Knowledge and brokerage in REDD+ policy making

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Knowledge and brokerage in REDD+ policy making: A Policy Networks Analysis of the case of Tanzania

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Salla Rantala

Abstract

As various countries are preparing their national REDD+ strategies, balancing different types of knowledge and interests for legitimate and effective policies has become a primary, pressing challenge. Knowledge and discourses on REDD+ are deliberated in political bargaining processes between various actors involved in the policy domain that differ in their resources and capacity to influence outcomes. Using Tanzania as a country case, this study assesses the relative influence of deliberation and knowledge brokerage on the dynamics of the REDD+ policy process and its outputs vis-à-vis institutional structures and power relations between the involved policy actors. It is proposed that the more public and politicized the policy process, the less the discursive dimension may be ignored and the more there is to gain for discourse coalitions with wide bases of legitimacy among policy actors with varying power resources and institutionalized opportunities for policy influence.

A structured survey and semi-structured in-depth interviews were carried out with sixty-four organizational actors involved in the Tanzanian REDD+ domain between March and September 2011. Social Network Analysis techniques were applied to analyze the quantitative survey data, complemented by a qualitative content analysis of the actors’ discourse and strategies related to the national REDD+ policy. The results suggest that through sustained public efforts, actors engaged in so-called protest events parallel to the formal government-led process have influenced the course of the policy process and to an extent, at the early formulation stage, policy content. Successful coalitions include brokers that occupy strategic positions in networks of information and resources, and have the capacity to enhance information flow and promote closure of REDD+ discourse on the appropriate policy proposals. Brokers that are characterized by discourses based on legitimized knowledge and ties to central policy actors have the greatest potential to enhance information flow and deliberation the policy process and outcomes. In the Tanzania case, there is considerable overlap between brokers and central actors, and the key brokers may be considered members of discourse coalitions rather than discursively neutral actors. Nevertheless, the influence of actors and coalitions that appear successful in the early stages of the policy process will be filtered by the institutional context applying to the formal decision making stages, and by shifting national and international political commitments to climate change mitigation and REDD+.

Keywords: policy, network, climate change, forest, REDD+, Tanzania

Citation

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It is available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/mrcbg/programs/sustsci/documents/papers/2012-03. Professor William Clark has approved this paper for inclusion in the working paper series. Comments are welcome and may be directed to the author, salla.rantala@helsinki.fi.
Author Biography

Salla Rantala was a Fulbright Research Fellow in the Sustainability Science Program during the academic year 2011-2012, and a PhD candidate in Forest Sciences, University of Helsinki, Finland (expected in 2012). Salla has worked in agricultural and forestry research and development cooperation in Central America and Southern and East Africa, including the World Agroforestry Centre, Nairobi, Kenya and the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Bogor, Indonesia. Her research interests center on the governance of tropical forests, including the governance practices and social impacts of community-based forest management, forest protected areas, and the emerging national and global policy processes around forests and climate change.

Sustainability Science Program

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# Table of Contents

1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1  
2. Conceptual framework ............................................................................................................... 2  
3. Context and methods ................................................................................................................ 5  
4. Analysis and findings .............................................................................................................. 8  
5. Discussion ............................................................................................................................... 34  
References .................................................................................................................................... 37  
Appendices .................................................................................................................................... 41
1. Introduction

Climate change presents myriad threats to both human and nonhuman wellbeing. Because up to a quarter of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions stem from deforestation and forest degradation, the conservation and restoration of forests and woodlands is central to the global response to climate change. Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) is a proposed mechanism to mitigate climate change while securing many additional environmental services provided by woodlands. In essence, this effort relies on payments by the international community to governments, communities, and individuals in return for maintaining and enhancing carbon stocks in forests, trees, and agricultural land. REDD+ has received international support in the recent United Nations Climate Change Conferences in Bali (COP-13), Copenhagen (COP-15), and Cancun (COP-16) where the Parties have agreed on the need for mechanisms to channel funds from developed countries to REDD+. Various tropical forest countries are currently preparing their REDD+ strategies in anticipation of an international compliance market.

Despite the widespread support for REDD+, there remain significant hurdles to its successful implementation. Primary among these is the need to balance different interests and types of knowledge in ways that increase the effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness of policies. The volume of climate change research and policy discussion has grown exponentially in recent years (Grieneisen & Zhang, 2011), adding to the complexity faced by policy makers involved in the national REDD+ processes. Considering other complex influences, shifting international commitments, and moral intricacies (Hajer & Laws, 2006), a key question for the analysis of processes shaping the effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness of policies is: how do policy makers make sense of this complexity and decide how to act?

Policy makers are often dependent on interpreters of knowledge related to the complex concepts and ideas on climate change and the required global regime to regulate it. Recommendations by scientists and advocacy groups regarding optimal mechanisms at different scales are typically based on data from empirical studies and experiences from previous policy implementation, claiming to represent ‘expert knowledge’. Although it is expected and sometimes assumed that scientists deliver ‘neutral’ information into policy making, the interpreters of scientific knowledge are not always void of political agendas (e.g. Grundmann, 2009; Haas, 1989). In general, policy outcomes are rarely the result of power-free deliberations where the best-supported argument wins, but rather of social bargaining processes between multiple actors (Arts & Buizer, 2009), which deliberation is part of. Moreover, the expert knowledge required to inform policy making is not limited to scientific knowledge, but may also encompass the expertise of societal actors such as NGOs and local knowledge of forest-dependent communities (Kleinschmit et al., 2009).

This study aims to contribute to the understanding of the role of knowledge and deliberation for REDD+ policy decisions in increasingly politically charged contexts. It sets out to identify the multiple actors involved in emerging national REDD+ policy formulation, using Tanzania as a case study, and to analyse their understanding of the policy problem and the appropriate solutions, motivations and strategies in the policy process. Using a Policy Network Analysis approach, the study investigates the impacts of relational and institutional structures, agency, and deliberation on the policy process and its outputs. A particular focus is on the role of actors that function as policy brokers and may potentially enhance knowledge and resource flows among actors, promote closure and achievement of policy decisions, and ultimately, catalyse more legitimate and effective policy outcomes.
2. Conceptual framework

*Actors, networks, and opportunities as elements of a policy process*

Along with a shift from traditional governments towards multi-level, multi-actor governance, recent years have seen the institutionalization of diverse forms of consultation and public participation in policy formulation. Because the state needs technical expertise and local support for effective policy implementation, participatory policy making is increasingly seen a prerequisite for success (Arts, 2012: 4). Policy actors are the multiple individuals and groups that are able pursue their goals, to varying degrees, in relation to a given policy initiative\(^1\).

An increasingly popular and promising approach to study policy processes and outcomes stems from the recognition of interdependencies between policy actors (Arts, 2012). The term ‘policy networks’ is used to describe patterns of communication and resource interdependencies between a bounded set of policy actors. Lasting patterns of interaction form structures that pose both social constraints and opportunities on the actors’ action repertoires in the policy process. A policy domain delineates a system whose members are interconnected by multiple policy networks (Knoke et al., 1996; Knoke, 2011).

The types of relations between policy actors in a given domain may consist of (cf. Knoke et al., 1996: 11): (1) resource networks, which include both material ties (exchanges/sharing of financial support, in-kind support, staff) and informational ties (exchanges of information, advice, expertise, data); (2) networks of meanings (i.e., shared concerns, beliefs/worldviews, discourses); and (3) participation in the same events.

In this study, the focus is on networks formed by organizational actors in the domestic REDD+ policy process. Brass et al. (2004) review antecedents for the formation of interorganizational networks. There may be material motives such as acquiring resources and reducing transaction costs, or strategic motives related to forming alliances and attaining joint goals. Organizations also benefit from networking through learning, which in turn may enhance their performance. Networks have been found to enhance imitation and information diffusion. Trust is manifested in the likelihood of the creation of interorganizational ties through boundary spanning individuals within the organizations. Finally, there is evidence that interorganizational collaborations are more likely if partners have similar status and power (Ostrom, 1990).

Resource mobilization to advance policy goals is a central element in the policy network models (Knoke, 2011). In addition, social movement scholars have drawn attention to the impact of political opportunity on the ability of different actors to influence policy processes and decisions. That is, actors’ prospects for resource mobilization, cultivating certain alliances over others, and the content of their claims and strategies in a policy debate are context-specific. The proponents of this theory strive to draw generalizable conclusions on how political opportunities are organized in time and space as opportunity structures. These include e.g. political openness and opposition as well as cleavages within the ruling elite (Meyer, 2004; Park, 2008). Some scholars also analyse institutional rules (e.g. Ingold & Varone, 2011) and institutionalized venues for communication and resource exchanges (Leifeld & Schneider, 2012) as opportunity structures.

Both the network and opportunity structure theories have been criticized for downplaying the effects of human agency (e.g. Park, 2008). This suggested under-conceptualization concerns both the intentional, creative human action to challenge existing structures and reproduce them, as well as the meanings and

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\(^1\) The broader term ‘stakeholders’ encompasses those who have an interest in particular policy decisions. Policy actors may be considered the subset of stakeholders that can influence a policy decision.
motivations attached to these actions, often with cultural underpinnings (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994). More recent work has intended to fill this gap, although disagreement remains among network analysts (Mische, 2011).

