DEONTIC RIGHTS IN INTERACTION
A CONVERSATION ANALYTIC STUDY ON
AUTHORITY AND COOPERATION

MELISA STEVANOVIC

ACADEMIC DISSERTATION
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ORIGINAL ARTICLES
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Helsinki, May 2013
Melisa Stevanovic

Kala tutkii merta ('a fish investigates the sea') was Bea’s explanation for her somewhat unexpected choice of the title of the thesis.
ABSTRACT

In this dissertation, I examine people’s orientations to their own and each other’s “deontic rights”—that is, rights to determine actions. Drawing on fifteen video-recorded church workplace meetings between pastors and cantors as data, and conversation analysis as a theoretical and methodological framework, I consider how participants establish and negotiate their own and each other’s deontic rights in the turn-by-turn sequential unfolding of interaction. The dissertation consists of six original articles and an introduction, in which I introduce the central concepts of the study, describe my data and method, provide an overview of the results of the study, and discuss the ways in which my study contributes to our understanding of social interaction.

In my analyses, I consider deontic rights from two different angles. First, I describe how participants in interaction may claim (and mitigate their claims of) deontic rights by virtue of their interactional conduct: in Article 1, I examine the participants’ ways of dealing with those claims of deontic rights that arise from their participation in an encounter and, in Articles 2-4, I consider how participants in joint decision making manage to establish and maintain the symmetrical distribution of deontic rights at different sequential loci. Second, I discuss the ways in which participants may deploy their deontic rights as interactional resources, as they design their communicative actions so as to be recognizable as such. The central argument presented in Articles 5 and 6 is that, instead of always needing to claim their deontic rights (deontic stance), participants may also trust in their co-participants being aware of, and taking into account, these rights (deontic status). It is thus the complementarity and relative weight of deontic stances and deontic statuses that constitutes a fundamental mechanism by which people may engage in tough power negotiations without yet causing any overt face threats.

The study highlights the significance of face-to-face interaction as a locus of social order and seeks to enhance our understanding of the linkages between the local and wider aspects of social organization that pertain to people’s interactional conduct.
LIST OF ORIGINAL ARTICLES

Article 1:

Article 2:
Stevanovic, Melisa (2013). Constructing a proposal as a thought: A way to manage problems in the initiation of joint decision-making in Finnish workplace interaction. Pragmatics 23(3).

Article 3:

Article 4:

Article 5:

Article 6:
TRANSCRIPTION SYMBOLS AND GLOSSING ABBREVIATIONS

Transcription symbols

.    pitch fall
?    pitch rise
,    level pitch
□□   marked pitch movement
_    level pitch
underlining  emphasis
-    truncation
[ ]  overlap
=    latching of turns
(0.5) pause (length in tenths of a second)
(.)  micropause
:    lengthening of a sound
hhh  audible out-breath
hhh  audible in-breath
(h)  within-speech aspiration, usually indicating laughter
C    smiley voice quality
#    creaky voice quality
°    whisper
♪    humming or singing
@    other change in voice quality
mt, tch, krhm  vocal noises
<word> slow speech rate
>word< fast speech rate

Glossing abbreviations

PL      plural
1, 2    person
0       zero person
GEN     genetive
PAR     partitive
ESS     essive
TRA     translative
INE     inessive
ELA     elative
ILL     illative
ADE     adessive
ABL ablative
ALL allative
INS instructive
ACC accusative
COMP comparative
INF infinitive
COND conditional
IMP imperative
CLI clitic
Q question clitic
NEG negation
PASS passive
PST past tense
PPC past participle
PPPC passive past participle
POSS possessive suffix

*Singular, third person, nominative, active and present tense are forms that have been considered unmarked. These have not been glossed.*
1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Object of the study

This dissertation is about people’s rights to determine their own and others’ actions—something that I refer to as “deontic rights.” The knowledge of having such rights is an important part of any individual’s sense of self-integrity. Besides, and above all, deontic rights constitute a fundamental aspect of our social relations, namely who we are to each other. Thereby, our deontic rights are essentially connected to our interactions with other people. For example, while someone can be a boss on the basis of her institutional position and thus have deontic rights with respect to her subordinates’ actions, it is through the interactions with her subordinates that these deontic rights are actually established and the institutional role of the boss is “talked into being” (Heritage 1984: 290). Still, the superior position of the boss can make it relatively easy for her to get her subordinates to cooperate with her in establishing her deontic rights. In other words, deontic rights, as constituents of our social relations, both shape our interactions with other people and are shaped by them. These two sides of deontic rights are the red thread running through this study: I examine how participants’ deontic rights are established on a moment-by-moment basis during the course of their face-to-face interactional encounters and how participants’ orientations to their own and each other’s deontic rights bear on the options available to them to design their interactional conduct. Simply put, I consider deontic rights both as interactional achievements and as interactional resources.

From the perspective of studying people’s deontic rights, certain types of interactions are more fruitful than others. When people’s orientations to each other’s deontic rights are highly conventionalized, these orientations may remain mostly unnoticed. But when these orientations involve incongruences, they become visible. Such incongruences are especially obvious in those workplace interactions where the participants’ professional roles have become blurred due to the structural changes in some occupational domains. In this study, I examine these kinds of interactions. My data are drawn from the planning meetings between pastors and cantors in the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Finland. Given the traditional authority of the clergy in the Christian church and society, on the one hand, and the contemporary workplace climate that places emphasis on teamwork and cooperation, on the other hand, the relationship between pastors and cantors has become ambiguous. While the rector is superior to the cantor, the hierarchy between cantors and “ordinary” parish pastors is not clear. While the public work tasks of pastors and cantors are defined in the Church Order,
it is especially the rights concerning the preparation of church events, which are relatively indistinct. The planning meetings between pastors and cantors provide, therefore, an excellent insight into the ways in which participants’ sometimes conflicting orientations to their own and each other’s deontic rights are displayed in their interactional conduct.

In face-to-face interactional encounters, participants’ deontic rights concern two major domains of action. First, participants may have deontic rights with respect to specific decisions (e.g., where to go for a dinner, what to buy as a present for a marrying couple, which hymn to take as the Opening Hymn of the mass). It is not self-evident that each participant in an encounter has an equal right to make such choices, but the exact distribution of deontic rights between the participants is something to be established cooperatively in interaction. Second, participants may have deontic rights with regard to certain choices in the interaction then and there (e.g., when to initiate a new sequence, whether to provide an answer to an uncomfortable question, how to terminate the whole encounter). Even if the local structures of interaction may democratize the participants’ social relations to some extent (for further discussion of the topic, see Section 4.4), they may still have different degrees of freedom to make such choices—a matter that is, again, managed through cooperative interactional practices. Thus, in both of these major domains of action, the participants’ ways of establishing and negotiating their deontic rights are essentially linked to the fundamentally cooperative human communication system. In this study, I highlight one particular aspect of this system which is particularly important from the point of view of participants’ deontic rights: instead of always needing to claim their deontic rights, participants may also trust in their co-participants being aware of, and taking into account, these rights.

Being aware of, and taking into account, the co-participants’ deontic rights—even when these rights are not demonstrated in the design of their co-participants’ utterances—can be crucial for action recognition, that is, for the process in which one participant comes to understand what social actions their co-participants’ utterances and expressions are meant to convey. Thereby, the participants can deploy their deontic rights as interactional resources when they design their communicative actions so as to be recognizable as such by their co-participants. In other words, participants may, to varying degrees, already in advance count on their co-participants’ cooperation in establishing their deontic rights and in taking these rights into account in the process of action recognition. While someone’s legitimate authority is associated with others’ cooperation, the fact that someone has lost her authority becomes apparent when others cease to cooperate in the way described. This cooperation-based mechanism that informs the processes of action formation and action recognition, I argue, allows people
to engage in tough power negotiations without yet causing any overt threat to the participants’ faces.

It is this interplay between authority and cooperation that I aim to describe in this study; each of the attached articles deals with one or more interactional practices or patterns that are relevant in this regard. In this way, the study highlights the significance of face-to-face interaction as a locus of social order and seeks to enhance our understanding of the linkages between the local and wider aspects of social organization that pertain to people’s interactional conduct.

In what follows, I will introduce the central concepts of this study and, in so doing, set the frame for my subsequent discussion on deontic rights. I will start by outlining a big picture of “power” in human social life and, thereafter, concentrate more specifically on the notions of “authority” and “deontic authority.” Then, after having discussed the phenomenon of “cooperation,” I will introduce the notion of “deontic rights” as the central focus of this study and formulate my research question.

1.2 Power in human social life

Human social existence is permeated by power. It is an essential feature of social organization in all forms of political, organizational, and institutional life; it is “a basic force in social relationships” (Keltner et al. 2003: 265). Russel (1938: 10) has even claimed that the “laws of social dynamics are laws which can only be stated in terms of power.” But what is power? According to Lukes (1978: 634), the common core to all conceptions of power is the notion of bringing about consequences. One celebrated definition comes from Weber (1978: 53), who regarded power as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.” Power is thus centrally involved in human agency: the person who exercises power could have acted otherwise, and the person over whom power is exercised would have acted otherwise had not power been exercised (Giddens 1979: 91). Besides producing changes in overt behavior, power may also alter people’s psychological states, such as their targets of attraction (Lewin 1938; Festinger 1950). And, of course, the notion of bringing about consequences is abstract enough to encompass also those consequences that involve the physical world only, such as a hole in the ground as a result of my digging it. But what is specific in the instances of “social power” (Cartwright 1959; French & Raven 1959; Mann 1986)—something that social scientists are interested in—is the idea of getting people to think or act in line with one’s
desires, beliefs, orders, instructions, commands, suggestions, and so on, in order to have an impact on the world through these people. While such an impact can involve the enactment of decisions, the suppression of issues from becoming “decisionable” in the first place, and influencing people in terms of their motivations, interests, and beliefs (Lukes 2005), it is clear that the more people, groups, and organizations one can get to act according to one’s will, and the bigger the consequences that one can thus bring about, the greater the power one has.

Inasmuch as power is thus to be seen as a “disposition concept” (Eskola 1961: 13)—that is, as something that a person or a group of people may possess—we may ask several questions: Why is it that some people appear to have more power than others? What, or who, determines the balance of power in a society? (Tannenbaum 1946; Dembitz 1971; Rothchild & Roeder 2005). What is it that power elites, members of upper classes, high-status professionals, and representatives of institutional power have that other people lack? Social scientific research literature provides many different kinds of answers to these questions, and the answers point to different levels of social organization. Thus, discussing macrostructures, Mann (1986), for example, has suggested that the principal “sources” of power have to do with the control over economic, ideological, military, and political resources. Moving towards a more macro-interactional level, French and Raven (1959) have proposed a model where there are five different bases of power: reward power is based on the perceived ability to provide positive consequences and remove negative ones, referent power is a result of personal liking, legitimate power stems from the belief that someone has the right to issue commands and expect obedience from others, coercive power is based on the capacity of someone to punish others for noncompliance, and expert power is a result of a difference in the knowledge level of two individuals in a particular area. In a similar vein, Eskola (1961) has identified two main sources of power that prevail in dyadic decision making: social likability and task ability.

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1 From this point of view, the concept of power is related to what has been called “social influence” in the social psychological research literature (Turner 2005; Eskola 1961; Turner 1991; Pfeffer 1992; Ng & Bradac 1993; Forgas & Williams 2001; Spears et al. 2001).

2 In this respect, the concept of power is seen differently, for example, in the Foucauldian tradition, where the researchers’ interests usually lie in the ways in which language and discourse are ideologically shaped by relations of power in society (see e.g., Foucault 1980; McHoul & Grace 1993; Miller & Rose 2008; Vrecko 2009).

3 Of course, this kind of question does not make sense from the point of view of those conceptions of power where power is seen as a collective capacity or achievement (Lukes 1978: 636). According to those views, the gaining of power by someone does not occur at others’ expense but, instead, increases the total amount of power in the whole community.
It is the bases of power that determine what actually needs to be done for someone’s power to become effective. According to Turner (2005), there are three possibilities for this: “coercion,” “persuasion,” and “authority.” Coercion can be defined as an attempt to control someone against his will and self-interest through the deployment of human and material resources to constrain his behavior. It is an inherently conflictual attempt at control, given that one cannot influence the other person in any other way (Turner 2005: 12). Coercion is thus the weakest form of social power, understood as getting others to act as an extension of one’s will. That the opposite is frequently thought is because the consequences of coercion can be extreme and dramatic. Certainly, destroying an enemy is a sign of great power, but it is also a confession of complete failure in terms of influencing and controlling the actions of the enemy (Turner 2005: 13). Inasmuch as others cannot help but try to cope with the situation, we may indeed talk about a specific form of coercion. Persuasion is quite different from coercion. It can be defined as an attempt to get others to think or act in line with one’s desires by providing reasons why the desired judgment, decision, belief or action is correct, right, moral, and appropriate (Turner 2005: 6). Importantly, if one can persuade others of the correctness of some belief or the rightness of some action, then others are likely to act on it as a matter of their own volition, as free, intrinsically motivated and willing agents (Turner 2005: 8).

Now, it is the notions of coercion and persuasion against which we may highlight the specific features of the third way in which power can operate: authority—a central topic of this study, and one which will be discussed in more detail below. While authority involves the acceptance of someone’s right to prescribe what should be thought or done, it is something quite different from coercion. Indeed, coercion is triggered precisely by the lack of authority and it undermines the remaining authority even further (Turner 2005: 12). Therefore, wherever possible, people try to disguise coercion as legitimate authority and minimize the threat to other people’s perceived freedom (Turner 2005: 16). But just as little as with coercion, authority has to do with persuasion. Authority is a “shortcut where reason is presumed to lead” (Lukes 1978: 640); it does not by definition require persuasion. People with authority have the right to prescribe what should be thought or done, but they do not have the obligation to convince others that this particular belief or action is right (Turner 2005: 8). In reality, the need to persuade only implies the lack of authority.

In sum, power—or social power, more specifically—is about getting people, groups, and organizations to act according to one’s will. While the bases of power may vary, they have an impact on what actually needs to be done for someone’s power to become effective: if the power is based on nothing else than, for example, control over military resources, it may be
coercion that is needed; but if the power stems, for example, from someone’s inside knowledge in a certain domain, it may be persuasion that works best. While both coercion and persuasion involve a person trying to influence other people one-sidedly, there is one form of social power—authority—whose effectiveness is essentially based on other people’s attitudes and behavior—something that brings us to our next topic.

1.3 Authority

1.3.1 On the concept of authority

“Authority” as a moral and political notion has been comprehensively explored in the fields of philosophical, sociological, and social psychological inquiry. It refers to the right of a person to expect another person’s compliance (Weber 1978; Zelditch & Walker 1984). To have authority over another is to have the right to demand certain actions of the other, regardless of the other’s personal opinions. People with authority have the right to allocate tasks, direct performance, set criteria, inspect and evaluate performance, and allocate sanctions on the basis of performance (Dornbusch & Scott 1975; Zelditch & Walker 1984). Still, authority is not merely about giving orders and commands but it involves an exercise of power that is regarded as legitimate by those subject to it (Wild 1974; Lukes 1978: 649). Authority is based on the fact that someone accepts another person’s right to prescribe his beliefs, attitudes, or actions. Because of such voluntary deference to authority, it is not experienced as an oppression of self but as submission to something with which one nevertheless identifies, such as the values of a community (Tyler & Degoey 1995). As pointed out above, one may not be persuaded that something is right but one is convinced that some person, group or role has the right to prescribe it, by virtue of her position within the group structure and by virtue of the group norms and values (Turner 2005: 8). Authority involves the “surrender of private judgment” (Lukes 1978: 639-640). To accept authority is to refrain from examining what one is being told to do or believe. Instead, it is to act or believe on the basis of a second-order reason that requires one precisely to disregard the balance of reasons as one sees it. Consequently, to exercise authority is not to have to offer reasons, but to be obeyed or believed because of authority.

