Russian modernization: a new paradigm

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1. RUSSIAN MODERNIZATION: A NEW PARADIGM
Markku Kivinen and Mikhail Maslovskiy

Abstract

Building on contemporary social science, we intend to go beyond current Russian studies by creating a completely new paradigm in the field. In this chapter, we develop the conceptual starting points of this new paradigm and specify our methodological approach to modernity and modernization. Our critique of previous paradigms is not 'flaw-centred'. Rather we intend to show that Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory gives us instruments for methodological specifications that broaden the horizon towards more comprehensive research programmes. Previous approaches do not seem to find ways to examine both structures and agencies at the same time. Russia’s development is explained either as an inevitable structural process, or only as a result of the intentions of the actors. We argue that it is essential to be able to study modernization both as a representation and as a broader analytical category referring to basic structural challenges. For this, we need new middle range theories and explanatory models. Our endeavour, however, is not only theoretical. Rather, we have developed the new paradigm in the context of interdisciplinary empirical analysis of the five major macro-level challenges of Russian modernization.

1.1 Relevance of Modernization

The most recent call for Russian modernization has been associated with a speech by the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in his 2009 state of the nation address (Medvedev 2009a), although similar expressions were also present in President Putin’s speeches. However, the slogan of modernization became especially widespread during Medvedev’s presidency. In fact, it remains a common topic even today, although the public rhetoric has concentrated more on foreign policy challenges, while the outside world tends to see Russia slowing down reform efforts. In his presidential address of December 2014, Vladimir Putin emphasised economic growth, technological modernization, innovation and international competitiveness as Russia’s top priorities. Only such factors, Putin argued, would secure for Russia a powerful and influence role on the world stage, and ensure its resilience as a nation (Putin 2014b).

The topic of modernization remains relevant because after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has had to re-build its state identity and the associated political, social, and economic systems. The country has been forced to re-define itself as a nation, a state, and a society, vis-à-vis global development on the one hand, and Soviet and Imperial Russian legacies on the other. Since the early 2000s, in an effort to consolidate power, Russia’s leaders have rallied behind a unifying conservative/neo-liberal ideology that has partly replaced, and partly built upon, Soviet and traditional models. A conservative turn and a simultaneous modernization effort seem like a typical Russian paradox. However, global social imaginaries and normative ideas concerning personal liberties, social-economic welfare, political freedoms, and the rule of law are all key elements for any 21st century state as part of the evolving multi-level global order. Russia cannot avoid facing these global modernization challenges.
However, we cannot explain Russian development only by this global normative horizon. We need a profound theoretical and empirical analysis carried out through state-of-the-art social sciences.

It is, of course, evident that when focusing on modernization we do not commit ourselves to the contemporary political project of Russian elites. Building on contemporary social science, we intend to go beyond current Russian studies by creating a completely new paradigm in the field. The starting points of this new paradigm are based on argumentation at five levels:

1. Specifying our methodological approach to modernity and modernization
2. Showing the limitations of previous paradigms in the field
3. Reflecting on previous Russian discussions on contemporary modernization
4. Developing middle range theories, explanatory models and concepts based on Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory
5. Defining our understanding of interdisciplinarity

Our endeavour, however, is not only theoretical. Rather, we have developed the new paradigm in the context of empirical analysis of the five major macro-level challenges of Russian modernization.

1.2 Relevance of structuration theory

In this book we do not present all-encompassing and totalizing concepts of the Russian manner of modernization before the empirical analysis has taken place. Rather, we have two basic dimensions in our research setting. The first aspect is a generic theoretical approach found in Anthony Giddens’ (1985) structuration theory. This approach has its strengths, as it can be used for generating concrete research settings concerning the various challenges in Russia’s institutional development. The second starting point is the understanding of Russian modernization as five fundamental challenges. We advance both theoretically and empirically on both of these aspects. Firstly, making Giddens’ structuration theory empirically-relevant, and secondly, trying to create synthetic answers concerning the major challenges of Russian modernization.

Several arguments can be suggested to support the view that Giddens’ theory should be the hard core of the new multidisciplinary paradigm (or research programme) in Russian studies (Cf. Kivinen & Cox 2016).

Firstly, Giddens’ theory is a synthetic social theory bringing together culture and power. However, his theory is not committed to any alleged master process of differentiation. Parsons’ evolutionary reflections, as well as the fundamental premises of the modernization theories of Niklas Luhmann (1997) insist that functional differentiation is a key process of modernity. For Giddens, the relationship between institutional complexes or subsystems is not given at the abstract level of general theory. The setting of boundaries between institutional complexes is a matter of actors, and the internal logic of institutions always is, to a large extent, an empirical issue depending on actors’ understandings and the intended and unintended results of their actions. Rather than postulating pre-given theoretical answers, Giddens’ theory generates insight for concrete research settings.
Secondly, Giddens does not refer to fixed structures but points to the fact that structures come into existence and fade away in dynamic processes of structuration. In these processes, actors continuously change structures. Even Russian modernization should not be seen as some kind of evolution and development without the actors and agency. Furthermore, in this process people also observe themselves, modifying their intentions and executing their actions differently. This brings us to the research focus; the prospect of learning and changing the understanding of interests and intentions. If we want to study the institutions, we cannot view them straightforwardly as the institutionalization of pre-given values. Rather, we should conceptualize them as a multifaceted tension field of various intended and unintended structuration processes.

Thirdly, for Giddens, people’s power resources really do make a difference. People are not (not even in Russia) cultural or economic automatons or dopes driven by an endogenous systemic mechanism. Rather they are knowledgeable actors who use their specific power resources in various and constantly changing ways. Because of contradictory interests, and the varying results of action, history at the level of nation-states and institutions will always have new beginnings – and then some periods of reproduction and continuous development based on established structural principles. This means that the functionality of the system has a rather limited timescale and is an empirical issue. In Russian modernization, general assumptions of functionality or differentiation seem almost completely lacking in any heuristic theoretical value. It is far easier to accept as a methodological starting point Giddens’ more modest ‘episodic’ conception of history.

All this being said, we have to acknowledge the abstract level and limitations of Giddens’ theorizing. First of all, Giddens does not give many concrete research examples of how structuration theory could be used for empirical analysis. The only major exception is his early analysis of classes (Giddens 1973). But even in this case Giddens constructs ad hoc dimensions of structuration without giving them any explicit theoretical substance. In our analysis of class, we accept the general idea of structuration but we also make an effort to conceptually specify various dimensions of class research based on reflection in the field in more comprehensive and exact sense. This is our understanding of the research strategy of structuration in general (cf. also Nikula and Chernysh 2020). In this book, we suggest several other middle range theories and research strategies to make the structuration theory empirically-relevant, and even falsifiable.

The second point from where we have to go ‘beyond Giddens’ is the concept of contradictions. Giddens is influenced by the sociological conflict theory (Dahrendorf 1957 and Lockwood 1964) when he argues that structuration has to be able to analyze institutions as tension fields. After the Cold War, there was a strong tendency in social sciences towards consensual and linear modernization theory, and furthermore conflictual approaches have not been much developed in this context or by Russian scholars. This makes Giddens emphasis on conflict relevant indeed. However, he does not elaborate any methodology for this idea. For this step of research, we suggest an approach where Russian modernization is conceptualized based on structurally-determined key antinomies in which the agencies cannot avoid in making their choices. This is one of the cornerstones of our new paradigm, linking our approach to the tradition of conflict theory. Our conceptualization of antinomies is also linked both with the structuration theory, and with the need for an interdisciplinary synthesis. In fact, Giddens’ structuration theory can be interpreted as a social science “operationalization” of Kant’s third antinomy of spontaneity and causal determinism. Interaction between structure and agency is thus a constituting principle of any society. However, in order to analyze the process of structuration in historically concrete societies, we have to go through empirical social sciences.
Since societies are complex systems (as we will argue more concretely below), after the disciplinary analysis we need new interdisciplinary synthetic conceptualization of antinomies. In our argumentation, antinomies in social sciences are not philosophical categories. They are empirically-observable, macro-level dilemmas that cannot be abolished either by philosophical mediation à la Hegel or by immediate political decisions. Thus, they define the tension field that constitutes choices for various agencies. Choices are always many, and so too are agencies. Antinomies give us a new social science vocabulary for constructing new approaches, theories, and hypothesis. This is what we mean by a new paradigm: providing new instruments for suggesting theories and explanations for ongoing social processes.

