Forest Conservation and Human Displacement

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3. FOREST CONSERVATION AND HUMAN DISPLACEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE DEREMA CORRIDOR, TANZANIA

Salla Rantala and Heini Vihemäki

Introduction

Establishment of protected areas has for a long time been a core strategy in efforts to sustain the biological diversity and ecosystem functions of the world’s tropical forests. This often involves different degrees of human exclusion from resource use. However, as the pendulum in the global policy agenda has swung between a focus on conservation and a greater emphasis on poverty reduction and sustainable development, exclusionary approaches to conservation have become subject to increasing criticism regarding a lack of synergy between conservation and social development goals such as poverty reduction, economic growth and social equity (Brockington et al. 2006; West and Brockington 2006, Sunderland et al. 2008). Exclusionary forest conservation is still very much on the agenda globally, perhaps more so than ever, since the increasing resources being directed to forest-based climate change mitigation efforts are raising concern about their impacts on indigenous and local communities (e.g. Angelsen 2009). In this chapter, we contribute to the discussion on the social impacts of exclusionary forest conservation, drawing on a case study of the establishment of a forest corridor in north-eastern Tanzania.

In post-independence Tanzania, the evolution of forest management policies has largely followed the trends of global conservation and development agendas (see Woodcock 2002). Tanzania is among the nations with the largest coverage of protected areas and is home to sites of high biodiversity value (Newmark 2002:67; Brockington 2005:102). Nearly 40 percent of the land area is protected at some level in Tanzania (WRI 2006). Since the 1990s, there has been a marked policy shift, supported by legal reforms, towards greater attention to and participation by local communities in forest management and conservation, while the expansion of a protected forest area network also remains a key strategy (cf. MNRT 2006). The international development aid and conservation communities have played a significant role in supporting, and undoubtedly influencing, the forest policy shifts in Tanzania (Woodcock 2002; Vihemäki 2009).
The East Usambara Mountains in north-eastern Tanzania represent a microcosm of the ecological, economic and social impacts of changing forest management objectives, policies, and donor interests. As a part of the Eastern Arc Mountains, the East Usambaras are considered one of the global biodiversity hotspots, hosting a high number of endemic species of plants and animals confined to the mountain forests (Rodgers and Homewood 1982; Burgess et al. 2007). The area is also home to people practising agriculture on the mountain slopes. A history of commercial logging and estate farming, and the expansion of smallholder agriculture, has created a mosaic of fragmented forest patches and agricultural land uses across the landscape. Expansion of farming and forest fragmentation are seen as threats to the endemic biodiversity and functioning of ecosystems (e.g. URT 2006).

Finnish involvement in the East Usambaras began in the late 1970s in the form of assistance to the development of commercial logging and sawmilling industries. An outcry by the international conservation community ended the logging activities; and Finnish assistance in the East Usambaras was gradually geared towards biodiversity conservation (Mwalubandu et al. 1991). The East Usambara Catchment Forest Project (EUCFP) 1990–1998, and its final phase, the East Usambara Conservation Area Management Programme (EUCAMP) 1999–2002, supported forest conservation in the East Usambaras for a total of around 7.6 million Euros (EUCFP 1995; EUCAMP 2002). One of the achievements of these projects was the enforcement and expansion of a number of forest reserves and the establishment of Amani Nature Reserve. As complementary measures to the protected areas, participatory forest management and farm forestry were also promoted. To address the negative ecological effects of forest fragmentation, several conservation corridors were proposed to connect the largest forest blocks confined within the reserves (Newmark 1993; Tye 1993).

The establishment of the Derema Corridor in the southern part of the East Usambaras was initiated during the last years of EUCAMP in order to reduce forest fragmentation. The local counterpart of EUCAMP, which was also the main organisation responsible for the management of the East Usambara mountain forests, was the Forestry and Beekeeping Division (FBD) of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT). After the closure of EUCAMP, the coordination of the Derema process was continued by MNRT and its World Bank funded Tanzania Forest Conservation and Management Project. The conservation approach chosen involved the displacement of hundreds of small-holder farmers from their farmland in the Corridor. Negative livelihood impacts were to be minimized through monetary compensation.
The establishment of the Derema Corridor provides many lessons learned for conservationists, donors, decision-makers and implementers contemplating similar conservation interventions. Primary among these lessons are those relating to the conditions for enhancing equity and the legitimacy of conservation decisions, processes and outcomes. In our account of the Derema conservation and displacement process, we assess the ways in which the intervention strived to legitimise the decisions and measures taken, and to involve the affected villagers. We demonstrate that the negotiations over the terms of conservation and compensation were not only conditioned by the shifting institutional framework which governed the process and the procedures adopted by the implementers, but also by other social structures and relations which affected the opportunities for effective and meaningful participation. Hence, our focus is on the agency of the affected people, meaning their actual ability to influence the process and its outcomes.

We draw here on empirical material gathered as part of two PhD research projects, one still on-going and the other recently completed. The data consists of ethnographic material (interviews, observations, discussions) collected by the researchers between October 2003 and February 2010. The most important source of data that we rely on is semi-structured and structured individual and group interviews conducted with local people in two villages adjacent to the Corridor. In addition, to a lesser degree, we draw from two household surveys, conducted in 2005 and 2008. Previous research reports from the area, official legal documents, and grey literature were also used as research material and as a means of cross-checking some of the information.

In order to tie our analysis of the Derema process to the biophysical and historical context, we first briefly address the history of natural resource use, the livelihood strategies, and the economic and policy changes that have affected natural resource management in the area. We specifically highlight the role of Finnish forestry aid in the shift in forest management objectives and practices from exploitation to conservation in the East Usambaras. We then present the relevant institutional framework, providing a backdrop for the overview on the conservation and displacement process. The strategies of the affected people to claim, contest and defend access, as well as the limitations on their agency, are then analysed in order to come to a conclusion on the factors that may affect the equity and legitimacy of compensation for displacement due to conservation.
Access and agency in displacement processes and outcomes

By ‘displacement’, we refer not only to the physical relocation of people or settlements, but have adopted a broader definition to include restricted access to production resources as well. Recognition of the impoverishment risks associated with economic displacement has led to the official adoption of this broader concept in, e.g., the World Bank’s Operational Policy 4.12 on Resettlement (Cernea 2005).

