From Friend to Foe, from Savior to Plotter:
Analysis of Representations of Russian-European
Relations in Russian Press

Polina Podshivalova
Master’s thesis
University of Helsinki
Faculty of Social Sciences
Media and Global Communication
May 2013
The aim of this thesis is to examine the representations of Russian-European relations in the articles covering the Pussy Riot case in four Russian newspapers: Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Komsment, Vedomosti, and Izvestia.

The subject matter is relevant due to the fact that in recent years relations between Russia and Europe have become stagnant and unproductive. There are a variety of reasons that underpin the deterioration of Russian-European relations, including the world economic crisis and NATO expansion. However, coverage of these changes in the Russian press is influenced not only by the actual situation, but also by the discourses of political parties as well as by Russian national political culture. Because media representations convey values, beliefs, and meanings, the representations in Russian newspapers play a crucial role in shaping the way people see themselves and the country they live in. Media representations also have potential to influence how people perceive their relations with others and have an impact on their behavior. It means that Russian-European relations are eventually partly constructed by the way they are represented in the Russian press.

The main research question is: how are relations between Europe and Russia represented in the articles covering the Pussy Riot case and in the context of Russian political culture and the discourses of different Russian political powers? The Pussy Riot case and associated events are a suitable angle for the research because they have invoked wide spread discussion in mass media and demonstrated some fundamental differences in Russian and European cultures. The Pussy Riot case is a criminal process of three members of the punk band Pussy Riot who were charged with hooliganism.

The research is conducted within the theoretical frames of media discourse and international relations theory. The basic supposition implies that media discourse is, to a large extent, shaped by the discourses of diverse political forces and by a national political culture. In order to answer the research question, a critical discourse analysis of the relevant texts has been conducted on three levels: linguistic, intertextual, and the macro level of social structures.

In the course of the analysis, it has been possible to retrieve a variety of representations of Russian-European relations. These representations are: political, cultural, and religious collision, Europe as a mentor, Europe as a savior, Europe as an economic partner, Russia as an integral part of Europe. The first one is more widely employed by the pro-government publications. The second and the third seem to be more relevant for the liberal press, while the last two representations are associated with the opinions of particular experts and politicians. Overall, the results enable us to conclude that the representation of Russian-European relations as a collision is hegemonic. It purports that regardless of what Putin’s government states in official papers and speeches meant for the European audience, it still does not consider Europe as a friend.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 2: AT THE CROSSROADS OF MEDIA DISCOURSE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

2.1 Discourse theory
   2.1.1 Discourse and reality
   2.1.2 Media discourse and power
2.2 Russian-European relations in Russians’ eyes
   2.2.1 Russia-European relations in historical context
   2.2.2 Political discourses on relations with the West
   2.2.3 Attributes of Russian political culture
2.3 Conclusion

CHAPTER 3: CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AS A RESEARCH METHOD

3.1 Research strategy
3.2 Data collection
   3.2.1 Analyzed newspapers
   3.2.2 The Pussy Riot case
   3.2.3 Data collection process and final data set
3.3 Data analysis method
3.4. Validity, limitations, and ethical considerations
3.6. Conclusion

CHAPTER 4: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE. REVEALING THE REPRESENTATIONS OF RUSSIAN-EUROPEAN RELATIONS

4.1 General patterns of the deployment of representations in the newspapers
4.2 Russian-European relations as a cultural/political/religious collision
  4.2.1 Double-standard policy
  4.2.2 Europe as an intruder
  4.2.3 Cultural/spiritual collision
  4.2.4 Media war against Russia
4.3 Representations of the liberal press
  4.3.1 Europe as a mentor
  4.3.2 Europe as a savior
4.4 Marginal representations of Russian-European relations
  4.4.1 Europe as an economic partner
  4.4.2 Russia as a part of the Western world
4.5 Conclusion

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Retrieved representation in the context of Russian politics
  5.1.1 Russian-European relations within the framework of the pro-government
  5.1.2 Russian-European relations within the framework of the liberal discourse
5.2 Social and political implications of the revealed representations
5.3 Limitations and suggestions for further research
5.4 Contribution
5.5 Final words

REFERENCES

APPENDIX 1: DATA SET

APPENDIX 2: DISTRIBUTION OF REPRESENTATIONS
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Again a tussle with Europe (oh, it's not a war yet: they say that we—Russia, that is—are still a long way from war)... and again in Europe they are looking mistrustfully at Russia. Yet why should we go running to seek Europe's trust? Did Europe ever trust the Russians? Can she ever trust us and stop seeing us as her enemy? Oh, of course this view will change someday; someday Europe will better be able to make us out and realize what we are like... (Dostoevsky, 1873-1876/1997, 515).

It is hard to believe that Dostoevsky wrote this passage in “Writer's Diary” almost 150 years ago. A reader will most likely agree that every word remains topical nowadays and as such, it may be easily applied to the description of the current relations between Russia and Europe. The word “tussle” is especially notable because it seems to be the usual state of Russian-European relations. It is worth referring here to the Cold War period, which was “not a war yet”, but rather a “tussle”. Generally, “tussle” characterized relations between Europe and the USSR throughout the whole 20th century.

If we consider the current situation, we will also see that “the day”, which Dostoevsky refers to, has not come yet. In recent years, relations between Russia and the EU block have faced hard times due to a variety of reasons. These reasons include the general deterioration of the world economy and the financial crisis, the deployment of the anti-ballistic missile system in Europe and the NATO expansion right up to the Russian borders and the supposed violations of human rights by the Russian government. Certainly, this deterioration in Russian-European relations could not have been neglected in the Russian mass media.

However, we may assume that, as relations between Russia and its European partners cannot be reduced to the “positive-negative” dichotomy, the representations of those relations portrayed in the Russia mass media are also likely to be much more complex than it may seem at first sight. That is why the aim of this research is to examine the representations of Russian-European relations in the articles covering the Pussy Riot case in four Russian newspapers: Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Kommersant, Vedomosti, and
As such, the research question is: how are relations between Europe and Russia represented in the articles covering the Pussy Riot case and in the context of Russian political culture and the discourses of different Russian political forces?

Let me note that there are many different opinions on what Europe is and what countries it includes. Because the discussion of these opinions is not the point of the research, by Europe I am referring primarily to the member states of the European Union (EU). I realize that this approach might be somewhat simplified because the relations between Russia and different members of the EU vary significantly due to historic, political, and economic reasons. Thus, covering all of the specific aspects of Russian relations with separate European states would definitely be of interest, but it is too broad for one study.

I have chosen to study press rather than any other means of mass communication. This is despite the fact that press does not attract as broad audience in Russia as, for example, radio or TV. There are two main reasons for this decision. Firstly, the press seems to exercise a little bit more freedom than other media types. This idea, for instance, finds support in an article written by a well-known Russian journalist Vladimir Pozner (2011, January 24). So, the press may provide this study with more diverse views than state controlled television because it is more likely to reflect not only the official representations, but be influenced by the discourse of other political forces besides the dominant one. The second reason for using the press is connected to some practical issues: at the Master’s level, it is almost impossible to transcribe the amount of TV programs needed for the research and to get access to the records of the programs.

I will study the coverage of the Pussy Riot case in four newspapers: Izvestia, Kommersant, Rossiyskaya gazeta, and Vedomosti. Izvestia was chosen because it has the largest circulation among the quality newspapers; Rossiyskaya gazeta is published by the Russian government and its publications have an explicit pro-government orientation. Finally, Vedomosti and Kommersant are liberal quality business newspapers which generally express pro-western ideas. Thus, the selected newspapers are supposed to satisfy the demands of diverse audiences and as such, they are more likely to paint a
very different picture of Russia’s relations with Europe. This diversity has helped to achieve the purpose of the study and to collect rich and versatile data.

It has been decided to analyze articles covering Russian-European relations in the articles covering the Pussy Riot case. This angle seems suitable because the case has provoked broad public and political discussion and has demonstrated some fundamental differences in perceptions and cultures within Russia and in the European countries. The Punk band Pussy Riot held a performance called the “Punk-prayer: ‘Holy Mother of God, Cast Putin Out!’” in the Cathedral of the Redeemer in Moscow on February 21, 2012. By March 16 three members of the band, Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, Mariya Alekhina, and Ekaterina Smutsevich were arrested on a charge of hooliganism committed because of religious hatred and animosity and in August they were sentenced to two years in prison. The Pussy Riot case has turned out to be one of the most scandalous processes in Russia in recent years and it has been followed carefully inside and outside the country.

The research consists of four chapters apart from the introduction. Thus, the second chapter is a literature review that outlines the major theoretical concepts applied in the research. The chapter also gives some historical and political background for a reader that is not well versed in Russian studies. The research is conducted within the theoretical frames of media discourse and international relations. The first part of the chapter uncovers the notions of discourse, media discourse, and representations. In the research the term “discourse” primarily means a particular way of representing a social practice. The second part examines the historical context of Russian-European relations, as well as provides information on the political discourses connected to these relations as articulated by Russian political force. It also examines the attributes of Russian political culture. In brief, the theoretical background is based on an idea that media discourse on Russian-European relations is shaped by the discourses of different political forces, as well as by a national political culture. Thus, representations of Russian-European relations in the press work as a bridge between political culture and the discourses of political parties and blocks.
The third chapter uncovers the principles of the research method. In order to answer the research question, I have applied critical discourse analysis (CDA) to retrieve and examine representations of Russian-European relations. In accordance with the CDA model offered by Fairclough (2001), the analysis has been carried out on three levels: linguistic, intertextual, and the macro level of social structures. Due to the wide range of texts, it has been decided to concentrate primarily on intertextual analysis. Also, linguistic analysis has been used as a supplementary tool when it was relevant and helpful. The fourth chapter is dedicated to the description of the results.

The fifth chapter synthesizes the results of the research with the concepts discussed in the literature review. To be more concrete, it builds the retrieved representations into the framework of social practices. This process is the macro-level part of a CDA. In this chapter, I have tried to explain why mass media represent Russian-European relations in the particular ways that it does. Specifically, I examine what influences Russian-European relations and where the representations are derived from. Finally, this chapter delineates the implications of the research, its significance and limitations.

The analysis of how the Russian press represents the EU countries and their relations with Russia is a relevant topic because it provides an opportunity to understand the notion of the world that is transmitted by mass media to an average Russian person. What is more, Russian diplomats and politicians dealing with the EU are constrained by national interests and international courtesies. Thus, I conjecture that they may have some latent implications while describing the attitudes of the Russian government towards Europe because their opinions are not openly stated. Meanwhile, the representations of Russian-European relations in the media directed at Russian citizens may provide clearer information that might otherwise be omitted in official diplomatic speeches and documents. Moreover, the analysis of the representations gives the reader some understanding of what aspects of Russian-European relations are taken for granted by Russian journalists as common sense knowledge and thus is conveyed to audiences as an unchallenged fact. The results of the research could be useful both inside and outside of Russia because they provide the reader with a better idea of the Russian government’s position on Russian-European relations and reveal some of the latent implications and intentions that they have with regards to international affairs. The
research also reveals some of the ways that Russian citizens perceive Russian-European relations.
CHAPTER 2: AT THE CROSSROADS OF MEDIA DISCOURSE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

As the goal of the research is to reveal and analyze the representations of the relations between Russia and its European partners in four Russian newspapers, it is easy to notice that the study unfolds at the crossroads of two academic fields: media and communications studies and international relations theory. As a result, in order to achieve the goal of the study, I have to provide theoretical background from both of the fields. Thus this chapter is divided into two broad sections. The first one concentrates on the notion of discourse in general, and media discourse in particular. The second chapter describes some of the unique aspects of Russian-European relations and examines those relations in a historic context.

2.1 Discourse theory

My research is built upon the concept of discourse. Discourse theory is exceptionally complex and has a variety of different approaches, including for example critical discourse analysis and poststructuralist analysis. Hence, the notion of discourse itself has a wide range of meanings and implications depending of which approach we choose. That is why I have to start by specifying the concept and providing an explanation of some other notions which are widely used in discourse theory. I will begin by explaining why discourse is one of the key concepts in my research. Then, I will move on to describe my understanding of discourse in general, media discourse and representations in particular.

2.1.1. Discourse and reality

Norman Fairclough (2001), whom I primarily rely on regarding discourse and critical discourse analysis, writes that discourse may function in three different ways. The first one is when discourse works “as a part of the social activity within a practice” (Fairclough, 2001, 2). He gives an example of a shop assistant who uses a certain type
of language in a particular way. In my view, this application of the word discourse may be quite often substituted by the word “genre”. Johnstone (2001, 2) defines this approach more concretely by saying that when one puts emphasis on a linguistic sense of the notion, discourse means “actual instances of communication in the medium of language.” The second way the term discourse may function, according to Fairclough (2001, 2), is when it serves as one of the elements of constructing identities: for example, “the identity of a political leader such as Tony Blair in the UK is partly a semiotically constituted way of being.”

The third way that it is used - which is specifically important for my research - is when discourse functions as representations. Fairclough (2001, 2) explains: “Social actors within any practice produce representations of other practices, as well as (reflexive) representations of their own practice, in the course of their activity within the practice.” Thus, “representation is a process of social construction of practices, including reflexive self-construction - representations enter and shape social processes and practices” (Fairclough, 2001, 2). Hence, when I refer to media representations of Russian-European relations, it can be interpreted as a reference to the representations of the practices that are applied and exploited by the Russian and European politicians and diplomats when they are engaged in the process of international relations. It should be made clear that these representations are also produced and interpreted by journalists and other authors of media articles. In this sense, the word discourse may be used in its plural form: “For instance, the lives of poor and disadvantaged people are represented through different discourses in the social practices of government, politics, medicine, and social science, and through different discourses within each of these practices corresponding to different positions of social actors” (Fairclough, 2001, 2).

It needs to be highlighted that throughout my research I generally use the term “discourse” as described in the third meaning outlined above. At this point it should be clear that the term “representation” stated in the goal of the study is connected to the meaning of the word “discourse” as a representation of a social practice.

It may be hard to discern and fully grasp connections between discourses, language in general, and reality. It is more or less clear what effect reality has on language, but the
reverse effects are not so obvious. Hall (1993, 96) explains it in the following way: “Reality exists outside language but it is constantly mediated by and through language; and what we can know and say has to be produced through discourse.” However, discourse is not reduced to conveying pre-existing meanings: it plays an important role in constructing those meanings as well. As a result, while reality exists outside people’s minds, it can be learnt and applied by people in the form of languages, myths, and ideologies in order to produce experiences in the context of day-to-day life. Purvis and Hunt (1993, 474) also add that while “this consciousness is borne through language and other systems of signs, it is transmitted between people and institutions”, but also “the way in which people comprehend and make sense of the social world has consequences for the direction and character of their action and inaction.” Thus, discourse changes not only the way people see and perceive the world, but also consequently, how they behave. Thereby, we could not describe discourse as just a bridge connecting language and social experiences or mental and material realms because the “bridge” itself in return has the ability to influence and construct these realms.

As it has already been said, discourse is not universal and we can find discourses referring to different spheres of knowledge and various aspects of our lives. Fairclough (2001) even acknowledges that there may be many discourses referring to the same field by saying that some orders of discourse turn out to be more common and dominant and even transformed into common sense beliefs. These “hegemonic” discourses are always challenged by the marginal ones, making up an open and interacting system of discourses. With the rapidly changing context, disruptive discourses may cause the overall instability of meanings. The result is a situation when people understand the same event or object in different ways.

Having outlined the basic concept of discourse, I want to focus on and dwell upon some of the particular aspects of media discourse that are relevant for my study.
2.1.2 Media discourse and power

This sub-chapter delineates a range of discursive concepts that are necessary in order to understand the mechanisms of interaction between media and a social environment. Particular attention is given to the relation of media discourse and power structures. Above all, the sub-chapter formulates why and how studying media discourse may help a reader to better comprehend Russian-European relations.

When people watch TV or read a newspaper, they believe that the main purpose of these activities is to acquire news on current events and to understand topical issues. This idea constitutes a superficial level of media consumption. More profound consideration makes us realize that at the same time a person also gains information about the way the world is organized, about common social practices and relationships between subjects. In other words, mass media are not merely the means of communicating information, but also the means of constructing reality and maintaining a social order.

This idea has become common knowledge through its description in both fiction and scientific literature. If we try to find examples in fiction, we may recollect “newspeak”, the official language of Oceania contrived by George Orwell in the well-known novel “1984”. He considered “newspeak” to be such a substantial part of the novel that he even wrote a separate appendix for it called “The Principles of Newspeak”. In this appendix, he mentioned that “the purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of thought impossible” (Orwell, 1949/2004, 372). This quotation perfectly illustrates the role and connections of discourse, language, and social life.

Having provided an example from fiction, let us move on to scientific sources. A starting point here is the fact that, as has been discussed in the previous sub-chapter, media discourse is an integral part of social life. As such, the role of discourse may vary considerably depending on a particular case. There are various factors determining this role, including different kinds of changes and transformations in social practices. Thus, the role of media discourse will be different in each particular case and as a result, every situation should be analyzed separately (Fairclough, 2001). The role of media discourse,
which is particularly important for the research, is that it can serve as a tool for exercising power in society.

Next, all discourses, including media discourses, vary depending on how much power they exercise. As it has already been mentioned, certain media discourses may become dominant due to a variety of different reasons. Firstly, according to Gamson and Modigliani (1989), some “media packages” may be more potent than others as they resonate with the views and beliefs that already exist in society or with the traditions and myths of a certain culture in general. In the other words, because the way information is processed by a recipient is shaped by pre-existing meanings, values, and beliefs, the discourses that correlate with those meanings will have more influence on a person (Scheufele, 1999). Moreover, Gerbner (1985), looking at this idea from a mass media perspective, states that media messages on symbolic or representational events are intentionally, though not always consciously, coded in order to connect the public to a feeling of some shared significance surrounding the event. Media discourse constructs and interprets a “common symbolic environment” for the way people understand, respond and support it (Gerbner, 1985, 13).

That is one of the reasons why I have decided to bring the concept of political culture into my study. Political culture will be described in the following sub-chapters. I have chosen a concept of political culture instead of a “common symbolic environment” of Russian citizens because the latter one seems to be too broad. At the same time, the attributes of Russian political culture constitute at least a part of a “common symbolic environment”, but they have been examined in academic literature and are presented as a coherent classification (Bova, 2010, 24-25).

