other (Haslanger, 2017, p. 4). As a result, neither will most likely change their view, and the usefulness of said debate can be questioned.

The other challenge that ideology faces, as we know, is the epistemic challenge. (Haslanger, 2017, p. 4). Haslanger connects the epistemic challenge to the fact that ideology, especially in the field of epistemic critique, is often described as being hegemonic, meaning that it is on some level unconscious and seen as natural and therefore not questioned (Haslanger, 2011, pp. 448–449). These two ideas of (falsely) seeing something as natural and defining ideology as hegemonic support each other: when something is seen as natural and not questioned, there is not a lot of thought or articulation put into it and therefore it becomes more and more unconscious. Here we can see how the epistemic critique focuses mainly on the task of unveiling and articulating the hegemony at work, whereas functionalist ideology critique does have this goal as well, but wants to implement it into action and create spaces for change.

But let's return to Haslanger's normative challenge. The cognitivist view, in Haslanger's account represented by Tommie Shelby (2003), approaches the issue of the normative challenge by appealing to a "high ground", meaning that it trusts in scientific inquiry and philosophy as means to show people that their beliefs or judgements are false. This is also an issue within the epistemic challenge, but we will return to it later. As the normative challenge points out, unfortunately people do not change their beliefs or views quite that easily. Racist ideology and racist beliefs, for example, persist, even though the science has shown us decades ago that no such thing as race exists in a biological sense (Haslanger, 2017, p. 5). But, it is important to point out, that changing

people's beliefs is not always even the goal of critical theory, and for Shelby, the point of scientific inquiry is not to change people's minds but to simply locate ideological fallacies (Shelby, 2003, p. 174). However, Haslanger's goal of societal change requires more than just unveiling ideology (Haslanger, 2011, pp. 474–475).

This is one of the reasons why Haslanger defines ideology as cultural *technē* (2017). Adapting the theory of cultural software by Jack Balkin (1999), she argues that an ideology is an *unjust* “web of meanings, symbols, scripts and such” (Balkin, 1999, p. 104, Haslanger 2017, p.16), Haslanger describes how this web relies on semiotic relations, meaning cultural *technē* (Haslanger, 2017, p. 16). This approach means that Haslanger usually describes ideology through culture and schemas (Haslanger, 2017, pp. 12, 17), not through the beliefs and implicit judgements of individuals. Haslanger's definition of ideology is dynamic, and it can be understood as a counter argument toward cognitivism: instead of existing only as the sum of beliefs and judgements of individuals, ideology exists also within the semiotic relations and structures that shape our beliefs and judgements (Haslanger, 2017, pp. 15–16).

Not all cultural *technē* is ideological. Ideologies are a network of semiotic relations which function to sustain unjust social relations (Haslanger, 2017, p. 16). So, when a form of cultural *technē* creates or supports injustice, it is a form of ideology. Ideology creates identities, roles, frameworks of meanings and symbols that give people justification to act in oppressive or otherwise unjust ways (*ibid*). So, ideology is a form of cultural *technē* that supports the unjust actions of societies and individuals.

Now when we know what ideology is according to Haslanger, how do we demand social change from ideology critique? The fact that ideologies persist even when we have knowledge that would prove the ideology false, brings us back to question of the falsity of ideology. The epistemic challenge posed earlier asked how can we recognize ideology, when in some instances it isn't necessarily false? Haslanger's ideology as cultural *technē*, ideology as “concepts, rules, norms, stereotypes” constituting a practice that is ideological, shows us that new knowledge isn't always enough to change these complex practices (Haslanger, 2017, p. 19). This is because these ideological practices create unjust “systematic looping of schemas and resources” (Haslanger, 2017, p. 18). What she means by this is that existing conditions and distribution of wealth, for example, create schemas that are ideological. These schemas and the distribution of

wealth are what create the existing conditions (ibid.). A concrete example: we might look at a racialized minority and see that they have a higher unemployment rate than the majority of the population. Therefore, we might make the conclusion that this minority is lazier than others. However, this presumption that this minority is lazier than others is the reason for the higher unemployment rate, because the members of the minority have more difficulties getting hired because of the fore mentioned racist presumptions. So, there is a loop between existing conditions and in this case racist presumptions. Another example of this is the caretaker example given earlier, where the existing conditions create distribution of wealth that is unjust and schemas that create the existing conditions.

Here Haslanger is answering the epistemic issue of ideology not always being false and gaining outsider knowledge: this looping nature explains why facts sometimes support ideologies. Ideology isn't always false (Haslanger, 2017, p. 4) and therefore ideology critique cannot consist of (only) pointing out the falsity of ideology. The previous example about racialized minorities living up to the racist stereotype of laziness because of difficulties of getting employed in a racist society, shows us that, yes, in some cases the ideology is at least partially true. The rate of employment is often actually lower within these minorities, so there is no falsity in that claim. But clearly there is ideology at play here. Thus, we cannot claim that it is only the falsity of beliefs that makes them ideological. Pointing out at "facts" and creating arguments based on them is not only difficult, because these structures of argumentation might work in the benefit of ideology, but it might not even help us critique ideology, since in some cases the facts support the ideology, at least to a certain degree.

Haslanger has an answer to the other issue within the epistemic challenge: the requirement of outsider knowledge. Debating and its actual effects on the world tells us that in her definition of ideology, outsider knowledge is not always needed, nor is it always useful (Haslanger, 2017, p. 15). Haslanger argues that reasoned debate might not facilitate change, since it might be working within the path laid down by ideology (ibid.). In addition to reasoned debate, we should also be open to other, more practice-based approaches that allow new experiences (Haslanger, 2017, p. 17). We should listen to people who have experienced injustice and create places where experiences that challenges ideology can be born (Haslanger, 2017, p. 19). These experiences allow for new "emancipatory concepts and other tools for thinking, feeling and acting" to be

created (Haslanger, 2017, p.11). This way, both social change and non-ideological knowledge are possible, without the need for outsider knowledge.

Haslanger's dynamic definition of ideology, with its reliance on social movements and different experiences, creates opportunities and different ways to experience things, gain knowledge, and change social structures than the definition of ideology as a false consciousness. Instead of claiming that ideology is an epistemic system that produces a false consciousness, Haslanger argues that language and culture, among other things, create the tools that we think with (Haslanger, 2017, p. 11). These tools have been created through the symbols and practices that we learn through socialization, and therefore they might also include the same biases and ideological issues that our society carries.

This is also the answer that Haslanger offers for the question of whether ideology is cognitivist or non-cognitivist, meaning that does it consist of the sum of individual beliefs and judgements etc. or does it reside somewhere else, like in institutions and social structures. Haslanger is a non-cognitivist, because she does not believe in idea that you could somehow reason or argument yourself out of thought patterns or beliefs. According to Haslanger, ideology exists also before our individual beliefs and judgements, within the cultural technē and therefore it cannot be cognitivist (Haslanger, 2017, p. 9).

Robin Celikates, whose critique of the epistemic definition of ideology is already familiar to us, comes to a similar conclusion as Haslanger, even though there are some key differences between these two approaches. The biggest differences between the two stem from different motivations to discuss ideology: Haslanger creates her definition of ideology against cognitivist viewpoints, whereas Celikates' main focus is in justifying that social theory must take agents and their critical capabilities as the starting point to understanding ideology (Celikates, 2006, p. 22). Both of motivations are connected, since they are both also criticisms towards the epistemic definitions of ideology.

Celikates' central point is that neither the division between outsider and insider knowledge nor viewing ideology purely as something positive or negative, is important (Celikates, 2006, p. 22,25). As the pragmatic turn shows us, social practices or ideologies cannot be understood from an objective standpoint alone (Celikates, 2006, p. 21). On the other hand, the positivist, or hermeneutic, view of ideology, where ideology

is seen as a neutral or positive force within societies, means that there is no longer the possibility to critique it (Celikates, 2006, p. 29). Celikates suggests that this division where ideology is completely harmless and therefore beyond critique *or* pejorative and in need of critique, where there needs to be a gap between the scientist and the agent, is false (Celikates, 2006, p. 30).

Celikates' solution is a third option that sees ideology neither as solely a positive thing nor as requiring a gap between scientists and agents (Celikates, 2006, p. 30). Celikates suggests that ideology critique can work on a level that is not completely objective and doesn't rely solely on the agent's viewpoint either (Celikates, 2006, p. 30). In this alternative there are "dominant positions in the social field that allow agents to impose their hegemonic definition on reality on others without having to engage in elaborate justifications" (Celikates, 2006, p. 35), and that these justifications can be ideological. So clearly, ideology can be pejorative. Critique of ideology can and should be applied when 1. according to the agents a wrong type of regime of justification is employed at the wrong time (Celikates, 2006, p. 31) and 2. when the entire justification for the regime is questioned by the agents (Celikates, 2006, p. 32). What is important to note here is that the initiative in both cases is made by the agents, not the scientist. These two applications of ideology critique mean that it should be employed against regimes of justifications that create

"closed social conditions and symbolic representations that hinder the use of critical and judgemental capacities in social practices, that block the transformation of capacities into abilities and prevent the practical realization of one's self-understanding as a judging and acting subject". (Celikates, 2006, p. 35)

These closed social conditions can be critiqued when a.) the agents themselves think it is ideological and b.) a social theorist confirms that they indeed are ideological, since they block the agent's ability to use some of their critical capabilities (ibid.). So, it seems that to close the gap between scientist and agent, Celikates wants to give the first initiative to the agent: if the agents claim that something is wrong, i.e. ideological, (being it a wrong regime of justification at the wrong time or something blocking their critical judgemental capacities), then the social scientist is allowed to swoop in and

make the final decision if something is, indeed, ideological, and therefore deserving of ideology critique.

