Ethnicity, Religion and Politics in Tanzania

The 2010 General Elections and Mwanza Region

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Ethnicity and religion have never occupied a prominent role in the politics of Tanzania. This was particularly the case during the one-party era, during which a strong emphasis was put on the undesirability of religious and ethnic politics as part of the efforts to consolidate national identity and unity. With the introduction of multi-party politics, both forms of identity seemed to come increasingly to the fore, and accusations of ethnic or religious bias are today commonly voiced in the political discourse of the country. This thesis gives a current account of the role of ethnicity and religion in the politics of Tanzania, using the 2010 General Elections, the region of Mwanza and the support structure of opposition party Chadema as case studies. The main focus of the thesis is on ethnicity and politics, but the conceptual framework developed in the text is relevant for the analysis of religion-politics connections as well.

The research is based in part on fieldwork conducted in Mwanza region and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania in the summer of 2011. The fieldwork consisted of semi-structured interviews with researchers, politicians, religious leaders and “ordinary” Tanzanians. In addition, both the theoretical and analytical parts of the thesis are based on an extensive body of literature concerning ethnicity, religion and Tanzanian political history. On the basis of this literature and augmented by the interview material, this thesis presents a framework for the understanding of ethnic identity and ethnic politics in Tanzania. It is suggested that ethnic identity may be divided into three separate categories: cultural, social and political ethnicity. Political ethnicity, or ethnic politics, is defined as the use of ethnic identity in the pursuit of public resources, and is divided into two further categories: political tribalism and the politics of origin. The former refers to evocations of the particular ethnic group identities that emerged out of colonial rule, and that are alluded to in political competition with other ethnic groups. The latter then connotes political references to identities of origin that are not reducible to political tribalism. These distinctions are important to make in order to assess the nature and the consequences of any case of ethnic politics.

The research results suggest that the social significance of ethnicity in Tanzania has not translated into political tribalism to any larger extent, but that other forms of political ethnicity, related to the politics of origin, are indeed rather prevalent. In particular, interviews in Mwanza region suggest that ethnicity and common origin might be important factors of political representation and inclusion. More specifically, it is argued that ethnicity is related to judgments regarding the trustworthiness of political candidates. However, it was also clear that respondents in general tended to downplay the role of ethnicity as a political factor. It is suggested that in part, this is attributable to the fact that ethnicity in Tanzania – in whatever form – has never evolved into a decisive or indispensable factor for the political distribution of resources. This in turn may be traced back both to the rather inclusive political system that was put in place in Tanzania after independence and that inhibited the emergence and articulation of group-grievances, and to the prevalence of a strong resentment among the population against the use of tribalism.

Religion and politics in Tanzania is analyzed using the same categorization into its cultural, social and political levels. Religion has assumed a rather more prominent space in the political discourse of Tanzania, involving at times severe tension between Muslims and Christians. It is suggested that the context of economic and social crisis in Tanzania enabled the emergence of religious revivalist groups, which increased the social and cultural saliency of religion. The emergence of political religion in turn was facilitated by the presence of group grievances, in particular on the part of the Muslims. Nonetheless, religious relations in Tanzania remain cordial and the research results from Mwanza suggested that religious politics were confined to accusations among political parties and competition between certain religious groups. It is suggested that similarly to ethnicity, religion has not constituted a decisive factor in resource allocation in Tanzania, and imbalances between faith groups has been addressed at least to some extent. As with ethnicity, this is attributed to Tanzania’s political history and the prevalence of the notion that religious politics should be avoided. However, it is emphasised that these conclusions are valid mainly for the region of Mwanza, and cannot be generalized for the whole country. Finally, concern is expressed regarding the future of religious relations in the country regarding the increasingly inflammatory rhetoric among religious leaders and politicians, and it is argued that these issues should be addressed politically.
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1. Introduction

The use of ethnicity and religion in political competition is a common feature in the politics of many African countries. In countries such as Kenya, competition between ethnic groups has dominated the political scene since the introduction of multiparty politics, and also in Zambia, ethnicity has emerged as an important factor in political contention (see e.g. Posner 2005; 2007; Bratton & Kimenyi, 2008). In Nigeria, both religious and ethnic competition has been a distinctive feature of the country’s political history, and one that has frequently led to violent conflict. In Tanzania, however, ethnicity and religion have not assumed a particularly prominent role in the politics of the country. Indeed, ethnicity seems to be all but absent from the political sphere: not only do all significant political parties seem to lack a clear regional or ethnic basis, ethnicity has never constituted the basis for political or economic contention in the country. This had led some to claim that ethnicity is “almost invisible in Tanzanian politics” (A. Weber, 2010, p. 4). Also religious relations in Tanzania have largely been cordial, even if tensions between Muslims and Christians have featured in Tanzanian politics ever since colonial times (e.g. Mbogoni, 2005, pp. 1-3).

In terms of religion, throughout Tanzania’s independence history both Christian and Muslim institutions have actively sought to influence political issues of their concern, and in particular the Muslims have developed narratives of discrimination vis-à-vis the state and the Christian institutions. Skirmishes between Christians and Muslims intensified and became more public from the mid 1980s throughout the 1990s, which raised concerns about the future state of religious relations in the country (e.g. Heilman & Kaiser 2002; Mbogoni 2005; Mesaki 2011; Tambila 2006; Liviga & Tumbo-Masabo 2006). Ever since the advent of multiparty politics in Tanzania, there have been concerns that also ethnic sentiments would gain salience in Tanzania (e.g. Gasarasi, 1997; Omari 1997; Mmuya & Chaligha, 1994; Erdmann 2002). This is related to the general notion, briefly addressed in chapter 5, which posits that democratization might lead to the emergence of ethnic and religious conflicts. As described in chapter 6, the period of one-party politics and its associated policies are generally credited for the lack of serious ethnic and religious conflicts in the country. The fear was then, also among ordinary Tanzanians, that the demise of the one-party state and emergence of opposition parties would lead to the increase of ethnic and religious politics (e.g. Chaligha et al 2002; Gasarasi 1997).
Furthermore, Tanzania is a rather diverse country both in terms of religion and ethnicity. Especially ethnic fragmentation has commonly been seen as a potentially divisive factor in the mainstream conflict literature (e.g. Easterly & Levine 1997; Collier et al. 2009). Estimates as to the number of ethnic groups in the country vary, but the figure is commonly put at 120 different ethnic groups (e.g. Jerman 1997; also chapter 6.1). As for religion, there are no reliable estimates regarding the proportions of Muslims and Christians in the country, but both groups are commonly considered fairly equal in terms of strength and number (Heilman & Kaiser, 2002, p. 703). Despite these concerns, however, both ethnic and religious relations have remained remarkably good in Tanzania by most standards. This is evident for instance in a range of surveys on the issue, which show that Tanzanians perceive of ethnic and religious relations in markedly more favorable terms than in most other African countries (e.g. Afrobarometer 2001; 2005; 2008; REDET 2000).

In this thesis, I originally set out to investigate the reasons for the low saliency of ethnicity in the politics of Tanzania. I later shifted focus to the 2010 general elections to analyze how ethnicity may or may not have influenced voting behavior and political mobilization in the elections. The focus was exclusively on ethnicity, however, since my main area of interest was to analyze the interplay between the apparently high social relevance of ethnicity in Tanzania and its seemingly low political saliency. This is still one of the main focal points of the thesis, and one which I address in some detail in chapters 6 and 7. In consequence, this is very much a work on ethnicity, and the main theoretical and analytical efforts have been placed on the role of ethnicity in the politics of Tanzania. However, in the preparations for my fieldwork period in the summer of 2011, the role that religious institutions had played in the 2010 election became increasingly evident to me. I therefore decided to devote a share of the fieldwork to investigating religious politics in the 2010 elections. In Tanzania, religion and ethnicity are frequently mentioned side by side, in particular with respect to Tanzania’s success in avoiding the emergence of religious politics (udini) and ethnic politics (ukabila). Also from this perspective it was thus logical to include religion in the analysis of this thesis.

In consequence, both religion and ethnicity are incorporated into the structure and layout of the thesis, particularly with respect to chapters 3-5, which are designed to provide a background to the theoretical and analytical discussion in subsequent chapters. The main aim of this thesis is then to give an account of the current state of ethnicity, religion and politics in Tanzania. Against the background of the relatively cordial relations between ethnic and religious groups in the country, I attempt to assess to what extent ethnicity and religion do or do not have political saliency in
Tanzania today. In particular, I investigate what shapes this political saliency may take, and how the various evocations of common ethnicity, religion or origin may be judged. I limit my scope by using the 2010 general elections as a case study, and by focusing mainly on the region of Mwanza in Northwestern Tanzania, where I conducted fieldwork in the summer of 2011. In addition, in chapters 7 and 9 on ethnicity and religion respectively, I will use the political party Chadema as a case study. Chadema emerged as the main opposition party in the 2010 elections, and while the incumbent ruling party CCM finally prevailed quite comfortably in the polls, Chadema largely dominated both the election agenda and the post-election debates with its anti-corruption campaigns (see chapter 4). Interestingly, accusations of either ethnic or religious bias have frequently been voiced against Chadema ever since its inception in 1994. In 2010, in particular allegations of religious bias in favor of the Christian groupings were commonly voiced. An assessment of these accusations and their basis thus provides a useful example of the connections between ethnicity, religion and politics in Tanzania today, even if an actual assessment of their validity is not part of my objectives.

The discussion in the subsequent chapters thus concerns both religion and ethnicity, but as mentioned above, the main theoretical and analytical focus of this thesis is on the connection between ethnicity and politics. Based both on the literature on ethnicity and Tanzanian politics, and augmented by my fieldwork interviews, I develop a conceptualization of ethnic identity and ethnic politics in Tanzania, which forms the basis of my analysis of the 2010 elections. I suggest that many of the theoretical and conceptual points made in chapter 6 and 7 are valid for the analysis of religion and politics in chapters 8 and 9 as well. To summarize the points, I argue that ethnic identity may be divided into three distinct categories: cultural, social and political. Further, I divide political ethnicity into political tribalism – a concept originally developed by John Lonsdale (1994) – and the politics of origin. The latter is further divided into different types, outlined in chapter 6.6 and the summarized in the conclusion. This distinction enables an analysis of the different ways in which ethnicity affects politics, and what these various forms of political ethnicity entail.

This work is rather extensive for a Master’s thesis, but I argue that the research questions at hand require a thorough treatment both in terms of theory and analysis. Also, a comprehensive theoretical basis is needed to appreciate the multifaceted nature of ethnic identity, which then deserves a proper treatment in the analysis as well. Also, leaving religion completely aside would have implied disregarding an important issue pertaining to identity politics in Tanzania, and its inclusion in this thesis makes for a considerably more valid analysis of the 2010 elections. Furthermore, the
discussion in chapters 8 and 9 shows that some of the important points relating to ethnicity and politics in Tanzania facilitate a proper understanding of religious politics as well, and thus serve to support the validity of the conclusions in chapters 6 and 7.

2. Research Questions, Structure and Limitations

The objective of this thesis is to give a balanced and thorough account of the current state of ethnicity, religion and politics in Tanzania, using the 2010 elections in Mwanza region as a case study. Throughout the thesis, I use a mix of sources in the discussion – academic literature, media reports, election statistic and personal interviews – I place the analysis quite firmly in a theoretical and conceptual framework. I limit my focus by looking in particular at political parties and multi-party elections. Politics is defined here as the process of making decisions regarding the production and distribution of public resources (see chapter 5) and ethnic and religious politics are in turn defined as the use of these identities in the conduct of politics thus defined. I have outlined three main research questions that this thesis attempts to assess. First, I am particularly interested in investigating the different ways in which ethnicity may come to the political fore in Tanzania, and what such an emergence might amount to. This is related to the fact that overt evocations of ethnic sentiments are unlikely in Tanzania, where there is a strong public discourse prohibiting its use in politics. The same is true for religion, but since ethnicity relates to a person’s “basic, most general identity” (Barth, 1969, p. 13) I was particularly interested in analyzing if there were alternative ways in which this identity might be manifested, and what the consequences of such manifestations may be. The first research question was thus:

1. *In which various shapes and by which means may ethnic identity influence politics in Tanzania, in particular with regard to multi-party elections?*

Second, this required an identification of some of the general circumstances that have led to the political emergence ethnicity in its various forms, and which factors in turn might inhibit such emergence. Although I cannot hope to give an exhaustive account of all the relevant factors involved, it is important for the overall analysis to outline some basic features. The same is true for religion, for which I use the same conceptual framework as for ethnicity, augmented with a specific theoretical discussion. The second research question is:
2. *How do ethnic and religious politics emerge in Tanzania, and how can these forms of politics be understood?*

Third and finally, I set out to analyze how ethnicity and religion featured in the 2010 General Elections, with particular emphasis on the region of Mwanza. Given the background outlined by the first two research questions, I investigated to what extent and in what form religion and ethnicity featured in the elections in Mwanza, and what this could imply for the current state of ethnic and religious politics in Tanzania. This was situated towards the background of the prevalingly good ethnic and religious relations in Tanzania, but also in the concerns for the rise of ethnic and religious sentiments in the politics of the country mentioned above. The third and final research question was thus:

3. *What was the role of ethnicity and religion in the 2010 elections in Mwanza, and what does this suggest for ethnic and religious politics in Tanzania in general?*

These questions will be further elucidated and specified in chapter 5, where I define some of the important concepts. Ethnicity and religion as identities in turn are defined in chapters 6 and 8, and the definition of ethnicity itself forms an important part of this thesis. However, as a rule, I use the term “ethnicity” and “ethnic group” in this thesis with reference to the clearly defined and delineated ethnic entities that emerged out of the colonial period in Tanzania. The terms thus connote such groups as the Sukuma, the Nyamwezi, the Haya, the Nyakyusa, the Chagga etc. – in other words those groups that in Tanzania commonly are referred to as (ma)kabila (tribes). This is certainly not the only form of ethnicity in Tanzania, as argued at length in chapter 6.6, but in order to avoid the continuous need to define which type of ethnicity is referred to, the terms ethnicity and ethnic group in this essay will denote the well-established ethnic groups referred to above, unless explicitly stated otherwise.

I have narrowed the focus of this thesis by using the Sukuma ethnic group and the performance of opposition party Chadema in the 2010 elections as case studies in my analysis. Apart from this, there are a number of additional limitations that are necessary to make in order for the thesis to retain its focus. First, I have chosen to omit Zanzibar from the analysis completely. The political landscape on Zanzibar differs substantially from that on the mainland, as the issues of contention largely revolve around the question of self-governance, autonomy and the union between the mainland and the islands. (see Kaya, 2004 for politics and the union; also Barkan, 1994 for an
Although religion is indeed an important political issue in Zanzibar, the Muslim-Christian contention on the islands relates strongly to the union issues in general (e.g. Kaiser 2001, pp. 94-95) which fall beyond the scope of this thesis. Second, out of the opposition parties in Tanzania I will focus mainly on Chadema, since it was by far the most successful opposition party in the 2010 election and has continued to play an active role in the politics of Tanzania after the elections\(^2\). While other parties such as NCCR-M and UDP are dealt with to some extent in section 6.6, I have chosen to give only very cursory attention to CUF. CUF emerged as the main opposition party in the 2000 and 2005 elections, and was frequently accused by the ruling party of religious bias towards the Muslims (e.g. Dr. Kamata, personal communication). An assessment of CUF’s support basis would have required a different kind of research and an inclusion of Zanzibar and the union issues in the thesis. I therefore decided leave both issues aside to limit my focus, and since CUF’s support in 2010 was only quite marginal, I chose to pick the more topical opposition party Chadema as the case study of this thesis. Finally, I have refrained from analyzing party manifestos in order to look for instances of ethnic or religious sentiments, as these are not likely to be found in official manifestos due to the strict election laws (see A. Weber, 2010 for an overview; also chapter 6.6 for election rules).

I have also chosen to omit African traditional religions (ATRs) from the analysis of religion. This is mainly due to the fact that African traditional religions in Tanzania do not have organized institutions with which to take part in politics. The influence of ATRs on politics can be assumed to be indirect and difficult to assess in a short field research period. (see e.g. Chabal 2009, chap. 3 for a treatment of traditional religion in African politics). Regarding religious groups and institutions, I focused in my interviews predominantly on the Roman Catholic Church and the Pentecostal Charismatic churches. The Roman Catholic Church has long occupied a rather dominant position in Tanzania (e.g. Mbogoni. 2005; Ludwig, 1994), and was also involved in some of the controversy regarding the role of religious institutions in the 2010 with the issuance of its election “manifesto” (see chapter 9). The Pentecostal churches have in turn witnessed a tremendous surge in the number of congregations in the past decades (e.g. Hasu, 2006) and in addition, some of the elected Chadema MPs belonged to Pentecostal congregations. The Lutheran and Anglican churches are thus mainly left aside due to space constraints but also due to their more subdued role in the 2010 elections. In terms of Muslim congregations, similar limitations are harder to make, but all of my

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\(^1\) For a treatment of political issues in Zanzibar during the 2010 elections, see for instance TACCEO’s (2010) and TEMCO’s (2011) election reports.

\(^2\) In the words of Dr. Kamata, lecturer in political science at UDSM, all other opposition parties are “dead”. (Kamata, 12.5.2011)
respondents were Sunni Muslims as are all of the major Muslim institutions, and I decided not to focus on Shia or Ishmaelite (Aga Khan) congregations due to their small size. As for ethnicity, I focus mainly on the Sukuma which is the predominant group in Mwanza, my region of research, but in addition I also give deal briefly with the Nyamwezi which are related to the Sukuma, the Haya, which are considered as highly influential, and the Chagga, because of their perceived connection to Chadema. Finally, I will leave aside two issue relating to ethnic identity and politics, namely that of nationality and race. Nationality was an issue also in my area of research during the elections and the position of Tanzanians with Asian heritage has also at times been used as a political issue (e.g. Nyang’oro, 2004, 46-50, for an account of the indigenous debate). However, these issues would have required a different kind of research focus and material, and have therefore been left aside.

The structure of this thesis is laid out as follows. In the next chapter, I will outline the basic methods and material used in this thesis, as well as explain the main methods and categories that I based the fieldwork period in Tanzania on. Chapter 4 will give a brief background to the politics and history of Tanzania, dealing with the 2010 elections and its pertinent political issues at some length. Chapter 5 will in turn work as a general introduction to the theoretical and analytical discussion in subsequent chapters. As mentioned, in this chapter, I define some central concepts and give a brief background to some of relevant topics in the analysis of politics in Africa: democratization, the state in Africa and voting motivations. Chapter six and eight then form both the theoretical and historical backbone to the analysis of ethnicity and religion, respectively. In these chapters, and in particular in chapter 6, I have attempted to illustrate the theoretical discussion with examples from Tanzania’s politics, history and ethnic/religious composition. I have therefore not kept a strict distinction between the theoretical and the empirical parts of the thesis, instead; I use both examples from my field material and the literature on Tanzania to develop the theoretical points at hand. As mentioned, the main focus of this thesis is on ethnicity and chapter 6 is thus considerably more comprehensive than chapter 8, which is more of a brief overview. Finally, chapter 7 looks at ethnicity and chapter 9 at religion in the 2010 elections, and these chapters are mainly based on my fieldwork in Mwanza. The last chapter 10 will then work as a conclusion of the discussion on the political role of ethnicity and religion in Tanzania.

Most prominently in the case of Chadema’s Ezekia Wenje, see for instance The Citizen, 5.9.2011
3. Method, Fieldwork and Material

The methods of analysis in this thesis include literature analysis, focused open-ended interviews and to a lesser extent, analysis of media reports. The literature analysis has consisted of basic content analysis of mainly academic works concerning the connection between ethnicity, religion and politics both on the theoretical and practical level. I have limited my scope to cover these issues as they are relevant to the African context. My approach has been theory-driven in that my theoretical reading has guided the conceptualization of the research question and thus the basis for the analysis and its academic sources. The theory also formed the premises for my fieldwork – in short, it gave the basis for how to conceptualize of the connections between ethnicity, religion and politics, and where to look for the these possible connections. My aim has been to employ triangulation of methods in the sense that any one of the research questions has been approached by using a mix of sources and tools. For example the issue of Chadema’s alleged religious bias in favor of Christians had been assessed by analyzing newspaper reports, looking at data on party composition and the regional spread of party support, interviewing respondents of different categories, professions, beliefs and locations, and by referring to academic sources. Also, in my interviews, I had a broad basis of respondents ranging from university professors in Dar es Salaam to subsistence farmers in Magu, Mwanza, which gave me a good variety of perspectives on the research issues.

This all being said, the final thesis differs quite substantially from the original plan of research. As mentioned, the initial focus of this thesis was on ethnicity much more than on religion. I was indeed aware of the political potency religion commands in Tanzania, but I regarded religion-politics relations mainly as an actual instance of identity politics, given the rather long history of periodic inter-religious or religion-state tension in Tanzania (see Mbogoni 2005; Tambila 2006; Luanda 1996 for overviews). Ethnic politics, as mentioned, in turn appeared as more interesting due to the apparent lack of political saliency of ethnicity despite its considerable social relevance (see chapter 6.4, 6.5). However, as my fieldwork progressed, the religion-politics connections became all the more interesting, given the fact that religion did seem to play a crucial role for some respondents, and no role at all for others, while religious beliefs per se in Tanzania are commonly perceived to be of great importance across the country (see e.g. Mukandala, 2006, p.1). Religion thus assumed an increasingly important role in my research in the course of the fieldwork, and while the final thesis is still inclined towards ethnicity, religion forms an integral part of the final analysis.
In terms of academic literature, I have used sources and influences from a range of different disciplines. Despite the fact that this in essence is a work of political science, the theoretical and analytical parts draw also on literature of history, sociology, conflict studies and anthropology. For ethnicity, I rely to a considerable extent on the works of John Lonsdale (1994), Bruce Berman (1998), Patrick Chabal (1999; 2005; 2009), Frederik Barth (1969) and Helena Jerman (1997); for religion, Jeff Haynes’ (1996; 2004) and Ellis & ter Haar’s (1998; 2007) texts have been particularly useful for conceptualizing religious politics, but have been augmented by numerous other academic sources. In the historical analysis of ethnicity, which has remained considerably briefer than originally planned, the main works are Koponen (1988), Iliffe (1979), as well as articles such as Monson (1998) and Bender Shelter (2010) and interviews with Professor Tambila and Dr. Lwaitama at the University of Dar es Salaam. The discussion on ethnicity and politics in Tanzania is based on several sources, amongst others Nyang’oro (2004), Barkan (ed. 1994), Erdman (2002) and Whitehead (2009). Whitehead’s analysis of regional party support of the various parties in the 1995-2005 elections also guided me in constructing my tables, attached in appendix 1.

The chapter on religion in Tanzania in turn is based in particular on REDET’s mastodon work on religion, *Justice, Rights and Worship* from 2006 (Mukandala et al. 2006), as well as Mbogoni’s 2005 book *The Cross vs the Crescent*. In addition, the various Afrobarometer (2001; 2005; 2008) and REDET (2000; 2001) surveys have assisted the analysis of both religion and ethnicity. Apart from academic literature, I have also followed the coverage of the 2010 elections and campaigns in different media outlets. I studied the Media Election Coverage Monitoring Reports (especially September and October 2010) published by Synovate as well as followed the news coverage of the two main English language magazines online, The Citizen and The Daily News. In addition, I was granted permission to study the newspaper archive at the University Library of UDSM, from which I was able to copy around 50 newspaper articles. Finally, I also studied the election reports published by the Tanzania Civil Society Consortium on Election Observation and Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee. In sum, I strived to obtain a research material that would be as varied as possible in order to give balanced picture of the research questions at hand.

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3.1 Fieldwork

The fieldwork part of the thesis was conducted over a six-week period in the early summer of 2011. I started and ended the fieldwork period in Dar es Salaam, but the main area of focus was Mwanza region by the shores of Lake Victoria. I chose Mwanza for several reasons. First, Mwanza is home to the largest ethnic group in Tanzania, the Sukuma, who number around 5 million (Languages of Tanzania, 2009). The Sukuma have not been known for their political activism and are only quite modestly represented in the halls of political power despite their size (e.g. Nyang’oro, 2004). Second, in particular CCM, but also CUF and UDP have maintained levels of political support in the region, but not Chadema has received only marginal support in Mwanza in the previous three multi-party elections. In the 2010 however, Chadema rose to power in both of the urban constituencies in Mwanza town, and fared well in most constituencies across the region, securing a total of 3 MP seats in the region. Politically, then, Mwanza proved an interesting region too. Third, in Mwanza town is the second largest city in Tanzania, but the same region is also home to large sparsely populated rural areas, which permits a mapping of both urban and rural attitudes in terms of ethnicity, religion and politics. Finally, while Muslims are in definitive minority in Mwanza region as a whole, there are considerable numbers of Muslims and Muslim congregations in Mwanza town. In sum, the region provided a very suitable context for analyzing the main research issues of this thesis.

In Mwanza, I started conducting interviews in Mwanza town, after which I spent a few weeks in Magu (Magu town and the villages of Kahangara and Mwamabanza) and Geita (Geita town and Katoro). Geita forms a region of its own since the beginning of 2011 but in the 2010 elections, it was still part of Mwanza region and I therefore treat it as a district of Mwanza in my analysis. In Mwanza and Dar es Salaam, I conducted a total of 77 focused individual and group interviews. In addition, I have also coded nine informal discussions that concerned the research questions. Most of the interviews were conducted individually, but a total of 29 interviews were either group or pair interviews. I chose to focus on four different groups of respondents. The first category of respondents was researchers (coded R1-R11) within the field of social sciences and history at the University of Dar es Salaam. These interviews were meant to give me an overview of the political situation in terms of ethnicity and religion in Tanzania and a general perspective on the 2010 elections. I conducted a total 11 interviews and two informal discussions with researchers, of which all were from the University of Dar es Salaam.
The second interview group was political representatives (coded P1-P25), among which I chose to focus mainly on CCM and Chadema representatives, since these two parties dominated the political scene in the 2010 elections. For the largest part, these interviews were conducted in Mwanza, except for three interviews with politicians in Dar es Salaam. In total, I conducted 25 interviews with political representatives, out of which 9 were group interviews. Out of the interviews, 8 were made with Chadema, 12 with CCM, 3 with CUF, 1 with TLP and 1 with UDP representatives. Further, out of the political representatives, four were Members of Parliament (2 CCM; 2 Chadema) and an additional four had competed for the post. Among the remaining respondents were for instance two senior party strategists, two regional party chairmen, several local councilors and a range of ward level representatives or activists. The third group of interviewees was termed “ordinary respondents” (coded O1-O30) which included any residents of the areas in which I conducted research who did not have a formal connection to any political party. My aim of these interviews was to be able to map how “ordinary” citizens perceived ethnicity, religion and politics in my area of research, and how they featured as voting motivations. In total I conducted 30 proper interviews in this category in addition to seven informal discussions.

The fourth and final group of respondents was religious leaders (coded RL1-RL11). The focus of these interviews was to get a proper overview of how religious leaders conceived of their own role and the role of their religious institutions in the 2010 elections. Further, I was interested in how congregation leaders viewed the relations between the main religious groups in the country and how this impacted the political level. I conducted 11 interviews in this category of which one was a group interview and one a pair interview, making for a total of 14 respondents who all represented different religious congregations. Out of the respondents, half were Muslim and half Christian. Across categories I attempted to ensure that the respondents were equally divided in terms of gender, age, party affiliation and rural/urban background. In terms of gender, this was most successfully realized in the “ordinary” category, but in the other three categories, there is a clear bias in favor of men. Among political respondents at the lower level, there was also a rather good balance, but on the higher levels, it was exclusively male representatives. Also, all of my religious leader respondents were men – which should be expected – but also among the researchers, only two were women. Tanzania is indeed a society in which men occupy many of the high-ranking positions and it is therefore not surprising that most of my respondents in the high ranks were men.

In the text, references to my respondents follow four different forms. In most cases, I refer simply to the code as well as the date of the interview (e.g. P9, 20.5.2011). However, in cases where the
informant is a public person such as a MP or a notable researcher, I occasionally use the full name (e.g. John Mnyika, 10.5.2011). Similarly, if I want to highlight what kind of respondent has provided a certain answer in order to support an argument, I refer to a description of the respondent (e.g. Elderly man, Kahangara, 21.5.2011). Finally, if reference is made to a statement that is confidential, I use only a broad reference (e.g. a senior party activist) in order to avoid the risk that the attached list of respondents would give away the identity of the respondent in question. In addition, I occasionally use a range of Swahili words in cases where proper English translations are difficult to fashion. For instance, I refer frequently to the word sera, which may mean either political program, policy and ideology. Also, in references to Muslim leaders I use the Swahili word shehe instead of sheikh. I have attached a dictionary to appendix 2, which includes the most common words.

All interviews I conducted were semi-structured and open-ended and broadly followed a preconceived structure that I prepared before and adjusted during the course of the fieldwork. As a rule, all interviews included open questions where the respondent could freely associate (e.g. what were the main election/campaign issues last year; or what are the important features of a political candidate for you); specific questions (e.g. were the elections/politics discussed in church/mosque during campaigns); theory-driven questions (e.g. what is expected of a political candidate once in power); and confrontational question, mainly directed at political representatives (e.g. when you are saying that Chadema and the churches did have the same agenda, didn’t the church then affect Chadema’s support?) (For an overview of these techniques, e.g. Flick, 2006, pp. 155-58). However, as is the purpose of semi-structured interviews, the questions, their phrasing and points of emphasis were adapted to the respondent and context in question. In structuring and preparing the interviews, the course Haastattelu kehitysmaatutkimuksessa (Interviews in Development studies) at the University of Helsinki was of great assistance. Regarding Tanzania, the questions of the political nature of ethnicity and religion are potentially sensitive, and I chose therefore not to address these issues straight away in any interview, also as this was expected to put the respondent in a defensive position (see discussion in particular in chapter 10). A large part of the interviews therefore consisted of a general discussion of politics in the country and the 2010 elections, and only after this “warming up” did the discussion turn to the role of identity factors.

Finding and approaching potential respondents to interview proved to be an easy task in all categories of respondents. Departing from initial contacts and interviews, I then relied on the so-called “snowballing strategy” (Flick, 2006, p. 118) or chain referral – that is, one respondent
recommends the next – to get in touch with potential interviewees. My research contact Bernadeta Kilian, head of the School of Journalism at UDSM, provided invaluable assistance in contacting my first researcher respondents, after which the following interviews were easily agreed on. I also had a rather decent picture of the central figures within the political science department, whom I contacted directly. In Mwanza, I relied heavily on the research assistance and translations of my research colleague Shauku. She found and approached the lion’s share of my respondents, and without her help, I would not have been able to conduct most of my interviews in particular on the countryside in Mwanza. Her infallible situational awareness and ability to adapt to changing environments and varying respondents contributed to a great extent to the quality of the interview material in this thesis. After Shauku’s departure from Mwanza, I worked for one week with Ahmed, an acquaintance. He proved to be a most resourceful assistant, via whom I came in contact with the street vendors in Mwanza town and some of my Muslim respondents, who would have been hesitant to agree on an interview had it not been for Ahmed’s negotiation skills.

I have analyzed all of my interviews using standard content analysis. I have written clean copies of all interviews, but they have not been properly transcribed, since the large number of interviews would have made this task too arduous for the scope of this thesis. Instead, I have put emphasis on the parts of the interviews that are relevant for ethnicity and religion, and transcribed those sections where the phrasing has been of particular relevance. Finally, a few reflective statements apply in particular to the short period of fieldwork and the large number of respondents. I see the large number of interviews as a clear strength of the thesis, which gives more validity to the results. However, the pace of the interviews was at times too high, which resulted in a situation where all interviewees were not given the same amount of attention. Also, in some instances we should have spent considerably more time in the locations to get a better view of the political issues that were relevant locally, which also could have elicited some additional issues of pertinence for our research questions. However, the aim has been to get as balanced and varied a picture as possible of ethnicity and religion as they pertain to the political level in my area of research, and I believe that my research was indeed successful in this respect.

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5 Shauku did not want her full name published
4. Tanzania: Political and Historical Background and the 2010 Elections

As with all other Sub-Saharan countries, Tanzania’s national borders are the creation of the power politics of colonialism, which paid little regard to the groups and habitats that became confined to the new borders. German colonial rule was established in present-day Tanzania in 1890 and lasted until the end of First World War, after which the League of Nations gave the Great Britain a mandate to govern over the former German colonies. Zanzibar was already under British authority and the administrative area of Tanganyika, corresponding to present-day mainland Tanzania, was subsequently created as part of the empire. Tanganyika remained under British administration, later as a UN protectorate, until its independence in 1961. Tanganyika’s road to independence was peaceful as opposed to many of its neighbors, and the nationalist independence movement TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) with its leader Julius Nyerere rose to the head of the newly established nation enjoying almost universal popular support (Barkan, 1994, p. 9; for an overview of Tanzanian history, Illiffe 1979 may still be the most comprehensive option).

Soon after independence, in 1963, Nyerere proclaimed Tanzania a one-party state, with TANU remaining as the sole political party in the country. The same year the sultan of Zanzibar, who headed a minority Arab government, was overthrown, and in 1964, Tanganyika and Zanzibar formed a state union, founding the nation of Tanzania. (Kaya, 2004; Glickmann, 1995; Klugman et al. 1999) In 1967, Nyerere set out the developmental plans of the young nation in the Arusha declaration, in which Tanzania was to follow the path of self-reliance and African socialism. The new politics were introduced as a means of ensuring an equitable economic development aimed at justice and equality for the entire population, watched over by the “benevolent party” (e.g. Barkan, 1994, pp. 14-17). The cornerstones of Arusha politics were self-reliance on all levels of society and economy and nationalization of all privately owned and run institutions, which taken together were to ensure a truly participatory form of development (e.g. Nyang’oro, 2004, pp. 24-25). The arguably most well known outcome of these policies were the *ujamaa* (ca. familyhood) villages, which were supposed to facilitate local development and self-sufficiency, but which resulted in major forced displacements of the population.

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6 Except for an area in northwest that became Burundi and Rwanda under Belgian administration
7 The name Tanzania was the winning entry in an official competition arranged by the government. There were 1534 other entries. (Glickmann, 1995)
The economic conditions that Tanzania found itself in towards the mid 1980s led the pressure from donors and the IFIs to the point that Nyerere, who had refused to adopt economic liberalization reforms on the grounds that they would put an end to Tanzanian self-reliance, eventually saw himself forced to step down in 1985. Ali Hassan Mwinyi, the vice-chairman of CCM, was elected in his place and promptly negotiated a reform package (the ERP of 1986) with donors, which entailed a substantial deregulation of the economy, including the devaluation of the shilling and the large-scale privatization of parastatals. (Barkan, 1994, pp. 28-9; Fischer, 2009, pp. 306-7) Economic liberalization reforms continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and both their consequences and implementations remain disputed and debated. However, in the literature, the negative impacts of liberalization and austerity measures are frequently referred to (see Chaligha et al. 2002; Barkan 1994; Fischer 2009). Pressure for political reform following economic reform can be seen against this background of disappointing economic performance combined with negative by-products of liberalization (Barkan, p. 31).

The pressure came from both civil society (mainly organized professional groups) and from within CCM itself. In addition, democratization in neighboring countries as well as the developments in Eastern Europe and elsewhere gave additional impetus for political reform also in Tanzania. (Livinga, 2009, pp. 6-7; Barkan 1994) In 1991, a group of 9 oppositional figures formed the Steering Committee for a multiparty system, headed by Chief Said Abdallah Fundikira, a staunch opponent of Nyerere’s, who had been ousted from TANU soon after independence. The steering committee would later, through many alliances and re-alliances, give birth to a range of opposition parties, including NCCR-Maguezi, UMD and CUF. (Glickmann, pp. 298-9; Chege 1994, pp. 53-4) However, the major impetus for political reform came from within CCM, rather than from civil society (e.g. Erdmann 2002; Barkan 1994; Nyang’oro 2004; Chaligha et al. 2002). Spearheading the sentiments for political change within CCM was Nyerere himself. In August 1990 after being succeeded by Mwinyi as party chairman, he argued for a gradual change towards multi-party democracy, which was to secure a transition free of disruption and conflict (Nyang’oro 2004, p. 41) Subsequently, in early 1991, Mwinyi appointed a presidential committee under Chief Justice Francis Nyalali, charged with the task of investigating the possibilities for a transition towards a multi-party system (Barkan, p. 32).

The committee recommended the adoption of a multiparty democratic electoral system in its report in early 1992. This was despite the fact that out of the 40 000 Tanzanians interviewed by the commission, 77 % were in favor of retaining the one-party system (Nyalali commission report,
cited in Chaligha et al 2002; Liviga, 2009). Two days after the commission presented its report the CCM called in an extraordinary National Conference, which accepted the commission’s recommendations unanimously, and the constitutional clause granting its monopoly position was subsequently repealed (Nyang’oro, 2004, p. 42). In the summer of the same year, parliament passed the Political Parties Act, which opened for the creation of political parties (Liviga, 2009, p. 7). A long range of political parties formed within the first years of multiparty politics, out of which 13 parties managed to secure registration by the first multiparty general election of 1995 (Erdmann, 2002, pp. 13-14). The results of the four multi-party general elections in Tanzania held since the demise of the one-party state are summarized in tables 4.1 and 4.2 below.

Table 4.1 Presidential elections results in Tanzania 1995-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>61,8</td>
<td>71,7</td>
<td>80,3</td>
<td>61,2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>6,4</td>
<td>16,3</td>
<td>11,7</td>
<td>8,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chadema</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>5,9</td>
<td>26,3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCR-M</td>
<td>27,8</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>0,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLP</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>7,8</td>
<td>0,8</td>
<td>0,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>4,0</td>
<td>4,2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turnout</strong></td>
<td>76,7</td>
<td>84,4</td>
<td>72,2</td>
<td>42,8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Gap points**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CCM</strong></td>
<td>34,0</td>
<td>55,4</td>
<td>68,6</td>
<td>38,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Gap percent**
| 123         | 341  | 587  | 132  |

Sources: Liviga 2009, p. 15; Erdmann 2002, p. 17; EISA Tanzania Election Results; National Electoral Commission of Tanzania 2010; TEMCO 2011

Legend: Gap points: percentage points difference between leading candidate and runner-up. Gap percent: leading candidate votes as percentage of runner-up votes. Turnout as percent of registered voters.

* There are some inconsistencies in the results. The results displayed are the official election results as published by NEC. Other results give 27,1 percent for Dr. Slaa and 62,8 percent for Kikwete (Psephos Election Archive)

Table 4.2 Parliamentary election results in Tanzania 1995-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCM percent of votes</td>
<td>59,2</td>
<td>65,2</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>60,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of seats</td>
<td>79,6</td>
<td>87,1</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>75,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUF percent of votes</td>
<td>5,0</td>
<td>12,5</td>
<td>14,2</td>
<td>10,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent seats</td>
<td>10,4</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>9,8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Curiously, the numbers vary quite largely: Nyang’oro mentions ”over 20 temporarily registered” and 13 registered parties by late 1992 (p. 43); Glickmann 27 announced, 11 registered by 1994; Chege mentions 12 parties by late 1993 (Chege, p. 63) and Chaligha et al again 13 registered by 1993 (p. 5)
I will not analyze the election results to any larger extent here, and brief discussions pertaining to the performance of various parties during the some of the elections will be held in chapters 6.6 and 7.1. Here it can be noted that CCM has managed to retain its dominant political position also after the introduction of multiparty politics, which is especially true for the 2000 and 2005 elections. Before the latest elections, opposition parties in Tanzania were uniformly judged as weak and without much capacity to challenge CCM’s dominant position (e.g. Liviga 2009; Nyang’oro 2004; Whitehead 2009). In the following sections I will look at the 2010 elections and some of the most prominent issues that featured on the campaign agenda. Since the 2010 elections results form an important backbone to the analysis in chapters 7 and 9, I will discuss them in some detail below. Chadema emerged as the main opposition party in the 2010 elections, and since analysis of the main research issues of this thesis – religion and ethnicity – will include Chadema, the discussion in this chapter will pertain mainly to Chadema’s support, in order to give a background to the subsequent chapters.

### 4.1 The 2010 General Elections in Tanzania

The 2010 General elections were similar to the previous three multi-party contests in that CCM managed to secure a comfortable majority on all three levels of the race – the presidential, parliamentary and local councilor elections. CCM received 61.2 percent in the presidential and 59.2 percent in the parliamentary election (but almost 80 percent of the seats, due to the first-past-the-post electoral system). Apart from this, the 2010 elections may be seen as exceptional in many respects, as Chadema managed to cause quite a stir in Tanzanian politics both before and after the elections (for an overview, see e.g. Whitehead 2010; TACCEO election report 2010; Shaba 2010; TEMCO 2011). Especially in the aftermath of the elections, as announcement of results was

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9 The local councilor results were not available to me at the time of writing
delayed, there was considerable unrest in many parts of the country (e.g. TACCEO, 2011, pp. 108-113). The post-election protests orchestrated by Chadema continued several months after the elections (The Citizen, 1.3.2011) and the by-elections in Igunga in the fall of 2011 were also accompanied by tensions and skirmishes (e.g. Daily News, 21.9.2011). Still a year and a half after the elections, in the spring of 2012, various protests and strikes seem to have become the order of the day, the latest in line being the doctors’ strike (see e.g. The Citizen, 24.3.2012)

In the actual elections, however, Chadema was quite far from challenging CCM in terms of election results. Chadema received merely 26,3 percent and 23,9 percent in the presidential and parliamentary elections respectively, but still emerged by far as the most successful opposition party. CUF, which had held the position of strongest opposition party in the 2000 and 2005 elections, was in turn significantly weakened. Its national support dropped from 11,7/14,2 percent to 8,1/10,2 percent, with large regional variations. For instance in my region of focus, Mwanza, CUFs support fell from 11,9 percent in the presidential race in 2005 to 3,9 percent in 2010, compared to Chadema’s increase from 6,6 to 34,9 percent. CCMs support in the presidential elections on the national in turn dropped from above 80 percent in the 2005 elections to just slightly above 60 percent five years later. When in 2005, CCMs Kikwete trumped over closest competitor Ibrahim Lipumba (CUF) by over 68,6 percentage points in the presidential elections, receiving close to six times the amount of votes, in 2010 his lead over closest rival Willibrod Slaa was 38,4 percentage points and just above twice the number of votes. As shown in tables 4.1 and 4.2, on the national level Chadema’s support in 2010 was approximately on the same level as NCCR-Ms in 1995, but it is clear from the above Chadema’s impact on the political agenda in 2010 exceeded that of previous opposition parties (see e.g. Whitehead 2010). Below, I will briefly discuss some of the campaign issues in the 2010 elections and some of the trends discernable in Chadema’s support, as well as the basis of its popularity in Mwanza; my area of research.

The most striking issue about the comparative election results above is the incredibly steep decline in voter turnout between 2005 and 2010. Whereas the turnout had been relatively high in the first three multiparty elections, it dropped to only 42,8 percent in 2010, a remarkably low figure by any standard. In addition, this figure represents only those who registered, and thus the turnout in terms of eligible voters is appallingly low. In my interviews, this was considered one of the main election issues, in particular among researchers and political representatives, and I will therefore address it briefly. While all respondents were quite puzzled by the low turnout, based on my interviews with
researchers, following list of possible reasons could be presented (source given as interviewee code).

First, it was suggested that the low turnout was due to large scale rigging of the polls, in which “massive numbers of votes” were thrown away. Chadema campaign manager Prof. Baregu presented the “hypothesis” that Chadema had in fact won the contest but was robbed of the victory through the spoiling of votes (Prof. Baregu, 13.5.2011). Also others supported the notion of some kind of rigging related to the low turnout (e.g. R9). Relatedly, another possible explanation that was mentioned was the large-scale buying of voting cards. This would have lowered the number of people able to vote in opposition strongholds (R9, 7.6.2011). Third, it was suggested that the low turnout was due to general voter apathy in the face of continuously declining standards of living and large-scale corruption within the ruling party. Disenchantment with the ruling party and distrust for the opposition thus led people to stay home on Election Day (R4, 12.5.2011; R2, 10.5.2011; R9, 7.6.2011). Finally, visible military presence in the days preceding the election and anticipation of vote rigging might have decreased voting motivation for some, as suggested by some opposition representatives (e.g. P3, 17.5.2011).

The reasons behind the low turnout or the validity of the accusations of election fraud cannot be addressed thoroughly here. However, it may be worth mentioning that the perceptions of fraud in the 2010 elections were relatively widespread among respondents in my interviews. Not surprisingly, this was particularly the case among Chadema representatives, but also other opposition parties (e.g. CUF P14 and UDP P9) and even some CCM respondents (e.g. P2) voiced these accusations quite explicitly. Many of my researcher respondents concurred with this contention as well (e.g. R1; R4; R9). The widespread buying of voting card was in turn mentioned mainly by ordinary respondents in both town and village, who also frequently mentioned bribery or gift giving in connection with the elections. In the vast majority of cases, it was the ruling party that was accused of this: “while the opposition uses its sera, CCM goes from corner to corner” (Elderly man in Geita town, 24.5.2011). The bribes had consisted of salt, fabrics, t-shirts or caps. Some also mentioned phones and money. A large group of women in Geita town claimed: “It is well known that there is motivation to vote; we are always given fabrics and salt” (O25, 27.5.2011). In many cases, respondents announced that the bribe didn’t have the desired effect: “I ate their money and voted for Chadema” (Young man in Mwanza O1, 19.5.2011); “We took the things because they were free, but didn’t vote for the party” (O18, Family mother, Mwamabanza, Magu). Also in terms
of intra-party “voting motivation”, CCM respondents mentioned corruption within the party as a major problem (e.g. P18; P19; P22).

What were the actual election issues then? The largest political issue in the run-up to the elections was no doubt corruption – *ufisadi* in the newly coined Swahili term for it. Well in advance of the elections, Chadema’s future presidential candidate Willibrod Slaa and MP Tundu Lissu published a “list of shame” in which notable CCM party members, among them the president, were accused of being involved in large-scale corruption. Chadema thus profiled itself as the anti-corruption party during the election campaign, and accusation of *ufisadi* against the ruling party was an integral part of the campaigns (For an overview, see e.g. Tanzanian affairs, September 2010; Interview with Dr. Slaa, The Guardian, 27.8.2010). However, as the TACCEO election report pointed out, accusations of *ufisadi* were also used as a sort of political propaganda to discredit ruling party candidates (TACCEO, 2010, p. 76). Chadema seemed to be able to set the agenda of the elections, as for instance the issues that featured prominently in the party’s manifesto – infrastructure, housing, education, health care and basic social services – were also those issues mentioned most frequently by my respondents of all categories as the main election issues. According to Dr. Kamata at UDSM, Chadema sounded almost “like the Arusha declaration” while CCM was unable to successfully address these issues. On the other hand, there might not be substantial issues in terms of manifesto between the parties (see A. Weber, 2010 for earlier manifestoes) and my CCM respondents mentioned more or less the same political issues as those listed above (e.g. P6; P12; P19). However, there was also rather widespread discontent within the party regarding its policies, as the focus on being the party “of workers and peasants” rang increasingly empty to some CCM respondents (e.g. P19; P22).