Secondly, some scholars believe that, because mass media are social institutions with their own identities, media discourses can be guided by their internal policies (Gerbner, 1985). It gives Davis (1985, 51) an opportunity to describe news texts as “a form of public, institutional discourse constructed according to unusually strict and conventionalised procedures.” His main point is that most news texts are extremely homogeneous and consistent in the way they portray social issues. It is so not due to the conscious biases of certain journalists or means of mass communications, but rather due
to “institutional mechanisms which process facts, events and personalities through the filter of highly contentious assumptions about such matters as democracy, the causes of inflation, the status of speaker’s opinions, or the audience’s capacity to understand” (Davis, 1985, 58).

Thirdly, I have discussed that media discourse is a powerful tool for constructing meanings and shaping audiences’ views and attitudes. Moreover, it is possible to reproduce or transform a particular social order by producing discourses. As a result, official, or governmental institutions, as well as private groups, will always have a reason to use discourses pro domo sua. At the same time, a society usually does not mind those groups controlling the discourse and sees it as normal because “every society takes special steps to assure that authoritative decision-making in the field of public-making is reserved to the key establishments of the power structure…” (Gerbner, 1985, 15). Overall, it means that any power structures always have a reason and an opportunity to misuse a media discourse.

Because there is enough evidence that Russia’s “all-important independent media had been brought under Kremlin control” during Putin’s first presidential term, it is necessary to draw special attention to the relations between media discourse and governmental institutions (Nygren, 2010, 40, see also Lipman, 2010). As a rule, governmental services have easier access to and, as a result, more influence on media discourse. Journalists covering a topic try not to neglect the official point of view because they consider governmental sources to be more objective, reliable and complete (Sigal, 1973, in Gamson at al., 1992). Though, quite often journalists do not make a special effort to promote official ideas: they use them out of convenience as a routine journalistic technique. As a result, Sigal (1973, in Gamson at al., 1992, 376) concludes that eventually journalists "are exploited by their sources either to insert information into the news or to propagandize."

However, the connection between official sources and objectivity is definitely not direct and obvious all around the world. It is possible to find with many cases where ordinary people or a journalist himself may possess even more reliable information than any official. Schmid (2004) developed and confirmed this theory while studying the
discourse used by the Soviet media to speak about nuclear energy after the Chernobyl disaster. Thus, she points out that the discourse was also used as a rhetorical tool “aimed at gaining, consolidating, or protecting authority and legitimacy of expertise, as well as control over decision-making processes in the energy sector and, as a result, in policy making in general” (Schmid, 2004, 354).

With regard to the relations between media discourse and governmental institutions, I have to describe some peculiarities of Russian journalistic practices by referring to Lipman’s article “Rethinking Russia: Freedom of Expression without Freedom of the Press.” She writes that “the political regime that Putin built has the appearance of having democratic institutions, but they have been radically emasculated” (2010, 161). It applies also to media institutions. By this I mean that generally all important mass media have to consider how Kremlin may react on this or that report. There is a certain level of criticism that is acceptable for a journalist that does not annoy the government, and it is important for a media outlet not to cross this level: if journalists “are careful not to encroach on powerful interests, reporters working for prominent Moscow publication can get away with challenging specific government policies or high-ranking officials” Lipman (2010, 161). If a reporter dares cross the allowed boundary, the government may use either subtle or brutal ways to deal with a defiant reporter. This indicates that for Russia the problem of governmental influence on media discourse is much more topical than in the majority of European countries.

Finally, a discussion on the relationships between media and state would not be complete without a brief reference to the correlation between the notions of “discourse”, “ideology”, and “propaganda”. Purvis’ and Hunt’s (1993) compare the terms “ideology” and “discourse” in the article “Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology...” Firstly, they mention that both “ideology and discourse refer to pretty much the same aspect of social life - the idea that human individuals participate in forms of understanding, comprehension or consciousness of the relations and activities in which they are involved” (Purvis and Hunt, 1993, 474). They express the idea that the relationship between the concepts is so tight that sometimes they are used interchangeably and, while sometimes they are counterposed in academic literature, it would be interesting to replace the term “discourse” for “ideology” in some
fundamental studies on this topic to see if their essence has somehow changed. To be clear, the concepts do not have exactly the same implications because “ideology”, as a term, rather depicts the ways “in which people, to paraphrase Marx, become conscious of their conflicting interests and struggle over them” (Purvis and Hunt, 1993, 476). Ideology puts emphasis on the connection between “interests” and consciousness, while “discourse” stresses the connection between social relations and language, or any semiotic vehicles (Purvis and Hunt, 1993).

Additionally, “propaganda” and “discourse” are also easily correlated notions. Of course, after the collapse of the Nazi and Soviet Regimes, the concept of propaganda does not seem to be attractive to Western scholars, but unfortunately it still remains a relevant issue in at least half of the world, including some Western countries. If we follow Ó Tuathail (2005, 363-364), who defines propaganda “as works of mass media deliberately designed by powerful state institutions to condition popular geopolitical attitudes and promote loyalty to the state, particularly the military,” we can conclude that propaganda is a certain type of media discourse aimed at reconstructing social order and that it can be seen as the ultimate level of governmental influence on society with the help of media discourse.

To sum it up, though media discourse is articulated by mass media, different power structures have a huge opportunity to potentially exploit it in order to maintain or transform social order depending on their particular needs.

To conclude this sub-chapter, let me summarize some of its main points. Firstly, the notion of discourse has a variety of meanings, but the in this research, to state in briefly, it is used as a particular way of representing a social practice. Secondly, media discourse can be used and abused by power structures as a tool for exercising power. I realize that the discussion of discourse, its forms and roles, is far from being complete, but I have tried to cover all aspects needed for the research.
2.4 **Russian-European relations in Russians’ eyes**

Having explained the concept of discourse, I will now concentrate on the part of my research that pertains to international relations theory. Firstly, I will provide a very general introduction into the history of orientation debate in Russia. Secondly, I will try to delineate a variety of representations of the relations in the discourses of different political parties. Thirdly, I will examine some of the attributes of Russian political culture that are likely to have influence on the analyzed representations.

2.2.1 **Russia-European relations in historical context**

The way the Russian nation perceives Europe and relates to Europe is exceptionally complex due to geographical and historical reasons: Russia is situated on the intersection of the two continents – Europe and Asia. Generally, the whole Russian nation has always been internally divided into those who believe that Russia should follow the Western patterns of development and those who are confident that Russia has “its own way”. The phrases “its own way/its particular way/Russian way” have even turned into a special notion, a symbol, which has certain subtle connotations and meanings in geopolitics and for the whole population (Engelbrekt, Nygren, 2010a, 7, Nygren, 2010, 55).

The history of the debates between the adherents of those positions dates back at least to the 18th century, namely to the rule of Peter the Great. In the middle of the 19th century, Russian intellectuals were split into “Westernizers” (“zapadniki”) who saw the Russian Empire as a part of Western civilization and “Slavophiles” who believed that Russia, due to its geographical location, neither belonged to the East nor to the West and should not strive to join either of them (Engelbrekt, and Nygren, 2010a, Legvold, 2007). In order to explain better the nature of those notions, let me refer once again to Dostoevsky’s “Writer’s diary”. Dostoevsky (1873-1876/1997, 237) who rather belonged to a Slavophile camp, characterized Westernizers as follows:

> Our Westernizers are the people who today are trumpeting at full volume and with extraordinary malice and satisfaction that we have neither science nor
common sense or patience or ability, that we are destined only to crawl behind Europe, slavishly aping her in everything…

Later on, he explains who, in his opinion, Slavophiles are: they tried to make people see that Russia was not Europe but a different creature altogether when they pointed out that the Westernizers were equating things that were dissimilar and incompatible and when they argued that something true for Europe was entirely inapplicable to Russia… (Dostoevsky, 1873-1876/1997, 519).

Though, Dostoevsky’s view on Westernizers and Slavophiles is definitely subjective and biased, nevertheless it gives a clear idea about the nature of contradiction between those movements.

What is specifically ironic is that in the beginning of the 20th century, the Bolsheviks began as Westernizers who tried to implant in Russian people not only the ideas of revolution and the importance of the proletariat, but also faith in progress, the repulsion of nationalism, and the belief in the common all-European way of development. However, within a decade after the Revolution, they turned into “Slavophiles” and extreme isolationists (Bayer, 2012, 1 October 1).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the idea of “its own way” lost its credibility for a decade because the government was headed by the “westernizers” who “tried to push Russian foreign policy and orientation towards cooperation with NATO and the European Union” (O'Loughlin, Ó Tuathail, Kolossov, 2005, 329). Smith (1999) clearly points out that during this period Russia aimed at becoming closer to the West economically by adapting a capitalistic model and by shifting its attitudes towards Western ideology: Russia was claimed to be “‘returning to civilization', again becoming 'an apprentice of Europe’” (Smith,1999, 482).

In the 2000s, pro-Western feelings in Russia have waned due to a variety of internal and external reasons: for example, the debt crisis of 2008 (which has formed prejudice against the Western liberal economic model even in some developed countries) increasing tensions in the relations with some Western leaders, and NATO expansion
(Engelbrekt and Nygren, 2010a). Nowadays in the Russia political arena there are advocates for both pro-Western development and Russian centric values: pro-Western supporters “remain a considerable and influential faction of Russian public opinion - about 20%” (O’Loughlin et al., 2005, 330) - and [there is also support] for “alternative” development, [from a group] who “see Russia as a distinctive civilization, different from the West in its cultural values and geopolitical security concerns and interests” (Smith, 1999, 488). In a certain sense, it means that fundamentally not much has changed since the 18\textsuperscript{th} century.

2.2.2 Political discourses on relations with the West

It must be clear by this point that relations with the West in general and Europe in particular have special importance for Russia. Some scholars, including for example Prozorov (2010), believe that those relations are much more important than relation with other countries because Russia has been building its identity with respect to Europe, not China or Japan. This is also true if we take into account the situation of the post-USSR period:

Ironically, the entire Russian political spectrum in the post-communist period has been tied to the figure of Europe, be it the early liberal-democratic optimism of the ‘Common European Home’, the desire of liberal-conservatives to ‘abduct Europe’ by disassociating it from the United States… The wild oscillation of positions that nonetheless all refer to Europe as a Big Other, whose recognition is necessary for the validation of one’s subjectivity … (Prozorov, 2010, 89).

As a result, it seems relevant to describe the contemporary geopolitical discourses of modern Russia. After the State Duma simplified the process of party registration in 2012, dozens of new political organizations appeared. However, very few of them have any political influence, and I will concentrate only on the discourses of the most prominent parties and blocks.

Nowadays, the Russian political spectrum can be conditionally divided into three sections. The first one is the “United Russia” party. It dominates the Parliament,
supports Vladimir Putin and is headed by the current prime-minister Dmitry Medvedev. The second block is a “system opposition”, or all the other political parties represented in the Parliament. This block cooperates with the “United Russia” party. The third block is the so called “non-system”, “non-parliamentary” opposition. These are political forces that are strongly opposed to the incumbent government, are generally suppressed by the dominating structures and as a result, cannot get into the Parliament (see, for example, Golosov, 2011 September 1; Trenin, 2012, March 2; Nichol, 2013, April 16). For my research, it is important to mention that the non-system opposition consists of a variety of different political movements. Hence, the range of views among its representatives varies from radical nationalism to radical liberalism. However, a significant part of them seem to have clearly pro-Western orientation and share the democratic ideals of European society (Trenin, 2012, March 2).

“United Russia” discourse on Russian-European relations

I will start with the discourse of “United Russia” and its unofficial leader Vladimir Putin. According to O’Loughlin et al. (2005), in the beginning of 2000s, the party had a unique double-faced approach towards relations with the West. This meant that it exploited elements of “Eurasianism” and a simplified idea of “Russian nationalism” “which grew up around authoritarian centralization, imperial expansion and the domination of civil society and public life by a coercive state” (O’Loughlin et al., 2005, 330). However, as Russia was highly dependent on oil sales to the European countries, it could not openly express a grudge against Western society. Smith (1999, 488) confirms this by saying that though the incumbent government felt “uneasy about Atlanticism as a geopolitical project, it is pragmatic enough to recognize that Russia must work with the West, and that it is in its interests to cooperate with Western-dominated international organizations.” Consequently, Russian top officials, including Vladimir Putin, had “to wear a Western mask to Western leaders and domestic Westernizers (zapadniki), but changing to a 'great power' Russian mask for different domestic constituencies” (O’Loughlin et al., 2005, 423). O’Loughlin et al. (2005) also say that the pro-Western vector dominated Russian foreign policy for pragmatic, mainly
economic reasons, while in terms of ideology, Russia was not much closer to the West than the USSR was.

All this gives sufficient evidence that in the beginning of the 2000s, Russian foreign policy discourse was clearly bilateral. As Colton and Hale (2009) say, one the one hand, Putin’s rhetoric made it clear that Russia saw itself a as member of the Western community, sharing common European views and values; on the other hand, he always expressed discontent with the Western internal and international policies and saw the West as “an unreliable partner that frequently harbors ill or disrespectful intentions regarding Russia and that therefore must constantly be kept in check at the same time that cooperation must still be pursued” (Colton and Hale, 2009, 496-497).

However, there is another way to look at this, namely that pro-Western attitudes in Putin’s discourse are either very superficial or may have never existed at all because “…Putin and his entourage have consciously and cynically promoted the nationalist, xenophobic and isolationist aspects of the Slavophile creed to keep real democracy out” (Bayer, 2012, October 1).

Nevertheless, if one could have doubts about whether Putin’s discourse was pro-Western or slavophilic in the early 2000s, by the end of the decade it became clear that the pro-Western tone has almost disappeared. More and more scholars agree that Putin nowadays stresses the threat from the West rather than the need for cooperation (Colton and Hale, 2009, Engelbrekt and Nygren, 2010, 8). They assert that Russian foreign policy has become much less oriented towards the West and it again accentuates the ideas of “power” and “geostrategic thinking”. Hence, “it therefore appears that the rhetoric of integration has acquired a life of its own, entirely detached from the actual state of Russia-Europe relations” (Prozorov, 2010, 81). In other words, while dealing with Europe, Kremlin continues to assert that Russia strives to become a legitimate part of it, but at the same time these statements do not correlate with the way Russia acts on the international scene.

We may regard the discourse of “United Russia” and Putin as a hegemonic one. However, mass media are likely to reflect the beliefs not only of the centrist Putin’s supporters, but also of those who favor other parties. That is why it is worth giving a
short overview of the discourses on Russian relations with Europe of the other major political forces.

Liberals’ discourse on Russian-European relations

I will start by mentioning the ideas of liberals and democrats. The liberal government came into power in 1991 headed by Egor Gaydar. Its major aim at this point was to liberalize the Russian economy and political system and to move towards a free market. From the 1990s through the 2000s, the liberal movement was represented by two major parties: “Union of the Right Forces” (SPS), whose views are similar to the right-liberals in the European political spectrum, and the Russian United Democratic Party “Yabloko”, which is similar in political views to the European left-centrists. Their adherents have always had a strong pro-Western orientation: they believe in capitalism, democracy and the absolute privilege of human rights and freedoms.

The influence of liberal ideology on the politics in general and foreign policy in particular gradually declined over the course of the 2000s. Nowadays these parties are not represented in the parliament. Nevertheless, Bayer (2012, October 1) asserts that liberal pro-Western camp has regenerated in recent years because the current political regime is quite open, comparing, for example, with the Soviet Union. As people can easily get access to the information on how democracy functions in Europe, they are likely to call for a similar standard of living and appropriate reforms. Some of the adherents and leaders of the liberals have become the prominent figures of the non-system opposition in recent years.

Discourses on Russian-European relations of other substantial political parties

Apart from “United Russia”, there are three other political parties represented in the State Duma of the current convocation 2011-2016: the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), “Just Russia” (“Spravedlivaya Rossiya”), and Communist Party of the
Russian Federation (KPRF). Let me briefly introduce their views on relations with Europe.

Firstly, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, or LDPR, according to Smith (1999), belongs to the New Right’s wing. The New Rights oppose Eurasianism both culturally and geopolitically, because they see it as a consolidation of the Eastern European forces and “Atlanticism” movement headed by the USA and NATO. Thereby, the USA turns out to be a power that is eager to reach unipolar supremacy and as such, Russia’s geopolitical goal is to unite world forces in order to resist “Atlanticism” (Smith, 1999, 485).

Secondly, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, as well as its predecessor the Communist Party of the USSR, stresses the economic and moral decline of Western capitalism and blames modern pro-Western liberals for spreading capitalistic ideas. That is why communists believe that Russia’s key geopolitical goal is to resist capitalism and globalization. This goal may be achieved by resisting the economic strength of the Western civilization (Smith, 1999, 486).

Third, according to the research conducted by Zevina and Makarenko (2010, May 5) in 2008-2009, the views of the electorate of the “Just Russia” party are quite similar to the ones of the “United Russia” voters, but somewhat more conservative and less market-oriented. The main value for them is the “orthodoxy and pre-revolutionary tradition”. Their views on the relations with the West are the same as the views formulated by “United Russia” (Zevina and Makarenko, 2010, May 5, 32).

Thus, it is easy to detect that most of the mentioned political forces have “slavophilic” views to at least some degree. Those Russians who share pro-European attitudes are not represented in the Duma by any particular party (though individual deputies may, of course, be pro-Western oriented).
2.2.3 Attributes of Russian political culture

This chapter examines some of the most important attributes of Russian political culture. At the outset, it is worth uncovering the concept of political culture. Berezin (1997, 364) defines it as “the matrix of meanings embodied in expressive symbols, practices, and beliefs that constitute ordinary politics in a bounded collectivity.” The concept has been widely used by social scientists throughout the 20th and 21st centuries in a variety of fields including sociology, ethnography, and political studies. As a result, it has a great number of connotations depending on the sphere that it operates in. Due to the fact that in this study the concept is auxiliary, I will use Bova’s (2010, 24) rather general definition, which says that political culture is a set of “shared goals, values and pictures of the political world.” The notion is useful for us because my eventual goal is to analyze media discourse, and the way discourse is processed by a recipient is shaped by the pre-existing meanings. At the same time, it is impossible to determine all of the meanings that Russian people assign to Russian-European relations. Hence, the analysis of political culture may give us at least some understanding of these meanings.

