At the intersection of racism and nationalism: Theorising and contextualising the anti-immigration discourse in Poland

Polynczuk-Alenius, Kinga

2021-07


http://hdl.handle.net/10138/342733
https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12611

acceptedVersion

Downloaded from Helda, University of Helsinki institutional repository.
This is an electronic reprint of the original article.
This reprint may differ from the original in pagination and typographic detail.
Please cite the original version.
At the intersection of racism and nationalism: Theorising and contextualising the ‘anti-immigration’ discourse in Poland

Name Kinga Polynczuk-Alenius

Address Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, PL 4 (Fabianinkatu 24)
00014 University of Helsinki, Finland

Biographical note
Kinga Polynczuk-Alenius is a Postdoctoral Researcher (Core Fellow) at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, where she is working on the project concerning mediated racism and nationalism in Poland. Her articles have been published in journals such as Globalizations, International Journal of Cultural Studies, and Media and Communication.

Abstract
This article contributes to a better understanding of the ‘anti-immigration’ discourse that has prevailed in Poland following the electoral victory of the Law and Justice party in 2015 by theoretically engaging the category of ‘race’ in the examination of Polish nationalism. To do so, it employs the Foucauldian perspective on racism, understood as deployed in defence of one’s own nation, imagined as ‘race’. The article also contextualises this discourse by elaborating how three globally circulated racist themes (threat, unworthiness, and otherness) are deployed to uphold three components of hegemonic Polish national self-definition (vulnerability, deservingness, and ‘Westernness’) against three aspects of the perceived liminality that destabilise this self-definition (temporal, moral, and spatial). The article concludes that in Poland, the ‘anti-immigration’ discourse deploys racism as a device symbolically to ‘protect’ the imagined ethnically, religiously and culturally homogenous Polish nation from the belittlement and dilution of collective self-definition under the conditions of globalisation.

Keywords: anti-immigration discourse; Central and Eastern Europe; nationalism; Poland; racism

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank all the colleagues who generously commented on the earlier versions of this manuscript. In particular, I wish to express my gratitude to Markus Ojala with whom the article was discussed on many occasions, to Andreas Bieler for his final pre-submission feedback, to Daria Krivonos for reading the final version of this article, and to the editors and two anonymous reviewers for their detailed, helpful, kind and encouraging comments.

**Word count 9,857**
At the intersection of racism and nationalism: Theorising and contextualising the ‘anti-immigration’ discourse in Poland

Introduction

A considerable volume of literature on the ‘anti-immigration’ discourse¹ in Poland has rapidly emerged in response to the palpably racist, anti-Muslim idiom deployed at the peak of the ‘refugee crisis’ by the Law and Justice party (PiS), which was catapulted to power in the 2015 parliamentary elections (Goździak and Márton 2018; Jańczak 2019; Krotofil and Motak 2018; Krzyżanowska and Krzyżanowski 2018; Krzyżanowski 2018; Narkowicz 2018). Such language has since been incorporated into mainstream political and societal discourses, amplified by the public service broadcaster, which has been hijacked by PiS and transformed into the propagandistic ‘national media’ (Kerpel 2017). In more detail, the existing literature concentrates on empirical instances of mediated ‘anti-immigration’ discourse produced by prominent political actors (Jańczak 2019; Krzyżanowska and Krzyżanowski 2018; Krzyżanowski 2018), religious institutions (Krotofil and Motak 2018), or explores the intersections of political, religious, and civil society discourses (Goździak and Márton 2018; Narkowicz 2018).

To further our understanding of the present ‘anti-immigration’ discourse in Poland, this article analyses its conditions of possibility—i.e. external contingencies by which discourses are rendered meaningful—by dissecting the entanglements between racism and nationalism.

Using the available empirical analyses and mapping exercises to outline the parameters of the ‘anti-immigration’ discourse in Poland, I argue that this discourse hinges on three essential themes. Firstly, and most crucially, the ‘anti-immigration’ discourse revolves around the notion of threat posed to the Polish nation by incoming Muslim asylum seekers. The list of threats includes threats to physical security (Jańczak
2019), biological welfare and health (Krzyżanowski 2018), as well as the cultural ('Western') and religious (Catholic) identity of the Polish nation (Goździak and Márton 2018; Krotofil and Motak 2018; Krzyżanowska and Krzyżanowski 2018; Narkowicz 2018). Secondly, the ‘anti-immigration’ discourse questions the worthiness of the asylum seekers and their deservingness of help. To do so, it either recasts them as economic migrants (Jańczak 2019; Krzyżanowska and Krzyżanowski 2018) or resorts problematically to the principle of *ordo caritatis* so as to prioritise ‘helping our own first’ (Krotofil and Motak 2018: 105). Thirdly, the ‘anti-immigration’ discourse relies on heavily orientalised representations to construct a supposedly insurmountable otherness around the asylum seekers, likening their arrival to an ‘invasion’ (Goździak and Márton 2018; Krotofil and Motak 2018; Krzyżanowski 2018; Narkowicz 2018).

This article sets out to theorise and contextualise this ‘anti-immigration’ discourse in Polish nationalism, an undertaking which the existing, empirically-inclined literature has begun but not completed. To do so, I grapple with the fundamental question: *How is the ‘anti-immigration’ discourse rendered intelligible and legitimate in Poland?* At first glance, the uptake of ‘anti-immigration’ discourse in Poland might appear puzzling. According to the latest 2011 census (GUS 2015), Poland was an extraordinarily homogenous country: a mere 1.5 per cent of the respondents declared a non-Polish ‘ethnic-national’ identity. In addition, less than 2 per cent among those respondents who specified their religious denomination identified as non-Roman Catholic (Jewish and Muslim minorities constituted less than 0.1 per cent each). Furthermore, in the aftermath of the ‘refugee crisis’, the number of asylum applications filed in Poland has been consistently low (from 12,325 in 2015 to 4,100 in 2018, compared to the total of 38.5 million inhabitants), and the number of asylum requests granted has been minuscule (348 in 2015 and 406 in 2018).³
At the heart of my project lies a vision of the ‘anti-immigration’ discourse as an intersection of racism and nationalism. Firstly, to theorise this discursive intersection, I lean on Foucault’s (2003a: 317) perspective on racism as deployed not necessarily against another ‘race’ but inevitably in defence of one’s own ‘race’ (see also Taylor 2011). Although ‘race’ in the Foucauldian sense resonates closely with the ethnic conception of the nation—both being ‘biologically monist’ unities (Foucault 2003b: 80)—I want to flesh out this connection even further by subscribing to Mosse’s (1995) view that nationalism operationalises racism, and racism, meanwhile, helps nationalism by drawing sharper lines of division between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (see also Balibar 1991).

