Michel Foucault on Bio-power and Biopolitics

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1 Introduction

“— my fear, is that the biopolitical can be transformed into a word that hides, covers problems instead of being an instrument for confronting them. A fetish word, an "open doors" word, a word with an exclamation point, a word that carries the risk of blocking critical thought instead of helping it. — I don't negate that there can be a serious content in the term, however I see that the use of the term biopolitics sometimes is a consolatory use, like the cry of a child, when what serves us are, in all cases, instruments of work and not propaganda words”. (Virno 2002).

“The notion of biopolitics has recently become a buzzword.” (Lemke 2011, 1).

In this thesis I will do a philosophical analysis of Foucauldian bio-power and biopolitics and aim to shed light on the ambivalences linked to these concepts. In his research Foucault was conceptualizing the problematic of bio-power roughly from 1975 to 1979 but never managed to give a univocal account of the topic rendering the notion rather slippery and complex to grasp. However, despite of the controversies around the topic, Foucault's influence onto the present discussion on biopolitics can hardly be overestimated. However, it is my thesis that for Foucault’s concepts of bio-power and biopolitics to have a robust analytical value it is essential to locate them in a wider philosophical framework. Hence in order to carry out a good philosophical work I consider it essential to cover three domains vis-à-vis biopolitics that also bear such a fundamental importance in Foucault’s oeuvre: power, knowledge and subjectivation process.

In chapters 2–2.2 I will argue that Foucault’s preliminary analysis of bio-power is linked to oppressive practices enabled by authoritarian relations of power and knowledge. The further my thesis goes the more importance will be laid on the relationship between governing of others and the self. Finally, it is my hypothesis that the study of the practices through which an individual subjects himself, in contrast to external coercion, led Foucault to distance himself from the theme of governance of population and bio-power, and guided him to investigate practices of freedom, and further, the ways in which ethical relationships are created with others. This shift in the center of gravity of Foucault’s point of view will render
his account of bio-power unfinished. However, I will put forward a view according to which it is possible, using the tools Foucault left us, to clarify how bio-power is connected with other forms of power and finally with the techniques of the self.

I will argue that bio-power is such a tricky subject in Foucault’s thought because the period in which he elaborates this concept includes also a methodological shift and a modification of his philosophical perspective (Foucault 1997c, 225). This implies introducing and experimenting with a new methodology, new concepts, answering earlier critique, testing hypotheses etc. This takes the concepts of bio-power and biopolitics into an adventure that moves from normalization and regulation via apparatuses of security to pastoral power and liberal welfare politics and finally to neo-liberal notion of homo œconomicus. This unfinished character of Foucault’s analysis which points to many directions and leaves room for different interpretations might be one of the reasons that there are no, at least to my knowledge, comprehensive analyses concerning Foucault’s whole project connected to bio-power and biopolitics. Many of the views and interpretations that I will be utilizing in this thesis are collected from extensive amount of different discussions. Thus my research will aim to bridge these gaps between scattered Foucault-commentaries on bio-power and also provide a substantial analysis of his own analysis.

Furthermore, the publication of Foucault's Collège de France -lectures from 1990’s onwards and their translation into English during 2000's has opened multiple possibilities to flesh out our understanding of Foucault's account of bio-power and biopolitics. Due to this my thesis is located into an interesting territory in Foucault-research for which these newly published lectures provide important material. Furthermore, they complete his already published works and enable us to deepen our understanding of Foucault’s ideas and methodology. However, Foucault did not mean his lecture material to be published and he often stresses that he is only presenting “work in progress”, giving “possible tracks to follow” or throwing out hypotheses (2007, 135-136).
Nonetheless, I have not come across any substantial contradictions between his lectures and published works; on the contrary, the lectures provide support for the arguments found in Foucault’s published works. Furthermore, in the light of his later work it seems that many of those ideas presented in his lectures were reworked and elaborated further (cf. Foucault 1982b; 1997a; 1997b; 1997c; 2000a; 2000b). To my view Foucault’s lectures contain considerable amount of highly elaborated material which complete his previously published works. Stone (2004, 1-4) has pointed out how some Foucauldian scholars have opposed the publications of his lectures. However, he argues that Foucault’s lectures should be considered as already “published” since they are transcriptions of the recordings of his public lectures and not edited from his lecture notes – which were nonetheless consulted. Similar view is adopted by Golder (2007, 157-161) who considers the lectures filling the gaps between the seemingly different styles of Foucault’s books published in 1960s (archaeology), 1970s (genealogy) and 1980s (ethics) and thus providing invaluable material for research on Foucault.

My methodology in this thesis consists in studying Foucault’s concepts of bio-power and biopolitics in his works which I will analyze chronologically. By this I aim to show how his analysis changes after the publications of History of Sexuality: An Introduction in 1976. My main argument is that we are able to have a better understanding of Foucauldian bio-power when we acknowledge this shift, and furthermore, when we think his later analysis of bio-power in terms of topological analysis (I’ll explain what I mean by this in the following paragraphs).

I will begin my thesis with an introductory chapter presenting pre-Foucauldian biopolitics according to Lemke (2011). He has made the first comprehensive introduction for this topic, although, given its introductory character he does not cover Foucault’s project very widely. From here I will move on to Foucault’s analysis which I begin by presenting the most crucial concepts utilized in this thesis. Then I will analyze Foucault’s usage and elaboration of bio-power in the framework of power over life (chapters 2–2.3). By this Foucault designates the tendency of modern power relations to focus on the behavior of individuals and biological phenomena of population in order to subject, modify and direct people’s conduct according to a given system of norms. Here my primary sources

In these works Foucault connects bio-power with race, sexuality and techniques aiming to modify and control biological phenomena related to human life. Furthermore, Foucault, as he himself retrospectively put it (1997a, 281-282), is trying to tackle the problem of how individuals are subjected through techniques of domination. This problematic is centered around two sets of relations: those of power and those of knowledge and in this framework bio-power is embodied in regulatory techniques by which human life can be modified. I will argue that this view is too abstract and limited by too totalizing and functional formulations.

My primary commentaries for these works will be, first, Stoler (2006) who criticizes Foucault for ignoring imperial realm in his account of racism and sexuality but also acknowledges the local character of Foucault’s arguments. Second I will rely on Repo (2011), who distinguishes between the death function of racism and the life function of sexuality in Foucault’s biopolitics. She also underlines how racism and sexuality are both pivotal in understanding Foucauldian biopolitics in the context of normalizing power. Lastly, I will follow Colliers’s (2009) critique of Foucault’s analysis in these works. According to him, in the aforementioned works Foucault is too intensively stuck in totalizing formulations and functional explanations while arguing that in the lectures of 1977-1979 Foucault manages to give a more satisfying analysis of modern power relations and their functioning. However, in my view Collier reads Foucault slightly too literally in order to prove his points and I will show that Foucault’s concept of power over life is not that totalizing than Collier argues.

In the second part of my theses I will focus on Foucault’s re-evaluation of his earlier works in which he put forward the thesis of power over life (chapters 3–3.3.2). Foucault replaces the earlier notion of power with a variety of different phenomena designating the relationship between government and its targets.
These include for instance his famous notion of governmentality, security, pastoral power and police. Bio-power is now understood as something that intersects all these specific fields, which in turn, are connected to population and its management. These issues are addressed above all in Foucault’s *Collegè de France* -lectures *Security, Territory, Population* (2007/1978) and *The Birth of Biopolitics* (2008/1979) but also in other lectures such as “Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism of Political Reason” (1979) and “The Political Technology of the Individuals” (2000a/1982) and in the essay “The Subject and Power” (1982b).

I will argue that the analysis of the relation between techniques of governing population vis-à-vis certain political rationality renders biopolitics “topological”. By topological point of view I designate the study of how given phenomena and things are connected, modified and transformed without losing some of their previous characteristics. In my application of a topological point of view I will rely on Collier’s elaborations of the concept. The notion originally comes from Deleuze who already put it forward in his book on Foucault (1988). Furthermore, topology is a point of view which looks for patterns of correlations, reconfigurations and problematizations. Accordingly, in his lectures of 1977-79 Foucault studies how bio-power dovetails other technologies and strategies of power. Above all this means that the center of the study is in locating continuities, reconfigurations and modifications in relations of power, knowledge and techniques of government. This produces a contrast to Foucault’s previous tendency to think historical developments in terms of straightforward epochs and overall architecture of power.

In this sense from the year 1978 onwards bio-power becomes a certain analytical perspective from which Foucault approaches relation of power and knowledge that affect on the practices by which human life is modified (cf. Collier 2009, 80; Deleuze 1988, 6, 118-119). Consequently, I will argue that a topological point of view sheds light to Foucault’s capillary analysis and micro-perspective from which he approached power and government. Other useful methodological points with respect to Foucault’s analysis of power and the state are offered by Golder (2007) and Senellart (2007), the editor of *Security, Territory, population*. 
I will finish my thesis with linking Foucault’s analyses of liberalism, pastoral power and neo-liberalism to bio-power. I will argue that Foucault’s analysis of subjectivation leads him to pose the question of the mode of subjectivation, that is, how an individual makes himself a subject according to an exterior ethical code. This is where Foucault begins to distance himself from the genealogies of power and moves towards investigations concerning ethical techniques of the self (Foucault 1990, 1-32; 1997c). From here onwards the Foucault’s research problem is opened up to the question of how an individual directs herself, instead of asking exclusively how individuals are guided through exterior techniques of government. In regards to this topic Dilts (2011) has given a neat analysis of the ways in which the neo-liberal subject, *homo œconomicus*, challenges Foucault’s previous analysis of government and paves ways to the analysis of ethical practices of the self.

After this shift from governance of population to directing the self I only know a couple of instances in which Foucault refers to the notions of bio-power or biopolitics (2000a, 416; 1997b, 256). Nonetheless, he seemed not to have abandoned the subject but perhaps was thinking of linking his last studies of sexuality to the analysis of bio-power. In an interview from 1983 Foucault was asked “Isn’t it logical, given these concerns, that you should be writing a genealogy of bio-power?” and he replies “I have no time for that now, but it could be done. In fact, I have to do it.” (Foucault 1997b, 256).

Finally, Foucault addresses massive philosophical themes which include, for example, race, power, sexuality, liberalism, state and so forth. Since this thesis is a study of Foucault’s notion of bio-power and biopolitics, there are not much of possibilities to connect Foucault’s ideas to broader philosophical discussions of these topics. Consequently, when I address the aforementioned concepts I will restrict myself to Foucault’s definitions with clarifications and analyze them in relation to bio-power and biopolitics. I will also briefly consider the possibility of affirmative biopolitics – a question which Foucault seems to invoke with his analysis of neo-liberalism. By this I will also point to possibilities for further research. Before beginning to analyze Foucault’s theses I will present Lemke’s
historical analysis of non-Foucauldian biopolitics as an introductory background for Foucault’s work.

1.1 Preliminary Remarks on Non-Foucauldian Bio-power and Biopolitics

To put it simply, the notion of biopolitics signifies politics concerned with life. The prefix “bio” comes from the Greek vocabulary which has two distinct words for life: Zoe referring to bare life or life as such, and bios denoting qualified life or life in some particular form (Esposito 2008, 15). Lemke has pointed out (2011, 2) that in English the notion of biopolitics is closely linked to biology (study of life) thus denoting “a politics that deals with life” without the Greek dichotomy. However, I think it is fruitful to take a look at the context in which the notion has come into existence and with what kind of problematic it has dealt with in order to grasp the proper signification of the biopolitics. I will provide an introductory framework for Foucault’s account of bio-power and biopolitics by summarizing Lemke’s history concerning the notion of biopolitics. Due to the reason that Foucault does not refer much to other people who use the term bio-power or biopolitics, I aim to contextualize these concepts with the broader philosophical framework.

In his pioneering Biopolitics: An Advanced Introduction (2011) Lemke traces the history of the concept biopolitics back to the early 20th century. According to him, one of the firsts to deploy the notion of biopolitics was a Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén, who put forward an idea of the state being a natural creature in which social struggles arise from different interests of classes and groups. These struggles Kjellén considered being analogous “to tensions of life itself” (quoted in Lemke 2011, 10). Among Kjellén’s contemporaries were many who shared similar ideas which Lemke puts as follow:

“The basic assumption is that all social, political, and legal bonds rest on a living whole, which embodies the genuine and the eternal, the healthy, and the valuable. The reference to 'life' serves here both as a mythic starting point and as a normative guideline.” (ibid.).
According to Esposito (2008, 16) the vitalistic conception of the state was especially strong in Germany and it culminated in National Socialistic conceptions such as “vital space” (Lebensraum). Lemke (2011, 10-13) continues by stating that in the thought of National Socialism the organic concept of the state was accompanied with racist bias and hereditary mythology. The National Socialist concept of biopolitics drew from social Darwinism, anthropology and biology. Consequently, biopolitics was seen as representing a rupture in regards to traditional politics. The main idea of biopolitics in the Third Reich was to legitimize authoritarian, hierarchical and homogeneous society by claiming its natural character and historical evolution.

However, Lemke stresses that the National Socialist concept of biopolitics was not very coherent. However he still acknowledges two distinguishable areas which dominated the discourse of biopolitics: one that was concerned with creating a program for racial hygiene, and the other which combined racial ideas with geopolitical considerations. Albeit the politics of the Third Reich is undoubtedly one of the most well-known examples of biopolitical interventions in human history, the Nazis were not alone. According to Lemke there were considerable interests in manipulating the human race around the globe even from the late 18th century to the end of World War II. By that time those interests blossomed at different political camps: from the sterilisations in the United States to the new soviet man of Stalin's dictatorship (ibid., 14-15. We shall see that this same point is made by Foucault [cf. 2003, 259-262]).

According to Lemke (2011, 15) the first wave of biopolitics, that was essentially linked with eugenics and questions of race, became seen in a rather bad light after the atrocities of Nazi Germany. Lemke locates the second wave of biopolitics to the 1960’s. On the front of the second wave was the United States based school called “biopoliticians” who draw on interdisciplinary sources. They emphasize naturalistic study of politics and “use biopolitical concepts and research methods in order to investigate the causes and forms of political behavior.” (Lemke 2011, 15). Although being a diverse group of scholars they share some fundamental aspects, such as, their object of study is primarily political action explicated
through biological factors, the aim of study is to render politics consistent with biological requirements instead of normative critique, and lastly, their methodology is based on seemingly objective biological factors and evolutionary history (ibid., 16-18). According to Lemke (2011, 18-19) they argue that human sciences do not pay enough attention to biological and especially evolutionary facts. Furthermore, in this approach several social issues become explainable through these facts, for instance social hierarchies are evident and justifiable due to certain aspects of evolutionary history. Despite of being active several decades the influence of the American biopoliticians remains exclusively within American intellectual scene.

Another second wave trend of biopolitics was linked to the awareness of environmental crisis. During 1960’s and 1970’s in the atmosphere created by the Report to the Club of Rome biopolitics acquired a new meaning: many political activists and social movements began to demand actions for saving and protecting nature and its resources from pollutions and over population. In these discussions biopolitics started to refer to those political actions aimed at preserving the environment and thus the future life of human race (ibid., 25-27). According to Lemke (ibid., 20, 23-4, 118), both of these approaches, that is, American and environmental biopoliticists, take ature as something given and essential. Whereas politics is reduced to reactive and deductive practice in relation to natural essences. In addition to this discourse Lemke points towards another strand of biopolitics that was emerging in the 1970s: along with the rapid development of biotechnology, biopolitics became more and more intertwined with questions of bioethics. Biopolitics was soon taken as the domain in which the decisions concerning regulatory mechanisms and jurisprudence vis-à-vis engineering processes of life take place. While the ability to manipulate biological processes and environment through technology is in continuous increase, according to Lemke (ibid., 29-30) many scholars have questioned the right to apply these techniques due to the uncertainty of their consequences. In these debates arguments often rely on some values and concepts of human nature which are taken as given. (Ibid., 27-30.) To disagree with those theorists who rely on a fixed ground from which to deduce values within biopolitical discourse, such as, human rights and individual freedom, Lemke points out that
“Biopolitics cannot simply be labeled a specific political activity or a subfield of politics that deals with the regulation and governance of life processes. Rather, the meaning of biopolitics lies in its ability to make visible the always contingent, always precarious difference between politics and life, culture and nature, between the realm of the intangible and unquestioned, on the one hand, and the sphere of moral and legal action, on the other.” (2011, 31).

This view comes close to Lemke’s definition of governmentality as a mentalité of governing, that is, the intellectual processing of reality as something that political technologies can tackle (2001, 191). In this way Lemke seems to consider biopolitics as part of the reflective practice by which a given way of governing may be analyzed and questioned. I think Lemke is following Foucault here: as we will see below, for Foucault biopolitics is a particular technology of power by which human life can be controlled and managed in its natural indeterminacy. Through a genealogical study we might be able to shed light on these arbitrary conditions in which politics takes place and transforms human life into something it was not before. For Foucault this process is always linked to relations of knowledge and power and constitution of the subject. I will now turn to study how Foucault saw bio-power and biopolitics emerging in his 1975-1976 works.

2 Introducing Foucauldian Biopolitics

“When life itself becomes an object of politics, this has consequences for the foundations, tools, and goals of political action. No one saw more clearly this shift in the nature of politics than Michel Foucault.” (Lemke 2011, 32).

As we can see Lemke credits Foucault for managing to grasp an important shift in politics by his account of bio-power. However, he also points out (2011, 34) that Foucault’s usage of the terms biopower and biopolitics is not very consistent. At times he uses these concepts very abstractly and provocatively while in other cases they are meant to refer to precise phenomena and historical events. Consequently, Foucault’s inconsistent usage of these concepts is no doubt one of
the greatest reasons for the variety of meanings connected to contemporary exploitation of these notions.

Following from this ambiguity we may find a variety of different lines of research and theoretical stances nowadays discussing Foucault’s ideas connected to biopolitics. These include biopolitics of gender (Repo, 2011), biopolitics in governmental studies (Burchell et al.1991; Lemke 2001), biopolitics linked to manipulation of the biological (Bliss 2009; Levina 2009; Rose 2001), biopolitical violence (Oksala 2010b), biopolitics of race (Stoler 2006; Macey 2009; Repo 2011), biopolitics linked to political economy (Virtanen 2006; Terranova 2009), biopolitics of medical normalization (Koivusalo 1995), biopower’s relation to rights, norms and resistance (McNay 2009; Cadman 2009) etcetera. Obviously there are also some differences in the applications of biopolitics in these writings. Very schematically one could draw a line between the negative approach which focuses on the oppressive effects of biopolitics (e.g. Oksala 2010b; Repo 2011; Stoler 2006) and the “neutral” in which biopolitics is seen as a way of governing which is not good or bad as such. Rather, biopolitics can be applied to variety of things and whether these are seen as good or bad is a matter beyond biopolitics (Bliss 2009; Levina 2009; Cadman 2009; Rabinow and Rose 2006).

Moreover, it is not always very clear how biopolitics linked to sexuality or race is connected with, for instance, biopolitics dovetailing political economy. Due to this rather wide scope of biopolitical research with its plurality of meanings given to its object of study, in this thesis I aim to dig up the analytical value that Foucault found from these concepts. In the following pages we will travel through Foucault's whole theoretical apparatus of biopolitics during which I will convey a philosophical-methodological analysis of his work with a help of a variety of commentators.

Consequently, I argue that we are able to shed light on the ambiguity around Foucauldian biopolitics with acknowledging a shift in his theoretical and methodological framework that takes place between the works of 1975-76 and the lectures held in 1978-79 (Collier has made a similar point, see 2009). This is not to suggest a revolution in Foucault’s thinking. Instead, I aim to point out how he
re-evaluated, revised and developed his former analysis in the light of new sources, ideas and critique of his contemporaries. Thus after the sabbatical year of 1977 Foucault adopts different point of view towards bio-power and biopolitics. This becomes clear in the ways in which Foucault begins to combine different forms of power with respect to various concrete historical events.

This meant a considerable change in his analysis of biopolitics. Thus I will deliver my analysis in two sections: first in the framework of power over life discussed in the works of 1975-76, and second, in the context of different governmentalities presented in 1977-79-lectures. As we shall see, the former is occupied with problems related to manipulation of biological factors in the context of population, race and sexuality, whereas the latter investigates the “topology” of power (I borrow this concept from Collier, 2009), that is, how mechanism of power work in a complex surface of society without being reduced to one prevailing form of power (pastoral, sovereign, disciplinary, bio etc.). In other words Foucault begins to stress that different forms of power and governmentalities should be seen as analytical divisions; theoretical tools for the sake of intelligibility. By this I mean that Foucault approaches different form of power through their distinctive aims and technologies, but which in reality constantly confront and dovetail each other.