In our approach, the concepts of access to resources and agency are seen to be closely interwoven in the analysis of social changes triggered by displacement. We assume that the actors, including groups of people, involved in a specific intervention can strategically use different resources, both symbolic and material, to promote their interests. In this case, these interests are mainly related to access to both the natural resources from which people were excluded, and to the monetary compensation for the lost resources. In our conceptualization regarding access and how it is constituted and contested by actors, we draw on Ribot and Peluso (2003), who have developed a ‘theory of access’ to analyse “…who actually benefits from things […] and through what processes they are able to do so.” We suggest a more limited definition of access, confining it to the actual ability of the actors to benefit from the resources at stake, and excluding the means and processes enabling access.

Rights indicate different types of socially acknowledged claims to resources, and form a sub-category of access (Ribot and Peluso 2003). Rights authorise their holder to use, manage and benefit from resources, but only when there is a statutory or customary social mechanism that allocates duties and binds individuals to them (Bromley 1991). The legal, or institutional, framework thus conditions access through defining rights. An important observation is that claims based on national legislation on the one hand, and on customary law on the other, may often be conflicting, or socially recognised to different degrees by different actors (Colchester 2008). Differing interpretations of rights to resources and compensation entail the threat of ignoring or further marginalising individuals or groups that do not possess a ‘voice’ to claim or defend their rights in displacement processes.

Hence, in addition to rights, it is important to analyse the means or strategies of claiming and defending access to given resources. These include, for instance, discursive means, existing social networks, and sometimes more hidden ways of action as well, such as non-cooperation (cf. Ribot and Peluso 2003). The means to which actors resort in negotiations or struggles over access are largely determined by their existing resource base. Ribot and Peluso (2003) also recognise structural and relational mechanisms conditioning access, such as technology, capital, markets, knowledge, authority, social identities, and social relations, which can constitute power over other actors.

A central reservation in our study is that social actors participating in or deemed to ‘benefit’ from a given project tend to differ in the material and symbolic resources they have to do so. The outcomes for different actors in a conservation intervention are always conditioned by the structures and relations not only between rural communities and external actors, but also within the affected communities (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). Nevertheless, interventions seeking to involve local communities in conservation frequently lump together all the actors in a ‘community’ as a single stakeholder, overlooking the various competing interests within the communities that may be at stake (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Ribot 2003). Those seeking ‘community consent’ to an intervention may also choose to only inform the official or political representatives of communities, or members that they usually or conveniently work with, begging the question of the representativeness and legitimacy of such consent (Freeman et al. 2008).
Study area: History of resource use and livelihoods in Derema

Human-induced forest change has long historical roots in the Usambaras, dating to the pre-colonial era (e.g. Hamilton 1989; Conte 2004), although it has varied in intensity and scope. The customary land and forest tenure system of the Shambaa, the historically dominant ethnic group in the Usambara Mountains (Feierman 1974), was based on loose community tenure. It began to erode at the start of the colonial era at the end of the 19th century (Hamilton and Mwasha 1989a, Woodcock 2002). Since then, land use in the East Usambara Mountains has been characterised by intensified forest and land utilisation.

Under German colonial rule, land was divided into forest reserves, private estates, and public land for the local people (Hamilton and Mwasha 1989a). Sawmills were established in different locations in the mountains, including one located in Derema (Schabel 1990). From the late 1940s, forest clearing expanded in the East Usambara Mountains with the emergence of new profit-oriented actors. The Sikh Sawmills bought several tea estates in the East Usambaras, focusing on producing timber rather than tea (Iversen 1991:14; Conte 2004:156). Migration from other parts of Tanzania into the area was fuelled by work opportunities in the tea and sawmilling industries. This also contributed to agricultural expansion, as many migrants settled in nearby villages, partially clearing forests for cardamom cultivation under the rainforest canopy. Cardamom was first introduced to the area by the Germans and gradually adopted by small-scale farmers as a profitable cash crop (Vihemäki 2009). The Derema area was assessed as almost completely under cultivation of cardamom and subsistence crops by the 1990s (Iversen 1991:64; Johansson and Sandy 1996). At the same time, it was also considered the largest tract of unprotected forest in the East Usambaras (e.g. Newmark 1993; Newmark 2002; FBD et al. 2004).

The Derema area included land belonging to five villages: Kisiwani, IBC Msasa, Kwezitu, Kwemdimu and Kambai (URT 2006). The field work for this study was conducted in IBC Msasa and Kwezitu, where many of the appropriated farms were located. Most of our work was focused on the hamlets of Makanya and Kwekuyu in IBC Msasa, and Antakae of Kwezitu, places in which a large number of inhabitants had lost farms to the Corridor, according to local key informants.

The majority of the people in the study villages identify themselves as belonging to the Shambaa ethnic group. A relatively high proportion of migrants in the population is a general feature of the study villages nowa-
days. A survey conducted in 2000 estimated that approximately 44 percent of the inhabitants of the area were immigrants (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000), although many of them had come from nearby villages.

As in other areas of the East Usambara Mountains, most of the people in IBC Msasa and Kwezitu depend on small-scale farming. Cash crops typically include cardamom and other spice crops, such as cloves and cinnamon and, increasingly, sugarcane. Subsistence crops such as yams are typically intercropped in the spice agroforestry systems; whereas maize and beans are cultivated in more open spaces. Other main sources of livelihood include small businesses and working on the tea estates. Some people have also benefited from development and conservation activities introduced in past years, such as butterfly farming and trading of the seeds of an indigenous tree species, *Allanblackia stublmannii*. For many people in the study villages, the Derema Corridor was an important source of income and food. Moreover, firewood, timber, building poles and ropes, bushmeat, and medicinal plants were also obtained from the area.

**Finnish aid in the East Usambaras**

The Finnish development cooperation in the East Usambaras started with technical assistance and financial support for commercial forestry in the 1970s. Finland supported the operations of the Sikh Saw Mills, by then nationalised, logging timber in the East Usambaras and processing them in the regional capital of Tanga. One of the main products of the company was crates for exporting tea (Mustonen and Räsänen 1985). A valuable indigenous tree species, *Cephalosphaera usambarensis*, was mainly used for this purpose. In addition to being highly extractive, logging led to environmental problems such as soil erosion and deterioration of roads and water sources. The forestry operations came under increasingly heavy criticism both locally and internationally, finally leading to the cessation in 1986 of Sikh Saw Mills
operations in the uplands of the East Usambaras (Mwalubandu et al. 1991; Hamilton and Mwasha 1989b).