The existing analyses of the ‘anti-immigration’ discourse in Poland tend to shy away from talking about racism, reserving the term for its most ‘blatant’ articulations (Goździak and Márton 2018: 132; Krzyżanowska and Krzyżanowski 2018: 616; Krzyżanowski 2018: 92; for a partial exception, see Narkowicz 2018: 357). However, following Goldberg (2009: 1273), I claim that the explicit theoretical and analytical attention to ‘race’ and racism is badly wanting in studies of discourses on migration because the two delineate the possibilities of how migrants are imagined, talked about and, ultimately, received. Engaging with this dimension of the ‘anti-immigration’ discourse is a particularly urgent task in Central and Eastern European contexts such as Poland. These national contexts exhibit an enduring suppression of ‘race’, which can be viewed as a legacy of state socialism whose operative ideology of internationalism sought to eradicate difference and transform populations into ‘raceless’ and ‘ethnicity-less’ subjects (see Law and Zakharov 2019: 84). This suppression of ‘race’ perpetuates the delusion of ‘exceptionalism’, premised on those nations allegedly not having participated in colonial conquest (Baker 2018) and having had what is assumed to be a peaceful multi-ethnic past (Pasieka 2014).
To contextualise the ‘anti-immigration’ discourse in Poland, I consider its *conditions of possibility* by taking a cue from Foucault’s discourse theory (Foucault 1981; Hook 2001). This approach immediately sensitises us to two things which the existing literature only acknowledges in passing. On the one hand, it challenges the newness of the recent ‘anti-immigration’ discourse. It does so by laying bare the discourse’s affinity to earlier discourses from the League of Polish Families, a party that promoted a fiercely anti-immigration stance on the eve of EU accession in the early 2000s when immigration was a non-issue (de Lange and Guerra 2009). But it also allows the current ‘anti-immigration’ discourse to be tied into racist discourses which have been present throughout the political history of post-communist Poland, such as when in the 1990 presidential campaign Lech Wałęsa, the legendary leader of Solidarity and the Nobel Peace Prize laureate, sanctioned the use of anti-Semitic innuendos for his own political gain (Gebert 1991).

The Foucauldian approach moreover prompts us to think about current ‘anti-immigration’ discourse and Polish nationalism in relation to historical ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity (see Balogun 2018). Indeed, Poland was only engineered as a homogenous country in the mid-twentieth century, after the Holocaust, World War II and the forced relocations that followed it, and the 1968 ‘anti-Zionist’ campaign (Hann 1998: 843). Ideologically charged (mis)understandings of this past diversity, unpacked throughout this article, underlie the current approach to migration. Importantly, the migration patterns in Poland are gradually changing; in 2016, for the first time, the net migration rate was positive (GUS 2018). This is, above all, a result of the inflow of a Ukrainian workforce, particularly following the war in Eastern Ukraine. Ukrainians, like Poles, are Slavs, and thus typically not considered to be a racialised population in a Polish national context. Although they are usually appreciated for their contribution to
the Polish economy, neither this nor their Slavness grants them absolute immunity from ‘anti-immigration’ discourse (Jańczak 2019: 133). Migration from outside Europe has however also been increasing, and is bound to accelerate further as emigration from Ukraine wanes. This trajectory makes it especially imperative to understand ‘anti-immigration’ discourse in Poland better, since the proportion of migrants from outside Europe is expected to rise.

This article seeks to contribute to an improved grounding of ‘anti-immigration’ discourse in racism and Polish nationalism by taking four steps. The first part theorises ‘anti-immigration’ discourse as the discursive intersection of racism and nationalism, leaning in the main on the approach offered by Foucault (2003a, 2003b). The second part, in turn, presents a para-methodological approach to contextualising the ‘anti-immigration’ discourse by studying its conditions of possibility. The third part builds on the preceding two in dissecting the ‘anti-immigration’ discourse in Poland: it begins by introducing a trimodal interface (between globally circulated racist themes, hegemonic national self-definition, and the perception of liminality) into which some of the relevant conditions of possibility can be analytically organised, then reveals how different elements of this analytical grid interact. Finally, the last part reflects on how the explicit attention paid in this article to ‘race’, racism and nationalism furthers the understanding of ‘anti-immigration’ discourse in Poland and its equivalents in Central and Eastern Europe more broadly.

Theorising the ‘anti-immigration’ discourse in Poland

As anticipated above, one core objective of this article is to theorise ‘anti-immigration’ discourse in Poland. I do so in two steps. Firstly, I draw on the notion of racism derived from Foucault’s (2003b) cursory genealogy in order to outline a trajectory of ‘race’ in
Poland. Secondly, I discuss how racism thus understood explicitly intersects and interacts with nationalism.

Sketched out in the 1975-76 lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault’s genealogy considers present-day racism to be a perversion of a discourse on ‘race war’. According to Foucault (2003b: 59), the discourse on ‘race war’ emerged in the seventeenth century in Western Europe as a means to challenge power, usually obtained through the conquest of one ‘race’ by another (e.g., the Norman Conquest of England). To demonstrate his point, Foucault (2003b) retraces the historico-political paradigm shift that occurred at the turn of seventeenth century: from the unifocal histories of the sovereign that perpetuated their power to more multivocal histories that attacked this power as enslavement and questioned its legitimacy. This new perspective produced the polyvalent discourse on ‘race war’ so as to articulate the ‘counterhistories’ of violence, conquest and subjugation (Foucault 2003b: 76). The understanding of ‘race’ is here necessarily flexible, linked not to ‘a stable biological meaning’ but to a ‘certain historico-political divide’, in which inequalities of power and privilege overlap with ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural separateness (Foucault 2003b: 77). This ‘mobility’ of the discourse on ‘race war’ allowed for it to be used by various groups subjected to unchallenged power, the lower estates and bourgeoisie alike (Foucault 2003b: 60, 74, 77; Taylor 2011: 750).