Bochenski (1974) describes authority as a triadic relation consisting of “the bearer” of authority (someone, \(x\), who is said to have authority), “the subject” of authority (someone, \(y\), for whom the bearer is an authority), and “the field” (class of entities, \(\gamma\), in which \(x\) has authority for \(y\)). Besides emphasizing the importance of the subject of authority in acknowledging the
bearer of authority as such, this definition points to another important feature of authority: the authoritative power is always restricted to specific domains; no one, except God perhaps, has authority in every possible field (Bochenski 1974: 69). For example, as pointed out in one of the articles of this study, “an individual professor may have the right to decide about the questions she will ask on an exam, but she might not have the right to decide what books the exam is about, and she has absolutely no right to decide whether the student will travel on foot, by bus or by bicycle to take the exam” (see Article 5). While people are regularly expected to possess authoritative knowledge about their biography, relationship histories, and personal experiences, in some institutional settings, such as in psychotherapy, even this may not be self-evident. Likewise, people’s legitimate right to decide about their daily routines, including dressing, eating, and sleeping, can vary with respect to the institutional setting in question (home, hospital) and with regard to the relationship between the persons involved (two acquaintances, parent and child).

Relying on the philosophical understanding of authority as legitimized power, we may ask: how does such legitimation operate? As pointed out by Turner (2005: 18), “authority can degenerate into coercion, just as coercion can be transformed into authority, and it is important to study how these changes occur.” Thus, in order to answer the above-mentioned question, sociologists have discussed the conditions for legitimization: the leader’s charisma, traditional norms, legal rationality (Weber 1964; Scott 1973), and the principles of absolute value (Spencer 1970). Besides, in the domain of social psychology, researchers have considered the psychological dynamics underlying the feelings of obligation to obey (Tyler & Lind 1992; Tyler 1997; 2001; 2002), the different types of collective sources of legitimacy (Zelditch & Walker 1984; Walker & Zelditch 1993; Johnson & Ford 1996; Hegtvedt & Johnson 2000; 2009; Zelditch 2001), as well as the mechanisms by which people may maintain and enhance their own positions in a given social structure (Ridgeway & Johnson 1990; Clark 1990; 1997; Ridgeway & Walker 1995; Kyl-Heku & Buss 1996). Conversation analysts, then again, have sought to describe the exact ways in which power becomes legitimization in different kinds of mundane and institutional environments (Fisher & Todd 1986), such as various medical settings (Heritage & Sefi 1992; Heath 1992; Boyd 1998; Peräkylä 1998; 2002; Ruusuvuori 2000; Stivers 2002; 2006; Heritage 2005; Pomerantz et al. 2007), classrooms (McHoul 1978; 1990; Mehan 1979; Macbeth 1991), courts (Atkinson & Drew 1979; Komter 1995), news broadcasts (Raymond 2000), and children’s play (M. H. Goodwin 1980; Griswold 2007). In general, conversation analysts have observed how authority is displayed in the ways in which participants’ turns are designed and linked to their co-participants’ turns of talk. Participants’ orientations to
authority can be perceived, for example, by the degree to which one participant can initiate, maintain and close up sequences of action, or maintain their version of the ongoing activity (Heath 1992; Ruusuvuori 2000).

1.3.2 Deontic authority

The concept of authority is inherently ambiguous (Walton 1997: 76). A widespread view involves a distinction between authority “by fact” (de facto) and authority “by law” (de jure) (Peters 1967). A person may be an authority either “in practice” or “in theory” (or, of course, both). Put in another way, a person may be “an authority” or “in authority” (Friedman 1973). This view is loosely linked to the idea that a person may be an authority either in a certain field of knowledge and expertise or he or she may occupy a certain position associated with certain rights to set the rules concerning what should be done. These two essentially different ways of being an authority have been dealt with in terms of “cognitive authority” vs. “administrative authority” (Walton 1997: 76-77), “epistemic authority” vs. “executive authority” (De George 1985), and “authority over belief” vs. “authority over conduct” (Lukes 1978).

In this study, I will rely on Bochenski’s (1974) distinction between “epistemic authority” and “deontic authority.” This is for three reasons. First, neither of these notions suggests that authority necessarily needs to go along with the official position of the authoritative person (cf. e.g., “administrative authority”), which is consistent with my conversation analytic endeavor to examine people’s orientations to authority as an empirical matter. Second, ever since the influential paper by Heritage & Raymond (2005), the concept of “epistemic authority” has been well established in the domain of empirical interaction research, which makes it natural to call attention to its deontic sibling. Third, these terms are in line with linguistic terminology, which involves a distinction between epistemic and deontic modalities—even if the relationships between these two modalities and the two above-mentioned forms of authority are far from straightforward (see Givón 2005: 149, 171-177).

It is the notion of “deontic authority”—someone’s legitimate power to determine actions—that forms the central focus of this study. In Bochenski’s description, the typical deontic situation looks relatively complex: “the authority of x is accepted by y in the field γ when y desires a certain event e, and the acceptance of the authority is necessary in order to realize e” (Bochenski 1974: 77). This means that if someone rejects deontic authority, they either do not desire the aim in question or believe that obedience to the authority is not a necessary condition for the desired aim, or both. In other
words, as already stated above, it is the intentions of $y$, not those of $x$, which occupy the central place in the construction of deontic authority. As pointed out by Weber (1978: 212), the motives for obedience may vary from habits to rational self-interested calculations. Most importantly, however, the subordinates themselves regard their subordination as something that they do of their own free will; for whatever reason, they think that it is useful for them to acknowledge another person as their deontic authority in a certain domain of action.

How do people's orientations to someone's deontic authority then show at the micro-level of their face-to-face interactional encounters? Inspired by Searle's (1976) way of categorizing speech acts with regard to their “direction of fit” between “the words” and “the world,” I have suggested that, in this respect, epistemic authority and deontic authority are associated with two opposite types of speech acts (see Stevanovic 2011). Epistemic authority is about getting the “words to match the world;” deontic authority is about getting the “world to match the words.” While epistemic authority is about knowing what is true, deontic authority is about determining what “ought-to-be”—what will be forbidden, obligatory, or permissible (the ancient Greek word deon, “that which is binding”). From this perspective, deontic authority can be associated with the class of “directive-commissive” speech acts (Couper-Kuhlen, forthcoming), including requests, proposals, and suggestions (directives), on the one hand, and offers, invitations, and promises (commissives), on the other hand. At the same time, however, epistemic authority and deontic authority are also intertwined in many ways, even within single utterances (Antaki 2012; Antaki & Kent 2012: 884; Kent 2012: 713). This is particularly clear from the point of view of the linguistic resources that are first associated with deontic authority (see Hakulinen & Sorjonen 2004; Givón 2005: 149, 171-177). Imperatives, for example, represent the most stereotypical way of issuing orders and commands (M. H. Goodwin 1990: 83; Craven & Potter 2010: 442) and thus constitute a central practice for claiming deontic authority. However, imperatives can also be used to perform actions that have little to do with deontic authority, like instructing someone towards the means of achieving something, or making an offer or an invitation (Wootton 1997: 62; Huddleston & Pullum 2005: 8; Maynard & Heritage 2005: 429). Another stereotypical way of claiming deontic authority involves deontic modality (Palmer 2001; Givón 2005: 149-177); archetypical deontic modal verbs, such as ought, must, should, can, may and could, can certainly be deployed to establish what is obligatory, permissible or forbidden (see Sterponi 2003; Curl & Drew 2008; Zinken & Ogiermann 2011). Still, the mere existence of a deontic modal verb in an utterance is not enough to make the utterance count as an instance of deontic authority. For example, the friendly advice of a work colleague to see a doctor
is most likely to contain such a verb (*you must see a doctor*), but if the question here is about authority in the first place, that authority is rather of an epistemic than of a deontic nature.

What can then be said about the participants’ orientations to deontic authority at the micro-level of interaction? To enhance our understanding of what kinds of cases could count as instances of deontic authority, we might start by noting what the other two power phenomena discussed above—coercion and persuasion—might look like in people’s interactional conduct. When it comes to coercion, we may think of any dominant interactional behavior that is unresponsive to other people’s concerns as some form of coercion (on “dominance,” see Drews 1993; on “domineeringness,” see Rogers-Millar & Millar 1979). For example, someone may talk much more than his co-participants, always trying to determine the topics of conversation, or seeking to impose his own views on the things talked about (Linell et al. 1988; Linell & Luckmann 1991; cf. M. H. Goodwin 1992; 2002; Hutchby 1996; 1999b)—and, of course, also issue orders and commands. Inasmuch as others cannot but try to cope with the situation, we may indeed talk about some form of coercion—something that needs to be kept separate from the notion of deontic authority. What about persuasion, then? It seems clear that, in spoken interaction, persuasion may operate, for example, through explanatory accounts (Heritage 1988; Houtkoop 1990), displays of emotion (Fitch & Foley 2007, Nikander 2007), or through discursive practices by which people may try to position themselves as being right, competent, and knowledgeable (Davies & Harré 1990; Harré & van Langenhove 1999; Thornborrow 2002; Harré et al. 2009)—through anything by which the participants may hope to be able to influence their co-participants’ beliefs, attitudes, or actions.

But now, when it comes to authority, we may need to shift our focus from the potentially authoritative participants to their co-participants; as pointed out above, authority is not primarily about someone claiming authority, but it is about others accepting someone as an authority. This means, by and large, that it is not the initiating actions of potentially authoritative participants that tell us about the participants’ orientations to deontic authority, but it is the ways in which their co-participants respond to those actions. At the local level of interaction, we may think about the issue from two different perspectives. First, while participants in interaction inevitably need to make choices with respect to their spoken and expressive contributions, someone’s authority in this specific domain of action becomes visible, for example, when people, in certain types of institutional interactions, comply with the asymmetrical turn-taking systems that endow them with quite different amounts of freedom in terms of their talk (Mehan 1979; Macbeth 1991; Kendall 1993) or, for other reasons, allow one
participant of the encounter (e.g., the chairperson of an organizational meeting) to exert control over the agenda for the emerging interaction (Greatbatch 1986; Drew & Heritage 1992; Boden 1994; Ruusuvuori 2000; McKinlay & McVittie 2006; Barnes 2007; Pomerantz & Denvir 2007; Angouri & Marra 2011). Second, while participants in interaction may sometimes discuss their more or less distant actions (often including actions other than those that are performed through talk), their orientations to someone having the authority to decide about those actions can be seen, for example, in people’s overt expressions of subordination (Griswold 2007), as well as in their displays of compliance and commitment to actions that have only been hinted at (Stevanovic 2011; on the well-known phenomenon of indirectness in directive speech acts, see Clark 1979; Brown & Levinson 1987 [1978]; Blum-Kulka 1987; Blum-Kulka et al. 1989; Byon 2006; Silverstein 2010). All this suggests that a person’s deontic authority is not so much a question of what this person does but, first and foremost, a question of how his utterances and other interactional behaviors are treated by his co-participants. This leads us to the issue of cooperation, which is to be discussed next.

1.4 Cooperation

Human action is intrinsically cooperative. In contrast to those views that posit that human action emerges out of egocentric calculations (on social exchange theory, see Homans 1958; Blau 1964; Ekeh 1974; Befu 1977; Cook & Emerson 1978; Settoon et al. 1996; Molm et al. 2000; Thye 2000; Lawler 2001; Erdrogan & Liden 2002; Tse et al. 2008; see also Hobbes 1962 [1651]), Tomasello (2009) has argued, and presented evidence, that human children are genuinely cooperative from early on (cf. Parsons 1949 [1937]; Rousseau 2006 [1754], see also Axelrod 1984: 3-4; Gronow 2008: 369). They have not learned this from adults; it comes naturally. And, of course, also our everyday experiences suggest that people can be cooperative quite spontaneously: many people pay their taxes honestly, participate in unions and protest movements even if this may cost them money, work hard in teams where their personal achievements might go unnoticed, and cooperate with strangers without any prospect of reciprocity or gain in reputation (Henrich et al. 2001; Fehr et al. 2002; Fehr & Gächter 2002; 2004; Johnson et al. 2003; Fehr & Schmidt 2004: 272). But then again, everybody can also see that cooperation is not all that there is in the world. Tomasello has thus argued that, later in ontogeny, children’s rather unselective cooperativeness becomes mediated by such influences as their judgments of likely reciprocity
and concerns for reputation. At the same time, they grow into internalizing
diverse cooperation-related societal and cultural norms.

People may engage in complex collaborative activities, such as singing
in a choir, preparing a meal together, collaborating scientifically, and so on. It
is in the context of such collaborative activities that language use also
prototypically occurs (Clark 1996; Tomasello et al. 2005: 675); a good
example of a collaborative achievement is the initiation, maintenance and
closing-up of a conversation (Schegloff & Sacks 1973; Button & Casey 1984;
Auer 1990; Robinson 2001; Antaki 2002; LeBaron & Jones 2002; Goldberg
2004; West 2006; Bolden 2008). Within the overall collaborative framework
of social interaction, even single “individual” actions are often more
collaborative than they might first appear (see e.g., C. Goodwin 1979). While
a single action may be compounded out of different kinds of interactional
resources, different actors may deploy dissimilar materials in order to
contribute to a single shared action (e.g., the speaker produces a verbal
utterance and, simultaneously, the hearer produces visual displays of affect,
which both contribute to the ongoing action). Charles Goodwin’s notion of
“cooperative semiosis” refers to the arrangement in which “action emerges
through a process in which signs are produced to be operated on by another”
(C. Goodwin 2011: 189). While cooperative semiosis as a phenomenon is
characteristic of all human interaction, the notion of cooperative semiosis is
particularly useful when researchers seek to account for interactions where
one or more of the participants are less-than-fully-competent speakers
(Kotthoff 2010), such as children (Cekaite 2010), second language learners
(Kasper 2006), and people with aphasia (C. Goodwin 2010; 2011).

In the context of human action, cooperation also reaches beyond to
what is immediately observable in people’s public conduct; it guides human
inference processes. In his seminal work, Grice (1975) has pointed out how
communicators and recipients necessarily need to work together to get the
communicator’s message across; in a normal case, it is the participants’ joint
goal to get the recipient to know the communicator’s social intention. Given
the unavoidable difference between what is directly said in an utterance and
what is the actual communicative intention behind the utterance (on the
(1975: 46) has suggested that, in a conversation, participants proceed
according to an implicit assumption that he termed the cooperative
principle: “make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk
exchange in which you are engaged.” According to Grice, all effective
communication in social situations is based on this kind of cooperation. Even
though the principle has been phrased as a prescriptive command, it is best
understood as a description of how the participants normally behave in
conversation; they assume that whatever their co-participants say in a conversation, it is meant to be heard as a contribution to the ongoing conversation—as something that furthers the purpose of that conversation (Bach 2006). Grice divided the cooperative principle into four maxims (the maxims of quantity, quality, relevance and manner), which describe the specific rational assumptions by which people who obey the cooperative principle interpret each other’s utterances (Grice 1975: 45-46).