From Giddens’ methodological limitations, it follows that we cannot see his explicit modernization theory as providing much relevance for our analysis of Russian or Soviet modernity. His concept of reflexivity as a key element of modernity looks more like a philosophical postulate à la Heidegger than a conceptual instrument for analyzing structuration processes in concrete societies. We also have to specify concepts of agency and state. When we analyse the agencies we have to emphasize that social relations cannot be ultimately reduced to capacities of individual human subjects (cf. e.g., Thompson 1982, Tomlinson 1982, and Johnston 1986). Rather, human decision-making and practice is always subject to the effects of specific organizational conditions of existence. This implies that agencies can be such entities as trade unions, NGOs, enterprises, as well as administrative structures or epistemic communities. People can act as individuals and their actions can have macro-level implications in social policy – for example, in Russia when people’s distrust of private pension funds almost eliminated them – but policy-making incentives and practices are institutional, and power resources are organizational. That said, we should also note that we do not see the state only as an agency that ‘exercises’ power. Rather we analyse the state as a set of locations where conflicts between agencies occur and as a regulative mechanism comprising complex processes of decision-making, outcomes (intended or not), and mechanisms of reflexive monitoring of the results.

**BOX: On unintended consequences, in the Soviet/Russian context**

*Brendan Humphreys*

There is an old saying; “Success has a thousand fathers, failure is always an orphan”. In retrospect, claims of intention are as common as the disowning of failure. It is a useful point of entry into the dilemma of the unintended consequences of action, to which there are several references in the present volume.

In Robert Merton’s classic 1936 article, “The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action”, he manages in a remarkably short space to present the complexity of the problem, and the multiple variables within the equation. Some of these break down into pairings such as; unforeseen and undesirable, intended and anticipated, conduct and behaviour, action and objective situation, organized and unorganized, rational and irrational, success and failure, and rationalization and truth. A formidable list, just an overview of which shows that the “ever-present difficulty of casual imputation must be solved for every empirical case which is studied” (Merton 1936).

As he formulated it, “The most obvious limitation to a correct anticipation of consequences of action is provided by the existing state of knowledge.” (ibid, 898). Merton’s seminal text continues, “We have the paradox that whereas past experience is the sole guide to our
expectations on the assumption that certain past, present and future acts are sufficiently alike to be grouped in the same category, the experiences are in fact different.” As a consequence, as he quotes from Poincare, “…prediction becomes impossible, and we have fortuitous phenomenon.” These latter have been since listed – by no means exhaustively – as unexpected drawbacks, unexpected benefits, perverse results, and perhaps the most commented-upon phenomenon, the self-fulfilling prophecy.

In his *Bloodlands*, Timothy Snyder offers an example – born in the most brutal of circumstances – of a Stalinist self-fulfilling prophecy. It referred to the repression of the kulaks in the years 1929-1932.

The kulaks were peasants, the stubborn survivors of Stalin’s revolution: of collectivization and famine, and very often of the Gulag. As a social class, the kulaks (prosperous peasant) *never really existed*; the term was rather a Soviet classification that took on a political life of its own. The attempt to “liquidate the kulaks” during the first Five-Year Plan had killed a tremendous number of people, but it *created rather than destroyed a class*: those who had been stigmatized and repressed, but who had survived. The millions of people who were deported or who fled during collectivization were forever after regarded as kulaks, and sometimes accepted that classification. What Soviet leaders had to consider was the possibility that the revolution itself had created its opponents. (Snyder: 2010, emphasis added)

In the present book, we use structuration theory in order to emphasize the methodological significance of unintended results. A society such as Russia, which tore itself from Imperial reaction to violent, modernizing revolution under the Bolsheviks, and finally found itself emerging from the disintegration of the USSR, would unsurprisingly product huge societal discontinuities, making planned social action, yet alone accurate prediction, extremely difficult, and hence the recurrence of the phenomenon.

### 1.3 Going beyond previous paradigms

Sociologists have often reflected on whether the Soviet Union was a modern society (see, for instance, Parsons 1951; Parsons 1967; Parsons & Shils 1951; Kotkin 1995; Lane 2006; Arnason 1993; Kirdina 2001; Srubar 1991; Nureev 2009; Pastukhov 2006). During the Soviet period, the leading paradigm among the Western scholars was based on the concept of totalitarianism. However, since the 1960s it was accompanied by the so-called ‘revisionist’ approach that focused on more modern aspects of Soviet society. After all, Soviet society was industrialized, urbanized, literate, and even the occupational structure of society did not seem to deviate too much from that of developed Western societies.

Among social scientist there in no common consensus about the concept of paradigm. Thomas Kuhn (1962) himself referred to social sciences as multi-paradigmatic fields and this claim can hardly be questioned to this day. However, within particular fields, scholars tend to be quite able to distinguish between the major paradigms. This seems to be the case in Russian studies. The most significant approaches have been:

Totalitarianism

The patrimonial model

Convergence of modernization/revisionism
Transition

Historical materialism

The civilizational approach

The neopatrimonial approach

Russian studies in general do not have a high profile in epistemological or methodological reflexivity. This implies that we have no ready-made answers to such questions as how to use the grand classificatory concepts of modernity, modernization, or entangled modernities in empirical research. Or, how to theorize modernization in a way that can also explain the ongoing contemporary transformation effort in Russia? In fact, we do not have any self-evident concepts with which to start. We should specify what kinds of explanations we are looking for, and what is the significance of empirical results for the theory? To what extent is theorizing about coming up with creativity, speculation, and imagination? To what extent we can rely on existing paradigms, and to what extent should we aim at creating new concepts, coming up with ideas to solve problems in a hypothetical and heuristic way? At what level will our concepts and statements be falsifiable?

When evaluating the relevance of previous paradigms in Russian studies, our argument is not that all previous efforts have been conceptually empty, or empirically misleading. Our critique of previous paradigms is not ‘flaw-centred’. Rather, we intend to show that structuration theory gives us instruments for methodological specifications that broaden the horizon towards more comprehensive research programmes. In this sense our approach is ‘virtue-centered’, recognizing the explanatory role of previous paradigms within a broader frame. In Russian studies, scholars too often stumble on a selective fallacy, where they only find what is already included in their own conceptual presumptions. They don’t consider opposite trends, counterpowers, or even the possible limitations of their own explanation. In such cases, the study does not produce surprising results, new or falsifiable hypotheses. Our argument is that in order to develop a new paradigm in Russian studies, we have to go back to the most fundamental theoretical starting points that concern the general constitution of society. Starting from this level we can show the limitations of the previous Russian studies paradigms, and open a new approach to study the ongoing processes in contemporary Russia.

It is not possible to go through the limitations of previous explanatory models in depth here, but a few basic arguments can be summarized. In light of structuration theory, previous approaches do not seem to find ways to examine both structures and actors at the same time. Russia’s development is explained either as an inevitable structural process, or only as a result of the choices and intentions of the actors. However, it is essential to combine these two aspects.

Starting with the traditional theory of totalitarianism, Friedrich and Brzezinski (1956), for instance, summarized the hallmarks of totalitarianism in five points:

- a charismatic leader
- a system of terror
- a permanent purge
- extensive ideological mobilization
- all-encompassing bureaucratization
The totalitarianism theory is back in fashion in Western popular opinion (cf. Gessen 2017). As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it has focused mainly on the officially non-existing dark sides of the radical modernization project of the Bolsheviks. This approach has failed to reflect on the intended results of the giant project that were emphasized by the official Soviet ideology. At the same time, it has overlooked the question of how controversial day-to-day Soviet life really was in the difficult reality beneath the official truth and the silent but well-known taboos (Kivinen 2002, 194–292). Thus, it is no wonder that an alternative perspective of historical research began to develop after 1960. The so-called revisionist approach was born, focusing on the shaping of the everyday reality and more modern aspects of Soviet society (Fitzpatrick 1979, 1999, 2000). As stated above, Soviet society was industrialized, urbanized and literate, and even the professional structure of society resembled that of Western societies.