Subsequently, Foucault (2003b: 65) asserts, the discourse on ‘race war’ underwent dramatic changes in the late nineteenth century, whereby societies were reinvented as homogenous in sociobiological terms to substantiate emerging nationalisms. Simultaneously, ‘race war’ was externalised, removed from the racially homogenous ‘nation’ and projected outside so as to justify colonial conquest of supposedly lesser ‘races’. Discourse on ‘race war’, therefore, was converted into racist
discourse and harnessed in support of the ideology of ‘racial purity’, which viewed unified nations as threatened from the outside by the representatives of races perceived as inferior as well as from the inside by their own members viewed as ‘substandard’ (Foucault 2003b: 80-1; Taylor 2011). This perspective unhinges racism from the loathing of other ‘races’ and, instead, attaches it to the defence of one’s own ‘race’ as its necessary precondition (Foucault 2003a: 317; Taylor 2011). Thus, what matters most in diagnosing racism according to Foucault is that those being perceived as a biologically or culturally unified ‘race’ are not primarily the objects to hate (‘them’) but the subjects who need to be protected (‘us’).

Foucault’s genealogy of racism, although distinctly Western European, helps to embed the current ‘anti-immigration’ discourse into the long history of ‘race’ discourse in Poland. It is useful to begin this history with the myth of ‘Sarmatism’, which is nowadays considered as a founding myth of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the source of its political system (Niedźwiedź 2015). This myth, which appeared in the Kingdom of Poland already in the fifteenth century, imagined the ruling nobility in ethno-cultural terms as a separate ‘race’, allegedly descended from the ancient Iranian tribe of Sarmatians. Crucially, this iteration of ‘race’ discourse was deployed in two directions: to control royal power (monarch was perceived as ‘racially’ equal to nobility), and to justify domination over other estates—Slavic peasants enslaved by serfdom and strictly regulated Jewish merchants (Brock 1994; Sowa 2011). Thus, unlike in the genealogy of discourse on ‘race war’ in Western Europe suggested by Foucault (2003b), in Poland ‘race’ discourse seems to have been invented not primarily to demand rights and recognition but to legitimise and reinforce political and social privileges of the group, which imagined itself in ‘racial’ terms.
Realigning with Foucauldian genealogy, the major shift in ‘race’ discourse in Poland was also brought about by the project of constructing a popular ‘national consciousness’. ‘Modern’ nationalism, which took hold at the end of the nineteenth century, envisioned the Polish nation as an ethnolinguistically, culturally and confessionally homogenous community (Brock 1994). Thus, the old ‘racial’ model of society composed of gentry as a ‘race’ separate from others was replaced with the idea of a biologically unified, ethnically Polish nation, struggling for survival against other ‘races’, marking the transformation of ‘race’ discourse into racist discourse (see Foucault 2003b: 80).

Racist discourse in the interwar period intertwined national and religious identities even more closely (Walicki 2000), as was naturalised in the notion of Polak-Katolik (Pole-Catholic) that has come to denote Polish national identity (de Lange and Guerra 2009). This interlacing was a strategy to consolidate the nascent nation as a homogeneous ethno-religious body, so that religious others, and particularly Jews who constituted about a tenth of the population, were singled out as threatening to the vulnerable Polish nation and stigmatised as anti-Polish foreign agents. Parallel with this, as we shall see below, racist discourse was articulated to a lesser extent in the never realised colonial ambitions expressed between the World Wars. Namely, some institutions, primarily the Maritime and Colonial League, and certain segments of the Polish society advocated the acquisition of overseas territories and expropriation of their human resources as well as natural reserves as a means of securing national growth and development in Poland (Balogun 2018).

The most recent metamorphosis of racist discourse in Poland transpired in the communist period and had to do with the redefinition and eventual exteriorisation of racism. Namely, the communist societies were nominally constructed as ‘raceless’
through active and institutional discouragement of ethnic and racial identifications (Baker 2018: 12). Consequently, racism was ideologically confined to a dichotomy between white and black and, as such, consigned to the capitalist world where the political discrimination and economic oppression of the racialised minorities was acutely visible (Law and Zakharov 2019: 84). Unlike most ideological products of the communist period, this definition of racism continues in the present, allowing racism to be swept under the carpet, given the limited presence and relative invisibility of the representatives of other ‘races’ who have come to constitute the only potential targets of racism.

This cursory overview permits drawing direct links between racism and nationalism in Poland, where racism has been continuously turned predominantly inwards, against minorities inhabiting the country rather than overseas populations. The relevance of this connection persists today because racialised others are currently encountered not as physically present, embodied human beings but primarily as discursively constructed bogymen, patched together from stereotypical representations circulated by global media and stored in the collective memory of a multi-ethnic past. Anderson (1983: 6) famously defined nationalism as a cultural process of ‘imagining’ a limited and sovereign national community of ‘us’, bound together by shared values and destiny, and separate from other nations. Such a perspective points to the not inevitable, but typically mutually beneficial, relationship between racism and nationalism (Mosse 1995: 163), which anticipates the symbolic objectification of others as a (negative) background against which a (positive) national self-definition can be established (Balibar 1991). Consequently, not only the a priori negative stereotyping of the ‘other’ but also the (quest for) the valorisation of the ‘self’ can be a source of racism (Miles and Brown 2003: 85). ‘Anti-immigration’ discourse in Poland, then, closely entwines racism
with nationalism in exercising social boundary-making and hierarchy-production that turns on the overemphasis of somatic, ethnic, cultural and/or religious differences (see Dikötter 2008; Grosfoguel et al 2015). In this sense, racism and nationalism provide a frame, albeit porous, for what can legitimately be said about others as well as oneself, for the former is configured as a ‘countertype’ of the latter (see Jańczak 2019; Mosse 1995).

**Studying the conditions of possibility for ‘anti-immigration’ discourse in Poland**

Not only does this article lean on Foucault’s approach to racism in theorising ‘anti-immigration’ discourse in Poland but it also takes a methodological cue from his discourse theory to contextualise the discourse in question. In particular, I aim to outline the selected *conditions of possibility* that render such a discourse intelligible and even acceptable in the Polish political and, more broadly, public domain. The notion of conditions of possibility is derived from the idea of ‘exteriority’, which Foucault (1981: 67) named among four core methodological principles of his archaeological research: ‘we must…on the basis of discourse itself, its appearance and its regularity, go towards the external conditions of possibility, towards what gives rise to the aleatory series of these events, and fixes its limits’. Although his methodological approach was subject to frequent and thorough revisions, Foucault never abandoned an interest in the external contingencies by which discourses are rendered meaningful and in which they are enmeshed (see Kendall and Wickham 1999).