Knowledge and deliberation

There appear to be two approaches to investigating the role of knowledge for policy formation that have gained popularity over others. First, knowledge and expertise may be seen as power resources to legitimize and justify different governance goals and measures (cf. epistemic communities, Haas, 1989), mapping onto the resource mobilization and political bargaining model. Weaker actors that do not have the same access to ‘expert’ knowledge or the capacity to use it as more powerful actors, much less to contest it, are disadvantaged or even effectively disenfranchised in the political struggle (Kleinschmit et al., 2009). Furthermore, actors representing different scientific disciplines or sectors can be seen as political competitors that struggle to be seen as primary definers of problems and providers of scientific expertise to problems (Giessen et al., 2009). Instead of scientific consensus on the best way forward, interdisciplinary conflict may contribute to the complexity faced by policy makers.

The second view, often misconceived as incompatible with the resource interdependency model, is the possibility of decision-making based on argumentation, which was re-introduced to policy theories in the early 1990s (e.g. Fischer & Forester, 1993). Dowding (2008: 150) argues that the reason why Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF; Sabatier, 1987, 1988; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993) has attracted so much interest is because it brought back the concept of ideas and their origins in the study of policy change, all the while being compatible with the bargaining model². Sabatier roots the ways in which different policy actors understand and present policy problems and the appropriate solutions in belief systems. Central to Sabatier’s model is the concept of advocacy coalitions, which are made up of people who share the same normative and causal beliefs and often engage in concerted action. The beliefs consist of core beliefs or worldviews, seen as nearly immutable, and secondary beliefs that are reproduced through policy learning. Policy change is seen to occur through policy learning across coalitions, requiring change in the core beliefs of actors due to accumulated strong evidence.

The emerging field of policy analysis that focuses on the role of ideas, presentations and argumentation in policy processes, and quite explicitly rejects the positivist ontology, may be labelled deliberative policy analysis. The deliberative orientation is argued to respond to the conditions increasingly present in arenas of multi-actor policy making which previous approaches to policy analysis, more tailored to the ‘old fashioned’ government decision making, fail to account for (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). First, it is now widely recognized that the linear model of ‘knowledge for policy’ is not feasible; we are increasingly aware that often policy decisions need to be made despite uncertainty and ambiguity (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003: 10; emphasis added). Rather than choosing which problems to solve and having the luxury to delve into them, policy makers have to manage a multitude of issues imposed upon them (Zahariadis, 1999). Second, it is recognized that the multiple policy actors involved in a given domain make sense of problems and appropriate solutions in varying ways, and that these differences complicate communication and consensus building. Yet, acknowledging the reality of interdependencies, some level of agreement is needed for a policy decision to be made, and the only way to achieve this is through deliberation (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003: 11).

Proponents of deliberative policy analysis draw our attention to frames, social constructs of the issue at hand that exist in the minds of people and in the social organization of which they are part, and affect the ways in which actors speak and behave. They cluster observations, experiences, interests, values and

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beliefs in an attempt to make sense of the world (cf. Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Hajer & Laws, 2006). In policy negotiation processes, conflicting frames become subject to dialogue (Arts & Buizer, 2009). According to Rein (1983, cited in Wagenaar & Cook, 2003), by looking at the actions a policy actor favours, we may discover the implicit frame organizing that action. Similarly, Hajer (1995) roots frames in action by arguing that discourses, which ensemble ideas and concepts, are embedded – produced, reproduced and transformed – in social practices. Hajer (1993, 1995) presents an alternative approach to investigating coalition formation in policy processes. Actors engaging in what he calls discourse coalitions do not necessarily need to share the same beliefs; what are shared are the terms and concepts used to articulate a certain policy problem and/or the appropriate solutions. He introduces the term storylines to describe narratives of social reality in which actors combine ideas, concepts, and categories. Storylines allow actors to expand their discursive competence beyond their own expertise and experience. Through gaining wider acceptance in policy networks, storylines are political devices that can help reduce fragmentation and approach problem closure. Discursive institutionalization happens when the concepts articulated by a coalition come to be acted upon in the policy process, mediated by resource interdependencies (Hajer, 1995). It has been proposed that in order to be successful, a coalition has to dominate the discursive space (Hajer, 1993), exhibit stability and high ideational congruence among its core members, and attract a large constituency (Leifeld & Haunss, 2011).

Brokerage

Policy brokers or entrepreneurs are variously defined in policy literature as exceptional individuals that may have an instrumental impact on the policy process (e.g. Christopoulos & Ingold, 2011). From the network structural perspective, brokers occupy a position that links pairs of otherwise unconnected actors (Gould & Fernandez, 1989). Brokers may offer peripheral actors a vehicle to gain support for their agenda, including feeding new ideas and concepts into the network (Stevenson & Greenberg, 2000), and in boundary-spanning positions between coalitions, mediating between different interests in the policy process (Knöke, 2011). Hence, brokers have the potential to enhance more effective information flow and more equitable participation and decision making. But, brokerage also has potential high pay-offs. Depending on the situation, brokers may either benefit from maintaining gaps between unconnected actors, or from promoting closure (Burt, 2005). Several scholars present brokers as strategic or opportunistic actors mostly driven by self-interests (cf. Christopoulos & Ingold, 2011; Ingold & Varone, 2011).

Christopoulos and Ingold (2011: 39) introduce a useful conceptual distinction between policy brokers and policy entrepreneurs, based on the relational profile and intended behaviour of actors. They leave the concept ‘entrepreneur’ for opportunistic power brokers and manipulators of problematic preferences that are driven by expectations of personal gain. ‘Brokers’ are hypothesized to take on bridging and bonding roles that intend to increase stability and promote closure. Yet, they argue, brokers are strategic and advocate for certain positions, contrary to the previously assumed neutrality associated with mediating roles; if brokers had no self-interest at stake, why would they allocate scarce resources to brokerage activities (also Ingold & Varone, 2011: 4)? How successful brokers and entrepreneurs are depends on the political context (Christopoulos & Ingold, 2011), including institutions (Ingold & Varone, 2011).

Analytical approach and objectives

This study, to an extent, identifies itself with the mainstream tradition of political science in which policy processes are seen as political bargaining “games” between actors mediated by structural elements, be they relational, institutional or opportunity related. But it also follows other recent studies (Healey et al., 2003; Ingold, 2011; Leifeld & Haunss, 2011; Leifeld & Schneider, 2012) in attempting to integrate the analysis of the effects of knowledge, agency and deliberation with the relational and institutional determinants of the policy process.
This goal has implications for the research approach, which integrates quantitative analysis of network structural properties and interpretative study on discourse coalitions in examining the role of knowledge and brokerage for the policy process and its outputs. In doing so, it rejects the often posited incompatibility of quantitative and interpretative methods (cf. Yanow, 2003) and follows others in suggesting that both have their merits, and that a mixed methods approach may be particularly fruitful in network analysis (Edwards, 2010). In this study, it is harnessed to study the impact of actions on policy making; to disclose the frames that order action, while highlighting the structural opportunities and constraints for the action.

The two main objectives of the case study are
(a) to understand the effects of deliberation and agency of discourse coalitions vis-à-vis the relational and institutional context on the REDD+ policy process and its outputs; and
(b) to identify and characterize brokers that are in a position to enhance information flow, public deliberation and closure (and ultimately the legitimacy and effectiveness of REDD+ policy decisions); as well as to highlight the structural opportunities and constraints for their success.

These objectives translate into the following research questions that the study intends to answer:
(A) What characterizes coalitions that gain dominance in the discursive space and achieve discourse institutionalization on REDD+ domestic policy in Tanzania?
(B) Is the success of the coalitions mediated primarily by the relational context (network positions) or political opportunity, including the effect of the institutional context?
(C) What are the relational positions, strategies, and coalition alignment of brokers that successfully advocate for positions that in their view enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of REDD+ policy?

3. Context and methods

Study country: Tanzania

In Tanzania, forests and woodlands cover about 33.5 million hectares. Around two thirds of them are on land with contested status of ownership and management regimes, and are perceived at a high risk of deforestation. REDD+ is seen as a promising way to counter this threat (www.reddtz.org).

The formulation of a national REDD+ strategy is currently underway, facilitated by a specific national Task Force established for the purpose (www.reddtz.org). As an intermediary step, a National REDD Framework (URT, 2009) was developed. “Development of National REDD Strategy is a continuous process involving series of consultations, stakeholders engagement, research and knowledge dissemination” (www.reddtz.org). A draft national REDD+ strategy was made public in January 2011, and inputs were solicited through the website of the Task Force as well as through a series of stakeholder meetings organized in several zones across the country. A second draft of the national strategy, which ought to incorporate the inputs of these consultations, was still pending public release at the time this paper was drafted in May 2012. The period of data collection for this study, February-June 2011, could be characterized as a stage in the policy process in which policy actors were still making sense of the REDD+ policy problem and the various associated policy proposals, at the same time as the Task Force was soliciting comments for the first draft strategy document.

An inclusive, participatory approach to policy making – at least in principle – is relative novel in Tanzania. ‘New modes’ of multi-actor governance (Kronsell & Bäckstrand, 2010) have emerged in recent years in the wake of decentralization reforms in various sectors in the 1990s-early 2000s. These reforms could be seen as a response to both observed shortcomings of centralized governance since
colonial times, and, more pragmatically, to requirements by donors supporting sectoral development. The public consultations in preparation for the land law reforms in the 1990s were hailed as some of the most extensive in the history of Tanzanian policy making (e.g. Coldham, 1995), setting precedence for other policy processes. The REDD+ strategy development, on the outset, intends to follow suit.