The totalitarianism theory could hardly explain the change in Soviet society. Even less is it sufficient to explain present-day Russia. Putin’s charisma may be a controversial thing, but today’s Russia does not have any prevailing ideology. Moreover, the current repression is not a systematic purge, but targeted selectively against opponents of the current elite. Neither is there extensive mobilization in present Russia; quite the contrary. In many respects, contemporary Russia is pluralistic in the extreme, and far from a totalitarianism that infiltrates everything. Memorial signs are being erected for the innumerable victims of Stalin, those victims are being declared saints – and at the same time, some people may openly worship Stalin. And to crown it all, statues are also being erected of the heavy-handed imperial Prime Minister Stolypin, who had pursued young Stalin. On the other hand, today’s analysis cannot exclude research into the Soviet taboos and dark legacy in institutions such as the FSB and other internal security directorates.

Transition theory was the prevailing approach in the theoretical discussions of the 1990s (cf., e.g., Carothers 2002). However, it seems to have only taken into account the intentions and plans of the liberal elite of that time. Thus, methodologically, we’re at the voluntaristic extreme. Such a starting point led to an exaggeration of the ideological turn. Transition theory could not explain the economic and social crisis in Russia.

The patrimonialism paradigm emphasises the personal nature of state-related relations as a long development trend in Russia. With regard to the study of contemporary Russia, the neopatrimonial paradigm with its many different versions has a strong foothold (Sakwa 2013, 2014, 2018). Significant research, both theoretical and empirical, has been carried out by Alena Ledeneva. Her studies show that networks play an exceptional role in today’s Russia, and the importance of informal networks, corruption and the economy of favours is undisputed (Ledeneva 2013). However, these issues do not cover all the institutions, structures and projects of Russian society. Rather, the relationship between official and unofficial rules must be examined as one of the structuration problems.

The paradigm prevailing in the Soviet Union’s own scientific community was historical materialism, which involved the axiom that the social formation of socialism was superior to that of capitalism. In contemporary Russia, historical materialism is not considered a sociological theory, and even in the later debate in the Soviet Union, the concept of economic social formation was replaced by civilizational analysis (Oittinen 2017b). In today’s Russia, this approach is linked to Samuel Huntington’s (1993) clash of civilisations theory. Huntington has become one of the most popular Western researchers in Russian social sciences. An entire discipline called ‘civilisatorics’ has been developed in Russia (cf. Bogdanova 2018). Within it, there is a strong tendency to emphasise Russia’s essential difference from the West (cf. Dugin.
This model of explanation is inclined towards all-encompassing, totalizing explanations. “The specificities of Russia,” be they geographical, historical or economic, belong to the whole of the civilization, although each researcher seems to bundle up those specificities in their own way (e.g., Kara-Murza 1993; Petrovoj 2014; cf. Mjør 2017; Maslovs'kij 2017). While cultural differences, naturally, are important for conceptually-disciplined and empirically-oriented social science, the totalizing methodology of civilisatorics will not help in finding causal mechanisms, or the results of structuration processes.

1.4 Russian perspectives on modernization

An analysis of modernizing processes in Russian society at different periods of its history can draw on the works of both Western and Russian scholars. As Kivinen and Cox argue, a new paradigm in Russian studies should include an interactive, dialogical approach to Russian intellectual history. From their viewpoint, ‘Russia’s history of ideas and traditions of social science have to be taken into account, while state-of-the-art Western humanities and social sciences contribute to the dialogue’ (Kivinen & Cox 2016, 15). Several perspectives on modernization are represented in Russian historical and sociological literature. The following discussion singles out some original contributions by Russian researchers to the study of modernization in imperial, Soviet, and post-Soviet Russia.

Long-term modernization processes in Russia have been studied by historians who have used some elements of sociological approaches. Thus Boris Mironov (2000) discusses a wide range of issues in his detailed study of social history of imperial Russia from the 18th to the early 20th century. These include the territorial expansion of the Russian state and ethnic relations, the transformation of the family, changes in social structure and patterns of social mobility, the evolution of political institutions, and the formation of civil society. In Mironov’s view, the essence of modernization consisted in the growth of individual autonomy and also the autonomy of the nuclear family, the transformation of the estates into professional groups and classes, and, finally, the evolution of Rechtstaat. Mironov emphasizes the universal character of changes in different social spheres within the process of modernization. From his viewpoint, imperial Russia was moving in the same direction as other European states (Mironov 2009). All in all Mironov follows an early functionalist version of modernization theory. It should also be noted that Mironov focuses on the pre-revolutionary period and offers only a very general characterization of the processes of social change in the USSR.

The Soviet version of modernization has been analyzed by Anatolii Vishnevskii, who also draws largely on functionalist theory. This scholar discusses the changes that led to an increase in complexity of, and differentiation with, Soviet society. Vishnevskii focuses on modernization in five spheres: economic, urban, demographic, cultural, and political. However, he admits that in each sphere there were serious obstacles to modernization. Contradictions between the goals and the means of modernization emerged after the initial period of success. As a result, the process of modernization in the USSR remained incomplete (Vishnevskii 1998, 418). He also elaborates on the concept of ‘conservative modernization’. He refers to the ideology of conservative revolution developed in Germany in the 1920s, which combined the vision of economic and technological progress with the idea of preserving traditional social institutions. As Vishnevskii claims, in Soviet Russia socialism found a basis for itself in archaic communal forms inherited from the pre-revolutionary period (ibid., 32).
Mironov’s and Vishnevskii’s works demonstrate some characteristic features of post-Soviet Russian modernization research. On the one hand, empirically-oriented social history rather than theoretically-oriented historical sociology was developing in Russia. On the other, the leading representatives of modernization studies drew mostly on the functionalist paradigm, but not on contemporary sociological theories. Nevertheless, these studies provide us with rich empirical material and theoretical insights upon which we can further elaborate.

Russian sociologists also seek to develop new approaches to the analysis of post-Soviet transformation. Thus Lev Gudkov, who is currently the head of the analytical Levada Centre, applies the concept of ‘abortive modernization’ to the processes of change in Russian society. He draws on the theory of totalitarianism, the functionalist paradigm in sociology, and the empirical studies of the ‘ordinary Soviet person’ by Yuri Levada and his colleagues. Some of the empirical studies conducted in the 1990s and 2000s sought to demonstrate what traits of the Soviet person persisted in the situation of large-scale social change, and to what extent they continued to influence people’s behaviour. On the basis of these studies, Gudkov (2011) draws a conclusion that the anthropological type of Soviet person should be considered the main obstacle to modernization processes in post-communist Russia. He maintains that the Soviet person’s fundamental distrust of the world and the experience of the recourse to violence make this human type incapable of accepting the complex social relations of modern society.

Gudkov claims that modernization has been systematically blocked in Russia. The strains and conflicts within the social system that required its further differentiation have instead been resolved by the rejection of complexity. All in all the processes of change in post-Soviet Russia have been characterized by the degeneration and reduction of institutions to more primitive forms, the absence of mechanisms of horizontal integration in society, conflicts of different systems of values and the resulting anomie, plus the spread of corruption at all levels of the administrative apparatus (Gudkov 2011, 370–371). Suppression of social differentiation has led to conservation of the central social institutions, particularly the structure of power. In Gudkov’s view, any hopes for ‘authoritarian’ modernization in Russia are groundless since the latent function of the political institutions is suppression of mechanisms that may initiate the emergence of more complex forms of social organization (ibid, 408).

Gudkov regards the post-Soviet Russia political regime of the 2000s as possessing both a new legitimation system and new technologies of power. He refers to ‘imitation traditionalism’ substituted by ‘modernization rhetoric’ and ‘imitation electoral democracy’ as the means of legitimizing the regime. In connection with ‘imitation traditionalism’ Gudkov considers the role of the Orthodox Church in Russian society. In his view, the Orthodox religion in Russia has proved itself ‘a label of ethno-confessional particularity that compensates for the weakness of national and social identification’ (Gudkov 2011, 394). As he claims, the church has been used by the authorities as a barrier against liberal ideas, and as a symbol of ethno-confessional unity and the glorious past.