During the 1980s, the focus of Finnish development cooperation gradually shifted from utilisation of the forests to conservation. The East Usambara Catchment Forest Project (EUCFP), Phases I (1990–1994) and II (1995–1998) were designed to assist the Tanzanian government in sustainably managing and protecting the environmental and biodiversity values of the mountain forests. In its last phase in 1999–2002, EUCFP and the IUCN-led East Usambara Conservation and Agricultural Development Project (EUCADEP) merged as the East Usambara Conservation Area Management Programme (EUCAMP). EUCAMP received around 2.4 million Euros from the Finnish government, in addition to a 1.4 million Euro contribution by the EU and over 300,000 Euros from the Tanzanian government (EUCAMP 2002). EUCAMP continued the core activities of EUCFP of forest conservation in protected reserves and biological research, in addition to providing support for community participation, a concept that had started to gain importance in the 1990s, through promotion of pilot activities in community forestry and agroforestry (EUCAMP 2002; Vihemäki 2009).

The association of forest management and Finland, or FINNIDA, as the government branch of Finnish development aid was formerly called, is still strong in many villages. In the same way as the 1980s project EUCADEP is simply referred to as “IUCN”, the Amani Nature Reserve and the Derema Corridor are often called “FINNIDA”. This illustrates the way conservation interventions are commonly associated with the external agencies involved, despite outwardly local or government ownership. The bad name gained by FINNIDA among the local population in the 1970s for forest destruction (cf. Mwalubandu et al. 1991) was still recalled in a village meeting in April 2009 where it was asked why the villagers, now challenged to take ownership of sustainable resource management, should “clean up the mess” i.e., the forest destruction caused by external actors thirty years ago. The Finnish nationality of the authors of this study also caused some suspicion at the beginning of our research. On one of our first visits to IBC Msasa in April 2008, a local farmer remarked “so, you have come to check your property”, referring to the Corridor.
Institutional framework of conservation and displacement in Derema

At the start of the conservation process, Derema was primarily perceived as unreserved public land although much of it was under cultivation in a customary tenure system. Contradictory accounts of the status of land tenure in Derema have been presented; apparently the situation was not clear to EUCAMP at the start of the Corridor intervention (Vihemäki 2009). Despite lacking official documentation of occupancy, local farmers considered themselves owners of their farms in the planned corridor (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000). Individual parcels of land were and still are bought and sold, inherited, leased and borrowed under the concept of private ownership.

The legal framework for the establishment of the Derema Corridor was defined by the Land Act (1999) and Village Land Act (1999). This legislation was part of the Tanzanian land law reforms of the late 1990s, which aimed at improving the security of customary land access. Derema was thus classified as village land (URT 2006:14-15), a type of legal land category meaning the area managed by the village council (village government) within the village boundaries. On village land, customary land rights are protected by the law as private land rights. Nevertheless, as a colonial legacy, all land (soil) in Tanzania remains under the ownership of the Head of the State as a trustee on behalf of the citizens. Village land can be transferred for public benefit to the category of ‘reserved land’ upon the decision of the President (through the Minister of Lands).

The Village Land Act defines the procedures for informing, consulting with, obtaining consent from, and paying compensation to local communities in cases of transferring land out of their domain, all of which were applicable to the Derema case. The Village Council, upon receiving the notice, is to inform all villagers, giving them at least 90 days to respond, and assist all those who may be affected. The Commissioner of Lands must attend a meeting of the Village Council or a Village Assembly (a public meeting open to all villagers above 18 years of age) to explain why the land is to be transferred and to answer any questions. Holders of rights to the land to be transferred, including holders of customary rights, whether registered or not (Village Land Regulations 2001), are entitled to compensation. The Village Land Regulations (2001, 8-10) define the compensation to be paid for the land itself together with improvements, as determined by the current open market value, or an assessment of lost income, or by replacement cost. In addition, compensation must be paid not only for the property of individual
occupants, but also for communal land within the village (Regulation 8a). The terms of the compensation, i.e., type, amount and timing, need to be mutually agreed upon before the transfer can take place. The Village Assembly has the power to approve or reject removal of under 250 ha of land from the village domain. The land law thus stipulates that there is a consultation and a negotiation component in the process, and assigns the community the right to give or withhold consent to the land transfer, but strictly limits this right by making it applicable only to areas smaller than 250 ha.

In addition to land laws, the establishment of protected forest areas is also governed by forest legislation. The Tanzanian National Forest Policy of 1998 (URT 1998) paved the way for a policy shift towards scaling up participatory processes in forest management nationwide; Participatory Forest Management was written into the law in the Forest Act of 2002. The implications of customary forest rights in the establishment of forest protected areas are defined in the 2002 Forest Act. Any objections, petitions, comments and presentations made by the communities should be recorded; and all claims of customary rights investigated. If such customary rights are proven to exist, different alternatives should be considered. These include: modification of the conservation plan so that these rights can continue to be exercised; conserving the area through community-based forest management, or continuing with the strict conservation plan, considering its high national or international importance. Holders of rights to the forest areas to be conserved are entitled to “full and fair compensation” for the reallocation of their rights. The 2002 Forest Act also defines redress mechanisms (2002, Sections 23-24). Despite the elaborate consultative processes outlined, the Forest Act does not assign affected communities either the right to consent to, or conversely, the right to veto conservation plans.

Despite Finland’s adherence to OECD guidelines on resettlement and compensation, the Tanzanian laws were applied by EUCAMP in Derema, instead of any international standards for compensation (URT 2006:8). At a later stage, the Government of Tanzania (GoT) sought financial assistance from the World Bank and thereafter agreed to follow the World Bank Operational Policy (OP) 4.12 on resettlement. Should any differences between the Tanzanian procedures and the OP 4.12 occur, the “stricter of the two” was to be followed (URT 2006:17).

The OP 4.12 covers impacts caused by “the involuntary restriction of access to legally designated parks and protected areas resulting in adverse impacts on the livelihoods of the displaced persons” (World Bank OP 4.12,
Section 3(c)). It has requirements that go beyond the Tanzanian law, including informing displaced people about their options and rights pertaining to resettlement, and advising on and offering choices among resettlement alternatives. In cases of restricted access to parks and protected areas, the OP 4.12 is specific about the requirement for a plan that describes the participatory means by which the project is to be prepared and implemented, the criteria for determining eligibility of displaced persons, the measures to assist the displaced persons in their efforts to improve or at least to restore their livelihoods, and monitoring of the entire process. The OP stresses that there should be a timely information flow to and from the affected parties, and provision of prompt and effective compensation at full replacement cost for loss of assets. It calls for special attention to protect the needs of vulnerable groups among the displaced, such as women, children, and the poorest people. Furthermore, the compensation to displaced persons whose livelihoods are land-based should be land-based. The combination of productive potential, advantages of the new geographical location, and other factors describing the new land should show that the new land is at least equivalent to the land taken (World Bank OP 4.12, Section 11).