The political culture of a country is always unique for historic reasons. Moreover, one can find regional differences in political cultures within the same state. It is not surprising that Russian political culture is also intrinsically different from the European political culture. I believe that its distinguishing characteristics have significant influence on the political discourses discussed above. The influence can be explained by the fact that the parties function not within a void, but within a framework of a national political culture. Moreover, I conjecture that media discourses on Russian-European relations will combine the representations derived from different political discourses with the basic features of the national political culture.

At this point, we can move on to examine an article “Russia and Europe after the Cold War” (2010), written by Russell Bova, a Professor of Political Sciences and International Studies at Dickinson College, USA. The author touches upon five attributes of Russian political culture: personalized authorities, statism, sobornost’, order, and unity of church and state. First, personalized authorities, according to Bova (2010, 24), imply a predisposition towards a desire among Russian people for a strong
leader, or powerful monarch. This feature has had a long history in Russian political culture that can be confirmed by numerous autocratic rulers from Ivan the Terrible in the 16th century right up to Vladimir Putin in the 21st. Secondly, “statism” can be briefly explained as an idea that a citizen should serve a state, rather than a state serving its citizens. It means that the role of a state and a state’s government play a much more extensive role than in so called “weak states” such as the USA and the majority of the European countries. Third, “sobornost’” can be roughly translated as “conciliarism”. The term broadly correlates with the idea of collectivism and the prevalence of a collective will over an individual identity, but it also has some spiritual and religious connotations. The importance of sobornost’ has multiple historic examples, including the peasant communities widely spread in tsarist Russia and the kolkhozes, or the collective farms, in the USSR. The next feature to be mentioned is Russians’ need for order, which is expressed, for instance, in “the desire for ‘a firm hand’”. What is crucial for the discussion of Russian-European relations is that order for Russian people turns out to be more important than such values as liberty and democracy, which are considered to be standard values for Europeans. The last feature is the unity of Church and State. It has a purely historic explanation and is tied to the special place that the Russian Orthodox Church has always occupied in the Russian politics. Bova (2010, 25) concludes the classification by saying that these features are in conflict with the features of the European political culture because:

Instead of rule of law, one finds personalized authority; instead of pluralism, one finds statism; instead of individualism, one finds sobornost’; in lieu of the emphasis on individual rights, one finds a hunger for order; instead of separation of church and state, one finds a more organic unity of church, state and larger society.

He also points out that definitely not everyone would agree with this classification. In my view, it seems quite valid, though there could be hardly any classification, which would exhaust all the peculiarities of any national culture or mentality. Any classification here is never full and is always, to a certain extent, subjective. Nevertheless, the majority of the points in the classification correlate with the classification formulated by Alexei Bayer (2012, 01 October), a prominent journalist
and economist, in the article “Putin's Slavophiles Gain over Westernizers”. For my part, when describing Russian political culture, it is necessary to address a couple of more issues that seem relevant for the following analysis.

The first issue is the so called concept of a “powerful Russia”, which, in a certain sense, pertains to the idea of statism. If we take Smith’s work (1999) as a foundation, we may say that Russians see their country as a leading Eurasian state. This concept infers that the overall goal of Russia is to return to the status of a great geopolitical power and become one of the leading political and economic forces in the world. According to O'Loughlin et al. (2005), the USA and NATO are often seen as a main obstacle and competitor with regards to this belief. This belief has hung around since the end of Cold War. It is especially obvious with regards to how Russian citizens reckon the USA as a destabilizing hegemonic power which has to be balanced by an alternative “pole of power”. In 2008, the concept of “a powerful Russia” was officially stated as a paradigm guiding both the internal development of Russia and its relations with other countries. What is more, the concept actually has deep historic roots. The legacy of the totalitarian USSR and authoritarian tsarist Russia confirms that the tradition of a strong state is quite deeply rooted in its history. The special importance of the “powerful Russia” concept for the Russian people is also reflected in the results of the survey conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) (Petrova, 2003, Novembers 13). 48% of respondents wanted Russia to be seen as a “strong”, “great” or “invincible” power, compared to 22% who wanted it to be considered as “rich” or “prosperous” and 6% as an “educated”, “civilized” and “cultural” country.

One more attribute, which characterizes Russian political culture, is a crisis of national identity (Kristof, 1967). Though Kristof (1967) reported this phenomenon almost half a century ago, the collapse of the Soviet Union meant that national identity continued to deteriorate. We can confirm this idea, for example, with the help of the study conducted by O'Loughlin, Ó Tuathail, and Kolossov V. (2006, 135), which has revealed that 36% of respondents consider themselves as “Eurasianists” meaning that they consider Russia as an equally Asian and European country. Subsequently, 44% see it as mainly European. Even the broad range of various political discourses on relations with Europe indicates that Russian society does not have a unified sense of identity. As a result, there
is demand for both a liberal discourse, which portrays Russia as a part of Europe, as well as for the discourses that portray Europe as an enemy. Such a disintegration of national identity cannot help but negatively affect relations with other countries. Kristof (1967, 947) states that identification and need for belonging are crucial factors for both individuals and collectives, which has substantial influence on how they behave and treat others.

The reason for providing a list of the attributes of Russian political culture is that they may have an impact of the way that Russian-European relations are presented in the Russian press and as such, they may explain particular aspects of the representations in case they do not directly correspond with the discourses of the political forces.

2.3 Conclusion

Having described the theoretical premises of the research, I would like to highlight several major points. The study is conducted within the framework of two main fields: media discourse and Russian-European relations. Media discourse can be characterized as a type of discourse used by mass media to represent a social practice, in our case Russian-European relations. While representing a social practice, media discourse interprets and constructs a “common symbolic environment” in the way people understand, respond and support it (Gerbner, 1985). In the research, instead of the concept a “common symbolic environment”, which is in my opinion quite vague, I use the synthesis of the discourses of diverse Russian political parties and the attributes of the national political culture. Thus, my research focuses on the analysis of the media discourse that can be seen as a bridge between the discourse of the Russian political forces and the overall political culture.
CHAPTER 3: CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AS A RESEARCH METHOD

As the aim of this research is to explore representations of relations between Russia and the EU in the Russian press, the analysis can be divided into three major steps: identifying the representations; thorough comprehension of how they are constructed; and building them in the broader social context by connecting them with the discourse of political parties and national political culture. This chapter provides information on how the aim of the research is achieved by describing the choice of a general research strategy, a method of data collection and a data analysis process. It also tries to rationalize those choices and explain why those methods lead to relevant and reliable conclusions.

3.1 Research strategy

The research question can be answered with the help of qualitative research methods. The main reason for choosing qualitative rather than quantitative methods is determined by the nature of the studied phenomenon. As I am seeking to distinguish and analyze the linguistic images of the relations between countries, the bulk of the acquired data will have a non-mathematical character. Moreover, the crucial point of the research is my interpretations of those images, “carried out for the purpose of discovering concepts and relationships in raw data and then organizing these into a theoretically explanatory scheme” (Strauss, Corbin, 1998, 11). That is why qualitative methods which are traditionally used when findings are not acquired by statistical procedures and have non-mathematical character, seem suitable for my research (Strauss, Corbin, 1998, 11).

The particular qualitative method that is utilized is critical discourse analysis (CDA). The specific reasons for employing CDA and its characteristics and procedures will be discussed in the following sub-chapters.
3.2 Data collection

The research data consists of articles discussing Russian-European relations in the Pussy Riot case coverage. The articles come from four respected newspapers. This chapter first gives an overview of the newspapers and explains why they have been chosen for the research. Secondly, it reminds the reader of the details of the Pussy Riot case and describes why it is a suitable example for the analysis. Finally, it defines the process of the data collection.

3.2.1 Analyzed newspapers

I have chosen to analyze four quality newspapers: Izvestia (“Известия”, IZ), Kommersant (“Коммерсантъ”, KO), Rossiyskaya gazeta (“Российская газета”, RG), and Vedomosti (“Ведомости”, VE). They were selected because they satisfy the demands of diverse audiences and as such, they are more likely to give versatile representations of relations between Russia and Europe.

Izvestia was chosen because it has the largest circulation among the quality press. According to the information on the web-site Izvesti.ru (2012), Izvestia is targeted at an active and well-educated audience with stable income and it covers a wide variety of topics including politics, economics, and culture. It has a distinctive pro-governmental, conservative editorial policy. The newspaper has been published since 1917. The print version is published five times a week, Monday through Friday. As stated in the media kit of the newspaper called “Media-kit gazety ‘Izvestia’” (Mediaguide.ru), the current circulation is 234,500 issues.

Vedomosti is a daily business newspaper that has been published since 1999. Vedomosti can be characterized as a liberal quality newspaper that expresses pro-western ideas. It is unique because it is a mutual project with the Financial Times and the Wall Street Journal. It has a circulation of 75,000 issues. In the article “Vedomosti. The Russian business newspaper” (Blei Worldwide advertising), Bill Casey, Special Projects Vice-President of The Wall Street Journal, describes it in the following way: Vedomosti “has developed a global reputation for accuracy, independence, fairness and courageous
business journalism. We at The Wall Street Journal are proud of our partnership with Vedomosti, and proud to be associated with its reporters, editors & executives.”

The media kit of Kommersant called “Media-kit gazety ‘Kommersant-daily’” says that Kommersant - Daily has been published six times a week since 1990 with a daily circulation of 117,000 issues (Mediaguide.ru). It is a national social and political newspaper with an extended economic section. Kommersant is often characterized as the most respected publication because it was one of the newspapers that “laid the foundation for the development of intellectual influence of the press” (Vychuba and Frolov, 2007, 51). The audience for this newspaper primarily consists of well-educated and propertied readers (Vychuba and Frolov, 2007).

Rossiyskaya gazeta is an official newspaper of the Government of the Russian Federation. All federal laws and decrees become effective only after being published in Rossiyskaya gazeta. According to a special section for advertisers on the newspaper’s website called “Advertising in Rossiyskaya gazeta” (“Reklama v ‘Rossiyskoi gazete’”, RG.ru), the circulation of the daily edition is 170,000 issues. The article also affirms that a distinctive feature of the audience is the predominance of retirees, who tend to be the most conservative part of any society. It is also read by officials of different ranks, and clerks of governmental institutions. The latter can be explained by the fact that most official bodies subscribe to it in order to get acquainted with the new laws.

The description of the newspapers shows that they satisfy the demands of diverse audiences. I assume that, because of that, they are more likely to provide a wide range of different representations than, for example, newspapers targeted at the same audience. According to research conducted in May, 2009, by TNS Media Intelligence, a section of TNS Global, a markets research company which specializes in media research, Kommersant, Rossiyskaya gazeta, and Izvestia are the most important sources of business and political news in the Russian media environment (TNS Global, 2009, June 5).

Another important point is the political orientation of the newspapers. Izvestia and Rossiyskaya gazeta are pro-government. This fact is obvious when we remember that Rossiyskaya gazeta is published by the government. However, the claimed pro-Kremlin
attitude of Izvestia needs some explanation: Mickiewicz (2008, 27) asserts that the newspaper is “owned by friends or clients of the government, i.e. large companies”. He also claims that it may even be considered “to be in government hands, because the owners are so close to the government” (Mickiewicz, 2008, 27).

On the other hand, Kommersant and Vedomosti are more independent in their content - at least to the degree which is possible nowadays in Russia because the Russian press is generally rated as “not free” by the Freedom House (Freedom House). Lipman (2010, 157) refers to Vedomosti and Kommersant as liberal high-quality print media that “pursue varying degrees of editorial independence and are not controlled or driven by loyalty to the state.” To prove this idea, Lipman (2010, 157) recollects how in 2003 Vedomosti covered the Khodorkovsky case and how thoroughly it depicted a scheme the government used in order to take over Khodorkovsky’s oil company. She characterizes this investigation as an example of “journalistic work directly challenging or defying the authority of the state” Lipman (2010, 157). This fact is crucial to consider when we analyze the discourses used in the newspapers because it can directly affect the character of the analyzed representations.

I have to explain two contrapositions that I will refer to in the study. They are: “liberal” – “pro-government” and “official” – “unofficial” which I will refer to in the study. Both of them are connected to the current political situation in Russia. As it has already been mentioned in the literature review, nowadays, the Russian political system can be conditionally divided into three blocks: United Russia party, “system opposition”, and “non-system” opposition. Thus, in the study, I use the contrapositions “liberal” – “pro-governmental” primarily regarding the newspapers I have chosen to analyze. The pro-governmental press means that a newspaper explicitly supports the present government. A liberal newspaper mainly shares the views of the pro-Western “non-system” opposition. Lipman (2010, 156) recognizes liberal media in Russia as the ones that adhere “to professional and ethical standards of independent media, as well as to western democratic norms and principles.” Elaborating on discourses, texts, and speeches, I quite often use the terms “official” and “unofficial.” “Official” discourse is a synonym of the state discourse, meaning that a statement or a text pertains to government sources and reflects the position of the dominating powers. Bukovskaya
(2006), for example, formulates a term “official political discourse” (OPD) and defines it defined as:

a special form of representation of senior public officials of a state, representatives of public authorities, as well as political institutions, government body of different levels… In any case, OPD is an expression of official point of view, not a means self-expression, and thus, identifies its subject as an official person in the pursuance of his duties.

“Unofficial” implies that a text articulates ideas and states positions that are not consistent with the official ones.

Regarding the chosen newspapers, I can also anticipate questions about their circulation. One might wonder if it is reasonable to compare discourses used by a publication that prints 234,500 copies, like Izvestia, and a publication with 75,000 copies, like Vedomosti. However, such discrepancy is impossible to avoid due to the current situation in the country. Only the media which serve relatively small audiences dare to express opinions that are inconsistent with the government ones “because the government that controls federal channels is indifferent in general towards what others do. The article published by Afisha.ru magazine called “New politics. What has changed in television” (“Novaya politika. Chto izmenilos na televidenii”, Afisha.ru, 2012, March 1) states that if an audience is small, you may write, speak and show whatever you want, - we do not care. But if you are watched by millions, we beg to intervene”. In scientific literature similar ideas are expressed by Lipman, (2010) and Mickiewicz (2008). Hence, if I did not accept this discrepancy in circulations, it would limit my research solely to the dominating discourse. Moreover, if we compare the number of published newspaper copies with the overall Russian population of roughly 141.9 million people, we will see that on this scale the discrepancy is not that significant.
3.2.2. The Pussy Riot case

I will analyze the articles discussing Russian-European relations covering the Pussy Riot case. This case is relevant as it has provoked broad public and political discussion and demonstrated fundamental differences in perception and culture within Russia and in the European countries. Moreover, the Pussy Riot performance, arrest, and the following court decision will provide me with enough material for the study as the Russian and European political leaders had to respond to these events and this produced official discourse that was conveyed to the Russian audience.

Punk band Pussy Riot hold a performance called the “Punk-prayer: ‘Holy Mother of God, Cast Putin Out!’” in the Cathedral of the Redeemer in Moscow on February 21, 2012. On March 3 two members of the band, Nadezhda Tolokonnikova and Mariya Alekhina were arrested, another member, Ekaterina Smutsevich, was arrested on March 16. They were arrested on a charge of hooliganism committed because of religious hatred and animosity. The legal investigation started on July 30, 2012. On August 17, the Khamovnisheskiy court passed the verdict of “guilty” sentencing the arrested members of the band to two years in prison.

The Pussy Riot case has turned out to be one of the most scandalous legal processes in Russia in the recent years, and it has been followed carefully inside and outside the country. In the Russian federal media as well as in the legal resolution, the case was positioned as exclusively religious. The political aspect - “Cast Putin away” - was obscured. As a result, according to the study conducted by the Public Opinion Fund (Fond Obsh’estvennoe Mnenie), a fund which studies public opinion, more than a half of the population of Russia see the verdict as fair (Kozhevina, 2012, August 30). Most of the people who share this view are pensioners and residents of small towns. These groups belong to the electorate of Vladimir Putin. They justify their opinion by saying that “the girls spitted [sic] into the souls of the believers” (Kozhevina, 2012, August 30). Inside Russia, those who support the band, in other words those who do not agree with the legal verdict regardless of whether they approve of the performance or not, have an above average income, live in bigger cities and tend to participate in demonstrations (Kozhevina, 2012, August 30). At the same time, the band was actively
supported by international political and cultural leaders: from 121 members of the German Bundestag to Paul McCartney and Madonna (see, for example, RIA Novosti, 2012, August 3).

3.2.3 Data collection process and final data set

The analyzed articles were published between August 1 and October 3, 2012. Still, the majority of the articles were published in August 2012, namely during the legal investigation of the case in the court and right after the verdict was announced.

In the course of the data collection, it became apparent that the case was often mentioned in the articles, which deal with Russian-European relations, but they are neither directly devoted to the description of the case itself nor to its influence on the Russian-European relations. This can be seen with the following example: in the beginning of October, 2012, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) discussed a report and, as a result, adopted a resolution analyzing how Russia commits its obligations to the Council of Europe (CE). The final resolution gave strict recommendations to Russia on how to comply fully with the European policies. The resolution denounced several recently adopted laws, human right violations, and the, what is important, a “patently disproportionate” verdict for Pussy Riot (Parliamentary Assembly, 2012, October 2012). This PACE session, which was devoted to the discussion of the resolution, was widely covered by the Russian mass media. Though the Pussy Riot case was not the main topic in those articles – usually the band was just mentioned among other people imprisoned on political grounds. The case itself was most likely one of the triggers for the resolution and demonstrated the cultural and political contradictions between modern Russia and Europe. This is why I include the articles covering the PACE session and the final resolution as well. Eventually, I chose October 3, 2012 as the closing boundary because the resolution was released on October 2, and the coverage in the daily newspapers shrank considerably after the 3th.

All the articles have been retrieved from the online archives of the particular newspaper. This was done out of convenience: otherwise, getting access to all the copies of the
analyzed publication would be challenging. The set of articles is only comprised of articles from the daily print editions. It means that although all the archives contain both the articles that were actually printed in the newspapers and articles that were only published in their online versions (as well as articles from the weekly enclosures and Internet updates), I have only used the ones that were published in the printed copies. I have decided to exclude different online updates because they generally have different style, are much shorter and include little relevant context. Thus, the articles that were not published in the printed versions have also been excluded.