### 4.2 Chadema and the increase

Since the advent of multiparty politics, a common trend for opposition parties in Tanzania has been the concentration of their support to urban areas (see Barkan 1994; Liviga 2009, also Dr. Kamata 12.5.2011). In order to determine whether this was the case for Chadema in 2010 as well, I looked at the rural/urban divide in order to get some general indications as to the nature of party’s support. I mapped the performance of the party in all mainland regions compared to how it fared in the main
urban center in that region to get such an indication. This was possible in every region except for Manyara, in which the district capital Babati was in fact the smallest constituency in the region in terms of votes cast. The tables attached in appendix 1. While the results are not clear-cut, on a general level, Chadema’s support was indeed considerably higher in urban centers than in the regions on average. In the presidential elections on the mainland, Chadema’s support was 35,22 / 34,3 percent in the main cities in total, compared to 27,1 / 26,2 percent total national support. However, while this difference is not remarkable, Chadema’s urban presence was remarkable in some regions. In the Southern Highlands, Chadema’s support in Iringa region was a moderate 19,5 / 25, 4 percent, in the main city of Iringa, the party obtained 43,1 / 50,4 percent of the votes. Mbeya town with 63,2 percent was Chadema’s most successful constituency in the country in the legislative contest, while in the bordering rural district of Chunya, the party received barely any support at all.

### Table 4.3 Chadema’s support in the 2010 elections by zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zonal support</th>
<th>Coast</th>
<th>Lake Zone</th>
<th>Southern highlands</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>Central</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional support</td>
<td>17,6 / 7,2*</td>
<td>32,8</td>
<td>24,3</td>
<td>42,6</td>
<td>18,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban support</td>
<td>19 / 15,3*</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>44,2</td>
<td>49,3</td>
<td>25,9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Without Dar es Salaam

Zones: Coast: Pwani, Mtwara, Lindi, Tanga, Dar es Salaam
Lake zone: Mwanza, Kagera, Mara, Shinyanga (Kigoma not included here)
Southern Highlands: Iringa, Mbeya, Ruvuma.
Central: Dodoma, Singida, Morogoro, Rukwa, Tabora

On the coast, the party’s support was modest in general, as shown in chapter 9, but also here the party had some urban presence. In Pwani (Coast) Chadema received only around ten percent of the votes in the region in total, but in the main town of Kibaha the support was a substantial 30,4 / 40,7 percent. In the Lake Region, Chadema’s performance in the urban centers was remarkable. While the party received around one third of the votes in the presidential elections in the lake regions on average, the support in the main town constituencies amassed to almost 50 percent. In the parliamentary elections, the urban concentration is even higher with over 50 percent. In terms of urban performance, the North is still in a category of its own, however. In Moshi, Chadema received 56 % in the presidential and a remarkable 62 percent in the parliamentary elections, while

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10 A comparison between all rural and urban polling results on ward level would have been a more apt description, but apart from the fact that such information is not available, such a thorough comparison would be way beyond the purpose of the discussion here.

11 Excluding Kigoma, which is included in the tables in the appendix.
the corresponding figures in Arusha were also over 50 percent. In conclusion, Chadema indeed has a considerably stronger presence in the urban centers than on the countryside, although the party did manage to build a strong base outside of the main cities in some regions, such as Shinyanga, Kigoma and Manyara. In terms of regions and zones, it is clear that the North and the Lake Zone are the backbone of the party’s support. These two zones provided a majority of the party’s total support nationally.

4.2.1 Mwanza region and the 2010 elections

As a background to the area of study, Mwanza was one of the regions where Chadema experienced its largest increase in support compared to the 2005 elections. In 2005, CCM’s Kikwete received almost 80 percent of the votes in the Presidential race in the region, while party’s candidates were supported by a substantial 68 percent in the Parliamentary elections. In 2005, the largest opposition party was CUF, with 20 percent of the vote in the parliamentary and 11 percent in the presidential elections respectively. Chadema only scored a mere 6.5 percent in both contests. In 2010 then, Chadema’s support suddenly skyrocketed up to 35.2 in the presidential and 30.9 percent in the parliamentary elections. The increase, albeit substantial, was not unique, since Chadema experienced similar increases in other regions (e.g. Mbeya, Shinyanga). However, in Mwanza town, Chadema managed to secure both available constituency MP seats, Ilemela and Nyamagana, and in addition it also won the MP race on the island of Ukerewe. This was interesting also due to the fact that I had been told before my field research in Mwanza that the Sukuma are politically “docile” and don’t change their political preferences easily (Mnyika, 12.5.2011). I was therefore interested in the reasons for the sudden ascent in popularity as general context for my research, and included questions on Chadema and the increase in most interviews in Mwanza. The relation between Chadema’s support and my main research objects ethnicity and religion are laid out in chapters 7 and 9.

During the interviews in Mwanza town, it quickly transpired that the main election issues for my respondents had been corruption, and something that could be called a drive for change. There was a clear irritation about the perceived arrogance of CCMs MP candidates Lawrence Masha and Anthony Diallo. In my interviews, reference to various comments by these two were frequently made. A popular quote was that which incumbent MP for Ilemela Anthony Diallo had supposedly made when asked about the bad conditions of the roads: “You are asking for a road while you can’t afford to buy even a bicycle” (see also Daily News 11.4.2011). Large-scale corruption scandals within the ruling party and the unpopular local CCM candidates with a perception of declining
standards of living seemed to be framework in which Chadema’s support can be understood. An elderly woman in Mwanza town serves as a good representative of the general atmosphere in my interviews:

I used to be a women’s leader for CCM but this time I voted for Chadema. Even my husband used to be CCM kabisa [completely] but this time he said: This household is voting for Chadema! Our relative who is a CCM stalwart in Dar es Salaam called us after the election results and asked: Mwanza vipi? [what’s up in Mwanza?] And I replied: tumechoka! [we are tired!] (O33, 19.5.2011)

The woman contended that it was not necessarily that voters were particularly fond of Chadema, but that they were simply tired of the ruling party. In general, tumechoka was one of the most frequently mentioned expressions in the interviews all together. Apart from these the general political issues related to welfare policies that were mentioned above, there were also issues that were specific for Mwanza. Many people thought that Mwanza had not benefited from the natural resources in the region, especially with regard to Lake Victoria. Chadema was advocating a policy where regions should benefit from their own resources to a larger extent, rather than revenues being pooled nationally (e.g. Chadema respondents P17; P3). Another Mwanza-specific issue was the Marching guys, or Machinga, as the Swahili version of the name would have it. These are small-scale merchants and vendors who had their stalls in central Mwanza, partially along the central Makoroboi Street. The CCM-dominated city council had wanted to move the marching guys out of town, in order to “clean up” the city center. Chadema campaigned actively for the rights of the merchants to remain in the city, and it was commonly perceived that Chadema had substantial support among them, which was also verified by my interviews on Makoroboi Street (O7-O9). (See also interview with Wenje 18.5.2011; Masinde 17.5.2011 and Pastor John 17.5.2011). This rather cursory account of the 2010 elections, serves as a background for the empirical chapters 7 and 9, in particular with respect to Chadema’s performance and the political situation in Mwanza. The substantive and theoretical part of the thesis starts with the following chapter.

12 It should be noted that some of the machinga had already become disappointed by the party’s performance by the time I made the interviews. One argument was that Chadema’s MPs focus too much on bashing CCM and too little on constructive projects at home (O27, 1.6.2011).
5. Introduction to the Theoretical Framework: Politics, Religion and Ethnicity in Africa

There is a broad and diverse literature on both ethnicity and religion and their role in the politics of Africa. In the various accounts of the nature and political impact of ethnicity and religion, both have been seen as anything from extremely salient social identities to mere tools in competition for political and economic resources (see e.g. discussion in Chabal, 2009; Heilman & Kaiser 2002; Laakso & Olukoshi 1996; Posner 2005; Emberling 1997). In chapters 6 and 8, I address some of these debates and outline the perception of ethnicity, religion and their political potentialities as relevant for the analysis in this thesis. This chapter then serves as an introduction to both the theoretical and the empirical discussion in subsequent chapters, and I will here give an overview of some of the basic theoretical and conceptual issues at hand in the analysis of politics, ethnicity and religion. I will also briefly summarize my understanding of ethnic and religious identity, as well as ethnic politics, in order to facilitate the discussion ahead. In addition, this chapter defines some of the central concepts and gives a brief introduction to the topics of democratization, the state in Africa and voting motivations in African democracies, which serve as a background to the rest of the thesis.

Some of the conceptual points presented below are largely based on the lengthy discussion in the chapters 6 and 8, and will be elucidated in detail in turn. The aim of the aforementioned chapters and the discussion below is to assess two main questions. The first is theoretical and conceptual: what is the nature of ethnic or religious identity, and what are the circumstances and processes that lead to the articulation of these identities in the political sphere? Conversely, what factors constrain the emergence of political ethnicity or religion in any given situation? The second question is related to the first, but more practical: what were the main trends in the development of ethnic and religious relations in Tanzania, and how can these relations be understood? An assessment of these two broad questions forms the backbone of how ethnicity, religion and politics are viewed in the analysis of the 2010 elections in Mwanza in chapters 7 and 9.

5.1 Politics, Religion and Ethnicity: definitions and background

The analysis of the role of ethnicity and religion in the politics of any given society requires a definition all three concepts involved: politics, ethnicity and religion. In addition, one needs to
define what is meant by ethnic or religious politics in order to engage in any meaningful analysis of how and when these might arise. Ethnicity and religion are discussed in detail in chapters 6 and 8, and in particular the definition of ethnicity and its political potential has been given a rather thorough treatment. Here, I will thus focus on politics, and the definition of ethnic and religious ditto. I base my definition of politics on the broad and general approach suggested by Adrian Leftwich. Leftwich defines politics as the process of “making binding collective decisions”, a universal human attribute which all societies and communities develop mechanism for (Leftwich, 2008, p. 5). These collective decisions in turn usually revolve around the use, production or distribution of resources, and politics can thus be defined as all the processes that are linked to making these decisions. Resources are likewise defined broadly, including both material resources such as land and capital, and immaterial or ideational resources such as freedom, opportunity or power. (Leftwich, 2008, pp. 5-6; 2000, pp. 5-6)

Leftwich’s broad definition is useful in pointing out the centrality of resource allocation in any conception of politics, but since he includes all aspects of making binding collective decisions in this definition, it also involves the private sphere, which is not the focus of this essay. Rather, the focus is on public resources and on what Leftwich calls “normal” politics or “games within the rules”, that is, the everyday level of political debate and contestation (Leftwich, 2008, pp. 9-10). In line with the discussion above, ethnic and religious politics thus may simply be defined as the use of ethnic or religious identity in politics, that is, in the pursuit of public resources. In accordance with Leftwich, I define resources broadly as any collective material or ideational resources, but given the discussion above, resources may be conveniently divided into political (power, representation etc.) and economic (material resources, capital, land, concessions) resources. Ethnic and religious identity can thus be used in pursuit of these resources as opposed to using either other identities (national, professional) or non-identity based means (e.g. political parties) of attaining them (see also section 5.2 below).

A few additional limitations in the definition of ethnic and religious politics are in order for the discussion to retain its focus. In this thesis, my focus will be in particular on party politics, elections and election campaigns on the local, parliamentary and presidential level. Especially regarding the analysis of the 2010 elections, the context is thus a representative multi-party setting. Mainly then, I will concentrate on political parties, but this does not mean that political parties are the only thinkable vehicles to pursue these ethnic or religious politics – for instance religious institutions such as the Tanzanian Episcopal Conference or the Supreme Muslim Council of Tanzania
(BAKWATA) frequently make attempts to influence the political decisions, as discussed in subsequent chapters. Also, it does not mean that the focus is exclusively on the formal level, but rather that my analysis is mainly limited to the kind of politics that is public and observable. Political dealings behind the scenes – the “politics of the veranda” as Kelsall (2002) has termed it with reference to Tanzania – is surely an important context in the question of resource distribution on ethnic or religious grounds, but one that requires a different kind of research than the one undertaken in here.

In this thesis, then, politics and the political sphere are understood as the level, or as attempts of reaching the level, where decisions regarding the allocation and distribution of public resources are made on the basis of public representation. This can thus involve a broad range of vehicles used to pursue public resources and the level where decisions regarding them are made, but my main concern is with political parties and representative politics. A further distinction needs therefore to be made with regard to the level at which ethnic or religious identities are evoked politically. Political elites – “innovators” (Barth, 1969, p. 32) or “entrepreneurs” (Altinordu, 2010, p. 524) – might evoke ethnicity or religion to gather support in political contest, but the electorate might likewise use ethnicity or religion as a criterion for voting, as a means of securing political inclusion. In both cases, it is a question of using ethnicity or religion in political contest and thus, in the pursuit of public resources. These points will be clarified in subsequent chapters, in particular 5.2, 6.4 and 8.3 In these chapters I will also further discuss the conditions that determine whether these identities are evoked in the pursuit of public resources or not.

5.1.1 Democratization, Ethnicity and Religion

It has been commonly mentioned that the wave of democratization that swept over Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s severely precipitated the emergence of ethnic and religious politics and conflicts (see Glickman 1995 for an account of democratization and ethnic conflict in Africa). The frequent emergence of ethnic and religious parties at the advent of multi-party politics seems to suggest that the one-party state so common in African countries had justifiably exerted dominance over society as to suppress these parochial sentiments. This argument is quite forcefully refuted by Laakso & Olukoshi, among others, who claim that the suppression of these identities itself ordained their politicization (1996, pp. 28-29). However, it is quite clearly the case that democratization in Africa is closely connected to the emergence of ethnic and religious loyalties. In part, this might be attributable to group grievances derived from an authoritarian era and suppressed by it, which find a way to be voiced with democratization (Agbu, 2011, pp. 10-11; 13; Laakso & Olukoshi, p. 29).
Another reason might be the withdrawal of the state as a major service provider, which has been witnessed in Tanzania as well. As Chabal contends, if national identity becomes politically or materially irrelevant, people may seek other identities to secure their living, and these are frequently communal (Chabal, 2009, pp. 101-102). In Tanzania, both religious groups and ethnic associations have become more important as means of economic and social security since the previously so ubiquitous state increasingly has withdrawn from service provision (e.g. Green, 2006; also interviews with Yahya-Othman; Tambila).

In Tanzania, the transition to democracy was resisted with reference to the ethnically and religiously divisive effects it might have for the politics of the country, which was also a concern voiced by the respondents in the Nyalali commission’s report (see 6.5 below; Chaligha et al 2002; Whitehead 2009). As explained further ahead, democratization in Tanzania did result to some extent in the surfacing of ethnic (chapter 6.6) and religious (chapter 8) sentiments in the public space. However, so far ethnic and religious relations in the country have remained cordial, and despite the sometimes vocal claims to the contrary (see in particular chapter 9) there are no veritable ethnic or religious parties in Tanzania. The bottom line here is that the impact of democratization on ethnic or religious competition is not uniform, and depends to a large extent on the historical and political context in question (Agbu, 2011, p. 7). Indeed, it has been frequently argued that ethnicity might have an integrative rather than divisive effect on national politics, as it might serve as a means of articulating legitimate group-based interests rather than inducing ethnic chauvinism (Lonsdale, 1994, p. 136; Laakso & Olukoshi, pp. 29-31; Agbu, p. 13). In sum, democratization may increase the possibilities for ethnic and religious mobilization, especially due to the existence of multiple political parties, but this mobilization should not be expected to occur automatically.

The definition of religious and ethnic identity is given considerable space in subsequent chapters – in particular ethnic identity – but I will forego the sections below by laying bare from the outset the basic assumption about religion and ethnicity that underlie this thesis. It is clear from the definitions above that I don’t view ethnic or religious politics as expressions of immutable parochial identity that inevitably force their way into the political field. Instead I assume that neither religious nor ethnic identities are immutable or eternal, maintaining their shape and structure over generations. Rather, these identities are social constructs that are closely connected to both political and economic realities as well as historical developments (e.g. Barth 1969; Berman, 1998; Lonsdale 1994; Chabal 2009). The colonial impact is particularly visible in the African context: the shape and
composition of ethnic groups were profoundly influenced by the colonial experience, while colonialism was instrumental in the introduction and spread of Christianity on the continent, as well as establishing religious-state relations have had far-reaching consequences in post-colonial Africa (e.g. Haynes, 1996; Mbogoni, 2005; Iliffe 1979). The fact that religious and ethnic identities have formed the basis of a vast number of political parties in post-liberalization Africa is telling of the capacity for political mobilization that these identities contain in the contest for power and resources. However, it is important to note that their mobilization capacity is derived from the fact these identities do have remarkable salience on the level of the ordinary believer or community member. Despite the fact that they are social constructs, ethnic and religious identities are thus nonetheless “real” and constitute a crucial element in the social fabric, social relations and self-conceptions of individuals and groups anywhere in the world. (Laakso & Olukoshi, 1996, p. 31)\(^{13}\).

5.2 The State in Africa

One of the liveliest debates in Africanist political science concerns the nature of the state in Africa and its connection to politics and society. The relevance of this discussion for the topic at hand is that state-society connections have a profound impact on the relations between ethnicity, religion and politics in any given country (for ethnicity e.g. Chabal & Daloz 1999; Bayart 2009; for religion e.g. Haynes 1996; 2004). The debate concerning the state in Africa has at times been rather intense and much of the early political science literature based on the modernization and dependence perspectives has been quite thoroughly criticized (e.g. Mamdani 1996, Bayart 1989; Chabal 1992; 1999; 2009; see Young, 1999 for an overview). There has also been a substantial theoretical debate along the classical dichotomy of structure and agency in the analysis of African politics, with a recent emphasis on agency rather than structure. The agency perspective is said to have emerged as a response to increasing Afropessimism, which saw Africa as destined to fail either due to external, imperialist power structures, or due to the structures of its own culture. Focus on agency then puts primacy on what has worked in Africa, espousing a rather more positive notion of African history and politics. (Chabal, 2009, p. 7-16) However, also the agency approach has been increasingly criticized, among other things for neglecting structural constraints (e.g. Mamdani 1996, pp. 10-11).

Whatever the specific approach or critique, much of the discussion has been based on the argument that the state in Africa is patrimonial\(^{14}\). “Patrimonialism” is usually defined as a system of

\(^{13}\) See also sections 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 below. Nature of ethnicity e.g. Lonsdale 1994; Berman 1998; Chabal & Daloz 1999; Posner 2005; Gentili 2005; religion e.g. Ellis & ter Haar 1998; 2007; Chabal 2009; Haynes 1996; 2004

\(^{14}\) The term originates from Weber, but its use in the Africanist discussion has been criticized for being a misreading of Weber’s original concept. According to this view, Weber’s patrimonial system was not a regime but a type of authority
personalized power revolving around the head of state and the allocation of political office and resources on the basis of personal relations. Controlling the state and the resources it commands is thus the ultimate objective of various political groups and their elites. The state is used for personal and particularistic objectives and its formal structures remain merely a shell, giving the state limited ability to perform its formal functions. (e.g. Chabal & Daloz, 1999, pp. 6; 8) Since patrimonialism is seen as a feature of “traditional” politics in Africa, post-colonial political systems are often referred to as “neo-patrimonial”, emphasizing the mixture of modern institutions and traditional politics. The neo-patrimonial approach stresses that beneath the surface of modern state institutions in Africa, relationships of loyalty and objectives of private enrichment dictate day-to-day politics. Officials depend on networks of clients who expect to be rewarded for their loyalty and are in turn rewarded by their superiors, which themselves are the clients of even more senior political actors. (Bratton & van de Walle, 1994, p. 458)

This is the core of the (neo) patrimonial system and is commonly referred to as clientelism or patronage, which in turn can be defined as “a more or less personalized relationship between actors (i.e., patrons and clients), or sets of actors, commanding unequal wealth, status or influence, based on conditional loyalties and involving mutually beneficial transactions” (Lemarchand, 1972, p. 69). Patron-client networks are commonly based on identity groups, and patrimonialism has therefore been seen both as contributing to competition among ethnic groups and thereby to conflict; but also as providing the basis for accommodation of particularistic interests and therefore as contributing to peace (e.g. Arriola, 2009; Lemarchand, 1972; see also section 6.5 below). Whatever the particular impact of patrimonialism, it is commonly perceived as “the principal mechanism of regulating political and economic life in Africa” (Arriola, 2009, p. 44).

According to Chabal & Daloz, that the patrimonial character of the state in Africa implies that it is not properly institutionalized as an independent actor differentiated from personal and local contests and (civil) society at large. Chabal & Daloz explain this with reference to what they term a Weberian view of the modern state, which is characterized by a set of autonomous political institutions and an independent bureaucracy, “emancipated” from particularistic and personalized interest in society. Only an emancipated state that has overcome patrimonialism is modern, according to this perspective (Chabal & Daloz 1999, pp. 1-6). While there is some consensus based on the acknowledgement of legitimate authority be the subordinates, thus giving the ruled a measure of control over the rulers (Pitcher, Moran & Johnston, 2009). This view is consistent with Chabal’s notion of authority and accountability (Chabal, 2009, pp. 50-57)
regarding the notion that the African state remains poorly emancipated, interpretations of this fact vary. Whereas the neo-patrimonial view explained above focuses on the failure of the state to institutionalize in Africa, the hybrid-state view instead highlights how Africans have managed to reshape western institutions according to local political practices, creating a genuinely indigenous state (ibid. 9-10). This view is closely connected to arguments about the rationality of resorting to ethnic loyalties as a reaction to a failed modernity, as most famously advocated by Jean-Francois Bayart in *The Politics of the Belly* (1989). Patronage systems and ethnicity are seen as a sort of revenge from society against a modernization that has brought increased insecurity and few benefits to the bulk of the population (Bayart 2009\textsuperscript{15}; see also Lonsdale, 1994, pp. 131-2).

Finally, a third interpretation holds that the transplantation of the modern, western state in the African context failed due to cultural specific reasons. According to this argument, the modern institutions of the state emerged and developed in a culturally specific setting, answering to culturally specific demands, and will cease to perform according to its original functions once moved to an entirely different cultural environment. Put simply, in this view it cannot be expected that certain institutions will perform in the same fashion in different cultural settings: when the western state was transplanted to Africa, it ceased to be western, nor was it a hybrid, but a completely distinct form of political organization. (Chabal & Daloz p. 10) This third view seems to me as the most sensible approach, but one that requires an explanation as to what factors led to the establishment of the state features described above. Patrimonialism has commonly been based on ethnicity, and sections 6.2-6.4 will discuss at some length the development of ethnicity into a viable identity for the pursuit of public resources. In chapter 8, some features of the connections between the patrimonial state and organized religion will be discussed. Thus, while the main focus of this essay is more on party politics and elections than ethnicity and religion in the public bureaucracy, patrimonialism and the discussion on the state in Africa does form an important context to the analysis, not least due to the academic prominence of the African state debate. In the final part of this chapter I will briefly outline some connections between patrimonialism, voting and ethnicity.

5.3 Voting, Clientelism and Ethnicity

Despite the prevalence of the patrimonial discourse, it is still a fact that (formally) democratic multiparty elections have been institutionalized in a long range of African countries since the early

\textsuperscript{15} New edition of *The Politics of the Belly*
However, a lot of the political science literature in Africa has assumed that political party programs and ideologies have only limited impact on voting decisions in African democracies. In this view, it is either patrimonialism that is the defining feature of politics even in a multi-party election setting, or opposition politics mainly aimed at ousting existing leaders from power in order to be included in clientelist networks. (e.g. Arriola, 2009; van de Valle 2003). According to this perspective then, voters would support whoever is the most able patron and connections between rulers and ruled are the structured according to a “vertical accountability modeled on the basis of economies of affection” (Lindberg & Morrison 2008, p. 101-102). This assertion has indeed been criticized by some who argue that political programs and past policies indeed do affect voters’ choices in Africa much as anywhere else (e.g. Therkildsen 2008). In this essay I will use a conceptualization of voting motivations presented by Lindberg & Morrison (2008), which takes into account the patrimonial view and ethnicity as well as voting motivations based on person or party program.

Lindberg & Morrison point out that the patrimonial model originates from a period when the one-party state was the dominant form of public politics in Africa, and they therefore set out to test how well it fits with voting preferences in the multi-party age, using Ghana as a case. The authors divide voting behavior into two broad categories: evaluative voting and non-evaluative voting. Evaluative voting is further categorized according to two main dimension: the orientation of voting – retrospective or prospective – and the object of voting: political party or political representative. First, evaluative voting implied that voters evaluated political parties based either on their past policies and performance in office, or on prospective voting, based on an evaluation of the likelihood that party would perform if voted into power. Lindberg & Morrison termed evaluative voting based on party platform as termed programmatic voting, in which an evaluation of the feasibility of the election manifesto or similar program influenced the voting decision. Alternatively, evaluative voting could be based on person or personality rather than the specific political party, and this type of voting was similarly judged as an evaluation either of past or future performance. Lindberg & Morrison categorized voting on the basis person by comments such as: “s/he is qualified as a representative of ‘our locality’, knows our needs, is a reliable person to [represent] us, will work for our community” or if a candidate was seen as fit to respond to a need in national politics. (Lindberg & Morrison, 2008, pp. 99-101)

Non-evaluative voting was in turn divided into clientelistic voting or proxy voting. Clientelistic voting was defined as giving support to a politician based on his or her ability to provide for the
voters on the basis of personal ties. Lindberg and Morrison do not include public funds in this, since public funds may be enjoyed by supporters and non-supporters alike. Clientelistic voting is instead based on the provision or promise of personal favors or goods such as giving gifts, paying for school fees, finding jobs, and showing concern on a personalized basis. Also, the authors make a distinction between clientelistic voting and that based on “admiration for a leader that may be personalistic and perhaps parochial, but certainly not clientelistic” National leaders such as presidents and opposition leaders could here be mentioned, who command popular support, but who don’t depend on personalized exchanges for this support. (p. 103) Regional support for national leaders in Tanzania will be analyzed with respect to ethnicity in section 6.6 below. Finally, proxy voting, the second non-evaluative category, is based on ethnicity or kin. According to Lindberg & Morrison, this is not necessarily related to resource distribution, but rather on voting for a candidate from the same ethnic group out of convention or due to kinship ties. The authors note that this kind of voting is assumed to be widespread in Africa, but mention that even where ethnic identity has considerable salience, research has shown that this does not necessarily translate into ethnic voting. (Lindberg & Morrison, pp. 101-104) It might be added here, however, that Lindberg & Morrison define proxy voting mainly in the “context of uneducated and rural populations” (p. 103) and that ethnicity can be an important factor in clientelistic voting as well (e.g. Chabal & Daloz, 1999). In addition, it is clear that ethnicity does play a large role in many African elections (e.g. Agbu, 2011) and for instance general elections in Kenya have been described as a mere “ethnic census” (Bratton & Kimenyi 2008, pp. 1-2)

Nonetheless, in Lindberg & Morrison’s study, which included two elections and some 690 respondents, the authors found that neither ethnic nor clientelistic voting was particularly predominant among Ghanaian voters. Rather, the vast majority of voters “reason and behave as relatively mature democratic voters by consciously evaluating the past performance or the promised policy programs of candidates and parties” (p. 121). However, candidates that were elected into office were almost exclusively born and raised in the constituencies they represented, and there was thus somewhat of a parochial aspect to voting. However, Lindberg & Morrison argue that this is not an ethnic issue since opposition candidates are commonly locals too. Rather, favoring local candidates may be seen as rational behavior, since this provides a way to overcome the “information problem” – that is, uncertainty regarding what a candidate will do once in office. A local candidate is more likely to be familiar with the both concerns and challenges of the area, the authors argue. Thus, if a candidate stems from the constituency, community members might have
more faith in his or her dedication to work for the community once in office. (Lindberg & Morrison, 2008, pp. 120-122).

In section 6.6, this point is augmented by Patrick Chabal’s conceptions of origin and kinship, which concerns the ways in which a local community may require political representatives to adhere to local norms and obligations as a means of retaining a degree of influence over their representatives. In essence, this implied that the communities were to benefit from their representatives being in power, either in symbolic or in material terms. Chabal’s conception is mainly derived from an extra-parliamentarian perspective, but essentially describes the same process as Lindberg and Morrison’s model: the legitimate attempts by the community to ensure their inclusion in the flows of political resources, by putting primacy on local candidates. The difference is where they place their emphasis: while Chabal’s account essentially is identity-based, Lindberg & Morrison in turn stress the non-identity aspect of preferring local candidates. These two notions form an important backbone to the final analysis of my field interview results, and will be further elucidated in sections 6.5 and 6.6. One caveat that might be added to Lindberg & Morrison’s model is that it may very well be difficult to determine whether a respondent’s voting decision in fact has been purely evaluative or in fact more influenced by clientelistic or ethnic ties. Especially in Tanzania, it is not likely that respondents will openly admit to having voted for someone due to ethnic convention or clientelistic ties, even if this were the case. Lindberg & Morrison mention this but assume that their respondents are knowledgeable about their own voting motivations, and the authors do therefore not doubt the accuracy of their answers and claims (pp. 99; 121). In my own research, I thus find myself forced to leave it up to the researcher to decide whether replies are trustworthy or not, and in the majority of cases, I lean towards the former. With the general theoretical and conceptual background given in this chapter, I turn to the discussion on ethnicity in Tanzania.
6. Ethnicity and Politics in Tanzania

It is commonly mentioned that African countries exhibit a striking plurality of ethnic and language groups, and Tanzania is no exception to this. Estimates vary, but it is commonly claimed that there are around 120 ethnic groups in the country. Some estimates put the figure at 150 (Omari, 1997, p. 51) while others mention 130 ethnic groups (Nyang’oro 2004) but in the literature in general, 120 seems to be the most quoted figure (Jerman 1997). This was also the figure most frequently mentioned by my researcher respondents in Tanzania (e.g. Prof. Chaligha; Prof. Tambila 7.6.2011). Tanzania is thus ethnically diverse, and as will be discussed in detail below, differences between ethnic groups are by no means void of social significance (section 6.4.1). Still, these ethnic differences have never resulted in overt political competition between groups in the country and it is safe to claim that ethnicity has never evolved into a salient factor in the political life of Tanzania (Jerman, 1997, p. 34). In essence, this means that the ethnic group has never become the locus of struggles for political power, land, work or other resources (Barkan 1994, pp. 9-10). Political parties have never formed on ethnic basis in the country, nor have any parties implicitly or explicitly followed an ethnic manifesto (e.g. Erdmann 2002, p. 28; A. Weber 2010). On the contrary, there are signs that evoking ethnic sentiments in campaigns may be outright counterproductive in Tanzania (see Whitehead 2009, pp. 264-5; Nyang’oro, 2004, p. 48), an issue that will be addressed also in subsequent chapters.

In this thesis, I do not set out to give a thorough explanation of the low political saliency of ethnicity in Tanzania, but I do attempt to outline some important factors that facilitate the understanding of its development. Berman argues that in order to properly analyze ethnicity in the African context, one needs an historical perspective that “stresses the linkage between cultural […] factors and material and economic forces” (Berman, 1998, p. 308). This is thus what I have attempted to do in this chapter, and I have chosen to develop the theoretical discussion alongside a brief chronology of Tanzanian politics and history – based on both the literature on Tanzania and my fieldwork material – that serves to illustrate the various theoretical points. In the first part of this chapter, I give a general overview of the main ethnic groups in Tanzania, after which I proceed to discuss their internal relations. Section 6.2 then gives a brief theoretical introduction to the issue of ethnic identity, after which section 6.3 deals with its historical development in pre-colonial and colonial Africa, using examples from Tanzania and the Sukuma and Nyamwezi ethnic groups.
I then turn to develop the theoretical discussion of ethnicity and politics in section 6.4. In that section, I outline one of the main arguments of the chapter, which posits that ethnicity in Tanzania may be properly understood by dividing the concept into three distinct categories: cultural, social and political ethnicity. I suggest that ethnicity in Tanzania developed from being mainly a cultural factor to gaining considerable social significance with the process of colonialism, but that a particular form of political ethnicity, commonly referred to as political tribalism (Lonsdale, 1994) did not develop in Tanzania. I discuss a number of potential reasons for this in section 6.5, with particular reference to the policies of the first independent government of Tanzania. Finally, in section 6.6, I account briefly for the introduction of multi-party politics and the emergence of political (opposition) parties in Tanzania with respect to ethnicity. In connection to this, I outline the second major argument of this chapter, divided into two parts. First, I suggest that all identities based on conceptions of common heritage, origin and culture may be understood as ethnic, and that political allusions to these identities may well be described as ethnic politics as well. Second, based on this, I argue that political ethnicity could be divided into two separate categories: political tribalism as defined by Lonsdale, associated with established ethnic groups; and what I have chosen to term the politics of origin, which describes political allusions to the above-mentioned identities of common descent or origin. The two main arguments of this chapter in particular will work as a backbone to the analysis in chapter 7.

6.1 Ethnic Groups and Inter-Ethnic Relations

There are some challenges connected to giving a general overview of the size and geographical distribution of ethnic groups in Tanzania since it has been prohibited by law to register the population on the basis of ethnicity or religion in the country since 1967 (e.g. Chege, 1994, p. 63). Nonetheless, estimates regarding the size of the various groups in the country are still frequently encountered in the literature, and have I chosen here to show the 1992 estimate from Glickman 1995, which list the seven largest ethnic groups in the country. In addition, I include the Afrobarometer results from 2005 and 2008, which list the ethnic origin of all respondents in those two surveys (N=1304; N= 1208). Based on these various estimates and calculations, I have compiled a list of the seven largest ethnic groups in Tanzania in table 6.1 below.
Table 6.1 Relative Size of Ethnic groups in Tanzania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sukuma</td>
<td>12.4 %</td>
<td>14 %</td>
<td>16 %</td>
<td>17 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyamwezi</td>
<td>3.3 %</td>
<td>8 %</td>
<td>4 %</td>
<td>4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chagga</td>
<td>3.6 %</td>
<td>6 %</td>
<td>5 %</td>
<td>3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makonde</td>
<td>3.9 %</td>
<td>6 %</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haya</td>
<td>3.3 %</td>
<td>6 %</td>
<td>4 %</td>
<td>2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hehe</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>6 %</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td>2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyakyusa</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>5 %</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td>2 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Afrobarometer sample, however, is too small to give reliable estimates for the whole population, and the figures shown above are therefore to be treated as indicative only. Therefore, I have also listed the ten largest language groups, including the number of speakers and their percentage of the total population, in table 6.2 below, based on the 2009 Languages of Tanzania (LOT) atlas. Languages boundaries frequently correspond with ethnic groups, and the main ethnic groups also have their distinct vernaculars, the exception being the Chagga, who can be divided into six separate language groups (LOT, 2009). Also, the LOT atlas lists a total of 150 languages spoken in Tanzania, which implies that certain languages that are not linked to any particular ethnic groups are included in the atlas, as for instance Lingala. Crucially, in the table below, Swahili is listed as the second largest mother tongue in the country, which thus to some extent subsumes other ethnic group membership. An additional discrepancy between language and ethnic groups is that knowledge of the vernacular does not need to be a prerequisite for ethnic group membership. The Sukuma, for instance, speak Kisukuma as a group, but far from all who are Sukuma by origin actually do speak the language. This is especially true in the cities, which was apparent for instance in my fieldwork in Mwanza. Despite these caveats, looking at the size and number of language groups gives some important hints as to the ethnic composition of Tanzania in the absence of official census information.

16 For instance the Zaramo population is put at only 200,000 speakers, while the Zaramo as an ethnic groups is estimated at around 600,000.
Table 6.2 Language Groups in Tanzania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Percent of pop</th>
<th>Speakers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sukuma</td>
<td>12.15%</td>
<td>5195504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swahili</td>
<td>5.57%</td>
<td>2379294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ha</td>
<td>2.88%</td>
<td>1229415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gogo</td>
<td>2.40%</td>
<td>1023790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyamwezi</td>
<td>2.25%</td>
<td>959832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haya</td>
<td>1.95%</td>
<td>833214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makonde</td>
<td>1.88%</td>
<td>805299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maasai</td>
<td>1.88%</td>
<td>803457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hehe</td>
<td>1.73%</td>
<td>740113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyakyusa</td>
<td>1.71%</td>
<td>733020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N total</td>
<td></td>
<td>42746620</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Languages of Tanzania Atlas 2009, UDSM

A few observations are still discernable from tables 6.1 and 6.2 above regarding ethnic groups in Tanzania. First, Sukuma is by far the largest ethnic group in the country, comprising between 12-17 percent of the population, depending on the estimate. Kisukuma is the most spoken language with around 5.2 million speakers, followed by Swahili, Ha and Gogo, which are the only languages that have more than a million speakers each. Second, most of the ethnic groups in the country are rather small. All other groups listed in table 6.1 above except the Sukuma comprise only around 2-6 percent of the population each; in the LOT atlas, none of the other groups exceed three percent of the population. Out of the 150 language groups on the LOT list, only 16 have more than half a million speakers. Conversely, there are 72 language groups with less than 50,000 native speakers each. Based on the 1992 estimate cited in Glickmann (1995) the eight largest ethnic groups in Tanzania combined make out roughly half of the population; this can be compared to Kenya, where the eight largest groups constitute up to 87% of the population (Glickman, 1995). Whereas this is an indication for the relatively small size of the larger ethnic groups in the country, it also shows that the other half of the population comprises more than a hundred language groups. Overall, it is safe to conclude that Tanzania is ethnically diverse, with a large number of small ethnic groups, of which even the largest ones, save for the Sukuma, are relatively modest in numbers.

Cities in Tanzania can be considered melting pots in terms of ethnicity, but most ethnic groups are predominantly based in certain regions or districts. The Sukuma are thus the dominant ethnic groups in the regions of Mwanza and Shinyanga, of which the former was my area of research.\(^{17}\) In addition, the Sukuma are closely related to the Nyamwezi, mainly based in Tabora region, and these

\(^{17}\) In addition, there are quite sizeable Sukuma populations in some other regions in the country as well, for instance in Kagera (ca. 200,000) and Tabora (ca. 600,000). LOT 2009
two groups thus dominate large areas of the Western and Northwestern parts of the country (precipitated by their “culture of expansion” Brandström, 1990). Other large ethnic groups from the area around Lake Victoria include the Haya from Kagera, who have spread to most urban centers in the country, the Kuria from Mara and the Jita, who are based in both Mara and Mwanza. In the North, the most sizeable groups include the Nilotic Maasai, who are predominantly to be found in Arusha, the Cushitic Iraqu in Arusha and Manyara and the Chagga, which are the dominant group of Kilimanjaro region, alongside the Asu/Pare. In the South and Southern Highlands, the large groups are the Nyakyusa based around Mbeya, the Hehe and Bena from Iringa and the Yao in Ruvuma and Mtwarara, while the Makonde are dominant in Mtwarara on the Southern Coast. Along the coast there are also the Zaramo, the Shambaa, the Zigua and the Bondeli, which populate the coastal region and partly the inland north of Dar es Salaam. In the west, the most populous groups apart from the Nyamwezi are the Fipa in Rukwa and the Ha people from Kigoma along the shores of Lake Tanganyika. In the central parts of the country, the Gogo are dominant in Dodoma and have a sizeable population in Singida as well.

6.1.2 Relations between Ethnic Groups in Tanzania

As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, ethnicity does not play a major role in political contestation in Tanzania, which is mirrored by what seems to be exceptionally good relations between ethnic groups in the country. This notion was reiterated by many of my respondents in the interviews as well, and the famed national unity of Tanzania was commonly emphasized: “We Tanzanians love each other, there are no signs of tribalism here” (O17 Elderly man in Mwamabanza, Magu). The Afrobarometer surveys in Tanzania (2005 and 2008 results listed below) largely seem to confirm this sentiment. Among many other factors, the surveys included questions concerning mutual trust between the ethnic groups and of their political and economic positions vis-à-vis each other. As is clear from the results listed in tables 4.3 – 4.5 below, Tanzanians do indeed seem to conceive of inter-ethnic relations in the country as rather unproblematic. In table 4.3 below, a total of 67 percent of respondents said they trusted members from other ethnic groups somewhat or a lot. This can be compared to a total of 80 percent who trusted their own ethnic group – intra-group trust was thus higher than inter-group trust, but both figures remain substantial. In the 2008 Afrobarometer survey, the question of trust in terms of ethnicity was omitted and replaced with the question of trust for other Tanzanians. When phrased like this, a total of 76 percent declared their trust for their fellow citizens. In the 2001 survey in turn, 68 percent of respondents had replied that they trust Tanzanians from other “tribes” (Chaligha, Mattes, Bratton and Davids, 2002, p. 14) and trust in other groups was thus high throughout the Afrobarometer surveying period.
Next, Afrobarometer also inquired whether ethnic or national identity was most pronounced among respondents. The results in table 6.4 are clear: only 3 percent of the respondents replied that their single and exclusive identity was ethnic, and around the same number announced that they “feel more ethnic” than Tanzanian. I have included results from the Kenyan 2008 survey as a comparison. While the differences to the Kenyan respondents are quite marginal in this category, there seems to be a substantially stronger sense of national identity in Tanzania. In 2005, a remarkable 76 percent announced that they felt “only” Tanzanian, and while this figure dropped to 69 percent three years later, it is still more than twice the share of Kenyans that announced the same regarding their national identity. Interestingly, the share of respondents who declared that they feel equally ethnic and Tanzanian more than doubled from 6 to 13 percent between surveys. In general, the 2008 results seem to hint at a stronger sense of ethnic identity than in 2005, but the since the Afrobarometer samples are small, as mentioned, this may also simply be variation due to sample size.

### Table 6.4 National or Ethnic Identity; Fair/Unfair Treatment of Ethnic Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I feel only ethnic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel more ethnic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel equally</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Often</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel more Tanzanian</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Always</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel only Tanzanian</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Afrobarometer Tanzania 2005; 2008; Kenya 2008

In 2001, the questions posed were again different, giving similar results, however. A total of 74 percent of respondents felt “more strongly attached” to being Tanzanian than to their ethnic group.
identity. When asked to choose a self-defined identity group\textsuperscript{18}, 76 percent chose an occupational category, nine percent a gender identity and only three percent an ethnic or language group. This may be contrasted to 48 percent in Nigeria and 36 percent in Zimbabwe who identified themselves foremost in ethnic terms. (Chaligha et al. 2002, p. 10) Afrobarometer respondents also rarely seemed to exhibit a feeling of unfair treatment on an ethnic basis. Only 2 - 3 percent of respondents declared that their group was “always” treated unfairly and 12 percent in 2005 and 9 percent in 2008 thought that their groups were being “often” treated unfairly. The difference to Kenya here is significant: While in 2008, 57 percent of Tanzanian respondents did not perceive their ethnic group as ever being unfairly treated; the corresponding figure in Kenya was only 26 percent. Similarly, almost twice the share of respondents in Kenya saw their group as being sometimes unfairly treated compared to their Tanzanian counterparts.

Table 6.5 Economic Conditions and Political Influence

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Much better</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Much more</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>More</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Less</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much worse</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Much less</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Afrobarometer Kenya 2008; Tanzania 2005; 2008

Finally, respondents were also asked to assess whether their own economic condition and political influence were equal, worse or better than those of other ethnic groups. Here there did emerge some signs of ethnic grievances – rather surprisingly, given the results above. A total of 42 percent in 2005 and 46 percent in 2008 declared that their group is worse or much worse off economically than other groups in the country. Conversely, around 15 – 20 percent thought their situation to be better or much better than that of others, while only a rough third of respondents saw the conditions as equal. As for political influence, there was a large difference between the two surveys, but the tendency was the same: 26 percent in 2005 and 40 percent in 2008 saw their group as less or much less and around one fifth in both surveys saw themselves as more or much more influential politically than other groups. According to these results then, a majority of the respondents believed that ethnic groups were unequal in terms of their economic situation and political leverage. It is

\textsuperscript{18} Question: besides feeling Tanzanian, which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?
striking how similar the figures are to the Kenyan results both in the political and economic parameters, especially given the large differences in the unfair treatment-category.

It is possible that this is accountable to actual differences that still exist among the ethnic groups in terms of education and employment and that have been discernable since colonial times. As Nyang’oro contends, ethnic groups like the Haya, the Chagga and the Nyakyusa are perceived to have had an educational advantage from colonial times, which subsequently translated into an occupational advantage in post-colonial Tanzania. In addition, the home regions of these groups were disproportionally favored in terms of investments and economic production in colonial Tanganyika. (Nyang’oro, 2004, pp. 10-11; see Illiffe 1979 for a thorough treatment) Jerman found that there were common perceptions that a dominance of the Haya in public sector employment was pertinent still in the 1970s (Jerman, 1997). The presumed educational advantage of the Haya and the prevalence of the Chagga in private enterprise were issue that frequently surfaced in my fieldwork interviews as well. The issues of ethnic prejudice is treated in section 6.4.1 and the imbalances between ethnic groups in section 6.5.1, but here it may be stated that while there are some perceptions of favoritism and discrimination among ethnic groups, this does not seem to have affected their mutual relation to any larger extent. This might be attributable to the fact that discrepancies are traced to the colonial period and thus to foreign influence, and that these imbalances were quite actively addressed by the first phase of government in independent Tanzania, under the leadership of Julius Nyerere (see section 6.5).

6.2 The Theory of Ethnicity and Ethnic Group Identity

Ethnicity has been on the academic agenda of anthropologist, political scientists and other social scientists for a long time, and the debate regarding the nature and relevance of ethnic identity has at times been rather intense (see Jerman, 1997; Emberling 1997 for accounts). In Africanist circles ethnicity was long dealt with mainly as a problem (Chabal & Daloz 1999, p. 56) and ethnicity has been equated with tribalism, denounced by Western observers and African politicians alike as an expression of a pre-colonial, traditional culture that is impinging on the process of modernization (Berman, 1998, p. 306). In contrast to this view, ethnicity as a form of social organization based on common identity and loyalty has also been seen as having the same positive integrative potential as nationalism (Lonsdale, 1994; Laakso & Olukoshi, 1996; see also chapter 4). In this essay, I will not engage in a normative discussion regarding the potential positive or negative effects of ethnicity, but in order to analyze the connections between ethnicity and politics, it is important to outline what
is meant by ethnicity and ethnic groups, and how they come to gain social and political importance for their members.