Establishment of the Derema Corridor

The Derema area was first considered for a forest reserve in 1974, but the plan was abandoned due to financial constraints. Inventories in the 1980s deemed that the area had been almost entirely “destroyed” under cultivation and was not worth preserving (Iversen 1991:64). In the early 1990s, in connection with the EUCFP a new plan was made for a 790 ha corridor in Derema to connect the Amani Nature Reserve in the southern part of the East Usambara Mountains with other reserves in the north (Tye 1993; Johansson and Sandy 1996). The process for the establishment of the Corridor was initiated as part of the work plan of EUCFP/EUCAMP 1999–2000 (EUCFP 1999). The main events in the process are summarised in Table 1.

Village meetings were planned in IBC Msasa, Kambai, Kwezitu and Kisiwani “to reach agreement on gazetting the proposed Derema forest reserve” (EUCFP 1999), but a social impact assessment (SIA) carried out in 2000 is documented as the first step taken (EUCAMP 2002: 33). The SIA was undertaken to provide data for the forest reserve planners on the potential positive and negative social impacts of the exercise (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000), but it also served to inform local people about the planned Corridor (Vihemäki 2009).
The Corridor plan initially met with opposition in the surrounding villages. A common line of thinking among the villagers was a rather open rejection of the appropriation of their land, although they were informed that they would receive monetary compensation for lost access and income (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000). Some of the farmers had previously lost farmland in the establishment of the Amani Nature Reserve, and many of them had been dissatisfied with the level of compensation received (Jambiya and Sosovele 2001; Vihemäki 2005, 2009). Resentment related to this previous experience partly explains the animosity with which the SIA team was met in some villages (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000).

Table 1. Main events in the establishment of the Derema Corridor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Derema first considered as a Forest Reserve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>early 1990s</td>
<td>East Usambara Catchment Forest Project starts. Derema again proposed as a Forest Reserve and later as a Wildlife Corridor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Gazetting of Derema Corridor included in the work plan of the last phase of EUCFP/EUCAMP (1999–2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2000</td>
<td>Social Impact Assessment (SIA) carried out in the five villages to be affected by the Corridor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2000</td>
<td>Stakeholders’ workshop on SIA results conducted in Muheza town.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March–June 2001</td>
<td>Boundary survey and demarcation, including slashing of crops along the boundary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2001</td>
<td>Mid-term review of EUCAMP recommends an alternative, community-based conservation approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2001</td>
<td>Another stakeholders’ workshop in Muheza decides to go ahead with the protected area approach; confirmed by the EUCAMP Steering Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2002</td>
<td>Compensation payments for boundary crops to 172 farmers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May–June 2002</td>
<td>Valuation of crops inside the corridor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>World Bank (WB) support sought, field mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Part of remaining compensation paid to farmers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Derema Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) prepared for WB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February–May 2008</td>
<td>Final compensation paid to farmers with WB funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2010</td>
<td>RAP implementation ends. Farmers yet to receive substitute farmland.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Iversen 1991; Tye 1993; EUCAMP 1999, 2000; Jambiya and Sosovele 2000; Sjöholm et al. 2001; Pohjonen 2002; URT 2006; authors’ field work.

Despite the resistance, the SIA reported that most people had “a clear understanding” of the ecological justification of the conservation exercise, although this might have been related to years of environmental education by the various projects in the villages rather than a concern over forest frag-
mentation per se. The SIA survey also suggested that about 13 percent were willing to shift their farming activities to other areas and supported conservation as “a good thing for the future generations” (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000:25). A small group did not comprehend the whole thing. A feeling of resignation was also reported to be common: “…if this is the government decision, what else can we do?” (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000:25). The contrasting responses reflect the diversity of interests and discourses among the villagers, some of whom had been more involved in the conservation and development projects and thus more likely than others to have been exposed to the ‘modern’ conservation discourse (cf. Vihemäki 2009).

Interestingly, in a workshop organised after the SIA was completed to share the findings with all the stakeholders and make recommendations on how best to proceed (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000:56), the villagers’ position had shifted, at least in the official arena of negotiations in which their representatives participated. The SIA report of the workshop gives the impression that the villagers’ representatives in the workshop were by and large positive about the conservation plan, and the general conclusion was that the Derema area must become a reserve (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000:65-66). However, only 24 villagers represented the thousands of people in the five affected villages (estimated 7878 in 2006, URT 2006). These 24 included the village and hamlet chairpersons, along with a handful of other villagers. Only one of them was a woman (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000, Appendix 4; hamlet chairperson, October 2003, Makanya). The level of consensus within the villages could have been lower than suggested by the workshop declarations. According to the results of the household survey conducted in Makanya and Antakae hamlets in 2008, 54% of the male respondents (n=46) and only 12% of the female respondents (n=42) who had lost access to land in the Derema process felt that they had participated in the decision about the Corridor. The lone female representative in the post-SIA workshop echoed the general concern of women documented in the SIA survey that specific measures would need to be taken to ensure that men alone would not collect the compensation money and use it for purposes other than the benefit of their families (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000, Appendix 4).

Regarding the conservation approach for Derema, a strictly protected government reserve appears to have been the dominant idea throughout the process. During the planning of the final phase of EUCAMP, the options suggested were either to conserve the area as a government forest reserve, or to create a series of community-managed village forest reserves. The decision was to be made after consulting the villagers (EUCAMP 1998:21).
Nevertheless, one of the EUCAMP advisors later stated that the original plan was to make the Corridor a “normal forest reserve” (pers. comm., May 2007), probably meaning a government forest reserve. Whereas the EUCAMP representatives and government officials stressed the integration of local people in the planning (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000, Appendix 2; Vihemäki 2009), the SIA was focused on the protected area approach and did not explore other alternatives (Sjöholm et al. 2001).

The mid-term review of EUCAMP in 2001 criticised the programme for sustaining an exclusionary approach to forest conservation and not considering local people’s rights. The review warned about the risk of conflict. It recommended that conservation of the Derema area should be through community-based forest management instead (Sjöholm et al. 2001; Pohjonen 2002). At this point, the boundary marking of the Corridor was already underway (Sjöholm et al. 2001). A “Derema villagers’ workshop on the selection of the management approach for the Corridor” was subsequently organised in Muheza town. The report on this workshop stated that the participants preferred the establishment of a government forest reserve in Derema over conservation through village forest reserves (Pohjonen 2002). The EUCAMP Steering Committee subsequently decided to continue the establishment of the Corridor as a government reserve (Pohjonen 2002). The Steering Committee reserved the option to involve the communities in forest management at a later date, through Joint Forest Management agreements (FBD et al. 2004).

