Migrations and welfare states: Policies, discourses and institutions

EDITED BY HEIDI VAD JØNSSON, ELIZABETH ONASCH, SAARA PELLANDER AND MATS WICKSTRÖM
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Saara Pellander, and Mats Wickström
The Nordic Centre of Excellence NordWel (The Nordic Welfare State – Historical Foundations and Future Challenges) is a multidisciplinary, cross-national research project and network of eight partner units in the Nordic universities. It is a part of NordForsk's Nordic Centre of Excellence Programme on Welfare (2007–2012). NordWel is hosted by the Department of Political and Economic Studies at the University of Helsinki.

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The NordWel Studies in Historical Welfare State Research series provides a publishing forum, particularly for volumes elaborated on the basis of the NordWel seminars and conferences. This is a peer-reviewed publication.

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Printed in Finland by Bookwell Oy, Jyväskylä 2013
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Preface

When Heidi Vad Jønsson e-mailed Saara Pellander in January 2009 to connect with a fellow PhD-student researching topics related to migration and the welfare state within the Nordic Centre of Excellence NordWel, neither of them anticipated that this e-mail exchange would grow into an active and inspiring network of young scholars, nor that the outcome of the network’s activities would develop into a book. After Heidi Vad Jønsson had been the primus motor in the first year of the network’s activities, Saara Pellander became the next coordinator at the first network meeting of the PhD Network for Research on Immigration, Integration and Welfare (WelMi) in Odense in the spring of 2010. In May 2011, Saara Pellander coordinated a WelMi conference in Helsinki, which included very inspiring public lectures by Professor emeritus Rosemary Sales, Professor Anette Borchorst, Professor Bo Bengtsson, and Associate Professor Peo Hansen. WelMi network members also had the opportunity to present papers at the conference and receive comments by the senior scholars. It was on this occasion that the idea to compile a book out of the seminar presentations came up, and with Marjukka Weide as the next coordinator and the book project manager, this goal was pursued at two subsequent book seminars in the autumn of 2011 and the spring of 2012.

The project benefitted greatly from scholars who generously shared their time and expertise by acting as reviewers for this refereed publication. For the book seminar in the spring, WelMi was lucky to have some of these scholars present at the seminar; the participation of Professor Rinus Penninx, Professor Pasi Saukkonen, Professor Sirpa Wrede, Dr. Johanna Leinonen and Dr. Johannes Kananen inspired intense debates about the book chapters. These debates and all of the reviews were invaluable to the development
of this book. We would like to thank these scholars for their participation and for sharing their valuable time, especially Professor Rinus Penninx, who travelled all the way from the Netherlands to share his insights with us. We are also very grateful for the other reviewers who provided their comments on the book chapters in written form, and would like to thank all of them – Professor Helena Blomberg-Kroll, Professor Anette Borchorst, Professor Patrick Emmenegger, Dr. Camilla Nordberg, Dr. Karina Horsti, Professor Pauli Kettunen, Professor Will Kymlicka, Professor Klaus Petersen, and Dr. Rosa Sanchez-Salgado. This book would not have been possible without the support and encouragement we received from this group of experts. The book would also certainly not have been possible without the NCoE NordWel (The Nordic Welfare State – Historical Foundations and Future Challenges) which supported WelMi from the very beginning. All activities have been funded by NordWel, and the NordWel director Pauli Kettunen and vice director Klaus Petersen have shown their continuous support for the further development of WelMi. A special thanks goes to both of them.

This provision of funding and an academically rich environment has made it possible for young scholars to meet and connect across countries, continents, and disciplines. We have received immense support from the NordWel-coordinator Heidi Haggrén, as well as her substitutes Anna Alanko and Jussi Vauhkonen. For our meetings in Odense, Mai Hostrup Brunse and Jakob Sinding Skött helped us with practical arrangements and we would like to express our gratitude to all these colleagues. Last, but not least, we are thankful for the great work on the professional language editing provided by Paul Wilkinson, the layout provided by Timo Jaakola, and the bibliography editing provided by Anniina Vainio.

WelMi, the network that was first established by PhD-students, has now developed into a network of young scholars and early career researchers. The list of network members has grown since the network was established and is an excellent example of transnational networking at its best. WelMi is guided by a steering group consisting of previous coordinators and is currently coordinated by Elizabeth Onasch. She has been tying the strings together at the crucial stage of this book project and pushing the other edi-
tors to keep our deadlines and timetables. We are looking forward to future projects and hope that this book inspires scholars of various disciplines to consider and re-think the various connections between migrations and the welfare state.

*Odense, Chicago, Helsinki, and Åbo, July 2012*

*Heidi Vad Jønsson, Elizabeth Onasch, Saara Pellander, Mats Wickström*
Introduction

Immigration and welfare are two salient yet charged themes in today’s political discussions within national, Nordic, and international or global contexts. State and non-state actors have worked to expand, retrench, and extensively reform welfare states in the years following World War II; these struggles have coincided with the thorough politicisation of immigration. Borders and barriers have been torn down and re-built at an increasing tempo over the last 20 years as migration has risen to the top of the political agenda. The aim of this volume is to examine how the welfare state as a normative and institutional framework shapes immigration discourse and policy and, in turn, how the welfare state as an ideal and as an arrangement of policies is shaped by immigration. In this introduction, we discuss the main concepts that appear within the volume and outline how the chapters engage with these concepts while addressing the aim of the volume.

Welfare states

Welfare states have historically emerged within national contexts, which varied in a number of important ways. Some of the states that built welfare systems were small nation states, whereas others were colonial powers, and some were old reformed monarchies, while still others were new republican states. Despite these many different outsets, most western states developed institutions that provided some kind of social and economic security for their inhabitants during the 20th century, especially in the post-war period.

In 1990, Gøsta Esping-Andersen developed his influential and controversial typology, which placed the many different welfare states in three welfare state regimes: a liberal/residual regime, with a relatively low degree of
de-commodification\(^1\) based on minimum benefits; a conservative or corporative welfare regime, where social security involves relying upon families; and finally, a social democratic or universal welfare regime with the general ambition of providing a high level of social security though the state financed by taxes.\(^2\)

These regimes, or ideal type clusters, of welfare states have been criticised for neglecting a variety of different parameters, including, for example, gender\(^3\) and ethnicity\(^4\). In the decades following the publication of Esping-Andersen's welfare paradigm, social scientists have set out to create alternatives or update it.\(^5\) For example, the anthology *Changing Social Equality: The Nordic Welfare Model in the 21st Century*\(^6\) uses different perspectives, including a focus on immigration, to bring the analytical concept of the universal welfare regime up-to-date. While the authors affirm that the key features identified by Esping-Andersen in 1990 are still part of the universal welfare model, they point out that immigration, along with other factors like globalisation, have led to an increasing emphasis on rights and duties as core elements of the model.

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1 Esping-Andersen uses the term de-commodification to 'capture the degree to which welfare states weaken the cash nexus by granting entitlements independent of market participation.' Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1999) *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies*. New York: Oxford University Press, 43.


4 Esping-Andersen responded to the feminist critique of his work by assessing 'defamilisation' in addition to 'decommodation.' While he defines a familiastic welfare regime as one that 'assigns a maximum of welfare obligations to the household'; he uses defamilisation 'to capture policies that lessen individuals' reliance on the family; that maximise individuals' command of economic resources independently of familial or conjugal reciprocities.' Esping-Andersen 1999, 45. Yet, as critics such as Clare Bambra state, Esping-Andersen's use of defamilisation is problematic, as it does not examine women's autonomy and independence from the family, but only focuses on the assessment of support by the welfare state to the family. Bambra, Clare (2007) 'Defamilisation and welfare state regimes: a cluster analysis.' *International Journal of Social Welfare*, Vol. 16, Issue 4, 326–338.

5 See, for example, the Social Citizenship Indicator Program database stored at Stockholm University.

Although updated and elaborated ideal type regimes are useful, they are still limited in how they represent empirical reality. Kettunen and Petersen have recently stressed this point, arguing that ‘there seems to be a growing awareness that regime or model typologies cannot be more than analytical ideal types or crude generalisations […]’7 Such models tend to conceptualise the welfare state only on a national level; although welfare states are indeed composed of national legislations and institutions, it is important to consider how they are also transnational constructions. States may borrow, translate, and implement ideas for social policy solutions that originated within other national contexts. Ideal type models also necessarily neglect the historical contingencies at play in the development of different welfare states. Thus, this volume, without abandoning the analytical ideal types, underlines the importance of analysing the transnational movement of people and ideas and the particular histories behind the development of different welfare states.

Both welfare state research and welfare states themselves are in a state of flux. The current political and scientific discourses on welfare include a tangible social phenomenon that, although old and common in human history, has only recently moved into the centre of welfare politics and research: migration. Migrants might still be excluded from or live on the margins of the welfare states, but the issue of immigration is no longer considered marginal.

Immigration and welfare states

During the last two decades, scholars have increasingly acknowledged that immigration is an important parameter when analysing welfare states.8 Some scholars claim that the diversity created by immigration erodes the solidarity and reciprocal trust that supposedly undergird public support

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for welfare states. This argument holds that majority hosts will not support social benefit programmes that they perceive to disproportionately benefit immigrants rather than natives. Empirical work on this problem has reached mixed conclusions. Some research has found that ethnic diversity does not undermine social cohesion, national solidarity, or trust, or even that a greater number of foreigners is correlated with more positive attitudes towards redistribution. Other research has found smaller historical growth rates of welfare spending in countries that experienced significant increases in their foreign-born populations, and a (weak) negative relationship between support for the welfare state and the perceived presence of immigrants. Furthermore, there is a great deal of heterogeneity in these relationships across countries.

These mixed findings may be partly explained by variations in elements of the relationship between immigration and the welfare state, including the nature of the welfare institutions themselves. A number of studies have found that Europeans may attach negative images to immigrants and

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15 Ibid.
perceive them to be less deserving of social benefits than natives, or that ethnic diversity negatively affects social cohesion and trust for all groups. These negative attitudes towards immigrants, and the relationship between these attitudes and support for social spending, may be mediated by the institutional context; different welfare institutions may be able to create trust and reduce ‘nativist resentment’. Comprehensive welfare states may encourage the social incorporation of diverse populations created through immigration by demonstrating impartiality and equality through universal benefits. In contrast, liberal states may foster distrust and stigma for immigrant recipients of welfare, because access to social benefits is limited through means-testing. Indeed, respondents in social democratic (universal) welfare states tend to be more in favour of granting equal rights to foreigners than people in continental or liberal welfare states.

In addition to mediating the effects of diversity resulting from immigration, welfare states may shape immigration policy itself. During the last ten years, increasing attention has been given to the policies that welfare states develop in relation to immigration. Two types of interconnected immigration policies are central for these analyses: entrance policies and integration policies.

Alien acts, EU treaties, and UN conventions address entrance policies. These types of policies are not directly connected to the internal policy framework of the welfare state. Rather, the relationship between entrance policies and national welfare policies manifests in the debates over the effect of immigration on social cohesion in welfare states, as well as political


discussions about the economic effect of immigration on welfare budgets. In many cases, ‘welfare’ and ‘nationalism’ come together to draw up boundaries based on the perceived scarcity of welfare resources and the need to reserve and preserve welfare for those belonging to the nation. While this interconnectedness of nationalism and welfare is a well-known social phenomenon, it had received very little scholarly attention beyond simple observation until recently, when scholars began to expand theoretically on the concept of ‘welfare nationalism’. The previous volume in the NordWel Studies in Historical Welfare State Research series, *Welfare citizenship and welfare nationalism*, tackles the issue of welfare nationalism head on and is a step forward in its investigation.21 This volume, particularly in the chapters of Pyrhönen and Paul, also explores welfare nationalism.

Integration policies are generally a type of immigration policy that aims to regulate immigrants’ behaviour and relationships with the state, labour market, and natives once they have entered the welfare state. These policies, especially in the form of current activation programmes, tend to be directly linked to welfare state policies. The form and contents of integration policies have varied over time and, often, according to the welfare state type, with the greatest variation historically existing between residual and universal regimes. Residual regimes are usually more ‘liberal’ and their integration policies tend to be less regulated than the universal welfare state regime.22 However, welfare regimes and immigration regimes do not always sync neatly; there is a good deal of within-regime variation, especially in terms of the amount of ‘substantive social rights’ states provide to immigrants.23 When analysing the connection between welfare and immigration qualitatively, the variations within the regime clusters sometimes become more prominent than the similarities, thus, bringing forth another critical challenge to the industry of regime/model classifications. In this volume,

we acknowledge the importance of attending to variations within regime clusters, but this does not, of course, mean that we disregard the similarities. Rather, we take a different approach and focus on the complexities of the different case studies, which reveal both differences and similarities between different welfare states and immigration and integration policies.

This volume brings together a selection of highly interesting chapters that employ a variety of methodological and disciplinary approaches. The research findings presented in these chapters further the investigation of the relationship between welfare states and immigration by addressing the role of the normative and institutional framework of the welfare state in shaping immigration and integration policies and discourses. The chapters examine discourses related to immigration and integration within many different arenas—parliamentary debates, political party platforms, public discussion of politics, legislation, and documents related to integration policy—and shed light on how the idea of the welfare state is employed for different ends. While the volume's comparisons between Nordic as well as Western European countries allow for insights on how the welfare framework affects policy and discourse across different welfare states, we also pay attention to transnational ideas on multiculturalism, human rights, welfare nationalism, and civic integration.

The order of the volume's chapters broadly reflects the different stages of the relationship between immigrants and the welfare state, moving from ideas and discourse, to entrance policies, to integration, and finally, to the civic participation of immigrants. The first half of the volume focuses principally on Nordic countries, while the second half expands to consider Western European cases and provide a broader context.

Overview of the chapters
In the first chapter, Mats Wickström takes us back to the Sweden of the 1970’s. His analysis of the development of multiculturalism sheds light on the historical interplay of immigration and the welfare state within the realm of ideas. While the multicultural turn in Sweden was conditioned by the institutions of the Swedish welfare state, the institutions themselves were not
the prime movers in this development. Using comparisons with the emergence of multiculturalism within Canada, and the lack of such policy development in Denmark, Wickström argues that the Swedish multicultural turn is primarily the result of white ethnic activism. The successful delegitimising of assimilation and the official recognition of ethnocultural groups within Sweden also came partly as a result of the perception that the immigrants in Sweden, who were largely white, were relatively culturally similar to the Swedes. In contrast, in Denmark, where there was a larger population of non-white immigrants, there were many more concerns about immigrants’ potentially incompatible cultures. Furthermore, the perception of immigrants’ temporariness within Denmark led to the establishment of introduction classes, rather than truly multicultural policies.

The ethnic activists and the Swedish politicians who took up the cause of multiculturalism also mobilised Swedish values and institutions linked to the expanding welfare state project. For example, the overarching goal of equality, the ‘spirit of internationalism’, and the idea of Sweden as a role model to the rest of the world were now re-identified as national ideals that supported multiculturalism. The advocates of multiculturalism also drew upon transnational ideals, like anti-racism and anti-nationalism, as well as Canadian multiculturalism to frame and support their cause.

In the second chapter, where Amanda Nielsen examines the contemporary discourse surrounding irregularity in the Swedish parliament, similar appeals to international ideals are apparent. Public and political attention to irregular migrants, and their social rights and access to welfare state services is, as Nielsen argues, part of the discovery of a ‘crisis’ that challenges the public understanding of Sweden as an inclusive and immigrant-friendly welfare state. Demands on behalf of irregular migrants are framed as human rights questions and linked to central welfare state ideals. Irregular migrants are either positioned as victims in need of protection, or as potential contributors to the welfare state. Nielsen posits that these arguments contribute to establishing an understanding of irregular migration as policy failure and may pave the way for an opening up to policy change. Thus, the potential inclusion of irregular immigrants into the Swedish welfare regime is an ex-
ample of how the concept of the universal welfare state can provide a political platform for immigration policy change.

Niko Pyrhönen’s analysis of rhetorical manifestations of anti-immigration sentiment in Finnish and Swedish right-wing party programmes and the grass root level of Finnish public online-debates, demonstrates that the idea of the welfare state can also be employed to argue for increasing exclusion, rather than inclusion, of immigrants. Instead of an ethnocultural or xenophobic rhetoric, Pyrhönen finds that the economic sustainability of the welfare state features as a key rhetorical construction in anti-immigration debates. The arguments of economic welfare sustainability relate immigration to the threat of a cheap work force that would undermine national workers’ interests, and stress the financial burden of humanitarian migration and integration measures to the welfare state. These findings challenge the conception that economic arguments are of secondary importance for populist right-wing parties24 and highlight the potency and flexibility of the idea of the welfare state in political debates.

Politicians may also employ the institutional frameworks of the welfare state to influence immigration policy. On the basis of her comparison between current discourses and policies on labour immigration in France and Germany—two countries with different welfare regimes but very similar policy goals when it comes to labour migration—Regine Paul argues that the political and administrational elite use the welfare state in different ways in the two countries to attract highly-skilled labour immigrants. The Bismarckian logic of the German welfare state frames German labour admission policies; as work is the pathway to rights in Germany, the immigrant who can be assumed to contribute is given special treatment in entrance policy. The immigrant who might not have been seen as a net contributor when entering, e.g. (former) asylum seekers, but that has shown she is capable of working, can also ‘earn’ admission into the warmth of the German welfare state. Of course this emphasis on work can also discriminate—those that cannot be expected to work must be denied admission.

Post-colonial France also gives ‘wanted,’ highly-skilled, immigrants the red carpet treatment in admissions. Due to the lack of a perceived labour shortage and the attention to post-colonial population management, the admission policies in France are not as governed by the perceived need to attract immigrants as the German polices. The French concept of *immigration choisie* has as much to do with keeping the ‘wrong’ immigrants out as it does with getting the ‘right’ ones in. The historical institutional structures of the welfare states matter in French and German admission policies, but the way they matter is highly contextual and contingent on the prevailing perceptions of migration among the political and governmental elite.

Elizabeth Onasch and Marjukka Weide explore the extent of national differences in the perceptions of immigrants and the nation in their comparison of the national discourse within French and Finnish civic integration programmes. The authors argue that although civic integration programmes have proliferated across Europe and have been the subject of increased coordination and soft policy development at the level of the European Union, it is possible to identify distinct national models within the French and Finnish policy discourses. In line with theories about policy convergence, the French and Finnish cases have developed roughly similar policy tools for integration, despite very different histories of immigration and national institutions. Accordingly, the authors identify similarities in the discourse surrounding the civic integration programmes in the two countries, specifically in terms of the programme justifications and the representations of national values and the targeted immigrant groups. Weide and Onasch suggest that the role of distinct national models becomes apparent in the way French and Finnish programme discourses frame and interpret the similar discursive elements, such as representations of targeted immigrant groups as being traditional and having unequal gender relations, in nationally-specific ways. The figure of the Finnish welfare state and a particular brand of multiculturalism specific to an extensive welfare state define, to a large extent, the Finnish national model, in contrast to that of France, which emphasises various interpretations of republican assimilation and ‘civic’ political belonging.
Roberto Scaramuzzino’s chapter on the participation of immigrant organisations in the Equal programme in Italy and Sweden addresses the interplay between the local, national, and supranational contexts. Scaramuzzino utilises the concept of political opportunity structures, as specified in relation to immigrant organisations by Bengtsson (2007), and analyses the factors that determine immigrant organisations’ access to the opportunity structure of the Equal programme within Italy and Sweden. He argues that the type of organisation and its initial level of resources, skills, and connections determine how an immigrant organisation will be able to take advantage of the opportunities provided by Equal. While the Equal programme seems to have offered new political opportunities and access to new resources, it leaves most immigrant organisations in a position of dependence on stronger actors. Scaramuzzino finds that the activities of the immigrant organisations that were carried out in Italy and Sweden were surprisingly similar, and thus suggests that the Equal programme has contributed to a Europeanisation of national civil societies.

Concluding remarks

This volume adds to a growing corpus of research literature\(^{25}\) that examines the multifaceted relationship between migration and the welfare state. It does not answer the normative question of whether immigration is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for the welfare state, a political question that has gained much traction in current research on migration and integration. Instead, it challenges this question by showing the complex interplay of migration, welfare state structures, ideas and diverse political actors. The welfare state model is not an empirical entity as such and as an abstraction, it cannot be harmed by immigration through a process of simple causality. Politicians and other political actors can make changes to those socio-political arrangements that

are considered foundational to the (historical) welfare state while referring to migration and immigrants as the reason for these changes. However, immigration can also, perhaps paradoxically, strengthen welfare states by providing an electoral platform for welfare nationalism. Furthermore, the welfare state, as a normative and institutional framework, can shape immigration policy.

The entangled relationship of migration and welfare regimes depends on the political process, even if migration ultimately springs from a demographical change in any given society. This volume shows the political nature of the relationship to be transnational, discursive, institutional, and open to the agency of organisational and individual actors. The chapters in this volume also highlight the versatility of the welfare state as a symbol within discourse surrounding immigration; the ideals of welfare states can be used to justify the exclusion of immigrants as well as support multicultural policies and the expansion of rights to irregular migrants. It is also important to remember that migrant groups – people crossing the highly regulated borders of the globalised world – are heterogeneous and diverse categories that, to a great extent, are products of political, social and cultural constructions and re-constructions. These constructions and re-constructions are also conditioned by the actions of the migrants – beginning with the act of emigration, whatever its final outcome.

The chapters in this volume make apparent that immigration seemingly has an effect on the welfare state as a whole, from how it is conceptualised in political discourse to how its institutional arrangements are re-configured, and that the welfare state, in turn, has an effect on the reception of immigrants. These relations are, however, hardly surprising considering that immigration lays bare the fundamental question of inclusion that lies at the heart of the national welfare state project(s): who is to be included in the project and through what means? Gary Freeman also made this point in his seminal article on the welfare state and migration: ‘When the welfare state is seen as something for “them” paid by “us”, its days as a consensual solution
to societal problems are numbered.26 The key word here is ‘seen’; how ‘us’ and ‘them’ are conceptualised in public and political discourse matters in everyday life as much as it does in the formulation and implementation of policy. The case studies within this volume demonstrate how the ideals and institutions of the welfare state itself can provide frameworks for defining the contents and boundaries of belonging, as well as the possibilities for inclusion. The current salience of the ‘threat’ discourse or framing is evident in many of the chapters, but the volume also includes chapters that show that the construction of a ‘them’ is not always done in order to demonise and ostracise. The construction of collectives for progressive policy purposes is, of course, nothing new when considering the history of welfare state regimes: it is a constitutional feature, at least of the universal welfare regimes.

The post-war welfare state in all its manifestations might be crumbling under the pressure of globalisation and neoliberalism, but many welfare regimes are still standing and their relationships to migration and immigrants are, as this volume shows, a politically open affair. Academics stressing the need for more research is somewhat of a cliché, yet this is precisely what the findings presented in this volume indicate; what is now needed is not over generalised dichotomies, but diligent and varied research on the different aspects of the welfare state and migration that avoids the conceptual pitfalls of contemporary political discourse. More studies of the welfare state’s construction and re-construction of immigrants and the creation of immigrant policies on the basis of these constructions are likely to come in the near future. We look forward to reading them.

26 Freeman 1986, 62.
In 1975, the Swedish parliament unanimously accepted a new immigrant- and minority policy centred around three general policy aims: equality, freedom of choice and co-operation. The term multiculturalism\(^1\) was not used to describe the new policy, but the policy goals embodied the meaning of the concept as it later has been defined in regards to policy: a policy or body of policies that specifically recognizes and promotes the unique cultural characteristics of all ethnic groups in a society and promotes the idea that the maintenance of ethnocultural groups enriches the whole of society. According to this definition, Sweden officially introduced a number of multiculturalist declarations and policies (MCPs) in the middle of the 1970’s, thus the country turned to multiculturalism. Not only did Sweden adopt a multiculturalist integration policy in 1975, the tenants of the idea of multiculturalism were also inscribed into the Swedish constitution in 1976 as a direct consequence of the new general policy: ‘Opportunities should be promoted for ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities to preserve and develop a cultural and social life of their own’\(^2\). The idea of multiculturalism therefore included a normative rejection of what was and is conceptualized as its

\(^{1}\) Mångkulturalism or multikulturalism in Swedish.
opposite; the ideal of homogeneity and all the social and political ills that are perceived to steam from this ideal, e.g. assimilationist policies. Following this shift, the idea of multiculturalism became, at least in the sphere of public rhetoric, the dominant idea in the governance of ethnic relations. The idea or concept of multiculturalism is manifested in the definition of multiculturalist policy made above and it’s primarily the emergence of the idea of multiculturalism in Sweden that will be explored in this chapter – how did the idea emerge and why did Sweden ‘choose’ to base its new policies on it? The MCPs themselves and their implementation is therefore not included in this study, which focuses on the ideational and ultimately ideological shift to multiculturalism from earlier, more assimilationist, ideas and the policies – or lack thereof – that had manifested these ideas.

Four years before the Swedish turn, a similar turn had taken place in Canada when the Policy of Multiculturalism within a Bilingual Framework was introduced, making Canada the first country to adopt a general multiculturalist policy. The Canadian turn also precipitated similar, officially marked, turns in two other British settler countries, Australia and New Zealand, in the 1970’s. Sweden was, however, the first non-settler country to officially declare a policy of multiculturalism. This chapter will analyze the Swedish turn first by mirroring it to the Canadian turn, then by contrasting it to a case where the dog (of multiculturalism) did not bark, even if the multiculturalist bark of Sweden could be heard across the strait of Øresund: Denmark. The Swedish turn to multiculturalism was not simultaneous with or followed by a Danish turn, even though Denmark had also become ‘multicultural’ in a descriptive sense due to labour immigration during in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Historian Ulf Hedetoft has emphasized the similarities of Sweden and Denmark when discussing the lack of historical path dependency in regards to multiculturalism:

The point is [...] to demonstrate that in spite of similar historical paths towards modernity and similar political and social structures, small welfare-states based on culturally homogenous histories do not necessarily spawn assimilationist integration policies.4

Hedetoft argues that Sweden, with its official multiculturalism, is a diverging case. In a more historical and a comparative perspective, it is easy to agree with this assessment; the divergent paths of the two neighbouring countries, or, for that matter, the divergent path of Sweden compared to most of the rest of Western Europe, in embracing the idea of multiculturalism, would have been nearly impossible to predict in the middle of the 1960’s. Homogeneity, or even uniformity, was an uncontested political norm in both countries at the time, perhaps more so in Sweden than in Denmark.5

The multiculturalist turn in Sweden also stands out when compared to the other multiculturalist turns of the 1970’s. Canada, Australia and New Zealand were all British settler societies and not ‘old’ ethnically-homogenous nation-states like Sweden. Sweden is, then, an outlier in both Scandinavia and the rest of Western Europe, where the labour immigration period ended without any implementation of (immigrant) multiculturalism.6 By comparing the Swedish case with the Canadian and Danish cases this chapter hopes to shed new light on the multiculturalist turn in Sweden and bring into view some significant historical contingences that have been overlooked in previous, nationally-centred, research. The comparison between Denmark and Sweden is particularly salient, as Denmark and Sweden are traditionally assumed to be structurally and historically similar. Contemporary public and academic discourse on migration and integration often con-

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5 This tentative assessment of the political cultures in postwar Sweden and Denmark is primarily based on the fact that the social democrats did not become as dominant in Denmark as they were in Sweden. Cf. e.g. Christiansen, Niels Finn & Klaus Petersen (2001) ’The Dynamics of Social Solidarity: The Danish Welfare State 1900–2000’. Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 26, Issue 3, 177–196.
6 During the 1970’s, The Netherlands adopted a semi-segregationist policy in line with the Dutch tradition of pillarization in order to facilitate a return of the labour immigrants, not to integrate them as part of a (new) multicultural society.
structs Denmark and Sweden as sibling opposites, and perhaps this chapter can provide some historical insight on this particular aspect of the sibling difference. The comparative perspective in this chapter is not limited to a comparison of analytically un-entangled cases; it also includes a tentative analysis of the transnational features of the emergence of the idea multiculturalism in Sweden. As historians Haupt and Kocha have convincingly argued, transnational or entanglement history and comparative history are not at odds with each other but, rather, complementary ways of conducting historical research. Transfers and entanglements cannot be properly understood without comparisons and comparative history should consider the connections and entanglements between the units of comparison.7

The multiculturalist turn of Sweden

The multiculturalist turn in Sweden has been covered— albeit, often superficially— by many researchers in different fields since its political formalization in 1975. The turn has garnered the most attention among social scientists, but when it comes to the actual mapping of historical process, one work, which most social scientific accounts also refer to, stands out: historian Lars Erik Hansen’s dissertation on the postwar history of Swedish immigrant policy.8 Hansen’s work provides an important outline of the development of Swedish policy and public debate from the end of WWII to the adaptation of the MCPs in 1975. However, even though the book is a fine empirical work, it does not track the process in any great depth and is theoretically sketchy. In a recent publication, political scientist Karin Borevi tried to answer why the multiculturalist turn took place based on the explanations forwarded in the Swedish literature and argued that one answer can be found in the radical Zeitgeist (‘the spirit of the times’) of the 1960’s and

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1970’s. Although an understanding of the *Zeitgeist* or public philosophy of the time is of utmost importance when considering context, we cannot leave our search for answers at this somewhat metaphysical level of analysis. Borevi also refers to another explanation related to the catch-all concept of *Zeitgeist*, the hypothesis of political scientists Demker and Malmström that the active foreign policy of Sweden largely determined Swedish integration policies. This is an anachronistic argument that, among other things, disregards the fact that what is now called multiculturalism was not in any way established as an international norm in the 1970’s, least of all in regards to immigrant groups or minority groups of recent immigrant origin. A more empirically and historically based explanation is Borevi’s own argument, relying on a first hand observation made by the Swedish immigration scholar and government expert Tomas Hammar, about the pivotal role of experts in shaping Swedish policies. This argument can be empirically explored and combined with another explanation Borevi briefly touches upon: the role of ethnic activism in facilitating the multiculturalist turn. These two explaining factors, ethnic activism and experts, will, along with the idea of multiculturalism that bound them together, constitute the analytical focal point of this chapter. In short: the existing research on the multiculturalist turn in Sweden has almost exclusively focused on Swedish structural conditions and the agency of established Swedish institutions and organizations. Ideas and ‘external factors,’ like the composition of postwar immigration, and the agency of the ‘objects’ of multiculturalism, i.e. ethnic groups and members of these groups, in advancing the idea of multiculturalism, have been overlooked. Parliament and the political parties were, to be sure, formally the prime determinants of policy, but the ideas that influence and legitimatize policy changes are not always generated within the government, 

12 Borevi 2010b, 69–70.
in the halls of administration, or in the research-policy nexus. The make-up of immigrant groups and the political agendas of the groups (sometimes transnational and/or deeply dependent on the perceived status of the group in the host society) are also important factors to assess when studying the ideational side of ethno-politics.

The argument presented here, that the postwar immigrants themselves were important in facilitating the multiculturalist turn through the introduction of new ideas and agenda setting, does not preclude the analysis and findings of existing research but complements it. By examining multiculturalism as a political idea that, like all political ideas, has a history that is constituted by the agency of actors advancing or opposing it and by the historical contexts associated with and framing the advancement of the idea, it is possible to gain a more empirically underpinned and analytical understanding of the history of multiculturalism. The emergence of the idea of multiculturalism is a historical phenomenon and can therefore be studied using the methods and theoretical perspectives of historical research as well as insights from the field of ideational research. Historians have for a long time known that ideas matter and the theoretical concepts of ideationally-oriented social science can, perhaps, provide historians with tools for explaining how ideas matter and also help translate the results of historians into an idiom understood by all scholars of ideas and politics. Theoretical concepts of ideational research like ‘framing’, ‘agenda setting’ and ‘opportunity’ will therefore be tentatively used in order to refine the arguments made in this chapter and to convey its results.13

Sources and methodological tools
The Canadian and Danish cases which are contrasted to the Swedish case will primarily be presented using research literature on ethnicity and politics in the two countries. The presentation of the Swedish case will combine research literature and a selection of primary sources in order to empirically

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ground the thesis about the emergence of the idea of multiculturalism in Swedish that is forwarded. The primary sources used in this chapter have been selected from a large body of source material collected for the author’s dissertation project. Even though this source material has been selected in order to carry the narrative, or process tracing, it is representative of the larger body of source material.\textsuperscript{14}

The source material, as it pertains to the emergence of the idea of multiculturalism in Sweden, has been primarily analyzed using methodological tools developed by Quentin Skinner and J.G.A. Pocock.\textsuperscript{15} This means that an actor-centred analysis of the textual material has been employed and the following heuristic questions asked: Who tried to do what through the use of (political) language? What authorial intentions can be inferred from an intertextual analysis of a text or recorded speech act? How have the claims and ideas presented through speech-acts been received and how have they spread? The comparative method deployed in the chapter also takes a cue from ideational scholars Béland \& Cox, who argue that one way forward for ideational analysis is to not only select cases based on the outcome, but to also include cases with similar starting conditions in order to strengthen the inferences made by ideational researchers.\textsuperscript{16} Their suggestion for the advancement of comparative ideational analysis is taken up in this chapter by selecting two comparison cases for the Swedish case; one (Canada) with a similar outcome, and one with similar starting conditions (Denmark).

**White ethnics and the multiculturalist turn of Canada**

The introduction of the policy of multiculturalism by Prime Minister Trudeau in the Canadian parliament on the 8th of October, 1971, was not a dramatic event. The new policy was supported across party lines and largely came about as a bi-product of the most significant Canadian political con-

\textsuperscript{14} This body includes archival material, published and un-published governmental reports, books, debate articles (newspaper and journal), news articles and interviews.


\textsuperscript{16} Béland \& Cox (2010), 16–17.
flict of the 1960’s: the status of Quebec and francophone Canada in the Can-
adian federation. Tellingly, the ideational basis for the policy was formulated ad hoc in the last report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (the B&B commission). The B&B commission had been established in 1963 to defuse the tension created by the Quiet Revolution in Quebec and it is worth noting that the policy of multiculturalism was explicitly placed ‘within a bilingual framework’. However, the policy of multi-
culturalism did not solely materialize in a top-down effort stemming from a sudden concern on the part of the Anglophone and Francophone Canadian elite for the ethnocultural identity of the non-charter groups of Canada. Canada’s policy of multiculturalism was demanded by Canadians who Will Kymlicka has categorized as ‘white ethnics’; people of Ukrainian, Polish, Finnish, German, Dutch and Jewish descent. According to Kymlicka, the political process during the formative period of multiculturalism in Canada, 1963–1971, was ‘driven by white ethnics’.17

In fact, the first person to use the concepts multicultural and multicultu-
ralism in the Canadian parliament was not PM Trudeau, but Canadian-
Ukrainian senator Paul Yuzyk. In his 1964 maiden speech in the senate, Yuzyk made a strongly-worded plea for the cultural recognition of what he called ‘the third element’ of Canadian society:

The third element ethnic or cultural groups should receive the sta-
tus of co-partners, who would be guaranteed the right to perpetuate their mother tongues and cultures [---].18

Several scholars have pinpointed the Canadian-Ukrainian claims for recognition and a more multiculturalistic conception of Canada during the 1960’s as the most influential of the claims made by the white ethnic groups.19 There were several reasons for the activity and influence of the Can-
adian-Ukrainian group and its lobbyists. The Canadian-Ukrainian com-

munity was well established and could present itself as one of the groups that had settled the prairie during the end of the 19th century and early 20th century when the first wave of Ukrainians arrived in Canada. The group argued that it had contributed and continued to contribute to Canadian society. The group was also relatively large; 2.59 per cent of the Canadian population was registered as being of Ukrainian origin in the 1961 census. 20 The group’s most important characteristic in terms of being able to advance the idea of multiculturalism was, however, its strong (in relation to other white, non-charter, groups) sense of ethnic/national identity. The group also included politically active elements as a direct consequence of the third wave of Ukrainian immigration during and after the Second World War and following the re-establishment of Soviet hegemony over Ukraine. Compared to other white ethnic groups in Canada, a significant proportion of Ukrainian-Canadians displayed a Diaspora mentality that was strengthened by religious and anti-communist sentiment. The homeland was existentially threatened by anti-religious Soviet imperialism, and it was therefore a Ukrainian duty to keep the nation alive in the Diaspora. 21

Canadian multiculturalism, then, grew out of a political climate in which the relationship between Francophone and Anglophone was at the forefront of the political agenda. According to Kymlicka, multiculturalism was ‘a way of deflecting opposition for the apparent privileging of French and English that was implicit in the introduction of official bilingualism’. 22 This opposition was carried out mainly by Ukrainian-Canadians looking for recognition and support, in the (from the end of the 1960’s) officially bilingual country. It was probably no coincidence that PM Trudeau announced the policy of multiculturalism on the 8th of October 1971, – he addressed the tenth Ukrainian-Canadian Congress the next day and was, according to one of the leading Ukrainian-Canadian activists, Manoly Lupul, ‘hailed as a messiah at the banquet’. 23

The history of Canada as a settler country and the tradition of conceptualizing Canada as pluralist in contrast to the American melting-pot, suggest that the historical conditions were favourable for some sort of official recognition of ethnocultural groups at a time when the reformist welfare state was expanding. However, the impact of ethnic lobbying, and the characteristics of the lobbying ethnic group, must still be emphasized in the birth of Canadian multiculturalism. Most of the white ethnics were Canadian citizens with the concomitant right to vote (incidentally the policy received bi-partisanship support) and were, according to Kymlicka, seen to be ‘fully committed to the basic liberal democratic principles’ of Canada, and as belonging to ‘Western civilization’, which, in this context, did not include communism. For instance, Senator Yuzyk emphasized the democratic and Christian nature of all Canadians in his speech on multiculturalism in 1964.

The introduction of multiculturalism in Canada was, to conclude, facilitated by ethnic activism of the ostensibly ‘white’, ‘Christian’, and anti-communist non-charter groups of Canada during the 1960’s. The Francophone claims for recognition were echoed in the claims of the ‘third element’ and the introduction of official bilingualism and later multiculturalism is a testament of not only the politically reformist climate of the 1960’s and 1970’s, but also the impact of the politically charged calls for recognition in an ethnoculturally diverse country. In hindsight, the introduction of multiculturalism in Canada can appear almost pre-determined – the settler country lacked a strong (ethno) national identity and had a tradition of pluralism and of successful immigrant integration – why would a number of relatively modest claims for recognition not have been met by the (liberal) government in an age of reform and economic prosperity? Keeping this case in mind, we now turn to Sweden and Denmark, which were both quintessential ethnically and religiously homogenous, ‘old’, European nation-states at the end of the Second World War. Both countries experienced historically

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25 Kymlicka 2007a, 71.
high levels of labour immigration during a period of high economic growth in the 1960’s and early 1970’s, which, like in Canada, was also a period of major political reforms and value liberalization. However, only Sweden would follow a path similar to that of Canada, which shows us that in universal welfare states, the official implementation of multiculturalism did not and does not automatically follow from an increase in ethnic diversity.

Sweden before the turn

Both Denmark and Sweden received a large number of war refugees during and after the Second World War; however, almost all of the refugees in Denmark, who were mostly Germans, left the country during the 1940’s. Returning home was not an option for the Baltic refugees in Sweden, and although some of the Baltic refugees were forced to return to the Soviet Union, ca. 30 000 remained in Sweden. In contrast, there were ca. 6 000 Baltic refugees in Denmark in 1945, but only 400 stayed. Most of these refugees came from Estonia and while in the Swedish refugee camps, the Estonians already established schools and a network of organizations, which were initially met with Swedish resistance. The Estonians did not heed the exhortation of the Swedish authorities and press and persevered in their efforts to establish an Estonian community in exile. Estonians and their Swedish supporters continuously lobbied the government and the Minister of Education, Tage Erlander, who eventually granted them their wish to establish schools of their own outside of the camps. The schools, most of which were provisional, were not supported financially by the state and were only allowed on the condition that the Estonians would be able to support and run the schools themselves. The Diaspora mentality of the Estonians in Sweden and the commitment to maintain the Estonian language and culture in exile, played an important part in the emergence of Swedish multiculturalism, just like the Diaspora mentality of similarly displaced Ukrainian

refugees played its part in the introduction of Canadian multiculturalism. Sweden also received 10,000 Jewish refugees as a result of the war, which increased the Jewish population by 65 per cent compared to its pre-war size and revitalized Judaism in Sweden. In 1955, the Hillel School was founded by the refugees in order to offer the Jewish children of Stockholm a more traditional and Zionist education, and in 1963, the Jewish Centre of Stockholm was established.  

When considering the establishment of the Estonian schools and the Hillel School, it is important to remember that the Swedish comprehensive school system, one of cornerstones of postwar social democratic Sweden, was not fully implemented until the early 1960’s. When the nine year comprehensive school system was finalized in 1962, the Estonian schools and the Jewish Hillel School became visible anomalies in the eyes of the Swedish social democratic elite and the supporters of the comprehensive school system in the other parties. When labour immigration increased during the 1960’s, the Jewish and Estonian schools, and the provisional support that was granted to them on a yearly basis, became even more ‘problematic’; as many politicians saw them as a dangerous precedent that other, larger, immigration groups might try to follow. Until the multicultural reforms of 1975, the stance of the Swedish social democratic party (which ruled Sweden from 1932 to 1976) on the Estonians and Jews was not one of active assimilation, but rather tolerance with the expectation of assimilation.

The war time immigration of refugees that refused to quietly assimilate brought not only, from a social democratic viewpoint, a breach in the long nourished dream of a uniform and equality-producing school system, but also the question of (minority) ethnic identity into Swedish politics, albeit on its margins. Although the ethnic identity of the majority had been politicized before and during the war, in the intellectual climate of the postwar period, concepts like nationalism and conservatism quickly lost ground.