The differences among various actors in terms of access to information and knowledge resources are considerable. In this sense, stakeholders to the Tanzanian REDD+ policy process such as rural communities in remote forested areas and government organizations located in the power hub of the capital are in a very different position. It may be assumed that despite efforts to involve various stakeholders in national REDD+ policy process, their resources and influence in policy networks are likely to vary a great deal. Due to lack of material and informational resources, some stakeholders may not turn out to be effective policy actors at all. More powerful actors, with relatively higher capacities to assimilate concepts and discourse related to REDD+ and forest governance in general, in addition to material resources needed for participation and influencing other actors, are likely to dominate the national policy dialogue.

The institutional context should also be kept in mind throughout the analysis. Despite the theoretical opportunities by all to contribute to policy content, in the end there will be no voting on the final content, but ultimately the REDD+ Task Force will decide on the proposal to be put forth to the cabinet and the parliament. This greater institutional predisposition for policy influence by some actors is likely to filter the effects of the relational context and agency of different actors.

Methods

The research approach of this study follows Policy Networks Analysis (PNA). The PNA draws from the principles and methods of Social Networks Analysis (e.g. Scott & Carrington, 2011), with a focus on the quantitative analysis of the impacts of relational constellations among policy actors on the policy process and its outcomes. It allows to

- analyze the structural constraints and opportunities for policy change;
- analyze power relations within policy processes through identification of different roles and levels of influence of actors (Wasserman & Galaskiewicz, 1994).

The first step was to map the core organizational actors in the national REDD+ domain, and the main national policy events and protest events related to the REDD+ policy development. Core organizations were defined as all organizations that consider themselves as part of the REDD policy domain and are perceived by others as such and thus able to influence (to varying degrees) the agenda setting, formulation and implementation of national REDD policies. The main policy events included in the analysis consist of a list of up to five critical, temporally located decision points in a collective decision-making sequence that must occur in order for a policy option to be finally selected. A protest event is a collective, public action regarding issues in which explicit concerns around REDD are expressed as an important dimension, organized by non-state instigators with the explicit purpose of critique or dissent together with societal and/or political demands (Fillieule & Jiménez, 2003: 273).

Based on the knowledge of the researcher and colleagues, preliminary lists of REDD policy actors and key policy and protest events in Tanzania were assembled. Next, a panel of seven key experts in the Tanzanian REDD+ policy domain (Table 1) was consulted through individual discussions to verify the actors and the events. The experts were allowed and encouraged to add relevant actors to the list. To consolidate a feasible sample using the criteria of relevance and potential influence on the Tanzanian national REDD+ process, organizations that had been mentioned three times out of seven or less were

\[3\] vs. ‘policy networks’ as a heuristic device (see e.g. Christopoulos, 2008; Dowding, 2008)
discarded. However, a departure from this rule was the inclusion of three domestic business organizations in the sample in order to maintain private sector representation in the study. In addition, because the actors also had to consider themselves as part of the REDD+ domain, any organization which declined to have an interest in the national REDD+ policy, despite having been considered an actor by the experts, was excluded.

Furthermore, the experts stressed the importance of local level actors, namely District Councils (DC) and Village Councils (VC), which are the lowest official units of government in the Tanzanian decentralized system. Since it was clearly impossible to cover all DC and VC that have a stake or take part in the process, two DC and four VC (two in each sampled district) were included. This small sample was not treated as representative of the two levels of government, and the intention was not to draw any conclusions about the involvement of districts and village councils in the national REDD+ policy process, but to begin to have an idea of the type of issues relevant to stakeholders at these levels. The criteria for selecting the DC and VC were that (a) they were implementing a REDD pilot project, and (b) the pilot project in question had a strong component of knowledge dissemination and awareness raising of REDD processes across levels of governance.

Table 1. Participants of the expert panel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of org.</th>
<th>Civil Society</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Private sector</th>
<th>Academic</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experts consulted</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Next, a social organization survey with high representatives of all core organizational actors on the final consolidated list was conducted. The survey elicited responses in a fixed choice format, covering questions on
a) Organizational beliefs, stances on and meanings attached to REDD4;
b) Partners in different kinds of relationships. The measured relations included
   1. Perceived influence on the domestic REDD+ policy process;
   2. Communication and information exchange on REDD+ policy matters;
   3. Sources of reliable scientific information;
   4. Contribution of substantial funds or in-kind resources5 to other policy actors;
   5. Receipt of substantial funds from other policy actors;
   6. Disagreement on REDD+ issues;
   7. Collaboration on REDD+ policy issues;
c) Participation in the policy and protest events;
d) Organization’s characteristics and resources.

For data on the policy actors’ frames regarding the policy problem and appropriate solutions, and their narratives to describe the same, in-depth interviews were conducted, ideally with the politically most knowledgeable officer of each organization. In most cases, the same person participated in the survey and the in-depth interview. In some cases, a high-ranking official assigned another officer to answer the

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4 Incl. thirty-five pre-defined statements about deforestation and forest degradation globally and nationally, and about potential challenges and policy proposals for REDD+ nationally; respondents signalled disagreement or agreement on a Likert scale 1-5 (0 = no organizational stance).
5 Incl. payments and cost-sharing for services or goods, or voluntary contribution including co-sponsoring of activities of common interest; emphasis on the word substantial to exclude e.g. sporadic contribution of human resources in the form of participation in meetings etc.
survey; in those cases, it was ensured that the respondent was knowledgeable of the REDD+ domain and could speak for the whole organization. The in-depth interviews were based on a semi-structured guide of open-ended questions designed to encourage respondents to talk in some depth about their stances on REDD+ and their strategies of policy action and knowledge sharing. The interviews were recorded and later transcribed for analysis.

Data from the social organization survey was analyzed using the UCINET social network software package, including NetDraw for visualization (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). The qualitative data from the in-depth interviews was coded using the Discourse Network Analyzer (DNA) freeware for qualitative category-based content analysis, which also allows the creation of network files readable by UCINET (Leifeld, 2011).

The obvious weakness of the interview method from a policy process perspective was that data was only collected at one point in time, which does not allow detecting dynamic changes in actor frames, strategies, and relations from one decision point to another. To gain insight into how the actors’ strategies and actions have impacted the course of the policy process and the outputs produced, interview data was complemented by reviewing relevant documents spanning a timeline from the first policy event to May 2012 when this paper was drafted (see Appendix I: Timeline of the national REDD+ policy process in Tanzania). These included official documents released by the government and donors supporting the REDD+ readiness activities, press releases and other statements by civil society actors, public correspondence between actors, and media reports. The same DNA software was used to analyze the content of some of the larger documents.

4. Analysis and findings

Policy actors, policy events and protests events

The organizational composition of the sixty-four policy actors in the Tanzanian REDD+ policy domain that were identified and interviewed is presented in Figure 1. Throughout this paper, the actors are in most cases discussed at the level of their organizational type and by referring to code numbers, in order to maintain their anonymity.
The expert panel acknowledged altogether eight policy events in the national REDD+ policy process. There was a high consensus regarding three of the events, acknowledged by all seven experts; in addition, two events that were mentioned three times were included (Table 2). All the experts considered Policy event no. 1 as the start of the REDD+ policy process: the formal commitment by the government of Norway to support REDD readiness activities, including policy development, in Tanzania. Policy event no. 2 was important in bringing together a number of governmental and non-governmental REDD+ stakeholders. It involved the establishment of the national REDD+ Task Force and the development of an outline for the National Framework for REDD (URT, 2009), which laid out the foundations for the national REDD+ strategy development. Event no. 3, the National Forest Resources Monitoring and Assessment, had been initiated separately from the official REDD+ policy process but was considered highly relevant as the main means to provide the baseline information for REDD monitoring in Tanzania. The importance of policy event number four, the Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP) for the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), for the national REDD+ policy process in Tanzania may be reduced compared to some other countries, since the national policy development was already underway with the Norwegian support. Nevertheless, Tanzania wished to join in the somewhat parallel process for knowledge and experience exchange opportunities with other participating countries. The R-PP was streamlined with the Draft National REDD+ Strategy. It also links to the chain of protest events by civil society organizations (Table 3). The publication of the first Draft National REDD+ Strategy (URT, 2011) was considered one of the most important REDD+ policy events in the country thus far (event no. 5).
Table 2. The relevant REDD+ policy events included in the analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Event name</th>
<th>Proposal / Decision Date</th>
<th>Main decision/ policy proposal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Letter of Intent with Norway regarding REDD</td>
<td>March 2008</td>
<td>Signing of the Letter of Intent on REDD between Tanzania and Norway. Quick-start activities defined: pilot projects, in-depth studies, national REDD strategy development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>NAFORMA</td>
<td>June 2010</td>
<td>National Forest Resources Monitoring and Assessment started with support by the government of Finland.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The three civil society experts in the panel provided information on REDD related protest events in Tanzania. The same experts were also high-ranking officials in the leading organizations of these events. All the protest events that were included in the study (Table 3) were conventional protests, defined as “demands for judicial review, actions such as collective representations to officials or elected politicians, public meetings, leafleting and the collection of signatures on petitions” (Rootes, 2003: 31). These events stemmed from the frustration of a number of civil society organizations (‘CSO’, including national and international NGOs, professional associations and the private sector) who considered that the national REDD strategy development had become an increasingly closed process since the Kibaha conference in early 2009, with few public consultations and a prolonged delay in the publishing of the draft strategy. The core group behind the protest events consisted mostly of NGOs piloting REDD+ projects in different parts of the country with the start-up support by Norway. An umbrella organization for national NGOs working on issues of natural resource governance functioned as the convening actor.