Accordingly, Foucault’s methodological approach is driven by an imperative to examine a discourse in two different orders: language-mediated articulations, and extralinguistic conditions of possibility and operation. The latter would typically include
social and spatial arrangements, architecture, or material practices (Hook 2001: 539; Kendall and Wickham 1999). Crucially, conditions of possibility always have a historical dimension, which is to say that the past can be mined as a resource to unsettle the sedimented discourses of the present (Hook 2001: 533). Building on all this, I seek to unravel some extralinguistic conditions of possibility of ‘anti-immigration’ discourse in Poland. This undertaking aligns well with critical race theory’s view of racism as a discourse that spans a variety of responses which must be construed in local contexts with their specific historical legacies and matrices of power (Goldberg 2009: 1271; see also Macedo and Gounari 2006: 5).

As a methodological pointer, I borrow Dikötter’s (2008: 1482) interactive model of racism that recognises ‘the polyphony and adaptability of racial discourse in different historical circumstances’ and analyses ‘the complex cognitive, social, and political dimensions behind the indigenization and appropriation of racist belief systems’. This model aligns with Goldberg’s (2009: 1273) argument that studies of situated racist discourses should be infused with a ‘relational’ approach, which links distinct local articulations of racism with each other as well as connecting them to ‘extra- and trans-territorial conceptions and expressions, those that circulate in wider circles of meaning and practice’. Taking all this on board, this article pays attention to both the local flavour and global resonances of ‘anti-immigration’ discourse in Poland, theorised as an intersection of racism and nationalism.

**Anatomy of ‘anti-immigration’ discourse in Poland**

The remainder of this article contextualises ‘anti-immigration’ discourse in Poland, approached as an intersection of racism and nationalism, by dissecting its conditions of possibility. To recapitulate, the general parameters of this discourse are:
(1) the notion of migrants as threatening (Goździak and Mártón 2018; Jańczak 2019; Krotofil and Motak 2018; Krzyżanowska and Krzyżanowski 2018; Krzyżanowski 2018; Narkowicz 2018); (2) the unworthiness of incoming asylum seekers (Jańczak 2019; Krotofil and Motak 2018; Krzyżanowska and Krzyżanowski 2018); and (3) their insurmountable otherness (Goździak and Mártón 2018; Krotofil and Motak 2018; Krzyżanowski 2018; Narkowicz 2018). For analytical purposes, the relevant conditions of possibility of ‘anti-immigration’ discourse can be organised into a threefold interface between (1) racist themes circulated in the communicating vessels of global media infrastructures, (2) hegemonic national self-definition, and (3) the perception of liminality, engendered by the transnational and global developments, that destabilises this national self-definition (see Figure 1).

![Diagram of 'anti-immigration' discourse in Poland](image)

Figure 1. Anatomy of ‘anti-immigration’ discourse in Poland.

The racist themes circulated in global media that I have in mind—threat, unworthiness, and otherness—resemble in scope the three nodal points of ‘anti-immigration’ discourse. Their inclusion aims explicitly to acknowledge the role of mediated communication in the interweaving, circulation, cross-pollination and adaptation of ‘anti-immigration’ discourse by detaching symbolic content from local contexts and its re-inscription into new contexts (Barnett 2004; Titley 2009). By focusing on hegemonic national self-definition, in turn, I acknowledge the intertwining of racism with
nationalism, whereby the national self-definition depends for its existence on negatively imagined others (Balibar 1991).

Liminality, the final component of the proposed interface, refers to the phase of in-betweenness in the process of becoming whereby one is no longer what one used to be but has not yet emerged anew either (Mälksoo 2009). As such, it attempts to acknowledge two interrelated processes, one global and one national. The former has to do with globalisation in general and the increased movement of people in particular, and with how the two destabilise the traditional territorial bases of identity. The intensified intercultural/interethnic/interreligious encounters, whether embodied or mediated, require change: they imply ‘the necessity to keep and to lose, to cope with fears and resistances, but also to transcend our given identities’ (Melucci 1999: 423). In contrast, the attempts to cling to old self-definitions are prone to beget racism and nationalism as, I believe, we are currently witnessing in Poland. On the national level, the sense of liminality results from the protracted post-communist transition, accompanied by the dilution of self-definition. Hence, liminality carries a strong reactionary potential: when the past status is lost and the target status becomes unattainable, the resulting prolonged instability can provide a breeding ground for racism and nationalism.

In the forthcoming three-part metalevel discussion, I will use the existing literature to both exemplify ‘anti-immigration’ discourse in Poland and dissect the conditions of possibility that foster it. To be sure, these conditions do not predetermine a universal Polish mindset. Instead, ‘anti-immigration’ discourse is contested and continuously challenged by counter-discourses centred on the notions of equality, human rights, and solidarity. Still, the pervasiveness of ‘anti-immigration’ discourse, resulting from its being sanctioned by the current ruling elites, calls for scholarly attention.
**Reinventing vulnerability in the age of security**

At the height of the ‘refugee crisis’, prominent politicians, mainly but not exclusively associated with PiS, became notorious for relentlessly rehearsing the racist assumption that foreign arrivals are inherently threatening to the cultural integrity, physical security and health of Polish society. Thus, they warned about the suddenly increased numbers of foreigners who might soon ‘declare they do not want to obey—our customs…or even simultaneously they impose their sensitivity and their claims in the public space in different spheres of life, and they do so in a very aggressive and violent way’ (Jarosław Kaczyński quoted in Krzyżanowski 2018: 86; see also Krzyżanowska and Krzyżanowski 2018: 615). Their ‘extremism’, culminating in terrorist attacks, will become ‘a very serious threat to the security of our citizens, as the experience of rich EU countries shows’ (Zbigniew Ziobro quoted in Jańczak 2019: 138). And even if they do not turn into terrorists, their very presence poses a health hazard:

> We already have symptoms of very serious diseases, not seen in Europe for long: cholera on the Greek islands, dysentery in Vienna, various parasites and protozoans which are not dangerous in those people’s organisms but can be dangerous here. I do not mean to discriminate but all this needs to be checked (Jarosław Kaczyński quoted in Krzyżanowski 2018: 90).