Ideological justifications and their identification depend on their context and the on the agents view of the situation, and therefore any identification by a social theorist of something as ideological needs to be justified (Celikates, 2006, p. 34). This justification does not have to be impartial: It is enough to the social scientist to reach a justification that is “good enough” in the sense that what is good enough “depends on the context and may in every particular context be open to contestation and revision” (ibid).

3.5 Critiquing the functionalist approach to Ideology

By replacing an epistemic definition of ideology with a more dynamic field of unjust practices, symbols and so on, both Haslanger and Celikates avoid most of the aspects of the epistemic challenge, namely the issues regarding whether outsider knowledge is required and how ideology does not have to be defined by its falsity (since in some cases it can be true). This is the clearest difference between the more contemporary approaches: they do not require objective or outsider knowledge, nor do they believe that such a thing is really possible (Celikates, 2006, p. 1). Haslanger’s way of describing ideology as cultural *technē* and its looping nature also explains very well how ideologies can in some cases be true and how they persist even when there is new knowledge to dispute them (Haslanger, 2017, p. 17).

Celikates’ approach does not actually define ideology, but instead it defines ideology critique. Ideology, and the justification that something is ideological, is to Celikates something so dependent on its context that it isn’t necessary to define. Therefore, its falsity doesn’t really matter: ideologies might for example function as regimes of justification that are true or functional, but just applied in the wrong situation (Celikates, 2006, p. 31). According to Celikates ideologies operate on a local level and can be very different, so trying to create a scientific definition of an ideology is useless (Celikates, 2006, p. 35).

Both Celikates and Haslanger try to explain how ideology, or ideology critique, relate to normative issues and to its possibilities to make normative claims. Ideology as unjust forms of cultural *technē* opens up new ways for social change that do not rely only on argumentation based on pointing to some universal facts, and therefore normative

claims and gaining non-ideological knowledge is very much possible. Indeed, Haslanger's emphasis on new experiences and listening to those who have first-hand experience of injustice is a way to have knowledge that is outside of the practices or semiotics shaped by ideology (Haslanger, 2017, p. 3). Celikates' ideology critique is mainly situated in normative claims: its goal is to find the solutions that are "good enough" to that exact situation that it is being applied to (Celikates, 2006, p. 34), and it does not attempt to find definitive definition to ideology.

It seems that both of these forms of ideology or ideology critique are flexible enough to avoid the issues of the epistemic challenge, but by doing this, they run into different issues. The biggest question is: how do we actually know when something is ideological? Haslanger's question is how do we know what is unjust or just? She points out herself that there is no practice that would be ideological 100% of the time (Haslanger, 2017, p. 18). The context of the actions defines the nature of practices and whether they are ideological or not (ibid.). But if it would be so easy to know by looking at an issue and its context, and evaluate which practice would be the most just, there would be no need for ideology critique. The exact problem is that looking at an issue in its context, we often make unjust decisions based on our own, for example racist or otherwise biased beliefs, shaped by a practice that has been formed by an ideology. So, how can we somehow then tell what is happening is ideological, and therefore unjust, when we have no clear view of what is wrong in this said practice or what exactly is unjust? Haslanger defines ideology by whether it is just or unjust, but she never defines justice itself.

This lack of definition means that Haslanger is unable to answer to the normative challenge of how do we actually know if ideology is bad. Not all cultural technē is unjust, and therefore ideological. But because the lack of defining justice, it is, if not impossible, at least extremely difficult for us to say when a form of cultural technē is being unjust. By giving such a loose definition to ideology we lose the ability to recognize ideology and the reasoning behind the claim why ideology is bad in the first place.

Celikates has a similar issue. He claims that we can tell if a regime of justification is ideological when agents describe a system or belief as such and so does the social scientist, while taking into account the agent's beliefs and noting that the system is

blocking the “exercise of the agents’ critical capacities” (Celikates, 2006, p. 34). However, how can we consider the agents’ views while simultaneously noting that their “critical capacities” are blocked? Celikates seems to claim that even here agents are indeed able see if a system is ideological: there is always room for agents to relate to social practices in different ways (Celikates, 2006, p. 35). Surely, the opinions and knowledge of agents needs to be listened to, but usually with complex social issues, like racism for example, the agents might have very different opinions. How can we know who is right? Whose solution should we adapt? Whose version of the story should the social scientist listen to (ibid.)?

Another issue is that Celikate’s theory on ideology critique relies so much on context, that it loses its context-transcendent quality. The lack of ideology critique beyond its context poses a question why social scientist’s critique is exactly ideology critique. If ideology critique is defined within its context to find a “good enough” solution each time it is practised, how does it differ from any other type of social critique? If ideology critique is defined by its context, it means that it might be completely different each time it is being used. What then is the component that makes it *ideology* critique? It seems that in practice this type of critique is the social critique of the issues at hand and therefore the ideology-component of the critique is quite irrelevant.

So, when Haslanger seems to lose the ability to point out what is ideological, Celikates loses the ability to define the actual actions that social theorists can do to study ideology. Both of these issues stem from the normative and the epistemic challenge and attempts to solve them. Haslanger seems to trust that if we pay enough attention when encountering injustice, we can deem it ideological and change it. This might not work: in many cases the exact moment of injustice in a practice can be hard to pinpoint. And even if this can be done, people are often not willing to change or even admit that there is an injustice in the first place. Haslanger’s reluctance to actually label any practices or semiotics as fundamentally racist or otherwise unjust is simultaneously the weakest and strongest point of her argument: it allows a very flexible definition of ideology, that avoids the authoritarian approach often linked to ideology critique. This flexibility is also Haslanger’s way to have a normative dimension in her definition, since new practices and new experiences might be a more effective way to create social change than reasoned debate. But since this definition of ideology is so flexible, it does not actually define what is racist, just, unjust, fair etc.

With Celikates the issue is that the erasure of the line between contextual practices of critique and ideology critique leads to the situation, where the gap between the scientists and agent's knowledge vanishes, but simultaneously there might be no need for ideology critique in general. It might be possible to replace it completely with context specific critique instead. The advantage of professionalization, that Celikates offers as a justification for the need of the social sciences, does not explain why the scientist should practice ideology critique (Celikates, 2006, p. 36).

As we can see with these accounts by Haslanger and Celikates, the contemporary form of ideology critique relies heavily on a functionalist definition of ideology, which is both its strongest and weakest point. The similarities between the issues that both Haslanger and Celikates face suggest that by dodging the authoritative and epistemologically challenging claims of objective knowledge, the functionalist definition runs into other issues. This approach seems to only postpone the task of defining: in Haslanger's case it is justice that needs to be defined, but isn't. With Celikates, the importance of ideology critique itself seems to be lost, since there are no context-transcending qualities of the critique.

This question of context-transcendence is the fundamental question that rises when employing a functionalist definition of ideology: if the definition is too flexible and there is no claim to any points of view that go beyond context, how is it possible to identify and criticize ideology? Both Celikates' and Haslanger's definitions have lost their context-transcending quality. This is due to the fact that both of the approaches are, indeed, functionalist: in locating the falseness of ideology in its functions, the definitions come too dependent on the context where these functions can be perceived and critiqued. The functional sphere of an ideology can differ in so many ways depending of its context, that finding a context-transcending element might be impossible. So, it seems that the more authoritarian, epistemic definitions of ideology have at least a way to define ideology in a way that is context-transcending, but the issue is the authoritative nature of these definitions. What ideology critique needs to do is formulated effectively by Maeve Cooke:

“In short, contemporary critical social theories require a conception of ideology in which the perspective from which false consciousness is analyzed is at once

context-transcending and epistemologically and ethically non-authoritarian.”

(Cooke, 2006, p. 7)

So, is there a way to find such a concept and what does this mean in regards to hygiene? If we return to our earlier example of free contraception for under 25-year olds, we can see that hygiene can be beneficial. However, the same practice of choosing a part of the population and attempting to reduce their pregnancies can be extremely oppressive, in a different context. How can we find a form of ideology that can explain both of these aspects of hygiene and still go beyond the context? It is clear that to be able to differentiate the financial aid within sexual hygiene from the oppressive ways that hygiene as a system is used to forcefully sterilize, discriminate and oppress, there needs to be a definition of hygiene that is context-transcendent. Otherwise the concept of hygiene as a form of ideology becomes too muddled in the everyday uses of the word. To see hygiene as a wide scale system, practised to control entire populations and to oppress certain groups in them, the concept of ideology must be able to explain the falseness of hygienic claims, like in the case of studying group differences in intelligence and the inherent bias in such attempts (Saini, 2019, pp. 122-124). As the quotation of Cooke clearly states, this definition has to still remain anti-authoritarian. My suggestion is that such a concept can be found in the works of Theodor Adorno, whose definition of ideology has qualities of both the epistemic and functional approaches to ideology.

4. The Definition of Ideology as Identity Thinking

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters I have accounted how both the epistemic and functionalist definitions of ideology fail to answer to the normative and epistemic challenges of ideology. In this chapter I will present Theodor W. Adorno's definition of ideology. I will suggest that this definition is able to avoid the pitfalls that the normative and epistemic challenges create against ideology, unlike the definitions in the previous chapter. This is because Adorno's definition of ideology is simultaneously epistemic and functional.