The discussion of Russian transformations in Gudkov’s writings owes much to Parsonian modernization theory. According to that theory, Western economic, political, and legal institutions represent ‘evolutionary universals’ and the West should be seen as the apex of modernity. In particular, American society of the middle of the 20th century was characterized by Parsons as possessing the highest adaptive capacity (Gudkov 2012, 10–13). Gudkov claims that the Soviet legacies should be identified with anti-modern elements. However, the functionalist differentiation theory can hardly be considered an adequate means for analysis of post-Soviet transformations.
Another scholar from Levada Centre, Boris Dubin discusses the issues of collective identity and historical memory in post-Soviet Russia. In his works, the formation of imaginary collective identity in Russia is considered in relation to rival communities represented in particular by the countries of East Central Europe and former Soviet republics. Dubin argues, that in the 1990s the idea of Russia’s particularity and specific way of development spread throughout public opinion and political discourse. The basis of identification in this period was ‘symbolic alienation’ from ‘others’ (Dubin 2011, 11–12). The traces of a totalitarian mentality and the ‘besieged fortress’ psychology characteristic for the Cold War period continued to influence Russian public opinion in the 2000s (ibid., 38–39).

According to Dubin, the main trends in Russian collective identification are the following: growth of isolationism and xenophobia, rejection of any change and acceptance of status quo, the position of non-involvement, and rejection of responsibility for the course of events. Dubin claims that the idea of Russia’s specific way of development (osobyi put’) is perfectly compatible with what he calls ‘an agreement of mutual irresponsibility’ between the masses and the power elite (Dubin 2011, 260). For the Russian authorities, this idea means first of all the absence of any outside control. At the same time, the majority of the country’s population choose passivity and non-involvement. Overall, according to Dubin, the social processes in Russia can be seen as the dynamics of ‘mass society’ without any actual modernization of its core institutions.

Gudkov’s and Dubin’s works make a substantial contribution to the analysis of modernization processes in post-communist Russia. While Gudkov concentrates on theoretical issues and institutional change, Dubin focuses on the problematic of historical memory and political culture. These authors follow a distinct approach that combines Levada’s model of the ‘Soviet person’ with elements of Western sociological and political theories. Nevertheless, Gudkov’s theoretical starting points do not acknowledge the basic problems of functionalism and, for example, the suggestion of a latent but dominating control function seems to contradict Dubin’s major argument of an agreement of multiple irresponsibility. This contradiction could only be solved by introducing more specified testable empirical hypothesis concerning the power resources and legitimacy. This problem shows that these theoretical interpretations are not very sensitive to bringing in empirical evidence. And Gudkov’s idea that the Soviet system can be seen as a deviation from the only road to modernity implies an overly-strong commitment to the singular modernity concept. We also find it more fruitful to study Russian problems as structuration antinomies, rather than assigning them to the so-called ‘homo sovieticus’.

1.5 Multiple modernities approach

The multiple modernities approach is often associated mostly with Shmuel Eisenstadt’s work, and particularly with his analysis of the impact of world religions on modernizing processes (Eisenstadt 2000a and 2000b). But Eisenstadt’s original theory has been subject to different interpretations. Within the multiple modernities paradigm, attempts have been made to move beyond his theoretical framework. Thus the concept of successive modernities has been elaborated on by Peter Wagner (1994; 2008), while Johann Arnason (1993; 1995) explicitly considered the Soviet model as an alternative version of modernity. In comparison with Eisenstadt’s theory, Arnason’s and Wagner’s approaches are more focused on the creativity of social action. In addition, unlike Eisenstadt’s perspective, both these approaches are influenced by the tradition of critical theory.
Eisenstadt discusses the impact of civilizational legacies on the political sphere and reveals the role of cultural factors for the peculiarities of political institutions in both Western and non-Western states. He also devotes considerable attention to the impact of revolutions upon the formation of modern societies. In particular, he focuses on the so-called ‘great revolutions’ that combine ‘a change of regime with the crystallization of new cosmologies and ontological conceptions with far-reaching institutional implications’ (Eisenstadt 2006, 4). In his view, the great revolutions represented the key episodes in the formation of the cultural and political programme of modernity as a ‘distinct civilization’. However, it has been argued that Eisenstadt ‘was clearly more concerned with the democratic revolutions of the Atlantic world than with the twentieth-century Communist ones’ (Arnason 2016, 47).

According to Eisenstadt, the modernization of non-Western societies took multiple routes and its results differed from the Western patterns. Eisenstadt argued that the spread of modern ideologies and institutions was accompanied by conflicts connected to the economic conditions of the development of capitalism, political struggle in the course of democratization, and interstate rivalry. In particular, he referred to the ‘ideologization’ of violence and terror that was exemplified by the French revolution of 1789 (Eisenstadt 2001, 333). It was in this context that Eisenstadt considered the Jacobin ideology in revolutionary France. In his view, Jacobinism set a paradigm for revolutionary changes of modernity. The essence of the Jacobin programme was the belief in transformation of society through political action. He claimed that Jacobin movements have been characterized by ‘totalitarian all-encompassing ideologies, which emphasize a total reconstitution of the social and political order’ (Eisenstadt 1999, 73).

As was mentioned above, in today’s sociology, influential versions of the multiple modernities theory are presented in the works of Peter Wagner and Johann Arnason. In his analysis of European and North American societies, Wagner elaborated on the idea of different versions of modernity that succeeded one another. It should be noted here that Giddens’ structuration theory was one of the sources for Wagner’s analysis of forms of modernity. According to Wagner, in Western societies the 19th century model of liberal modernity was succeeded by organized modernity that persisted until its crisis in the 1970s, after which a new version of extended liberal modernity finally emerged (Wagner 1994). However, Wagner’s analysis deals only with European societies and new societies founded by European settlers. These cases include modifications of European cultural and institutional patterns rather than alternative projects of modernity. It remains to be seen if this approach could be applied to those societies whose trajectories of development were radically different from the Atlantic world.

Wagner criticizes some of the ideas in Eisenstadt’s tradition. In his view, this approach exaggerates the degree of continuity in the development of non-Western societies and does not pay sufficient attention to the processes of social change in today’s world. Wagner argues that in recent debates on the sources of multiple modernities, the main focus was on ‘classical’ civilizations such as the Chinese, Japanese, and Indian. He believes that the civilizational perspective is hardly applicable to such societies as South Africa or Brazil (Wagner 2011, 95). Instead of theorizing civilizations, he proposes discussion on the self-understanding of these societies and the ways in which they addressed epistemic, political, and economic problématiques. As Wagner claims, ‘the study of “new societies” can generate not only novel insights on the trajectories of these societies but can also trigger conceptual innovation in social and political theory and in comparative historical and political sociology’ (ibid., 99).

One of the characteristic traits of Arnason’s theory is his focus on ‘intercivilizational encounters’. As Arnason believes, this concept is more appropriate for sociological study than
the notion of the ‘clash of civilizations’. Arnason considers the plurality of forms of encounter and emphasizes the ability of cultures to learn from each other. He regards the series of encounters between the West and other civilizations as involving the interaction of indigenous and Western traditions, and also ‘the dynamics and the visions of a modern transmutation, plus the counter-modernities (totalitarian ones among them) that grew out of Western countercultures’ (Arnason 2006, 52). For Arnason, modern Russian history has been shaped by the interaction of all the above-mentioned factors.

Arnason has offered a detailed analysis of the Soviet version of modernity. In his view, after the collapse of the Soviet system there was a tendency to regard communist societies as ‘pre-, anti- or pseudo-modern’. However, he argues that these societies represented ‘a distinctive but ultimately self-destructive version of modernity rather than a sustained deviation from the modernizing mainstream’ (Arnason 2000, 61). Arnason examines the Russian cultural and political tradition, which combined a peripheral position to the Western world with some traits of a separate civilization. In particular, he focuses on the character of imperial modernization in Russia. He claims that the origins and later transformation of the totalitarian project can only be understood with reference to that background. For Arnason, the Soviet model incorporated both the legacy of imperial transformation from above and the revolutionary vision of a new society. Their synthesis led to a ‘reunified and re-articulated tradition’, which served ‘to structure a specific version of modernity’ (ibid., 87).