The key concepts of the Swedish postwar intellectual elite included universalism, equality, progressivism, and internationalism.\textsuperscript{31} As a consequence of the war, a newly organized ethnic group, the Estonians, was established in Sweden and an old ethnic group, the Jews, was revitalized. By the time historically large numbers of labour immigrants started arriving, primarily from the neighbouring country of Finland in the 1960's\textsuperscript{32}, many of the Estonian and Jewish refugees had become integrated into Swedish society in such a way that it was possible for them to voice demands for cultural recognition in Swedish and in the political language(s) of Swedish society. This was an important development, for without sufficient language skills (in a broad sense) it is nigh impossible to try to set an agenda, even if the society is democratic and influential public arenas are formally available.

The introduction, promotion and impact of the idea of multiculturalism in Sweden

In 1964 Sweden’s biggest and most influential daily Dagens Nyheter published the article ‘Utlänningsproblemet i Sverige’ (The problem of foreigners in Sweden) by the Jewish refugee David Schwarz. With this article Schwarz became the first person to question the concept of assimilation in a prominent public forum in the postwar immigration era.\textsuperscript{33} The article sparked a debate in Dagens Nyheter about the ‘foreigners’, a category that in this context included every non-ethnic Swede in Sweden, and their social and cultural needs. Other immigrants joined Schwarz in his plea for recognition and tolerance of non-Swedish groups in Sweden. According to one of the activists, Estonia-born Sven Alur Reinans, the debate in Dagens Nyheter included, like subsequent debates, coordination on the part of at least some of the participants who were in favour of what, at roughly the same time,  

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32 The labour immigration of Finns, and later of Yugoslavs, Greeks and Turks, was caused by the labour demand of the Swedish economy which was growing rapidly during this time and facilitated, in the case of the Finns, by the common Nordic labour market which had been established in 1954 with concomitant intra-Nordic labour and social rights.

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was called multiculturalism by senator Yuzyk in Canada. This first serious attempt at agenda setting was, however, not an instant success. When *Dagens Nyheter* summarized the debate in an editorial, the paper professed sympathy for the calls for tolerance, but rejected the idea that the Swedish state had any responsibility for the maintenance of ‘traditional culture’. The state did not assist the nonconformist farmer from the rural parts of Sweden in maintaining his way of life when he moved to the city in search of work and neither should the state provide this service for his non-Swedish equivalents. According to the paper, modernization and the march of progress were unavoidable facts of life for both native and foreign born. Still, by giving the activists space to air their claims and proposals and by treating these concerns as valid, the debate in *Dagens Nyheter* set in motion a change in political discourse that would be fulfilled to such a degree that the rebuttal made by *Dagens Nyheter* in 1964 would seem politically reactionary and morally inappropriate just a few years later. This discursive change was, to be sure, made possible by the reality of historically large-scale immigration to Sweden: an ‘immigration field’ was being constituted by and within the administrative structures of the welfare state and as long as immigration levels remained high the ‘immigrant question’, which by government decision had gained status as a pertinent social question in 1966, was not going to disappear.

The advocacy of Schwarz and the other activists kept the idea of multiculturalism alive both in the public sphere and in the halls of government. When assessing the impact of the activists, particularly Schwarz, one has to keep in mind that Sweden was a small country and its public and political arena was physically much smaller during this time than it is today, even if it might have been intellectually broader. In the middle of the 1960’s Sweden had one TV-channel, three national radio channels (no local radio stations) and the home and office phone numbers of the members of cabi-

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34 Author’s interview with Sven Alur Reinans 17 Dec. 2009.
36 The Working Group on Immigrant Issues (Arbetsgruppen för invandrarfrågor), the precursor to the Swedish Immigration Board, was established in 1966.
net were listed in the phone book.\textsuperscript{37} The Government Offices also employed a fraction of the people it does today. When Schwarz at the beginning of 1966 wanted to pitch his case for multiculturalism to the Prime Minister he simply called Olle Svenning, one of only four state secretaries at the Prime Minister’s Office, who then arranged a meeting.\textsuperscript{38}

In 1965 Schwarz introduced the term ‘the multicultural society\textsuperscript{39}, which he embedded with notions of ethnocultural recognition, progress and societal harmony. The multicultural society, conceptually equivalent to the term multiculturalism as it is defined in this chapter, was contrasted to the reactionary concept of assimilation and old-fashioned notions of Swedish homogeneity. Swedish assimilationism was, according to Schwarz and the other activists, an unfortunate product of Sweden’s insular history and it would have dire consequences if it was not eradicated and replaced by the new political ideal of the multicultural society, i.e. multiculturalism. Assimilationism would produce mentally unstable immigrants in both the first and second generation and conflict between the oppressed minority groups and the Swedish majority. For the sake of the immigrants and for the whole of Swedish society, general political reforms that recognized and supported the culture of non-ethnic Swedes in Sweden were needed.\textsuperscript{40} In 1965 Schwarz also personally influenced future PM Olof Palme, then Minister of Education, who subsequently incorporated the multiculturalist idiom of the ethnic activists into his political discourse. It had, since the 1930’s, been customary for a prominent Swede to hold a radio speech on Christmas day to the Swedes abroad, but Palme broke with this tradition by nominally directing his speech to the foreigners in Sweden, although the speech was in fact aimed at the Swedish majority. In the speech Palme stressed the need for the Swedes to make the spirit of internationalism, which according to Palme was especially strong in Sweden, a reality also in daily life by accepting and

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Det flerkulturella samhället} or, synonymously, \textit{det mångkulturella samhället}. Both were used from this moment on.
helping the ‘harbingers of internationalism’, i.e. the immigrants. Palme also told the Swedish people that the immigrants should not be forced to ‘become just like us’, as they wanted to, and would always be, different.41 The immigrants would become ‘different Swedes’ Palme claimed, using an expression coined by the refugee worker Inga Gottfarb in her support of Schwarz in 1964.42 Palme combined one of the key concepts of his political life, internationalism, with the multiculturalist idiom of the ethnic activists and thus embedded their arguments in a persuasive ideational framework. Ten years later Palme, who was now PM, oversaw the introduction of the multiculturalist policy. A statement also made in 1965 by Palme’s mentor and boss, PM Tage Erlander, on the racial upheavals in the US, was probably more in line with the general assumptions about the blessings of homogeneity within the social democratic party and the Swedish mainstream: ‘We Swedes live in an infinitely more happy condition [than Americans]. The population of our country is homogenous, not only in regards to race but also in many other aspects.’43

In 1966 Schwarz published the anthology Svenska minoriteter (Swedish minorities) which included articles written by experts, mostly social scientists, on immigration and ethnic groups in Sweden. The title of the book contained a political statement as the concept of (ethnic) minority, which historically carried international judicial and political connotations that a term like immigrant group lacked, was applied to all non-Swedish groups in Sweden. The ethnic activists tried to appropriate the concept of minority in order to advance their cause by arguing that the established and growing (both in size and in quantity) ethnic minorities in Sweden needed recognition and support. The immigrants were framed as minorities or at least as minorities in the making by the activists. The minority concept did not, however, have any judicial bearing in Swedish law44 even if Sweden was

44 The status of the Sámi was primarily regulated by laws pertaining to reindeer keeping, not de jure minority rights.
home to two *de facto* minority groups in the North: the indigenous Sámi and the Finnish speaking Tornedalians. *Svenska minoriteter* was the first publication of its kind and it became a standard work in the field of immigration and minorities research in Sweden.

Social scientists were at the time highly regarded as scientific experts and they could therefore influence policy making, particularly through the Swedish Commission System. Both the leading social scientists attached to the Commission of Immigration as experts, Arne Trankell and Harald Swedner, had taken up multiculturalist positions by the turn of the decade, even if they had started out as assimilationists in the universalist, Myrdalian, mould when they began their research on the Swedish Roma and the immigrants in the mid-1960’s. The emerging field of immigration and minorities research was deeply influenced by the multiculturalist ideas initially emanating from the ethnic activists in Sweden. This development was also reinforced by the so-called ethnic revival of the postwar period which influenced — and was influenced by — ideas on ethnicity in the transnational social scientific community. It is, however, important to note that the multiculturalist turn in the Swedish social sciences preceded the high-water mark of the ethnic revival in the West in the 1970’s. In the Danish social sciences, multiculturalist perspectives and rejections of assimilationism became influential in the 1980’s, but this turn in Danish academia did not have the same influence on Danish policy as the Swedish turn had, even if it might have had some influence on practices on the local level and public discourse. The research-policy nexuses of Sweden and Denmark have been shown to be remarkably different in immigration matters for the last 20 years, and this time period can be stretched back even further. The impact and influence of the Swedish research-policy nexus was probably at its peak during the tail end of the uninterrupted social democratic reign from 1932 — 1976,

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45 Wickström, forthcoming.
i.e. the time when the ‘immigrant question’ became part of the nexus and formed its own sub-nexus within it. When similar sub-nexuses were formed in Denmark, immigration had already become party-politicized, which meant that the Danish experts were much more politically curtailed than their Swedish counterparts, at least until the mid-2000’s.\textsuperscript{49}

1967 was a breakthrough year for the idea of multiculturalism in public discourse. Political pressure to deal with the ‘immigration problem’ had started to mount, mainly due to the influx of a large number of Finnish and Yugoslavian labour immigrants. These immigrants were \textit{de facto} ‘foreign workers’ in the sense that they were foreign citizens who had come or been brought to Sweden to work. It was at the time of course unclear how many of these labour immigrants would stay in Sweden and, like the labour immigrants in Denmark, many of the immigrants expressed, both in action and in speech, their intention of returning. The presence of the labour immigrants, who the government from 1966 onwards started to conceive of as settling immigrants, brought a sense of urgency to the debate on non-Swedes in Sweden which the activists tried to capitalize on. In 1967 plans were even made to form a party of the ‘minorities’, which would represent both the naturalized and the, as of yet, non-naturalized labour immigrants. The leading spokesperson for the Finns in Sweden, meteorologist Artturi Similä, who had come to Sweden in the 1950’s, was to helm the project. According to Similä, the potential party would not participate in daily politicking or position itself on a right-left axis of Swedish politics, but act as a pure interest party for the advancement of the ‘minorities’. The party would primarily pursue state supported minority schools, extensive public service in the languages of the minorities and official political recognition of the minorities. The project quickly collapsed in the face of intensive critique from social democratic Finns in both Sweden and Finland who saw the project as an attempt at destabilizing the labour movement.\textsuperscript{50} Similä was subsequently ousted from his position in the na-

\textsuperscript{49} Jørgensen 2011.
\textsuperscript{50} Korkisaari, Jouni & Kari Tarkiainen (2000) \textit{Suomalaiset Ruotsissa}. Turku: Siirtolaisinstituutti 212–213. According to Korkisaari & Tarkiainen, the plans to establish a political party for the immigrants were made on the initiative of Baltic refugees, but this information is derived from a contemporary actor, the social democrat Yläraakkola, who probably had political reasons to claim that the idea was of exile Baltic origin, i.e. rightist or even fascist according to socialist rhetoric of the time. In an interview with the author, the Estonian-Swedish activist, Sven Alur Reinans, claimed that the idea for a party originated from Schwarz, who in spite of Reinans’ objections pursued it for some time together with Similä.
tional association of Finnish associations by the social democratic Finns in 1970 and the new leadership firmly rejected the idea of multiculturalism as threatening to the cohesion and struggle of the labour movement well into the 1970’s. 51 This development within the main Finnish political organization in Sweden, which, semi-formally, represented all (Finnish speaking) Finns in Sweden, accentuates the importance of the Diaspora groups, the Estonians and the Jews, and the agency of the activists in using these groups both as bases and as positive examples in advancing the idea of multiculturalism. It also gives evidence to the impact of ideas and experts – the multiculturalist turn took place even if the idea of multiculturalism was seen as incompatible with the (perceived) interests of the labour movement as they were interpreted by the new, social democratic, leadership of the Finns in Sweden. That the democratically elected leadership of the, by far, largest immigrant group rejected multiculturalism and the concept of minority it rested on while the Commission of Immigration was still working on its policy proposals is indicative of the usefulness of the ideational approach in explaining the multiculturalist turn. The multiculturalist agenda had taken root where it mattered and the experts who had accepted the idea of multiculturalism now believed they knew the real interests of the immigrants. The tables on what was ‘reactionary’ and what was ‘progressive’ had been turned and the, now outdated, views of the social democratic leadership of the Finns mattered little. Then again, it can be argued that the social democratic co-optation of the Finnish leadership facilitated the turn: there was no longer a risk of ‘nationalistic’ Finns using multiculturalism as a platform for political mobilization that could have been harmful to the social democrats.

Despite the setback in organizing a political coalition made up of all non-Swedes residing in Sweden, the activists made other inroads into the established political centres of Swedish society. The powerful Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) adopted a very multiculturalist ‘minority programme’ in 1967 and submitted an official demand to the social democratic government to take action in line with this programme. The author

of the programme, ombudsman Lars Ahlvarsson, had extensive contact with Schwarz, who he regarded as a teacher in these matters, before submitting the programme to the National Executive Council of the Swedish Trade Unions Confederation, which accepted it and forwarded it to the government. The programme was basically a copy of a similar programme that Schwarz and Svenning had earlier, unsuccessfully, tried to get passed through the political machine of the social democratic party.

In its petition to the government, LO demanded that the government should announce an official minority policy that should include a clearly stated recognition of the cultural aspirations of all of the ethnocultural minority groups. LO also demanded that the government convene representatives of the minorities in an advisory capacity. This ad hoc advisory body of minority leaders could later be transformed into an official advisory board. Commissions with minority representatives should be set up and minority representatives should be added to existing commissions that dealt with issues concerning the minorities. All of these demands, and the explanations justifying them, had been made earlier by the ethnic activists. LO repeated the argument of the activists that Sweden pursued a policy of total assimilation that was no longer viable. In adopting the claims and rhetoric of the activists, as well as their framing of the ‘problem’, LO facilitated the normalization of the idea of multiculturalism and paved the way for the marginalization of (explicit) assimilationism.

When Swedish public radio aired its first educational serial on the immigrants in 1967, Schwarz was involved in its making as an ‘expert’, and Swedish minorities was picked as the self-study book for the course. Although this series also included voices in favour of assimilation, 1967 was the last year that any sustained support for assimilationism was heard in Swedish public discourse for years. The leading critic of the ethnic activists, Michael Wächter, a pre-war refugee from Germany, signed off with a general plea for tolerance in the middle of 1967. In this about-turn, Wächter, who had previ-

52 Author’s interview with Lars Ahlvarsson 26 Feb. 2010.
ously criticized the claims of state sponsored discrimination made by the activists, proclaimed assimilation an impossibility as long as the Swedes discriminated against non-Swedes.\textsuperscript{55} Symbolically, the same issue that featured Wächter’s withdrawal also included an article by Schwarz and Svenning that advocated for the introduction of multiculturalism and with it a new, civic, conception of citizenship in Sweden and described the immigrant critics of multiculturalism, e.g. Wächter, as pathological.\textsuperscript{56}

Parts of the Estonian-Swedish community had strong ties to the Conservative party, which, in 1968, became the first political party in Sweden to release a multiculturalist policy programme. One of the leading Swedish-Estonian activists, Voldemar Kiviaed, had functioned as the secretary for the working group that had produced the programme. In the programme, the Conservative party stated that the aim of the party was the freedom of each and every minority member to choose however they wanted to assimilate into the majority population or retain their ethnic identity. Freedom of choice, which also included the freedom to choose on the behalf of one’s children, was to be guaranteed by the state through its support of the ethnocultural groups. The state was to therefore provide financial assistance to minority institutions, including church communions and schools, and guarantee mother tongue education in the public schools. The establishment of new minority schools and extensive support to all minority schools, as well as the establishment of a new radio channel devoted to the minorities, were also part of the programme.\textsuperscript{57} The fact that the idea of multiculturalism found its first party political home in the Conservative party again testifies to the role played by the activists, in this case Estonian, who were able to promote the idea from within the party organization. It also supports the more general argument forwarded in this chapter: who the immigrants were and how they interacted with and were perceived by the established political organizations mattered profoundly.

In the election year of 1968, the social democratic government introduced a new immigration bill that established regulated immigration and social equality between immigrants and citizens as official policy aims.\textsuperscript{58} The government also headed the calls for the establishment of a commission on the ‘immigrant question’ and set up the Royal Commission on Immigration. The name is misleading, as the commission was not to deal with the regulation of immigration, only the societal position of resident immigrants. Sweden has an almost 100-year-old tradition of establishing government commissions when a ‘social problem’ emerges (or is constructed) in order to first examine the problem scientifically and then to establish political consensus on the proposed solutions to the problem. The commission system has been an important arena for the interaction between the interests groups of Swedish society. The commissions have been appointed to deal with specific issues and they have had a consensus-building role in Swedish politics, at least up until the late 1970’s. The government commissions have also functioned as important knowledge-producing institutions as the commissions were supposed to base their proposals on scientific research and findings.\textsuperscript{59} The Commission on Immigration was, according to the directives of the government, tasked to study the position of immigrants in Swedish society and propose policy measures for the improvement of their adjustment to Swedish society. Most of the seven members that formally made up the Commission were MPs and the Commission was always chaired by a social democrat. The Commission employed a full time secretariat and also enlisted the services of various external experts, primarily social scientists Trankell and Swedner mentioned above.\textsuperscript{60}

In 1974, the Commission on Immigration put forward the proposal for a new comprehensive immigrant and minority policy based on the concepts of equality (between Swedes and immigrants), freedom of choice (to retain

ethnocultural identity), and co-operation (between Swedes and immigrant/minority groups). The establishment of the Commission in 1968 had not abated the activities of the ethnic activists who continuously tried to influence the Commission. In fact, one of the leading activists of the 1960’s, Sven Reinans, worked as an assistant secretary in the Commission and his co-activist from the 1960’s, David Schwarz, was a frequent visitor at its offices.\(^{61}\) Still, the ideational leg work for making the political shift possible seems to have been successfully done by the end of the 1960’s. By the early 1970’s, no leading political figure in Sweden assumed an assimilationist position, at least not in public. The famous Swedish social scientist Gunnar Myrdal, one of the deans of postwar universalist assimilationism\(^{62}\), did, in 1974, criticize what he called ‘voluntary ethnics’ for advancing harmful ‘romantic ethnicity’ in the US in the wake of the so-called ethnic revival, but apparently Myrdal did not realize, notice, or care that what he pejoratively called ‘romantic ethnicity’ in the US was becoming official policy in his native country.\(^{63}\)

In the early half of the 1970’s, the question was no longer whether the ethnic identities of the non-ethnic Swedish residents of Sweden should be recognized and supported, but to what extent. The Canadian policy of 1971 certainly provided transnational inspiration for the Commission on Immigration,\(^{64}\) but the Commission was by then open to the Canadian example. At least some of the persons involved with the Commission had assumed multiculturalist positions even before the B&B Commission released its final report, *The Cultural Contributions of Other Groups*, which would form the basis for the new Canadian policy, in 1969.\(^{65}\) By 1971, all three of the centre-right parties in the Swedish parliament had, ostensibly without knowledge of the Canadian multiculturalist turn, already expressed sup-

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\(^{61}\) Author’s interview with Sulo Huovinen 22 Dec. 2010. Huovinen was an under-secretary at the Commission.


\(^{65}\) E.g. commission member Ingrid Diesen, MP for the Conservative party, scientific expert Harald Swedner and secretary Sven Alur Reinans.
port of multiculturalist policies to varying degrees.\textsuperscript{66} And it was only after the policy of multiculturalism was introduced in Canada that the Swedish policymakers in the Commission really started paying attention to Canada; Chairman Yngve Möller and head secretary Jonas Widgren made a study visit to Canada in December 1971.\textsuperscript{67}

Denmark – postwar immigration without a multiculturalist turn

It has been suggested that the Swedish turn to multiculturalism was partly due to the increasing ‘non-Western’ origins of the immigrants.\textsuperscript{68} The rationale behind this argument is that the host nation deems multiculturalism necessary to introduce because of the large cultural differences between the immigrants and the majority population. However, a historical analysis of the rise of multiculturalism shows that the purported causal link between ‘non-Western’ or ‘non-white’ immigration and the introduction of multiculturalism cannot be established. As a matter of fact, the proportion of ‘non-Western’ immigrants\textsuperscript{69} was roughly the same in Denmark and Sweden in 1974, ca. 39 000 in Denmark and approximately 90 000 in Sweden. There were, for instance, more Turkish citizens in Denmark (8138) than in Sweden (5601), and there was not even a significantly higher total amount of adult non-Europeans in Sweden than in Denmark, even though Sweden’s total population was almost twice as large.\textsuperscript{70} On the face of it, then, the same necessary condition (historically large-scale immigration, whatever the ‘colour’) for the introduction of multiculturalism was in place in Denmark.

In contrast to Sweden, neither the immigrants nor the small domestic minorities in Denmark participated in the public debate about immigration and the position of the immigrants in Danish society to any great extent. A

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{67} ‘Invandrare i Kanada får kulturstöd’ (1972). \textit{Ny i Sverige} Vol. 1, Issue 2, 24.
\item \textsuperscript{69} This category here includes, for the sake of argument, immigrants from South and East Europe. ‘Non-Western’ is of course a fluid and contested concept.
\item \textsuperscript{70} Coleman, David & Eskil Wadensjö (1999) \textit{Immigration to Denmark}. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 154; Invandraruutredningen (1974), 63.
\end{itemize}
Danish Guest Worker’s Council, which regarded itself as an interest group for the immigrants, was established in 1976, but its impact was limited. The name and purpose of the council is quite telling in comparison with the ethnic organizations in Sweden. In Sweden the established immigrant organizations acted as interest groups for the respective ethnocultural minorities, not as some general category of immigrant workers belonging to the (international) labour movement. The immigrants who mobilized politically in Denmark during the 1960’s and 1970’s did so primarily as workers and not as minority members. The lack of interest on the part of immigrants together with the lack of resources, both economic and social, limited the influence of immigrant organizations and initiatives. This was probably a result of three factors: time spent in the country, socioeconomic status (class) and self-identification. It was difficult to be politically active in a new polity without knowledge of the language and the political culture. The thought of political activity in a foreign country directed at the domestic politics of that country probably seemed remote even if the immigrant had an interest in politics. Even if the immigrant was educated and had political experience, his/her priorities did not necessarily include ‘identity politics’ in the country of residence, especially during this time of radical leftist politics in Western Europe, and in light of the serious political conflicts in many of the sending countries (e.g. the Junta in Greece). General pleas for tolerance, equal treatment by the judicial system and perhaps some targeted social policy measures in housing and health care might have been enough for the immigrant who was able to voice his/her concerns in public, just as it was for some of the intellectual social democratic Finns in Sweden. This, however, does not mean that the immigrants in Denmark were not concerned with ‘ethnic identity’ or ‘culture’. The Pakistanis sent their daughters back to Pakistan in order to avoid the corruption of Danish society and

73 Vad Jønsson & Petersen 2010, 149.
many Greeks and Turks were also worried about their children becoming too Danish. Some Danish politicians were also concerned about the ‘culture’ of the immigrants but from an opposite standpoint – they claimed that there were negative, ‘primitive’, aspects of immigrant culture in comparison to modern Danish culture. However, the culture of the immigrants was not a salient political issue in Denmark as long it was officially assumed that no permanent immigration had occurred and the immigrants were conceptualized as temporary residents. The foreign workers would take their ‘culture’ with them when they left. In Sweden the ‘culture’ of the immigrants could be framed as an important question because the immigrants were officially conceptualized as permanent residents – problems related to the ‘culture’ of the immigrants (and their children) would therefore be Swedish problems for the foreseeable future.

During the 1980’s, when the culture of the guests who stayed (the permanent immigration of the former guests became publically affirmed from the middle of the 1970’s onwards) became a contentious political issue in Denmark, the question of ethnocultural difference between ‘Danes’ and ‘non-Danes’ was framed in the following way: if the culture of the immigrants was parochial, chauvinistic and generally un-Western or un-Danish and therefore incompatible with the modern Danish culture, then why should it be recognized and supported by the state? This rhetorical question was also a central argument of the short lived public critique of the idea of multiculturalism in Sweden during the 1960’s. The early critiques of multiculturalism claimed that what the advocates of multiculturalism were in fact advancing was tolerance of intolerance: ethnocentrism, sexism and religious fundamentalism. Charges of immigrant illiberalism were, perhaps, harder to make in Sweden in the 1960’s and 1970’s than, for instance, in the 1980’s

in Denmark. The example of well-integrated Estonians and Jews and culturally similar and ‘hardworking’ Finns could be brought to bear against those that argued in a way that today is common place in all of Western Europe. The Finns, who mainly emigrated from the peripheral parts of Finland, may have been unruly and unsophisticated in the eyes of the ‘modern’ Swedes, but in principle these ‘cousins from the countryside’ shared the same basic culture with the Swedes even if there were concerns about the communist activities of some of the Finns, which testifies to principal ‘civilizational’ divide of the Cold War period. The Finns were not dangerous because they were Finns, but because they could spread communism.\(^79\) The immigrants in Sweden needed to be and were culturally ‘othered’ by the ethnic activists and the experts in order to gain support for and legitimize ethnocultural recognition, but the differences that needed to be recognized were framed as benign. Ethnocultural recognition could also, according to the advocates of multiculturalism, prevent marginalization and radicalization among the immigrants, which could provoke negative reactions among the majority population and thus lead to a vicious cycle of ethnic tension. Ethnocultural recognition was therefore presented as being in the interest of the Swedish state and both wings of the labour movement. The main issue of public contestation, the upbringing of children, could also be defended by invoking the European Convention on Human Rights, which, according to the activists, gave the family prerogative over the state when it came to the education of children.\(^80\) However, the Swedish brand of the popular sovereignty principle cancelled out any outright constrictions on domestic politics by international conventions in this period, if the labour movement regarded an implementation as incompatible with its general aims. In Sweden, the people were to rule and the people's rule should not be constricted by any, ostensibly conservative, and definitely metaphysical, judicial ideology.\(^81\)

80 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 2, Protocol 1 (Paris 1952): No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religions and philosophical convictions.
The most important difference between Denmark and Sweden in the 1970’s is, then, to be found in the conceptualization of the immigrants. In Denmark, the general line of thinking was, as in most of Western Europe, centred on the return of the foreign worker to his native country. This line of thinking was easily ‘confirmed’ by the immigrants themselves, who often expressed their intentions of returning. The immigrants did not consider themselves as settlers; they were simply guest workers who would return as soon as they had earned enough money. Hence, the immigrants in Denmark did not just lack resources and an ‘acceptable’ Western culture; they did not have a claimed or ascribed minority identity like many of the ethnocultural groups in Canada and Sweden. Consequently, there was no group in Denmark that displayed a strong Diaspora identity like the Ukrainians in Canada and the Estonians and Jews in Sweden; it was these Diaspora groups which formed the political spearhead for advocacy of multiculturalism in Canada and Sweden. The Eastern Europeans, mainly Poles and Russian Jews, who had immigrated to Denmark at the end of the 19th century and during the first decades of the 20th century had, according to historian Søren Kolstrup, been assimilated by the 1960’s. For instance, the Yiddish organizations and cultural institutions established by the first generation of Russian Jewish immigrants had all withered away by the end of the 1960’s.\(^8\) This can be contrasted to the re-vitalization of the Jewish community in Sweden during the same decade and the buzzing organizational life of the Estonians, which were the result of the aspirations of the first generation of immigrants. The difference between the immigrant groups who had arrived in Sweden and Denmark before the labour immigration period was that the aspirations to maintain ethnocultural identity were still strong among the two first-generation groups in Sweden compared to the second and third generation of pre-war ‘immigrants’ in Denmark, when the labour immigrants became a, at least minor, ‘social problem’, that had to be ‘solved’ by a welfare state in its prime. In contrast, labour immigration during the reformist period of the welfare state opened a window of opportunity in

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Sweden for immigrant groups who were more ethnoculturally active and mobilized than the older immigrant groups in Denmark.

The stance of the respective Conservative parties in Sweden and Denmark is a case in point of how the characteristics of the groups and the agency of individual actors mattered. After it became clear around the mid-1970’s that foreign workers were going to stay, the Danish Conservative party took an explicitly assimilationist position, whereas the conservative party in Sweden, as has been shown, was the most multiculturalist party in Sweden in the late 1960’s. And the stance of the Conservative party in Sweden can partly be explained by its ties to the Estonian organization, _Esternas representation_ (The Estonian Representation), since the end of the 1950’s. The support for minority institutions, especially schools, went hand in hand with the party’s general opposition to the comprehensive school-system, but it is unlikely that the Conservative party would have embraced the idea of multiculturalism so wholeheartedly without the internal advocacy of the Estonians. When the immigrants in Denmark demanded, or Danish activists demanded on their behalf, policies and services that, in hindsight, could be categorized as multiculturalist, the demands were grounded in the presumed return of the immigrants. The children of the immigrants should be taught the language of their native country so that the whole family could move back when the time came. Thus, the ‘multiculturalist’ educational policies (e.g., mother tongue education for migrant children) implemented in Denmark at the municipal level in the 1970’s were not motivated and legitimized by the idea of multiculturalism as they were in Sweden, but instead, by the idea of return. The free-school system of Denmark, which included constitutionally guaranteed support for non-publicly run schools, also diminished the incentive for coalition-building and intra-ethnic demands for official multiculturalism, because the different non-majority groups in the country were formally free to pursue the continuation of the culture of the

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83 E.g. Hammer, Ole (1973) _Fremmedarbejder_. København: Høst, 16.
group through state-subsidised private schools.\footnote{Due to space limitations this important institutional difference between Denmark and Sweden and the different histories of pluralism in the political cultures of the two countries can’t be explored further, but the first minority school established by postwar labour immigrants was established in Denmark in 1978. This highlights the ambiguities of excluding de facto and historical expressions of ‘multiculturalism’, or in this case institutional pluralism, in favour of explicit manifestations of multiculturalism expressed in policy and public discourse in studies on multiculturalism. The Danish free-school system can, from a contemporary perspective, be categorized as ‘multiculturalistic’ even if it was not established to enable the ethnocultural emancipation of immigrant groups.} A research-policy nexus in the field of immigration comparable to that of Sweden was also never formed in Denmark. Furthermore, while a strong research-policy nexus can be regarded as a necessary condition for the introduction of multiculturalism in Sweden, it was not a sufficient condition; the players in the nexus still had to embrace the idea of multiculturalism.

Another important difference between Denmark and Sweden was the position of the trade unions. In Sweden, the powerful Trade Union Confederation provided strong support for multiculturalism with its 1967 petition, whereas the Danish unions did not divert from their ‘equal treatment’ position until the late 1990’s.\footnote{Wrench, John (2004) ‘Trade Union Responses to Immigrants and Ethnic Inequality in Denmark and the UK: The Context of Consensus and Conflict’. European Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol 10, Issue 1, 11.} In 1970 DASF, one of Denmark’s largest trade unions, published the report \textit{Same vilkår} (\textit{Equal conditions}) in which the union demanded that measures be taken to ensure equality between Danish workers and foreign workers. The report was not explicitly assimilationist in its policy proposals, but neither was it multiculturalistic like the 1967 petition of the Swedish LO.\footnote{Schwartz, Jonathan Matthews (1985) \textit{Reluctant Hosts: Denmark’s Reception of Guest Workers}. København: Akademisk Forlag, 15–16.} Again, this is hardly surprising considering the lack of ethnic activists in Denmark and the general conceptualization of the immigrants as temporary residents. There were no activists in Denmark that informed, and, more importantly, convinced the Danish trade union officials, social scientists or politicians that the foreign workers were minorities in the making and as such were in need of special, multiculturalistic, policy measures. The dog of multiculturalism did not bark in Denmark because no-one unleashed it – the idea could not have an impact when there was no advocacy for it.
Conclusion
The importance of white ethnic advocacy in the emergence of multiculturalism in Canada has been noted by several scholars. Multiculturalism in Canada was introduced as the formal recognition of the ‘third element’ of Canadian society, those of non-English and non-French descent, who, unquestionably, could be deemed as contributing to Canadian society or even of having contributed to the settling of Canada. Multiculturalism could therefore be advanced with the argument that the state should recognize the past and present contributions of hitherto neglected groups of citizens and their ethnocultural heritage. In postwar Sweden, where the past primarily functioned as a negation in the legitimization of contemporary policy reforms, the emphasis was squarely placed on contemporary and presumed future contributions of the non-Swedish groups. There was, for instance, no discussion about recognizing the Finnish group based on the historical contributions made by the Finns in the kingdom of Sweden87. Still, the Finns and the other labour immigrants, as well as the former refugees, were, at the time, net providers to the coffers of the Swedish Welfare State; thus, it was argued that it was only fair that their special ethnocultural needs were recognized, as long as this did not threaten the social cohesion of the (social democratic) People’s Home. Multiculturalism was not introduced and accepted because the immigrants were radically different from the Swedes; it was accepted because they were perceived to be sufficiently similar.

To be sure, immigration levels mattered, but the relationship between the amount of immigration and policy ideas is highly contextual. Switzerland received (per capita) more labour immigrants from a neighbouring country than Sweden and reacted politically in a diametrically opposite way with the Überfremdung referendum in 1970. But Switzerland and Sweden do not share, again in the words of Hedetoft, ‘similar historical paths towards modernity and similar social and political structures’88, like Denmark and Sweden do. However, despite the historical and structural similarities of

87 The territory of modern day Finland was an integrated part of the Kingdom of Sweden from the 13th century to the beginning of the 19th century.
88 Hedetoft 2010, 112.
Denmark and Sweden, the labour immigration period of the 1960’s and 70’s, which brought historically unprecedented numbers of foreign citizens to the two countries, did not result in the same political or ideological outcome in how these newcomers should be handled. Immigration in itself did not bring about the introduction of multiculturalism in Denmark, or in any other of the west European welfare-states for that matter. The sources of immigration to the rest of Western Europe were predominately more ‘non-Western’ than those of Sweden, and it could be argued, in line with Kymlicka’s assessment of the lack of a perceived societal threat as a prerequisite for the introduction of multiculturalism in Canada, that it would have been more difficult to officially affirm the idea of multiculturalism if the groups demanding it were numerous, growing in size and in some way perceived as threatening. When the multiculturalist policy of Sweden was introduced in 1975, non-Nordic labour immigration had been halted and immigration from Finland had been significantly reduced, thereby limiting the increase in ethnic diversity. The size of labour immigration, both factual and perceived, facilitated the politicization of the issue in the end of the 1960’s, making it possible to advance new ideas, but without the activists’ promotion of multiculturalism, Sweden might never had diverged from the assimilationist path.

The comparison undertaken between Sweden and Denmark, following the comparison between Canada and Sweden, also shows the importance of ideas, the agency of the actors that promote ideas, and the context in which these actors operate and frame their ideas. Although, the idea of multiculturalism was first introduced by ethnic activists trying to set an agenda, it was only when this agenda gained traction among key actors in the Swedish corporate political system that the idea moved into the formal institutional policy process, and ultimately, led to the official introduction of multiculturalism. The conceptual figures of ‘the immigrant’ (as opposed to ‘the foreigner’ or ‘the guest worker’) and the ethnoculturally ‘non-Swedish’ citizen were crucial conceptual stepping stones in the advancement of multiculturalism. In 1966, immigrants were already formally conceptualized as new permanent residents of Swedish society, and this provided a formal political platform for the promotion of multiculturalism. In Denmark, the notion
of temporariness was embedded in the labelling of immigrants as guests, even though the official treatment of the immigrants was roughly the same as in Sweden, striving for formal equality in labour and social rights. This difference in the conceptualization of labour immigration seems to, at least partly, stem from the activities of the former war time refugees. There were already established and organized ethnic communities existing in Sweden when labour immigration picked up the pace in the 1960’s; activists from these communities could speak on behalf of all non-ethnic Swedes in the country, no matter whether they were citizens or potential citizens. Unlike the recently arrived labour immigrants, these ‘non-Swedish’ citizens of Sweden could voice demands on behalf of all immigrants and ethnocultural minority groups in Sweden and prescribe solutions to the perceived problems of these groups which went beyond the basic equal treatment formula that had been the (unwritten) rule up to that point.

The current differences in immigration and integration policies between Denmark and Sweden cannot, of course, be solely attributed to the existence or absence of white ethnic activism during the foundational years of policy making. It can, however, be argued, as Borevi convincingly has, that Sweden, on an integration policy level, has retreated from multiculturalism and that this retreat was already under way in the mid-1980’s. Still, the Swedish state currently fully supports ethnoculturally oriented free-schools, e.g., Islamic and Finnish schools. Finnish, as well as Romani, Yiddish, Sami, and Meänkieli (Tornedal Finnish) were also recognized as official minority languages in 1999. The normative proclamation of the basic tenants of the idea of multiculturalism is still strong in public discourse, the policies of public institutions (e.g., public broadcasting and the museum field), and even in constitutional law. For instance, the new Swedish constitution of 2010 strengthened the wording in the paragraph concerning the state’s responsibility for the preservation of minority cultures in Sweden from ‘should’ to ‘shall’. The current discursive divergence between Denmark and Sweden

can, therefore, partly be traced to the formative period of the 1960’s and 70’s, which put the way in which immigration and ethnicity are addressed in public on two remarkably different paths. Sweden exhibits a public ethos of multiculturalism similar to that of Canada, much more than Denmark or any other Western European country, even if Sweden’s current integration policy is not as group-oriented as the policy introduced in 1975.

Multiculturalism has recently been declared dead by many political leaders and public intellectuals in the West, whereas in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Sweden, it remains a guiding principle in the management of ethnic relations. The fact that multiculturalism is still alive, at least as an officially affirmed idea, in the first countries to introduce it, highlights the significance of the time when multiculturalism was introduced and how it was conceptualized at the moment that set it on its path-dependent way. State-sponsored multiculturalism was a response to claims-making by ethnic minority citizens and citizens-to-be for support and just treatment within the frame of liberal-democratic welfare states. Furthermore, these claimsmakers were both contributing to and integrating within the welfare state, as shown, for instance, by their ability to make reformist claims in the public sphere. The multiculturalist turn of Sweden was ultimately legitimized by a unanimous parliament and implemented by the expanding welfare state, but the idea manifested in the turn was initially formulated and advanced by white ethnic activists seeking ethnocultural recognition for (some of) the non-Swedish minority groups in Sweden.
CHAPTER 2

Rightlessness as welfare state disruption and opening to change: Analysing parliamentary debates on irregular migration as a negotiation of the demarcation of the welfare state

AMANDA NIELSEN

The 2000’s has seen intense political debates in Sweden following the ‘discovery’ of a group of people staying irregularly in the country. The group, whose existence was brought to public awareness as a result of persistent NGO campaigning, was commonly portrayed as lacking all social rights, being exploited in the labour market and living in constant fear of deportation. Consequently, their appearance in the public has challenged the often held understanding of Sweden as an immigrant-friendly and inclusive state. On the contrary, Sweden has been held out as one of the most restrictive countries when it comes to access to public services for irregular migrants. The presence of a group of people, living in society without any rights, has thus ruptured the understanding of the Swedish welfare state and triggered discussion about both asylum policy and migration policy in general, as well as their links to welfare policy.

The term irregular migrants is often used to refer to noncitizens that have either crossed state borders or remained within state territory without sanction from the host state. In the Swedish case, an irregular status is almost

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exclusively a result of the latter, as it is generally assumed that the bulk of those staying irregularly in the country are former asylum seekers. Historically, as well as comparatively, the term has however tended to be linked to the former and often invokes associations with (labour-driven) immigration to Southern European countries with large informal sectors of the economy. From this perspective, Sweden, like the rest of the Nordic countries, has generally not been considered an attractive destination for irregular migrants, because it has a reputation for being highly regulated. The character of irregular migration in the Swedish context thus differs from that in many other countries of Europe.

Correspondingly, from the outset, the Swedish debate has been strongly linked to an ongoing political debate about the alleged shortcomings of Swedish asylum policy. The conditions of irregular migrants first became the subject of major political debate in 2005 when, in connection to a major restructuring of both the asylum body of regulation and the framework for decision-making, a campaign for general amnesty was initiated. The amnesty, suggested by a broad coalition of NGO’s, religious communities and political parties, was aimed both at those asylum seekers that were waiting for an assessment and those who had had their applications turned down but had chosen to stay irregularly. The demands for a general amnesty were voted down in parliament but the campaign was partly victorious in the sense that it opened up a space for the regularization of some irregular migrants through a provisional legislation. Furthermore, the campaign was successful because it raised awareness of the precarious circumstances of irregularity and initiated a continued debate. In the aftermath of the debate, public investigations have been put in place to overhaul present legislation that regulates irregular migrants’ access to public services, such as school and medical care.

3 Düvell 2010, 4.
4 More precisely, the former order where appeals were handled by a special board, Utlänningsnämnden, was replaced by an order where appeals are handled, within the judiciary, by three courts that have been assigned the responsibility to try appeals that are related to migration.
This chapter provides an analysis of parliamentary plenary debates that followed on the ‘discovery’ of irregular migrants in Sweden. I start from the assumption that this moment can be conceptualized as a kind of crisis, in that the current circumstances clashed with commonly held understandings of an inclusive and comprehensive welfare state. Consequently, it spurred a debate over how to understand the occurrence of irregular migrants in society as well as over how society ought to respond to it. The aim of this chapter is twofold; first, I study the discursive articulations that attempt to establish an understanding of the problem. These attempts, in essence, consist of struggles over categorization and over the interpretation of the situation in relation to current policy as well as circumstances in the surrounding world. Second, I study the (diverse) discursive articulations that, allegedly, are made in attempts to advance the interests of irregular migrants.

I take my overall starting point in theorization on citizenship. More specifically, I draw upon the duality of the concept of citizenship to account for the dynamics at work in struggles over the demarcation of the welfare state; i.e. the attempts to establish the group of people to include in the rights-bearing community that the welfare state constitutes. Thus, the emphasis on duality serves to shed light on the simultaneous processes of inclusion and exclusion that are interwoven with the national welfare state as a political project. The starting point for my analysis is that this demarcation of the welfare state is open to contestation and, further, that it is continuously being negotiated in debates on migration. In this study I investigate how this process of negotiation is played out in Swedish parliamentary debates throughout the 2000’s.