Adorno defines ideology as a form of *identity thinking*, where the priority of concepts makes us miss particulars that fall into said concepts. The solution to this is *negative dialectics*, which is Adorno's approach to ideology critique. In the first section of this chapter, I discuss identity thinking, since for Adorno ideology is a form of identity thinking. Identity thinking is the priority of the concept over the particulars, where the particulars are seen as identical with the concept. This fits our definition of hygiene very well, since it accurately describes the power that hygiene has when it labels and categorizes people under its concepts.

Identity thinking has its counterpart which is non-identity thinking. The practice of non-identity thinking is what Adorno calls negative dialectics, which is the form of ideology critique within his work. In the final sections of this chapter, the theory of Adorno is contrasted against the discussion on ideology in the previous chapter: First, I will examine whether Adorno's definition of ideology is cognitivist or non-cognitivist. This is a difficult division, since Adorno's definition falls short in some of its aspects concerning non-cognitivism, even if I argue that it can still be categorized as such. Second, the answers to both the normative and epistemic challenges will be discussed within the context of ideology as identity thinking.

The purpose of this chapter is not to offer exhaustive definitions of these concepts. That would not be possible within the scope of this work. Instead, this chapter is here to offer us enough of an insight to Adorno's writings that we can see how his definition of ideology might be a solution to the challenges previously discussed. If Adorno's concept of ideology does in fact successfully answer to the normative and epistemic

challenges, as I think it does, it is indeed the best option when it comes to practising ideology critique towards hygiene.

4.2 Subject, Object and Identity Thinking

To understand ideology, we must first understand Adorno's thoughts on the subject-object relationship and identity thinking. Identity thinking is a building block of the subject and also the basic form of perceiving the object. Identity thinking is the most basic level of conceptual thinking that all of us employ: when we look at objects, we cannot think about them without identifying them as something, this something being a concept, like "a rock", "a woman" etc. Thus, identity thinking is the human need to create overarching (universal) concepts and to identify most things, particulars, within the limits of these concepts. It is key for us to understand what is meant with identity thinking, since a particular type of identity thinking is also what Adorno calls ideology (Cook, 2007, pp. 169–170).

Identity thinking stems from the need to control the surrounding world. In *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1997), Adorno and Horkheimer describe the birth of the subject through the adventures of Odysseus. The heroic adventures leave Odysseus constantly at the mercy of natural forces (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1997, p. 47). In these moments of danger, by losing himself within the power of nature, Odysseus finds himself as something that is different from it (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1997, p. 48). To survive these instances, Odysseus must abandon nature, fight against it. At a moment like this, concepts and the objects that they are supposed to be referring to start to separate from one another (Cook, 2001, p. 3). This moment of separation described here is of course a myth, but it describes the human need to separate oneself from nature and use concepts. Any philosophical or sociological systems motivated by this need are bound to fail, since they will end up using only identity thinking and mistaking the particular with the concept (Rose, 2014, p. 30).

But what exactly is the issue with identifying particulars as concepts? The issue is twofold: it is a.) the prioritization of concepts and b.) the false sense of objectivity that stems from misunderstanding the subject-object relationship. Adorno writes how "The more relentlessly our identitarian thinking besets its object, the farther will it take us from the identity of the object" (ND, p.149). Prioritizing concepts, meaning viewing particulars through their concept, leads to a false belief that what we are accurately

perceiving the object just as it is in the world (ND, p.149). We falsely believe that our knowledge of these particulars is completely accurate (ibid.). There are many ways that this can go wrong: we might be attributing characteristics to a particular that are not there, because we see it as a perfect representation of its concept, or vice versa, miss out on attributes because we fail to consider them within a concept. This attempt to capture a particular under a concept will only take us further away from it: the subject is only widening the gap between themselves and the object (CM, p.247).

An example of hygiene functioning in this manner is an example of contemporary mental hygiene. An example of hygiene functioning this way can be found in the way that the public health care systems administer support for psychotherapy. This is a good example on hygiene as a form of ideology, because it has the hygienic goal of labelling people as mentally well or unwell while simultaneously being clearly steered by exchange value. This is because the possibility to get medical support for mental illness is connected to the capability of the applicant to work. Public health care in Finland requires people to justify their need for publicly funded psychotherapy by explaining why this support will help them be able to work full time. Here, the service providers are the subject, separating oneself from the people seeking help. The separation happens, because the system described here reduces the people seeking help, the object, to only members of the workforce. This requirement means that the service providers are not in touch with other aspects of the people; there is a separation between how the service providers see the objects (as only members of the workforce) and what the objects actually are (complex human beings). This situation also homogenizes our views by implicitly claiming that the only valid reason to have the right to use these services is the capability to participate in the workforce when in reality there is a multitude of good reasons and rights to be able to access mental health services.

In this example we can see how our ideas of health and exchange value come together as a form of hygiene, i.e. ideology. The object, the mentally ill person here, is seen as identical to a member of the workforce. The value of said person is directly connected to the exchange value that the person brings through being able to participate in labour. The hygienic practice is labelling this person as not functional or efficient enough, or in the danger of becoming such. In this example, hygiene is being practised through measuring people's capability to work, and deciding their right for mental well-being and right for treatment only through their role as fully employable citizens.

The fact that there is a gap between the subject and object, meaning the way we perceive things and the thing itself, is not an issue if we are aware of it. Our example demonstrates this: the issue is not that there are requirements for accessing publicly funded psychotherapy, since resources are limited. The issue, and possible injustice, stems from the idea that it is only the ability to work that justifies access to said treatment. There are a multitude of different, and perhaps even more serious, reasons for one to be able to go to psychotherapy, one very simple one being general well-being. Since the gap between the subject and object here is not, at least on an institutional level, recognized, all these other reasons to enter psychotherapy are non-existent. They are not part of the concept of an individual who has the right to have their psychotherapy funded by the state. Therefore, this system becomes rigid and is rarely questioned. When this gap between perception and reality is not considered, the subject forgets that the gap exists and they falsely believe that their knowledge is completely objective. This leads into the false sense of objectivity, where the subject's mind dominates the object and is unable to see that their mind is not all-mighty and cannot always grasp reality as it is (CM, pp.246-247).

It is important to remember that it is not the use of concepts themselves that are the issue here. The problem is when we mix the necessity of concepts with their priority. Concepts cannot be our priority, because the particulars do not fulfil the concept (Cook, 2001, p. 7). So, if we take concepts as a priority, we are narrowing down our understanding of particulars and homogenizing our worldview (Eagleton, 1991, p. 126).

This raises the question of the possibility of ever grasping the object as it is. Adorno is quite clear that the gap between the subject and object cannot be completely closed, but this does not mean that there would not be an objective world (CM, 246-247). For Adorno the real is "conceptual but not a construct" (Rose, 2014, p.58). This means that the real does exist as is, it is not constructed in our minds, but our fundamental understanding of the objects around us are always conceptual: it is just the way our minds work. However, there are better and worse ways of using and prioritizing concepts and identifying things, and therefore better and worse ways of getting closer to the object. This also why Adorno cannot be said to fall into relativism (MM, p.127-128). Thinking that our concepts correlate directly with the real means that the subject does not see the object as a moment in history, but as a part of a universal, objective concept. This in turn leads to the fact that the subject misses all the connections and

historical processes that have made the object what it is in the eye of the subject, and therefore the gap between subject and object gets only wider (CM, 246-247, ND 162). Adorno discusses this issue often as a “positivist fallacy”, limiting our imagination regarding options and change and therefore supporting the status quo (CM, 246, Cook, 2001, pp. 14).

All this is quite abstract so it is important to remember that Adorno is referring mainly to social sciences. He was concerned that the approach to social sciences as they were natural sciences, would strip it from its critical potential. He criticises heavily the “positivist” approach of natural sciences, which assumes it is observing the world as it is (Cook, 2001, p.10)⁵. This, of course is identity thinking at its purest and by limiting ourselves to only thinking and researching already existing issues, we are not actually getting any closer to seeing particulars beyond their concepts, and therefore gaining knowledge of the social world. This type of descriptive science does not attempt to go beyond how things are, it is only registering facts (Cook, 2001, p.11). This limits our critical capacities and makes us see the world in an even more homogenous way and narrows our capabilities to imagine and to criticize. Simply put, trying to objectively observe the social world will only end up in a loop where we describe how things currently are. This ends up easily legitimizing the existing conditions, since there is no critical component. Our thought loses its autonomy if its too grounded on the level of identifying “facts” or relies only in what it can describe (MM, p. 126 & Cooke, 2001, p.11). This false sense of objectivity means the loss of a lot of differences, nuances and ways of thinking (ND, 172). Our thought loses its ability to “penetrate reality” (MM, p. 126), because we cannot tell apart the particulars from the concept.

When discussing a sense of false objectivity, we must remember that this applies to social phenomena, not natural sciences per se. In the case of social phenomenon, the danger is that if we assume that a particular (social phenomenon occurring in the world) fulfils its concept (for example, freedom) we will miss the way these phenomena are constructed. The danger is that we will end up in a situation where we see how things are and assume it is the way things should be (Cook, 2001, p.12). This brings us to Adorno’s use of the concept of *reification*. Gillian Rose writes about reification: “It is the way unlike things appear to be identical or equal and the mode of thinking which

⁵ Adorno seems to be aiming this criticism towards all sciences, natural and social, but for the sake of making the argument simpler, I will be implementing this critique only to social sciences.

can only consider them as equal, which is reification as a social phenomenon and as a process of thinking for Adorno” (Rose, 2014, pp.60).