All four newspapers have their own search engines. The Kommersant web-site has an extended search option that allows you to search through printed editions of the newspaper, through other publications printed by the publishing house “Ъ” (e.g. in magazines Weekend, Citizen K), through Kommersant-FM (materials from the Kommersant radio-station), and Kommersant-online (materials from the online version of the newspaper). One can also choose a regional version of an issue and a certain time period. I have specified only the starting and closing dates in the search for articles from the print edition.

The Vedomosti web-site gives an opportunity to search through the “newspaper” (printed copies), “news” (online news updates), “blogs”, “Friday” (weekend enclosure), “How to spend” (an enclosure), “conferences,” and “Vedomosti.ru” (the materials that are published only online). The articles can be sorted by date. Thereafter, I have marked an option to search through just the “newspaper.”

The web-site of the Rossiyskaya gazeta offers an extended search option, which, however, is limited to specifying the dates and periods. It also allows you to search either in articles or in documents. Thus, I have had to separate out the “printed” articles manually. This information was given at the top of every article.

Though the search engine of the Izvestia web-site helps to sort the articles by date or by relevance and allows you to search by different sections such as “army”, “culture”, ”world”, and etc., it does not provide an opportunity to select only the articles from its printed version. So, I have had to do it manually.
In order to find the articles related to both the Pussy Riot and Russian-European relations, the following sets of search words in Russian have been sequentially applied (I provide both the words used in Russian and their English translation):

- “Pussy Riot”, “Europe”, “Russia” ("Pussy Riot", “Европа”, “Россия”);
- “Pussy Riot”, “EU”, “Russia” ("Pussy Riot", “ЕС”, “Россия”);
- “Pussy Riot”, “Finland”, “Russia” (“Pussy Riot”, “Финляндия”, “Россия”);
- “Pussy Riot”, “Germany”, “Russia” ("Pussy Riot”, “Германия”, “Россия”);
- “Pussy Riot”, “France”, “Russia” (“Pussy Riot”, “Франция”, “Россия”);
- “Pussy Riot”, “Italy”, “Russia” (“Pussy Riot”, “Италия”, “Россия”);

The variations of the sets are based on several considerations. Firstly, the newspapers may have different stylistic preferences in terms of using “Europe”, “EU”, or “European Union”. Secondly, I wanted to test whether or not there was a difference between the discourses used in constructing relations between Russia and the whole EU and Russia and some particular countries. I chose Germany, France, the UK, and Italy because they were the four largest European economies in 2011 (Sammy, 2011, September 16) and, as such, they probably exert more influence on the EU relations with Russia and are more likely to be mentioned in articles. Thirdly, the set “Pussy Riot” - “Finland” - “Russia” was selected because Finland is a neighboring country, which has always had close ties with Russia and is also may be covered more actively in the press than the other EU countries.

The overall data set consists of 50 articles. It contains articles of various genres, topics and styles, including interviews, standard news stories, and opinion articles. On the one hand, that wide range of different materials has made analytical process more complicated, but on the other hand, it has ensured that none of the representations under study are omitted and as such, guarantees more reliable results. The “Table 1” indicates that the articles are distributed unevenly in the newspapers and there are much more
articles in Izvestia than in the other newspapers. It is connected to the standard formats that the newspapers use. For example, Izvestia publishes many news articles on the relevant topic, which sometimes contain repetitive information. In addition, the distribution and amount of the articles are not that significant for a qualitative research because I am not eager to obtain any statistical results, but to explore the nature of representations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Data set</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vedomosti, VE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommersant, KO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia, IZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rossiyskaya gazeta, RG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The final step of the data collection process involves the preliminary analysis of the gathered articles and the elimination of the ones that were inconsistent with the goals of the research, for example, the ones that include all the search words but do not give any information on international relations. For example, the article “The root of all evil: the faith in conspiracy is invulnerable” (VE, 2012, September 18) has been dropped from the set because it primarily discusses the nature of the faith in a world conspiracy. It mentions Europe with regards to the “European values”, but does not investigate the Russian-European relations. The overall selection criterion has been whether an article says something about relations between Russia and Europe, either on a political, economic or cultural level. For that reason, I have selected, for instance, the article called ‘It just smelled bad” (RG, 2012, September 6). It does not provide any representations of political relations, but studies particular aspects of the liberal-minded population in Russia. However, the author seems to connect liberal attitudes with a pro-Western propensity. Hence, this idea is relevant for the research as an example of a representation of cultural relations.

I have already mentioned in the introduction that there are many different opinions on what Europe is, but by Europe in this research I understand the state-members of the
European Union. However, it needed to be emphasized that some of the analyzed materials pertain not only to the Russian-European relations, but to the Western-Russian relations. As a rule, they consider Europe as part of the Western civilization that includes Europe and the USA. In such texts, the word “Europe” might have broader cultural implications. I believe that these texts are essential for the research because they bring civilizational aspect into the analysis and enable me to retrieve more profound implications of the representations, which overflow mundane political and economic relations. This is one of the reasons why in the research I apply generally the word “Europe” rather than “EU”.

3.3 Data analysis method

The main research method is a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of representations collected from the articles. This method has been applied for three main reasons. Firstly, it gives a chance to detect and study “the dialectical relationships between semiosis (including language) and other elements of social practices” (Fairclough, 2001, 4). According to Fairclough, “textual analysis can give access to the detailed mechanisms through which social contradictions evolve and lived out, and the subtle shifts they undergo” (Fairclough, 1995, 15). Thus, simply speaking, with its help we can analyze what representations and are conveyed by mass media to the Russian population by the political forces and examine why these representations are conveyed.

Secondly, CDA is used here due to the fact that unlike other discourse analytical approaches such as discourse psychology, critical linguistics, or sociolinguistics, it stresses relations between discourses and power while a discourse is always seen as a means of expanding power. This idea can be explained by the fact that those “who produce the discourse also have the power to make it true – i.e. to enforce its validity, its scientific status” (Hall, 2007, 56). In other words, when, for example, a politician makes a statement about Russian-European relations that belongs to a particular discourse, the discourse adds the power to the statement and gives it a certain social impact.
Thirdly, according to Huckin (2002), this method, though being used for different types of data, has a particular focus on media, including news reports and articles. Besides, “for researchers, CDA offers a powerful arsenal of analytic tools that can be deployed in the close reading of editorials, op-ed columns, advertisements, and other public texts” (Huckin, 2002).

To begin a more detailed description of the data analysis, it is necessary to repeat that “a discourse is the language used in representing a given social practice from a particular point of view” (Fairclough, 1995, 56). This implies that our words both depend and have influence on social and cultural changes and reflect our power status, while CDA tries to explore the connection between language/texts, discursive practices, and social and cultural structures and processes (McGregor, 2003). Hence, in my case, I am looking at how relations between the EU and Russia are constructed within the discourses of different Russian power structures with regard to the Pussy Riot case discussion and in the context of Russian political culture.

Fairclough (1995, 62) says that a critical discourse analysis scheme has to include the following elements: the analysis of texts on the linguistic level; their examination from the point of view of discursive practices, or intertextual analysis; and finally, an attempt to connect them to the sociocultural environment. This scheme is based on the idea that the texts are built upon certain discursive practices, meaning the ways they are produced and consumed. They, in turn, link the texts to the broader power structures and sociocultural conventions and changes.

Firstly, I will start by carrying out an intertextual analysis. Fairclough (1995, 75) defines it in the following way:

> It is an analysis of texts from the perspective of discourse practice, and more specifically from the perspective of ‘discourse process’ – in terms of the ways in which genres and discourses available within the repertoires of orders of discourse are drawn upon and combined in producing and consuming texts, and the ways in which texts transform and embed other texts which are in chain relationship with them.
The most important point of the definition is the idea that intertextual analysis is underpinned by discourse practice that connects “textual and the social and cultural, between text and sociocultural practice, in the sense that the link between the sociocultural and the textual is an indirect one, made by way of discourse practice…” (Fairclough, 1995, 59). To sum it up, intertextual analysis may be described as a bridge between the articles and “discourse practice” dimensions.

In order to build this bridge, it will be necessary:

- to differentiate between official (e.g. opinion of the minister of foreign affairs Lavrov in the article “‘Reloading’ can’t last forever” (KO, 2012, October 3)) and unofficial (e.g. an opinion article of a political scholar Alexander Rahr “Pussy Riot, clash of civilizations, and revolution” (IZ, 2012, August 8)) Russian discourse and the discourse of European politicians and experts. This approach seems to be the most relevant as it puts emphasis on different levels of the power of a discourse and different forms of domination,

- to determine “hegemonic” and marginalized (“peripheral”) discourses and to see what power structures have access to the media, and the extent of this access (e.g. Putin vs. opposition leaders). While I divide the newspapers into either opposition and pro-government, this differentiation into dominant and marginalized is still important within each analyzed newspaper. It is connected to the fact that, for example, opposition leaders still have access to the governmental press, though this access might be quite limited (see, for example, "Gudkov calls upon his colleagues in the Duma not to disgrace themselves in front of Europe" (IZ, 2012, September 5)). At the same time, Putin’s statements play a huge role both in pro-government and liberal media (see "Vladimir Putin about Pussy Riot: ‘I do not think that the girls should be judged that strictly" (IZ, 2012, August 2) and “In the shade of Syria” (VE, 2012, August 2)).

- to detect broad ideological themes of texts and the motives that may drive authors to exploit those themes (Huckin, 2002). In the research, this point pertains to differentiation between pro-government and liberal representations.
to identify whose “voices” and doing the “speaking”, and how they are embedded into the articles (e.g. how the speeches of pro-government politicians are used in the liberal press). It means that I pay close attention to how and why a journalist incorporates this or that “voice” in an article (see, for example, the analysis of the article “‘I can come to Moscow to meet Naryshkin’” (IZ, 2012, September 2))

• to identify presuppositions, or what is taken for granted and what is omitted by an author. The analysis of presuppositions constitutes an important part of the study because the way a text positions a reader depends on what values, believes, and opinion a journalist ascribes to him or her (Fairclough, 1995, 107). I apply this technique, for example, in the analysis of the article “Civilization without roots” (RG, 2012, August 28).

Thus, in my opinion, intertextual analysis is the crucial stage of the research because it yields most of the data that are necessary for us: it helps to retrieve the common representations of the EU countries in relation to Russia as well as to analyze the majority of the aspects needed on the semantic level.

The second stage is a descriptive linguistic analysis of the separated representations. With its help it is possible to examine both the meanings and forms of texts more closely. Fairclough notes that it may be quite effective to try to separate a meaning of a text from its linguistic peculiarities and to contrast these two aspects, but in practice it can be hardly achieved because a meaning often conditions certain forms and genres (Fairclough, 1995, 57). That is why, as a rule, intertextual and linguistic analyses take place simultaneously because separating out and examining a type of discourse is also bound to examining its unique linguistic aspects. This is why the analysis chapter is not divided into intertextual and linguistic sections.

Nevertheless, I want to highlight the fact that the thesis will focus mainly on intertextual analysis while linguistic analysis is applied as a subsidiary tool that helps if there are any difficulties on the intertextual level. Huckin (2002) points out that at this stage one can pay attention at the word/phrase, sentence/utterance, and text levels. A researcher may choose to analyze dozens of different aspects of language and linguistic
expressions depending on the salience of the aspects and the purposes of a study. In my research, I am going to concentrate primarily on two features:

a) vocabulary level: “connotation” - as the nuances of the meaning of a word. This point can be illustrated with the word “mollify” in the phrase “Our delegation could not mollify the European parliamentarians”, which imports that Russia is ready to make concessions, while Europe is not ("PACE adopted a tough resolution on Russia”, IZ, 2012, October 2). The linguistic technique is used to give a certain additional framework to the main meaning of a text and might be crucial in reflecting the position of a power structure.

b) textual level: genres of the chosen texts (interview, news articles, analytics). In other words, the standard types or genres. Genre differentiation is significant when I analyze interviews, for example, the interview with Sergei Lavrov “‘Reloading’ can’t last forever” (KO, 2012, October 3) because the genre peculiarities have direct influence on the articulation of a representations. In case of interviews, as we will see later, we may identify two representations: one articulated by a journalist and one articulated by an interviewee.

The third stage is the analysis of sociocultural practices. Fairclough claims that this analysis has many angles and dimensions. At this level, I have carried out the content analysis considering the internal feelings and implications of the retrieved representations, and their roles and purposes. This stage also is conclusive in a sense because it provides visible connections between the theoretical and practical parts of the research by demonstrating which representations of Russian-European relations have more power and influence and why.

3.4. Validity, limitations, and ethical considerations

In addition to the data analysis method, it is necessary to address the question of the validity of the research. Validity turns out to be an extremely debatable issue when it comes to general qualitative research design based primarily on subjective interpretations and the personal perceptions of a researcher. However, it becomes even
more challenging to validate a study based on CDA. Teun van Dijk (1997, 5-6) ascertains that it is so hard to differentiate “good” and “bad” discourse analysis because words, phrases and texts never have fixed exhaustive meanings: these meanings depend on a researcher’s experience, perceptions, and tend to change overtime. This is why it is not a simple task to come up with good evaluation criteria for research based on critical discourse analysis.

While there are an innumerable amount of different approaches and strategies for a qualitative research validation, I will use the scheme suggested by Creswell (2006). This scheme is applied mainly to an ethnographic research, but some of the criteria can be also used to validate a CDA study. Firstly, Creswell (2006, 208) notices the necessity of peer reviews and external checks from a “devil’s advocate” “who asks hard questions about method, meaning and interpretation.” This criterion is secured by research approval process at University of Helsinki. The next point seems to be self-evident, as it highlights the importance of refining the research question in case of a negative result. In other words, all data have to fit well and support the hypothesis being researched. A researcher also has to clearly indicate all the limitations of her study and her personal biases or assumptions. This criterion is addressed in the sub-chapters “Limitations and ethical considerations” and “Limitations and further research”. Finally, one of the crucial ways to validate CDA research is to provide thick descriptions of the phenomena that will let a reader “transfer information to other settings”, which by this point might have been partly achieved (Creswell, 2006, 209).

I must elaborate on three main limitations that affect this study. The first two are embedded in the research design and the last one pertains to ethical problems. The first one is grounded in the nature of CDA research. As it has already been mentioned before, CDA does not give strict guidelines on what aspects of discourse should be studied and as a result, it keeps many options open. Thus, there is a chance that the researcher may stress some less significant aspect the data, while some cardinal locus remains neglected. Therefore, some significant information can be missed. Additionally, as CDA is based on researcher’s perceptions, there will always be the possibility for misinterpretation, thus leading to wrong conclusions or missing information.
The second limitation deals with the linguistic analysis that underpins CDA. As all the analyzed articles are written in Russian, while the main language of the research is English, I have had to translate a sufficient amount of the texts. As a result, some information could be lost due to the fact that I do not have a specific academic background in translation and linguistics. Moreover, some of the articles are rich in metaphors and untranslatable puns. Many words may have a different connotation or even meaning for people coming from different cultural backgrounds.

The ground on which the third limitation rests has clear ethical implication. I have to admit that being a Russian citizen, I adhere to a certain political position. I do not support the current Russian government headed by the president Vladimir Putin and I do not support its politics. Thus, while analyzing discourses, I might be inclined to sympathize with the liberal discourse. Moreover, some of the retrieved representation may also be bias due to the fact that I myself have a well formed opinion of the relations between Russia and Europe. As a result, it might be hard to stay away from my own perceptions of the state of affairs, especially if a certain representation contradicts my views and beliefs, and concentrate only on the was representation is portrayed. Hence, the only means to avoid biases is to be constantly aware of this challenge and pay closer attention and scrutinize the discourses more thoroughly.

3.6. Conclusion

This chapter was designed to outline the research procedures that have been conducted in order to achieve the purpose of the study. Thereby, the research is based on qualitative data analysis primarily due to the fact that it aims at investigating and interpreting non-mathematical data. The data corpus comprises of 50 articles from four Russian newspapers, with both a pro-government and a liberal orientation. It has been decided that the best method to adopt for this investigation was critical discourse analysis because it addresses the power relation of different discourses. The CDA is going to be carried out according to the three-fold scheme suggested by Fairclough, thus including linguistic, intertextual, and sociocultural analysis of the articles (Fairclough,
1995, 62). Finally, the methods of validation and some of the limitations were identified and reported.
CHAPTER 4: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE. REVEALING THE REPRESENTATIONS OF RUSSIAN-EUROPEAN RELATIONS

This chapter presents the results of the data analysis. One of the key findings of the research is that the Pussy Riot case is most commonly used in both pro-government and liberal press to collide Europe and Russia. Consequently, this representation can be seen as hegemonic. It has also been possible to retrieve two representations that clearly belong to the liberal discourse: “Europe as a mentor for Russia” and “Europe as savior”. The representations “Europe as an economic partner” and “Russia as an integral part of Europe” cannot be clearly connected to a particular discourse and are discussed separately.

Therefore, the chapter has the following structure. Firstly, I start by scrutinizing the way the representations are deployed by the newspapers with the help of intertextual analysis. In other words, I explain what kind of representations different newspapers are more likely to exploit. I try to provide evidence of connections between the official press and hegemonic representations and between the liberal press and the representations of Europe as a mentor for Russia and Europe as savior. Secondly, I move on to the next sub-chapter where I uncover the specific details of all the representations. The sub-chapter sequentially focuses on each of them by applying intertextual and linguistic analyses.

4.1 General patterns of the deployment of representations in the newspapers

The representations that have been discovered are not deployed evenly across different newspapers. Though there is a certain correlation between a representation of Russian-European relations and a newspaper, it is not absolute (see APPENDIX 2). For example, if one takes a representation of the relations as a collision of civilization, he cannot be absolutely sure that it belongs to Rossiyskaya gazeta. However, I was able to detect some general patterns of the deployment of different representations. Thus, the relations as a political, civilizational, or religious collision is a representation that is found mainly in Rossiyskaya gazeta and Izvestia. Seeing Europe as a mentor or a savior
is more typical for Kommersant and Vedomosti. The official press refers to those representations only when it wants to illustrate the position of the liberals, quite often ironically. The representations of Europe as a purely economic partner of Russia as well as the representation of Russia as an integral part of Europe were found quite rarely. I can suggest that they are associated not with certain newspapers or discourses, but rather with the ideas of particular scholars and politicians. Now I would like to address the peculiar aspects of the deployment of different representations in the analyzed newspapers.