A number of recent studies have explored the circumstances of irregular migrants in Sweden and Scandinavia. These studies shed light on the

7 The minutes from parliamentary sessions where such debates have taken place have been located using a number of search strings (such as papperslös [’without papers’] and amnesty) in the online archive of the Swedish parliament. Henceforth, I will refer to these debates as parliamentary debates and political debates.
discrepancy between the conception of the inclusionary welfare state and the experiences of irregular migrants from different angles. In this chapter I build on insights generated in these studies as well as in previous research on the connection between conceptions of the welfare state and migration policy more generally. While I share a theoretical point of departure in critical citizenship theory with several of the scholars who have conducted research on irregular migration in the Swedish context, my study approaches the topic somewhat differently. In contrast to many previous studies, which have relied on ethnography and interviews and focused on the everyday lives of irregular migrants, I have chosen to focus on how the phenomena in question have been understood and discussed in the political debate. My overall analytical framework is discourse theoretical and my analysis centres on the attempts to establish a certain understanding of how to interpret and act upon the presence of irregular migrants. Particular emphasis is put upon those discursive articulations that challenge the present order through attempts to secure rights for those staying in the country irregularly.

In addition to providing an empirical account of how the issue of irregular migration has been debated in the Swedish context, I consider the relationship between these debates and overarching conceptions of citizenship. My analysis is inspired by the growing field of research that emphasizes how the mobilization of irregular migrants contests prevailing conceptions of citizenship and, in doing so, opens up a space to make claims for rights. My study however differs from these in that it is parliamentary debates— and the stances taken by politicians— that are the object of my investigation rather than the actions and claims of irregular migrants themselves. It is


12 I regard it as likely that the positions taken by politicians to some extent have been influenced by the political mobilization of both irregular migrants themselves and NGO’s claiming to speak on their behalf; however, an investigation into the discursive overlaps and a tracing of their origins fall outside the scope of this study.
important to stress this significant difference, because the scholars associated with this approach tend to put their emphasis on precisely the importance of the acts of those involved rather than on the attempts to advocate on their behalf.

Methodological framework
The analysis in this chapter starts from a discourse analysis framework. Discourse theory is, broadly defined, concerned with the constitution of meaning. It entails a relationist, contextual, and historicist view on identity formation. Accordingly, it advocates an understanding that identity is shaped through a series of relations and in correspondence to other meanings. Furthermore, it considers meaning to be embedded in particular discursive contexts that condition its construction and interpretation. Within this paradigm, then, all social practice is considered to be conditioned by discourse. That is, things said, thought, or done are all dependent on the existence of a (constantly modified) system of meaning.\(^{13}\)

Discourse theory stresses that meaning is always both contingent and partially fixed.\(^{14}\) This is the precondition of political struggle, in the sense that political conflicts are played out in attempts to stabilize meaning.\(^{15}\) Hence, discourses are forged and expanded through practices of articulation.\(^{16}\) Attempts to stabilize meaning are particularly urgent in circumstances of dislocation, where the contingency of the discursive structures has been made visible.\(^{17}\) A discourse becomes dislocated when it is confronted with events that can’t be integrated, i.e. explained or represented, into its system of meaning. This failure leads the way for political struggles, entailing attempts to define and find solutions to the problem that has arisen, which


\(^{15}\) Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000, 15.

\(^{16}\) Torfing 2005, 15.

\(^{17}\) Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000, 13.
eventually result in the articulation of a new discourse. Dislocation should thus be understood as a process that disrupts identities and discourses and, in doing so, triggers the rise of new discourses. In the analysis, I treat the discovery of irregular migrants in Sweden as an instance of dislocation. The appearance of people without rights, living within the boundaries of the state yet excluded from the community of rights bearers, constitutes an anomaly that cannot be accommodated within current understandings of a welfare state marked by inclusion and equality. The presence of irregular migrants thus poses a challenge to the demarcation between different categories of residents and the corresponding allocation of rights, which destabilizes the current discursive formation and stimulates an intense political debate.

This chapter provides an analysis of these debates. More specifically, it provides an analysis based on a reading of minutes from parliamentary debates where the topic has been discussed throughout the 2000’s. The analytical strategy is threefold and corresponds with a division of the analysis into three sections. In the first section I trace the imperatives behind categorization, i.e. the attempts to sort out the statuses of different individuals and groups in relation to current policy, as a central process in the debate. In the second section I map how irregular migration is constructed as a policy ‘problem’; i.e. the understanding of what constitutes the problem and how it relates to current policy. In the third section I identify the discursive strategies employed to mobilize support for an enhancement of rights; i.e. the different discursive articulations that seek to establish the irregular migrants as rights-bearers.

The duality of citizenship

The analysis in this chapter utilizes insights from different strands of citizenship theory to shed light on the inherent duality in the ideals and practices of the welfare state. In the following section I will provide a brief introduction to how notions of citizenship are linked to the welfare state and how the duality of the concept can be used as a starting point for contestation.

18 Torfing 2005, 16
The welfare state, understood as a discursive formation, is held together by a social imaginary that invokes the image of a society based on freedom, equality and solidarity, where people are protected by means of social citizenship. Citizenship, in this context, refers to a status in a community that grants everyone some basic economic, political and social rights. This is the idea of inclusive citizenship, most often associated with T. H. Marshall, who emphasized the social dimension of citizenship and its link to the welfare state. Internally, then, citizenship is connected to the welfare state and widely considered to be ‘an inherently egalitarian ideal’, in the sense that it ‘implies full legal and political equality among citizens’. However, as has been pointed out by Linda Bosniak, while the idea of citizenship is often ‘invoked to convey a state of democratic belonging or inclusion’ the inclusion envisioned presumes a bounded and exclusive community. Consequently, she argues, it is also characterized by a ‘basic ethical ambiguity’. This means that while the ideal of citizenship can be mobilized against subordination, it also represents an axis of subordination itself. Rogers Brubaker has made the same point, emphasizing that citizenship is simultaneously internally inclusive and externally exclusive. This basic ambiguity arises from the fact that the articulation of citizenship requires the marking of its exterior, its constitutive outside, in the form of the noncitizen. Correspondingly, the rights and opportunities that follow from citizenship are enjoyed in the context where they are denied to noncitizens.

The irregular status of certain categories of migrants has its origin in this system that designates some as citizens of a bounded and territorialized state. There is, thus, an integral connection between the constitution of the irregular migrant and the constitution of the citizen. The demarcation

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25 McNevin 2011, 16.
26 McNevin 2011, 20,23.
between different categories of residents, and the corresponding allocation of rights, is however fragile and potentially open for negotiation, and in this process, the ambiguity of citizenship can be mobilized. As emphasized by Bosniak, the entry of noncitizens into the ‘spatial domain of universal citizenship’ opens up a space for contestation, as it is not evident which norms of citizenship should apply\textsuperscript{27}. That is, the position of migrants, present in the state as permanent residents, yet not citizens, and thus, at the interface of contradictory understandings of citizenship is the starting point for a discussion about the rights these migrants should be granted in their society of residence.

This chapter is guided by the conviction that an investigation of current principles and practices of migration control through the lens of citizenship is beneficial because it illuminates the ambiguous implications of the welfare state. The tensions arise from the fact that while citizenship signifies a normative ambition to guarantee all citizens an equal status, these inclusionary objectives tend to bring about the exclusion of those regarded as ‘alien’ to the community because these objectives, so far, have been framed in bounded communities. Theorization on the duality of citizenship provides two different kinds of insight relevant to my analysis. First, it sheds light on the logic of migration control in the national welfare state; that is, attempts to secure a comprehensive social citizenship, the key feature of the welfare state, tend to result in restrictive positions on migration. Second, it highlights the contingency of the current order and, further, how the notions of inclusiveness associated with citizenship can be mobilized in an attempt to contest this order. Theorization on citizenship can thus also be drawn upon to show that the demarcation between different categories of residents, and the corresponding allocation of rights, is open to negotiation. In the next section I sketch a brief summary of how the Swedish approach to migration and integration has developed over time in order to account for how the duality of citizenship is played out in this specific context.

\textsuperscript{27} Bosniak 2006, 4.
Balancing openness and inclusion – the duality of the Swedish welfare state

Large-scale migration to Sweden took off after World War II when, in response to labour market demand, large numbers of migrants arrived from Finland and, later, southern Europe. In 1968, what was to become the fundamental principles of the Swedish approach to migration and integration was first adopted in the wake of this wave of migration. At this point, the parliament accepted a government proposal establishing that the overall principle of the universal welfare state—equal social rights for all residents—would apply to immigrants on the same terms as for citizens. At the same time another, equally important, principle was established in the form of the overall need for a regulation of migration. From this point onwards the Swedish approach to migration can be characterized as an attempt to find a balance between generous policies on entry and comprehensive inclusion in society through various welfare institutions. The implication of this balancing act has been the establishment of the point of entry as the important threshold, so that migrants, once granted a permanent residence permit, have been entitled to most of the rights allocated to citizens.

However, the attempts to balance openness and the ability to secure full inclusion in the welfare state became more complicated when the patterns of migration shifted from labour migrants to refugees. The approach adopted in 1968 presupposed that the state would be able to control migration in correspondence with current capacities to provide work, housing, and education. This posed no problem as long as the majority of those arriving were labour migrants—when Sweden put a stop to labour migration in 1972 the primary argument was an inability to secure full inclusion for those ar-

30 Öberg 1994.
31 Borevi 2010, 59.
riving and a fear of a divided society. The approach became problematic as the character of those arriving shifted. From the 1970’s onwards labour migrants were replaced by refugees and people granted resident rights in the capacity of close relatives. With the arrival of rising numbers of refugees the ability to control immigration in order to safeguard equality was compromised as other considerations trumped this one. Most importantly, the moral imperative and the promise to abide by international conventions made it practically impossible to refuse refugees entry or deny family reunification for those already staying in the country. Consequently, the state’s ability to impose restrictions on migration, corresponding to shifts in the (perceived) ability to offer comprehensive inclusion, was undermined.

Furthermore, this shift in migration patterns also brought about a shift in the way measures of control were carried out. The focus of control thus shifted from ensuring that those granted a residence permit had a job offer to ensuring that those granted a residence permit had legitimate grounds to apply for asylum. That is, the shift in migration patterns resulted in increased preoccupation with establishing that those arriving were in fact ‘real’ refugees.

The Swedish approach to migration could, up until 2008, be characterized as dual in the sense that it consisted of a combination of a restrictive policy on labour migration (entailing that it would only be considered in a situation where there was a domestic shortage of labour) and a ‘generous’ asylum policy. That is, the integration capacity of the state was openly recognized as a ground for regulation but only for certain categories of migrants. Initially, there was wide agreement on the policies adopted in relation to migration and integration, but this initial consensus was abandoned with the increased politicization of migration that started in the mid 1980’s. Following the rise of right-wing populist mobilization to restrict immigration, as well as counter mobilization in the form of the formation of NGO’s de-
fending the right to asylum, migration became a contested political field. Parallel to this, Swedish asylum policy also moved towards greater restriction as a result of a revision of alien legislation and the imposition of stricter terms of admittance. These measures were followed by rising rates of refusal as well as, consequently, deportations. It is often claimed by researchers that it was this restrictive turn of asylum policy that gave rise to irregularity in a Swedish context.

To sum up, the working of the Swedish welfare state has historically had two central implications in relation to migration. The first implication is that it is crucial to control immigration. That is, the fact that the generous welfare model is supposed to incorporate all, yet is considered to be susceptible to overload, has been taken to require a selection of and demarcation in relation to potential new members. The second implication is that it is necessary to safeguard the inclusion of newcomers into the labour market as well as society at large. Taken together, these implications attest to the presence of an overall constitutive tension between the inclusionary and exclusionary dimensions of the Swedish welfare state. This tension is visible in the enforcement of strict entry policies in order to uphold the comprehensiveness of social citizenship. At the same time, the fact that a strict entry policy is legitimized with efforts to secure inclusion makes migration control particularly susceptible to accusations that the policies accomplish the opposite of their goal. Consequently, the coming into existence of a group of residents who lack all kinds of rights due to their irregular status poses a challenge to the current order of migration control.

Negotiating the demarcation of the welfare state

The analysis in this chapter thus starts from two set of assumptions. First, following the framework provided by discourse theory, it is assumed that the meaning of the welfare state is subject to change. Second, following the framework provided by citizenship theory, it is assumed that the current meaning of the welfare state is built upon a constitutive tension between two contradictory logics. In my analysis, I explore discursive articulations surrounding irregular migrants in Swedish parliamentary debates as an example of the negotiation of the demarcation of the welfare state. The analysis is divided into three sections in which I discuss the imperatives behind categorization, how categorization works in the construction of irregular migration as a policy ‘problem,’ and the discursive strategies employed in the debates. First, however, follows a section in which I provide a short introduction to the overall setting of these debates in order to contextualize the discussion in the subsequent sections.

Contextualizing the debate

As I have previously stressed, migration and integration became policy areas marked by fundamental disagreement in the 1980’s, as the previous post-war consensus was abandoned. Subsequently, a dividing line occurred between the Social Democrats and the Conservative party, and the other parties in parliament. The former two parties formed an alliance and cooperated in the formation of policy relating to asylum and rules on family reunification throughout more than a decade. These policies were heavily criticized by members of the other parties on the grounds of being too restrictive. Since the mid 2000’s, the patterns of conflict have grown slightly more complicated with the introduction of a new dimension to the debate in the form of labour migration. Calls for a more open labour migration policy started to be voiced in the early 2000’s and resulted, in 2008, in the (re) instatement of a heavily disputed labour migration regime. This move was supported by the four right-wing parties in parliament and the Green party,

39 Spång 2009, 74.
while the Social Democrats and the Left party opposed it. The discussions of irregular migrants in the Swedish parliament have thus taken place against a backdrop of two distinct cleavages related to asylum and labour migration policy respectively. Furthermore, throughout the period studied, the overall political situation has changed significantly on two occasions; the general elections in 2006 and 2010 affected the constellations of parliamentary alliances. The election of 2006 brought about a shift in government with two important implications; first, the co-operation between the Social Democrats and the Conservatives came to an end and, second, the instatement of the new labour migration regime was made possible. In the election of 2010, the Sweden Democrats, a party with an openly anti-immigration rhetoric and a platform of severely restricting migration, managed to win seats in parliament. This meant that voices openly hostile to immigration, as well as to proposals to grant rights to irregular migrants, became present in the debate.

In 2003, when the topic of irregular migrants was first raised in the debate in the form of concern for ‘hidden refugees’, Sweden was run by a Social Democratic minority government that generally relied on support from the Left party and the Green party. However, in matters of migration, as mentioned earlier, the Social Democrats relied on support from the Conservative party. Following this established pattern, the two parties took a similar stance and rejected the demands for a general amnesty that were raised in connection to the reformation of the asylum process. Both parties claimed that a general amnesty would undermine the right of asylum and the very principle of regulated migration. The other five parties in parliament were in favour of an amnesty as a way to give restitution to all of those who had been mistreated by a failed order that they had consistently criticized over the years.

In 2006, Sweden had a shift in government as the elections resulted in a success for the newly-formed alliance between the four right-wing parties in Sweden. The election was also followed by a change in positions; those
right-wing parties that had previously been in favour of a general amnesty shifted their position with the argument that the demands for amnesty were restricted to a certain moment in time, which had passed, with the instatement of the new order. Thereafter, the Left and the Green parties were the only parties raising consistent demands for regularization. However, a broad alliance, comprising all parties except the Conservative party (and, since 2010, the Sweden Democrats), has called for an expansion of social rights to address the most acute vulnerability of people staying irregularly in Sweden.

The centrality of categorization

Categorization of people and phenomena taking place as part of political debates is especially prominent in debates on migration, since labels, as pointed out by Elspeth Guild, serve a crucial function as instruments to sort out different individuals’ relation to citizenship regimes. Categorization is also closely linked to legitimacy since the words we use to describe individuals and groups carry normative loads. The label ‘refugee’, for instance, carries a moral imperative and a nonnegotiable right to stay if the status is recognized, whereas the label ‘economic migrant’ renders claims to stay illegitimate and provides the state with a legitimate reason to renounce responsibility. Thus, the labelling of people in contemporary debates on migration policy serves the function of sorting out who does and does not have a legitimate claim to stay, and as such, to be incorporated in the community with all it entails in the form of attached rights.

Distinctions between different kinds of migration and migrants are thus constitutive of discourses on migration. Furthermore, this emphasis on categorization is closely linked to attempts by states to regulate migration flows. Sweden is no exception and, as the following quotes attest, there is an overarching agreement on the principle of regulated migration:

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An independent country with its own laws and welfare systems must have a regulation of migration and be able to decide who is and who is not to settle here.

(Ulf Nilsson (LiP)\textsuperscript{42}, 2007/08:43)\textsuperscript{43}

One of the most important goals of migration policy is to ensure that the regulation of migration is maintained /.../ In order to meet this new situation our attitude must be to take our international responsibility at the same time as we defend our own national welfare.

(Anita Jönsson (Soc D), 2004/05:40)

At the same time, it is generally recognized that the fundamental principle of the state's right to regulate entrance is in tension with another basic assumption. As is made evident in the quote below, it is acknowledged that the state's capacity to act is circumscribed by international conventions, as well as other agreements, to which Sweden has promised to commit:

We have the goal to stand up for the right for asylum. We shall have an open door for all people who are persecuted. At the same time we have the goal that we shall have a regulated migration. There is a tension between these goals.

(Barbro Holmberg (Soc D), 2004/05:40)

The quote above summarizes the Swedish approach to migration and its adherence to two contradictory aims; while the right of states to control migration and the necessity of such controls is a given starting point, there is a general consensus that the right to asylum constitutes a restraint on

\textsuperscript{42} Since it is not my intention to map out differences in stances between political parties I will not discuss which party different Members of Parliament belong to in my analysis. I will, however, mark the party membership of each individual being quoted making use of the following abbreviations: GP- Green party (Miljöpartiet), LeP- Left party (Vänsterpartiet), Soc D- Social democrats (Socialdemokraterna), CP- Centre party (Centerpartiet), LiP- Liberal party (Folkpartiet), MP- Moderate party (Moderaterna) and CD- Christian democrats (Kristdemokraterna).

\textsuperscript{43} All quotes in the paper have been translated from Swedish to English by me. I have tried to remain as faithful as possible to the original statements while making some small adjustments in order to make the translations comprehensible and (somewhat) grammatically correct.
the state’s ambition to regulate migration. Consequently, migration policy circles around how to balance these two principles.

It is this tension that gives rise to the preoccupation with categorization, because categorization is essential in determining whether prospective migrants are considered to have legitimate claims to stay in Sweden. As previously stressed, efforts to sort out the precise status of those arriving to Sweden became increasingly important as opportunities to enter as a labour migrant were restricted, and in order to qualify for entry, migrants had to be able to show that they were proper refugees and worthy of protection. The centrality of attempts at categorization is also visible in the Swedish parliamentary debates on irregular migrants, where it is possible to identify competing interpretations of who constitutes the category of irregular migrant, and why they have decided to stay irregularly. Among the most prominent features of these discussions have been the attempts to establish the status of irregular migrants in relation to the asylum regime; that is, to establish whether they are actually ‘real’ refugees or rather, economic migrants. The primary importance of categorization is thus due to the fact that it is crucial in determining whether migrants’ claims to stay in Sweden are legitimate or illegitimate. Historically, being recognized as a refugee has been the principal path to legitimacy due to a general agreement that those who are refugees according to the criteria spelled out in the Geneva Conventions should have an undisputed right to stay. Likewise, in line with recent emphasis on the need for labour migration, a new basis of deserving has opened up for those passing as hard-working migrants contributing to the advancement of the general welfare of society.

Debating and defining the ‘problem’ of irregular migration
The process of categorization, that is the classification of migrants and the supposed causes of their entry, has a privileged position in the debate because it is crucial to the establishment of a particular understanding of what constitutes the problem. As Carol Bacchi has pointed out, it is important to investigate how problems are framed, since they are endogenous to, or created within, the policy-making process, rather than exogenous and existing
outside in the world. That is, policies shape problems rather than simply address them\textsuperscript{44}. Consequently, the formulation of policy also gives an indication of how the problem is defined and, thus, leads Bacchi to stress the analysis of the problem through the policy solution. Accordingly, in this section I investigate how irregular migrants are conceptualized as a problem in the political debates with particular emphasis on the solutions offered\textsuperscript{45}.

There has been widespread agreement that former asylum seekers (who have had their applications declined) constitute the bulk of those staying irregularly in Sweden. However, it is possible to identify competing understandings of why their applications were turned down, and consequently, what the origin of the phenomena is. The initial mobilization claiming to act on behalf of irregular migrants clearly linked the problem to the failures of Swedish asylum policy. The first calls for an amnesty appeared at a point in time when a consensus on the need for a major reform of the Swedish asylum system had been reached. Hence, amnesty was first introduced as a practical solution (solving the problem of a large number of open cases in need of a final decision) as well as a solution to the moral failure of the old order. Similarly, parliamentary debates have tended to circle around the alleged failures of Swedish policy and the estimations made in relations to people’s claim for asylum.

In the parliamentary debates analyzed, it is possible to identify a fundamental division between those who argue that applications for asylum have been turned down because the assessments are too rigid and those who argue that applications have been turned down because people fail to fulfil the criteria spelled out in legislation. The former position can be identified as an underlying premise in many of the statements that emphasize the rationality of migrants’ decisions to go into hiding:

\textsuperscript{44} Bacchi, Carol (2009) \textit{Analysing Policy. What's the problem represented to be?} French Forets: Pearson, x-xi.

\textsuperscript{45} As Bacchi is associated with an elaborated methodological approach to the investigation of how problems are constituted in the policy-making process, I wish to stress that the analysis in this paper is not carried out in accordance with this framework.
This politics of asylum forces people to live hidden […] because they have no alternative when what is offered is return to a country where they run the risk of being persecuted, oppressed and maybe even tortured.

(Kalle Larsson (LeP), 2009/10:107)

To live hidden is associated with the worst form of exposure […] In order to expose oneself and one’s children to this you have to have a very marked fear of the alternative, a fear as well-founded as any fear can be.

(Sven Brus (CD), 2005/06:3)

In emphasizing that the migrants have no choice but to hide from the authorities, these debaters indirectly affirm their claims for asylum. According to this understanding, the problem consists in an unduly strict application of present regulation. The opposite understanding can be identified among those who stress that the rising rates of declined applications are due to changing conditions:

Today fewer people are estimated to have grounds of asylum by responsible authorities. To an increasing extent, other reasons cause people to leave their homeland with the hope that another country will offer better conditions. This changed mobility among people […] is by many taken as an indicator of harsher policy and a change of praxis.

(Göte Wahlström (Soc D), 2004/05:99)

There has been no change in legislation. There has been no change of praxis. The reality, however, has changed. What we can see today is that the number of refugees in the world is decreasing. In the entire EU we see that the number of people with claims for asylum actually has decreased because the world is different. That does not mean that people have no reasons. Many have very strong reasons, but not always reasons related to asylum.

(Barbro Holmberg (Soc D), 2004/05:99)
According to this understanding it is changes in migratory patterns rather than Swedish policy and praxis that explain apparently increasing ‘restrictiveness’. The implication of this conception is that a growing number of those applying for asylum lack legitimate claims, and thus, are not ‘proper’ refugees.

A similar understanding of the problem can be identified in the statements made by those representatives who stress that the current predicament is associated with the lack of alternative ways to enter Sweden. These participants in the debate share the interpretation that rising rates of refusals are due to the fact that more and more people fail to fulfil the criteria for asylum, but their understanding of the problem at work differs somewhat because they regard this to be due to the absence of a regime of labour migration:

These problems are, amongst others, due to the fact that we, on the one hand, are to receive refugees for the sake of protection while we, on the other hand, have created obstacles for people who come here as labour migrants […] Unfortunately, it has only become possible to come to Sweden as a refugee in need of protection. That means that people who otherwise wouldn’t appeal for protection in order to get a residence permit have been forced to do so.

(Tomas Högström (MP), 2005/06:3)

It is probable that increased possibilities [of labour migration] would reduce the large influx of asylum seekers without claims for asylum or protection to Sweden. You should be directed to the right queue from the start. You should be in the queue for labour instead of the queue for asylum if you lack grounds to appeal for asylum.

(Tobias Billström (MP), 2004/05:130)

This kind of argumentation confirms the image that most contemporary asylum seekers are, in fact, not refugees in the proper sense of the term. Consequently, labour migration can be brought forward as a solution to the
problems associated with the processing of appeals for asylum. In correspondence with such an understanding, labour migration can be described as a form of ‘relief’ in relation to the pathway for refugees, because increased possibilities to enter as a labour migrant will result in fewer unfounded asylum claims, and thus, shorter waiting periods and greater chances of positive rulings in relation to valid asylum applications. The common denominator of these statements is that they, as suggested by the quotes offered above, assume that many of the people who apply for asylum are not ‘real’ refugees but rather labour migrants.

Throughout the period of investigation there are thus two competing conceptions of the origins of the problem of irregular migration: 1) the application of asylum policy is unduly strict or 2) people lack legitimate grounds to appeal for asylum. Moreover, if these two understandings are combined with the policy solutions suggested, it is possible to discern three distinct positions depending on how the problem is linked to different kinds of policy failure. Those who stress the first understanding link the problem to a failure produced by a deficient policy and praxis of asylum, whereas those who stress the second understanding disagree on the kind of policy failure at hand. Some recognize only minor deficiencies in the current system and legislation and stress the lack of ability and ambition to enforce the decisions taken in relation to migration (i.e. neglecting to enforce refusals and deportations). Correspondingly, they argue in favour of an asylum process with a final closure, where those migrants whose applications have been turned down must leave the country. Other speakers who agree that many irregular migrants lack legitimate claim to asylum, stress a policy failure in the form of a lack of a path of entry for labour migrants. The debates on irregular migration thus become linked to the broader struggles of migration policy, as different actors try to promote a specific understanding of the problem at hand, as well as suitable solutions. Both proponents and opponents of a more flexible regulation of labour migration (an issue that was on the agenda throughout the 2000’s, both

46 (Fredrik Malm (LiP) 2006/07:37)
preceding and succeeding the instatement of such a regime in 2008) tried, in diametrically opposed ways, to link their favoured policy to the discussion on irregular migrants.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the very understanding of what constitutes the problem of irregular migration is interesting in a comparative perspective. The Swedish debates circle around the assumption that it is irregular migrants’ lack of rights, and the corresponding vulnerability from which they suffer that constitute the main problem. A number of scholars have pointed to that there has been a tendency within the EU, as well as many of its member states, to debate illegal migration as a threat and that many politicians have been engaged in a race for taking the toughest stance on the matter. Thus, irregular migration has recurrently come to be linked to a range of more or less related issues, such as shadow economies and the informal labour market\(^\text{47}\), and framed as a security issue\(^\text{48}\) in many countries. Given this context, it is worth mentioning that this tendency remains marginalized in the Swedish debate, thus indicating that there are paths not taken. Although there are undercurrents pointing in such a direction—this position has, admittedly, been properly represented in political debates since the entrance of the Sweden Democrats following the 2010 election— I contend that the conceptualization of irregular migration as a burden or threat is much less prevalent in Sweden.

**Discursive strategies**

The analysis of discursive articulations that seek to establish irregular migrants as right-bearers shows that several, more or less intertwined, strategies are employed by participants in the debates. These can be distinguished according to whether the participants put their emphasis on rights or actions in their attempts to secure rights for those staying in the country irregularly. Rights are stressed in relation to both claims for regularization and claims for an expansion of social rights in the form of access to schooling and sub-


The provision of subsidized medical care, whereas actions are primarily stressed in relation to claims for regularization.

**Stressing rights**

Participants in the debate who claim to advance the interests of irregular migrants—by arguing for either general amnesty or the granting of basic social rights—continuously employ different notions of rights. There is, most evidently, a recurrent tendency for these debaters to make references to international agreements and draw from the discourse of human rights in their pleas for policy revision. In the parliamentary sessions I have studied, there are repeated references to the different international agreements that Sweden has promised to abide by, such as the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Children’s Convention, as well as the Geneva Conventions. Swedish policy is held to be unacceptable if it breaches these agreements through the denial of either claims for refuge or basic human rights.

Accordingly, the most prevalent discursive strategy in demands for regularization is to claim the victimhood of migrants and call for restitution. The first demands for amnesty were initiated against the backdrop of the alleged humanitarian failures, which were framed as resulting from Swedish policy and praxis. Thus, the target group of the reform was clearly singled out as:

…”those who have gone underground because they are afraid of returning to their country of origin. Those who hide fear abuse, rape, and persecution in their countries of origin more than living under miserable conditions somewhere in Sweden.

(Anne-Marie Ekström (LiP), 2005/06:3)

Through recurring references to ‘hidden refugees’, participants in the debate recognized those failed asylum seekers as ‘real refugees’ despite their formal lack of such status, thus creating a moral imperative to help them. These speakers also established a link between the failure of the (abandoned) old system and the need for regularization. This line of argument
stresses the victimhood of the irregular migrants by focusing on their suffering and vulnerability.

It is about people who have had their application for asylum turned down, but, who, both in accordance with Swedish law and international conventions have reasonable claims for protection in Sweden [...] Many of these people live hidden in Sweden and have stayed because they, with good reason, fear inhuman treatment, harassment and humiliation in the country of origin they have once fled from.

(Sven Brus (CD), 2005/06:26)

Those holding this view repeatedly return to the fact that the irregular migrants have been mistreated by the old order.

Those people who have become victims of an asylum policy characterized by its inhumanity, lack of legal security and arbitrariness must be offered restitution and a chance to restart their lives.

(Anne-Marie Ekström (LiP), 2005/06:3)

This discursive strategy ultimately draws on the right to asylum. It is based on the recognition of irregular migrants as refugees who, as such, should have been granted asylum. It is this assumption that makes it possible to constitute irregular migrants as victims who have been mistreated by the system.

Notions of human rights are drawn upon by those who make the argument that there are some basic social rights that should be granted to all residents independently of their legal status. According to one interpretation, as expressed in the quote below, the current denial of basic social rights breaches the principle of human rights:

Are you primarily a human being or are you primarily a citizen? Are the human rights supposed to be rights of citizenship, something you earn because you are born in a certain country [...] or do you
have them from birth […] just because you are a human being? My answer to that question is: human rights are human.

(Kalle Larsson (LeP), 2007/08:115)

This radical interpretation draws the conclusion that the rights Sweden today reserves for residents with legal status should be granted to everyone residing in the country, because everyone, in their capacity as human beings, is entitled to these rights. The discursive articulations that seek to secure rights through this strategy differ in the scope they accord to human rights. A number of contributions to the debate explicitly attempt to problematize the distinction between human rights and citizenship rights. They consistently offer the conclusion that the two kinds of rights differ in the sense that citizenship rights are linked to citizenship and are national, whereas human rights are linked to the individual and are universal. Speakers using this distinction between citizenship rights and human rights argue that medical care is a human right and, as such, should be provided to all people in the country. That is, although ‘people who stay here illegally should not have all the rights that citizens have’ there still are a number of ‘certain basic human rights’ and to these belong ‘the right to life and health’ 49. Debaters recurrently claim that ‘all people should have a right to health and medical care as a part of human rights’, and stress that the issue of providing medical care should not be used to support more restrictive migration policy 50. These speakers confront the assumption that improving the conditions of those staying irregularly by granting them social rights would make irregular stay a more attractive option and undermine the possibility to enforce refusals.

Thus, notions of universal human rights can be mobilized to challenge the current system of rights tied to citizenship. Furthermore, in the Swedish context, the ideational complex underpinning the welfare state can serve a similar function because, as I stressed in the initial discussion, its inherent ambivalence can be used as a starting point for contestation. The historical efforts to secure inclusion for all through the welfare state open up a space

49 (Ulf Nilsson (LiP) 2009/10:26)
50 (Gunvor G Ericson (GP) 2007/08:115)
for critique in relation to the fate of the irregular migrants. In the debates I have studied, there is a general agreement that the precarious circumstances to which irregular migrants are exposed are unacceptable and that these conditions are unworthy of the Swedish welfare state:

How is it possible that a country that praises itself for being the most important outpost of welfare on Earth, as well as a conscience of the world when it comes to humanity, treats those most worthy of protection, and at the same time the most defenceless children, in the cruel fashion of today?

(Inger Davidson (CD), 2004/05:84)

My interpellation is about people who are in Sweden and work in Sweden. As such, they contribute to Swedish welfare. They have jobs and apartments, live here [...] But they are excluded from what we know as the Swedish welfare.

(Gustav Fridolin (GP), 2004/05:61)

A similar thought reappears in another statement which deems it unacceptable that a ‘[labour] market consisting of people who have been labelled as ‘illegal’ emerges in a welfare society such as Sweden’\textsuperscript{51}. In the quoted passages, the circumstances of the irregular migrants are put in contrast with the presumed workings of the universal welfare state. Specifically, the group’s rightlessness and vulnerability appear as a crisis because these conditions are incompatible with the widely shared norms of the welfare state that all people are entitled to basic rights and social security. Thus, the norms and other ideals of the welfare state can be mobilized to draw attention to the unacceptability of the present conditions.

\textit{Stressing actions}

So far I have discussed how notions of rights can be used to challenge the

\textsuperscript{51} (Gustav Fridolin (GP), 2005/06:125)
rightness and precarity that follow from irregularity. Another discursive strategy is to stress the actions of irregular migrants. Saskia Sassen has, in the US context, argued that the fact that irregular migrants embody citizens in practice opens up a space for claims-making. Sassen stresses that the engagement of many irregular migrants who are long-term residents in the same practices and routines of everyday life as formally-defined citizens produces an informal social contract between the migrants and the communities in which they live. She argues that it is this social contract, based on the demonstration of ‘civic involvement, social deservedness, and national loyalty’, which makes it possible for migrants to claim the right of (legal) residency. Hence, irregular migrants gain a platform from which they can claim rights, recognition and inclusion in society by embodying citizens, despite being formally excluded from citizenship.

I argue that the continuous references to irregular migrants as taxpayers, workers, and parents in the Swedish parliamentary debates serve a similar function. As exemplified by the next quote, there is a tendency in the debates to appeal to the fact that the irregular migrants are already integrated into society:

They know the language and our society. They are in many cases already well integrated. They have children and family here and social networks, and many have jobs […] They are here and they will not return to their countries of origin.

(Bodil Ceballos (GP), 2006/07:37)

This emphasis on the fact that irregular migrants engage in the same kind of activities, as citizens, such as working and raising children, serves the function of drawing attention to common experiences. As such, these references are ultimately an attempt to establish a kind of everyday commonality in shared humanity. Although I recognize the important differences that make simple comparisons with the US context impossible, I suggest

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52 Sassen 2005.
that these kinds of arguments can be seen as a parallel to the logic of ‘acting as citizens’ that has been identified by Sassen in the US. By performing the practices associated with citizenship, whether it refers to formal obligations such as paying taxes or the informal everyday acts of providing for one’s family, migrants come to embody citizens and gain a claim for legitimacy.

This discursive emphasis on action differs from the strategies previously mentioned, in that it downplays both rights and victimhood and stresses the actions of irregular migrants. Discursive articulations that stress how irregular migrants contribute to society constitute a particular kind of this strategy. The quote below exemplifies the tendency among proponents of regularization to argue that irregular migrants could be turned into tax-paying citizens that contribute to society.

> It is about people who could give a great contribution to Sweden and be of great benefit if we made use of the resource these people constitute. A great many of these people have jobs and pay taxes, their children go to school and we know that Sweden will need more people who work in the future.

(Birgitta Carlsson (CP), 2005/06:3)

The articulations belonging to this category not only emphasize the fact that irregular migrants embody citizens through their actions, but also stress those actions that establish irregular migrants as productive and contributing members of society. This can be linked to the gradual increase in interest in labour migration, which is coterminous with the debates on irregular migration. I contend that the logic of ‘acting as citizens’ gains a further dimension, the emphasis on productivity, as a result of this parallel debate. As I have previously shown, there are attempts to establish the understanding that irregular migration has arisen as a consequence of protectionist policy. Accordingly, irregular migrants are constituted as prospective workers that have illegitimately been kept from entering the labour market.

It should be noted that the discursive strategies drawn upon, and the bases of merit they establish, carry somewhat different implications. That
is, if the right to stay is legitimized with reference to the potential contributions from migrants in the capacities of worker and tax-payer, this creates demands that these expectations are actually fulfilled. Consequently, for the individual migrants, it matters what kind of line of argumentation is used to legitimate their stay. Furthermore, even though a strategy that emphasises the economic and social benefits of migration can be successful and result in inclusion for some migrants, it also runs the risk of reinforcing the overall division of migrants into ‘productive’, i.e. ‘desirable’, and ‘unproductive’ categories. Consequently, there is a risk that in the long run this argumentation contributes to the erosion of the right to asylum.

Implications for the current citizenship regime
The different discursive strategies employed in the debate all aim to establish irregular migrants as right-bearers, by either shifting their status (i.e. regularizing them) to a category that has an established access to rights or granting rights to a category of residents that currently lack them. These two kinds of demands, however, relate differently to the current regime of citizenship. The demands that challenge the denial of legal status to irregular migrants (and, consequently, also the accompanying rights) and seek to legalize their stay, aim to secure rights for irregular migrant by accommodating them within the present regime. In contrast, the demands for basic rights, such as medical care and schooling, for migrants who lack legal status entail, although implicitly, a destabilization of the current order, because they undermine the link between citizenship and rights.

A decision to grant people staying in the country irregularly access to some basic rights might, from an activist perspective, be a less satisfactory outcome. At the same time, such a decision would, from an analytical point of view, be considered more far-reaching it would entail a clear break with the current approach which reserves rights for people belonging to the different categories of legal residents. In the wake of the political debates analyzed in this chapter, two public investigations have been initiated to review

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present regulations. The first investigation, *Schooling for all children* [SOU 2010:5 *Skolgång för alla barn*], was presented in January 2010 and concluded that all children have a right to education irrespective of legal status. The second investigation, *Medical care according to need and on equal terms - a human right* [SOU 2011:48 *Vård efter behov och på lika villkor - en mänsklig rättighet*] was presented in May 2011 and concluded that people staying in Sweden irregularly, as well as asylum seekers, should have access to medical care on equal terms with other permanent residents. Most importantly, they should be entitled to subsidized care.

There is currently broad parliamentary support for both measures across the government-opposition division. This broad support indicates that the discursive struggles have resulted in a shift in the understanding of the connection between rights and legal residence and, importantly, that political actors have not withdrawn their support for these challenges to the current order upon obtaining decision-making power. Despite this support, the proposals have not been realized and there have been accusations that the current government is delaying the decision-making process. In June 2012 it was, however, announced that a change in legislation will be implemented on July 1, 2013, in accordance with an agreement reached between the government and the Green party. The proposed revisions will, when implemented, give irregular migrants access to medical care under the same terms as asylum seekers.

Both the proposals suggested by the public investigations and the less far-reaching government proposal for expanded access to medical care constitute a break with the principle that the privileges associated with social

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54 One instance where such critique has been raised is when representatives of the youth organizations of a number of Swedish political parties made a mutual contribution to the debate in a leading newspaper. In this they stressed the urgency of the reform and the importance of initiating the chain towards implementation. *Svenska Dagbladet*. 10 February 2012. ‘Inte anständigt att fortsätta diskriminera.’

55 Regeringskansliet. *Fakta-PM om överenskommelsen om vård.*

56 The proposal is less far-reaching than the changes called for by the public investigation, which suggested that both asylum seekers and irregular migrants should be granted the same access to medical care as (legal) permanent residents. Currently, adult asylum seekers enjoy only restricted access to subsidized care and the new government proposal will incorporate adults staying irregularly in the country under the same terms. Correspondingly, children staying irregularly will enjoy full access to medical care, as do children applying for asylum.
citizenship should be reserved exclusively for those who reside in the country legally. As such, the proposed changes can be understood as attempts to further expand the community whose members carry rights, equivalent to the historic expansion where non-citizens with a permanent residence permit, so-called denizens, were attributed rights. Furthermore, as previously stressed, references to notions of human rights are a key component of the discursive strategies to challenge the current order. This can be taken as an instance of the general trend of notions of human rights contributing to a destabilization of traditional notions of citizenship. As Yasemin Soysal has pointed out, the ‘national order of citizenship’ is undermined as the rights and privileges that were once reserved for citizens are ‘codified and expanded as personal rights’. In a classic analysis, she accredits the expansion of rights granted to migrants to changes in the understanding of citizenship, or more precisely, to a shift to universal personhood, rather than national belonging, as the qualifying principle. Hence, notions of human rights can be mobilized to undermine the link between social rights and citizenship upon which the national welfare state is premised.

Concluding remarks
This chapter has offered an analysis of recent political debates on irregular migrants in Sweden starting from the assumption that the ‘discovery’ of this group can be interpreted as an instance of dislocation, which has triggered a struggle over meaning. The analysis, conducted with a discourse analysis framework, has focused on the struggles to establish an understanding of irregular migration, as well as the related attempts to categorize the migrants constituting the group. Furthermore, the analysis contains a mapping of the discursive strategies mobilized in the debates in order to grant rights to those staying in the country irregularly.