Grice’s cooperative principle is important in that it explains how it is possible for human communicators to use very simple gestures to signal many different kinds of more or less complex intentions. For example, someone may point to a pen to make a request for her partner to give it to her, to inform the recipient about the presence of the pen, or to share her happiness of having found the pen. Or, the communicator might point to a pen, apparently, just to inform the recipient about its presence, but with the ulterior motive of suggesting that the recipient uses it. Or, she could do this with the intention of proposing that the participants play “spin the bottle” with it. What is then the basis on which the recipients may infer all these different kinds of intentions? The mere cooperative principle cannot determine the specific contents of those interpretations that, in each case, would best further the purpose of the conversation. Instead, the specific contents of those interpretations are guided by the participants’ considerations of several “real world” features: all the normative expectation that the members of the same culture share, the participants’ common history, everything that they know about each other, as well as the current encounter—everything that has happened in this very interaction so far. Taken together, all these matters make up what can be called the participants’ “common ground” (Clark 1996; Enfield 2006; Tomasello 2008; 2009)—the set of knowledge, beliefs and suppositions (concerning both the material and social world) that the participants believe that they share, and which enables them to coordinate their joint actions and activities. It makes it possible for them to match up between what each of them means and what their co-participants understand them to mean.

In his writing on common ground, Clark (1996: 112-121) takes into special consideration the effect that social relationships have on language production and interpretation. Notably, he suggests that, for people, their social relationships are basically defined by the type and amount of common ground that two people have. From this point of view, someone’s deontic authority in a certain domain of action is nothing but a potential part of certain participants’ common ground, which helps them to determine how they should design their communicative actions so as to be recognizable as such by their co-participants and how they should interpret their co-participants’ utterances and expressions as actions. In other words, people’s...
common orientations to someone’s deontic authority are one of those things that help them to decide what to do in order to be cooperative.

1.5 Deontic rights

While the notion of deontic authority captures the idea of asymmetrical distribution of power to decide about actions, we may introduce the more general notion of “deontic rights” to be able to describe the variety of ways in which power can be distributed among participants. The notion of deontic rights refers to the latent potential that a participant has in a specific domain of action in relation to his co-participants. Just like the concept of deontic authority, the notion of deontic rights is also in line with the recent conversation analytic literature on “epistemics” (Heritage & Raymond 2005; 2012; Raymond & Heritage 2006; Heritage 2012a; 2012b; 2012c), where the notion of “epistemic rights” refers to people’s “relative access to, or rights to assess, knowledge, events, behavior, and the like in specific, locally organized sequences of talk” (Raymond & Heritage 2006: 681).

Now, people may design their utterances in ways that suggest a more or less symmetrical relative distribution of deontic rights between the participants. Indeed, some of the linguistic choices that are available for the participants in this regard have already been described in several conversation analytic studies (Ervin-Tripp 1976; M. H. Goodwin 1980; West 1990; Heinemann 2006; Curl & Drew 2008; Craven & Potter 2010). Ervin-Tripp (1976), for example, has ordered different directive forms with regard to the relative power relationship between the participants that they imply. On the basis of her findings, we may assume that “need statements” (I need a match), for instance, suggest a relatively asymmetrical distribution of deontic rights between the participants, while “question directives” (Gotta match?), for example, are more symmetrical in this respect. Likewise, Heinemann (2006) has discussed positive and negative interrogatives as ways for senior-citizens to display their entitlement to have different kinds of services from home help providers. With positive interrogatives the care recipients display an orientation to their requests as something that they are not fully entitled to make. In contrast, with negative interrogatives the care recipients display that they are really entitled to have the requested service. Along the same lines, Curl and Drew (2008) have shown that the request forms that speakers

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4 Mann (1986: 7) was ready to dismiss the whole concept of authority, because of the black and white way of thinking that it presupposes. And Lukes (2005: 65) pointed out that, even within a binary relationship, authority may characterize only some of the interactions between the participants.
select reflect their understandings of the contingencies associated with the recipient's ability to grant the request, and thereby also their entitlement to make the request: by prefacing a request with a modal verb (e.g., Can you...?), speakers display high entitlement to make the request, while, by choosing some other request formats (e.g., I wonder if...?), they display low entitlement.

In this study, I will invoke the notion of “deontic stance” to refer to the strength of deontic rights relative to the recipient in a certain domain—as it is claimed by the choice of the form of an utterance (Stevanovic 2011). In general, the term “stance” signifies a positioning that is achieved through overt communicative means (language, gesture, and other symbolic forms) and thus made publicly accessible (Du Bois 2007: 169). Deontic stance thus denotes the positioning that a person occupies on a “deontic gradient” (on the analogous notion of “epistemic gradient,” see Heritage 2012a). As an example, we may imagine that someone wants to get her spouse to stop humming so that she can hear the radio weather report. In principle, she could say one of the following utterances:

\[
\begin{align*}
(a) & \text{ Shut up!} \\
(b) & \text{ Would you please be quiet?} \\
(c) & \text{ I'm sorry. I can't hear the radio weather report.}
\end{align*}
\]

Each of these utterances conveys a request for (non-)action, but they have very different forms. While the imperatively framed request (a) involves a rather blunt claim of deontic authority, the interrogative format (b) conveys a mitigated stance on deontic rights: the recipient’s “quietness” is presented as something that is contingent on the recipient’s choice to comply. Then again, by formulating the request as a declarative (c), the speaker claims a relatively weak deontic stance: it is entirely up to the recipient to sort out the implications that the speaker’s utterance has on the recipient’s own future actions. Of course, we may assume that deontic stance is not only a question about word choices and syntactic structures; further research is needed to assess the extent to which speakers may upgrade their deontic stances, for example, through gaze, gestures, and different kinds of prosodic realizations of the verbal content of their utterances (see Stevanovic & Frick, submitted). Given that the recipients may fail to recognize the deontic significance of the first speakers’ utterances, there might even be practices by which the first speakers may clarify that aspect of their actions ex post facto and, in so doing, “pursue” (Pomerantz 1984b) or “mobilize” (Stivers & Rossano 2010a) a deontic response from the recipient (see e.g., Raymond 2004).

Deontic rights are not only about people trying to get others to do things, but also about people being able to determine their own doings.
Hence, one important interactional environment where people’s deontic orientations become relevant is the activity of planning. When people talk about future actions—what will be done—they will have to orient to the deontic rights that each of the participants might have in the respective domain of action. There is, therefore, also another way of putting together a deontic gradient—something that can be exemplified by the following utterances.

(d) I’ll submit my dissertation now.
(e) Do you think that I could submit my dissertation now?
(f) When do you think that I could submit my dissertation?

In (d), where the speaker’s utterance is a declarative statement, the decision about the action in question is presented as already established. Thus, when said by a graduate student to his supervisor, the utterance clearly embodies a strong deontic stance—in a domain that does not traditionally belong to the student’s sole jurisdiction. In (e), in contrast, where the utterance has the form of a polar question, the realization of the speaker’s plan is presented as contingent on the recipient. Therefore, the utterance embodies a weaker deontic stance in the matter at hand. The speaker’s deontic stance is even weaker in (f), where the speaker produces a wh-question; it is the recipient who is invited first to articulate the appropriate plan for the first speaker. Now, what is absolutely crucial here is that the declarative statement in (d) does not involve any specific linguistic characteristics that, as such, could be associated with a strong deontic stance. Indeed, the declarative statement can be heard as embodying a strong deontic stance merely because of certain contextual considerations that have to do with the relationship between the speaker and the recipient. If the same utterance had been said by a student, for example, to his mother, the utterance might not have had any deontic implications at all. Thus, given the importance of contextual considerations for the deontic hearing of certain types of utterances, we may need to find a way to systematically deal with the possibility that people’s orientations to their own and each other’s deontic rights may sometimes go beyond to what is publicly observable in their overt conduct.

Because people’s deontic orientations may thus not always be captured by the mere notion of deontic stance, we may invoke yet another notion—that of “deontic status” (see e.g., Tomasello 2009: 55, 59; on “epistemic status,” see Heritage 2012a). While the term “status” is used to describe the position a person occupies in a social structure (Linton 1936), with the term deontic status I refer to the deontic rights that a certain person has in a certain domain, irrespective of whether they momentarily claim these rights or not. While deontic stance and deontic status are often congruent with each other,
this is not inevitable. Since deontic status increases the probability of others’ cooperation, highly authoritative speakers rarely need to command. Instead, speakers with low authority, who cannot rely on other people’s readiness to cooperate in the desired ways, may sometimes try to inflate their authority with more assertive directives. The notion of deontic status allows us to account for these kinds of situations, or any other situations where there is a discrepancy between the linguistic design of an utterance and its deontic strength—for example, when an imperative is heard as an offer or a piece of advice. Even if someone’s deontic status can be altered from moment to moment as a result of specific interactional contributions, it is still a “real world” feature—something that can be taken as “given” and thus be deployed as an interactional resource.

From the perspective of those conversation analytic views, according to which nothing external to what is observable in the participants’ public conduct should be given an explanatory status in the account of interaction (see e.g., Schegloff 1997), this way of thinking might appear somewhat radical. I will, therefore, return to this issue later in this study (see Section 4.2). At this point, I merely maintain that, despite my theorizing about the participants’ tacit orientations to their social relationships and about their inferences based thereupon, the kind of approach that I adopt here does not make one lose sight of the minor details of the participants’ publicly observable conduct. Rather, the question is about taking into account all the information that one can possibly get, in order to be able to capture, as far as possible, the participants’ own interpretations of what is happening in the interaction then and there (cf. Arminen 2000)—something that, in this case, involves their orientations to their own and each other’s deontic rights.

1.6 Research question

In this study, I examine people’s orientations to their own and each other’s deontic rights, trying to shed light on the interplay between authority and cooperation. My research question can be formulated in the following way:

How do people establish and negotiate their own and each other’s deontic rights cooperatively in the turn-by-turn sequential unfolding of interaction?

Each of the articles of this study deals with one or more interactional practices or patterns that are relevant in this regard.
2 DATA AND METHOD

2.1 Church workplace meetings as data

The data of this study are drawn from a set of 15 video-recorded planning meetings where pastors and cantors discuss their joint work tasks. The data were collected in seven congregations of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Finland in the dioceses of several bishoprics during spring 2008. Among the church workers there were fifteen pastors and ten cantors. In one meeting there were two pastors and one cantor present. In another meeting there were one pastor and two cantors. The remaining thirteen meetings were dyads. The length of the meetings varied from 20 to 60 minutes. The total length of all the video-recordings is about 10 hours. In the following, I will describe this particular interactional setting in more detail and try to make it clear why I think it is an excellent site for studying people’s orientations to their own and each other’s deontic rights.

Recently, working life has been subject to profound changes and developments. Since the 1990s, many traditional boundaries and rigid ways of organizing work have been abandoned in favor of modern collaborative types of work organization. One such type of work organization has been teamwork, which requires seamless collaboration and interaction between different kinds of employees with distinct competencies (Koster et al. 2007: 118; Vogl 2009). Even if boundaries of social entities, such as professions and occupations, are important from the point of view of people’s identity formation and sense of autonomy and endurance (Abbot 1995), the boundaries around highly specified job roles have now, nevertheless, become blurry (Lindbeck & Snower 2000; Powell 2001). Of course, this gives employees new opportunities for learning, which may even enhance their happiness with their work (Luoma 2009: 16). Besides, deeper collaboration provides a site for the development of solidarity among workers; it forces the workers to interact with one another in ways that go beyond superficial mixing (Koster et al. 2007: 118; Vogl 2009)—something that has been proposed to provide the basis for expanding democratic participation within the whole society (Grady 1990: 146-147). But besides these positive effects, all these changes may also generate stress for today’s employees (Morgan & Bowers 1995). One reason for this is that employees today are constantly confronted with having to negotiate their knowing, their doing, and their
worker identities in interactional encounters with other people (Iedema & Scheeres 2003).

The above-described developments are also reflected in the church workplace, where pastors and cantors have started to collaborate more than before. Selecting hymns for church events is a case in point. While, previously, it has been quite common for pastors to decide about the hymns unilaterally, recently, it has become more and more common that such decisions are made by the pastors and cantors together. Of course, the point of such collaboration is to be able to come to “better” decisions,—that is, hymn choices that are sensitive both to the theological concerns of the pastor (e.g., that the hymns fit the sermon or the bible readings of the day) and to the musical concerns of the cantor (e.g., what other musical material, such as preludes and postludes, are available for the hymns; how to make the transitions between the hymns and the sung parts of liturgy). At the same time, the pastors and cantors are quite careful not to intrude into the domains of each other’s expertise. I suggest that this is because the justification of the whole collaboration between pastors and cantors is essentially based on the participants’ distinct “territories of knowledge” (Heritage & Raymond 2005; Heritage 2012a; 2012b). To demonstrate this, let us consider Extracts 1 and 2.

In Extract 1, a pastor (P) and a cantor (C) are discussing an upcoming Mass and trying to find a suitable “hymn of the day”—a hymn that is centered on the theme of the lectionary texts of a given Sunday. At the beginning of the fragment, the cantor makes a proposal by pointing out that a certain hymn (“four-five-three,” l. 1) has the needed content. With the word tietenkin “certainly” (l. 2) the cantor presents the matter at hand as self-evident. However, through her immediate “self-repair” (Schegloff et al. 1977), where she replaces the word tietenkin “certainly” (l. 2) with the word varmaan “probably” (l. 3), the cantor displays her orientation to herself as having no epistemic authority in the domain in question—a domain that has to do with the theological content of the hymn in relation to the bible texts of the mass.

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5 It is, however, worth noting that the new models of work organization also enable remote work away from one’s actual work place, which again decreases the need for face-to-face collaboration within work communities.

6 Still, the actual efficiency of joint decision making not self-evident (for social psychological literature on joint decision making, see Dewey 1910; Bales & Strudtbeck 1951; Bales & Slater 1957; Eskola 1961; Fisher 1970; Hall 1971; Janis 1989; Poole & Roth 1989; Stasser & Stewart 1992; Brodbeck et al. 2007; for conversation analytic literature on the same topic, see Francis 1995; Heritage et al. 2001; Huisman 2001; Alby & Zucchermaglio 2006; 2008; Clifton 2009).
In Extract 2, the participants talk about the opening hymn of the mass and about the kind of music that should pave the way for it. At the beginning of the fragment the cantor (C) announces her intentions in this respect (l. 1).

The cantor's announcement ("I would do such a, (0.6) #proper#, (0.7) prelude," l. 1) is followed by the pastor's mentioning of the possibility that the cantor's prelude could indeed be "quite majestic" (l. 2). By formulating her utterance as a question, the pastor displays an orientation to the cantor's superior epistemic rights in the matter. In response to the cantor's minimal
uptake (“yea.” l. 3), the pastor goes on to account for her prior turn and does this by characterizing the hymn upon which the cantor is supposed to improvise as “massive” (l. 6). By starting her characterization of the hymn with the words *ku se on* “cause it is” (l. 4), the pastor claims immediate access to knowledge about the hymn and her rights to display this knowledge. However, what comes next is repair: by adding to her utterance the word *muistaakseni* (“as I recall,” l. 6), the pastor downgrades her epistemic rights in the domain in question—domain that deals with the musical content of the hymn.

Extracts 1 and 2 elucidate how pastors and cantors display sensitivity to their locally relevant identities as theologians and musicians, and refrain from intruding into the domains of each other’s expert knowledge. While such asymmetries with regard to epistemic authority can be an essential part of the justification for the collaboration between pastors and cantors, this is not the case with respect to *deontic* authority—something to be demonstrated by the following instances.