2.1 Foucault’s Methodology and Key Concepts on My Research

Foucault’s philosophical method can be quite difficult to define univocally. He called his research methods archaeology and genealogy. The former is the study of an epistemological structure, a set of rules or a historical a priori according to which discourses and concepts can be formed in a given period (Foucault 1972, 135-140, 216-207). The latter denotes the study of practices and strategies to modify these epistemological structures. Thus according to Foucault (2003, 8-11) archaeology is a specific method for analyzing local discursivities, whereas genealogy traces the struggles that belong to the process by which certain discourse can be constituted as science or knowledge instead of others. In these studies Foucault tends to mix history of ideas and empirical sources while always
insisting to be strictly interested in philosophical aspects of his research, which he
names the politics of truth (2007, 3). Through investigating relations of power
and knowledge Foucault wants to show how power dovetails the truth production
in scientific practices (1997d, 63-64; 2003, 6-11). Furthermore, Foucault claims
(2008, 35-37) that the political importance of historical analysis lie exactly in
bringing to light the conditions by which certain truths are produced and by
which practices these truths realize their effects in reality.

In this thesis I rely mostly on Foucault’s works which are often characterized as
genealogical. By means of genealogical method Foucault wants to go beyond the
normalizing effects of universalizing and formal scientific discourse. He wants to
shed light on the ways in which, through certain power mechanisms, some
knowledges are marginalized while others are legitimated as truth. In this way
Foucault sees genealogy as means to fight against power effects springing from
scientific normalization. (2003, 6-10.) Furthermore, by genealogical method
Foucault wants to avoid rendering history intelligible through explanatory
principles of unity, original cause or a genesis; rather, he is looking for
intelligibility from multiple causes, variety of relations, from differentiation
among the necessity of different connections, contingencies etc. This is to say that
the task of a genealogist is to reconstruct the network of relations by which a
singular event takes place (Foucault 1997d, 63-64). In other words, to map the
topological space of multiple power relations.

Consequently, as Foucault was committed to experiment with philosophical
concepts and was always trying to re-evaluate the framework of his own thinking
(1990, 8-9), I consider it fruitful to convey a methodological analysis on the side
of his arguments. Foucault claimed that a theory cannot be a basis for analytical
work since it requires a prior objectification. On the other hand this analytical
work needs constant conceptualization to proceed and here it calls for critical
thinking, a constant checking as Foucault put it (1982b, 778). The first thing
Foucault insists to check is the historical condition that motivates our
conceptualization. Second, when we have historical awareness of our present
condition we may reflect the immediate reality which we are dealing with (ibid.).
I see much of Foucault’s philosophical value lying precisely in this constant
checking of his methods and concepts. Thus I will pay much attention to studying the methodological and philosophical refinements, re-evaluations and developments in Foucault’s work. My aim with this is to clarify Foucault’s notions of bio-power and biopolitics and by situating them conceptually into a broader framework of Foucault’s work I believe it will be easier to grasp the philosophical content on these notions.

Let me define the key concepts in this thesis. At the beginning there will be a bit of circularity in my definitions but this will ease when we get further. So, what do we mean when we speak about, perhaps the most well-known Foucauldian notion, power? Foucault elaborates this concept throughout his whole career\(^1\) but I try to be brief and clarify this concept from the point of view of biopolitics. First of all, in his 1970s works Foucault approaches power from the point of view of how does it function (2003, 24). This is to say that instead of looking at power from the traditional philosophical perspective in which, according to Foucault (ibid.), rights are means to limit power, Foucault wants to investigate what types of power relations are able to produce truth discourses and have such profound effects in modern societies.

Consequently, Foucault sets his notion of power against philosophical theories that reflect power in terms of law and the sovereign\(^2\). Foucault insists that power cannot be thought only in terms of laws or prohibitions and it is not enough to reduce power to sovereign-subject-model. Rather, Foucault sees it essential to reveal relations of domination rather than sources of sovereignty (2003, 46). In this sense power is not seen as being fixed into institutions or state apparatuses (police, courts and prisons) but is a name for those relations and practices by which human beings are, first, subjected to adopt certain social roles (students, workers, insane etc.). Second, power should be also understood as those relations by which the condition for human action is constantly changed (controls,

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legislations, individual responses etc.). Furthermore, according to Foucault every human relation includes also a power relation, although the form of this power may be different in sexual relationships and in political arguments (1997a, 283). This is to say that even if there are unequal power relations, they are always juxtaposed and thus modify each other. This is due to Foucault’s view according to which a power relation to even take place requires a possibility for an action upon the action of others. Thus total subordination is not power but a state of excessive domination without room for negotiation or reaction. (Foucault 1978, 94-95; 1982, 794.) In this sense bio-power is only a name or an analytical tool by which Foucault clarifies a specific set of practices and techniques that modify human life as a biological phenomenon.

An important feature of Foucault's power analysis is that power produces – not just hierarchical relations or domains of the legal and the illegal but also the very conditions in which knowledge is produced and human subjects constituted. This is to say, that human beings are situated in a specific historical power-knowledge network which defines the rules for practices and discourses by which humans can be constituted as subjects (1995, 194). It must be emphasized that power-knowledge is not a metaphysical constant. Rather, it is a historically contingent ontological condition for the constitution of subjects. It is contingent since it is in a state of constant change. Hence for Foucault there is no fixed or essential human subjectivity. Rather, human subjects are constituted through discourses and practices which are in relation to a complex network of power-knowledge. Thus according to Foucault “we should be trying to discover how multiple bodies, forces, energies, matters, desires, thoughts, and so on are gradually, progressively, actually and materially constituted as subjects, or as the subject.” (Foucault 2003, 28).

With his analyses of the subject Foucault investigates the problem of how a certain set of rules determines the way in which a subject, a discourse or a type of behavior can be seen valid or invalid, true or false (1997a, 297). Here he considers it essential to neglect any a priori theory of the subject, as presented in existentialism or phenomenology for instance (ibid., 290). In other words, Foucault wanted to conceptualize techniques through which a certain body with
its material and conscious components is turned into subject – only this way one can grasp properly what a human individual is: “To become individual one must become subject.” (2007, 231 footnote). Here it is crucial to think power in terms of production: “In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production.” (Foucault 1995, 194). I will argue that in this framework biopolitics is a technology of power by which an individual subject can be modified and subjected both as individual (through particular biological qualities linked to sexuality and race) but also as anonymous member of a population (being a member of a biological continuum).

Furthermore, in his famous “The Subject and Power” Foucault claims that his “objective has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects.” (1982, 777). Foucault’s works of the 1970’s, which are at the heart of my analysis, focus on subjection (assujettissement) and subjectivation (subjectivation) (cf. 1978; 1995). Later he introduces the term of mode of subjectivation (mode d’assujettissement) to designate the individual techniques of the self by which an individual turns himself into subject (1984a, 264). As we will see, along with this shift Foucault puts his analysis of bio-power aside. Foucault often reminds that there are two meanings of the word subject: subject to and subject of (e.g. 1978, 60; 2007, 231 footnote). However, in his later works Foucault seems to stress that even being an active subject of includes subjection to oneself either through self-knowledge or conscience (1982, 781).

Again in “The Subject and Power” Foucault presents his work as a study of three “modes of objectification which transforms human beings into subjects.” (1982, 777). These being first, the way in which human beings are objectified in scientific analyses as subjects of certain actions (speaking, thinking, laboring etc.). In other words, how scientific objectifications produce certain kind of subjectivities. The second mode Foucault calls dividing practices i.e. how individuals become separated from the others through categories, such as the mad and the sane or the sick and the healthy. The third mode is the way in which an individual turns her/himself into subject. This is the mode of subjectivation that
Foucault studied roughly the in 1980s by which he means “the way in which people are invited or incited to recognize their moral obligations.” (1984a, 264). Further in this study we will see that bio-power and biopolitics are intertwined with all these three modes of subjectivation – albeit Foucault's 1975-76 works deal mostly with the two former, whereas starting from the lectures 1977-78 Foucault begins to pay more attention on the third field of objectification as well.

By concepts of bio-power and biopolitics I will mean the following: the former is a form of power that is oriented towards human beings as living members of a species with certain biological characteristics (2003, 249; 1978, 143). These characteristics may be studied scientifically and they can be affected through multiple interventions. Biopolitics then is a technology of power that consists in techniques (see below), practices and procedures that are aimed at organizing, regulating and governing the phenomena peculiar to life in the context of population (2003, 246-247). Life here must be understood as a process comprising of forces, energy and desires by which an organism persists in being, grows and reproduces. Bio-power is hence occupied with multiple life-related phenomena that affect the way human life develops, and which can be modified through interventions. However, bio-power should be understood as a name to designate the general and abstract force that is realized through biopolitics i.e. strategies to affect on all the things that depend on the biological. Thus biopolitics refers to the specific set of means, including techniques and knowledge, by which one aims to produce the biological in a specific form. However, the actual composition of biopolitics is always dependent on particular political rationalities and technologies according to which one aims to rationalize the phenomena characteristic to a living population. (cf. Foucault 1982b, 779-784; 2000a, 409-410).

However, it must be emphasized that our relation to life (and biology as a science of life) is always constituted by particular historical frameworks. These include, above all, cultural values and beliefs, scientific paradigms and technology, means to utilize natural resources etc. Thus according to Foucault it is not until the mid-18th century that a particular historical formation occurs which fulfills the proper relation between knowledge and power and can be called “the entry of life into
history, that is, the entry of phenomena peculiar to the life of the human species into the order of power and knowledge, into the sphere of political techniques.” (1978, 141-142). In this sense different forms of power may include bio-power for which the necessary condition is sufficient scientific knowledge of human biology and techniques for its modification.

Foucault often utilizes the concepts of technology and technique, which are closely linked to the functioning of power and different political rationalities (Foucault 1978, 141; 1995, 26; 2003, 246, 249; 2007, 8). In general terms we can define the former as a set of skills, practices and knowledge that are instruments for realizing a given object. The latter represents some of these specific skills by which one reaches towards the objective. In relation to these Foucault also uses notion of mechanism to designate a given technique or a procedure by which certain power effects are carried out in reality (2003, 32-33). When technologies and techniques are combined in order to produce certain mechanisms Foucault often uses the notion of apparatus (dispositive) to designate the whole machinery harnessed to produce particular effects (1978, 55-56, 84; 1995, 173,201-205).

In addition to the notion of apparatus in Security, Territory, Population Foucault (2007, 108, 193) introduces the concept of governmentality referring very broadly to technologies by which human conduct can be directed (cf. 1997c). In order to shed light on the characteristics of a given governmentality and the relation between governmental techniques and knowledge Foucault utilizes the notion of reflexive prism. This implies the reflective practice by which a given phenomenon or thing becomes an object of thought: how it is problematized or reflected by certain group or community of people, such as scientists, governors, theorists, advisors of governors, experts etc. By isolating a given reflexive prism Foucault is able to investigate from what kind of problematic an object under study has come into existence. In other words, what are the motives and aims behind practices by which a given thing becomes realized. Reflexive prism comes close to what Foucault later emphasized as problematization (problématization), that is, a certain form “that defines objects, rules of action, modes of relation to oneself.” (Foucault 1997c, 318). I hope that the readers now have a preliminary understanding of the key concepts and issues in this research. In the next chapter I
begin to analyze how Foucault presents biopolitics in relation to discipline in the framework of power over life.

2.2 Biopolitics in the Context of Power Over Life

From the early 1970s onwards Foucault was occupied with conceptualizing characteristics of what he called the normalizing society, and especially, how power functions in normalizing context (1978, 144; 2003, 24). In other words he was interested in the ways in which the plurality of human individuals becomes trained, modified and categorized within a system of norms and normalities. Furthermore, Foucault analyzed the ways in which the interplay between constructing norms and practices based on these norms reflect on social institutions. This included investigating the ways in which discourses and knowledge are produced and how they modify reality. Although Foucault introduces the notion of biopolitics already in a conference in Rio in 1974 (Esposito 2007, 27) he does not utilize the concept in his 1975 published Discipline and Punish (1995, hereafter DP) but only in the last chapter of History of Sexuality Vol 1 (published in October 1976, hereafter HS). However, between these published works Foucault held a lecture series titled “Society Must Be Defended” (from January to March in 1976, hereafter SMD) in which bio-power and biopolitics are analyzed as part of the emerging biology-based racism thus constituting an integral part of the normalizing power.

I will apply Foucault’s notion of power over life which he mainly elaborated in the last chapter of HS to grasp how bio-power was deployed in managing life. However, in the aforementioned works Foucault approaches bio-power and discipline essentially as overlapping each other, and thus I will utilize this notion to designate the power apparatus that targets human life.

To put it very schematically, in DP Foucault presents the first formulations of power over life i.e. a form of power that differs significantly from other forms of power, such as pastoral and sovereign power. According to Foucault (1978, 140-
power over life is characterized by aims of modifying human life in order to render it both manageable and productive. In DP Foucault investigates techniques and practices through which individuals become subjected in different institutions, such as, prison, barracks, and labor camps. The crucial problem for Foucault to examine is how human body is rendered docile and useful in a context of a particular social system (1995, 163-169). In HS Foucault turns to investigate how sexuality has been used in different discursive systems and practices in order to produce particular power effects. There Foucault links sexuality with bio-power as one of its most important techniques. Thus power over life, on the one hand, consists in individualization and subjectivation through discipline and surveillance, and on the other, in regulation and manipulation of the overall qualities of population:

“In concrete terms, starting in the seventeenth century, this power over life evolved in two basic forms; these forms were not antithetical, however; they constituted rather two poles of development linked together by a whole intermediary cluster of relations –– The disciplines of the body and the regulations of the population constituted the two poles around which the organization of power over life was deployed.” (HS, 139).

I will begin with Foucault’s account of discipline. I emphasize that rather than aiming to produce a universal theory he wants to shed light on a local and particular development during which disciplinary practices swarmed into modern society (1995, 28-31, 209). After summarizing the crucial points of discipline I will tie this analysis to bio-power.

2.2.1 Two Technologies of Power: Discipline and Biopolitics

The discussion on the themes of DP and HS has been enormous until today. Thus I will only discuss the themes most important vis-à-vis biopolitics. As Fontana and Bertani (2003, 279) point out disciplinary power and bio-power have sometimes been seen as constituting different theories in Foucault's thought. This reading however, as they also stress (ibid.), is not supported by Foucault's texts. When analyzing power over life Foucault puts it very explicitly that this form of
power operates essentially within the frameworks of discipline and bio-power (1978, 139, 140-141), and further, that these different poles of the same power apparatus intersect through, for example, norms, sexuality and race.

In Foucault’s notion of power over life disciplinary and bio-power form the two poles of the same architecture of power. I will start with discipline and then connect that with bio-power. In general, Foucault’s point in DP is to show what kinds of procedures were linked to specifically modern forms of power. Foucault investigates the implications of the emergence of state apparatuses and social institutions, such as schools and workshops, which adopted disciplinary techniques as their primary means for realizing certain objectives. In order to question views which reduce power to ideology Foucault shows how power techniques penetrate human beings through practices and discourses (1995, 25; cf. 2003, 28). Furthermore, Foucault studies how the management from an individual to the population was actualized through establishment of norms and techniques that enabled production of a reality along these norms, especially in terms of labor effective individuals (1995, 163-169).

In DP Foucault stresses a methodological view what he calls micro-physics of power (1995, 26-31). According to this view power is essentially capillary (1978, 84): it flows from bottom to the top and is embodied in practices at every level of social relations. For Foucault human bodies are always part of political field where “power relations have an immediate hold upon it [the body]; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs.” (DP, 25). However, these techniques directed to bodies are not reducible to violence, state apparatuses or ideologies but they may be much more subtle and non-violent. This is to say, the very power that subjects individual bodies constitutes an art through which individuals may be targeted towards preferred action. Thus we are dealing with “the political technology of the body” (ibid., 26), which includes knowledge that is not exactly knowledge of its functioning, but rather, knowledge of how to use it.

In brief, the objective of disciplinary power is to make individuals internalize certain roles and practices within a given framework. Domains and techniques
that disciplinary power exploits in the process of subjectivation are multiple and in DP Foucault makes many analytical enumerations and divisions between different disciplinary procedures and their aims. Here it suffice only to summarize the most important: above all, the purpose of disciplinary techniques is individualization and subjectivation. In order for discipline to be effective every human being needs to be distinguished from every other in their own singularity so that they can be investigated, manipulated and schooled as individuals. The effects of disciplinary power are produced especially through hierarchies, spacial divisions, control over daily rhythm, constant presence of either punishment or reward and norms and rules according to which individuals must conform (DP, 167).

Foucault’s main claim connected to discipline is that power does not simply repress: “In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production.” (DP, 194). What interests Foucault then is “how multiple bodies, forces, energies, matters, desires, thoughts, and so on are gradually, progressively, actually and materially constituted as subjects, or as subject.” (2003, 28). In effect, this is what Foucault tried to show in his inquiries of the mid-1970’s: how certain forms of subjectivity come into existence instead of others. On what ground certain subjectivities are more legitimate, normal and desirable while others are marginalized or excluded. In what ways relations of power-knowledge affect to the ways in which the order of things is divided according to normal and abnormal. And finally, according to what kind of set of rules the relationship between subject and truth is realized (ibid., 25). However, the question is not only how power takes hold on individuals but on human life in general. In order to govern population one needs other techniques than solely disciplinary which is focused on individualization. Thus it is precisely at this point of our analysis that bio-power comes to complete power over life. Foucault writes:

“If one can apply the term bio-history to the pressures through which the movements of life and the processes of history interfere with one another, one would have to speak of bio-power to designate what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm
of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life.” (HS, 143).

According to Foucault power over life started to appear during the 17th century, first in the form of disciplinary power, “an anatomo-politics of the human body” (HS, 139). Then somewhat later emerged a power that concentrated upon the species body with its characteristic phenomena including propagation, dying, illness, health, life expectancy, mortality rate, sexual behaviour etc. Moreover this power aims to manage all the things that can make the aforementioned phenomena to vary, such as, famine, scarcity, hygiene, medical techniques etc. This is what Foucault calls “a biopolitics of the population” (ibid.). In this process life is invested thoroughly and no more is power meant to manifest itself by taking lives as the former sovereign power did, but to establish a “calculated management of life” (ibid.,140). However, Foucault argues that the old sovereign apparatus did not disappear but that it had to adjust itself onto the new political-economic situation:

“[sovereign power] found itself unable to govern the economic and political body of a society that was undergoing both a demographic explosion and industrialization. So much that far too many things were escaping the old mechanism of the power of sovereignty, both at the top and at the bottom, both at the level of detail and at the mass level.” (SMD 2003, 249).

That is to say that the relations of power were fundamentally rearranged through and due to new types of scientific knowledges of human body and natural phenomena. All these developments in natural and human sciences rendered new ways of government and manipulation of human life possible. Foucault refers to this moment in history as the “threshold of modernity” i.e. the point in which man is no more what he was for Aristotle: “a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence” (1978, 143), but a member of a species that can be affected through a number of techniques. Furthermore, Foucault claims that

“––this was nothing less than the entry of life into history, that is, the entry of phenomena peculiar to the life of the human species into the order of knowledge and power, into the sphere of political techniques.” (1978, 141).
What Foucault emphasizes here is the connection between power over life and the rise of capitalism. The era from Early-Modern to Modernity is of course full of phenomena with great historical importance, such as industrial take-offs, scientific and technical progress, birth of civil society and so forth, but in DP and HS Foucault seems to think that all these things were effects of the techniques deployed by power over life. Disciplinary and bio-power brought a radical shift in existing power relations based on sovereignty and feudal societal relations. Foucault writes:

"This bio-power was without question an indispensable element in the development of capitalism; the latter would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes. But this was not all it required; it also needed the growth of both these factors, their reinforcement as well as their availability and docility; it had to have methods of power capable of optimizing forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making them more difficult to govern." (1978, 140-141.)

I must emphasize one crucial methodological point here. Although in DP, SMD and HS Foucault links power over life fundamentally with bourgeoisie thought, capitalist mode of production, emergence of modern human sciences and liberalism, he is not arguing that power over life was created by liberal bourgeoisie or capitalists because it served their interests – this would be too naïve view and simplifying explanation. On the contrary, for a variety of reasons it became possible to think people as population having some observable constants and as individuals possible to extract surplus value from. At the same time new techniques of power allowed or made it possible to produce productive subjectivities without making them more difficult to govern. New techniques of surveillance and scientific means made it possible to create new kinds of hierarchies and exclude certain types of individuals. (e.g. Foucault 2003, 32-33.)