Arnason emphasizes three ‘reference points’ that he sees as problematic in the Soviet model: movements, empires, and civilizations. He discusses the formation of the international communist movement, which came to be subordinated to the Soviet centre. He argues that the impact of the imperial legacy was manifest in the fact that the Bolshevik government inherited not only the geopolitical situation and internal structural problems of the Russian empire, but also the tradition of social transformation from above. In his view, the civilizational aspect of the Soviet model can be seen ‘in the twofold sense of a distinctive version of modernity and a set of traditional patterns which it perpetuated in a new setting’ (Arnason 1995, 39).

The Soviet system defined itself as an alternative to Western modernity. This system was supposed to transcend Western societies in the economic, political, and cultural spheres. Nevertheless, in each of these spheres there were inherent contradictions in communist modernity: ‘central planning was to be reconciled with unfettered technological progress, party sovereignty with active but guided participation, and immutable doctrinal principles with unlimited growth of scientific knowledge’ (Arnason 2000, 73). As a result, the Soviet model could be regarded as ‘inherently and permanently crisis-prone’ (ibid., 76). Arnason demonstrates different strategies of ‘crisis management’ used by the communist regimes. Thus he refers to the Czechoslovak reform movement of the 1960s and Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempt to restructure the Soviet empire, the latter of which resulted in radical and irreversible change. The relevance of Arnason’s approach for understanding the causes of Soviet collapse has been considered recently by Richard Sakwa, who stresses that the Soviet experiment represented an attempt to create an alternative modernity, but ‘failed to sustain itself as a coherent social order’ (Sakwa 2013, 74). As he succinctly puts it, the Soviet system was ‘not anti-modern, but mismodernized’ (2013, 75).

1.6 Debate on Soviet modernity and neo-traditionalism
In historical studies of the Soviet system, particularly of the Stalinist period, two approaches that stress the modernity of the Soviet regime or its neo-traditionalist aspects have been identified. Firstly, the modernity approach focuses on such phenomena as ‘planning, scientific organization principles, welfare-statism, and techniques of popular surveillance’ (Fitzpatrick 2000, 11). In notable contrast, the neo-traditionalist approach concentrates on the ‘archaicizing’ phenomena: ‘petitioning, patron-client networks, the ubiquity of other kinds of personalistic ties like blat, ascribed status categories, “court” politics in the Kremlin, the mystification of power’ (ibid.).

Similarly, the distinction between ‘modernist’ and ‘neo-traditionalist’ approaches to Soviet history has been examined by Michael David-Fox. He argues that different trends can be found within each category, but the ‘modernists’ tendency to stress projects and programmes has left an opening for the ‘neo-traditionalists’ to look for *results* rather than *intentions* and to emphasize unexpected consequences in the guise of Stalin-era retreats (David-Fox 2006, 539). At the same time, the American historians who followed the ‘modernist’ approach were ‘implicitly’ moving towards the sociological multiple modernities perspective represented in particular by Eisenstadt’s works (ibid., 538).

The neo-traditionalist interpretation of the Soviet social order emerged partly as a reaction to the modernity approach. One of the main points of the ‘neo-traditional’ critique was that ‘Bolshevik projects met Russian reality to produce unexpected reincarnations of traditional societies’ (David-Fox 2015, 27). In this connection David-Fox considers Terry Martin’s oft-quoted statement: ‘Modernization is the theory of Soviet intentions; neo-traditionalism, the theory of their unintended consequences’ (Martin 2000, 175). Nevertheless, as David-Fox stresses, representatives of that camp equated modernity with Western societies and did not accept the possibility of illiberal or non-Western modernity. At the same time ‘defining tradition remains one of the most pressing issues for any conception of neo-traditionalism’ (David-Fox 2015, 27).

In a quite recent article published in the Russian journal *New Literary Review* David-Fox distinguishes four perspectives on Russian/Soviet modernity that could mostly be found in English-language historical works of the last fifteen years. Firstly, there is a trend to reject the concept of modernity in discussing Russian history, particularly the period from the 1850s to the 1950s. Secondly, there is a tendency to regard modernity as a unified phenomenon and to concentrate on what Russia and the USSR had in common with other modern states. The third perspective draws on the works of Eisenstadt and his colleagues, who argued that Soviet communism represented an alternative version of modernity. Finally, the fourth position, which also presupposes a multiplicity of modernities, emphasizes their entanglement and interaction (David-Fox 2016, 2; Cf. Wittrock 2000).

David-Fox stresses the relevance of the concepts of ‘alternative’ and ‘entangled’ modernities for the field of Russian/Soviet studies. In his discussion of alternative modernity, he draws on Eisenstadt’s theory and historical works dealing with Nazi Germany, imperial Russia, and the USSR. Thus, according to David-Fox (ibid., 36), the notion of ‘alternative’ Soviet modernity, which is sometimes used in historical studies, is quite compatible with the sociological theory of multiple modernities. He also dwells on the concept of ‘failed modernity’, which is connected to conceiving the Soviet system as an alternative modern form. In this regard, he poses the following question: ‘does regime change mean that an entire system, an alternative modernity, failed? Or could it be that other strands of a broader Russian/Soviet modernity that straddled 1917 also survived 1991?’ (ibid., 37).
In his discussion of ‘entangled modernities’ David-Fox refers to the works of Therborn (2003) and Arnason (2003), discussed above. He emphasizes that from this perspective, modernity is not seen as a single systemic whole but it is rather ‘broken up into its component elements and conceived in terms of the interactions of those elements across space and time’ (ibid., 39). In his view, this approach allows one to draw a more differentiated picture of differing paces of change and cross-border entanglements in the political, economic, and cultural spheres. He believes that combining the concepts of ‘alternative’ and ‘entangled’ modernities could be a promising avenue of research in Russian studies.

At the same time, the historical debate on Soviet modernity does seem relevant for a discussion of the legacies of the Soviet system in post-communist Russia. Overall the issue of the historical legacies of communism remains controversial in studies of post-communist transformations. As Kotkin and Beissinger (2014, 1) emphasize, historical legacies should be ‘thought about empirically, contextually and with greater rigour’. But it has been noted that to ‘empirically establish a precise causal relationships between well-specified elements of the past and present’ should be seen as ‘a very limited, if not impossible, task’ (Ekiert 2015, 334) due to the complexity of political, economic, and social developments in various post-communist states.

According to Ekiert (2015), studies of post-communist transformations have returned recently to exploration of historical and cultural contexts and their impact on the processes of change. The new ‘historicism’ approach focuses not on nation-states but rather ‘on sub-national units, cross-border regions and wider “civilizational” identities on the macro-level’ (ibid., 335). It seems that – like representatives of the ‘modernist’ approach to Soviet history discussed by David-Fox – followers of new historicism in the study of post-communist transformations are moving only ‘implicitly’ towards the theories of multiple and entangled modernities. However, in this book we argue that even this step is not convincing without more specified sociological analysis of structuration processes.

Markku Kivinen has suggested that in order to understand the Soviet modernity and its tragic elements we have to also seek new sociological explanations (Kivinen 2002 and Kivinen 2011). He tries to show that the Durkheimian concepts of sacred and profane can be a key to understanding the specificity of the Soviet modernization project and its intended and unintended results. On this basis he has defined the cultural code or model variables of Soviet modernization. The model variables developed by Talcott Parsons (e.g., 1951 and 1967) are the core concepts for his theory of modernity, as well as for the modernization paradigm as it existed since the 1950s. Kivinen shows that the basic variables of the Soviet modernization were completely different. The Bolshevik project is also based on the idea of the inevitability of modernization, but unlike Parsons, the transition to a modern society is not perceived as a gradual development towards the expansion of market-orientation and professionalism, functional differentiation and universal value patterns, but instead as a revolutionary interruption between the past and the future.