As a starting point, the conception of ethnicity in this thesis follows the assertion made by both Lonsdale (1994) and Chabal & Daloz (1999) that ethnicity is a universal human attribute that is part of every individual’s identity. However, despite the fact that ethnicity is a prominent academic field of research it is notoriously difficult to apply objective markers to the definition of an ethnicity or an ethnic group. Sure enough, ethnic groups are commonly defined by such external markers as language, region of origin, culture, tradition and heritage (Posner 2007, p. 1303; Muigai 1995, p. 161). However, as Fredrik Barth (1969) has argued, in some cases ethnic group membership and the customs and traditions of an ethnic group may change entirely while the group itself continues to exist. In other cases the ethnic group vanishes while its customs, language and membership remains. In one of the most influential contributions to the discussion of ethnicity, Barth therefore asserts that it is not the “cultural stuff” of ethnicity that matters, but the maintenance of ethnic boundaries vis-à-vis other groups. The most crucial aspect of ethnicity is the self-ascription of a certain identity by members of the group, as well as the use of that ascription by others. In other words: it entails judging oneself and being judged by others according to certain parameters. These are indeed commonly based on cultural factors but ethnicity is not an unfiltered expression of cultural heritage. Rather some cultural aspects – overt signals and basic values – are emphasized while others are toned down. Crucially, boundaries are social and are maintained by continuous expression of identity, based on the factors that have gained social relevance in a given context. (Barth, 1969, pp. 10-17)

The difference between ethnic identities and other social identities will be discussed in section 6.6, but it should be noted here that I follow Barth’s assertion that a group ascription is ethnic when it pertains to the most basic general identity of a person, commonly related to origin and background (Ibid, p. 13). However, there has been a substantial and long-standing debate about the social and political role of this identity, and how its usage is to be judged. This academic discussion has largely revolved around various forms and degrees of the primordialist, instrumentalist and more recently, social constructivist approaches to ethnicity. Primordialist interpretations of ethnicity see it as a relic from a far away past, either as evidence of some atavistic barbarianism, or, alternatively, in terms of a romanticized notion of unspoiled and natural communities (Gentili, 2005, p. 35).

19 In terms of the anthropological discussion on ethnicity, Emberling talks about B.B (Before Barth) and A.B (After Barth).
Expressions of ethnicity in political and social situations are thus in the first place expressions of attachment to cultural factors of that ethnicity. The most notable academic contribution within this line of thinking, albeit a very balanced and meticulous one, might be Donald Horowitz *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* from 1985. The instrumentalist view in turn sees ethnicity largely in political terms, as a tool used to attain political and economic resources. According to this approach ethnicity was constructed and manipulated during colonial and post-colonial times, and is as such a modern phenomenon. (Gentili, ibid; Berman, p. 309) Influential contributors within this field include Daniel Posner, for instance in *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa* (2005). It is important to note, however, that few accounts remain strictly confined to either approach and they might be seen more as “ideal types” than actual schools of thought (cf. Emberling, 1997, p. 306; Jerman p. 51).

During the past two decades there has been an increasingly influential attempt to transcend the dichotomy between views that highlight either the constructed/invented or the natural character of ethnicity. This *social constructivist* approach combines elements of both primordialism and instrumentalism in a rather more historically grounded take on ethnicity. In this view, both approaches are considered as giving useful insights to the understanding of ethnicity, but also as being too limited in their scope. In this view, instrumentalism for instance rightly points to the way in which ethnicity can be used to pursue material advantages, while the primordial approach is correct in emphasizing that ethnicity is based on “real cultural experience that differentiate it from other bases of political identity and mobilization” (Berman, 1998, pp. 308-9). However, according to the social constructivist school, both primordialism and instrumentalism fail to take the historical factors shaping and reshaping ethnicity into account, and therefore disregard a crucial constitutional part of ethnic identity, in particular in Africa. In this line of thinking, ethnicity is not a given or solid identity, but the outcome of historical process in which political, economic and cultural factors all play their role. Ethnic identity is fluid and malleable and while it does indeed have pre-colonial roots in Africa, its present day shape is the result of a continuous process from the pre-colonial to the post-colonial periods. During this process the meaning of ethnicity has been constantly contested and therefore frequently reshaped, and present day ethnicities are therefore both old and new, at the same time both modern constructions and age-old cultural expressions. (Chabal & Daloz, pp. 56-7; Berman, pp. 309-12; Chabal, 2009 pp. 32-34)

The bottom line of this discussion is that ethnicity is real: it is built upon cultural and social factors that are meaningful to people in their self-identification. At the same time, however, the common identity is subject to continuous expression, creation and invention. Acknowledging this mix of real
and constructed, ethnicity has been referred to as an “imagined” identity of imagined communities. This concept is borrowed from Benedict Anderson (1983) who originally referred to nations as imagined communities. Here the important point – on which there is considerable academic consensus – regarding the African context is that ethnic groups as they exist in present-day Africa emerged as a consequence of colonial rule. This implies that while ethnic groups indeed may be based on pre-colonial realities, they received their present shapes, structures and even geographical distribution as a consequence of political, economic and cultural processes of colonialism. (Chabal & Daloz, p. 57; Berman, p. 311; Turton, 1997, p. 79; Posner, 2003, p. 127; see Posner, 2005 for a specific example from Zambia). To a large extent, this implies that the shape of ethnicity changed with colonialism, moving from a rather fluid and malleable identity to a clearly defined and demarcated group identity. This process is traced in the next section, using the Sukuma, my ethnic group of focus, as an example to illustrate the historical discussion.

6.3 The Historical Development of Ethnicity as Political Identity

There are somewhat differing points of view regarding the nature of political systems in pre-colonial Africa (as far as they can be generalized at all), especially in terms of the patrimonial nature of relations between rulers and ruled and the leverage held by the people over their chiefs (e.g. Lemarchand, 1972, pp. 72-3; Berman, 1998, p. 310; Chabal pp. 88-93; Pitcher et al. 2009) There seems to be considerable agreement in the literature, however, that ethnicity in pre-colonial Africa was less rigidly defined than it is today. Ethnic identities were surely important in pre-colonial Africa, but as argued above, these identities were usually fluid and their boundaries porous and constantly redefined; identities could be multiple and overlapping (e.g. Berman, 1998, p. 310-12; Chabal 2009, pp. 32-33). In Tanzania, the period preceding colonialism was one of considerable social upheaval, which was a consequence of interrelated factors of drought, famine and war, as well as the increasing penetration of outsiders to the interior of Tanzania (see Koponen, 1988, for a through account). War and forced migration created both the assimilation and the dispersion of various groups and communities within the area, and the social units that existed at the onset of colonialism thus by no means represented age old form of social organization (Bender Shelter, 2010; Monson 1998).

To be sure, ethnicity did exist in pre-colonial Tanzania in the form of people who had a common ground such as occupation, language or customs and who shared what Lonsdale has called a “moral
economy”: a shared set of norms and values based on common experience and occupation (Lonsdale 1994, pp. 136-7). This is what Jerman has described as “objective ethnicity” (see section 6.4). In the Tanzanian case, Koponen argues that there indeed were “deep-going ethnic difference among people in the area”, which formed major “language-production groups” (Koponen, 1988, p. 184). The Tanzanian area was extremely ethnically diverse, and among these major groups, there were numerous sub-groups, which in turn contained additional ethnic borders. Koponen outlines five rather clearly differentiated sub-groups among the Bantu in the Tanzanian area that had emerged towards the end of the pre-colonial period. These subgroups differed in terms of language, customs, institutions and economies, as well as “cloths, marks and styles of dancing”, and are classified by Koponen as follows:

a. The Chagga-Taita in Kilimajaro and west of it
b. West-Tanzania, mainly including Nyamwezi-related people
c. Lacustrine around Lake Nyanza (e.g. Haya and Zinza) and are which exhibited particularly clear differences to the other bantu-dominated areas,
d. Southern Tanzania, incorporating areas from Rufiji and Ruvuma to Ungoni
e. Tanzania-Coastal, which in fact covers large area of the interior, from the northern coast through the central parts to the area between Lake Tanganyika and Lake Nyasa.

(Koponen, 1988, p. 187)

Apart from these, there were also Nilotic groups (e.g. various Maasai groupings; Luo and Datoga) and Cushtic-speakers (e.g. present-day Iraqw), which were in turn divided into several sub-groups and divisions (Koponen, pp. 184-187). Notwithstanding these categories and differences, Koponen argues that ethnic boundaries in pre-colonial Tanzania were still vague and fluid, and the differences that were observable hardly gave a clear basis for the categorization of people into “compact tribes” (ibid, p. 187). This process started then with the first travellers venturing into the area, and with the advent of colonialism, the rather fluid and constantly changing context of social group association became neatly delineated into distinct ethnic groups or tribes. In this process of ethnic solidification, much emphasis has been put in particular on the British system of indirect rule, a system of “decentralized despotism” (Mamdani, 1996, p. 25). This system sought to govern the colonized through what was perceived as “traditional” means of authority, which in the eyes of the colonialist was the tribe. Mamdani argues that the consequence of this recreation of traditional rule and customary law – which in many cases rather was an invention of it, or just the recreation of the most recent forms of these customs – made the colonial project one of “civilizing” entire communities at a time. (Mamdani, 1996, pp. 18-25) In consequence, “the African was containerized, not as a native, but as a tribesperson” (ibid. p.22). However, it was not necessarily the totality of the colonial state that brought about the increased significance of ethnicity, but rather
its careless imposition. Chabal & Daloz argue that colonialism as a system of indirect rule aimed at maintaining order to the lowest possible cost which could enable the economic exploitation of the area (Chabal & Daloz, 1999, pp. 11-12). "Modern" institutions were therefore never properly institutionalized, and instead “traditional” forms of governance were encouraged, thereby creating a basis for ethnic (e.g. tribal) authority for which there was little social basis.

The system of indirect rule, according to Berman, was one of divide and rule. In order to avoid an alliance of African communities against the colonial state, groups were separated and power was exercised through existing systems of chiefly rule and existing modes of clientelism. (Berman, 1998, p. 315) Where these didn’t exist, the colonial state was prone to the creation of new ones (Lemarchand, 1972, pp. 77-78), a process that resulted in what Deutsch termed “tribal makeshift solutions” (Deutsch, 1996, p. 31). The chiefs therefore became clients of the colonial masters, while remaining patrons in their communities. The state was established as the main source for accessing resources, and patron-client networks as the means of channeling these resources, both for chiefs and ordinary people. The divide and rule practices demarcated distinct borders between chiefdoms and therefore between ethnic group identities, and the established patron-client networks between groups and the state enforced these ethnic group identities and the importance of belonging and adhering to them. Indirect rule thus created a system of dependency between people and their rulers through the distribution of resources (Berman, 1998, pp. 312-325; Lemarchand, 1972, p. 77-79.) This was exacerbated by the colonialist romanticized notion of the “organic” tribe, which the colonial administrators were keen to “preserve” (Berman, pp. 318-320). Missionaries’ work had its share in this process, institutionalizing cultural traits and creating unified tribal languages of groups that previously had numerous languages and cultural customs. (Lonsdale, 1994, 137-38)

Intergroup competition on the basis of the newly vitalized ethnic identities was further intensified by the introduction of generalized labor markets, according to Lonsdale, where Africans now were competing for the same resources as opposed to the complimentary trading systems that were common earlier. Also, colonialism brought with it the creation of a centralized state, and since ethnic groups had differential access to the resources of the state, hierarchies between groups emerged (Lonsdale, 1994, pp. 136) The resources to be had from connections to the colonial state included education, material wealth and technology, and the main channel to access these became, as mentioned, the clientelistic networks based on the tribe. With independence then, Lemarchand

20 In German: “tribalistische Hilfskonstruktionen”
argues, loyalty towards political patrons was based on these same factors, and political parties became transformed into political machines, focused on the dispensation of resources along ethnic, clientelist lines. (Lemarchand, 1972, pp. 77-79) This thus enabled an instrumentalization of the relationship to the state, in a system where clients needed the protection of clients, and patrons the loyalty of clients. (Berman, 1998, pp. 319; 323-25; 329-30; Chabal & Daloz, 1990, p. 60)

This also goes some way to answer an obvious question concerning the “invention” of ethnicity: why would Africans have agreed to such a manipulation of their identities? It is clear that this process did not always work out smoothly, and Lemarchand points out that in instances where colonial patronage networks proved incompatible with traditional structures, major disruptions did take place (Lemarchand 1972, p. 79). Identities here as anywhere were the outcome of negotiation, even though the colonial state set the parameters for this negotiation (Mamdani 1996, p. 22). In addition, of course, there were important continuities in identity formation between the late pre-colonial and colonial times (Chabal & Daloz 1999, pp. 11-12). Ethnicity was, as mentioned, based on “real” cultural factors. However, the newly vitalized ethnic identities also seemed to create a measure of continuity and order in a time of major social, economic and cultural change, disorder and insecurity. This may have increased the incentives for ordinary people to adopt and articulate the increasingly salient ethnic identities. (Berman, 1998, p. 325) In the words of John Iliffe: “Europeans believed African belonged to tribes, Africans built tribes to belong to” (Iliffe, 1979, p. 324). Also, there was a considerable amount of agency on the part of African elites involved in advancement of “tribal interests” within the colonial state, where tribal identities formed means for the elites to push for access to resources (see in particular Iliffe, 1979, chapters 10 and 12 for this point in Tanzania; also Deutsch, 1996, pp. 32-33).

6.3.1 Sukuma and Nyamwezi

The case of the Sukuma and Nyamwezi in Tanzania provides a working example for some of the points above. Sukuma is today a clearly delineated ethnic group with its own distinct language, Kisukuma, and as shown in section 6.4.2.2, with various traditions, customs and characteristics that are commonly thought to be distinctive for the Sukuma. In my interviews in Mwanza, it was evident that respondents identified with Sukuma ethnic identity and that it thus commanded salience as a social self-referent. Nevertheless, there are strong indications in the historical literature that “the Sukuma never thought of themselves as Sukuma before they were told that certain powerful, influential people were thinking of them as such” (Holmes, 1969, p. 2). This happened only sometime in the late 19th Century. In pre-colonial times, there were indeed considerable similarities
in language and custom among the people who became known as the Sukuma, but in addition to these, there were some considerable differences within the area too. Also, the similarities that did exist were shared across the whole geographical area referred to as Greater Unyamwezi; the country of Nyamwezi or Sukuma-Nyamwezi, which encompassed basically the present-day areas of Mwanza, Shinyanga and Tabora. (Holmes, 1969, pp. 1-2; Brandström 1990 b, pp. 2-7) Indeed, the first explorers saw all peoples of this large area as belonging to the same group, the Nyamwezi, but later distinctions were made between the Nyamwezi, the Sukuma and the smaller groups of the Kimbu, Sumbwa and Konongo (Brandström, pp. 2-5).

As for the Sukuma, there was not necessarily anything particular about the political or social institutions of those living the area that would have warranted their categorization as a distinct ethnic group (Koponen, 1988, p. 182). Sukuma means “north” in both Kisukuma and Kinyamwezi, and it has thus been suggested that the name of the ethnic group has been a mere directional marker used by outsiders as they started to venture in the region. History Professor Tambila from UDSM described the process of ethnic labeling, in particular by the colonialists, as follows:

So they started from Tabora and went and asked people: Which tribe are those to the north of you? They would say: ‘Oh those are Sukuma, north’. And they went to next village: ‘the next village is Sukuma’. What they did was to draw a line north of Nzega, people north of this line are Sukuma, south are Nyamwezi. Imagine if they had started in Mwanza and moved south, these fellows would have been saying: ‘these are southerners!’

Prof. Tambila, 11.6.2011

This could indeed have occurred, since Brandström points out that within the larger area of Sukuma-Nyamwezi, directional markers are used internally to refer to the different groups of the area, and groups are thus labeled as Basukuma (northerners), Badakama (southerners), Banang’weli (westerners) and Banakia (easterners). These refer mainly to differences in intonation and dialect, although Brandström points out that some characteristics are commonly connected to them. Importantly, however, the definition of a person in accordance with these markers depends to a large extent on one’s own geographical location, and is thus not absolute (Brandström, pp. 7-8). A southerner to some could thus be a northerner to others.

21 There was, however, an ntemiship called Basukuma in the very north of the area, and the question has remained whether the area and the people have been named according to this ntemiship or vice versa, and whether this refers to the word for North or not. Holmes suggests that the chieftainship may have derived its name from a splinter group of immigrants from the Kamba (of present day Kenya, not to be confused with the Kamba ntemiship in present day Sukumaland) referred to as Basukumaji, “those who prefer to stay apart” due to their segregation. With the establishment of the ntemiship and later contact with (Arab) outsiders, this name may have morphed into Sukuma and become the marker for the people of the area. (Holmes, 1969, pp. 547-49)
In pre-colonial times, the societies of Sukuma-Nyamwezi were constructed on the basis of chieftainships revolving around a chief, *ntemi*. These *ntemiships* formed the largest political unit of the area, but certain ruling or royal families, clans, could extend authority over several of them, such as the Kwimba, Kamba, Siha or Binza (note that some of these are present district of town names). While Brandström argues that people in the area did not think of themselves as Sukuma or Nyamwezi, they did think of themselves as members of these *ntemiships* and the clans. This identification with the *lwimbo*, the clan name, could at times be strong, and was closely linked to a certain territory of origin. (Brandström, 1990b, pp. 8-10; Holmes, 1969, pp. iv; 2; 8-11; 24)

As with the ethnic label Sukuma, also the term Nyamwezi seems to have been adopted quite arbitrarily, as *mwezi* means moon in both Swahili and Nyamwezi. Since the caravan trade had a considerable influence on the lives and livelihoods of those called Nyamwezi today, it appears as if their western location made those travelling from the east refer to the people as Wanyamwezi, “of the moon” (e.g. Brandström, p. 4). Whatever the etymology, the area of Sukuma-Nyamwezi consisted of hundreds of *ntemiships* in pre-colonial times (Holmes, p. 24) but these did not form a coherent ethnic group, since they lacked the “fundamental characteristic of the latter”, which is self-identification (Koponen, 1988, p. 183). Soon, however, these ethnic categories became relevant for people themselves, and Brandström notes that in the population censuses of 1947, 1957 and 1967, all five groups of “Greater Unyamwezi” were listed as separate tribes, which implies that these ethnic groups had become categories of self-identification for census respondents. In line with the discussion above, Brandström sees this largely as a consequence of the British system of indirect rule, which also in Sukuma-Nyamwezi was based on traditional system of authority. These were slowly transformed in order to answer to the demands for larger territorial administration, and the ensuing administrational units were given ethnic labels. In sum:

> “In the interaction with […] the colonial government, implying fixed provincial and district boundaries, with tax registration and population censuses, formerly rather loosely knit social groupings were given new identities under exclusive tribal names” (Brandström, 1990b, p. 5).

Also, ethnicity became a locus for collective action, as witnessed by the emergence of federations and councils between both Sukuma and Nyamwezi chiefdoms during late colonialism. The strengthening of chiefdoms and their territorial unification created or supported the creation of paramount chiefs across Shinyanga and Mwanza, and while these “paramountcies” were not everywhere maintained, the amalgamations of small chiefdoms into larger entities formed the basis of the Sukuma union in 1945 (Iliffe, 1979, p. 330). The union was formed in part to advance the
educational and social position of the “backward” Sukuma, and while earlier, Sukuma had identified themselves as Nyamwezi to outsiders, a clear distinction in terms of identity was now made among Sukuma vis-à-vis the Nyamwezi (ibid. pp. 487-88).

In consequence, originally a “directional classification” (Brandström, p. 11) among a larger cultural area comprised of linguistically related people, Sukuma had become a viable social and political identity towards the end of colonial rule. The Sukuma union had already lost significance by 1956 but according to Iliffe, what remained was “heightened tribal awareness” (Iliffe, p. 478). Similar unions formed among other recently invigorated ethnic groups such as the Chagga, the Haya, the Kuria and Zigua, as well, to mention a few, who attempted to advance the common interests of their groups22 (Iliffe 1979; pp. 487-490; Deutsch, 1996, p. 35). Yet, as was made clear in the beginning of this chapter, political competition on the basis of ethnicity has not featured prominently in independence Tanzania and ethnic relations in the country have remained on solid ground. How can this apparent contradiction be explained? In the following section, I will return to the theoretical discussion to suggest some ways in which ethnic relations in Tanzania may be analyzed.

6.4 Cultural, Social and Political Ethnicity

In order to analyze the development of ethnic identity in Tanzania, and in particular its lack of politicization despite the background given above, it is useful to make a distinction between different types of ethnicity and ethnic identity. Based on the literature on ethnicity and a reading of the history and politics of Tanzania, I suggest that ethnicity may be divided into three main categories: cultural, social and political. All of these types of ethnicity relate to the process of colonialism described above and may be seen as stages in a process, but it is the stage between the latter two, social and political, which may give some clues to the low political saliency of ethnicity in Tanzania. Jerman (1997) makes a distinction between the first two factors, cultural and social ethnicity, which she also conceives of as objective and subjective ethnicity. Objective ethnicity refers to a pre-colonial state of affairs as described above, where ethnicity exists as a cultural category of traditions, customs, languages etc., but has not developed into a self-ascribed group identity. As this type of ethnicity is not used as a self-referent of individuals and groups, it does not have significance in social interaction; it is not the basis of a social identity. Subjective ethnicity in turn is used to describe the form of rigidly defined ethnic groups that emerged as a consequence of

22 The definition of which sometimes proved challenging, as Iliffe explains in pp 487-490)
colonialism in Africa. In this process, ethnicity became part of the self-definition of individuals and groups, through which it gained social significance. This was precipitated by the fact that ethnic group membership became attached to a certain position vis-à-vis the resources of the colonial state, as described above. In other words, cultural ethnicity is the objective substance of ethnic identity, which assumed importance for the social self-identification of individuals and groups with the process of colonialism. In essence, culture became used for the articulation of “we-ness” and “otherness”, which in turn opened for the use of these factors in social and political mobilization. (Jerman, 1997, pp. 57-64)

However, if the categorical distinction is left at cultural and social ethnicity, then the political process that forms the link between the social significance and the political relevance of ethnicity is taken for granted. As the case of Tanzania shows, ethnicity does not automatically assume political significance in a situation where its social significance has increased. In order to explain the difference between social and political ethnicity, I use John Lonsdale’s (1994) famous categorization of ethnicity into moral ethnicity and political tribalism. According to Lonsdale, both forms of ethnicity emerged as a consequence of the process of colonialism. Moral ethnicity can be understood as the moral and ethical norms and meanings based on social interactions and forms of labor that exist within a community that is more or less imagined. While this may seem as an abstract definition, its interpretation can be straightforward: it is the question of ethnicity as identity; the ethical norms and rules that guide and shape people who have a common identity within a certain community. It is also a question of the negotiations concerning social rights and obligations, authority and property within an ethnic group. It was this process of negotiation and definition of the boundaries of the ethnic groups that occurred during colonialism, and which resulted in the more rigidly defined ethnicity observed in section 6.3. Thus, moral ethnicity can be understood as social ethnicity in the three-part scheme above. Political tribalism, then, is the use of this ethnic identity in political competition with other groups. (Lonsdale, 1994, p. 132)

Political tribalism emerged during colonial times as collective political action “across communities of moral ethnicity” (Berman, p. 324). Initially, it was used in the independence struggle against the colonial administration and was later intensified in competition between ethnic groups in the independent nation state (Lonsdale pp. 139-140; also Mamdani 1996, pp. 23-25; chapter 4). In the post-colonial context, then, political tribalism can be defined as the pursuit of private and public resources on the basis and to the advantage of one’s own ethnic group, at the expense of the other ethnic groups in the country (Ngugi, 2008, p. 18). It is commonly tied to the resources of the state,
and therefore easily becomes a “zero-sum game” (Laakso & Olukoshi, 1996, p. 31). This definition is in line with the definition of ethnic politics in the previous chapter: it is the use of ethnicity in the pursuit of political or economic resources, with the caveat that this essay focuses exclusively on public resources. In order to recognize instances of ethnic politics for the analysis in chapter 7, it is useful to outline some of its features here. It is commonly mentioned that the mobilization of ethnicity for competition with other groups required some measure of “myth making” vis-à-vis the other ethnic groups. Thus, as the very boundaries of the ethnic group are defined in relation to other groups (Barth, 1969; Laakso & Olukoshi 1996) so does the process of political tribalism require differences to be drawn between the self and the “other” on the basis of conceptions of good and evil, virtue and morality, oppressor and oppressed. (Lemarchand, 1999, p. 4; Berman 1998, pp. 324-25; 327-330)

As mentioned, the process of ethnic competition in Africa might be seen with particular reference to the nation state and its resources, as the state is commonly a main provider of both employment and appropriable resources (e.g. Azam, 2001; Bates, 2008). In the process of this competition, ethnic myth making and rivalry are spread across the ethnic groups as privilege and discrimination around the question of who gets the spoils of the nation state determines both ethnic elite participation in sharing public resources, and through this, it affects the inclusion of the “ethnic grassroots” in the modern state. This process was outlined by Alexander Wimmer in his aptly named article “Who owns the state” (1997), where he suggests a three-staged model for how ethnicity was politicized in post-colonial African countries. First, one of the competing ethnic groups manages to dominate the state bureaucracy, in effect “ethnicizing” the state. Second, elites from other groups are systematically discriminated in terms of influence on public policy and positions within the administration. Since state employment is the most dominant form of formal employment and resource accumulation (see also Azam 2001), this may lead to serious grievances. Third and finally, the “ethnic grassroots” become activated in this setting of ethnic competition as they find themselves excluded from “the fruits of modernization” (Azam, 2001, p. 437), that is, access to the resources the state commands. (Wimmer, 1997, pp. 632-651)

This is a rather rigid scheme for viewing the process of politicization of ethnicity, but it highlights the importance of elite inclusion or exclusion, since it eventually reverberates among the lower level communities who find themselves excluded from the material and symbolic resources of the state. I argue that this scheme is useful also in the analysis of religious conflicts, as the same elite-grassroots processes are relevant there too (see chapter 8). The pertinent question is then obviously
which factors have contributed to the emergence of political tribalism in any given case, and conversely why these factors apparently have not been at work in Tanzania. As a starting point, it seems clear that the political competition between ethnic groups presupposes some mobilizing efforts by political elites, or innovators, as Barth calls them (Barth, 1969, p. 33). Posner has argued that it is social institutions – “formal rules, regulation and policies that structure social and political interactions” – that determine which ethnic identities there are to choose from (language, heritage, location etc.) and which ones will be deemed most “advantageous” to use by individuals and groups in their pursuit of resources. (Posner, 2005, pp. 2-8).

However, Posner’s model fails to explain why in some instances people choose not to voice ethnic identities politically at all, or only to a limited extent. In the case of Tanzania, for instance, he only notes that the applicability of his social institutions model is lacking due to the “lesser salience of ethnicity per se” in Tanzania compared to other countries (p. 259). The argument here, however, is that ethnicity does command considerable saliency in Tanzania on the social level, but that this social saliency has not translated into a corresponding political saliency. Since it was argued above that political ethnicity – political tribalism – is best seen in relation to the struggle for resources within the nation state, it seems sensible that the incentive to mobilize on the basis of ethnicity for the attainment of these resources should be addressed in order to prohibit the emergence of ethnic politics. This is the argument of section 6.5 below. Before this, I will substantiate my argument regarding the social saliency of ethnicity in Tanzania with a few examples from the literature and my fieldwork.

6.4.1 Social Ethnicity, Utani and Ethnic Self-Identification in Tanzania

An example of how ethnic relations in Tanzania play out on the social level is a phenomenon called utani, the joking relationships between ethnic groups. Utani is a system of “privileged verbal abuse” (Abrahams, 1981, p. 124) among the major ethnic groups in Tanzania in which presumed stereotypical characteristics – often in mildly derogatory terms – are used in social interaction. As Prof. Tambila observed (personal communication, 10.6.2011), these joking relationships started already in the late 19th century with the caravan trades, when groups that had previously never encountered each other started to intermingle. For the caravans, there was a need to be on friendly terms with the people encountered since they were dependent on the dominant groups of the areas they trespassed for food, shelter and medical services. In the course of the years as system of friendly bantering developed, in which differences and potential areas of conflict were subsumed
under joking terms and relations. The Nyamwezi, being in the center of the largest trade route from Bagamoyo to Tabora, acquired the largest number of *watani*, according to Prof Tambila, because “whoever came across them” had to establish friendly relationships with them.

Abrahams notes that although similar joking relations are common among kin and family anywhere in the world, the “extent of their development” particularly between the Nyamwezi and other groups, has “rarely been matched elsewhere” (Abrahams, 1981, p. 124). Abrahams suggests that originally, *utani* may have been based on hostility between groups, possibly even between adjacent chiefdoms, but that it later emerged as away of ensuring peaceful relations in the face of increasing interaction between groups (ibid). In this view, then, *utani* emerged as a way of managing ethnic diversity. According to professor Tambila, this “helped in politics” as well, since the various groups in the country were already well acquainted and had established working relationships when the national political movements started. This point is supported by Abrahams, who argues that *utani* helped foster the awareness of “bonds well beyond those of the village or the chiefdom on which the social unity of modern Tanzania now depends” (Abrahams, pp. 124). According to Abrahams, *utani* can in many circumstances still provide a system of privileged relations of support and inclusion between the groups that are *watani* (ibid).

What were these joking stereotypes, then? I had this quite vividly brought home to me at a wedding I attended in Dar es Salaam during my field research. Tanzanian weddings commonly have a Master of Ceremony who entertains the audience, and at this wedding, between speeches, the MC decided to entertain the guests by joking about the different ethnic groups present at the wedding. Through anecdotes, the Kuria were depicted as belligerent; the Haya as ostentatious; the Chagga as shrewd businessmen; and the Sukuma as simple and compliant. The descriptions clearly seemed to find their targets, as every depiction was followed by roaring laughter and nods towards whatever guests represented the ethnicities being ridiculed. During my field research, I encountered references to *utani* on several additional occasions too. It was not always put forth in the manner of particularly friendly joking, however. In the town of Katoro, Geita for instance, a young Ha man from Kigoma told me that he could never marry an Mhaya woman, because the Wahaya are the *watani* of the Waha. This implied among other things that Haya women were conceived as unfaithful, and since Waha men according to him travel a lot, it is better to “leave people from this tribe alone”. An old Kuria man who joined the same discussion argued along the same lines. He thought Haya women difficult to deal with: “marrying a Mhaya women would be against my tribe.
All the tribe elders [wazee wa kabila] would oppose it”. The two then moved on to inquire the ethnic background of my research colleague, Shauku:

M: What tribe are you Shauku?
S: Makonde
M: Ooh.
S: I am joking, my mother comes from Kagera and my dad comes from Singida
M: That’s means you’re a Nyiramba in tribe although you look more Mhaya in terms of appearance and actions.
S: Actions like what?
M: Haya people are really educated so your English can tell that too. Also your sharp character; most Haya people are like that!
(O37, Discussion in Kotoro, 26.5.2011)

This type of conversation was not uncommon during the field period. Curiously, however, it seems as if the Haya as a group have particularly strong stereotypical attributes attached to them. I therefore chose the Haya, next to the Sukuma, as an example about ethnic ascription in this chapter.

6.4.1.2 The Haya and the Issue of Ethnic Favoritism

In Helena Jerman’s doctoral thesis from 1997 on ethnicity in Tanzania, she mentioned that in the 1970s, there was a common conception that the Haya were dominant in the administration and in some parastatals, putting their fellow tribesmen in positions to the detriment of others (Jerman, 1997, 325-28). This sentiment was echoed by a young Haya woman I interviewed in Dar es Salaam. She contended that the Haya managed all their affairs through contacts. If she needed to get ahead with something, she would ask her parents to find out whether there are any Wahaya people working in key positions in the respective office and things would commonly arrange themselves (O36, 9.5.2011). It is interesting to note how frequently this conception was reinforced in my various interviews, especially since my aim was at no point to investigate Haya ethnic identity. As an example, I discussed differences between ethnic groups with three young men in Dar es Salaam, who all were from different ethnic groups. They had grown up in the city and did not speak their vernacular languages. I wanted to get at the importance of ethnicity for the “modern” Tanzanian: the young and urban demography who have never lived in their families’ areas of origin. In the discussions they all agreed that all other ethnic groups in Tanzania are “fine” except the Wahaya, since they were too boastful, and also because they supposedly “have ukabila”. (O35, 8.5.2011)

Another example was an interview with a party official in a small town in Mwanza, who had announced that he was an Mhaya during the interview. After we finished the interview, we asked
him whether there are any restaurants close by for lunch. He nodded and led us to the complete opposite end of town, passing by numerous restaurants on the way, and into a small and plain restaurant next to the bus station. Shauku anticipated the set-up and greeted the restaurant owner in Kihaya, and she duly replied, after which Shauku laughed: *Wahaya, wana ukabila sana* (The Haya, they have a lot of tribalism). Finally, in a rather difficult interview in Geita town with a group of eight women in a hair salon, it transpired that two of the women present were Wahaya, after which Shauku started chatting in Kihaya with the women. The previously reluctant and tense interview atmosphere changed completely after Shauku started joking in Kiswahili, in an overemphasized Kihaya-accent, about her numerous master’s degrees from abroad, referring to herself as *koku* (child or daughter in Kihaya). Consequently, some familiar *utani* chord was struck, also showing the interviewees that she was not taking herself too seriously, and we left the interview on a positive note. Of course, the above does not by any means prove any inherent drive towards ethnic favoritism among the Haya, but it does show that both self-identification and ascription by others commands considerable social saliency in the case of this ethnic group.

### 6.4.2.2 Sukuma Ethnicity and Self-identification

The history of the Sukuma was cursorily traced already in section 6.3 and it was argued that the Sukuma ethnic group in its present form is more or less a consequence of external definition by other groups and actors in colonial and pre-colonial times. Nevertheless, it was also contended that Sukuma as a common ethnic identity today indeed seems to be quite relevant both as a self-referent and as an ascription by others. This clearly transpired in my interviews, and I will illustrate this point with some examples from the fieldwork in Mwanza. I included questions of the social and cultural relevance of Sukuma identity in my interviews mainly in the ordinary-category in Mwanza town, Geita town, Katoro and the villages of Mwamabanza and Kahangara. Among respondents, there was a quite clear conception of Sukuma ethnic identity as a viable common and uniform identity across the rather large area of Mwanza and Shingyanga, which is sometimes referred to as Sukumaland. In some cases, the Sukuma of Bariadi, Shinyanga – which were referred to as Nyatusu – were depicted as something of a distinct group, with somewhat differing customs and traditions, mainly in terms of accent, professional practices such as cattle rearing as well as dowry payments (O13-16; O18). One respondent who hailed from that Bariadi contended that people there tended to view themselves as the “pure” Sukuma (O29, 23.5.2011).

For the most part, however, my respondents did not identify any subgroups or differences among the Sukuma, but seemed to see the ethnic group as a rather coherent entity. How this group was to
be defined objectively was more complicated, however. Given the large number of, particularly urban, Sukuma who don’t speak the vernacular, language could not be a criterion, neither was there any consensus regarding which customs or traditions would set the Sukuma apart from other groups. In a large group interview in the small town of Mwamabanza, the 50 or so villagers present could not agree on a common denominator for how Sukuma identity could be defined, although language, clothing, traditions, customs, accent or names were all suggested (O14, 22.5.2011). In other interviews, heritage or lineage were also proposed, but in many cases it was simply contended that it is “difficult to define” Sukuma identity (e.g. O13). However, most would quite readily confer various characteristics and qualities to Sukuma as a group. Some of the verdicts of respondents on their own group would be less that flattering, such as the women in Mwamabanza who defined Sukuma as essentially “from the bush” (O15) or as people who don’t “understand things” (O17). Others preferred to describe the Sukuma as cheerful and polite (O17; RL8; RL9), conservative and hard headed (P3) or peaceful people who prefer to avoid trouble (RL4).

The point here is that in general, it can be said that the although respondents largely failed to mention common denominators defining ethnic group membership, there was still a strong sense of common ethnic identity and a conception that the Sukuma as a group shared certain common characteristics. Nonetheless, as in Tanzania in general, this common ethnic identity has so far not been translated into common political consciousness. However, preconditions for such politicization could be presumed to be present among the Sukuma, since the regions of Mwanza and Shinyanga commonly are considered among the most economically backward areas of the country (Nyang’oro, 2004, p. 10). In addition, there has been a common conception that the Sukuma have been underrepresented in terms of high positions of power (e.g. P 19). Nonetheless, there has so far been little political movement to increase Sukuma leverage in terms of political influence and representation. With the advent of multiparty politics in Tanzania, parties that were said to strive for increased Sukuma unity and influence in national politics did emerge in Sukumaland (mainly UMD and UDP, see e.g. Chege 1994; Erdmann 2002; Whitehead 2010; Omari 1997). However, these have never managed to attract sizable support across Sukumaland, as explained in section 6.6. I included questions on the incidence of such mobilization and the relevance of ethnic unity-rhetoric in most of my interviews in Mwanza, but with few exceptions, the issue had little resonance among respondents. While some did not perceive underrepresentation to be an issue (e.g. O13; O18; O24), others were familiar with the issue but emphasised that Sukuma preferred national unity and cooperation above advancing ethnic interests (e.g. O11; O14; O22). As a CCM senior politician
stated: the lack of political unity among the Sukuma “is good for the country, good for other tribes, but bad for us” (P19, 30.5.2011).

The fact that the Sukuma had not been united politically to pursue their interests was commonly attributed to the characteristics of the Sukuma mentioned above. The Sukuma were seen by themselves and by ethnic outsiders (e.g. P3; P22) as good spirited and avoidant of conflicts, which supposedly explained the lack of ethnic politics in the area. In the words of a Pentecostal priest in Kahangara, the “Sukuma are ordained by God to avoid tribalism” (RL4, 21.5.2011). This exemplifies the difference between social and political ethnicity quite visibly: certain traits and a common identity is ascribed to the entire group, and these are then in turn used to explain the lack of political action on the basis of that same identity. However, there were indeed some who saw the issue of Sukuma political influence as gaining in importance, particularly in the multi-party setting (e.g. RL4; RL9; P3). Mwanza has considerable natural resource endowments amid persisting conditions of poverty, which, some argued, given the size of the Sukuma group, could gain political significance in the future (e.g. RL4; see also chapter 4). On a general note, however, throughout the independence period, Sukuma ethnic identity does not seem to have commanded considerable political leverage in Mwanza region despite its social and cultural relevance. The next section finally deals with some potential reasons for this and in the good ethnic relations in Tanzania in general.

6.5 The Lack of Political Ethnicity and the Politics of Nyerere

It should be quite clear from the discussion above that ethnicity does command some social relevance in Tanzania, but the question remains why this has not led to the use of this ethnic identity in the pursuit of political and economic resources, as in other former British colonies such as Kenya and Nigeria. In the literature on Tanzania, this is commonly attributed either to the large number of ethnic groups in the country, or to the socialist policies pursued by the first president of the country, Julius Nyerere. As stated earlier in the discussion, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to properly assess the reasons for the low saliency of ethnic politics in Tanzania, but I will discuss the two common explanations below, dealing at some length with the politics of Nyerere and its effect on ethnicity.
The fact that no ethnic group is large or economically strong enough to dominate the others has frequently been mentioned as a reason for the lack of ethnic politics in Tanzania (e.g. Barkan 1994, p. 10; Hyden 1994, p. 79; Glickman 1995, p. 289). Anke Weber referred to this as the “ethnic structure argument” (Weber, 2010, p. 7), and as Weber argues, it does not make for an entirely convincing explanation, which can be made clear with reference to the situation in Kenya. In Kenya, another former British colony, ethnicity has long played a significant role in the politics of the country, to the point that elections in Kenya have been described as a mere “ethnic census” (Bratton & Kimenyi 2008, pp. 1-2; see also for instance Barkan 1994; Posner 2007 for this point). However, it would be difficult to argue that this is due to a stronger sense of ethnic identity in Kenya, or because of the larger and more powerful ethnic groups that exist in Kenya compared to Tanzania. In fact, ethnic groups competing for power and resources in Kenya are often blocks constructed out of smaller groups, which appear as one common ethnicity on the national political level – the Kalenjin being the prime example of this (Posner 2007, pp. 1316-18; Cohen 1995, pp. 5-6; A. Weber 2010). Even so, for instance the Kalenjin are smaller both in number and in relative size than the Sukuma of Tanzania. The reason why the Sukuma have not attempted to maximize their political influence as an ethnic group (or even to do so by joining forces with the Nyamwezi) can therefore not be found in their size. I would therefore suggest that it is more instructive to look at the incentives for mobilizing a political following on the basis of ethnicity.

Again, I return to the theoretical discussion and develop some of the points made so far. As argued extensively in the discussion above, ethnic groups in Africa and Tanzania, such as the Sukuma, Nyamwezi or Haya, are socially constructed, or invented units, whose invention was based on real cultural or social factors – what was termed objective ethnicity. In the “process of invention and re-invention”, which resulted in the construction of ethnic groups with clearly demarcated boundaries – social ethnicity, of which moral ethnicity was part – Laakso & Olukoshi argue that ethnicity in Africa gained a “specific, inherent political load.” (Laakso & Olukoshi, 1996, p. 31) This implies that whenever these identities are evoked in the political field, it is not to be judged as an expression of some primordial ethnic identity, but rather as an instrumental use of ethnicity geared towards attaining political or economic ends. In sum, as noted in the definition in chapter 5, political ethnicity is closely connected to resource distribution, and Laakso & Olukoshi add that this is particularly the case with regard to real or punitive grievances or perceived threats related its distribution (ibid; also Berman, 1998, p. 328). However, as mentioned earlier, political tribalism “cannot be conjured out of thin air” (Ibid, p. 324) and grievances and claims to resources must therefore be perceived as viable by the members of the ethnic group.
This suggests that the incentive for using ethnicity in the resource struggle must be addressed if political ethnicity is to be avoided. The second explanation mentioned above essentially does this with reference to Nyerere’s socialist policies of nation building. This “standard narrative” (Nyang’oro, 2004, p. 3; Heilman & Kaiser 2002, p. 699 “standard view”) of Tanzanian politics holds that policies of Nyerere’s first government had a strong emphasis on creating a uniform national identity, and aimed at guaranteeing a level of equality between ethnic groups. This was made among other things by leveling out imbalances and discrepancies in terms of education and employment, and ensuring relatively equal representation of groups in political and civil office. A look at the literature on conflict origins would seem to refute such an assessment, however, as the research linking conflict and inequality is quite inconclusive (Chabal, 2009; Cramer, 2005; Bates, 2008) regardless if emphasis is on low income (e.g. Sambanis & Hegre 2006) economic growth and per capita income (Collier et al 2009) or state revenues (Bates 2008). Most notably, Paul Collier has quite vehemently rejected grievances related to inequality as a motivation for conflict, and has instead highlighted explanations based on greed or feasibility; that is, cost-benefit calculations for state capture (Collier & Hoeffler 1996; Collier 1999; Collier, Hoeffler & Rohner 2009).

However, this ambiguity of research results may not so much indicate that inequality factors do not matter, but rather that their effects on conflict or peace are contingent on a range of historical, social and cultural factors, as well as the structure of inequality in a society (Chabal, 2009, p. 163; Cramer 2003, pp. 400-05). This is what Frances Stewart (2000; 2005) has addressed in her distinction between horizontal and vertical inequalities and their relations to conflicts. Stewart’s emphasizes that it is not inequality in society per se (horizontal inequality), but inequality between social groups that are that clearly demarcated in terms of ethnicity, religion or class (vertical inequality) that may increase the risk for social conflicts. Also, Stewart argues that inequality should not be measured only in terms of economic factors such as income and employment, but she suggests a list of 25 different factors that need to be taken into account, including issues relating to social position and political participation of groups. (Stewart 2000, pp. 249; 252-3) Stewart’s distinction would thus

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23 Collier has lately proposed a more balanced view, however, and aptly named his 2009 article *Beyond Greed and Grievance* (Collier, Hoeffler & Rohner, 2009, see also Collier, 1999)

24 Stewart sees the identity groups mobilized as entirely constructed entities, which are mobilized for political ends. This doesn’t correspond to the definition of ethnicity that informs this thesis, but regardless of whether ethnicity is seen entirely instrumentally or as a result of a long historical process, it has been argued that its political use is indeed instrumental as it aims at securing resources.
support the notion that addressing group inequalities matters, and extends the argument to include other than economic factors in the definition of inequality.

Vertical inequalities can be avoided first by instituting various means of power sharing and inclusion of the various groups in the distribution of political and economic resources. The state in effect “buys” the loyalty of the groups by co-opting them. (Azam, 2001, 429-431) This argument was introduced by Lemarchand already in the 1970s, as he argued that resource distribution and state clientelism can lead to both ethnic conflict and ethnic accommodation, depending on how they are managed. If control over national resources is given to nationalist politicians, argues Lemarchand, the nationalist party can evolve into a “political machine” presiding over an equitable clientelist system. This system would link ethnic groups to the state and mold the groups together through the allocation of resources. (Lemarchand, 1972, p. 85) It is not only material resources that matter, however, but symbolic representation – what van de Walle terms the “less tangible bonds of ethnic identity” – is important as well (van de Walle, 2003, pp. 313; see also next section).

Representation is thus based both material factors, on providing a share of national cake; as well as symbolic aspects, of politicians “sharing their status with subordinates” (Berman, 1998, p. 331; also Chabal & Daloz 1999, pp. 41-43). As Dr. Lwaitama from the University of Dar es Salaam put it, a “feeling of inclusiveness” is projected from seeing “people of your kind” in position of power. The basis of the accommodation of identity groups is thus representation: “They might think: if there is one minister from my group, my child might be a minister too”. (Dr. Lwaitama, 10.5.2011) In this view ethnicity does play a crucial, instrumental role in the distribution of resources, but in a manner that allows for political integration and stability. It may be the saliency of its identity factors over group members and its cultural, moral and normative basis that has made some observers see in it the same integrative potential as nationality may command (Lonsdale, 1994, p. 139; Laakso & Olukoshi, 1996, pp. 29-31).

However, Miguel (2002) does not regard power-sharing relationships between ethnic groups as the explanation for ethnic peace; instead, where they exist, they are manifestations of good ethnic relations rather than their cause.\(^\text{25}\) Political socialization, especially with regard to the media and the education system, is needed for these systems to function. Nationalist politicians can use media and the curriculum to enforce a sense of nationalism and loyalty to the nation at the expense of loyalty to the ethnic group. (Miguel, 2002, pp. 5-6) In this view, then, a national identity can replace ethnic

\(^{25}\) In fact, Miguel argues that power sharing systems in certain circumstances can lead to political differences between ethnic groups becoming institutionalized, rather than neutralized (Miguel 2002, pp. 4-5)
identities and loyalties and pave the way cordial relations between ethnic groups (Stavenhagen, 1990, pp. 25; 33). National consciousness will thus reduce the incentive for politicization of sub-national identities (Whitehead, 2009, p. 287). This conceptual discussion would thus support the standard explanation of Tanzanian politics, and it is time to look closer at this explanation in order to elicit some hints as to the low saliency of ethnic politics in Tanzania.