‘Threat’ as a foundational premise of Polish ‘anti-immigration’ discourse is a carbon copy of the racist theme, circulated through global media and communication infrastructures, that associates migration with phenomena such as violence, ghettos, terrorism, ‘Islamisation’, and the ‘clash of civilisations’ (Betz and Meret 2009; Holmes and Castañoeda 2016; Nalborczyk 2004; Pędziwiatr 2015; Titley 2009; van Dijk 1989; Wodak 2015). Although threats supposedly posed by migrants have not materialised in Poland, their mediated articulations have effectively tapped into the local societal imagination. This has been possible, I posit, because the theme of threat resonates with,
on the one hand, vulnerability as a key tenet of hegemonic national self-definition and, on the other, temporal liminality that unsettles the perception of nation as a natural, timeless and continuous entity. Concerning the former, the nationalist imaginary hinges on the conception of the Polish nation, developed in the late nineteenth century and solidified in the interwar period, as a fragile, ethnically and religiously unified community, continuously threatened—physically, morally, culturally and economically—by others, both external and in its midst (see de Lange and Guerra 2009; Walicki 2000). Temporal liminality, in its turn, means that the Polish nation finds itself poised between past vulnerability and present security, whereby the current migration processes are not located in the context of present-day (engineered) national homogeneity, stable statehood and a growing economy, but are (mis)understood through ‘mythic overlaying’, i.e. the ahistorical use of the past to interpret the present (Pytlas 2015).

The modern idea of national vulnerability harks back to the interwar period but has its roots in 123 years of statelessness that coincided with the formation of national consciousness. Poland lost political independence after three successive seizures—in 1772, 1793 and 1795—in which Imperial Russia, Prussia and Habsburg Austria had partitioned the vast territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, inhabited as it was by an ethnically, religiously, linguistically and culturally diverse population. In 1918, Poland was restored as a multi-ethnic state in which ethnically non-Polish minorities constituted at least a third of the population (see Brock 1994; Brubaker 1996; Hann 1998). This multiethnicity was concurrent with the precarious geopolitical location between two former hegemons that rendered the nascent Poland politically vulnerable to external threats.
What is important here is the tying together of external threats with internal ethnic, linguistic and religious heterogeneity in a relationship of false causality (see Jańczak 2019). That is, in the interwar years minorities had come to be viewed in the popular imagination as threatening ‘others’, infiltrating the national fabric (Pytlas 2015; Walicki 2000). While Slavic groups were invited to assimilate into the reinvented Polish nation—not unlike the present-day conditional acceptance of migrant workers from Ukraine and Belarus—Germans and Jews were presumed unassimilable due to their alleged strong ethnic identities and intracommunal allegiances. Particularly, the sizeable but generally disadvantaged Jewish minority was singled out as a threat to statehood and national cohesion (Plonowska Ziarek 2007; Walicki 2000). In parallel with this, the idea—redolent of the Foucauldian understanding of racism (Foucault 2003a, 2003b)—rose to prominence that societal biological homogeneity and individual physical/mental ability were the safeguards of national survival (Balogun 2018). Arguably, this notion planted the seed of anti-pluralism on which the recent ‘anti-immigration’ discourse rests (Krzyżanowska and Krzyżanowski 2018; Krzyżanowski 2018).

The vulnerability coded in Polish national self-definition has an actionable flipside: the idea of Poland as a bulwark of Western—i.e. Christian—civilisation, poised to defend Europe from external threats (see Brock 1994; Pytlas 2015). Popularised in the interwar period as a part of the volatile nation-building project, this myth sought to unite people who share ‘history, national characteristics, culture, rights’ by giving them a sense of shared purpose (Sugar 1994: 11). Likewise, this sense of a national mission reverberates throughout ‘anti-immigration’ discourse, which envisions Poland as the outpost of the EU, bent on protecting Europe from the influx of undesirable and/or illegal migrants, particularly after the ‘capitulation’ of Western Europe that is seen to have thoughtlessly succumbed to the dangerous ‘ideology’ of
multiculturalism (Krzyżanowska and Krzyżanowski 2018: 615; see also Jańczak 2019; Krotofil and Motak 2018).

All in all, the modern notion of Polish nationhood was born under the condition of statelessness, consolidated when its statehood was extremely fragile, besieged again at the outbreak of WWII, and challenged during the communist period. As a result, the fact and, crucially, the threat of ‘political annihilation became the cornerstone of the Polish national idea’ (Brock 1994: 319). This aspect of Polish national self-definition seems to be frozen in time, stubbornly hung on to the interruption that WWII caused in the nationalising trajectory originally set in motion in the interbellum years. In this way, Polish national self-definition articulates a disbelief in the accomplishment of an ethnically and religiously homogenous Polish nation, perhaps because this homogeneity resulted from foreign interventions (Hann 1998; Jańczak 2019). Indeed, almost the entire population of Polish Jews perished in the Nazi-organised Holocaust; German and non-Polish Slavic minorities were relocated to match the state borders redrawn at the post-WWII conferences; and the extraordinarily efficient nationalising activities of the socialist state, located as it was in the orbit of the Soviet Union, led to the completion of the homogenising project. Now that external threats to Poland are mitigated by memberships in major international organisations—such as NATO and EU—racism helps to invent new threats, presently embodied in the main by Muslim asylum seekers, so as to stabilise the unsettled national self-definition as vulnerable.

Reaffirming own deservingness through others’ unworthiness

In the aftermath of the ‘refugee crisis’, incoming asylum seekers have not only been viewed as less worthy than the Polish citizens to whom they posed a threat, but have also been arbitrarily split into ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ (Krotofil and Motak 2018:
The latter notion usually turned on the spurious distinction between ‘real’ refugees and ‘economic migrants’: ‘[W]e have to divide firmly between refugees, who really are fleeing the war, from economic migrants…We can help refugees but, let me repeat, in a way that is safe and secure for the Polish people’ (Jarosław Kaczyński quoted in Krzyżanowski 2018: 87). This discursive boundary-making, however, transcended party lines: while it was clearly perceptible in the ‘anti-immigration’ discourse articulated by PiS, it also underpinned the responses to the ‘refugee crisis’ presented by its political opponents. The key politicians of the Civic Platform, which was then leading the government, argued for example that ‘the principle of voluntarism and working out how to distinguish economic migration from actual refugees is crucial’ (Rafał Grupiński quoted in Jańczak 2019: 136).