Aside from Durkheim (cf. 2001), Kivinen’s argument is constructed on the semiotic analysis of Yuri Lotman. In his famous article on binary models of Russian culture, Lotman has analysed the world-view of Russian Orthodoxy:

In Western Catholicism, the world beyond the grave is divided into three spaces: heaven, purgatory, and hell. Earthly life is correspondingly conceived of as admitting three types
of behaviour: the unconditionally sinful, the unconditionally holy, and the neutral, which permits eternal salvation after some sort of purgative trial. In the real life of the medieval West a wide area of neutral behaviour thus became possible, as did neutral societal institutions, which were neither “holy” nor “sinful”, neither “pro-state” nor “anti-state”, neither good nor bad. This neutral sphere became a structural reserve, out of which the succeeding system developed. Inasmuch as continuity is obvious here, there is no necessity to emphasize it structurally, nor to re-create it consciously and artificially. (Lotman and Uspenskii 1985, 32)

By contrast, Russian Orthodoxy has no mediating sphere and no neutral area. Lotman argues that the absence of neutral areas is distinctive of Russian culture in general. This brings about a particular duality of culture, which is most clearly reflected in such sharp distinctions as those between old and new, Russia and the West, knowledge and ignorance.

It is in this context that Kivinen applies Durkheim’s concepts to the analysis of Bolshevik collectivity and the sacred. Following Lotman, he starts out from the specific binary codes of Bolshevik culture. Lenin and Stalin serve as symbols and totems for the complex social reality and for its ideal manifestation in the Bolsheviks’ grand narrative. It is this complex social reality, and the related conception of the sacred, that lie behind the Bolsheviks’ grand social project. Rather than starting out from big packages of modern, antimodern or counter-modern, Kivinen looks at the grand narrative that lies behind the Bolshevik project. There are countless versions of this key narrative, but reduced to its bare essentials it can be formulated as follows:

Russia is a backward country ruled by a despotic government. Most people live in the countryside, where poverty and religious prejudices are rife. The most important challenge is progress through the development of the forces of production. The only way this is possible is through socialism. The proletarian party will show the way towards progress and a glorious future.

The sacred expressed in this narrative can be summed up in terms of the following binary oppositions:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Holy (Modern)</th>
<th>Secular (Traditional)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Backwardness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of forces of production</td>
<td>Poverty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Countryside</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proletariat</td>
<td>Bourgeois</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Czar</td>
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<th>TABLE 1.1 HOLY VS. SECULAR</th>
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<td>Source: KIVINEN 2002</td>
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The binary elements of the sacred are always combined and linked together. Although these links produce strong semantic forces and motivations, they are at once the weak points of the argument. If the sacred can in principle be freely and publicly reclassified and deconstructed, the breakdown of just one link could cause the whole structure to collapse. In Stalinism,
however, old links could be undone and new ones formed all the time by virtue of the special unity of power and the sacred.

It is these kinds of codes of the sacred that provide the impetus and motivation for action. They offer an interpretation that makes people capable of the exceptional actions, sacrifices, and self-denials that the revolution requires. Political speeches, military actions, and organizational practices were to dramatize these semiotic distinctions. The semiotic grammar makes certain acts and incidents possible. Hence the elements of rationality, class orientation or collectivity find expression in certain organizational practices, ways of life, or principles of education. The sacred elements of the Soviet state were not mere products of propaganda imposed by the leadership on the people. From a semiotic point of view, propaganda must appeal to existing discursive possibilities. The purpose of propaganda is to influence the way in which people classify events, nations, and leaders within a certain field of cultural codes.

However, this sacred was in constant flux throughout the existence of the Soviet Union. All sacred things were accompanied by a negative or problematic shadow:

- the demonization of reality
- chaos
- consumption
- the peasant way of life
- the nomenklatura and the new middle class
- the NKVD

Because the Bolsheviks’ sacred constitutes a complex semiotic structure, the changes in that sacred cannot be seen simply in terms of an erosion of charisma. There is no simple grand promise; rather, the relationship of the code and the real incidents have to be articulated separately for each aspect of the structure. From the contradiction between the code and the reality there emerged complementary instances corresponding to each aspect of the sacred.

It was not then the small, everyday events that gradually eroded the sacred, nor were there alternative political lines that might have prompted deconstruction or declassification. Rather, the Bolshevik project had unintended consequences that brought about particular tensions between the code and reality; and for each aspect of the sacred there was a particular complementary instance. This “third” is initially an area bypassed and ignored by the dual code. But with the first efforts, in real social practices, to change the world on the basis of this code, the third begins to appear as unintended consequences of actions taken. However, it is not only the intended values that are institutionalized, as Parsons assumes (cf. Parsons & Shils 1951), but the unintended consequences also unfold into complementary structural forms and institutions. The initial code is not able to meet them, however, but they evolve into taboos, the negative sacred that cannot be touched. Alongside the actual sacred there develops a specific complementary instance (an unthematized area or unintended structural feature). From here on, the political process takes place in the strained field between the actual sacred and the complementary instance.

This implies that Soviet modernity was not constituted through the same processes as in the West, and it was not outlined using the same cultural categories. The Soviet modernization starts from the sacred code and ends up in creating a form of modernity, in which all the traditional elements are supposed to disappear for good. We call this the eliminating form of modernization. It has both intended and unintended results, and the latter constitute structures like nomenklatura and NKVD implying a demonization of reality, which become taboos. (See,
Our understanding is that this interpretation of Soviet modernization can help us to analyze both intended and unintended results of Perestroika (Kivinen 2011).

In this book, the challenge before us is to analyze the basic starting points of the new Russian modernization. Here we cannot start the analysis from the extremely dualistic cultural codes of the Bolshevik project. Western modernization is based on the coexistence of modern and traditional. In this sense all modernizing societies have to face the general antinomies of modernization that the Bolsheviks wanted to solve by eliminating the traditional elements of society. The contemporary Russian modernization is also based on coexistence and plurality.

Modernization in Russia is not a one way street, but the past strikes back in two ways. Firstly, as a restoration of the old pre-revolutionary Russia. This can be seen in the growing role of the Orthodox religion and imperial traditions, sometimes even monarchism. Secondly, as a continuity in the unintended results of the Bolshevik project of demonization and, at times, taboos in politics, e.g., the role of the secret police, nomenklatura privatization, sustainability of premodern forms of networks in ordinary life. However, in order to conceptualize this contradictory reality we cannot proceed very far by such classificatory concepts as modernity or pre-modernity. We agree with Richard Sakwa’s argument that he calls the ‘neo-modernization’ approach. This starting point:

…stresses that Russia’s future will be shaped thorough the dynamic interaction of contradictory pressures, and that its destiny will be forged through the combination of a diversity of paths, pluralism of forms and unity of ends. This ultimately is what ‘neo-modernization’ means: accepting that global modernity today requires certain principles of economic order and political inclusion; but this does not mean that modernization equates to Westernization, let alone subordination to the Western power system, even when presented as a universal ‘liberal international order. (Sakwa 2019, 10-11.)

Our argument in this book is that we can develop a new paradigm in Russian studies by conceptualizing contradictory processes in terms of structuration theory, paying attention to interaction of structures and agencies, as well as to intended and unintended results of action. We want to highlight that this enables concrete empirical analysis of contradictory processes that cannot be theorized at the level of general categories of modernization, or even neo-modernization. We clarify our critique of big classificatory conceptual packages in the next subsection.

1.7 Modernization as structuration

Making an effort to study modernity and modernization, we seem immediately to lose our way in a multitude of definitions and conceptual specifications. The concept of modernity is always both philosophical and empirical, both substantive and epochal, at the same time both conceptual and historical (Wagner 2008 and Therborn 1995 and 2013). Modernity in sociological theory has been defined as an era and as a set of institutions. Parsons’ theory of functional differentiation has been one of the most influential conceptualizations of this kind. Put into the history of philosophy, this theory can be interpreted as a sociological version of the Enlightenment idea of the growing dominance of man over nature, as well as a growing liberty and freedom. On the other hand, we have the great critical approaches to modernity (Marx, Weber, Robert Michels, the Frankfurt School, and Foucault). The duality of modernity...
is well represented in the definition by Charles Taylor, “By *modernity* I mean that historically unprecedented amalgam of new practices and institutional forms (science, technology, industrial production, urbanization), of new ways of living (individualism, secularization, instrumental rationality) and of new forms of malaise (alienation, meaninglessness, a sense of impending social dissolution.” (Taylor 2002, 91).