6.5.1 Nyerere’s Tanzania and the Politics of Ujamaa

The politics of the independence government of the first president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere (often referred to as the first phase of government in Tanzania) have been dealt with in numerous publications throughout the decades since independence and need not be addressed in detail here, but I will present a brief overview. I suggest that the policies in terms of their effect on ethnicity in the country may be conceived of in terms of the “grand nationalist project” (Nyang’oro, p. 9) of Nyerere, with particular reference to three factors: the one party-state and the dominance of TANU; the equitable system of representation and distribution of resources; and the national identity, language and educational system. Miguel’s (2002) summary of the various factors at hand may serve as a suitable introduction:

"Taken together, the Pan-Africanist ideology of Julius Nyerere, the promotion of Swahili as a national language, the aggressive political and civic education in schools, the dismantling of tribal authorities, and the relatively equal distribution of resources contributed to the growing salience of a coherent and popular Tanzanian national identity, which binds Tanzanians together across ethnic lines”. (Miguel, 2002, s. 13)

It should be clearly stated here that many of the issues that are claimed to have contributed to preventing ethnic sentiments from arising did have largely the same influence on religious relations. Nonetheless, religious relations in Tanzania have their own particularities, and above all tensions, which will be dealt with in chapter 8, and the discussion below will therefore be refrained to referring mainly to ethnicity.

6.5.1.1 The Dominance of TANU

As Tanzania was proclaimed a one-party state in 1963, TANU was remained in the only political party in the country which was to oversee the ambitions development plans of the young nation, in particular as set out in the Arusha declaration of 1967. Soon after independence, TANU began to assert its control over society, and since the process of Africanization of the administration and civil service was pursued quite rapidly, TANU soon had control over much of the civil service. The party set about co-opting independent civil society actors – unions, womens’ organizations,
cooperatives\textsuperscript{26} – to the extent that Barkan described the entire Tanzanian civil society as being incorporated into the party within a few years of independence. (Barkan, 1994, pp. 13-20) While ethnicity was not specifically mentioned in the Arusha declaration or addressed in national planning (Nyang’oro, p. 9) there is little doubt that the conscious efforts by Nyerere to counter the potential danger of ethnic and religious factionalism influenced the design of the \textit{ujamaa} policies, in particular the strong emphasis on national unity (e.g. Miguel, pp. 9-10). That being said, it is also quite clear that the system which was created, with absolute dominance by TANU over government and civil society, as well as the relatively equitable distribution of resources and power across groups and regions, also served to consolidate power in the hands of the governing elite (e.g. Blum, 2006, p. 26-27).

Soon after independence, a range of measures aimed at minimizing the public role of ethnicity were introduced. TANU abolished the council of chiefs and tribal authorities, which had been instituted by the colonial government, and established elected village and district councils. According to Miguel, these councils greatly decreased the political and public role of ethnicity (Miguel, 2002, p. 12). In addition, as mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, registering the population of the basis of ethnic or religious background was prohibited in 1967. Ethnic associations were prohibited in 1962 and as competing political parties were abolished a year later, there remained no formal means of creating an ethnic political following. Apart from addressing these organizational issues, as Saida Yahya-Othman noted, Nyerere’s government actively suppressed and subdued ethnic sentiments and interests, at times quite forcefully (Yahya-Othman, 9.6.2011). Dr. Lwaitama put it this way: if a politician voiced ethnic sentiments publically, he or she “would be cooked” (Lwaitama, 10.5.2011). Deutsch contended that TANU’s dominance of society guaranteed that no tribal politics could emerge at any political level (Deutsch, 1996, op. 39). However, this does certainly not mean that ethnicity was completely absent from political life. As Omari has pointed out, ethnicity has always played a part in local level politics in Tanzania, even under the one-party state (Omari, 1997, p. 63). Glickman notes that while the emergence of ethnic sentiments was suppressed on the national level, ethnic interests were coopted into the party on the local level, ensuring local level ethnic representation in the party organs (Glickman, pp. 291-92; Jerman 1997, p. 322). At any rate, mobilization on the basis of ethnic loyalties was actively discouraged, and the means to do so curtailed by the dominance of the one-party state.

\textsuperscript{26} Barkan mentions that all actors except the churches were co-opted, but the Nyerere government established very close relationships to especially the Roman Catholic church, which increased the party’s domination over society, as discussed in chapter six
6.5.1.2 Representation and public resources

As will be discussed in the next section, there were indeed considerable educational, professional and economic imbalances between ethnic groups in Tanzania as the country gained its independence. Nyang’oro argues that discrepancies were partially compensated by instituting a system of representation in government, civil service and administration that was inclusive and aimed at ensuring as widespread a representation of various social groups as possible (Nyang’oro, pp. 10-11). Elites and politicians from various groups, as the civil society actors mentioned above, were thus coopted into the party and the state, and through this, they were incorporated into the rent-sharing systems of the state. The government also actively strived to ensure the relatively equitable distribution of resources such as public investments across geographical regions (Miguel, p. 12). Taken together, this created a political system where potential grievances were directly addressed through inclusion and redistribution, which also guaranteed a level of stability for the state. Also, the socialist policies pursued and the cooptation of civil society groups curtailed the growth of a “rural petty bourgeoisie” (Whitehead, 2009, p. 258) and hindered the emergence of an elite leadership that would have been able to mobilize around ethnic interests. As for the elites that existed, being associated with the party and the state may have proved the most viable means to access benefits and resources. (Whitehead, pp. 257-58; Blum, 2006, p. 26-28; Glickman, 1995, pp. 292-93)

As for the system of representation in the public administration and government, Dr. Lwaitama from UDSM argued that Nyerere favored a policy where the highly educated groups were encouraged to pursue careers within the professional fields, while the less privileged groups in turn were given access to public and political office – cabinet position, principal secretaries, regional commissioners etc. (Lwaitama, 10.5.2011). The conscious efforts made by Nyerere’s government to balance representation was one of the most commonly mentioned reasons for the good ethnic (and religious) relations in the country in my interviews with researchers at UDSM. Obviously, given the 120 or so ethnic groups in Tanzania it was not possible to ensure representation of all groups; representation was thus constructed on a regional rather than an ethnic basis. (Prof. Mushi, 7.6.2011) Mushi emphasizes that the equal representation in public office in terms of regions had to be designed as something of a given: he argued that people were not to be encouraged to “think in ethnic ways”. According to this interpretation, the balancing was in the interest of the highest leadership because it resulted in a situation where, according to Hydén, Nyerere could rely on members from any ethnic group for loyalty (Hyden, 1994, p. 84).
The system of ensuring widespread and fairly equal representation of the various regions in the country seems to have prevailed after Nyerere’s retirement as well. Nyang’oro listed the regional and ethnic background of cabinet ministers in the 1990, 1995 and 2000 governments, and the background of regional commissioners and permanent secretaries in 2000, and found a considerable variety of ethnic groups and regions represented, with no particular group being dominant (Nyang’oro, 2004, pp. 11-14). The balanced ethnic composition of government and civil service was ensured also in institutions such as the military, in particular after the attempted military coup of 1964. Particular effort was put into the geographical and ethnic mixing of recruits in the army, while the higher command of the army was coopted into the TANU and the potential spoils associated with it, in order to contain the political ambitions of the army leadership (Blum, 2006, p. 26; Glickmann, p. 293). The balanced ethnic composition of the army and its close relationships to the party and its rent-sharing mechanisms has been ascribed quite some importance in ensuring peaceful ethnic and political relations in Tanzania (Omari, 2002; also Yahya-Othman, personal communication).

6.5.1.3 Nationalism, Swahili and the Educational System

Building a strong national identity within the boundaries of the national state inherited from colonialism was an intractable part of the policies pursued by the Nyerere’s government. Indeed, it has been seen as his greatest accomplishment: Nyang’oro claims that “Nyerere’s grand nationalist project of creating a nation of Tanzanians who viewed themselves as Tanzanians first and other identities second has been a resounding success” (Nyang’oro, 2004, p. 38). The importance and saliency of national identity in Tanzania was evident also in tables 6.3 – 6.5 showing the Afrobarometer results above. Whitehead goes as far as to suggest that no other African country can match Tanzania in terms of its strong sense of national consciousness. He argues, quite obviously, that this exceptional national identity has undermined the emergence of ethnic, religious or other subnational identities (Whitehead, 2009, p. 286-88). Whitehead notes that Tanzania’s peaceful history and national consciousness is a source of considerable pride among Tanzanians and my interviews in Tanzania very much support this claim. In particular with regard to the absence of tribalism, numerous respondents highlighted the exceptional state of Tanzanian national unity (e.g. O17; O11; O13). I will discuss this point further in chapters 7 and 9 and here I will merely discuss a few of the policy issues that can be said to have influenced the construction of this national identity.
Obviously, the borders Tanganyika inherited at independence no more reflected a natural state of affairs than any other national border in Africa, and much effort was thus put into stuffing the newly forming national identity with cultural content. This process involved the creation of various ministries and department fashioned to the task, and the active promotion of various cultural symbols; a process that has been traced in detail by Jerman (1997, e.g. pp. 78-80; 318-322). Also, symbols of independence, self-reliance and nationhood were prominently displayed and propagated: the national motto *uhuru na umoja* (freedom and unity); the uhuru torch race by the TANU Youth League; and not least the policies of self-reliance by the government, to mention a few (e.g. Whitehead, pp. 291-92). While the cultural and symbolic aspects of nationalism were surely important, the main instruments in the construction of national identity were arguably the educational system and the promotion of Swahili as the national language.

*The Education System*

Miguel in particular has highlighted the role of the media and the educational institutions in imbuing citizens with a sense of national identity. According to Miguel, the curriculum of Tanzanian schools was fashioned to instill students with a strong sense of national and pan-African identity (Miguel, 2002, p. 10). Schools that had previously been run to a large extent by religious or other private organizations were now nationalized, and the government put a particular emphasis on ensuring a regional mix of students in the schools, in order to “cement national unity” (Kaya, 2004, p. 165). It was customary for students to venture outside of their regions of origin to attend secondary school. For instance many of my respondents in Mwanza, in particular the older ones, attributed the good ethnic relations in Tanzania to the circulation of the educational system:

“In the schooling system, everyone was transferred to different parts of the country. I went to Chagga land myself. You couldn’t stay in your home area to study. So the tribes were mixed up and eventually you became friends.” P19, Veteran politician, Mwanza

Many of the respondents in Mwanza who originated from other regions had originally come to Mwanza to attend secondary school, and emphasized how the ease of moving to different regions in the country both was due to the good ethnic relations, while at the same time contributing to the maintenance of cordial relations (e.g. P23; RL8). A retired opposition politician in Mwanza phrased it this way: “You spend six years in another region, so there is no fear of *kabila* or *dini*. Without this, there might be problems, because if you’re Makonde, then you will know only Makonde. But if it is mixed, then you will know many cultures.” (P23, 1.6.2011)
As hinted at above, were considerable educational and economic discrepancies among the various regions in the country at independence (e.g. Illiffe 1979) and since regions and the major ethnic groups frequently coincide, this posited a potential problem for ethnic relations. Some ethnic groups were both better educated and their geographical areas economically more developed (Chagga and Kilimajaro, Haya and Kagera, Nyakyusa and Southern Highlands) than the rest of the country (e.g. Nyang’oro, 2004, pp. 10-11). As mentioned above, this was in part addressed through representation in public office, and in addition, a quota system was introduced for students from regions with lower educational standards, so that entry requirements to secondary school were different depending on region of origin (Cooksey et al., 1994, pp. 216-17; also personal communication Prof. Mushi, 9.6.2011). This project obviously aimed at redressing imbalances in education, but also to ensure equality in employment possibilities. It was not entirely successful, however. As Glickman points out, the “privileged” groups remained better educated and employed than other groups (Glickman, 1995, pp. 292-93). Also in my interviews, it was commonly mentioned that certain groups had an educational advantage over others (e.g. O13, P19) and inequalities between ethnic groups also transpired in the Afrobarometer results in table 6.5. The conscious efforts by the government to level these imbalances and the system of equitable public representation and inclusion might have countered the tendency by ethnic groups to voice these grievances (e.g. Dr. Lwaitama, 10.5.2011). However, education remains one of the most central bones of contention regarding religious relations in the country, which will be discussed in chapter 8.

Swahili: The National Language

The second major contributing factor to the successful construction of national identity in Tanzania is the use and promotion of Swahili as a national language and the language of instruction in primary schools. Swahili was introduced as the language of administration already by the German colonial government, and Nyerere actively promoted its use in all sectors of public administration (Miguel, p. 10). The suitability of Swahili as a national language was based on it being seen as neutral language without a clear to connection to any particular ethnic group, while at the same time being an indigenous African language, as opposed to the colonial languages of English, French or German (ibid; Glickman, 1995, p. 292). As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, the Languages of Tanzania Atlas counts up to 150 languages in the country, and Swahili was thus consciously used as a means of facilitating national integration and communication across groups (Hyden, 1994, p. 83). It was also an integral part of the nation building process (Jerman, p. 323) and Barkan notes that the language in itself developed a “political idiom, which has fostered the
development of national political culture” (Barkan, 1994, p. 10). This presumably includes concepts such as *ujamaa* (familyhood) and *umoja* (unity). In addition, the use of a common national language facilitated the recruitment of personnel to the public administration, putting groups from different parts of the country on the same level and facilitating inter-elite communication (Glickman, p. 292). The “language of unity” (Yahya-Othman, personal communication) thus contributed in a decisive manner to the saliency of national identity and to cross-ethnic accommodation and communication. In the Tanzania of today, Swahili is the main and frequently sole language of communication for urban youth, who do not necessarily speak the vernaculars of their parents (Nyang’oro, p. 39).

The account above is not meant to elicit unreserved support for the policies of Nyerere’s government, which had grown increasingly unpopular towards the end of his reign as economic problems mounted (e.g. Glickman, 1995; Barkan, 1994). Rather, the aim of the discussion is to point to how ethnicity and ethnic relations were actively addressed on the political level by Nyerere’s government. In the words of Göran Hydén, Nyerere’s Tanzania managed to “elevate political discourse to a level where ethnicity doesn’t count” (Hyden, 1994, p. 83). There are plenty of signs that this situation has prevailed, even after the introduction of multiparty politics. As argued by Nyang’oro in 2004: “a sure way for a politician to make himself or herself unwelcome in the political arena is to pursue the ethnic route” (Nyang’oro, p. 48). There is no doubt that the TANU/CCM government ever since independence has actively decried the use of tribalism or religious politics and that this has resulted in a situation where ethnic or religious sentiments simply are not easily evoked in the political realm (e.g. Whitehead 2009; Chaligha et al. 2001). There is no doubt, as mentioned earlier, that the national unity and peaceful history of the “exceptional nation” of Tanzania is the source of some pride to Tanzanians, and the CCM has actively profiled itself as the guardian of this national unity (Whitehead, 2009, chapter 12). The avoidance of *ukabila* and *udini* is seen by many as one of the main accomplishments of independent Tanzanian and the legacy of Nyerere (e.g. Yahya-Othman, 9.6.2011; Nyang’oro 2004). This goes some way to explain the exceptional effect that accusations of ethnic and religious bias leveled against political opponents have in Tanzania. This is particularly true for ruling party CCM. In my interviews at UDSM, researchers were quite candid in emphasizing that turning to ethnic and religious accusations might have considerable effect, when political opponents are on the rise and political developments run against the ruling party (e.g. Dr. Kamata, 12.5.2011). In reading the analysis of ethnicity and religion in the 2010 election in chapters 7 and 9, it is useful to bear in mind the strong political discourse in Tanzania that prohibits the use of *udini* and *ukabila*. 
6.5.2 Concluding discussion

The account of the politics of socialist Tanzania under Nyerere given above thus falls quite neatly in line with the theoretical discussion earlier, as Tanzania seems to have addressed vertical inequalities, guaranteed inclusion of various groups and aimed at constructing an overriding national identity. The incentives for various groups to use ethnicity for political purposes were thus reduced, and the means to mobilize in the basis of ethnicity severely curtailed. However, although the balancing was done with reference to regions rather than ethnicity (Prof Mushi) it still seems as if ethnicity was quite actively targeted, which would be evident also in the many quotes by Nyerere decrying tribalism and religious politics. As mentioned above, the system of inclusion, redistribution and ethnic balancing aimed at “projecting a feeling of inclusiveness” that was based on a sense of representation of “people of your kind” in the words of Dr. Lwaitama (see above). In this interpretation, representation is thus a way of ensuring inclusion with reference to common origin. In the next chapter, I explain why references to common origin may be seen as ethnic, and make a distinction between different types of ethnic politics. Here it may be stated that the inclusive system of politics during Nyerere’s reign were in part based on the management of ethnicity, and thus as a form of ethnic politics.

However, this is clearly something different than tribalism, which above was defined as competition between ethnic groups for resources in a zero-sum fashion. Rather, what this chapter has shown is that the management of ethnic diversity by the first independence government of Tanzania could be seen as one example of the integrative effect of ethnicity envisaged by Lonsdale (1994) and mentioned by Laakso & Olukoshi (1996) in the beginning of this chapter. In the last section of this chapter, I will connect this argument to the notion by Lindberg & Morrison (section 5.3) regarding the rationality of electing local candidates and Chabal’s perspective on origin and politics (6.6) to show how allusions to common origin can be interpreted in different ways. On last point regarding the Nyerere’s influence on ethnic politics must be however before moving on, however. Based on section 6.3 it seems as if there was a potential for politicization of ethnicity towards the end of the colonial period, given the numerous tribal unions and groups that had formed and that pursued political influence. Still, in newly independent Tanzania in 1961, TANU rose to power virtually unopposed by other political movements and enjoyed almost universal popular support in the beginning of the 1960s (e.g. Glickman, 1996, pp. 294-95; Barkan, 1994, p. 9). How did TANU and its chairman Nyerere manage to unite all the disparate tribal unions and groups into one independence vehicle from the very outset of assuming power in 1954?
It is not possible to assess this question here, it could be argued that ethnic groups in Tanzania have a history of cooperation that sets it apart from other former colonies. Examples of this could for instance be the maji maji rebellion in 1905 (Monson, 1998) or the caravan trade, which mixed people from different parts of the country laid as basis for management of common issues as argued by Abrahams (1981) and Prof Tambila (see section 6.4.1). Nyang’oro argues that in the struggle for independence, even individual “tribal” struggles gained national character, like the Meru land case in Arusha, where the Meru leader Kirilo Japhet was joined by leaders to other tribal unions to mobilize for independence. Tribal unions were also actively included in the independence movement led by TANU from the beginning (Nyang’oro, 2004, p. 4). In contrast, in Kenya, for instance, by the late 1950s, there was already considerable competition among political parties (KANU and KADU) that were based to a large extent on ethnic organizations (Muigai, 1995, pp. 163-66). It has thus been suggested that ethnic identities in Tanganyika were never politicized as in other British colonies, since the system of indirect rule was not as meticulously implemented there as elsewhere. This was supposedly due to the legacy of mixed German and British colonial systems combined with the fact that Tanzania was a peripheral colony. (Deutsch, 1996, in particular pp. 34-36; Weber, 2010, pp. 10-13) Ethnicity was therefore not as rigidly attached to competition for and allocation of public resources. Anke Weber, in her account of the development of ethnicity in Tanzania, sees it as a combination of this colonial legacy and the polities of Nyerere (Weber, 2010, p. 23). The argument cannot be further pursued here, but it might be added that is was quite adamantly refuted by the researchers I interviewed at UDSM (e.g. history professor K. Tambila and Professor and REDET Chairman S. Mushi). Whatever the case, it seems fair to suggest that when looking for the reasons for the good ethnic relations in Tanzania, one should not focus exclusively on the politics of independent Tanzania.

6.6 Ethnicity, Politics and other Social Identities

The final section of the analysis of ethnicity in Tanzania consists of two parts. First, I will briefly discuss the transition to multiparty politics and the new political parties that emerged after liberalization with regard to ethnic politics. Second, I will use examples from Tanzania’s multiparty history as well as the most recent elections to discuss different types of ethnicity and how they might result in different kinds of politics. In essence, I argue that all identities that espouse a conception of common origin, descent and culture might be defined as ethnic. The politics made on the basis of these identities may however differ substantially with regard to its consequences and
nature. I therefore suggest that ethnic politics in Tanzania may conveniently be divided into two categories. The first category is political tribalism, which can be understood, in accordance with Lonsdale’s definition, as the evocation of ethnicity for political purposes in competition with other ethnic groups. Ethnic group is here understood as those groups that formed and become consolidated as a consequence of the process of colonialism: the Sukuma, the Haya, the Nyamwezi, and so on. The second category is termed the politics of origin, a term which I will use to describe identity politics that are tied to some sort of common origin, but are not extended or restricted to an ethnic group as defined above. While the term politics of origin might not be optimal as a description of the issue at hand, it does serve the purpose of making a conceptual distinction between different types of ethnic politics, which underlies the analysis in chapter 7.

6.6.1 Liberalization, Democratization and Ethnicity

As Tanzania was moving towards political and economic liberalization, president Mwinyi ordered a commission under Chief Justice Francis Nyalali to investigate the precondition for a transition towards multiparty democracy (see chapter 4). In the Nyalali commission report on the introduction of multiparty democracy in Tanzania in 1992, 77% of the respondents interviewed had been in favor of retaining the one-party system (Nyalali Commission, 1992, cited in Liviga 2009). Interestingly, out of the reasons cited for rejecting reform, a fear that multi-party democracy will “divide people into irreconcilable groups” was one of the most central factors (Chaligha et al 2002). Mirroring the fear that multipartyism may lead to inter-group conflict, the new Political Parties Act laid out strict requirements for political parties to register, which are still in effect. First, according to the requirements, parties can only contest elections if they manage to obtain a minimum of 200 registered members in 8 out of the 20 mainland regions and on both Pemba and Zanzibar. Second, and more importantly, parties were prohibited to “aim to further the interest of” any religious, ethnic or racial group or “only a specific area” in Tanzania (Political Parties Act, Tanzania 2002). In addition, the Tanzanian Electoral Code of Conduct further stipulates that campaign meetings are to be held in Swahili – an interpreter is to be used where Swahili is not understood – and meetings cannot discriminate on the basis of tribe, religion or ethnic group (Tanzania Electoral Code of Conduct, 2010). While some, as Nyang’oro (2004), see the guidelines as a “concerted effort by the government to further the nationalist project of Julius Nyerere” (Nyang’oro 2004, p. 43); others have seen them, at least in part, as attempts to complicate the registration procedure (see Erdmann, 2002, p. 14; Chaligha & Mmuya 1994, pp. 96-7). Whatever the case, the possibilities for political parties to secure a following on ethnic or religious basis has been severely curtailed by the formal
electoral rules in Tanzania from the very outset of multiparty politics (see Moroff, 2010 for an assessment of the effectiveness of ethnic party regulation in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda).

6.6.1.2 Opposition Parties, Ethnicity and Regionalism
New political parties began to emerge at a quick pace and the political leaders of the emerging opposition parties were either erstwhile independence period TANU loyalists that had fallen out with the government, like Oscar Kambona or Chief Fundikira; or “young urban professionals” who questioned the economic management of the country by CCM (Chege, 1994, p. 62). Some, like Edwin Mtei of Chadema were both former TANU-actives and severe critics of the governments economic policies. In any case, most of the new parties were “organized from above” rather than from the grassroots (Chaligha et al, p. 5; Chaligha & Mmuya 1994). Despite the strict registration rules, Chaligha & Mmuya argue that some of the newly formed political parties seemed to exhibit some ethnic or regional bias, focusing their mobilization efforts on only a few regions of the country (Chaligha & Mmuya, 1994). Indeed, the three major parties that emerged at the time and still contest elections today – Chadema, NCCR-Maguezi and CUF – all had regional strongholds, as did some of the smaller parties, like UMD and UDP (see Whitehead 2009, p. 265-69; Erdmann 2002)

Furthermore, in an analysis of ethnicity in 1995 elections, Charles Gasarasi (1997) found numerous instances of ethnic campaigning and political rhetoric in the post-election regional monitoring reports from across the country. These were mainly confined to local level campaigning or even intra-party candidate nomination, where candidates commonly sought to discredit competitors on the basis of ethnicity. Among other examples, Gasarasi found an instance in Arusha where NCCRs Maasai candidate had questioned the right of CCM:s candidate (incidentally future prime minister Edward Lowassa) to run for office, considering his Meru background in the Maasai constituency. (Gasarasi 1997, pp. 249-253) Also in Mmuya & Chaligha there are reports on the use of vernaculars by CCM candidates to discredit opposition candidates who originated from outside their regions of contest (Mmuya & Chaligha, 1994). Ethnicity did thus apparently play a role in the first multiparty elections, in particular in local level skirmishes, but this did not necessarily affect national level political contestation. Where it did, Whitehead argues that ethnicity was simply to ”fragmented and lacking in saliency” to build a political basis that could have challenged CCM (Whitehead, 2009, p. 265). However, it is quite questionable to what extent the political parties that emerged actually based their support on ethnicity in the form of ethnic group identity. This point will be made with
reference to UDP and NCCR-M in the remainder of the chapter, and with respect to Chadema in chapter 7, but also as for the other parties evidence of ethnic mobilization is scant.

To be sure, there were small and short-lived parties such as UMD that may have had an ethnic basis: Its first chair, Chief Fundikira, was a hereditary chief of Unyanyembe in Unyamwezi, and thus received some support among the Wasukuma and Wanyamwezi (Chege pp. 53; 62; Barkan pp. 32-33). However, the party’s support has always been marginal, and the party never managed to appeal to any substantial part of the Sukuma or Nyamwezi. CUF has long been seen as a Zanzibar-based party (e.g. Gasarasi, 1997) and has secured most of its following on the islands and along the coast of the mainland, as well as in some of the urban centers of the country. The party has long been accused of having a religious bias in favor of Muslims, accusations that were particularly vocal when the party had emerged as the largest competitor to CCM. (Dr. Makulilo, personal communication) While it might be true that CUF’s support has been somewhat geared towards Muslim-dominated areas, it can hardly be described as a religious party, which is discussed also in chapter 9. CUF actives also vehemently denied the party’s alleged religious bias in my interviews, and assured that the party had sought national appeal even at its height of popularity (e.g. P 14; P 20). In the first multiparty elections of 1995, NCCR-M was by far the most popular opposition party in both presidential and parliamentary elections. NCCR-M’s and its chairman Augustine Mrema’s support with regard to regional or ethnic structure will therefore be dealt next, alongside the example of UDP’s John Cheyo, which will work to elicit the complex connection between ethnicity and politics in Tanzania.

6.6.2 Ethnicity, Origin and the “Homeboy Effect”

In age of multi-party politics, accusations of ethnic bias leveled against opposition parties – in particular by the ruling party – have figured prominently in the political rhetoric of Tanzania (e.g. Erdmann, 2002, p. 28; Dr. Kamata, personal communication). As mentioned at the end of section 6.5.1, the ruling party has commonly portrayed itself as the ”guardian of national unity”, and accusing political opponents of ethnic or religious bias has had particular effect since it is suggesting a threat against the much-guarded national unity of the country (see Whitehead, 2009, esp. chapter 12). Therefore it might be advisable to treat allegations of ethnic or religious politics with some caution. I will illustrate and discuss this point with reference to political parties or individual politicians in Tanzania who command a strong local support basis or whose support is predominantly based only in certain parts of the country. This has commonly been equated with ethnic loyalty (e.g. Omari 1997; Mmuya & Chaligha 1994), which is largely due to the fact that
regional/district level and ethnic borders coincide in many cases. Should these support structures be judged as ethnic support in the sense of ethnic group loyalties? As Dr. Makulilo, lecturer in Political Science at the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM), phrased it: “if a Chagga wins in Kilimanjaro or a Sukuma in Mwanza, can you say it is because of ethnicity?” (Makulilo, 9.5.2011) I will look at a few examples from the 1995 and 2010 elections to discuss the relation between ethnicity and regional support basis.

In the 1995 presidential elections, NCCR-M candidate Augustine Mrema, an ethnic Mchagga, had a substantial following in his home region of Kilimajaro, showing support levels some 50 percent above national average, and winning in all of the six constituencies in the region that are commonly taken to be Chagga-dominated (Whitehead p. 473, see chapter 7 for these constituencies). It was also reported that Mrema was strongly supported by Chaggas in all main urban centers of the country, some of which followed him on his election trail as well (Gasarasi 1997; Omari 1997). This has led Cuthbert Omari to describe Mrema’s success, particularly in Kilimanjaro, as being based on ethnicity. Omari for instance quoted voters in Shinyanga who rejected Mrema and NCCR-M because they refused “to be dominated by the Chagga” (Omari, 1997, p. 65). In consequence, NCCR was also commonly depicted as a Chagga-dominated party (Erdmann, 2002, pp. 17; 25; 29). Similarly, Omari saw the success of UDP’s John Cheyo in his home district of West Bariadi as being based on Sukuma ethnicity. Cheyo had defected from UMD and was attempting to appeal to partially the same groups as that party, albeit focusing mainly on the Sukuma. In the 1995 elections, he did indeed receive a substantial backing in several constituencies in these regions, which contributed to 67 % of his national votes. The fact that his support was the most regionally concentrated of any candidate in the presidential race tells of his regional appeal. (Whitehead 2009, p. 267). Omari claims that Cheyo had made frequent references to mwenzetu (swa: colleague) to infer ethnicity during the campaigns, which supposedly was to work as a “code word for belongingness” (Omari, 1997, p. 64). It was also commonly reported that Cheyo had used Kisukuma in his campaigns, in violation of the election code (Gasarasi, 1997, p. 253) In the end, according to Omari, people had voted for Cheyo in Bariadi West “simply because he comes from that area” (Omari, p. 51).

It is far from clear, however, that Mrema’s and Cheyo’s support can be seen strictly in terms of ethnicity, understood as Sukuma or Chagga ethnic group identity. While there are indeed reports that UDP and in particular John Cheyo have attempted to appeal to Sukuma ethnic identity in their campaigns (Gasarasi, 1997, p. 248), there is little evidence that this has been effective. For instance,
Cheyo’s support in the 1995 presidential elections was based mainly in areas dominated by the Sukuma, but he was far from being the most popular candidate in Sukumaland in general. In the 1995 presidential election, Cheyo’s most successful bid, even in his home region in Shinyanga, CCM’s Mkapa won most constituencies comfortably, a trend that was even stronger in Mwanza, the other Sukuma-region. In the constituency of Shinyanga urban, for instance, Cheyo lost not only to the CCM candidate Mkapa, but also to NCCR’s Mrema and CUF’s Lipumba. (Erdmann, 2002, pp. 19; 29; Tanzanian Electoral Commission) In the 2010 elections, UDP was quite successful in the, the party’s support again firmly anchored in Sukumaland. Cheyo managed to get elected as MP of his home district of Bariadi, Shinyanga, and in addition party old-timer Julius Ngongoseke (interviewed 20.5.2011) lost only by a hair’s breadth in the MP race in Magu town in Mwanza. Here again, however, the same logic applied as above. UDP’s support did not stretch beyond the districts of Meatu and Bariadi in Shinyanga and Magu in Mwanza, which cover only a small part of Sukumaland. For UDP, in 2010 as in 1995, the bulk of its supporters are Sukuma, but the bulk of the Sukuma did not support the party.

While Cheyo’s support did not encompass anything resembling the whole ethnic group, Mrema’s support in turn was not confined to it. It is true that Mrema’s support among the Chagga in Kilimanjaro was exceptional (77,5 % in the region as a whole) and his support among urban Wachagga might have been substantial as well, as argued by Omari. However, in 1995, Mrema was the second most popular presidential candidate in all regions on the mainland except for Shinyanga (where Cheyo had his stronghold) and the Zanzibar and Pemba regions (where CUF’s Lipumba was the favorite). His support was also well above national average in regions such as Mbeya and Rukwa, were the Chagga influence can safely be assumed to be low. (Results in Whitehead, pp. 472-6) In particular, his support was exceptionally high across the north, also in those districts were the Chagga were not predominant, as in most of Arusha. A similar example from the 2010 elections helps to make the point. In the presidential race, Chadema’s Willibrod Slaa’s support was significantly above national average in the districts of Arusha and Manyara in which his ethnic group the Iraqw is dominant, for instance Mbulu (62,7 %), Karatu (62,1 %) and Hanang (53,2 %). However, Slaa secured remarkable support across the whole northern zone (Kilimanjaro, Arusha and Manyara), as shown clearly in chapters 7 and 9 above. While Slaa’s and Chadema’s support in 2010 was significantly higher in urban centers than in rural constituencies in the country on average (see chapter 4), in the northern zone, it was consistently high across both rural and urban districts. In Arusha rural, for instance, a rural district where there are hardly any Iraqw speakers at all, Slaa received well over 40 percent of the votes. In addition, in Babati rural, where Iraqw is the most
spoken language, Chadema’s local MP candidate got only marginal support, while Dr. Slaa in turn received over 50 percent of the vote in the same district. This would indicate that Slaa’s support was not based on his party or his ethnicity, but his person.

6.6.2.1 The Homeboy Effect and the Politics of Origin

In order to conceptualize the phenomenon of local strongmen that are not directly attributable to ethnicity as ethnic group identity, it is possible allude to what Gasarasi has called the *homeboy effect*. This is a “milder form” of ethnic parochialism, which refers more to the local standing of a politician than to “ethnicity proper” (Gasarasi 1997, pp. 249; 248). According to Makulilo, “it’s a question of being born, doing business and living in that area. People will say: we know this guy” (Makulilo, 9.5.2011). Does the homeboy effect then imply a type of identity politics based on origin that is distinct from ethnicity? At this point it is instructive to return to the theoretical discussion. So far an extensive discussion has dealt with the historical “invention” of ethnicity, its political character and how the emergence of political ethnicity may be prevented, but not much has been said about how ethnicity may be defined in relation to other social identities. As mentioned in section 6.2, Barth suggested that an identity is ethnic when it appeals to the most basic general identity of a person, related to origin and background (Barth, 1969, p. 13). Emberling suggest a list of additional criteria for distinguishing ethnic groups from other social groups. Of these criteria, the most prominent is the conception of a common decent and ancestry among members of an ethnic group. Ethnic groups, according to this view, form an extension of family, clan or kinship, but the common genealogy is culturally constructed; the link is social rather than biological (even though actual kinship obviously may form part of it). (Emberling, 1997, pp. 302-304)

More specifically: “As an identity based on kinship, [ethnicity] differs from political, national, regional, status, class, and professional identities. Although kinship may be important within each of these categories […], it is not the organizing principle of the category as a whole” (Emberling, p. 305). In addition to kinship and common descent, however imagined, is the perception that the group shares a number of customs and traditions (e.g. Jerman, 1997). While the actual “cultural stuff” that is highlighted in the identification and self-identification of an ethnic group does not necessarily constitute age-old traditions of some cohesive social organization, the conception of a common ethnic identity is closely associated with the conception of common customs and traditions. This clearly transpires in accounts on ethnic groups in Tanzania, with respect to which customs and traditions are evoked as common heritage in various situations (see Abrahams, 1981 for the Nyamwezi; Jerman 1997 for the Zigua; Brandström, 1990 for the Sukuma-Nyamwezi). This
was also apparent in my interviews in Mwanza as explained in section 6.4.1, where Sukuma identity frequently was defined in cultural terms.

Finally, common descent and heritage are also closely connected to a certain locality and community. Jerman has shown how land (*nchi*) was an integral part in forming the identity of people and communities among the Zigua in Tanzania (Jerman, 1997, e.g. p. 281). Origin as based in part on locality is emphasized also by Chabal as the core of an individual’s identity (see below). Based on the discussion so far, an ethnic identity can thus be defined and set apart from other identities such as class or profession with reference to a common heritage or descent, which entails a conception of common origin. This is commonly tied to a certain locality, and to certain traditions and customs. This expanded definition of ethnicity implies some consequences for the definition of ethnic politics. Barth argues that when elites choose to emphasize ethnic identity, they can choose between several of identities provided by “traditional social organization: Tribe, caste, language group, region or state all have features that make them a potentially adequate primary ethnic identity for group reference” (Barth, 1969, p. 34)\(^{27}\). Barth thus defines all of these identities as ethnic, which would make political evocations of any of these identities amount to ethnic politics.

In sum, the argument here is thus that an identity is ethnic when it appeals to the basic factors of origin, and that political evocations of such identities are thus to be viewed as ethnic as well.

This is in line with Brandström’s argument that the process of colonialism, in which ethnic group identities like Sukuma and Nyamwezi were consolidated, resulted in the creation of multiple layers of identity, in which older identities continued to exist alongside the larger overlapping ones. A explained above, in the Sukuma-Nyamwezi area, there was an extensive system of chieftainships that were clearly tied to a place of origin, with strong identification factors attached to belonging to a chieftainship (see section 6.3; Brandström 1990; Holmes, 1969). According to the definition above, these identities are thus to be judged as ethnic as well. I have no evidence that these older identities are actually used for political purposes in the Tanzania of today, but according to Brandström, they remained important identification factors in post-colonial Tanzania alongside ethnic group identities, be they Sukuma or Nyamwezi (Brandström, pp. 10-11). On a general level, however, it may be concluded that allusion to ethnicity in the form of ethnic group identity – Sukuma, Haya, Chagga etc. – is only one form of ethnic politics, that which has gained particular influence in many parts of Africa due to the process of colonialism. It is useful to make a

\(^{27}\) Cf. “situational ethnicity”, which stresses how individuals alternate between various identity factors in their dealings with the outer world e.g. Fenton, 1999, p. 94; Emberling, 1997, p. 306).
categorical distinction between this type of ethnic politics and those based either on more local ethnic identities, or on wider regional identities, also tied to notion of common origin. The former type is termed political tribalism, in accordance with the discussion in sections 6.2-6.4, while I call the latter type the politics of origin. The importance of making this distinction is further elucidated below, but first I will slightly develop the argument of common origin.

6.6.2.2 Origin and Chabal’s Being and Belonging

Patrick Chabal writes about the importance of origin for politics in Africa in his much-debated book The Politics of Suffering and Smiling (2009). Origin is part of what Chabal calls the politics of being and belonging, which form part of Chabal’s approach to analyzing African politics. What matters in terms of identity, argues Chabal, is which identities are negotiable and which are not. While identity in Africa is often simply equated with ethnicity or religion, he sees these identities as fluid, malleable and adaptable identities, while the factors of origin, on the other hand, are not negotiable and therefore constitute an integral part of any person’s identity. (Chabal, 2009, pp. 30-35). Chabal therefore regards origin as something different than ethnicity, but his argumentation is still useful for the general points made here. In Chabal’s account, the origin of an individual is constructed on the basis on land, ancestors and beliefs, and these are central to the formation of an individual’s identity. Land has an impact on self-perception of communities and often marks its actual physical boundaries as well as determines occupation: pastoralist, farmers, fishermen etc. Land can therefore shape the self-definition, socio-political organization and local political economy of a community or a group. Ancestors in turn are often linked to land, since it is commonly believed that they inhabit the lands of origin and are not separable from it (see also Ellis & ter Haar, 1998; 2007). Land and ancestors then form the basis of a belief system that guides both ethical and socio-political values, which, as anywhere, have an impact on politics. All of these are related to locality, which refers to a community, and to the place and role of the individual in this community. (Chabal, 2009, pp. 24-42)

The point is that according to Chabal, in large parts of Africa authority is gained by adhering to the norms and structures of local societies. This may be further clarified with respect to how Chabal views kin and reciprocity. Chabal argues that these two factors are not be reduced to “primordial, traditional or ascriptive” ethnic identities, but rather kin is to be understood as a vast association of

28 Chabal’s approach has been quite thoroughly criticized among other things for putting too much emphasis on cultural factors in explaining African politics. A collection of reviews of the book and Chabal’s reply were included in Critical African Studies No 2, 2009. See reference below under Chabal, P et al Where Next …
people that are bound together by a connection to a certain locality. These associations form networks with other associations on the local and national levels. Chabal claims that belonging to a kinship network is crucial for the social identity of individuals and it gives value, legitimacy and merit to political action. Indeed, it is what makes one human; one exists socially only as far as one is part of a kinship group. If identity is communal, then politics must reflect this; politics, Chabal argues, is about collective virtue as well as power, and therefore politicians need to display the identity and qualities of his/her kin association on the national political level. The links between the kin association and the politicians, according to Chabal, consists of a system of obligations between members of the kinship groups. This extends to the political sphere, which, according to Chabal, itself can be seen as a network of obligations. (Chabal, pp. 43-50)

Obligations are in turn defined by what Chabal calls structures of reciprocity. Identity-based reciprocity is based on well-defined rules of exchange of both symbolic and material resources between rulers and ruled. This is commonly epitomized by what the community of origin expects of their politicians when in office. Apart from representing the "formal" interest of his or her constituency, political representatives are also expected to guarantee certain material benefits, as well as represent a number of identity markers (e.g. in terms of ethnicity or religion) and the qualities and virtues that the community of origin holds of itself. In other words, the political representative is to be “a proper constituent members of the group as it defines itself”(p. 53) In effect, then, the legitimacy of politicians depends on their ability to fulfill their kinship obligations, and even if politicians take on national attributes and identities, they are still bound by expectations of delivering the local public good. (Chabal pp. 50-57)

These points relate to the notion of accountability of rulers to the ruled. In the face of a failed modernization and democratization, these informal channels of influence provide a rational means for ordinary citizens to keep their representatives in check and to be included in the flows of power and resources. At the same time it is a way for politicians to maintain an amount of legitimacy. While Chabal sees these means of accountability as mainly playing out in the informal field, he admits that democratic institutions may indeed serve as a reciprocal mechanism as well, electing representatives, distributing resources, producing legitimacy and providing channels of influence for local community members. (Chabal pp. 56-57) It could be added that the informal and formal,

While these factors relating to the politics of being provide some explanation to the partisanship of politicians witnessed throughout Africa, Chabal stresses that communal factors can also be exploited and abused to motivate corruption and “sheer greed” (p. 38).
democratic and non-democratic, do not necessarily have to be seen in opposition to each other. Alluding to the factors of origin might be a way also for a democratic electorate to ensure inclusion in the political system and compliance with their standards. The pertinent issue is whether there is a need to resort to identity factors to gain leverage over politicians, or if factors relating to person and political agenda function as political accountability, in accordance with the scheme outlined in section 4.3

A problem with Chabal’s model is that he fails to define in what ways origin differs from ethnicity. He merely states that origin does not directly allude to identity but rather to community, but still, the factors that compose origin – land, ancestors and beliefs – are integral for forming a person’s identity (p. 27). Also, the discussion above regarding what is expected of representatives of a community are not very different from Lonsdale’s moral ethnicity, which entails a “multi-vocal” debate as to what membership in an ethnicity entails and who is to represent it (Lonsdale 1994, p. 140). Thus, Chabal’s conception of origin is useful for understanding how local forms of identity may be used in the political sphere, but it is argued here that these identities are in fact a form of ethnicity. More specifically, common origin, heritage and culture form the basis of what ethnic identity is about, with the caveat the actual commonness of these factors may be largely a social construction. However, origin does not necessarily need to be defined strictly as by Chabal above (land, ancestors, beliefs) and in my field research, I understand origin in general terms as relating to a certain locality and the community associated with that locality.

In sum, then, the overarching ethnic identity of an individual or a person may be Sukuma or Nyamwezi, but this identity might coexist with more locally confined identities related to place of origin; or these locally defined identities may be part of the larger ethnic identity. In addition, origin might in some cases span a larger area than that occupied by one’s ethnic group. In my interviews, I attempted to elaborate on this latter point by asking respondents in Mwanza what area would be considered as “home”, if referred to from far away (in most cases, I simply used Dar es Salaam as an example). While the replies varied, in general respondents would consider the whole larger Lake Zone, in particular Mwanza, Shinyanga and Mara, as “home”. This implied that if a person from those parts were encountered in DSM, he or she would be ndugu, as opposed to someone from other parts of the country (e.g. O23; O24). Reference to common origin might thus be used as a political referent as well, and it is towards this background that the regional, zonal or district level popularity of local strongmen or national politicians may be seen. In conclusion, factors of origin may be used for ethnic politics as much as the ethnic group identity commonly referred to as kabila in Tanzania.
However, if this is the case, what use is it making the categorical distinction argued for at some length above?

I would suggest that the importance of making a distinction lies in what consequences different types of ethnic politics may be expected to have. A few examples from Tanzanian politics may serve to prove this point. Augustine Mrema’s, as mentioned above, Mrema fared exceptionally well in the 1995 presidential elections in his home region of Kilimanjaro, and was at times perceived by many as a Chagga candidate. In the by-election of 1996 in Temeke, Dar es Salaam, Mrema contested for the MP seat against a local candidate on the CCM ticket. His competitor attempted to discredit Mrema on the basis of him being both Chagga and Christian, and therefore not fit to represent the predominantly Muslim constituency, where the ethnic groups Wadengereko apparently was predominant. Despite this Mrema prevailed quite comfortably in the elections, and occupied the seat of MP for Temeke until the following elections. (Whitehead, 2009, p. 264) Thus, in the case of the presidential elections, Mrema might have been supported as something of a son of the soil in Kilimanjaro and the entire north, but he was also a national opposition politician. Despite Mrema’s alleged Chagga-profile, then, voters in Temeke were not appealed by the use of ethnicity and religion to undermine his position as a political representative. Thus, the politics origin supported Mrema in 1995, but had he resorted to outright political tribalism, specifically mobilizing the Chagga as an Mchagga, then his seat in 1996 could have looked very differently.

Another example is the performance of Benjamin Mkapa in the 1995 presidential elections. Gasarasi attributes Mkapa’s performance in the south of Tanzania to the “homeboy” factor, as Mkapa received remarkably high support across the whole south, in which opposition parties were rather successful in the parliamentary elections (Gasarasi, p. 252). Kelsall (2002) writes that Mkapa was expected to steer resources to the South once in office, and to a certain extent, this did occur in the form of a large-scale infrastructure project (Kelsall, 2002, p. 604) and by allocating a considerable share of cabinet positions to southerners (Omari, 1997, p. 65-66)30. In the end, however, Mkapa didn’t necessarily conform to the expectations of material benefits, but the example shows how representation on the basis of origin may be expected to convey certain advantages, but also how origin might have a cross-ethnic appeal. The case of Willibrod Slaa in 2010 might be slightly different, since it is difficult to know whether his support in the north was

30 Although Southerners quickly became disenchanted with his policies as his loyalty towards the South didn’t reach the levels expected. Kelsall contends, however, that Mkapa’s reign did entail an increase in patrimonial relations. (Kelsall 2002)
similarly was based on expectation of returns if voted to office. Rather, in the case of Slaa as with Mrema in 1995, as powerful opposition figures, their appeal to the northern zone might have been more in terms of the symbolic representation of origin in its wider geographical sense.