Adorno’s theory of reification is based on the Marxist notions of commodity fetishism and exchange value (Rose, 2014, pp.55). Something is reified when a property of a relationship between people seems like a property of a thing, meaning that this property is inherently part of this relationship and cannot exist without it (Rose, 2014, pp.60.) Exchange value, meaning our capitalist system and its mode of measuring and valuing all things, defines the concepts that we use and the way we see the concepts as successfully describing its objects. This is because the exchange principle uses identification as its main method to create a social model based on exchange, (Rose, 2014, pp.59-60).

It is also here where we can see how identity thinking becomes ideology: reified thinking, meaning identity thinking, creates a situation where we identify a thing falsely through a concept defined by exchange value and, again, falsely assume that these reified properties attached to the thing are a fundamental part of said thing. Ideology to Adorno is a certain type of identity thinking pierced by exchange value and commodity fetishism, which through reification convinces us that we are a.) seeing objects how they truly are and b.) the objects are natural and unchangeable. Reification makes us see things that are arbitrary as necessary.

Reification leads to a situation, where we take concepts as facts (MM, pp. 126-127). This is what homogenizes our social world and therefore leads to a positivist approach (in social sciences), as we know. To break free from this, we need to practice ideology critique, of course, which in Adorno’s case means practicing negative dialectics.

To sum up: Identity thinking is the priority of the concept over the particulars while thinking, where the particulars are seen as identical with the concept. Identity thinking is the most basic level of conceptual thinking and in itself, not an issue. It becomes an issue when it is ideological, and makes us believe that particulars are, indeed, identical with their concepts and when it homogenizes the world view of subjects making it more difficult to see options and actions outside of how things already are. We mistake things that are either constructed or otherwise arbitrary as necessary, beneficial or unchangeable. Identity-thinking creates a consciousness where societal facts are masked in this manner.

To bring this back to hygiene, we can clearly see that hygiene fits the definition of identity thinking: it includes concepts like dirty, clean, healthy etc. explicitly and concepts such as crazy, ill, unwanted and so on more implicitly. Hygiene identifies and puts things under these concepts just as a form of identity thinking does. This process of identity thinking reifies things like nation, population and workforce, making us see them as natural, unchangeable categories. How often are, for example, concepts like Finnishness or workforce questioned and analysed in everyday life? These concepts carry implicit properties like whiteness, mental stability and able-bodiedness within them but most of the time these go unnoticed, becoming something natural and already assumed, in other words, reified, as a neutral, scientific reality and therefore they cannot and shouldn't be changed.

4.3 Non-identity Thinking and Negative Dialectics as Ideology critique

One of the predicaments for critical theory and breaking free from ideological identity thinking is the ability to imagine situations that do not currently exist. Thought needs to employ "exaggeration, of over-shooting the object, self-detachment from the factual, so that instead of merely reproducing being it can, (. . .), determine it" (MM, p. 126–127). If we are unable to imagine possibilities and situations beyond what we are currently witnessing, we are closing our eyes from the unfamiliar sides and nuances of existing things. To be able to do this, one needs to use negative dialectics and that happens through *non-identity thinking*.

For Adorno, the key for seeing outside identity thinking is non-identity thinking. This does not mean getting rid of all identities and concepts; as mentioned earlier, they are necessary tools for thinking. What we need to do instead is to reverse the priority: to see the concepts as collections of non-identical things (ND, p.12). This practice is what Adorno calls negative dialectics. Prioritizing the non-identity is not getting rid of all concepts, it is instead being aware of the fact that concepts are always referring to particulars and these particulars are not identical with their concepts (ibid.). To reverse the common order of priorities and to bring the particulars to the forefront, is the decisive goal of negative dialectics

An example of non-identity can be found in Adorno's notion on freedom. Through non-identity thinking it is possible to see the contradiction of what freedom could be and

how its potential is not being realized (Cook, 2001, p. 8). Freedom "lags behind itself" as soon as it is actually practised (ND, p.151), since the ideal of freedom cannot be reached, that is why it is an ideal. A particular case of freedom can never fulfil the concept of ideal freedom. Ideological freedom would be the claim that ideal freedom has been reached. Adorno is not arguing that there is no freedom anywhere, but that the ideal cannot be fully reached: when we negate the current case of freedom with an ideal concept of freedom, there is always something missing.

Understanding this contradiction between what is and what could be and negating from what is, what isn't, is non-identity thinking. This force of thinking and seeing what could be "shatters the appearance of identity" (ND, p.149). Now we are capable of seeing how the different forms of existing freedom do not fill the concept. From this we can negate the things that exist from the ideal and try to get closer to them. Thinking through this negation of what is and what could be, is negative dialectics. This realization is what makes societal change possible. Thinking as a way of resistance in this sense is what makes us realize how far from the full potential of different concepts, like freedom or autonomy, we are and what our options to proceed are.

Finally, one of the questions to arise from this definition of ideology, is that why do societies stick with it, or why do ideologies last? One of the reasons for this is what Adorno calls the "individuation principle" that stems from the dysfunctional subject-object relationship (ND, p.348). This principle means that ideology is able to both be claimant of universality, while simultaneously seeming to individuals that it caters to each individual's specific needs. When the driving force of a society is individuality, individuals become confined in their own interests (ibid.). These individual interests mean that a society that is based on said individuality, becomes very appealing (ibid.). Everyone is an individual in their own right, but this individuality is also what makes everyone the same, making individuality quite paradoxical. However, since ideology creates this sense of individuality, it seems to individuals that it is in fact reasonable and beneficial for them.

This effect is partly the reason that keeps contemporary societies together: everybody feels like they are that one individual that might be able to make it in the current system even if they would be aware of the fact that the system is deeply flawed. This is why individuals are willing to bind themselves to the current ideology even when they are

aware of at least some of its flaws (ND, pp. 348-349). A perhaps slightly simplistic example of this individuality principle in practice would be the belief that everyone has the same opportunities to succeed in life, if they just work hard enough. According to this type of thought, surely, we are all individuals, different but similar enough to have the same possibilities of success. Of course, this is not really the case most of the time.

The moving force of identity-thinking and this individuation principle, and therefore ideology, is self-preservation against nature, as discussed in the earlier section. Self-preservation links ideology back to biology which makes it “fatal” (ND, 349). This is because this connection to survival and biology means that identity, and self-preservation, are seen as the most important goal. This leads to the conclusion that what exists must be preserved, which brings us back to the idea of only noting how things are and not thinking about how things could be. Preservation as the goal of ideology creates a tautology of identity. It makes us think only through identity thinking, that “what ought to be, is what is anyway” (ibid.). This becomes a false consciousness, an ideology, that makes us not able to question or imagine things beyond the things that already exist. This ideology based on self-preservation is particularly deceiving today, since self-preservation is made easy (ibid.). The need for self-preservation combined with the ever-present force of exchange value, means identity thinking drives us to see the means as an end, meaning that instead of seeing life itself as the end or goal, the forces of production become the end goal.

Adorno’s theory and the total nature of reification has been often accused of being unnecessarily bleak or pessimistic. Luckily, the situation is not quite as sombre: Even with identity thinking piercing all aspects of society and individuation, it always carries potential for non-identity thinking (Vouros, 2014, p. 179). Identity thinking always includes the possibility for non-identity thinking, and therefore the possibility to practice ideology critique, in this case negative dialectics. We know that identity thinking is what enables ideology and the spell of it can be broken off with negative dialectics, with prioritizing the subject instead of the object (Zuidervaart, 2015). Through negative dialectics, we are able to have a “consistent consciousness nonidentity” (Zuidervaart, 2015). The gap between the subject and object cannot be completely breached, but there is always the potential and hope to get closer to the real through non-identity thinking.

This potential of non-identity thinking that identity thinking carries is because of its dialectical nature. Dialectics in this case are the chain of events where the object does not fill the concept and this creates a contradiction in a form of non-identity (ND, 5). When we try to fit a (particular) object into a (universal) concept, there is always something that doesn't fit, there is a contradiction between the concept and the object. This element, that is not the concept, the excess of the object, is the non-identical (Zuidervaart, 2015 & ND, 5). Non-identity, the ability to see the object beyond its limiting concept, is what happens during a genuine experience, when the experience exceeds the grasp of thought (Zuidervaart, 2015). This moment of non-identity exceeds identity thinking (ND, 5) There is a possibility before identity thinking to be conscious of the non-identity, and therefore see the heterogeneity of the object (ND, 5). In this moment, through this experience, the subject can transcend its preconceptions and see the object more clearly (O'Connor, 2012, p. 102) This ability to see heterogeneity is the dialectical method that functions through contradiction (ibid.). We see that the particular is not (only) the concept.

In Zuidervaart's article we are offered three key principles for the methodology of negative dialectics: we must always be able to keep in mind that 1.) the subject is constructed and that 2.) no object can be fully known. If we meet these two criteria's we are able to 3.) honour nonidentity and embrace the plurality of objects and options, which will lead to a point of view where we are able to critique the current societal situation and ideology (Zuidervaart, 2015).