In Extract 3, a pastor (P) and a cantor (C) are about to start their meeting, during which they are going to plan an upcoming church event. At the beginning of the fragment, the pastor tells the cantor about her prior preparations with respect to the event (l. 1-6). There are several features in the design of the pastor’s turn which suggest that this kind of talk is somehow problematic. First, the turn involves many pauses, hesitations and restarts, which clearly indicate that something problematic is about to be said. Second, the idea of the pastor having made a proposal for the church event in question is presented as a “sin” (“I sinned and made also (0.9) some kind of a proposal then.” l. 5-6), which makes visible the pastor’s orientation to the ideal unfolding of the planning meeting as an occasion where the preparation activity is starting from scratch. Third and finally, the pastor begins her turn by referring to an email that she has got from the cantor (“I have been reading, (1.1) your mail,” l. 1), thus implicating that the private activities that she is about to start describing have, after all, a collaborative basis: these activities relate to the content of the cantor’s email.

(3) (VYLYT 0:07)

01 P: mä oon sitä sun, (1.0) postia lukenuj ja
   SG1 be-1 SG3-PAR SG2-GEN mail-PAR
   I have been reading, (1.1) your mail and

02 jotenkij jo, (0.2) ähhh (.) jo
   somehow already, (0.2) ehhh (.) already

03 näitä virsiä (.) sit tietysti (.) kattonu myös?
   these-PAR hymn-PL-PAR PRT of.course look-PPC too
   looked at (.) of course (.) these hymns too?
Extract 3 demonstrates how pastors and cantors, in their joint planning meetings seem to orient to the expectation that their joint face-to-face encounters are primarily to be used for making decisions; the participants are not expected to discuss decisions that one of them has made unilaterally before the meeting.

Extract 4 is from a three-person conversation with two pastors (P1 & P2) and a cantor (C). The fragment is drawn from the middle of a meeting where the participants have been planning a mass and it starts by one of the pastors (P2) initiating talk about the acclamation “This is the holy gospel,” which may, but need not, follow the gospel reading (l. 1-2). Since it is the other pastor present in the meeting (P1) who is supposed to read the gospel, the utterance can be heard as a suggestion that the participants decide about the matter now; after all, whatever the decision will be, it has an influence on the cantor’s duties in the mass (l. 15-40; 75-76; not shown in the transcript). The other pastor (P1), however, does not seem to be willing to consider the matter as something that the participants can decide upon jointly, then and there, but, instead, declares that she will decide about the matter afterwards, on her own (l. 61-62).
Even if the pastor’s (P1) domineering conduct might appear problematic from the point of view of the participants’ collaboration, her co-participants (P2 & C) nevertheless manage the potentially awkward situation quite effectively—with the help of humor. In fact, they make fun of their co-worker. The cantor suggests, in a mocking way, that the pastor might still want to “contemplate” (l. 63) or “work upon” (l. 66) the issue of acclamation (something that is actually a simple yes-no decision, which, moreover, hardly has any significance for anyone—except for the cantor). The other pastor (P2) laughs (l. 67, 70). In response to her co-participants’ reactions, the pastor puts a slightly embarrassed smile on her face, and asserts that she will work upon the issue “right here” (l. 68-69).

Extracts 3 and 4 demonstrate how the planning meetings between pastors and cantors are permeated by expectations of deontic symmetry: those details of the upcoming church events that the participants discuss in
their meetings are ones upon which the participants are to make decisions together. As mentioned before, this is particularly interesting from the point of view of the recent developments in church work communities. The traditional authority of the clergy in the Christian church and society is mirrored in the fact that sometimes the word “priest” is used as a metaphor for authority in general (see Peräkylä 1998: 317). While during the church history the position of the cantor has varied from the personal servant of the pastor to the highly respected music director (Edler 1983), nowadays, in the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Finland, the relationship between pastors and cantors is rather ambiguous. Cantors are musicians, not theologians, but they have an academic training comparable to that of pastors. Besides, cantors are inaugurated into their offices by the Chapter of the Church—just like pastors. At the local level, the vicar is superior to the cantor, but the hierarchy between cantors and ordinary parish pastors is more or less a matter of negotiation. Certainly, there are pastors who see themselves as superior to the cantors and regard the joint planning meetings between them as unnecessary. But, at the same time, more and more church workers try to avoid such hierarchical thinking in favor of more egalitarian views. While the public work tasks of pastors and cantors are clearly defined in the Church Order, it is especially the pastors’ and cantors’ deontic rights with regard to the preparation of church events which are relatively blurry; the cantors are responsible for the music in church events, but the pastors are responsible for the church events as a whole, which also includes music. Therefore, the idea about pastors’ and cantors’ joint planning meetings is associated with an open question: what kinds of issues—if any—are supposed to be taken into the sphere of joint decision making and deontic symmetry and what issues should definitely not be taken into that sphere? Even if the discrepancies in this regard might be inconvenient for the participants themselves, the happy news for a conversation analytic researcher is that the pastors’ and cantors’ sometimes conflicting orientations towards their own and each other’s deontic rights in different domains of action make these orientations per se visible in their interaction.

2.2 Conversation analysis as a method

In this study, I examine the pastors’ and cantors’ joint planning meetings within the methodological framework of conversation analysis (Heritage 1984; Boden & Zimmerman 1991; Psathas 1995; Hutchby & Wooffit 1998; ten Have 2007; Schegloff 2007; Sidnell 2010; Sidnell & Stivers 2012). The initial formation of conversation analytic ideas is documented in the sociology
lectures given by Harvey Sacks in the University of California between 1964 and 1972 (published as Sacks 1992a & 1992b). Sacks’s main idea was to study the social world by using recordings of naturally occurring conversations as data. This new technological innovation allowed him to “sit back and observe the structural quality of the world as it happens” (Boden 1994: 65). Conversation analysis was thus a radically empirical enterprise which presented itself as an alternative to the experimentally driven social psychology and to sociological theorizing on human action. The first conversation analytic findings were published in several groundbreaking papers, which aimed at explicating the systematic organization of generic conversational practices that inform the production and recognition of intelligible courses of action: these practices concerned turn taking (Sacks et al. 1974), repair (Schegloff et al. 1977), conversational openings (Schegloff 1968; 1979) and closings (Schegloff & Sacks 1973). The early conversation analytic studies highlighted the amazing extent to which conversations are organized: there is order at every point—even in the finest details of the interactional conduct (Sacks 1984). Later on, conversation analytic research has indeed been able to show that many features of talk, which have been regarded as anomalies of speech production (e.g., agrammatism, stammering, fumbling) and, therefore, as being of no interest from the viewpoint of social interaction per se, can actually be used as powerful interactional devices (see Schegloff 2003; Heeschen & Schegloff 2003).

In conversation analysis, turns at talk are not primarily regarded as being about expressing thoughts and ideas but as being about implementing social actions, asking, asserting, inviting, proposing, requesting, commanding, agreeing, disapproving, arguing, warning, accusing, criticizing, offering help, apologizing, and so on (cf. Austin 1962; Searle 1976). The basic idea of conversation analysis is very simple: it is used to study the ways in which these different kinds of social actions are organized into sequences. As pointed out by Arminen (2005: 2), conversation analysis is about asking “what an utterance does in relation to the preceding one(s) and what implications an utterance poses for the next one(s).” It is assumed that, on the one hand, turns at talk make relevant certain kinds of next turns and these next turns get their “meaning” in relation to the prior turns, while, on the other hand, these next turns ultimately define what the prior turns were doing—a question is a question precisely because it gets an answer (Schegloff & Sacks 1973; Sacks et al. 1974: 729; Heritage 1984: 245-253; Schegloff 2007: 20-21; Enfield 2011: 285-287). This idea is particularly clear in so-called adjacency pairs (e.g., question/answer, greeting/greeting), where the dynamic relation between two different turns at talk is highly conventionalized (Schegloff & Sacks 1973). Arguably, adjacency pair organization is strongly normative in character, which is shown not only in
the multitude of cases where the first action is followed by the appropriate next action, but, in particular, in those instances in which this is not the case. In such instances—for example, when a greeting is not returned—the appropriate next action is “noticeably absent” (Schegloff 1968; 1996) and the absence can become the object of “remedial efforts and justifiable negative inferences” (Goodwin & Heritage 1990: 287).

Since conversation analysts use video or audio recordings of naturally occurring social interactions as their data, they are given direct access to the details of interaction, which they can scrutinize over and over again. The specific research questions are expected to arise inductively from the detailed scrutiny of data; they are not determined beforehand. Still, this scrutiny is normally guided by the concepts and overall theoretical ideas that arise from the previous conversation analytic literature. The research process usually starts with the transcription of the data. Audio data are usually transcribed according to the conventions developed by Gail Jefferson (Schegloff 2007: 265-269); these include conventions for transcribing a wide variety of vocal and interactional phenomena, such as turn-final intonations, overlapping speech, latching of sounds, sound stretches, pace, volume, silences, audible in-breaths and out-breaths, etc. Conversation analysts have also developed many different kinds of methods to add information about visual phenomena into their transcripts (see e.g., C. Goodwin 1981; Heath 1986; Heath & Luff 1996; Nevile 2006)—even if these conventions are less standardized. Notably, however, it is not the transcripts that constitute the conversation analytic data, it is the original recordings (Heritage & Atkinson 1984: 12). Transcription, nevertheless, works as a major “noticing device” (Jefferson 1985); a researcher is forced to attend to many details of interaction which would otherwise escape their attention. After the transcription, the data analysis proceeds case by case, sequence by sequence. Ideally, the analysis starts with “unmotivated looking” of some pieces of data until the researcher notices something “interesting” happening at some moment. From that moment on, the aim of the researcher is to elaborate on and provide evidence for that rather intuitive understanding (ten Have 2007: 124). The next phases of the research process involve collecting instances of the phenomena of interest, determining their variation, explicating their structural features in relation to the previous conversation analytic research literature, and discussing the wider implications of the investigated phenomenon. The inclusion of the data transcripts in publications is important since it allows readers to check the validity of the analytic claims made in the study (Heritage 1995: 395; Peräkylä 1997). Thus, depending on the specific phenomenon of interest, some researchers complement their transcripts with pitch and intensity contours produced with the signal analysis software package PRAAT to provide evidence for a detailed auditory and acoustic
analysis, or with still pictures, either in the form of drawings or in the form of digitized frame pictures, to enable thorough examination of the visual aspects of the data.

With Sacks’s early work on helpline calls and group therapy as an important exception (see Sacks 1992a: 3-20, 268-280), the first conversation analytic studies focused mainly on informal, everyday conversations. Relatively soon, however, conversation analysts increasingly started to apply their method to the studying of interaction in various institutional settings, such as in court (Atkinson & Drew 1979; Maynard 1984), medical consultations (Fisher & Todd 1983; Heath 1986; Silverman 1987), classrooms (McHoul 1978; 1990; Mehan 1979; Macbeth 1991), or news interviews (Heritage 1985; Clayman 1988; Greatbatch 1988; 1992; Heritage & Greatbatch 1991; Ekström 2001; 2009; Clayman & Heritage 2002; Clayman et al. 2007). In institutional contexts, conversation analysis has been understood as being about the ways in which talk is specialized and reduced to accomplish the institutional tasks at hand and, thereby, about describing how social institutions are “talked into being” (Heritage 1984: 290) by the participants engaged in institutional interaction (Drew & Heritage 1992; Arminen 2005). This idea draws from the ethnomethodological notions on the constitution of social realities in interaction (Garfinkel 1984 [1967]; Heritage 1984; 1987). Essentially, the institutional context has been regarded as something that both poses constraints on participants’ social actions and is renewed by these actions (Heritage 1984: 280-290). Participants’ orientations to institutional realities have been shown to be located, for example, in their lexical choices and ways of taking and designing their turns, or in their displays of epistemic asymmetries (Drew & Heritage 1992: 29-53).

While the number of conversation analytic studies of institutional interaction experienced a rapid growth in the 1990’s, from the point of view of this study, it is the studies on meetings, negotiations and multiprofessional teamwork that are most central (e.g. Boden 1994, 1995; Bilmes 1995; Button & Sharrock 1995; Walker 1995; Meier 1997; Kangasharju 1998; Housley 1999; 2000; 2003; Huisman 2001; Arminen & Perälä 2002; Buttny & Kellog Rath 2007; Barske 2009; Clifton 2009; Nielsen 2009; for overviews, see Firth 1995; Asmuss & Svennevig 2009; Nikko 2009; Asmuss 2011; Asmuss & Oshima 2012). For one, this is because meetings and negotiations are often essentially about decision-making (see e.g., Francis 1995; Heritage et al. 2001; Huisman 2001; Clifton 2009), which again is directly linked to the question about the participants’ deontic rights with respect to specific future actions. Importantly, conversation analytic studies on meeting talk have shown how decisions are far from being straightforwardly identifiable phenomena. Instead, as pointed out by Huisman (2001: 70), “decision-making is an incremental activity in which members of an organization move their
agendas forward, step by step.” Another reason for the relevance of the above-mentioned studies for the present considerations lies in the fact that also many other central topics in these studies—turn-taking and turn-allocation, participants’ orientations to agenda, the role of the chair (see e.g., Boden 1994; 1995; Holmes et al. 2007; Pomerantz & Denvir 2007)—have a lot to do with the participants’ deontic rights—that is, their rights concerning their local interactional choices.

Although conversation analysis has its roots in sociology, it has also been widely applied and developed in linguistics, psychology, anthropology, and other disciplines. Besides the verbal content of talk and the sequential placement of utterances, many conversation analysts have also started to pay increasing attention to the prosodic delivery of utterances—that is, their rhythm, tempo, intensity, pitch register, pitch movement and voice quality (Couper-Kuhlen & Selting 1996; Couper-Kuhlen & Ford 2004; Szcepek Reed 2009; 2010; Barth-Weingarten et al. 2010). At the same time, other conversation analytic researchers have been interested in the visual aspects of the participants’ conduct—that is, their gaze, facial expressions, gestures, and body postures, as well as their deployment of material artifacts and other features of the environment as interactional resources (C. Goodwin 1981; 2003; Heath 1986; Heath & Luff 1996; 2010; 2011; 2012; Nevile 2006; Haddington 2006; 2010; 2012; Peräkylä & Ruusuvuori 2006; 2012; Mondada 2007; 2009; Ruusuvuori & Peräkylä 2009; Markaki & Mondada 2012; see also Enfield 2009). Furthermore, as mentioned above, there is an important line of conversation analytic research revolving around the notion of epistemics, which focuses on participants’ orientations to what each of them knows and on the ways in which they adjust their actions in this regard (Heritage & Raymond 2005; 2012; Raymond & Heritage 2006; Kim 2011; Heritage 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; for early work on the topic, see also Drew 1991). Moreover, there has been work on what can be called the “action formation” problem—that is, what are the practices of talk and other conduct which have as an outcome the production of particular, recognizable social actions, such as requesting, inviting, and complaining (Schegloff 2006: 87-89; 2007: 7)? In other words, while the conversation analysts have long observed how participants design their turns at talk so as to be recognizable as specific social actions, they have recently started to consider why it is that a certain utterance is heard as conveying a certain action and not something else (Levinson 2012). As a result, we can evidence a growing amount of literature about so-called “social action formats” (Fox 2007)—that is, regularly patterned clusters of resources that are deployed to convey specific actions, such as requests for information (Jones & Beach 2005; Clayman & Heritage 2009; Heritage 2012a), requests for action (Wootton 2005; Lindström 2005; Heinemann 2006; Asmuss 2007; Curl & Drew 2008;

As I see it, the current developments in the domain of conversation analysis exhibit a tendency to account for the organization of interaction in a way that goes beyond the distinction between mundane conversations and institutional interactions. For example, some of the studies on social action formats draw on both mundane conversations and institutional interactions as data, in order to be able to make more general claims about the relationship between action and turn design (see e.g., Curl & Drew 2008). The same also holds for research on epistemics; while both societal institutions, such as schools and hospitals, and mundane institutions, such as parenthood and friendship, pertain to the relative distribution of epistemic rights between participants, the central interest in this line of research is to account for the practices by which these rights can be negotiated in the turn-by-turn sequential unfolding of interaction—indeed, as it were, of what the exact source of these rights in each case is. This is essentially the kind of approach that I adopt in this study, too. Even if my data are drawn from a certain type of institutional interaction, my primary aim is not to describe this particular institutional reality as such but to shed light on the ways in which participants may negotiate their deontic rights—for example, claim deontic authority, challenge their co-participants’ deontic authority claims, or establish a symmetrical distribution of deontic rights between the participants. This, I hope, is something that can be relevant for the study of analogous interactional phenomena across different contexts, where the participants’ deontic rights may be oriented to as more or less symmetrical or asymmetrical, negotiable or pre-established.