Finally, John Cheyo serves as a rather good example of how origin plays out through representation in the way Chabal outlined. Cheyo has remained in politics ever since the 1995 elections, securing reelection from the same constituency even 15 years later in the 2010 elections. His family has long roots in the area, and he is a prominent community member financially as well – he has been one of the main funders of his party since the first multiparty elections (Erdmann, 2002, p. 25; 32). It would thus seem as if Cheyo fits well into the picture of a “foremost patron” of his area of origin (Whitehead, 2009, p. 265). However, Cheyo was elected outside of his home constituency, as well, as MP for Magu in Mwanza in the years 1997-2000. It should be noted that he was perceived as an example of someone coming from the “outside” and assuming office Magu by some of my respondents, as explained in chapter 7. Therefore, despite being a Sukuma, he was not necessarily perceived as a local by the constituency members. This means that although Cheyo might have considerable parochial appeal in his home district based on local level ethnicity, this does not translate into appeal across the Sukuma ethnic group, and its mobilization potential and effect on politics is therefore considerably more limited in scope.

In sum, the case could be made that while ethnic groups in Tanzania, can be assumed to have a readily available mobilization potential due to the inherently political process of colonialism, identities based on local or regional origin cannot be assumed to exhibit this inherent politicization potential to the same extent. To take the example of regional identities, there have indeed been zonal blocks of influence in Tanzanian politics – north, south, lake zone, central –but the competition between them as blocks has only reached relatively modest levels and associations are relatively loose (Kelsall, 2002, p. 612). Also, I found no signs that for instance Willibrod Slaa would have appealed to the northern regions as a block in 2010 elections; rather Chadema’s campaign machinery was focused more intensively on the Lake region (e.g. P1; P3: R6). Local level ethnic appeal like that of Cheyo in turn is less dangerous for national politics because of its geographical limits. While both forms of ethnic politics are identity-based, parochial and factionalist, they differ in their potential or risk to induce severe ethnic competition on the national political level.
6.6.3 Concluding Discussion: Ethnicity and Politics in Tanzania

Before moving on to the analysis of ethnicity and politics in the 2010 election in Tanzania, it is instructive to pull the various threads together, in particular with reference to the discussion of ethnicity and origin and their effects on politics. The different forms of ethnic politics may be distinguished as follows. A direct referral to ethnic group identity – Sukuma, Haya, Nyamwezi – in competition with other groups for resources should thus be defined as a distinct form of ethnic politics, here termed political tribalism. This is a straightforward allusion to ethnic identity as it emerged as a consequence of colonialism, and it is evoked as a tool, explicitly targeted at other ethnic groups (definition based on Lonsdale 1994; Lemarchand 1999; Ngugi 2008; see section 6.4). There are however other, more subtle forms of alluding to ethnicity, which I have termed the politics of origin. These include a number of different ways of voicing ethnic identity in the political sphere, and these various forms may differ quite substantially from each other. They can be divided into three inter-related categories on the basis of the discussion in this chapter. First, there might be references to either local level or zonal level ethnicities that either don’t expand to the entire ethnic group or are not confined to it. An example of this was the case of John Cheyo, where the candidate himself alluded to common origin in campaigning (according to Omari 1997; Gasarasi 1997). In addition, an example where reference of common origin had been made with respect to a larger area, in which a national level politician might be seen as something of a son of the soil, were the cases of Mkapa, Mrema and Slaa. In this instance, common identity might either be mentioned by the candidates themselves (of which I didn’t find any references in the case of the three mentioned above31) or be a factor behind voter’s decisions (as Kelsall 2002 claimed it was in the case of Mkapa). This, however, should be seen as a rather mild form of ethnic politics, and which like that of local level strongmen has been termed the “homeboy effect” (Gasarasi, 1997)

Second, and relatedly, there may also be attempts by constituency members to keep representatives in check by demanding adherence to local norms of reciprocal, kinship-based obligation, as argued by Chabal. In Chabal’s account, he puts particular emphasis on extra-parliamentary politics, and references to common origin are essentially identity-based. A similar point was that of Lindberg & Morrison, mentioned on in chapter 5.3, where the authors saw the emphasis of voters to choose local candidates as a rational means of ensuring that the elected candidates would work for their constituency once in office. Lindberg & Morrison thus found that voters exhibited a degree of

31 But it was explicitly mentioned with respect to Ibrahim Lipumba (CUF) who was said to have campaigned in Shinyanga, referring to the common origin of people from those areas (Lipumba hails from Tabora) (O29, 23.5.2011).
parochialism in their voting behavior, but essentially saw this as non-identity based behavior, where the final voting decision was based on the political programs of various parties or the personalities of the individual candidates rather than common identity. The line to be drawn here is fine, however. If the origin of a candidate is an important voting motivation, even if not evoked by the candidate him- or herself, then (common) identity has obviously been a factor in the voting decision. I suggest that one interpretation of Lindberg & Morrison’s scheme would be that common origin and locality (ethnicity) worked as a sort of proxy for voters to overcome the “information problem”, and thus to ensure political inclusion. In this situation, then, voters’ emphasis is not on the factors of ethnicity, but on person, party or program, but common origin works as a measure of the trustworthiness of these factors. In the final analysis in chapter 7, I will discuss whether such an interpretation is feasible with reference to my fieldwork material.

As the third part of this categorization, I refer to the politics of Nyerere’s government as the final example of the various ways in which ethnicity may come to play politically. I briefly argued at the end of chapter 6.5 that the inclusive politics of Nyerere in part may be interpreted as a system of ethnic integration. In this system, ethnic representation was ensured “from above” as for instance my researcher respondents agreed that demands on the basis of ethnic inclusion were not tolerated by the regime (Yahya-Othman, Mushi; Lwaitama). It thus differs in some respects from the concept of integrative ethnic politics in a multi-party setting, which was based on the advancement of legitimate claims on part of the ethnic groups themselves (see Laakso & Olukoshi, 1996, p. 29; see distinction made in chapter 2). It is clear that if demands of ethnic inclusion arise from the ethnic group itself, then this is of different order than if the same groups are already included as an a priori. Further, it may be argued that these claims open for the type of ethnic competition that later leads to the “inflationary spiral of ethnic claims and counterclaims” and eventually to political tribalism (Lemarchand, 1999, p. 4). The point remains however, as with the two other examples above, that ethnicity in its different shapes may be used as a means of securing inclusion in the flows of political, economic and symbolic resources; that is, in the political dealings of society. This remains as valid factor, I argue, in the politics of Tanzania, where ethnicity in many cases may be important in terms of political representation.

Taken together, these three examples attempt to make the following point: ethnicity may have an influence on the politics in Tanzania in a variety of shapes and using various different means, and

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32 Lindberg & Morrison do not explicitly refer to identity or non-identity based factors, but the argumentation can clearly be interpreted also in this way.
all of these should not necessarily be taken as a form of political tribalism. Rather, some of these forms might amount to a rather legitimate attempt to guarantee political and economic inclusion. In consequence, accusations of ethnic bias leveled against political parties in Tanzania are not in all instances to be taken at face value as a sign of political tribalism. The distinction between political tribalism and politics of origin as outlined above will form an important backdrop to my analysis of the role of ethnicity in the 2010 elections in Mwanza, which I will turn to next.

7. Ethnicity, Politics and the 2010 elections in Mwanza

“Whether you’re Sukuma or not, if your actions don’t match your words, you can’t get elected” (Elderly man in Kahangara, Mwanza)

Following the categorization of the two types of ethnic politics – political tribalism and politics of origin – outlined in the chapter 6, I set out to investigate to what extent ethnicity had played a political role in the 2010 General Elections. I did this with particular emphasis on the region of Mwanza, where I conducted fieldwork in the summer of 2011. The interviews conducted in the various parts of Mwanza were designed to elicit either whether ethnicity had been a voting motivation for my respondents, or if respondents perceived of ethnicity as a factor in the mobilization efforts by various parties in the campaigns. My interviews attempted to focus at which types of ethnic identities – ethnic group, local level identities or wider origin-based identities – that may come to the fore in various circumstances, and how these are expressed. Finally, given the discussion in the last part of chapter 6, I wanted to investigate whether emphasis on locality and common origin by necessity need to be seen as ethnic politics, and in which other ways they might be interpreted.

In my analysis, I started by studying the Media Election Coverage Monitoring Reports (especially September and October 2010) by Synovate and the news coverage of the two main English language magazines online, The Citizen and The Daily News. In addition, I was also granted permission to study the newspaper archive at the University Library of UDSM. Given the strong discourse prohibiting the use of ethnicity in political campaigns in Tanzania (see 6.5), I didn’t expect to find many examples of outright political tribalism in the 2010 elections. And indeed, ethnicity did not seem to feature prominently in the election campaigns or media reports. Even the
previously vocal accusations of ethnic bias leveled against Chadema seem to have somewhat subsumed (e.g. Shaba. 2010; TACCEO, 2010, p. 76). Despite this trend, Chadema’s alleged Chagga-bias still remained the most frequently mentioned ethnic issue in the campaigns in the newspaper reports. Given the party’s relative success in the elections, the ethnic bias accusations thus remained the most prominent ethnic issues on the national political level. I therefore decided to address the Chadema-Chagga connection in section 7.1 below, but the aim of this discussion is not to critically assess the validity of the allegations. Rather, I address the nature of the accusation and their connections to the perception of my respondents as well as the election results in order to give a picture of the use of ethnicity in political discourse in Tanzania.

The example of Chadema illustrates how ethnicity may be used as a political weapon in Tanzania, in the form of accusations of tribalism leveled against political opponents. However, it also shows these accusations do not necessarily reverberate among the electorate, and that ethnicity is still largely absent as an exclusive building block of political parties in Tanzania. The main discussion of the chapter, however, is in sections 7.2 and 7.3. In section 7.2 I give a brief overview of ethnicity in the 2010 elections and provide an example of what political tribalism might look like in the Tanzanian context. In addition, based on the extensive discussion in chapter 6, I attempt to assess in particular in which ways local level ethnicity and political representation are inter-related, and whether a connection between these two by necessity amounts to ethnic politics. My field results indicate that outright political tribalism is likely to be rare in Tanzania, and there still seems to be strong opposition among both ordinary people and politicians against the use of *ukabila*. As for the politics of origin, it seems probable that ethnic identity is an important factor of political representation in Tanzania. Above all, in line with the discussion in chapter 6, I argue that it may be understood as a means of ensuring political inclusion. I suggest that common origin (ethnicity) might be a measure of trustworthiness of political candidates. However, I also conclude that ethnicity is not an indispensable measure of this, since it has never evolved into the sole determinant of political resource distribution in Tanzania.

### 7.1 Chadema, Kilimanjaro and the Wachagga

Throughout the multiparty period, there have been accusations leveled against Chadema, portraying it as a party dominated by the Chagga ethnic group. This may be based on the fact that the party indeed has its roots in Kilimajaro, the home region of the Chagga. Chadema was registered in 1993 and was initially chaired by Edwin Mtei, a former finance minister and an ethnic Mchagga, who
was a strong advocate of economic reform and private enterprise. Chadema originally established its base in Kilimanjaro and received support from among the cash-crop growing areas in the region (Chege 1994, p. 62) since the area had “long opposed the socialist policies of CCM” (Barkan, 1994, p. 33). As Chadema was expanding its campaign in the run-up to the 2010 elections and increased its national presence, allegations of the party being a Chagga-party were still abundant, however. These accusations were commonly voiced in particular in the newspapers loyal to the ruling party. In the newspapers Taifa Tanzania, Hoja, Rai and Al-nuur, as well as in certain radio channels, the accusations of tribal affiliation were particularly vocal. (Synovate, October; September 2010)

According to Dr. Keya from the linguistics department at UDSM, the argument that was put forward was that the Chagga dominance of Chadema would ensure that if the party got elected into power, the largest share of “the national cake” would go to Kilimanjaro. (Dr. Keya, 6.6.2011)

Similarly, Dr. Lwaitama, lecturer at UDSM, pointed out that Chadema’s funders are largely based in Kilimanjaro, which has led to concerns that the investors would want to see some kind of “return” on capital invested, if the party comes to power (Dr. Lwaitama, 12.5.2011). While I can’t substantiate or dismiss these claims, it may be noted that the same issue was brought up in a range of other interviews as well, albeit mainly by CCM respondents (e.g. P6; P12; P18)

In order to assess these accusations, I looked at the party’s support in the 2010 Parliamentary and Presidential elections to determine whether it showed signs of geographical concentration, which would indicate ethnic voting. Also, to map the perceptions of ethnic politics, I included questions of the alleged ethnic bias of Chadema in most interviews I made in Mwanza and Dar es Salaam. In my interviews, it was apparent that the argument of Chadema as a Chagga party was indeed familiar to most respondents. However, most respondents who agreed with the notion of Chadema’s Chagga-dominance were CCM representatives. In addition, some of the Muslim leaders that I interviewed also described Chadema as a Chagga-party, but these were the same respondents who tended to see the party as a Christian party as well (e.g. RL8; RL11; see chapter 9). In terms of perceptions among my other respondents, however, it quickly became clear that the issue of Chagga-dominance did not find resonance among “ordinary” respondents. In some instances the question was not even properly understood, and in general, it simply seemed to lack relevance. Especially on the countryside in Mwanza, the alleged Chagga-dominance of an opposition party contesting with mainly local candidates against other local candidates did not strike a chord with the respondents. The question was met with such weak response that I chose to omit it from the later interviews in the ordinary-group. Likewise, in the five interviews with representatives of other opposition parties (CUF and TLP), the notion received only weak support.
Why then, according to those insisting on Chadema’s Chagga-dominance, had people in regions such as Mwanza *en masse* decided to vote for a Chagga-dominated party in 2010? The responses to this question were somewhat unclear. The regional secretary of CCM in Mwanza contended that the reason was “mob psychology” and influence of rich Wachagga: “wherever Chadema wins, there are Chagga” who support the party financially. (P6, 18.5.2011; also senior party strategist, 30.5.2011)

The dominance of Wachagga among the founders and those in leading positions within the party was commonly highlighted (e.g. P11; P14; P15; P19). Indeed, party founder Edwin Mtei is from Kilimanjaro, as is Freeman Mbowe, the current party chairman. Mbowe is also married to Mtei’s daughter (e.g. The Citizen 31.8.2009) who works for the party. It is this “family business” which was commonly mentioned in the interviews with CCM representatives (P18; also P6; P12) and which has featured in media discourse as well (TACCEO, 2010, p. 76). Again, it is not possible for me to assess to what extent this family business indeed has an relevance for party finances and policies, but it was commonly mentioned that particularly Mtei still exerts considerable influence over in the party.

Looking at the actual leadership structure of Chadema, the Chagga-dominance is far from clear, however. Mbowe’s deputy chairmen Said Amour Arfi and Said Issa Mohammed are from Rukwa and Zanzibar, respectively. The General Secretary Dr. Slaa is in turn from Karatu, Arusha, which admittedly can be counted as belonging to the same Northern zone as Kilimanjaro. His deputies, however, are Zitto Zuberi Kabwe from Kigoma and Hamad Mussa Yusuf from Pemba. For instance, among the most prominent original leaders of Chadema is Bob Makani, a Msukuma, who was the party’s second chairman. Mmuya and Chaligha (1994) provide a table discerning the regional background of the founding members of the various opposition parties in 1994. Chadema had founding members from all regions in the country except Lindi and Kagera, and Kilimanjaro does not stand out as particularly well represented. Founding members came from 3 out of the 5 districts of the region, but this can be compared to 5 out 8 in Arusha and 5 out of 6 in both Mwanza and Mbeya. (Mmuya & Chaligha 1994, pp. 209-214) As for the administration, the situation seems similar. For instance in the current secretariat, only 3 out of 19 members are from Kilimanjaro. A slight overrepresentation, surely, but hardly a dominance.

In my interviews, some of the respondents based their claims of Chadema’s Chagga-bias on the allocation of special seats. In Tanzania, each party is awarded a certain number of special parliamentary seats for women (*viti maalum*) in accordance with the party’s electoral performance.
The seats are appointed by the party, and it is was argued that Chadema’s true ethnic character was exposed in these appointments:

“In 1995 Chadema won in Karatu, Tarime and Kigoma. But in special seats for women, all seats went to Moshi, to cousins and uncles, circulating within the Mtei clan” (Simon Amsiyaawo, CCM secretary, Geita)

It is indeed possible that the special seats have had an overrepresentation from the North previously. In Mwanza, the TLP regional chairman Chacha Kisyeri, who had a very favorable disposition towards Chadema, described the biased special seats appointments in 2005 as a “big mistake” by the party (Kisyeri, 31.5.2011). In addition, Chadema MP candidate in Geita town, Rogers Ruhega, also admitted that many special seats previously had been filled by Northerners.33 (Ruhega, 26.5.2011) Either way, in 2010, out of the 25 special seats, only two were from Kilimanjaro, and another two each from Arusha and Manyara (Chadema.or.tz). Again, then, the North is well represented, but hardly dominant. How about the electoral performance of the party, then?

7.1.1 Chadema’s Electoral Performance 1995-2010

If there is merit to the claims of Chadema’s Chagga-bias, then one would logically expect the party’s support in Kilimanjaro – the home region of the Wachagga – to have been substantial throughout the multiparty era in Tanzania. Chadema has participated in the every election since the inception of multiparty politics, but did not field its own presidential candidate in 1995 and 2000. In these two elections, Chadema’s support was indeed strong in Kilimanjaro: 18 percent and 23 percent respectively. In both instances, the figures were well above the party’s national support, and especially so in 2000 (compare to national average of 4,2 percent). However, on both occasions, Chadema’s strongest region in the country was Kigoma, which can hardly be defined as Chagga-dominated. In Kigoma, Chadema’s support was 21 percent in 1995 and 26,8 percent in 2000, and Kigoma thus by far outperformed for instance Arusha, the second Northern region, in which Chadema scored 10,5 and 17,5 percent respectively.

Neither was Chadema the most dominant opposition party in Kilimanjaro in these elections. In 1995, NCCR-Mageuzi easily toppled Chadema, winning in five out of the six Chagga-dominated constituencies of Kilimanjaro under its chairman Augustine Mrema, a prominent Chagga politician

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33 He insisted, however, that that these appointees, such as Halima Mdee, had earned their parliamentary seats by being long-time actives and volunteers. 32 Halima Mdee was elected MP of Kawe, Dar es Salaam in the 2010 elections in the normal procedure.
(Pietilä, Ojalammi-Wamai & Laakso 2002, p. 289). It is thus possible that the Chagga in large numbers voted for one “of their kind” in the 1995 elections, in an attempt to increase their leverage vis-à-vis the state, as Pietilä et al. (2002) suggest. But it wasn’t necessarily Chadema that was the Chagga party of choice. On the countryside and among the poorer Chagga, people put their trust to the anti-corruption and underdog rhetoric of Mrema and NCCR-M instead. Chadema, on the other hand, was largely regarded as a party for the wealthy elite, and a “CCM number two”. In consequence, rather than being a uniting Chagga-party, Chadema divided the Chagga of Kilimanjaro on a socio-economic basis in these early days. (Pietilä et al. pp. 286-91; 297)

In 2000, it was TLP, to which Mrema had defected, which was the dominant opposition party in the Presidential elections in Kilimanjaro, nearly defeating CCM’s Mkapa in the race. Chadema did prevail over TLP in the Parliamentary vote, but was far from being dominant in the region with its support of a mere 23 percent. In 2005, Chadema finally fielded a presidential candidate of its own, Freeman Mbowe, a Mchagga from Kilimajaro, and this time Kilimanjaro was indeed the party’s strongest region in the presidential race. However, Mbowe’s support in his home region was a mere 20,6 percent, and even in his home constituency of Hai in Kilimanjaro, his decidedly non-Chagga competitor Jakaya Kikwete received a majority of the votes. In the parliamentary elections, Arusha in turn emerged as the party’s strongest region in the country.

In sum, then, there is no compelling case for a particularly disproportionate support among the Chagga of Kilimanjaro for Chadema based on the 1995-2005 election results. The results from the 2010 elections are listed in table 10.1 and 10.2 below. I have chosen to look at the whole Northern Zone, analyzing Chadema’s support from a regional perspective first in Kilimanjaro, but also in Arusha and Manyara. The tables show the parliamentary and presidential performance of Chadema in these regions, but the discussion below concern the district level results as well.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.1 Presidential Elections: Chadema’s support in the Northern Zone</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chadema votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chadema votes in percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compared to national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of total CDM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region % of total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the division of Kilimajaro into Chagga-dominated constituencies, see section 10.2.1
In all three regions above, it is clear that Chadema’s support is well above the national average for the party. In the three regions on average, Chadema’s support was 42.6 percent in the Presidential and 39.3 in the parliamentary elections. However, in both contests, Manyara and Arusha emerge as stronger regions for Chadema than Kilimanjaro. Also, looking at the district level, Chadema’s performance shows considerable variation in the region. Out of Kilimanjaro’s seven districts, five are commonly taken to be Chagga dominated: Moshi urban, Moshi rural, Rombo, Siha and Hai. The Pare/Asu ethnic group is predominant in the remaining two districts, Same and Mwanga. In the various elections, constituencies have been formed partially on the basis of these districts, creating nine constituencies, of which six can be considered Chagga-dominated: Moshi urban, Moshi rural, Hai, Rombo, Vunjo and Siha. (Division in accordance with Pietilä, Ojalammi-Wamai & Laakso, 2002, pp. 283; 289; Whitehead 2009; Tanzania Language Atlas 2009) In these constituencies, Chadema’s support in 2010 was indeed strong, but not overwhelming. For instance, in the presidential elections, Chadema candidate Slaa managed to win in only one of these six constituencies (Moshi urban) while the remaining five went to CCM’s Kikwete.

Table 7.2 Parliamentary Elections: Chadema’s support in the Northern Zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Arusha</th>
<th>Moshi</th>
<th>Babati</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chadema votes</td>
<td>149,907</td>
<td>142,261</td>
<td>97,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total votes</td>
<td>363,788</td>
<td>378,226</td>
<td>248,808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chadema percent</td>
<td>41.20</td>
<td>37.60</td>
<td>39.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compared to national</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>11.50</td>
<td>13.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of total CDM</td>
<td>8.20</td>
<td>7.80</td>
<td>5.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region percent of total</td>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>5.40</td>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Electoral Commission of Tanzania
Legend: Compared to national – percentage points above/below party average on mainland; Percent of total CDM – region’s votes as percent of the party’s total votes nationally; Region % of total - the region’s votes as percentage of total votes cast nationally

On average, Slaa received 40.5 percent of the votes in these constituencies and his party scored only slightly more, 41.4 % in the parliamentary elections. In the parliamentary race, however, Chadema still managed to win 3 out of the six districts. There was also large volatility in the parliamentary results: for instance in Hai district, where Chadema chairman and former presidential candidate
Freeman Mbowe, an ethnic Mchaga, won the parliamentary race by a narrow majority. Kikwete defeated Slaa by over 30 percentage points.

In total, Chadema won 23 constituencies in the parliamentary elections, out of which 6 were from the Northern regions (26 percent). The others included three MPs in Mwanza, two in Mbeya, two in Dar es Salaam and three in Shinyanga. In sum, there is no doubt that the Northern Zone is a Chadema stronghold. On average, the party’s support in these three regions was 15.6 / 13.2 percentage points above national average. The party received 20 / 21.3 percent of its total votes from these three regions, compared to their overall contribution of 12.7 / 14.2 percent of the votes nationally. Manyara was the party’s most successful region in the presidential elections and Moshi the town with the highest support in the nation. However, there is no clear ethnic pattern discernable in this support structure. There is also little evidence to support any claims of the party’s alleged Chagga-character. The party indeed received considerable support from Chagga-dominated areas and in particular in Moshi urban. However, the support levels in Chagga-constituencies on average were not extraordinary, compared for instance to other Northern constituencies or urban centers such as Mwanza, Iringa or Mbeya (compare chapter 9).

It may well be that Chadema’s leadership and officials have disproportionally been based in Kilimanjaro in previous years, as the party was a more marginal political player. According to John Mnyika, MP for Chadema in Ubungo, DSM, this was natural as it was obvious that the party had to start consolidating itself from where it had a base: “charity start from home” (John Mnyika, 12.5.2011). My researcher respondents seemed to concur with this. While the party may have had an inclination towards Kilimajaro previously, this was no longer the case, and it certainly seems as if their (relative) electoral success was not based on this either. (e.g. Prof. Chaligha; Prof Mushi 7.6.2011) Some final remarks regarding Chadema’s support will be made in section 7.3 below.

7.2 Ethnicity, Origin and Representation in the 2010 General Elections

I already mentioned in the introduction of this chapter that ethnicity did not seem to have played a significant role in 2010 elections. For the most part, this view was supported in my interviews in both Mwanza and Dar es Salaam. However, there were a few notable exceptions to this. In the beginning of my fieldwork, still in Dar es Salaam, I interviewed a CCM activist who claimed that in the recent election campaigns, ethnicity had been the “number one” campaign factor. He had
contested in the CCM primaries in his home district in the south of the country, despite having lived most of his life in Dar es Salaam. This was due to the fact, according to him, that in order to get elected, a candidate must be born as well as have family and relatives in the constituency in which he or she runs:

“The first thing they ask you is where were you born, which tribe are you? Are you Makonde, yes, which place do you come from; they want to know the exact place: where is your grandfather, where are your parents? This time if you were not born in this place, or we do not know where your parents are, we cannot vote for you, we cannot trust you.” (P2, 12.5.2011)

According to this young politician, in the 2010 campaigns these sentiments were voiced all over the country, not only in the areas where ethnicity traditionally had been important – Kagera, Mwanza and Kilimanjaro, in his view. He emphasized that this had been unheard of before, and that nowadays, candidates even had to campaign in their vernacular languages in order to succeed, even if only a few words were needed to “make people feel attached”. (P2 12.5.2011)

Was it indeed the case that ethnicity played such a central role on the 2010 elections? By and large, I did not find any indications that this would have been so. Instead, ethnicity in terms of ethnic group identity was alluded to mainly with reference to Chadema, as mentioned above. In a report on the 2010 elections, TACCEO\(^{35}\) asserted that the allegations against Chadema as a party had shifted towards “individual attacks” \(^{35}\) against certain candidates (p. 76). However, I did not find evidence of such attacks either, at least not in Mwanza. Also on a general level, personal attacks seem to have focused on issues of nationality rather than ethnicity. A prominent case in Mwanza was the questioning of Chadema MP elect Ezekia Wenje’s citizenship (see e.g. The Citizen, 5.9.2010). Alluding to Tanzanian nationality is indeed a form of identity politics, and one that has to be distinguished from the understanding of ethnicity in this essay. Leaving the issue of nationality aside, ethnicity seems to have played a minor role in the 2010 elections in Mwanza, at least judging by the considerable number of candidates with other ethnic backgrounds than Sukuma who were elected into office. The MP elect of Kwimba village in Mwanza, Hiran Shanif Mansoor, for instance, is of Indian heritage and easily defeated a Sukuma of Kwimba, Leticia Nyerere\(^{36}\) in the race for MP. In Mwanza city, the Ilemela MP elect Ezekia Wenje was born in Musoma and is an ethnic Luo, whose mother is from Kenya. His contestant Lawrence Masha, who was the incumbent MP and minister of the interior in the previous government, is not an ethnic Sukuma either. Moreover, the Chadema MP from Mwanza’s Nyamagana, Highness Kiwia, was born in Mwanza,  

\(^{35}\) Tanzania Civil Society Consortium on Election Observation

\(^{36}\) Wife of Madaraka Nyerere, the son of the late Mwalimu Julius Nyerere
but his family are Wachagga from Kilimanjaro. Also the elected MP of Geita town, Donald Max, is not a native of Geita.

7.2.1 Local level politics and ethnicity

In terms of ethnicity as ethnic group identity, it was commonly mentioned that Mwanza town is an area of mixed populations, and that ethnicity therefore could not be used as a political tool there (e.g. O29, 23.5.2011). Correspondingly in my interviews, there were few instances where ethnicity had reportedly been used by politicians to gather support on the level of MP or President. While this indicates that ethnicity was hardly "number one" for voters in Mwanza, it does not mean that ethnic sentiments were completely absent in the elections. In my initial interviews, I was told that issues relating to ethnicity and place of origin could indeed be used on the ward level during election campaigns (Dr. Killian). Also in my interviews with researchers, this was a rather common perception (for instance Prof Chaligha, 7.6.2011). According to Professor Mushi, on the local level, ethnicity had always had an impact on politics in Tanzania:

"It takes places within the local context. People whisper rather than making it loud: ‘this fellow comes from a different tribe, I am more of your baby’. It is not said publicly. It is whispered." (Prof. Mushi, 7.6.2011)

This view is shared by Omari (1997) who claims that ethnicity has always been the basis for creating constituencies in Tanzania (p. 63). It was made clear in chapter 6.6 that ethnicity might come to play in the form of local level identities in Tanzania as well, and I thus decided to focus quite some effort on analyzing the local level, which in practice meant looking at elections for local councilor, *diwani*. With this focus, I found one actual instance of political tribalism in a ward in Central Mwanza. In an interview with a former CUF candidate for local councilor in the ward (P20, 31.5.2011), the respondent declared that the election had gone awry because of the many instances of *ukabila* and *udini*. According to him, the elections had been a veritable show of political tribalism. The ward in which he had contested was close to the lake and therefore to a large extent populated by people that moved over the lake frequently – to Bukoba and to Ukerewe. Therefore there were large populations of Wahaya and Wajita in the ward, and in addition to this, there were also substantial numbers of both Muslims and Christians, as is often the case in urban centers in Tanzania.

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37 See also section 6.5.1
In the elections for *diwani* in 2010, party lines had happened to correspond to both ethnic and religious demarcations. The CCM candidate in the ward, whom I also interviewed (P24, 1.6.2011), was a Muslim and also an ethnic Mhaya, and he had prevailed against a Christian Mjita man in the CCM primaries preceding the elections. The Mjita man had then defected to Chadema – another not uncommon practice in these elections38 – and ran as the party’s candidate in the elections. In the campaigns, he had then allegedly used ethnicity quite blatantly, calling for his fellow Wajita, which are “indigenous” to Mwanza region as opposed to the Wahaya from Bukoba, to “kick out these dogs”. In addition, he had supposedly also incited religious divisions by attempting to appeal to church congregation members and encourage them not to vote for the Muslim candidates from CCM and CUF.

While Chadema candidate eventually prevailed in the poll, the CCM candidate filed a lawsuit against him, among other things on the grounds of breaking the electoral laws concerning the use of religion and ethnicity in campaigns (see chapter 8). However, the CCM candidate provided a list of the breaches of the electoral code that the Chadema candidate had allegedly conducted, to which there supposedly had been numerous witnesses (see appendix). Unfortunately, I was unable to reach the Chadema candidate for comments, but the provided evidence at least points towards the fact that religion and ethnicity had featured prominently in the ward elections. In consequence, is this evidence or indication of widespread practices of political tribalism in local politics in Tanzania? Based on my material; most likely not. This was the only instance in all of my interviews where such a case was mentioned. The example does suggest, however, that even in a country like Tanzania, identity factors may be easily used for political mobilization provided party lines follow identity demarcations. I will discuss this further in the concluding section 7.4 below, and next, I will turn to the politics of origin in Mwanza.

### 7.2.2 Origin, ethnicity and representation in Mwanza

In chapter 6, I presented a range of different ways in which identities related to common origin may affect politics in other ways than through political tribalism, and termed this the politics of origin. Mainly, this could take the shape of identities either more locally or more broadly defined than ethnic group identity; and it was argued that if a community put weight on electing local candidates, this could be seen as a rational way of securing inclusion in politics. I suggested that ethnicity might work as a means of overcoming what Lindberg & Morrison (2008) called the “information

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38 Notable defectors after lost primaries include for instance long time MP for Maswa John Shibuda
problem”, which essentially revolves around the question of political trust. In the section below, I will further discuss the interplay between common origin and trust, and discuss its implications for ethnic politics. Finally, with reference to the system of ethnic inclusion during Nyerere, it was suggested that also ethnic group identity might constitute a way of advancing such legitimate claims. In the beginning of my fieldwork, I had been told that identity politics was “very important in Sukumaland” (P3, 17.5.2011). To the background of the various types of ethnic politics outlined in chapter 6, I therefore set out to investigate what form of identity was important, and how it came to play in the 2010 elections on the local level in Mwanza. In particular, what I have termed the politics of origin will be the focus of the discussion. To this end, I posed a range questions in my interviews, which in various direct and indirect ways attempted to elicit the importance of these different aspects of political representation to my respondents. My questions included:

- What issues and characteristics are important when electing a political candidate at the local councilor (diwani) level?
- Is it important that a candidate is from here – this town, district or region?
- Can someone get elected here even if he or she is born somewhere else? From another ward, town, district, region? (e.g. where is “somewhere else”?)
- How long does someone have to live here to be considered local/electable?
- What languages are commonly used in campaigns?
- Can you get elected if you don’t speak Kisukuma? Has it ever happened?

These questions were obviously often attendant questions posed in reaction to some statement by the respondent. I chose to avoid straight question about ethnicity as such (kabila or ukabila) since these were likely to create adverse reactions based on the strong normative foundation of anti-tribalism in the country. The concern was that an automatic connection to tribalism would inhibit any further discussion on identity factors in the elections. In some cases, however, respondents interpreted the question in terms of tribalism nonetheless, which always provoked a negative reaction: “in Sukumaland, we have no tribalism” (e.g. RL4, 21.5.2011). Despite these caveats, however, I was able to gather a rather broad material concerning ordinary and political respondents’ views on the issues of ethnicity and origin in the various districts of Mwanza. I conducted nine interviews with “ordinary people” in Magu district (O10-O18) out of which three were group interviews. In Magu, I also made four interviews with political representatives (P8-P11); and three out of these were group interviews. In addition, I included similar questions in my interviews in Geita, although most of the Geita respondents were more or less urban, as the interviews were in Geita town and in Katoro, the main town in Busanda constituency. In Geita, I conducted eight interviews in the ordinary category (O19-O26); half of these were group interviews. I also made
seven interviews with political representatives from Geita district, out of which two were MPs, two had been MP candidates and two were larger group interviews with local party activists.

7.2.2.1 Interview results
By and large there was indeed a strong conception among my respondents that political representatives should be natives of the constituency in which they run for office. This was expressed mainly in terms of trustworthiness – aminifu\(^\text{39}\) – and attachment to the place of origin. It was believed that a politician is more morally bound to his or her place of origin than an outsider: “For example, diwanis can misuse funds if they’re not from there. If they’re from here, they can’t do that” (CUF ward secretary, Geita). It was commonly agreed that the character of the candidate was the most important election motivation, and if a candidate hailed from the constituency, voters would know his or her character and be able to judge it. The same line of argumentation was evident for both local councilor and Member of Parliament. Representatives needed to have an attachment to the area in the form of family, relatives and property. Commonly references were made to absentee MPs, who had lost their connection to their home constituency. This seemed to have been an important election issue as well, and one that MP candidates were well aware of. The MP elect for Busanda, Geita, Ms. Lolesia Bukwimba noted that 60 percent of the MPs in the 2010 parliament were first timers, due to the fact that people had “expressed their wish to have MPs that stay in their region”. Again, this was related to trust:

“I originate from the community, they know I’m not mfisadi [corrupt]. All of the candidates were coming from there. People look at it. It is really important that you’re coming from there. You have to live there, you have to be known, it’s important that people know who you are.” (Lolesia Bukwimba, 3.6.2011)

Who was defined as being “from here”, then? There seemed to be no consensus regarding this among respondents. In a group interview with elderly CCM activists, for instance, origin was perceived of in rather broad terms. They complained about the fact that Chadema had candidates from “the outside” and insisted that “representatives should come from among people, people from this area. We want true representatives, people who understand the whole situation.” Area, however, was defined as people from the whole Lake Zone: “anyone who deeply understands our needs.” This included Waiita, Wakerewe, Wasukuma and “whoever is indigenous”. According to these CCM activists, a candidate who originates from the area could be expected to work hard to develop it. (P11, 21.5.2011) Conversely, other respondents conceived of origin in much narrower

\(^{39}\) Can also mean faithful, and indeed, as explained in chapter 9, aminifu in terms of faithfulness was emphasised in particular by Christian leaders
terms. For instance, when asked if it has ever occurred that an outsider had been elected into office in Mwanza, two respondents in Magu (O15; P10) referred to John Cheyo, who was a MP in Magu 1997-2000. Cheyo is an ethnic Sukuma from Bariadi, Shinyanga, the neighboring region. Similarly, in a large group interview I conducted in Mwamabanza, Magu, respondents defined someone from Bariadi and Shinyanga as an outsider (O14). Shinyanga is a Sukuma-dominated area as well, so at least for these respondents, origin here was not equated with Sukuma identity.

However, those respondents who employed the broadest definition of being “from here” also seemed to put the most weight on actually originating from the region. Correspondingly, those who had a narrower definition of location of origin, tended to put less weight on the importance of origin. These respondents commonly argued that while it while origin was important, this was mainly due to familiarity and trustworthiness of the contestant. These respondents would contend that the character of a political candidate was the most central voting issue, which entailed that an outsider could be elected as well as a native provided he or she was well-known, able (mfaa or having uwezo) and had a trustworthy character. A case in point is a large group interview with around 40 participants, which I conducted in the small village of Mwamabanza in Magu district. First, the group insisted that a political candidate would need to come from Mwamabanza or Magu in order to be “close to people”. However, a while later the group agreed that as long as a candidate knew the area and was well known there, the most important attributes were his or her character: trustworthiness and “being after peace and justice” [amani na haki]\(^{40}\). (O14, 22.5.2011)

The differences in emphasis can be further exemplified by the only group among my respondents who clearly stated that ethnicity was the most important voting motivation for them. This group consisted of a large family who we interviewed in the outskirts of the small village of Mwamabanza, Magu. We expected to get similar answers concerning origin and ethnicity as in the other five interviews in Mwamabanza, where all respondents had emphasized that only the character of the candidates mattered. As it were, however, this family strongly emphasized the importance of Sukuma identity in terms of political representation. There were 11 family members present, and although one of the family members, a man in his 30s, answered most of the questions, it was clear that the family had a common stance on the issues, which was confirmed by frequent nods and comments. When asked about the importance of origin, the man replied:

\(^{40}\) Haki can mean justice but also rights, righteousness and justness. (Oxford Standard Swahili-English dictionary)
He argued that if someone comes from outside of Sukumaland, this person couldn’t have true knowledge of the culture of the Sukuma: “we really need someone indigenous.” Interestingly, in this interview origin – or indigenousness – was defined strictly in terms of Sukuma identity: “all Sukuma are the same”. Sukuma from Shinyanga and Mwanza were thus put on the same line, as opposed to the examples above. Also, when asked, two of the women in the group maintained that if the choice was between a Sukuma living in a different region and an outsider having lived in Magu for a long time, they would opt for the Sukuma: “we like our people to lead us”. Even someone having lived in the area for decades and speaking Kisukuma perfectly could not be elected, they argued, if he is not Msukuma by blood. Sukuma identity, then, was defined as a matter of bloodline, not knowledge of the language or place of residence. (O18, 22.5.2011) This family was an exception to the rule, however. With few other exceptions, respondents insisted that candidates who come from the “outside” could be elected, provided they are well familiar with local conditions and challenges, are known by the people and have the right qualities: “If he has stayed here for a long time and is mfuaa [suitable/able ] then he can be elected” (O11, Elderly man, Kahangara Magu, 21.5.2011). This tendency is further emphasized by the views on the use of Kisukuma in the campaigns.

7.2.2.2 The Use of Kisukuma
I also included questions regarding the use of the local language in my interviews as an indicator of the significance of ethnicity. While language and ethnicity certainly are not the same thing (e.g. Posner, 2005) language boundaries nonetheless frequently coincide with ethnic groups, also in Tanzania (e.g. LOT 2009). Widespread use of the local language could thus be seen as an indication of the importance of belonging to the ethnic group dominant in your region of contest, in particular since the electoral laws emphasize the use of Kiswahili in campaigns rather than local languages. Joeli Nanauka, the CCM candidate mentioned in the beginning of the chapter who saw ethnicity as “number one” in the 2010 elections, had noted the widespread use of vernaculars during campaigns in his Southern constituency. I therefore included questions, direct and indirect, on the use of Kisukuma as a campaigning language in Mwanza. The responses to this question were quite similar to those above. On the straight question of which language was most frequently used in campaigns and rallies, the vast majority replied that it was Kiswahili. Most agreed that knowledge of Kisukuma was not needed in order to get elected in Mwanza region. In areas where Kiswahili is not
understood, candidates could just use an interpreter, it was argued. An old woman in Kahangara told me: “Even you don’t speak Kisukuma, and still you are here” (O10, 21.5.2011). Her neighbors in Kahangara insisted that if a candidate doesn’t know the language, they would teach him or her (O12, 21.5.2011).

Kisukuma might have been used on the countryside, some added, but it was largely limited to a few words when addressing a crowd. In Katoro, a respondent announced that it was important to add words from the vernacular language, but there was some confusion as to which language was meant: Kisumbwa, Kisinza and Kisukuma are all spoken in the area and the respondent herself originated from Ukerewe (O23, Vendor woman Katoro, 26.5.2011). However, when asked if it had ever occurred that someone indeed was elected without knowing Kisukuma, the answers were less clear. On the MP level, there have certainly been such candidates; Ezekia Wenje being a case in point. In general in towns and cities, there have surely been numerous such local councilors, but on the countryside the situation may be different. None of my respondents could actually name a candidate without knowledge of Kisukuma who would have been elected into local office. Also, none of my respondents could recollect an instance where an interpreter had been used in the campaigns. It should be noted that in the large group interview in Mwamabanza referred to above, my questions had to be translated first from English to Kiswahili and then to Kisukuma for them to be properly understood. This would suggest that, at least in part, the assertions regarding the unimportance of Kisukuma were based on normativity as much as the realities of campaigns.

This suggestion seems to be supported by comments of those keen to emphasize the importance ethnicity in the elections. Not surprisingly, the family in Mwamabanza who had stressed the importance of Sukuma identity also claimed that Kisukuma had been the main language of campaigning in the area. A young university educated public official whom I interviewed in Mwanza also emphasized the importance of ethnic identity and knowledge of the ethnic language in order to be elected. Without knowing Kisukuma, he claimed, a candidate is easily defeated in Sukumaland. He stressed the importance of being known in the constituency and being attached to it through lineage and clan, but also through owning property. While tribalism was particularly prevalent in his home region of Bariadi, Shinyanga, he claimed that in all areas dominated by Sukuma, it was difficult for an outsider to become elected. In order to succeed on the countryside, parties had to send locals to contest elections, he insisted. (O29, Frankie, 23.5.2011) The implications and conclusions of the discussion above will be outlined next.
7.2.3 Discussion: Ethnicity and Origin in the 2010 Elections in Mwanza Region

On the basis of the discussion above, three levels may be distinguished regarding the weight given by respondents to the various factors of identity. First, there are the comments above by the family in Mwamabanza and the university graduate in Mwanza town, as well as the case of the incitements of ethnic division in the ward in central Mwanza. These evoked ethnicity directly, in terms of ethnic group identity pertaining to the whole ethnic group – as Sukuma, or Jita, as in the case above. Second, there were those, such as the CCM activists in Kahangara, who stopped short of mentioning ethnicity, but regarded origin as markedly significant, and defined it broadly. Here, however, origin seemed to be either a sort of code word for ethnic group identity, or alternatively, it might be interpreted as the sort of wider, zonal ethnicity that was discussed with reference to various presidential candidates in section 6.6. However, I would lean towards the interpretation that it was mainly a political argument to counter the increasingly popular opposition candidates with other than local background. Third, there were the majority of respondents, who saw it as important that local representatives come from their area of origin, and this area was quite narrowly defined. However, the importance of origin was mainly framed in terms of trustworthiness and familiarity of the candidate. These respondents would all emphasize that knowledge of the local language was not needed to contest, and that “outsiders”, including those from the same ethnicity, who knew the area and were known in it, were as likely as locals to prevail in elections. Time and again, “the character” and “abilities” of the candidate were emphasized, regardless of all other factors.

One interesting aspect of this is that most of these respondents were both ethnic Wasukuma and knowledgeable in Kisukuma. In contrast, I did encounter a number of political representatives from different parties who in fact did stress the importance of Sukuma identity and Kisukuma language when contesting in Mwanza. These respondents were all either from outside the region or not ethnic Wasukuma. A senior opposition party strategist told me that his party had actively looked and eventually co-opted notable Sukuma politicians to contest in Mwanza and Shinyanga because of the importance of identity factors. According to this seasoned politician, who belonged to a small Lake Zone ethnic group, the Sukuma only “believe” in a political party if they see some “famous Sukuma” in it. Chacha Kisyeri, TLP regional chairman in Mwanza and an ethnic Luo, claimed that knowledge of Kisukuma is crucial in some parts of Mwanza region. Kisukuma was also used as a political tactic; as an appeal to ethnicity in order to get more support, he argued. He also complained that there had been frequent attempts during the course of the years to discredit him on the basis of his ethnic background, portraying him as a belligerent Kuria, due to his origin in Mara.
Similarly, Aristide Ndibalema, an ethnic Mhaya who was active within Chadema in Geita, emphasized the importance in having an ethnic Sukuma to lead the party in Geita:

“It is easier to grab the group if you have an Msukuma. You can make politics here around town but when you go into the interior, you need someone who can explain in Kisukuma. If you talk Sukuma language, you can see people start laughing; it’s like now they understand. But if you can’t talk Kisukuma, maybe five words, they will look at you like you are an intruder.”