This brings us to the idea of seeing objects as *constellations*⁶: as things that are constructed from many different pieces of history, societal order etc. Rose writes that "To examine something by a 'constellation' means to juxtapose a cluster of related words or connotations which characterise the object of investigation without implying that the concepts used are identical with their objects" (Rose, 2014, pp. 116–117). Looking at an object through its negation, we can see different historical mechanisms, like exchange value, which constructs the concepts that we use to perceive the object (Rose 2014, p.61). This is why over-shooting and exaggeration is important, because

⁶ This idea of constellation was originally formulated by Walter Benjamin (Benjamin, 2019, p. 11), who compared the understanding of an Idea to an astrological constellation (Osborne & Charles, 2021). Adorno adapted this idea to his own political philosophy and my thesis is concentrated on this adaptation. It is still important to note that Benjamin's writings had a huge influence on the works of Adorno. Another key influence was György Lukács and his concept of reification (Lukács, 1971 & Rose, 2014, p.51). Similarly, Adorno implements this idea in his own way to his political philosophy.

through them we can see what the object isn't, what it doesn't fulfil in the concept, and see how it has become that we have mistakenly thought that it being identical with the object. Seeing these connections, historicity and processes in relation to other things is how we get closer to the actual object (ND, p.162). Constellations show us the things that identity-thinking has missed by limiting the perception of the object to fit into a concept (ibid). As Adorno puts it: "Cognition of the object in its constellation is cognition of the process stored in the object" (ND, p.163).

The third principle, honouring non-identity even in the face of identification, may seem vague. Even if Adorno agrees that the ideal of identity shouldn't be discarded (ND, p.149) and accepts the fact that particulars cannot fulfil the concept, we are still using identity thinking. This is how the realization of non-identity contains identity: we are still aware that these particulars can be put under a concept (ibid.). We cannot see the world without any concepts. This is also why there are moments when identity thinking does capture how things are, even if it doesn't grasp the whole truth, or constellation of the matter, meaning that in this definition of ideology, it can sometimes be true in the sense that is accurately describing how things are.

Even with the inevitable use of concepts, this approach of negative dialectics gets us closer to the actual, individual object, or particular. It narrows the gap between subject and object. This demonstrates how, even if Adorno admits that no completely objective knowledge is possible, he is still very far away from relativism. Being aware of the weaknesses of perception and the pitfalls that positivism and the distorted subject-object relationship create brings us closer to perceiving the actual object. Even if we use identity thinking, it is still possible to avoid the epistemic issues of ideology and get closer to perceiving objects as they are.

4.4 Identity thinking as Ideology: cognitivist or non-cognitivist?

In the previous chapter on ideology both the non-cognitivist and cognitivist approaches to ideology were discussed. The discussion between these two categories is related to the question of whether ideology can be reduced to the ideas and beliefs of individuals or whether it is an entity that exists also outside the minds of individual people. The cognitivist believe that ideology can be reduced to the beliefs, ideas etc. of individuals, the non-cognitivists do not.

The issue on whether Adorno's definition of ideology is non-cognitivist or cognitivist is complicated. Adorno does claim in several different instances that ideology does not reside in the minds of individuals (Rose, 2014, p. 72), but his focus on defining ideology as a thought process and ideology critique as a better way to think, makes this claim weaker. The focus on subject-object relationship and thinking puts the focus of identity thinking, and implies that the spell of ideology could be broken by only "thinking right"; or thinking through negative dialectics in this case. As previously mentioned, there are a lot of issues if one claims that emancipation could only happen through "thinking right" or that ideology lies within individual beliefs (how would ideologies, then, persist, for example?). However, I would still argue that Adorno's definition of ideology is non-cognitivist because of Adorno's concept of society as a totality.

It is society as totality which shapes the individuals and their actions (O'Connor, 2012, p. 28). The nature of this system is defined by the ideology that is most prevalent at the current moment (Vouros, 2014, p.178s). Totality in this case means the "sum total of "social relations" (*Produktionsverhältnisse*) which remain hidden from individuals" (Vouros, 2014, p. 177). Once again, it is through reification that we mistakenly think here that the current society that we have, seems natural and inescapable. This might sound bleak, but one must remember that for Adorno, even totality is immanent and it always includes a possibility of negation, of negative dialectics. Therefore, even if society is seen as total, it does not mean in Adorno's case that there would not exist a chance for social change and critique.

The question of whether ideology is in the minds of individuals or whether the minds of individuals are affected by ideology from outside is a question that Adorno would probably himself reject, since he is sceptical of describing ideology or totality through causation (O'Connor, 2012, p.29). The reason for this is the goal to avoid economical determinism, the issue that some Marxists face, if their theory ends up claiming that the economic base of society defines everything, including the actions of individuals (O'Connor, 2012, p. 28, ND p.268). In my view it is not causality that Adorno is against per se, but instead the idea that there is a single principle or base that would be the root cause for all things societal and individual. Adorno is also still supportive of the Marxist materialist argument of how the exchange form of society creates an ideology and

thought processes that are connected to the exchange value and support the current ideology (CM, 248).

The interaction between society as a whole and individuals in it is more circle-like than just one thing, like the economic structure, causing another thing, like individual behaviour (O'Connor, 2012, p. 29, ND 267). This also supports the idea of society as a totality, since society and its influence can be seen also in the actions of individuals as well as in the systems themselves; it is total. What I mean by this is explained by Adorno's idea of *reciprocity* (O'Connor, 2012, p. 33–34). This reciprocal nature of the relationship between the individuals and society means that just as much as the economic structure influences norms and individual actions, the individual actions and norms also affect and support the economic structure. So, this system of cause and effect is more a network or a circulation of causes than a simple cause-and-effect-chain (O'Connor, 2012, p.29).

As we know, in identity thinking, concepts go unnoticed, and they are thought to represent particulars accurately. These concepts create closed identities and norms, which seem neutral to us or go completely unnoticed (O'Connor, 2012, p. 27). This process of reification works on a social level: for example, the concept of a woman carries within it stereotypes and expectations, which uphold and support a patriarchal system. The identity thinking in this case is happening both on an individual and conceptual level: the norms and ideas of womanhood are also created by institutions and norms that reside outside one's beliefs. Identity thinking is not just the thought process of an individual, meaning that it is not just cognitivist, even if it clearly does have a cognitivist aspect to it. Totality is also factor here: society (as totality) has the power to create a sense of false neutrality, or "forgetfulness of repression", which socializes and attaches us to the totality of society (ibid., Jameson, 2007, p.27). It is identity thinking both on individual and social level that is the source of ideology and where it reproduces itself. This totality can of course be challenged through negative dialectics, which is also the first step towards societal change: "The socialization of mind keeps it boxed in, isolated in a glass case, as long as society itself is imprisoned" (MM, p.197). So, as long as the mind is caged, so is the society, and vice versa. The two cannot be completely separated.

One still has to admit though that there is some vagueness of Adorno's theory: it is still quite unclear how one goes from the individual level of thinking to the level of actual societal change. Often the way Adorno writes about identity thinking, makes it seem like the discussion is centred on an individual and their way to think. But clearly this is not the case with the theory as a whole. However, what is clear is that ideology lies within this circular chain of influence between individuals and society and within the systems and norms it creates. Ideology cannot be reduced to only the beliefs or ideas of individuals nor to economic structures, even if they both play an important role in constituting it.

An important factor about why Adorno focuses on the thoughts of an individual as much as he does, is his concern over the fate of the individual, “the lost subject of society” (Rose, 2014, p.136). Adorno claims that one effect of identity thinking and capitalism is that it’s mode of domination turns people into a ”mass of individuals”, destroying their true individuality and autonomy (Rose, 2014, p.84). This sentiment was echoed in the earlier chapter on hygiene, where Adorno described how people are turned into organic ”composition of capital” (MM, p.229) So, the individual is less where ideology can be found and more the victim of ideology, and the emancipation and autonomy can be reached when one becomes aware of this and practices negative dialectics.

The idea of constellations supports my claim that Adorno’s theory is non-cognitivist: Looking at things as constellations, clusters of historical, societal and other connections, as the solution of seeing beyond ideological identity thinking, and becoming aware of ideology, suggests that it is in these connections where ideology resides. Ideology goes unnoticed when we are unable to see the arbitrariness and reified nature of concepts, but we become aware of it when we understand the structured nature of concepts. It is these structures and connections where ideology works. In the end, Adorno’s final goal with negative dialectics was to

“redefine the subject and the object, and their relationship, without presupposing their identity, and to show that this can only be accomplished if the subject and object are understood as social processes and not as the presuppositions of pure epistemology” (Rose, 2014, p.72).

Identity thinking as non-cognitivist form of ideology would situate hygiene in different social practices, institutions, economical, historical structures *and* in the thought processes of the individuals. After all, one can remain non-cognitivist and still admit that ideology exists *also* in individual beliefs.

Ideology as non-cognitivist fits hygiene well, since it is quite clear that hygiene on an individual level is rarely harmful. Hygiene, like identity thinking in general, is in many cases not harmful and even necessary. But just like identity thinking becomes an issue when it is ideological, so does hygiene. Hygiene as ideology, its oppressive side, resides in the societal, institutional practice of it, not only in our individual thoughts or actions.

4.5 Ideology as Identity Thinking and the Normative and Epistemic challenges

Now that we have a basic understanding of the definition of ideology that Adorno gives us, let's return to the common issues with ideology discussed in the previous chapter.

To recap, the two main challenges are the normative and epistemic challenges, that can be summarized to these key questions:

The epistemic challenge: does ideology require knowledge that is separate from the experiences of agents, and if yes, how is it possible to avoid epistemic authoritarianism? Is ideology necessarily false? How do we explain the situations where ideology isn't false? If no, how do we recognize ideology if not by its falsity?

The normative challenge: the question of the normative implications and reasons to define something as ideology. Why and how is ideology detrimental to societies and why should we practice ideology critique in the first place?