This second pillar of the ‘anti-immigration’ discourse—the unworthiness of incoming asylum seekers—connects neatly to similar themes circulating in the global media. Unworthiness sets people seen as worthy of rights, respect and help apart from those who are not, often based on their birthplace (Holmes and Castañeda 2016). On a more submerged—symbolic and pervasive—level, unworthiness serves to administer and hierarchically order individuals through regulating their physical visibility and symbolic inclusion, depending on their arbitrary ‘racial’, ethnic, cultural and/or religious ascription (Sendyka 2016; Stoler 2011). In Poland, I propose, the racist theme of unworthiness is rendered intelligible and acceptable as a way to uphold the national self-definition as deserving against the moral liminality of being at once an explicit object (victim) of ‘anti-immigration’ discourses that target Polish migrants abroad, and a subject (culprit) of ‘anti-immigration’ discourses at home.

Deservingness is a key tenet of Polish national self-definition, predicated on two interlocking assumptions that date back to the period of partitions. At its core, it
relies on the recasting of partitions in moral terms as a struggle between the forces of good and evil. Encapsulated in the myth devised by romantic poets and artists of Poland as the Christ of nations—suffering unduly ‘for our freedom and yours’—the two assertions refer to, firstly, the presumed victimisation of the Polish nation and, secondly, its righteousness, proven self-referentially by its ordeal (Porter 2000). Victimisation, an instrumental theme in the formative stages of Polish nationalism, has been woven into the very idea of Polishness: ‘[t]he image of Poland as occupied, humiliated and oppressed by aggressive imperial powers has reinforced the feeling of the constitution and the stability of national identity’ (Misztal 2009: 212). Other traumatic events that structure Polish public memory are taken to confirm the two prongs of deservingness: WWII, which tormented the country and saw the ‘indifference’ of the West to mass destruction and death, and the imposition of communism, regarded as a betrayal committed by the Allies (Pytlas 2015; Snochowska-Gonzalez 2012). Based on this reading, Europe is deemed to owe a debt of gratitude for all the suffering that the Polish nation endured, thereby reconfirming Poland’s moral superiority.

The relentless rehearsing of the tale of victimisation in mediated, educational and political discourses generates the assertion that the Polish nation has suffered more than others, most notably Jews (Krzemiński 2002), but that its suffering is not sufficiently recognised in the global arena. This contention lays bare a bifurcation in how WWII is remembered: the supposedly ‘excessive’ memory of the Holocaust in the West is in Poland seen to belittle the suffering of non-Jewish Poles, in whose land the war drama was played out (Gebert 1991). In the past, the bitterness engendered by this mnemonic discrepancy was cynically exploited, and thereby reinforced, by the communist authorities, who sought to increase their political legitimacy through dovetailing their historical narrative with popular sentiments (Blacker 2014; Misztal
To this end, they instrumentalised the Holocaust to augment the self-definition of the Polish nation as unduly victimised and, by extension, morally righteous. Thus, on the one hand, the official statistics enfolded Polish Jews who perished in the Holocaust into the overall number of ‘Polish’ victims, despite otherwise denying their claims to ‘Polishness’ (Zubrzycki 2006). On the other hand, the knowledge about anti-Jewish violence perpetrated by Poles was obliterated: viscerally known but rejected, and institutionally divorced from national history (Drzewiecka 2014).

This long upheld national self-definition as victimised and morally righteous is gradually unsettled by moral liminality, generated by the ever-louder reminders—enabled as they are by the lifting of state censorship—that the Polish nation is not only a victim but also a perpetrator of wrongdoings, straddling the positions of being the object of ‘anti-immigration’ discourse and being the subject of it. Perhaps the clearest illustration of this self-definitional crisis was the controversy that surrounded the book ‘Sąsiedzi’ (Neighbours), in which Gross (2000) revealed the details of the ‘collective murder’ committed in 1941 in Jedwabne by the Polish township on their Jewish neighbours. The book sparked not only a critical national introspection that the author had hoped for but also a self-defensive backlash (e.g., Plonowska Ziarek, 2007).

A recent example of the Polish nation being caught between the positions of subjects and objects of ‘anti-immigration’ discourse was the co-occurrence of well-documented racist attitudes being expressed in Polish society (Bulka and Winiewski 2017; CBOS 2017, 2018; Hall and Mikulska-Jolles 2016), and the targeting of Polish migrants in the UK by a hateful campaign and outright violence during and after the Brexit referendum campaign (Rzepnikowska 2019). Historically, the most poignant instance was the raging antisemitism of the interwar period in Poland, which ran in parallel with Nazi ideologues recognising Poles, as well as other Slavs, as an inferior
‘race’ destined for enslavement. Yet these developments are rarely thought about together; while victimisation and righteousness are central components of Polish national self-definition, evidence of Poles perpetrating wrongdoings destabilises the nationalist imaginary (see Plonowska-Ziarek 2007).

In this light, Muslim asylum seekers can be viewed as an embodied reminder of this ambiguous positioning, which makes the prospect of their presence particularly uncomfortable. Indeed, Poland refuses to be held culpable for the plight of, or at least offer serious help to, the incoming refugees, despite the recent military presence of Polish troops in Afghanistan and Iraq being a likely contribution to the destabilisation of the region. Against this background, unworthiness incorporated into the ‘anti-immigration’ discourse provides the basis for keeping the possible victims of wrongdoing at bay as undeserving of help. As such, unworthiness becomes entangled in a larger dynamic of excessive remembrance of the suffering endured by the Polish nation and the ‘aphasia’ related to the suffering that it inflicted on others (Drzewiecka 2014).

Achieving ‘Westernness’ by means of othering

Finally, the Polish ‘anti-immigration’ discourse during the ‘refugee crisis’ hinged on exaggerating differences between the Polish nation and the (Muslim) asylum seekers, whose coexistence within the same physical space was supposedly bound to generate tensions. The evidence of these allegedly insurmountable differences abounds in Western Europe, according to this discourse:

…[L]ook at Sweden, at the 54 zones with Sharia law. At Swedish concerns about displaying the national flag, because it features a cross. Female Swedish students are not allowed to wear short skirts because it is disapproved of… What is happening in Italy? Churches have been taken and are treated like toilets now. And
in France? The ongoing riots, Sharia law and patrols ensuring it is being observed... Do you want the same thing to happen in Poland? Do you want us to stop feeling like hosts in our own country? (Jarosław Kaczyński quoted in Jańczak 2019: 142)

This third tenet of the ‘anti-immigration’ discourse corresponds to the globally circulated set of ideas—such as orientalism and coloniality—which can be grouped under the label *otherness*. Otherness turns on portraying others as lesser, not-quite-human and, hence, in need of civilising and available for exploitation (Balogun 2018; Mick 2014). With this in mind, I argue that in Poland otherness is symbolically deployed to reaffirm the national self-definition as ‘Western’, which is destabilised by the *spatial* liminality of the country’s cultural, economic and geopolitical suspension between ‘East’ and ‘West’.