Whether we would define modernity in positive or negative terms, it is clear that as an abstract category modernity cannot become a causal power in empirical analysis. As Ronald Suny concludes: modernity is such a broad concept that unless particular elements and the causal links are demonstrated it may obscure more than it illuminates (Suny 2008, 258). Our intention in this book is to focus on empirically-observed processes.

In the contemporary Russian case, we have on the one hand modernization as a ‘native’s category’ in political programmes and, on the other, modernity and modernization as analytical categories defining the subject for scholarly inquiry. It is evident that even within social sciences we have a multitude of categories. Parsons’ modernization theory experienced a powerful revival in studies on East European transition. This concept of modernity represents a powerful claim to singularity: modernization is a long and continuing project central to the history of United States and Western Europe, and in turn defines a goal to which the rest of the world aspires. But modernity in non-Western societies can also be seen as plural. As we have already discussed, we have witnessed a growing theoretical discussion on “multiple modernities” and “alternative modernities”. These arguments bring out the way in which non-Western peoples develop cultural forms that are not mere repetitions of tradition, but which bring their own perspectives to progress. On the other hand, it is not clear why an alternative modernity should be called a modernity at all. As Frederick Cooper points out:

If any form of innovation produces a modernity, then the term has little analytical purchase. On the other hand, if the alternative modernities all represent alternatives to European modernity, then one package of cultural traits is being awarded a European pedigree while other packages are being linked across time to a people, however defined, as in Chinese modernity or Islamic modernity. Both the idea of package making, and its time transcending, essentializing association with a particular people demand scrutiny. (Cooper 2005, 114).

Cooper ends up presenting two fundamental questions. If we are talking about modernity as a particular condition, then the question is whether modernity as an analytical category encourages us to ask good questions as to what that condition is. If we connect modernity to representation, then the question is *whose* representation we are talking about.

Our understanding is that the structuration approach can give us a possibility to find relevant answers for both questions. And, these answers are interdependent: we have to be able to study modernization both as a representation and as a broader analytical category referring to basic structural challenges. Another important understanding in Giddens’ theory is that social structures come about in dynamic processes in time and place, where both the intended and unintended results of actions must be examined. Therefore we cannot explain the institutions and developments of Russian (or any other) society in any other way than studying the views of various actors and the results of their actions. When we started to study the modernization of Russia, some critics identified our approach with the modernization projects of the Russian elite of that time. Of course, this was not the case. The perspective of structuration theory takes into account many actors and their representations, forces and counterforces, structural continuities, and not only the intended but also the unintended results of actions. From this point of view, the horizon of structuration theory is not limited to a mere discourse analysis, let alone
programmes of the elite. Rather, it places the representations produced by the actors in a broader context of structuration, which also focuses on practices and institutions.

If modernity is everything and everything is modernity, the concept does not help us distinguish anything from anything else. In this book we strive for conceptual rigor. However, our argument is that this can be achieved only by taking into account both the aspect of agency and the aspect of structure in studying modernity and modernization. To put it simply: modernization must be conceptualized as a structuration process. Consequently, we agree with Cooper that scholars should not try for a slightly better definition of modernization when trying to talk about modernity more clearly. Rather we would like to listen to what is being said in the world. When we hear the Russian elites and various other agencies speak about modernity and modernization, we should ask how these terms are used and why. Consequently, the analytical categories and explanations connected them cannot be used bypassing the perspective of concrete agencies talking and acting. And these agencies also act, orienting themselves into the world according to their schemata or frames, using their power resources to implement their plans and bring out various results.

All this said, we also have to go beyond the horizon of particular agencies. As social scientists, we have to be brave enough to use the sociological imagination to connect individual perspectives with macrosociological issues and challenges. This does not mean shoehorning issues and structures into highflying categories of modern, post-modern, or anti-modern discourses. This would only lead to unfruitful reductionism and empirically-empty theorizing.

Framing debates in terms of modernity, anti-modernity, and alternative modernities has not provided a precise or suggestive vocabulary for analyzing the relationship of different elements of change, the alternative ways in which political issues can be framed, or conflicting dreams of the future. (Cooper 2005, 135)

One way to advance towards historical reality has been to conceptualize modernity as a process, that is, speaking about modernization by specifying it in terms of other key processes discussed intensively among sociologists: secularization, urbanization, industrialization, proletarianization, individualization etc. But these processual concepts are almost as big “packages” as modernization itself, and also used as such as explanation of action. It is no accident that they are usually used as some kind of processes of the “natural historical kind” or self-propelled movements without any reference to any concrete agencies, contradictions, or struggles. However, nowhere have these processes happened in a linear or straightforward way. Rather than trying to reduce the contemporary Russian developments to these processes, we have to approach the actual structures and institutions as concrete and historical tension fields of contradictory interests, power resources, and processes. This is our intention in conceptualizing the “objective” five challenges of Russian modernization as our starting point. In fact, it is obvious already in the first sight that many of these processes are rather reversed in Russia, where desecularization is strong and deindustrialization is one of the key processes of transition bringing forth diversification of the economy, as the key economic challenge of the country.

1.8 Three levels of conceptualization

Within classical (functionalist) modernization theory, traditional and modern societies were counterposed using some of Parsons’ key model variables. Instead of such counterposing, our approach aims at specifying the Russian way towards and through modernity in terms of
institutional development by conceptually-informed empirical analysis. Nor can we postulate as a starting point that a clear functional differentiation of the society’s institutional spheres is an inevitable constitutive feature of modernization process. In order to analyze the interaction between economy and politics, welfare and the political system, culture and foreign policy, we need historical ideal types and new explanatory models characterizing the structuration principles and contradictions of the contemporary epoch in the Russian society. These cannot be found in the Western modernization paradigm that presupposes functional differentiation.

Consequently, we do not have all-encompassing and totalizing concepts of the Russian way of modernization prior to the empirical analysis. Rather we suggest two new conceptual openings. The first is a generic theoretical approach in Giddens’ structuration theory. This approach is strong because it can be used for generating concrete research settings concerning the various challenges in institutional development of Russia. The second starting point is the understanding of Russian modernization as five fundamental challenges.

Since we cannot start our analysis from generic process categories, our effort to approach Russia’s contradictory and complex reality comprises three interconnected but essentially different levels of conceptualization.

Firstly, a general theory of constitution of society comprises the essential concepts of structuration: structures, structural constrains, agencies, and the various results of action. As the second level of conceptualization, we proceed from the abstract to the concrete by ‘operationalizing’ the various aspects of structuration in contemporary Russian society. We do this by creating middle range theories, models, and concepts. While structuration theory as such is not falsifiable, in these more concrete sets of theoretical propositions we should aim at creating falsifiable propositions concerning the concrete historical explanations of structuration processes.

In several studies, especially by Kivinen 2015, Aalto and others 2014, Kivinen and Cox (ed.) 2016, we have tried to show how Giddens’ structuration theory, as a conceptualization of the constitution of society, can become the hard core of the new interdisciplinary paradigm in Russian studies. This core is abstract enough to avoid the overly strong functionalist assumptions of the classical modernization theory, and open enough to empirical research to avoid totalizing explanations of Russia that previous, too structurally-based paradigms suggested. We argue that Giddens’ theory cannot be empirically tested, but it opens a ‘protective belt’ consisting of specified concepts of structure and agency within several disciplines, leading to series of propositions that can be empirically tested and periodically adjusted. On the other hand, we argue that Giddens does not specify how this general approach should be understood in an actual empirical research process. This leaves a lot of room for new middle range models, concepts, and theories. Since no general rules are given by Giddens or the existing literature, each of our chapters offers new suggestions and conceptualizations. Explanatory models are created in connection with empirical analysis. In that sense we argue within that form of theorizing that Talcott Parsons called “common law type”. Concrete suggestions for middle range concepts are, the structuration model for energy policy analysis, scope logic approach to class analysis, as well as structuration capacity and vulnerability theory in social policy analysis. These are major theoretical steps in our effort to create a new paradigm at the middle-range level.