Foucault continues by pointing out how discipline and bio-power function through norms. In order for power over life to carry out its regulatory and corrective mechanisms it will need an operational system of norms. Norm is
basically a dimension through which life and behavior can be measured, qualified and constantly corrected vis-à-vis utility and value (Foucault 1978, 144; 1995, 182-187; 2003, 253). According to Foucault (1978, 144) in the framework of power over life juridical system of the law loses its exclusive role of directing people through force. In the end law can only threat people with death whereas power over life needs more effective means of correction. In other words, power over life directs people to internalize certain norms while law and institutions of justice do not disappear, but they become more and more incorporated with other regulative apparatuses, such as medical and administrative institutions. Thus for Foucault the crucial distinction is no more the obedient and the enemies of the sovereign but the normal and abnormal: “A normalizing society is the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life.” (1978, 144).

Let us summarize what has been said above. According to Foucault modern power essentially manifests itself in human urge to control and modify life. This takes place on two distinct levels: on the level of individuals through disciplinary techniques and on the level of population through bio-power and its techniques i.e. biopolitics. Both of these modes of power are aiming to maximize and extract forces from human bodies, in other words, produce life in a given form by utilizing techniques of disciplinary subjection and biopolitical techniques of reinforcing life. Foucault says:

“Both technologies are obviously technologies of the body, but one is a technology in which the body is individualized as an organism endowed with capacities, while the other is a technology in which bodies are replaced by general biological processes.” (2003, 249).

Here it must be emphasized that even if we can distinguish between disciplinary and bio-power by their different techniques and domains of application, these are once again analytical distinctions which are not to be found from reality in their pure forms. Discipline always escapes those closed institutions created for it and its techniques are applied in the social body thoroughly. At the same time bio-power is realized in many instances which are also constituted by disciplinary techniques such as medicine and psychiatry. In this way, discipline and bio-power
overlap in Foucault’s account of power over life (Foucault 1995, 220-221; 2003, 250-251).

2.2.1.1 Power and Subject – a Functional Relation?

To conclude this chapter I would like to consider some possible theoretical shortcoming in Foucault’s thesis of power over life; namely, it seems to be a rather totalistic-functionalist view of reality. Foucault’s totalizing theses of power targeting human life have been a great source of controversy (cf. Fraser, 1989, 28). By totalizing I designate the idea according to which power constitutes a fixed form of relations, a structure, which determines the ways in which human beings are constituted. Accordingly, a totalizing structure implies that the whole reality is in relation to this structure. Whereas by functionalism I mean the view according to which a given thing or a phenomenon can be made intelligible by referring to its function in a greater whole (cf. Levin 2010). These kinds of ideas are certainly invoked by some of Foucault’s formulations according to which in modern society disciplinary techniques and biopolitical regulation took hold upon everything (1995, 29-30; 1978, 141), and again in SMD, in order to locate certain power techniques into broader economy of power relations reinforced by the bourgeoisie, Foucault says “They [procedures to exclude the mad] consolidated the system and helped it to function as a whole.” (2003, 33) which is precisely establishing the intelligibility of these techniques with reference to the function of the whole.

The problem is then, did Foucault actually put forward a view according to which power is a structure in which particular phenomena can be explained through their functions in this broader structure of power? This is argued, for example, by Hardt and Negri (2000, 18). They claim that Foucault couldn’t distance him from the structuralist movement influential in France at his time and thus stayed too firmly in the theoretical framework they provided. Along similar lines Collier argues that SMD and HS are still strictly in the framework of DP thus presenting an excessively functionalist view of reality:
“—when Foucault examines how disciplinary and regulatory mechanisms are configured in more general architectures of power he offers a surprisingly epochal, functionalist, and even totalizing analysis.” (2009, 84).

Furthermore, Collier points how DP has had a privileged position in commentaries and thus the standard interpretation is too much colored by DP, and, in the light of Foucault's lectures of 1978-79, too narrow and one-sided. I agree with Collier and Hardt and Negri to the extent that in DP, SMD and HS Foucault seems to be unable to properly distance himself from the structuralist-functionalist vocabulary. Thus he ends up producing a controversial account of the functioning of power which is at the same time epochal and functional but also constantly escapes any coherence leaving individuals a space for resistance.

This controversy can be seen from the ways in which Foucault opposes totalizing formulations already in these works. In SMD he says: “They [individuals] are in a position to both submit to and exercise this power.” (2003, 29) which implies that individuals respond to and make use of power as actors. The same point is made in HS: “where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.” (Foucault 1978, 95). Furthermore, in HS Foucault also explicitly renounces the possibility of constructing a solid social whole: “It is not that life has been totally integrated into techniques that govern and administer it; it constantly escapes them” (1978, 143), and further, already in the end of HS Foucault refers to actual struggles and resistance to techniques of power over life (1978, 144-147). This implies that he does not give a picture of a fully determining power structure but stresses power as relation of action upon action (cf. 1982b). Thus already in these works Foucault (cf. 2003) thinks society as a field in which different strategies fight for power in order to produce real effects for whatever reasons behind them; rather than as a functional whole seeking to produce relations for contributing its own coherence. Deleuze has put this in following way:

“In brief, Foucault’s functionalism throws up a new topology which no longer locates the origin of power in a privileged space, and can no longer accept a limited localization.— – Here we can see that ‘local’ has two very different meanings: power
is local because it is never global, but it is not local or localized because it is diffuse.” (1988, 26).

Consequently, especially in the light of the lectures following SMD (Foucault 2007; 2008) it seems that Foucault’s reference to functional whole as a ground for intelligibility should be taken as slippage – or at least in his later works Foucault is very consistent in opposing any functional grounds for producing intelligibility (see especially 2007, footnote 119; 2008, 186; 1982b, 793). Furthermore, as Deleuze points out above even if Foucault addressed certain things in functional terms these should be taken as referring to a diffuse and non-stable network of power instead of a firm totality. However, Foucault will be much clearer and more analytical about the functioning of power and governing in his following lectures of 1977-79. In chapter 3 I will argue that in these lectures Foucault manages to give more satisfactory analysis of the topological space of different forms of power and the mechanisms through which they circulate in social relations.

I have now presented the overall analysis of power over life as it appears in DP, SMD and HS. In the two following chapters I will address Foucault’s views of race and sexuality and their fundamental role in modern biopolitics.

2.2.2 Race and Biopolitics

In SMD Foucault elaborates the theme of race to which he already referred in his previous lectures Abnormal (2003a, 315-316), thus giving his only considerable analysis of racism. In Foucault’s account of the power over life race and sexuality are both fundamental phenomena through which bio-power operates. In SMD race is analyzed in detail but only appears briefly in HS (1978, 149). Then in HS it is almost the exact opposite: biopoliticised sexuality is widely discussed there while only briefly mentioned in SMD (2003, 252-253). We may only speculate why Foucault preferred to stress sexuality instead of racism in his published work, although Repo sees this as an example of Foucault's choice in his account of biopolitics to underline the regulated production of life instead of killing and
exclusion linked to racism (2011, 75). However, I see these two works essentially dovetailing each other; and, in effect, both racism and sexuality constitute integral techniques of bio-power: they allow the establishment of the biological norm that serves as the ground for interventive procedures and also justifies them.

While Foucault’s ideas of race have been influential (McWorther 2011) he has also been criticized for ignoring the colonial realm. Stoler for instance has pointed out in her illuminating Race and the Education of Desire (2006) how Foucault neglects the imperial character of sexual-racial apparatus of 19th century Europe: “The sexual discourse of the empire and the biopolitic state in Europe were mutually constitutive: their “targets” were broadly imperial, their regimes of power synthetically bound.” (2006,7). Furthermore, Stoler remarks that Foucault is neither the first to trace racism from the historians of whom he speaks in SMD – in effect, according to her there were some major works published on French racism in the 1970s prior to Foucault’s lectures (ibid., 58, 67).

To grasp the limitations of Foucault’s analysis of race I think it is fruitful to situate these lectures to a wider problematic regarding Foucault’s work and also reflect to what he is aiming at in his analysis. Fontana and Bertani (2003, 275-276) have pointed that with race Foucault begins to examine his new hypotheses regarding the analysis of power and history: the crucial problematic being the relation between liberal or democratic states and totalitarian ones. To elaborate this problematic Foucault introduces the concept of bio-power to portray the power relation that a modern government establishes vis-à-vis its subjects. Furthermore, by conceptualizing biopolitics in relation to nation-state racism Foucault is able to show how bio-power functions as a purifying mechanism and as a technique of exclusion.

However, it must be clarified that Foucault’s interest in studying racism is in tracing the historico-political discourse that divides society according to binary structures, thus provoking political struggle, and not in producing a coherent genealogy of racism itself (see third lecture in SMD. [2003, 44-62]). With introducing this binary-based discourse Foucault wants to challenge the notion of the subject as having universal rights (sovereign model) and focus on the ideas
which from the beginning see society in terms of a struggle (2003, 51-54). Hence the focus in SMD is to analyze functioning of power in society through the model of war, struggle and resistance; and, according to Stoler, trace recuperations and reinscriptions in discursive formations: “What concerns him [Foucault] is not modern racism’s break with earlier forms, but rather the discursive bricolage whereby an older discourse of race is “recovered”, modified, “encased”, and “encrusted” in new forms.” (2006, 61).

Thus the analysis of these new forms is to constitute the answer to the question which is at the heart of Foucault’s account of biopolitics in SMD: how can it be that a power that by definition is for promoting life tolerates death so easily – even at a mass level (2003, 257). Foucault begins to sketch this answer by distinguishing between traditional racism and biology-based racism. The former refers to the idea according to which different human races are either superior or inferior vis-à-vis each other, while the latter signifies a division within a single race. According to Foucault, alongside with the development of biology this biological race war became the prevailing form of social struggle: “The war is going on beneath order and peace, the war that undermines our society and divides it in a binary mode is, basically, a race war.” (2003, 59-60).

It is here that bio-power’s relation to knowledge crystallizes quite clearly. According to Foucault (2003, 181), to view human races as having lines of division according to biology is not possible until developments in scientific thought allow life3 to enter the reflexive prism in the first place. Historically this also meant a homogenization of knowledges (e.g. through university and other state institutions) which contributed to legitimize power over life. Foucault asks: “how could rules be imposed upon the population—not so much to make it share this knowledge, as to make it find it acceptable?” (2003, 181). I think Foucault manages to touch something very fundamental here: when life really steps onto the scene of history and enters the reflective prism of scientific and political

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3 On Foucault’s usage of the term life see Mader 2011. A comprehensive analysis of the developments in biological thought is presented in Foucault’s *The Order of Things* (1994). See also Foucault 1970.
thought, people become at the same time subjects and objects of knowledges that operate within the field of life. These knowledges are possible only if people can be submitted to regular empirical measurement and supervision of their condition, but by the same token, in order for these knowledges to carry out their modifying effects at the level on population people have to internalize certain ways of acting according to these knowledges and the norms they prescribe.

In DP Foucault introduced the notion of panopticon (1995, 208-209) to designate a mechanism through which the functioning of disciplinary power was made more subtle and economic by means of presenting people an idea of excessive surveillance. When people internalize the presence of this surveillance there is no need for actual human gaze anymore: people act as if there is somebody watching. Now it seems to me that this same process of internalization is essential with bio-power as well – or, perhaps with whatever political rationality. In this process disciplinary and especially pastoral \(^4\) techniques of individualization played a crucial role: individuals were subjected to norms, knowledge and aims which made them internalize certain notion of human life and the direction it should be steered to. Thus the essential part of making this power over life function is not just to subject people through discipline. One has also to discipline knowledges in order to set them to serve a legitimizing and justifying role within the processes that limit, organize and modify human life (Foucault 2003, 60-61, 181-183).

Thus Foucault argues that through sciences, such as evolutionary biology, the social war that was based on different races or class struggle \(^5\) gained another biology-based meaning. Within this biological discourse the race struggle is no more to signify a fight against other racial groups (traditional racism), but it begins to point out a split within single race into superrace and sub-race. Macey

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\(^4\) By pastoral techniques I mean two things: a process of individualization through asubordination to the pastor who subjects a given person according to the inner truth of the individual. This truth is produced trough confession which the pastor is then able to interpret right i.e. to produce a certain truth of the subject and guide a person towards salvation. Second, pastorate also includes techniques of taking care of the whole population through surveillance and control. (2007, 183-184, 191-. See Ch. 3.3.2)

\(^5\) Here Foucault refers to a letter written by Marx where Marx stresses the importance of the concept of race struggle put forward by French historians in relation to his own idea of class struggle (2003, 79, see also endnote 85).
has pointed out how this traditional racial thinking is structured by sovereign power and takes form of conquerors and vanquished (2009, 194), but it is not until bio-power emerges that race becomes a way to fragment, divide and organize the field of biological (ibid., 189; see also Foucault 2003, 255). This is where race and racial discourse become deployed as a particular biopolitical technique supporting a variety of procedures of normalization. In normalizing society a whole variety of phenomena from delinquency to mental illness, from colonized people to social classes became to be seen in biological and racial terms (2003a, 315-317). As Foucault puts this:

“It [the discourse of race struggle] will become the discourse of a battle that has to be waged not between races, but by a race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against those who deviate from that norm, against those who pose a threat to the biological heritage.” (Foucault 2003, 61).

For Foucault this is a discourse that eventually makes “race struggle function as a principle of exclusion and segregation and, ultimately, as a way of normalizing society.” (Foucault 2003, 61). This is a very important development in the genealogy of the power over life since the biology-based racism offers one possible way of answering to the paradox mentioned above: why modern power that is fundamentally for reinforcing life through bio-power includes so much killing. Foucault’s thesis in SMD is that if one wishes to exercise the old sovereign right to kill in the framework of the power over life one must become racist. Here Foucault underlines that by “killing” he does not mean only the actual murder but also “exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on.” (ibid., 256).

Furthermore, Foucault claims that evolutionary biology was adopted by state apparatuses and developed into state racism in the form of eugenics for instance.

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6 Stoler emphasises that here Foucault begins to involve state more profoundly in his analysis of power: “For those who have characterized his [Foucault’s] conception of power as one that wholly eschews its statist locations, these lectures encourage some reconsideration. Here,
Consequently for Foucault this is the appearance of “racism that society will direct against itself, against its own elements and its own products. This is the internal racism of permanent purification, and it will become one of the basic dimensions of social normalization.” (ibid., 62). In other words, racism becomes a means of targeting techniques of exclusion and normalization towards whomsoever who is not compatible with prevailing system of norms.

I think the most important, and perhaps the most bewildering, thing that Foucault shows here with great clarity is the extent to which different scale fascist thought, i.e. that certain forms of life should be done away with or excluded, was an integral part of modern governance of the population. Even the Third Reich was no accidental lunacy but quite a logical continuation to the whole apparatus of exclusion, coercion and killing that was directed on human life long before 20th century. When Foucault writes in SMD that “We all have some element of fascism inside our heads,” (2003, 30) or in his preface to Anti-Oedipus “— the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior,” (1977, XIII) he is pointing precisely to the tendency of Western societies to produce hierarchies according to which people can be arranged in unequal and coercive order.

Interestingly, according to Foucault (ibid., 83, 259-263.), biopolitical racism is inherent in all modern states: quite obviously in the Third Reich and the Soviet Union but provocatively he claims that equally anti-capitalist socialist and leftist thought of his days had adopted racist biopolitics without much opposition. In modern states, Foucault claims, it is racism that introduces “a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die.” (ibid., 254). It seems that Foucault wants to make the same

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7 This point is obviously made, although from rather different perspective, by Horkheimer and Adorno in their Dialectic of Enlightenment (2002, see for example p. 86-99). Foucault rarely cites them but evidently knew their work. He credits them, inter alia, in his “The Subject and Power” (1982, 779) and “Onomik et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism of Political Reason” (1979) although positing his own studies regarding relation between rationalization and power into different perspective. Another influential analysis of race, class and totalitarianism is offered by Arendt (1962). On Foucault’s and Arendt’s notions of politics and biological life see Oksala 2010b.
claim with racism as with discipline: as the latter spread throughout the whole society (1995, 209, 215-216) so does the principle of excluding biologically inferiors reach beyond explicit relations of race.

To conclude this chapter let us summarize what has been said and tie this to our next topic which is sexuality. Foucault's main point in discussing about race and biopolitics is to demonstrate how from the early 19th century onwards a whole line on phenomena became thought in terms of race, biology and evolution: from delinquency to mental illness, from colonized people to social classes. This biology-based racism spread to multiple state institutions such as programs of public hygiene. Hence Foucault says of racism that “we are dealing with a mechanism that allows biopower to work.” (ibid., 258). This could be interpreted as if bio-power as a form of power promoting life could not have been integrated into the technologies of other forms of power without introducing means of division and hierarchization. For instance sovereign power and disciplinary power operate through robust hierarchies and divisions. These forms of power were already constitutive in the modern state. Thus it seems that in order to be able to function along with the modes of power, bio-power had to introduce its own dividing principle which was racism.

However, according to Foucault (1978, 149) it is not enough to exclude the abnormal, the degenerate and the insane by appealing to biological justification. There is still a threat of contaminated blood. Hence sexuality, as it was produced in the normalizing society, became linked straight to bloodline. Consequently, in the following chapter I will study how racism intersects sexuality and reproduction in the framework of normalizing society.

### 2.3.3 Sexuality and Biopolitics

According to Foucault (1978, 12; cf. Repo 2011, 75) rather than being something given in human nature sexuality is a formation and result of a complex network of relations of power and knowledge. In Foucault’s analysis of power over life sexuality occupies a very distinct position: first, along with scientific discourse
and disciplinary mechanisms it is something through which an individual may be subjected. Sexuality produces certain truth about the subject, thus making it a tool of disciplinary production of subjectivities. In this sense it forms an important part in the production of truth about oneself as a certain categorical subject (homosexual, pervert or heterosexual for instance) in relation to normal. Second, sexuality is the domain in which the blood line is produced and thus it is a possible field for racist interventions (Foucault 1978, 149). Third, in the level of population sexuality is intertwined with the most important biopolitical constants, such as, natality and transmission of diseases.

In the framework of normalizing power sexuality thus produces a specific phenomenon in which body and population meet. Historically, Foucault argues, sexuality became to bear such a great importance from the 19th century onwards since it enabled the power-knowledge apparatus to intervene into both an individual and a social body:

“We, on the other hand, are in a society of ‘sex,’ or rather a society ‘with a sexuality’: the mechanisms of power are addressed to the body, to life, to what causes it to proliferate, to what reinforces the species, its stamina, its ability to dominate, or its capacity for being used. Through the themes of health, progeny, race, the future of the species, the vitality of the social body, power spoke of sexuality and to sexuality; the latter was not a mark or a symbol, it was an object and a target.” (1978, 147).

For Foucault it was medicine that, above all, took the role of “a power-knowledge that can be applied to both the body and the population, both the organism and biological processes, and it will therefore have both disciplinary effects and regulatory effects.” (Foucault 2003, 252). This is a theme Foucault will elaborate further in linking medicine and welfare politics with pastoral power (cf. 2007, 199; Cp. 3.3.2 below). In other words, medicine became a scientific discourse which created demarcations of normal and abnormal, and precisely due to its scientific status was able to project the biological-medical norms on other deviant groups and justify their exclusion. Here again we are able to see how the norm binds techniques of power targeted to body and population together:
“The norm is something that can be applied to both a body one wishes to discipline and a population one wishes to regularize. The normalizing society is therefore not, under these conditions, a sort of generalized disciplinary society whose disciplinary institutions have swarmed and finally taken over everything. – – The normalizing society is a society in which the norm of discipline and the norm of regulation intersect along an orthogonal articulation.” (ibid., 253).

In the context of biopolitics sexuality serves what Repo calls the “life function” (2011, 84) against the death function of racism. This is simply because sexuality is the domain in which life is made to continue. However, as she also argues (ibid., 75), biological racism that was studied in the previous chapter is fundamentally linked with sexuality. Together they enable the man of modernity to distinguish between what must live and what must die – whether we speak of wide spread eugenics that were applied in most western countries (Rose 2001, 4; Macey 2009, 200) or the mechanisms by which those who do not fit into the system, become the lower ranks of society and towards whom interventions are not just possible but necessary (e.g. the poor, the insane, the criminal, the perverse etc.). Thus, in a normalizing society a whole field of relations is explicated and justified through desirable biological factors and normal sexuality.