Spatial liminality is caused by Poland’s ambiguous status as an East European, post-socialist EU member state (Popow 2015; Törnquist-Plewa 2002). According to postcolonial readings, in the wake of the 2004 EU enlargement, Central and Eastern Europe has come to be perceived as an essentially different, ‘internal other’ of ‘Old Europe’ (Kuus 2004). Its difference, akin to the differences between the Occident and Orient thematised by orientalism (Said 2003[1978]), is articulated through a series of binary oppositions, such as development and underdevelopment, rationality and passion, secularism and religious devotion, tolerance and bigotry, nationhood and nationalism (Kuus 2004). Due to this difference, Central and Eastern European nations must continuously be socialised into full Europeanness, which implies—among other things—internalising the elements of othering discourses that are used to describe them (Popow 2015). Thus, the argument goes, while Poles tend to recognise themselves as ‘Western’ in both cultural and geopolitical terms, they viscerally realise that they are perceived as inferior by their ‘truly Western’ counterparts (Törnquist-Plewa 2002).
Here, two interlocked aspects of Poland’s spatial liminality are worth considering: its ambivalent economic status in between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’, and its position between the ‘coloniser’ and the ‘colonised’. The former, signalled earlier, can be briefly articulated using world-systems theory, which locates Poland precariously in between the centre and periphery of the global economy (Wallerstein 2004). Existing since the ‘long sixteenth century’, this economic liminality was deepened particularly by Poland’s communist past—largely regarded as imposed from without (Gebert 1991)—and the country’s fairly recent transition to a capitalist market economy, hailed as a return to the ‘West’. Against this background, the ‘anti-immigration’ discourse serves to buttress belonging to the ‘West’ in economic terms. It re-articulates the post-communist transition in moral terms, whereby an ethos of self-enterprise supposedly superseded the ‘communist mentality’, which consisted of laziness, lack of resourcefulness and an inability to take responsibility for one’s own life (see Grzymski 2010). This condemned mentality is then projected onto prospective migrants, typically imagined as potential recipients of social benefits, in a bid to position the Polish nation mentally closer to its ‘properly Western’ neighbours (see Jańczak 2019; Krzyżanowska and Krzyżanowski 2018). Moreover, the very fact that the ‘anti-immigration’ discourse constructs Poland as a potential destination for incoming migrants marks a historic shift in its economic status: its approaching ‘graduation’ from a sending to a receiving country.

Regarding its position between the ‘coloniser’ and the ‘colonised’, Poland is poised between being, on the one hand, a premodern coloniser of Eastern Europe (Sowa 2011), an aspiring coloniser of Africa (Balogun 2018; Borkowska 2007), and an internal coloniser of interwar minorities (see Mick 2014; Walicki 2000), and on the other hand, a nation ‘colonised’ by three empires for 123 years prior to WWI (Porter 2000), a
victim of Nazi invasion and a subject of Soviet supremacy. This ambiguity is manifest in the coexistence of colonialist idioms with the ‘colonised mindset’ (Snchowska-Gonzalez 2012). While the latter has been hijacked and exploited by the ultraconservative right wing, most notably PiS, what is important for grasping the conditions of possibility of the current ‘anti-immigration’ discourse is the persistence of colonialist and orientalist vocabularies over time.

Colonialist and orientalist repertoires in Polish nationalism, which first took full form during the partitions, continued uninterrupted even during major geopolitical upheavals in the nineteenth and twentieth century. In the nineteenth century, they were deployed primarily in two directions: towards the former eastern borderlands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and towards the urban Jewish populations. On the one hand, during the partitions, the Polish elites considered ‘Polonisation’ as a means of civilising the ‘East’ (Ukrainians, Belarusians and Lithuanians, perceived as backward and culturally as well as politically incapacitated) and bringing those populations into the fold of the emergent Polish nation (Mick 2014: 128). On the other hand, Polish journalists, themselves the objects of the colonising gaze and the civilising efforts of three empires, revelled in orientalising descriptions of Jewish neighbourhoods as poor, dirty and feculent spaces of questionable reputation, which functioned outside society, and were inhabited by the destitute, crooked and sexualised (Matyjaszek 2013). Both these tendencies continued in interwar Poland, forming the basis of nationalising state policies (Brubaker 1996; Mick 2014).

Simultaneously, coloniality and orientalism also provided knowledge about those racialised populations that Poles did not have physical access to. Such knowledge, for example, informed the idea that Poland could contribute to the ‘civilising’ mission in Africa (Borkowska 2007; Hunczak 1967). Crucially, Polish colonial ambition in the
interwar period involved cultural expansion as well as territorial acquisitions and seizure of resources, most important of which would be the local workforce, harnessed through a slavery-like system (Balogun 2018: 2562). This approach was popularised by means of mediated representations that orientalised Africans as essentially different from, and inferior to, Europeans; savage, uncultured, immature and unfit to govern themselves; and carefree, lazy and indolent but also servile (Kwiatek 2011). Arguably, then, in the interwar period colonialisim imaginaries helped the newly re-emergent Polish nation to differentiate itself from the decidedly ‘non-Western’ others and, thereby, reclaim its position in the European milieu.

Following WWII, the discursive deployment of coloniality and orientalism was temporarily suspended, at least in the public domain, by communist policies of portraying the ‘Third World’ as friends and allies in the struggle against capitalist forces (Nalborczyk 2004). However, the persistent availability of the othering discourses quickly manifested itself again after the lifting of state censorship. The ill-informed and predominantly negative media coverage of non-European others predictably intensified, and became ever more vitriolic, in the aftermath of the ‘refugee crisis’ (see Pędziwiatr 2015). Again, the exaggerating filter of otherness helped to build a distorted backdrop against which the post-socialist Polish nation could re-establish itself as truly ‘Western’.