The hegemonic representation, according to which Russian-European relations are framed as a collision fully, dominates the pro-government press. The possible explanation might be connected with the fact that Rossiyskaya gazeta and Izvestia, as a rule, fully rely on official governmental sources. The opinion articles are generally written by conservative experts and pro-government politicians.

It is even possible to say that this representation is presupposed in the Russian pro-Kremlin press and “the clash” is given as self-evident. The latter quotation provides a clear example of a linguistic presupposition: the journalist in “Civilization without roots” (RG, 2012, August 8) takes it for granted that Europe’s “appraisals” of Russia are “hasty, biased and politically committed and, what is more, that they have been that way for a while” (e.g. “another tide”, “…for some human right organization and mass media… it is just an opportunity to brawl in the anti-Russian field once again”). The fact that the journalist does not see a reason to articulate the foundation for these statements also means that this view is supposed to already be shared by his readers. By the same token, the article "Moscow votes against" (RG, 2012, October 3) reads that “the [PACE] deputies again criticized Russia for the decisions made in the political and juridical sphere” and quotes the State Duma deputy Vyacheslav Nikonov in saying that the PACE resolution is “an ordinary anti-Russian attack.”

It is worth mentioning that in particular cases journalists working in the official press even have to make a specific effort to articulate the hegemonic representation, for instance, when their interviewees or other sources of information have alternative opinions on relations between Russian and Europe. This idea can be better explained
with the help of the interview in *Izvestia* with Thorbjorn Jagland, Secretary General of the Council of Europe. The opening sentence of the article is: “We do not consider the banishment of Russia from the Council of Europe as our goal” (*IZ*, 2012, October 2). On the intertextual level, we can see how the journalist’s “lead” and questions correspond with the representation of a “collision” and frame the ideas of the interviewer, which could also be rather connected with another discourse. I elaborate on this example in more detail in the sub-chapter devoted specifically to the representation of the collision.

In addition to this, since the representation of European-Russian relations as a collision is not solid, some articles combine different aspect of this representation. This is exemplified by the article “Civilization without roots” (*RG*, 2012, August 8). The article can be conditionally divided into two parts and the first one is the lead written by the journalist. In particular, the journalist stresses the idea of “double standards” as a cause of the collision between Russia and Europe. The second part is the reported speech of Lukashevich, the official representative of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, who believes that the clash is intrinsically tied to the fact that “post-modernist” Europe “forgets about its religious roots”. Lukashvich portrays Russia as a country of high moral and spiritual standards, thus making it superior to Europe. He also denounces the fact that “they [many people in the West] support the full freedom of the actions similar to the ones the Pussy Riot band is ‘famous’ for” (“Civilization without roots”, *RG*, 2012, August 8). What we can observe here is a visceral but obviously unintended contradiction. Lukashevich thinks that a main cause of the wide gap between Russia and Europe is the contradiction between “religious” Russia and “post-religious” Europe, while the journalist thinks that it because of the European policies that are based on “double-standards”. It is notable that both of these aspects belong to the same “collision” discourse.

This contradiction can be found not only in the meanings, but also in the style of the two parts of the article. While the journalist uses more colloquial and ironic language (e.g. “in order to spite”), Lukashevich applies an official, or business, style in general (e.g. “the fundamental international legal apparatus regarding human rights...
determines...”) and even jumps to an elevated style when he speaks about Russian morality (e.g. “the oblivion of the moral norms... is baneful”) (RG, 2012, August 8).

Having thus discussed how the official press uses different representations of Russian-European relations, it is time to consider this issue with regards to the liberal press.

The “collision” representation would not be hegemonic if it was not present in the liberal press as well as in the pro-government press. The analyzed liberal press, Vedomosti and Kommersant, cannot avoid highlighting it when presenting the point of view of governmental officials: for example, Tarasenko in the article called "Segey Naryshkin disposed of the PACE's amendments" (KO, 2012, September 28) quotes Sergey Naryshkin, who is speaking about the anti-Russian attitudes of the PACE leaders.

However, while the “collision” representation constitutes the core message of the articles from the pro-government Izvestia and Rossiyskaya gazeta, Vedomosti and Kommersant are more inclined to add some marginal aspects or at least offer some additional opinions to the hegemonic one. For instance, the Kommersant article "Segey Naryshkin disposed of PACE's amendments" (KO, 2012, September 28) is clearly divided into two parts. The first part is dedicated to the description of the position of the Russian official delegation on the forthcoming PACE session and includes the commentaries of Sergey Naryshkin, Chairman of the State Duma, and Aleksey Pushkov, Chairman of the State Duma's International Affairs Committee. Then, in the second part, the author moves on to outlining the European and, finally, comes to presenting an alternative understanding of the modern relations between Russia and Europe by referencing a geopolitical expert called Fedor Lukjanov. As it has been said, in contrast to this article, the majority of the articles in Rossiyskaya gazeta and Izvestia are limited to the description of the Russian official position. It is possible to conclude that the liberal press is more prone to the collision of different types of representations within one article. For example, in an interview with the head of the ministry of foreign affairs, Sergei Lavrov, a journalist definitely shares liberal views and doubts, while Lavrov articulates the representation of “collision” caused by Western intrusion into
Russian domestic affairs (“Reloading’ can’t last forever”, KO, 2012, October 3). This will be discussed in detail in the following sub-chapter.

Nevertheless, the dominant representations in the liberal press are “Europe as a mentor” and “Europe as a savior”. This type of representation is rarely found in the pro-government newspapers. Generally, unlike Izvestia and Rossiyskaya gazeta, the Kommersant and Vedomosti authors tend to focus on the point of view of the European politicians, while not giving a lot of consideration to the opinions of Russian authorities. Thus, in the article "European deputies stood up for the Russian one" (KO, 2012, September 14) the author extensively quotes the representatives of the European parliament, the resolution itself and the fallen into out of Kremlin’s favor deputy of the State Duma, Gennady Gudkov.

4.2 Russian-European relations as a cultural/political/religious collision

Having broadly shown how different representations are used in different newspapers, I want to now describe some specific aspects of these representations.

The differences between the attitudes towards the performance and punishment of the punk band Pussy Riot in Russia and Europe are often symbolically transferred to the clash of the European and Russian civilizations on political, religious, and cultural levels. This representation is clearly formulated in the opinion article “Europe-Russia: what we spell the death of” (Rahr, RG, 2012, September 11). Its author, famous German political expert Alexander Rahr, describes Russian-European relations by saying that: “New conflicts shake the relations of Russia and Europe. Many people in Germany believe that the mutual understanding and connection between the West and East are hopelessly lost. The idea of the common European home is dead” (Rahr, RG, 2012, September 11).

Now let us look more closely at the examples of how this representation is constructed. One of the most distinct instances is the previously mentioned interview with Thorbjorn Jagland (“We do not consider the banishment of Russia from the Council of Europe as our goal”, IZ, 2012, October 2). The subheading “Secretary General of the Council of
Europe speaks about the attitudes of the European authorities towards our country” sets the tone for the interview right away by using the “they” vs. “we” dichotomy. The lead text written by the journalist reads: “And the countries, included in this Council, must follow the recommendations, Thorbjorn Jagland, Secretary General of the-CE thinks” grammatically stressing the necessity and obligation of following these recommendations by using the strong model verb “must”. For a Russian reader that tone may mean that the interviewee in particular and the council in general try to speak to Russia from a position of strength. The interviewer tries repeatedly to show that the Council of Europe tries to affect Russia by asking questions such as: “if those recommendations are adopted, what consequences they may have for Russia”; “what, in this situation, the control by the cabinet council may lead to”, “will Russia be banished from the Council of Europe” (“We do not consider the banishment of Russia from the Council of Europe as our goal”, IZ, 2012, October 2). All the questions imply that the recommendations may have negative consequences for the country.

In contrast, Thorbjorn Jagland is very accurate in expressing himself and putting his ideas into words: “But we in the Council of Europe in general and the cabinet council in particular are anxious about … some laws”; “There are some consideration I would like to discuss with the Russian authorities”; “I will try to find the most effective way of using the information I am acquiring in the course of monitoring” (“We do not consider the banishment of Russia from the Council of Europe as our goal”, IZ, 2012, October 2). Jagland does not mention any actions towards Russia, apart from general considerations and overall analysis of the situation. It sets his statements against the journalist’s concerns and the body of the interview against the heading and the lead. The following conclusion can be drawn from the article: the questions asked by the journalist and Jagland’s statements highlighted in the heading and the lead contrast with the general tone of Jagland’s discourse due to the fact that the journalist tries to sustain and reproduce the representation of European-Russian relations as a collision of civilizations, despite the fact that his interviewee tries to convey a different perception to the Russian readers.

A similar approach is also used in the interview with the PACE President Jean-Claude Mignon (“I can come to Moscow to meet Naryshkin”, IZ, 2012, September 2). While
Mignon stresses the basic order and regulations of the CE and calls for mutual dialogue, the journalist seems to be interested in trying to detect any latent disparities or hostile attitudes towards Russia.

In addition, I must note that the representation of “the collision” is not just based on one idea. In truth, there are several aspects that shape Russian-European relations as a clash rather than as integration. In accordance with the first one, the clash of Europe and Russia is caused by the preconceived opinions and prejudices against Russia. According to the second one, the cause of the clash is the desire of European politicians to intervene in Russian domestic affairs. The third one is the idea that Russia and Europe are two fully different civilizations, mentalities, and as a result, they will never be able to understand each other fully. I call these aspects “double-standard policies”, “Europe as an intruder”, and “mentality/religious collision”. One must remember that those aspects should not be thought of as being absolutely separate from each other because quite often they are intertwined together in the same article. In the following sub-chapters, I will elaborate on them in more detail.

4.2.1 Double-standard policy

The first aspect to analyze is the so called “double-standard policy”, which Europe supposedly applies to Russia. Generally speaking, it can be conceived as the idea that Europe is biased against Russia and applies higher standards to it than to other developed countries. As it has been mentioned, this representation is common for Izvestia and Rossiyskaya gazeta.

This idea can be illustrated with the article “And how does it work there” (RG, 2012, August 20). The whole article is devoted to bringing up examples from different European countries of how the European law has treated people who have not respected sacred objects or buildings. The article is written in an extremely ironic manner. Here is an excerpt from the article.

After a photographer decided to make a picture of a man and woman dressed in costumes of Adam and Eve on the solea of Cologne Cathedral in 1977, in
accordance with the German law, he had to be on parole for four month and pay the fine of 1.5 thousand euro. And latter-day ‘Adam’ had to pay around two thousand euro” (“And how does it work there”, RG, 2012, August 20).

Then, the article scrutinizes the regulations of the European court of human right (ECHR) on “self-expressions and performances”. For example, it says “all the more so, Russia joined the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 1998 and took the obligations to consider the ECHR position…” and presents some of the statements from the convention that may seem contradictory to the negative reaction of some Western politicians with regards to the Pussy Riot case. Thus, Rossiyskaya gazeta mentions that “the ECHR thinks that the government has the right to take measures of state and legal… response in order ‘to prevent certain people from having an impression that their religious views have become the object of unfounded and insulting attacks’” (“And how does it work there”, RG, 2012, August 20). What the author obviously implies is that Russia behaves correctly and tries to comply with the European regulations, while its European partners find baseless reasons for challenging Russia. This is seen as a double standard because these reasons do not correspond with European standards.

In general, the representation of “the double-standards” is often bound to the idea of the following proverb “people who live in glass houses should not throw stones”. One can find it in a variety of articles, including “Should not go” (RG, 2012, September 28), “Segei Lavrov proves himself as a sport diplomat” (KO, 2012, August 21), and “The Ministry of foreign affairs has detected the conflict of civilizations in the sentence to Pussy Riot” (IZ, 2012, August 22). Let me provide several more examples. According to the article “Moscow is ready for the criticism” (RG, 2012, September 28), Aleksey Pushkov, Chairman of the State Duma's International Affairs Committee, assures people that “… Russia is not going to fulfill any violent appeals based upon double-standards…” by saying that “We are going to have dialogue only on the basis of co-operations, without any diktat.”

Similarly, Marc Roussset, a French political scholar and historian, expresses the same view in his commentary in the article “The Crusade” (RG, 2012, August 22):
… In France acts of hooliganism or violations of religious feelings are punished by a prison sentence. Let someone try to arrange something like this [the Pussy Riot performance] in the Notre Dame de Paris or in the Great Mosque … I am sure that the reaction of congregation and, I hope, of the authorities would be representative.

This commentary is crucial for my analysis, as well as for the readers of Rossiyskaya gazeta because it introduces the opinion of a Western historian: it appears that even the representatives of the European elite confirm the idea of “double-standards” though they do not have any reason to slander their homeland.

All of these provide sufficient evidence that the representation of “double-standard” policies is deeply rooted in the official discourse. This representation as a whole infers that the contradictions between Russia and Europe are caused by a “double standard” that Europe has applied to Russia and that Russia could be an integral part of Europe if Europe treated it impartially.

4.2.2 Europe as an intruder

The second explanation of the collision that one can find in the Russian press is the alleged attempt of Europe to intrude into Russian domestic affairs. Let me start with some examples.

In the Izvestia article "PACE adopted a tough resolution on Russia” (IZ, 2012, October, 2) we can see Europe portrayed as trying to impose its values on Russia. In response to this intrusion, the Russian delegation does everything it can to resist this influence and protect the interests of the country: “Moscow responded to the preparing resolution ... ultimately strictly”, the “Russian delegation became strictly opposing, fighting against the project of the resolution” ("PACE adopted a tough resolution on Russia”, IZ, 2012, October, 2). The same idea can be found in the previously mentioned interview with Mingon “I can come to Moscow to meet Naryshkin” (IZ, 2012, September 2). One of the remarks of the journalist shows her surprise: “But Pussy Riot is not included in the
obligations [of Russia to the CE]!” meaning that the CE is looking for loopholes to put extra-pressure on Russia, in addition to the legal means that it has the right to use.

What is central to the analysis of this representation is that Russia is portrayed as if it remained open to dialogue with Europe despite all the pressure Europe puts on it. Hence, it is possible to derive the following conclusion: if Europe was a bit more flexible, Russia, in turn, would be ready to yield as well. This point can be illustrated with the following quotation: “Our delegation could not mollify the European parliamentarians”, which implies that Russia is ready to make concessions, while Europe is not (“PACE adopted a tough resolution on Russia”, IZ, 2012, October 2). In another article, one of the representatives of the Russian delegation comments on the resolution in the following way: “this time could repulse” (“PACE adopted a tough resolution on Russia”, IZ, 2012, October 2). It means that the European recommendations are seen by the delegation as unhelpful and obstructive.

Moreover, sometimes the European attempts to influence Russia are understood and portrayed as attempts to violate Russian sovereignty. We can see this in the article “Moscow is ready for the criticism” (RG, 2012, September 28), where Aleksey Pushkov says “However, some conditions make these document deliberately unacceptable for the Russian delegation. It says that we have to revise our legislation.” Further on, he continues “it is absolutely obvious that nobody in the world revises their laws in accordance with the requirements from abroad. We remain a sovereign state, though we are the member of the Council of Europe. Sometimes the CE forgets about it” (“Moscow is ready for the criticism”, RG, 2012, September 28). (See also the article “PACE will not see the Speaker of the State Duma” (2012, IZ, September, 27): “‘Nobody in the world revises their laws in accordance to the requirements from abroad,’ – Pushkov declares. - ‘Besides, the European countries as well as the USA should pay attention on their own rules. Participation in demonstrations is always penalized by imprisonment or huge fines.’”) I have to mention here that, as has been discussed in the literature review, the question of sovereignty and power is a central aspect of Russian political discourse because it underpins the concept of “a powerful Russia”.
What is only implied in the article “Moscow is ready for the criticism” (RG, 2012, September 28) is openly stated by the Aleksander Rahr in the article “Europe-Russia: what we spell the death of” (RG, 2012, September 11). Rahr says that the West:

…sees itself in full authority to export its idea of a liberal revolution all around the world. In the West, people piously believe that democracy and human rights are universal values of all the mankind and that liberty should be implanted and even forced… When the Russian elite reproaches the West for undermining the principles of the state sovereignty and, thus, for violating international law, it gets the following response: the world order has changed, when human right are violated somewhere, the liberal West has a moral right to intervene into domestic affairs of other countries protecting the weak from arbitrariness of dictators.

It is clear that this idea is not well received by the Russian government and most likely by many Russian people as well because they still, to a certain extent, show their Soviet imperialistic views and believe that Europe does not have any right to impose its liberal ideas.

4.2.3 Cultural/spiritual collision

The third reason underlying the conflict between Russia and Europe that I could find in the articles is a cultural or civilizational clash. In my opinion, this image is one of the most contradictory ones because it has many variations. Some authors just stress the differences between Russian and European mentalities (e.g. “Sick in the head”, (IZ, 2012, September 12)), others portray Europe as Satan trying to destroy Orthodox Russia (e.g. Dugin’s quotations in “Eurasians threatens to roll ‘March of millions’ under asphalt” (IZ, 2012, September, 14)).

It seems that the most wide-spread basis for this representation is the idea that Europe is “post-religious”, “postmodernist”, or “post-Christian”, while Russia is the only country adhering to “genuine Christianity” and spirituality. This position is well explained in the commentary in the article “The Crusade” (RG, 2012, August 22) by the German
political scientist Alexander Rahr. The article actually deals with the action of the Ukrainian feminist protest movement called FEMEN whose representatives destroyed a monumental cross commemorating the victims of political repressions as a response to the Pussy Riot sentence. Rahr says:

But it seems that everything goes towards the war of cultures, of civilizations, where the Western post-religious world, rather aggressively and dogmatically worshipping liberal values, is on the one side and the fundamentalist Christian traditions of the non-Christian societies, to which I ascribe Russia and the Ukraine and where religion was prohibited for 80 years, are on the other side. (“The Crusade”, RG, 2012, August 22).