(Ndibalema, 27.5.2011)

There did thus emerge a rather interesting pattern, where indigenous respondents – with the few exceptions mentioned above – downplayed the importance of Sukuma language and identity, whereas ethnic or regional outsiders in turn emphasized their importance. As outsiders, they may have felt that they were lacking those identification factors that locals don’t necessarily emphasize but which are nonetheless important. An old CCM stalwart in Mwanza town may have correctly summarized the issue at hand when he stated: “This place, Mwanza, belongs to us. We don’t always elect fellow Sukuma, but if you are Msukuma, then you are easily accepted. Representation has to come from among one of you.” (P19, 30.5.2011)

Many of my respondents may thus have overemphasized their flexibility in terms of language and heritage, but their responses are significant in themselves: They wanted to express and underline that ethnicity and ethnic heritage did not have political significance for them. Nonetheless, it is quite likely that Sukuma identity indeed does matter and that knowledge of Kisukuma in some parts of Mwanza is quite indispensable. How should this be interpreted? As mentioned earlier, ethnicity may be used as a means of securing political inclusion. The emphasis on trustworthiness of political candidates in my interview may be seen in the same way. Trustworthiness here entailed that a candidate would work for the best of the community, which in essence means pursuing public resources for the good of the constituency, rather than keeping them for him or herself. The continued emphasis on trustworthiness, ability, familiarity and knowledge of local conditions may thus be seen as a way for the constituency to ensure their political inclusion, that the candidate chosen is someone who may be trusted to work for the community. One measure of this trust was thus common origin – ethnicity. I will discuss the implications of this in the final concluding section of this chapter.

41 Compare to discussion in chapter 6 on joking ethnicity, which not always is a joke
42 Who also was Chadema’s MP candidate in Bukoba rural in 2010
7.3 Conclusion: Ethnicity in the 2010 elections

The discussion in this chapter has shown that the role of political ethnicity in the 2010 elections is not likely to have been substantial, in particular with regard to Mwanza. There were indeed a few exceptions to this, which transpired in my interviews, but the general conclusion is that ethnic politics did not feature prominently in the election campaigns. This does not mean that ethnicity was inconsequential for voters and candidates in all its forms, a point that I will develop in this final section. I will discuss some general implications of my fieldwork results for the issue of ethnicity and politics in Tanzania, and refer back to the lengthy discussion developed in chapter 6. First, however, I will make some final remarks about Chadema and the accusations of ethnic bias. As I concluded in section 7.1 above, it is quite difficult to justify the allegations of Chagga-bias leveled against Chadema, considering the party’s structure and profile in 2010. What is the reason then for the persistence of these allegations? First and most obviously, these allegations are rather powerful as a political tool in a country that puts considerable pride in having overcome the risk of ethnic and religious politics. As mentioned in chapter 6.6, Tanzanians interviewed in the Nyalali commission report in 1992 were deeply concerned that multiparty politics would bring about divisions between groups in the country. In the analysis of the 2001 Afrobarometer survey, Chaligha et al. (2002) note that 10 years later, trust for political parties was among the least trusted public institutions listed, although trust was still significant, at around 60 percent (Chaligha et al, 2002, p. 43).

As Dr. Kamata from UDSM contended, CCM has long portrayed itself as the guardian of the famous national unity of Tanzania, and which in some cases even entails direct accusations against opposition parties of threatening this unity (Kamata, 12.5.2011). Whitehead, for instance, found quotes from both Kikwete and former president Mkapa from around the 2005 elections, accusing the opposition of inciting religious and ethnic tension (Whitehead, 2009, p. 264). It was a common conception among my researcher respondents that much of the ethnic and religious discourse indeed did emanate from the ruling party, and that it was used as political propaganda against the opposition, although it must be added that not all researchers supported this claim. In sum, the accusations seem to serve as a convenient tool for discrediting the opposition in a country where ethnic politics are commonly frowned upon: as noted in one evaluation of the elections, the accusations are a form of “character assassination” of notable opposition figures (Shaba, 2010, p. 2). In addition to this, however, in the early years of multiparty politics, Chadema might indeed have been slightly skewed towards the Chagga or the north both in terms of membership, support
and in particular funding, and this may still dominate the conception of the party by its political opponents (including certain media outlets).

However, I noted clear differences in terms of age and position among CCM respondents with regard to the accusations of Chagga-dominance. Younger and lower ranking CCM respondents were a lot less likely to accuse Chadema or any other party of ethnic bias than older and higher ranking officials. In addition, it seemed that many of the older respondents sincerely believed in their claims of ethnic bias (e.g. P18; P19; P12). This divergence in opinions may thus be seen as a generational issue and one of party rank. The high-ranking and elderly CCM-respondents (e.g. senior party strategists; regional secretary; regional chairman; district secretary; even in some instances MPs) represented the “old CCM”, who had the historical perspective where Chadema, and other political parties for that matter, were viewed with skepticism, especially with regard to their ethnic or religious basis. But also, for this class and generation of CCM leaders, these accusations seem to be part of every-day politics, while for the lower ranking actives, religion and ethnicity were not relevant in their political dealings. This is indeed a good sign, since it would suggest that first, these issues indeed were quite irrelevant; and second, that any bickering in the form of ethnicity that may occur on the elite level does not translate into ethnic politics on the grassroots (cf. Wimmer’s model in section 6.5).

What can be said about ethnicity and politics in Tanzania on a general level then, based on my field results? As a general contention, it is quite safe to assume that outright political tribalism is still relatively rare in Tanzania. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to assume that tribalism is unthinkable in Tanzania, despite its historical absence. In the example from the ward in central Mwanza, there was a clear instance of tribalism, as the Jita candidate used his ethnic identity in order to prevail against his Haya competitor. As noted in section 6.6, Gasarasi (1997) reported that instances of tribalism were fairly common on the district or regional level already in the 1995 elections, and in addition Erdmann contends that multiparty politics is likely to have increased the incentive to evoke ethnic sentiments (Erdmann, 2002, p. 29). It was earlier argued that the dominance of the one-party state in Tanzania curtailed the possibilities for ethnic sentiments to be voiced during the one-party period. The introduction of multiparty democracy in Tanzania and elsewhere in Africa coincided with large economic and political transformations, and the withdrawal of the previously dominant state from service provision combined with an opening of the political field thus gave an opportunity for ethnic and religious sentiment to be voiced in many
parts of Africa, as discussed in chapter 5. Saida Yahya-Othman saw this in particular with respect to economic and social security in Tanzania:

“Ethnicity has become more prominent not only in politics but also generally. It is another disturbing factor. I try to explain it in terms of that the government has withdrawn from providing the basic services, the economy is in a bad shape, there is a lack of basic needs, so people need to organize in way that will enable them [to survive]” Prof. Yahya-Othman, 9.6.2011

In line with the definition in this thesis, then, ethnicity may function as a means of pursuing resources, and in the Tanzanian context, the incentive to do so might thus have been precipitated by demise of the political system that previously had ensured political and economic inclusion. Still, there is no automation in this, and in Tanzania, instances of political tribalism remain the exception. A closer case study, for instance in the case of the Jita and Haya in Mwanza, could reveal which social and political factors affect why tribalism is used in certain circumstances, and why the electorate in responsive to such rhetoric in those cases. Ethnic group identities in Tanzania were in chapter 6 seen as having an inherent potential for politicization given their constant invention and re-invention, but based on this one example in my fieldwork, it is not possible to assert in which circumstances this mobilization becomes a viable option. The point here is that political tribalism remains a political option even in Tanzania, and in the presence of a social environment conducive to the mobilization of ethnic identity, this may indeed occur.

Another example in the same vein is the comments by a senior CCM stalwart, whom I interviewed in Mwanza. He contended that CCM would field a Sukuma candidate to contest against Wenje in the next general elections in 2015. Since there was a mix of ethnic groups in Mwanza town, he contended that the Sukuma needed to be united in order to defeat Wenje. (P19, 30.5.2011) The somewhat naïve implicit assumption in this statement, that Wenje had been elected by others than Sukuma and that Sukuma would support CCM, may be left aside for the more important assumption that given an ethnic other, the Sukuma would unite at the ballot to protect their common interests. This has been unheard of before, which the same respondent also had admitted earlier in the interview. His comments thus represent a rather peculiar admission that ethnicity may be used by political parties if there are important resources at stake.

Notwithstanding these examples, there are clear indications that Tanzanian voters are quite wary of evocations of ethnicity or religion by political representatives. Gasarasi made this point in the evaluation of the 1995 elections, where he argued that despite the attempts to ethnic mobilization,
the Tanzanian electorate was “enlightened” enough not to buy into ethnically divisive appeals
Gasarasi writes in 1997. This was due to the fact that Tanzanians had reached a level of political
“maturity” and were steadfast in their efforts to preserve national unity and not to succumb to
divisive policies (Gasarasi, 1997, pp. 255; 266). This claim is in fact largely supported in my
interviews. In most cases, respondents showed a clear aversion to ethnic or religious mobilization.
Frequently, allusions were made to the fact that Tanzanians had managed to overcome tribalism; it
was not a factor in the politics of the country. TLP regional secretary Chacha Kisyeri claimed that
the use of ethnicity is straight out counterproductive: “If you try to use tribalism you can’t succeed.
No one can use tribalism to win a position in Tanzania, there is no single case of this.” (Kisyeri,
31.5.2011) Indeed, for instance the example of Mrema in Temeke in 1996, explained in chapter 6.6,
would seem to be a case in point.

This relates to ethnicity as political tribalism, however, and it is very clear that the strong normative
foundation of Tanzania’s national unity still prevails with regard to udini and ukabila. In my
interviews, reference was frequently made to the policies of Julius Nyerere and his efforts to curtail
the rise of ethnic politics. Mwalimu (“teacher”, Nyerere’s nickname) had “taught” the people that
ethnic and religious politics were to be avoided, and the people had understood (e.g. O11,
21.5.2011). The responses of my respondents regarding the use of Kisukuma in the campaigns and
the non-importance of ethnicity and common origin of candidates have to be seen towards this
background. In essence, ethnicity does not matter because it should not matter. However, this
relates to the fact that ethnicity is seen exclusively in terms of tribalism, and therefore exclusively in
negative terms. This discourse thus hides the different ways in which ethnicity might affect voters,
and which cannot be attributed to outright tribalism.

These other forms in which ethnicity may come to the political fore in Tanzania may be conceived
of largely in terms of what I have termed the politics of origin. In particular, it revolved around the
importance of political representation coming from among the locality, which could be either the
ethnic group as in Sukuma, or as sharing the same origin, which in this thesis is seen as a form of
ethnicity. The importance of ethnic representation was underlined by the fact that all of my
respondents in the politician-category who were either not natives of the region or had a different
ethnic background than the regional majority, emphasized the importance of either ethnicity or
knowledge of the ethnic language when contesting elections in Mwanza (e.g. P19; P3; P17; P21).
This was contrasted against the fact that most respondents in the ordinary-category – the vast
majority of which were ethnic Sukuma – downplayed the importance of common ethnicity or
knowledge of the language. Most of these respondents instead chose to emphasize the character and suitability (kufaa), abilities (uwezo) and trustworthiness/faithfulness (uaminifu) of political candidates rather than his or her origin. Origin was important rather as a means of being attached to the constituency and “knowing its challenges”, rather than representing its values and identity.

How can this apparent contradiction in replies be explained? Two different interpretations suggest themselves. First, one could argue that my respondents simply denied the importance of ethnicity as voting motivations due to the strong discourse prohibiting the use of ethnic and religious politics in Tanzania. The emphasis on trustworthiness and familiarity could thus be interpreted simply as a “code word for belongingness” (Omari, 1997, p. 64) and thus, for ethnicity. Second, the opposite may be true, in which case ethnicity instead worked as a measure of the trustworthiness of political candidates. In this interpretation, common language, locality and background thus made candidates more familiar, more attached to the community, and in consequence, more trustworthy. This would thus be an adaptation of attempts to overcome the “information problem” as outlined by Lindberg & Morrison (2008), but I would still argue that both interpretations above might be seen as instances of ethnic politics.

I would be inclined to support the second interpretation, which is particularly telling of a distinctive feature of ethnicity and politics in Tanzania. Ethnicity has featured as a factor of political representation throughout Tanzania’s independence history, as explained in chapter 6.5, and representation on the basis of ethnicity is therefore still likely to be important. Nonetheless, it has never evolved into a decisive factor in the allocation of resources and I therefore suggest that it was not conceived as an indispensable part of representative politics among my respondents. The point here is that while ethnicity might indeed have been an important factor influencing voting motivations, it is not an unconditional requirement. Therefore, if political candidates are suitable, well known, able, faithful and trustworthy, they are perfectly electable even if they do not share the same ethnicity as their constituency. This has certainly occurred in Mwanza, and based on my field results, there is little reason to assume that ethnicity in the future will develop into an unconditional requirement for supporting political candidates.

8. Religion and Politics in Tanzania

African societies are commonly depicted as very religious, which is evident among other things in the vast number of various Muslim, Christian and other faith groups that exist in most African
countries (e.g. Chabal, 2009; Uzodike & Whetho 2008; Haynes 2004). It is frequently mentioned that religion is an important and pervasive force in African societies: Ellis & Ter Haar for instance claim that “religious belief operates at every level of society in Africa” (1998, p. 177) while Chabal sees religion as the “glue that binds societies together” (2009, p. 68) There is little doubt that these depictions are relevant in Tanzania as well, which by any account must be described as a country where religious country and religious institutions play a very important role (Mukandala, 2006, p.1). Faith-based organizations (FBOs) have an increasingly important position in the social service provision in Tanzania (see e.g. Leurs et al 2011; Green 2006) and religious leaders have long occupied prominent social and political positions both on the national and on the local level (see below). This is a common trend in Africa, where religious leaders are commonly conceived as trusted public figures (Uzodike & Whetho, pp. 202-03). In fact, according to a global survey conducted by the BBC in 2005, religious leaders are trusted more in Africa than on any other continent in the world (BBC/Gallup International 2005).

In this thesis, the discussion concerning religion and politics serves as an augmentation of the lengthy account on ethnicity in chapters 6 and 7. Much of the features of ethnic politics apply for religious politics as well (e.g. Heilman & Kaiser, 2002, p. 692) and I will here employ the same view on religious identity as on ethnic identity: that it is a socially constructed, but nonetheless “real” and salient identity. (cf. Laakso & Olukoshi, 1996, p. 28-31) In other words, religion is “deeply rooted in the fabric of material social relations” even though its basis as a collective social identity is largely constructed (ibid. p. 31). I also suggest that religion in Tanzania may be seen using the same categorization that was employed for analyzing ethnicity; that is, distinguishing between its cultural, social and political levels. I see religion as having assumed an important cultural and social position in Tanzanian society with considerable relevance for every-day activities and social relations. This may have been precipitated by the spread of Christian and Muslim movements that have been termed “fundamentalist”43, and which are commonly thought to espouse strict prescriptions for both religious practices and the social role of religion (see section 8.3).

By cultural religion, I thus refer to the importance of religious practices in the every-day life of believers, and by social religion to its importance for social identification and interaction. I am aware of the critique that has been leveled against attempts to reduce religion to its social or cultural

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43 The use of the term fundamentalist has, not surprisingly, been criticized, which will be addressed in section 8.3.1 below.
functions (e.g. Ellis & ter Haar 2007; Marshall 2009; Bompani & Frahm-Arp 2010) but I will nonetheless employ these categories to facilitate the understanding of religious politics and how it may emerge. The political level of religion – religious politics or political religion – is thus defined in line with earlier definitions simply as the use of religion in the conduct of politics: the pursuit of public resources. As with ethnicity, this does not occur automatically and is not a straight consequence of the social or political saliency of religion. The focus here is thus again on the incentives to mobilize religion politically. However, the borders between the various levels of religion are not as clearly defined as was the case with ethnicity, and the categories partially overlap. For instance, religion commonly works as a self-referent even if religious groups do not exhibit a great amount of social cohesion and relevance. In addition, they can hardly be thought of a following the same kind of historical transition scheme as was argued in the case of ethnicity. Finally, in this chapter I cannot substantiate the argument with the same kind of theoretical and conceptual discussion as in chapter 6. The aim of this discussion is to point to some general trends regarding religion and politics in Tanzania, and the categorization above may work as a general conceptual background to this discussion.

In comparison to ethnicity, religion has assumed a clearly more visible political role in Tanzania and this was in particular the case in the early 1990s, when conflicts between various Christian and Muslim “revivalist” groups resulted in a series of clashes and tensions. In consequence, existing and newly emerging religious organizations increasingly attempted to gain influence in politics and government (brief account below, see also Luanda, 1996; Mbögoni, 2005; Ludwig, 1999, chap. 18). In the period preceding liberalization, state-religion relations had been marked by stability and cooperation, and the increasing religious tensions in early 1990s thus raised concerns for the introduction of multi-party politics (e.g. Luanda, 1996, p. 181). While religious tensions seem to have subsumed since (e.g. Dr. Heilman, personal communication), the 2010 elections again gave impetus for religious sentiments to be voiced, as the main opposition party Chadema launched Dr. Willibrod Slaa, a former catholic priest, to run against CCM’s incumbent Jakaya Kikwete, a Muslim. Accusations of religious bias were frequently voiced against Chadema, and an additional range of religious issues in the pre-election campaigns – election manifestos by religious institutions and vocal calls for the re-establishment of Muslim courts – contributed to the conception that religion featured prominently in the elections.

Despite the seemingly visible role of political religion in Tanzania, there is still considerable consensus that relations between Muslims and Christians are quite cordial (see survey in Tambila,
2006 below) and that religion plays a relatively minor political role (e.g. Mallya, 2006; Heilman & Kaiser, 2002). In this and the following chapter, I thus set out to suggest some factors that might facilitate the understanding of religion and politics in Tanzania. In this chapter, I will first outline some of the background reasons for the emergence of religious politics in Tanzania in the early 1990s. In sum, I argue that the increased tensions between Christians and Muslims may be seen first with reference to the spread of “fundamentalist” versions of both religions in Tanzania from the 1970s and 1980s onwards, and the particular social and political character of these groups. The context in which these movements emerged was the deteriorating social and economic conditions in Tanzania around this time, which contributed to the relevance of these groups. Second, an element of vertical inequality has developed between religious groups in Tanzania, which in turn facilitated mobilization on the basis of religion. These vertical inequalities should be seen in terms of real or punitive group-based grievances of discrimination, which in essence relate to inclusion or exclusion from the state. Chapter 9 will then analyze this situation with reference to the 2010 elections and party politics and suggest some reasons for why these grievances have not led to the more common occurrence of religious politics in Tanzania.

8.1 Religion in Tanzania and Africa

In this essay, I use a broad definition of religion which is based on the discussion in Ellis & ter Haar (1998 and 2007) and which simply defines religion as a belief in the existence of an invisible world which has substantial influence and power over the material world (Ellis & ter Haar 1998, p. 181; 2007, p. 387). For the sake of political analysis, it is useful to add to this definition Haynes’ assertion that the religious consists of both the institutional and the spiritual. Its institutional form then entails religious institutional organization, while the spiritual form signifies a system of guiding individual and social behavior. (Haynes 1996, pp. 1-2) As a general contention, it may be said that the social and political aspect of religion is thus based these two pillars; on the fact that it is “founded on transcendental values giving order to human relations and fate” (Laakso & Olukoshi, 1996, p. 32), which in turn may function as the basis for individual and group action (Haynes p. 233).

In Tanzania, the main religions are Christianity, Islam and traditional religions, often called ATRs (African Traditional Religions). As mentioned in chapter 2, I have chosen to omit ATRs from the analysis of this thesis. In Tanzania, there are few exclusive practitioners of ATRs who do not confess to Christianity or Islam as well, and leaders of ATR rarely engage directly in politics.
(Mhina 2006, pp. 116; 125). To be sure, Chabal argues that ATRs have considerable influence on political dealings all over Africa (Chabal, 2009, chapter 3) and Mhina found that up to a quarter of political candidates in the 2000 general elections in Tanzania consulted traditional spiritual leaders during election campaigns, and on the village level ATR leaders could be quite influential (Mhina, pp. 125-26). Still, as argued in chapter 2, ATR have no religious institutions that attempt to influence political dealings, and are essentially non-universalistic and non-expansionary, and therefore commonly locally confined (Mhina, p. 115). In this essay, I thus focus on the political use of religion mainly as conducted through the various Christian and Muslim institutions and organizations in Tanzania.

Islam has a long history in Tanzania, having set root in the area from the 9\textsuperscript{th} and 10\textsuperscript{th} centuries onwards (Tambila 2006b, pp. 172-3). Christianity is much younger as the various Christian denominations began their actual missionary work only in the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century, although there had been contacts at a much earlier stage (Tambila & Sivalon 2006, pp. 225-8). Although there have been tensions between the two faith groups from the very beginning of their encounter in the Tanzanian area relations between ordinary Muslim and Christian believers have remained cordial, and as Mbogoni points out, Christians and Muslims commonly attend each other’s festivals and funerals, and inter-marriage is likewise common (Mboboni, 2005). In the REDET survey on religious relations in Tanzania, 78 percent of respondents (n=839) announced that that relations between Christians and Muslims were good, while only 3.7 percent though the relations to be “disharmonious” (quoted in Tambila, 2006a). However, 12.8 percent of respondents saw the relations as moderate, and as Tambila points out, the Kiswahili word for moderate – wasiwasi – can also be interpreted as “not so good” (Tambila, p. 58). There were approximately the same results for the question of relations between religious institutions in the same survey, with only slightly less respondents, 71.2 percent defining them as good. Also, in 2000, close to 90 percent of the REDET respondents declared that no religious group was favored over the other in Tanzania, albeit 6.3 percent saw the Christians as favored and 3 percent viewed the Roman Catholics in particular as privileged. Finally, a substantial 83.8 percent were not aware of any religious conflict in the country. In sum, Tambila argues the results are “an indication that inter-religious conflicts are not part of life in Tanzanian society” (Tambila, 2006a, p. 60).

The population in Tanzania has not been registered on the basis of ethnicity or religion since 1967, and the since there are no official figures concerning the size of the various religious groups, this has remained an issue of contention between Muslims and Christians. In my interview, it was for
instance common for religious leaders from both camps to argue that their religious group was in fact the more numerous (e.g. RL1; RL9; RL8). Historically, Muslims also question the last official census of 1967, particularly with reference to the fact that in the preceding census of 1957, Muslims had still outnumbered Christians 3 to 2, while ten years later, Christians were officially more numerous (Heilman & Kaiser, 2002, pp. 697-8; Luanda, 1996, p. 171). Below, I have compiled information on the proportions of the various groups of the total population based on different estimates and surveys. The Afrobarometer surveys of 2001, 2005 and 2008 have listed the religious background of their respondents, but as with the Afrobarometer results in chapter 7, these should be treated mainly as indicative of a trend.

### Table 8.1 Religious composition of population in Tanzania

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<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
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Sources in order of table: Census 1967; Glickman 1995; Mukandala 2006; Afrobarometer Tanzania 2001; 2005; 2008

In table 8.1 above, the REDET estimates from 2003 (cited in Mukandala, 2006, p.1) correspond rather well with the census of 1967 and the 1992 estimates in Glickman (1995). The Afrobarometer results point towards a different direction however. In all three surveys, the proportion of Christians was around 60 percent while the share of Muslims more or less corresponded with the earlier estimates. It is possible that this difference is attributable to the fact that ATR was not registered as a religious background in the Afrobarometer surveys. Most Tanzanians today would declare their religion as either Christianity or Islam, even though the ATR practices still are widespread (Tumaini-Mungu & Mvungi 2011, p. 2; Mhina 2006). It may thus be that previously ATR-dominated areas today identify with Christianity rather than Islam. However, what table 8.1 shows more than anything else is that it is difficult to make any clear assessments regarding the proportions of the Muslims and Christians in Tanzania. Since both groups are sizeable and widely spread, however, for the sake of this analysis I will follow Heilman & Kaiser’s contention that both groups may be expected to be relatively equal in terms of strength and numbers (2002, p. 703).

The Christian believers in Tanzania are mainly divided into Roman Catholics, Protestants, Anglicans Moravians, Seventh Day Adventists and the Pentecostal churches. The Catholics are the largest denomination, followed by the Lutherans and the Anglicans, but the Pentecostal churches have been rapidly expanding in Tanzania recently. According to figures in Tumaini-Mungu &
Mvungi (2011) the number of Pentecostal churches already by far exceeds that of the other denominations, although these churches have not focused as much social service provision or developmental activities as the older denominations (pp. 27-28). All major Christian denominations have their corresponding institutions, which take part in the political debates of the country to a greater or lesser extent. The Catholics are represented by the Tanzania Episcopal Conference (TEC), the Lutherans by the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania (ELCT) and the Anglicans by the Anglican Church in Tanzania (ACT), previously referred to as the Church of the Province of Tanzania. The protestant churches are further organized under the Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT), which has taken an active political role both during the one-party state and after its demise (e.g. Ludwig, 1999). Finally, the various Pentecostal churches, albeit being protestant, are not members of the CCT, and while there have been considerable conflicts among the various congregations, the Pentecostals have formed the umbrella institution Free Pentecostal Churches in Tanzania (FPCT).

Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa is commonly seen as distinct from its Middle Eastern counterpart, in that a large part of African Muslims adhere to what is called Sufism (Haynes 2004, p. 72; Chabal, 2009, p. 35). In the case of Tanzania, Lodhi & Westerlund mention that a commonly held is that up to three fourths of the Muslim population in Tanzania can be described as Sufi (Lodhi & Westerlund 1997). In terms of Muslim institutions, the vast majority of congregations and organizations are Sunni, as the Shia groups are mainly limited to Aga Khan Ismalites, who are predominantly Asian (Lodhi, 1994). For most of the one-party period there was only one Muslim organization, BAKWATA (The Supreme Muslim Council of Tanzania), which was “virtually a carbon copy of the CCM’s structure and its leadership is dominated by Muslims who are also CCM leaders” (Luanda, 1996, p. 173). BAKWATA was formed as the sole guardian of Muslim interests in 1968 as previous Muslim organizations such as ANMUT (African National Muslim Union of Tanzania) and EAMWS (East Africa Muslim Welfare Society) had been dismantled. This was surrounded by some controversy and is still used by some Muslims as evidence for Christian dominance of Muslims (for an extensive account of this process and argument, see Mbogoni, 2005, chapters 6 and 7). With liberalization, BAKWATA’s position was increasingly challenged and a range of competing institutions were formed. The first among these was Warsha Warsha ya Waandishi wa Kiislam (Islamic Writers' Workshop) which originally was a division within BAKWATA mainly responsible for educational issues, but which grew increasingly critical of both BAKWATA and the status quo, and was eventually excluded from the organization in 1982 (Lodhi & Westerllund, 1997).
BALUKTA (Baraza la Ukuzaji Kurani Tanzania; Tanzania Council for readers of the Koran) was one of the Muslim organizations that took part in the increasingly inflammatory religious rhetoric in Tanzania in the early 1990s (Lodhi & Westerlund, 1997). The organization was involved the pork butchery incident in Dar es Salaam in 1993 in which three pork butchers were killed, upon which the organization was dissolved by the government (Ludwig, 1999, p. 207). The organization also vocally advocated the creation of an Islamic state and has urged Muslims to vote for other Muslims, seeing government by Christians as “blasphemy” (Luanda, 1996, pp. 176-77). One of the most persistent organizations formed in the early 1990s was Baraza Kuu la Jumuia na Taasisi za Kiislam (The Supreme Council of Islamic Organizations) commonly referred to simply as Baraza kuu, which emerged in 1992 mainly in critique of BAKWATA. It had a strong basis among highly educated Muslims and it has sought to replace BAKWATA as the unifying organization for Muslims in Tanzania (Lodhi & Westerlund, 1997).

8.2 Politics and Religion in Tanzania

During the one-party era in Tanzania, religious institution maintained stable and cordial relations to the state, which is in line with what the literature on politics and religion in Africa would predict (Haynes 1996; 2004). Tanzania could be defined as a secular state with a liberal approach to religion, where various “civil religions” are allowed to flourish quite freely (Hallencreutz & Westerlund 1996, p. 4). Nonetheless, it is clear that religious institutions have maintained close links with the state and the state elites in Tanzania. Luanda uses the term “secularized religiosity” to refer to the relations between the state in Tanzania and the Roman Catholic Church in particular (Luanda, 1996, p. 169). In the literature on religion and politics in Africa, political power and religion are commonly considered to be closely intertwined, despite the formal separation of religion and politics: “it is difficult to be sure where ‘religion’ ends and ‘politics’ begins in Africa⁴⁴.” (Haynes, 2004, pp. 80-81). In Africa, argues Marshall, the religious has had a tendency spread into a range of other domains, especially the political, and Bompani & Frahm-Arp contend that religious and public political spaces in Africa are commonly used concomitantly (Marshall 2009, p. 20; Bompani & Frahm-Arp 2010, pp. 241-246).

With regard to pre-colonial Tanzania, a clear distinction between religion and politics was difficult to make, since commonly political and religious authority overlapped, sometimes even in the same

⁴⁴ It should be noted that Haynes does not take this to be an exclusive feature of African societies
There is a broad literature that highlights the persistence of these tendencies, in which it is emphasized that religion in Africa is a permeable force in which all aspects of life and society are imbued with spiritual power and meaning (e.g. Marshall 2009; Ellis & ter Haar 1998; 2007; Bompani & Frahm-Arp 2010). Essentially, according to this view, African societies “use the lens of religion as a fundamental component of social construction and social interpretation” (Bompani & Frahm-Arp, p. 3). The political implications for this view are outlined for instance by Ellis & ter Haar who regard politics and religion as inseparable from each other as religions in Africa have a “holistic approach, where sacred and the secular can be considered to constitute one organic whole” (Ellis & ter Haar, 2007, p. 386). Political and economic events are thus increasingly interpreted through “religious idioms” the authors argue, making “religion the emerging political language of our time” (2007, p. 399; 393). Contrary to this popular view, I do not assume that religion in Africa has any inherent quality which makes it more culturally entrenched or politically feasible here than elsewhere. Instead, focus should be put on the social and institutional factors that have enabled the strong salience of religion on the social and political levels. (cf. Green, 2006, pp. 635-36; 641; 647). This is in line with the distinction between social and political religion made above. I will thus outline some general aspects of this below, beginning with the state-religious relations in the one-party era in Tanzania.

8.2.1 Politics and Religion in Nyerere’s Tanzania

It is commonly though that in particular the Roman Catholic Church and the TEC had close relationships to the government of Nyerere, in part because Nyerere was a devout Catholic (e.g. Luanda 1996; Mbugoni, 2005). It has been suggested that various catholic congregations maintained close links with Nyerere even before independence, and that there was a measure of expected reciprocity behind the maintenance of these relations. Through their influence on the government, the Catholics hoped to counter what it perceived to be the two largest “undesirable tendencies” in society, namely communism and the influence of Islam (Mbugoni, 2005, 128-130; Luanda, 169-170). The Catholic church had controlled a large part of the missionary schools in colonial times and played an active role in “leadership education” in independent Tanzania, and combined with personal links to the ruling elite, it managed to “carve out a special niche for itself in the political affairs of Tanzania” (Luanda, 1996, p. 169). However, it was not only the Catholics but also the CCT had close relations with the state throughout Nyerere’s reign (Ludwig, 1999), and as mentioned above, BAKWATA was closely aligned with TANU/CCM from the beginning.

This is largely in line with Jeff Haynes (1996) conceptualization of state-religious relations, where
he predicts that “mainline” religions will strive to maintain stable and cordial relations to the government. Haynes defines mainline religions as those religious institutions which have “established regularized forms of interaction with the state over time, and which are regarded by the latter as official representative of large numbers of people” (Haynes, 1996, p. 20). Haynes includes in this definition those Muslim organizations represented by the *ulama*, the religious authorities, but with regard to Tanzania, it could be argued that Muslims organizations such as BAKWATA would rather fit the description. On the Christian side, this would refer mainly to the Anglican, Lutheran and Catholic denomination and their corresponding institutions. Haynes frames the religion-politics relations of the mainline religions in terms of the neo-patrimonial system prevalent in many African countries as outlined in section 5.2 above. He sees state-religion relationships in accordance with a Gramscian notion of hegemony, according to which state and religious elites are both engaged in a “hegemonic” striving to legitimate their rule. The maintenance and construction of hegemony is facilitated by the allusion to common interests of the whole nation such as national unity or national self-determination (self-reliance). Religious leaders are thus part of the same patrimonial networks as politicians, and particularly in times of economic and political insecurity, they are likewise dependent on upholding networks of reciprocity, involving to some extent also kin and family. (Haynes, 2004, pp. 63-71; 73-79)

In consequence, Haynes sees religious and state elites as having common interests, and therefore the mainline religions have had a vested interest in the maintenance of a stable political order in post-colonial Africa. A number of specific issues have influenced the incentives of religious leaders, particularly Christian, to maintain good relations to the state, according to Haynes. Religious leaders and their institutions may have benefitted from the prevailing order and also realized that their “corporate position”, that is influence, in society hinged on state support. Church-state relations were close in colonial times, and these relations were in many cases simply maintained in post-colonial Africa. There have been consistent and close personal relationships between religious leaders and secular elites as well, which furthers stability. Also, Haynes suggests that religious leaders and institutions may be considered inherently conservative, believing that public authority and power was ordained by God, and should therefore not be interfered with. This also explains the church’s hesitance, according to Haynes, to back democratization before the push for democracy has received sufficient popular support. (Haynes, 2004, pp. 69-70; 71; 73-76) In general, mainline religions will be reluctant to challenge the status quo, as their main goal,

45 I refer here to Haynes 2004 article *Religion and Democratisation in Africa* but the same arguments are made in his 1996 book Religion and Politics in Africa. For the sake of clear referral, I mainly mention the article in the references
according to Haynes, is “the maintenance of order and continuation of elite domination” (2004, p. 73).

While I cannot engage in a discussion on the potential patrimonial interest between church and state in Tanzania, it is clear that the church during the one-party period put a primacy on stable and personal relations to the state, and was not prone to push for change. Ludwig (1999) writes that the churches actively sought to establish good relations to the state and avoided open conflicts, which implied that whenever an issue of concern arose, the church – particularly the CCT and the TEC – would send delegations to meet the president or the minister in question. The meeting would be held behind closed doors, with the main issues commonly revolving around the church’s role in service provision (education and health care) given the expansion of state services, and the influence of Muslim communities (Ludwig, 1999, pp. 61-64) The concern that the Christian Churches expressed was that Muslims were less “tolerant” of religious plurality in Tanzania than Christians and therefore would seek to establish an Islamic state, if Muslims were to assume power (Mbogoni, p. 131; Luanda, p. 170). More realistically, in particular the Catholic Church may have been concerned about losing its privileged access to the state if Muslims’ influence were to increase. (Luanda, ibid.).

However, relations between the Roman Catholic Church and Nyerere’s government were not always marked by mutual support, since the Catholics long were quite wary of the suitability of the policies of African socialism which Nyerere outlined in the Arusha declaration, due to their concerns over the influence of socialism (Mbogoni, 2005, pp. 130; 139-144). Nonetheless, church-state relations were influenced to a great extent by personal contacts between religious leaders and state elites. For instance, Ludwig reports that the Lutheran bishop of Bukoba, Josiah Kibira, was common dining companion of both Nyerere and long-term vice-president Rashidi Kawawa, a Muslim. (Ludwig, 1999, p. 64-65) While Ludwig argues that this resulted in a situation where “any criticism of the policies of the government [was] almost impossible” (Ludwig, p. 65). Even as the government of Nyerere became increasingly authoritarian, including for instance the deportation of the political dissidents and the prohibition of opposition parties, the churches did not interfere or voice their concerns. The churches generally referred to the need to maintain law and order, which justified the authoritarian measures of the government (ibid. pp. 65-69).

Throughout the 1960s and for most of the 1970s, the mainline churches were by far the most dominant Christian institutions in Tanzania, while Muslims had been represented exclusively by the
CCM dominated BAKWATA. Towards the 1970s, this started to change, as the Pentecostal movement spread with increasing pace in Tanzania, and later various Muslim organizations emerged who challenged the position of BAKWATA, as mentioned above (for accounts, e.g. Ludwig pp. chapter 181-190; 206-210; Luanda, pp. 173-178). The “revivalist” or “fundamentalist” groups were frequently confrontational as the Pentecostal groups engaged in “crusades”, which were focused to a large extent on the conversion of Muslims. The Muslim fundamentalist groupings in turn increasingly engaged in *mihadhara*, open-air comparative preaching, often including statements that were perceived as blasphemy by Christians. This discourse also spread to newly established newspapers such as Msemakweli and An-Nuur, which thus emerged as religious media outlets. (Mbogoni, 2005, pp. 171-180). Tensions also translated into actual physical skirmishes, of which the most notable were attacks by Muslims fundamentalist against pork butcheries in Magomeni in Dar es Salaam in 1993, in which three pork butchers were killed; a police arrest in a mosque in Mwembechai, also in Magomeni, which sparked protests in which two protesters died in 1998; in 2002 two further people died in front of the same mosque in confrontation with police (referred to as the Mwembechai killings); and a series of further confrontations either between Muslims and Christians or between state authority and protesters. (Heilman & Kaiser, 2002, p. 695; Luanda, 1996, 177-78)

Muslims action was to a large extent based on a particular narrative of discrimination, which posited that the Muslims had been at disadvantage vis-à-vis the Christians since colonial times in terms of education, employment and public/political representation. Muslims had featured prominently in the independence struggle and in the ranks of the first independence movement, the African Association (AA), and later formed the majority in the council of elders in TANU, but there was a common perception that they had been sidelined in the high-ranks of TANU, as well as later when positions of government were distributed. (Mbogoni, 2005, pp. 115-116). The main issue behind this, as mentioned above, was education. Despite the sometimes rather belligerent rhetoric around the educational issue, it is nonetheless quite clear that Christians have maintained an educational advantage over the Muslims, which harks back to the colonial educational system (Ludwig, p. 208; Ishumi, 2006; Yahya-Othman, 2006). The basis for these imbalances was laid during British colonial rule, as a shift occurred from a dual system of government and private school to an emphasis on private actors. It was mainly the missions who could afford the large-scale construction of schools, which they undertook with particular intensity, while colonial government put little effort into provision of education. As a result there was a clear imbalance in the number of Christian and public schools towards the end of colonial rule, not the mention the ration of Christian
and Muslims schools. (Mbgoni, pp. 107-108; Ishumi, 2006, e.g. pp. 438-40) The consequences of this were considerable, as Mbgoni notes: “Since education in colonial Tanganyika was linked to social and economic mobility, the historical distribution of educational opportunities is an important key to understanding Muslim complaints, then and now, about their marginalization.” (Mbgoni, p. 111)

The validity of these grievances has been the subject of an intensive debate, where the response from some Christian institutions has essentially been that Muslims were themselves to blame for the educational imbalances, since secular education had not been held in high regard in the Muslim communities and institutions. (e.g. personal communication Prof. Mushi; Prof. Tambila; also Heilman & Kaiser, 2002, p. 702; Mbgoni 116-119). I cannot evaluate the accuracy of either claim here, but it may be noted that Nyerere’s government nationalized schools all over the country in an attempt to guarantee equitable inclusion of all social groups, as explained in chapter 6.5. Whatever the case, towards the end of the 1980s, Muslims grievances were voiced to an increasing extent, and while the content and range of the accusations varied, the basic gist has been that Muslims have been treated as second-class citizens in Tanzania, who have not been allowed to organize in pursuit of their interests despite the close relations between church and state that had prevailed since independence. Further, it was argued that the state has not addressed the historical imbalances between the religious groups and is mainly protecting the interest of the Christian community. (Heilman & Kaiser, 2002, pp. 701-702; Leurs et al. 2011, pp. 36-37).

In sum: many Muslims “perceive both Christianity and the state as fellow collaborators against Islam” (Luanda, 1996, pp. 172-73). These arguments sometimes took quite extreme measures, as the most polemic of Muslims debaters would accuse the government of Nyerere of having deliberately subordinated Muslims (Luanda, pp. 176-77; interview with Ilunga Kapungu, 2.6.2011). However, it must be clearly stated here that far from all Tanzanian Muslims support these claims (Heilman & Kaiser, 2002; Mbgoni 2005) and the most polemic statements seem to reverberate mainly among a niche group of Muslims in Tanzania, as argued in chapter 9.5. Nonetheless, it is likewise true that the basic argument about the privileged position of Christians in the history of Tanzania is supported also by moderate and intellectual elements in the Muslims community (Yahya-Othman, 9.6.2011). As for the Christian groups, Ludwig notes that the mainline churches were slow to react to the changing environment in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and expected to maintain their stable relations to the state and also the Muslim groupings. What turned the tide for the Christians, according to Ludwig, were two incidents: the unilateral membership declaration of
the Zanzibar in the Organisation of the Islamic conference, and a conflict within the Meru diocese, in which the state had intervened in opposition to the view held by the Lutheran bishops and the ECLT. According to Ludwig, the Meru diocese episode showed the church leaders that issues could not longer be resolved behind closed doors with state representatives, and the state would not always necessarily act in their favor. (Ludwig, pp. 210-212).

Zanzibar’s OIC membership was in turn an issue that was ferociously opposed by the churches, in particular CCT and ELCT. The OIC is an international organization whose member states are countries with sizeable Muslims populations and officially, the organization is aiming to look after the “interest of the Muslim world” and to promote “peace and harmony among various people of the world” (OIC.com). Zanzibar had unilaterally joined in the OIC in 1992, apparently with Union government consent, and the move was defended with reference to the economic benefits membership would bring. Christian institutions protested vocally against what they perceived to be a threat against the secular state of Tanzania. Zanzibar eventually withdrew its membership, but the issue has emerged as a dividing line between Muslims and Christians, since also many mainland Muslims had supposedly supported Zanzibar’s membership. (Ludwig, 1999, pp. 210-214; Mesaki, 2011, p. 256; Luanda 1996, pp. 179-180)

Following these two episodes, Christian churches started demanding the government to act against the spread of *mihadhara* and Muslim fundamentalism in general. (Luanda, pp. 179-180). Increasingly, the various Christian organizations started criticizing the economic and political management of the country as well, focusing on issues such as public corruption, to the point that “the challenges from the Christian churches to the state literally resembled those of a party in opposition” (Luanda, p. 180). Towards the mid-1990s, then, both Muslim and Christian groupings had started to take active part in the political debate, frequently voicing religious sentiments. How did this situation come about? It is clear that stable state-religious relations that had prevailed were challenged by the fact that mainline religious institutions lost their dominant position in presiding over the Christian and Muslims believers in Tanzania with the emergence of competing congregations and institutions (Ludwig, p. 207). The spread of the “fundamentalist” Christian and Muslims movements is also clearly linked to a global phenomenon of religious revival, as mentioned above (e.g. Westerlund, 2009). In addition, for the Muslims side, Mwinyi’s presidency might have provided a “conducive political climate for the establishment of several Muslim organizations whose agenda was Islamic revivalism” (Mbogoni, 2005, pp. 171; 146). However, while these enabling factors might have contributed to the rise and spread of the “fundamentalist”
versions of Christianity and Islam, I argue that it is useful in the first place to look at the factors that give the articulation of religious identity social and political relevance.

8.3 Politicization of Religion and Fundamentalist Religious Movements

I argued already in the introduction to this chapter that religion in Tanzania might be understood using the same categorization into cultural, social and political types as suggested in the case of ethnicity, but that the applicability of the model is less clear and the boundaries more overlapping. In the case of Nyerere’s government, it could be argued that religion had a political role in the same way as ethnicity, in that the inclusive system of governance incorporated inclusion on the basis of religion. In addition, however, religion also had a more direct political role, as witness by the close church-state relations, and churches were an integral part of the nation-building project (account in Mbugoni, 2005, pp. Ludwig, 1999). However, this does not necessarily mean that religion groups constituted socially cohesive entities with a strong sense of common identity and interests. In part this is attributable to the same factors outlined in section 6.5: the complete dominance of TANU over civil society; the repression of ethnic and religious sentiments; the conscious attempts at balancing imbalances in education and representation; and the integrative power of the common language.

However, as economic crisis was exacerbated and the state gradually withdrew, a space was opened for the gradual assertion of religious sentiments, in particular through their role as social service providers (see Leurs et al for an account of the importance of FBOs in Tanzania). As will be explained below, the “fundamentalist” religious groups that emerged during this time commonly develop strong group cohesiveness, and espouse a strict view of the desirable society, as well as the means to reach it. They thus provide some prerequisites for the consolidation of social religion, but also for collective action on the basis of it – political religion. The context to this is this the decline of the one-party state and economic crisis, which provides both the impediment and the space to turn to religious identities (cf. Chabal, 2009, 121; chapter 6.5). In other words, when national identities and a strong sense of national ideology is lacking, religion may come to the fore, especially “in a corrupt system where citizenship identity as a basis for claiming rights is weak” (Mushi, 2006, p. 31-32). This is a point also advanced by Ludwig in particular with respect to how the social and economic crisis in Tanzania affected the spread of Pentecostalism (Ludwig, pp. 188-190; see also Kaiser, 2001). Luanda similarly argues that the situation in Tanzania in the 1990s...
amounted to a “social and ideological vacuum”, which had not been filled by political parties, and which left the field open for religious and other identities to be expressed (Luanda, p. 173). This view was also broadly supported by my researcher respondents at UDSM (e.g. Yahya-Othman; R3).

In general, it may be said that a context of religious revival like that which occurred in Tanzania from the 1980s and 1990s, is rather prone the politicization of religion (Altinordu, 2010). Altinordu argues that revival marks a situation where various religious groups and their leaders became more visible and active, which commonly sparks a counter-reaction by other religious groups. Crucially, this leads to a solidification of religious identity, which in the process of assertion and re-assertion gains increased organizational capacity, as well as a clearer formulation of both religious group identity and its cultural and social content. Usually the situation where groups assert their religious identity in political competition with other groups requires the active mobilization efforts of “religious-political entrepreneurs”, who may mobilize on common grievances or threats to the social and political position of the group. (Altinordu, pp. 522-525). Altinordu thus argues that political religion is not an unmediated expression of religious identity; rather, religious identity is fundamentally transformed by the process of politicization itself both its content and expression becomes more clearly defined. Politicization happens as groups engage with other social actors, and is thus borne out of social interaction. (Altinordu 2010, pp. 540-42). This conceptualization of the politicization of religion is thus well in line with the discussions on social and political ethnicity in sections 6.4-6.6.

Both Altinordu and Laakso & Olukoshi point out that politicization is commonly connected to the real or punitive discrimination in the distribution of resources, or in threats posed to this distribution (cf. section 6.4 above). This may commonly relate to the resources of the state, and in case of perceived discrimination, it may relate to “the very definition of citizenship” (Laakso & Olukoshi, p. 31) or in other words, in the “feeling of inclusiveness” (Dr. Lwaitama) in the state (cf. Wimmer 1997). The Muslims narrative of discrimination touches precisely on the factor of inclusiveness: according to this view, Muslims were sidelined from education, from employment, from governmental representation – in short, from the state. As the powerful national identity and national ideology started to subsume, there was increasing space for the articulation of these grievances. Religion was used in pursuit of resources since it was perceived that religion had been a factor in the discrimination of their distribution previously. However, Christians have increasingly developed their own grievances of exclusion. In the case of OIC and the Meru diocese mentioned above, the church realized that their inclusion in the auspices of the state was not guaranteed, and
with Jakaya Kikwete in power, Christians increasingly perceive themselves as discriminated in
terms of public appointments and policies, as explained above. In the reminder of this chapter, I will
further elucidate the some of the points made so far by briefly addressing the literature on
“fundamentalist” religious groups, and how common social and political traits of these groups can
be seen to influence some of the observations made above.