A report by the GoT’s Forestry and Beekeeping Division (FBD), and other organisations involved (FBD et al. 2004), suggests that conservation through village forest reserves was not accepted by the ‘communities’ because they believed that it would be impossible to combine cultivation with conservation. According to an FBD official who had been involved in the process (interview, Dar es Salaam, 4 January 2008), the community-based management approach was rejected because under this plan the farmers would not have received any compensation. He also cited doubts about the villagers’ capacities to control illegal activities in the forest. The same risk was also mentioned by some villagers in later discussions as a reason to support the idea of making Derema a government reserve. At the same time, these villagers also maintained that only a minority of the villagers had supported the exclusionary approach, but that this minority “had given better reasons” or justified their position better in village assemblies, leading to the ‘community consent’ of the protected area (group interview, Makanya, May 2008).
Only farms were included in the proposed reserve plan, boundaries being designed to exclude settlements and homes to avoid costly relocation (URT 2006). The boundary demarcation in mid-2001 involved slashing the crops along a 3-metre wide, 27 km long boundary surrounding a 956 ha corridor (EUCAMP 2002; Pohjonen 2002). The slashed crops were recorded together with the farmer’s photograph. An estimate of the applicable compensation was not available until months later (Pohjonen 2002).

Subsequent developments imply that the consent within the villages in regard to the Corridor establishment was not as broad as the reports prepared to complete the process suggested. At the time of the boundary survey, some farmers refused to cooperate with the demarcation, since they perceived the location of the marked boundary as different from the location that had been agreed upon (Sjöholm et al. 2001:54; authors’ field data 2005, 2008). The situation became tense, the police intervened, and some people were arrested in IBC Msasa (interview with Village Environmental Committee Chairman, IBC Msasa, March 2005; group interview with women, Makanya, May 2008). The issue was later resolved at a meeting of the village leaders, EUCAMP representatives and a local Member of Parliament (Pohjonen 2002). An agreement was reached to move the boundary in two places (Sjöholm et al. 2001), and the demarcation was completed (Pohjonen 2002).

Since the early stages of the process of creating the Derema Corridor, the affected farmers had been concerned about the rates of compensation and the schedule for payments, of which they had little knowledge (Sjöholm et al. 2001, authors’ data). The compensation to be paid, and the funds reserved by EUCAMP for that purpose, had first been calculated in 1998 according to the old land law. The project was advised early on to adhere to the new land law, but an important departure from both the new Village Land Regulations and the World Bank OP 4.12 was maintained until the end of the compensation process; that is, compensation was only paid for lost annual income per crop. Although in 2001 the overall cost of Derema compensation was foreseen to consist of “the boundary crop valuation, the final crop valuation, determination of the land value as well as the value of other possible land rights” (Pohjonen 2002), no compensation was paid for the lost farm land itself or for communal land. In the first document clarifying the process, which was prepared for the World Bank, compensation was stated as not being for the land itself since the area “is not gazetted as village land and hence technically belongs to the state” (Derema World Bank, ND, 3). Yet in the Derema Resettlement Action Plan (URT 2006), prepared by GoT when applying for World Bank funding in 2006, the Corridor area...
was defined as village land which would therefore be dealt with within the legal framework of the Village Land Act. Despite the requirements of the OP 4.12 which were applicable to the Resettlement Action Plan, the basis for the compensation calculation remained the same until the end, compensation being paid for lost crop income but not for the land itself.

How the terms and form of compensation were negotiated between the parties has not been well documented. The law does not require, for example, the compensation to be monetary. Some interviewees stated that they had agreed to give up their land after they had been promised payment within six months (IBC Msasa, October 2003; URT 2006:20). This was probably related to the land law clause on interest to be added to the compensation upon failure of payment within six months. Even though the official reports and documents on the Derema process repeatedly refer to “consultations of the local stakeholders all along the way” (URT 2006:28) on “what alternatives [the villagers] would accept” (Derema World Bank, ND, 3), few events have been documented. Those that have been documented include the SIA, and the two workshops in which a few representatives of the villagers participated. Some meetings at village level were also held in mid-2004 in preparation for the World Bank involvement in funding the process.

A change to the compensation procedure mandated by the new legal framework that was implemented was using the farmers’ own estimations of yields as the basis for compensation, instead of a periodically updated government crop value schedule (URT 2006). Compensation for the slashed boundary crops was paid in March 2002 at highly profitable rates per plant (Ths 28,800; approx. US $22 in 2009), based on the farmers’ estimations of cardamom yield. This was many times higher than the normal yield in similar conditions (Dr. T. Reyes, Pers. Comm., December 2007). Later seen by its implementers as a decisive complication to the process, the sum to be paid to the farmers increased 12-fold following the change in the calculation method (URT 2006). It also raised expectations among farmers about high compensation for the remaining crops.

In mid-2002, the crops within the Corridor were valued. Teams formed by a crop value consultant, Muheza district agricultural officers, forest officers and research assistants visited each farm in the Corridor, counting crops and recording their stage of maturity. People were called to their farms, photographed and requested to sign a form on which their crops were recorded. No other data concerning the people who showed up except their names were recorded (URT 2006:18-19). The farmers later described a two-step procedure in which they signed the crop form at the village office following
the farm visit, but it was not always the same person who represented the family on the two occasions. A government representative who had been supervising the process equated the signing of the crop forms to an agreement by the farmers with the valuation (informal discussion with an FBD official, Dar es Salaam, February 2010). Agreements were probably also fuelled by expectations of profitable compensation. During the valuation, the number of farms in the Corridor increased from the estimated 648 during boundary marking to 1547. Rapid new plantings and a higher number of farms were observed in the villages that were counted later (URT 2006:18-19).

In 2002, EUCAMP closed without sufficient funds to complete the compensation payments. The government of Tanzania was left to collect bits and pieces of conservation funding from various international conservation organisations and development partners to finalize the process. In the final report submitted on completion of the programme, the EUCAMP advisors pleaded for additional assistance to finalise the compensation process, stating that failure to pay compensation would “not only result in... the loss of investment, but also in conflicts within and between local communities, policy makers and the conservation institutions in the Tanga region” (EUCAMP 2002:46).