58 It should however be noted that Soysal’s argument has been developed to account for the granting of rights to migrants arriving during the wave of post-war labour migration.
60 Although, it should be noted that the link between social rights and citizenship was already destabilized decades ago as a result of the decision to grant rights to migrants with residence permits.
Drawing on insights offered by citizenship theory, I have elaborated on how the demarcations of the welfare state are contested and negotiated in contemporary political debates. The analysis starts from the assumption that the demarcation between different categories of residents in relation to citizenship regimes and the rights granted to citizens, denizens, and aliens respectively are, ultimately, open to negotiation. Historically, there has been an expansion of rights for those residing in the country permanently, i.e. denizens, and the conclusions from my analysis indicate that we are possibly moving towards a new expansion. I argue that the discursive struggles over how to interpret the appearance of irregularity have been of key importance in bringing about an opening for policy change. The establishment of an understanding of irregular migration as policy failure has created a platform for making demands. Furthermore, through turning the provision of basic social rights into something to be claimed by everyone in society—drawing on both conceptions of human rights and the inclusiveness of the welfare state—proponents of policy revision have established a widespread agreement on the need for revision. Hence, I argue that the recurring debates on irregular migration can be understood as an instance where the demarcations of the welfare state are being contested and negotiated.

Finally, the analysis in this chapter has also explored how the constitutive tension of the (national) welfare state manifests in the contemporary struggles over the rights granted to irregular migrants. The findings suggest that the duality of the welfare project can be understood as both the source and the solution to the ‘problem’ of irregular migration. It is the source in that the limiting of welfare ambitions to a restricted community gives rise to migration control and, consequently, produces a situation where staying irregularly, despite the subsequent lack of rights and security, becomes the only choice for people who do not consider leaving the country an alternative. The inherent duality of the welfare state is also the solution to the ‘problem’ of irregular migration; the universalist framing of the inclusionary ambitions of the welfare state creates expectations that can be used to mobilize on behalf of those without rights.
CHAPTER 3

‘This welfare of ours’:
Justifying public advocacy for anti-immigration politics in Finland during the late 2000’s

NIKO PYRHÖNEN

The anti-immigration oriented political mobilization and the rapidly rising public support for anti-immigration politics has been a heated topic in the Finnish and Swedish media, particularly after the recent electoral victories of Perussuomalaiset\(^1\) (PS) in 2008 and 2011 and Sverigedemokraterna (SD) in 2010.\(^2\) It is hardly surprising that in the public debate, there has been little agreement between the voters of the said parties and other commentators when it comes to the reasons behind the success of populist anti-immigration political agenda. Editorials, blogs and letters to the editor have referred to the electoral successes with a variety of expressions, among others as ‘red-neck elections’\(^3\), ‘manifestation of resentment towards upper classes and ‘the

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\(^1\) In this chapter I refer to the parties with their original names, rather than translating them. The main reason for this is to avoid ambiguity related to the English translation of Perussuomalaiset. During the period covered in this chapter, Perussuomalaiset used the translation ‘True Finns,’ but as of August 2011 started referring to themselves as ‘The Finns’ in international contexts. Since ‘True Finns’ is an outdated name, but referring to them as ‘The Finns’ is an analytically problematic translation, running the risk of the party being conflated to Finns as the people, using the original names allows for conducting the analysis with as little ambiguity as possible.


end of consensus"4, ‘victory of democracy’5, ‘the yeast that brings the spirit back to politic’6, ‘brought about by the opaqueness of the public debate’7, and ‘brought about by the myth of opaqueness of public debate’8.

What such interpretations in mainstream media have in common, is that they attribute the electoral result – the increased support for populist parties – to various latent, macro-level phenomena; resentment, erosion of political consensus or problems in how the public debate functions. It is far less common to encounter accounts that focus on the agency side and emphasize on what the parties and people affiliated to them actually said or did in order to achieve this manifold increase in electoral support. Also regarding the recent academic approaches to anti-immigration advocacy, much of the literature has been looking into the demand side9 of the phenomenon, in terms of fleshing out how factors such as the social psychology of xenophobia and the societal macro-level developments – most importantly globalization and work-related precariousness – facilitate public anti-immigration advocacy.10

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9 Here I refer to the typology that divides approaches seeking to explain the support for European populist radical right parties into supply and demand approaches. The demand side approaches focus more on the macro level societal features that render the potential electorates favourable to the populist political agenda. The supply side approaches, on the other hand, focus on how the parties themselves construct and make use of various ‘background phenomena’, effectively converting a potential for support to actual support. See, Mudde, Cas (2007) Populist radical right parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 201, 232, 256.
Another branch of relevant academic literature focuses on the mechanisms through which public media exposure facilitates the electoral success of right-wing populist parties that commonly advocate anti-immigration policies on their agendas. In the Finnish context, Mari Maasilta recently conducted an interesting study that indicates how immigration-related topics are channelled from traditional types of media to social media and vice versa during the Finnish parliamentary elections of 2011.

Even so, the agency-oriented supply side – that is, what various anti-immigration actors do and say in concrete and empirical terms in order to actualize the potential for popular support – has been studied somewhat less. Cas Mudde extensively researched populist radical right parties in Europe in the late 1900’s, and Antonis Ellinas has studied how differences in party organization help to explain why some populist parties ‘survive their initial electoral breakthroughs while others collapse’. These agency-informed studies of anti-immigration parties are invaluable, but unfortunately do not include the Nordic countries or assess the implications of a welfare state context for party behaviour. In her Master’s thesis, Johanna Ryan-Kraujale assesses how Finnish online discussants construct their anti-immigrant arguments, but without a particular focus on how the advocacy for anti-immigration politics is being justified. Most recently, Milla Hannula has studied how anti-immigration advocates themselves perceive the change in the attitudinal climate and the increased presence of anti-immigration arguments in the public debate.

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15 Hannula 2011.
One of the central motivations in this chapter is to bring the supply side and discursive agency of anti-immigrant advocates to the fore and critically assess how various actors articulate and justify the advocacy of anti-immigration politics in the Finnish context. To that end, this chapter seeks to elucidate a particular facet of this question of agency, namely how the advocacy for anti-immigration politics – highly pertinent in both the PS and SD political agendas – is presented and justified in the public debate during the period from 2008 to 2011.

Rather than assessing the reasons behind the public demand for the introduction of anti-immigration issues to the political agenda, I focus on the discourses that the anti-immigration advocates supply to the public debate, in order to both meet and create this demand. This allows an illustration of how actors on party and grass-roots levels employ a broad range of discourses with the purpose of presenting anti-immigration politics as necessary and justifiable. This entails, firstly, a theoretical and empirical assessment of how populist discourses of necessity can be constructed in a welfare-state context, in order to present anti-immigration advocacy as derivable from the concerns for social policy and the economic sustainability of redistributive welfare mechanisms. Secondly, such illustration requires an elucidation of how the justificatory discourses, building on the notion of necessity, seek to unlink the anti-immigration advocacy from any xenophobic or ethnocentric associations and interpretations that might undermine its broader social acceptability.

This chapter advances in three sections in order to show how discursive linking of anti-immigration arguments to questions of social policy and welfare economy in the public debate can be used for the purposes of facilitating advocacy for anti-immigration political agenda. The first section introduces the theoretical frame which the subsequent analyses employ. This theoretical discussion explores the role of justificatory discourses in the promotion of populist anti-immigration advocacy. In so doing, it argues for the importance on focusing to how context-sensitive use of categorizing welfare and social policy discourses can open justificatory avenues, which facilitate public endeavours to present anti-immigration advocacy as both socially acceptable and necessary.
The second section analyzes how anti-immigration political agenda is discursively justified in the PS electoral programmes\textsuperscript{16} for the municipal elections of 2008 and the parliamentary elections of 2011. While this analysis should not be understood as a full-fledged comparative study, I use the SD electoral programme for the parliamentary elections of 2010 as a point of contrast. This helps to highlight the crucial role of discourses pertaining to welfare economy in the promotion of advocacy for anti-immigration political agenda in the PS electoral programmes.

The third section expands this justificatory discourse analysis into the grass-roots level of Finnish online discussions. First, as a methodological note, I discuss the importance of complementing the analysis of electoral programmes with an analysis that focuses on how private actors present and justify their anti-immigration advocacy in Finnish online discussion boards. Rather than looking at the anti-immigration activists’ blogs and fora,\textsuperscript{17} this set of data consists of public argumentation aimed at mainstream audiences that are not necessarily convinced of the anti-immigration political agenda to begin with.

To this end, the object of analysis consists of a sample of three online discussion board threads, each consisting of a commentary on a newspaper article, in which a Finnish high-profile politician outlines ‘an immigration-related problem’. The threads selected for analysis are located on the website of Finland’s largest nationwide newspaper \textit{Helsingin Sanomat} (HS), and – as I will illustrate in the third section of this chapter – the selection criteria of the threads ensures that they represent the country’s most commented online debates on immigration policy during the period from November 2008 to July 2011. This time frame – starting from the wake of the 2008 municipal

\textsuperscript{16} The PS refers to its manifestos as ‘programme’, while the SD calls the document a ‘contract’. Considering that the focus of this paper is on the PS, I refer to the manifesto by both parties as ‘programmes’ as a compromise between maintaining the integrity of the primary sources and having the text as fluent as possible.

\textsuperscript{17} As a result of this delineation of focus, several anti-immigration blogs and pamphlets that have received significant media coverage – such as Jussi Halla-aho’s \textit{Scripta} and \textit{Nuiva vaalimanifesti} – are not assessed here. This variety of anti-immigration activism, however, has been studied elsewhere in varying detail (see, for example, Puuronen, Vesa (ed.) (2001) \textit{Valkoisen vallan lähettiläät : rasismin arki ja arjen rasismi}. Tampere: Vastapaino; Puuronen, Vesa (2011) \textit{Rasistinen Suomi}. Helsinki: Gau-deamus; Keskinen, Rastas & Tuori 2009; Förbom, Jussi (2010) Hallan vaara : merkintöjä maahanmuuton puhetavoista. Helsinki: Like; Hannula 2011; Horsti & Nikunen 2012, forthcoming).
elections and ending right after the 2011 parliamentary elections – overlaps with the period that marked the unprecedented rise in the PS electoral success, during which the electoral programmes analyzed in the second section were introduced. Using this time frame also makes it possible to observe the transference between the justificatory discourses for anti-immigration political advocacy present, firstly, in the party programmes and, secondly, in grass-roots level of online public debates.18

Both analyses employ the methodology of rhetorical discourse analysis.19 Extending the focus beyond the nature of discursive practices per se, this method allows for the elucidation of how exactly participants in public debate proliferate anti-immigration advocacy via the context-sensitive application of justificatory rhetoric. For the purposes of this chapter, this entails analysis of the use of various discursive mechanisms, through which public anti-immigration advocacy is bundled to appeals for ‘saving our welfare state’ from economic ruination.

By employing rhetorical discourse analysis it is possible to illustrate how this discursive bundling of immigration and welfare – their pernicious interplay constructed as an undeniable social fact – is then used to justify the necessity for exclusive categorizations and boundary-work, on which much of anti-immigration political rhetoric builds.20 This persuasive rhetoric employs an interplay between various other, often implicit, justificatory strategies, through which the discussants seek to alter and manage public perceptions concerning the acceptability, the justifiability and the necessity of anti-immigration politics. These strategies include, among others, fact construction through invitations for an imagined audience to complete suggestive narratives (along the aforementioned lines), favourable and advan-

18 The order in which the two sets of data are discussed here is not hierarchical. It is not within the scope of this chapter to assess the extent to which the justificatory rhetoric within the discussion board debates has contributed to the rhetoric used in the electoral programmes or vice versa.
tageous speaker positioning, reductive quantification of complex qualitative questions, lists and repetition, and connotation management through metaphors.

The theoretical discussion and the analyses lead to a concluding discussion that evaluates the broader implications arising from the widespread use of various discourses on welfare in order to justify advocacy of the anti-immigration political agenda in public debate. Most importantly, the discussion focuses on how to engage in a meaningful public debate with such proponents of anti-immigration politics, who base their advocacy on the conviction that their arguments are based on a sound economic assessment of the welfare economy and social policy, and attribute any and all racism, xenophobia and ethnocentrism only to ‘extremists’.

The construction of public discourses seeking to justify anti-immigration advocacy in a welfare state context – From categorizing nationalist discourses to exclusionary (social) policy

Questions of social policy – including policy mechanisms through which welfare is being redistributed – cannot be tackled without assigning people to different categories. This is because belonging to a category – such as unemployed, immigrant or asylum-seeker – serves to justify why certain measures need to be applied to a certain group of people but denied from another. While some categorizations seem relatively straightforward, each category is to some extent constructed in order to establish certain functions, such as the promotion and justification of a particular redistributive regime.

In public debates touching the issue of social policy in a welfare state, the political actors on both party and grass-roots levels commonly seek to evoke shared moral principles and construct narratives of how some people

24 Jokinen et al. 1999, 143.
deserve to be included or excluded from a category guaranteeing access to a particular set of welfare benefits. The varieties of nationalist mobilization rhetoric – applied by PS and SD in their electoral campaigns with an unprecedented success – can offer a highly applicable moral resource for publicly justifying a set of welfare inclusion criteria.  

However, when anti-immigration actors seek to expand the public acceptability of exclusionary anti-immigration politics in a welfare state context – marked by relatively strong norms of social justice – there are some important hurdles these actors must pass, before their agenda can be seen as primarily motivated by mundane concerns for the welfare state.

‘Saving our welfare state’ – a core ideology or tactical rhetoric?

There is some academic dispute concerning the role of justificatory discourses in the populist political agenda. For example, Cas Mudde, basing his understanding of populist ideology on the assessment of motivations of the party representatives and activists, considers the economic justifications for populist radical right agenda as merely secondary or ‘tactical’ rhetoric, that seek to justify a nativist ‘core ideology’. If the justificatory discourses are indeed only secondary in the anti-immigration advocacy, is it really important to study these discourses in length?

One must note, however, that public discourses advocating any political agenda are never simply derived from an ideology, since the causality runs in the other direction as well. Narratives seeking to promote political advocacy also constantly reconstitute the ideology it pertains to. This gives a theoretical reason for reconsidering Mudde's hypothesis that economy is ‘merely’ a tactical feature in right-wing populism. It also underlines the importance of a social constructionist focus on the discursive dimension of how the advocates of anti-immigration populism publicly deliberate and persuade their imagined audiences of their political agenda.

In order to promote the social acceptability of exclusionary political agenda, the sociocultural importance of publicly denying any racist motivations is greatly dependent on how openly the elites exhibit ethnocentric reasoning. Therefore, regardless of what prejudices or ideological constructions in the Muddean sense might actually motivate the actors, the public justificatory discourses this paper focuses on do not exhibit articulations of contested ideological elements. Particularly in the Nordic context – where the ‘elites’ and the mainstream media are widely considered rather ‘multiculturalist’ than nationalist – the proliferation of anti-immigration advocacy among the general public is facilitated by the use of discourses that present the exclusionary political agenda as not dependant on racist, xenophobic or ethnocentric notions. So even though any populist party, by definition, seeks to avoid using rhetorical tropes with a strong similarity to the (political) elite, actors seeking to proliferate anti-immigration advocacy within public fora cannot simply disregard the relatively strong norms of tolerance and anti-racism without severe repercussions for their ability to persuade new audiences.

In order to illustrate the variety of possible rhetorical avenues to escape this social dilemma, van Dijk proposes four categories of denial of racism: act denial (‘I did not do/say that at all’), control denial (‘I did not do/say that on purpose’, ‘It was an accident’), intention denial (‘I did not mean to’, ‘You get me wrong’) and goal denial (‘I did not say/do that in order to...’). Public anti-immigration actors, too, make use of these denials. The former two denials can be useful for protecting the speaker from the social stigma of being racist, but they are limited in their applicability for the purposes of promoting the acceptability of anti-immigration advocacy as they effectively entail the cost of abandoning the initial (anti-immigration) argument. The latter two, on the other hand, maintain the initial anti-immigration argument, but seek to remove its attachment to any racist, xenophobic or

29 Hannula 2011, 118–123.
30 Mudde 2007, 23.
31 van Dijk 1992, 92.
ethnocentric elements. The discourses drawing from intention denial and goal denial promote the social acceptability of anti-immigration advocacy, because they argue that while the anti-immigration advocacy might appear racist, the actual motivation behind their political agenda is only to protect the sustainability of the welfare state against any and all challenges it faces, regardless of whether the challenges are posed by people who are ethnically distinct from us.

In the welfare state context, the arguments risking the interpretation by mainstream audiences of being racist can be consistently complemented and justified with narratives drawing explicitly from welfare economy considerations. This has important implications to the ideological core that supposedly underlies the rhetorical ‘tactics’ of persuasion. The rhetorical practice of constantly invoking arguments against immigration that are framed in terms of welfare economy suggests that the considerations for economy are actually crucial for the social acceptability of anti-immigration advocacy. Indeed, achieving broader social acceptability for the populist political discourse – by drawing from the Nordic peculiarity\textsuperscript{32} of the consensual support for the welfare state – has greatly facilitated both political mobilization among new constituencies as well as general public advocacy for populist policies.\textsuperscript{33} From this we can infer that the ‘newly converted’ anti-immigration-minded people are increasingly convinced that their political ideas can be largely derived from welfare, the ‘economic realities’, as constructed in the public anti-immigration discourses.

When assuming that Mudde is correct in arguing that populist ‘socio-economic principles’, such as the need for a more exclusionary social policy, ‘proceed from the core tenets of [the populist] ideology rather than determine them’,\textsuperscript{34} this juxtaposition of ‘core tenets’ and the ‘tactical discourses’ is most meaningful when the unit of observation is the partisan masterminds. However, studying the use of discursive avenues for articulating ideas is also crucial for understanding changes in the political climate and, indeed,


\textsuperscript{33} Hannula 2011, 7–8; Keskinen et al. 2009, 7–8.

\textsuperscript{34} Mudde 2007, 133.
within the anti-immigration ideology itself. The assessment of these public justificatory discourses in the civil society at large also necessitates the complementation of electoral programme data with the analysis of discussion board debates. I will discuss in more detail the assets of including the two sets of data below.

Finally, from the point of view of political sociology, there is evidently a question more interesting than the role of economy as a personal motivation of anti-immigration actors. Indeed – regardless of whether the justificatory discourses are constructed on public fora as tactical manoeuvres or out of ideological conviction by the advocates of anti-immigration politics – a crucial question remains: how are the electorates and the general public actually being persuaded by the anti-immigration actors to internalize the interaction between welfare economy and anti-immigration policies that supposedly justifies anti-immigration advocacy?

So how exactly are the public advocates of anti-immigration politics able to link their political agenda to the concerns for the maintainability of the welfare state and its redistributive regime? And how do they then employ this link and establish a discourse justifying the social acceptability and the necessity of anti-immigration politics? In order to pursue these questions in the following analysis, it is important to first consider the populist logic according to which much of welfare chauvinism on different levels operates.

**Right-wing populism as ‘welfare chauvinism’**

Public advocacy of right-wing populism – in party programmes as well as on the grass-roots level – commonly builds on the nativist idea that lifestyles, values and interests of ‘the people’ are inherent goods. In populist, welfare chauvinist rhetoric – on the level of public justification as well as personal rationalization of anti-immigrant advocacy – the autochthonous population’s access to these goods, and their material manifestations, is commonly presented as being challenged by various ‘others’ and their interests. It can

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35 Mudde 2007, 63.
appear problematic to label populism in Nordic countries as right-wing populism, especially when one considers the extent to which such populism presents itself as promoting the interests of ‘the people’ by preserving ‘our’ welfare state as the means – and in so doing capitalizes on the nostalgia towards a national past marked by solidarity and a relatively generous, if exclusive, social policy.37 However, vis-à-vis social policy, belonging to the right-wing must be understood in broader terms; not as traditionally as the antagonism to public spending and emphasis on private property, but rather as the conservative practice of constructing existing inequalities as ‘natural’ and thus falling ‘outside the purview of the state’.38

This conceptualization of right-wing populism helps to understand the logic of welfare chauvinism, where the advocacy for a relatively generous system of welfare redistributions can be used to justify the exclusionary categorization of immigrants as ‘naturally’ having a weaker claim to ‘our’ welfare.39 Indeed, the analysis of the electoral programmes in the second section of this chapter indicates how both the SD and PS – as well as the anti-immigration discussants in the online discussion boards – construct the categories of ‘immigrant population’ and ‘autochthonous people’ so that inequalities in the treatment of these juxtaposed groups are justified as a consequence of this ‘natural order’.

With regard to the role of (welfare) economy in populist ideology and rhetoric, there is, however, some significant dispute within contemporary research. In the early 2000’s, a great deal of the research considered a subscription to neo-liberal economics as a common core ideology of populist radical right parties.40 More recently, Mudde has challenged this notion in his study on 12 European populist right-wing parties, indicating that (1) many key representatives of this party family do not hold neoliberal views

on economics and (2) that the economic programme is of secondary importance both in the populist party ideology and for advocates of their political agenda.41

Economic justification of anti-immigration advocacy in a welfare state context

It must be noted that Mudde’s focus is delineated so that his data includes neither the SD nor the PS. Because of this, Mudde admits that when it comes to contexts that his empirical material does not cover, his conclusions should be considered hypotheses offered to be tested.42 Accordingly, I consider the Nordic countries during the late 2000’s to constitute a context that necessitates such reassessment of Mudde’s ‘economy is secondary’ hypothesis, especially in light of recent developments pertaining to the rapidly increased electoral support and public advocacy for the populist (anti-immigration) political rhetoric of the PS and the SD.

Firstly, the significance of the welfare economy discourse for justifying a right-wing populist agenda is accentuated in the context where an overarching, consensual support for the welfare state exists across the multiparty system.43 This makes it difficult for any political actor to mobilize large constituencies by advocating a substantive restructuring of welfare spending in general, and furnishes the discourse of ‘the sustainability of our welfare state’ with considerable justificatory potential in the Nordic context.

Indeed, Mudde actually bases his hypothesis44 on previous research, indicating that when electorates consist of ‘groups with opposing economic interests (objectively defined)’, it is taken for granted that economy is largely a secondary issue.45 But there are some good reasons for challenging the extent to which this is applicable in the Nordic context that is marked by a rela-

41 Mudde 2007, 119–120.
42 Mudde 2007, 5.
43 Esping-Andersen et al. 2002, 175.
44 Mudde 2007, 135.
tively encompassing welfare system. Under such a comparatively universalist system, the economic interests between classes are considered to coincide to a greater degree, since a significant portion of the population belongs simultaneously both in financers and net-beneficiaries of the welfare system.\textsuperscript{46}

Therefore, Nordic political actors in general – and populist parties in particular, not least by the virtue of their semi-permanent position outside the government – can play two hands at once. On the one hand, they can appeal to the blue-collar population that regards itself as net-losers of globalization in general and immigration in particular. This potential constituency can be mobilized by employing a discourse pertaining to welfare economy, promising to increase or at least maintain the welfare spending channelled to them as a result of taking off some other extra burden through policy measures. For the purposes of this chapter I will focus on the discourses based on categorizations that serve to justify policy mechanisms that restrict immigrants’ access to welfare benefits.

On the other hand, the same political actors can reach middle-class constituencies by justifying the very same anti-immigration policies with reference to tax-cuts that these policies supposedly allow. The argument here is that once the number of people entitled to various welfare redistributions is decreased by enacting less immigrant-inclusive social policies, the amount of taxpayers’ money needed for funding the welfare system can then supposedly be reduced, thus enabling tax-cuts. Moreover, even the beneficiaries of the welfare redistribution are more likely to perceive such tax-cuts as advantageous within a system where the benefits, too, are subject to taxes (for instance, in Finland and Sweden and unlike in the United Kingdom).

These arguments for the heightened role of welfare economy rhetoric find further support in the fact that Nordic populist parties – the PS in particular – are rapidly expanding their support among the middle-classes, who traditionally emphasize considerations for economy when aligning themselves politically.\textsuperscript{47}


Justifying anti-immigration policies with welfare economy rhetoric in the latest electoral programmes of Perussuomalaiset and Sverigedemokraterna

Considering that the period between 2008 and 2011 marked the steepest rise in the electoral success of PS and SD – the most rapidly growing Nordic political parties during the time – it is important to assess the mobilization rhetoric with which this electoral success was reached.

Naturally, the electoral victories cannot be reduced to the actions of the parties and regarded simply as the result of the internalization of the discourses of necessity and justification the parties present as there are numerous explanations for the pre-existing public demand for such an anti-immigration agenda to which I have alluded in the introduction. However, as this chapter seeks to explain how the parties seek to convince their electorates of the necessity and justifiability of the anti-immigration elements on their political agenda, the following analysis focuses on the parties’ agency, illustrating the discourses used by the parties with the purpose of creating and mobilizing constituencies.

Within the confines of this chapter it is not possible to conduct a full-fledged comparative study between the Finnish and Swedish public discourses of anti-immigration policy advocacy. Therefore, the main focus will be on the PS electoral programmes, to which the SD programme offers an interesting point of contrast, highlighting the relative importance of the welfare economy rhetoric in the Finnish context.

Another factor necessitating this delineation of the focus is that a relatively superficial content analysis reveals a key difference between the formats of the three documents analyzed here. The SD programme (actually called ‘electoral contract’) for the 2010 parliamentary elections presents the immigration-pertinent problems and their remedies mostly in a bullet-point format and consequently, as I will indicate in the following, constructs its boundary-drawing narrative on a significantly higher abstraction level.

Moreover, the PS programme for the 2008 municipal election totalled 21 pages and the programme for the 2011 parliamentary elections incorporated 69 pages – being far more verbose than any other electoral programme
in the Finnish 2011 parliamentary elections – while the SD programme consisted of only seven pages. Even though a direct comparison of these documents is thus a less fruitful an endeavour, it is important to illustrate how the PS elaborates on social policy concerns when justifying anti-immigration politics, while the SD relies on abstract, nativist articulations.

The following analysis is structured by a preliminary, inductive content analysis of the electoral programme data. This makes it possible to focus the analysis of the programmes on the issues that are most commonly discussed in conjunction with questions of immigration. On the basis of this preliminary assessment, the analysis in this section is divided into three parts: ‘Immigrants and the Labour Market,’ ‘Refugees and the Responsibility for Victims of Global Injustices’ and ‘National Identity, Immigrants and Social Policy.’ This structure reflects the discursive choices the parties employ in the programmes in order to construct and emphasize the immigration-related competences of the welfare state and persuade their imagined audiences of their validity.

Immigrants and the labour market

Controlling working life has typically ranked highly in contemporary welfare policy agendas, and both the SD and the PS are keen to refer to working conditions in their critique toward existing immigration policy. In their 2008 programme, the PS discusses the issue of the foreign workforce within the care sector under the subheading ‘For Nordic welfare state.’ They argue that in the long run, importing inexpensive labour ‘endangers the education of our own youth as well as their possibilities to be employed with the wage required to cover Finnish living expenses.’ Here the welfare chauvinist anti-immigration message is clearly conveyed to an autochthonous blue-collar worker ‘of ours’, incorporating an assumption of the worker having an obvious claim to ‘our’ welfare. A person in this category is implied to have much

50 See, for example, Freeman 2009; Rydgren 2006.
to gain economically from the regulation of labour that the PS portrays as a core competence of the welfare state.

This kind of discourse seeks to appeal to the blue-collar constituencies with an explicit reference to the economic benefits of labour regulation. In order to reach the middle-class audiences, the anti-immigration rhetoric relies in its ability to attribute both moral and economic value for the maintenance of the ‘willingness to pay taxes’. This willingness is presented as threatened by, for example, ‘ethnically based operations’ ‘endorsed by the parties in power’ that serve to promote the ‘mass migration’ of the labour force – a practice that is considered to ‘increasingly diminish the welfare redistributions to our families’.

In later formulations on the working life and the welfare state, the PS has steered away from potentially divisive economic issues such as the immigration of the workforce. Instead, the 2011 programme makes several references to ‘non-labour oriented immigration’ within the welfare frame, constructing it as ‘abuse of the welfare system’. The programme explicates: ‘Non-labour oriented immigration will cost a lot for Finland’. Distinctions between the categories of asylum-seeker and immigrant are downplayed by concluding that the burden of non-labour oriented migration can be alleviated by ‘handling applications for asylum rapidly and efficiently, in order to save public funds’. The amount of public funds that can be saved is carefully left unmentioned, an instance of a pseudo-quantifying rhetoric, in which the actual quantifications are only implied to and the narrative of prudent spending is left for the audience to fulfil.

Actual labour migration is mentioned only once in the 2011 programme and no moral formulations are offered in conjunction with it, unlike in the 2008 programme. Rather, the whole issue is only discussed in terms of the potential economic loss to the welfare state because of illegal workers: ‘Perussuomalaiset does not think that we should accept the kind of labour migration to Finland that involves breaches of Finnish labour regulation or

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51 Perussuomalaiset 2008, 5.
where taxes are not paid to Finland.\textsuperscript{54} The assertion that it is immigration that creates these illegal working practices is both the point of departure and conclusion by the PS, and is thus constructed as a fact that needs no further discussion.\textsuperscript{55} The problem in the allegedly ongoing acceptance of these illegal practices is emphasized by referring to the potential benefits in avoiding them in explicitly economic terms: ‘Eradicating the grey economy will allow society to recoup a multifold amount of the costs involved.’\textsuperscript{56} Again, this justificatory discourse makes use of a vague quantification of economic benefits, this time reinforced with the evocative expression ‘multifold’, with the purpose of presenting the regulation of immigration as a socially acceptable political agenda;\textsuperscript{57} not xenophobic, but only motivated by a firm pro-welfare state stance.

The SD begins its programme by defining itself as a ‘Sweden-friendly’ party and continues directly to the issues of labour. They demand ‘stricter regulation for labour immigration’ because, as they mention in the lead: ‘In our Sweden, each Swedish wage earner can feel safe with their interests being the top priority.’\textsuperscript{58} This formulation, taken together as a whole, bears some resemblance to the earlier PS programme in the sense that it seems to address the blue-collar workers whose interests are suggested to be challenged by labour migration. The nativist frame of justification, however, allows no additional resource with which to appeal to middle-class taxpayers, and the only economic justification for stricter labour market regulation is the privileged position given to the Swedish wage-earner, rather than any reference to welfare economy.

Even though various welfare economic justifications for the anti-immigration stance were given in both of the PS programmes, no justification transcending the immediate economic benefit to the ‘Swedish wage-earner’ is postulated or any reference is made to the welfare state in the SD pro-

\textsuperscript{54} Perussuomalaiset 2011, 40.
\textsuperscript{55} Potter 1996, 21.
\textsuperscript{56} Perussuomalaiset 2011, 40.
\textsuperscript{57} van Dijk 1992, 94.
gramme. With regard to labour, then, the SD’s programme does not appear to deviate from Mudde’s view on the economy as an instrumental means to a core, ideological end.59

Refugees and the responsibility for victims of global injustices

When discussing immigration and particularly asylum policy, parties invested in welfare states as producers of territorially bound welfare also address the suffering elsewhere. Both the PS and the SD programmes participate in this discourse, although with quite different emphases. The SD, in demanding ‘responsible immigration politics’, qualifies this demand with the juxtaposition of Swedish welfare and help to others: ‘Our Sweden helps people in distress, but Swedish welfare and prosperity must come first.’60 Contrary to the SD labour market approach, which is not justified with references to welfare economy, here the resources required by domestic welfare are used in order to justify the restricted possibilities to promote global economic redistributions. Nevertheless, the position that economic considerations are not a central issue justifying the asylum politics is crystallized in the SD’s advocacy for Sweden’s ‘heightened support for the world’s millions of refugees through a multifold increase in the funds for the UNHCR.’61 Such argumentation positions the SD as an unselfish actor that does not consider the regulation of public spending as the reason justifying a stricter control of immigration. Instead, the notion that controlling immigration promotes ‘Swedish prosperity’ – even if it means greatly increasing UNHCR spending – suggests that economic considerations do not constitute a central justificatory resource for anti-immigration policies.

There is one significant similarity between the PS and SD positions on granting asylum. Like the SD, the PS also promotes a response to refugees’ distress that would take place outside the receiving nation-state. However, the PS position is immediately qualified through the construction of the fact that border closing anti-immigration policy can be justified in terms of

59 Mudde 2007, 119–120.
60 Sverigedemokraterna 2010, 4.
61 Sverigedemokraterna 2010, 4.
the practical and efficient allocation of economic resources: ‘Perussuomalaiset thinks that it would be wiser if the state promoted the safety [of refugees] closer to their countries of origin, where fewer economic resources would likely result in an equally good or even better outcome.’\(^{62}\) However, in their 2011 programme, the PS takes a greater step away from the spending in supra-national bodies that the SD promotes, by using the EU as the common enemy, seeking to overburden the Finnish economy with asylum seekers: ‘The EU would likely want to increase the number of refugees and migrants taken into Finland […] Finland must not participate in the sharing of this burden.’ The welfare economic anti-immigration justification is further invoked with regard to the question of refugee quotas: ‘The amount of quota refugees must be adjusted with regard to the general economic development. If public spending and services are cut, the refugee quotas must be cut as well.’\(^{63}\)

Here, the PS role as an actor actively seeking to regulate immigration is forcefully downplayed. The opposition to policies benefitting immigrants is justified through the discourse of economic necessity. This justification is based on a narrative that presents prudent immigration policy as nothing but the function of the ‘economic facts’ that then create a framework outside of which the welfare state, as a matter of fact, could never operate.\(^{64}\)

### National identity, immigrants and social policy

Whilst both the SD and the PS juxtapose distressed refugees with national welfare in their electoral programmes, the SD does not justify their approach with a discourse of welfare economy as the PS repeatedly endeavours to do. Rather, the SD employs nativist arguments for an identity-level of welfare, constructing a homogenic ‘Swedish society’ that is being challenged by refugees and other immigrants alike: ‘Immigrants must adjust to Swedish society and not vice versa.’\(^{65}\) Overall, the SD makes no references to welfare economy in order to justify its position on national identity. Instead,

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\(^{62}\) Perussuomalaiset 2008, 19.
\(^{63}\) Perussuomalaiset 2011, 42.
\(^{64}\) Bobbio 1994, 26.
\(^{65}\) Sverigedemokraterna 2010, 4.
the SD’s investment in the Swedish identity, culture or lifestyle is repeatedly presented as an inherent value to be protected: ‘In our Sweden, the Swedish cultural heritage, the people’s home is built on a common value base and the Swedes right to develop their culture as they see fit is protected.’ In a similar vein, apart from the single exception of ‘ending the free health and dental health care of illegal immigrants’, their rhetoric established no links to financing the welfare state or its social policy in formulating their anti-immigration policies.\textsuperscript{66}

On the PS political agenda, too, national identity is held in very high esteem and the programmes argue in various contexts the importance of protecting ‘a Finnish unity and communality’. However, most commonly these values are presented as instrumental to the preservation of the welfare state, instead of being justified in exclusively nativist terms or presented as normative ideals sprouting from a notion of Finnishness as Mudde suggests.\textsuperscript{67} Indeed, in the PS programmes, the anti-immigration oriented remedies to these – allegedly immigration-induced – threats to such nationalist values, are repeatedly justified with discourse drawing from the welfare chauvinist understanding of how the welfare economy can be sustained.\textsuperscript{68} One of the most explicit ways of establishing this connection between the national identity and welfare economy employs the construction of a textbook example of the so-called ‘recognition-redistribution trade-off’\textsuperscript{69} as a social fact. According to the PS, because the national solidarity must be protected from the corroding effect of value-heterogenization, ‘in the integration of immigrants our national identity and patriotism must play a role’.\textsuperscript{70} This

\textsuperscript{66} Sverigedemokraterna 2010, 4.
\textsuperscript{67} Mudde 2007, 119–120, 258.
\textsuperscript{68} Freeman 2009.
\textsuperscript{69} Recognition-redistribution trade-off refers to the variety of arguments that are based on the assumption that there is an inverse relationship between the degree the state is able to recognize and accommodate the special needs of minorities and the state’s ability to redistribute welfare. The trade-off commonly postulates that the recognition policies either crowd-out the redistributive policies from the political agenda, that they corrode the solidarity on which the redistributive policies are based or that they misdiagnose issues rising from economic inequality as minority recognition issues. For a more detailed account on the recognition-redistribution trade-off, see the introduction in Banting, Keith & Will Kymlicka (eds) (2006) Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: recognition and redistribution in contemporary democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
\textsuperscript{70} Perussuomalaiset 2011, 9.
assimilative response to heterogenization – constructed as a result of immigration – is justified through a narrative according to which a ‘[u]nified people guarantees the willingness to pay taxes’.

Moreover, the tax populist argument for stricter regulation of immigration seeks to justify why the ‘Perussuomalaiset thinks that the requirement for economic self-sustainability must be extended to all immigrants coming to Finland on the basis of family reunification’ because, ‘[i]n accordance to the Danish model, it is possible to expect, for example, that a person applying for family reunification has not received income support during the past two years’. PS further refers to a crowding-out effect that immigration can have for the zero-sum game of welfare redistribution, calling it ‘irresponsible to attempt to gather seniors in our country when at the same time the elder care queues are growing and the age structure of the Finnish population is a cause of concern’.

A nativist variety of national unity is clearly constructed as a value in and of itself, by both the PS and the SD. However, concerning the discourse for persuasion of the potential constituencies to advocate the anti-immigration measures the parties outline in the programmes, the PS presents national unity as facilitating support for the redistribution of welfare. Moreover, and unlike the SD, the PS also repeatedly justifies the necessity redistribution of welfare in terms of a zero-sum game, where anti-immigration politics are the sine qua non for the preservation of the welfare state and the welfare chauvinist redistributive regime it entails.

Justifying anti-immigration advocacy in discussion board debates

The mobilization rhetoric of the populist parties with anti-immigration political agenda analyzed in the previous section is only one of the facets of anti-immigration advocacy in public debate. The electoral programmes are, by definition, aimed at more or less potential constituencies with the purpose of gaining more votes for the parties. On the other hand, the grass-

71 Rydgren 2006, 52.
72 Perussuomalaiset 2011, 42–43.
roots level discussants – as private political actors on a mainstream public forum – are highly concerned with the social acceptability of their arguments and the political identities they represent. This is why the grass-root actors, unlike political parties, do not primarily seek to convert their imagined audiences into voters of populist parties. Rather, they hope to present their anti-immigration advocacy as a soundly justifiable political agenda and, accordingly, seek to discursively insulate their political activities from the social stigmas of racism and xenophobia.\(^{73}\)

As such, the analysis of the Finnish discussion board data in the following sections complements the analysis of anti-immigration political mobilization in electoral programmes. Firstly, this analysis illustrates a high degree of transference between the economic justificatory rhetoric used by the party political actors, on the one hand, and the grass-roots level of the anti-immigration advocacy on the other. Secondly – by focusing on grass-root narratives seeking to promote anti-immigration advocacy and insulate this political agenda from stigmatizing criticisms (of being xenophobic) – it also allows a broader understanding of the discursive practices through which anti-immigration sentiment is advocated and justified as a reasonable position in a public debate.

In order to study the grass-roots level of justification discourses for anti-immigration advocacy, the three discussion board threads analyzed are selected from the same time period as the electoral programmes. One of the threads dates four months after the PS electoral victory of 2008, the second dates two months before the 2011 elections, and the discussions in the third thread take place one month after these elections. In addition to being situated in this critical junction, the selection of the threads is subjected to three criteria.

Firstly, each of the threads is based on a newspaper article in the *Helsingin Sanomat* (HS) that exhibits a critical evaluation of an immigration-related phenomenon, and is articulated by a high-ranking political actor. The articles are based, respectively, on statements by the Minister of Econo-

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\(^{73}\) van Dijk 1992, 87–88.
my, Jyrki Katainen (Thread A), the PS leader Timo Soini (Thread B) and President Tarja Halonen (Thread C).

Secondly, immigration is the main topic of discussion in each of the threads, defined as making an explicit reference to ‘immigration’ at least once per A4-sheet. With the discussion within each of the threads consisting of about 300 A4 sheets, this translates to at least 300 references to immigration per thread.

Thirdly, each of the threads considered here belong among the ten most commented topics of the month the thread originates in, each thread consisting of more than 200 posts. The threshold of 200 posts is a very high threshold. As a point of comparison, the average number of posts in the 17 most discussed threads of any topic in January 2011 was 173 posts per thread according to the HS. Any thread exceeding this threshold therefore signifies an exceptionally intense debate.

The discourses justifying anti-immigration advocacy within each of the three threads are coded using the Atlas.TI-program up until a saturation point is reached. A thread is considered saturated when, firstly, more than 50 posts are analyzed and, secondly, the number of posts not seeking to justify anti-immigration advocacy (labelled as off-topic or anti-racism) exceeds the count of the most common justification given in the thread for anti-immigration advocacy. The subsections illustrate all the discourses identified in each thread until the saturation point is reached and continue to quote some of the most illuminating posts and discuss the articulations within in more detail.


77 It is important to note that the discussants participate in the debates anonymously using aliases, and sometimes submit posts that are not in accordance with the Finnish legislation against hate speech. Considering that the debates are being moderated by the HS staff, the number of posts submitted is likely to exceed the actual number of posts published online.
The tables in the beginning of each subsection illustrate the relative frequency (in percentages) of different discourses with which the discussants seek to justify their anti-immigration arguments and deny racism in their intentions and goals (as discussed in Section 2). The discourses are divided into four main types, depending on whether the justification seeking to insulate anti-immigration advocacy from the critique of being racist points to ‘Rights of the majority’, ‘Immigrants as the Other’, ‘Economic redistribution’ or ‘Norms of public discourse’. Many of the posts employ multiple justificatory discourses, often also belonging in several types of justification. This is why the combined count of justificatory discourses (n) is greater than the number of posts analyzed in each of the three discussion board threads analyzed.

The following analysis is divided in three sections, each covering one discussion board thread. Each section discusses the division of the types of discursive justifications for anti-immigration advocacy and illustrates the function of the particular discourses by quoting the posts that indicate how the discussants in practice formulate the justifications in their posts. Following each discussion board excerpt, the justificatory discourses employed within are indicated in square brackets. Appendix B defines in more detail what the discourses entail and how they are coded for the purposes of the analysis.