Figure I in Appendix 1 presents the timeline of the national REDD+ policy process in Tanzania, highlighting the key policy and protest events included in the study.
Table 3. The REDD+ protest events included in the analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protest event description</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Links to policy event no.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A group of CSOs submit comments on the Tanzanian R-PP to the FCPF.</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>November 2010</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSOs submit recommendations for the National REDD strategy to the Task Force.</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>November 2010</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSOs sign a statement for the Tanzanian negotiators in the COP 16 in Cancun regarding what a global agreement on REDD+ should look like.</td>
<td>National, International</td>
<td>November 2010</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakfast debate titled “How do we solve the conflicts in the politics of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation?”</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>January 2011</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs piloting REDD+ in Tanzania discuss the draft national REDD+ strategy and draw a statement of key suggestions for improvement, submitted to the Task Force.</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>February 2011</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Non-response was less than five per cent in the structured survey and 23% in the qualitative interviews. In cases in which it was particularly difficult to elicit a response from an actor to our interview requests, the in-depth interview was dropped in order to secure at least the structured survey data (the quantitative network analysis being more sensitive to biases due to missing data). However, this was primarily only done in case of seemingly marginal actors, i.e. actors not receiving ties from other interviewed actors.

**Characterizing the relational context: networks and actor positions**

Data analysis was begun by conducting a number of network level measures regarding the seven relations included in the structured survey (Table 4). These network level measures characterize whole networks and provide an idea of the relational-structural context in which individual policy actors operate.

Table 4. Network level measures (N nodes for all networks = 64).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure/Network</th>
<th>Influential actors</th>
<th>REDD+ information exchange</th>
<th>Sources of reliable scientific information</th>
<th>Resources received from others</th>
<th>Resources contributed to others</th>
<th>Disagreement on REDD+ issues</th>
<th>REDD+ collaboration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralization</td>
<td>0.520</td>
<td>0.452</td>
<td>0.503</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>0.580</td>
<td>0.781</td>
<td>0.987</td>
<td>0.246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.266</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homophily (E-1 index)</td>
<td>0.520</td>
<td>0.485</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.485</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Partitioning variable: organizational type.*
The low overall densities, high centralization and low fragmentation reflect core-periphery structures that especially the networks of influence, communication and collaboration exhibit. That is, there is a core group of densely connected actors (“leaders”), and a periphery of other actors (“followers”) loosely connected to the core and to one another, if at all (Valente, 2010). The relatively higher fragmentation of resource networks is due to the significance of one actor, representing the government of Norway, eclipsing all the rest as a source of REDD+ funding. The high fragmentation of the disagreement network is explained by few interviewees being willing to nominate others that they would disagree with in REDD+ policy issues (although the analysis of frames below demonstrates that disagreements do exist). Homophily, or the tendency of actors to establish ties with others sharing the same attribute (in this case, organizational type) was measured for networks of information and collaboration, and will be discussed in sections 4.3 and 4.5.

The central position of an organization in a network is usually considered a good indicator of power and status. The centrality measures calculated here for the policy actors in the various networks include in-degree (the number of nominations/ties received) and Freeman betweenness (the relative number of times actor $k$ lies on the geodesic linking $j$ and $i$) (Valente, 2010). In-degree is used to measure centrality in networks of influence, sources of scientific information, resources, and disagreement, because of interest in the “popularity” of an organization or the extent to which other actors perceive it relevant. Betweenness is used for the networks of communication and collaboration to detect actors in potentially strategic positions in networks of information and resource flow. In both networks, there was a strong positive correlation (at 0.01 level) between the actor in-degree centrality and betweenness scores.

Table 5 compiles the normalized centrality measures for the top ten most central actors in terms of their perceived influence on domestic REDD+ policy decisions in all networks. Figures 2-7 highlight the positions of the actors in the various networks vis-à-vis their centrality. The same five actors – two government executive departments that comprised two thirds of the national REDD+ Task Force in 2011 (no. 10 and 19), a research organization that functions as the Task Force Secretariat (22), a national university (21), and the foreign government agency representing Norway (59) – are the most central ones in most of the networks. An intergovernmental organization with a large multi-country REDD initiative (52) and two national NGOs (34 and 35) are not far behind.
Table 5. Normalized degree and betweenness centrality of the top 10 most influential actors (as perceived by others) in the Tanzanian REDD+ policy domain.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Influence (in-deg.)</th>
<th>Information sharing (betw.)</th>
<th>Scientific information source (in-degr.)</th>
<th>Resources received (in-degr.)</th>
<th>Resources contributed (in-degr.)</th>
<th>Disagreement (in-degr.)</th>
<th>REDD+ collaboration (betw.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>010 (Gov’t, Task Force)</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>019 (Gov’t, Task Force)</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>022 (Research, Task Force Secretariat)</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>021 (Research)</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>059 (Foreign gov't agency)</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>052 (Intergov't)</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>053 (Intergov't)</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>034 (National NGO)</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>035 (National NGO)</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>054 (Intergov't)</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2. Centrality in the network of perceived influence. The size of a node corresponds to its in-degree centrality.
Figure 3. Centrality in the network of communication and REDD+ information sharing. The size of a node corresponds to its betweenness centrality.

Figure 4. Centrality in the network of sources of reliable scientific information on REDD+. The size of a node corresponds to its in-degree centrality.
Figure 5. Centrality in the network of received resources. The size of a node corresponds to its in-degree centrality.

Figure 6. Centrality in the network of resources contributed to others. The size of a node corresponds to its in-degree centrality.
Figure 7. Centrality in the network of collaboration in REDD+ policy issues. The size of a node corresponds to its betweenness centrality.

The importance of being a central actor for the diffusion of knowledge, ideas and concepts is highlighted by Figure 8. Even the networks in which reciprocated ties might be expected, those of communication and collaboration, exhibit low reciprocity (Table 4). Following Leifeld & Schneider (2012), it was hypothesized that information exchange is not fully reciprocated, because actors that are perceived more influential receive more information ties, or attempts to establish these ties, by other actors. The hypothesis was confirmed by a strong positive correlation (Pearson correlation coefficient 0.8532, significant at 0.005 level) between an actor’s centrality in the network of communication and REDD+ information exchange and that of the network of influence (Figure 8). This may mean that other actors seek out the actors that are perceived influential as sources of information, and it may also mean that central actors have an advantage over others in terms of accessing new information.
Participation in the same events and institutionalized venues for collaboration and communication

Participation in the same events may open opportunities to policy actors for the establishment of new information and resource ties, and ultimately, influence. It was tested whether this was true for the Tanzanian policy actors engaged in the key REDD+ policy and protest events. In addition, the effect of involvement in institutionalized venues for information sharing and collaboration was considered. These included affiliations with (a) the group of NGOs piloting REDD with Norwegian support, (b) NGOs participating in the Forestry Working Group hosted by Tanzania Natural Resources Forum, (c) the national REDD+ Task Force, including the Secretariat, and (d) Development Partners, a group of the main Overseas Development Aid contributors to Tanzania, including foreign government agencies and intergovernmental organizations.

Simple correlations (Table 6) appear to suggest a relationship between formal participation in policy events and collaborative, information and scientific information exchange ties, and protest event participation and information exchange. Scientific information exchange and affiliation with the above collaboration venues is correlated with REDD+ information exchange and collaboration.
Table 6. Correlations between networks of information and collaboration, and participation in policy events and venues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Collaboration</th>
<th>Information exchange</th>
<th>Scientific information exchange</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jaccard coefficient, Sig.</td>
<td>Jaccard coefficient, Sig.</td>
<td>Jaccard coefficient, Sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in policy events (formal participation)*</td>
<td>0.183 0.000**</td>
<td>0.240 0.000**</td>
<td>0.128 0.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in protest events*</td>
<td>0.082 0.011</td>
<td>0.092 0.001**</td>
<td>0.025 0.548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in other venues for collaboration*</td>
<td>0.151 0.000**</td>
<td>0.144 0.000**</td>
<td>0.062 0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific information exchange*</td>
<td>0.271 0.000**</td>
<td>0.258 0.000**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- *Dichotomized relations: any shared event/structure=1, no shared events/structures=0.
- o Transposed data, directed tie from sender to receiver of scientific information.

However, performing a multiple regression analysis in an attempt to predict one relation knowing the other weakens these associations (Table 7). Shared organizational type is included as an independent variable.
Table 7. Multiple regression quadratic assignment procedure for networks of collaboration, information exchange, and scientific information exchange (number of permutations for each model: 2000).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: collaboration</th>
<th>R-square Adj R-Sqr Probability</th>
<th>0.088 0.087 0.000 # of Obs 4032</th>
<th>Un-stdized Coefficient</th>
<th>Stdized Coefficient</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Proportion as Large</th>
<th>Proportion as Small</th>
<th>Std Err</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in other venues for collaborationa</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.00**</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in policy eventsa</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.00**</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in protest eventsa</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational type</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.00**</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: Information exchange</th>
<th>R-square Adj R-Sqr Probability</th>
<th>0.125 0.124 0.000 # of Obs 4032</th>
<th>Un-stdized Coefficient</th>
<th>Stdized Coefficient</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Proportion as Large</th>
<th>Proportion as Small</th>
<th>Std Err</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in other venues for collaborationa</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in policy eventsa</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.00**</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in protest eventsa</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational type</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.00**</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: Scientific information sharinga</th>
<th>R-square Adj R-Sqr Probability</th>
<th>0.044 0.043 0.000 # of Obs 4032</th>
<th>Un-stdized Coefficient</th>
<th>Stdized Coefficient</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Proportion as Large</th>
<th>Proportion as Small</th>
<th>Std Err</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in other venues for collaborationa</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in policy eventsa</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.00**</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in protest eventsa</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational type</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Valued relations: no. of shared opportunity structures (1-2) or shared events (1-5).