We start our empirical analysis from five macro-level challenges as they are presented in existing literature. We analyse them using concepts of structuration theory, finalizing our approach at the third conceptual level of interdisciplinary synthesis.
The first challenge: diversification of the economy. Russia’s modernization prospects will be based on its economy, regardless of the approach adopted. Therein the key challenge is economic diversification. While Russia must reap full benefits from its energy resources to generate the necessary finances, it also must lessen its excessive energy dependency in both domestic economy and foreign trade. Our approach to diversification refers not only to the diversification of industry, but also to the social and organizational forms of public and private units involved in economic activities.

In the second chapter of this book, we analyze the structuration of Russian diversification, starting from a specified structuration model. We study choices in the energy sector and in manufacturing, taking into account both structural constrains and agencies. This analysis comprises several dimensions. Starting with technological resources and infrastructure, our analysis advances to business, and even to the broader institutional dimension. Finally, we examine the ecological dimension, both in energy sector and in manufacturing sector in general.

The second challenge: democratization. The development of Russian political institutions remains at the core of the modernization process. Russia used to be an authoritarian communist system without proper civil law or political rights. In the third chapter of this book we ask what the Russian state is like today, and what will determine its institutional development in the future. Although all formal structures of competitive democracy exist in contemporary Russia, the political system has strong elements of authoritarian rule, plus rent-seeking and corruption. Our analysis connects the concepts of agency, rules of the game, and cultural self-understanding. We produce a comprehensive picture of political and legal systems, and public administration within an ongoing reform effort in the conditions of complex hybrid system.

The third challenge: the welfare regime. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, socialist welfare structures have experienced rapid, large-scale changes and constant reformulation. Modernization and institutional reforms have not necessarily proceeded as expected and Russian welfare institutions remain rather weak and of low quality.

The fourth chapter of the book examines the structuration of Russian welfare system with regard to resources, rules, and agencies. We suggest a new instrument for analysis of the capacities and vulnerabilities of welfare policy. This chapter looks first at the major problems of poverty and health. As the second step, several social policy fields are analysed in detail. Finally, we analyse the role of agency in terms of classes, trade unions, and civil society organizations.

The fourth challenge: culture and ideology. After the collapse of the communist system there was a lack of common ideological or cultural representation of society. In our fifth chapter, we analyse the development of culture as a horizontal experience, as well as ideological projects promoted by various agencies. In contemporary Russia there are several competing narratives concerning the reconstruction of society in economy, politics, and culture. Various agencies promote their discourses based on varying power resources. We suggest that periodization of the fundamental change in the ideological regulation of society was experienced first as an anomic situation with too-rapidly changing cultural codes and normative structures. As the second phase of development, the anomy was replaced by the return of the traditional religious values and desecularization emerged as a dominating cultural process. In the third phase of development, desecularization is accompanied by a more organized ideological project of conservative value-orientation.
The fifth challenge: foreign policy. The intertwined nature of domestic politics and international relations means that the quest for modernization also affects Russian foreign policy. Russia’s foreign policy has been based on the aspiration to establish and strengthen its position as a great power. However, there are several ways to define the term ‘great power’. If Russia wishes to modernize according to the Western model, it must be recognized as a fully-fledged liberal democratic country that is embedded in key international liberal organizations. If Russia chooses the Eastern style of modernization, it will use its economic power, especially in energy politics, to control key areas close to its borders and make its voice heard as a great power. The greatness of a traditional great power would be based on military power and direct territorial control.

In the sixth chapter, we analyse Russian foreign policy as it now stands in terms of various approaches and resources. We start by analyzing the reforms concerning the resources of hard military power but we also look at the elements of international interaction in terms of trade and soft power. In the final subchapter we give an overview of the green elements of Russian foreign relations.

Our understanding of the research setting is presented in figure 1.1 below.
Our most significant synthetic conclusion is that in each of these challenges we can identify several discourses, agencies, and action frames. The interaction of top down strategies and bottom up processes complicates the structuration processes and make them contradictory. Analyzing both the intended and unintended consequences in Russia’s modernization efforts seems to be highly relevant on all levels of analysis. If we want to analyse the patterns in this kind of a complex system, an effective method for modelling such a phenomenon must offer insight into its separate facets as well as into the self-organizing, complex pattern produced by their overall interaction. The individual facets can be studied within traditional disciplines whereas interdisciplinary study is a logical candidate for developing specific, whole, complex systems to study such phenomena. Consequently, an interdisciplinary approach draws insights from relevant disciplines and integrates those views into a more comprehensive understanding. Our understanding is that Giddens’ theory of structuration allows the thematization of research focus in terms of various agencies and structures, but this sociological theory does not give specific concepts for economic, political and cultural analysis. We do not have a master discipline in the sense of Parsons’ functionalist sociology. The relationship between various facets of society is not theoretically given. It is an empirical issue.

1.9 Interdisciplinary approach

Scientific work is traditionally organized in disciplines. A commitment to a discipline seems to ensure that theories, concepts, and methods are used according to the rules within a particular field of science. However, during the last twenty years this has been challenged, and interdisciplinarity and multidisciplinarity have become objects of intensive enquiry for scholars, funding agencies, and even governments. Interdisciplinarity is often linked with more general transformation in the relations between science and society. Immanuel Wallerstein’s Gulbekian Comission’s report in the US (Wallerstein 1996), the German Science Council report 2000, and HM Treasury report (2006) all suggested that interdisciplinarity should lie at the heart of new accountability of science, which could ensure more responsiveness to the needs of society.

An exemplary prominent scholarly problematization was a suggestion by Helga Nowotny and her colleagues (Nowotny, Scott & Gibbons 2001) that the concern with interdisciplinarity is part of a shift from what they call Mode-1 of science to Mode-2 knowledge production. The latter is said to include:

- transcending disciplinary boundaries
- undermining disciplinary forms of evaluation and developing new forms of quality control
- displacing of a ‘culture of autonomy of science’ by a ‘culture of accountability’
- the growing importance of the ‘context of application’ as a site for research
- diversity of sites at which science and knowledge is produced (Nowotny 2003; 211-212 cf. Barry, Born & Weszkalnys 2008, 20-22.)

None of these aspects is self-evident, and they all seem to need further discussion. In this respect the programme for Mode-2 knowledge production seems to be a work in progress,
involving not only fields of substantive research and philosophy of science, but those of sociology of science and science policy as well. For our analysis, the key to interdisciplinary synthesis is the most fundamental relation between the concepts of interdisciplinarity and complexity. We start with William H. Newell’s (2001) argument that the distinguishing characteristic of interdisciplinary studies – synthesis or integration – is at last explained in terms of the unique self-organizing pattern of a complex system. On this basis, we conclude that the most relevant way to understand Russian modernization is to see it as a complex system, and therefore a new paradigm for Russian studies must be interdisciplinary.

Let us start with Newell’s definitions:

The phenomena modelled by most complex systems are multi-faceted. Seen from one angle, they appear different from one another, because the viewers see facets (represented as sub-systems) where different components and relationship dominate. Like the phenomena modelled (i.e., represented typically as a set of equations or a diagram) by all systems, their overall pattern of behaviour is self-organizing, thus different from the sum of its parts and not fully predictable from them. Because the various facets are connected by nonlinear relationships, the overall pattern of behaviour of the phenomenon (and thus the system) is not only self-organizing but also complex. As such the pattern is only quasi-stable, partly predictable, and dynamic. (Newell 2001, 2.)

If we want to analyze the patterns in this kind of complex system, Newell argues, an effective method for modelling such a phenomenon must offer insight into its separate facets, as well as into the self-organizing, complex pattern produced by their overall interaction. The individual facets can be studied within traditional disciplines whereas interdisciplinary study is a logical candidate for developing specific, whole, complex systems to study such phenomena. Consequently, an interdisciplinary approach draws insights from relevant disciplines and integrates those views into a more comprehensive understanding.

An interdisciplinary synthesis requires new concepts that are not in use in traditional disciplines. As we have indicated above, our argument is that in social sciences the concept of structuration antinomies can help us to conceptualize key tensions within the major macro-level challenges of Russian society. This concept also enables an interdisciplinary view of the interaction of the various facets of society