8.3.1 “Fundamentalist” Religions and Politics

Jeff Haynes defines Muslims and Christian “fundamentalist” religions as those who have a strict
view on the relevance of the holy scriptures for day-to-day life and which tend to regulate “all
aspects of individual and social behavior” (Haynes, 1996, p. 199). To this definition should be
added Hallencreutz & Westerlund’s (1996) assertion, that regarding the Christian fundamentalist
movement, fundamentalism implies not so much the literal reading of the bible as its inerrancy
(Hallencreutz & Westerlund, 1996, p. 4). Hallencreutz and Westerlund also question the suitability
of the term “fundamentalist”, especially with regard to the Islamic groups, as it commonly thought
to have a derogatory ring to it, espousing western stereotypes about other religions. Also, in terms
of the importance of the Holy Scriptures, the inerrancy of the Koran and its relevance for guiding
behavior, “fundamentalist” Muslims do not differ substantially from ordinary believers, according
to Hallencreutz & Westerlund. What sets fundamentalists, or anti-secularists, as the authors prefer,
 apart from ordinary believers, however, is the political nature of their pursuit as well as their
opposition to the secular nature of politics. (Hallencreutz & Westerlund pp. 4-8) Fundamentalist, or
anti-secular, movements are thus political in nature, which is an important distinguishing factor.

Notwithstanding these remarks, I use the term fundamentalist broadly to describe the various
Christian and Muslim movements that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s in Tanzania. On the
Christian side, this thus includes various groupings that have been referred to as Pentecostal, Born-
Again Christian, Charismatic-Christian or Evangelical Charismatic churches. These groups are
quite diverse in terms of doctrines, institutions and social position but in much of the literature (e.g.
Marshall 2009; Gifford 1996; Haynes 1996; 2004) these are treated as part of the same
phenomenon. The common denominator of these movements, regardless of label, can be seen as the
belief “in the gifts of the holy spirit” (Westerlund, 2009, p. 19) and “miraculous experiences for the
individual believer such as prophecy, healing and speaking in tongues” (Hasu 2006, p. 680).

Pentecostalism originally emerged in the early 20th Century but experienced a revival from the
middle of the century and spread with particular vigor in Africa from the 1970s onwards, in what is
sometimes referred to as neo-Pentecostalism (Westerlund, 2009 pp. 5-6). In Africa, it has arguably
left its greatest mark in Nigeria (Marshall 2009, p. 2) but it has spread remarkably widely in many other countries as well. It has been estimated that over 20 percent of the populations of countries such as Kenya, Zambia and Uganda are “Pentecostal-charismatic” (Hasu, 2007, pp. 223-4) and in some African countries, Pentecostals are estimated to form the majority of Christians (Westerlund, 2009, p. 6). In Tanzania, no such statistical figures are available, but also in Tanzania the spread of Pentecostal churches has been rapid from 1970s onwards (Hasu 2007, p. 229; Ludwig, 1999, pp. 181-83).

The fundamentalist Islamic groups are in turn divided by Haynes into two categories. The first is the intellectual group with influence from Iran and Saudi-Arabia, who aim at constructing the “pure” Islamic society. The second is a group that has emerged in response to Christian-Muslim competition and is focused on protecting and advancing the rights of the Muslims vis-à-vis Christians. It is a defensive form of Islamism, which is urging for a “closing of ranks of Muslims qua Muslims” in relation to Christians (Haynes, p. 19, emphasis in original; also p. 212). Both forms exist in Tanzania, and it can be argued that the latter form has been more common and visible. Hallencreutz & Westerlund (1996) argue that Islamist groups that are active in Africa, frequently being intellectuals, are often removed from the level of ordinary believers. The authors argue that many Muslim groups commonly seek autonomy from the state, and that this is true also for the Islamist, anti-secular groups. Through this institutional and organizational autonomy, Islamist groups can provide veritable political opposition to the state (Hallencreutz & Westerlund, pp. 12-14). The political aspect of this is important, since Hallencreutz and Westerlund contend that what Islamists oppose in particular is the de-politicization of Islam and its confinement to the private realm. In the Islamist view, Islam should take on the role of a “total” ideology, in which it is given the position of “a complete societal and political order” (ibid, p. 7).

As mentioned above, the emergence of Muslim and Christian fundamentalist movements from the mid 1980s onwards has commonly been seen in close connection to the deep economic, political and social crisis that plagued many African countries throughout this and the following decade (Uzodike & Whetho, 2008, pp. 197-200). Common arguments have related it explicitly to the negative aspects of globalization and neo-liberalism or the general crisis of “modernity”, including unemployment of urban youth, violence of daily life, political and economic exclusion and the breakdown of support networks (Marshall 2009, p. 22; Haynes 1996, pp. 12-13). This confusing social situation then gives rise to a need for fixed identities and “moral mastery” (Marshall, pp. 8; 27). The new religious movements address this “moral confusion” by offering ways to overcome it,
mainly through their fixation on and clear distinction between good and evil (Ellis & ter Haar, 1998, p. 200). Marshall has pointed out how the Born-Again (Pentecostal) movement, through the identification of the demonic in society and by providing ways to collectively overcome it, brings internal cohesion for the groups as well as a relevant group identity for collective action (Marshall, pp. 214-5). Furthermore, Marshall describes Born-Agains as a prescriptive regime\(^{46}\), which gives clear dictates as to how society should be ordered (ibid. p. 45). Thus, membership in this group gives a common identity, a clear normative view of what society should look like and how it this goals is to be attained.

In the face of economic crisis and changing social contexts, then, people seek “solace” in religion, which provides a sort of security and common identity that fills the void left after the recession of the nation state (Uzodike & Whetho, 2008, pp. 198-200). However, the Haynes points out that reasons why people join fundamentalist or popular movement include also the purely spiritual needs in addition to the communitarian and the political, as well as the sometimes material needs (Haynes 1996, pp. 11-15). Islamic and Christian fundamentalist movements have not been particularly active in forming actual political vehicles. As for the Born-Again movement in Africa, it has commonly been stated that it is basically a-political, as it advocates non-interference with the formal political and government matters. The aim of the movement in Africa has been evangelical: “taking the continent for Jesus” (Gifford, 1996, p. 199). For both Christian and Muslims movements, it has been said their objective is the reintroduction moral and ethical values in society, and this is achieved mainly through individual conversion. Social change will therefore be contingent on the inner transformation of individuals: “Christian and Muslim revivalists seek less to establish theocracies than to effect a change of heart in individuals or to purge society of evil and sickness” (Ellis & Ter Haar 1998, p. 183; ibid 2007, p.395). For the Born-Again Christians, central to religious revival is a struggle against spiritual decay in the governing ranks of society, which gives the Born-Again movement a “political critique of the abuse of power, practices of corruption, and elite predation that were seen as being responsible for the current state of things” (Marshall p. 12; p. 9). The embodiment of this is a new birth, a renewal and regeneration of individuals and groups in response to corrupt religious and political traditions (pp. 2-3). Ruth Marshall therefore argues that the Born-Again project is highly political, because its objective is to replace the corrupt government of the day with a “righteous” form of authority, based on a society of “ideal citizens” that will abide by Christian moral and ethical rules. (Ibid. pp. 13-14)

\(^{46}\) Marshall bases her argumentation on a complex theoretical framework where she uses a Foucauldian notion of power, knowledge and governmentality to construct an image of the how the Born-Again movement functions
In consequence, Marshall argues that Born-Again movements rarely form political movements, but the emphasis on conversion implies that if enough people are reached by the gospel and converted, they will choose among them a leader that is “righteous” (Marshall p. 205). Gifford makes a similar observation when he contends that the political aspect of Pentecostal Christianity is mainly focused on evangelization, as it sees as the only solution to political problems the installment of a Born-Again Christian presidents in all countries (Gifford, 1996, pp. 203; 210). Interestingly, both the Zambian pastors Gifford refers to in his account and the Nigerian pastors that feature in Marshall’s texts mention the importance of electing the “right person” into political office, and that this would happen as a consequence of the conversion of a sufficient number of people. According to Gifford, the “right person” basically means electing (or installing) a Christian (Gifford, pp. 212-13). This is quite consistent with the emphasis of my Pentecostal respondents in Mwanza town on electing the “right” candidates in the 2010, which coincided with the fact that two of the MPs elected in Mwanza town were Born-Again Christians. However, as argued below, my respondents were particularly less confrontational than the reading of the literature on Pentecostal politics would lead one to believe.

Thus, the moral and ethical concerns for the state of society give the fundamentalist movements a political undertone. While their focus, especially for Christian movements, is on issues that are not necessarily political in character as such – family issues, sexuality, gender roles, social justice, moral norms – these may give believers a sort of “manifesto for social change”; a program for social reform, according to Haynes. (1996, pp. 198-99) Despite profound differences between Islamic and Christian groups, they are thus both “inspired by a quest for justice”, according to Marshall, and strive for a “politics of piety and righteousness” (Marshall, 2009, p. 215) In particular Pentecostal groups may in certain circumstances get directly involved in political matters as well, however. This usually requires what Haynes calls a “trigger issue”. Corruption may be one such trigger issue, since the Pentecostal movements espouse a clear conception of moral right and wrong, and are therefore fiercely opposed to corruption. Other trigger issues may include what is perceived as negative social and moral effects of modernization – such as homosexuality, abortion and other social-moral issues. (Haynes, 1996, p. 203-6; see also Marshall 2009 about resisting the “chaos” of these forms of behavior p. 209) Finally, the threat of Islamization may constitute an important trigger factor that has led the movements to get politically engaged. This is also the sole factor Gifford mentions as effecting direct political engagement by Pentecostal groups (Gifford, 1996, p. 214).
The emergence of “fundamentalist” groupings within both Christianity and Islam has led to more polemical relations between the faith groups not only in Tanzania, but all over Sub-Saharan Africa, even though relations between ordinary believers are commonly cordial (Frederiks, 2010, pp. 266-68). These polemics relate to the fact that Born-Again Christianity and revivalist Islam frequently see each other’s goals as mutually incompatible. Both camps will therefore tend to regard the risk for religious conflict in society as highly likely. (Haynes, 1996, p. 240) Since the movements are mutually exclusive in terms of their goals, Marshall emphasizes that the competition between them for supremacy is one of the main political struggles for both groups (Marshall 2009, p. 33). Haynes argues that Muslim fundamentalist groupings in particular have a strong mobilizational potential since they commonly have culturally well grounded group identities and frequently are in common opposition to the state (Haynes 2004, pp. 85-86; 1996, p. 237). As for the Born-Again side, Marshall contends that the way the Born-Again groups frame the battle against the evil forces and wickedness allows “the interpretation of political events in terms of the demonization of the other” (Marshall, 2010, p. 217). In cases where this “other” and its politics and power, especially in terms of mismanagement, can be connected clearly to another religion, such as Islam, this group in essence becomes the evil to be convicted and overcome. (Ibid, 2009, p. 14) Similarly, Gifford argues that in the face of a perceived “Muslim threat”, Pentecostal groups that otherwise emphasize their political neutrality, team up with other Christian denominations to “combat” the perceived threat (Gifford, 1996, p. 212).

However, it should be noted that notwithstanding the remarks above, Ukah (2009) stresses with reference to Nigeria that Pentecostal groups have very diverse approaches concerning their relations to Muslims: while some may be confrontational, others may practice more of an “inclusive theology” (Ukah, 2009, pp. 108-09). Confrontational relations between Born-Again groups and Islamist or other Muslim congregations should therefore not be assumed as given. However, as Marshall contends, it is no coincidence that the Islamic and Born-Again movements have emerged more or less simultaneously: they both arise from the same social classes, they are both “products of post-colonial education” and they both “seek to create moral and political renewal and order from chaos” (Marshall, 2009, p. 219). In sum, then, given the need for “moral mastery” and social and spiritual support, these movements could occupy a space in Tanzania that was left behind by both the state and the mainline religions. The practices and goals of these movements, being less tolerant of religious diversity and having incompatible goals, obviously contributed to the ensuing tensions in Tanzania in the 1990s. Pentecostalism and Islamism in Tanzania are very much based on
individual conversion, and as Mbogoni argues, the spread of Muslim *mihadhara* was to a large extent a reaction to the attempts by the *walokole*, the Pentecostals, to convert Muslims. The *mihadhara* at the same time worked to discredit Christianity and the bible in order to win converts for Islam (Mbogoni, 2005, pp. 171-173).

One interesting aspect the this situation is that despite the apparent prevalence of religious politics towards the early and mid-1990s as described above, it is not possible to discern any clear religious tendencies in terms of party support in the first multi-party elections of the 1995. Gasarasi (1997) notes that there were common conceptions in the run-up to the 1995 election that CUF was a Muslim party, citing numerous reports of how various sheikhs had supported the party. Likewise, there were instances where Christian churches had embraced NCCR-M or CCM. Gasarasi concludes that while there were signs that “the religious card was played” in the elections, there was no clear pattern of religious support for any party. In addition, out of CUF’s candidates, for instance, a majority was Christian. (Gasarasi, 1997, pp. 257-262) The lack of a clear religion-party connection is also supported by the tables 8.2 and 8.3.

**Table 8.2 Party support by religion Afrobarometer 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chadema</td>
<td>72,7 %</td>
<td>11,4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>61,8 %</td>
<td>30,7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>75 %</td>
<td>25 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 1208 Afrobarometer Tanzania 2008

**Table 8.3 Party support by religion, REDET 1999.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chadema</td>
<td>63,6 %</td>
<td>27,3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>50,4 %</td>
<td>49,4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>36,5 %</td>
<td>63,5 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=2394. Source Mallya, 2006, p. 401

The tables above depict religious background of the survey respondents who declared political party preference (only three parties chosen here) in the REDET survey of 1999 (cited in Mallya, 2006) and Afrobarometer 2008, where I have cross-tabulated religion with party preference. Particularly the REDET table point to the fact that CCM is supported evenly by both groups. In the Afrobarometer survey Christian dominate, but the figure correspond almost exactly with the
proportions of Muslims and Christians in the whole survey (see table 8.1 above). Also, the REDET survey shows that political parties at the end of the 1990s were rather mixed in terms of support, even if there was a clear inclination towards either faith group for CUF and Chadema. Afrobarometer results show more concentrations in terms of religious support, but this is somewhat misleading, since the overall percentage of CUF supporters in the survey was only 2 - 5 percent and for Chadema a mere 0.4 – 3 percent. Nonetheless, what these examples show, is that there are no clear and unequivocal patterns of exclusive religious party support in Tanzania. The following chapter will thus deal with the party politics in relation to religion, focusing on the 2010 elections.

9. Religion and Politics in the 2010 General Elections

In the 2010 elections, the set-up of the presidential race may already have raised concerns regarding religious relations in the country. The incumbent CCM candidate, Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, is a practicing Muslim, while his main contender in 2010, Chadema’s Willibrod Slaa, is a former Catholic priest and former Secretary General of the TEC. It was not the first time the main presidential contenders in Tanzania had different religious backgrounds – in 2000, Benjamin Mkapa’s main challenger was CUF’s Muslim Chairman Ibrahim Lipumba. However, Lipumba’s support in 2000 was 16,3 percent nationally, or around 10 percentage points lower than Willibrod Slaa’s in 2010. In 2010 then, the race was considerably closer, and as discussed below, there were a range of religious issues that featured in the campaigns, including the “elections manifestoes” by TEC and Baraza kuu, as well as the debates around the possible OIC membership and the re-establishment of the Kadhi courts.

The political campaigns in 2010 turned out to be rather fierce and confrontational (Prof. Baregu, 13.5.2011) and religious sentiments had their part in the polemic political rhetoric. The existence of religious tensions seemed to be confirmed by Kikwete during his speech at the inauguration of the 10th Tanzanian parliament after the elections. Kikwete mentioned that there had been “religious incitements” during the campaigns, which according to him could jeopardize national unity. He announced that “the election is over, we must now concentrate on building our country” and assured the parliament of his “readiness to collaborate with fellow politicians, religious leaders and those of the community to find a solution to the problem” (The Citizen 18.11.2010; Kisembo, IPPMedia, 19.11.2010). What was the problem that needed to be solved, and which were the religious incitements that had emerged during the campaigns?
This was the point of departure for my field research with regard to religion. As mentioned in chapter 6, I had studied media outlets and elections reports and based on this analysis it was clear that religious accusations featured frequently in the media. Commonly, these took the shape of accusations leveled against opposition party Chadema for having an alleged Christian bias. The newspapers Al-Nuur, Hoja, Taifa Tanzania, Mtanzania and Rai were particularly vocal in their accusations of Chadema as a Christian-dominated party. Commonly, the accusations of religious bias were combined with references to a threat to the peace and unity of the country in rather raffling headlines: “Bishops will cause another Rwanda with their Slaa”⁴⁷ (Al-Nuur) or “The heat of politics, tribalism and religious discrimination is extinguished by spilling blood”⁴⁸ (Mtanzania). (Synovate Media Monitoring Report September 2010 pp. 46; 48; October 2010 pp. 27-28, 30-32) Essentially, the arguments brought forth in newspaper reports and in my subsequent interviews were that Chadema was biased towards the Christians in terms of its: a) leadership composition, b) voter composition and c) support structure; mainly receiving support from the Christian congregations. As for CCM, I found no direct accusations against CCM in terms of religion in the newspaper reports. However, President Jakaya Kikwete had made a range of high profile appointments of Muslims after assuming power in 2005 (e.g. International Religious Freedom Report 2006) and was seen by many of my Christian respondents as disproportionally favoring Muslims (e.g. RL3; RL4; RL1). In addition, the OJC and Kadhi court issues featured rather prominently in the campaigns, and CCM had embraced both these issues at one point or the other (see e.g. Mesaki, 2011).

Chapter 8 briefly outlined the development of religion-politics connections in Tanzania, and suggested some factors that have led to the emergence of religious tensions in Tanzania, particularly in the early and mid-1990s. It was argued there, however, that these tensions have not lead to widespread party-political mobilization on the basis of religion. I thus set out to analyze the current state of religious politics in Tanzania to the background of the accusations and connections mentioned above, in order to assess the connection between religious politics and party politics. I have focused in particular on Chadema and CCM and have left CUF aside, for the reasons mentioned in chapter 2. The aim here, however, is not to either verify or dismiss allegations of religious bias, although the discussion below will include some general observations regarding the validity of these accusations. Rather, the assessment of the religion-party connections in the 2010

⁴⁷ Maaskofu wataleta Rwanda na Slaa wao
⁴⁸ Moto wa siasa, udini, ukabila, hazimishwa baada ya kumwaga damu
elections will give a picture of the contemporary state of religious politics in Tanzania, and will thus work as a case study with particular reference to Mwanza region. I will relate the discussion to the theoretical and practical points made in chapters 6 and 7.

Of particular relevance for the assessment of the above questions were obviously my interviews with religious leaders. I interviewed a total of 14 religious leaders in 11 different interviews, which are coded as R1-R11. Of the interviewees, half represented Christian congregations and half were Muslim leaders. Out of the Christian leaders, two were Roman Catholic, and five represented the Pentecostal/Born-Again congregations. All were pastors/priests of local congregations. On the Muslim side, all seven respondents were Sunni. Four out of these were local mosque leaders, one was an elder at the mosque, one represented the National Executive Committee of the Muslim Council of Tanzania (BAKWATA), and one was a youth leader at a local mosque. In addition, I included questions pertaining to the role of religion in politics and the recent elections in my interviews in all other categories as well. In total, I conducted 25 interviews with political representatives, 27 with ordinary respondents and 10 with university researchers where religion featured as part of the interview questions. I have divided the chapter into four parts. In section 9.1, I deal briefly with three religious issues that featured in the campaigns, after which I discuss the possible connections between the Christian community and Chadema in section 9.2. The Muslim congregations and CCM are then the topic of section 9.3. Finally, sections 9.4 and 9.5 will draw general conclusions on the role of religion in the 2010 elections and current state of religious politics in Tanzania in general.

As a summary, the picture that emerged out of my research was that inflammatory rhetoric revolving around religious politics indeed was a feature of the 2010 elections and election campaigns. Among both religious leaders and political representatives, there were those who readily accused the other side of employing religion to further their political goals. Among the religious leaders, there were in particular two respondents in each group who admitted to having actively encouraged believers to vote according to religion, which also entailed voting for particular political parties. For the most part, however, it still seems difficult to make any clear party-religious connections in Tanzania, and political religion seems confined to the level of political accusations on one side, and struggle among rather marginal regional groups on the other side. I argue that political religion has not found resonance among ordinary believers since religion has not assumed

49 There are very few Shia congregations in Tanzania, mainly Aga Khan Ismalites, which are predominantly Asian (Lodhi, 1994).
a decisive and systematic role in the conduct of politics – the distribution of resources, despite the prevalence of group grievances. As with ethnicity, this point is at least to some extent attributable to the conscious attempts in Tanzania’s independence history to ensure inclusion of and redistribution between social groups.

9.1 Religious Issues in the Campaigns

There was a range of issues relating to religion that featured in the pre-election campaigns. The Organisation of the Islamic Conference became topical again in 2008 with the announcement by the union government that they saw no obstacles to Tanzania’s joining the OIC. The main line of argument now as in 1992 for those advocating membership was that it would make Tanzania eligible for cheap loans and other benefits. (Mesaki, 2011, p. 256; Tanzanian Affairs, 2009) BAKWATA took a neutral stance in the question, and saw it as an issue to be decided on by the government (BBC, 28.10.2008). Baraza kuu in turn took a firmer stance than BAKWATA and maintained that OIC had no religious agenda (Tanzanian Affairs, 2009). Christian leaders, as in the early 1990s, forcefully opposed the proposal for membership, and the CCT even demanded the resignation of foreign minister Bernard Membe, who had advocated membership (CNSnews, 27.10.2008). The government eventually dropped the issue with no apparent conclusion to the debate (e.g. Mesaki, 2011).

The Islamic Kadhi courts in turn stood out as more widely debated issue. In the campaigns before the General Elections of 2005, CCM had announced that it would work for the establishment of Islamic courts in the country if reelected. Kadhi courts had existed during colonial rule but were dismantled by the first independence government, and Muslims had long argued for their re-establishment. At present, there are functioning Kadhi courts in Kenya and in Zanzibar, and the argument was that also in Tanzania, Islamic courts and judges were needed to help the government “correctly interpret Islamic issues” (Mukandala, 2006, p. 4). The issue sparked intense debate on both the Muslim and the Christian side. Some Christian believers saw it as the ruling party was “betraying the Christians” (Pastor in Kahangara, MZ, RL4, 21.5.2011) whereas Muslims saw it as their due right and not as a political issue (e.g. Shehe in Mwanza, RL8, 28.5.2011). BAKWATA and Baraza kuu forcefully advocated for their establishment, while the TEC, CCT and Pentecostal

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50 In fact, the courts were removed from the government’s official judicial system, rather than being completely abolished. They were never reestablished on private basis. This was also part of the recent debate: should the courts be part of the governmentally administered judicial system, or be organized independently of government. (see AllAfrica.com, 13.02.2010)
churches fervently opposed it, again with reference to the secular state of Tanzania (e.g. BBC News, 24.10.2008) Eventually, CCM announced in 2009 that establishing Kadhi courts was not on the agenda of the government, but that “Islamic principles” would be incorporated into lawmaking (Eyakuze & Akech 2010). Both Baraza kuu and BAKWATA threatened to mobilize Muslims against CCM in the 2010 elections as a revenge for its “broken promise” (Tanzanian Affairs, 2009; Africa News Service, 7.7.2009; The Citizen, 6.7.2009) but as will be shown below, I saw no signs of this in my field research.

The third religiously related pre-election issue was the release of the so called “elections manifestos” by religious organizations, as mentioned above. The Roman Catholic Church released a Pastoral Letter more than a year before the elections, whose object it was to “sensitize” believers to make informed choices before the elections. The document became commonly referred to as the “election manifesto” of the church. (Tanzanian Affairs, 2009; 2010; Mesaki 2011, pp. 256-7) According to the document, the country was experiencing leadership problems and Catholics were therefore encouraged to use their vote to choose “good” leaders who rejected corruption (Pastoral letter: Mpango wa Kichungaji Kuhamasisha Jamii Kuelekea Uchaguzi). In itself, the document was not necessarily controversial. As Tambila points out, the Roman Catholic Church has released similar “manifestos” before each multiparty election in Tanzania (Prof. Tambila, 10.6.2011), and the language of the manifesto was kept broad and general. This time, however, the document caused controversy since it was seen by some as a statement by the church for the opposition and against CCM. Chadema had been markedly active in uncovering and debating in parliament a series of high profile corruption scandals involving high-ranking CCM politicians during the years preceding the elections. Therefore, as Saida Yahya-Othman put it: “when you’re talking about ufisadi [corruption], you can only be talking about CCM, because they are the ones who have been in power” (Yahya-Othman, 9.6.2011). Tambila argued that in essence, the church indirectly stated that Kikwete was not a suitable candidate because he had been in charge of a government and administration in which grand corruption had been taken place (Prof. Tambila, 10.6.2011).

In the late summer of 2009, Baraza kuu, replied to the Church’s document by issuing circular called Mwongozo (Guidelines). In the document, which supposedly was drafted by around 100 imams from all over the country, Muslim believers were asked to vote for a candidate who would look after the interest of the Muslim community. BAKWATA, however, chose not to support the release of the document and announced that it had not been consulted in its drafting. (Tanzanian Affairs, 2009; The Citizen 28.8.2009, Mesaki 2011, p. 257) Either way, the consequence was that a year
before the elections, powerful religious institutions from both the Christian and the Muslim camps, had released statements relating to the elections, in effect taking a political stance. At this point of the campaigns, according to professor Baregu, “there was a feeling that the election was going religious” (Prof. Baregu, 13.5.2011). But what was the actual impact of the manifestos and how did they affect voters?

Out of the two circulars, the Roman Catholic document definitely raised more attention. In my interviews, the Muslim *mwongozo* was mentioned only a handful times, whereas the Roman Catholic ditto was referred by respondents from all groups. Muslim leaders and CCM representatives were particularly critical of the circular, which they saw as direct support for Chadema. This was precipitated by the fact that Dr. Slaa is not only a former priest, but was also the Secretary General of the TEC from 1985 to 1991 (e.g. Tanzania Daily News, 17.9.2010; Parliament of Tanzania). It is not surprising then, that the circular appeared as dubious to both Muslim leaders and political opponents. In particular the more polemic among Muslims respondents saw a straight connection between church and party: “the leaders of Chadema are Christian, Slaa is a bishop, and the church expected that things would be easier when Chadema is in power.” (RL10, 1.6.2011) Chadema representatives, on the other hand, quite vehemently denied any direct connection: “having the same view as Chadema doesn’t mean supporting the party (Masinde, 17.5.2011). The accusations were mainly seen as cheap propaganda by CCM to discredit the party. (e.g. P1; P3; P4)

The following section will deal with the alleged party-religious connections between Chadema and the Christian community.

**9.2 Chadema, Christianity and the Congregations**

Particularly among Muslims leaders and CCM representatives, there was a rather strong conception that Chadema was a Christian-dominated party. Shehe Ilunga Kapungu in Mwanza declared flatly: “Chadema is a Christian party, without hesitation” (RL11, 2.6.2011). Being a Christian party, according to these accusations, implied that Christians dominate Chadema’s leadership and party structure, and that the party was mainly supported by Christians. It is not possible for me to assess in any reliable way the religious background of the party’s representatives or actives, but it might very well be that Chadema has a slight overrepresentation of Christians in terms of leadership, MPs and administration, and that the party is more popular in Christian dominated regions than in the country on average. The General Secretary Dr. Slaa, and the Chairman of the party, Freeman
Mbowe, are Christian, and so are many of the party’s MPs. Also most of the Chadema respondents that I interviewed were Christians. The party is by no means exclusively Christian, however. For instance, both Deputy Chairmen of the party and both Deputy General Secretaries are Muslims, and the for instance Chadema’s Kigoma North MP Zitto Kabwe has been one of the party’s most prominent MPs, and its legal adviser Prof. Abdallah Safari has also figured visibly in the media. All Chadema respondents that featured in my interviews were also quite adamant in emphasizing the religious plurality of the party. In consequence, it is hardly the case that the predominance of Christians in the party is the result of a conscious effort, rather to the contrary.

Was Chadema supported by Christians to a disproportionate extent, then? This was a fairly common view among some respondents. For instance Professor Chaligha, a NEC commissioner and associate professor in Political Science, claimed that there was a religious character to Chadema’s support: “you can look at regions where they won and make your own conclusions.” (Prof. Chaligha, 7.6.2011) I decided to do just that, and attempted to analyze the election results based on Muslim and Christian-dominated regions. However, since there is no reliable data available regarding the religious composition of the various regions of Tanzania, I have thus chosen to use Afrobarometer’s country research from 2008, where the religious background of respondents is indicated, and cross-tabulated religion with home region. I combined the results the regional division on the basis of religion made by the REDET research team (Mukandala et al 2006) and based on these sources, I have classified all mainland regions into Muslim or Christian dominated as well as mixed-religion areas.

Box 9.1 Region by Religion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Muslim dominated regions</th>
<th>Christian dominated regions</th>
<th>Mixed regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mtwara</td>
<td>Kilimanjaro</td>
<td>Tabora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanga</td>
<td>Arusha</td>
<td>Kigoma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindi</td>
<td>Dodoma</td>
<td>Mwanza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pwani</td>
<td>Kagera</td>
<td>Shinyanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iringa</td>
<td>Singida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mbeya</td>
<td>Dar es Salaam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rukwa</td>
<td>Morogoro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ruvuma</td>
<td>Manyara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mara</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

51 As Safari moved from CUF to Chadema, he mentioned religious tensions and put the blame for the “religion that engulfed the last General Election” on CCM, claiming that it was “CCM propaganda to win the election”. While he had been concerned about the allegations of religious bias in the Chadema, he had been convinced by the party’s leadership that they were groundless, he announced (e.g. The Citizen 2.4.2011)
Sources: Based on Mukandala et al 2006, p.7 and Afrobarometer 2008, Summary of Results Tanzania

This regional division can then be compared to the electoral results of the 2010 elections. Below is listed Chadema’s performance in the various regions of the country in the Presidential elections on the mainland. The parliamentary election results are attached in the appendix. In the discussion below, presidential results are mentioned first and parliamentary second.

Table 9.1 Chadema’s performance in the Presidential elections 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Coast</th>
<th>Lindi</th>
<th>Pwani</th>
<th>Tanga</th>
<th>Dar</th>
<th>Mtwara</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>W/out DSM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chadema %</td>
<td>5.20%</td>
<td>8.88%</td>
<td>8.64%</td>
<td>33.90%</td>
<td>6.03%</td>
<td>17.75%</td>
<td>7.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of CDM national</td>
<td>-21.9%</td>
<td>-18.2%</td>
<td>-18.4%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>-21.0%</td>
<td>-9.3%</td>
<td>-19.87%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total CDM</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region % of total</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Highlands</th>
<th>Ruvuma</th>
<th>Mbeya</th>
<th>Iringa</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chadema %</td>
<td>13.22%</td>
<td>33.95%</td>
<td>19.49%</td>
<td>24.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compared to CDM national</td>
<td>-13.8%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>-7.6%</td>
<td>-2.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total CDM</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region % of total</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>Arusha</th>
<th>Kili</th>
<th>Manyara</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chadema %</td>
<td>44.90%</td>
<td>36.81%</td>
<td>47.13%</td>
<td>42.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compared to national</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total CDM</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region % of total</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Extended Lake Zone</th>
<th>Kigoma</th>
<th>Mara</th>
<th>Mwanza</th>
<th>Shinyanga</th>
<th>Kagera</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chadema %</td>
<td>41.55%</td>
<td>30.95%</td>
<td>34.96%</td>
<td>29.15%</td>
<td>36.14%</td>
<td>34.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compared to national</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total CDM</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region % of total</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Central Region</th>
<th>Dodoma</th>
<th>Morogoro</th>
<th>Tabora</th>
<th>Rukwa</th>
<th>Singida</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chadema %</td>
<td>11.38%</td>
<td>22.35%</td>
<td>14.43%</td>
<td>31.32%</td>
<td>16.79%</td>
<td>18.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compared to national</td>
<td>-15.7%</td>
<td>-4.7%</td>
<td>-12.6%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>-10.3%</td>
<td>-8.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total CDM</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region % of total</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: Chadema % - percent of votes received in of total votes cast in region; Compared to national – percentage points below or above the party’s mainland average; % of total CDM – the percentage of total party votes derived from this region; Region % of total – the percentage of the region’s total votes of the total votes cast nationally
From the tables above, a few observations are discernable. First, Chadema’s support seems to have been considerably lower in the coastal regions, which also are the only Muslim-dominated regions, than in the country on average. If Dar es Salaam is left out, the four coastal regions Mtwara, Pwani, Lindi and Tanga contributed only 3.9% / 4.1% of the total votes for Chadema, while having 15.5% of the total national population. On average, Chadema’s support was only 7.2% / 7.3% in these four regions, compared to the national average of 27.9% / 26.9%. According to the Afrobarometer material, the average percentage of Muslims in these regions was 78.7%. Second, looking at the areas where Chadema enjoyed above or below average national support, there is again a rather clear tendency. In the presidential election, 6 out of 11 of the regions (Arusha, Kilimanjaro, Mbeya, Mara, Rukwa, Kagera) where Chadema had support above national average were Christian-dominated, or put differently, six out of the nine Christian-dominated regions were above-national-average regions. The rest were mixed religion areas, including DSM, Manyara and Kigoma, as well as Mwanza and Shinyanga, which are likely to have a quite substantial Christian majority. In the parliamentary elections the picture is similar, but when turning the argument around and looking at those regions where Chadema scored below national average, the results are slightly more mixed, featuring regions with both Christian and Muslims majorities as well as mixed regions.

On the basis of these results then, it does seem as if Chadema on average had a slight inclination towards Christian dominated regions, and that the party was not very successful in Muslim dominated areas. However, there is by no means a clear causality between religious composition and party support. For instance, as argued in chapter 4, Chadema’s support was affected by the urban-rural divide to a large extent as well, and along the coast, there are few urban centers apart from Dar es Salaam. Kigoma serves as a valid example of how the connection between religion and support is not straightforward. Kigoma has a substantial Muslim population, but still Dr. Slaa’s second highest support derives from this region. Kigoma is also a traditional stronghold of Chadema and the home region of Zitto Kabwe. In the parliamentary elections, Kabwe comfortably beat his Christian CCM opponent in Kigoma north, while Chadema’s Muslim contender in Kigoma town lost against his Christian CCM counterpart. In the smaller constituencies in Kigoma, opposition party NCCR-Mageuzi clearly toppled Chadema as the main opposition party, winning against both Muslim and Christian CCM and Chadema candidates. In short, it is not possible to

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52 Dar es Salaam, as the country’s largest city and administrative capital as well as a main target of in-movement from the entire country, can be thus be assumed to have many demographic, social and political features that make it distinct from other cities or regions in the country.
assert that religious background of candidates had any *systematic* and determinable effect on voter choices for the country as a whole.

Nonetheless, it is clear that the party’s leadership and representatives were quite aware of the perception of Chadema as Christian party and of the skewed regional distribution of the party’s support. Professor Baregu, campaign manager for Chadema, said that given the accusations of the religious bias voiced by their opponents, the party had to make a strategic decision “whether or not to be drawn into that”. The options would have been trying to recruit notable Muslims to the party or to focus the campaigns on Muslim dominated areas. Instead, the party had decided, so Baregu and Lake Zone campaign manager Silvester Masinde argued, to focus on the most populous areas of the country, where they expected their effect to be the largest. (Baregu, 13.5.2011; Masinde, 17.5.2011) Chadema representatives insisted, however, that wherever they did campaign, they managed to create massive support from both faith groups. Ubungo MP John Mnyika for instance reported on the “huge numbers” of supporters who came out to their rallies in Sumbawanga and Tabora, both towns with sizeable Muslims populations (Mnyika, 12.5.2011). Both Mnyika and his Chadema colleague in Mwanza’s Nyamagana, Ezekia Wenje, emphasized that they had been elected by comfortable majorities in their mixed-religion constituencies, winning across both religions”. (Wenje, 18.5.2011)

**9.2.1 Religious Leaders and Voting Motivations**

Given the pastoral letter of the TEC and, in the case of the MP elections in Mwanza, the availability of Born-Again Christian candidates on the Chadema ticket, how did Roman Catholic and Pentecostal priests conceive of their role in the campaigns and the elections? How did the assumptions about Pentecostal practices and politics play out in the elections? In general, the Christian congregations played a rather substantial role in the run-up to the 2010 elections, giving “voters education”, but most of the Christian leaders were quite stern in denying any direct support for any political party. Regardless of denomination, church leaders emphasized their role in educating people to choose the *right* leaders. Although the pastors and fathers differed in what aspects of leadership they emphasized, in general good leaders were those with the right qualities (*sifaa*), abilities (*uwezo*), and who were truthful (*wakweli*) and faithful (*waminifu*). The two Roman Catholic fathers admitted that the issue of truthfulness and good leadership was directly connected to the bishops’ manifesto, but denied that this amounted to support for any particular political party. The bishops’ document had guided the congregations in educating people to elect leaders with the “right qualities”, which according to one Roman catholic pastor implied a person with “a human
heart, who is peaceful, cares for people and who acknowledges the existence of God.” (RL3, 20.5.2011) In sum, the two fathers argued, the church had thus “targeted certain characters”, not certain parties.

Pentecostal pastors had a similar conception of their role in the elections. Two pastors I interviewed in Kahangara, Magu; one from the Faith ministry, the other from EAGT, contended that amongst other things, they guided people “vote for the right person” (RL4, 21.5.2011). Right persons were those who stayed away from corruption, “because it is against the stance of God”. But there was also a more practical aspect to the church’s activity. According to these pastors, an important ability (uwezo) of a candidate was “the ability to change people’s lives, because for 50 years we think that life hasn’t changed a lot”. This candidate, however, could belong to any party and Chadema was popular in the region, according to these priest, simply because CCM was unpopular. In a similar fashion, a young EAGT pastor in Mwanza highlighted the developmental aspect of the election choice. He contended that “a political leader carries the destinies of the lives of the people we have in church” and it was thus crucial to guide congregation members to elect good leaders. He was adamant throughout the interview that it was the sera, the ideology/program, of the political party that mattered and nothing else. Since he at the same time expressed support for Chadema, his emphasis on the importance of sera may be interpreted as an attempt to stress that the Christian character of the party was not the important issue, but its policies.

In my interviews, there were two Christian leaders who admitted to supporting Chadema directly. Both of them represented the Pentecostal congregations, EAGT and the Tanzania Assemblies of God. Pastor Michael from EAGT who I interviewed in Mkoloni, Mwanza, was very frank and straightforward about his role in supporting Chadema. He his claimed that his congregation supported Chadema in various ways: by directly supporting members of theirs who were active in the party; by urging people to support these members financially and to pray for them; and by teaching members about the politics of Chadema and why the church supports it. According to this pastor, not only his church, but 90 percent of all churches of all nominations did the same. The main aim of the churches was to “get the ruling party out of power and Chadema into power.” This was done because “we believe that it is God’s season to make changes by using Chadema”. The reason for this was the “historical background of CCM”, which had brought about corruption and benefits for only a small share of the population. (RL2, 19.5.2011)
The young Pentecostal Pastor John from Magu was initially more objective and talked about the role of the church in giving voters’ education and explaining difference between parties. However, when quizzed of the reasons for the activism of the church, he replied: “the church likes the truth. Politics used to be about lies, but recently there has been truth spoken in politics.” He added that it was Chadema who had spoken the truth and how he thus had educated people about the sera of the party and “convinced them that it is time to put this political party in a position of power.” (Pastor John, 17.5.2011) Also Pastors John and Michael first maintained that the religious background of the candidates was unimportant. In general, the important thing for Christian leaders was that candidates should have fear of God (RL2), acknowledge the existence of God (RL3) or be from God (RL1). When asked directly, this God needed not to be Christian. The major objective was instead was to put someone “faithful”, apparently regardless of faith, into power. Consequently, I asked pastors John and Michael if their churches could have supported a faithful Muslim as much as a faithful Christian? Apparently, however, this “would have been difficult” according to Pastor John, since he eventually opined that in the end, every truly faithful person is a Christian (RL1, 17.5.2011). Pastor Michael elaborated along similar lines, as he contended that fear of God is a central aspect of candidate choice and that there was a “there is a difference between Muslims and Christians” in terms of how fearful of God they can be. Had Wenje and Highness been Muslims, they could have been supported by the church, he said, “but not in the same numbers” (RL2, 19.5.2011). In both cases, this was admitted only after a long discussion, and subsequently it appears as if faithfulness was just a code word for Christianity for many of the church leaders.

To what extent did this influence voters and congregation members, then? I noted above that there are some indications that Chadema’s support was slightly skewed in favor of Christian-dominated areas and it is also likely that the party representatives are pre-dominantly Christian, although there are notable exceptions to this. Not surprisingly, among some of the Muslim leaders, there was a strong conception that Chadema had been supported by the church, and thus Christians had voted for the party. The Muslim youth leader in Mwanza contended:

“Christians voted as Christians for Chadema. Few Muslims voted for Chadema. The biggest reason for Chadema’s success [in Mwanza] was religion. The Christian majority was told in church: vote for Chadema, and they went to vote but didn’t know why they voted.” (RL10, 1.6.2011)

Rather surprisingly, a Roman Catholic father in Magu, who had previously refuted allegations of the church’s support for Chadema quite adamantly, argued in along similar lines. Although the

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53 Practicing in Mwanza, where I interviewed him
church had been neutral, he argued that the reason for Chadema’s success was that the party had profiled itself as a Christian alternative. This had been a salient strategy only because CCM had a Muslim candidate who was known to “join hands” with the Muslims, and was doing things “in an Islamic way”. Had CCM had a Christian candidate as well, then Chadema’s leverage as a Christian alternative would have been weaker, he contended. Therefore, due to the issue of religion, many Christians had voted for Dr. Slaa whereas Muslims in turn had opted for Kikwete. (RL3, 20.5.2011) Interestingly, according to this priest, people had turned to Chadema as a Christian alternative baada ya kuingia udini – after religiousness had already been introduced to the campaigns. The actions were thus reactions.

However, it must be noted that the other Christian leaders did not seem to concur with this interpretation, and also most Muslims leaders stopped short of supporting the claim of religious voting in the 2010 elections, as discussed further below. How did ordinary respondents conceive of the role of religion in the 2010 elections? Among ordinary respondents, there was only scant support for the notion that religion had worked as an actual voting motivation. There were some exceptions to this, however. For instance two vendors in a shoe shop on Makoroboi Street in central Mwanza maintained that Chadema was both dominated by Christians and supported mainly by them, whereas few Muslims had supported the party, “because there were these mambo ya udini (religious issues)”. (O9, 18.5.2011) Similarly, a group of women in a hair salon in Geita contended that people “voted for Chadema because of sera ya udini,” while those who “didn’t believe” in these issues voted for CCM (O25, 27.5.2011). These were the lone exceptions in the ordinary category who expressed such views, however. The vast majority of respondents did not see religion as a factor affecting voting decisions and by and large, my respondents did not conceive of any particular party-religious or party-church links either.

This was the case in particular on the countryside. In Magu, including the small rural towns Mwamabanza and Kahangara, the most common replies to the question of the role of the churches in the elections were that church leaders had told members to pray for the elections to go by peacefully (e.g. O14; O18); had emphasized that people should vote (e.g. O13) or that they should choose a good person with the right qualities (e.g. 010; 011). This last point could be interpreted in different ways. An elderly woman in Kahangara said: “They told me to vote for a good person [mfaa] and I think I did. We voted for [Festus] Limbu because we know him”. (O10, 21.5.2011) Limbu was the CCM MP candidate in Magu who won the elections amid allegations of fraud. Hence, the issue of mfaa did not necessarily seem to be interpreted as voting for or supporting
Chadema. Similarly, there were few respondents on the countryside who had even heard about Chadema’s alleged Christian dominance, and those who had, dismissed the allegations as insignificant: “People could say that Chadema is Christian but I believe that it is just a party.” (O17, 22.5.2011)

In town, the issue of church-party connections was more familiar, however. In a shoe shop in central Mwanza, I was told that “the bishops were also supporting Slaa; they trusted he will take down corruption” (O9, 18.5.2011). In the hair salon in Geita referred to above, I was told that Chadema had been campaigning on religion, declaring: “don’t vote for this candidate because he’s a Muslim, vote for this one because he’s Christian”. In the same interview another respondent added that Chadema had told people not to vote for Kikwete due to him being a Muslim. However, none of the respondents could mention concrete examples of when or where this had happened (except for “in the streets”) or who in particular had voiced these sentiments. (O25, 27.5.2011) For the most part, while the arguments of church-party links or Chadema’s christian bias was more familiar in towns like Mwanza and Geita, most respondents dismissed the allegations simply as propaganda by the ruling party (e.g. O7; O21). A shopkeeper along Makoroboi street in Mwanza noted: “it is true that Chadema is [more] Christian, but that was not the reason people supported them, the reason was their sera” (O8, 18.5.2011). In conclusion, there were indeed some respondents in the ordinary category who saw the elections in terms of religious party affiliations, but these were in clear minority. The following section pulls together the discussion in this chapter so far, before moving on to the Muslim congregations.

9.3.2 Discussion: Chadema and the Congregations

What can be said about party-religious connections on the basis of the discussion concerning Chadema and the Christian congregations above? As mentioned in the introduction, I will not attempt to assess the validity of the accusations against the party, but some general observation regarding political religion may be discerned. First, there was some considerable convergence between Chadema’s political agenda and the electoral issues highlighted by the church, although this did not always amount to direct support for the party. In particular the emphasis Christian leaders put on the truthfulness and quality of character of the candidates matched Chadema’s call for honesty in the management of public resources. One should thus not be surprised that associations were made between the Christian congregations and Chadema, in particular considering TEC’s manifesto to the background of the dominant position of the Catholic Church in Tanzania. Also, it was noted that Chadema might have a certain inclination towards the Christians
in terms of party composition and support structure. However, much of my interviews point towards the fact that Chadema strives to be a party of national character, and has welcomed religious plurality in its membership. In some cases, the question of the party’s religious bias was met with quite some indignation. In the party’s office in Magu town, for instance, I was told: “look, this woman is a Muslim, I am Christian, but we’re working in the same party together every day. In Chadema there are not only Christians, there are Muslims, traditionalist and even non-believers!” (P8, 20.5.2011) In sum, based on my field research it is not possible to make any clear and unequivocal party-religious connections with regard to Chadema.