In 2004, the MNRT approached the Tanzania Forest Conservation and Management Programme, funded by the World Bank, to request financial aid in order to complete the Derema Corridor compensation (URT 2006:11). In the meantime, half of the compensation was paid to each farmer in 2005, in anticipation of the coming presidential elections (URT 2006:11). The final compensation payments were paid out with World Bank funding during the period of the authors’ field work in February-May 2008.

Some of the recommendations of the SIA – if not all of its findings – were taken into account in the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP), especially regarding the planning of the WWF-mediated ‘resettlement’ project. In 2001, with the agreement of the District Commissioner, alternative farmland on former sisal estates in the lowlands was made available for those wishing to relocate. But even though some farmers from the affected Derema villages signed up, the land was not explicitly intended for the displaced farmers (URT 2006:24). The plans to facilitate new three-acre plots for the affected farmers on the sisal estates only became part of the ‘resettlement’ process during the implementation of the RAP in 2008–2009. A RAP component for creating alternative income generating activities, such as keeping dairy cattle, beekeeping, butterfly farming and cultivating fish in ponds, was also suggested to help those worst affected, i.e., those who lost land and received
very little compensation (Dr. G. Jambiya, pers. comm., January 2008). In addition, interest was added to the final compensation sums to compensate for the inflation which occurred during the delays in the process (URT 2006).

**Villagers’ strategies and limits to their agency**

Although contacts and the flow of information between the government and the Derema farmers regarding plans to complete the conservation intervention were irregular after the closure of EUCAMP, communication continued with the involvement of new actors. In mid-2004, representatives of the World Bank supervision mission to the Tanzania Forest Conservation and Management Programme, together with representatives of donor and conservation organisations, visited Derema and discussed with some villagers the prospects of completing the conservation and compensation process (Derema World Bank ND; interview with an FBD official, Tanga, December 2004). An official of the FBD explained the strategy used to convince the farmers to continue waiting for their compensation (interview, Tanga, December 2004): “We told them that as long you do not go there, we will be motivated to look for the money.” The completion of the compensation was thus made conditional upon continued restraint from active farming in the Corridor, while at the same time there was a large degree of uncertainty about the future of the intervention.

Increasing frustration was reflected in the discourse of the people affected while the compensation process dragged on. They repeatedly requested to be either paid the compensation or be given their old farms back. Many of the people affected were concerned about the government’s willingness and ability to complete the compensation payments.

There were also threats – perhaps strategic ones aimed at influencing the process through the researchers – that young farmers would go and slash regenerating vegetation on their former farms if the money was not paid soon. Several people claimed that the failure to receive compensation had impoverished them because the income from their cardamom harvests had collapsed. They were not allowed to plant new crops on the forest farms and were not actively tending crops any more, but they did not have the money to start farming elsewhere (group interviews, IBC Msasa, 2003, 2008). Such comments also imply discursive resistance to the way the conservation and compensation intervention was being conducted.

Rumours were also abundant and persistent. For instance, women from Makanya village argued in several group interviews (October 2003, May
2008) that wild animals would be brought into the Derema forest following gazetting, stirring up fear about future crop losses in surrounding areas and dangers for children on the way to school and for women collecting firewood. The speculation about wildlife being introduced had already been discussed in the post-SIA workshop (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000), where the project representative had denied such a plan. This repeated claim probably reflected the articulation of a general fear of how the intervention reduced local people’s control over their surroundings, or was used as a discursive effect to underline the respondents’ powerless, victimised position.

The Derema conservation intervention gradually led to the affected villagers’ mobilisation as they tried to exert pressure on various agencies. By late 2003, the farmers had already sent delegations to district and regional level authorities to request information about the compensation process (e.g. Village Environmental Committee group interview, IBC Msasa, October 2003). The farmers also made several visits to the District Commissioner, the Regional Commissioner of Tanga, and the Catchment Forest Office of FBD in Tanga in the subsequent years.

By May 2005, affected people from the five villages had organised themselves into a ‘follow up committee’ which had sent a delegation three or four times to the office of the Regional Commissioner. The committee members considered this action not only as a means of trying to acquire information but also as a way of putting pressure on decision-makers and officials to speed up the process. Nonetheless, they only received partial information and were asked to come back later to consult other officials, which undermined their efforts. In addition, the ‘locus’ of authority – who had the information and the power to decide about the compensation payments – was not clear to them. The committee members contributed their time and money, their own as well as support collected from other villagers for the costs of the trips, which made follow-up costly for them. By September 2009, members of the committee who were interviewed explained the cessation of follow-up activities as being due to exhaustion and running out of financial support, although they still did not consider the process to be over.

In their efforts to access information and ultimately obtain compensation, the farmers affected not only approached those authorities who were officially involved but also others whom they thought capable of dealing with the issue, or with whom they had had previous contacts. For instance, a delegation was sent to meet with the Regional Commissioner of Dar es Salaam (meeting of the affected farmers’ committee, April 2005). In their attempts to
speed up the compensation process, villagers thus tried to use their existing social networks in addition to the formal channels.

The uneven distribution of resources among the local people, including material resources and social position, was reflected in who became more involved in the follow-up. Those who participated in meetings and represented others had usually had previous contacts with government authorities, or the experience and resources to commit to the task. Many of them were older, more affluent, educated men. The members of the Village Environmental Committee and Village Council members, and other people with experience in representing others, were also among the most active local people. Perhaps reflecting their respected social position, the survey of 2008 revealed that the follow-up committee was highly trusted by most of the affected respondents, although many of them, especially women, were not fully cognisant of the committee’s mission or tasks. Despite this general trust, some respondents in the 2008 survey expressed doubts about the capacity of the follow-up committee to influence the process. It was also asked whether they were accountable to the villagers or to “higher levels”. This reflects the complexity of the task of the members of the committee who, as messengers and self-appointed negotiators between the affected villagers and the authorities, were often forced to return home without news of the compensation, or with only vague promises of progress.

At the same time, the representatives of the villagers were in a position to filter the information flow between the affected people and conservation officials, and to influence the negotiations according to their own interests. For instance, in the later stages of the process in 2008, a member of the follow-up committee who was also the leader of a local dairy farmers’ network, encouraged affected farmers to participate in a cattle keeping training course for a fee, and to construct animal shelters, based on a vague plan by the RAP project to potentially provide cows for the poorest, most affected farmers. The latter then felt betrayed “yet again” when the plan did not materialize.