Thread A:
‘[Minister of Finance] Katainen demands an open discussion also on problems related to immigration’

(February 19th 2009, thread saturated at 168/396 posts)

A few months after the municipal elections of 2008 that marked the beginning of the steep rise in the electoral success of the PS, the Minister of Finance, Jyrki Katainen, acknowledged the validity of some of the concerns that were regarded in the public debate as immigration-related by calling for an ‘open discussion’. Table 1 indicates how anti-immigration advocacy is being justified in this online debate.
Within the thread A, the proponents of anti-immigration politics in this discussion commonly argue that the public debate is marked by taboos that need to be broken in order to achieve an open public debate. Almost half of all the justifications given for anti-immigration advocacy pertain to what the discussants consider to be distorted norms of the public debate. This type of justification claims that it has not been possible to critically examine immigration-related phenomena in public and voice what the discussants consider genuine and legitimate concerns. According to this narrative, this is why presenting ‘immigration critique’ as something not marked by racism, subjects the discussant to the risk of being considered a racist. As such, presenting arguments for anti-immigration advocacy vests a discussant with a courageous and unselfish speaker position. Such position therefore

deserves respect, and arguments from such a position deserve a role in public debate, even if the critique does not always meet its mark. This type of meta-level justificatory discourse commonly frames the subject-matter related discourses against immigration.

The following excerpt from a post in thread A illustrates the most prominent discourse, in which economic redistribution and the norms of the public debate are being evoked in order to justify anti-immigration advocacy:

Alias ‘malmilainen’:
‘A simple opening towards the direction of an honest and open discussion [. . . ] would entail admitting that so-called humanitarian immigration is an expense, that is, an item of expenditure for taxpayers. Once this is a crystal clear fact for everybody, we can discuss mainly about how big an expenditure this is and how we can affect its magnitude.’ [open debate; taxpayer perspective; welfare state macro-level]

This argument justifies anti-immigration advocacy by asserting that the fact that the officials have not acknowledged humanitarian immigration as an expense for taxpayers means that immigration is not ‘honestly and openly’ discussed in public. The post seeks to appeal to its audience’s common sense by constructing this as ‘a crystal clear fact,’ one that would be ‘simple’ to remedy by (re-)starting the immigration discussion from the perspective of how the state allocates its resources vis-à-vis immigration, thus effectively making the economic redistribution as the primary discourse within which to assess the feasibility of immigration.

Another common avenue of justification links the economic considerations to assertions of how immigrant groups behave, usually seeking to insulate these characterizations of immigrant cultures from the accusations of being racist:

Alias ‘kauku’:
‘I think that this is not about race, culture or religion but rather about a topic as dreary as money. […] The immigrants do not integrate well enough. So we would need more money. We have only a couple of options. a) We regulate the number immigrants so that we may focus more resources per individual. b) We gather more resources (money) for example by raising taxes. Not many people are willing to do that.’ ['this is not racism'; scarcity of resources; immigrant behaviour; taxpayer perspective]

This argument begins justification of anti-immigration advocacy by explicit speaker positioning that concerns, such as race, culture and religion – as typical starting points of xenophobic arguments – are not in play here. Rather, to the extent that rising taxes are not what the majority wants and nobody can deny that resources are limited, the (unsupported) acknowledgement that immigrants do not integrate well enough results in the conclusion that anti-immigration politics is needed. The justification for anti-immigration advocacy is that since all-inclusive policies are not feasible and immigrants ‘obviously’ have a weaker claim to common resources than does the autochthonous population, it must be illogical to publicly reprehend advocating exclusionary policies.

The reductive quantification of issues of immigration as merely questions of economic resources – as is done in posts by ‘malmilainen’ and ‘kauku’ is dependent on two implicit fact constructions. The first one is that the immigrants are not ‘well enough integrated’ (with few attempts to actually define what counts for well enough integration), and the second one is that integrative measures are as efficient as can be, and that only increasing the volume of public spending can facilitate ‘better integration’.

Both assumptions construct national identity and integration as unproblematic and unquestionable ends. However, it is interesting to note that the concepts are, although undefined, typically connected to justifications

80 van Dijk 1992.
that present national identity primarily as an instrumental good, allowing the pursuit of a sustainable welfare state. The prevalence of this discourse goes against the Muddean understanding of national identity as a primary populist goal in itself.\textsuperscript{82} This is because the discourse entails that the construction of anti-immigration policies is a means to fight the solidarity corroding effect that supposedly reduces the willingness to pay taxes and thus threatens the sustainability of the welfare state.\textsuperscript{83}

Table 1 also indicates that the use of welfare economy justifications is much more accentuated in this thread than nativist discourses.\textsuperscript{84} Of course, this is not to say that the narratives would not be motivated by ethnocentric perceptions. Below is a particularly lucid example of such imaginative use of reductive quantification in the construction of welfare state macro-level considerations that supposedly justify anti-immigration advocacy:

Alias ‘Jäynääjä’:
‘When we bring 10 incomers to be supported, 1 of them will get employed who (maybe) supports himself, while the other 9 are covered from tax revenues. With about 70\% likelihood, this individual must be educated all the way from the alphabet, and it is pretty certain that he will accumulate expenses from the health service etc. as much as a Finn does […] (let’s be optimistic and say that the expenses incurred for kindergarten, interpretation, bureaucracy, etc. are 0 euro.) So we end up with a calculation that one of these ten becomes a net producer in 33 years and the other 9 never.’ [immigrant behaviour; welfare abusing immigrants; welfare state macro-level]

As Jäynääjä’s post reveals, these ‘economic realities’ can take on a life of their own. It is evident that the ‘calculations’ presented constitute little more than prejudiced figments of the contributor’s imagination. What is remarkable, nevertheless, is that debaters do construct the welfare economy

\textsuperscript{82} Mudde 2007, 119–120, 258.
\textsuperscript{83} Banting et al. 2006, 11–12.
\textsuperscript{84} See, for example, Fetzer 2000.
pertinent justifications for anti-immigration advocacy seemingly out of thin air. This testifies for a strong conviction present on the grass-roots level debates that there is great normative, justificatory potential in presenting anti-immigration advocacy as benign and ‘merely’ motivated by welfare economic considerations, and that this discourse can mask the pejorative and unfounded presentation of immigrant cultures as a worthless burden.

The less common discourses of justification of thread A – in particular the ones belonging in the ‘rights of the majority’ type – are hardly ever evoked on their own, and usually seek to gain support from the discourses of economic redistribution and norms of public debate:

Alias ‘Jugi’:
‘One would not think that wanting to keep Finland Finnish is somehow an anti-immigrant comment? Or do you think that Finland should become, for instance, an Islamic state, so that [immigrants] could feel themselves “integrated”? [I]t is hard to understand why cherishing the Finnish culture and habits should be somehow a racist activity against people who have come here from other cultures?’ [reaffirming our ways; open debate; ‘this is not racism’]

Here the opposition to immigration is first justified on the basis of the concern for the cultural rights of the majority. However, a denial of a racist intention quickly follows the hyperbolic straw man of the ‘extreme tolerant’ position (as in the position that Finland should become an Islamic state). Such justificatory narratives typically employ the logic that since many of the nativist anti-immigration arguments are not really about immigrants themselves (as the proposed justification instead seeks to present a legitimate concern for ‘the Finnish culture’), it follows that such arguments should not be possible to be defined as racist in the public debate. The general implication of such a justificatory narrative is that as long as the discussants supporting anti-immigration policies do not refer to explicitly racist goals, anti-immigration advocacy should not be considered racist, either.85  

85 van Dijk 1992, 94.
What is remarkable, though, is that the discussants never acknowledge that the implementation of the actual policies for 'keeping Finland Finnish' may (very likely) have racist outcomes. As long as reaching racist outcomes cannot be shown to be the reason why the discussants advocate anti-immigration measures, labelling anti-immigration advocacy racist would then be the kind of an *ad hominem* accusation that must not be accepted in an open debate.

Thread B:
‘Perussuomalaiset would relocate unemployed immigrants in the peripheries’

(February 25th 2011: thread saturated at 75/241 posts)

The discussion in thread B takes place right on the threshold of the parliamentary elections of April 2011, and is grounded quite differently from the thread A discussion board, which originated from the Minister of Finance’s nod towards the electoral success of the PS. The news article to which the posts are related discusses a specific policy proposal – as presented in the PS electoral programme – of accommodating the unemployed immigrants in regions where housing expenses are lower. Table 2 (next page) illustrates that here the justifications for anti-immigration advocacy mostly draw from the discourses of economic redistribution, these being almost twice as frequent as either the discourses referring to the Norms of public debate or Immigrants as the Other.

As this debate originates from merits of a particular anti-immigration policy measure – presented as an economic remedy to an immigration-related problem by a party soaring in the polls – the discussants are keen to appeal to economic ‘logic’ and ‘pragmatism’. This way the anti-immigration advocacy is sought to be contained within a ‘mundane’ social political debate that conceptualizes redistribution in terms of a zero-sum game, similar
to the PS approach. This can be illustrated by quoting posts by aliases ‘Public PC’ and ‘Riitu S’:

Alias ‘Public PC’:
‘I guess the immigrants are allowed to reside wherever they please, as long as they cover the expenses themselves. As long as society pays for the accommodation of the immigrant, he shouldn’t have anything to complain about the location where society finds an apartment for him.’
[welfare state macro-level; taxpayer perspective; ‘this is not racism’]

In employing the economic redistribution discourses, the narratives justify anti-immigration advocacy through the reductive quantification of

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86 Rydgren 2006, 52.
complex welfare issues. Many background assumptions of how welfare redistribution works are left implicit, but narrated vaguely as something that must evidently be internalized by the other discussants. Firstly, the fulfilment of any enabling function for economic redistribution is never articulated as grounds for deciding whether the advocacy for an anti-immigration policy measure is justifiable. This is remarkable in a welfare state context, where the *raison d’être* for redistributions has commonly been understood in terms of a more or less positive understanding of freedom, whereby redistributing monies allows people to have a greater deal of independence than they would have without such redistribution.

Secondly, there is an underlying supposition – commonly linked to liberal regimes of welfare in the academic discussion – that the beneficiaries of redistribution should have no say concerning their satisfaction in the outcome of redistributive policies. This supposition manifests itself lucidly in the excerpt from the post by ‘Riitu S’:

Alias ‘Riitu S’:

*They are being put in the most inexpensive place possible until they can support themselves. [...] [T]hey reside in the cheapest possible place and immediately when they support themselves, they can freely choose their domicile. Logical, right?’* [welfare state macro-level; taxpayer perspective]

It is remarkable that the justification of anti-immigration policy of regional restrictions for housing subsidies for immigrants as merely ‘logical’ omits any discussion concerning the welfare chauvinist logic according to which Finns are implicitly perceived as entitled to the favourable treatment of having regionally unbound access to housing subsidies.

Even the discourses that justify anti-immigration advocacy by presenting immigrants as the ‘other’ most commonly construct this ‘otherness’ in

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87 Jokinen et al. 1999, 146.
89 Esping-Andersen 1990, 3.
90 Esping-Andersen 1990, 26–27.
economic terms, arguing that immigrants live in a way that threatens to excessively strain the resources. Such discourses of ‘othering’ are made more lucid when juxtaposed with the common (counterfactual) assertion that the autochthonous population’s use of welfare resources is mostly insignificant:

Alias ‘jebbe21’:

‘One can move to Helsinki or any other place once one can pay for the costs of one’s own accommodation. I think this is quite logical, and although a Finnish social bum can move to a rental apartment of any city this is relatively insignificant, in comparison to the fact that almost all of the humanitarian immigration is like this.’ [welfare state macro-level; welfare abusing immigrants; immigrant behaviour]

Moreover, the economy-related anti-immigration discourses often imply – and sometimes even explicitly argue – that welfare resources used by immigrants are actually abused. In the excerpt from jebbe21’s post, this type of justification for anti-immigration advocacy is sought by presenting ‘a Finnish social bum’ as the closest point of comparison for humanitarian immigrants in the debate on housing subsidies.

‘Othering’ comparisons between immigrants and the autochthonous population can also be employed for the purposes of constructing a narrative in which immigrants are portrayed as challenging the majority’s entitlement to scarce welfare resources. For the purpose of justifying anti-immigration advocacy, these comparisons often seek to reinforce the discursive link between the purported nature of immigrants and the ‘realities’ of economic redistribution:

Alias ‘Iivari Tahko’:

‘In Finland people emphasize equality in everything, also incl. equality between refugees and the Finnish citizens in every possible respect. […] Actually, the truth to the matter is such that the economic situation of a refugee can be easily shown to be better
than that of a poor, Finnish person. [...] Situating [refugees] to peripheries has the added benefit of preventing the concentration of [refugee] accommodation, urban decay, in many cases. ['this is not racism'; scarcity of resources; majority’s entitlement; immigrant behaviour; welfare state macro-level]

This justification of anti-immigration advocacy moves on multiple discursive levels. First the discussant seeks to pre-empt any accusation of racism by employing a national self-categorization,91 which presents Finns as people, who emphasize equality between refugees and the autochthonous population ‘in every possible respect’. By the virtue of being a Finn, who greatly values equality, he then points to the inequality in the asserted fact that the poor Finns are supposedly worse off in their own country than refugees, who are claiming the (housing) resources the poor Finns used to be entitled to.

Anti-immigration policy measures – such as placing refugees to peripheries – are being justified by using narratives that combine discourses of scarcity and denial of racism. A typical narrative of this kind presents the measures as a way for the majority to remedy the unfair loss of their privileged entitlement to scarce welfare goods. Additionally, the anti-immigration policies are often presented as having the ability to address a macro-level solidarity corroding challenges that the heterogenizing welfare state is supposedly facing.92 The issue of urban decay is an example of the kind of a problem that discussants are keen to link to immigration and immigrant behaviour, thus arguably justifying the advocacy for anti-immigration measures for countering the problem. This selective combination of justificatory discourses makes it possible to construct fears pertaining to livelihood as ‘economic facts’. Such construction of facts allows presenting immigration as playing a significant role in the accentuation of the pertinent problems surrounding the welfare-state, and to advocate anti-immigration measures as a simple and effective means to tackle these issues.

91 Billig 1987, 70–73.
92 Banting et al. 2006, 11–12.
Thread C:
‘President Halonen urges the government to oppose racism’

(May 28th 2011: thread saturated at 137/265 posts)

The news article based on President Halonen’s plea against racism, discussed in thread C, was published only three months after the discussions in thread B took place. In the meantime, however, the parliamentary elections of 2011 were held, which changed the atmosphere for public debate significantly. The elections translated the promising polls into a major victory for the PS (as indicated in Appendix A). This meant that their concerns for immigration could be expected to be on the governmental agenda, especially seeing as the formation of the government coalition was still on-going until late June. Against this background, it may be surprising to note, as Table 3 (next page) indicates, that the posts justifying anti-immigration advocacy with economic redistribution discourses were significantly less common than the ones using other justificatory discourses.

One way to address this shift in the use of justificatory narratives between threads B and C would be to note that by participating in the domestic political debate, the president clearly put the advocates of anti-immigration politics on a defensive stance. Moreover, the fact that the anti-immigration-oriented political agenda had already succeeded in prevailing in the elections can help explain why the discussants may have experienced less of a need to rearticulate the perceived (economic) assets of their political agenda. As the electoral result already manifested notable public support for these claims, more imminent goals can be identified in the discussion boards. Often these goals pertain to the public image of anti-immigration advocacy, challenged in numerous ways (as crystallized in the presidential critique in Thread C). The challenged public image appears to have prioritized narratives that seek to discursively reposition anti-immigration advocacy in a way that allows its insulation from the public critique, rather than emphasizing for the importance of having immigration issues on the political agenda as in the earlier threads. Another observation pointing to this conclusion can be found in
the fact that the most common discourse in thread C – ‘this is not racism’ – has a much greater lead respective to the second most frequent justificatory discourse (4,6 pp) than the leading discourses in threads A (0,0 pp) and B (0,9 pp).

In a sense, here the ball is thrown back to anti-immigration advocates. They seem to interpret this as entailing the responsibility to show how they are not racist, first and foremost, because they are the ones suffering from a variety of arguably immigration-related phenomena. This interpretation is supported by the dominance of the victimizing discourses pertaining to the rights of the majority, which were the least common type of justification in the earlier threads.

Indeed, thread C introduces two new and highly frequent discourses of justification, both of which are closely connected together and also commonly linked to the ‘this is not racism’ discourse. Firstly, many discussants
construct the supposedly extensive debate on the difficulties the immigrants face as one pertaining to a relatively insignificant societal issue, but nevertheless crowding out the concerns the Finns would like to put on the political agenda. This common, zero-sum perception that immigration-related issues automatically have the greatest salience in a public debate is generally employed for the purposes of asserting, in accordance with welfare chauvinist logic, that the pre-existing, natural and just dominance of ‘our concerns’ is now being taken over by a focus on immigrants’ concerns. This is exemplified in the excerpt below:

Alias ‘eri maailmassako’
‘In the country unemployment is increasing, treatment of the elderly and the sick is overlooked [...]. And what might our opinion leader [President Halonen] be doing? Venting her points on racism [...] which is not a problem in our country, as opposed to the lack of food and employment [...] Halonen and other politicians should focus on removing these.’ [displacing majority’s concerns; ‘this is not racism’; scarcity of goods; majority’s entitlement]

The displacement and scarcity discourses are commonly used in conjunction with the denial of racism discourse, as it allows the discussants to present their indifference or hostility towards the immigrant claims-making as not rooted in racism, but rather in the majority’s want. Such linking serves to construct a speaker position, in which anti-immigration advocacy only reflects the concern that other important societal issues face the danger of losing their saliency to questions of racism, which is narrated as brought about by the presence of immigrants in the first place.

This displacement discourse is also linked to the discourse of the vilified majority, in order to construct the position of the majority as the victim, whose anti-immigration advocacy should be seen as nothing but the struggle for its own recognition and survival. The narratives employing this

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93 Banting et al. 2006, 10–11.
94 Rydgren, 52.
discourse suggest that addressing the concerns of minorities in public and political debates is excessive in its current form, which only serves to marginalize the members of the majority group.95 This is visible in the following particularly rich – if condensed – excerpt that makes use of each of the four types of justificatory discourses:

Alias ‘Sosiaalityömies’:
‘Particularly hetero men with family experience themselves as being discriminated against. They are the self-evidence that is left under the feet of minority groups. Media visibility is given several times a day to [. . .] minorities. Immigrants and language minorities. No one says anything about the wellbeing or the societal importance of an ordinary, white, hetero taxpayer or that of an unemployed male. Why? […] Is it really so [. . .] important to discuss what is not happening to or done for minorities in their own opinion – rather than discuss what should be done according to the majority who maintains, finances and builds society? […]’ [reaffirming our ways; vili-
ified majority; displacing majority’s concerns; scarcity of goods; ma-
iority’s entitlement; open debate]

What comes clear in the excerpt by Sosiaalityömies – whose very alias embodies an authoritative speaker positioning as ‘social working man’ – is that the majority’s (experience of) marginalization is what justifies anti-immigration advocacy, and that the diminishing access to material welfare resources is only one facet of this marginalization. The combination of discourses in the justificatory narrative constructed by ‘Sosiaalityömies’ presents ‘the minorities and their sympathizers’ as taking a prominent role in the public debate and in the media, thereby pushing the majority away from the central position in the public exchange of ideas that the majority should, ‘obviously’, rightfully occupy.

95 Fetzer 2000.
The main thrust of the justifications given for anti-immigration advocacy in thread C is that immigration is currently discussed from the wrong angle, one that vilifies the majority and displaces their concerns, instead of focusing on the majority’s concerns and problems that immigration arguably causes to the welfare state and the just economic redistribution within it.

Conclusion

Many of the narratives seeking to justify anti-immigration advocacy in the current public debate return to the ancient Aesopian themes of desert and entitlement to resources from a common pool. Who, in the end, have worked or can be trusted to work for the common good, and to whom are these goods common? Even though the questions of desert greatly overlap with those of ethnicity and culture in the public discourses justifying anti-immigration advocacy, the most basic level of justification for differential, exclusionary or unequal treatment of groups of people in a welfare state context requires little more than identifying a group as newcomers, and challenging the group’s claims to resources and equal recognition on this basis. 96 While the innermost motivations against immigration are commonly understood to routinely have their roots in fears and anxieties of different kinds – also pertaining to immigrants and their cultures 97 – the advocates of anti-immigration politics rarely articulate such motivations for their activity, as they understand that presenting such motives would greatly undermine the public justifiability of their political advocacy. 98

Rather than seeking to characterize the ‘actual’ motivations of the anti-immigration actors, I have illustrated in this chapter the public use of different discourses of justifications for anti-immigration advocacy, as they are manifested both at a party-level and at a grass-roots level. The analyses of both levels of advocacy in this chapter reveal a significant commonality between the discourses employed in the electoral programmes and on the discussion boards. There is a clear transference between the electoral pro-

97 See, for example, Puuronen 2011.
98 van Dijk 1992, 94.
grammes by the PS and the discussion board debates, in the sense that both invoke and justify national identity and anti-immigration measures as an instrumental means to a (welfare) economic end. In particular, they make use of a narrative of necessity, where immigration is constructed as an easily quantifiable ‘extra’ strain on ‘our’ welfare system. While this finding challenges the Muddean notion of economy as secondary in populist rhetoric to a degree, it must be noted that ‘their strain on our system’ as the point of departure obviously involves strong normative, nationalist sympathies and welfare chauvinist assumptions that cannot really be derived from purely economic phenomena.99

Even so, it is important to acknowledge that the advocates of anti-immigration politics do make extensive use of the questions of economic redistribution for the purposes of justifying their political views vis-à-vis immigration in public debate. This is crucial, because from this acknowledgement it also follows that the endeavour to publicly counter the arguments by the anti-immigration advocates on the basis that the arguments are motivated by racism or xenophobia, is somewhat misguided, even when such motivations are indeed implicit (as they commonly appear to be).

The problem with confronting anti-immigration advocacy with predominantly anti-racist discourses is that the xenophobic position does not, obviously, invalidate the proposed policy solutions for tackling welfare economic problems any more than a non-racist motivation validates them. Indeed, the analysis points to the conclusion that in the current public debate, many of the anti-immigration discussants consider their political arguments valid, because their opponents base their criticism on the questionable motivations for anti-immigration advocacy, which the anti-immigration discussants often do not recognize in themselves and in their arguments. And even though some discussants certainly do recognize them, they also know

99 For instance, it is far from obvious, which redistributive measures cause a strain that should be considered ‘extra’, as opposed to a welfare system operating as business as usual. And who belongs to the ‘we’ that is constructed as obviously entitled to welfare goods, as opposed to the supposedly less deserving newcomers? Indeed, the justificatory discourses analyzed in this chapter are typically ambiguous on these points, even though the actual (in)validity of the anti-immigration arguments, in the end, depends on how soundly and objectively these questions can be tackled.
that by being careful in not explicating these motivations in the justificatory discourses they employ, they can make it very hard for anyone to give watertight proof for the existence of such motivations – let alone to convince those, who are prone to internalizing the economic justifications employed by anti-immigration advocates. As a result, many of the discussants feel that since they regard themselves as not being racists and use no explicitly racist arguments for anti-immigration politics, there can be few objections to their predominantly economically framed justifications for anti-immigration oriented political agenda.

The analyses point to the conclusion that the discussants – even when constructing an economic justification of anti-immigration politics – rarely feel the need to present any concrete, causal mechanisms through which the implementation of anti-immigration measures they propose would remedy the problems attributed to immigration. This is at least partly due to the relative dearth of arguments in the public space that would challenge the outcome of the anti-immigration policies advocated by the parties and the discussants. While several studies indicate that it is highly unlikely that implementing anti-immigration policies would either alleviate the issues welfare states are currently experiencing or help the autochthonous population in any significant way,¹⁰⁰ the discussants’ use of welfare chauvinist discourses as a justification for their anti-immigration agenda is not typically challenged in terms of the factual accuracy of their assertions. Consequently, the anti-immigration advocates reinforce the public justifiability of their political agenda by linking the unchallenged arguments of economic necessity to discourses that portray the autochthonous population as the victim. This facilitates the internalization of the narrative that constructs immigration – and any public focus on immigrants’ concerns – as the prime causes for the various globalization and heterogenization-related economic and cultural challenges. These are challenges that the majority population (together

with the immigrants) indeed commonly face. Even so, if the actual reasons why the immigrant-targeting policies cannot be the remedy are discussed in public at all, it is only after the racist outcomes of the anti-immigration ‘solutions’ have been identified as their advocates’ motivation for voicing the concerns.

An additional difficulty is that the victimizing discourses justifying anti-immigration advocacy are rendered more effective by the welfare state context. Regardless of how they interpret immigration, public discussants – due to their double role as both taxpaying financers and as net-beneficiaries of economic redistribution – have much at stake in how welfare is structured and organized. The concern for the consensually supported welfare state facing immense global challenges is a widely shared concern, making such a concern a resilient point of departure for justifying anti-immigration advocacy on both the party and the grass-roots level.

As concrete and convincing remedies to the complex difficulties the welfare state is facing are few and far between, many discussants perceive the anti-racist arguments against the advocates of anti-immigration policies as belittling their authentic and valid concerns, and as unjustly vilifying the majority and inaccurately presenting their concerns as motivated by racialized, ideological convictions. The dilemma is that both the PS and the grass-roots discussants remain silent on the concrete mechanisms and effects of anti-immigration measures, which are consequently difficult and time-consuming to expose as unjust and inefficient with substantial arguments in the hectic and heatedly competed space of public media. At the same time, the abstract anti-immigration narratives draw from commonly shared, real concerns of the future of the welfare state and successfully employ discourses of economic necessity and solidarity eroding heterogenization, thus providing the anti-immigration advocates with seemingly non-racially motivated and therefore publicly acceptable rhetorical avenues to justify their political agenda. As a consequence, the mainstream variant of anti-immigration advocacy remains motivated and mobilized by a genuine belief in the projected outcome – imprecisely articulated in the electoral programmes and never publicly elaborated upon within the discussion
boards, but also infrequently challenged in public with any level of concreteness. Having anti-immigration politics on the political agenda is considered by them to somehow alleviate the precariousness they see Finns as currently suffering from as ‘innocent victims.’

On the basis of the analysis of the discussion boards, the mainstream advocates are animated online not only by sharing anecdotal evidence of ‘immigration problems’ and mutually reinforcing, utopian expectations, but also by being reduced to ‘just racists,’ as the critique they most commonly face runs. Many of them either genuinely do not see why unjust and exclusionary treatment would necessarily result from the policies they advocate or they consider the extent of such differential treatment to be minute in comparison to the widely ameliorated collective and personal prospects they hope to be able to enjoy in ‘their country’ as a result of implementing anti-immigration policies.

The way in which the anti-immigration argument is constructed, narrated, advocated and reinforced in the public debate suggests that there is much room to challenge the justification of anti-immigration politics, if the current focus on xenophobia and racism is complemented in two ways. Firstly, there is a need to move away from the debate that concentrates on the motivations of the anti-immigration actors and the moral justifiability of the public presentation of anti-immigration arguments (within the confines of the law), and rather focus on the projected outcomes of the proposed (anti-immigration) measures. This shift of focus has two distinct benefits. Firstly, it undermines the moral resource the anti-immigration actors find in their ability to present themselves as the brave victims, selflessly championing the cause of the silent majority and carrying the unjustly issued stigma of a racist. Secondly, the focus on outcomes also creates room for narratives illustrating how the unjust and exclusionary outcomes following from the implementation of the measures on the anti-immigration agenda would actually diminish the role the welfare state can take in empowering its citizens and denizens at large.

Secondly, there is a distinct need to acknowledge that the concerns for the welfare state are valid and can have a prominent role in the public debate,
even in conjunction with questions of immigration. This makes it possible to address and illustrate the inefficiency of anti-immigration measures in tackling issues of welfare that are presented as justifying anti-immigration advocacy. This entails emphasizing that there are very few positive developments that can be expected from the implementation of anti-immigration policies – not least because it possible to show that the difficulties the welfare state faces are a common concern, but one that cannot be attributed to immigration.
Appendix A:
The development of electoral support (% of the vote) of Perussuomalaiset and Sverigedemokraterna in municipal, parliamentary and EU elections from 1998 to 2011
Appendix B:
Operationalisation of the justification types and discourses
The four types of justification are indicated as italicized subheadings in bold. The quotes that begin with an italicized claim crystallize the content of the 11 discourses identified in the discussion board analysis. The codes of the discourses, also identified in the three tables are in bold inside parentheses.

**Economic redistribution**
‘*Influx of immigrants results in…*
…taxpayer money to be misplaced.’(*taxpayer money*)
…the same amount of goods to be shared among greater number of people.’
    (scarcity of goods)
…macro-level problems for the economic sustainability welfare state.’
    (welfare state macro-level)

**Rights of the majority**
‘*Recognizing immigrant cultures’ divergent needs facilitates the development where…*
…non-immigrant concerns lose the moral priority they deserve over immigrant ones.’(*majority’s entitlement*)
…non-immigrant concerns lose their issue saliency in the media and in the political decision making and can no longer be adequately heard.’
    (displacing majority’s concerns)
…the majority’s concern for its culture and practices are vilified as racist.’
    (vilified majority)
…the previously self-evident fact that our ways are better for us must be constantly reinstated in the public debate.’(*reaffirming our ways*)
‘This welfare of ours’: Justifying public advocacy for anti-immigration politics…

Immigrants as the Other

'We must oppose immigration and immigrant practices, because…

…immigrants and their habits cause all kinds of public disturbance.'

(immigrant behaviour)

…immigrants are being pampered by our welfare system and abuse it without remorse.' (welfare-abusing immigrants)

Norms of the public debate

'**It's perfectly ok to publicly advocate anti-immigration politics, because…**

…our arguments against immigration cannot be linked to any kind of racism.' ('this is not racism')

…only that way immigration-related societal problems get debated more openly and the debate becomes marked by a healthy, critical distance from the pro-tolerance dogmas.'(open debate)
CHAPTER 4

Managing diverse policy contexts: The welfare state as repertoire of policy logics in German and French labour migration governance

REGINE PAUL

Migration scholars widely acknowledge that welfare states ‘constitute key arenas within which issues of inclusion and exclusion are mediated’. Geddes argues that welfare states have become ‘an “internal” method for the regulation of migration’. By providing access to, or exclusion from, welfare support, European states have sought to welcome some forms of migration while deterring others. In line with this claim this chapter conceptualises the relationship between welfare states and migration from a critical political economy perspective, arguing that welfare states serve as repertoire of policy logics which are employed selectively in migrant admissions to serve specific selectivity goals. Labour migration management across the world is certainly always concerned with the economic utility of migrants as workers.

Yet, some suggest that economic selectivity as it features in migration policies coincides more smoothly with Bismarckian social insurance model and entitlement logics than with the universal Scandinavian welfare state logics, as the latter can less easily sustain a disjunction between the normative underpinnings of universal citizenship and migrants’ social exclusion. More precisely, Sainsbury’s comparative work has shown that the Bismarckian insurance model ‘appears to dovetail nicely with labour migration, enhancing the social rights of foreign workers [...] [while at the same time] employment has been a central condition for a residence permit and the right to abode’. More than that: if we take Geddes’ notion of ‘internal method of regulation’ seriously, Bismarckian entitlement logics – social rights derived from labour market success and relative status maintenance for welfare recipients – can be expected to serve as a crucial policy repertoire to distinguish wanted from unwanted migrant workers in the governance of first admissions in Continental Europe.

Based on the conceptual notion of repertoire of policy logics, and aiming to test the empirical claim of functional concurrence of migrant admission policies with Bismarckian entitlement logics, this chapter scrutinises labour migration policies (LMP) in France and Germany in a comparative perspective. Whilst not offering a cross-welfare model comparison I aim to specify whether two comparable welfare state models in Continental Europe ‘dovetail’ with utilitarian selectivity in LMP in the straightforward manner suggested above. I seek explanation for potential variation in the wider policy context of each case.

The chapter concentrates on labour admissions from third countries, covering a policy area that has recently experienced a revival across Europe. Labour migration offers a suitable empirical field for exploration as respective policies embrace highly selective and tightly regulated entry schemes with a strong focus on the anticipated economic utility of migrants as work-
ers’. If anywhere, the claim of functional concurrence between Bismarckian entitlement logics and migrant admission selectivity should be expected to be pronounced in the – allegedly – economically driven field of LMP. Germany and France offer suitable case studies as they share key institutional and formal policy characteristics: within limits, both count as Bismarckian welfare regimes of Continental Europe; both revived active foreign labour recruitment at roughly the same time in the new Millennium; both admit a comparable number of foreign workers through admission systems which looks quite similar from the outlook.

In a case-oriented comparison, the chapter explores the ways in which Bismarckian entitlement logics functionally coincide in German and French labour admission governance and policy discourse, and explains comparative variation in relation to policy context. Methodologically, I analyse and explain the relationship between LMP and the Bismarckian welfare state by means of interpretive policy analysis (see next section), meaning that high-ranking policymakers’ accounts of policy drivers and rationalities form the core of the analysis. Analysing data from 22 legal documents and 17 in-depth interviews with high-ranking policymakers in both countries, this chapter comes to the conclusion that the reach of the functional concurrence argument – between Bismarckian entitlement logics and economically selective LMP – is a matter of specific policy contexts and their management in labour admission regulation.

To develop this argument, the subsequent sections firstly conceptualise the relationship between welfare and migration as politically constituted in governance processes, drawing attention to the importance of repertoires of policy logics and their selective usage in policy-making. I then establish presumptions about typically ‘Bismarckian’ entitlement logics based on ideal types in welfare regime theory. Following this theoretical benchmarking, I will contextualise, describe, and analyse German and French LMP to appraise roles and meanings attributed to Bismarckian entitlement logics in

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labour migration governance, and explain variation in relation to diverging policy contexts. The last section will conclude the findings and discuss implications for future research.

Setting the analytical terrain: governance, welfare states and migration policy

In order to assess the extent to which Bismarckian entitlement logics dovetail with utilitarian LMP approaches in Germany and France, we require a conceptual understanding of governance as well as an analytical framework which captures welfare state logics and makes them accessible to empirical scrutiny. This section defines key concepts, briefly discusses methodological implications, and develops an analytical benchmark based on ideal types derived from welfare regime theory.

**Key concepts: governance, policy logics, repertoire**

I understand governance as the political ordering of social relations which is achieved (and continuously re-shaped) through public policy. This critical perspective is less interested in the technical procedures, institutions or administrative levels of governance in their own right, and more concerned with exploring the means, ends and effects of structuring different people’s access to different rights through policy. In this context, I take Fischer’s critique of ‘conventional’ policy analysis seriously, who castigates the emphasis on effectiveness and efficiency of policy-making at the expense of capturing the underlying values, ideas and the contested character of policies as political ordering attempts. From this perspective, policymakers employ semiosis – or meaning-making – strategically to order the social world

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8 Paul 2011. In my reflections on critical governance studies, I am indebted to intellectual exchange in the Governance Research Group at the Department of Social and Policy Sciences of the University of Bath.

9 A fragmentation of rights across the economic, social, political etc. dimension for different groups of migrants leads to empirical bricolages of rights regimes. For this argument see: Carmel, Emma & Regine Paul (2009) ‘From Stratification to Bricolage: Politics, Markets and Migrant Rights in the EU.’ Paper presented at the 5th ECPR General Conference. Potsdam, Germany.

and relations within it in a specific and selective way\textsuperscript{11}. This chapter thus dedicates its analytical heart to the substance of public policy governance and its normative inscriptions, bearing disciplinary overlaps with critical political economy and critical policy studies. This dictates a strong methodological commitment to the interpretive turn in policy analysis\textsuperscript{12} and the application of interpretive methods of data access and data analysis\textsuperscript{13}. Policy is understood – and reconstructed through document and interview analysis – as policymakers’ attempt to create and impose specific meanings and relationships in the social world and thereby govern it\textsuperscript{14}. This view equally frames the need for an ideographic small-n comparative approach that aims to understand cases in-depth and in their complexity\textsuperscript{15}. This chapter takes the link between philosophical underpinning and methodology seriously by using qualitative methods of document and interview analysis, scrutinising the meanings vested in policies in Germany and France in-depth, and explaining configurative variation between the cases in an ideographic and contextualised manner.

\textit{Policy logics} constitute my analytical entry point to the interpretive study of governance processes. This concept encapsulates the meaning of complex institutional arrangements such as the welfare state in the form of rules of access, provision, funding etc. It is by means of reconstructing these meanings, examining their reach across policies, and evaluating the relevance of alternative logics, that the interpretive analyst can unpick the meaning of governance processes. For instance, logics of ‘universal access’ to social services would imply specific normative assumptions about social equality and citizenship. Usage or non-application of universal access logics in migration policies would thus entail specific meaning-making and order migrants’ subject positions in the host country in accordance with these norms.


\textsuperscript{14} More details in Paul 2011.

The concept of \textit{repertoire}, finally, links logics to the institutional frameworks in which policies are embedded. The notion of repertoire underpins a critical analysis of governance (in contrast to more conventional institutionalist or rational choice approaches), as it captures selective uses of institutional logics in policy-making as a distinctly political act\textsuperscript{16}. The pool of potential logics is not independent from structural factors; policymakers do not make logics up in unbound ways. Rather, complex and heterogeneous institutional arrangements such as ‘the welfare state’ prescribe a range of specific policy logics. They do not do this in a functionalist way though; logics are selectively drawn on in legislation depending on political objectives. Some logics might get emphasised, others silenced. Logics might even be tweaked to mean something slightly different in a specific context. They might also be mixed and arranged in novel ways. The concept of repertoire aims to capture the ability of policymakers and legislators to use policy logics in this highly selective way. It bridges the divide between structural determinism and radical contingency by analytically capturing both the structural embeddedness of meaning-making in governance processes (overall repertoire) and its constitutive character (specific choice and combination of logics). It is by means of interpretive policy analysis, in this case a combined analysis of legal documents and high-ranking policymakers’ interpretations of documents’ meanings and intentions, that these sense-making processes are reconstructed in the remainder of this chapter.

\textit{Analytical benchmark: Bismarckian entitlement logics in labour migration policy}

In this chapter, governance is understood as the intentional political act of selective usage and arrangement of policy logics from a bounded repertoire offered by the institutional infrastructure surrounding any one policy. This conceptualisation lends itself to an understanding of welfare states not in terms of migrants’ social stratification and inclusion patterns within a given host country ex-post first entry as many conventional analyses would have

\textsuperscript{16} This, again, draws on notions of selective accentuation and prioritisation of parts of the social world in policymaking, as developed in the Cultural Political Economy framework by Jessop 2009.
it\textsuperscript{17}, but as ex-ante strategic allocation and governance mechanism with regard to migrants’ initial admission as workers. But what policy logics come with the Bismarckian welfare state and how can we expect them to coincide with LMP?

From the perspective of the welfare state, the basic repertoire of policy logics in German and French labour admission governance should have a fairly similar shape. Despite slight national variations, the two cases are much more similar to one another in their ways of doing welfare than anyone of them would be to an Anglo-Saxon or Scandinavian country. An examination of the usage of this very repertoire will hence enable me to highlight variations in labour migration governance in relation to different policy contexts. A brief review of welfare state theory below informs a theoretical reflection as to the Bismarckian entitlement logics LMP could principally employ.

The seminal work of Gøsta Esping-Andersen\textsuperscript{18} triggered now longstanding debates about the variable organisation and underpinning political objectives of social policy and welfare provision. Conservative-corporatist welfare states – such as Germany, France, or Austria – provide social rights with reference to occupational statuses. Entitlements are usually proportional and originate from an individual’s labour market participation and the associated social insurance contributions paid into the \textit{Sozialkassen} and \textit{Caisses Sociales}. This model uses wage replacement rates to achieve proportionality between contributions and welfare entitlements. The Bismarckian welfare state\textsuperscript{19} eventually works as ‘compensator of first resort’ in cases when

\textsuperscript{17} Morris, Lydia (2002) \textit{Managing Migration: Civic Stratification and Migrants’ Rights}, London: Routledge; Sainsbury 2006; Schierup et al. 2006; Carmel et al. 2011.


\textsuperscript{19} In the remainder of the chapter I will use the term ‘Bismarckian’ welfare state, rather than ‘Conservative’ or ‘Corporatist’, as a shorthand for the German and French welfare systems. The chapter’s analytical focus is not on the role of political parties or ideologies (‘Conservative’), or the function of societal groups in self-organising social policy (‘Corporatist’). It rather emphasises the specific analytical value of the Bismarckian social insurance logics in understanding labour migration governance. I equally neglect the attribute ‘Continental’ as it bears no analytical value beyond a description of geographical distribution.
income from labour market participation fails. The relative preservation of previous income and status in case of unemployment, sickness, old age, and parental leave etc. by means of relatively generous replacement rates bears modest decommodification effects depending on the former income. However, indirect dependence on the market is held up as benefit levels depend on prior employment.

Germany and France figure as paramount examples of Bismarckian welfare states in regime theory. Germany has the longest-standing social insurance model in the world; indeed the social and health policy reforms of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in the 1880’s have baptised an entire social policy model. In comparison to other Western countries, Germany and France grant moderately generous benefits, focussed predominantly on status maintenance in social policy, and display lower levels of redistribution than the Scandinavian welfare states. A recent comparative volume on reform trajectories demonstrates that there has not been any ‘instances of brutal departure from Bismarckian ways of thinking and doing’ even though incremental reforms progressively changed the layout of social policy in Continental Europe over the last decades. The relevance of status maintenance and rights acquisition via labour market participation prevails to date even where elements of universalism and means-testing have been introduced. Most importantly, entitlement to social rights is still largely dependent on labour market performance.

The subsequent analysis of German and French labour migration governance focuses on the ways in which policy logics of Bismarckian welfare states coincide with LMP, aiming to explain variations in the use of this rep-
ertoiré in governance. From the discussion above we can assume that the equivalence between social insurance contributions and someone’s welfare entitlements create 1) a logic of entitlement via labour market participation and 2) a logic of differential statuses depending on the level of contribution.