To conclude, Foucault sees sex or sexuality having had such an enormous importance within the techniques utilized by power over life since it enables power effects to be produced very effectively from the tiniest relation of individual subjection to the widest scope at the level of population:

“First, the notion of "sex" made it possible to group together, in an artificial unity, anatomical elements, biological functions, conducts, sensations, and pleasures, and it enabled one to make use of this fictitious unity as a causal principle, an omnipresent meaning, a secret to be discovered everywhere: sex was thus able to function as a unique signifier and as a universal signified” (ibid., 154).

Finally Foucault’s analysis of racism and sexuality is fundamentally history-based which raises questions of its importance for today. In my view Foucault manages to give very valuable tools for understanding certain social phenomena.
of exclusion and dominance in his analysis of power over life. However, in the next chapter I will briefly locate Foucault’s ideas to present day discussions and reflect to what extent they could still be considered valid and to what extent they might be limited by a different norm system of contemporary societies.

2.3 Conclusions of Power Over Life

In chapters 2 - 2.1.3 above I have presented the main points connected to bio-power as Foucault analyzed it in his 1975-76 works DP, SMD and HS. There he links bio-power with disciplinary power which together realize an apparatus by which power targets, penetrates and modifies human life. It is Foucault's thesis that there are no phenomena of life that would not be studied by science and affected by power. In other words, life in its totality has entered the reflexive prism constituted by the power-knowledge nexus.

Accordingly, in his analysis of normalizing society Foucault sees biopolitics as a specific technology through which certain relations and conditions are realized in the social realm – the aim of biopolitics is above all to reinforce the vital force of the population and direct it according to a certain rationality. According to Foucault biopolitics is carried out through two distinctive ways: first through promoting public health and regulating harmful phenomena. Second, by excluding or even doing away with life deemed unworthy to live. These fields of action are intertwined with a system of norms which is constantly modified and reinforced to be functional with a given set of aims.

Foucault's account of biopolitics as normalizing power over life has been an inspiration for extensive critique towards violent normalization (cf. Agamben 1998; Esposito 2008), but, as we will see below, is not sufficient for a comprehensive analysis of today's biopolitics (cf. Ch. 3.3.2 and 4). However, it is my thesis that it was not meant to be an overall explanation or a theory in the first place. It is a critique of very particular phenomena with particular power relations that enabled these phenomena to take place in a specific historical time (cf. Foucault 2003, 6) – and, although to some extent those relations of power and
knowledge analyzed in DP, SMD and HS are still constitutive in contemporary societies (cf. Rabinow and Rose 2006; Repo 2011; Stoler 2006) our present is also something else (cf. Foucault 2008, 149). Rabinow and Rose argue (2006, 209-211) that we are not in the framework of normalizing power over life anymore and cannot understand biopolitics only through its negative killing strategies such as eugenics or exclusion of the abnormal. Instead, we have to pay attention to the modifications of biopolitical techniques enabled by molecular and gene technology. As they argue (ibid., 2011) in contemporary societies biopolitics has become essentially a means of improving the quality of life through variety of medical procedures. This invokes a question if biopolitics in fact has an affirmative character in present day societies. I will come back to this question in Ch. 3.4

Furthermore Fontana and Bertani have pointed out how Foucault’s emphasis on domination and war-model in DP and SMD is not enough to “explain either the multiplicity of the real struggles that are provoked by disciplinary power or the effects government has on the modes of behavior produced by biopower.” (2003, 283). This is a point with which I fully agree: there are things which Foucault’s thesis of power over life leaves ambiguous – the most important perhaps being the questions of resistance, counter conducts and the role of an active subject. Furthermore, Foucault’s emphasis on discipline and normalization has provoked many authors (e.g. Lazzarato 2006, 62-63; Vähämäki 2005, 12-13) to think Foucault’s analysis as being outdated. They claim that in contemporary societies discipline is no more a pivotal way of subjection or governing. However, in the light of Foucault’s lectures of 1977-79 it is clear that there are more constitutive forms of power in modern societies than only discipline. In *The Birth of Biopolitics* Foucault says:

“But we have gone beyond that stage [disciplinary mass society of consumption and spectacle]. We are no longer there. The art of government programmed by the ordoliberals around the 1930s, and which has now become the program of most governments in capitalist countries, absolutely does not seek the constitution of that type of society. It involves, on the contrary, obtaining a society that is not orientated
towards the commodity and uniformity of the commodity, but towards the multiplicity and differentiation of enterprises.” (2008, 149).

This quote on neo-liberalism clarifies neatly Foucault’s new approach in his following lectures of 1977-1979. He moves towards multiplicity of power relations and political rationalities. In the next section of my thesis I will study the ways in which Foucault refines his previous analysis concerning discipline and bio-power. Foucault directs his research towards techniques of government and their relation to population. Through an analysis of security and police apparatus Foucault links bio-power to liberal and neo-liberal governmentalities in the forms of medicine, welfare and security. He also introduces an analysis of pastoral power – a form of power that supports the integration of biopolitics into the governing techniques of modern state. The most lucid difference compared to Foucault’s account of normalizing society is that in the liberal or neo-liberal governmentalities power will be analyzed through a topological point of view, that is, how different forms of power overlap and how different political rationalities modify the mechanisms by which population is governed.

3 Biopolitics Revised: Lectures of 1977-79

After holding one sabbatical year from lecturing in 1977 Foucault began to analyze the problematic previously posed through the framework of normalizing society from a different perspective. Now the crucial question is the relationship between the state and population, and this relation is reflected through the notion of government. Hence in Security, Territory, Population (2007, hereafter STP) and The Birth of Biopolitics (2008, hereafter BBP) Foucault gives a detailed account of developments in theories of government and reflections of the state. Foucault’s aim is to shed light on the ways in which different kinds of political rationalities spring from the modifications in conceptions of, for instance, human

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8 Here Foucault (2008, 113-114) is criticising the situationist critique of the capitalistic mass society of the spectacle (put forward by Debord see 2005) of their fixation to liberal techniques of constituting the state through market logics. Foucault himself emphasises (2008, 117-118) that with neo-liberalism totally new relations between market economy, the state and society are put forward. In other words, neo-liberals embrace multiplicity of enterprises instead of consumerist mass society (ibid., 149).
nature, good society and, accordingly, good government. And vice versa: how these rationalities modify conceptions of a given thing and also affect practices through which certain things are dealt with. Many of these arguments are summarized and elaborated in later interviews and public lectures which show that even if Foucault did not have the time to publish these works in the form of thorough study he did not abandon the problematic of governmentality and biopower (see for example Foucault 1979, 1982, 1997a, 1997c, 2000a, 2000b).

Consequently, while the task during the earlier works of the 1970s was to show how human beings become subjected by certain techniques of power, Foucault now turns to investigate the ways in which the complex problematic constituted around the notion of population was dealt with in relation to government. In brief, turning his analytical gaze towards governmentality Foucault wants to “tackle the problem of the state and population.” (2007, 116). Furthermore, Foucault wants to locate the state in the broader history of governmentality that originates from the Christian church and its pastorate (2007, 129-130). In addition to pastoral power Foucault analyzes political rationalities of the reason of state, liberalism and neo-liberalism.

The reason of state designates an excessive state administration which aim is to produce a flourishing and powerful state (2008, 19). In this thesis I will follow Foucault’s definition of liberalism according to which liberalism is a system aiming to rationalize the government of the reason of state by letting people act and exchange freely in the market. This implies that liberal government must govern through production of freedom because the interests of the individuals and the common good cannot be combined without apparatuses of security that guarantee that freedom of exchange will take place (2008, 63-65). Consequently, the main issue in liberalism becomes the problem of how two distinct things can coincide. First, the subjects whose rights to free exchange governmental practices must respect, and second, a population whose conduct needs to be conducted while also taking care of their living conditions (see chapter 3.1). As we shall see in chapter 3.3.1 this problem originates from Christian pastorate and its paradox of taking simultaneously care of individuals but also of the whole population.
On the other hand, Foucault sees neo-liberalism as a governmentality that for its part aims to rationalize liberalism through organizing society around the principle of competition. According to Foucault (2008, 109-112) neo-liberals claim that the liberal governance is based on an invalid conception of the market and on too excessive and costly security apparatus. Thus to answer liberal inconsistencies neo-liberals introduce their own theory of homo oeconomicus and human capital which are the basis of competition based governance. I will come back to this in chapter 3.3.2. Through this neo-liberal notion of homo oeconomicus Foucault also continues the preliminary sketches of the techniques of the self introduced in the context of pastoral power (2007, 183-185; 2008, 145, 282-285).

Consequently, in contrast to the previous thesis of a uniform power over life, in STP and BBP the analysis is carried out by investigating multiple forms of power that intersect and modify each other. Foucault also clarified later that in his genealogical work he did not manage to clearly distinguish between power seen as strategic games by which the conduct of others can be affected and relations of domination (1997a, 299). Consequently, Foucault intended this notion of governmentality to be an analytical tool by which the analysis of power can be distanced from the framework of subjects of law, that is, the relation established between political institutions and people in terms of laws and rights (ibid.). Thus the notion of governmentality enabled Foucault to study power as strategies and techniques used by free individuals who aim to control and modify the conduct of themselves and others through certain means at their disposal (ibid., 300).

In these lectures Foucault, according to the editor of STP Michel Senellart (2007, 354 endnote 33), also answers to critique claiming that Foucault produced a circular ontology in his previous analysis of power. This point is also made by Golder (2007, 171) who argues that after the publication DP Foucault was heavily criticized for not having produced a proper analysis of global relations of power and of the state apparatus. To answer this critique Foucault demonstrates how it is

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9 Foucault says that he is “well aware that there are those who say that in talking about power all we do is develop an internal and circular ontology of power,” (2007, 247-248) and then puts his own account in opposition to those criticising him. Neither Foucault nor Senellart mention who actually are these opponents or define precisely what they mean by “circular ontology”. However Golder (2007, 171) points to Marxist Left and suggests to look at for instance Nicos Poulantzas’ State, Power, Socialism, trans. Patrick Camiller, London: Verso, 1980, p. 44.
perfectly possible to carry out a genealogy of the modern state without having to assume any ontology of the state as such i.e. a state has no essence which produces power and power has no essence producing the state (2007, 354). By this Foucault wants to stress that the state is not itself the source of oppression, but rather the political rationalities that govern through the state. According to Foucault the state is only a way of governing, an episode in governmentality, or a combination of technologies of power that are coagulated in the form of a state:

“What if all these relations of power that gradually take shape on the basis of multiple and very diverse processes which gradually coagulate and form an effect, what if these practices of government were precisely the basis on which the state was constituted?” (ibid., 248).

From this perspective Foucault wants to investigate how governmental reason historically intersects “society, economy, population, security, and freedom [that] are the elements of the new governmentality [liberalism]whose forms we can still recognize in its contemporary modifications.” (ibid., 354). I will present Foucault’s genealogy of governmentalities from the perspective of how different rationalities of governing are linked to biopolitics and how his analysis differs from that we have seen in the works delivered in 1975-76. I will argue that by introducing the study of governmentalities, liberal apparatuses of security and neo-liberal competition Foucault is able to flesh out his former analysis of biopower. This is especially due to showing how biopolitics is linked to different political rationalities that govern population according to different principles. However, this is not to say that an epoch could be reduced into one determining governmentality. Rather, different rationalities are in a constant state of confronting and modifying each other and this process modifies practices as well (Foucault 2008, 313).

Therefore, albeit governmentality is without a doubt one of the key concepts of Foucault’s 1977-79 lectures, I will not refer to it as master category determining one epoch but rather as an intelligible concept denoting a strategy, political rationale and a way of doing and approaching things. This is due to my view that by thinking governmentality as a coherent whole creating a specific type of
society, such as liberal or neo-liberal, misses Foucault’s point of stressing that
governmentality is a method for studying the multiple strategies, means and
practices by which individuals interact with each other (1997a, 300). I will also
perform my analysis from a point of view which pays attention to the
subjectivation of individuals. Even if biopolitics is a technology posed on
population, I think it is fruitful to reflect how does it function vis-à-vis
individuals, what kind of power effects does it produce and so forth. For instance
in order to collect statistical knowledge of population and alter the constants
arising from it, one needs to have techniques by which individuals are subjected
as objects of this knowledge and made to internalize certain types of behavior
enabling this knowledge. For the sake of grasping this guiding process is
precisely why the concept of governmentality becomes important here. We shall
see that especially pastoral techniques of guiding will be dovetailing bio-power in
Foucault’s later analyses (Foucault 2007, 47-49; 1979, 9).

Alongside with references to governmentalities I will convey, following Collier’s
definition, a topological analysis which, by contrast to governmentality and its
general strategy of power, “— brings to light a heterogeneous space, constituted
through multiple determinations, and not reducible to a given form of knowledge-
power.” (2009, 99). In other words, topological analysis investigates how,
through certain modifications and reconfigurations, social institutions, practices
and rationalities transform while preserving to some extent their previous
characteristics. Thus according to topological analysis I will study how different
forms of power connect to different governmentalities and convey a point of view
which is sensitive to the constant struggle inherent to politics and historical events.
Hence the problem of biopolitics is no more posed only in relation to disciplinary
power or as a means to control life in its totality as in the last chapter of HS
(Foucault 1978) and last lecture of SMD (Foucault 2003).

Furthermore, the analysis of bio-power constitutes the study of a reflexive prism
in which the reflections concerning desirable forms of human life are realized.
Consequently, when Foucault is dealing with different political rationalities one
important point in which these rationalities differ is their conception of human
nature and population. Consequently, whether one sees people as subjects for
sovereign state (the reason of state) or active individuals realizing useful actions in the market (liberalism) has very specific consequences to the techniques of government by which this population is supposed to be managed. In regard to this Foucault introduces the concept of veridiction (see chapter 3.3.1; 2008, 36-37) to designate the process by which a certain discourse or practice is produced as truth. According to Foucault this process has a specific set of rules according to which a truth can be produced. These include a variety of cultural codes and conceptions which determine whether a truth (of a discourse, practice or a person as certain subject) is seen as valid or invalid (1997a, 297).

In this sense governmentalities can be considered as different ways of producing the conditions for veridiction and consequently bio-power will dovetail the production of truth about the desirable form of human life, which accordingly, becomes integrated in practices of governance of population but also directing oneself. Hence bio-power intersects all three modes by which human beings are subjected in Foucauldnian framework: objectification through knowledge, objectification through dividing practices and techniques of the self by which an individual objects herself as a self-directing subject (1982b, 777-778).

3.1 Methodological and Conceptual Refinements

It can be seem from the two first lectures in STP that Foucault was not completely satisfied with his analysis of disciplinary power, bio-power and biopolitics presented in his previous works: he spends the beginning of these lectures with explicating and refining his analysis from a new perspective. Collier has showed with great clarity (2009, 86-90) how Foucault abandons the epochal quasi-functional analysis (cf. Chapter 2.1.1.1) of one paradigmatic power characterizing one era and moves towards, in Collier's words, a topological analysis of power. Above all this means that, instead of trying to capture one hegemonic apparatus of power Foucault begins to investigate correlations and combinations of different types of techniques of power. Hence follow the crucial point: he is not analyzing successive elements. “There is not the legal age, the disciplinary age, and the age of security.” (Foucault 2007, 8). On the contrary,
there is a complex interplay of all the different technologies of power that sometimes dovetail each other in order to respond a given problematic, while in other occasions different techniques of power collide and oppose one another.

Stone (2004, 79) has emphasized how Foucault continues to use his archaeological method even in the lectures of the 1970’s, which are usually taken as genealogical. However, he makes this argument only vis-à-vis Foucault’s lectures of *Abnormal* 1974-75 and SMD, whereas Golder (2007, 161) points out that in STP Foucault is methodologically securely on a genealogical terrain. It is out of the scope of this thesis to consider the possible extent to which Foucault still utilizes archaeology in STP and BBP. However, I wish to point out that in STP, during an analysis of the physiocrats\(^{10}\), Foucault claims that instead of looking at the ways that govern the formation of physiocrats' concepts and guiding theoretical principles (archaeology of knowledge) he wants to proceed to a genealogy of power, that is, to reconstruct the functioning of the physiocrats' writings “according to its objectives, the strategies that govern it, and the program of political action it proposes.” (2007, 36). Thus it seems that Foucault himself sees the center of gravity in his methodology being in genealogy (on archaeology and genealogy cf. Ch. 2.1).

In STP Foucault targets his genealogical method toward governmentality. It should be born in mind that Foucault’s definitions for the notion of governmentality are diverse (2007, 108) and thus there may be different applications for the concept. However, the concept is important here because Foucault mostly links it with the problematic of population and thus with bio-power (e.g. 2007, 108, 116, 339, 342-354; 1997c, 225). In one instance in STP Foucault identifies governmentality with liberalism as follows:

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\(^{10}\) According to Encyclopedia Britaennica *physiocrats* denotes “a school of economists founded in 18th-century France and characterized chiefly by a belief that government policy should not interfere with the operation of natural economic laws and that land is the source of all wealth. It is generally regarded as the first scientific school of economics.”. Foucault refers to them in many instances in STP. Physiocrats are above all set to object mercantilist state interventionism and the state reason related to it (Foucault 2007, e.g. 34-36).
“First, by governmentality I understand the ensemble formed by institution, procedures, analyses and reflection, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument.” (ibid.).

It is out of the scope of this thesis to reflect thoroughly on Foucault’s changing denotation of governmentality11. When analyzing STP and BBP I will use it as an analytical tool by which Foucault tries to tackle the problem of population and its governance through the state. Thus I will study how in different governmentalities bio-power is modified into specific procedures of biopolitics. As Golder (2007, 161) has pointed out, Foucault’s introduction of governmentality in STP marks a turn towards the study of individual techniques of the self. This interpretation is supported by Foucault’s retrospective clarification to the concept: “This contact between the technologies of domination of others and those of the self I call governmentality.” (1997c, 225). Furthermore, in an interview from 1984 Foucault re-elaborates the concept by saying

“I am saying that ‘governmentality’ implies the relationship of the self to itself, and I intend this concept of ‘governmentality’ to cover the whole range of practices that constitute, define, organize, and instrumentalize the strategies that individuals in their freedom can use in dealing with each other. Those who try to control, determine, and limit the freedom of others are themselves free individuals who have at their disposal certain instruments they can use to govern others. Thus, the basis for all this is freedom, the relationship of the self to itself and the relationship to the other.” (1997a, 300).

Thus I propose the reader to keep in mind that governmentality will be an important concept vis-à-vis techniques of the self. However, in STP and BBP Foucault is still more focused on the question of how some men are to govern others – and here biopolitics will be one specific domain of directing human behavior. I will come back to this question of how the study of governmentalities as a relation of government that already supposes an individual to have a certain

11 Foucault’s historical-philosophical analysis of governmentality is well presented by e.g. Burchell et al. (1991) and Välikangas (2011).
relationship with himself opens up new perspectives vis-à-vis Foucault’s concept of power and governance. In STP and in BBP this question is tentatively analyzed in regards to pastoral power (see chapter 3.3.2) and, finally, Foucault’s analysis of neo-liberal notion of homo œconomicus (chapter 3.3.3) leads him towards the problematic of how an individual subjects himself according to practices of the self that are nonetheless proposed and imposed to him by his surrounding culture and social group (1997a, 291).

Furthermore, when Foucault speaks of governmentalities in STP and BBP he underlines a certain methodological framework: by analyzing different ruptures or integrations in history he is not looking for explanatory universals or principles which would render historical events intelligible (2007, 238-239). Rather, for Foucault the isolation of phenomena into their own manageable unities represented by a given type of governmentality, is a methodological choice done for the sake of forming a grid of intelligibility (Foucault 2008, 186). He is not claiming to put history into one totalizing theory but only demonstrating one line of events taking place in history as manageable, though artificial, singularities.

This is clearly stated when Foucault ends his last lecture of this series of governmentality: in BBP Foucault says “You can see that in the modern world, in the world we have known since the nineteenth century, a series of governmental rationalities overlap, lean on each other, challenge each other, and struggle with each other – -.” (2008, 313) and this is precisely the definition that Foucault gives for politics (ibid.). This is already a familiar theme in SMD and HS where Foucault puts forward his agonistic view of politics: “politics is war pursued by other means” (1978, 93; 2003, 48). Albeit here the war model is complemented with techniques of government, and thus the center of gravity is rather on the strategies of direction than on straightforward struggle or oppression.