Negotiations over the conditions of compensation and the follow-up process turned out to be largely a men’s affair. Nearly all women interviewed categorically considered that their voices were not heard or adequately taken into account in the displacement and compensation process. In general, women’s information channels differed from those of men. According to the results of the household survey carried out in 2008, sixty percent of the male respondents (n=63) had found out about the Corridor plan at a village assembly, whereas only onethird of the female respondents (n=75)
had heard about it this way. Most women had heard the news through family, neighbours and other villagers. Women’s participation in village meetings is limited by chores such as farming, taking care of children and domestic animals, cooking, and fetching water and firewood, especially in places such as Makanya hamlet, located far from the village centre, where most meetings take place. It is also not uncommon that women are directly discouraged from public participation by their husbands. Most, if not all, of the village leaders who participated in the public consultations regarding the Corridor were men, as were the follow-up committee members. Their views on, for instance, suitable forms and methods of compensation are likely to have been different from those of women, and could have influenced the way the payments were ultimately made. Pohjonen (2002) reports that ‘farmers’ preferred personal cheques instead of payments to family accounts in the bank.

Nevertheless, women tried to use the channels available to them to voice their concerns over the social effects of the displacement and the compensation method. They tried to make their voices heard especially through the interviews carried out at various points of the process, the SIA, the post-SIA workshop (SIA 2000, Appendix 2), and the authors’ interviews and surveys in 2005 and 2008. For example, women requested that portions of the compensation for family farms should be paid separately to husband and wife (SIA 2000, Appendix 2). Despite the early documentation of these concerns, they were not effectively taken into account in the process.

Lack of access to information was thus a key constraint on the villagers’ efforts to influence the process and its outcomes. At the same time, the perceived ‘secrecy’ and gaps in information flow left room for differing interpretations of the process, and served as a reason for continuing to contest the outcomes even after the finalization of the compensation payments. The villagers’ arguments also changed as their understanding of the process grew and their perceptions of their rights changed. In 2009, a new issue, the question of why compensation had not been paid for the land itself in addition to the crops, became central to the villagers’ discourse. A member of the follow-up committee had learned about the legal right to compensation for land through a radio program. The farmers thus tried to apply different discursive means to keep negotiations open and shape the outcomes of the process even after the formal decisions about final compensation had been made. At the same time, the authorities saw the last payments as closure to the lengthy and painful process. This was similar to the social dynamics of the process that started in the 1990s of establishing and negotiating the compensation levels in the case of the Amani Nature Reserve (Vihemäki 2009).
Equity and legitimacy of compensation

The consequence of the limitations of the villagers influence on the displacement and compensation process—access to information, bureaucratic and delayed procedures, and the unclear locus of power and responsibility to deliver compensation—was a widespread perception that the compensation for lost land access was neither fair nor legitimate.

Discontent with the amounts of compensation had already been expressed in 2005, when parts of the pending compensation were paid. Although according to the RAP the calculations of the amounts of compensation per plant were based on data provided by farmers and buyers, farmers rejected the values assigned to their crops (URT 2006:29). Many still took the money offered. In 2008, after the final compensation payments, farmers repeatedly stated that the sums received were smaller than they had expected, based on the number and types of plants each farmer recalled having had, and the level of compensation per type of plant according to the RAP (copies of which the hamlet leaders had, and the contents of which had been discussed among the villagers). The farmers also claimed that they had not received prior information on the amounts of individual payments, so that the amount came as a surprise when the cheque was collected; or that they had not been informed about the exact way each individual payment had been calculated. In the survey of 2008, the most salient response to what were seen as the problems of the Derema process was “insufficient compensation”. The dissatisfaction of the farmers affected with the final compensation is likely to have been a combination of two factors: high expectations raised by the initial boundary compensation, and incomplete knowledge and understanding of the payment calculation method, which had changed during the delays in the process.

The single measure taken to study the customary ownership of the farm plots in Derema and to identify the holders of the rights to land and eligibility for compensation was the crop valuation exercise, in which the people who turned up at the farms on valuation days were recorded as the “owners”. This method was inadequate to capture the complex patterns of local land ownership vis-à-vis land dependency, and effectively blocked women from both the previously accessed farmland, and compensation for lost access. After the final compensation payments in 2008, women’s worries over the compensation process appeared to have been justified. Whereas 95% of male survey respondents in 2008 had received compensation for the land they lost in the Derema corridor, 73% of the women had not. Women
were sidelined in the registration for compensation; only about 5-10% of the names on the compensation lists were female (URT 2006:19). Women also had reduced access to compensation for a jointly owned farm.

Although most men and women affected stated that the compensation money was intended for the entire household regardless of who signed up for compensation, women usually had no knowledge about the amount and timing of the payments, which in turn reduced their control over how the money was used. If the husband returned from the cheque collection trip to town with a gift such as bread or a *kanga* (traditional textile worn by women) and the money was nowhere to be seen, “you could just accept that” (group discussion, women, Antakae village, April 2008). They would normally be given their share for petty household daily consumption with no knowledge of the whole sum received. This was seen as a significantly worse arrangement than having access to the family farm where cardamom could be harvested and sold when financial needs arose, for example, at the time of school fee payments. But even with less knowledge of the amounts, the women concurred with the men in that the compensation was less than expected, making it difficult to be able to carry on with normal life or make investments to improve their livelihoods.

It is possible that the compensation method not only excluded some holders of land rights from compensation but also allowed other actors to access it illicitly. It had been observed that new seedlings were being planted in the Corridor as the 2002 crop valuation exercise progressed (URT 2006). In initial discussions, villagers explained that upon learning about the Corridor, young farmers had rushed to plant more seedlings in the area where they held farms but were not actively cultivating because many of them were still in school. From the conservation implementers’ point of view, farmers were attracted by the prospects of a “cash bonanza” (URT 2006:9).

As the rapport of the authors with the villagers developed, more explanations were offered. It was claimed that the area had been invaded by swarms of new-comers from the Bulwa tea plantation and business people from nearby towns as the news of compensation spread. The tricks used to register for compensation included buying bush land from locals and quickly planting seedlings, or simply posing on someone else’s farm so that the same farms were valued repeatedly with different ‘owners’ by different valuation teams. Even corruption involving the valuation officials was hinted at. Whereas it is impossible at this point to verify the type and extent of any fraud that occurred, some is likely to have taken place considering the
observed over two-fold increase in the number of farms during the valuation exercise from what had been originally estimated. Farmers later saw the lower final compensation rates as being due to the categorisation of their plants according to size and maturity, with seedlings entitling them to a very small payment, as a direct consequence of the increased number of ‘farmers’. “We were told not to invite guests, but some still called their relatives. We ruined it for ourselves” (key informant, Makanya village, September 2009). Some villagers stated that they had had no means of controlling the outsiders, offering a more victimised view of their position in the whole event (group discussion, men, Makanya, October 2009).