Based on this theoretical sketch and existing empirical research we can derive preliminary ideas about the functional concurrence of these Bismarckian entitlement logics with LMP. Analyses of migrants’ social integration have confirmed functional concurrence arguments. In the case of German guest workers, for instance, stable employment quasi automatically – albeit unintended by policymakers at the time who firmly embraced the idea of return migration – generated social rights such as old-age pensions and healthcare for migrant workers and their families. I have argued elsewhere that the labour market has therefore offered a dominant domain of inclusion for guest-workers in Germany. Koopmans has recently shown that Bismarckian welfare systems enact comparatively higher employment-incentivising functions for migrants than the Scandinavian universal social system. Equivalence between contributions and social rights seems to discipline migrants to partake in formal employment for the sake of their own future entitlement record and status maintenance. These findings seem to support Sainsbury’s entry statement that the strong labour market participation orientation of the social insurance model ‘appears to dovetail nicely with labour migration, enhancing the social rights of foreign workers [...]’. Their economic contribution can earn migrant workers social rights through the equivalence logic, and help them achieve and maintain a certain life standard and socio-economic position via status maintenance. At the same time,

27 Sainsbury 2006.
to make employment a central and highly selective condition for residence rights – as in fact all LMP schemes tend to do – seems to logically coincide with Bismarckian entitlement logics whilst putting the universal logics of the Scandinavian models in much fiercer legitimacy conflicts\textsuperscript{28}.

Whilst the above cited literature finds functional concurrences of LMP and Bismarckian entitlement logics (labour market derived rights and status maintenance), my conceptual framework suggests that repertoires of policy logics are used selectively in migration governance depending on policy objectives and policy context. The following sections illuminate the empirical terrain case by case and pave the way for a joint discussion.

**Germany: functional concurrence of Anwerbepolitik and Bismarckian welfare state**

German labour migration policies – officially revitalised with a 2005 law – are set in a policy context of demographic shrinking and urgent labour shortages. This section shows in which ways *Anwerbepolitik* (recruitment policy) engages with the Bismarckian socio-economic integration logics in order to positively discriminate groups of workers that are deemed to serve the economic interest of filling shortages. I delineate policy context first, then map the current de jure provisions for labour admissions of third country nationals based on the document analysis of 11 legal texts, reconstruct the meanings policymakers attach to admission policies from the analysis of interviews with 10 policymakers, and analyse if and how these meanings draw on Bismarckian logics. The findings indicate that German LMP full-heartedly employs the policy repertoire entailed in the welfare state. I argue that the policy context of demographic shrinking, related labour demand, as well as a lack of colonial bonds and a history of utilitarian guest-worker recruitment, jointly explain why German labour migration governance *can* dovetail so neatly with the Bismarckian way of doing welfare.

\textsuperscript{28} Schierup et al. 2006.
Policy context: labour demand in a demographic decline scenario

In 2009, almost 3.3 million foreign individuals accounted for 9.4 per cent of the German workforce\(^{29}\). The profound *Europeanness* of the German labour geography seems striking in comparison to France, or also the UK, as I have discussed elsewhere\(^{30}\). Turkish residents account for almost a quarter of all foreigners living in Germany in 2009, Italians and Greeks jointly make up another 11 per cent, and Serbs and Montenegrins are the second largest non-EU population in Germany\(^{31}\). This composition of the foreign resident population in Germany is the result of several past political decisions and contexts: a deliberate exclusion of most non-Europeans from guest-worker recruitment agreements in the post-war era\(^{32}\); a simultaneous lack of colonial labour ties to other parts of the world; a strongly promoted integration of ethnic Germans from Russian territories up to the early 1990’s underpinned by an ethnic model of citizenship\(^{33}\); and the principal origin of asylum-seekers from the Balkans during the big ‘waves’ of this type of migration in the 1990’s. It is important to consider this specific empirical context of current German LMP, especially in comparison to the distinctly post-colonial character of foreign residents in France.

The German *Zuwanderungsgesetz*\(^{34}\) (Migration Act) from 2005 has been interpreted as a paradigmatic shift towards active migrant worker recruit-

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ment mainly based on a strong perception of demographic ‘pressure’\textsuperscript{35}. Catalysed by the debate around a German ‘Green Card’ for IT-specialists\textsuperscript{36}, the foreign labour recruitment stop of 1973 had been gradually reviewed since 2000. Policy debate at the time suggested that the German national economy ‘had to attract highly skilled immigrants to remain economically competitive’\textsuperscript{37}, thus overhauling the long cherished belief of being ‘no country of immigration’. Underpinned by a change of government from 16 years Conservative-led rule towards a Social Democrat-Green majority, the scenario of urgent labour demand significantly changed the parameters of the policy debate and inspired policy reform. Eventually, the Migration Law came into force in 2005 and provided several new routes and liberalisations for foreign labour recruitment under the heading of Anwerbepolitik. Semantically, this term stresses the need to recruit and attract (certain types of) workers through policies.

Before scrutinising these provisions in more detail, it is important to take the demographic labour shortage argument for what it is: a genuine driver of policy change. Unlike France, Germany experiences considerable workforce shrinking, fuelled by the third lowest fertility rates worldwide (after Japan and Italy) and an ageing population. While population projections estimate a population growth by 4 million people in France 2010–2050, the German population is expected to shrink by around 8 million during the same period. The trend is not just prospective and shapes the contemporary policy context: in 2010 the proportion of the population aged 65 and over was much higher in Germany (20.4 per cent) than in France (16.8 per cent)\textsuperscript{38}.


\textsuperscript{36} Vacancies between 75,000 and 150,000 had been reported in 2000: Werner, Heinz (2001) ‘From Temporary Guests to Permanent Settlers? From the German ‘Guestworker’ Programmes of the Sixties to the Current ‘Green Card’ Initiative for IT Specialists.’ ILO International Migration Papers 42,1–25.

\textsuperscript{37} Green 2007, 112.

While not precluding the potential layering of economic drivers (i.e. responding to labour shortages) with other agendas in German labour migration policy-making, the demographic context means that a pledge for foreign labour recruitment in the German case might indeed functionally link to the labour market situation to a considerable extent. The utilitarianist gist of the current recruitment rhetoric also mirrors Germany’s strong guest-worker heritage. Even though debates about the ‘unintended consequences’ of economically-driven recruitment in the post-War era has triggered a policy focus on societal integration, the analysis below will show that a basic distinction between economically wanted and unwanted workers still seems to be widely accepted in policymakers’ discourse. This distinction is further underpinned by the lack of post-colonial obligations – as the comparison with France will demonstrate. Germany features a predominantly European labour geography with descendants of former Turkish, Italian and Greek guest workers, former asylum seekers from the Balkans, and newcomers from the Eastern European EU member states being the most numerous groups.

**Labour migration policies in Germany**

The most relevant policy tools in labour admissions are work-residence permits, which migrant workers can obtain when they fulfil certain admission criteria, related to their skills profile for instance (see Figure 1 for a de jure snapshot of selection mechanisms in German admission policies). These permits by default require migrants to present a binding job offer to admission authorities and to pass the resident labour market test (RLMT). This labour market protective tool establishes whether a domestic worker, including foreign legal residents and EU free movers, could fulfil the labour shortage instead of a third country national (TCN) worker.

While most labour migrants can only be admitted under the RLMT and job offer condition, the admission regime entails further selection criteria

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40 The labour geographies of Germany, France and Britain are analysed as a variable policy context in much more depth in Paul 2011.
– some more beneficial, others more restrictive – which lead to highly differential work and residence statuses for migrants, predominantly organised around different skill levels (Figure 1). Most importantly, one of the novelties introduced with the 2005 Migration Act has been the settlement permit for high-skilled individuals (Niederlassungserlaubnis). This allows highly qualified foreigners – high-ranking specialists in their field with a university degree or those who earn at least 66,000 Euros per year – to settle without limitations, with immediate family reunion rights, and with access to the entirety of the German labour market. By contrast, standard temporary work-residence permits (Aufenthaltserlaubnis) are for designated jobs only, fixed term for the duration of the job contract, restrict family reunion options, and only offer free labour market access to migrant workers after three years of social insurance contributions in regular employment. Table 2 indicates that the latter represent the overwhelming majority of work inflows while the benevolent rights entailed in a settlement permit apply to a very small number of professional elites.

Significant exceptions to the domestic labour preference principle further apply to graduates of German universities and those who were either trained in the vocational education system or acquired relevant skilled work experience in the country. These workers can accept a job offer on an equal footing with Germans and EU nationals without passing the RLMT. In derogation from the usual job offer requirement for a work-residence permit, a recent amendment of the Migration Law (Arbeitsmarktsteuerungsgesetz) further allows graduates of German universities to search for a job in their academic speciality for up to a year with a post-study work permit. These provisions also benefit tolerated residents, so-called Geduldete: if they have worked in a job that requires a vocational education for three years without

41 Data for 2010.
43 Duldung in German law refers to the temporary omission of expulsion orders for asylum seekers on German territory who have been rejected as refugees but cannot be expelled due to the unstable situation in their home country, for example. While Duldung is not a secure residence status and expulsion can be executed at any time, many Geduldete have resided in Germany for several years, go to schools, do training etc. and are de facto long-term residents. This is why I use the term ’semi-legal’ in this context.
University degree

- Academic staff, high ranked specialists and blue collar workers
  - Minimum annual earning of 66,000 Euros
  - Resident Labour Market Test
  - Settlement permit with free labour market access and family reunion rights

- Domestic graduates
  - Also as ex-post admission of semilegal residents
  - Post-study job search visa for one year

Vocational education or equivalent professional experience

- Domestic training and work experience
  - Also as ex-post admission of semilegal residents
  - Free labour market access to skilled jobs
  - Temporary work-residence permit (for duration of work contract, designated job only, restricted family reunion rights)

- Listed shortage professions
  - Resident Labour Market Test
  - Bilateral agreements**

- Unskilled* no vocational certificate or degree
  - Listed shortage professions
  - Resident Labour Market Test
  - Bilateral agreements**

*In the unskilled realm, the Employment Agency can prohibit recruitment in districts with unemployment rates 30 per cent above national average

**mostly with European countries, many EU accession candidates

e.g. IT-specialists

e.g. care workers

e.g. house keepers

e.g. care workers

e.g. house keepers

Figure 1. German labour admission regime for non-EU workers
interruptions and without relying on social benefits in at least the last year of employment, they can legalise their status and switch to the employee category. By contrast, workers who are not considered as highly skilled and lack a German qualification or work experience face more stringent entry conditions. Figure 1 highlights that additional criteria, such as a shortage list matching or a bilateral agreement with a sending country, are required of migrant workers in skilled and unskilled jobs.

Table 1. Labour inflows per type of permit in Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Set</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub</td>
<td>Settlement permit</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub</td>
<td>Temporary work-residence permit</td>
<td>29466</td>
<td>28761</td>
<td>29141</td>
<td>25053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub</td>
<td>Post-study work switch to employment</td>
<td>2742</td>
<td>4421</td>
<td>5935</td>
<td>4820</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Provisions overall indicate a beneficial treatment of TCN workers in high-skilled jobs and/or with domestic qualifications or work experience. Lower skilled shortages are catered for mainly from within the EU in the German case, and the phasing in of free movement for Eastern Europeans has de facto legalised previous informal flows. From this brief review of main selection principles, the German labour migration regime displays a strong consideration of educational and economic pathways to social inclusion, therewith apparently dovetailing Bismarckian welfare state logics. When analysed jointly, interview data and legislation expose several explicit links between utilitarian governance of labour admissions and the German ‘way of doing welfare’.

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45 Paul 2012.
46 Sainsbury 2006.
Anticipation of socio-economic integration pathways

Interviewees widely recognize the German welfare system as a relevant reference point for assessing and anticipating the economic and social inclusion capacities of a migrant worker before admission. The imperative of a binding job offer, for instance, is not just described as an economic rationale of demand-led shortage recruitment. German policymakers frequently link it to social integration policies more generally: ‘I mean, work is the utmost and first priority and essential also with regard to integration capacities’ 47. In this understanding, successful labour market integration – and a job offer seemingly works as guarantor here – serves as a proxy for anticipated successful societal integration: ‘[...] work is indeed one of the most crucial paths to integration. This is why it is always underpinning labour migration management’ 48.

Interviewees construe a functional link between labour market participation and social inclusion outcomes, and are strongly internalising the equivalence and status maintenance logics of the Bismarckian welfare state in their accounts of labour migration policy-making. Most experts directly refer to the guest-worker heritage when contextualising current labour migration policies. They speak of ‘lessons learned’ with policies now – much more than back in the guest-worker era – anticipating pathways of inclusion and settlement. Policies seemingly aim to select candidates who seem (or have proven) likely to succeed as longer-term employees, welfare contributors, and social citizens in the Bismarckian fashion.

Following this pattern, the highest integration potential is ascribed to high-skilled migrant workers, who are seen to ‘deserve’ the beneficial rights regime offered by the settlement permit. Interviewees perceive high professional skill levels among respective workers as guarantor for quasi automatic and successful labour market inclusion. Eventually, the status maintenance principle of contribution-based welfare provision in the Bismarckian welfare state will prompt high levels of social inclusion for high-paid and high-contributing professionals as well. Although a similar ‘automatic integration’

47 GER5.
48 GER7.
argument is brought forward with respect to high-skilled migrants’ exemption from language proficiency requirements and immediate family reunion rights, some policymakers castigate this vision as unrealistic and unfair towards other migrant groups in Germany\textsuperscript{49}. Irrespective of that critique, wider societal integration through labour market participation is writ-large as an omnipresent subtext in German labour migration governance.

The latest MIPEX\textsuperscript{50} illustrates significant trade-offs between the Bismarckian social integration ‘automatism’ via the employment route and general openness to migration, confirming the findings above. However, initial access to employment and eligibility conditions for long-term residence are only halfway favourable in Germany, and lofty economic requirements apply to secure residence. Nevertheless, Germany also ranks among the most favourable rights regimes when it comes to equal access to welfare benefits and the labour market, equal working conditions and a highly secure resident status for a carefully selected group of high-skilled workers. These rights provide a carefully selected group of migrant workers who (are expected to) contribute successfully in economic and labour market terms with a comparatively advantageous status. In Germany, the logics of the Bismarckian welfare state work as a hub for this discrimination of wanted and unwanted migrant workers.

\textit{‘Earned’ integration via education and labour market}

The functional link between labour market inclusion and equivalent social and residence rights also works as ‘earned integration’, thus accounting for the comparative weight of domestic skills in German regulation. As Figure 1 highlights, so-called 
\textit{Bildungsinländer}\textsuperscript{51} can access the labour market without RLMT or shortage assessment. This is justified as recognition of their already demonstrated professional and educational integration: ‘achieving a German educational degree means a demonstration of your integration

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item 49 GER2, GER4.
\item 50 Huddleston, Thomas & Jan Niessen (2011) Migrant Integration Policy Index III. Brussels.
\item 51 TCN with domestic qualifications, i.e. university or VET certificate or equivalent domestic work experience; the term implies a strong notion of \textit{domestification} of a group of foreign workers which obtained qualifications in Germany.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
capacities\textsuperscript{52}. Whilst this chapter does not offer enough room to discuss the relation between migrant integration and education systems in depth, I have argued elsewhere that educational attainment has become increasingly relevant for migrants in a predominantly employment-related domain of social inclusion in Germany\textsuperscript{53}.

The work-welfare link also plays a significant part in the ex-post regularisation of foreign residents in semi-legal positions. Most importantly, the retrospective acknowledgement of education and employment achievements as integration success structures the residence rights regime for \textit{Geduldete} (see Footnote 4). Policymakers overwhelmingly request a settlement perspective for those semi-legal residents who have acquired a German qualification (as above) or worked and contributed to social insurance consecutively for two years\textsuperscript{54}.

The philosophy of [the former Minister of Labour] was that those who have been here many years should be able to stay and not be restricted in their labour market access. […] Because if they stay, it makes sense in terms of humanitarian and labour market policy concerns to say: if they are willing to integrate in the labour market, they should have an option to do so, and who succeeds to maintain their own living should have a residence rights perspective. Especially as we will need more workers\textsuperscript{55}.

This statement summarises a wide-spread perception that those who are already integrated in the labour market and are successfully gaining a living should benefit in terms of residence rights. The last sentence of the quotation indicates, however, that this policy is not purely driven by humanitarian concerns: surging labour shortages in the widely accepted demographic

\textsuperscript{52} GER10.
\textsuperscript{53} Kaiser & Paul 2011.
\textsuperscript{54} At the time of interviewing in December 2009, a revision of labour market access provisions for this group was ongoing, so it does not come as a surprise that all interviewees referred to it without the interviewer particularly inquiring the issue.
\textsuperscript{55} GER3.
decline scenario also shape alleviations for an otherwise highly excluded group of migrant residents in Germany.

**Attracting high-skilled workers via welfare and residence rights**

Lastly, there is a strong element of status differentiation by migrants’ skill level which interacts with the belief that the German welfare state can be used to attract high-skilled workers. Policymakers largely adhere to the idea that in order to attract high-skilled and highly specialised employees the German companies allegedly need, regulation must literally welcome these workers ‘with a red carpet’\(^{56}\). It is through the tool of generous residence rights for high-skilled workers that German administrators think they can best provide this red carpet. I have argued elsewhere that the relative openness to these migrants is deeply enshrined in an economic imaginary of ‘high-skilled global labour competitiveness’ and collapses for migrants of lower-skill levels\(^{57}\). Moreover, one official also refers to the social protection system as a particular strength in the perceived ‘global competition’ for talents: ‘Our social protection system and our labour law is indeed a trump card that we can make the most of. It protects foreign employees […] and is interesting for the highly qualified.’\(^{58}\)

In this context, some have argued that labour admissions in Germany form another institutional complement in support of the specific mode of production and competitiveness in a typical Coordinated Market Economy\(^{59}\). Varieties of capitalism (VoC) scholars contend that those possessing the specific skills required in this kind of economy are usually courted with high levels of security and protection\(^{60}\). The analysis above indicates that LMP translate the usual job and unemployment protection applying to domestic workers into increased residence security and generous labour mar-

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\(^{56}\) GER3, GER1.

\(^{57}\) Paul 2012.

\(^{58}\) GER 3.

\(^{59}\) Menz 2009, 2010

ket access for high-skilled migrant workers, i.e. the advantageous settlement permit. It can thus be argued that the typical role attributed to Bismarckian social protection in Coordinated Market Economies in attracting specialised workers – as suggested by VoC accounts – is mimicked in labour admissions for high-skilled migrants. It is again important to note, however, that this argument does not assume a natural functional concurrence between LMP and the German economy, but that – from a critical political economy viewpoint – any functionalist link has to be understood as a result of strategic governance and creation of meaning through policy. Moreover, the policy claim that lower-skilled migrant workers are not needed in the German economy is of course juxtaposed in practice, as high demand for workers in areas such as domestic care indicate.

The analysis of the German case shows that the Bismarckian welfare state can serve as a veritable linchpin in labour admission policies. The equivalence between social insurance contributions and welfare entitlements is strongly utilised to create a publicly supported pathway of socio-economic integration for migrants both ex-ante and ex-post their initial entry. Certainly, not only in Germany is work seen as a prime pathway for migrants to obtaining – and ‘deserving’ – other sets of rights. Yet, we have seen that in the German case Bismarckian entitlement and status differentiation logics coincide smoothly with economically selective labour admission policies – just as Sainsbury\(^\text{61}\) has claimed. The repertoire of policy logics offered by the ‘way of doing welfare’ is fully employed to discern and amplify desirable socio-economic integration patterns in labour admission governance. More than that: German policymakers seem to be at more liberty to utilise this specific policy repertoire than their French counterparts, precisely because the lack of post-colonial obligations, no widely cherished notion of civic citizenship, and the perceived urgency of finding solutions to demographic decline and labour shortages in the German case create a policy environment in which the almost untainted economic selectivity of migrant workers is largely acceptable.

\(^{61}\) Sainsbury 2006.
France: tensions between *immigration choisie* and post-colonial citizenship

French labour migration policies – officially revitalised with a 2006 law – are primarily set in a policy context of negotiating family reunion, settlement and citizenship rights of post-colonial migrants. Based on a mapping of 11 legal documents and interpretations of 7 high-ranking policymakers in France, this section shows that *immigration choisie* (selected immigration) also dovetails with Bismarckian logics but to a much more limited degree. Due to the overwhelming concern with ‘post-colonial downsizing’\(^{62}\) – rather than a strong perception of urgent labour demand like in Germany – Bismarckian socio-economic integration pathways for labour migrants are highly contested as a means of selecting workers in French LMP. While trying to impose an economically selective admission regime in which expected high-end labour market success is rewarded with beneficial residence and mobility rights, French labour admission governance openly clashes with the traditional post-colonial Republican citizenship regime. The findings presented below further indicate the relevance of policy contexts in the governance of labour recruitment – especially when compared with the German case – and expose the variable interaction of economically selective LMP with specific integration and citizenship models as a future venue for research.

Policy context: reducing post-colonial family flows

Around 1.5 million individuals with a foreign passport worked in France in 2009, accounting for 5.8 per cent of the workforce\(^{63}\). The smaller share in comparison with Germany is arguably due to easier historical naturalisation practices and civic citizenship in France, which allowed more foreign residents and their children to become French by *ius solis*\(^{64}\). The civic citizenship model usually associated with France has been entangled with post-colonial

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62 This concept has been used to describe Britain’s strategic detachment from its former Empire throughout the 1970’s. In this chapter, I apply the same notion to current French policy-making, which represents a case of late ‘post-colonial downsizing’ compared to Britain. See: Geddes, Andrew (2003b) *The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe*. London: Sage.

63 OECD 2011.

64 Brubaker 1992; Howard 2009.
belonging when entries from former French colonies started to pick up. Indeed, the ethnic composition of registered foreign residents in France displays striking differences compared to Germany as it reveals a less European and strong post-colonial pattern. Residents of North African descent are the largest minority group living in France; Algerians and Moroccans have been most numerous in 2005. France has also seen a growing South-East-Asian and Sub-Saharan African resident population. While the French government had tried to impose ethnic hierarchies and re-europeanise inflows since decolonisation, the general picture is one of increasing relevance of workers from former colonial territories in the French labour geography and a decline of the traditionally European workforce from Spain, Italy and Portugal which was targeted with the French guest-worker scheme after the Second World War. The urban riots of French nationals of Maghrebin descent in Paris in autumn 2005 have recently added to the heated debate about national identity, post-colonial relations and citizenship rights. Again, this specific French context matters: with most migrants originating from her former colonies, migration and integration policies tend to have a strong post-colonial underpinning in France.

Labour migration was one of the pet subjects of Nicolas Sarkozy’s (won) presidential campaign in 2007 while fierce rhetoric on severely curbing family migration accompanied his (lost) campaign in spring 2012. As Home Secretary in 2006 Sarkozy set out to ‘profoundly transform immigration policy in France’. The new law’s regulative aim was to tailor flows after the country’s economic needs and to choose entries (immigration choisie), rather than having flows ‘imposed’ (immigration subie) by mainly family reunion. This has co-occurred with the following: the introduction of an

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65 Huddelston & Niessen 2011.
67 The idea of ‘ethnic hierarchies’ alludes to the deliberate selection of Catholic European guest workers in the 1950’s (mainly Italians) to fill labour shortages, whilst Maghrebin workers were only recruited when intra-European supply did not suffice. It is argued that France tried to impose these ethnic hierarchies again after decolonisation and the respective immigrations from former colonies. See Spire, Alexis (2005) Étrangers À la Carte. Paris: Edition Grasset & Fasquelle; Paul 2011.
integration contract for newcomers targeted mainly at family members, a further tightening of entry conditions and assimilation requirements for non-work migrant categories, and the abolishment of automatic access to permanent residence rights after 10 years of residence, which also applied to irregular workers.

The direct coupling of the professional migration agenda to the aim of reducing family reunion flows indicates a conflation of labour migration with citizenship and residence rights restrictions in the specific post-colonial context of France. More precisely, the policy aim was to boost levels of professional work inflows to 50 per cent of all entries by 2012 with the help of incentivising new labour migration routes, permits and right regimes, as well as by de-incentivising non-work routes and settlement\textsuperscript{69}. Compared to Germany, there seems to be a much stronger preoccupation with signalling desirability of professional entries and at the same time transmitting a message of being unwanted (‘subie’) to already residing and settled migrant groups, including family members of French citizens\textsuperscript{70}. As a preliminary step in a similar direction, the Horteheux Law in 2007 introduced a procedure of exceptional regularisation on a case by case basis in professions and regions with labour shortages (TCN shortage list, see Figure 3). This conflates the management of irregular workers and residents with the professional migration approach and signals to residents and newcomers that economically useful workers are welcome, even when previously informal, while tough measures will apply to all others. Overall, compared to Germany, we can expect that the post-colonial setting and Republican citizenship\textsuperscript{71} – with its long cherished civic pathway of inclusion for long-term residents on French soil – create a very different context for LMP, its links to Bismarckian entitlement logics, and its interaction with conflicting norms of inclusion in France.


\textsuperscript{71} For a discussion of the highly diverging migrant integration and citizenship models in France and Germany, see: Brubaker 1992; Howard 2009.
Labour migration policies in France

The French legal infrastructure makes a clear distinction between so-called ‘professional’ schemes and shortage routes for migrant worker admissions\textsuperscript{72}. As in Germany, migrants of different skill levels face quite different selection criteria and rights regimes, with the higher-skilled and ‘professional’ entries being treated most benevolently (see Figure 3 for a de jure snapshot of selection mechanisms in French admission policies). Generally speaking, foreigners need a work authorisation to enter the French labour market. Since the recruitment stop in the 1970’s, migrant workers have been admitted with specific job offers and through an RLMT procedure, just as in Germany. More specifically, companies have to offer vacant positions on the domestic labour market through the National Employment Agency (\textit{Pôle Emploi}) before being able to employ any TCN worker.

A scrutiny of permits and selection procedures highlights the judicial concentration on high graduate level skills. A range of different residence and work permits is available for the relatively smooth recruitment of the highly-skilled and the protection of the domestic workforce has partly been removed since 1997 (\textit{Chèvenement Law}). Since 2006, a renewable three-year permit for ‘skills and talents’ (\textit{carte compétences et talents}) opens options for prolonged professional stays and even eventual settlement. The permit is explicitly targeted at attracting highly-qualified workers\textsuperscript{73}. As in the German case, the number of workers coming in via this route is rather low compared to the standard RLTM entries (Table 4).

In addition to ‘skills and talents’, foreign graduates with a French post-graduate degree also encounter facilitated entry conditions: they can look for a job irrespective of the domestic labour market situation for six months with a job search visa and can obtain a ‘paid employee’ permit (\textit{carte salarié}) for a job offer that suits their academic speciality. Special permits also exist for scientists and young professionals. The required skills for these favourable migration routes include specialist expertise in research and science,


Figure 2. The French labour admission regime for non-EU workers

- **Skills and Talents’** 3 years
  - Post-study job search (6 months)
  - Temporary work permit paid employee (1 year access to designated job only)
  - Switch to work permit if successful; minimum earning of 1.5 times average income

- Domestic degree
  - Eligible project in France and home country
  - Quotas and returns enforcement for nationals of PZ* countries
  - Bilateral agreement** with home country
  - Quotas and returns enforcement for nationals of PSZ* countries
  - Quotas and returns enforcement for nationals of French colonies
  - Quotas for nationals from former colonies and PSZ countries

- Skilled (at least vocational training)
  - Shortage listed professionals (35 skilled jobs listed)
  - Bilateral migration management agreement** (can list additional jobs)
  - Resident Labour Market Test
  - Resident Labour Market Test

- Unskilled
  - Switch to work permit if successful; minimum earning of 1.5 times average income

- Domestic degree
  - Eligible project in France and home country
  - Quotas and returns enforcement for nationals of PZ* countries
  - Bilateral agreement** with home country
  - Quotas and returns enforcement for nationals of PSZ* countries
  - Quotas and returns enforcement for nationals of French colonies
  - Quotas for nationals from former colonies and PSZ countries

- Domestic degree
  - Eligible project in France and home country
  - Quotas and returns enforcement for nationals of PZ* countries
  - Bilateral agreement** with home country
  - Quotas and returns enforcement for nationals of PSZ* countries
  - Quotas and returns enforcement for nationals of French colonies
  - Quotas for nationals from former colonies and PSZ countries

- Domestic degree
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  - Bilateral agreement** with home country
  - Quotas and returns enforcement for nationals of PSZ* countries
  - Quotas and returns enforcement for nationals of French colonies
  - Quotas for nationals from former colonies and PSZ countries

- Domestic degree
  - Eligible project in France and home country
  - Quotas and returns enforcement for nationals of PZ* countries
  - Bilateral agreement** with home country
  - Quotas and returns enforcement for nationals of PSZ* countries
  - Quotas and returns enforcement for nationals of French colonies
  - Quotas for nationals from former colonies and PSZ countries

*The ‘zones de solidarité prioritaires’ comprise 54 developing countries, including e.g. Congo, Senegal and Mali

**Migration management agreements exist with former French colonies: Benin, Burkina-Faso, Cameroon, Cape-Verde, Congo, Gabon, Mauritius, Senegal, Tahiti

Algerians cannot access any of these work permits; a special Algerian residence permit applies
specific skills in some sectors like IT, academic and professional experience, and in some cases high potential earnings.

Statistically speaking, the vast majority of skilled workers have to enter via the RLMT route and acquire a paid employment permit. Exceptions are predefined shortage lists via which migrants with a suitable skills profile can access specifically listed ‘shortage’ professions without RMLT. Since a legal amendment of the foreign admissions and residence code in 2007, the shortage list for TCN workers can also be used as a tool of exceptional regularisation of sans-papiers who are employed in the listed shortage professions.74 Table 4 indicates that about 1,500–2,600 workers per year benefit from this provision, but these admissions lie in the discretionary decision-making realm of prefectural administration.

Table 2. Labour inflows per type of permit in France

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skills and talents</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid employees</td>
<td>8377</td>
<td>8356</td>
<td>13448</td>
<td>18371</td>
<td>15155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exceptional regularisations</td>
<td>2697</td>
<td>2695</td>
<td>1541</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>2583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerian residence certificates</td>
<td>31344</td>
<td>31060</td>
<td>26635</td>
<td>26133</td>
<td>25245</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the French admission regime we moreover observe a multi-layered differential treatment per country of origin, which mainly distinguishes former colonies, developing countries (often former colonies), and other third countries. Country of origin selectivity cuts across permits in several ways and feeds into a fine-grained system of classifying migrant workers (Figure 3). Circular migration schemes determine admission and residence rights for nationals from so-called priority solidarity zone76 countries (PSZ). For

74 GISTI 2009b, L’admission Exceptionnelle au Séjour par le Travail dite «Régularisation par le Travail». Paris.
76 The ‘zones de solidarité prioritaires’ comprise 54 developing countries including for instance Congo, Senegal and Mali. French development policy aims to prevent a brain drain from these countries.
instance, a ‘skills and talents’ permit for individuals from PSZ countries can only be issued if a bilateral agreement exists, flows can be capped, and TCNs have to agree upfront to go back to their country of origin after a maximum stay of 6 years, thus relinquishing long-term resident inclusion pathways\textsuperscript{77}.

Most emblematic for French selection by origin are bilateral ‘migration management agreements’ with former colonies\textsuperscript{78}. In exchange for access to the French labour market granted to some of their nationals, sending countries consent to fighting irregular flows by enforced emigration controls and facilitated repatriation procedures. French development aid to former colonies is contingent on their contractual commitment to facilitate the repatriation of their nationals, and to strictly control their borders to avoid informal entries to France. Moreover, Algerian nationals cannot enter via any of the labour-related routes. According to the Evian Agreements of 1962, the Certificat de résidence pour Algériens has to entail free labour movement rights. De facto, however, this de jure beneficial treatment means that Algerians are often outright rejected as migrant workers. Table 5 indicates that Algerian inflows – at around 25,000 in 2009 – are still larger than the TCN work routes added together, but they have been decreasing considerably over the last years.

In sum, we find a similar concentration on high-skilled workers, with some privileges for in-country graduates and ex-post regularisation options for informal workers in shortage jobs, as in the German case. We now turn to the meanings policymakers vest into this legal infrastructure.

\textit{Attraction of high-skilled workers and socio-economic integration pathways}\n
French policymakers contextualise the new high-skilled work permits as part of a global competitiveness strategy\textsuperscript{79}. They consider permits to be

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\textsuperscript{79} I offer a comparative empirical specification of the different economic imaginaries that underpin labour migration policies elsewhere: Paul 2012, forthcoming.
'tools for growth'\textsuperscript{80}, utilised to attract bright minds: ‘the skills and talents permit reflects the interest of the French state. It is about France’s attractiveness for highly-qualified people\textsuperscript{81}. As in Germany, but much less emphasised in policy discourse overall, labour migration seems to figure as yet another labour reproduction strategy in capitalist coordination, focusing on high skills and negating the need of lower-skilled labour recruitment. The welfare system plays a crucial – and functional – part in attracting desired migrants, with policymakers differentiating between its incentivising role in terms of attracting high-skilled workers, and a restricting and shielding function towards others:

Social rights [...] concurrently form veritable barriers as to avoid migration that would both ruin the social systems and damage the rights of already resident workers, but they are also a factor of attractiveness. If you wish, the worker coming to France knows that they will benefit from equal rights; once having crossed the border he is a man like everyone else. [...] That means that we can well decline someone wanting to come to France, that’s quite easy, but when they are resident in France, they have all rights.\textsuperscript{82}

Policy experts highlight that the French system offers equal treatment to foreign workers in terms of access to social security, health care, housing etc., but also equal working conditions (this is confirmed in recent MIPEX scores) and regard these rights as a tool for attracting especially high-skilled workers. As in Germany, the contribution-equivalence logics of the Bismarckian social insurance model seemingly dovetail with the highly differential treatment of workers of different skill levels in admission decisions. Most importantly, French legislation expects both the socio-economic contribution and integration potential of high-skilled professionals to be high and therefore waives the usual integration requirements. While all newcom-

\textsuperscript{80} FRA6.  
\textsuperscript{81} FRA7.  
\textsuperscript{82} FRA6.
ers otherwise need to sign the contrat d’acceuil et d’intégration (admission and integration contract) and indicate their French language proficiency, these conditions are lifted for ‘skills and talents’ permit holders: ‘We assume that since they are highly qualified they will integrate in our country without difficulties, even if they do not speak French when first arriving.’ 83 These high – and quasi automatic – integration expectations are used in immigration choisie to symbolically invalidate similar integration pathways for other migrant groups, especially residents of post-colonial descent.

‘Earned’ integration for sans-papier workers and its contestation

As in Germany, a notion of ‘earned’ integration surfaces in the French governance of informal workers. Policymakers feel that someone who integrated into the labour market deserves – under certain conditions – a secure residence status, thus justifying the policy tool of exceptional regularisation via shortage lists: ‘Well, we recognise that there should be a regularisation of a certain number of irregular workers who have been in France for a certain time, […] under the condition that they have a preceding work contract, that they will have a new contract for the future.’ 84

However, ex-post admissions to the labour market bear significant limits, indicating the conflict over utilitarian socio-economic integration pathways in France. The employment to be regularised has to be in line with French droit social, the social norms around working hours, wages and other labour rights. Indeed the Bismarckian welfare state had inclusive effects for those paying social insurance in work, even where their residence was irregular as in the case of sans-papiers. Yet, the droit social clause triggers uneven effects for workers of different skill levels: as in Germany, it is likely to render those at the lower skill and lower pay end of the labour market ineligible for regularisations.

We have to bear in mind though that in contrast to Germany, informal workers in France are mostly TCNs of post-colonial descent rather than Eastern European EU nationals. Together with the much higher salience

83 FRA1.
84 FRA6.
of informality in France, especially in low-skilled and low-paid segments of the economy\textsuperscript{85}, the conflation of informality and post-colonial belonging has triggered a highly politicised debate on the recognition of precarious employment conditions of \textit{sans papiers}\textsuperscript{86}. Critiques argue that ex-post shortage regularisation is no genuine escape from informality, but has the potential to confine the often post-colonial informal working population to low-skilled jobs in precarious spaces of both the labour market and society\textsuperscript{87}. In sum, while being clearly activated in policymakers’ rhetoric of \textit{immigration choisie}, utilitarian LMP that operates with logics of ‘earned integration’ and negates lower skilled TCN labour needs sits much more uncomfortably with the French post-colonial citizenship model and informal labour market reality. It is not surprising then that it causes much more open contestation than in Germany.

\textit{Labour migration as post-colonial population management}

The analysis above indicates considerable differences in the context of LMP and the use of Bismarckian entitlement logics in French policy-making and policy discourse when compared to the German case. Policymakers in interviews contextualise \textit{immigration choisie} in a governance agenda that symbolically invalidates the settlement and naturalisation pathway for other, not ‘chosen’ migrant groups. Several interviewees claim an intention of revoking family reunion rights and traditionally inclusive settlement and citizenship paths via the promotion of economic selectivity in \textit{immigration choisie}. The targets of increasing ‘selected’ labour inflows and simultaneously reducing family entries are not coincidentally coupled in policy: ‘When stating ‘but we need these people and all,’ what is also implied is that those who


we do not need, they can go back home. Several interviewees argue that discourses of economic selectivity carry signalling functions vis-à-vis post-colonial residents, especially family members: they have not been ‘chosen’ according to economic needs and are hence not desired. Concomitant rights cut-backs for other migrant groups (asylum seekers and family members mainly) stress this point.

This struggle over residence pathways and over what should constitute a legitimate entitlement to live and work in France is mostly expressed through the lens of post-colonial population management. The differential treatment of descendants from former colonies, those from developing countries, Algerians, and other third country nationals is highly evident in legislation. Policymakers construe policy tools like the _accords de gestion_ as vehicles of post-colonial resident population control and ‘post-colonial downsizing’. _Immigration choisie_ is employed to restructure post-colonial migration and resident patterns along economic utilitarian logics, hence evidencing a wider trend of conflating ethno-cultural discriminations with neo-liberal economic policy drivers in European migration policies. In contrast to Germany – which domestic legislators perceive as ‘relatively unencumbered’ with respect to historical migration links – the French context of post-colonial migration and residence considerably layers LMP. The conflation of economic utility considerations with an intended weakening of post-colonial ties causes levels of contestation in France plainly unparallelled in the German case.

In summary, French labour migration governance displays a more ambiguous relationship with Bismarckian welfare state logics in comparison to the German case. This can be explained by diverging policy contexts shaped by different migration histories and citizenship regimes and open-
ing more or less possibilities for LMP to utilise the policy repertoire offered in Bismarckian welfare state contexts. As in Germany, French LMP targets high-skilled workers in anticipation of their good socio-economic integration potential, and rewards informal residents who are integrated on the skilled-labour market with a secure residence perspective. Yet, the attempt to prioritise an economically driven labour admission regime that utilizes Bismarckian entitlement logics to select wanted migrant workers and stigmatise all others as unwanted is subject to highly politicised struggles over French citizenship and post-colonial Republican belonging. In this specifically French context of conflicting entitlement logics, a utilitarian LMP agenda coincides much less smoothly with the welfare state as a denominator of differential statuses. While immigration choisie is explicitly aimed at seizing the Bismarckian socio-economic entitlement logics to select and stratify ‘wanted’ migrant workers, the conflation of this selectivity with post-colonial population management is highly contested in French political debate. Compared to Germany, the distinct French policy context offers less scope and ease for using a shared Bismarckian policy repertoire to conduct an economically selective LMP.

Conclusion: policy context and variable uses of Bismarckian policy repertoire

This chapter has explored the relationship between Bismarckian welfare states and migration from the angle of initial admissions. I have argued that the institutional arrangements of welfare states do not merely matter with regard to social inclusion pathways of migrant residents, but equally serve as repertoires of policy logics which policymakers draw on to structure initial admission routes for non-EU migrant workers. From the perspective of the Bismarckian welfare state the utilitarian selection of migrant labour can be expected to functionally concur with the Bismarckian logics, mainly equivalence of contributions and entitlements, and status maintenance. By means of an interpretive policy analysis this chapter has compared German and French LMP to explore how labour admission policies draw on Bismarckian entitlement logics and how different interaction dynamics between LMP and the Bismarckian welfare state can be accounted for.
Labour admission governance in Germany and France frames LMP with reference to a pathway of socio-economic inclusion that champions high-end labour market success as the admission and residence criterion. Especially the selection of migrant workers by skill level is presented as being functionally concurrent with the logics of Bismarckian welfare entitlements. This seems to suggest that – while LMP regimes elsewhere similarly target migrants’ economic utility and tend to differentiate migrants by skill level\(^92\) – the Bismarckian welfare state offers a repertoire of policy logics fit to promote and support the differentiation of ‘wanted’ from ‘unwanted’ migrants. Studies in the Scandinavian context have shown that the logics of the universal welfare state are much more at odds with an economic selectivity regime\(^93\).

Yet, the interpretive policy analysis has exposed that different policy contexts in Germany and France trigger a highly variable usage, meaning and political contestation of Bismarckian entitlement logics. The strongly perceived demographic decline and labour shortage scenario in Germany, paired with a lack of post-colonial obligations, allows for a seemingly smooth interaction of the welfare state as chief status allocation mechanism and economic selectivity in LMP. The German example showcases that Bismarckian pathways of socio-economic inclusion can be amplified in labour admission governance in an environment where economic selectivity of migrant workers does not seem to clash with the norms of citizenship. In the French case, however, post-colonialism, Republican citizenship and related notions of belonging directly conflict with the attempt to use Bismarckian entitlement logics in labour admissions governance and fuel fierce political struggles over immigration choisie.