The second observation from the discussion above is that the actions of religious leaders don’t necessarily correspond with the assumptions in chapter 8. To be sure, Pentecostal leaders in particular emphasized the importance of choosing “right” and faithful leaders who would work against corruption, and for at least two of them, this implied choosing a Christian leader, since “every truly faithful person is a Christian” (Pastor John). This is in line with the discussion in chapter 8 where it was argued that Pentecostals see the remedy to social ills, such as corruption, in choosing the right leader – a Christian leader. However, the same rhetoric of choosing the “right” and the “faithful” leaders was also used by the Roman Catholic priests, and should therefore not be seen strictly in relation to Pentecostal politics only. More importantly, Pentecostal leaders had an outlook on their political activity that espoused a direct engagement with rather practical political issues, such as infrastructure and resource endowment, next to the issue of public corruption (e.g. RL1, RL4; RL6). Pentecostal priest were thus ardent advocates of change, but rather than a "spiritual regeneration", the changes were related to rather practical issues such as poverty reduction and economic development. While some certainly preferred to see Christians in charge of this change, I did not perceive the political engagement as being closely tied to a struggle against Islam. I will discuss this last issue further in the concluding discussion and now turn to deal with the Muslim congregations and CCM.

9.3 The Muslim congregations and CCM

Officially and on a national level, as expected, Muslim leaders did not support any particular political party. While during my field period I encountered accusations that Tanzania Chief Sheikh Mufti Shaaban bin-Simba had "joined hands" with Kikwete before the elections (e.g. RL4, 21.5.2011), his official and public stance was that of neutrality and diplomacy: “Election time is not
the right time for religious leaders to support a certain presidential or parliamentary candidate.” (Sheikh Mufti Simba cited in The Citizen, 3.10.2010). The Muslims leaders who featured in my interviews conceived of their role in the 2010 elections in similar ways as their Christian counterparts. Most of the shehe saw their election work as making sure their congregation members chose “good leaders” (RL5; KJ, RL7) or to encourage mosque members to use their right to vote (RL10). They also referred to their role in “contributing to peace” by telling the believers to “stay calm” regardless of the political developments (e.g. RL5; RL8). Most Muslim leaders were quite keen to point out that they did not support any party or candidate but supported anyone who was “after peace” (RL8, 28.5.2011). They were also keen to emphasize that they as Muslim leaders did not mix politics and religion (e.g. RL7).

However, as with the Christian leaders above, there were those Muslim leaders who were less neutral in their assessments of the elections. According to Shehe Ilunga Kapungu in Mwanza, Muslims leaders had been forced to react to the campaigning activities of the church. According to Kapungu, the Catholic Church’s election campaign had started already with the release of the Bishops’ Letter in the summer of 2009, whereas the Muslims for their part had “become aware very late”. Luckily, he said, during the last two months of the campaign: “we did our work as Muslims” because otherwise “Kikwete would be out of Ikulu [The State House] by now”. This work included mobilization in the mosques and during Friday prayers, as well as in the radio and newspapers. In this process, Muslim believers had been told to vote for Muslim candidates, regardless of party affiliation, according to Kapungu. Since Christians had decided to vote for their fellow Christians, Muslims should do the same, he argued. According to Kapungu, the tactic worked: in large numbers, so he argued, Muslims had voted for fellow Muslims. (Shehe Ilunga Kapungu, personal communication, 2.6.2011)

A young shehe in Mwanza had a similar conception of Muslim action in the elections, and made a connection between the ruling party and the interests of the Muslim community. According to him, “a lot of Muslim congregations” were supporting CCM, and Muslims leaders had guided their believers to vote for the ruling party. Like shehe Kapungu above, also his younger colleague saw this action as a response to what was seen as campaigning by the Catholic Church. He argued that if Christians were building their own party, Muslims should support theirs. In short: “Muslims wanted their leader to be Muslim because Christians wanted their leader to be Christian”. This then translated into support for CCM since it was the obligation of Muslims, so the Youth leader, to support a Muslim brother who had been put under attack. Accordingly, he explained, there had been
campaigning in mosques, where believers were taught to vote for the ruling party. He argued that “if CCM is still in power, people will be free to practice their religion”. (RL10, 1.6.2011) It is important to note that this polemic rhetoric was not shared by most Muslim respondents or believers whom I interviewed. I will deal with the conceptions of my Muslims leader respondents in more detail below, but first I will briefly address two general issues relating to the possible connection between CCM and the Muslim community: regional party support structures and President Kikwete’s alleged bias in favor of Muslims.

9.3.1 CCM’s Regional Support Structure

There do not seem to be any clear indications that CCM support in the 2010 elections would have been disproportionally skewed towards Muslim-dominated areas. Below I have presented CCM’s support by region only for the presidential election, since the issue of Muslim bias was closely linked to Kikwete rather than to the party in general. The results below are shown for the mainland only and the region to national average performance is calculated in the basis of CCM’s mainland average support of 63.1 percent.

Table 9.2 CCM Support by Region Presidential Elections 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>North &amp; Lake</th>
<th>Arusha</th>
<th>Kilimanjaro</th>
<th>Manyara</th>
<th>Kagera</th>
<th>Kigoma</th>
<th>Mara</th>
<th>Mwanza</th>
<th>Shinyanga</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCM support %</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region/national</td>
<td>-11.3</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
<td>-14.1</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
<td>-11.8</td>
<td>-9.4</td>
<td>-7.9</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South &amp; Coast</th>
<th>DSM</th>
<th>Lindi</th>
<th>Iringa</th>
<th>Mbeya</th>
<th>Mtwara</th>
<th>Pwani</th>
<th>Ruvuma</th>
<th>Tanga</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCM support %</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>63.16</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>75.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region/national</td>
<td>-12.4</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Dodoma</th>
<th>Morogoro</th>
<th>Rukwa</th>
<th>Singida</th>
<th>Tabora</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCM support %</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>68.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region/national</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Electoral Commission of Tanzania
Legend: CCM support & - CCM’s share of total accepted votes in region. Region/national – Performance in region compared to average mainland support in percentage points.

The table does not give any clear indications of support based on religion. The areas where CCM fared worst more or less correspond with the areas where Chadema received most support. All regions belonging to the (extended) Lake Zone and Northern Zone show a below mainland average.
support for CCM. The party attracted considerably below average support in Chadema’s top regions Manyara, Kigoma and Arusha. The same logic does not apply vice versa, however. Along the Muslim dominated coast, CCM performed more or less according to national average, except in Tanga, where the party managed to secure 75.5 percent of the vote. Among the regions where CCM’s support was at its lowest there was only one Christian dominated region, Arusha, and among the regions with the highest support, there was equally only one Muslim-dominated region, Tanga. Both among the highest and the lowest scoring regions, and those with support close to national average, there was a mix of Muslim, Christian and mixed-religion areas. The urban-rural divide seems to have been more prevalent than any religious division, as the party performed well below national average in urban Dar es Salaam, but significantly above average in mainly rural Singida and Dodoma, for instance. In Christian-dominated Iringa, CCM received a remarkable 76 percent in the regions as a whole, while Iringa town in turn was a Chadema stronghold (see chapter 4). CCM’s support also had considerably less regional variance than Chadema, which is not surprising. In short, however, despite the substantial drop in national support for the party, CCM still has a remarkable national presence. There is no clear religious pattern discernable in terms of the regional variation in the party’s support structure.

9.3.2 President Kikwete and Public Appointments

As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, there have been some voices raised on the Christian side that Kikwete had disproportionally favored Muslims in terms of political and public appointments since assuming office. This conception was strong among some Christian leaders who I interviewed, and apart from public appointments, also the issues of OIC membership and the Kadhi courts were seen as evidence of the president’s bias (e.g. RL1; RL3; RL4). It is somewhat difficult to assess these claims, since there is no information accessible as to the religious background of governmental appointees – ministers, regional commissioners, principal secretaries. However, during the terms of Kikwete, there have been a series of high-profile appointments of Muslims to top governmental and administrative positions. During his first term, Muslims featured prominently in the Ministries of Defense, Finance, and Foreign Affairs; the Principal Judge and the representative to the UN, among others, were other notable Muslims in high-ranking positions. (International Religious Freedom Report 2006, US State Gov)

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54 For instance CCM’s worst performing region in the presidential elections was Manyara, which in turn was Chadema’s best performing region
55 I have calculated lowest/highest support based on support above/below the standard deviation of CCM’s support on the mainland (6.71 percentage units).
However, there is still a common conception among Muslims is that they are starkly underrepresented in these positions (e.g. RL8; RL11; for general assessment Prof Mushi; Prof Yahya-Othman; Prof Tambila). Prof Yahya-Othman from UDSM doubted that there in fact have been more Muslim appointees during Kikwete’s reign than before, and to the extent that this has happened, she argued, it had been a question balancing out imbalances. (Yahya-Othman, personal communication 9.6.2011) The appointments of Muslims by Kikwete have attracted attention, Yahya-Othman argues, simply due to the long history of Christian dominance in top positions: “it hasn’t happened in the past so now people perceived it as something out of the ordinary.” In sum, then, it is not easy to assess whether there indeed has been a movement towards increased Muslim influence in governmental affairs under Kikwete. While there might have been a tendency by Kikwete to “balance” appointments, none of the Muslim respondents I interviewed felt that the government was more lenient towards Muslims under Kikwete than before. There is also hardly a Muslim dominance of public affairs in present day Tanzania.

9.3.3 Muslim Leaders and CCM

How did the Muslim leader respondents relate to CCM, then? Even though the young shehe quoted above conceived of the support for CCM as something of a Muslim obligation, the other shehe who featured in my interviews were not as keen to expose any party-political affiliations. For instance, the older BAKWATA representative insisted that Muslim leaders in general supported no particular political party, and emphasized, as his Christian counterparts, the importance of looking only at the sera of the various parties. Still, he blamed the opposition parties (Chadema and CUF) for waging religious politics and for giving deceitful promises. CCM, on the other hand, he argued, was the only party that catered for both religions. (RL8, 28.5.2011) Given these statements and his background within BAKWATA, it was not unclear which was his party of choice. In a similar logic, a middle-aged shehe in a group interview in Katoro insisted that Muslims were neutral in terms of party affiliation, but emphasized that CCM was the only party “for both religions”. In contrast, he saw Chadema as biased in favor of Christians and claimed that the party isolates Muslims. A Muslim youth leader who took part in the same interview told me afterwards that his older colleague was a CCM stalwart, and therefore “hostile” towards Chadema. He himself had voted for Chadema, and told me that most of the young Muslims in town did the same. (G, KJ, RL7, 26.5.2011)

56 In general, the underrepresentation of Muslims is attributed to lower levels of education
The example above may serve as a good representation for the divergence among Muslim leaders in terms of political sentiments. While there may have been an inclination among my Muslim leader respondents to look favorably at CCM, this was not the case for all of them. How did “ordinary” Muslim believers conceive of the party-religion link, then? Was there a tendency towards sympathizing with the ruling party and correspondingly a resistance against Chadema? My field results point to nothing of the sort. In fact, most of my respondents in the “ordinary” category who identified themselves as Muslims were supporters of Chadema. In addition, both Chadema representatives and Muslim leaders (except for RL10) maintained that the party had many Muslim voters. Again, there was one interesting exception to this pattern. A young Muslim in Mwanza whom I interviewed had chosen to vote for CCM mainly because according to him, everyone expected him to. His father had been rather prominent in the Muslim community, and the “boys on the street” therefore dismissed him as a CCM supporter. In consequence, he chose to conform to this, as a sort of a protest. (O31, 31.5.2011) This tells of an interesting dimension in urban Mwanza, where the opinion among the “boys on the street” had been strongly favorable to supporting Chadema (e.g. interviews O7-09; O27; 030; 031). However, this is not an indication for any widespread Muslim support for CCM, but it possibly hints at a perception among a politically mobilized segment of the population as to the role of religion in the political context of the 2010 elections.

In sum, however, it is not possible to establish a clear link between CCM and the Muslim community based on my field material. There are examples of Muslim leaders who openly supported CCM as well as of those who were mainly focused supporting Muslim candidates, regardless of party. But there were also those Muslim leaders who had no such inclinations. As seen above, there was a similar divide among the Christian leaders. Some of the results – the example in the previous section and the comments of some of the shehe – may indicate that CCM with Kikwete at the reigns does have an appeal to parts of the Muslim community. Whatever the case, it is still quite safe to assume, however, that CCM’s appeal as a national party is stronger than any Muslim proliferation it may have, which is apparent simply on the basis of the election results. In the next section, I will discuss the issue of religion and politics in the 2010 election on a general level.

57 I did not specifically ask for the religious background of the respondents, but in the vast majority of cases it transpired during the interview. The exception is O20, 24.5.2011, a Muslim vendor in Geita, did not reveal his party-political preferences, but had supposedly worked his way through all opposition parties since 1995. He was thus in opposition to CCM, but not clearly in favor of Chadema.
9.4 Discussion: Religion and politics in the 2010 elections

Considering the rather heated debates on Kadhi courts and the OIC membership, the various “elections manifestos” by different religious congregations, the background of the increased tensions between Muslims and Christians in Tanzania from the late 1980s onwards, as well as the rather polemic comments from some of the religious leaders above, it would seem fair to say that religion played a rather significant role in the 2010 elections. Religious leaders, in general, seem to have taken an active part in the elections, and while this work may have been party-politically neutral to a large extent, in some cases it was not. Also, religion featured as a media issue and was actively addressed in my interviews by politicians from both CCM and Chadema. Was President Kikwete right in his assessment on the elections mentioned in the beginning of this chapter – did religious rifts emerge among the population during the elections? What are the consequences of this and was there merit to the warning issued by Muslims leaders 10 months after the elections, that “the ongoing hatred based on faith has to be controlled” (The Citizen, 1.9.2011)? It is quite fair to say that religion indeed featured as an issue in the elections, but it is more difficult to assess to what extent religious politics actually influence the political landscape of Tanzania today.

Among researchers, the assessment by Kikwete regarding religious rifts was dismissed quite adamantly. While many of the researcher respondents indeed agreed that religion had assumed a rather prominent role on the level of political rhetoric, they did not conceive of this as a matter of great relevance for the electorate. Some, like Professor Mushi from REDET, for instance, thought that religion in general had played only a minor role in the elections. (Prof. Mushi, personal communication 7.6.2011). However, most saw the increased involvement of religion in politics, and in particular the increased accusations of religious bias, in relation to CCM and the party’s election tactics. Dr. Makulilo, lecturer in political science at UDSM, pointed out that during the period when CUF was the strongest opposition party, CCM accused it of being Muslim-dominated. As Chadema increased its support, CCM simply turned these accusations of religious bias against Chadema instead (Dr. Makulilo, 9.5.2011). According to Dr. Kamata, also lecturer in political science at UDSM, CCM attempts to portray itself as the national party, as the only party capable of catering for both Muslims and Christians. Thus, Chadema was portrayed as a Christian party in order for Muslims and moderate Christians to shun it and instead stick to the ruling party. (Dr. Kamata, 12.5.2011) A doctor in philosophy at UDSM also put the blame for the advent of religion in politics on CCM, and had a harsh verdict for the ruling party:
“Using religiosity in Tanzania, accusing a party of having religion as its base is stupid. I cannot find another word. The same population that supported you five years ago cannot suddenly turn and be based on religion. That is belittling the Tanzanian population.” (R3. 11.5.2011)

Professor Baregu, in his double capacity as university don and Chadema campaign manager, agreed that religion had been an issue in the elections, but stopped short of accusing CCM for it. He did contend, however, that out of the two parties, CCM had more of an “incentive to mobilize the religious vote”. According to Baregu, all the substantive issues – corruption, infrastructure, water, sanitation, health care etc. – were “running against CCM, so they needed an issue.” (Baregu, 13.5.2011) While many of the researchers thus saw CCM as responsible for the emergence of udini in politics, Saida Yahya-Othman was hesitant to point at CCM alone. While CCM had indeed addressed the issue, she argued, this was mainly as a response to what was “actually happening”. The support of the Roman Catholic Church for Chadema had been clear, according to Yahya-Othman, and she emphasized that this was a pertinent issue to address if religious strife is to be avoided in the country. Instead of actually facing the issue, she claimed, Chadema had simply put the blame for raising it on CCM. (Yahya-Othman, 9.6.2011)

Nonetheless, in my interviews, respondents in the various districts of Mwanza and Geita declared quite clearly that for them, religion had not been a voting motivation. Most of them had also not conceived of religion having featured prominently in the elections campaigns at all, and saw no particular links between any parties and religious communities or institutions. This was particularly true on the countryside, where the issue of politics and religion even seemed unfamiliar to many respondents. Among most ordinary people in Mwanza town, religious concerns were subordinated to other issues – standards of living, resource endowment, corruption. This was true in interviews with both Christian and Muslim respondents, as well as in mixed groups (e.g. O7-O9 Makoroboi Street; O26). This being said, the results may have looked quite different had the area of focus been for instance a coastal region. For example Joeli Nanauka, who had contested in the CCM primaries in Mtwara, said that one of the main reasons for him loosing the primaries was the fact that he was Christian in a predominantly Muslim region. In several interviews too, it was claimed that religion was a main reason for Chadema’s low support on the coast (e.g. O30; RL6; R5). On the countryside in Mwanza, there are very few Muslims, and the Muslims-Christian dichotomy was therefore not relevant as it may have been elsewhere.

However, in Mwanza town, there are significant numbers of Muslims, and here religious politics was indeed more prevalent, particularly among Muslim leaders. The most polemic responses
regarding the role of religion in politics were received in Mwanza town. Despite this, even in town, ordinary Muslim believers did not seem to attach great significance to religion, and the same is true for Christians. An obvious caveat that needs to be added to my results is the fact that I conducted interviews in a rather large area in a rather short time, and for the most part, my research assistant was a Christian woman. This may surely have affected the kind of respondents I was able to interview. Particularly among ordinary Muslim respondents, it seems logical that those who were pro-Chadema were more likely to agree to an interview with a foreign (presumably Christian) researcher working with a Christian (female) Tanzanian, than those Muslims who may have had religious reservations about politics. Nonetheless, we consciously avoided any allusions to Christian connections in our interviews, with Shauku even refraining from using her Christian first name on most occasions.

An interesting aspect with respect to field interviews was that many of the politicians and religious leaders who had argued for the increased presence of udini in politics did not seem to attach any real significance to it\(^58\). What this means is that in most cases, these respondents commonly described the issues as simple “politicization” or “techniques” by the various political parties (e.g. RL6; RL9; RL7; RL8). This then poses the question, that if religion was used by political parties and religious leaders alike for “politicizing” purposes, how then does that not amount to religious politics? In other words: if religion is politicized, how come it is still conceived as void of political significance? According to the definition of religious politics in this thesis, it is not, of course. Religion was used by various actors with respect to electoral competition, and thus to the conduct of politics. What the replies by my respondents suggest, however, is that these attempt at religious politics have not gained a real significance in determining political behavior – although religion was used politically, this had not found resonance among a majority of people. This would suggest, in effect, that religion has not assumed a real significance for the distribution of resources, despite the presence of group grievances among both Muslims and Christians. It should be noted, however, that this is likely to apply mainly to my regions of research, and the situation might be different in other parts of the country. In the final concluding section below, I will attempt to analyze this in a wider context.

\(^{58}\) This excludes those more polemic respondents, like Ilunga Kapungu, who saw religion as the most important election factor.
9.5 Conclusion: Religion and Politics in Tanzania

The emergence of religious tension and clashes in the early in 1990s, and the general saliency of religion in the politics of Tanzania, was attributed to two general factors in chapter 8. First, the economic and social crisis in Tanzania in the 1980s and 1990s, combined with the withdrawal of the previously dominant state in Tanzania, gave a context for the emergence of Christian and Muslim religious movements, which have been referred to as "fundamentalist". This may still be a relevant context. Many of my researcher respondents argued that the weakened role of the state as a service provider has led people to turn to religious organizations for social “protection” (e.g. interviews with Prof. Mushi; Prof. Yahya-Othman; Dr. Lwaitama). This was also seen as something that could be exploited by politicians, as a CCM politician argued:

"That’s how people survive, they can get something from the church. So the preacher becomes like God. Then Chadema goes to the church and says: if I win the elections, I’ll give you this and that, and they accept it. It’s because the government has left them." (P18, 28.5.2011)

Also, as argued by Dr. Kamata among others, the declining political force of national ideology in Tanzania opened a space for politicians to attempt to mobilize on religion, given the lack of a unifying national ideology, which would have incorporated the whole population (Dr. Kamata, 12.5.2011; also R3, 11.5.2011). The role of religious groups in providing social and economic comfort, in particular in urban settings, were seen by many as a distinctive feature of religious revival in Tanzania (e.g. Prof Tambila). As argued in chapter 8, this social function also provided members with a strong sense of common purpose group cohesion and identity, and thus a potential force for collective action.

The second factor was specific group grievances had emerged, in particular on the Muslim side, which could be used for mobilization of religion. These group grievances were indeed voiced to a considerable extent in my interviews as well, and as shown above, Christians increasingly developed their own grievances of discrimination with respect to Kikwete’s terms in office. In my interviews, propagation on the basis of these claims was clearly conducted by both Muslim and Christian leaders (e.g. RL8; RL1; RL2; RL4). As hinted at above, both Muslims and Christians accused the other side of waging religious politics, to which each side had seen itself forced to react. In line with the predictions in chapter 8, the most polemic “fundamentalist” respondents in my interviews, particularly on the Muslims side, were also those most concerned about the future of the inter-group relations. The two shehe in Mwanza who had admitted to having encouraged their
congregation members to vote for Muslim candidates only (RL10; RL11), both contended that if the mixing of politics and religion continues at this rate, it would bring civil war to Tanzania. Kapungu was convinced that “it is just a matter of time” until the country is divided into Muslims and Christians fighting each other, making Tanzania “go like Rwanda”\textsuperscript{59}, in part because Muslims were finally speaking up against continued discrimination.

Correspondingly, many of the Christian leaders (RL1; RL2; RL3; RL4) accused the Muslim side for the emergence of religion in the political life of Tanzania, to which the church had reacted by “sending some people” to contest elections, for instance due to concerns over the Kadhi courts (R1, Pastor John). This thus seems to correspond with the assumption in chapter 8, that fundamentalist Christians and Muslims will see real or punitive Islamization or Christianization as a prime motivation to engage politically. However, I found few indications that religious leaders in general, or the Pentecostals in particular, would have seen the battle for supremacy (Haynes, 1996) against the religious “other” as their most salient political issue. On the contrary, many stressed that the persisting cordial relations among believers and institutions still prevailed. For instance, the EAGT pastor in Mwanza stressed, quite adamantly, that \textit{tunakaa vizuri na mashehe, tuko vizuri tu} (we’re on good terms with the shehe, we’re just fine) (RL6, 24.5.2011). On the Muslim side, particularly Ilunga Kapungu (RL11) and the Mwanzan youth leader (RL10) definitely did see politics in terms of a battle for supremacy and influence against the Christians. However, the other Muslims leaders were far less confrontational. On both sides, the way religious leaders conceived of political problems and actions concerned rather practical political issues, as mentioned above, which concerned the general development of the country.

In sum, an increasingly polemic and inflammatory rhetoric among some religious leaders did not expand to all of them, and in addition, it did not seem to find particular resonance among ordinary believers. Further, it is clear that politicians in Tanzania have so far largely refrained from, at least the overt, political mobilization of religious identities (e.g. Heilman & Kaiser 2002, p. 697), despite the presence of group grievances. In consequence, a situation seems to prevail in Tanzania where religion features actively on the level of political bickering – accusations and counter-accusations of religious bias by various political parties, Chadema and CCM most notably. In addition, there are elements among Christian and Muslims groupings who see the competition against the religious

\textsuperscript{59} Alluding to the war in Rwanda is an extremely powerful discourse deployed by politicians and loyalist journalist in Tanzania to discredit whatever political or religious other (see e.g. TACCEO 2010 for media report on the elections; Whitehead 2009 on the general issues particularly chap 12)
other as an “extremely salient political struggle” (Marshall, 2009, p. 33) and who see the other group as constantly trying to assert its influence politically. Further, they conceive of strong group related grievances related to the state and to the other religious group. However, with regard to Mwanza region and my interviews in the various categories, it seems as if these group grievances do not resonate among ordinary believers sufficiently to make religion a political issue. As Heilman & Kaiser argue, there are considerable numbers of Christians and Muslims in all classes and other social groups (Heilman & Kaiser, 2002, p. 698) and it could thus be argued that the group grievances that exist do not amount to veritable “vertical inequalities” (Stewart 2000).

With respect to the educational discrimination narrative by the Muslims, this assessment seems to be supported by a survey (N=1046) conducted by Ishumi (2006) in 2001, in which almost 50 percent of respondents said that the government had “positively responded to educational imbalance and actually initiated corrective measures”. Only 1.5 percent of the total sample contended that government had not addressed these issues due to religious discrimination. Furthermore, when asked what additional efforts needed to be made to address imbalances, there was “virtually no perceptions or statements” that referred to the imbalances between Muslims and Christians. Rather, the most cited initiative advocated was the construction and running of more schools. (Ishumi, 2006, p. 452-53). In addition, an investigation made by Yahya-Othman showed that there was no unilateral tendency of Christians to perform better than Muslims in the educational system in general, although this clear tendency was discernable at the lower levels of education. (Yahya-Othman, 2006) Even these, Yahya-Othman argues with reference to the same material quoted above, “are not widely taken to be the result of deliberate efforts [...] on the part of the government of those in power” (Yahya-Othman, p. 494).

This would lead me to conclude that the political rhetoric concerning grievances on the Muslims side have not necessarily translated into a strong conception among ordinary people that politics – the distribution of resources – is strictly related to religion. While precisely the attachment of religious grievances to resource distribution might explain the emergence of religious tensions in the first place, these do not seem to reverberate on the level of ordinary people to a significant extent. Although religious politics therefore indeed feature prominently in Tanzania, a specific form of political religion has not emerged, where the allocation of resources by necessity is attached to religious identity. In consequence, it might well be that religious revival in Tanzania has increased the social and cultural role of religion in Tanzania. Religious groups are increasingly important service providers (see Leurs et al. 2011) and religious communities might provide a measure of
social and economic support in a context of insecurity, as argued above. In addition, it is likely that religious revival has led to an increase in the significance of cultural aspect of religion, that is, religious practices and the content of religious service. In a similar line of argument as that used for ethnicity, then, I argue that this increased social relevance of religion has not translated into political significance, since mobilization of religion for political purposes is contingent on the saliency of connecting religion to resource distribution – in other words, it depends on the saliency of the discourse of discrimination.

I argue that this is largely attributable, as in the case of ethnicity, to the deliberate attempts at inclusive politics in particular during the reign of Nyerere, which is seen as having attempted to actively address imbalances. This relates to the strong normative discourse discussed in chapters 6 and 7, and the same comments apply here. Among my interviews respondents, there seemed to be a strong conception that religion simply should not be used politically. As with ethnicity, respondents frequently referred back to the political system of Nyerere, which had ensured that religion was to play no role in the politics of the country. While this relates to the point of normativity discussed in chapter 7 – self-censorship with regard to religious politics is not uncommon in Tanzania, as argued by Yahya-Othman (2006, p. 494) – but this strong normative conception may at the same time also prohibit the further emergence of religious politics. As far as my research results are concerned, it seems that Tanzanians still exhibit a rather strong sense of national identity and a desire for national unity. However, as mentioned above, these conclusions are based to a large extent on my analysis of the situation in Mwanza, and might not apply to the entire country. For instance, as indicated previously, religion might have emerged as a more salient political issue and hence a voting motivation along the coast than what seems to be the case in Mwanza.

In addition, there is no guarantee that religious relations will remain cordial, and that political religion will be confined only to certain elements in the future as well. There are indeed trends in religious-political relations in Tanzania that raise some concerns. While no political party in Tanzania would attempt to openly portray itself as religiously based, this does not keep politicians, as shown above, from fervently accusing their opponents of religious bias. It is easy agree with Saida Yahya-Othman on the need to take increased religious-political connections seriously. The perceived disadvantage of Muslims in terms of education and public employment, and issues of right and justice, continue to remain on the political agenda of Muslim organizations (see The Guardian 1.9.2011; Daily News, 11.9.2011). Among Christians, there is a growing concern that the government is increasingly biased towards the Muslims community, in effect sidelining Christians.
This solicits the need for religious grievances, as well as accusations of religious bias on the part of political parties, to be addressed in an open and inclusive way. The political legacy of Tanzania would seem to provide a conducive climate for such discussion, but in an environment of increased political competition, it is less likely that this will occur.
10. Conclusions

This thesis has come a long way to elicit the political role of ethnicity and religion in the politics of Tanzania. I believe that my results have some relevance for the state of religion, politics and ethnicity in Tanzania in general, although my conclusions should be seen as valid mainly for my region of research, in particular with regard to religion. In this concluding chapter, I will return to the three research questions presented in chapter 2 and assess them through a summary of the main points made in this thesis. The three research questions were:

1. *In which various shapes and by which means may ethnic identity influence politics in Tanzania, in particular with regard to multi-party elections?*

2. *How do ethnic and religious politics emerge in Tanzania, and how can these forms of politics be understood?*

3. *What was the role of ethnicity and religion in the 2010 elections in Mwanza, and what does this suggest for ethnic and religious politics in Tanzania in general?*

**Questions 1 and 2**

In this thesis, I have suggested that ethnic identity may be divided into cultural, social and political levels, and that the shift from cultural to social ethnicity – ethnicity as self-identification – may be seen as a consequence of the process of colonialism. Whereas in many other colonies, this was paired by a development of political ethnicity, a transition which I conceptualized using Lonsdale’s terms *moral ethnicity* and *political tribalism*, this distinct form of ethnic politics did not emerge in Tanzania to any larger extent. Political tribalism connoted a form of ethnic politics that entailed the mobilization of the particular types of ethnic identities, which had emerged out of the process of colonialism. These identities were used in competition with other ethnic groups. This is not the only conceivable form of ethnic politics, or political ethnicity, however. I defined ethnic politics as the use of ethnicity in the pursuit of public resources, and any political allusion to ethnicity was thus included in this definition. With reference to the literature, ethnic identity was in turn defined as any collective identity that referred to common origin, locality, heritage and cultural practices, although the actual commonness of these factors could be based on a social construction.

The need to broaden the definitions of ethnicity and ethnic identity was solicited by the fact that there were several examples of ethnicity-politics connections in Tanzania that could not be defined
as political tribalism. I argued for instance that ethnicity (and religion) functioned as means of inclusive political representation during the one-party era in Tanzania. I also noted that there was a range of political developments in multi-party Tanzania in which politicians enjoyed a strong regionally confined support, which was not directly attributable to ethnic group identity. In consequence, I suggested that ethnic politics could be divided into political tribalism and what I termed the politics of origin. The latter included various types of allusion to identities of common origin, which did not amount to political tribalism. In section 6.6, I suggested three such types of ethnic politics, which can be briefly summarized as follows.

a) “Homeboy” politics, referring to the strong standing of a politician either on the local or zonal level, which cannot be reduced or expanded to an ethnic group such as Sukuma, Nyamwezi or similar. This was seen as a rather “mild” form of parochial politics

b) Local level constituency politics, where the need for a political representative to share the origin of the constituency members is emphasized. This could take different forms as suggested in the literature, and be based either on common kinship and the obligations associated with it (Chabal 2009) or as an emphasis on common origin as a way of measuring the trustworthiness of a candidate – overcoming the “information problem” (cf. Lindberg & Morrison, 2008).

c) The third form was based on political representation with reference to Nyerere’s system of inclusive politics. Here it was suggested that political representation might be constructed on the basis of ethnicity as a means of inclusion of various social groups and parts of the population. This thus relates to the notion of the positive, integrative effect that some scholars envisaged for ethnicity (e.g. Lonsdale, 1994).

These three forms of politics of origin are not absolute categories and may overlap, but are indicative of some relevant forms of ethnicity-politics connections. The importance of making the distinctions argued for above was that different forms of ethnic politics might have very different kinds of political connotations. Particularly the second and third form of ethnic politics might very well constitute legitimate attempts to ensure political inclusion by a constituency. While all three implied that ethnic identity was tied to resource flows, and thus to politics, the argument was that the political use of ethnicity may in certain circumstances be both legitimate and constructive, although this certainly is not the case in all instances. However, based on this I argued that accusations of tribalism in Tanzania should be treated with caution, since all connections between ethnic identity and politics should not by definition be seen as detrimental to the ethnic relations in the country.

I argued at some length that emergence of political tribalism had been prevented – at least to a large extent – by the fact that the incentives to mobilize on ethnicity had been addressed. This might be understood with reference to the political system that was put in place in Tanzania after
independence and governed by Julius Nyerere. This system sought to ensure political inclusion and representation of the various social groups, while at the same time redressing previous imbalances between them. In addition, during this political era, an exceptionally strong sense of national identity and national unity developed, which put particularly strong emphasis on the undesirability of using ethnicity and religion in the conduct of politics.

As for religion, I argued that the same categorization into social, cultural and political religion was applicable to religious identity, but did not attempt to identify further sub-categories of religious politics. I suggested that the emergence of religious tensions in Tanzania in the late 1980s and early 1990s were related to the availability of group grievances, particularly among the Muslims, which found a conducive environment to be voiced and mobilized in the context of economic crisis in Tanzania. During the same time, a period of religious revival began in Tanzania as in other parts of the continent, which increased both the social and the cultural role of religion. Due to the availability of group grievances, the increased social and cultural saliency of religion contributed to its political saliency as well. I suggested based on the literature that the religious movements that emerged during this time – which have been termed, somewhat controversially, “fundamentalist” – have certain characteristics, summarized in section 8.3, which contributed to the emergence of confrontational relations between faith groups in Tanzania.

In particular however, the saliency of groups grievances related to the perceived political exclusion of the Muslim community, mainly in terms of political representation, employment and education. This thus increased the incentive to mobilize on religion in pursuit of resources, since the perceived discrimination in the allocation of resources had supposedly followed religious lines as well. I noted that the Christians had developed their own conceptions of political exclusion from the mid 1990s onwards, and that this had been precipitated during Jakaya Kikwete’s terms in power. Nonetheless, it is also clear that despite this background, political religion has not evolved to a stage where it dominates the politics of Tanzania and there is a marked absence of outright religious political parties. In addition, it seems on the basis of a range of surveys that religious relations in the country remain quite cordial, which was reiterated by nearly all of my respondents as well. I suggested with reference to my field material that this might be due to the fact that group grievances after all have had limited resonances on the level of ordinary believers. This relates to the third and final research question.

Question 3
Finally, chapters 7 and 9 analyzed the role of ethnicity and religion in the 2010 elections to the background of the theoretical and conceptual points in previous chapters. It is important to note that my result and conclusions mainly apply to Mwanza region, where I conducted the bulk of the field research. Regarding ethnicity, I did indeed encounter a few references to outright political tribalism, but argued that in general, the scope for tribalism is still likely to be low in Tanzania. Given certain circumstances, politicians might attempt to evoke this form of political ethnicity even in Tanzania, as one particular case in central Mwanza town showed, but my material did not permit me to assess in which social circumstances the electorate might be responsive to such mobilization. Also, I could see no clear determinable connection between ethnicity and the opposition party Chadema, which had been accused on being biased towards the Chagga ethnic group. Ethnic politics in Mwanza in the 2010 elections could instead for the most part be understood with reference to what I termed the politics of origin. To be sure, most of my respondents were keen to point out that ethnicity – factors such as Sukuma identity, common origin, language and heritage – were not important factors affecting voting decisions. It was commonly mentioned that political candidates that the importance of common origin was that candidates needed to be local in order for the constituency members to be familiar with them and “judge their character”. The important thing, however, they pointed out, was the trustworthiness and abilities of a candidate.

However, most ethnic or regional outsider who featured in my interviews in turn pointed to the importance of Sukuma identity and common origin when conducing political campaigns in the area. I was thus inclined to argue that ethnicity was likely to have been a factor affecting voting motivations in Mwanza, and that it might have worked as a measure of determining the trustworthiness and suitability of candidate. If a candidate was local, it was argued by one respondent quoted, he could not steal from the community (CUF ward secretary, Geita). Common origin – ethnicity – might thus have worked as a way of ensuring the political inclusion of the constituency; that is, that political representatives used public funds for benefit of the community. Crucially, however, I argued that ethnicity had not developed into a decisive and unconditional factor in the distribution of resources in Tanzania, and therefore ethnicity was also not an indispensable factor in the judgment of the suitability of candidate. While my results are valid mainly for Mwanza, I argue that the situation described above is likely to prevail in many other parts of Tanzania as well.

Concerning religion, I noted that religious issues had featured rather prominently in the campaigns of the 2010 elections, but it was less clear to what extent religion had functioned as a voting
motivation in the elections. Some of the religious leaders in both faith groups had directly supported certain religious parties due to religious concerns, and there were many political representatives, mainly from CCM, who would readily accuse Chadema of religious bias. There were indeed some connections between Chadema and the Christian community, and in particular the emphasis of the church on the importance of honesty among political candidates corresponded well with Chadema’s anti-corruption policies. Nonetheless, I argued that the party could not be described as a religious party, and few of my respondents perceived of any strong links between party and church. In general, as with ethnicity, respondents underlined quite forcefully that religion had not been an important election issue for them.

I thus suggested that the groups grievances mentioned above might not have gained sufficient staying power among ordinary believers of Christianity or Islam for religious sentiments to amass more widespread political significance. This might have to do with perception that imbalances had been addressed to some extent, in particular during Nyerere’s era. Finally, references to the national unity of Tanzania were frequent among respondents and it was perceivable, as with ethnicity, that there was considerable resentment among many respondents against the use of religious politics. However, as noted above, these results are strictly limited to the region of Mwanza, and their validity might be reduced by the fact that a vast majority of my respondents were Christian. The situation may differ substantially in other parts of the country and in addition, it was noted that there are indeed alarming tendencies regarding religious relations in Tanzania, which should be addressed if the cordial religious relations are to prevail.
11. References


**Official Documents**


**Reports**


**Online sources**


**Media reports**

Appendix

Appendix 1. General Elections 2010, Chadema’s Results in Presidential and Parliamentary Elections by Region

Legend
1. Chadema votes in region
2. Total votes cast in region
3. Percentage of Chadema’s votes of total votes in region
4. Percentage points below or above Chadema’s average performance in all regions
5. Percentage of votes cast for Chadema in regions out of total votes cast for Chadema
6. Percentage of total votes cast in region out of total votes cast nationally (compared to nr. 5 tells if region is stronghold)

Presidential Elections 2010
Results for Chadema by region and zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extended Lake Zone</th>
<th>Kigoma</th>
<th>Mara</th>
<th>Mwanza</th>
<th>Shinyanga</th>
<th>Kagera</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<td>7,1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shinyanga</td>
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<th>Dar</th>
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### Southern Highlands

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### North

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### Major City

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<td>76010</td>
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<td>6,1%</td>
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<td>14,2 %</td>
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**Parliamentary Elections 2010.**
Results for Chadema by region and zone

### North

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### Extended Lake Zone

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</tr>
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### South and Highlands

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## Central

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<td>2,1%</td>
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## Coast

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<th>Lindi</th>
<th>Pwani</th>
<th>Tanga</th>
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<td>Compared to CDM average</td>
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<td>-14,8%</td>
<td>-15,8%</td>
<td>-23,2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>% of total CDM</td>
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<td>0,5%</td>
<td>1,4%</td>
<td>1,6%</td>
<td>0,5%</td>
<td>18,0%</td>
<td>4,1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Region % of total votes</td>
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<td>3,3%</td>
<td>4,1%</td>
<td>4,3%</td>
<td>25,7%</td>
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## Major city

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<th>Kibaha</th>
<th>Tanga</th>
<th>Mtwar</th>
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<td>40,7%</td>
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</table>
Appendix 2. Dictionary and Background

Sera  Political program or ideology
Ukabila  Tribalism
Kabila  Tribe / ethnic group
Udini  Using religion for political purposes or in opposition to other religions
Dini  Religion
Shehe  Sheikh, Kiswahili word for Muslim leader
UDSM  University of Dar es Salaam

Places for field research

Mwanza  Region in the Lake Zone, North-Western Tanzania
Geita  Newly formed region since January 2011, previously part of Mwanza region, including during the 2010 election. Also name of the region capital
Magu  Predominantly rural district in Mwanza, also name of main town in district
Mwamabanza  Small village in Magu district, Mwanza
Katoro  Main town in Busanda district in Geita
Kahangara  Small town in Magu, close to the town of Mwanza

Political Parties

CCM  Chama cha Mapinduzi (The Party of the Revolution) since 1977, formerly TANU (Tanganyika African National Union), in power since 1961
CUF  Civic United Front, registered since 1993, largest opposition party 2000-2005
CHADEMA  Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (The Party of Democracy and Development), registered since 1993, main opposition party in 2010 elections, shadow government in current parliament
TLP  Tanzania Labour Party, marginal opposition party around Augustine Mrema
UDP  United Democratic Party, marginal opposition party around John Cheyo, mainly supported in Mwanza and Shinyanga

Politicians

Julius Kambarage Nyerere  First Prime Minister, President of Tanzania, leader of Independence movement, “Father of the Nation”

Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete  President of Tanzania, re-elected for second term 2010

Dr. Willibrod Slaa  Chadema Secretary General, Presidential candidate in 2010 Elections

Prof. Ibrahim Lipumba  Chairman of CUF since 1995

Freeman Mbowe  Chairman of Chadema

Edwin Mtei  Co-founder and former chairman of Chadema

John Cheyo  Chairman of UDP, prominent opposition politician in the early years of multipartyism

Augustine Mrema  Chairman of TLP, presidential candidate of NCCR-M in 1995 and main contender in elections

Appendix 3. Respondents in interviews

1. Politicians

John Mnyika, MP Ubungo, CDM
Joeli Nanauka, CCM
Silvester Masinde
Ezekia Wenje, MP Nyamagana, Mwanza. CDM
CCM Ward secretary and chairman, Central Mwanza
CCM Head Regional office, Regional chairman and secretaries, Mwanza
CCM Ward, Mkoloni, Mwanza
Chadema district office, 7 respondents, Magu
UDP MP candidate Julius Ngongoseke
Chadema veteran politicians, Kahangara, Mwanza
CCM Ward Office Kahangara, senior actives
CCM district office Geita, secretary Simon Amsiyaawo
Chadema district office, Geita, 6 respondents
CUF district office Geita, 4 respondents
CCM district office Katoro, Geita, secretary
Chadema MP candidate Rogers Ruhega, Geita
Chadema MP candidate Bukoba rural, Aristide Ndibalema
CCM MP, Geita Donald Max
CCM zonal campaign manager, Charles Masala Kualangw, Mwanza
CUF local councilor candidate, central ward in Mwanza town
TLP local councilor candidate in Mwanza town, Marva Chacha Kisyeri
CCM ten cell leader, central ward in Mwanza
Veteran politician, former CUF member, Mwanza town
CCM local councilor candidate, central Mwanza
Busanda, Geita MP Lolesia Bukwimba CCM

2. Ordinary

O1 Bar in Mkoloni, Mwanza, 3 respondents
O2 Muslim men, Mkoloni, Mwanza, 2 respondents
O3 Group of women, Mkoloni, Mwanza, 3 respondents
O4 Shop in Magu town, Mwanza, 4 respondents
O5 Bar in Magu town, 4 respondents
O6 Waitresses at hotel, 3 respondents
O7 Group of "machinga", Makoroboi street, Mwanza town
O8 Man on Makoroboi street, Mwanza town
O9 Shoe shop, Makoroboi street, Mwanza town, 2 respondents
O10 Elderly woman, Kanhangara, Magu
O11 Elderly man, Kahangara, Magu
O12 Group of women, Kahangara, Magu, 7 respondents
O13 Elderly man, Mwamabanza, Magu
O14 Big group, Mwamabanza, Magu, ca. 40 respondents
O15 Woman, Mwamabanza, Magu
O16 Woman with children, Mwamabanza, Magu
O17 Elderly man, Mwamabanza Magu
O18 Large family, Mwamabanza, Magu, ca. 10 respondents
O19 Disabled activist, Geita
O20 Shoeshop keeper, Geita
O21 Group of elderly men and women, Geita, 4 respondents
O22 Elderly man, Geita
O23 Women sellers, Katoro, Geita
O24 Shop sellers, Geita town, 4 respondents
O25 Group of women in hair salon, Geita town, 8 respondents
O26 Group of youth, Geita town
O27 Group of salesmen in bag shop, Mwanza town, 6 respondents
O28 Urban couple, Mwanza town
O29 Family father, Mwanza town
O30 Family mother, Mwanza town
O31 Young man, Mwanza town
O32 Radio station employees, 3 respondents, Mwanza town
O33 Family mother, Mwanza town
O34 Young man, Dar es Salaam
O35 Group of young men, Dar es Salaam, 3 respondents
O36 Young woman, Dar es Salaam
O37 Group discussion, Katoro, Geita, 3 respondents

3. Religious leaders

RL1 Pastor John, Pentecostal, Mwanza town
RL2 Pastor Michael EAGT, Mwanza town
RL3 Roman Catholic father, Magu
RL4 Pastors from Faith Ministry and EAGT, Kahangara, Magu
RL6 Pastor Aron, EAGT, Mwanza
RL7 Sheikh of mosque; Youth group leader; Elder of mosque, Katoro, Geita
RL8 BAKWATA representative, Mwanza
RL9 Roman Catholic father, Mwanza town
RL10 Muslim Youth leader, Mwanza town
RL11 Shehe Ilunga Kapungu, sheikh and debater, Mwanza town

4. Researchers

R1 Dr. A. Makulilo, lecturer in political science and public administration, UDSM
R2 Dr. A. Lwaitama, lecturer, Department of Education, UDSM
R3 Lecturer in Philosophy, UDSM
R4 Dr. N. Kamata, lecturer in political science and public administration, UDSM
R5 Dr. B. Hellman, Senior Lecturer in Political Science and Public Administration, UDSM
R6 Prof. M. Baregu, Professor in Political Science, SAUT
R7 Dr. Keya & Dr. G. Mapunda, lecturers in linguistics, UDSM
R8. Prof A. Chaligha, Associate Professor in Political Science and Public Administration, UDSM
R9. Prof S. Mushi, Professor in Political Science and Public Administration; Head of REDET
R10 Prof. Saida Yahya-Othman, Associate Professor, Department of Education, UDSM
R11 Prof K. Tambila, Professor in History, UDSM