Alexander Rahr elaborates even more upon this concept in the article “Europe-Russia: what we spell the death of” (RG, 2012, September 11) also published in Rossiyskaya gazeta:

… After the communist persecution of religion for almost the whole 20th century, Russia now is trying to develop according to the neo-Christianity… Mockery of the own religion, century-old spiritual traditions and priests is not considered to be a bad taste among the Western intellectuals… In Russia everything is different… Even unbelieving Russians sympathize with religion because they understand that the return to traditional roots is the guarantee of the nation’s development.

At the same time, sometimes this representation can also imply Russian moral and spiritual superiority over Europe. In this sense, the already mentioned article “Crusade” (RG, 2012, August 22), which deals with the actions of the aforementioned FEMEN movement, provides a distinctive example of this. The aspect that is important for the research is found in the phrase: “Practically they [the activists]… are not involved in the investigative actions, willingly communicate with the fans online, and declare that Europe will protect them because they are almost like Timoshenko, but younger.” This phrase in particular as well as the whole article refers to the idea of the disruptive influence of Europe. Like many other former soviet republics, the Ukraine had two geopolitical alternatives in geopolitics after the collapse of the Soviet Union: to co-
operate more closely with Russia or to strive for Western integration. As the Ukraine chose Europe, it is often seen as having betrayed Russia in Russian politics. “The Crusade” (RG, 2012, August 22) particularly accentuates the idea of what can happen in a country that was “seduced” by Europe: one can even destroy a cross without any legal prosecution. The article, thus, intrinsically gives a warning to the Russians who are inclined to share European values and implicitly rebukes Europe for its spiritual inferiority.

A more moderate version of the representation can be found in the article “Sick in the head” (IZ, 2012, September 12). Its author criticizes Russian intellectuals who choose to leave Russia for the USA or Europe because “the majority of the western citizens have very approximate idea of the past and present Russian history, of the peculiarities of the Russian mentality.” It is possible to infer out of this phrase that Europeans and Russians will never be able to fully understand each other because they are intrinsically different and a Russian person does not fit in well in Europe.

Finally, I must provide an example from a speech made by Alexander Dugin, the leader of the Eurasian Union and a famous Russian philosopher and political scholar. Dugin is quoted in Rossiyskaya gazeta as saying: “Satan is coming… Everyone who sympathizes with liberals, Pussy Riot, the West belongs to Satan…If America and Europe stand behind the organization of anti-Putin demonstrations, billions of other civilizations stand behind the Eurasians…” (“Eurasians threatens to roll ‘March of millions’ under asphalt”, RG, 2012, September 14). Of course, it is quite a radical statement, but the fact that it was included in an article of a federal newspaper shows that it may be regarded as an extreme example of the hegemonic representation. Moreover, it also provides an example of the combination of two aspects of “the collision” representation, namely “Europe as an intruder” and the religious collision.

4.2.4 Media war against Russia

To wrap up the representation of Russian-European relations as a collision of two civilizations, I would like to touch on such the belief in a conspiracy by the Western
countries against Russia or in a media/propaganda war against Russia. I do not consider it as a separate representation, but it is important to understand this idea as it may be one of the framing premises of the “collision” representation. This idea is not quite clearly articulated in the press. Usually it is just mentioned as a matter of fact when journalists or their sources try to explain the origin of the religious clash or the supposed desire of Europe to influence Russia.

This idea is explained well by the author of the article “Punk-prayer and the responsibility of the government: Why they cannot be forgiven”, Sergey Markov (Markov, VE, 2012, August 17). He says that for the majority of Russian society, the actions of Pussy Riot are “a part of the strategic campaign profaning the values sacred for the Russian nation. The final goal of this campaign is the annihilation of Russian nation as a subject of world history.” Therefore,

the Pussy Riot action is not a folly of young girls, but a part of a global conspiracy against Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church… The further the campaign in support of Pussy Riot is deployed, the more foreigners are taking part in it, - the more confirmation it gives to the version of conspiracy. (Markov, VE, 2012, August 17).

The conspiracy is also bound up in the belief that Europe conducts a “media war” against Russia: “The hype around the Pussy Riot must be considered in connection with the fact that though the Cold war is over, the information war against Russia is going on” (The Crusade”, RG, 2012, August 22). Subsequently, a well-known Russian journalist, Arkadiy Mamontov, mentions in his interview to Izvestia that actions against Russia, including the Pussy Riot performance, are arranged in order to destroy the Orthodox culture (“Arkadiy Mamontov: ‘There is no ordered information. These are my views’”, IZ, 2012, September 12)

At this point, it is also important to say that the “media/propaganda war” idea is shared not only by the journalists working in pro-government newspapers, but rather is a deeply ingrained concept in the Russian official politics. This can be seen in the following quote from the Kommersant interview with the head of the ministry of foreign affairs Sergei Lavrov:
Unfortunately, Russia often has to face rough distortion of truth and direct lies by some of the world mass media... The same thing is the Pussy Riot propaganda campaign, hyped up in the West. Haste and partiality of the most of the commentaries from the EU countries and from the USA allow concluding that the authors did not bother to examine the circumstances of the case, process of judicial session and norms of the Russia legislation. (‘‘Reloading’ cannot last forever”, KO, 2012, October 3)

Having thus outlined the main features of the representation of European and Russian relations as a collision, let me move forward and describe the representations of the liberal press.

### 4.3 Representations of the liberal press

While I have enough evidence to conclude that Russian-European relations are most commonly portrayed as two collided civilizations, there are a number of other representations which constitute an entirely different picture of the relationship. In the liberal press, we can observe a different set of relations than in the pro-government press. I call them: “Europe as a mentor” and “Europe as a savior”. Some of the aspects of these representations are parallel or similar to the representation of relations as a collision, but with a number of different connotations. In the following sub-chapters, I am going to uncover some of their key aspects and features.

#### 4.3.1. Europe as a mentor

One of the essential representations for the Russian liberal press is the Europe as a mentor or a teacher that tries to educate and implant European values in Russia or “cure” the authoritarian Russian regime. Though the representation has some variations, it most likely originates from within official European discourse because after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Europe has always seen the establishment of Western-style democracies as its main mission in Eastern Europe. Basically, this representation
can be seen as the reverse side of the “intrusion into Russian affairs” idea. The difference pertains to the fact that “Europe as a mentor” implies a positive influence rather than unwanted intrusion.

This representation well illustrated by the article “European deputies stood up for the Russian” (KO, 2012, September 14). It is mainly dedicated to the description of the critical resolution adopted by the European parliament and to denouncing some of the recent legal cases, including the Pussy Riot case, and to unseating the opposition deputy of the State Duma, Gennady Gudkov. In the article, Europe is portrayed not as an impartial judge, but as a “big brother” that is caring and strict. The following statement clearly illustrates my point: “The authors of the resolution are convinced that their pressure may cause positive changes in Russia.” To a certain extent, the representation is similar to “the intrusion” representation because the analyzed Kommersant article stresses the fact that the European parliament tries to influence Russian politics (e.g. “Brussels is convinced that the pressure on Russia can be effective”) and quotes one of the authors of the resolution as saying: “Apart from the emotional reaction of the Russian diplomats and politicians, we sometimes also see concrete return steps from their side.” What distinguishes this article from the articles that are subsumed within “the intrusion” representation is that it seems to simply accept that the European efforts are natural without actually qualifying this position. The journalist is not concerned about whether there is actual pressure or not or whether the external pressure is a negative or positive thing, rather he is just concerned with its effectiveness.

Therein, it is worth considering the structure of the article. The official opinion is expressed in one paragraph situated towards the end. It is significant to mention that the journalist chooses very radical statements for illustrating an official position. The head of the international affairs committee of the State Duma, Aleksey Pushkov, is quoted in the article saying: “The European parliament looks like a parasite that wants to leech to the protest movement that expresses the wishes of a part of the Russian society…” (“European deputies stood up for the Russian”, 2012, September 14). According to Pushkov, the authors of the resolution “proceed from the wrong premises that they can always put forward their terms to Moscow, and the development of the relations with them is an award for fulfilling these terms.” It would probably be not incorrect to
conclude that the description of the Russian official position in *Kommersant* may be somehow associated with a description of a “naughty child” who does not follow the obvious and rational decision making path. For example, in Pushkov’s statements: “The Russian authorities assert that the most appropriate response to Strasbourg’s statement is to fully ignore it” (“European deputies stood up for the Russian”, KO, 2012, September 14). It is evident that the article combines two representations of relations: Europe as a mentor and Europe as an intruder, as it is articulated by Pushkov.

A similar representation emerges in the *Kommersant* articles “Russia was failed on the European session” (KO, 2012, October 3) and “Russia is passing a hard session” (KO, 2012, October 2). Both headings metaphorically refer to Russia as a student who has failed an exam: in Russian the word “session” («сессия») also means a series of examinations after every school semester. The representation is also advanced by the author of the document Andreas Gros, quoted in the article “Russia was failed on the European session” (KO, 2012, October 3), who says that “such documents do not change anything by themselves. They are like a doctor’s diagnosis and prescription. It is in the interests of Russia to take recommendation into account.”

The article "Sergey Naryshkin disposed of PACE’s amendments" (KO, 2012, September 28) sheds light on the origin of that image: “Now, in the context of the hard economic situation in Europe and its loss of considerable leverages on the world scene, Moscow perceives in a haughty manner all the complaints from the PACE.” It means that Russian authorities “do not want or are not going to undertake any significant efforts to change the attitudes in Strasbourg because of some considerations based upon principles.” It is possible to interpret this idea as meaning that perhaps Russia felt that Europe was not as strong economically now as it had been before and did not have as many tools to repress Russia’s political activities.

The “Europe as a teacher” representaions can be not only critical and perceived as preaching, as we have seen in the examples above, but also inspiring and motivating. In an interview with a famous director, Kirill Serebrennikov, a journalist assumes that as Russia attracts a lot of attention today, this attention should positively influence the
awareness of the Russian movie industry abroad ("What we are doing is an attempt to put oneself right", KO, 2012, August 30). The director answers:

The attention is attracted, but what kind of attention! Stupid statements of the Russian government are the worst regime for the Russian cinema. We are all the hostages of the Pussy Riot process. No movie promoters, no cultural events can improve the image of Russia, if there is not justice in the country, just corruption, hatred and obscurantism. All that we do in cinema are the patriotic attempts to show that we are not so wild and horrible as it seems. We are Europeans, we can consider a human-being, love, and have read “Faust”…. It is an attempt to apologize for what is going on in the country.

It means that for a certain category of Russian people, Europe looks like a moral standard that Russia should aspire to reach.

By the same token, we can analyze the article "Gudkov calls upon his colleague in the Duma not to disgrace in front of Europe" (IZ, 2012, September 5). The opposition politician Gennady Gudkov says that “If Russia does not want to disgrace itself in Europe, if it wants to be involved in the European integration; it has to behave as a normal and adequate partner.” Moreover, he says that he is going to meet the head of the European Parliament to discuss the situation in Russia. Obviously, the pursuit of European integration is a natural desire for opposition politicians like Gudkov who share pro-Western views because Europe serves as an example of how a democracy should function and develop. The most striking thing about this article is that it was published in the pro-government Izvestia. The article consists almost solely of different statements by Gudkov, with very few journalistic comments. I should point out that the way this image is built into the overall Izvestia discourse may turn it into an example of “the intrusion” representation for the Izvestia readers. Gudkov’s attempts to appeal to Europe and involve it as a judge may be seen by them as a confirmation that Russian liberal politicians are in collision with European politicians, while Europe with their help tries to intrude into Russian domestic politics. This is another illustration of how the representation of Europe as a mentor works as the other side of the representation of Europe as an intruder.
4.3.2. Europe as a savior

The representation of Europe as a savior is similar in many ways to the representation of Europe as a mentor. However, if the former mainly infers that Russia should learn and adopt European values and democratic standards, then the latter ascribes a greater role in Russian development to Europe. This corresponds with the beliefs of the pro-Western part of society who believe that the West could and should play a more substantial role in making Putin’s regime more democratic. Let us look at some examples.

The first article to consider is “PACE and Russia get closer with seven-league strides” (KO, 2012, September 6). As opposed to the aforementioned discussion on the representations of the “double standards” that Europe applies to Russia, this article articulates the idea that PACE treats the Russian government too gently. First of all, its author rigorously analyses all the critical suggestions that PACE makes for Russia and covers each one in detail. (It is interesting to have a look at how this approach is different from the approach used by the author of the Izvestia interview “I can come to Moscow to meet Naryshkin” (IZ, 2012, September 2). She refers to the PACE recommendations in a highly informal and direct manner: “Duh! Here is the requirement to revise the verdict to Pussy Riot, to stop breaking up demonstrations…”)

The close attention to the PACE requirements indicates the value and importance that the Kommersant authors attach to them. Again, it directly contradicts to the multiple articles from Izvestia where the requirements of PACE were portrayed as unfounded.

Secondly, while reading the article, it becomes self-evident that the Kommersant authors look at the resolution and at the situation in Russia with European values in mind and as such they take into consideration “the functioning of the ‘pluralistic democracy’, supremacy of law as well of human rights and basic liberties” (“PACE and Russia get closer with seven-league strides”, KO, 2012, September 6).

In order to uncover the specific aspects of the representation that the article frames, I will describe the structure. As it has already been said, firstly, the article provides us with the opinions of the European officials: “The speakers are confirmed that the upcoming months will play decisive role in a democratic future of Russia” (“PACE and Russia get closer with seven-league strides”, KO, 2012, September 6). Secondly, it
mentions the position of Russian officials in one (!) passage saying that a vice-speaker of PACE Leonid Slutsky, representing the Russian delegation during the discussion of the report by the Monitoring committee, “was content with the project of the resolution having called it ‘balanced and critical within reasonable limits’”.

For the representation we analyze, it is more important to pay attention to the end of the article where opposition politicians, including Vladimir Ryzhkov who called the resolution “week and even cowardly”, are quoted (“PACE and Russia get closer with seven-league strides”, KO, 2012, September 6). Ryzhkov continues by saying that “the tone of the resolution does not reflect the situation in our country” because “according to his words, Russia de facto does not meet the European conventions at all: ‘the Monitoring committee should have given strict time constrains to comply with the requirement. Instead of it, they got away with the general phrases’”. We can conclude that one of the main points of the text is to rebuke Europe for its inadequate and insufficient evaluation of the Russian government. It means that at least a part of Russian society believes that Europe may be or actually is able to influence the Russian government. Moreover, there are people who actually expect Europe to take certain tangible measures apart from just expressing its disappointment.

The article “The Pussy Riot list” (VE, 2012, September 11) has a very similar structure to the previously analyzed article from Kommersant. It extensively refers to the representatives of the European parliament. Then, it briefly mentions the Russian official position without providing a direct quotation. Then, the authors provide several quotes from the Pussy Riot lawyer Mark Feygin, who hopes that “the new resolution will urge the Russian judicial authorities to adopt a legitimate and humane decision” with regards to Pussy Riot case.

This representation of Europe as an anticipated savior is even more clear in an opinion article written by Alexander Yanov, a historian from the City University of New York, called “Notes of historian: To remember history and not to lose hope” (Yanov, VE, 2012, September 7). Yanov feels that Europe plays a fundamental role in establishing Russian democracy and working towards transforming Putin’s regime. He attaches tremendous importance to the “protests of the European public against “the witch
trials’’ in the 21-century Moscow.’’ The situation in Russia today reminds him of the Soviet Union of the 1970 and the Pussy Riot case reminds him of the dissidents’ trials in the 1970s. Yanov asserts that the split of the Russian elite under the threat from the West was one of the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union:

The USSR decayed and the smell of rot … turned out to be unbearable for the [European] public… The same thing happens now with Putin’s regime. It is decaying. The Pussy Riot case as a distinct symptom of degeneration roused the [European] public. (Yanov, VE, 2012, September 7).

The author believes that “the initial (but critical, able to split the elite of the regime) shove should come from outside [of Russia]”, “The shove” from Europe does not imply anything “dramatic”, but just “a financial investigation”, namely an attempt to find Putin’s assets. It would split the Russian elite and thus give the Russian opposition a chance at power.

I suppose that the representation of Europe as a savior might be crucial for the Russian liberal press. This image resonates with the hopes of the pro-Western Russians who inherently believe that at some point - after another disputable legal case or a human rights violation - Europe will no longer be able to deal with Putin’s authoritarian regime. However, the regime will not be able to survive solely, as for example Belarus does, due to the dependence on the economic connections with Europe. Thus, the only option it will have is to become more democratic. Hence, the more attention that the human rights violations gets in Europe, the more probable it is that the Russian government will react to it. This might be one of the reasons for such a detailed description of the European reaction and Russia’s demonstrative disregard towards it.

4.4. Marginal representations of Russian-European relations

In the course if the analysis, it was possible to detect two more representations of Russian-European relations, namely “Europe as an economic partner” and “Russia as an integral part of Europe”. Because these representations are not quite wide-spread, I am reluctant to include them under the government/liberal or official/unofficial categories. I
can only mention that they seem to be more common in the liberal press than in the pro-government press. However, it might be connected with the fact that the liberal press is more prone to presenting versatile representations than to sticking to a particular one. Anyway, as the goal of my study is to explore the representations rather than organize them into categories, the following sub-chapter presents the linguistic and intertextual analysis of these final two representations.

4.4.1 Europe as an economic partner

First, I would like to address the representation of Europe as an economic partner. This representation portrays Russian-European relations as if they were based solely on the mutual economic advantages. This representation implies that the relations should be free of any political or ideological elements and be founded upon mutual economic benefit. Though this representation is quite rare compared to the others, it is worth examining it due to the fact that it is important to the political discourse of Putin and Medvedev, which will be elaborated upon in the discussion chapter.

An example of this image can be found in the article “Strasbourg is detrimental to Naryshkin” (VE, 2012, September 27). The article discusses Naryshkin’s denial to participate in the PACE session and looks at the different strategies behind his participation. The main idea of the article is the fact that Russia is presented as an equal partner of Europe. The specific aspects of this idea can be summarized as follows: though the resolution is extremely negative and PACE might be biased, Russia has to behave rationally. Russia had taken some responsibilities, but it also should not support an “unbridled and reactionary attitude.” Russia has to work with Europe as long as it is beneficial because failure to cooperate may in particular hurt its image.