Consequently, I think it is fruitful to consider Foucault's investigations concerning different modes of governance and their individual rationalities as explications for what brought certain practices, attitudes and struggles into existence. Although, it could be admitted that Foucault's style of dwelling in detail in a given governmental rationality for great lengths can give a hegemonic
picture of a given governmentality under analysis. But when put to explicit methodological context there is no obscurity with Foucault's aim: he is doing genealogical mappings of different styles of governance and relations of power that can be acknowledged in modernity. Collier has pointed out how the concept of governmentality is prone to reification and sums up the problems of reducing one epoch into one governmentality as follows:

“— first, the concept of governmentality has itself provoked (mis)applications of this work that commit the synechdochal error of confusing the 'parts' (techniques and so on) with some mysterious neoliberal 'whole'; second, the problems of misinterpretation have been multiplied by an overvaluation of the concept of governmentality, which has obscured much of what is novel and important in Foucault's 1978-9 lectures, specifically his shift to a more dynamic topological analysis of power relations.” (2009, 98).

Following Collier I think we must be really careful in reducing any historical periods into some totalizing principles of power. In my view this cannot be a point of departure for an analysis since it confuses the diversity of phenomena in reality. Rather, we should be sensitive towards the multiplicity of causes and relations (cf. Foucault 1997d). Lastly, I want to emphasize Foucault's explicit determinacy to oppose functionalist explanations in his 1977-79 works while insisting the analysis of micro-powers as point of departure (2008, 186).

Although Foucault underlined already in DP that discipline is only a modality for exercise of power and cannot be identified with an institution nor an apparatus (1995, 215) he still used formulation with functionalist connotations (ibid., 216). Now Foucault clarifies his position more profoundly:

“— power can in no way be considered either as a principle in itself, or as having explanatory value which functions from the outset. The term itself, power, does no more than designate a [domain] of relations which are entirely still to be analyzed, and what I have proposed to call governmentality, that is to say, the way in which one conducts the conduct of men, is no more than a proposed analytical grid for these relations of power.” (Foucault 2008, 186).

Accordingly in STP:
“By de-institutionalizing and de-functionalizing relations of power we can grasp their genealogy, i.e., the way they are formed, connect up with each other, develop, multiply, and are transformed on the basis of something other than themselves, — — Technologies of power are endlessly modified by the action of numerous factors.” (2007, footnote 119).

Consequently, micro-analysis is to be taken as a point of view rather than a division principle between different levels. However, Gordon claims in his influential “Introduction” in *The Foucault Effect* (1991, 4) that bio-power produces the link between micro- and macro-analysis in Foucault’s thought (this interpretation is followed by, for instance, Gastaldo 1997, 115). Newman for his part (2001, 98) takes different view and criticizes Foucault for shying away from macropolitical analyses. I must disagree with both these views since it is in fact Foucault’s point in STP to show how his methodology is applicable to the whole social field without having to assume any dividing levels in the analysis. In STP Foucault says:

”– – there is not a sort of brake between the level of micro-power and the level of macro-power, and that talking about one [does not] exclude talking about the other. In actual fact, an analysis in terms of micro-powers comes back without any difficulty to the analysis of problems like those of government and the state.” (Foucault 2007, 358).

Collier has also rightly pointed out (2009, 83) that there is no micro-scale and macro-scale analysis of power according to which Foucault would project his 1975-76 key concept power-knowledge towards new objects. For instance, towards macro-level governance as argued by Gordon (1991, 4). On the contrary, for Foucault micro is an analytical tool for revealing the dynamics of a given combination of power relations and this method can quite neatly be applied to explicate so called macro-level phenomena. Foucault clarifies this in *BBP*:

“What I wanted to do—and this was what was at stake in the analysis—was to see the extent to which we could accept that the analysis of micro-powers, or of procedures of governmentality, is not confined by definition to a precise domain determined by a
sector of the scale, but should be considered simply as a point of view, a method of
decipherment which may be valid for the whole scale, whatever its size.” (2008, 186).

In the next chapter I will investigate how these methodological upgrades
modified Foucault’s analysis of bio-power and biopolitics. To me it seems that if,
during the 1975-76 framework, Foucault was exclusively focused on the "dark
side” of the liberal-capitalistic society (cf. 1995, 222), that is, it’s mechanisms of
exclusion, subjection and dominations, he now turns to investigate different ways
in which the society and population can be managed. This includes paying
attention to techniques by which individuals can be directed as active subjects
who, in a given framework, should be allowed certain freedom to act according to
their own interests. In this analysis apparatuses of security play a crucial role and,
as we shall see, they do not take excessive hold on the society as power over life
seemed to do. Instead, they let, to certain extent, people exercise their freedoms in
social interaction.

According to the topological analysis I will study what are the techniques that
security may share with law and discipline and how it will, on the other hand,
differ from these. By this topological point of view I aim to shed light on
Foucault’s seemingly complex analysis that moves from governmentality and
apparatuses of security to the state, pastoral power and liberalism.

3.2 Security as Biopolitics

In STP Foucault begins to apply his micro-point of view to the analysis of
population and state. This will lead Foucault to conceptualize biopolitics as
operating through apparatuses of security. Albeit, during the first three lectures of
STP Foucault only refers to biopolitics a couple of times linking it with the
thought of the physiocrats (2007, 22), he distinguishes between discipline and
security in such a manner that in the light of his previous analyses it is clear that
he is identifying apparatuses of security with biopolitics. Furthermore, security
deals precisely with the same phenomena as biopolitics presented in SMD (2003,
243-244).
Consequently, STP opens with the following phrase: “This year I would like to begin studying something that I have called, somewhat vaguely, bio-power.” (Foucault 2007, 1). Foucault continues the analysis he began in the last lecture of SMD (2003, 243-244) i.e. the analysis of how to manage phenomena that are aleatory and unpredictable in the context of population. In STP the field of research is opened by the notions of milieu and the town. It soon becomes clear that Foucault’s account of bio-power is changed compared to SMD. As we recall in SMD Foucault saw bio-power as seeking to establish a total control over the biological, “making” live and “letting” die, (2003, 241), or as a technology by which human life could be strengthened to serve a given purpose: "Like disciplinary mechanisms, these mechanism [disciplinary and biopolitical] are designed to maximize and extract forces – –” (ibid., 246). Finally bio-power was essentially linked with three different axes: race, sexuality and reinforcing life forces.

In contrast to this, in STP bio-power is no more an anonymous or abstract form of power directing life into some specific form but it is presented within concrete framework of apparatuses of security. Collier (2009, 87-90) has set forth an interesting remark according to which in STP Foucault starts to emphasize actors and explicit historical thought and events instead of a coherent architecture of power. According to him in STP we can see “a kind of analytical decomposition” (ibid., 87) which is to say that Foucault brings certain phenomena in relation in a topological space but lets them remain heterogeneous.

Furthermore, in DP, SMD and HS Foucault presented power-knowledge as a historical changing constant which somewhat determines possible forms for subject, conceivable forms of knowledge and the field of possible action vis-à-vis others and the self (1995, 194; 2003, 28-29; 1978, 140-141). In STP the power-knowledge relations typical to a given period of time are replaced by looking at different forms of power, political rationalities and contradictive knowledges. In this way the center of gravity in Foucault’s investigations transfers towards the study of multiplicity of motifs, arguments and collisions by which procedures are realized, and further, towards events, effects and the interrelation of multiple
phenomena\textsuperscript{12}. Thus the topological view allows us to tackle different transformations and phenomena analytically without having to connect them to a broader set of principles – such as in Foucault’s analysis of power and knowledge in the context of power over life.

A good example of the topological point of view is Foucault’s analysis of apparatuses of security in STP. Foucault contrasts them with mechanisms of discipline – not in the sense of successive elements, “but that security is a way of making the old armatures of law and discipline function in addition to the specific mechanisms of security.” (Foucault 2007, 10). According to the topological view Foucault sees security mixing with the aforementioned analysis of power over life:

“What is involved is the emergence of technologies of security within mechanisms that are either specifically mechanisms of social control, as in the case of the penal system, or mechanisms with the function of modifying something in the biological destiny of the species.” (ibid.).

As we can see there is no straightforward transition from discipline and regulating biopolitics to security. Rather, Foucault wants to study how the emergence of technologies of security within discipline and biopolitics will modify the general economy of power. Hence Foucault now moves from the former thesis of disciplinary-normalizing society to investigate whether we can speak of society of security (ibid., 11). Albeit dwelling in his historical analysis Foucault interestingly connects this question to his present by wondering if “the general economy or power in our societies is becoming a domain of security?” (ibid., 10-11).

\textsuperscript{12} See, for example, Foucault’s analysis of security and town in third lecture of STP (2007, 55-79) where he distinguishes between disciplinary and security management of the sick. The former manages through isolation, but the latter through establishment of normal curves at the level of whole population. With apparatuses of security Foucault introduces a problematic that is constituted by multiplicity of phenomena that affect on given object that needs to be controlled. For instance, the problem space for security in town includes scarcity, revolt, contagion, epidemic diseases, milieu, street, circulation of men and things etc. which cannot be suffocated through discipline but organizing things according to natural constants. New notions vis-à-vis these threats are “case, risk, danger, and crisis” (ibid., 61).
3.2.1 Security and Space: Differences to Discipline

Foucault begins his analysis of security with posing a particular problematic linked to space, or more precisely, spaces of security. Sovereign and disciplinary power are of course already fundamentally intertwined with questions of space and territory. However, Foucault (2007, 12-15) finds the singularity of security from the dynamics of the town. By referring several strategies and town plans Foucault shows how, instead of aiming at producing an artificial surveyed place for constant perfection of things (discipline), security works with several material givens such as flows of water, air, goods and people. Furthermore, security draws its targets for interventions from these natural facts and works with probabilities. It takes things as they are and tries to maximize the positive and decrease or control the negative. Thus security entails an endless search for constants which reveal the possible ground for interventions in space. (Ibid., 11-20.) To summarize all this Foucault says:

“Sovereignty capitalizes a territory, raising the major problem of the seat of the government, whereas discipline structures a space and addresses the essential problem of a hierarchical and functional distributions of elements, and security will try to plan a milieu in terms of events or series of events or possible elements, of series that will have to be regulated within a multivalent and transformable framework.” (Ibid., 20).

To fully conceptualize the domain of security Foucault introduces the notion of milieu which is simply “a certain number of combined, overall effects bearing on all who live in it.” (Ibid., 21). Accordingly, security vis-a-vis milieu establishes the very domain for application of biopolitics: milieu is the field of intervention in which “one tries to affect, precisely, a population.” (Ibid.). To underline the fundamental dependence of population to its surroundings Foucault defines population here as

“– a multiplicity of individuals who are, and fundamentally and essentially only exist, biologically bound to the materiality within which they live. What one tries to reach through this milieu is precisely the conjunction of a series of events produced
by these individuals, populations, and groups, and quasi natural events which occur around them.” (ibid. Two commas added for the sake of clarity.).

I think we are able to see clearly how Foucault's analysis has shifted from the disciplinary-regulative framework to a more elaborated analysis of how a population can and have been conducted vis-à-vis a given milieu. Consequently, even though already in DP, SMD and HS Foucault tries to present biopolitics as management and manipulation of the population, his analysis stays either at the level of abstract interplay of structures and functions – for instance when claiming that “The growth of a capitalist economy gave rise to the specific modality of disciplinary power,” (1995, 221). However, in STP Foucault begins the topological analysis of, first, the spacial points in which biopolitical management and regulation take place. Second, by referring to concrete examples, such as scarcity and valorization, Foucault shows how and according to which rationalities certain biopolitical techniques were made acceptable for doctors, administrators and finally for people themselves (Foucault 2007, 59).

In STP we can also acknowledge a movement from an analysis of straightforward interventions to an analysis of more subtle control that affects particularly the framework of possible action and phenomena. Deleuze has summarized this kind of power well:

“Control is not discipline. You do not confine people on highways, but by making highways you multiply the means of control. I am not saying that this is the only aim of highways, but on them people may move endlessly and not be at all confined while being perfectly controlled. This is our future.” (Deleuze 1987, my translation. 13).

What Deleuze is after is that these technologies of power, which Foucault calls apparatuses of security and he names control, modify the set of rules and means

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13 This quote is taken from a lecture. I have modified the translation to be compatible with the written form. “Voyez en quoi un contrôle ce n’est pas une discipline. Je dirai, par exemple, d’un autoroute, que là vous n’enfermez pas les gens, mais en faisant des autoroutes, vous multipliez des moyens de contrôle. Je ne dis pas que cela soit ça le but unique de l’autoroute {rires}, mais des gens peuvent tourner à l’infini et sans être du tout enfermés, tout en étant parfaitement contrôlés. C’est ça notre avenir.”
according to which a given action is possible. The idea is that within a predefined framework one is able to practice her freedoms but only to the extent and according to the modes which are made possible by apparatuses of security. Thus what characterizes security and control is that their principal aim is not to discipline individuals but to govern and modify the area of possibilities for individual and collective action.

According to Foucault (2007, 58-67) security functions essentially through confronting different problems, which will be managed through an analysis of probabilities, tendencies and patterns of behavior found in a given field in question. Then these identifiable constants will function as a reference point for techniques of regulation and control which are aimed to bring the desired results at the level of population. Hence in STP biopolitics is intertwined with control of the possible and the management of probabilities. Thus in contrast to the general and abstract regulation presented in SMD (2003, 245-247) the new topology of biopolitics comprises the interplay of biological factors, their relation to natural tendencies of things and their dependency on a given milieu. Consequently, with a case of smallpox one can manage the risks posed by the disease through vaccinations which will serve as model for further actions of what Foucault calls medical police (2007, 58). Finally, the crucial characteristic of security is that it does not try to prevent things as such. Rather, it takes certain phenomena as natural givens from which it aims to find specific points of support. By taking the possible points prone to modification and combining them with specific techniques, apparatuses of security can make them function in relation to other elements of reality so that a given phenomenon will be either canceled out or regulated so that its effects will be more favorable (ibid., 59).

It seems that in STP Foucault tries to define biopolitics in an exact manner by linking it with security. This can be seen from the way in which he tries very analytically to distinguish between discipline and security. Discipline functions essentially by isolating a space in which power may function without a limit. Furthermore discipline concentrates, determines and prescribes. Apparatuses of security, in contrast, organize and absorb things in ever wider circuits; in order for security to function it must allow new elements to be integrated constantly, for
instance, behavior of producers and buyers and their relation to broader mechanisms of the market. Accordingly, discipline must let nothing escape it; in order to function it has to regulate everything. Apparatuses of security for their part let things happen; things have to be taken care of at the level of their natural, inevitable and necessary course so that the necessary elements will be combined with other elements of reality in a most favorable way. (Ibid., 44-46.) As we will see in chapter 3.3 this naturalness inherent in things will be one of the guiding stars in liberal governance, and accordingly, apparatuses of security will be at the heart of liberal biopolitics. Finally Foucault ends this directory of differences between law, discipline and security as follows:

“In other words, the law prohibits and discipline prescribes, and the essential function of security, without prohibiting or describing, but possibly making use of some instruments of prescription and prohibition, is to respond to a reality in such a way that this response cancels out the reality to which it responds—nullifies it, or limits, checks, or regulates it. I think this regulation within the element of reality is fundamental in apparatuses of security.” (ibid., 47).

In other words biopolitics in the form of security consists in a set of procedures, which, by working with the given elements of reality itself, are directed to modify certain phenomena in this reality. This analysis is crucially different from the thesis of power over life where discipline and bio-power were presented as two modes of a great machinery of power targeting life. In STP it seems rather that Foucault wants to make a clear analytical distinction between discipline and bio-power which is now identified with apparatuses of security. Collier has made similar point: “If previously Foucault saw regulatory power and discipline as complementary parts of a coherent logic of power that operated on different registers, then in the later work he posits no necessary link between them.” (2009, 87).

In my view this is because in order to clarify the analytical value of discipline and biopolitics Foucault wants to distinguish clearly between them. In his earlier analysis Foucault identified disciplinary and bio-power being the essential forms of power in modern societies. They were the two extremes of the whole
architecture of power relations he called the power over life. In STP Foucault seems to have reconsidered this thesis and considers modern society as being constituted by multiple technologies of power rather than reducible to power over life.

Furthermore, in STP Foucault refines the distinction between disciplinary normalization and biopolitical normalization in terms of security. In the SMD “The normalizing society is a society in which the norm of discipline and the norm of regulation intersect along an orthogonal articulation.” (2003., 253). This is to say, that a given predefined norm always determines the normal. But in contrast to this, in STP, discipline is something that utilizes techniques of normation:

“Disciplinary normalization consists first of all in positing a model, an optimal that is constructed in terms of certain result, and the operation of disciplinary normalization consists in trying to get people, movement, and actions to conform to this model, the normal being precisely that which can conform to this norm, and the abnormal that which is incapable of conforming to the norm.” (2007, 57).

Thus, the abnormal and the normal are not primary for discipline; it is the norm that constitutes the normalization process. Hence Foucault rather says “that what is involved in disciplinary techniques is a normation (normation) rather than normalization.” (ibid.).

However, in the case of security apparatuses the norm can only be established from the normal – which Foucault now understands as constants arising from population, for instance, an average mortality rate of smallpox (ibid., 62). Hence “normalization in the strict sense” (ibid., 63) is now a feature of apparatuses of security. This is precisely because security works with natural elements of a given phenomenon from which one can deduce constants, which, according to certain rationality, are more favorable than others. Therefore the favorable constants will serve as the norms while other elements of reality will be arranged so that these constants will be reinforced while less favorable constants will be nullified. In
other words, the norm becomes established through an observed interplay of different normalities that spring from population. Foucault puts this as follows:

“The normal comes first and the norm is deduced from it, or the norm is fixed and plays its operational role on the basis of this study of normalities. So, I would say that what is involved here is no longer normation, but rather normalization in the strict sense.” (2007, 63).

To conclude this chapter I emphasize that these analytical distinctions between discipline and security-biopolitics should be taken as means for producing a grid of intelligibility for an analysis of different mechanism of power. These concepts are analytical isolations that may not be found in their pure form in reality. For instance, as we will see below, in medical practices and in the police institution disciplinary power, bio-power and pastoral power are in constant interaction where they produce techniques and effects constituted by all these forms of power. Accordingly, security is not pure biopolitics but includes different technologies of power as well (Foucault 2007, 10). Nonetheless, security is essentially biopolitical because it includes the management of population which is fundamentally biologically bound to its material surroundings. Consequently, security deals with biological risks and dangers and reinforces certain favorable natural constants.

3.2.2 Physiocrats, Security and the Scientific Rationalization: Towards Liberal Governmentality

In this chapter I will show how Foucault sets liberal apparatuses of security against the security management of the reason of state. There are two important arguments in Foucault’s account. First is that the physiocrats adopted the view of laissez-faire\(^4\) which for them is a certain technique for rationalizing the

\(^4\)Laissez-faire is a political-economic doctrine according to which there are domains, especially in commerce, to which government should not intervene. According to Foucault the notion of laissez-faire comes from a former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs marquis d’Argenson (1694-1757) who used it in a sketch demanding free trade (2008, 20 cf. end note 13). I’ll follow Collier (2009, 92) in pointing out that in STP physiocrats are identified with liberal laissez-faire policy even though in BBP Foucault (2008, 284-285) sets them against liberalism by claiming that
government of population. Second, this rationalizing process connected to laissez-faire is enabled by sciences, especially mathematics and empirical techniques of collecting data, which allow effective means for management of the fluctuation linked to natural phenomena (Foucault 2007, 59). Consequently, the relation between these new scientific means and the way in which they modify the techniques of government is Foucault’s primary target of research – and of course vice versa: how certain techniques of government produce new types of knowledges. Thus in order to clarify how a given political rationality affects on the ways in which population is governed Foucault juxtaposes two different logics of government: physiocrats’ apparatures of security and mercantile-cameral\textsuperscript{15} state regulation (2007, 102-103).

Foucault juxtaposes (2007, 30-33, 58-59) the aforementioned security management of smallpox with management of scarcity. By this he shows how in mercantilism the risks posed by scarcity and disease were taken care of with force and compulsion: controls, quarantines and regulations. In contrast to mercantilism physiocrats’ techniques for handling these risks are based on a management of a possible event with its natural fluctuations. This is to say that there is a set of factors in the mechanism of these phenomena themselves to which one is able to affect so that scarcity and disease will cause the minimum costs possible. It is precisely here that Foucault sees security becoming thought in terms of risk management (ibid., 61). Furthermore, according to Foucault (2007, 69-70) what is crucial in the ideas of physiocrats and other 18\textsuperscript{th} century economic theorists (économistes, hereafter economists) is the claim that the best remedy against scarcity is free circulation. Thus physiocrats are promoting an apparatus of

while they are promoting free economic activity this is only due to the flourishing of the despotic sovereign.