2.3 Research process

Previously, I provided an account of conversation analytic research processes in general. I will now describe the research process of this particular study.

My decision to study the interaction between pastors and cantors was a spontaneous idea that emerged on one day in January 2008. I was on maternity leave from my job as a cantor in the parish of Loimaa and I received a visit from our daughter’s godmother, who worked as a pastor in the same parish. We realized that there were a couple of church events that we needed to discuss together (despite my maternity leave, I occasionally
played at church services), and I came up with the idea of recording our discussion. At that point, I did not know much about conversation analysis. But I knew that my cousin’s cousin’s cousin, Esa Lehtinen, had applied this methodology in his dissertation, and I had thus been wondering whether I could write such a dissertation, too. I wanted to test whether the planning interactions between pastors and cantors would provide interesting data for such a purpose. That first video-recording turned out to be interesting indeed. I was shocked to see the way in which I had continuously ignored my co-participants’ proposals and tried to impose my own views on her. I also came to think about Matti Taatila, the rector of the Loimaa parish, who had emphasized the inescapable “structural tenseness” of the relationship between pastors and cantors—irrespective of the persons involved in that relationship. Intuitively, I believed that my boss was right but—inspired by my video-recording—I became interested in learning more about the structural properties that might actually cause this tension.

So, I wanted to collect more data. I selected the parishes where I thought that I could relatively easily do that—a decision that was based on my personal acquaintances with certain cantors and/or on practical issues concerning my travelling to different parishes. I made my first contact with each parish by phoning the cantor (or one of the cantors) of the parish; I thought that it would be my fellow cantors who would most likely be motivated to organize the needed appointments for data collection. Also, because in parishes there are regularly more cantors than pastors, it is usually cantors who know best whether there are collaborative planning activities in their work communities. With most of the cantors that I spoke with, we could indeed set up a date for data collection. When this was not possible, it was usually for practical reasons: either we could not find a suitable date for my visit to the parish or there were no pastors in the parish who planned church events together with the cantor—something that cantors usually deeply bemoaned. A couple of times I needed to contact the pastors as well, to ask their willingness to participate in the study. Typically, however, it was the cantors themselves who recruited their co-workers for the study. My intuition is that, in most cases, the participants would have had their joint planning meetings anyway, independent of my request to video-record their meetings. Still, there were several cases in which I had the feeling that the cantors made use of the situation and deployed my study as an excuse to suggest joint planning meetings to pastors with whom they would not usually collaborate in this way.7

At the end of June 2008, I had video-recorded fifteen planning meetings between pastors and cantors in seven different parishes in the

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7 How this might pertain to the participants’ interactional conduct will be discussed later in this study (see Section 4.4).
dioceses of several bishoprics. Besides this, my research plan had been accepted by the scientific board of the Sibelius Academy, which meant that I could officially start working on my dissertation. So, during the next six months after the data collection, I transcribed my data with Transana. I was still on maternity leave but, practically every time my baby daughter had a nap, I started transcribing. During my transcribing I often got a strong feeling that something interesting is going on beneath the surface of the interaction and I urgently wanted to learn how to tackle these phenomena. After having my data transcribed, I thus started to analyze my data, but I found it very hard. I even tried to make collections of different kinds of interactional phenomena, but none of these collections turned out to be useful. As I have understood later, it is indeed difficult to do conversation analysis alone; you need the support of a conversation analytic community in order to be able to develop your analytic skills at a satisfactory level. Indeed, it was when I later started hanging around with other conversation analytic researchers that things became easier. One of the turning points of my whole research process was when I heard about Raymond and Heritage’s article “The Epistemics of Social Relations: Owning Grandchildren” (2006). At that time, I did not have access to the electronic databases of the University of Helsinki, but I purchased the article with the conviction that it would somehow change the direction of my research. And it indeed did. I started to examine my data through the lenses of epistemics. However, when I tried to apply the notion of epistemics to the situations in which I had the feeling that the participants were engaged in implicit authority struggles, it became clear to me that these struggles were not primarily about epistemics. As a result, I started to play with the idea of deontics, with which I felt that I could make sense of these other types of authority struggles. Later on, I also came across with Bochenski’s (1974) distinction between epistemic authority and deontic authority, which encouraged me to keep on looking at my data in this way.

In February 2010, after yet another maternity leave that I had after the birth of our second child, I started doing my dissertation full time—now, in the Department of Social Research in the University of Helsinki and under the supervision of Professor Anssi Peräkylä. I started by making another round of analysis of my data, taking the idea about deontics as my guiding star. This led me to focus on sequences in which the participants discussed future actions, and I made collections of sequences starting with informings/announcements and proposals. In my analysis, I considered the ways in which these initiating actions were responded to by the recipients—something that, in my interpretation, revealed participants’ orientations to their own and each other’s deontic rights. These considerations resulted in the first article of my dissertation (Article 5). The article was co-authored by
Anssi Peräkylä, who significantly contributed to the final formulation of the idea about deontics.

The other five papers of this dissertation more or less overlapped with each other. Three of them were the result of my work with proposal sequences. After having expanded my collection of proposal sequences with new cases that I had initially ignored, I started to examine these sequences from three different perspectives: I investigated the ways in which they were brought to closure (Article 4), considered their overall trajectories (Article 3), and studied the ways in which they were initiated (Article 2). The two remaining papers of this dissertation are about topics other than proposals and joint decision making. One of them is about humming as a way to manage participation and thus to deal with certain types of deontic claims (Article 1). Of all the papers included in this study, this is the paper with which I have worked the longest; I started to collect instances of humming as soon as I realized that I had such cases in my data, but without the help of Helena Kangasharju and Mai Frick, who later on gave me access to their data on humming, I would not have come far with that work. Finally, there is a paper that discusses how the idea about deontics relates to other types of social organization that may pertain to the ways in which people design their interactional conduct (Article 6). In this predominantly theoretical work, Anssi Peräkylä has, again, played an important role. The central idea of this paper has emerged in our joint discussions, and, as a co-author, he has clarified the concepts of the paper, edited the text especially with respect to its length, and contributed to the data analysis in essential ways.
3  **DEONTIC RIGHTS IN INTERACTION: OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS OF THE STUDY**

In my examination of people’s orientations to their own and each other’s deontic rights, I approach the issue from two different angles: I (1) describe practices by which participants in interaction may claim (and mitigate their claims of) deontic rights in the turn-by-turn sequential unfolding of interaction and (2) discuss the ways in which participants may deploy the deontic rights that they have as interactional resources, as they design their communicative actions so as to be recognizable as such. In what follows, I will first provide an overview of the results of Articles 1-4, which deal with the former issue. Thereafter, I will turn to those articles that consider the latter issue (Articles 5 & 6). Throughout my discussion, I aim to shed light on the interplay between authority and cooperation, as it appears from the point of view of people’s deontic orientations.

### 3.1 Claiming deontic rights by virtue of what the participants do

In this section, I will consider participants’ deontic rights as interactional achievements—that is, discuss the interactional practices by which these rights are established in face-to-face interactional encounters on a moment-by-moment basis. My focus is on the participants managing their claims of deontic rights by virtue of what they do—something associated with the notion of deontic stance (see Section 1.5).

#### 3.1.1 Deontic claims associated with encounter

In **Article 1**, I examine the ways in which participants may deploy humming as an interactional resource. While our everyday understanding of humming involves the idea of people being happy in their thoughts, I argue that people can also make use of humming, as it were, “intentionally,” to achieve specific interactional goals. My claim is based on the empirical observation that, in interactional encounters, the act of humming occurs systematically in connection with certain interactional problems and contributes to their solution. I suggest that this is because, through humming, the participants may redefine the participation framework of the problematic situations—more specifically, they may mitigate those deontic claims that arise from the status of a social situation as an encounter.
While all human social life entails organization and constraint, these come into play most clearly when two or more people in a social situation jointly ratify one another as participants in an encounter—be it a game of tennis, an interview, or a psychotherapy session (Goffman 1964; Kendon 1988: 24). There are several reasons for this. First, there are rules that govern the relationship between the encounters and the rest of the world; these rules concern things like the initiation and termination of encounters, the entrance and departure of particular participants, and the appropriateness of space and sound that must be observed relative to other people in the situation (Goffman 1964: 135). Second, encounters call for the participants to sustain the appearance of joint involvement in the activity at hand; this is regularly realized through a larger arrangement of the participants’ mutually aligned bodies (M. H. Goodwin 2006; C. Goodwin 2007). And third, there are normative expectations concerning the “naturally bounded interchanges” (Goffman 1981: 17) that take place in encounters; normally, these successive doings are “treated by the participants as being somehow linked together, often in such a way that B’s doing is regarded as some sort of a response to A’s previous doing” (Kendon 1988: 31). This is strongly related to the conversation analytic notions of “adjacency pair” and “sequence organization,” which involve the idea of speakers posing constraints on the speakers to come in terms of their next utterances (Schegloff & Sacks 1973: 295-296; Heritage 1984: 245-253; Schegloff 2007: 9). All this means that encounters are permeated by deontic considerations: every utterance that takes place in an interactional encounter involves some kind of an implicit claim of deontic rights (while, of course, some utterances, like questions, do this more clearly than other utterances; see e.g., Heritage 2003), and each gaze, facial expression, gesture and body movement by which participants manage their involvement in the encounter, can also be treated as relevant in this respect.

Notably, however, the precise extent to which a particular social situation is to be regarded as an encounter is something that is negotiated in the interaction then and there; people index their own level of engagement in

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8 What binds the first pair parts and second pair parts of an adjacency pair together into a coherent sequence is the conditional relevance of the second pair part upon the completion of the first pair part (Schegloff 1968; Schegloff 2007: 20-21)—a principle that can be regarded as a norm in all focused interaction taking place in an encounter (Couper-Kuhlen 2010: 36). Notably, the notion of conditional relevance refers only to items—that is, utterances or actions and their relationship with one another (Schegloff 2010: 39)—not to the actors who produce these items. In this study, however, my focus is precisely on the actors: it is the speakers of the first pair parts who put their recipients under normative constraints either to produce relevant second pair parts or to become accountable for not doing that (Heritage 1984: 245-253).
the interaction, as well as the level of engagement that they expect from others, both through their choices of action and through the ways they design these actions (Stivers & Rossano 2010b: 50; see also Goffman 1978; Ruusuvuori 2001). As recently suggested by Stivers and Rossano (2010a), speakers may choose to impose more or less rigid constraints on their recipients by the deployment of particular “response-mobilizing” features of turn-design: interrogative lexico-morphosyntax, interrogative prosody, recipient-directed speaker-gaze, and recipient-tilted epistemic asymmetry. Instead of always using maximal pressure, speakers may occasionally want to give the recipients precisely the freedom not to respond. What this means is that speakers may sometimes want to downgrade the amount of deontic rights that they implicitly claim by their doings, and that this shift can be understood in terms of reducing the extent to which these doings are to be seen as taking place in an encounter. Besides, we may assume that modifying the status of the interaction can also be a way to resist other people's deontic claims—I don’t need to respond to your utterance if we are not in an encounter with each other.

My central claim in Article 1 is that humming can be used as an interactional resource to attain the above-described objectives. But why would it make sense for people to try to blur the boundaries between the mere social situation and encounters? As I point out in my study on humming, interactions may involve different kinds of problems: co-participants may not respond in adequate ways or they may be engaged in actions that appear ill-suited, or participants may also realize that they themselves cannot provide the expected responses or that their own actions are somehow inappropriate. Because, in encounters, the participants “have declared themselves officially open to one another for purposes of spoken communication and guarantee together to maintain a flow of words” (Goffman 1967: 34), all the deviations from this expectation may threaten the sense of the situation as a whole (Heritage 1984: 84-97). It is, therefore, that participants may occasionally want to redefine the current participation framework and try to remove the organization and constraint associated with encounters. As I demonstrate in Article 1, humming can be deployed as a resource in solving such problems: it can be used to publicly “accept” the co-participant’s solitary engagements, to maintain the separateness of the participants’ activities, to signal a need for “time out” from the joint activity, and—most importantly from the point of view of this study as a whole—to downgrade the deontic claims involved in one’s own embodied actions.

9 In Article 1, I have described my empirical findings without reference to the notion of deontics. This is because I submitted this paper (as well as Articles 2-4 discussed below) before the deontic authority paper (Article 5) was published. Therefore, in Article 1, instead of talking about the “deontic claims” that could be embodied in the participants’ interactional
Hence, it is when interactional problems emerge that it can be most useful to mitigate the deontic significance of the participants’ doings by making the interaction appear ambiguous with regard to its status as an encounter. By this, the question is about solidarity, operating on the micro-level of interaction. According to Collins (2004: 110), “the failure of solidarity, down to the minute aspects of coordinating mutual participation in a conversation, is felt as a deep uneasiness or affront.” Or, as argued by Thomas Scheff (1990: 74), even a “missed beat in the rhythm of conversation” can lead “to the painful emotion of embarrassment, shame, or humiliation.” It thus seems important for the participants to try to do everything that can possibly be done to frame or mask their joint interaction as a successful one.

3.1.2 Deontic claims associated with joint decision-making

In Articles 2-4, I describe a number of interactional practices needed for the participants to be able to achieve and establish the “jointness” of their joint decisions. This genuine jointness—something that I refer to as “deontic symmetry”—is particularly important when it is required of the participants that they share the responsibility for what is to be decided. However, as I demonstrate in Articles 2-4, achieving such jointness is quite complicated: it needs to be established right at the beginning of a potential decision-making sequence, as the participants make the important “meta-decision” about what to decide upon next; it must be actively maintained in the turn-by-turn unfolding of the whole decision-making sequence; and, it should still be preserved at the point at which the participants bring the decision-making sequence to closure. In Articles 2-4, I thus examine the ways in which participants manage to maintain deontic symmetry in these different sequential loci.

In Article 2, I consider the interactional practice in which speakers construct their proposals as thoughts. I investigate two different types of conditional utterances in which a speaker presents a plan: (1) “asking conditionals” (jos ‘what if’ prefaced declarative conditionals and interrogative conditionals) and (2) “stating conditionals” (declarative conditionals). While asking conditionals mark the plan as contingent on the recipient’s approval and involve a straightforward request for the recipient to engage in joint decision making about the proposed plan, stating conditionals are regularly treated as informings about plans in which the recipients have actually no conduct, I have more generally referred to the “interactional import” of the participants’ doings.
say. However, when asking and stating conditionals are prefaced with references to the speakers’ thoughts (mä aattelin ‘I was thinking that’), the projected responses and sequential trajectories are more open-ended: the participants are given the opportunity to share the responsibility for their interactional agenda. I suggest, however, that the exact ramifications of this particular practice are somewhat different in connection with asking conditionals and stating conditionals. In connection with asking conditionals, the speakers’ references to their thoughts function primarily to decrease the pressure on the recipients to engage in joint decision making; the recipients are given the freedom to enter into the process “voluntarily.” Then again, in connection with stating conditionals, the prefatory references to thoughts convey that the speakers’ plans can still be changed, also with respect to the recipients’ views; the recipients are thus invited, but not enforced, to engage in joint decision making about the matter at hand.