The second article written is called “In the shade of Syria” (VE, 2012, August 2). It analyzes the visit of Vladimir Putin to Great Britain. This was his first visit in seven years. The main idea of the article is that relations between the two countries are developing despite all of the political disagreements, including the disagreement with the results of the Pussy Riot case.
To conclude this sub-chapter, I want to provide a quotation from article "Farewell to the pan-European home" (Rahr, IZ, 2012, August 16). This article sheds light on the emergence of the "Europe as an economic partner” representation and its implications. The article states: “Russia was interested in the particular projects and in the dialogue with Germany on the European security… Berlin from the very beginning perceives the dialogue as a forum for communication between the established German civil society and the incipient Russian.” In accordance with this statement, we may think that the difficulties of European-Russian relations are tied to the fact that the Russian authorities see Europe purely as an economic partner and do not understand how Russian domestic politics can spoil its relationship with Europe. This causes difficulties and misunderstanding, “but it always seems for Russians that the criticism from the West is connected to the too primitive understanding of Russian reality, with the ‘double-standards’ policies or with a certain ‘order’” (IZ, 2012, August 16). On the other hand, the moral standards of European society do not let it maintain relations with a regime that is not fully democratic without attempting to reinforce democratic values.

4.4.2. Russia as a part of the Western world

Finally, I have retrieved several examples from the articles that try to depict Russia as a valid member of the West. In the article “Punk-prayer and the responsibility of the government: Government should be a shock absorber” (Lukjanov, VE, 2012, August 17) the author Fedor Lukjanov also concentrates on the clash of civilizations. The peculiar feature lies in the fact that this is not a collision between Europe and Russia, but rather between two other trends: on the one hand, the global community and globalization are themselves washing away traditional views, norms and rules, and, on the other hand, the rise of traditionalism turns into a “destructive obscurantism.” Thus, the author describes the world, including Europe and Russia, as being filled with struggle between liberalism and traditionalism. What is important here is that Russia is placed on the same level as the USA and Europe.

Another perspective on Russia as a part of Europe is presented in the article "To remember history and not to lose hope: It will take a long time" (Inozemtsev, VE, 2012,
The article defies the idea articulated by the political scholar Yanov that the relations between the West and Russia are now similar to those of the Cold war period, or even of the 17th century, when Europe was a direct threat to the Russian statehood. According to the author, due to the fact that Russia is no longer a world super-power, Russian-European relations are limited to, on one the one hand, the West using “milliards of dollars [of the Russian elite] parked in its banks” and, on the other hand, to Western intellectuals being concerned with the oppressed position of some social categories in Russia. In other words, with the Russian position in the world being so weak, one cannot speak about any serious possibility of any conflict between Russia and the West. Moreover, the author believes that the rising youth in Russia, which “has never breathed air of unfreedom” and has not lived in the Soviet Union, already knows “if not the European values, than at least the European way of life” (Inozemtsev, VE, 2012, September 10). Thus, these youths will sooner or later take power in the country and as such, the author believes that the European norms and beliefs will become dominant in Russia politics.

A similar idea can be found in the article “Pussy Riot, clash of civilizations, and revolution” (Rahr, IZ, 2012, August 8):

…one third [of the Russian population] is an educated middle class that has the same perception of the Pussy Riot case as the West has. These people want to live like people do in Europe; Russia with its ‘peculiar world-view’ is alien to them. The number of ‘the educated westernizers’ is growing by leaps and bounds, and they will constitute the majority of Russians of the next generation.

Thus, this article may be seen as a combination of “the collision” and “the integration” representations.

I also have to mention that the representation of Russia as a part of Europe seems to be present in the press primarily as the opinion of certain politicians or scholars and not as an integral element of the pro--government or liberal discourses. Nevertheless, the “integration” representation in general is not found in the Russian press very often and
4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have retrieved and carried out critical discourse analysis of the representations of European-Russian relations from four Russian newspapers. I have primarily analyzed these representations on the intertextual level, but I have also applied some elements of linguistic analysis when it was necessary and relevant.

Thus, I have revealed that Russian-European relations are most commonly portrayed as a religious, civilizational or political collision especially if we consider the pro-government newspapers *Izvestia* and *Rossiyskaya gazeta*. These representations are often underpinned by the belief that the West conducts a war against Russia and has some secret agenda against it.

The liberal press is more likely to portray Europe as a teacher or a moral and political standard that the Russian government has to strive to achieve. In some articles this representation seems to develop into the representation of Europe as savior. The adherents of this representation believe that Europe should have more influence on Russian politics and that European politicians have to undertake some tangible steps to make the Russian government more democratic.

Finally, it was possible to detect some peripheral representations, namely “Europe as an economic partner” and “Russia as an integral part of Europe” that are not easily as elements of the pro-government or liberal discourses. Quite often they are based on the personal opinions and beliefs of particular experts and politicians.

In the next chapter, I will summarize and combine some of the main findings of the literature review and the intertextual analysis. The result will constitute the macro-sociological part of the critical discourse analysis.
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This chapter is divided into five parts. The first part tries to connect the results from the data analysis to a broader socio-political context. The second part forms a bridge between the concepts discussed in the literature review and my own findings. Third, I address some of the methodological limitations and difficulties that I have faced while conducting the analysis and also present some suggestions for further research. The last two parts of this chapter delineate the main contributions of the project and give some final notes on the topic.

At the beginning, I want to underscore that in the course of the data analysis it was possible to answer the research question of how relations between Europe and Russia are represented in the articles covering the Pussy Riot case in the context of Russian political culture and the discourses of different Russian political forces. As a result, I conclude that the main purpose of the study, which is to explore the representations of Russian-European relations in Russian media, has been successfully achieved.

Thus, relations between Russia and Europe have a variety of different representations in the Russian press: political, cultural, and religious collision, Europe as a mentor, Europe as a savior, Europe as an economic partner, Russia as an integral part of Europe. The first one generally corresponds with the official discourse and is more widely employed by the pro-government publications Izvestia and Rossiyskaya gazeta. The second and the third seem to be more relevant for the liberal press. The latter ones do not form a distinctive picture and are associated with the opinions of particular scholars and politicians. One may be tempted to say that the last two representations, while not constituting a solid image, might have been omitted. However, I believe that since the purpose of my study was to demonstrate the variety of representations in its fullness and richness, those representations have to be included as well.

5.1 Retrieved representation in the context of Russian politics

The main method of the analysis applied in this study is CDA as it is described by Norman Fairclough (1995). A constitutive component of this method, apart from the
intertextual and linguistic parts, is the exploration of relations between texts and a socio-cultural context. Moreover, in the literature review, I have shown that a media discourse is influenced by the discourses of political forces and the national political culture. That is why the following two sub-chapters are devoted to the descriptions of how the retrieved representations are connected to and interact with both the pro-government and liberal political discourses. The connections between these representations and Russian political culture are explained in section 5.2.

5.1.1 Russian-European relations within the framework of the pro-government discourse

As it has been found, the core representation of Russian-European relations is the so-called cultural, political, and religious collision and its variations. It implies that Russia is structurally, mentally, and culturally different from Europe and even in some way superior to it. If we refer to Modigliani (1989), who says that some media discourse may be more potent than others because they resonate with the views and beliefs that already exist in society or with the traditions and myths of a certain culture in general, we may consider the “collision” representation as the most potent one because it is mainly articulated by the dominant forces in Russian politics. Thus, the representation finds support in many official doctrines, for example, in the “Concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation” written in 2008 published on the official web-site of the Russian President (Prezident Rossii, 2008, July 15).

For instance, firstly, the Concept (Prezident Rossii, 2008, July 15) states that one of the main goals of Russian foreign policy is:

- to ensure security of the country, maintaining and reinforcing its sovereignty and territorial integrity, stable and authoritative positions in the world community, equitable as much as possible to its [Russia’s] interest as one of the most influential centers of the modern world and necessary for the growth of its political, economic, intellectual and spiritual potential…
From this statement and throughout the whole document, it is possible to conclude that there is thought to be a certain threat to the Russian security, sovereignty, and integrity. We can assume that this idea underpins the representation of Europe as an intruder who wants to impose its interests and values on Russia.

Secondly, the same concept puts emphasis on acting in accordance with international regulations and legislation: thus Russia criticizes “…the disregard by certain states and groups of states of the main principles of the international law. Russia demands that the generally recognized norms of the international legislation should be totally universal in terms of their understanding and application” (Prezident Rossii, 2008, July 15). This is just one of many references to the importance of the international legislation in maintaining healthy relations between countries. This is an important point to consider with regards to the representation of the “double-standard” policy representation in the press. I have tried to demonstrate how some articles articulate the idea that Europe sometimes changes their interpretation of their internal standards as well as international legislation depending on what country it deals with and what interests it pursues in a country. As a result, according to the “double-standards” representation, it has an opportunity and a motivation to apply higher standards to Russia.

Thirdly, the Concept (Prezident Rossii, 2008, July 15) mentions that

The importance of religious factor in formation of modern international relation is growing and in particular the importance of its moral foundations. This task cannot be solved without addressing to a common moral denominator that has always been present in major world religious.

The emphasis on religious morality here corresponds with the representation of the moral and religious collision between Europe and Russia and the belief in Russian moral superiority that can be found in some publications.

Finally, the Concept does not seem to contain any direct references to a “media war” or “conspiracy” against Russia. But it has some points that may be interpreted as the basis for this idea:
The response of the historic West to the perspective of losing its monopoly over globalizing processes is expressed in particular in the inertia of the political and psychological guidelines of “deterring” Russia, including the attempts of using for these purposes a ‘selective history’ approach… (Prezident Rossii, 2008, July 15).

Thus, the concept of “deterring” Russia in the official discourse could be transformed into belief by the general population, or vice versa, in a media war.

To sum it up, the representation of “collision” is intrinsically tied and, probably, finds its origin in the official governmental discourse and doctrines. This may be one of the reasons for the current situation in the country, where “only about a third [of the population] saw Europe as a partner with whom a long-term relationship could be developed and enhanced. Furthermore, while almost half (45 per cent) considered Europe as a potential threat to Russia” (Bova, 2010, 30).

5.1.2 Russian-European relations within the framework of the liberal discourse

On the other hand, the representations of Europe as a mentor and as a savior seem to meet the demands of the liberal and pro-Western part of society because they are more widely used in the liberal Kommersant and Vedomosti. Many of their readers believe that Russia nowadays has diverged from the true European path. A common view among them is that there is no such a thing as a special “Russian way” (Engelbrekt, Nygren, 2010a, 7, Nygren, 2010, 55), which was explored in the literature review.

Those representations are also associated with the liberal approach towards international relations (IR) in the Russian academic discourse. Actually, liberalism in IR is a versatile movement, but due to the lack of space I cannot go deep into the specific details of its different aspects and that is why I will limit myself only to mentioning just the most general principles. Tsygankov (2003/2004) claims that liberalism was the dominant approach to IR in the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but then was set aside. Thus, Tsygankov (2003/2004) says that liberalism in international relations implies that:
in a rapidly changing context of international relation, the main goal of a state’s foreign policy is not asserting its own interests, but co-operation for the sake of the triumph of universal values, with such values as human rights and freedoms, market community, and pluralistic democracy being the main ones.

In accordance with his article “Liberalism in the Russian international relations theory”, Russian liberals considered the collapse of the USSR to be a historic chance for Russia to become a flourishing country if it could stop “the established stereotypes” and, first of all, “the suspiciousness towards the West and traditional Russian ‘great-power policy’” (Tsygankov, 2003/2004).

Hence, I suggest that while the liberal approach lost its dominant position when Putin came into power, it has not absolutely disappeared and it still remains topical for a certain part of Russian society. This can be confirmed by the presence of the representations of Europe as a mentor and Europe as a savior in the Russian press. It seems that Europe as a teacher is a direct echo of the official course of the Russian foreign policy of the 1990s when the gap between Russian and European political cultures was narrowing (Bova, 2010). As a result, this representation still puts emphasis on learning from the Western practices.

I assume that the representation of Europe as a savoir is a newer one and belongs to the liberal discourse of the 2000s because it seems to carry a particular meaning of seeking Europe’s help in order to transform the current political situation in Russia. At the same time, in the 1990s, pro-Western liberals were the dominant political power and president Yeltsin himself declared that Russia was ready to integrate in Europe (Smith, 1999). As the liberals were the hegemonic force (contested only by the Communist Party of the Russian Federations), they had all the tools to transform the regime themselves in case it was necessary and did not need any savior. However, after they had lost the hegemonic position, which was eventually occupied by the “United Russia”, they had to call upon Europe to help them return the hegemony.
5.2 Social and political implications of the revealed representations

What I have been trying to accomplish by providing extensive quotations from official and academic sources is to demonstrate that the retrieved representations originate not in the press itself but are deeply rooted in the foundation of the Russian nation. As a result, we have proof that the hegemonic representations of the collision are intrinsically tied to the discourse of “United Russia” and the top-officials. At the same time, it goes without saying that the liberal representations are bound to the discourse of liberal forces.

At this point, it is worth referring to the discussion about Russian political culture by highlighting Bova’s (2010, 24) list of its main attributes: personalized authorities, statism, sobornost’, order, and unity of church and state. Most of them resonate, to a certain extent and perhaps even directly with the representations of the cultural/religious/political clash and official discourse in general. One of the most potent examples is the connection between statism and the representation of Europe as an intruder. As Russians are preoccupied with the idea of a strong state (Petrova, 2003, Novembers 13; Smith, 1999; Bova, 2010), which is capable not only of protecting itself, but also of having an impact on the world, it seems natural that they are repulsed by the fact that Europe tries to implant its own rules upon Russia, despite that fact that Europe may have good intentions in mind. Thus, statism implies that any kind of influence will be regarded by the majority of the population as superfluous. In this context, it is also easy to explain the belief in “a media war” and the concept of the media being a powerful mechanism of European influence.

Another attribute that cannot be omitted here is the unity of the Orthodox Church and state. It clearly shapes the basis for the “religious clash” representation. As I have described, this representation has multiple variations, but the core of all of them is the fact that most Russians tend to attach much more importance to the role of Church and religion in a country than Europeans (Bova, 2010, 24-25, Legvold, 2007, 109). Moreover, these representations give the impression that religion not considered by the people to be connected to personal beliefs and values, but rather is important in in the
context of the nation and state. As a result, any possible outrage against the Church is seen as an outrage against the state. This in turn takes us back to the notion of statism.

To sum up this point, one could definitely find more correlations between the official representations and the attributes of the political culture described by Bova (2010): “religious collision” can be also connected with sobornost’, “double-standards” with the desire for order and the desire to make everyone follow the same rules. What should also be highlighted here is that these are the official representations that correspond with the Russian political culture, while the liberal representations generally contradict it. It is probably one of the factors that make official representations hegemonic.

The second conclusion is that the retrieved representations show the presence of a strong opposition between two parts of Russian society. It is easy to see that generally the analyzed press maintain the separation between “Slavophiles”, for whom Russia is “marked to lead a grand Slavic civilization” (Legvold, 2007, 110), and “Westernizers”, who believe that “Russia’s path to progress requires that Russia acknowledges its cultural affinity with Europe and dedicate itself to emulating Europe’s values and institutions” (Legvold, 2007, 108). The representation of “collision” directly reflects “Slavophiles’” worldview, while the liberal representations can be associated with the “Westernizer” discourse.

The contradiction between government and liberal discourses is reinforced by several “inverse” representations: “Europe as an intruder”, used primarily in the pro-government press, is opposed to the idea of “Europe as a mentor” that is presented in the liberal press. Similarly, the belief in a “media war” is opposed to “Europe as a savior”. The representation of Russia as an integral part of Europe can be seen as the opposite side of the “collision” representation in general. The demand for the “inverse” representations confirm that society is clearly divided into two, though not equal, parts. The most distinctive example is that the similar statements of scholars/politicians may serve to illustrate different representations and obviously are interpreted in different ways by different social groups.

Thirdly, at such, it is crucial to underline a certain contradiction between the extent to which liberal representations are used in the press and the fact that the adherents of the
liberal discourse are not represented in the State Duma. By this I mean that the liberal representations of Russian-European relations constitute a substantial element of the analyzed media texts. Here, I have to refer to the idea discussed in the literature review that media discourses have to resonate with the worldview and perceptions of audiences (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989). It implies that a certain part of Russian society has a demand for a liberal discourse because they share liberal values. At the same time, no party in the Duma articulates any kind of discourse that would correlate with their values. As it has been mentioned in the first chapter, liberal views are expressed primarily by the representative of the non-system opposition, which have little access to the official policy-making (see Golosov, 2011, September 1, Trenin, 2012, March 2, Nichol, 2013, April 16). This asymmetry may only indicate significant disproportions that exist in Russian society. Moreover, this pertains not only to the relations with Europe, but to some other elements of social, economic, and political life. In brief, a substantial part of Russian society wants liberal political discourse (not only in international relations, but in other spheres as well) that is not satisfied by the parties represented in the Duma.

The most distinctive example of the broader social consequences of the above mentioned disproportions is the strengthening of a protest movement in Russia in 2011-2013. By a protest movement I mean a series of political demonstrations that began after the State Duma elections December 4, 2011, and are periodically organized up till now. The movement has clear anti-government and anti-Putin orientation. One of the first demonstrations, on the Bolotnaya Square, turned out to be the most mass demonstration of the last decade (Volkov, 2012). The participants of the demonstrations consist primarily out of well-educated and affluent people from the largest cities. (Golosov, 2011, September 1, Volkov, 2012). Volkov (2012, 5) explains this by mentioning that while the majority of the Russia people are severely limited in material resources and are used to adapting to any political conditions, the more affluent minority have much higher demands, but they are almost totally bereft of political influence. It is not surprising that, according to the results of the research conducted by Volkov (2012, 22), most of the participants of the demonstrations describe themselves as “liberals” and “democrats”. As a result, this affluent minority tries to defend its rights
by actively participating in protests. Thus, one of the causes of the strengthening of the movement is the fact the political views of affluent liberal Russians are not represented in official politics. This confirms my idea that a part of the Russian society expresses demands for liberal political discourse not only in foreign affairs issues, but in other spheres as well. The fact that those demands are not satisfied by the parties represented in the Duma causes unrest in society.