Adorno's answer to the epistemic challenge is quite simple in the sense that he does not believe that grasping completely objective, or in this case outsider, knowledge, is possible in the first place (ND, p.162). Even if the gap between the subject and object can be made smaller, it can never be completely breached. The thought adopted from natural sciences that completely objectivist knowledge exists, is the very thing that leads us astray and results in the positivist fallacy of thinking that what exists should exist (Cook, 2001, p. 12). In this sense, the pragmatic turn that questions the objectivity and

authority of the philosopher or scientist, would in Adorno's book be a good thing (MM, p.27).

Criticism stemming from a sense of superiority is bound to fail because it supports the bourgeoisie status quo (MM, p.27.). Truth is always subjugated to life and there is no way out of entanglement, meaning that nobody can somehow rise above the socially situated nature of objects and knowledge about them (ibid.). To miss the complexity and circular nature of society totality is to also miss the social facts of society all together. Adorno writes how counting only on an objective knowledge and sticking only to describing things as they are, we only move further away from particulars and observing them (MM, p.126-127). This can be easily interpreted as a similar sentiment as the pragmatic turn: trusting only on an authoritative position of knowledge will take us only further away from the actual experiences and knowledges what the agents might have.

Eventually, the answer to the epistemic challenge lies in the subject-object relationship and in the form of constellations that perception creates. The goal of negative dialectics, seeing objects constructed as constellations, means to not get rid of the subjectivities of knowledge but to be aware of them. Seeing the object as a constellation, meaning as a historically and socially constructed thing, as well as a real thing, is the goal of negative dialectics (Zuidervaart, 2015). Therefore, there are indeed better and worse ways of perceiving objects but no outsider knowledge is required and the experience and social context of the object is put in the forefront.

What about the normative challenge then? Adorno has explicitly stated that an ideology is false, but there are several examples (like women as caregivers) that prove otherwise. There are some nuances to this because Adorno admits that ideology can have truth content, since it creates its own standards, meaning that ideology can define whether things are true or false (Cook, 2001, p. 9). Adorno does also say that ideology is false, but he claims that it is simultaneously true, because it is necessary (Jaeggi, 2009, p. 68). So, for Adorno an ideology is a *necessary false consciousness* (Adorno, 1972, p.465).

Adorno demonstrates this claim with an example of entrepreneur-labour force relationship: for an entrepreneur to succeed he must run his business in a way that a portion of the people's labour that work for him go to him as profit (ND, p.37). For him to be able to do this, it is necessary that he believes that this is a fair exchange of labour

against the cost of reproduction (ibid.). However, it is easily shown that the fairness of this scenario is an objective falsehood (ibid.). There is a sense of social relativism in the way that the entrepreneur would justify this situation to himself: this goes to show that the social laws and social relativity obey the current laws of means of production (ibid.). So, the ideology dictates what is seen as true and false. Anything goes, if it fits in the current mode of society, and therefore for Adorno, relativism is “bourgeois skepticism” (ibid., sic.). Jaeggi rephrases this argument in her article in a following manner: Namely, freedom is an ideal in a capitalistic society, but clearly, its realization is far from perfect. On some level, the ideal of freedom does indeed happen: on paper a contract between a worker and employer is a contract between two equal parties in which both willingly decide to participate (Jaeggi, 2009, p. 67). However, in many cases we know that people have no other choices than to work, even if the contract or work is exploitative (ibid.). So, on one level the ideal of freedom is indeed true, but on another it is not only false, working against freedom by enabling exploitative relations between workers and employers.

This same phenomenon applies to our earlier example of mental hygiene, the example of applying for the state supported psychotherapy. On paper, the Finnish state does provide free psychotherapy for its citizens. However, the reality is not as simple, since there are usually still additional costs, that are too high for many and a long, bureaucratic process, where one must justify their right to get access to said treatment by appealing to the fact that said treatment will enhance their ability to work. Still, especially when looking at this phenomenon from a distance, one could say that the Finnish health care system does provide free psychotherapy to its citizens, even if this is very rarely the actual case.

But let’s go back to ideology as necessary and false and focus on the necessity of ideology. Jaeggi gives us a three-part explanation of how ideology is a necessary false consciousness:

1. Ideology is false in the traditional sense, that it creates a false consciousness. With this example of freedom this manifests itself when we indeed think that everybody has the freedom to work in a non-exploitative way.
2. Ideology is necessary, so even if it is false, it does still correspond to reality in some sense. The ideal of freedom does indeed exist on some level.

3. So, it must be both necessary and false. It must be false even if it corresponds to reality, because the reality in this case is distorted as well due to ideology. (Jaeggi, 2009, p. 68)

If we look at another example from the previous chapter, where the ideological claim that racialized minorities actually have higher unemployment rates, we can see that this situation, where ideology is in some sense true, can be explained with the necessary and false nature of ideology that Adorno offers us. Yes, racialized minorities have higher unemployment rates, but this truth gets tangled with the ideological untruth of these same minorities being lazier. So, in a sense this claim and its implications are both true and false. In a racist, capitalistic society this fact is also necessary: society moulded by these ideologies has created a situation where it is nothing but necessary for racialized minorities to have higher unemployment rates, since due to racist structures, it is significantly harder to get employed as a member of said minority. This gets untangled with false, racist stereotypes of laziness and we end up in a situation where this ideological claim of racialized minorities working less is both true and false. It is ideology here that creates the framework of truth and falsity. In this it is more difficult for racialized minorities to find work, and therefore making its own claim, that racialized minorities have a lower employment rate, true. Therefore, it is quite clear how ideology can in some cases be “true”, but still pejorative in a normative sense and worth of critique.

4.6 Conclusion

So, is Adorno’s definition of ideology able to face the issues formulated in the previous chapter, namely the issue of being both context-transcendent and epistemologically and ethically non-authoritarian (Cooke, 2006, p. 7)? I find this plausible. The methodology of negative dialectics is context-transcending and can be applied universally, but it is connected to the actual experiences of people and therefore is not authoritative. It is capable of considering the complex relationship between the individuals and society by looking at objects as constellations, as socially and historically constructed entities.

The denial of completely objective knowledge while still acknowledging the fact that there are better and worse ways of gaining said knowledge is compatible with the pragmatic turn of social sciences as well as still staying away from relativism. The examples in the previous section demonstrate, Adorno’s definition is also able to

explain situations where ideologies are in some sense true: they are accurate, because they are necessary to uphold the current societal order and ideology and because this ideology is also what defines the trueness and falseness of things. Simultaneously, ideology in this sense can be identified through its falseness because it is not true in the sense that what it is describing is how things are naturally or how they should be.

All in all, negative dialectics as ideology critique combines successfully an epistemic and somewhat functional form of ideology critique, since it is based on the epistemic notion of the false relationship between the subject and object while also taking into account the role of experience in ideology critique. After all, for Adorno, the critique of society is the critique of knowledge (CM, p.250). Because negative dialectics is able to answer to both the epistemic and normative challenges of ideology, I believe it is the form of ideology critique we should employ to critique hygiene as an ideology. Identity thinking successfully describes the nature of hygiene, where it is on an individual level harmless but as a social concept possibly oppressing. In the next chapter I will attempt to illustrate how negative dialectics as ideology critique can indeed be used as a way to critique a large social phenomenon, in this case hygiene.

5. Answers to possible criticism and final conclusions

5.1 Introduction

I will begin this final chapter of my thesis with addressing the possible criticisms that may arise when combining critical theory and a Foucauldian approach. I argue that these traditions are not as far away from each other as has been assumed, e.g. Owen (2002), since negative dialectics is capable of critiquing more than just beliefs of individuals. This will happen through examining the article by David Owen (2002) and by concluding that these two traditions are similar enough to be combined in the context of my thesis, even if they are often pitted against each other. Critical theorists have criticised Foucault's theory for its lack of normative claims (Owen, 2002, p.224). It is seen by critical theorists as a failed form of critique, since without normative criterion it is unable to successfully critique existing conditions and aim for emancipation (Owen, 2002, pp.224-225). On the other hand, critical theory has been criticised for being too focused on proving the falseness of ideological beliefs and therefore having a blind spot towards aspectual captivity that genealogy addresses (Owen, 2002, p.226). I argue that these differences are not as fundamental as Owen makes them seem.

After this I will offer a summary of my research questions for this thesis and the ways in which I have reached them. My three main goals are: a.) to define hygiene b.) justify the use of Adorno's definition of ideology as identity thinking and c.) to argue that hygiene is indeed a form of ideology and therefore, ideology critique (negative dialectics) should be used to confront it. This section will offer an answer to how I have reached these goals within this thesis.

In the last section 5.3, I will make my final conclusion that hygiene as ideology creates implicit values and ideals of what the members of populations should be like and be able to do, in manner that can be oppressive and exclusionary. I will argue that because hygiene is a form of ideology, it usually escapes criticism and is taken as given, and because of this, we should pay more attention to it. The methodology to critique hygiene should be negative dialectics, because it gives us the scope to examine hygiene as a wide-ranging phenomenon and system, not just as individual cases. Through

negative dialectics we can see hygiene as a constellation, as something constructed and possibly oppressive, and therefore in need of criticism.