\textsuperscript{15} Mercantilism is a governmental rationality which emphasises state regulation of national economy in order to augment state’s power vis-à-vis other rival states (cf. Encyclopedia Britaennica). Foucault clarifies his view on mercantilism as follows: “it is a particular organization of production and commercial circuits according to the principle that: first, the state much enrich itself through monetary accumulation; second, it must strengthen itself by increasing population; and third, it must exist and maintain itself in a state of permanent competition with foreign powers.” (2008, 5). According to Senellart (footnote 25 in Foucault 2007, 25) “Cameralistics or cameral science (Cameralwissenschaft), designates the science of finance and administration.” It became a university discipline in Germany in 1724 and it was aimed at securing the welfare of the state.
security that would allow free economic activity since they claim that the market mechanisms are the best suited for avoiding scarcity, i.e., the best way of ensuring security is laissez-faire.

Physiocrats’ conception of laissez-faire stems from a particular idea of certain naturalness inherent in population: in order to realize given favorable effects people must be let to act according to specific natural principles, for example, to exchange freely in the market. According to Foucault this is the birth of political economy, that is, “— knowledge of processes that link together variations of wealth and variation of population on three axes: production, circulation, consumption.” (ibid., 350 footnote). By the same token this is the emergence of the limitation of state interventionism precisely from the point of view of good government: if state power does not apply laisser-faire to a proper extent so that things can take their natural course, it acts blindly, it is ignorant or mistaken in scientific terms and thus inefficient and even irrational. In other words, a good government must include scientific rationality according to which governmental practices may be located on the side of the natural processes springing from the things themselves. (ibid., 351).

This has important implications for the government of population: the idea of naturalness renders population governable through variety of factors on which the composition of this very population depends on. These include for instance taxation, laws, climate, material surroundings, intensity of commercial activity, religious and moral views etc. Accordingly, Foucault (ibid., 71) stresses that from the economists’ point of view sovereign power and its regulatory apparatus are not efficient enough or even capable of producing the desired effects at the level of population; it is by definition not in sovereign’s power to know the endless series of factors according to which population varies, and this is why the principles for government should be scientific management of the population and laissez-faire.

Consequently, I argue that bio-power should be seen as a form of power by which the developments in natural sciences were able to be modified to support certain political rationality and its techniques of government, namely liberalism. As
Foucault points out (ibid., 59) the developments in mathematics made a calculated management of probabilities possible and allowed certain medical practices such as valorization to be combined with already accepted fields of rationality. However, it was not until certain techniques of security enabled the rational management of probabilities to spread to the whole variety of social domains while certain knowledges, norms and benevolent consequences rendered these techniques acceptable for population. For instance, Foucault sees (ibid., 58-59) valorization as an example of this process: through valorization one could show how the mortality rate decreased at the level of population compared to non-valorized populations. In this way valorization supported the acceptability of modification of population-related phenomena due to their benevolent consequences. On the other hand, these techniques also opened up new ways to govern population according to scientific rationalization of given phenomena.

It is important to emphasize the way in which this idea of naturalness inherent in population crystallizes an emergence of whole new domains of knowledge linked to population. According to Foucault, what the idea of naturalness most of all implies is that it renders population to be seen “as a sort of technical-political object of management and government.” (ibid., 70). Consequently, biopolitics will be realized through two different domains which we could call the positive and the negative. First, the positive is linked to the reinforcement of the favorable effects by affecting natural variables, such as promoting health through medicine and avoiding scarcity through market principles. The latter should be arranged according to the framework of laissez-faire so that the most beneficial effects follow from the activity of the population. By the same token, these natural variables, which seem to take their course according to accidents, conjunctural causes and individual action appear, in fact, to be quite regular. Thus the negative task linked to biopolitics is to reduce certain risks behind these regularities. This includes, for example, diminishing mortality rate connected to a given phenomenon through mechanisms of security. (Ibid., 70-74.) Thus, biopolitics in terms of security will take a form of reducing risks at the level of population while reinforcing the positive phenomena.
I think it becomes quite clear here how Foucault’s former analysis of biopolitics becomes revised with an explicit analysis of the relation between historical events and political rationalities that modify population as an entity prone to alteration through scientific techniques. Furthermore, Foucault shows here explicitly how different governmental rationalities, namely the reason of state and liberalism, are based on different principles and confront each other according to these principles. This is to say that their truth production is different (I will come back to this in chapter 3.3.1 with Foucault’s concept of *veridiction*). This can be seen from the way in which Foucault (2007, 78-79) claims that the transition from natural history to biology and from the analysis of wealth to political economy was enabled by a new understanding of population. Accordingly, these new scientific approaches constantly reflected back on the ways in which population was thought within a more general framework of politics and power relations:

“A constant interplay between techniques of power and their object gradually carves out in reality, as a field of reality, population and its specific phenomena. A whole series of objects were made visible for possible forms of knowledge on the basis of the constitution of the population as the correlate of techniques of power. — — Hence the theme of man, and the ‘human sciences’ that analyze him as living being, working individual, and speaking subject, should be understood on the basis of the emergence of population as the correlate of power and the object of knowledge.” (ibid., 79).

These are familiar themes from *The Order of Things* (1994) but in STP Foucault elaborates his analysis, that was in the former concentrated upon the concept of life, with the notion of population. In other words in STP, population is the pivotal point through which Foucault investigates the different relations of knowledge and power found in different governmentalities. In brief, I think we could summarize Foucault’s argument as follows: in liberalism biology becomes the most important mode of knowledge through which population becomes studied as a living mass; security as biopolitics is the most important technology through which population is governed, and finally political economy is the primary means of reflections by which these biological factors combined with liberal notions of human nature and exchange are conciliated to the relations of government. (ibid., 76-79, 108).
Hence Foucault is now interested in the way in which these three different ways of approaching population (i.e. biology, security and political economy) were adopted by liberal governmentality and affected on the ways in which population became problematized in relation to government. Thus biopolitics became a science of normalizing population according to its own naturalness – or, more precisely, according to what was seen favorable in its naturalness. I will now turn to an analysis of a special apparatus, which, according to Foucault, was historically formed in order to take care of population as a manageable ensemble and thus served as a background for liberal apparatuses of security; namely police.

3.2.2.1 From Police to Security

“We can say now that the true object of the police becomes, at the end of eighteenth century, the population; or, in other words, the state has essentially to take care of men as a population. It wields its power over living beings as living beings, and its politics, therefore, has to be a biopolitics. Since the population is nothing more than what the state takes care of for its own sake, of course, the state is entitled to slaughter it, if necessary. So the reverse of biopolitics is thanatopolitics.” (Foucault 2000a, 416).

In Foucault’s account of bio-power a special institution or apparatus plays very distinctive role. This is police. Through an analysis of police Foucault continues to stress the collision of two different governmental rationalities, the reason of state and liberalism. The main point for Foucault is to show how in the reason of state police was entitled to take care of the negative task of protecting the state through controlling the risks linked to population, but also of the positive task of improving the living conditions of the population. Thus police, as it was born out

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16 The word in French is police and in German polizei. Foucault notes that the English term police is different from these but do not specify further (2000a, 410). When Foucault introduces his concept of police it refers to an apparatus by which a proper art of government can be spread into ever wider circles: from the ancient notion of governing one's family, that is, economy (oikos) to the whole state. Thus, police will be a kind of public administration in terms of economy: ”To govern a state will thus mean the application of economy, the establishment of an economy, at the level of the state as a whole, that is to say, exercising supervision and control over its inhabitants, wealth, and the conduct of all and each, as attentive as that of a father's over his household of goods. (Foucault 2007, 95; see also Virtanen 2006, 89-92). Thus police is “the set of means by which the state's forces can be increased while preserving the state in good order.” (ibid., 313).
of the concern of locating population into the governmental practices of a modern state, seems to be a biopolitical apparatus par excellence: police is concerned with population and its relation to its surroundings. However, according to Foucault, police is only a preliminary apparatus of bio-power: it constituted the reflexive prism for creating a government of population, but calculated biopolitics did not emerge until a properly scientific modification of the constants springing from population was possible (2007, 58-59, 277-279).

In Foucault’s previous account of power over life police was already seen as constituted by these negative and positive tasks. In DP (1995, 209, 214-216) Foucault presents police as a mechanism by which ruler’s sovereignty can be distributed to the smallest particles in society. In other words, police for its part enabled discipline to spread outside closed institutions. Accordingly, in HS police is briefly referred to as an institution that has to take care of sex for the sake of maximization of collective forces and public welfare (1978, 24-25), and also as a state institution utilizing anatomo- and bio-politics as techniques of power (ibid., 141).

However, in STP and Foucault’s lectures of “Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism of Political Reason” (1979) and “The Political Technology of the Individuals” (2000a) this rather general and abstract analysis concerning police becomes revisited in great detail. Foucault now turns to study police as a certain apparatus comprising of techniques and practices by which a particular government is put into play (1979, 17). By introducing the analysis of police Foucault is able to deepen the study of the ways in which government of the population was historically problematized and finally carried out through the police apparatus that integrated individuals into state power. Consequently, with the analysis of police Foucault aims to find out

“What kind of political techniques, what technology of government, has been put to work and used and developed in the general framework of the reason of state in order to make of the individual a significant element for the state?” (2000a, 409-410).
Above all, police constitutes a reflexive prism in which scientific reflections and techniques of government were able to approach population and integrate it into a way of governing which is called precisely the state17. However, in liberal governmental rationality the notion of population goes through a fundamental reconsideration as an object of governmental practice. In the reason of state population was thought in terms of a passive resource which should be harnessed to labor in order to produce a flourishing state. In contrast to this, in political economy or liberalism population becomes thought as an active group of individuals. (Foucault 2007, 333-353.)

The philosophical argument in Foucault’s account is that police is constituted by a different governmental rationality than apparatuses of security. In the reason of state police is an apparatus of control which prevents things through regulations and discipline. In contrast to preventive police regulation liberal governance seeks to establish apparatuses of security which enable the natural regulations to take their course (ibid., 353). As we saw above these natural regulations are realized through modification of given natural qualities by organizing other elements in reality so that certain favorable effects will follow. For example, in liberalism the natural tendency of people to constitute a well-functioning market is realized through a framework that guarantees laissez-faire and produces benevolent effects to the whole society (ibid., 352-353).

However, what Foucault tries to show with his analysis of police, in the context of governmentality, is how liberal ideas of good governance began to question the effects of excessive police regulation (2007, 353). In my view Foucault seems to think that the forms of power applied by police, namely sovereign, pastoral and disciplinary (2007, 339; 1982b,784; 1995, 216), were not possible to be combined with the liberal idea of naturalness and the laissez-faire it calls for. Hence I claim that bio-power should be seen precisely as a form of power that enables the adaptation of population as a natural entity to the wider topology of power.

17 To fully grasp the important of police as a problem space with respect to population it must be emphasized that police is not just a state apparatus. It was taught as an academic discipline (especially in German speaking Europe as Polizeiwissenschaft) which had a great impact on the administrative technologies from Napoleons entourage via Austrian and Prussian courts to Russia (Foucault 2000a, 414).
Generally speaking, according to Foucault this intermediary role of police between different forms of power was already addressed by the theorists of police in the context of the reason of state (e.g. Delamare, Turquet, 2007, 334; 1979; 2000a). However, they lacked the scientific knowledge of manipulation of the natural qualities of things themselves, and thus were unable to produce the grounds for biopolitics in the strict sense.

In a way one could claim that it is precisely biopolitics which constitutes the collision between the reason of state, liberalism and, as we shall see, even neoliberalism (Foucault 2000a, 415; cf. chapter 3.3.3). The fundamental question which divides these political rationalities is the extent to which state power should intervene into the lives of individuals in order to produce security, well-being and in liberalism also freedom. Consequently, it is with the rationality introduced by the economists that Foucault sees a collision of different political rationalities which have not been settled even in contemporary politics (ibid.). As already seen the police of the reason of state consists both, in the negative action against the internal and external enemies of the state, but also in the positive aim of permanently producing something which fosters people and the strength of the state. On the other hand there are liberal economists who oppose this excessive state interventionism mainly by appealing to economic principles that are put forward due to a certain view of human nature, namely, that individuals are constituted by a set of interests which produce certain benevolent effects at the level of the whole society and population (ibid., 352). Thus Foucault points to a fundamental problem of modern political discourse that dovetails bio-power from top to bottom:

“...The problem of permanent intervention of the state in social processes, even without the form of the law, is as you know, characteristic of our modern politics and of political problematics. The discussion from the end of the eighteenth century till now about liberalism, Polizeistaat, Rechtsstaat of law, and so on, originates in this problem of the positive and the negative tasks of the state, in the possibility that the state may have only negative tasks and not positive ones and may have no power of intervention in the behavior of people.” (Foucault 2000a, 415).
This problem between the negative and positive tasks of the state will be at the heart of liberal problematic according to which one always governs too much (Foucault 2008, 319; cf. Ch. 319). However, it must be stressed that according to Foucault’s topological view there is no straightforward transition from the reason of state to liberal governance. Rather, when economists begin to consider sovereign power as inefficient or even irrational vis-à-vis managing population, they will nonetheless embrace many techniques developed by the theorists of the reason of state. Above all these include the statistics already utilized by mercantile police\(^{18}\). Furthermore, in STP Foucault (2007, 343) seems to consider mercantile police as similar police apparatus presented in DP and HS, that is, a system of regulations whose essential form of intervention is generalized discipline (cf. 1995, 214-216). Whereas, as I clarified above (Ch. 3.2.1), in the topological space constituted by different power relations, security is defined as a technology that may utilize some of the features of law and discipline but it does not aim to prevent things, but rather, to work with natural phenomena by letting them take their controlled course (Foucault 2007, 47).

Consequently, Foucault’s crucial argument is that, in spite of the fact that liberal thought sets itself against the positive state interventionism, it will adopt biopolitics as an integral part of its political technology in the form of security apparatuses (2007, 353; cf. Ch. 3.3.1). Liberalism inherits the problem of the state and population from the thought elaborated in the context of the reason of state but it totally modifies the answers and techniques to deal with them. Liberalism will establish a complex set of relations between economy, society, population, freedom and security (2007, 48) and the state has to guarantee that these relations take their proper structure but this very structure will also limit state interventionism itself. Thus the positive-negative police apparatus of the 17th and 18th centuries will break down into series of institutions and apparatuses ensuring the positive functions that were previously entrusted to police (ibid., 354).

Foucault then points out how, in the history of liberal societies, it has been above all medicine that has taken responsibility of interventions on population:

\(^{18}\) According to Foucault statistics is etymologically “knowledge of the state, of the forces and resources that characterize a state at a given moment.” (2007, 274).
“In the second half of the eighteenth century, taking responsibility for the population will involve the development of, if not sciences, then at least practices and types of intervention. These will include, for example, social medicine or what at the time was called public hygiene, and it will involve problems of demography, in short, everything that brings to light the state’s new function of responsibility for the population in its naturalness;” (ibid., 352).

This connects liberalism and its state fundamentally to two forms of power: bio-power and pastoral power. I will first summarize Foucault’s arguments of how liberalism modifies the previous analyses linked to biopolitics in the context of power over life and also the problem space created by the reason of state. Most of all this is due to production of freedom and prevention of dangers through security. Foucault also introduces new interesting points due to the truth-production in liberal governance which I will integrate into my analysis. Then after analyzing liberal governance I will show how Foucault considers Christian pastoral techniques being absorbed into modern state and how they supported biopolitical practices of the state via social security, welfare politics and medical practices.

3.3 Liberal Governance and Its biopolitics

According to Foucault (2007, 49) liberalism is a technology of power, which establishes the administration of free individuals and their interests in relation to natural elements. It seems that the reason why Foucault reflects liberalism in such a detailed manner is that, on the one hand, it neatly crystallizes different forms of power, and on the other, constitutes an integral form of governmental rationality that was still operative at the time of Foucault’s investigations (e.g. 2008, 18, 22; 2000a, 415). It must be emphasized though, that Foucault never published his analysis of liberalism, neo-liberalism and their relation to biopolitics as a coherent study. He continuously stresses that he is only throwing out hypotheses and
sketching possible ways of approaching certain problems (e.g. 1979; 2007, 135-136).

However, given this unfinished character of Foucault’s ideas in these lectures many of the core arguments can be tied together with those presented in Foucault’s later public lectures, interviews and writings. In this regard it seems that Foucault didn’t reject his preliminary hypotheses of liberalism and neoliberalism. From this point of view it seems that liberalism functions as a special problem space for Foucault; a form of governmentality embodying the whole variety of technologies of power to which Foucault is drawing attention to. Consequently I will begin here with tying liberalism with biopolitics i.e. explain why Foucault’s analysis of liberalism is important with respect to biopolitics; and further, why he goes as far as to claim that “— only when we know what this governmental regime called liberalism was, will we be able to grasp what biopolitics is.” (2008, 22). In his Course Summary in BBP Foucault adds that the course ended up being devoted entirely to what should only have been its introduction:

“The theme was to have been “biopolitics”, by which I meant the attempt, starting from the eighteenth century, to rationalize the problems posed to governmental practice by phenomena characteristic of a set of living beings forming a population: health, hygiene, birthrate, life expectancy, race… We know the increasing importance of these problems since the nineteenth century, and the political and economic issues they have raised up to the present. It seemed to me that these problems were inseparable from the framework of political rationality within which they appeared and took on their intensity.” (2008, 317).

Immediately Foucault clarifies that he is not claiming to do an exhaustive analysis of liberalism but rather to give one possible level of analysis with respect to governmental reason and of those techniques by which human conduct is directed

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19 As Lemke (2001, 190-191) points out many other themes presented in STP and BBP were taken up later in books and other writings but especially the problematic posed by liberal and neoliberal governmental practices and their relation to biopolitics was never elaborated further. This might be due to Foucault’s unexpected death since one year before this unfortunate event he still claims in an interview that he would have to carry out a genealogy of bio-power (Foucault 1997b, 256).
through state administration (ibid., 322). I will restrict my analysis of Foucault’s interpretation of liberalism to its immediate relation to biopolitics, which, as I argue, is constituted by the production of freedom at the expense of controlling biological dangers.

3.3.1 Philosophical implications of Liberalism

What characterizes liberal government according to Foucault (2008, 13, 319) is the constant fear of governing too much and thus making government irrational. In Foucault’s account of liberalism the most important issues are the relations between the state and individuals or population (2008, 63-70; cf.1982b). Hence the crucial task is to investigate the political rationalities and ways of governing that on the one hand produced something like a state, and on the other, focused on the aim of rationalizing population-related phenomena. At the same time Foucault’s wants to localize points of collision and even contradictions between different political rationalities and technologies of power which are integrated into liberalism – and which still constitute many present day political struggles (cf. 1982b; 2008, 313). Consequently, I will present Foucault’s interpretation of liberalism as a governmental technology and analyze the precise points which connect it to biopolitics.

According to Foucault (1982b, 780-782) a modern is state historically constituted by different types of governmentalities, of which the most important seem to be pastoral techniques, the reason of state and liberalism. From the mélange of their techniques of government modern state emerged, quite paradoxically, as individualizing and totalizing at the same time. The form of power that both utilizes individualizing techniques and totalizing procedures Foucault calls the pastoral power. This form of power dates back to the Christian Middle Ages and became integrated in the practices of modern state through the reason of state (ibid.). I will scrutinize pastoral power in the next chapter. Here I will focus on Foucault’s account of liberalism and how it produced biopolitics as part of a broader topology of power.
Let us begin with presentation of the philosophical-historical background of liberalism and linking that with biopolitics. This will pave our way towards pastoral power and its relation to biopolitics and modern state. In analyzing liberalism Foucault introduces the term veridiction (véridiction). By this concept Foucault designates the process by which and the conditions through which something can be presented as truth (2008, 35-37). With this approach he also challenges the tradition of the critique towards European rationality “from romanticism to the Frankfurt School.” (2008, 35). This is to say that instead of focusing on the relation between a given rationality and its peculiar form of power, Foucault prefers to look at things from the point of view of rules of veridiction: “The critique I propose consists in determining under what conditions and with what effects a veridiction is exercised.” (ibid., 36).