While more case studies across Continental Europe would be required to sustain more general claims, these findings nourish the claim that the reach of the functional concurrence argument between Bismarckian entitlement logics and LMP is a matter of governing policy contexts. Labour


\(^93\) Schierup et al. 2006.
migration governance uses the repertoire of welfare state logics selectively in accordance with highly contextualised policy objectives. The theoretical functional concurrence of LMP and Bismarckian entitlement logics, therefore, depends on their interaction with the wider policy context of the policy-making process, especially the extent to which conflicting logics of integration and entitlement prevail in the political struggle over policies. Future research on the relationship between welfare and migration should take seriously the relevance of policy contexts when analysing and comparing the governance of labour recruitment in different countries. Otherwise we risk overlooking subtle nuances between LMP and their variable implications for the variable labour markets and societal environment they act upon. The interaction of economically selective LMP with specific integration and citizenship models, but also with the varying composition of resident migrant populations, represents a particularly promising future venue for research.

The conceptualisation of welfare states as repertoires of policy logics offers considerable analytical mileage, as this chapter has shown. Adding to critical governance scholarship in migration studies and beyond, this perspective enabled us to expose the powerful role of legislators to selectively draw on institutional architectures and logics in order to achieve specific policy goals. In the case of Germany and France at least, the relationship between the welfare state and migration is not functionally determined. It is part of the on-going political ordering of social and economic relations in governance processes, which includes the negotiation and re-working of distinct policy contexts by means of selectively drawing on a shared repertoire of welfare state logics. As the French case has indicated, the possibilities for what I label ‘governance of context’, however, are highly bounded. They are delimited by the political acceptability of re-constituting the very foundations of the citizenship model through LMP. Eventually, context does not just matter as a passive container within which policies operate; it is an active and constantly re-shaped component of political struggles over the norms that should guide migration policy.

94 I offer an analysis of the interactions of LMP for non-EU workers with EU free movement and variable labour geographies in specific empirical contexts elsewhere: Paul 2013, forthcoming.
Acknowledgements

I am deeply grateful for the time and effort interviewees were willing to dedicate to support my research. The institutional support I received as a visiting researcher both at the Social Science Research Centre in Berlin (WZB), particularly by Antje Blöcker and Ulrich Jürgens, and at the Unité de Recherches ‘Migrations et Société’ in Paris (URMIS) by Alain Morice facilitated fieldwork and triggered valuable intellectual exchange. I gratefully relied on funding both from a University of Bath University Research Studentship, and a young researchers’ grant for fieldwork in Paris by the Office Franco-Allemand pour la Jeunesse. Charlotte Branchu and Karin Paul offered great support in transcribing anonymous interviews. I am particularly grateful to Helena Blomberg-Kroll, Patrick Emmenegger, and Mats Wickström for critical feedback on an earlier draft. With thanks to the editorial team for their great support, and all participants of the Odense workshop in October 2011 for stimulating intellectual exchange. Special thanks are due to Marjukka Weide for getting me on board the WelMi project. I would lastly like to thank Emma Carmel and Sue Milner for supporting my doctoral project of which this book chapter is but a small component. All remaining mistakes are fully mine.
Civic integration programmes are an increasingly prevalent measure within national immigrant integration policies across Europe. These programmes principally target newcomers originating from outside the European Union, particularly lower socio-economic status and family migrants. As part of a reaction to a potential ‘integration crisis’ proclaimed by prominent European politicians, the latest modifications of civic integration programmes help set the tone for the place of these immigrants within European national communities and welfare states. The programmes also present a productive vantage point from which to understand current attempts to define national identities within a context of transnational migrations and European Union governance.

This chapter addresses the recently renewed emphasis on national belonging across the European Union, and attempts to identify how the discourse surrounding civic integration and language programmes constitutes and employs ‘national models’. Our point of departure is the academic discussion about the decline or persistence of distinct national models guiding immigrant incorporation in the social systems of European nation-states.


2 The concept of discourse is defined and employed in a number of ways within social scientific research. In this chapter, we define discourse as a specific way of speaking about an issue or a pattern of speech.
According to the widely cited thesis by Christian Joppke, the approaches to immigrant incorporation of a number of European nation-states have started to converge, indicating that these countries are abandoning their nationally-specific ways of dealing with resident foreigners and new ethnic minorities. This view has been challenged by Dirk Jacobs and Andrea Rea, who claim that despite the similarities at the overall level of policy tools now used to address immigrant incorporation, the civic integration programmes in fact differ from each other to such an extent that it is still meaningful to speak about national models.

The contributions in the academic discussion around models and Europeanization typically utilise an empirically-intermediate level of analysis in which a number integration policies at large, or civic integration programmes in particular, are scrutinized according to a fixed set of criteria. Furthermore, while comparative work on integration and immigration policy often uses the term 'national models' to describe different policy constellations, there is also a tendency to employ national models as independent variables that shape policy preferences. This use of national models as static national self-understandings that have historically determined and continue to shape policy not only tends to neglect the agency of social actors and rely on popular 'political stereotypes', it also masks contradictions and tensions within national self-understandings and institutions.

Our contribution to the discussion of the persistence of national models is two-fold; we interrogate the assumed coherence and distinctiveness of different national models as cultural references, and we employ tools of qualitative analysis, which allow us to access more subtle, yet revealing, differences or similarities in the meaning-making that takes place in policy

material. We define national models, borrowing from a critique by Bertossi, as ‘structures of reference’ that ‘frame the questions of identity, common belonging, and inclusion and exclusion.’ Based on this concept, we explore the use of national models by comparing how belonging and identity are framed within the discourse of the political debates and legislation related to civic integration programmes, as well as the discourse of the programmes themselves. In shedding light on the discursive side of the civic integration programmes, we argue for the need for analysis at various levels to facilitate the broader discussion around the development of integration policies and their complex relationships with national models.

In this chapter, we examine the cases of France and Finland. France regularly appears in work on integration and immigration policy not only because it was amongst the first countries to adopt an integration programme, but also because the French ‘Republican’ national model has come to serve as a prime example of civic assimilationism within scholarship and politics. France has a state-funded programme of language acquisition and integration courses, which are contracted out to training agencies, and links participation in its integration programme to the renewal of residence permits. Although it has received less attention, Finland also belongs to the early adopters of a civic integration programme. Initially developed for unemployed migrants around the same time as France’s initial policy, the programme has recently expanded to include all foreigners. In contrast to France, however, the approach to diversity in Finland has been characterized by a particular brand of multiculturalism that is specific to an extensive welfare-state framework. The Finnish civic integration programme has a varied and relatively individualized system of language courses, vocational training, and some civic education contracted out to different educational institutions and is linked to eligibility to receive a social benefit, rather than residence permits. A large part of the migrants participating in the French integration programmes come from former French colonies in the Global

7 Bertossi 2011, 1573.
8 For an influential example of this scholarly classification, see Brubaker, Rogers (1992) Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
South, while the majority of the Finnish programme participants come from neighbouring Russia, or are refugees from various countries.

The rough similarities of the integration programmes within these two cases with very different histories of immigration, institutional frameworks, and cultural resources exemplify the convergence debate; while there are considerable differences between the French and Finnish integration policies, they do share certain policy tools with each other and the European level integration framework. It is within this context of possible convergence that we evaluate the role and contents of the supposedly distinct French and Finnish national models. This chapter will proceed by reviewing the general developments and characteristics of integration programmes, then delving into how and why policies that emphasize nationally-bounded communities appear to be becoming increasingly common among several European nation-states. After discussing our methods and data, we present our analysis of national models within the French and Finnish cases. Finally, we discuss the similarities and differences of the two cases and provide conclusions about the persistence and nature of national models.

Civic integration programmes in Europe

Civic integration programmes are one example of a broader category of ‘integration policies’, which concern the reception of immigrants and address an array of issues, including access to the labour market, nationality, long-term residence, family reunification, education, political participation and discrimination. In addition to targeting migrants and their children, many of the policies, such as anti-discrimination laws, aim to make sure the receiving community enables the incorporation of immigrants.

Public measures for the incorporation of resident foreigners were generally initiated in response to perceived needs to guide refugees and family and labour migrants in different national and/or local contexts.” The earliest

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versions of the current civic integration programmes were instituted in the Netherlands and France in 1998.10 In Finland, an equivalent programme was adopted a year later. Over the last ten years, the basic philosophy within the EU soft policy on integration has shifted from the idea that rights and access would facilitate integration and performance of civic duties, to a paradigm in which the fulfilment of duties and proof of integration are necessary conditions for the bestowal of rights and access.11 Ten EU member states have introduced an ‘integration condition’, which restricts access to certain rights to those immigrants who fulfil specific criteria, e.g., signing an integration declaration or passing a test.12 A number of countries have also developed ‘integration-from-abroad’ programmes, which require that potential family reunification migrants submit to linguistic and civic evaluations and training while in their country of origin, in order to receive a visa.13 Thus, while the initial versions of the civic integration programmes often served as support and employment mechanisms14, the recent versions entail more explicit aspects of conditionality and control.

The most common component of the programmes is host-country language assessment and instruction. The programmes also increasingly entail civic education in the host country’s institutions and laws, and sometimes the country’s history, values, symbols, and traditions. Some programmes are funded and administered directly by the state, while others are run by private actors contracted by the state, and sometimes partly funded by participation and material fees. The programmes also vary in the number of hours of coursework, type of evaluation, whether participation is mandatory, and how residence permits and access to social benefits are linked to participation.

13 Goodman 2011.
International convergence on the national

The development of civic integration programmes reveals growing similarities in policy across national contexts\textsuperscript{15}, including a renewed emphasis on national identity.\textsuperscript{16} According to the convergence thesis, similar civic integration policies are developing across European nations, despite historically different ‘philosophies of integration’ and constellations of immigration and integration policy.\textsuperscript{17} While Jacobs and Rea argue against over-estimating the similarities between different national programmes and point to a number of key differences, they do allow that civic integration programmes as a policy tool have become more common.\textsuperscript{18} Whether it is a result of convergence or parallel development, the proliferation of integration programmes indicates a point of similarity in integration policies across different nations.

The similarities among different integration policies could, in part, be the result of countries reacting to increasing economic globalization and population changes, and the demands of economic elites for policies that selectively encourage migrants according to their economic utility.\textsuperscript{19} Policy similarities may also be connected to ‘Europeanization’ through EU legal mandates and coordinated soft policy.\textsuperscript{20} Two legally-binding European level directives concerning immigration adopted in 2003, the Council Directive on the Right to Family Reunification\textsuperscript{21}, and the Council Directive on the Status of Third-Country Nationals who are Long-Term Residents\textsuperscript{22}, legitimated the implementation of civic integration programmes by including the possibility that member states make the granting of residence permits and other rights and protections contingent upon migrants meeting integration requirements.\textsuperscript{23} The non-binding EU policy on immigrant integration was

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} Joppke 2007.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Acosta 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{17} For discussion of ‘philosophies of integration’ see Favell, Adrian (2001) Philosophies of integration: immigration and the idea of citizenship in France and Britain. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Jacobs & Rea 2007, 265.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Joppke 2007, 245–247.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Acosta 2010; Goodman 2011, 241–243.
\end{itemize}
published in 2004 in the form of the 11 ‘Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union’, which emphasize that the integration of migrants should facilitate their employment, education, equal ‘access to institutions and resources’, and democratic participation. The principles were further elaborated in 2005 and their implementation has been supported by European Commission handbooks on integration for ‘policymakers and practitioners’. Due to the soft policy nature and the open method of the development of these policies, they reflect different national interests and traditions and do not act as a simple top-down influence on member states. Nevertheless, the establishment of EU integration policies does suggest increasing coordination and consensus around the basic purposes and methods of immigrant integration within Europe.

In addition to policy similarities, the increasing emphasis on gender equality and interest in defining acceptable public religious practices within EU and national integration policies may also be a product of cultural Europeanization. This emphasis reflects a construction of a ‘European’ identity in contrast to a ‘non-European,’ and specifically, Muslim, other. This contrast historically facilitated the formation of a European identity, and has recently manifested in the insistence that gender equality and religious moderation are central ‘European’ values that Muslim immigrants, who are presumed to hold opposing beliefs, must accept in order to integrate within Europe and European nation-states.

Civic integration programmes focusing on national identity may seem paradoxical within the context of cultural and legal Europeanization. Indeed, Soysal argued that international regimes, such as the EU, and claims to universal human rights would decrease the significance of the nation-state in matters of immigration and rights. This argument, however, does not appear to hold true for integration policies: integration conditions that require national cultural and linguistic conformity in order to reside in a national territory extend the reach of the national beyond the institution of national citizenship.

Much has changed since post-national theories, such as Soysal’s, became popular in the context of 1990’s. The current ‘return to the national’, or the renewed emphasis on national belonging, comes partly in response to 9/11 and other violence and the perceived threat to the welfare state by immigrants. Governments appear to be retreating from policies entailing societal accommodation and attempting to protect social solidarity, which they frame as ‘national’. This framing is influenced by populist right-wing parties, as mainstream politicians in European countries take up some populist rhetoric and concerns with the definition, maintenance, and protection of national identity. Furthermore, while previous emphases on national identity formulated that identity in contrast to those of other nation-states, the current emphasis focuses instead on a contrast with the identities of migrants. This formulation of national identity necessarily relies on an image of immigrants as culturally different and may be used to support integration.

32 Goodman 2011, 235.
33 Kofman 2005, 454.
35 Kofman 2005, 454.
37 Bertossi 2007.
requirements of cultural conformity as a method of protecting and maintaining national solidarity.

Overall, the current prevalence of civic integration programmes represents a trend across European countries to emphasise nationally-defined communities and identities in immigrant integration policies. This pattern begs the question of whether national models as cultural frames and structures of reference still appear within integration policies. If so, are these national models now similar, like the integration policies themselves, thus perhaps reflecting a European identity, or do they remain distinct?

Methods and data

To address whether French and Finnish national models are constituted and deployed differently and the extent to which these ‘models’ incorporate references to a European identity, we examine the discourse of the French and Finnish civic integration programmes and identify 1) the justifications of the policies and programmes, 2) how and what values\(^{40}\) are articulated as core elements of ‘national identity’, and 3) the constructions of those targeted by the policies.\(^{41}\) Programme justifications give insight into whether and how national discourses use national models to frame and support the integration programmes. National values and the representations of the policy targets may be constructed in juxtaposition to one another and provide us with examples of how national identity and belonging is framed.

In order to access these discursive constructions, we rely upon qualitative, text-oriented content analysis with attention to the political context, and focus on discursive practices such as naming, category definitions, and binary oppositions. Giving a phenomenon a name makes it visible and forms a boundary between it and its surroundings. Similarly, categorization joins together various individuals or elements, ascribing them distinguish-

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\(^{40}\) For this analysis, we define values as ideals or ways of being in the social world that we interpret as being ascribed worth by the authors of the texts.

\(^{41}\) We borrow our focus on programme justifications and the representations of the national community and the migrants targeted by these programmes from Bacchi’s ‘What is the problem represented to be?’ (WPR) approach. Research utilizing the full WPR approach would ideally also include elements of process-tracing, effects evaluation and alternative policy propositions. Bacchi, Carol Lee (2009) Analysing policy. What's the problem represented to be? Frenchs Forest, N.S.W.: Pearson.
able attributes different from other categories. Naming and categorizing are thus not natural or apolitical acts but creative, contingent and political. It is therefore meaningful to examine which issues need explicit description or motivation and which, again, are represented as given.\footnote{Bacchi 2009, 4–9; Ginger, Clare (2006) ‘Interpretive Content Analysis: Studies and Arguments in Analytic Documents’. In Interpretation and Method. Empirical Research Method and the Interpretive Turn. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 331–348; Potter, Jonathan (1996) Representing Reality. Discourse, rhetoric and social construction. London: Sage, 177.}

The empirical text analysis was carried out through close-reading and qualitative coding. Two types of codes were created: thematic and interpretive. The former type of coding mapped the thematic substance of the documents analysed, marking contents related to our research interests.\footnote{Not all passages of the text included in the corpus were coded – the analysis was not ‘grounded’ (cf. Charmaz, Kathy (2003) ‘Grounded Theory: Objectivist and Constructivist Methods’. In Strategies of qualitative inquiry. SAGE.).} This gave us the possibility to assess the documents in terms of content: which issues were taken up and which were not. The interpretive coding marked sections of the corpus with our evaluations of what the piece of text ‘does’ in terms of naming, categorization or assigning hierarchical positions. As a result, we were able to point to unique and interesting textual constructions as well as discursive patterns, or recurrent ways of speaking about integration and its subjects in the contexts of the two nation-states.

The data for this chapter is listed in Table 1. The selected documents present discourses from different political actors or bodies and address a variety of audiences. Most of the texts connect directly to civic integration courses. It was, however, not always possible, or fruitful, to limit the analysis to only the contents of integration policies that specifically concerned civic integration programmes.

The following sections present the findings from France and Finland; each case starts with an introduction to the historical, legislative, and political contexts, followed by our analysis of the programme justifications, national values, and representations of the target groups.
Table 1. Texts selected for analysis*

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<tr>
<th>Material for Newcomers</th>
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<th>Legislative Documents</th>
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<td></td>
<td>• National Assembly Bill Nº 823 on Immigration Control and Residence of Foreigners, 30/4/2003</td>
<td>• Act on the Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers L 493/1999 (Integration Act 1999)</td>
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<td>• National Assembly Bill Nº 2986 on Immigration and Integration, 29/3/2006</td>
<td>• Act on the Promotion of Integration L 1386/2010 (Integration Act 2010)</td>
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<td>• National Assembly Bill Nº 57 on Immigration Control, Integration and Asylum, 4/7/2007</td>
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<th>Governmental and administrative reports</th>
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<td>• Parliamentary reply E. V. 239/2010 vp</td>
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* Quotes from French and Finnish language sources are translated by us unless stated otherwise.
** Although the ‘Welcome Booklet’ is no longer supplied to participants in the ‘Living in France’ classes, we still analyse this text because it was designed to be used with the Reception and Integration Contract.
France – Republican reception and assimilation

Both the patterns of immigration and the integration policies in France reflect French colonial history. Large-scale migration to France from former colonies and other European countries formed as a result of labour demand during the first post-war ‘boom’ decades. Many guest workers from the Global South settled in France and established durable migration flows despite the 1974 immigration control policy that only allowed labour migration from nations within the European Community and family reunification. As of 2008, there were 5.3 million migrants living in France, constituting about 8.4 per cent of the total population. While about 34 per cent of these immigrants originated in other European Union member states, 42.5 per cent were born in Africa, more than half of whom came from former colonies in the Maghreb and 12.5 per cent of whom came from other parts of Africa. About one million migrants originated in other parts of the world, principally Turkey and Asia.

Scholars and political actors have traditionally identified France as a universalist, ‘civic’ nation, where belonging is supposed to be based on political citizenship, rather than ethnicity or primordial ties. Access to French citizenship through naturalization requires ‘assimilation to the French community’, through sufficient mastery of the French language, along with other more ambiguously defined criteria of assimilation. Thus, entry into the universal French community involves renouncing, or relegating to the private sphere, aspects of culture and faith that are judged to be incompatible with French national identity. Importantly, these incompatible aspects of culture tend to be attributed to non-Europeans and, particularly, Muslims.

The relegation of religion to the private sphere is a feature of the French form of secularism, laïcité, which dictates the separation of church and state. While laïcité historically allowed the French state to overcome the political power of the Catholic Church, more recently political actors have used this concept to criticize the ‘public’ religious practices of non-Christians. The French emphasis on cultural assimilation is also congruent with both the history of French nation-building, which involved the creation of a ‘French’ population through the imposition of a standardized ‘French’ national culture and language, and the French colonial legacy of explicit cultural tutelage exemplified by the mission civilisatrice.

Despite the emphasis on assimilation, which appears to place the responsibility for successful integration on immigrants themselves, there has also been an acknowledgement of the barriers to integration faced by immigrants. In the late 1990’s, integration policies began to address discrimination directed toward migrants, thereby highlighting the role and responsibility of the French state to provide immigrants with equal access to resources. While anti-discrimination policies still exist, this concern has partly faded in the public debates over integration, as it was replaced in the early 2000’s with a focus on group tensions and laïcité as a ‘moral framework that defined [French] identity’.

The development of the Contrat d’Accueil et d’Intégration (The Reception and Integration Contract, CAI) reflects the idea that assimilation is crucial to immigrant integration. In 1998, the French government put in place plates-formes d’accueil (introduction platforms) aimed initially at those migrants arriving through family reunification. These voluntary programmes consisted of a half day of instruction on French culture and everyday life. In

50 Scott 2007.
53 See, i.e., Long, Marcéau (1988) Etre Français aujourd’hui et demain. Paris: La Documentation Française
55 Bertossi 2011, 1570.
56 Joppke 2007, 251.
April 2003, the inter-ministerial committee for integration established the more extensive CAI for non-European immigrants on a trial basis.57

The CAI is administrated by the Office Français de l’Immigration et de l’Intégration (the French Office of Immigration and Integration, OFII). As part of the CAI, migrants attend a welcome session, which includes a short presentation about the contract and a film, *Vivre ensemble, en France* (Living Together in France), about entering the French national community. On the same day, the migrants are required to attend a medical visit and a personal interview, during which they sign the contract after an auditor has evaluated their level of French fluency, as well as any other specific needs, and has explained the requirements of the contract with the help of a translator, if necessary. If the auditor judges the migrant’s level of French fluency to be insufficient, the migrant must complete a more thorough language evaluation and attend the recommended state-sponsored French classes in order to reach the lowest Diplôme Initial de Langue Française (Initial Diploma in French Language) fluency standard.

All CAI participants must also attend a day-long civics class that presents the fundamental rights, laws, values, and institutions of the French Republic. Depending on the needs of the migrants, their contracts may also require them to attend a workshop on *Vivre En France* (Living in France), which aims to facilitate their comprehension of French society and their access to public services, and an individual interview for labour market integration, which includes an assessment of their professional competencies and information on how to find appropriate work. The contracts last one year, and may be extended for an additional year under certain circumstances. If the administration finds that the contract has not been fulfilled satisfactorily, the migrant may be denied a renewal of their residence permit.

The initial years of the programme saw inconsistent participation with many applicants failing to follow-up on their recommended French language courses58 and in 2006, the second ‘Sarkozy Law’ established the CAI as obligatory.59 The integration programme was extended in 2007 with a

58 Joppke 2007, 252.
law which requires family unification migrants to complete certain integration requirements in their country of emigration in order to receive a visa.\textsuperscript{60} Additionally, the \textit{Contrat d’Accueil et d’Intégration pour la Famille} (Reception and Integration Contract for the Family, CAIF), which was legislated in 2008, requires immigrants who are bringing their children to France through family reunification to attend a special course on the ‘rights and duties of parents in France’ \textsuperscript{61} More than 510,736 CAI were signed between July 2003, when the contracts were introduced, and the end of 2009.\textsuperscript{62} In 2010 alone, 101,355 people signed the contract, 23.7 per cent of whom were required to take additional language training. Participants from the Maghreb states represented the largest regional group, making up about 38 per cent of the 2010 participants.\textsuperscript{63}

\textit{Programme justifications}

The Reception and Integration Contract and its associated civic integration courses developed within the context of concerns about migration control and claims that the project of integrating immigrants into the French Republic had failed. Migration control is a central issue within the bills and laws that established the integration programme. For instance, the integration requirement was introduced in the 2003 bill on Immigration Control, Residence of Aliens, and Nationality, which began by stating the need to manage migration flows and fight against the illegal migration that was ‘crystallizing the fears of our citizens and feeding xenophobia’. In addition to stating that a demonstration of integration into French society should be a requirement for receiving a ten-year residence permit, this bill advocated for the need to streamline expulsion processes and better sort out and protect ‘victims of persecution’.\textsuperscript{64}

\begin{flushleft}
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\textsuperscript{60} Loi n°2007–1631 du 20 novembre 2007 Relative à la Maitrise de l’Immigration, à l’Intégration et à l’Asile.
\textsuperscript{62} Direction de l’Accueil et d’Intégration 2010.
\end{flushleft}
The bill for the 2006 law on Immigration and Integration that made the Reception and Integration Contract mandatory also expressed the importance of fighting illegal migration and highlighted the need to continue the current stabilization and control of migration. The bill identified the insufficient integration of immigrants who lack 'a job, housing, and sufficient knowledge of the French language' as a problem, and proposed that the contract be mandatory and include a civic programme, linguistic formation, and an assessment of professional expertise. The bill also argued for a more thorough evaluation of immigrants' integration in order for them to receive a ten-year residence permit, stating the need to examine 'the foreigner’s personal commitment to respect the principles that govern the French Republic, the actual respect of these principles, and sufficient knowledge of the French language'. As part of an effort to reduce 'endured' migration and increase 'selected' migration, this same bill also proposed the Compétences et Talents (Skills and Talents) residence permit. Highly-skilled migrants with this permit are allowed to bypass the integration programme requirements.

Finally, the 2007 Immigration Control, Integration and Asylum bill and law extended the reach of the Reception and Integration Contract to family migrants still in their countries of origin so that potential migrants could 'better succeed in the process [of integration] by beginning before they come to France'. The law also instituted the Reception and Integration Contract for the Family, arguing that migrants with children needed to be familiar with the 'essential principles that, in accordance with the laws of the republic, govern family life in France'. The introduction of integration from abroad in 2007 mirrors the policy suggestions in the EU framework in 2005.

While the titles and contents of the bills and laws that instituted the French integration programmes suggest that the integration requirement is...
part of a broader project of immigration control, political actors also justified the development of the programmes as a reaction to the continued failure of integration, indicated by both identity conflicts and the socio-economic disadvantage and segregation of immigrants and their children. These integration problems were also connected to the threat of civil unrest and violence, which Sarkozy obliquely referenced in 2009:

The integration policies of the last 30 years in France have not achieved their objectives. More than 60 per cent of foreigners live in three regions (Ile de-France, Rhône-Alpes, Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur). In these regions, the immigrant population is concentrated in areas marked by urban tensions and the effects of ‘communautarism’. Several recent events that have taken place in these areas show how much the feeling of relegation can damage that of belonging to our national community.72

The need to address a supposed lack of national identity, particularly among second and third generations73, played a role in the implementation and strengthening of integration policies; however, references to more concrete phenomena, such as segregation, the high unemployment rates of migrants, and the poor scholastic performance of their children, were more common in justifications for the programme. With a somewhat circular logic, educational achievement and employment represented not only indicators of the level of integration achieved, but the paths to achieving integration. Civic integration programme documents emphasize that in order to integrate into French society, immigrants must have knowledge of the French language and French values. This knowledge can be obtained through the


French education system, which is ‘where the primordial construction of political citizenship takes place for the majority’ 74, or, alternatively, through the state-sponsored civic integration programme and language courses.

The value of education as a route to integration not only justifies requiring general civic training for migrants, but also justifies intervening in the parenting of school-age children. While the CAIF has a day-long course focusing on the rights and duties of parents in France, even the CAI’s materials for migrants contain extensive advice on parenting children in school. For example, migrants are instructed to follow their children’s school work, and more specifically, to ‘ask every night what they must do for school. If there is too much noise around them at that moment, they will not succeed. Turn off the television!’ 75 Furthermore, policy documents use the importance of education and parenting as part of the justification for targeting immigrant women in the integration programme, due to their ‘role in the heart of the family and in the education of children.’ 76

The language requirements of the integration programme are justified with the argument that mastery of the French language is the ‘greatest asset’ 77 in the process of integration. Speaking French is presented as essential for finding a job, understanding French culture and values, and even establishing gender equality. 78 The integration programme as a whole is also justified by its efforts to facilitate immigrants getting jobs, because, ‘the best path to integration, other than knowledge of the French language and adherence to our principles of community life, is legal, declared and protected work.’ 79 To this end, the contract process involves not only an assessment of professional skills, but also connections to employment agencies and job opportunities created through OFII partnerships with organizations, such

74 Le Haut Conseil à l’Intégration 2009, 61.
as those representing the care and transportation industries. Programme documents further highlight efforts by the French government to encourage businesses to hire immigrants by awarding participating businesses with a ‘diversity label’.80 The emphasis on employment and education as key factors in integration fit with the Common Basic Principles.

Values and the civic integration programme
Knowing and respecting French ‘Republican values’ constitutes a central requirement in the French process of integration; yet, with the exception of gender equality and laïcité, these values remain general and abstract in the integration programme’s legislative texts. Two documents directed towards immigrants signing the contract — the Livret d’Accueil (Welcome booklet) and the Reception and Integration Contract itself — provide slightly more detail on the values to which participants are acquired to adhere. Both documents highlight and elaborate on several values, including gender equality and laïcité, and leave the rest to appear in lists.

The Reception and Integration Contract is an actual contract with articles listing first the commitments of the state, and then those of the signer, as well the duration of the contract and the specific requirements that the individual immigrant must fulfil. These articles are followed by signature lines for the immigrant and the official. Before the articles of the contract, the document begins by stating that, ‘France and the French are attached to a history, a culture and certain fundamental values. To live together, it is necessary to know and respect these values.’81 It goes on to describe these values in a series of bullet points divided according to five headings. These headings state that France is a country of democracy, rights and duties, secularism, and equality. The contract text describes France as ‘an indivisible, secular, democratic and social republic’ in which ‘the power rests in the sovereignty of the people, expressed by the universal suffrage available

to all French citizens over the age of 18. The section on rights and duties highlights the equality of rights, lists the right to freedom (of opinion, expression, meeting, movement), the right to personal safety and protection by the state, and the right to personal property, and points out that regular (legal) foreigners have the same rights and duties as French, except for the right to vote. Under a heading describing France as a *laïque* country, ‘*laïcité*’ is explained with the statement that while the French state respects all faiths and the freedom of religion, religion is relegated to the private domain and the state is independent from all religions. Finally, under the heading of ‘France, a country of equality,’ the contract text elaborates specifically on gender equality and the equal rights and duties of men and women.

The Welcome Booklet, which presents information on everyday life in France to supplement the courses of the integration programme, lists democracy, freedom, equality, fraternity, safety, and secularism as the fundamental Republican values to which one must commit when signing the integration contract. Like the contract, the book also has a section dedicated to explaining gender equality as ‘a fundamental principle of French society,’ which goes into the different rights that men and women share, the laws that support the freedom of choice in marriage, and the illegality of ‘forced marriages’ and polygamy. The booklet does not have a section dedicated to *laïcité*, although the concept appears many times throughout the text. Two other sections in the booklet address the equality of rights, expounding upon the illegality of discrimination, particularly according to race, and the right to personal safety, which forbids ‘the treatment of the human body like an object or merchandise’.

In its 2009 report on introducing the values of the French republic, *Le Haut Conseil à l’Intégration* (The High Council of Integration, HCI) criti-
cized the superficial treatment of values and symbols within the booklet and the civic courses, arguing that respect for French republican values (rather than memorization) would be facilitated by more thorough discussions of the specific histories of the values and symbols.\textsuperscript{86} Considering the importance that the integration programme legislation has given to understanding and respecting French national values, it does appear to contradict the goals of the civic integration programme that these values are not more thoroughly explained in the written material for migrants analysed here. Even if the French values are manifested in the laws and obligations discussed in the program materials\textsuperscript{87} this connection is not made evident. While this apparent negligence could support arguments that French integration programmes are designed for purposes of immigration control, rather than acculturation\textsuperscript{88}, the integration programme may have improved the oral instruction at the day-long civics and ‘Living in France’ classes to better elaborate on the national values since the HCI evaluation.

The HCI report also emphasizes the importance of discussing the imperfect realization of the French values; for example, the report states that it is necessary to acknowledge that there is a great deal of inequality in France, and that ‘more than ever, the ideal of equality is a work in progress’.\textsuperscript{89} The programme materials convey this flawed reality in the case of discrimination; the booklet states that ‘despite campaigns to fight against xenophobia (hostility toward foreigners) and racism, [the reader] may encounter intolerance or rejection’\textsuperscript{90}, and encourages the reader to contact local authorities or The French Equal Opportunities and Anti-Discrimination Commission\textsuperscript{91}. This statement provides a rare glimpse of the possible gap between the stated French values and the values to which people in France actually subscribe and adhere. In her analysis of the representations of the French

\textsuperscript{86} Le Haut Conseil à l’Intégration 2009, 33–34.
\textsuperscript{87} Suvarierol 2012, 221.
\textsuperscript{88} See, e.g., Goodman 2011.
\textsuperscript{89} Le Haut Conseil à l’Intégration 2009, 25.
\textsuperscript{90} Le Ministère de l’immigration de l’intégration de l’identité nationale et du développement solidaire 2009a, 9.
\textsuperscript{91} As of March 2011, HALDE was replaced by the organization, Le Défenseur des Droits (Defender of Rights).
nation-state and the migrant in the official materials provided to migrants, Suvarierol highlights the booklet’s statement that domestic violence ‘concerns all social classes and cultures’92, which can represent another acknowledgment of this gap. Overall, however, the integration materials often add that French laws ‘apply to all’ but tend to not address the question of how much French citizens espouse and adhere to French values.93

The French integration programme differs from the EU level suggestions in that it does not focus much on the relationship between French citizens and immigrants and does not articulate the value of cultural exchange. However, perhaps because they are at a similar level of abstraction, the broader lists of French values line up well with the general list of European values presented under the second Common Basic Principle: ‘respect for the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law’ and ‘dignity, freedom, equality and non-discrimination, solidarity, citizen’s rights, and justice’.94 While the specific values of gender equality and laïcité (or a comparable concept) do not appear explicitly within this list as they often do in the French lists, a concern for the equal rights of women appears several times in the elaboration of the Common Basic Principles and the eighth principle highlights the freedom to practice one’s religion, as long as these practices ‘do not prevent individual migrants from exercising other fundamental rights or participating in the host society’.95

Representations of the policy target groups
The populations targeted by the integration programme are often referred to as ‘immigrants’ or ‘migrants’, or, according to their role in the programme, e.g., ‘participant’, ‘signatory’, ‘trainee’; however, the most common term used in the legislation is ‘étranger’, or ‘foreigner’. This designation is interesting in

93 As the exception in this analysis, the 2009 HCI report considered to what extent French citizens adhere to the values that are being presented to immigrants.
that, unlike ‘immigrant’, or ‘participant’, which signal some sort of role or action (e.g., immigrating to the country), ‘foreigner’ signals a more basic, static status of outsider. The purported need to educate target populations on French culture and values indicates a perception of cultural difference between the French and the targeted immigrant groups. The texts also occasionally explicitly reference conflicts or incompatibilities between French and immigrant cultures, and characterize immigrant cultures as traditional or communitarian.

In line with the concept of binary oppositions, it is also possible to discern an image of the target population as a contrast to the image of the French that the programme discourses present. The repetition of gender equality and laïcité as important French values, while others often remain unnamed or unelaborated, strongly suggests that immigrants might not subscribe to these values. In the same way, the frequent interdiction of polygamy and the repeated use of genital mutilation and ‘forced marriage’ as examples of practices in contradiction to the French right of personal safety suggest that these are practices relevant to immigrants.96

It is also possible to discern an image of the target population by considering what kinds of information about everyday life appear in the Welcome Booklet. For example, the inclusion of sections on how to use the postal system and a bank card suggests that immigrants may be unfamiliar with these systems. The booklet also warns that in France, ‘it is often necessary to dress warmly and buy winter clothes’, thereby implying that immigrants may be used to warmer climates.97 In line with the image of migrant cultures as less gender equal, the booklet informs migrants about practices of equality in spousal relationships in France:

In the family, the husband and wife are equal and stand together in making important decisions (choosing a home, making important purchases). Even if she does not work, the woman must, for example,

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96 See, also, Suvarierol 2012 for a similar conclusion about the portrayal of immigrants as gender unequal within the Welcome Booklet.

97 Le Ministère de l’immigration de l’intégration de l’identité nationale et du développement solidaire 2009a, 12.
sign the couple’s taxes. The woman does not need her husband’s permission to work or to open a bank account. Concerning the children, both parents jointly exercise parental authority and participate in the child’s education.98

Finally, the Welcome Booklet text suggests migrants may have different or even inadequate parenting practices. The booklet contains a list of instructions related to child care, including directions to maintain a baby’s room at a maximum of 19 degrees Celsius, to lay a baby on its back to sleep, and not to let children under the age of eight cross the road alone.99 This perceived need to educate immigrants on parenting practices is also reflected in the development of the CAIF and the associated training on the rights and duties of parents in France.

Finland – the Nordic welfare framework applied

Finland is a latecomer to the group of post-World-War-II immigration countries. It remained an emigration country until the turn of the 1990’s, providing labour mainly to Sweden.100 In the early 1990’s, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the war in Somalia brought new citizens to Finland – some of them asylum seekers and refugees, some family migrants, others Ingrian Finns migrating as ‘returnees’, a status granted to them due to ethnically Finnish origin and historical circumstances. Until 2007, Finnish citizens moving (back) from Sweden formed the largest group of inbound migrants, reported by citizenship and country of emigration. At that point, foreign citizens moving from Estonia to Finland outnumbered Finns migrating from Sweden. The percentage of foreign citizens in the population of Finland was as low as 0.53 per cent in 1990 and rose to 3.39 per cent by 2011.101

99 Le Ministère de l’immigration de l’intégration de l’identité nationale et du développement solidaire 2009a, 43.
While arrangements for the reception of refugees and asylum seekers have existed since the 1970’s\(^\text{102}\), Finnish immigrant integration policy was first formulated in 1999 in the form of an Integration Act.\(^\text{103}\) Contrary to the French approach to ethnic diversity, the 1990’s were generally a time in the Finnish politics of several legislative projects related to rights and recognition, such as a basic rights reform and the constitutional reform. The latter stipulated the ‘right to maintain and develop one’s own language and culture’, explicitly mentioning the Roma and indigenous Sámi people.\(^\text{104}\) Linguistic recognition was not, however, a novelty of the 1990’s. The first Finnish constitution (1919) defined the public system as bilingual, and the constitution continues to recognize the historically important Swedish language as equal to Finnish.\(^\text{105}\)

A positive discourse around diversity by Finnish authorities was continued in the 2000’s. Thus, at the level of the official framework, the immigrant policy in Finland can be classified as belonging to the ‘multiculturalist’ way of dealing with minorities and incorporating newcomers.\(^\text{106}\) Laura Huttunen et al. have pointed out that ‘Finnish multiculturalism’ has been driven by public authorities who other actors, in turn, have expected to solve all its problems.\(^\text{107}\) Finnish policies have, furthermore, been depicted as more occupied with the concepts of tolerance and multiculturalism than antiracism.\(^\text{108}\) Discourses of services and rights are typical of administrative, tech-


\(^{103}\) L 493/1999 ‘Laki maahanmuuttajien kotouttamisesta ja turvapaikanhakijoiden vastaanotosta 9.4.1999.’


\(^{106}\) Saukkonen, Pasi (2012) ‘Suomi: Euroopan multikulturalistisin maa? ’ *Oikeus*, Vol. 41, Issue 2, 226–243. It is too early to assess how the recent sharpening of tones in politics and media debates will be reflected in the language of authorities. Saukkonen (ibid.) points out that the *resourcing* of incorporation policies is at a very modest level compared to the positive approach and high goals set in the policy texts.


nical, or otherwise ‘apolitical’ Finnish texts on immigrant integration. In the parliamentary and other public fora, issues related to immigration are much more contested. While politicians with an anti-immigration agenda have gained more parliamentary mandates since 2008, there have also been members of parliament voicing welfare chauvinist and xenophobic sentiments during the past decades.

The Integration Act was reformulated in late 2010. Under the new rules, not only the unemployed immigrants but all foreigners living in Finland are entitled to an ‘initial assessment’ of their needs in relation to the integration services and can be referred to courses. The core ‘clientele’ of the integration services remain, however, those newcomers who have an agreement with the Employment and Economic Development Office or their municipality about an individual integration plan. This agreement is made for a year to begin with but it can last up to three years. An integration plan can consist of a variety of elements that aim to enhance the individual’s employability, such as civic integration courses, basic education, vocational training and internships at workplaces. Involving several public actors at the state, regional and local levels, the system of integration service provision in Finland is rather complicated. In the following, we concentrate on the civic integration courses more specifically.

Contracted by a regional authority, various kinds of educational institutions organize civic integration courses. From 2012, the content of the courses has been regulated by an instruction by the Finnish National Board of Education. Previous recommendations by the same body left considerable room for local adaptation. The new instruction did not, however,
change the basic idea of the course: to introduce the course participant to information deemed relevant for everyday life and labour market participation, with a focus on language learning. Learning Finnish or Swedish\textsuperscript{114} constitutes a major part of the civic integration programme for most of those enrolled. Apart from being represented in policy texts as the most important factor for finding employment, language skills also form part of the legal criteria for naturalization.\textsuperscript{115}

In 2010, the number of participants at civic integration courses was 13,800, and the number of recipients of the cash benefit called Integration Assistance was 15,500.\textsuperscript{116} These figures indicate that most recipients of Integration Assistance are enrolled in a civic integration course at some point during their integration plan period. The biggest single nationality group amongst the recipients was Russian citizens, accounting for 21 per cent of all recipients, followed by Iraqis and Somalis (both at 11 per cent).\textsuperscript{117}

Policy justifications

After the adoption of the Integration Act in 1999, Finnish immigrant policy has roughly undergone two periods, the first being informed by humanitarian and family migration, and the second, starting in the mid-2000’s, acknowledging the growing need for labour migration.\textsuperscript{118} In the presentation below, we divide the discussion of the selected texts into these two periods.

\textsuperscript{114} While the government documents consistently formulate the language goal as 'learning Finnish or Swedish', Swedish is not always mentioned or practically available as an option at the implementation level. Actors guarding the Swedish language in Finland have recently given more attention to the right to 'choose to integrate in Swedish' (see e.g. Creutz, Karin & Mika Helander (2012) \textit{Via svenska. Den svenskspråkiga integrationsvägen}. Helsingfors: Magma.)

\textsuperscript{115} The language skill requirement has been in place since 2003. Since 2011, it has been possible to naturalize a year earlier than before if the applicant passes the language requirement already at that point. Kuosma, Tapio (2003) \textit{Uusi kansalaisuuslaki}. Helsinki: Lainvoima, 116–123; L 359/2003 'Kansalaisuuslaki. 16.5.2003'.