It may be concluded that formal participation in the same policy events increases the likelihood of collaboration, information sharing, and scientific information exchange; and that participation in the same institutionalized venues for collaboration increases the likelihood of collaboration. Shared organizational type also appears to be a predictor of collaboration and information exchange. To contrast the last result, it should be noted that the degree of organizational homophily for these networks is low (Table 4). That is, at the level of whole networks, actors are not especially prone to seeking relations with others sharing the same organizational type. This is related to the core-periphery structures which span actors of several organizational types.
Overall, there was a high consensus among the survey respondents and in-depth interviewees regarding REDD+ as an appropriate policy instrument to address deforestation and forest degradation (Figure II, Appendix 2). Most of them also agreed with such normative expectations as the need for REDD+ to deliver co-benefits for biodiversity and poverty reduction (Figure III, Appendix 2). Furthermore, there was broad consensus regarding the main challenges for achieving an effective REDD+ policy in Tanzania (Table 8; Figure IV, Appendix 2). Divergence of stances was evident only when it came to the appropriate mechanisms to arrange REDD+ financial flows and rewarding for emission reductions (Figure 8; Figure V, Appendix 2).

Table 8. The main challenges for achieving an effective national REDD+ policy in Tanzania mentioned by in-depth interview participants (coded qualitative data).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main challenge for REDD+</th>
<th>All interviewees (n=35)</th>
<th>Government and donor (n=12)</th>
<th>Others (n=23)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy structure: charcoal</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor inter-sectoral engagement and coordination</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor awareness and understanding of REDD as concept and opportunity</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclear land, forest and carbon tenure</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global uncertainty over REDD</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic structure: agriculture</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlling leakage</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor coordination of current and past policy efforts</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An analysis of the storylines that the various stances are part of, and the actors who ‘utter’ these storylines (Hajer, 1995) explains why there appears to be widespread consensus or closure regarding the key issues, some of them predominantly normative (e.g., benefits for people and biodiversity), some backed by a number of research studies and policy analyses (e.g., the significance of the energy and agricultural drivers of deforestation), but fragmentation regarding the appropriate policy responses. Next, the actors behind the polarizing policy proposals are identified, discussing the underlying frames that favour certain actions.
Figure 9. Stances by actors, grouped according to organizational type, regarding the statement “All REDD accounting and payments should go through the national governments”. Key: 1 – Strongly disagree; 2 – Disagree; 3 - Neither agree nor disagree; 4 – Agree; 5 – Strongly agree.

Although there is a weakness in the formulation of the question depicted in Figure 8, lumping accounting and rewarding in the same statement, it captures the main disagreement between what may be identified as two opposing discourse coalitions in the Tanzanian REDD+ policy domain. That is, there were (mostly) government actors who considered all REDD+ accounting and rewarding best handled at the national level by the central government, and those who feared that a national reward mechanism – more concretely, a national REDD+ trust fund – would impede the REDD+ benefits from reaching those who incur costs from forest emission reductions, i.e. forest adjacent rural communities. The difference between the organizational groups in Figure 8 was significant (1-way ANOVA, F=3.13, Sig. at 0.005 level).

A negative stance towards a national REDD+ trust fund was more prevalent among those actors who had participated in protest events than those who had not (1-way ANOVA, F=19.38, Sig. at 0.005 level). As previously described, these actors were mostly domestic and international NGOs piloting REDD+ projects in various parts of Tanzania, with support by the Norwegian REDD+ readiness funding. They initially came together for sharing experiences and knowledge, but found that they all shared a frustration with the sluggish government-led national REDD+ policy process, which led to their mobilization and the protest events. This group exhibits a stable core of actors across the protest events (Appendix 3), which has been suggested as one of the determining characteristics of a discourse coalition (Leifeld & Haunss, 2011). The leading actors of this coalition are among the most central actors of the Tanzanian REDD+ domain (organizations no. 34 and 35, Table 5). Their arguments were centred on the importance of communities’ rights to carbon benefits and participation; i.e. strong normative notions regarding the importance of issues of fairness for the domestic REDD+ policy, consistent with the main demands of the protest events. They also saw REDD+ as a chance to finally channel significant rewards for forest management to local communities, as opposed to the long-prevailing idea in the forestry sector regarding local responsibilities to participate in forest management, with or without compensation. Hence REDD+ was also seen as an opportunity to improve the effectiveness of management through increased incentives.
Most members of this “protest coalition” were for a national accounting approach, considered necessary to tackle leakage of deforestation from areas under REDD+ regimes to other forest areas. They did not consider that national level accounting and a centralized approach to benefit sharing should go hand in hand. “We’re not opposed to a national accounting system. We think there should be a national accounting system. But what we’re opposed to is a national reward system. And the reason being that there’s no history in Tanzania of a national government capturing basically rewards from natural resources at the national level, and then taking them to communities” (interview, domestic NGO representative, 30 March 2011). “… from our past experience, in debt collection in this country it is always the treasury, for it to come to the communities is close to impossible. If it comes, it is really very small” (interview, domestic NGO representative, 20 April 2011). Hence the protests against a national level reward mechanism appeared to stem from a frame of ineffective and unfair centralized benefit sharing, based on previous experience (cf. TFWG, 2010). A related feature in the covert opinions of civil society actors and also some donor agencies – hinted at in the interviews despite officially generally positive stances on REDD – was REDD+ as a potential threat to communities’ land and forest rights that the legal reforms of the late 1990s aimed to secure; an incentive for recentralization and government appropriation of resources.

A positive stance towards a centralized system of accounting and rewarding was, as mentioned above, associated with government organizations, including the members of the national REDD+ Task Force, two of them considered the most central actors in the whole REDD+ domain (Table 5). The discourse of these actors was also littered with references to equity and fairness of benefit sharing, and the need for REDD+ to produce co-benefits for poverty reduction and biodiversity. But while the “protest coalition” members were explicit about their fairness goals, what appeared to drive these government actors were mainly concerns over fulfilment of technical qualifications for international REDD+ funding. Like the opposing coalition, they stressed REDD+ as an opportunity to secure long-term funding for forest management, but with emphasis on addressing national level priorities. “Tanzania has a lot of areas set aside as reserves and most are the forest but…. we have been participating in conserving the forest of course without any reward, from our understanding that natural resources, particularly forest, are very important for the good environment, you see. But now there is this chance, after Kyoto protocol, there is this chance where people dealing with conservation, forest planting, forest… they will be rewarded something” (interview, member of the Task Force, 22 March 2011). In their arguments, the government had a key role as an intermediary between the local sellers of carbon credits and the international market. “We don’t want… after all there is no deadline, why don’t we have a good mechanism so that we move with our people, if there is any advantage then let them get that advantage, but don’t just rush to open up and people will be cheated, and will end up as a loser, not the government but people will be losing, and of course, those who are ruling, they will be… people will get angry to the people who are in position, so we didn’t want that” (interview, member of the Task Force, 22 March 2011). Thus, while seen as a covert attempt at recentralization by some of the CSOs, the push for centralized accounting and rewarding by the government actors may also be ordered by a frame of the government being held accountable for failing to protect local interests (and the associated potential political defeat). In fact, the government has recently been accused of exactly that, in relation to land grabbing by foreign investors (cf. TNRF et al., 2012).

It must be re-iterated that while we talk about a “protest coalition” mainly drawing members from the civil society, especially those involved in the protest events, and a “government coalition” including the 2011 Task Force members, based on the core frames of the core actors, the boundaries of these two discourse coalitions are loose and do not fully match with our (imposed) typology of organizational types. As Table 9 below demonstrates, there was considerable variation within the organizational groupings regarding the key issues that they promoted in the national REDD+ policy development. For example, some government executive departments would have liked to see different structures of rewarding and accounting in Zanzibar and the Tanzanian mainland, and were for a nested approach. One big
international conservation organization differed from the rest of the NGOs in supporting a national approach, despite having participated in the protest events. A considerable number of actors stated that they had no specific goals that they were actively promoting, especially the academic and research organizations (Table 9). These organizations cannot be easily mapped as part of any discourse coalition.

Table 9. Main goals of the various organizational policy actors regarding the national REDD+ policy (percentage of actors within each organizational grouping that mentioned the goal).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational goal regarding national REDD+ policy</th>
<th>District, village council (n=6) %</th>
<th>Gov't executive dept (n=15) %</th>
<th>Research/educational (n=4) %</th>
<th>National NGO (n=14) %</th>
<th>Business (national/foreign, n=4) %</th>
<th>Int'l NGO (n=7) %</th>
<th>Inter-gov't (n=5) %</th>
<th>Foreign gov't agency (n=4) %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equity in REDD+ benefit sharing</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nested approach to benefit-sharing</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective MRV system</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity in participation in REDD+ policy formulation and implementation</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector participation in REDD+ policy formulation and implementation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More capacity building on REDD+ for all actors</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and biodiversity safeguards</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDD+ as part of holistic climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National approach to accounting and benefit-sharing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarified land, forest and carbon tenure</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectively addressing drivers of DD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved forest governance</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compatibility of REDD+ with sectoral planning</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender equity in REDD+ participation and benefit sharing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land use planning as part of REDD+</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration to carbon markets</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest conservation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous people's rights</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest certification</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No specific organizational goals</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note: coded data, responses to open-ended survey questions regarding key policy proposals and goals in the protest events. Only the interviewed actors have been included.