Immediately after the final payments in 2008, many of the farmers affected were reluctant to acquire alternative farmland in the lowlands surrounding the mountains. Some openly questioned the legitimacy of the plan to distribute uniform 3-acre plots to all the farmers affected, regardless of the size of their area previously accessed in the Corridor (affected farmers’ meeting, September 2008). At the time, many were still harvesting – although not maintaining – their farms in the Corridor, and living off the cash compensation. But by late 2009, the Corridor was considered officially protected, and people stated they were not entering the forest any more. Compensation money was to many but a distant memory, especially to those who had received small sums and used it on daily consumption. Receiving land in the lowlands had become the new pressing issue, although there were also complaints that there was no money left for the improvement of new farms, due to the delay in land allocation. Resentment towards the authorities, who were perceived as “having cheated again” in the land issue, was increasing. The farmers were also demanding cash compensation for the lost land itself. They were greatly concerned over the land issue not being settled before the end of the WWF-facilitated resettlement project in January 2010. The alternative income generating activities planned in the RAP for the poorest, most affected farmers had also not been facilitated yet. The despair of the RAP project coordinator over the slow progress in the bureaucratic procedures of re-allocating former sisal estate land to the Derema farmers (personal communication, September 2009) echoed the pleas for assistance by the out-going EUCAMP officers in 2002.
Conclusions

In spite of the efforts of the Corridor planners and implementers to mitigate
negative social impacts and legitimise the process, many of the Derema
farmers found that they had lost more than they had gained in the end.
Some of the common conclusions on the negative social consequences of
development related displacement found in case studies in the 1980s and
1990s (e.g. Cernea 1993) resonate with this case. Poor preparation leads
to delays, increased costs and lost benefits, which negatively affect the
displaced and undermine development objectives. Particularly difficult cases
may lead to an unwelcome political backlash or unintentional environmental
degradation (Partridge 1993, Cernea 2008).

As of a way improving the equitability and social acceptability of
outcomes, Cernea (1993) has called for going beyond individual studies
and formulating decisive policies to prevent the same mistakes from being
repeated time and again in displacement and resettlement processes.
Recommendations based on previous studies, such as the adoption of a
broader concept of displacement which would include restriction of access
to production resources, were incorporated into the World Bank Operational
Policy 4.12 on resettlement. This World Bank Policy 4.12 was also applied in
the later stages of the Derema process. Nevertheless, it appears evident that
a progressive policy alone is not enough to ensure equitable and legitimate
outcomes. In the Derema case, some of the departures from the World Bank
policy were obviously due to its late implementation, which did not permit
a revision of the conservation approach. Furthermore, the means and scope
of compensation, i.e., monetary restitution of investments without adequate
supportive measures, remained the same until the end. The intention to
address the situation of the poorest and most affected was undermined by a
limiting political environment in which the time for implementing livelihood
support measures as a part of the resettlement strategy was consumed by
the bureaucratic constraints of land allocation.

More focused efforts to define rights-holders to land and compensation at
the beginning or at least during the formulation of RAP, could have helped
to mitigate the negative social effects experienced by some groups. The
displacement process accelerated social differentiation, since actors who
had few initial resources or means of defending their interests, such as
women, had very limited access to compensation while some outsiders
allegedly benefited. Successful cases of resettlement underline the
importance of thorough social research at the first stages of an intervention
involving displacement (cf. Partridge 1993). Research alone is not sufficient, however; the results must be effectively incorporated into the planning and implementation of the intervention. Why the findings of the SIA and especially the concerns of the women, which were documented as fears in 2000 and as actual facts in 2008 and 2009, were not better taken into account, remains subject to speculation.

At the same time, it should be noted that the people affected were not merely passive victims in the process, although the means and resources available to local actors to defend their interests varied across different groups. The consultations with the local people during the planning of the Derema Corridor, even though limited in scope and inclusiveness, probably served to give some of the farmers more confidence and opportunities to defend their interests, and later to actively try to work through their representatives and networks to influence the conditions and outcomes of the establishment of the Corridor. This political mobilisation was one of the unforeseen consequences of the process.

Access to information appears to have been a key factor shaping the agency and strategies of the actors involved. Most of the time, the villagers had to base their actions on very limited or incorrect information; the conservation implementers probably faced similar constraints. As the affected farmers’ understanding of the process grew, and their knowledge and perceptions of their rights changed, so did their discourse and arguments. The realisation that the lost land itself had not been compensated for served as an entry point for keeping the process ‘open’ from their point of view, with renewed demands for additional compensation, whereas the authorities already considered the case closed. This is very illustrative of how actors often actively employ different interpretations of concepts and ideas in their attempt to influence and enact processes (cf. Freeman et al. 2008; Sikor and Lund 2009).

New conservation corridors are still being planned for the East Usambara Mountains, but since the start of the Derema process ten years ago there has been a big push towards more extensive local participation and devolved forest rights to the communities. Participatory Forest Management (PFM) is now actively promoted in all parts of the East Usambara mountains, including Finnish support for the East Usambara Forest Landscape Restoration Project (http://www.tfcg.org/eusambara.html). Extensive research on the effects of PFM on local agency and livelihoods has been carried out (e.g. Vihemäki 2009; Rantala, forthcoming). However, there is still an obvious gap in studies to determine the capability of government protected areas vs. PFM to attain ecological goals in order to draw conclusions as to the most effective,
equitable and efficient way of protecting the East Usambara forests and their multiple values. Elsewhere, research has tended to conclude that PFM is at least as effective, or even more effective, as a means of doing so compared to protected areas (e.g. Chhatre and Agrawal 2009; Nelson and Chomitz 2009). Conservation decision-makers and implementers should nevertheless be wary of relying in forest management on one ‘policy panacea’, such as PFM or protected areas, which may come up short when confronted with the realities of particular cases (Ostrom et al. 2007; Berkes 2007). The Derema case stands out as a staggering example of the unpredictability of the outcomes of social change processes in complex socio-ecological realities.

Conservation and development nearly always involve trade-offs, but those trade-offs should be based on informed decisions (Sunderland et al. 2008). If the establishment of protected forest areas is to remain as part of the tool box to achieve socially and ecologically optimal conservation outcomes, a few basic principles can be learned from the Derema case. Clear definitions of local rights to resources, coupled with inclusive mechanisms for participation, and backed by the sustained presence and commitment of the conservation agencies, are pre-requisites for forest conservation interventions involving compensated human displacement which aim to avoid negative social consequences for those affected.

References