As suggested by Lukes (2005: 23), any joint decision making is accompanied by a huge number of so-called “non-decisions”; there are always potential issues that the participants could discuss together but which “non-decision making prevents from being actual.” From this point of view, one important precondition for deontic symmetry in joint decision making involves practices by which participants may jointly deal with such non-decisions, as well. As I suggest in Article 2, the practice of constructing a proposal as a thought can be seen as one such practice; whether the speakers’ “reports” on their private mental processes will lead to non-decisions or whether they will ultimately count as sequence-initiating actions in joint decision-making sequences is something that is essentially dependent on the co-participants’ willingness to cooperate with the first speakers by furthering their assumed projects (cf. Pomerantz 1980; Schegloff 2007: 81-90). But even if the recipients refrained from such cooperation, the situation would involve no overt threat to the participants’ “faces” (Goffman 1955; Brown & Levinson 1987 [1978]): the recipients do not need to be overtly uncooperative; they may simply choose not to cooperate.

Along the same lines, in Article 3, I examine the overall trajectories of decision-making sequences. At the beginning of a decision-making sequence, the speaker usually makes a proposal—that is, describes or names a course of a desired action or state of affairs, while suggesting that both the one who makes the proposal and the one who receives it have a say in the decisions about what will be done (Charles et al. 1997: 685–687). In Article 3, I thus examine what is needed for a proposal to get turned into a joint decision: how do people negotiate the outcome of the decision-making processes in terms of whether they indeed comprise new decisions and whether these decisions are genuinely joint ones? Simply put, a joint decision gets established when the recipient approves the first speaker’s proposal. However, as I demonstrate in
Article 3, such approving responses are quite complex: in order to establish a joint decision, the recipient needs to do three things: (1) establish access to the subject matter of the proposal, (2) express his or her agreement with the proposer’s views, and (3) display commitment to the proposed future action. These three components of approval become constitutive features of a joint decision. This means that there are several junctures in the decision-making sequence at which participants may engage in implicit negotiations about whether they will further the sequence into the direction of a new decision or drop the matter out of the decision-making agenda: these junctures are between the proposal and access, between the access and agreement, and between the agreement and commitment. If a proposal is abandoned before these components have been completed by the recipient, the outcome of the proposal is a non-decision. And then, if the recipient bypasses either the access or the agreement (or both) while yet displaying acquiescence in the proposer’s plan, the outcome of the proposal is a unilateral decision.

I suggest that it is at the above-mentioned junctures, between the different components of approval, where the participants’ orientations to deontic symmetry are most obvious: while it is the first speaker who has set the initial frame for the joint decision making and thus contributed significantly both to the content of the emerging decision and to the fact that participants have started discussing the matter at hand, the participants seem to orient to the expectation that, after that, it is primarily the task of the recipient to lead the sequence in the direction of a new decision. The first speaker, in other words, relies on the recipient’s cooperation when it comes to furthering her assumed project (cf. Pomerantz 1980; Schegloff 2007: 81-90). This gives the recipient several opportunities to exercise power through “non-actions” (cf. Lukes 2005: 20-25) without yet causing overt threat to the participants’ faces; instead of accepting or rejecting the first speaker’s proposal, the recipient may, for example, pose a question about the content of the proposal and thereby start a side-sequence, without necessarily ever coming back to the main sequence. While letting the recipient initiate the return to the main sequence, the first speaker may be sure that the emerging decision (inasmuch as it actually emerges) is genuinely a joint one—that is, the first speaker has not been imposing her plans on the recipient. Besides, and most importantly, in this way, the participants can also establish joint “non-decisions”—that is, share the responsibility for their implicit decisions not to talk about the proposed issue anymore. This happens when the first speakers cooperate with the recipients and take seriously the implications of their (lack of) conduct and, therefore, “voluntarily” refrain from pursuing their proposals anymore.

Finally, in Article 4, I study the prosodic features of the turns at talk by which new decisions are declared as established and the decision-making
sequences as ripe for closure. From the verbal point of view, these, what I refer to as “approval turns” are typically either action declarations (“yea, let’s take it”) or positive evaluations (“yea, that’s good”). However, by modifying the prosodic delivery of their approval turns, the recipients can fine-tune their responsive actions in terms of the extent to which these turns actually signal the emergence of new decisions and implicate sequence closure. In Article 4, I examine the interactional import of three prosodic patterns that are common in the approval turns of my data. When the recipients deliver their approval turns with a (1) dynamic prosody (increased loudness, excessive pitch movement), they signal the emergence of a new decision and implicate sequence closure, irrespective of whether the lexical format of the turn is an action declaration or a positive evaluation. Then again, by delivering their approval turns with a (2) flat prosody (decreased loudness, minimal pitch movement), the recipients do not immediately establish new decisions. It is only after these turns are supplemented with further talk that the participants write down the new decisions; but even after that, the decision-making sequences are not effectively brought to a close. Paradoxically, however, when the recipients signal their approval with a (3) flat-stylized prosody (stylized figure, embedded in flat prosodic features), they signal both the emergence of new decisions and sequence closure. This surprising similarity between the sequential consequences of dynamic and flat-stylized approval turns is something that I seek to account for with reference to emotion: I argue that the similarity of the sequential consequences of the dynamic and flat-stylized approval turns is related to the fact that, in both cases, the speakers display a clear emotional stance toward the matter at hand—even though the “valences” of these stances differ from each other. Then again, if the emotional stance is not clear in the recipient’s utterance, the first speaker keeps on pursuing a more adequate response from the recipient.

The closure of the decision-making sequence is thus yet another locus where the participants may cooperate in trying to achieve and maintain deontic symmetry. While it is the task of the recipient to lead the sequence in the direction of a new decision (see the discussion above), it is also his task to display his ultimate approval of the first speaker’s proposal in a way that appears truly sincere—something that is most effectively accomplished through the prosodic displays of emotion. Only this can warrant for the jointness of the new decision. However, the recipient may also do a little bit less than is needed for sequence closure and thus communicate to the first speaker, in a subtle way, that she may still need to provide further reasons for her idea before the decision about it can be settled.

In sum, the emergence of any joint decision is a result of a specific decision-making sequence—something that is not always actualized but can
still be oriented to as an entity by the participants. Importantly, the rules that hold such a sequence together cannot be described merely with reference to the relation of the conditional relevance between the proposal and its approval. Instead, the sequence can be abandoned at many junctures without this abandoning ever needing to surface. And, arguably, it is precisely this vagueness and ambiguity that is absolutely crucial for the participants to be able to establish and maintain deontic symmetry at different loci in the decision-making sequence—both in terms of the control over the decision-making agenda and in terms of the impact on the sequential outcome.

### 3.2 Having deontic rights by virtue of who the participants are

Previously, I discussed the ways in which participants in interaction may claim deontic rights by virtue of what they do. Some of these claims arise from the status of the interaction as an encounter; other claims are more clearly related to the specific activity that the participants are engaged in. In both types of instances, the deontic claims emerge from the way in which the participants design their interactional contributions. While this way of thinking is in line with the general ethnomethodological and conversation analytic spirit of paying less attention to social scientific theorizing on social life and, instead, treating it as something that people achieve through their everyday practices (Garfinkel 1984 [1967]; Heritage 1984), in this study, however, I have also wanted to consider the other side of the coin. The reason for this is quite plain: while conversation analysis is first and foremost about trying to capture the participants’ own orientations to what is going on in interaction (see e.g., Garfinkel & Sacks 1970: 345; Schegloff 1997), I believe that this is not possible without any theorizing about these orientations. This is because the participants’ orientations may quite likely exceed the boundaries of video recording. Indeed, the need to find a way to deal with these kinds of orientations systematically is something that has become relatively clear with some of the contemporary developments in the domain of conversation analysis, which involve, most notably, the research revolving around the notions of action formation and action recognition.

In principle, action formation and action recognition is not a new topic in the domain of conversation analysis, and conversation analysts have long observed how participants in interaction design their turns at talk so as to be recognizable as specific actions. Still, the exact mechanisms of action formation have mostly been unknown (Levinson 2012; Heritage 2012a). While the rigorous principles of sequential analysis have provided conversation analysts with a way to make claims about what specific turns at
talk are doing locally, in recent years, there has been a growing interest in looking beyond the “next turn proof procedure” (Sacks et al. 1974: 729), to find out why it is that some utterance is heard as conveying a certain action and not something else. As expected, conversation analysts have mostly concentrated on the features of the participants’ publicly observable conduct that might bear on the mechanisms of action formation and action recognition. Besides the sequential structures, linguistic constructions and lexical choices, conversation analysts have considered a wide range of other semiotic resources (prosody, gaze, body movements, etc.) that people may use when they try to make their actions recognizable to others (Levinson 2012). However, the recent work of Heritage (2012a) is exceptional in this respect; Heritage has shown that participants’ judgments about their respective epistemic statuses are absolutely crucial for their understanding whether, for example, a declarative utterance is to be interpreted as a question or not. Furthermore, most interestingly, Heritage’s work raises the question about the possibility of other comparable resources for action formation and action recognition. As suggested by Sidnell (2012: 54), such “action recognition machinery” might consist of a suite of different kinds of action-recognition heuristics, which might sometimes cluster, resulting in easily identifiable “speech act”-like products, and sometimes generate “near-unique one-offs that seem not to fit in any one speech act category clearly.” In this study, I consider one such heuristic. My essential argument is that, besides the deontic rights that are constructed locally by virtue of what the participants do (deontic stance), there are also deontic rights that arise from who the participants are (deontic status), and these rights have an impact on how the participants’ publicly observable conduct is interpreted by their co-participants. This theoretical idea lies at the heart of Articles 5 and 6, which I have written together with my supervisor, Professor Anssi Peräkylä.

In Article 5, we examine the recipients’ responses to proposals and assertions dealing with future actions or states of affairs. While proposals (declaratives or interrogatives in the conditional mood) imply that there is a decision to be made, and that this decision is contingent upon the recipient, it makes relevant the recipient’s approval of the decision. As suggested in Articles 2-4, it is through proposals and approvals that the participants can establish a relatively symmetrical distribution of deontic rights between them. The situation is, however, more complex with assertions, which state future facts without any contingencies (declaratives in the indicative mood). When such a turn is responded to with a compliance token, such as selvä “allright,” the recipient displays his awareness of the fact that the first speaker’s assertion has consequences for him, which he thereby accepts. Through his “compliance token” (Schegloff 2007: 7; see also Beach 1993: 329-330; Sorjonen 2001: 111-112; Stivers 2006), the recipient establishes the
first speaker’s deontic authority in the matter at hand.\textsuperscript{10} When an assertion is, however, responded to with an information receipt token, such as \textit{aha} “I see,” the recipient treats the matter as being outside of the “deontic domain” and thus refrains from acknowledging any speaker-tilted deontic asymmetry. This means that utterances with the same key design features can be heard and treated differently depending on the participants’ judgments about their respective deontic rights in the domain in question.

In Article 6, we outline a conceptual framework revolving around three orders in the organization of human action: \textit{epistemic order}, \textit{deontic order}, and \textit{emotional order}.\textsuperscript{11} We claim that participants make judgments about their epistemic, deontic and emotional statuses relative to each other and use these judgments as resources as they design their utterances to perform certain actions. At the same time, they also take the possible deployment of these resources into account as they interpret their co-participants’ utterances as actions. Moreover, we invoke the notion of the “momentary relationship of the participants”—something that emerges out of the participants’ respective epistemic, deontic, and emotional statuses at some point in the interaction—in order to build a bridge between the local and wider aspects of social organization that bear on human action. On this basis, we demonstrate how the participants’ momentary relationships can be negotiated through the ways in which the first speakers’ deployment of their epistemic, deontic, and emotional statuses is acknowledged by their co-participants. If the recipients refrain from acknowledging the first speakers’ epistemic, deontic, or emotional statuses, which have, nevertheless, been central to the first speakers’ ways of designing their utterances, the participants’ momentary relationships are modified with respect to these aspects. The advantages of such theorizing are twofold. On the one hand, it enables us to conceptualize the manifold of the ways in which participants’ social relationships are built-in in the organization of human action—that is, how they pertain to the processes of action formation and action recognition. On the other hand, the idea about three distinct social orders helps us to

\textsuperscript{10} Importantly, however, the comparison between the English and Finnish ways of displaying compliance may not be quite straightforward and requires further investigation. In research on medical interaction, for example, the findings on doctors pursuing the patients’ “okays” after treatment decisions (see Stivers 2006) have not been replicated in equivalent Finnish data (see Ijäs-Kallio et al. 2011).

\textsuperscript{11} This framework has roots in an analytic division that has been originally developed by Johanna Ruusuvuori and Anssi Peräkylä for purposes of teaching conversation analysis at the Universities of Tampere and Helsinki. The original model, listing three aspects of social interaction that are fundamental in constructing social relationships: emotion, control, and epistemic rights, has also appeared in a recent Finnish edited volume in social psychology (see Ruusuvuori 2012).
account for the kind of relationship negotiations that involve a complex interface between knowledge, power, and emotion.

Our theoretical framework is well-suited to the analysis of implicit power negotiations between participants. In many cases, the question is about the second speakers somehow resisting the kind of distribution of deontic rights that the first speakers have suggested. While the second speakers may display their analysis of the prior speakers’ utterances by responding to them in certain ways, it is also possible that “the treatment that a bit of talk gets in a next utterance may be quite different from the way in which it was heard” (Goodwin & Goodwin 1987:4). Instead of presenting a naked analysis of the prior talk, the next utterances may also deal with it, not in its own terms, but in the way in which it is more liable for the intentions of the subsequent speaker (see e.g., Stivers 2005; Waring 2005; 2007; Stivers & Hayashi 2010; Heritage & Raymond 2012). Participants may blur, conceal or otherwise avoid displaying their true appreciation of the interactional import of the earlier talk and “avoid taking up and dealing with what they perfectly well know is accomplished or implicated by prior talk so as to influence the direction of talk towards some desired objective” (Heritage 1984: 260). In Articles 5 and 6, we consider this way of responding: we analyze instances in which second speakers, while agreeing with the content of the first speakers’ utterances, ingeniously challenge the first speakers’ claims of deontic rights. For example, as we demonstrate in Article 5, the second speaker’s evaluation of the first speaker’s unilateral decision can be a way for the second speaker to indicate that she has actually a word to say in the first speaker’s decision; no matter how positive such an evaluation might be, it serves as a vital demonstration of the fact that no “surrender of private judgement” (Lukes 1978: 639-640) is occurring (see Section 1.3.1). And, indeed, it is precisely the apparent cooperativeness of the second speakers’ evaluations that make this strategy particularly “effective;” it makes it almost impossible for the first speakers to address the second speakers’ resistance directly at the meta-level.