Unpacking the concept of “governance” in Tables 8 and 9 helps understanding how the storylines of the different policy actors assemble ideas of the current challenges. The most salient governance concerns for the REDD+ policy among all in-depth interviewees were related to rent-seeking on different levels of government. The extent of governance shortfalls in the forestry sector, particularly in relation to illegal logging in the Southern part of the country, was exposed in a report by TRAFFIC and partners in 2007 (Malledge et al., 2007). The report was widely endorsed, and it is hard for any actor, including the government, to deny the existence of this problem. Other challenges mentioned – frequently in relation to the first issue – could be categorized as concerns over transparency in decision-making and implementation, non-implementation of laws and policies, and distrust between the authorities and the public. CSO and donor actors tended to link non-implementation with rent-seeking and elite capture in their arguments, whereas it was predominantly associated with resource shortages in the government actors’ narratives.

A governance-related concern, separated as a category in Table 8, was that of unclear land, forest, and carbon tenure (see also Table 9). On the CSO side, this was mainly seen to be related to varying interpretations of the land and forest laws, considered progressive on paper but poorly implemented. The operationalization of the different legal land categories in the REDD+ policy, with important implications for benefit sharing and especially for the communities’ access to benefits, had become the focus of targeted advocacy efforts (Table 9; TFCG & MJUMITA, 2011). The government actors also mentioned the land tenure situation as a challenge (Table 8), but for a different reason. To them, government ownership over land was unquestioned (contrary to spirit of the decentralized policies and CSO claims), so which legal provisions to draw from when planning benefit sharing? The refusal to acknowledge communities’ lands and treating them as general lands under the central government (cf. TFCG & MJUMITA, 2011) appeared to stem from an equation of common pool resource management with open access. “Here we have another challenge where, when you have something for community, communal land, it belongs to nobody except for… communal […] Now, collective, to have collective responsibility, for community members to make sure that this is ours, it is also very difficult, and that’s why you see forest in Tanzania, where you have the public forest, that is where all this problem of encroachment, deforestation, that is where it is taking place. Because it is communal, it is public land, public forest, so even communal, once it belongs to nobody…” (interview, member of the Task Force, 22 March 2011). This also seemed to be related to the distrust between levels of governance, especially the central government and village communities, in resource management, as suggested by the CSOs.

Comparing the REDD+ discourses of the two coalitions on the whole, that of the “protest coalition” was characterized by strong, concise messages, focusing on communities’ rights and the need for social and environmental safeguards to ensure the effectiveness and legitimacy of REDD+ schemes (interview data; cf. REDD Pilot Projects, 2011; TFWG, 2009, 2010). A salient feature in the discourse of the “government coalition”, in turn, was the highlighting of ambiguity, describing REDD+ as something new and not yet entirely within the grasp of most national policy actors as a concept and a policy problem. “We don’t know where we are going, when we are going conclude the negotiation under REDD, how REDD is going to be implemented, and if you think about REDD you can find, you can meet a lot of questions, and some of the questions they have no answers” (interview, member of the Task Force, 22 March 2011). In contrast, according to the Executive Summary of the second draft National REDD+ Strategy (URT, 2011: 6), the ‘preliminary analytical phase’ of policy development had already been completed by the time the interviews were carried out.
**Knowledge pathways and brokerage**

As part of the preliminary analytical phase of the national REDD+ strategy development, the Task Force commissioned a number of in-depth studies on various aspects of REDD+ policy options, specifically regarding the Tanzanian context, in 2010\(^6\). In spite of this, and the REDD+ communication and information sharing network that all of the surveyed organizations were part of (Figure 3), half of the in-depth interviewees considered access to REDD relevant knowledge a challenge for effectively participating in the policy process. The relevant knowledge did not only include scientific or research-based knowledge; in fact, the majority of the survey respondents (63%), including members of both discourse coalitions, were in agreement that scientific experts were not the best and final authority on REDD+. Research-based knowledge was only ranked first in terms of relevance for REDD+ policy decisions by the research organizations (n=4) and international NGOs (n=6) among the respondents. Half of the government organizations (n=10) valued local knowledge the most, whereas the national NGOs (n=9) rated practical knowledge, accumulated through their own work, the highest\(^7\). The other organizational groupings were more spread out in their rankings. It could be speculated that the core actors of both coalitions considered the key policy issues ‘un-scientific’ and more in the realm of political bargaining; i.e., research might provide inputs for the arguments of the policy actors, but does not play a definite role for policy decisions. “REDD is based on community participation rather than scientific findings” (national NGO representative, 4 April 2011). It was also lamented that most scientists involved were natural scientists with little understanding of the social-political ramifications of REDD+. Hence the role of scientific experts seemed to have been reserved for the technical issues related to monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV). “Reference levels are technical and it is the domain of experts” (REDD consultant, national private business, 8 April 2011). When the survey respondents were asked if scientific experts dominated the national REDD+ policy discussion, less than half (44%) responded in the affirmative, with no significant differences among the organizational groupings or discourse coalitions.

Yet, when the survey respondents were asked to indicate which sources of information their organizations regularly/routinely relied on to enhance their understanding of REDD+ and base their actions on, a majority indicated scientific articles, among a number of other sources (Table 10).

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\(^6\) Available on [www.reddtz.org](http://www.reddtz.org) (29 May, 2012)

\(^7\) Survey respondents were asked to rank different knowledge types in their order of relevance for REDD+ policy decisions. The types were defined as ‘Local knowledge’: anchored in a certain local context, incl. traditional knowledge; ‘Practical knowledge’ of societal actors accumulated e.g. through project implementation; ‘Political knowledge’: experience of previous policy processes; and ‘Research-based knowledge’, incl. scientific knowledge: follows a scientific method acknowledged by peers (van Kerkhoff & Lebel, 2006)
Table 10. Sources of REDD+ relevant knowledge\(^a\) among the survey respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>All actors (%, n=46(^\circ))</th>
<th>Organizations with a REDD+ knowledge dissemination mission (%, n=28)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct stakeholder consultations and discussion forums</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific articles</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research reports</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-house expertise and research</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media: newspapers, TV, radio, documentaries etc.</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local communities</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email lists and online forums</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External key experts and advisors</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Specifically mentioned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research reports from (times mentioned)</th>
<th>External experts (times mentioned)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Website reddtz.org and in-depth studies commissioned by the national Task Force (4)</td>
<td>US-based NGO-affiliated experts (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIFOR (3)</td>
<td>UK and US-based academics (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFCCC, IPCC (2)</td>
<td>National academics (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International research projects with Tanzanian partners (2)</td>
<td>UN (UN-REDD, FAO, UNDP-GEF), FCPF (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National universities (2)</td>
<td>CGIAR (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign government agencies (2)</td>
<td>NORAD (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other international organizations, each mentioned once (5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Question in a fixed-choice format, with a request to mention additional sources as pertinent.

\(^\circ\) Note the difference to N total survey respondents: only actors with a strong REDD+ knowledge dissemination mission were requested to answer the question, but some others did, too.

Among the surveyed organizations, 28 had a specific mission of facilitating the diffusion of REDD+ relevant knowledge among national REDD+ policy stakeholders, and 12 of them considered themselves government advisors in REDD+ policy issues. When inquired about their motives, the vast majority (93\%) of these 28 actors indicated that locally felt problems, based on empirical consultations, determined the focus of their knowledge dissemination efforts\(^8\). The global policy agenda and processes were also relevant to 79\% of them. Half of them were influenced by the interests of the scientific community, 46\% by knowledge requests by partners, and 43\% by requirements by donors. The concrete activities\(^9\) undertaken in order to link knowledge to the action of policymaking are presented in Table 11.

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\(^8\) Question in a fixed-choice format, with a request to mention additional factors as pertinent.

\(^9\) As previous.
Table 11. Activities undertaken by actors with a REDD knowledge dissemination mission in order to inform the REDD+ policy process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>%, n=28</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Re-packaging information so that it is easier disclosed to wider audiences, for example through reports, pamphlets, posters, press releases, email newsletters etc.</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal discussions with key persons/organizations</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convening meetings and establishing forums for dialogue</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizing training</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitating cooperation and data exchange</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publishing research results in scientific journals</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding others to undertake the above</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brokerage analyses (Gould & Fernandez, 1989) revealed that few of these organizations with a REDD+ knowledge mission were actually occupying strategic positions in the networks of REDD+ communication and information, or of REDD+ scientific information flows\(^\text{10}\). The focus was on identifying actors connecting organizations in different groups from the broker itself (‘consultant’; ‘liaison’ when the connected actors also belong to different groups from each other) as well as brokers that could be considered ‘representatives’ of their own groups, functioning as contacts with outsiders (Gould & Fernandez, 1989).

Figures 10 – 11 present actors in ‘liaison’\(^\text{11}\) roles in the networks of REDD+ communication and information exchange and REDD+ scientific information exchange, with organizational type as the grouping attribute.

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\(^{10}\) Treated as directed networks, considering that an information tie from actor A to actor B requires intentional action by actor A.