With regards to the third conclusion, I also argue that the liberal discourse has a strong potential to substantially challenge the hegemonic discourse. It seems relevant here to briefly revisit some of the aspects of media discourse theory discussed in the literature review. The first one is Hall’s (1993, 96) idea that “reality exists outside language but it is constantly mediated by and through language; and what we can know and say has to be produced through discourse”. The second one is that discourse is not reduced to conveying pre-existent meanings, but rather plays an important role in constructing those meanings as well. All of these let me conclude that if a certain type of discourse is constantly conveyed to people - such as, for example, the representations of Europe as a savior - sooner or later it may become capable of constructing reality and influencing the worldviews and perceptions of more and more people. Regardless, this does not mean the liberal representations are now close to becoming hegemonic ones, but only that politicians and diplomats, especially in Russia, have to take into account that the liberal representations are quite wide-spread in the media, but are not represented in the official political spectrum.

Fourth, as it has been mentioned several times, while the representations of Russia as an integral part of Europe and Europe as an economic partner are not clearly reflected in the analyzed press, it is necessary to mention that they seem to have a small and undefined place in both the liberal and pro-government discourses. The origin of these representations are more or less clear with regards to the liberal discourse as they have clear a “Westernizer” implications (Engelbrekt, and Nygren, 2010a, Legvold, 2007). However, these representations might also be regarded as an echo of Putin’s discourse of the beginning of the 2000s when the formal Russian foreign policy was clearly bilateral. Let me recollect here Colton’s and Hale’s (2009) thought that at that point, Putin’s rhetoric made it clear that Russia saw itself a as member of the Western
community, sharing common European views and values. While at the same time, Putin always expressed discontent with the Western internal and international policies. Thus, these representations might be seen as an echo of the pro-Western part of the official discourse.

Finally, an additional result is that the representations are deployed unevenly by the different newspapers. A reader of Izvestia and Rossiyskaya gazeta seems to acquire a much more unified image of Russia-European relations and is not presented with alternative views because the articles rely primarily on the official government discourse. Moreover, the opinions of the Russian opposition and European politicians are either not mentioned at all or mentioned in an ironic manner. At the same time though, the liberal press also uses a more or less established set of representations, but it does try to examine government opinions and thus conveys a more diversified picture.

Indeed, this conclusion is supported by the ambiguous position of the Russian press that I have discussed before. Let me here recollect once again Lipman’s article (2010) “Rethinking Russia: Freedom of Expression without Freedom of the Press”. Even the name of the article implicates how contradictory the position of Russian media is. One the one hand, the press is rated as “not free” by the Freedom House (Freedom House). Consequently, the most influential media outlets, including newspapers, are by different means controlled by the government and thus produce discourses, which are consistent with the government point of view. This is, obviously, one of the reasons why the representation of collision between Russia and Europe that is associated with the Kremlin discourse is a dominant one.

On the other hand, lack of freedom of press does not automatically induce lack of freedom of expression. It is confirmed by the fact that some media conduct brilliant journalistic investigations and one can acquire different information and opinions, which are inconsistent with the government’s ones, for example from the Internet and relatively small media (Lipman, 2010, 156). Lipman (2010, 155-156) writes that this group of media is collectively described as liberal and they even dare publish “reports of governmental corruption and mismanagement”. In my research, this situation is upheld
by the presence of a more versatile set of representations in relatively small liberal Vedomosti and Kommersant.

5.3 Limitations and suggestions for further research

The main methodological obstacle that I have faced while conducting the research is that the representations are generally intertwined. When an author refers to many different information sources, each of whom has his/her own perception of Russia-European relations, it might be very difficult to determine what picture an author himself wants to convey and what representation is a the prevailing one. In order to overcome this difficulty, I apply structural and linguistic analyses of texts. As a rule, the place in an article where a journalist refers to a source, how much space is given to a reference, and how this reference is framed may cast some light on what representation a journalist has in mind. That is also one of the reasons why I pay so much attention on the structures of some articles. Besides, when an article contains several representations that are equally important, quite often with regards to the interviews, I subsume it under all the relevant categories.

Nevertheless, I believe that some future research should be conducted in order to understand more thoroughly the connections between discourses from different news sources, such as experts and politicians, and the discourses of journalists. It seems relevant to study how a journalist frames the statements of his news sources, for example, by looking at how different publications apply and frame opinions of the same expert or official. It would provide us with a better understanding of the role and level of objectivity of the Russian mass media in portraying a particular issue, shaping the perceptions of their readers and exploiting specific linguistic tools. Besides, despite the fact there have been done a variety of research that theoretically examine the connections between media and political discourses (e.g. Nikitina, 2006; Zinoviev, 2003), it seem that there is a lack of research analyzing the connections and interrelations of those discourse in Russia from a more practical perspective, which would concentrate on concrete and clear examples from modern politics.
Also, additional research has to be conducted in order to examine the origin and implications of the representations of Europe as an economic partner and Russia as an integral part of Europe. Though they are not quite typical for the four analyzed newspapers, they may be essential for some other types of media. Further analysis of these representations would also contribute to the understanding of how Russian-European relations are portrayed in the Russian media.

5.4 Contribution

My research has been carried out at the crossroads of communication studies and international relations and thus contributes to the both fields. Moreover, I believe that some of the results might have some significance for foreign affairs practitioners and politicians who are engaged in Russian-European relations.

There have been a variety of studies which analyze relations between Russia and Europe as well as the approaches and attitudes of different political forces in the context of these relations (e.g. Legvold, 2007, Smith, 1999). As an example, I want to mention a book “Russia and Europe: Building Bridges, Digging Trenches”, edited by Kjell Engelbrekt and Bertil Nygren, that comprises the articles covering manifold aspects of Russian-European relations: from energy and security issues to some particular aspects of norms and values that pertain to those relations. There is also research that examines the attitudes towards Europe among the general Russian population (see O'Loughlin et al., 2006, O'Loughlin et al., 2005, Petrova, 2003, November 13). Subsequently, my research complements these two types of studies by building a bridge between how the relations are seen by officials and experts and what picture is conveyed to and formed by the Russian population as a whole.

One of the distinguishing features of this research is a critical discursive perspective that gives the reader a chance to see more profound aspects of Russian-European relations. It seems self-evident that Russian-European relations are structured not only by the government positions stated in official doctrines, but also by the perceptions and attitudes of the nation as a whole. In my view, some of these generally accepted views
and attitudes in society cannot help but influence the official Russian foreign policy in return. Critical discourse analysis of the media coverage has enabled me to detect those perceptions and attitudes and touch upon their historical and cultural background.

5.5 Final words

Let me summarize the key results of the research. First of all, there are several typical representations of Russian-European relations in the analyzed Russian newspapers: political/cultural/religious collision, Europe as a mentor, Europe as a savior, Europe as an economic partner, Russia as in integral part of Europe. The first one originates and is tied to the official discourse of the incumbent government and it can be considered to be hegemonic. The second and the third representations seem to correlate with the discourse of the Russian liberal movement. The last two can be seen as peripheral and not clearly represented in the analyzed texts. Further research has to be done in order to determine what discourses they belong to. Secondly, the correlation between the particular newspapers and representations confirms that Russian society is clearly divided into two groups: one part sees Europe as a teacher and the other sees Europe, if not as an enemy, then at least as an opponent. Nevertheless, if we take a critical discursive perspective here, we will see that the latter part has a clear hegemonic position which is contested by marginal discourses.

I want to conclude by saying that unfortunately during the last decade relations between Russia and Europe have not always been friendly and neighbourly. The way they are presented in the Russian media explains the nature of some of the contradictions much better than official speeches and documents because the foreign affairs politicians who formulate them are generally bound by diplomatic courtesies and national interests. The media texts I have analyzed are the documents meant for the Russian citizens and thus they have much more freedom in interpreting events. This can be seen by how the emphasis on acting in accordance with the international laws in the official discourse corresponds with the representations of the “double-standard” policies and prejudice against Russia in the press.
It is also possible to say that many of the aspects causing misunderstanding and contradictions seem to be cultural and historical, and are not always based upon any objective reasons. The retrieved representations give us evidence of the strong importance of such factors as state power, sovereignty, and religion for Russian people. It is crucial that the European politicians and scholars realize the significance of these cultural and historic factors and take them into consideration when they deal with Russia. Otherwise, their good intentions might be interpreted – as happens now – as a confirmation of the fact that Europe intrudes into Russian domestic politics or as an example of “double-standards”.

Finally, though the results of the research provide us with a variety of different representations, it is worth noting that namely the representation of cultural/political/religious collision belongs to the discourse of the pro-Kremlin newspapers and most likely takes its origin in the official discourse. It claims that “…the Russians' desire for greater influence, power, and security in the world has not diminished” (Suny, 2007, 65) and regardless of what Putin’s government states in the official papers and speeches meant for the European audience, it still does not consider Europe as a friend.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX 1: DATA SET

Kommersant, KO


'What we are doing is an attempt to put oneself right.’ (”То, что мы делаем,— попытка оправдаться”) (2012, August, 30) Retrieved 2012, October 12 from: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2011192


Russia is passing a hard session. (”Россия сдает трудную сессию”) (2012, October 02) Retrieved 2012, October 12 from: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2035098

Russia was failed on the European session. ("Россию завалили на европейской сессии") (2012, October 3) Retrieved 2012, October 12 from: http://kommersant.ru/doc/2035987


Notes of a historian: To remember history and not to lose hope. (“Заметки историка: Помнить историю и не отчаиваться”) (2012, September 7) Retrieved 2012, October 13 from:
http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/306201/pomnit_istoriyu_i_ne_otchaivatsya

Punk-prayer and the responsibility of the government: Government should be a shock absorber. (“Панк-молебен и ответственность государства: Государство должно быть амортизатором”) (2012, August 17) Retrieved 2012, October 13 from:
http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/294491/gosudarstvo_dolzhno_byt_a
mortizatorom

Punk-prayer and the responsibility of the government: Why they cannot be forgiven. (“Панк-молебен и ответственность государства: Почему их нельзя простить”) (2012, August 17) Retrieved 2012, October 13 from:
http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/294501/pochemu_ih_nelzya_prostit

Strasbourg is detrimental to Naryshkin (“Страсбург вреден для Нарышкина”) (2012, September 27) Retrieved 2012, October 13 from:
http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/317571/strasburg_vreden_dlya_naryshkina

The Pussy Riot list. (“Список Pussy Riot”) (2012, September 11) Retrieved 2012, October 13 from:
http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/307991/spisok_pussy_riot

To remember history and not to lose hope: It will take a long time. (“Помнить историю и не отчаиваться: Это будет долго”) (2012, September 10) Retrieved 2012,
October 13 from:
http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/307161/eto_budet_dolgo

Izvestia, IZ

‘For the Brussels Timoshenko is a tool to hold the Ukraine on a distance.’ (“Для Брюсселя Тимошенко — инструмент, чтобы держать Украину на дистанции””) (2012, September 4) Retrieved 2012, October 16 from:
http://izvestia.ru/news/534401

‘I can come to Moscow to meet Naryshkin’: (“Я могу приехать в Москву и встретиться с Нарышкиным””) (2012,October 2) Retrieved 2012, October 16 from:

‘We do not consider the banishment of Russia from the Council of Europe as our object’. (“Мы не считаем своей задачей изгнание России из Совета Европы””) 2.02.(2012,October 2) Retrieved 2012, October 16 from:
http://izvestia.ru/news/536734

Arkadiy Mamontov: “There is no ordered information. These are my views”.


Farewell to the pan-European home. (“Прощание с общеевропейским домом”)
(2012, August 16) Retrieved 2012, October 16 from:
http://izvestia.ru/news/533043

Gudkov calls upon his colleagues in the Duma not to disgrace themselves in front of Europe. (“Гудков призвал коллег по Думе не позорить Россию перед


One can get up to three years in prison for religious outrage in Europe. (“За оскорбление веры в Европе грозит до трех лет тюрьмы”) (2012, August 3) Retrieved 2012, October 16 from: http://izvestia.ru/news/532111


The Pussy Riot case will make the way to Europe easier to the Russian youth. (“Дело Pussy Riot облегчит российской молодежи путь в Европу”) (2012, August 20) Retrieved 2012, October 16 from: http://izvestia.ru/news/533286

The verdict to Pussy Riot” will be announced on August 17th. (“Приговор Pussy Riot огласят 17 августа”) (2012, August 8) Retrieved 2012, October 16 from: http://izvestia.ru/news/532466


Rossiyskaya gazeta, RG


### APPENDIX 2: DISTRIBUTION OF REPRESENTATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Article name (English)</th>
<th>Representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>&quot;Arkadiy Mamontov: “There is no ordered information. These are my views”&quot;</td>
<td>Europe as an intruder, media war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>&quot;Farewell to the pan-European home&quot;</td>
<td>religious collision, Europe as an economic partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>&quot;Gudkov calls upon his colleagues in the Duma not to disgrace themselves in front of Europe&quot;</td>
<td>Europe as a mentor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>&quot;Lugovoi accused Berezovskiy of the information war against Russia&quot;</td>
<td>media war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>&quot;One can get up to three years in prison for religious outrage in Europe&quot;</td>
<td>double-standards, religious collision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>&quot;PACE adopted a tough resolution on Russia&quot;</td>
<td>Europe as an intruder, conspiracy against Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>&quot;PACE is puzzled why Naryshkin cancelled the visit&quot;</td>
<td>Europe as an intruder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>&quot;The end of the symphony&quot;</td>
<td>religious collision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>&quot;The press and Pussy&quot;</td>
<td>Europe as an intruder, media war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>&quot;The verdict to Pussy Riot will be announced on August 17th&quot;</td>
<td>Europe as a mentor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>&quot;Uprising without ideal&quot;</td>
<td>Europe as an intruder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>&quot;Vladimir Putin about Pussy Riot: ‘I do not think that the girls should be judged strictly”&quot;</td>
<td>Europe as an economic partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>“‘For the Brussels, Timoshenko is a tool to hold the Ukraine on a distance’”</td>
<td>Europe as an intruder, media war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>“I can come to Moscow to meet Naryshkin”’</td>
<td>Europe as an intruder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>“We do not consider the banishment of Russia from the Council of Europe as our object”’</td>
<td>Europe as an intruder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>“Eurasians threatens to roll “March of millions” under asphalt”</td>
<td>religious collision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>“In Moscow the members of “March of millions” started gathering”</td>
<td>religious collision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>“Lavrov urges not to go off into hysterics because of the Pussy Riot”</td>
<td>double-standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>“Moscow was outraged by the participation of Pussy Riot in the Sakharov Prize”</td>
<td>double-standards, Europe as an intruder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>“PACE will not see the Speaker of the State Duma”</td>
<td>Europe as an intruder, conspiracy against Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>“Pussy Riot, clash of civilizations, and revolution”</td>
<td>religious collision, Russia as a part of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>“Sick in the head”</td>
<td>mentality collision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>“The Ministry of foreign affairs has detected the conflict of civilizations in the sentence to Pussy Riot”</td>
<td>religious collision, double-standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>“The Pussy Riot case will make the way to Europe easier to the Russian youth”</td>
<td>double-standards, Europe as an intruder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommersant</td>
<td>“Russia is passing a hard session”</td>
<td>Europe as a mentor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommersant</td>
<td>&quot;European deputies stood up for the Russian one&quot;</td>
<td>Europe as a mentor, Europe as a savior, Russia as a naughty child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Quote</td>
<td>Interpretation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommersant</td>
<td>&quot;Segey Naryshkin disposed of PACE's amendments&quot;</td>
<td>Europe as a mentor - Russia as a naughty child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Reloading’ can’t last forever&quot;</td>
<td>Europe as an intruder, media war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Russia is losing its image”</td>
<td>Europe as a mentor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Russia was failed on the European session”</td>
<td>Europe as a mentor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Segei Lavrov proves himself as a sport diplomat”</td>
<td>Europe as a mentor, double-standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;What we are doing is an attempt to put oneself right’”</td>
<td>Europe as a mentor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“PACE and Russia get closer with seven-league strides”</td>
<td>Europe as a savior, Europe as a mentor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rossiyskaya gazeta</td>
<td>&quot;It just smelled bad&quot;</td>
<td>religious collision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rossiyskaya gazeta</td>
<td>&quot;Moscow votes against&quot;</td>
<td>Europe as an intruder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rossiyskaya gazeta</td>
<td>&quot;The crusade&quot;</td>
<td>religious collision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rossiyskaya gazeta</td>
<td>“And how does it work there”</td>
<td>double-standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rossiyskaya gazeta</td>
<td>“Civilization without roots”</td>
<td>double-standards, religious collision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rossiyskaya gazeta</td>
<td>“Europe-Russia: what we spell the death of” (verbatim: “Europe-Russia: what we put the cross on”)</td>
<td>religious clash, Europe as an intruder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rossiyskaya gazeta</td>
<td>“Moscow is ready for the criticism”</td>
<td>double-standards, Europe as an intruder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rossiyskaya gazeta</td>
<td>“Should not go”</td>
<td>double-standards, Europe as an intruder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rossiyskaya gazeta</td>
<td>“Autumn. What will be with the Church and with us”</td>
<td>religious collision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rossiyskaya gazeta</td>
<td>&quot;Up the Downing Street&quot;</td>
<td>Europe as an economic partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vedomosti</td>
<td>&quot;Strasbourg is detrimental to Naryshkin&quot;</td>
<td>Europe as an economic partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vedomosti</td>
<td>&quot;To remember history and not to lose hope: It will take a long time&quot;</td>
<td>Russia as a part of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vedomosti</td>
<td>“In the shade of Syria”</td>
<td>Europe as an economic partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vedomosti</td>
<td>“Notes of a historian: To remember history and not to lose hope”</td>
<td>Europe as a savior, Russia as a part of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vedomosti</td>
<td>“Punk-prayer and the responsibility of the government: Government should be a shock absorber”</td>
<td>Russia as a part of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vedomosti</td>
<td>“Punk-prayer and the responsibility of the government: Why they cannot be forgiven”</td>
<td>media war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vedomosti</td>
<td>“The Pussy Riot list”</td>
<td>Europe as a savior</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>