Consequently, what is now at stake with liberalism and other governmental practices is the same Foucault claims to have been doing in his earlier studies of madness, criminality and sexuality. In other words to study how it is possible to hold a certain discourse of a given phenomenon as truth. For Foucault the political significance of historical analysis lies in defining the rules of a given veridiction: how is it possible to assert certain things as truths in a given context. According to Foucault the way in which liberalism drastically differs from the reason of state is that in the framework of liberalism the constitutive site for veridiction (lieu de véridiction) becomes the market (ibid., 32, 36-37).

Foucault highlights that this is a remarkable event in the history of Western governmental practices because, on the one hand, market is the measure by which one can tell a good government from the bad: market tells the truth of governmental practices. On the other hand, through its role as a site of veridiction market will prescribe the jurisdictional mechanism or their absence vis-à-vis market. Thus Foucault poses a constitutive question of liberal governmentality:

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20 Foucault adds here a clarifying point: he does not claim “that there was the formation of a scientific and theoretical discourse of political economy on one side, and then, on the other, those who governed who were either seduced by this political economy, or forced to take it into account by the pressure of this or that social group.” (2008, 33). The task he takes is to study the history of truth i.e. veridiction vis-à-vis phenomena such as madness, criminality and sexuality and its coupling with the law. A regime of veridiction is thus “the set of rules enabling one to establish which statements in a given discourse can be described as true or false.” (ibid., 35). Consequently,
“What bases can be found for the law that will structure the exercise of power by public authorities when there is at least one region, but no doubt others too, where government non-intervention is absolutely necessary, not for legal, but for factual reasons, or rather, for reasons of truth?” (2008, 38).

It is out of the scope of this thesis to address Foucault’s answer to this question in detail. Here it suffice to summarize Foucault’s argument of how the limiting of governmental action by a demand for freedom ties biopolitics to liberal production of freedom: in order for freedom to take place and to function as a governmental instrument it requires the control of dangers and risks which are essentially linked to biological threats (2008, 66). Foucault claims (2008, 39) that in the history of liberalism there have generally speaking been two different solutions to this problem of limiting governmental power. First, there is an approach that Foucault calls juridico-deductive which tries to limit governmental action through defining natural or original rights and then to define under what conditions these rights can be limited by government. The other way of limiting the exercise of public power begins from governmental practice itself. In this approach one must analyze and evaluate government in terms of utility: given a certain state of things in particular fields such as population, resources and economy the desirable limits for governmental interfering must be defined through an analysis determining whether this intervention would be useful or harmful. (ibid., 41).

With this distinction between natural law and utility Foucault draws attention towards two different ways of approaching freedom in liberal thought (2008, 42). He emphasizes that these two concepts are not exclusive or contradictory; in fact, they have overlapped throughout the history of liberal though. Against this background Foucault introduces another crucial anchorage point of liberal governmental reason: interest. According to Foucault (ibid., 44) market functions

there is no straightforward cause to be found for the constitution of the market as a site for veridiction, rather, Foucault finds a problem space comprising of variety of different phenomena which made it possible to evaluate things in terms of economic value and exchange (e.g. demographic growth, intensification of agricultural production, theoretical answers to economic problems, particular monetary situation etc.)(ibid., 33).
as a mechanism of exchange and a site for veridiction of the relation between value and price. Utility in turn is the principle by which the exercise of power by public authorities can be measured and evaluated. The common factor between exchange and utility, then, is interest: it is the principle of exchange and the criterion of utility. Accordingly, Foucault highlights that with the emergence of interest as a principle to which government must conform liberal governmentality introduces

“--a complex interplay between individual and collective interests, between social utility and economic profit, between the equilibrium of the market and the regime of public authorities, between basic rights and the independence of the governed.”(ibid., 44).

Consequently Foucault poses the fundamental question of liberalism: “what is the utility value of government and all actions of government in a society where exchange determines the true value of things? (ibid., 46). The answer is, of course, that the utility value springs from securing freedom. Foucault clarifies here that we could also speak of naturalness: we have already seen above that it is most of all the naturalness in things that limits governmental action and not so much individual freedom. Consequently, according to Foucault, liberalism is a double articulation between freedom and control:

“-- it [liberal governmental practice] is a consumer of freedom inasmuch as it can only function insofar as a number of freedoms actually exists: freedom of the market, freedom to buy and sell, the free exercise of property rights, freedom of discussion, possible freedom for expression and so on. -- Liberalism must produce freedom, but this very act entails the establishment of limitation, controls, forms of coercion, and obligations relying on threats, etcetera.” (2008, 63-64. Quotation modified).

Therefore, Foucault claims (ibid., 65) that within the liberal regime freedom is not a given but it is constantly produced by governmental practices\textsuperscript{21}. Even

\textsuperscript{21} As an example Foucault shows how these limitations have historically included preventive actions towards too powerful countries (e.g. European countries and USA for free trade against British hegemony in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century), legislation against monopolies, creating a free labour market including qualified workers who are sufficiently politically disarmed thus preventing them to exert pressure on the labour market (2008, 64).
already mentioned natural rights become relational and regional in liberal government. Furthermore, the true meaning of security is in guaranteeing that individual and public interest do not pose threat to one another. The interplay of public and individual interest must not produce a danger either to enterprises or individuals; nor can individual accidents, illnesses and inevitable old age produce a danger for individuals or society. Strategies for establishing security must correspond to all possible danger that human condition poses. Thus for Foucault “Liberalism turns into a mechanism continually having to arbitrate between the freedom and security of individuals by reference to this notion of danger.” (2008, 66).

This is the point in which liberal governmentality introduces biopolitics: the notion of danger becomes from the beginning to refer to a variety of biological phenomena such as disease, hygiene, sexuality and degeneration – “degeneration of the individual, the family, the race, and the human species.” (Foucault 2008, 66). By introducing the liberal notions of danger and security Foucault is also able to tie together the red threads from many former studies of his: already in his lectures 1974-1975 titled *The Abnormal* Foucault links psychiatry and medicine as techniques to protect society from the dangers posed by individuals in abnormal condition (2003a, 316). It is also in these lectures Foucault presents racism as a technique to exclude individuals with defects from the rest of the society (ibid., 316-317). This theme becomes elaborated in SMD in the context of bio-power and biopolitics. Accordingly, in DP Foucault is already pointing to the paradox between liberal rights and the subjection to these rights through disciplines:

“The general juridical form that guaranteed a system of rights that were egalitarian in principle was supported by these tiny, everyday physical mechanisms, by all those systems of micro-power that are essentially non-egalitarian and asymmetrical that we call the disciplines.” (1995, 221-222).

In STP this analysis is then judged as “not completely wrong, of course, but, in short it was not exactly this” (2007, 48), rather
“-- something completely different is at stake. This is that this freedom, both ideology and technique of government, should in fact be understood within the mutations and transformations of technologies of power. More precisely and particularly, freedom is nothing else but the correlative of the deployment of apparatuses of security.” (ibid.).

And then after locating the political culture of danger being at the heart of liberalism in BBP Foucault points out that the counterpart to the notion of danger is the following:

“The second consequence of this liberalism and liberal art of government is the considerable extension of procedures of control, constraint, and coercion which are something like the counterpart and counterweights of different freedoms.-- Economic freedom, liberalism in the sense I have just been talking about, and disciplinary techniques are completely bound up with each other.” (2008, 67).

I think from these quotes we can interestingly acknowledge the way in which the question of liberal governance was preliminarily formulated in terms of normalization and unequal power relation enabled by techniques of discipline. Then this same problematic became revisited in STP and BBP in terms of topological analysis. Here liberalism produces a specific reflexive prism that is centered on population. Through investigating different techniques of liberal government Foucault finds it being constituted by technologies of security and biopolitics that are reconfigurations of earlier technologies of pastoral power and the reason of state. Consequently, what interests Foucault in STP and BBP is through what kind of ways of governing one affects on population and establishes the relationship of conducting one’s conduct. In liberalism this relationship is carried out above all through subjecting individuals to liberal notions of freedom-danger-security: social and individual risks are to be controlled by a calculated management of life processes (2008, 21).

In this sense liberal notion of freedom is not universal: freedom is a privilege for those who subject themselves to liberal rationality and are thus seen as responsible and good citizens while individuals who do not absorb liberal way of
doing things are deemed as threats to society. Consequently, I think this is exactly what Foucault means by stating that power relations are dangerous (2000b, 372): even if liberalism promotes freedom there is certain rationality according to which particular ways of life are constantly set over the others which for its part produces social hierarchies and processes of exclusion (ibid., 376).

It seems that Foucault’s pivotal claim vis-à-vis liberalism is that despite its constant concern of governing too much it ends up with producing a massive state machinery in terms of different security apparatuses (cf. 2008, 63-70, 319). This excessive security production is followed by a paradox: according to Foucault (1982b, 780-782) in liberal societies there has been a specific power of medicine over population and of administration over the ways people live. Both of these, medicine and administration, brought effects which were far away from liberal principles of freedom and laissez-faire. Foucault (ibid.) considers this tendency of liberal state to intervene into the lives of the individuals to be springing from pastoral techniques of directing population which were already integrated into the state of the reason of state.

Furthermore, in liberalism and its state certain subjectivities are posed on people through scientific, especially medical, discourse and different administrative techniques. According to Foucault this is due to security by which people as biological entities must be directed to reinforce desirable and useful qualities: health instead of malady, vitality against degeneracy and so forth (2000b, 367-369). Consequently, according to liberal framework biopolitics takes a very complex form comprising of risk management, health policies and fight against degeneration through race and sexuality (Foucault, 2008, 66). In the next chapter I will study Foucault’s arguments concerning pastoral power and how it techniques of subjectivation and guiding integrated into modern state and liberal biopolitics.

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22 In an interview Foucault gives an example of this in the form of welfare politics: “Our systems [the French] of social coverage impose a determined way of life that subjugates [assujettit] individuals. As a result, all persons or groups who, for one reason or another, cannot or do not want to accede to this way of life find themselves marginalized by the very game of institutions.” (Foucault 2000b, 369).
3.3.2 Biopoliticized State: Pastoral Power, Welfare Politics and Medicine

In order to fully grasp the complex dynamics of topological power relations in Foucault’s analysis of modern Western societies, we have to look at the ways in which bio-power is integrated into liberal governance and modern state by the support of what Foucault calls pastoral power (1979, 1982).23 My purpose in this chapter is to point out how, starting from the topological analysis in STP, Foucault considers pastoral techniques of governing as a prelude for modern state and its biopolitics (2007, 184). Foucault’s argument is above all that pastoral techniques are integral in constitution of the subject, but also that techniques of directing population in modern states spring from the Christian pastorate (1982b).

To continue the topological analysis of how different forms of power overlap in different political rationalities Foucault claims that, beside the liberal techniques of governance (cf. Golder 2007, 160; Foucault 2008, 318), pastoral power supported the techniques by which individuals were eventually located within the mechanisms of governmentalized state. Pastoral techniques played a very considerable part in the actualization of discipline and biopolitics: from the very beginning of organizing state through the reason of state and its police apparatus to the liberal apparatuses of security, pastoral relations were integrated into practices of conducting the conduct of individuals and managing population (2007, 95, 109-110). Consequently, in addition to the notion of governmentality (Foucault 1997c, 225), pastoral power constitutes another meeting point for governing the masses and subjecting individuals to a particular political rationality and its truths.

I will briefly present the key characteristics and philosophical implications of pastoral power.24 Above all, pastoral power is power of care: there is somebody

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23 It is true that Foucault did not publish any elaborated study of the pastorate and Christian techniques of the self and thus we will have to once again rely on essays, interviews and lectures. However, he was working with the subject until his death and actually wrote a book titled *Confessions of the Flesh* (*Les aveux de la chair*) about Christianity which unfortunately was not edited before his death and thus still waits for possible publication (1997b, 268).

24 A Brief history of the pastorate according to Foucault (1979, 3): pastorate historically originates from ancient cultures of the Middle-East from where it became adopted through the Hebrews by Christianity; and finally its techniques of governing were integrated in the reason of state. This millennial history of the pastorate is of course full of ruptures, modifications and reforms – as can
else who knows one’s good better than oneself. From this basis a hierarchical relationship of guidance-obedience is established between the pastor and the guided. However, there are only few pastors who will take care of a multiplicity of men or a population. Hence the great paradox of the Christian pastorate, in Foucault’s words:

“On the one hand, the shepherd must keep his eye on all and on each, omnes et singulatim, which will be the great problem both of the techniques of power in Christian pastorate, and of the modern techniques of power deployed in the technologies of population.” (2007, 128. Quotation modified).

In Foucault’s analysis of pastorate its techniques are constantly set against ancient Greek practices (see for example 2007, 182-183; 1979, 11-19; 1997b; 1997c); however, to compare these techniques even at superficial level is beyond the scope of this thesis. Anyhow, Foucault emphasizes that we should understand pastorate most of all as “the art by which some people were taught the government of others, and others were taught to let themselves be governed by certain people.” (2007, 151). According to Foucault (2007, 184) Christian pastorate creates a very specific relationship with salvation, law and truth. It is the pastor who knows the law of God, the road to salvation and thus the truth. Consequently, it is the pastor who teaches the truth and directs people to accept certain truth. Through a complex set of investigations, self-examination and surveillance the pastor is able to grasp the inner truth of each soul and this constitutes the element around which the whole exercise of pastoral power is organized. (Foucault 2007, 183; 1979, 4-5). According to Foucault this is the historical background of the techniques by which in the Western culture individuals are constituted as subjects:

be seen, for instance, from the appropriations and modification of Hellenistic self-examination and guidance of conscience to ensure the functioning of individualising knowledge in pastoral framework (ibid., 11). Furthermore, from the pagan Hellenistic traditions via Middle-Ages until the Reformation the whole institution of the pastorate was a field of constant struggles and counter-conducts which constantly modified its inner truth game i.e. the role of the pastor to its parish and the truths and dogmas which determine the proper form of guidance (ibid., 13; Foucault 1997b, 242-245; Foucault 2007, 148-150).
“Analytical identification, subjection, and subjectivation (subjectivation) are the characteristic procedures of individualization that will in fact be implemented by the Christian pastorate and its institutions. What the history of the pastorate involves, therefore, is the entire history of procedures of human individualization in the West. Let’s say also that it involves the history of the subject.” (2007, 184).

From this quote we can notice an important moment in Foucault’s thought. It is precisely here with pastoral techniques that Foucault begins to pay attention to what he later calls mode of subjectivation, that is, how people are “incited to recognize their moral obligations.” (1984a, 264). Pastoral power includes a relation by which an individual makes oneself a governor of oneself with respect to a normative code. This same process is addressed with neo-liberalism and forms a decisive point towards the research of techniques of the self (cf. next chapter).

Through analyzing the principles of pastoral governance Foucault seems again to stress the heterogeneous topology of power and finds the same power techniques utilized by different technologies – such as here pastoral power intersects disciplinary and bio-power. Consequently, resembling Foucault’s previous account of police, pastoral techniques can function only if they intervene permanently to the daily lives of individuals and can survey every detail from an individual to the town and ultimately the whole world (2007, 95, 154). As we recall from above these techniques of intervening and constantly integrating more elements to general system of surveillance were absorbed and modified in terms of security. Thus another reconfiguration of pastoral techniques can be found from apparatuses of security.

Furthermore, Foucault claims (2007, 197, 338-339) that along with the reason of state political government began to take more and more responsibility of people’s conduct. From this onwards pastoral techniques of governing started to integrate into secular governance – especially through institutions such as police and medicine (1982b, 784; 2007, 199). Accordingly, biopolitics become integrated with the modern state and with social and human sciences, as Foucault puts this:
“From the idea that the state has its own nature and its own finality to the idea of man as living individual or man as a part of a population in relation to an environment, we can see the increasing intervention of the state in the life of individuals, the increasing importance of life problems for political power, and the development of possible fields for social and human sciences insofar as they take into account those problems of individual behavior inside the population and the relations between a living population and its environment.” (2000a, 416).

I hope that against the background of previous chapters it is clear how pastoral power, liberal state and modern biopolitics come together forming a type of governmentality that Foucault considers being singular in human history: “Never, I think, in the history of human societies—even in the old Chinese society—has there been such a tricky combination in the same political structures of individualization techniques and of totalization procedures.” (1982, 782).

According to Foucault this individualizing and totalizing structure of the state should be seen as an outcome of the application of pastoral power in modern techniques of governance. It was through its principle of omnes et singulatim (all and each) by which individuals were integrated into the state structure as entities prone to alterations according to a given political rationality. Due to this Foucault suggest us to approach modern state

“— as a very sophisticated structure, in which individuals can be integrated, under one condition: that this individuality would be shaped in a new form and submitted to a set of very specific patterns. In a way, we can see the state as a modern matrix of individualization or a new form of pastoral power.” (1982b, 783).

Here Foucault is clearly continuing his analysis of the problem of how individuals can be integrated and modified vis-à-vis given political rationality. Thus the topological space in which modern state as a way of governing is located comprises above all of techniques by which individuals can be individualized but which also allow them to be governed as a totality, a population. Consequently I think it is fruitful to think pastoral power as a technology that enabled bio-power to have such a profound impact on population. It seems that through an analysis of pastoral power Foucault is able to clarify the totalizing theses linked to his
previous analysis of normalizing society. Pastoral techniques enabled people to be individualized through race, sexuality, public hygiene, medical care etc. and thus became combined with both disciplinary and biopolitical techniques by which population became medicalized and biologized within liberal paradigm of security. On the other hand, Foucault also points out that there were political rationalities, such as liberalism and neoliberalism, which, despite of adopting some of pastorate’s techniques, tried constantly to diminish the totalizing tendencies of guiding the whole population as a single flock by appealing to the rationality of the governed themselves (1982b, 784; 2008, 313).

In chapter 3.2.3 I argued that bio-power should be seen as the technology by which liberal government was able to adjust the government of population into the other mechanisms of power. With Foucault’s later analysis of pastoral power it seems that its techniques were inseparable from the emergence and functioning of biopolitics. As Foucault puts this:

“Finally, the multiplication of the aims and agents of pastoral power focused the development of knowledge of man around two roles: one, globalizing and quantitative, concerning the population; the other, analytical, concerning the individual. And this implies that power of a pastoral type, which over centuries—for more than a millennium—had been linked to a defined religious institution, suddenly spread out into the whole social body; it found support in a multitude of institutions. And, instead of a pastoral power and political power, more or less linked to each other, more or less rival, there was an individualizing “tactic” which characterized a series of powers: those of the family, medicine, psychiatry, education, and employers.” (1982b, 784).

There is something very familiar in this quote. Perhaps Foucault after all felt that with pastoral power and individual techniques of the self he could upgrade his analysis of normalizing society and power over life. But when introducing the self-constituting subject Foucault did not abandon his theses of relations of domination and subjection, but, above all, managed to connect his refined micro-analysis of power with analyses of counter conducts and freedom (cf. especially 1997a). This meant that the topological analysis he began in 1978 with STP was
supplemented with a creative power that an individual is able to pose upon herself. This creative power is closely linked to the problematic Foucault found in BBP from the neo-liberal notion of *homo œconomicus*. In the next chapter I will briefly present Foucault’s view on neo-liberalism. I will argue that the crucial modification vis-à-vis biopolitics will take place through the analysis of homo œconomicus. Homo œconomicus will not be governed through totalizing procedures as a member of a population, but rather, as an active individual. Thus biopolitics cannot consist in any overall procedures which target population as a whole.

It is my hypothesis that by this problematic Foucault felt it necessary to leave his analysis of bio-power aside for a while. Instead of studying how to govern a population he now moved on to tackle the problem between individual government of the self and its relation to government of others. However, as we see from the previous Foucault-quote few years later he became back to this problematic of totalizing power. This problem is closely linked to biopolitics which by definition targets a totality. However, with pastoral power Foucault seems to stress that in order to carry out the government of population one needs individualizing techniques to support biopolitics.

### 3.3.2 Neo-liberalism: Biopoliticed Subjects?

In this chapter I will present Foucault’s account of neo-liberalism. It has a specific importance due to biopolitics because it includes a problematic which drastically changes the grounds of biopolitics and, in my view, seems to lead Foucault to investigate questions linked to the techniques of the self, instead of governing population as a whole. As Dils (2011, 130-132) has also pointed out this follows from the neo-liberal notion of homo œconomicus which presents individuals as active self-directing subjects and thus the framework of governing

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changes to the production of a framework in which these active subjects can compete freely (Foucault 2008, 118-121).