\(^{11}\) Results for ‘consultant’ roles were very similar.
Many of the same actors that had been previously identified as central in this network (Table 5, Figure 3) occupied strategic positions as a ‘liaison’ in the network of communication and REDD+ information exchange (Figure 10). They included one of the governmental members of the national REDD+ Task Force (no. 10), the foreign government agency representing Norway (59), two national NGOs (34 and 35), the Task Force Secretariat (22), and an intergovernmental organization (52).
In the network of scientific information flow (Figure 11), the REDD Task Force Secretariat, a research institute embedded in a national university, emerged in a liaison role overwhelmingly more times than any other actor. In addition to functioning as the Secretariat, with formal responsibilities over REDD+ information dissemination, it was also conducting REDD+ related research in Tanzania, and involved in consultancies and capacity-building on REDD+.

In the following figures, actors are highlighted in the network of REDD+ communication and information sharing according to their position regarding the polarizing issue of a national vs. nested approach to REDD+ benefit sharing, and their role as a ‘representative’ of others sharing the same position (Figures 12) or as a ‘liaison’ between different groups (Figures 13).
Figure 12. Network of communication and REDD+ information exchange. Size of the node reflects the times an actor is in a representative role between actors advocating for different approaches to REDD+ benefit sharing.
Figure 13. Network of communication and REDD+ information exchange. Size of the node reflects the times an actor is in a liaison role between actors advocating for different approaches to REDD+ benefit sharing.

Another way of looking at actor strategic positions in networks is through investigating how likely they are to form ties with other actors belonging to the same group according to a pre-defined attribute. These measures of homophily for the key actors, identified through centrality and brokerage measures, are presented in Table 12, with organizational type as the partitioning variable.

Table 12. Homophily (E-1 score) for key actors in networks of REDD+ communication and information sharing, collaboration and scientific information flows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization, code no.</th>
<th>Communication and REDD+ information</th>
<th>REDD+ collaboration</th>
<th>Scientific information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>0.543</td>
<td>0.895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>-0.600</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>-1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>0.833</td>
<td>0.786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td>0.579</td>
<td>0.778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: -1: maximum homophily and +1: max heterophily. Partitioning variable: organizational type.

What the homophily scores tell us is that overall, the key actors are not specifically prone to limiting information exchange and collaboration within their own organizational groupings (except for the government Task Force member no. 19). On the contrary, they highlight the role of these actors in connecting to various groups, as is also supported by the brokerage measures (Figures 10 – 13).
Qualitative analysis of the knowledge pathways of the key actors supported the notion of their heterophily regarding organizational affiliation. One of the most central government actors in all networks (and see brokerage roles in Figures 10, 12 and 13), no. 10, referred to a long list of regular organizational sources of REDD+ relevant knowledge, including national academic institutions, domestic and international NGOs implementing REDD+ pilot projects, and multilateral projects and organizations (though none of them outside of the domestic REDD+ policy domain). The numerous sources were explained by the current situation of ambiguity and complexity in which a lot of learning was going on and it was desirable draw from as many sources as possible. “We are not yet in a situation to say some information is not relevant” (in-depth interview, 26 April 2011). The other government Task Force member, no. 19, which held a central position in the network of collaboration but not in the communication network (Table 5), described a smaller pool of sources of REDD+ policy relevant knowledge. It mostly consisted of organizational sources based in Tanzania, but also included scientific articles, IPCC reports, and study tours to Norway, Brazil and Australia that the bilateral cooperation with Norway had enabled.

The Norwegian government representative emerged in a key liaison position between different organizational groups (Figure 10) as well as a neutral liaison between the coalitions for a national and a nested approach in the communication network (Figure 13). This observation may be unsurprising considering their established formal links to a number of core actors through financing of the national REDD+ strategy development and the REDD+ pilot projects. This actor utilized a variety of international knowledge sources in addition to the Tanzanian experiences that were to inform the policy process.

The national REDD+ Task Force Secretariat was overwhelmingly salient as a broker in the scientific information network (Figure 11), and also prominent as a liaison between those favouring a national approach and those advocating for a nested approach. In the survey, it maintained a neutral position towards the majority of the issues, including the question of nested vs. national approach in REDD+ benefit sharing. Yet, it was perceived as taking sides by the CSOs, the representatives of which doubted its capacity or willingness to pass on their views and ideas to the Task Force. At the same time, it was applauded by some actors as very successful in mediating between the different government agencies involved. Holding strategic positions in the networks, it stands to benefit from maintaining its official role as the REDD+ policy process facilitator.

The national NGOs no. 34 and 35 emerged as key players in the network of REDD+ communication and information exchange, and representatives of the discourse coalition for community rights and nested approach to benefit sharing. Despite their focus on domestic REDD+ issues and being very orientated towards local challenges in natural resource governance, they had been actively part of many international research and advocacy collaborations during the whole timeline of the REDD+ policy process. This, together with a large constituency domestically (especially no. 35 as an umbrella organization by definition), might work to legitimize their knowledge and discourse. They were also well connected to other central players as part of the core structures in the networks. Collaboration with and inclusion by government actor no. 10 is likely to have helped their positions in the REDD+ domain, in addition to the deliberate advocacy efforts through the protest events.

Deliberative quality of the policy process

In spite of the official goal of an interactive, participatory REDD+ strategy development process, the majority of the interviewees (excluding representatives of government organizations) saw shortcomings in the consultations and integration of the different viewpoints into policy development. The most frequently mentioned concerns were related to the representation of the voices of the forest-adjacent communities that REDD will affect. It was suggested that the zonal consultations which gathered participants from some civil society organizations and regional and district governments, but not all, and virtually none from the community level, missed out on the largest segment of REDD+ stakeholders in
the country. The timing and the modalities of the zonal consultations only a couple of months after the first draft national REDD+ strategy had been released were also criticized. “...We have no opportunities for in-depth discussions with anybody of consequence. Because the timing and the venues and the processes used in this discussion are so superficial... it’s very large groups, it’s very rushed, issues are sort of noted and then they disappear. You don’t feel that there is a serious in-depth debate that engages societal actors [...] When I contrast that to the quality of the debate that we have had between each other as civil society organizations, you can’t say the same thing in consultations on the national process, there is no space for that” (international NGO representative, March 14, 2011). Many of the interviewees were not aware of the zonal consultations, including representatives of one of the most central organizations (Table 5). At the same time, difficulties in engaging all relevant actors out of such an enormous pool of national stakeholders were sympathized with. It was stated that the only thing to do was to continue the consultations at all levels while investing heavily in awareness raising on REDD+. “You could poke holes in the current consultation process, too, until you’re tired basically. If I look at the bigger picture and compare it with other policy processes, it’s certainly far stronger. Where it needs to build now is to be kind of more holistic [...] The Task Force I know are thinking the same way. But it needs to be realized” (foreign government representative, April 6, 2011).

Whether the CSO actors were cognitively aware of their positions in the networks – some of which appear very conducive for influence – or not, most of them, especially the national NGOs and businesses, were very pessimistic about their chances of influencing the policy process and content. The government discourse of ambiguity was seen as both a window of opportunity, as well as a challenge for meaningful deliberation. “No, I don’t think they [CSO inputs] have been seriously considered, but on the other hand they have not been rejected, either. I think they have been shelved for dealing with later [...] My hope is, for example, the governance technical working group which is supposed to be dealing with safeguards could be a very interesting venue to insert ideas and watch them trickle up” (international NGO representative, March 14, 2011). “It [first draft national REDD+ strategy] is very bland and broad, when clearly, when we have conversations with them [Task Force members], you can see that they have very strong viewpoints on the way that things should be done, and yet, those viewpoints are not being put in an official, public way in which you could actually challenge them and make comments on them” (national NGO representative, 30 March 2011).

Recent developments in the policy process

Following repeated demands by the CSOs to broaden the organizational base of the national REDD+ Task Force, and the notions shared by various policy actors regarding weak intersectoral coordination in the Tanzanian REDD+ policy process (cf. Table 8), the Task Force was expanded in February 2012. It now consists of six new governmental members (organizations no. 3, 5, 6, and 9 in this report, as well as two other ministries not included in the analysis) and one CSO member (34), in addition to the original three governmental members (4, 10, and 19). The CSO member was elected through online voting by the member organizations of the Tanzania Forestry Working Group and the REDD pilot projects, among candidates proposed by the same organizations. This process formalized the strategic position of organization 34 as the representative of the CSO voices, already reflected in the network data from 2011 (Table 5; Figures 3, 7, 10, 12).

Convened during 2011 and officially launched at the same time with the expanded Task Force, special ‘Thematic Working Groups’ have begun working on five thematic areas with the purpose of providing technical knowledge for the national REDD+ strategy development. These include

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12 The author observed the process through subscribing to the email lists but did not take part in the voting which was restricted to the member organizations only.
While the organizational members of the working groups have not been publicly disclosed, the members were said to have been “nominated by their respective institutions and comprised of the government, research and academia, private sectors and civil society organizations” (National REDD+ Secretariat, 2012: 2).

The expansion of the Task Force, and the composition and thematic areas of the Working Groups, map onto the main concerns of the policy actors regarding challenges for REDD+ in Tanzania (Table 8). The full second draft of the national REDD+ strategy, which ought to incorporate the various stakeholder views from the consultations in 2011, was not yet publicly available at the time this paper was drafted. Hence the content of an Executive Summary of the draft, dated November 2011 (URT, 2011), was analyzed in terms of the salience of the key concepts promoted by the different coalitions. Issues of governance and tenure feature extensively; several propositions to decrease perverse incentives and elite capture of REDD+ benefits, and to scale up the implementation of the decentralized land and forest policies, including building local government and communities’ capacities, have been included. Safeguards, advocated for by the CSOs, are explicitly referred to various times in the draft strategy summary (including goals for developing a national safeguards framework and implementing Strategic Environmental and Social Impact Assessments), in addition to being the focus of one of the Working Groups. At the same time, the position that the majority of the forests are currently situated on general land, and open access, remains in the strategy summary document (URT, 2011: 2). There appears to be a focus on launching more studies on the relevant institutional arrangements for REDD+ and land tenure systems [although at the same time, an output ‘REDD+ related land tenure system in place and operational by 2012’ is included (URT, 2011: 16)], despite previous studies during the official ‘analytic phase’ of policy development, and the CSO suggestions that the current system just needs to be better implemented.