5.2 Combining Critical Theory with a Foucauldian Approach

My attempt in this work is not to reconcile the differences and tensions between Foucauldian scholars and critical theorists. However, I will argue that the gap between the two traditions may not be as big as is often assumed (for example, see Cook, 2018). At least in the context of this work, they can complement each other. Hygiene can be best understood when we look at it as a positive technology of power, but also as a form of ideology. My argument is that the differences between these two approaches are somewhat misunderstood and not as radical as Owen seems to think and that the scope of ideology critique is much larger than some of its critics seem to believe (Owen, 2002, p. 217) The main objection to ideology critique in Owen's article is that it only targets individual (false) beliefs, which, as was explained in the section 4.4, is not true, at least when it comes to ideology critique as negative dialectics.

Owen (2002) offers us some background information when it comes to the reasons for this conflict between Foucault and critical theory. Owen argues that there are at least two types of self-imposed, non-physical captivity: being held captive by ideology and being held captive by a picture perspective (Owen, 2002, p. 216). Being held captive by ideology is characterised by what could be called a false consciousness; a self-delusion where the agents do not realize that their constraints are self-imposed (Owen, 2002, p. 217). According to Owen, this is the target of ideology critique in critical theory (ibid.). Owen is mainly citing the works of Raymond Geuss (1981, 1999) when discussing critical theory, so it is safe to assume that with critical theory Owen means the traditional, Frankfurt School theorists, just like Geuss. The other form of captivity, being held captive by picture perspective, is independent from the agent's belief in the falsity or accuracy of said constraints (ibid.). The picture perspective is not true or false, it is "a way of conceptualizing the real" (ibid.). This means that in a sense the picture perspective comes before trueness or falseness: it is the backdrop of all things true or false, since it is what guides the whole thought process (Owen, 2002, p. 218). This second form of captivity is the target of Foucauldian genealogy.

The key difference here is that according to Owen ideology critique addresses false beliefs that legitimize oppressive social structures, ideology in this context meaning that somebody thinks that something that justifies oppression is true, when it is not (Owen, 2017, p.217). In contrast, picture perspective focuses on a failure to “recognise this possibility as a possibility” (Owen, 2002, p. 219). This would be, as we learned in the second chapter, an epistemic definition of ideology (Geuss, 1981, p.13). Here the genealogical approach attempts to free the individual from aspectual captivity so that the individual can make sense of themselves as a subject and strive towards self-governance (Owen, 2002, p. 222), whereas ideology critique tries to show the individual that their constraints are based of false beliefs and therefore self-imposed. Genealogy works through identification of the picture perspective that is holding us captive by contrasting it to other aspects (Owen, 2002, p. 224). This way the subject is capable of making sense of the perspective that is holding them as captive and then make better sense of themselves as an agent (ibid.) and therefore get closer to the goal of self-governance.

According to Owen, since critical theorists make the mistake of criticizing genealogy as if it was a form ideology critique, which it is not (Owen, 2002, p. 224). Owen writes that the most common criticism towards genealogy from critical theorists is that genealogy fails to articulate any normative or immanent critique or criteria, but this is not the goal of genealogy nor is it needed for successful critique (Owen, 2002, p. 225). Genealogy is focused on the possibilities of different perspectives or frameworks, not in their normative ranking. However, genealogy is still concerned with normative issues, namely self-governance (ibid.). Owen writes how Foucault clearly is taking a normative stance through the value of self-governance as the goal of genealogy. Therefore, the criticism from critical theorists does not hit its mark (ibid.).

However, I argue that Owen makes the same mistake which he is accusing the critical theorists of making with genealogy: he is giving a very uncharitable reading of critical theory and its practice of ideology critique. He writes how the need to have a normative criterion within ideology critique boils down to the idea that

“the *only* threat to the exercise of our capacity for self-government which requires critical reflection (as opposed to action) is the existence of false beliefs

concerning the justifiability of our moral norms or the legitimacy of our political institutions and practices, where such false beliefs are the products either of ignorance and mistakes or ideological captivity”. (Owen, 2002, p. 226).

This is not completely false: ideology critique does target the false beliefs that justify oppressive structures like political institutions and this of course does require a normative dimension. However, it is unclear why this excludes ideology critique from targeting structures that create such false beliefs. Owen claims that the focus on these normative claims and false beliefs makes critical theorists blind to the “non-physical, self-imposed captivity which genealogy is designed to address” (ibid.). This would be true only if ideology would be defined just as a sum of the false beliefs of the individuals and if those beliefs truly were the *only* target of ideology critique. Indeed, it seems that Owen’s uncharitable reading of ideology critique boils down to his belief about ideology being a *self-imposed* coercion, or *self-delusion*. Ideology critique does indeed target these self-delusions or false beliefs as well, but the issue is that Owen thinks that this is the *only* target of ideology critique and that ideology would be only the sum of false beliefs. By now, as discussed in chapter 3, we know that this type of cognitivist definition of ideology that Owen is referring to is not very viable. Many definitions of ideology are very aware of this issue of defining ideology as a sum of the beliefs of individuals. They do also target larger structures which are behind said false beliefs, just like genealogy. Non-identity thinking is an example of ideology critique that does not stop at individual beliefs, just like the approaches of Haslanger’s (2017) and Celikates’ (2006) mentioned in the previous chapters.

Because of the definition of ideology that Owen portrays, we run to the issue of the falseness of ideological beliefs. Owen characterises ideological beliefs as the agents having a set of epistemic principles. Further he argues that they are proper sources of legitimation only if these beliefs can be acquired free from coercion (Owen, 2002, p.221). Ideology creates the false belief that these principles have indeed been acquired autonomously. But since these beliefs are acquired under ideology, and therefore not freely of coercion, they must be false since their legitimacy only holds if they are formulated autonomously. This characterisation relies on the issue of ideology being false, which, as discussed in previous chapters, is not always the case. The example by Haslanger (2017) of higher unemployment rates in racialized communities highlights

this issue. The unemployment rate is indeed higher, but it is the result of an ideological, false belief: the belief that racialized people are not as good employees as others. So, ideology critique does not rely only on the falseness of ideological beliefs, but also on social structures and institutions that rely and create these false beliefs and oppressive structures that end up enforcing oppressive conditions.

Owen's characterisation of ideology as self-imposed self-delusion is also an uncharitable reading of ideology and ideology critique (Owen, 2002, p. 217). Often individuals are aware of their own delusions, but cannot break free from them out of necessity or habit. This means that I might know that something is false on a fundamental level, but that there is a dissonance between that knowledge and my everyday actions, since societal norms around me do not allow me to break free from them and their falsity.

Owen describes how genealogy goes beyond this by not challenging the belief itself but instead a possibility of having other beliefs, a possibility of having a different perspective (Owen, 2002, p. 219). This is very close to the description of non-identity thinking. Just as being held by a picture perspective makes us think that what is, is the only thing that can exist, so does identity thinking narrow our ways of imagining and seeing options for change (ibid., MM, p.126). It seems then that Owen's idea of ideology is cognitivist and therefore his characterisation of ideology critique is overly focused on the beliefs of individuals and their falsity. But if we look closer to other renditions of ideology critique, we are able to see that the differences between ideology critique and genealogy are not as significant as Owen seems to think.

If we are to broaden our idea of ideology critique, we are able to see a very important common denominator within the works of Foucault and Adorno: the inability to see how an object could be approached in a different way: The question is not of the object itself but more of how the processes of perceiving said object fool us. The Foucauldian approach targets "the powers of judgement concerning such and such a picture or perspective as the only way of reflecting the topic in question" (Owen, 2002, p. 219). Hence, it is a lack of ability of seeing that there are options to this perspective or picture. Adorno's approach and criticism of concepts is very similar: the primacy of the concept over the individual means the inability to see the constellation that forms said

individual (ND, pp.162-163). Identity thinking then, is also not critiquing just the object itself but instead the approach that one has when looking at things only as concepts. Just like Foucault, Adorno is asking us to change our approach to the world through non-identity thinking. He is not targeting only the falsity of the object itself: the goal of non-identity thinking is also to change the perspective of perceiving things.

Genealogy as an approach attempts to show through the study of history that the subject has a history and that things have been otherwise. This means that the situation, universal or other things at hand that are seen as necessary, are actually arbitrary and should not be taken for granted (Owen, 2002, p. 221). This is in many ways very similar to what Adorno is attempting to do with non-identity thinking: he is also attempting to bring forth the arbitrariness of things. Adorno wishes to reverse the priority from the concept to the individual, so that we can see how the individual does not fulfil the concept. When realizing that the individual does not fulfil the concept, we can see what the individual actually is and what it could be (ND, 149). Realizing that there are options to what the individual object could be, that it has not fulfilled its potential yet, we are able to see that things do not have to be how they currently are. Just because something is the way it is, is no longer enough for its justification.

Non-identity thinking then, is not only what Owen claims ideology critique to be, since it does not just show falseness of beliefs. Non-identity thinking targets the entire mode of thinking when it asks for the prioritisation of the particular over the concept. The question of falseness of beliefs is present: Adorno does believe in the same claim as other critical theorists that ideology is false, but this falseness is quite nuanced, as discussed in the previous chapter in section 4.5. Yes, ideology is false but it is also necessary (Adorno, 1972, p.465 & Jaeggi, 2009, p.68). This means that ideology might accurately describe the world, i.e. a racialized community having a higher unemployment rate than rest of the population, but this is due to some more fundamental falseness which creates the necessity for the situation to be the way it is. In this example it would be the false racist prejudices against racialized people that necessarily affect their employment. It has to be this way, because this is how racist ideology works. However, there is still a falseness here, because this situation is the result of ideological racist prejudices and not a natural, or objective occurrence. Here it is not just the belief about the world that is false, but it is the ideological nature of the

belief that makes it false. In a similar fashion, non-identity thinking targets not just the falseness of individual beliefs but the false sense of objectivity, the thought that one could be able to grasp the object just as it is in the world (ND, 149). So, the target of non-identity thinking, or negative dialectics, is not just falseness of a single belief, but also the picture perspective.