At the same time, we may assume that situations where someone’s deontic status is not acknowledged by their co-participants in the ways that they have expected can be experienced as painful—especially if the person has been maintaining expectations that go along with a particular identity that they have adopted (cf. Douzinas 2002: 385). Luckily, however, human social interaction is organized in a way that allows the participants to minimize the amount of embarrassment that such situations might generate (cf. Goffman 1956). Namely, as pointed out by Tomasello (2008: 79), in all human communication, the relationship between the participants’ overt interactional conduct and what they postulate to be its shared, intersubjective context, the so-called “common ground” (Clark 1996; Enfield 2006) is complementary: “as more can be assumed to be shared between communicator and recipient,
less needs to be overtly expressed.” Tomasello (2008: 79) even suggests that “if enough is shared in common ground, the overt expression of either motive or referent may be totally eliminated without diminishing the message at all.” Therefore, a highly authoritative speaker may assume that his deontic status alone is enough for the recipient to understand that, for example, his apparently tentative interrogative conditional utterance is actually to be understood as a command. But then again, a less authoritative person may realize that they need to produce an imperative in order to be understood. It is thus the complementarity and relative weight of deontic stances and deontic statuses that constitutes a fundamental mechanism by which people may negotiate their deontic rights. Thereby, the central question is whether someone’s deontic status is treated as something that can overrule the deontic stance or whether the deontic stance is to be taken at its face value. Because both options are equally supported by the formal organization of interaction, the participants may indeed engage in tough power negotiations without yet causing any overt threat to anyone’s face (Goffman 1955; Brown & Levinson 1987 [1978]).
4 DISCUSSION

4.1 Face and solidarity

Human social interaction involves many different kinds of threats to face and solidarity but, at the same time, it is ordered in ways that allow the participants to minimize these threats (Heritage 1984: 265-280; Goll & Meier 1997; Clayman 2002). As has been well described in the conversation analytic research literature, there are several aspects in the sequence organization which function as resources for the participants to promote cooperative actions and suppress uncooperative actions. For example, the conversation analytic studies on preference organization have shown that, in general, cooperative responsive actions tend to be performed more straightforwardly and faster than uncooperative responsive actions, which are often produced indirectly, with hesitations and delays (Pomerantz 1984a; Davidson 1984; Bilmes 1988; Schegloff 2007: 58-96; see also Ogden 2006); the delayed positioning not only mitigates the force of an uncooperative response, but also facilitates the avoidance of such a response altogether (Clayman 2002: 235). Other solidarity-promoting aspects of sequence organization include prefaces, pre-sequences and other preliminaries, which systematically favor cooperative outcomes: they enable the participants to determine in advance whether their requests, invitations, etc. are likely to be accepted, and then proceed with those actions only if the prospects for cooperative responses are good (Schegloff 2007: 28-57). What also minimizes the interaction-related threats to solidarity is people’s tendency to mitigate their uncooperative actions, for example, by explanatory accounts (Heritage 1988; Houtkoop 1990).

In this study, I have described further interactional tools that help the participants to maintain their mutual solidarity—in this case, in the face of potentially problematic negotiations on people’s deontic rights. In Article 1, I have talked about how people may deploy humming as an interactional resource to deal with potentially embarrassing interactional problems which could threaten the sense of the situation as a whole. In Articles 2-4, I have discussed the ways in which participants in joint decision making may negotiate the trajectories and outcomes of decision making sequences without needing to engage in any overtly uncooperative actions.\footnote{At the same time, these articles also deal with another aspect of solidarity—that which involves the sharing of power (McCay 1988; Berkes 1997; Borriini-Feyerabend et al. 2007; Shindler & Cheek 1999). While Honneth (1995: 129) has suggested that “social relations of symmetrical esteem” constitute a prerequisite for solidarity, we may safely assume that an integral part of that symmetry consists of the relatively symmetrical distribution of power} In Article 2,
I have considered one practice—that of constructing a proposal as a thought—by which first speakers may suggest joint decision making about some topic without yet making their recipients accountable for their possible non-cooperation in this regard. Similarly, in Article 3, I have examined the ways in which the participants can cooperatively drop a topic from the decision-making agenda. Then, in Article 4, I have described the subtle prosodic means through which a recipient, who ostensibly approves the first speaker’s proposal, may communicate to the first speaker that still further reasons are needed before the final decision on the matter can be treated as established. And, lastly, in Articles 5 and 6, Anssi Peräkylä and myself have discussed the complementarity and the relative weight of deontic stances and deontic statuses as something that constitutes a central mechanism by which people may negotiate the power-related aspects of their mutual relationships without causing any overt threat to anyone’s face. All these practices and mechanisms are directly linked to the fundamentally cooperative nature of the human communication system, where it is the participants’ joint goal to get the communicator’s message across (Grice 1975) and which thus allows the participants to minimize their potentially face-threatening interactional contributions.

4.2 Beyond agnosticism

One of the basic ideas of conversation analysis is that social interactions are organized in an orderly way and that this orderliness can be discovered by the close analysis of the rules and structures of naturally occurring interactions (e.g., Heritage 1984; Psathas 1995; Schegloff 2007). While the early conversation analytic studies have mainly focused on the sequential organization of talk, the broader features of social context, such as power, have been paid less attention to. In general, conversation analysts have rejected the “bucket theory of context” (Heritage 1987; Goodwin & Heritage 1990: 286) in which pre-existing circumstances and social frameworks are seen as determining and enclosing the interaction from above. Instead, conversation analysis has approached context as locally produced and constantly transformable in interaction. Rather than seeing the context as an abstract social force, which imposes itself on the participants, conversation analysts have usually begun from the other direction and observed how participants actively display their orientations to the context, to one another and hence also to the analyst (Hutchby & Wooffitt 1998: 147). This means within these relations—something that can be partly captured by my notion of “deontic symmetry.”
that contextual features are not considered so relevant for the research as long as the participants in the interaction do not orient to their relevance in their publicly observable behavior (see Schegloff 1968; 1991; 1997); one needs to take “relevance-to-the-parties as the warrant for relevance-for-the-analyst in order to specify how the orientation to a context has become consequential for the participants’ conduct” (Arminen 2000: 446). Thus, when it comes to “higher level” social phenomena, such as power, researchers should not assume the significance of any such variable a priori; instead, the issue is one for empirical investigation. No matter how good this all sounds, in practice, however, this initial conversation analytic skepticism has often led to some kind of “agnosticism”—that is, to a claim that the existence of the higher level social phenomena is actually unknowable (Hutchby 1998: 86). Furthermore, this agnosticism has usually appeared in combination with a deep reluctance to engage in any social scientific theorizing, which has led many sociologists to question the whole bearing of conversation analysis on what might be called the sociological agenda (Hutchby 1999a: 87; for debates, see Schegloff 1997; Schegloff 1998; Wetherell 1998; Billig 1999a, 1999b; Schegloff 1999a, 1999b).

Inasmuch as power relations are seen as matters that actually determine the courses of interactional encounters, I wholeheartedly agree with the conversation analysts’ warnings against taking such relations for granted. I also subscribe to the conversation analytic idea that power relations cannot exist outside of concrete interactional practices; power relations are not natural but oriented-to features of interaction. Where I disagree, however, is with the view according to which power relations could not be taken as “given” by the participants themselves. Even if such relations do not determine, or one-sidedly influence, the participants’ concrete interactional performances from above, in this study, I have argued that these relations—as they pertain to the participants’ deontic statuses—are sometimes used as resources for action formation and action recognition. Thus, it is at those particular moments of interaction, when the participants make use of their deontic statuses in order to design their turns at talk as intelligible social actions, and take the deployment of the same resources into account as they interpret their co-participants’ actions, that the participants indeed orient to their power relations as pre-established—even if this relation is continuously changing as a result of each new contribution in the interactional sequence. Importantly, in my view, the participants still have the freedom of choice with respect to the resources that they want to deploy

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13 This is something that has also been pointed out, for example, in the research on doctor-patient interaction, where patients have been shown to design their own diagnostic proposals at the beginning of the medical consultation consistently as tentative, in this way displaying orientation to the doctors’ medical authority (Ruusuvuori 2000: 30).
and consider in these processes (e.g., whether to rely on the deontic status as a resource and utter an interrogative conditional in order to perform a command, or to upgrade the deontic stance and issue an imperative to implement the same action).

This idea can be clarified with reference to two broad dimensions of context that Hanks (2006) has called *emergence* and *embedding*. Emergence designates aspects of context that arise from production and reception of utterances as ongoing processes. This dimension of context is usually associated with the idea of the speaking subject’s communicative intentionality. Conversation analysts in particular have long emphasized the view according to which participants can endow the tiniest details of their talk and conduct with relevance. Embedding, then again, describes the ways in which utterances are framed in some broader contexts. This dimension of context is thus associated with social theoretical debates on the extent to which social actors and actions are determined by external social forces. Hence, there seems to be an initial alignment of emergence with the local aspects of interaction and embedding with the global aspects. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Hanks, this might not be the most fruitful way of thinking about context; there is no reason to think that emergence could not be observed at the global level and embedding at the local level. Thus, to situate my argument within Hanks’s considerations, I have suggested that also the global aspects of interaction, such as people’s power relationships, can be associated with emergence and communicative intentionality. Even if people might be thrust into positions and social relations that are independent of their intentional states and that thus define them from above, people can still make use of these “social facts” (Durkheim 1982 [1895]), as it were, intentionally. The social world in which an interaction is embedded does not determine what participants do—something that also applies to the notion of “culture” as a potential source of behavior (Collins 2004: 143). Instead, just like the constitutive rules of chess create the very possibility of playing chess (Searle 1995: 27-28), the social world enables people’s doings through the resources that it offers to them—resources that people may deploy in unpredictable ways.

The talk about such an “immaterial” thing as a person’s deontic status as an interactional resource raises the question whether something like that can really be treated as comparable to “material” resources, such as verbal utterances, facial expressions, and hand gestures, that people may resort to in order to implement social actions. Is there any empirical evidence to support the “reality” of deontic statuses—besides, the ways in which they help to account for some systematic features in the data, as demonstrated in Articles 5 and 6? Even if such evidence cannot be provided by using the qualitative methodology of conversation analysis, something like this has been offered
by recent studies in social neuroscience: they point to the importance of the identity of the speaker as the recipient seeks to interpret that person’s spoken message. For example, 4-month-old infants have been found to have quite different brain responses to their own mother’s voice compared to unfamiliar voices (Purhonen et al. 2004; 2005). Moreover, it has been shown that listeners make immediately stereotype-dependent inferences about a speaker, and bring the associated stereotypes to bear on what is being said (Van Berkum et al. 2008). Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that a listener’s interpretations of a speaker’s utterances are strongly influenced by whether the listener likes the speaker or not: we tend to interpret the behavior of the people we like by using higher-level mentalistic descriptions of their thoughts, goals and emotions (e.g., ringing a doorbell to see if someone is at home). In contrast, we tend to interpret the behavior of the people we do not like by using lower-level mechanistic descriptions of their publicly observable behavior (e.g., moving a finger) (Marsch et al. 2010). All this suggests that many aspects of the social world “out there” are inherently connected to the mechanisms of action formation and action recognition.

Now, there is something in the latter-mentioned study of Marsch and her co-workers (2010) that seems to be worth noting. From the point of view of that study, to be interested in only what is publicly observable in the participants’ talk and conduct implies an attitude towards the research subjects that appears quite disturbing: the researchers themselves may not like those people whose interactional conduct they are analyzing, but it is possible that the participants themselves like each other. Therefore, in order to really make sense of the ways in which participants design their turns at talk as intelligible social actions, researchers should be sensitive to who the participants are to each other. Even if the focus of analysis is on the fundamental structures of conversation, it is also important, as recently pointed out by Stivers and Rossano (2010b: 55), to recognize that “people are performing actions to, with, and for others. Who these people are to each other and what their respective projects are, matter both to the interactants and for the interaction, and thus inescapably for those who are committed to the analysis of their conduct.”

4.3 On the origins of deontic rights

The way of thinking about the participants’ deontic rights that has been adopted in this study allows the researcher to consider the interactional consequences of people’s orientations to their own and each other’s deontic rights. What is left open, however, are the exact origins of someone’s deontic
rights—whether they emerge, for example, out of the participants’ institutional roles or from something that one of the participants has just previously said. While something about these origins has been elucidated in those social scientific studies mentioned at the beginning of this dissertation which deal with the macro-structural and macro-interactional bases of power (see Section 1.2), at this point, however, I will turn to discuss two recent conversation analytic studies that can shed light on the more local origins of the participants’ deontic rights.

First, there is the most recent study by Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen (forthcoming). Drawing on a large database of conversational American English, Couper-Kuhlen has considered the linguistic forms that people deploy to implement what she calls “directive-commissive” actions (cf. Searle 1976), which have in common the aim to bring about something in the future, be it temporally immediate and intrinsic to the speech-event situation, or temporally “remote” and at a remove from the speech-event situation (cf. Houtkoop 1987; Lindström 1999: 104-139; Egbert 2011). Couper-Kuhlen found that, even if there are multiple formats used in turn design for each action type, each action type still has certain “preferred” formats. Nevertheless, there is some overlap between the preferred formats for different action types; for example, you should X can be used to implement a request, a suggestion and a proposal. The same applies to do you want/need X, which can be used to implement requests, offers and proposals. According to Couper-Kuhlen, the most “polysemous” of the recurrent directive-commissive action formats are positive imperatives. Yet, even if similar linguistic forms can be used to implement these different kinds of actions, nevertheless, the participants in mundane interaction can usually distinguish between them without major problems. One of the reasons for this is what can be called the “beneficiary heuristic” (Sidnell 2012: 54); as the participants design their turns at talk so as to be recognizable as specific social actions, they pay attention to who will bear the costs of the future action in question and to whom its benefits will accrue. Thus, while both offers and requests advocate something that the recipient should do, in offers, these doings will benefit the recipient and, in requests, they will benefit the speaker. Proposals, then again, advocate something that should be of benefit for both participants. Another reason for the ease with which the participants in everyday conversations can deal with the above-mentioned polysemy is what can be called the “responsible agent heuristic” (Sidnell 2012: 54); they design their utterances also with respect to who will execute the action being planned—whether it will be both of the participants or only one of them. So, while requests and suggestions call for the recipient’s actions, in offers, it is the speaker who needs to act and, in proposals, it is both participants.
Then, there is the study by Curl and Drew (2008). As mentioned earlier, this work analyses the choices between two request forms: simple forms prefaced with modal verbs (e.g., *Could you do X?*) and more complex forms prefaced with specific markers of deference (e.g., *I was wondering if you could do X*). Initially, Curl and Drew found a broad association of these forms with specific interactional settings: the simple modal forms were more common among family members, while the more complex accounts of wondering were typical in calls to a doctor's surgery. Now, out of this, one could draw different kinds of conclusions: one might assume that it is the context and the participants’ roles in these settings that determined their linguistic choices, as it were, from above, or, one could suggest that it is through these choices that the participants’ constructed their mundane and institutional identities (He & Keating 1991; Schegloff 1991; Ochs 1993: 288; He 1995; Antaki & Widdicombe 1998; Zimmerman 1998; Bucholtz 1999; Bucholtz & Hall 2004; Waring 2005; Cook 2006: 269; Saito 2012). Interestingly enough, Curl and Drew did not pay much attention to either of these options. Instead, by comparing their everyday data with their institutional data, they came up with a more local explanation of the participants’ choices of request form. They argued that these choices not only involved a claim to the speakers’ entitlement to make the request but, in addition, they reflected the speakers’ awareness of the range of contingencies that the recipients might have in granting the request. Crucial evidence for this more local explanation came from those medical interactions where the speaker used the simple request format and observably oriented to the recipient’s granting of the request as self-evident, as well as from those everyday conversations where the speaker used the more complex format and noticeably oriented to the recipient’s compliance as somehow contingent. Thus, as recently pointed out by Peräkylä (2011: 372-373) in his description of the study, “by not terminating their analysis prematurely by using ‘institutional context’ as an overall explanation, Curl and Drew were able to show in detail what the participants locally oriented to in their choice of request form.”