Furthermore, it seems clear from the Financial Mechanism Working Group title and the draft strategy summary that the Task Force will push on with the idea of a centralized REDD+ trust fund, envisioned to be in place by the end of 2012 (URT, 2011: 12). The establishment of the REDD+ trust fund is supposed to include the assessment of “the performance of past forest revenue management systems, benefit sharing and incentive schemes” (URT, 2011: 8).

Recently, the parliament has requested information on REDD from the Task Force to “better inform high level debate and decision making” (TNRF, 2012). This could be an indication that while still dominated by government executive officials, CSOs and the donor community, the REDD+ policy debate might soon move to the legislative arena.

5. Discussion

The two main inter-organizational constellations with a strong interest in the Tanzanian REDD+ policy domain may be best described as loose discourse coalitions (Hajer, 1995), with considerable conceptual overlap in their arguments regarding the policy problem. The characteristics and strategies of the “protest coalition”, a group of CSOs behind the protest events, also resemble those of an advocacy coalition (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993): a group of actors that share strong normative beliefs and repeatedly act in concert to promote their discourse. Szarka (2004) has suggested that advocacy coalitions may be
treated as a subset of discourse coalitions, which seems like an adequate description of the current situation. The other coalition, centred in the original national REDD+ Task Force members and characterized by a vision of a strong government role, appears not driven by shared core beliefs as such, but more pragmatic concerns over implementing their executive roles. In dealing with ambiguity, the government coalition draws from the same concepts as the other coalition, but without a clearly shared understanding of those concepts. The storylines of most members of this loose discourse coalition are not as coherent and consistent as those of the CSOs.

Although the individual members of the protest coalition were cynical about their chances of influencing the REDD+ policy process and policy content, it appears that through persistent efforts to publicize the policy process, they have gained discursive space from the government organizations. The core frames of their discourse – equity in participation and benefit sharing, operationalized through attention to rights and safeguards – are so salient on the global REDD+ policy agenda that it is impossible for the opposing coalition to sideline them without risking loss of support domestically and internationally. As a result, both coalitions draw from the same pool of concepts, but it could be argued that the protest coalition does it more convincingly and effectively. By doing so, the CSOs have forced themselves into the policy arena, and become officially recognized core participants, pushing for the enhanced legitimacy of the policy.

It is noteworthy that the strategic positions of the core members of the current “protest coalition” in the relational space extend beyond the REDD+ policy process to a broader national deliberation on forest governance. Furthermore, they have long established connections to the global advocacy community on forest governance and REDD+. It is plausible that the success of this coalition in gaining discursive space would have been more limited if all members of the coalition had been peripheral actors to start with.

The limits to discursive gain by the protest coalition are apparent in the issue of centralized benefit sharing. It seems clear that the Task Force is fully committed to the idea of a centralized REDD+ trust fund and will continue to push it. It may be the right time to focus advocacy efforts on issues where some conceptual agreement exists, at least superficially or to a certain degree, concentrating on achieving concrete commitments to secure communities’ rights to benefits and social and environmental safeguards. The government coalition may be avoiding these commitments by maintaining a discourse of ambiguity, even when there is relevant evidence, but it will have less and less space to do so when faced with consistent, publicized demands.

Despite both main coalitions being represented in the core REDD+ policy structures, the inclusiveness and legitimacy of the process may still be questioned. Private sector, apart from REDD consultants, is virtually absent in the policy networks. And how effective are the CSOs in truly representing the interests of the rural population that stands to lose most from REDD related forest access restrictions? Assessing the quality of this representation will be crucial. The local governments and villages included in the analysis, while showing ideational congruence with the CSOs (Figure 9, Table 9), are only linked to the broader policy networks through the REDD piloting NGO in their area (Figures 3 and 10). After all, the frames by the CSOs on risks associated with national rewarding, as well as those anticipated in relation to direct subnational market linkages by the government, are both based on previous experience. It could be argued that neither approach is objectively “fairer” than the other, and that similar assumptions of transparency and accountability hold regarding the two.

The policy actors that emerge as key brokers in the networks are mostly domestic organizations. Although informing the REDD+ policy process is high on their agenda, this typically involves repackaging knowledge in such a way that it supports their advocacy. Organizations that are traditionally characterized by a strong mandate of linking knowledge to action, such as research organizations and some international and multilateral organizations, do not occupy network positions that are strategic for information flow (apart from the Task Force Secretariat). The qualitative analysis supports the notion that
research organizations and research-based knowledge do not feature in the frontline of the REDD+ policy debate in Tanzania, despite a large number of the policy actors stating that they have REDD+ knowledge gaps. Perhaps this is a reflection of the hard task that Hajer and Laws (2006) envision for a good policy advisor: pulling in the direction of clarity while illuminating precisely what we do not understand. By focusing on the technical details of MRV, deemed the most complex, expert knowledge requiring area of REDD+, scientific experts get marginalized in the discussion by actors with clear, seemingly unambiguous messages on ‘unscientific’ ethical-normative issues.

While the REDD+ policy process in Tanzania remains at a stage in which politically mandated decision makers are yet to get involved in the debate, the experiences from the process so far provide some promising indications that publicized and targeted advocacy efforts may widen the deliberative space and the scope for influence by various policy actors spanning different sectors of the society. The study also highlights how their influence is constrained by the relational resources of the various actors and the institutional context. Future analysis of the data of which this Working Paper provides an overview might reveal how deliberation plays out within the discourse coalitions and the institutionalized collaboration structures, how intra-coalition dynamics translate into political action, and whether and how formal decision making reflects the agenda-setting and agency of the coalitions that appear successful at the early stages of the policy process. To move closer to an evaluation of the legitimacy and effectiveness of the policy process, future research should also assess the lines of accountability of key actors, and the quality of vertical representation between brokers and their ‘constituents’. Importantly, it will also have to take into account the changing policy context beyond the national REDD+ domain, especially regarding international commitments to climate change mitigation, which is likely to determine to a great extent whether and in which form the REDD+ policy agenda moves forward in Tanzania.
References


Tanzania Natural Resources Forum (TNRF), Research for Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), & International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED). (2012). Understanding land and


Appendices

Appendix 1. Timeline of the REDD+ policy process in Tanzania.

Note: Key policy and protest events included in the analysis are highlighted in the red-lined boxes.
Appendix 2. Distribution of organizational actors’ stances on selected REDD+ policy issues based on the analysis of the structured survey data.

Figure II. Boxplots of selected statements related to REDD+ as a global and national policy instrument (N respondents = 64).
Key: 0 - Not known / no response; 1 – Strongly disagree; 2 – Disagree; 3 - Neither agree nor disagree; 4 – Agree; 5 – Strongly agree.

- REDD is an effective option for reducing greenhouse gas emissions globally.
- REDD is a financially affordable way to mitigate climate change.
- REDD will assure fairness in the international distribution of environmental costs and benefits.
- REDD schemes are also likely to help countries to cope or to adapt to the consequences of climate change.
Figure III. Boxplots of selected statements related to REDD+, biodiversity and people (N respondents = 64).

Key: 0 - Not known / no response; 1 – Strongly disagree; 2 – Disagree; 3 - Neither agree nor disagree; 4 – Agree; 5 – Strongly agree.
One of the main challenges for an effective REDD national strategy is …

… lack of knowledge and awareness of REDD by relevant stakeholders.

… achieving effective coordination between state agencies, private sector, and civil society.

… the lack of technical expertise for monitoring carbon emissions and sequestration.

… the delay in the clarification of tenure rights.

… contradictions between forest and agriculture and other sectoral laws and regulations.

… social conflict and local resistance.

… effectively addressing main drivers of deforestation without compromising development objectives.

Figure III. Boxplots of selected statements related to **challenges for achieving an effective national REDD+ strategy** (N respondents = 64).

Key: 0 - Not known / no response; 1 – Strongly disagree; 2 – Disagree; 3 - Neither agree nor disagree; 4 – Agree; 5 – Strongly agree.
Figure IV. Boxplots of selected statements related to **REDD+ financial flows and accounting** (N respondents = 64).

Key: 0 - Not known / no response; 1 – Strongly disagree; 2 – Disagree; 3 - Neither agree nor disagree; 4 – Agree; 5 – Strongly agree.

**REDD schemes should only be financed through funds.**

**In the long-run REDD should be included in schemes to offset credits in compliance carbon markets.**

**All REDD accounting and payments should go through the national governments.**

**A national approach (for reference levels, MRV, rewards etc.) is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of REDD schemes (as compared to a project-based approach).**
Appendix 3. Networks of core actors in protest events.

Actors participating in…

At least one protest event

At least two protest events

At least three protest events

At least four protest events

All five protest events

Key:
Line width: number of shared events (1-5)
Green: national NGO;
Turquoise: international NGO;
Grey: private national business
Size of node: in-degree centrality in the network of collaboration in REDD+ policy issues