From this point of view, it seems that the clash between ideology critique and the Foucauldian tradition is not as wide as one might expect, even if the traditions do have differences in what they see as the key issues. Owen's critique towards seems to apply only to cognitivist definitions of ideology critique. I would argue that contemporary ideology critique is also capable of critiquing a picture perspective, and indeed one could argue that critiquing an ideology is just that, at least in the case of negative dialectics.

Owen also brushes off the critique of critical theorists towards genealogy too easily (Owen, 2002, p. 226). It is possible to claim that genealogy as a form of critique does not pass the normative challenge, as Owen also admits in his paper. Surely Owen would argue that genealogy does not need to pass the normative challenge: it is not a form of ideology critique and it does not attempt to argue that some picture perspectives are worse than others, only that different possibilities exist. Furthermore, the goal of self-governance brings a weak normative dimension to genealogy (Owen, 2002, p.225). It is still quite vague why self-governance is the normative value that runs through all of genealogy. If one aspect is not better or worse than the other, why does it matter to know that these different possibilities for aspects exist? Why is self-governance the most important value in the first place?

From all this we can conclude that negative dialectics is a form of ideology critique that does not only target the beliefs of individuals, but the entire system of thought (identity thinking). Just as Owen describes picture perspectives creating the backdrop for judging what is true or false (Owen, 2002, p.217), so does Adorno describe ideology having the same power to define the truth value of things (ND, p.37) From this we can derive that in the case of hygiene, where the concern are the bodies and their characteristics and abilities, negative dialectics is capable of critiquing the underlying ideals and assumptions that hygiene carries. Like the effect of the economization of the body,

hygiene as ideology attempts to make a population as efficient as possible. These attempts can be successfully illuminated through negative dialectics. One of these examples has been the example of psychotherapy, but also looking at immigration policies and seeing the hygienic implications in them, is an example where negative dialectics can be used to highlight the oppressive use of hygiene.

Adorno's definition of ideology has been, justifiably, criticised for focusing on the mental processes of individuals too much (Rose, 2014, p.136), even if his definition of ideology is fundamentally non-cognitivist. Perceiving objects as constellations locates ideology not only in individual beliefs but also within historical and social structures. This is starkly different from the way in which Owen describes ideology critique, since it's focus is much broader than just the beliefs of individuals. Combining negative dialectics and its way of looking at things as constellations with a more general outlook on epistemic systems, or picture perspectives as Owen calls them, can give us an opportunity to implement the practice of negative dialectics on larger societal processes, like hygiene. I believe that this was Adorno's goal, but his emphasis on individual thought makes it more difficult to see how this implementation could be done. Finally, both of these traditions are concerned on the norms and effects capitalism and exchange value create. They both discuss what effect these norms have on the body on a systematic level, so it is no surprise that the two theories can complement each other.

5.3 Conclusion

The goal of this thesis has been to a.) define hygiene b.) define ideology as a form of identity thinking and c.) define hygiene as ideology so that it can be the target of ideology critique. In chapter one I defined hygiene as a positive technology of power, a tool in a larger scheme of a normalizing society. Hygiene has the power to make us monitor ourselves and others and to repeat hygienic actions to stay within the categories of normality and "health" (Foucault, 2004, p. 45)., This does not concern only individual action, since the parameters of normality and the actions required for it are set by social structures and institutions.

Hygiene has this power because of its use of abjection. Abject is something that is between object and subject, something that separates the two, like bodily fluid separate us from our outside world, and is met with disgust (Kristeva, 1982, p. 3). The concept

applies on a social level: abjection happens between groups of people and these ideas of dirt are put in use when differentiating and creating hierarchies between groups. This is hygiene in practice. These concepts of dirtiness and impurity come with certain value judgements and connotations, this labelling implies moral categories, the purer being of course the superior. Therefore, the process of abjection can be used in oppressive manners, when building for example national identities. So, hygiene is a positive technology of power that uses abjection as a building block for identity, which is used to label and categorize people in a possibly derogatory or oppressive way.

The same theme of identity rises when we look at ideology as identity thinking. The reason why I argue that this approach is the most appropriate in this context is because, unlike some other definitions of ideology, it passes the normative and epistemic challenges of ideology, meaning that it can fulfil the following requirements:

- a.) being able to give a pejorative definition of ideology, meaning the ability to make normative claims (Cooke, 2006, p. 6).
- b.) to make such claims, we must be able to distinguish normative structures from another and make evaluative claims like form of power x is more oppressive than form of power y (ibid.).
- c.) the reasoning behind the distinction in b. needs to be context-transcending (ibid.), or have a non-normative aspect to it. If ideology is misleading, basing it only normative basis means that we might be basing it in said (misleading) ideology.

My argument is that ideology as identity thinking and ideology critique as negative dialectics can fulfil all of these requirements. Ideology is detrimental because identity thinking and its prioritization of concepts makes us falsely see particulars as identical to their concepts, which leads to the situation where we become content with how things are because we are incapable of seeing other possibilities. As our examples, like the example of state funded psychotherapy, show us, we can use negative dialectics to pinpoint normative issues and see how far away from their actual concept, or potential they are. Negative dialectics, however, is not dependent on normative issues, and is, as a method, context transcending and can be applied to different normative situations without being based in them. Ideology as identity thinking is both epistemic, in the sense that challenging it with negative dialectics will give us better knowledge of the

objects around us. It is also functional in the sense that it explains the way societies function, and because it is necessary and creates the justifications for said function itself.

However, it must be said that identity thinking has its issues when it comes to describing it as non-cognitivist. I have previously explained that even with a certain vagueness on how identity thinking applies on a social level, Adorno's definition of ideology can still be described as being non-cognitivist. The focus on objects as constellations, as clusters of historically and socially constructed meanings and traces, locates ideology outside the minds of individuals. This approach implies that ideology resides in these meanings and constructs, as well as in individual beliefs.

On the most basic, normative level, hygiene creates implicit values on what a population and its functional and acceptable members should be like. As my examples have demonstrated, this applies in many different contexts, like mental hygiene, concerns about the age dependency ratio and genetic study on group differences. This is because hygiene is a form of ideology and a positive technology of power.

These social structures and concepts of normality are affected by our current economic system in the sense that normality, or the categorical average, is often defined by the ability to participate in a capitalistic society. The strive towards normalization is also a strive towards efficiency, which Foucault describes as rationalization of the body (Foucault, 1982, p. 329). But since hygiene is applicable in so many different ways, only pinpointing examples of where it is being used is not enough. That is why I find it necessary to categorize it as an ideology, to understand hygiene as a widespread system, that exists as practices, structures and ways of thinking, not just as excluded cases.

This idea of the connection between hygiene's effect on the body and our current economic system is also another reason what connects ideology and hygiene. Ideology, as we know, in the Adornian sense, is deeply invested in the way that concepts and identities are formed and used to control both individual bodies and the bodies of masses. Hygiene does just that: it creates concepts (such as impure, unhealthy etc.) and identifies individuals within them. This process of identification is ideological in nature and therefore its aim is to control, and often in an oppressive sense, said bodies

Because hygiene is ideology, it goes unnoticed or is deemed useful, even in its oppressive implementations. In the Finnish context, for example, hygiene creates the false, implicit belief, that most Finnish people are, or at least they should be healthy, white, able bodied and so on, as our example on the dependency ratio demonstrates. This is because hygiene is used to identify people under its concepts, as healthy, white, straight etc. These traits become the norm, because they are connected to the concept of Finnishness, even if we are aware of the fact that not all Finnish citizens have these properties.

I have argued that ideology has the power to assign characteristics of concepts to particulars, that are not actually the traits of the object, but instead conceptual. Hence, the concept carries certain traits, and if the particular does not fill them, they are seen as deviating from the norm. This has of course, moral implications, and therefore it can support oppressive structures. Even if we know that not all Finnish citizens are white and able-bodied, for example, there is the commonly held belief that most Finnish citizens are just that or that this is how things should be. There is a sense of necessity of claiming that most Finnish citizens have certain traits, even if it is not true, just as there is a certain necessity to keep things as they are.

This, of course, is true outside of Finland as well, and most western countries can be seen as carrying this type of implicit, ideological beliefs and they also usually have population wide hygienic practices, as one of the more gruesome, contemporary, examples in my introduction about the use of sterilization in U.S prisons, shows us. So, clearly the way that hygiene labels people under its concepts, practices control over their bodies, while still seeming beneficial, is a way of identity thinking, and therefore ideology.

To be able to criticise hygiene as a specific yet extremely versatile phenomenon, it should be identified as identity thinking, as a form of ideology. As negative dialectics shows us, already the identification of hygiene as a form of identity thinking gives us the tools to criticise it, because identifying always includes the negation of what the identified object leaves unfulfilled from its concept. In the case of hygiene, the identification of its issues, its implicit biases and strive towards normalcy, means that we are able to question its applications and the characteristics that it assigns to some.

Through negative dialectics we are able to see hygiene as a constellation: a socially structured entity, that carries within it a historical baggage, implicit values, different practices and concepts that we usually take as given. Hopefully this thesis has given enough reason to question and examine hygiene in a more detailed manner.

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