Hence, while Ervin-Tripp (1976) has argued that the speaker’s choice of the directive form is dependent on “the relative power of speaker and addressee” (Ervin-Tripp 1976: 29), in light of the above-described studies, the situation seems much more complicated than that. To apply the central concepts of this dissertation, it seems that the relative strength of the speaker’s deontic stance (for definition, see Section 1.5) is informed by the interplay between at least three different kinds of considerations that are relatively independent of any structural power relationships between the participants: the participants’ agent roles (who will perform the action in question), the allocation of costs and benefits between them (who will benefit
from the action), as well as the contingencies surrounding the actualization of the future action in question (whether the action is easy or difficult to perform). What I want to add in this (already complex) picture, are two general ideas. First, what two participants are to each other at a particular interactional moment may not always be exhausted by the “local” considerations alone, for there might be other considerations that can trump one or other of the local considerations. For example, as can be seen in Articles 2-4, in the planning meetings between pastors and cantors, an utterance about a future action can be treated as a proposal, not so much because the action in question would be performed by the participants together or because it would benefit them both, but simply because both of the participants—by virtue of their institutional roles—have a word to say in the matter.14 Second, people’s deontic stances do not necessarily mirror their understanding of their deontic statuses relative to their co-participants: for example, as discussed in Articles 5 and 6, there are declarative requests for action15 which get their deontic strength from the participants’ relative deontic statuses, not from the deontic stances that they embody.

As pointed out above (see Section 4.2), the participants’ social relationships are not only a concern for them themselves but, besides, for those who study these people’s interactional conduct. Given the limits of empirical interaction data, it is here that the theoretical notion of deontic status is particularly helpful. Besides enabling us to account for situations where the design of an utterance or an expression (deontic stance) does not directly tell about its deontic strength, the notion of deontic status allows us to think about the potential origins of people’s deontic rights without needing to limit ourselves only to what is publicly observable in the participants’ conduct. Thereby, it allows us to draw linkages between theorizing about the social world, associated with the social sciences and organizational studies, on the one hand, and the examination of the minor details of the participants’ publicly observable conduct, associated with conversation analysis, on the other. Some of these linkages might even have some “emancipatory” potential (on “emancipatory” conversation analysis, see Kitzinger & Frith 1999; Weatherall 2000; 2002; Stokoe 2000; Kitzinger 2000; 2009; Stokoe & Smithson 2001; Stokoe & Weatherall 2002; Tanaka & Fukushima 2002; Speer 2002; 2005; Ohara & Saft 2003; Tainio 2003; Land & Kitzinger 2007; 14 Of course, this should not be taken to mean that this “primary” consideration could not overlap with the agency and beneficiary considerations.

15 A good example for such a request, which is drawn from the study of Ervin-Tripp (1976: 29), is the situation in which a customer says to a bartender: “I’ll have a Burgie.” The same utterance by the same customer—even in the very same physical environment—may not have any deontic implications at all if it is said by the customer to their companion—to inform their companion about their intentions with respect to a beer.
Given that a person with a high deontic status may assume that his status alone is enough to warrant for the deontic significance of his utterances, we may think about the kind of power relations that are maintained, for example, by recommendations to be found in the most celebrated guides to relationships, such as John Gray’s (1992) *Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus*.

Women often think they are asking for support when they are not. When she needs support, a woman may present the problem but not directly ask for his support. She expects him to offer his support and neglects directly to ask for it. (Gray 1992: 165.)

As pointed out above, there are indeed situations where a person’s deontic status is *not* acknowledged as a resource for action formation and action recognition in the way that the speaker has expected. But, from the point of view of this study, we may also see how urging people to claim an explicit deontic stance may function as an effective way for others to refrain from recognizing these people’s deontic status; these people are taken away the feeling of *having* deontic rights without always needing to *claim* them. (Stevanovic 2011.)

### 4.4 Justification of an encounter

As discussed in the previous section, deontic rights can have different origins. While some of these origins are relatively stable, such as gender, others are more dependent on the specific situational circumstances. Besides, as discussed earlier in this study (see Section 3.1.1), there are deontic rights that simply arise from the status of a social situation as an *encounter*—that is from the fact that two or more people have jointly ratified each other as authorized co-sustainers of a single focus of visual and cognitive attention (Goffman 1964: 135). Encounters, as natural units of social organization, are permeated by constraints that they impose on their participants. For example, the kind of embodied organization of participation in an encounter that has been referred to as the “ecological huddle” (Goffman 1964: 135-136) is not a matter of deliberate choice but, as demonstrated by Goodwin (2007), it has actual consequences on how participants orient to each other as moral actors.

Similarly, in Article 1, I have shown how interactional problems, such as a lack of response when it would be due, call for the participants’ remedial efforts, the aim of which are to maintain the sense of the situation as a whole. Importantly, the normative obligations that arise from the status of a social situation as an encounter are the same for all its participants. As pointed out by Goffman (1961: 71), “an encounter provides a world for its participants”—a
“democratic” mini world that is, as it were, independent of the hierarchies of the world “out there” (see also Goffman 1983; Drew & Wootton 1988). At the same time, however, Goffman also pointed out that the character and stability of this mini world is “intimately related to its selective relationship to the wider one” (Goffman 1961: 71). This raises the question of how this particular relation operates. How are those normative obligations that arise from the status of a social situation as an encounter tied to the normative obligations arising from wider social structures? Are there certain “higher order” deontic considerations that bear on the emergence of interactional encounters in the first place and, thereby, to the deontic rights that the participants in these encounters might have? This is something that I will consider next.

Given the number of normative obligations that any interactional encounter creates for its participants, we may assume that there always needs to be some kind of legitimate reason for any person to ratify another person as a participant in an encounter. While Collins (2004: 373) has argued that humans are “emotional energy seekers” and are thus particularly drawn to those interactional encounters where they can get the best emotional energy payoff, it is also clear that the mere hope for an emotional energy boost is something that a person can seldom make use of as an explicit justification for an encounter (cf. I wanted to come to talk to you because you always make me feel so good). In other words, even if the “real” reason for someone’s willingness to interact with another person were related to the anticipated emotional rewards that could be gained through the interaction, encounters are usually—more or less explicitly—justified on other grounds, such as imbalances with respect to knowledge (How was your holiday?) or practical advantages that the participants can gain from the interaction (I think we need to discuss the revisions to our paper). Besides, some encounters can be justified with reference to third parties who have defined the encounter as obligatory for certain participants (The Chapter demanded that we need to have a performance appraisal interview at least once a year).

Now, whatever the exact basis upon which an encounter can be justified is, I suggest that this justification may really pertain to what actually happens in the interaction then and there. This idea is related to what has been suggested about the influence of the participants’ overall activity framework on the types of actions that the participants are likely to perform in their interactional encounter (Levinson 1992; see also Ryave 1978; Ford 1999; Heath et al. 2000; Vine 2004; 2009). But now, however, my question is not about this likelihood per se but about its origins: why would certain participants in specific settings be likely to perform particular types of actions? I argue that this is not only to keep the overall activity going (cf.
Stivers & Robinson 2006) but, at the same time, it is to maintain the justification of the encounter. If there are no other reasons for the participants to interact with each other than those reasons that have to do with the participants’ official activity, every departure from that official activity in effect undermines the sense of the situation as a whole—as has been pointed out in Article 1. But, of course, if there are more reasons for the participants to spend time together than just the one associated with their official activity, they may more freely deviate from the expected course of interaction. Hence, it is the exact justification of an encounter which determines what the participants should do in order to maintain the sense of the situation, but this justification, again, is fundamentally dependent on who the participants are to each other. In this way, the justification of an encounter can serve as one possible bridge between the two worlds mentioned by Goffman: the democratic mini world of the encounter and the wider social world with its distinct structures.

The planning meetings between pastors and cantors are normally justified on practical reasons: the participants need to prepare their joint work tasks. However, as pointed out earlier, not every church worker regards such meetings as necessary: the decisions about hymns and other details of upcoming church events can also be made, for example, by the pastors alone, who may afterwards inform the cantors about their unilateral decisions. Timewise, such a procedure would indeed be quite effective. But what really justifies the joint planning meetings between pastors and cantors is the anticipation that these meetings will lead to “better” decisions, to the emergence of which both the pastors with their theological expertise and the cantors with their musical proficiency contribute. Thus, I have suggested, and presented empirical evidence, that the justification of the planning meetings between pastors and cantors is based on two different kinds of expectations: on expectations of epistemic asymmetry and deontic symmetry (see Section 2.1). Indeed, from this point of view, we can clearly appreciate why the pastors and cantors in their joint planning meetings strive so hard to make sure that their joint decisions are genuinely joint ones—something that is demonstrated in Articles 2-4.

As pointed out above, the demands that an interactional encounter makes on its own behalf, such as the obligation of joint involvement (Goffman 1957), concerns all its participants in the same way. However, this symmetry does not necessarily apply to the maintenance of the justification of the encounter—that is, the participants may not always feel equally obliged to engage in those specific types of actions in light of which the encounter makes most sense. Indeed, it is relatively common that an encounter has been suggested or initiated by one particular person who has more at stake in the encounter than those with whom they want to interact with. This person
may even have tried to persuade his potential co-participant(s) about the necessity of the encounter, for example, by referring to the mutually acceptable reasons in light of which the encounter appears important. Now, I suggest that this kind of a “higher order” asymmetry may bear on the participants’ interactional conduct in the encounter. This happens by influencing the options available for each participant: while that person on whose initiative the encounter has taken place has the obligation to prove that the encounter is justified, others do not have such obligations and can design their conduct more freely. As a result, the participants have fundamentally different deontic statuses to begin with. Hence, it is not only the wider structural realities or the local interactional contingencies that have an impact on the participants’ deontic statuses but these may also be shaped by the simple dynamics of setting up interactional encounters: the one who suggests or initiates an encounter is accountable for its success.

In my data, the participant who usually occupies the most vulnerable position with respect to the justification of the encounter is the cantor. Unfortunately, I cannot judge whether this is merely because of my choice to make my first contact with each parish through the cantor, who recruited their co-workers for the study, or whether it reflects a more general pattern in the church workplaces. As pointed out earlier, it is possible that some of the cantors made use of my study and deployed it as a justification for the joint planning meetings that they suggested to the pastors. Whatever the case might be, there are certain patterns in my data that can be explained with reference to this particular type of vulnerability. For example, one interesting way for the cantors to maintain the symmetrical distribution of the participants’ deontic rights, and thus to preserve the justification of the encounter, is to display their wholehearted approval of the plans that the pastors have presented as unilateral decisions of their own; one such instance has been described in Article 5. At the same time, the pastors have the opposite tendency to treat the cantors’ proposals as announcements of the cantors’ unilateral decisions and thereby—in a most sympathetic way—indicate that these topics are not worth joint discussion; two cases of this type are discussed in Article 3.

While it seems throughout possible that the justification of an encounter could serve as one potential origin of the participants’ deontic rights, further research is needed to provide more empirical support for the idea. This kind of research involves special challenges: on the one hand, this is because any video or audio recording usually starts at the point at which the participants have already agreed on their encounter and its justification is thus no longer explicitly discussed. On the other hand, this is because all the recordings are produced by the prevalence of one major justification that might easily trump
other justifications: the recording. To overcome both of these challenges may thus necessitate new innovative research methods.

4.5 Deontic ticker

Even if deontic rights may have different origins, one thing is clear: deontic rights do not exist outside of people’s orientations to them. They are thus ultimately a product of our communication system, where each communicative act is understood by reference to what we postulate to be its shared, intersubjective context (Tomasello 2008; 2009). This common ground is a result of the interplay between a vast number of different kinds of ongoing considerations at several levels of social organization. At the same time, it is something that we usually grasp intuitively. The human capabilities of recursive mind reading (I know that you know that I know etc.), role reversal imitation (placing myself in your shoes), and sharing attitudes and feelings, are all preconditions for us to be able to see ourselves and others from a bird’s eye point of view—something that we need to be able to come to conclusions concerning the relative distribution of deontic rights between us.

I argue that people are continuously computing the amount of rights and obligations that they have in relation to different people, in different domains of action, in order to be able to use their deontic statuses as interactional resources and to be able to make sense of other people’s utterances and expressions as actions. The idea about such a “deontic ticker” is, again, analogous to and inspired by Heritage’s insights on epistemics. According to Heritage (2012a; 2012c), we may talk about an “epistemic ticker” as a basic element of human communication; people continuously monitor their epistemic statuses relative to others—that is, they keep a check on what they know relative to the other, how they know what they know, and assess whether how they know what they know is different from how others know these matters.

Interestingly, Heritage has connected his idea about the epistemic ticker to biological and evolutionary research by Dunbar, who has suggested that the hominid brain size is positively correlated with the size of the groups in which hominids have lived and worked (Dunbar 2003; Dunbar & Schultz 2007). According to Dunbar’s famous “social brain hypothesis,” a larger brain is needed to maintain cooperative and solidary relations at the group level; hominids that live in larger groups have needed to develop larger brains in order to be able to deal with the cognitive demands caused by living in large groups, where individuals need to be able to meet their own requirements, while coordinating their behavior with others, so as to defuse the direct and
indirect conflicts that could be generated by foraging in the same space (Dunbar & Schultz 2007: 1345). Thus, Heritage has suggested that some of these cognitive demands may well have been of epistemic nature.

What can then be said about the cognitive demands of deontic nature? While epistemic considerations can be seen as characteristic of human communication,\textsuperscript{16} we may ask whether the same applies also for deontic considerations. Or could it be that deontic considerations are more primordial and primitive than epistemic ones? Is it possible that we share them with other animals? The degree of hierarchy that prevails for bonobos, gorillas, and chimpanzees (Boehm 1999), as well as for animals other than apes (Chase 1974), could be seen to indicate that. But even if there were some sort of deontic considerations among lower animals as well, we still need to remain sensitive to the very special nature of human deontic considerations. As an example, we may consider Tomasello’s point about the fundamental difference between the human and ape forms of recruiting others for their own purposes:

The difference [between humans and apes] is that instead of ordering the other what to do, humans often do something more gentle like requesting help (from someone who likes helping). That is, unlike ape imperatives, human imperatives can range from orders to polite requests to suggestions and hints, depending most fundamentally on the degree to which a cooperative attitude may be assumed of the recipient (italics mine). (Tomasello 2008: 84)

The essential difference between humans and apes, in other words, lies in the fact that human deontic considerations are deeply anchored in the human communication system, which, as suggested by Tomasello (2008; 2009), is fundamentally cooperative, though people may also manage the exact amount of cooperation that they undertake and expect from others in each case. In this study, I have argued that people’s judgments about their own and each other’s deontic statuses play a central role: a person with a high deontic status may count on others’ cooperation more than a person with a low deontic status. Thereby, my study highlights the significance of face-to-face interaction as a locus of social order, where both the local and wider aspects of social organization pertain to people’s interactional conduct.

\textsuperscript{16} For instance, according to Tomasello (2009: 15), while human infants are capable of understanding informative pointing, apes point “mainly to get humans to fetch food for them.” Even ape alarm calls, as Tomasello (2009: 18-19) points out, are not generated by an informative intent but, more likely, by an attempt to recruit others to attack the predator.
REFERENCES