Importantly, however, the path to ‘Westernness’ pursued at this juncture—devised largely but not exclusively by PiS—diverges from the previous renditions. As the quotation that opens this section makes plain, the present vision decidedly rejects the notion of emulating Western Europe, defined as it is by its universalist values and post-national ethos, particularly in terms of its approach to immigration (see Krastev and Holmes 2019). Instead, PiS seeks to redefine Europe retrospectively by referring to Europe’s somewhat fictitious and clearly idealised past as a collection of homogenous
nation-states, united by their shared Christian moral and cultural heritage. Thus, the ‘anti-immigration’ discourse performs a double function. On the one hand, in so far as it hinges on racism, it serves brutally to reject the representatives of othered cultures, considered to be barbarian and alien to the Polish ‘civilisational’ heritage. On the other hand, in so far as it operationalises nationalism, it acts to reaffirm unapologetic ‘Polishness’ as a model for true ‘Westernness’, envisioned against the compromised liberalism of Western Europe (Jańczak 2019: 142).

**Concluding remarks**

This article grappled with the question of how ‘anti-immigration’ discourse is rendered intelligible and legitimate in Poland. To this end, it used the existing literature to outline the following parameters of the discourse in question: (1) the notion of immigrants as threatening, (2) the unworthiness of incoming asylum seekers, and (3) their insurmountable otherness. Having done that, the article theorised this discourse as a discursive intersection between racism and nationalism by drawing on the Foucauldian (2003a, 2003b) perspective on racism, tied even more explicitly to nationalism (Mosse 1995).

The article then contextualised ‘anti-immigration’ discourse by unpacking some of its conditions of possibility. To do so, it looked at a threefold interface between (1) racist themes circulating in the global media and communication infrastructure; (2) hegemonic national self-definition; and (3) the perception of liminality, which destabilises this national self-definition. Arguably, this framework can be deployed to study ‘anti-immigration’ discourse in other national contexts, particularly in Central and Eastern European countries that share certain historical trajectories, nationalist imaginaries and liminal legacies with Poland. In addition to general, more theoretical
analyses, empirically inclined studies can in the future also explore how the conditions of possibility illuminated here play out in selected linguistic and material articulations of ‘anti-immigration’ discourse in various national settings.

This analytical model was used to elaborate the Polish case in three steps. Firstly, the article reflected on how the racist theme of threat interacts with temporal liminality to uphold the notion of vulnerability—embedded in national self-definition—which might otherwise become meaningless under the present-day conditions of national security. Secondly, the article considered how the idea of unworthiness of (at least certain) migrants serves to rescue a two-pronged deservingness as a key tenet of national self-definition. The notion of deservingness is currently challenged by moral liminality caused by the Polish nation’s position as both object and subject of ‘anti-immigration’ discourses. Thirdly, I discussed how othering of migrants helps to counteract the spatial liminality caused by Poland’s historical suspension between ‘East’ and ‘West’, by constructing migrants as radically different and simultaneously condemning Western European countries for being overtaken by these alien intruders and becoming devoid of ‘Westernness’. Consequently, the article attempted to look at ‘anti-immigration’ discourse as multi-scalar and multi-modal: from globally circulated racist themes to national self-definition and its extralinguistic conditions of possibility. To the best of my knowledge, no similar cross-cutting consideration of ‘anti-immigration’ discourse in Poland exists.

All in all, the major contribution of this article is its explicit theoretical attention to ‘race’ and racist discourse, which are often obscured in analyses of migration and nationalism in the Polish context and substituted with more ‘neutral’ and empirically descriptive labels such as ‘anti-immigration’. In taking this approach, I plugged into the scholarship that argues for the importance of the idea of ‘race’ in Central and Eastern
Europe but does not take Poland into account (Baker 2018; Law and Zakharov 2019). Following this literature, the article accordingly sought to dismantle Polish exceptionalism, which thrives on Poland’s presumed non-participation in colonial conquest and cherry-picks positive examples of tolerance and hospitality from the multi-ethnic past to refute present-day accusations of racism (Pasieka 2014).

In doing so, the article also nuanced the reading of racism in Central and Eastern Europe that typically casts it as a tool to bridge the ‘East’ – ‘West’ divide and attain ‘Whiteness’ through the reproduction of global civilisational hierarchies. The key proposition is that in the liminal context of Poland, ‘anti-immigration’ discourse has primarily a ‘defensive’ function, which cannot be fully grasped if the concept of ‘race’ is overlooked. Namely, the ‘anti-immigration’ discourse deploys racism to offer a symbolic protection to Polish nation—imagined as ethnically, religiously and culturally homogenous—which finds itself ‘under siege’ in the present global conjuncture that intensifies the movement of people (Melucci 1999; Mosse 1995). Simultaneously, ‘anti-immigration’ discourse, undergirded by racism and nationalism, attempts to overcome Poland’s liminal condition by firmly locating the Polish nation in time (by excavating the idealised nationalist past and projecting it into the future), space (by redefining what it means to be ‘Western’), and global moral hierarchies (by recasting Poland as a prospective victim and immigrants as ‘invaders’).

**Endnotes**

1 I place ‘anti-immigration’ in quotation marks in order to denote that the term is prevalent in the extant literature but also to indicate that in this article I am placing it under a critical microscope.

2 *Ordo caritatis*, a Christian principle of ‘order of charity’ maintains that moral obligations towards other people are not equal and can be ordered hierarchically.

It might strike the reader as odd that a Polish politician draws a line between Poland and the ‘rich EU countries’ but this seemingly self-deprecating economic self-definition is rather common as will be discussed in more detail later in the article.

The Roma population, especially in rural areas, received the same journalistic treatment in the mid-nineteenth century, often leading to forced expulsions as a solution to the ‘social problems’ they supposedly posed (Gontarek 2016). This discourse on the Roma as an inherently problematic group continues to this day but receives scant scholarly attention, perhaps due to the limited presence of this minority in Poland, both historically and presently (Winiewski, Witkowska and Bilewicz 2015).
References


Bulska, D. and Winiewski, M. 2017. ‘Powrót Zabobonu: Antysemityzm w Polsce na podstawie Polskiego Sondażu Uprzedzeń 3’ [The Return of Superstition:
Antisemitism in Poland 3],

CBOS [Public Opinion Research Center], 2017. ‘Stosunek do Przyjmowania Uchodźców’ [Attitude towards Receiving Refugees],

CBOS [Public Opinion Research Center], 2018. ‘Stosunek do Innych Narodów’ [Attitude towards Other Nations],


(Accessed 28 October 2019).


Winiewski, M., Witkowska, M. and Bilewicz, M. 2015. ‘Uprzedzenia wobec Romów w Polsce’ [Prejudice against the Roma in Poland] in A. Stefaniak, M. Bilewicz and
M. Winiewski (eds), *Uprzedzenia w Polsce* [Prejudices in Poland]. Warsaw: Liber Libri.