Continuing the topological analysis with neo-liberalism Foucault takes distance to discipline and normalization and turns towards studying what he calls environmental governmental action (2008, 260). Very simply put, this means that government is supposed to arrange the social environment, e.g. prohibitions and reinforcements of certain phenomena, so that the free competition will take place (ibid.,102). Consequently, as we recall, in Foucault’s view liberalism is constituted by the assumption that the market, exchange and competition are natural phenomena which call for laissez-faire in order to bring out useful effects. However, Foucault (ibid., 109-112) claims that neo-liberalism rejects laissez-faire as being naïve naturalness – i.e. it does not bring out those results liberalism assumes. Furthermore, liberal balancing between freedom, control and security is simply seen incoherent by neo-liberals since it will ineluctably, following its internal logic, end up producing an excessive, even totalitarian, state (ibid.).

According to Foucault (ibid., 116) the German ordoliberals modify classical liberalism by claiming that there is not a state because it has to secure and supervise market; there is a state in order to actively produce such an environment that the market will take place and the principle of free competition can operate (ibid., 118-121). Consequently, ordoliberals strive for a government which intervenes to social framework as such so that the competitive mechanisms can carry out their regulatory role (2008, 143-145). Furthermore, Foucault argues (ibid., 177-179) that ordoliberals think that the historical tendencies of capitalist societies to become centralized, absorb economic processes within the state and thus violate freedom are to be avoided by intervening on these tendencies at the social level. This is to say that there is no single logic of capitalism: for capitalism to function without its so-called contradictions one can

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27 Foucault divides his analysis of neo-liberalism into two parts: the German school also known as The Freiburg School or as Ordoliberals according to a journal in which they presented their ideas; the other one is the American tradition known as the Chicago School (2008).

28 This is to say that malfunctions of the market such as unemployment has to be dealt with according to competition (e.g. private insurances, entrepreneur-based economic growth etc.) not according to state intervention (such as tax based social security) (2008, 143-145).
always modify social environment so that capitalism will flourish. Accordingly, Foucault presents ordoliberal project as producing a logic that can always nullify these anti-free-competition-tendencies with legal interventionism: government is to arrange the environment in society so that the free competition will take place (ibid.,102).

However, the most important change in governmental practices follows from neo-liberal notion of homo œconomicus. Foucault (ibid., 220-221) reads neo-liberal theory to be challenging all Marxist, classical liberal and Keynesian notions of labor. According to Foucault (ibid.) they saw labor as an abstraction measured in temporal terms or as a passive factor in production. In contrast to these preceding economic analyses the point of departure for neo-liberals is the study of how an active subject makes choices. In other words they study the ways in which scarce means are targeted to competing ends that cannot be superimposed on each other. This analysis presupposes an active economic subject, in other words, homo œconomicus. Consequently, whereas in liberalism homo œconomicus was thought in terms of exchange based on the interplay of interest, utility and needs, neo-liberalism replaces this view by proclaiming that homo œconomicus is an entrepreneur of himself (ibid., 223-226). This is the introduction of the notion of human capital: capital is no more only something that is invested, exchanged and accumulated at the market; rather, it is inseparable from the entrepreneur of the self who constitutes the very capital itself (ibid.,224). Thus individual endeavors, including labor, can be seen as investments which bring future income (cf. Dilts 2011, 136).

According to Foucault (2008, 226-229) it is especially American neo-liberalism that views individuals as ability-machines whose skills, knowledge, health, genetic make-up and so forth are all ways of making income through their application towards different ends. By these notions of homo œconomicus and human capital American neo-liberalism applies economic thinking to all areas of social life: from marriage and education of children to criminality. (ibid., 229-230, 268). By the same token Foucault paraphrases Becker’s definition according to which homo œconomicus is:
“– the person who accepts reality or who responds systemically to modifications in the variables of the environment, appears precisely as someone manageable, someone who responds systemically to systematic modifications artificially introduced into the environment. Homo economicus is someone who is eminently governable.” (2008, 270).

From this quote it becomes clear that neo-liberal governmentality consists in procedures which ensure the environment in which individual competitions can take place; homo economicus is eminently governable because he or she will compete according to certain rules when given the right circumstances. Consequently, in neo-liberal framework, biopolitics can be seen applied in two distinctive ways: on the one hand economic principles of competition and interest form regulatory mechanisms for the environment for individuals and populations. In this sense, effects at the level of population can be realized through regulating the legal-institutional environment for competing individuals. In general terms this is what we have seen above – only that the regulatory principle now is free competition instead of race, sexuality or security.

On the other hand, as Dilts argues, “entrepreneurial activities and investments are the most important activities of the neo-liberal self.” (2011, 137). In this sense everything which we have seen above as domains for biopolitical interventions such as reproduction, people’s genetic make-up in partner market, biological risks vis-à-vis one’s health etc., become biopolitical techniques of the self. Here neo-liberalism incites and directs individuals to make better versions of themself in terms of human capital – of which biological qualities of the body are an integral part.

However, here the biopolitical analysis becomes puzzling: if neo-liberalism replaces the normalizing or securing biopolitics (Foucault 2008, 146-147, 228) with individuals taking responsibility of their own biological well-being as human capital, where does the actual politics happen. How can there be any political strategies of producing effects at the level of population if individuals always act according to subjective principles of interest and competition thus realizing only individual strategies. Does this not point towards a decomposition
of population to groups having unequal amounts of capital by which they can access to means of biological improvement?

At this point one could even deduce that neo-liberalism seems to be anti-biopolitical – at least if we still stick to our previous definition according to which biopolitics is the technology by which phenomena arising from population are modified. But in actual fact, this seems to be Foucault’s argument: neo-liberalism is not an overall system to affect individuals as populations but as active individual subjects. As Dilts (2011, 138-139) argues in neo-liberalism there are individuals striving to realize their own self-interest through competition and this is what renders them responsive to reality. Accordingly, Foucault sets neo-liberalism against liberal normalization. According to Foucault (2008, 145, 149) neo-liberal governmentality strives for differences and multiplicity of enterprises and in this sense represents a counter strategy for totalizing governance such as liberal state and its pastoral techniques. However, in the end this does not seem that we should abandon the notion of biopolitics but to reconsider it in the neo-liberal context.

It seems that the crucial difference to biopolitics in the context of power over life and liberal security is that in neo-liberalism biopolitics loses its universal and totalizing character. It is no more meant to be realized through the pastoral principle of *omnes et singulatim*, but rather through individual choices. Thus, instead of being realized through state apparatuses such as schools, hospitals and public medical care, neo-liberal biopolitics becomes, first, decomposed into private enterprises and, second, more and more connected to treating genetic risks and biological dysfunctions in order to invest in human capital (cf. Foucault 2008, 227-228). In chapter 2.1.2 I compared biopolitical techniques of subjection to Foucault’s notion of panopticon. With neo-liberalism it seems that this allegory does not work anymore: neo-liberal biopolitics is centered around increasing one’s human capital and quality of life, rather than proposing models on the whole population according to which individuals should act. Above all this is to say that whereas in the context of power over life Foucault had analyzed subjection in terms of external direction and even compulsion, he now turns to pay a profound attention towards how individual constitutes herself as a particular
subject in relation to surrounding cultural codes and norms (cf. Dilts 2011, 130-134).

As a concluding point I would like to remind how in HS Foucault (1978, 144-145) points out that, in fact, power over life has since the 19th century invoked many struggles opposing the power that was bend over the lives of individuals. These struggles were above all articulated in terms of rights to life, to one’s body and to health. Again in “The Subject and Power” Foucault (1982b, 780-783) refers to these oppositions as anti-authority struggles which are, above all, directed against a specific kind of individualization and forms of subjection. This is to say, that Foucault thinks that the unifying factor under these oppositions to the power of one group over the other (e.g. of men over women, medicine over the population and administration over the lives of individuals) is, in effect, the opposition to the ways in which in contemporary western societies people are categorized and attached to their identities. This is done through certain process of veridiction that poses a certain truth on people defining their relations vis-à-vis others.

Consequently, neo-liberalism can be seen as an alternative, a counter struggle, for these types of individualization techniques that are based on a hierarchical system of producing truth through certain status, such as expert, pastor, scientist etc. This could be one way of approaching the success of neo-liberal governmental rationality in contemporary societies: it introduces a way of challenging the old armatures of governing population through techniques of pastoral power and liberal normalization according to constants. Neo-liberalism suggests rather a social framework in which identities may be picked up freely: individuals are allowed to detache themselves from suffocating categories while making markets and public administration all the more effective by principle of competition.

3.4 Reflections on the Affirmative Biopolitics

In chapter 1.1 I presented non-Foucauldian approaches to biopolitics in order to demonstrate from what kind of through this concept of biopolitics emerged outside Foucault’s investigations. In these discussion biopolitics was essentially
linked to four themes: purification of the race, utilizing evolutionary history and biological factors as a source of explaining social phenomena, protecting nature from excessive exploitation, and finally, the critical evaluation of the usage of biotechnology in order to manipulate natural processes – including human bodies.

According to Lemke (2011, 26-27) the influence of the second and the third approach has been diminishing while the questions of race and biotechnology dominate contemporary discussions. However, despite there being a vast literature of the subject of how new scientific knowledge alters the conception of life and mechanisms to control life’s processes (cf. Lemke 2011, 93) surprisingly little has been written of affirmative biopolitics.

By this notion of affirmative biopolitics I mean a collective action which aims to improve biological qualities of human beings without producing unequal power relations. This theme has not been widely discussed in Foucault scholarship. For instance, in spite of promoting Foucauldian reading of biopolitics for grasping most profoundly the relation between contemporary politics and life, Lemke (2011, 5, 32) does not address the possibility of affirmative biopolitics in the Foucauldian context. Since Foucault seems to open up the possibility of affirmative biopolitics with his analysis of neo-liberalism, I think the following question is worth asking: can biopolitics in fact be stripped off its oppressive and violent tendencies and become a life endorsing affirmative practice? In neo-liberalism this seems to be the case: its rationality does not include a drive for modifying everybody’s life according to a given set of norms. Instead, neo-liberal governmentality strives for creating a framework in which individuals can make choices according to principles of competition and private interest.

However, Foucault’s idea of affirmative practice is not identical with neo-liberalism. As Dilts has pointed out (2011, 144), Foucault does not agree with the neo-liberal account of the subject as homo œconomicus since it lacks the historical awareness of the relations and regimes of veridiction which constitute the subject. Thus, I agree to Dilts’ claim, according to which, with the notion of homo œconomicus neo-liberalism sacrifices any possibility of critical re-evaluation of its own truth production: individuals are rational because they are responsive to a given framework of competition (ibid., 145). Consequently, in a
search for affirmative biopolitics we cannot rely exclusively on neo-liberal theory of the subject; rather, it only points to some points from which to proceed further, such as integrating an active choosing subject into the analysis.

I admit that in order to answer this question of affirmative biopolitics in the Foucauldian sense we would have to fill in the gaps between biopolitics as directing the conduct of population and what Foucault in his later work called practices of freedom. The latter are essentially connected to individual techniques of guiding oneself as opposition to technologies of power which direct human life through subjection from the outside (1997a, 284; cf. Lemke 2011, 51). However, although the actual examination of this question is a matter of future research, I do not see any a priori restrictions for the possibility of biopolitics which could be less authoritarian and be integrated with other practices increasing freedom in the Foucauldian sense.

This question of the possibility of affirmative biopolitics is addressed by Hardt and Negri (2000; 2004) and Esposito (2008) in their Foucault-inspired approaches. According to Lemke (2011, 51-52) Hardt and Negri’s account has been more influential while I see Esposito’s account having more analytical value. Whereas Hardt and Negri (2000, 344, 364-365, 411) see bio-power as essentially coercive power over life, in their framework biopolitics is a democratic and non-authoritarian way of improving the life of the living mass which they call the multitude. Although Hardt and Negri present an interesting analysis of biopolitical production, their analysis seem to be so comprehensive that biopolitics loses its analytical value (this critique is also made by Rabinow and Rose [2006, 198-199] and Lemke [2011, 74]). Thus I do not see how their work could help in addressing the possibility affirmative biopolitics in Foucauldian framework.

Esposito (2008, 45-) for his part tries to solve the puzzling relation between affirmative biopolitics and lethal thanatopolitics (politics of death) with his concept of *immunization*. Immunization designates the power to preserve life against exterior enemy (ibid., 46). Esposito sees Western modern politics being essentially characterized by this urge of preserving life though immunization. He
goes even that far to claim that the Nazis only followed the logic of immunization in their endeavor of doing away with the species that were seen as threats to the life of German race (2008, 137-138). Following the thought of Deleuze, Esposito (2008, 191-194) suggests us to recognize the immanent norm in life itself which would enable the decomposition of individual and collective bodies which constantly seek to protect themselves through the destructive logic of immunity. Only by opposing the homogenization effect of external governance of life are we able to create affirmative relations at the collective level. Albeit the closer examination of Esposito’s arguments is out of scope here, in my view he has opened an interesting point of view towards affirmative biopolitics which completes Foucault’s idea of racism as a source of thanatopolitics (cf. Foucault 2003, 256-258).

Rabinow and Rose (2006, 212-213) for their part take the analysis of biotechnology as their research target. Above all they elaborate what Foucauldian biopolitics could designate in neo-liberal, or what they call advanced liberal, societies. They find the affirmative dimension of biopolitics in neo-liberalism being in the maximization of quality of life through modification of the biological (ibid., 211). Above all they see human reproduction as a biopolitical domain par excellence. Accordingly, they consider present day infertility treatments and embryo disease scanning in terms of individual autonomy and risk management. In this way these are pivotal parts of the bioeconomic apparatus specific to advanced liberalism (2006, 209-211). However, even if genome and biotechnology have opened up novel ways to modify human life, Rabinow and Rose have pointed out (2006, 214) that it is still the political rather than the medical which directs how medicine is applied to populations. Due to the fact that neo-liberal competition creates unequal relations of economic and political power, they do not see biopolitics of advanced liberal societies being on an equal ground (ibid.).

According to Rabinow and Rose (ibid., 213-215) two profound changes are taking place: the capitalization of medicine and epistemological change due to molecularization of life. According to Rose (2001, 14) the rise of genome studies in the late 20th century caused an epistemological change in regards to life, but it
also made the research of life dependent on extremely expensive laboratory equipment rendering life sciences needy for private funds. Rose argues (2001, 15; 2007, 32) that this had led to the contemporary commercialization of biopolitics: it has become bioeconomics, that is, biomedicine has become a massive field to extract surplus value. Accordingly, the idea of self-realization and investing in one’s human capital through modifications of the biological is another field of economic profit and competition. Consequently, in contemporary societies biopolitics seems to be just another field in which unequal power relations come forth. Thus the affirmative biopolitics is always a matter of politics not of the means to modify the biological. In this way it becomes even clearer that whatever neo-liberalism has modified in contemporary societies it does not imply an equal access to means of health and improvement of the biological.

5 Conclusions

This thesis began with the hypothesis according to which we can clarify Foucault’s concepts of bio-power and biopolitics by locating these concepts into his wider philosophical problematic. Above all this meant studying the ways in which bio-power is linked to three modes constituting the subject: knowledge, power and governance of the self. Moreover, it is my thesis that the ambivalences linked to bio-power spring partly from Foucault’s experiments with new methodology while trying to tackle the problem of population and government. I began by showing how Foucault introduces bio-power and biopolitics in the framework of normalizing society and power over life. In this context, together with discipline, bio-power was another mode of power constituting the normalizing society. In this framework race and sexuality were the pivotal reference points by which medicine, human sciences and liberal techniques of government were able to realize their power effects vis-à-vis human life. However, Foucault was not completely satisfied with his preliminary analysis of bio-power and thus tries to approach the problem of directing population from different perspectives.
These included approaching bio-power from the perspective of governmentality, pastoral power and security. Following Collier (2007) I argued that this was also a transition towards a topological analysis of power relations and strategies of governance. My claim was that by applying topological point of view we can better grasp how Foucault’s idea of bio-power changed from his earlier analysis. In topological space biopolitics became intertwined with security, which comprises, for instance, public hygiene and organizing social environment so that the favorable biological factors are reinforced. Accordingly, government of population was realized through police, laws and regulations and techniques of pastoral power. I suggested that already with governmentality and pastoral power Foucault begins to move towards the elaboration of individual techniques of subjectivation. Nonetheless, it seems that through the analysis of liberal problematic of freedom and the analysis of neo-liberal notion of homo œconomicus Foucault felt it necessary to integrate another field of analysis in his research. In order to fully grasp the relation between techniques of government and individuals, it was essential to study individual techniques of subjectivation – which finally led Foucault towards different problems than those of bio-power.

Accordingly, we saw above how bio-power has taken different forms when applied according to different political rationalities with their specific views of human nature and the subject. It is my thesis that in Foucault’s thinking bio-power and biopolitics designate two things: first, the modification of human life as it springs from population in the form of observable constants; second, the practices of guiding and conducting by which an individual is subjected as a subject who considers himself as having certain biological qualities. These qualities are then to be directed according to certain system of norms and certain rationality. However, the most important thing to grasp in Foucauldian framework is that what we mean by human life, and especially with desirable or avoidable forms of human life, is always relational due to the combination of relations of power and knowledge, and thus our biopolitical practices change according to alterations in relations of power and knowledge. This is why Foucault’s notion of biopolitics can be explicitly defined with historical examples but Foucauldian biopolitics can never take a fixed universal form. The struggle of conducting human life into a given direction reaches always beyond biopolitics.
In this thesis I have put forward a view according to which Foucauldian biopower and biopolitics are not independent modes of power, but instead, theoretical tools in order to make certain aspects of modern techniques of government understandable. Consequently, it is my contention that if we are to develop Foucauldian notion of bio-power further we need to be careful with those things that make biopolitics what it is in a given social environment. Thus I am skeptical towards approaches, such as Hardt and Negri’ (2000), which fix biopower and biopolitics into a universal form. I think the fruitfulness of Foucault’s analysis of bio-power lies in showing that the way in which human life has been historically modified in its biological variables is dependent on actual practices constituted by different political rationalities. Hence, biopolitics is useful as an analytical concept helping us to re-evaluate the relation between life and politics.

This is why Foucault’s notion of biopolitics is so important for critical thinking of nature, life, human bodies and politics. Lemke has pointed out (2011, 118) how pre-Foucauldian notions of biopolitics saw nature as invariable and politics was deemed as deductive practice by which society can be arranged according to natural facts. With his analysis of bio-power Foucault manages to go beyond these conceptions of a given nature and provides us tools to analyze the very limits of politics itself. In other words, to reflect the conceptions which guide our own processes of veridiction. The importance of Foucault for contemporary analysis lies in his profound analysis of how, through three different overlapping realms of knowledge, power and subjectivation, social reality is constituted as it is. In the final chapter of this thesis I raised the question concerning the possibility of affirmative biopolitics. I think much of the critical value of the concept of biopolitics crystallizes in the following question: who is able to negotiate how life is managed and from which kind of position.

Consequently, if we want to make a critical analysis of contemporary biopolitics, we should investigate, first, who has the power to define what is seen as truth. Who is entitled to define the process of veridiction? Second, we should study what kinds of power relations are embodied in truth production: by which mechanisms some interpretations become seen as truth while other alternatives
are excluded. Furthermore, we should ask whose health and bodies matter. Which biological forms of sexes, of races and of individuals are seen worth living and which are deemed unworthy? Finally, through what kind of guiding techniques individuals are incited to recognize themselves as subjects of particular biological qualities. How doctors, teachers, parents and health experts guide people to subject themselves as being strong or week, capable or handicapped, normal or abnormal, part of supreme or inferior race etc.?

I see Foucault’s philosophical aim being the search for less authoritarian ways to direct human life and engage with others. This is what links the analysis of biopolitics to the broader philosophical project of Foucault: “In its critical aspect—and I mean critical in a broad sense—philosophy is that which calls into question domination at every level and in every form in which it exists, whether political, economic, sexual, institutional—...” (1997a, 300-301). Finally, I see the possibility of affirmative biopolitics lying exactly in this constructive critique of the exclusion mechanisms of our own culture. This also implies that we should by no means to restrict our analyses to conceptions that Foucault provides, but rather to proceed to analyzing what new forms and modifications may be found from the field of biopolitics. If Foucault manages to teach us something, it is that power relations are not fixed. By reflecting our own regime of veridiction with its specific rationality we may be able to create more egalitarian biopolitics as well.

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