\textsuperscript{117} Kela 2011, 248.

\textsuperscript{118} See Saukkonen 2010, 36–37. A new period may now be incipient, considering the claims for more restrictions made and spread by the True Finns populist party and smaller political movements.
Early 2000’s: The 1999 Integration Act and the 2002 Implementation Report

The purpose of this Act is to promote the integration, equality and freedom of choice of immigrants through measures which help them to acquire the essential knowledge and skills they need to function in society […]. […] In this Act: 1) integration means the personal development of immigrants, aimed at participation in working life and society while preserving their own language and culture […].119

Justifications for immigrant integration measures in Finland, in our reading of the documents, are chiefly connected to two features of the Finnish state: its tax-funded, domicile-based welfare system and the special importance of language issues in the Finnish nationhood. Firstly, it is from the perspective of the extensive welfare state that the approach to integration as a broad set of measures, found in the policy texts, makes sense. The primacy of employment for ‘good integration’, as also indicated in the quote above, further connects to two intertwined elements in society: on the one hand, to the principle of the state as a common project to which everyone should contribute, and to the cultural importance of wage labour, on the other.120

Secondly, the dual focus on learning Finnish or Swedish, and the right to one’s own language and culture can be seen in the light of the Finnish language as the key element of the late 1800’s nation building and the official bilingualism of the state. The constitutional reform granting the Sámi, the Roma and ‘other groups’ the right to develop their language and culture121 was concluded the same year with the first Integration Act; the recurrent mentioning of the right to culture in the implementation report on the Integration Act (2002) echoes this spirit of recognition.

Outi Lepola’s research on the 1999 Integration Act and connected documents also points out the primacy of employment in the concept of inte-

121 L 731/1999.
gration. According to her, a newcomer’s unemployment was defined as the primary policy problem which was to be solved through various kinds of educational measures and recruitment initiatives. Integration policy of the 1990’s was, in the Finnish context, understood as an anti-marginalization policy; given the task of the welfare state to support vulnerable people in general, immigrants had to be cared for as well. Integration was further framed as a process of becoming equal with Finns in terms of access to work and services, and awareness of rights and responsibilities. Policy documents additionally listed instruments such as the promotion of tolerance, directed at the society in general rather than the newcomer alone – something that was later named the ‘two-wayness’ of integration. The introduction of conditionality, parallel to other job-seekers obligations to take part in activation measures, again, connected the reception of Integration Assistance to fulfilling measures listed in one’s individual integration plan. In this sense, there was a contractual and disciplining element to the Finnish civic integration programme already from the beginning. In contrast to the French case, the Finnish integration plan is, however, not a proper contract; it does not legally obligate the authorities.

Late 2000’s: the 2008 Implementation report and the 2010 Integration Act
The 2008 Implementation report marks a transition to the current, 2010 Integration Act. The report established the diversification and bigger volume of immigration to Finland as grounds for developing integration services to cater for a broader clientele. In addition to previous ways of understanding it, the concept of integration was now increasingly connected to (future) labour migration, necessary for a society with an ageing population. Unemployment and the underlying marginalization thus no longer alone represented the opposite of integration. Insufficient integration could also mean insufficient knowledge of the society despite the seemingly ‘integrat-

122 ‘Two-way integration’ is a term used in the Common Basic Principles that repeatedly appears in the Finnish 2008 implementation report.
ed’ behaviour (paid work). As we will see below, however, increased focus on societal knowledge was not implemented with a focus on values to the same extent as in France.

The exclusion of housewives from the services provided by the Integration Act, due to them not being registered as job-seekers, was another important argument for broadening the coverage definition of the act. The Administrative Committee, the parliamentary body responsible for migration issues, concluded that, without language skills, the newcomer is at risk of weakened inclusion, and that integration courses should therefore, according to an initial assessment of needs, be offered to all immigrants.\textsuperscript{125}

The assessment is not compulsory to those economically independent of the state, but they have the right to ask for one. With the pressed economic situation in the municipalities, however, it is likely that newcomers who do have employment continue to be regarded as ‘integrating with the help of work life’.\textsuperscript{126}

While the first Finnish Immigrant Integration Act was adopted before the Common Basic Principles, their influence can be identified in the 2010 Act. Compared to the former purpose statement and definition of integration, the act now more explicitly stresses active participation by the immigrant and the two-way character of integration:

The purpose of this Act is to support and promote integration and the possibilities of an immigrant to participate actively in the Finnish society. Furthermore, the Act aims at promoting equality and parity, and positive interaction between groups of people. […] In this Act: 1) integration means interactive development of the migrant and the society that aims at giving the immigrant the knowledge and skills required in the society and work-life while supporting their possibilities of preserving their own language and culture […]\textsuperscript{127}

\textsuperscript{126} Valtioneuvosto 2008, 11.
\textsuperscript{127} L 1386/2010.
Furthermore, there seems to be some interest amongst parliamentarians in developing the Finnish integration policy in the stricter direction of France, Denmark and the Netherlands. When processing the Integration Act, the parliament adopted propositions not only related to integration but also regulation of entry and settlement, requiring the government to report in the future on a variety of issues, such as the possibility of a knowledge test for naturalization and the possibility of tying the Integration Assistance to documented progress in the language course or other education. In other words, although the integration programme does not include features such as immigration tests, it is seen by certain parliamentarians as a potential tool for restricting migration and access to benefits.

Values and the civic integration programme
Civic integration programmes in Europe have been said to have focused increasingly on the national identity of the country of residence during the past decade. During this time, Finland has been a ‘lucky bystander’ with regard to tragedies such as ‘home-grown terrorism’ and honour-related violence leading to deaths; tragic events at a national scale have generally not been related to migrant families. Public debates on social cohesion and ethnic diversity have pertained to unemployment and, increasingly, to residential segregation – with the occasional reference to the worst case scenario of the ‘French riots’. Perhaps this is partly why a canon of Finnish values to-be-adopted-by-newcomers is not included in the material as a specific topic. It does not mean, however, that values do not appear at all, they simply feature in other and less overt ways. In the material collected for this analysis, we identified both explicit and implicit ways of referring to values.

If the culture of the immigrant youth’s families differs significantly from the Finnish, they are in a conflicting situation. In the worst case, the youth does not adopt the values of their own family, nor those of the Finnish society.

When referred to explicitly, values were often given an ambiguous or vague content. For example, the quote above expects the reader to know Finnish values at a sufficient precision; these values are merely defined by their potential contrast to values of the migrated families. Interestingly, however, the quote does not directly judge adopting the family’s values but does position them against the Finnish ones as bi-polar, possibly irreconcilable options.

The 2012 instruction on civic integration courses by the Finnish National Board of Education presents a notable exception to the otherwise scattered text on values. Instead of shorter passages on values in a previous recommendation text, the instruction now dedicates a whole page on the ‘value base’ of the integration courses, and the values of Finnish public education in general. The main principle of constitutional equal rights is specified in the context of civic integration courses to mean regional equality (availability of courses in all parts of the country), gender equality, equality regardless of means and other personal attributes. Respect for life and human rights, aspiration for the good, truth and humanity, promotion of justice, democracy, welfare and prevention of marginalization are further mentioned. Goals at a more practical level include learning about the practices of the Finnish society, intercultural communication and respect:

The studies support the cultural traditions of the immigrants and helps evaluate and reform them, if they are in conflict with laws in effect in Finland. […] The student is encouraged to evaluate the congruence and possible conflict between expressed values and reality, and reflect critically on the possibilities and flaws of the Finnish society. In the studies, values and principles are articulated when possible.132

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132 Opetushallitus 2012, 10–11.
Values presented at the beginning of the instruction are expected to
guide the organization, planning, and implementation of the courses. In the
actual syllabus, values belong to the theme Cultural Identity and Multicultural Interaction. Here, ‘Finnish customs, values and norms’ are not further
specified, but other items in the same section include global ethics, intercultural networks, freedom of religion and cultural elements not allowed
in Finland. Under the theme of general societal information, the students
are introduced to the Constitution, Equality Act, Non-Discrimination Act,
Child Protection Act, Citizenship Act, Integration Act and public right of access.

Much more frequently than discussing values explicitly, passages in the
text corpus refer to ways of being and acting that are clearly valued and
ascribed worth without defining them explicitly as ‘values’. This is, for in-
stance, evident in the depictions of the desirable state of society, as in the
2002 evaluation report defining the aims and effects of the Integration Act
to include the development of a ‘pluralist, ethnically equal, reciprocal and
tolerant society.’\footnote{VNS 5/2002, 9.} Equality, chiefly in terms of ethnicity and gender, seems
to be the most common value item in the Finnish material.

Equality is closely linked to the more general construction of the Finnish
society as one governed by law and functioning through public institutions.
This is the overall picture conveyed by the online civics material Vilma, de-
veloped in the first half of the 2000’s in a European Social Fund project with
the latest updates made in 2010.\footnote{While the instruction obliges the course organizers to include certain topics in their teaching, there
is no fixed syllabus or teaching material for teaching civics (see Ahokas, Laura, Marjukka Weide & Niklas Wilhelmsson (2011) \textit{Maahanmuuttajien yhteiskunnallisen osallistumisen tukeminen julkis-
hallinnossa ja puolueissa}. Helsinki: Oikeusministeriö). A couple of authoritative websites link to
the Vilma material at http://virtuoosi.pkky.fi/vilma/, but it is not possible to find out how widely it
has been used by civics teachers or individual students. The material is linguistically and visually
of rather poor quality and this may have made it less popular. Vilma is divided into two levels; the
more advanced one was used for the analysis.} Compiling a syllabus necessarily entails
choices, and the sheer selection of topics thus indicates what is held impor-
tant in a specific context.\footnote{See Saukkonen, Pasi (1999) \textit{Suomi, Alankomaat ja kansallisvaltion identiteettipolitiikka: tutkimus
kansallisen identiteetin politiikasta, empiirinen sovellatus suomalaisin ja hollantilaisiin tekstiin}.
Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 144–152.} The Vilma material, for example, dedicates a
chapter to ‘Rights and Responsibilities’ which includes introductions to the Finnish Constitution and ‘Human rights of the UN’ which is said to have been a model for the Finnish Constitution. The choice implies an emphasis on individual dignity as a value to be presented to newcomers. This attention to different systemic levels is exceptional; the material is generally very nationally centred. The European Union, for example, is only mentioned in passing.

The system-oriented main body of the Vilma teaching material is contrasted by a narrative about the history of the Finnish nation, presented in a rather traditional manner and focusing on the wars of 1939–44. The text, for instance, reproduces the story of motivated and tough Finnish soldiers. 136 This contrast between the various chapters can be interpreted as an attempt to encompass both the values of the system – individual rights and the rule of law – and the values of the ‘people’ operationalized into a historical focus on the wars. Such an attempt can also be found within a single chapter, as in the case of the gender equality text, where the short introductory passage establishes that the law declares men and women equal, but that equality has not yet come true in all aspects of life. Interestingly, the text on equality confines itself to the realm of the labour market where the Equality Act is applied and does not take up any specific issues often related to migrant women’s work-life in public debates and policy texts, such as the use of the headscarf.

The most ambivalent value-related element in the Finnish integration policy seems to be the ‘right to culture’, the feature that conceptually links the policy to the framework of multiculturalism. The government bill justifications for the 1993 basic rights reform subordinated the right to freedom of religion to some other basic rights. More specifically, the justification did not restrict legislation on the basis of ‘generally accepted moral and ethical values’ requiring adaptation in religious practice. How the issue was formulated in the justifications, according to Lepola, reflects an affirmation of the Finnish majority culture and the possibility to exclude the values of minori-

136 The representation becomes especially significant when taking into account that the biggest group of course participants by country of nationality are Russian citizens, whose previous home country was at war with Finland.
ties. Lepola concluded that the emphasis on the right to one’s own culture was, as a rule, counterbalanced by the stress on the limits of the acceptable in political debates. In fact, as it was noted by the 2002 implementation report, the right to preserve one’s culture was not specified in the Integration Act and functioned therefore mainly as an abstract principle ideally guiding implementation. In our material, ‘right to culture’ was sometimes generously recognized, other times questioned. An example of the latter is found in the presentation of social norms in the brochure Welcome to Finland. In addition to the values explicitly named as such (safety, security, clean environment, public service, punctuality and honesty), the book entails detailed advice about social conduct such as agreeing on appointments beforehand by telephone. While not informing the newcomer about any social conventions in Finland would seem inconsiderate, the message conveyed through the many pieces of advice is that, having entered Finland, one should now act culturally on the Finns’ terms. Fitting together the constructions of social conformity, the constructions of valuing cultural diversity and the concept of two-way integration proves difficult, since living out one’s minority culture with the majority population would inevitably infringe and possibly alter the Finnish norms and values, constructed as given.

Above, we have shown how the values represented in the selected Finnish documents include both broad and trans-nationally recognized elements, such as human rights, equality and plurality, and more specific features related to culture. None of these values were framed as European apart from the passages dealing with Communications by the Commission of the EU. The Common Basic Principles were introduced in the 2008 report. The concept of two-way integration was highlighted and the Principles in general claimed to be mainly equivalent to the basis of the Finnish Integration Act and integration policy. It was further claimed that the concept of integration

137 Lepola 2000, 212.
138 Lepola 2000, 269.
139 Valtioneuvosto 2002, 8.
140 Analysing the 1996 edition of ‘Facts about Finland’, a semi-official publication for business visitors and tourists, Saukkonen (1999) observed that, in contrast to a similar publication about the Netherlands, the Finnish guidebook placed greater emphasis on the traditions of everyday life.
has become more similar between European countries since the adoption of the Common Basic Principles. The possible effects of the convergence on the Finnish policy were not reflected upon.

Representations of the policy target groups

Crammed living wears the flat and inescapably causes more noise both in the stairway and in the flat. In the common meetings of authorities and immigrants, especially the Somalis have criticized the small number of places for meetings and gatherings.\textsuperscript{141}

Unemployment, low income, dependency on social security, lack of Finnish or Swedish skills, cultures restricting the rights of girls and women, physical and psychological segregation, lack of information, restricted interaction with the original population and discrimination in work life and elsewhere in society make one predisposed to marginalization.\textsuperscript{142}

In the texts analysed, the construction of the target of the integrative measures takes place through the assessment of service needs; ‘immigrant’ is used as the general object of legislation and policy while it is clear that it is not any inbound migrant but those in the weakest socio-economic positions that the legislators are addressing. Groups are also classified in terms of entry status, such as refugee or returnee, and occasionally nationality or language groups or ethnic backgrounds may be mentioned in the texts such as the implementation reports, evaluating the situation of a number of specific groups, including elderly immigrants and immigrants with impairments. The implementation reports express special concern for women, considered vulnerable due to their culture and/or caring for many small children as these may restrict the access of women to services, such as the civic integration course, and to interaction with the society at large. In the

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{141} Valtioneuvosto 2002, 45.
\item\textsuperscript{142} Valtioneuvosto 2008, 45.
\end{itemize}
Vilma teaching material, the concern for migrant women is formulated more indirectly by underlining that, in this society, men and women, boys and girls, husbands and wives have all equal rights. Work-aged migrant men as gendered individuals mostly remain in the blind spot of policy language; however, they may be implied as problematic through the discussion on women’s problems.

The focus on service provision entails that integration measures can be seen as a privilege that the recipient should be grateful for: ‘Most immigrants covered by the Integration Act did not seem to know that they have a special status compared to other immigrants. They seemed to take the things [services, MW] related to job-seeking and education for granted.’ The integration service is, however, not an unconditional gift to the newcomer, neither can they claim the right to services mentioned in their integration plan if the authorities do not have the resources to offer them.

The more inclusive and out-reaching approach of the 2010 Integration Act is, in part, embodied by the booklet ‘Welcome to Finland’. As the Basic Knowledge Material stipulated in the Integration Act, the booklet is distributed to immigrants when they are in contact with authorities who register their residence or grant their permit. While the booklet tries to cater to all newcomers, it cannot possibly reach a nuanced result in its 44 pages. The focus is on informing the reader, on the one hand, about a variety of legal rights and restrictions as well as a range of social norms, and, on the other, about welfare services and entitlements. In listing all the welfare state features one may be entitled to according to one’s situation in life, the booklet reproduces the construction of a newcomer as someone bound to need some public support, and the Finnish society as a strange planet, unique and foreign to them. The figure of a refugee who has few personal resources seems continuously to inform the way target groups are defined in the Finnish immigrant integration sector.

143 Valtioneuvosto 2002, 22.
144 The 1999 Integration Act included an economic sanction mechanism for those failing to follow their individual integration plan. The Administrative Committee unsuccessfully suggested extending conditionality further to the residence permit system. (Lepola 2000, 183.)
Comparing the French and Finnish cases: the role of national models

A comparison of the role and contents of national models within the French and Finnish integration programmes reveals some differences and many similarities in the basic programme justifications and the representations of national values and target immigrant groups. In our discussion of the comparison, we will focus on the way similar ideas are expressed, supported, or elaborated differently in the two cases.

Although the integration policy structures were not our immediate focus, we will start our discussion by detailing some of the similarities and differences between the integration programmes of France and Finland that emerged during our discursive analysis. Failure to fulfil the integration programme requirements is attached to sanctions in both countries; the reduction or denial of access to a specific cash benefit in the Finnish case, and the denial of a renewed residence permit in the French case. In both countries, immigrants are required to actively participate in and commit to the integration process. In the French case, the immigrant engages with the state through a contract that details the commitments of both parties. In the Finnish case, there is an engagement, though not explicitly contractual, between the immigrant and the state. The discourse of the Finnish programmes also highlights another engagement, between the immigrant and the receiving society more broadly, which exemplifies the ‘two-way integration’ concept from the EU Common Basic Principles. In contrast, the French texts are relatively silent on the role of French society in the integration process.

Both countries share several other elements with the Common Basic Principles. The French and Finnish integration programmes mirror the Common Basic Principles’ emphasis on employment as a pathway to integration. Interestingly, it is possible to note a movement in the Finnish discourse from the idea that employment in itself would suffice to integrate immigrants, towards the idea, which is prevalent in the French case, that immigrants must also be familiarized with host country’s values and general culture in order to integrate into the nation. Like the European level dis-
course, the French and Finnish integration programme discourses also emphasize freedom of religion and gender equality as values, and characterize the targeted populations as lacking gender equality. While we do not venture to forward any arguments about the overall effects of European level legislation on national integration programmes, we note that in the case of the Finnish Integration Act reform, it may be possible to trace the influence of the Common Basic Principles in the policy of the late 2000’s. The direction of the relationship between French integration programmes and EU level recommendations is harder to intuit, given the close timing and the observed influence of French actors in EU immigrant integration policy-making.147

Despite policy similarities and shared concerns that reflect those of the EU level integration strategies, the discourses of the French and Finnish integration programmes remain nationally-framed. Not only do these discourses claim the cultural and territorial nation as the site of integration, they also use national models to interpret what integration entails. Two central differences characterize the French and Finnish national models in our analysis. First, there is a general contrast between French assimilationism and Finnish multiculturalism: the French discourse employs the image of a civic Republican nation that people may access by adhering to French values and laws, and the Finnish discourse references a type of multicultural nation where people have the right to maintain their own cultures and languages, while they are simultaneously expected to take part in the Finnish institutions and work life. Second, ‘the state’ appears very differently in the two cases: the French state acts as a gate keeper for the nation and the main entity with which immigrants are to engage during their integration, while the Finnish state is rarely distinguished from the broader Finnish society, which is the site for immigration integration. This difference can be linked to both the extensive Finnish welfare state, which blurs the distinction between state and social, and the fact that the Finnish integration process is managed with significant amounts of variation at the municipal level, which results in the distancing of the figure of the central state.

147 See, e.g., Schain 2012, 221.
The role of these different national models can be seen in the discussions of employment and language acquisition as justifications for the integration programmes. In the French discourse, employment is presented as a path to integration in itself, with little explanation of why or how employment is important for integration. In the Finnish texts, employment is also equated with integration. The Finnish emphasis on employment as a pathway to integration was similarly assumed for the most part, but sometimes employment was presented as beneficial because it provided an opportunity to have social contact with Finns. Furthermore, in political discourse, employment also derives importance from providing immigrants with a way to contribute to the welfare state system that benefits them, thus legitimizing their stay in the country. \(^{148}\) The necessity of speaking the host country’s language is paramount in the discourse justifying the French integration programmes and can be linked to the importance of the French language in uniting disparate populations during French nation-building. The discourse justifying Finnish integration programmes also emphasizes the necessity of speaking the host country’s language, but explicitly references the right to also maintain one’s own language. The maintenance of another language – an idea that is absent from the official French discourse – can be related to the important presence of a Swedish-speaking minority within Finland, as well as recent legislation to protect the rights of other groups, like the Roma and the Sami, to maintain their own language.

The value of the freedom of religion is also refracted through the prisms of French and Finnish national models. Both countries highlighted immigrants’ religious differences, along with unequal gender relations, as something that defined their integration programmes’ targeted groups, but the national values of religious freedom took different forms in the discourse. The French value of religious freedom was expressed through laïcité, which theoretically separates religion from the state and the public sphere, and relegates it to the private sphere. In contrast, the Finnish value of freedom of religion was framed more as a right permitted by a state that is not devoid of

\(^{148}\) See Pyrhönen, Niko (2012) “‘This welfare of ours’. Justifying public advocacy for anti-immigration politics in Finland during the late 2000’s” in this volume.
religious ties. There was also an interesting difference in the framing of gender equality as a national value in the two countries; the French discourse framed gender equality as a defining fact of life in France, while the Finnish discourse emphasized gender equality as a Finnish value, but also acknowledged that this ideal was not always achieved.

Finally, the over-all presentation of national values also indicates the role of national models in integration programme discourse. As evident in the detailed advice delivered in a similar, sometimes patronizing tone, both programmes’ discourses constructed the imagined immigrant reader of their manuals to the society as relatively unknowledgeable about national values and customs. The French discourse strongly emphasized the need to learn and practice French values, boldly placing the ‘values of the republic’ in document titles, but the majority of these values remained abstract or were only expressed in the form of the French laws that the programme presented. While expecting migrants to respect the existing legislation, the Finnish documents, however, maintained an echo of mutual recognition and did not use the word ‘values’ as much. The Finnish discourse also differed in that in addition to providing similar lists of abstract concepts, it presented more concrete descriptions of everyday values held by the Finnish people, such as punctuality and honesty.

Conclusions
In this chapter, we have qualitatively explored the French and Finnish civic integration programmes in order to shed light on the nature and role of national models within discourse surrounding these programmes. While the broader debate over policy convergence and the continued relevance of national models tends to compare policies and place the countries within typologies of traditions and institutions of incorporation, we approached the idea of national models from a discursive perspective. To this end, we chose two cases that had roughly similar integration policy tools, despite being very different along a range of relevant factors, and we focused on how the policy discourses related to national identity.
Are national models, or constructions of unique nationhood, central to the discourse of incorporation in the age of policy level Europeanization and various processes of globalization? Based on our comparison of the French and Finnish cases it is easy to conclude that, despite the strengthened voluntary coordination between the EU-countries in the field of integration of third country migrants, the rhetorical frame of reference for these programmes is the nation-state. In the French case, it is the Republican secular central state, and in the Finnish case, the welfare state/society. While considerable efforts are continuously made by the European Union to encourage the citizens of their member states to ‘feel European’, this does not appear to be a goal for the extra-EU citizens settling in the member states. Even with similar constructions of immigrants, increasingly similar policies, and the dissemination of ‘European’ identity discourses by the EU, national models expressed as unique national ways of incorporating migrants appear resilient.
CHAPTER 6

The EQUAL-programme in Sweden and Italy: A new opportunity structure for immigrant organisations?

ROBERTO SCARAMUZZINO

People who migrate and settle in a new country have always had a disposition to form associations based on a common local, regional, or national origin. Participation in such organisations, and in civil society organisations in general, has been described as having a direct positive impact on individuals’ integration, as a result of the members being able to come together in order to promote their interests towards the state and society. Furthermore, involvement within organisations has an indirect positive effect as they serve as ‘schools of democracy’ in which individuals have the opportunity to develop the skills and attitudes that are also important for political participation in society. However, immigrant organisations, like civil society organisations, are highly dependent on the institutional context and the related institutional structures that provide opportunities for collective actions, so-called ‘political opportunity structures’. Such political opportunity structures are spread on different levels, from the local to the international in a layered multi-level system, in a scenario ‘… characterized by the coex-

3 In this chapter I will make use of the term ‘civil society organisation’ as a synonym with ‘voluntary organisation’, ‘third sector organisation’, ‘NGO’ etc.

Immigrant organisations struggle with the task of mobilising resources, finding new arenas for their activities, joining new networks of organisations and making their voice heard. We find them interacting with political opportunity structures at all levels: local, national, EU and UN. The way in which such political opportunity structures affect immigrant organisations touches upon an important channel for the integration of immigrants and their children in the host society. In fact, the authorities’ attitudes towards immigrants and the way in which newcomers are intended to be incorporated affect the way in which such authorities address immigrant organisations.\footnote{Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu (1994) \textit{Limits of Citizenship – Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe}. Chicago. Chicago Ill.: University of Chicago Press for the national level; Alexander, Michael (2004) ‘Comparing Local Policies toward Migrants’. In Peeninx Rinus, Karen Kraal, Marco Martinello & Steven Vertovec (eds) \textit{Citizenship in European Cities. Immigrants, local politics and integration policies}. Aldershot: Ashgate, 57–84 for the local level.}

in which immigrant organisations also make use of the political opportunity structures offered by the EU is a topic that has not been given so much attention by research. The few studies present have focused on the participation in the decision-making process\textsuperscript{10} rather than the service provision and implementation of policy\textsuperscript{11}. This is a gap that this study aims to fill by focusing on the participation of immigrant organisations in an EU-financed programme to support new methods for preventing discrimination and to fight against inequalities in the labour market.

The aim of this chapter is to describe the participation of immigrant organisations in the Swedish and Italian Equal programme and to explain how the different national contexts in which the programme is implemented affect the participation.

The chapter will focus on the similarities and differences between the experiences of the Italian and Swedish immigrant organisations participating in the Equal programme. By choosing to compare the participation of immigrant organisations in two different national contexts in the same EU-programme, I aim to explain how the national setting influences the way in which immigrant organisations interact with the structure and how this interaction affects their functions. In this sense I do not intend to test the theory that ‘context matters,’ but rather develop this theory by focusing on ‘how it matters.’ This study adopts a ‘societal approach’ to cross-national welfare research, seeking ‘… to identify general factors within social systems that can be interpreted with reference to specific societal contexts.’\textsuperscript{12}

**Studying the Equal programme: methods and data**

This study focuses on the Equal programme because it is one of the largest European common initiatives in the field of labour market inclusion. Previous research shows that participation in Equal has given some civil


\textsuperscript{11} See Sanchez-Salgado 2010 for a distinction.

society organisations the possibility to finance new activities that might be positive for their target groups and strengthen the position of the organisations within society. Equal has, in this sense, contributed to adding another layer to the political context of civil society organisations, besides the national and the local setting. However, participation requires administrative and organisational skills and competences which are not always easy to find in small civil society organisations. Immigrant organisations, in particular, often rely on the efforts of non-professional volunteers and are usually strongly dependent on time-limited public funding.

The national Equal programmes are designed through negotiation between the commission and single member-states. It is the single member state that chooses which concrete projects are to be carried out and has the responsibility for the implementation. Equal can be seen as an expression of the EU common social welfare agenda based on policies of anti-discrimination and labour-market integration targeting a range of disadvantaged groups, not only migrants. It follows a specific ideology which emphasises the role of civil society: ‘The EU:s new outlook on integration conforms to Third Way ideology in its heavy emphasis on the prominent part to be played by “civil society”’.

One of the main principles of the programme is that the activities to be funded by the programme should be implemented by so-called Development Partnerships (DP) involving: public organisations, private enterprises and civil society organisations. Furthermore, the guidelines state the principle of empowerment, i.e. that ‘…those involved in the implementation of activities should also take part in the decision-making’. Hence, the guide-

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14 Sanchez-Salgado 2010.
15 Odmalm 2004.
16 Scaramuzzino et al. 2010; Sanchez-Salgado 2011.
lines motivate an expectation that immigrant organisations should, at least to some extent, be participating in the DPs that implement activities in the field of integration.

To be able to identify immigrant organisations among the hundreds of organisations that have participated in the Swedish programme and the thousands that have participated in the Italian programme, an operational definition was needed. Therefore, immigrant organisations have been defined in the following way based on the organisations’ self-presentation in the official documents of Equal or on the internet:

1. The organisation is a voluntary organisation,
2. Most of the members of the organisations are immigrants or immigrant organisations (in the case of umbrella organisations19),
3. Experience of migration is part of the organisational culture and identity.

From the list of all participating organisations in the Swedish and Italian Equal programme it was possible to identify 31 organisations for Italy and 21 for Sweden participating in development partnerships distributed among all five themes/objectives of the Equal programme20. The organisations can be divided into the following categories based on the social composition and the identity of the organisation:

- Ethnic organisations (representing one foreign national or ethnic group),
- Inter-ethnic organisations (representing more than one foreign national or ethnic group),
- Hybrid organisations (representing immigrants but with a significant component of members from the host society).

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20 The Equal programme was developed around five different themes/objectives: increasing employability, encouraging inclusive entrepreneurship, facilitating adaptability, promoting gender equality and integrating asylum seekers.
The definition included local and national organisations, umbrella organisations, regular membership-based associations, cooperatives, social economy enterprises, trade unions, political organisations, religious associations etc. These categories correspond to the types of organisations that are usually considered as immigrant organisations in most international studies and research.

With the information available, it was possible to trace, contact and perform interviews with representatives for 22 organisations; 10 for Sweden and 12 for Italy. The interviews were performed face-to-face, by phone and by e-mail, with the persons who had been involved in the work with Equal for all of these 22 organisations. The interviews were conducted in Swedish and Italian, sometimes using English as an aid. They were semi-structured by a guide with questions about the organisations’ regular activities and about the experience of participating in the Equal programme.

Theoretical framework

The Equal programme is studied as an example and expression of the EU as a political opportunity structure for civil society organisations. The political opportunity structure approach stresses ‘...the importance of the broader political system in structuring the opportunities for collective action and the extent and form of the same,’22 and has been used by European scholars in cross-national comparisons of social movements.23 Differences in the political characteristics of the national contexts have been put forward to

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explain differences in the structure, extent and results of comparable social movements.\textsuperscript{24} In the last decade, the use of the concept ‘political opportunity structures’ has become more common also in migration studies with a focus on immigrant organisations.\textsuperscript{25}

The concept of political opportunity structure is not easy to simply transfer from classic social movement research to the study of immigrant organisations, which are often more static and less ideological than social movements and the organisations they give birth to (as for example Human Rights groups and organisations).\textsuperscript{26} Immigrant organisations are not necessarily connected to social movements and are often multifunctional and resemble more community-based and/or interest-organisations.\textsuperscript{27} The functions of immigrant organisations, which have been described and categorised in different ways in previous research\textsuperscript{28}, often include functions that are more connected to the social or cultural sphere than to the political one.

The definition of the concept of political opportunity structure as adapted for immigrant organisations is formulated by Bengtsson in the following way: ‘Structural and institutional conditions – including consistent actor constellations – that provide opportunities for politically and non-politically oriented collective action, within civil society, with direct or indirect political impact.’\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{24} McAdam et al. 1996.
Both the political opportunity structure approach and the resource mobilisation theory highlight the importance of the context for explaining the mobilisation of different groups and the development of processes of self organisations. However, the resource mobilisation theory shifts the focus from the structures to the collective actors that interact with them. It is thus an important perspective that complements the political opportunity structure approach in the theoretical framework for this study. The political opportunity structure approach as an analytical tool highlights the way in which the structures provide opportunities as well as constraints to the immigrant organisations, while the resource mobilisation theory highlights the strategies that the immigrant organisations choose in relation to such structures. The resource mobilisation approach stresses that in order for social movement organisations to achieve their aims and goals, they must have access to resources. Such resources are in the hands of individuals and of other organisations and can include legitimacy, money, properties and labour\textsuperscript{30}.

Most organisations in this study describe their relationship with their environment and especially their interaction with political opportunity structures in terms of the organisations being affected by the structures. Their own rational strategies in coping with possibilities and constraints are much less of a focus in the empirical data. Nonetheless, the organisations make strategic choices, which are often implicit in the data. The choice of complementing the political opportunity structure approach with the resource mobilisation perspective is made with the purpose of treating the immigrant organisations in this study as actors that make choices in relation to their environment and are not only a product of it.

Rosa Sánchez-Salgado also argues in favour of the importance of focusing on the civil society organisations’ response to political opportunity structures in her article about the efforts by EU-institutions to give a European dimension to civil society organisations. She writes that:

Even if it can be maintained that the institutional environment has a significant impact on voluntary organizations, the size and organizational characteristics of each voluntary organization also have implications for the use of political opportunities [...] Consequently, the effort to analyse the impact of European incentives has to take account of voluntary organizations’ willingness and capacity to use existing opportunities.31

In this study I will thus use the political opportunity structure and resource mobilisation approach to analyse the use that immigrant organisations make of the opportunities offered by the Equal programme and the way in which the programme as a structure shapes the organisations’ opportunities. In this sense it is a study of the implementation of Equal at the micro-level32 through specific types of organisations, and of the usage of Europe33 by the same organisations.

The two national contexts

Sweden and Italy as national contexts in the cross-national comparison are compared following the *most-different* logic34. The countries are compared as representing national contexts in which many crucial dimensions, such as the organisation of the welfare system, the integration policy and the roles and functions of immigrant organisations, are assumed to be different based on previous research.

The organisation of the welfare state, and especially the division of responsibilities among the state, private enterprises, and civil society, is a relevant part of the context because it indicates which role organised civil society has in the production of welfare. The Swedish system relies on the public

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31 Sánchez-Salgado 2007, 256.
sector and offers a wide range of risk coverage with generous entitlements. The Italian system shows great inequalities in protection and entitlements, both between regions and social groups, and strongly relies on private solutions to social problems, especially through the family. Thus, the welfare systems rely on different logics; the Swedish model is based on the public sector taking major responsibility in the provision and production of the welfare service while the Italian model relies much more on the family and organised civil society. Also, the third sector in the two countries shows some differences. While both have a strong third sector, the Swedish one is more oriented towards advocacy and expressive functions, and the Italian one is more oriented towards service production.

Sweden has a relatively long experience of large-scale immigration dating back to the end of World War II. Large scale immigration to Italy is a newer phenomenon that started during the 1980’s. The integration policies of the two countries are also different. A comparison between Italy and Sweden based on the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) shows that Sweden clearly positions itself close to the multiculturalist model (cfr. Mats Wickström’s chapter in this volume) as a state with a policy inspired by a civic territorial definition of citizenship and a pluralist view on cultural issues. Italy appears to be further from the multiculturalist model; the ‘equality of individual rights’ is less oriented towards a civic-territorial interpretation of citizenship and more towards an ethnic one. These differences are especially significant, as they manifest in political participation with more limited electoral rights and political liberties, and access to nationality with stricter eligibility rules, conditions and a weaker security of status.

35 Kazepov 2008.
38 The comparison follows the dimensions 'equality of individual access to rights and citizenship' and 'cultural difference and group rights' as in Koopmans, Ruud, Ruud Statham, Marco Giugni & Florence Passy (2005) Contested Citizenship – Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
The immigrant organisational field also differs between the two countries. The definition of immigrant organisations in Sweden has included almost only so-called ethno-national organisations. These organisations are built upon a collective identity connected to the group’s national or ethnic background. The focus of research on these kinds of organisations has corresponded to an interest by politicians for the social and cultural dimensions of integration and for the social and cultural functions of immigrant organisations. This, together with a state-subsidy system based on the culture-preserving function of organisations, has led to what Carl-Ulrik Schierup calls the ‘ethnization’ of immigrant organisations.

In Italy, the definition, both in research and in the political debate, is much broader. In the study of immigration and the third sector in Tuscany, for example, we find three categories of immigrant organisations: mono-national or mono-ethnic (one national or ethnic group), multi-national (more than one national group: for example an organisation for immigrant women), and mixed multi-national (both immigrants and nationals). When looking at immigrant organisations in the region of Tuscany, it is found that about 50 per cent were mixed multi-national, while the rest were fairly equally divided among mono-national and multi-national.

Immigrant organisations in Sweden have been described as serving four different functions in their activities: the cultural function aimed at preserving their own culture, the political function aimed at affecting the receiving country politics, the adaptation function aimed at bringing their own group and the larger society closer to each other, and the home-related function aimed at affecting the politics of the country they came from. Looking at the activities of the national organisations and the local organisations in

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Malmö, Inge Dahlstedt finds that the cultural function is the strongest one, followed by the adaptation/integration function. Political and home-related functions are much weaker, especially for local organisations. These Swedish studies are based on a definition that includes mono-national or mono-ethnic organisations. Italian studies show an interesting division of functions between the mono-ethnic organisations and the pluri-national organisations, where the first group (mono-ethnic) are much more oriented towards cultural activities both directed towards their own group and the wider society. The second group (pluri-national), on the other hand, is more oriented towards mutual aid and assistance as well as political and union representation.

Overall, Sweden is often described as having one of the largest proportions of organised immigrants in Europe, not least as a product of the specific support system for ethnic organisations that has strengthened many organisations in Sweden, especially in their administrative capacity, which is a precondition for many other activities. In Italy, public support plays a much more marginal role for mono-ethnic organisations, and these organisations can rely on many fewer resources (they are mostly self-financing) and administrative capacity. Instead, pluri-national and hybrid organisations seem to have access to more public funds and are able to rely on stronger organisational capacity. The differences in the funding system towards immigrant organisations in the two countries could be explained as depending on the differences in the view on cultural pluralism in the two countries, as described above.

45 Dahlstedt 2003.
Participation of immigrant organisations in Equal

Organisations and activities
This section will start by analysing which types of immigrant organisations have actually participated in the programme. The following table shows the two populations of immigrant organisations in the two national programmes divided into categories. The columns show which organisations are based on individual membership and which are umbrella organisations. The rows show different types of immigrant organisations based on the organisational identities (see introduction):

Table 1. Type of participating immigrant organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Individual membership</th>
<th>Umbrella</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15 (&lt;71%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-ethnic</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6 (29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Italy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>11 (35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-ethnic</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10 (33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>10 (32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>31 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the fact that the number of participating immigrant organisations in Sweden was smaller than in Italy, the participation was actually higher in relation to the total number of organisations that participated in the programs (481 organisations participating in the Swedish programme and 8,597 in the Italian51). The fact that the presence of immigrant organisations

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50 The organisations included in the table are those that have been identified as immigrant organisations, according to my definition, among lists of all participating organisations in the Swedish programme (Scaramuzzino et al. 2010) and the Italian programme (Compendium Iniziativa Comunitaria Equal I & II).

tions in the Swedish Equal programme has been stronger in relative terms than in the Italian one might be a consequence of the more developed immigrant organisational sector in Sweden.

From the table we see that the typologies of immigrant organisations participating in the national programmes are different. A larger number of umbrella organisations participate in the Swedish programme than in the Italian. This is consistent with the Swedish immigrant organisational landscape, which has been created through state subsidies directed towards national ethnic umbrella organisations. In Italy, the umbrella organisations are mostly interethnic regional organisations. This is also consistent with the devolution of social welfare and integration policies to the regional level in Italy, as well as the lack of representation of immigrant organisation at the national level.

Interethnic organisations appear to have a relatively strong position in both programmes. In both Sweden and Italy they represent almost one third of the participating immigrant organisations. While this is consistent with the image of the Italian organisational field we get from previous research, it is remarkable when it comes to Sweden. In fact, inter-ethnic organisations are almost invisible in the research on immigrant organisations. However, it is hard to tell if this depends on the relative absence of these organisations in the Swedish landscape or on the way of defining immigrant organisations in Sweden. In Italy we also find the same share of hybrid organisations which is also consistent with the image of the organisational field we get from previous research.

These figures present, as mentioned before, the total population of participating immigrant organisations identified among all participating organisations in the two national programmes. This study though is mostly based on interviews with representatives of 10 immigrant organisations in Sweden and 12 in Italy. The rest of the chapter will be based on these data.

The projects that were financed by the Equal programme, in which the immigrant organisations were involved, include a certain variation. All had a perspective oriented towards inclusion in the labour market, in accordance with the aims of the programme, but the projects focused on different aspects of this inclusion. Many projects aimed at fighting discrimination by producing information on immigration, racism and discrimination.

Beside projects focusing on knowledge production and discrimination, we find projects directly focusing on producing new services for immigrants. These projects usually had a double aim: to find new ways of helping immigrants by starting new services, and to fight unemployment among immigrants by employing immigrants in the project. These activities have been usually performed through other organisational forms such as cooperative or social economy enterprise, even when the participating organisation was an association.

Another type of activity that we find among the participating immigrant organisations is within the field of education and training. These organisations have performed activities aimed primarily at helping and coaching people in finding a job, a position as a trainee or an education programme. Some immigrant organisations have only worked as an intermediary between the labour market, the education system and the immigrant groups by matching people with different positions, while others have arranged courses themselves and provided coaching.

There are thus three main types of activities that the immigrant organisations have performed within the Equal programme: knowledge production and information directed towards wider society (e.g. about own culture, discrimination), social welfare service production, and education, training and coaching aimed at strengthening the individual’s position on the labour market. The next table shows the distribution of the activities performed among these three types.
Table 2. Type of activities performed by the organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge production and information</td>
<td>2 (20%)</td>
<td>3 (25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social welfare service production</td>
<td>4 (40%)</td>
<td>5 (42%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, training and coaching</td>
<td>4 (40%)</td>
<td>4 (33%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows very similar profiles for the immigrant organisations in the two Equal programmes. As a political opportunity structure, Equal seems to imply certain conditions for access and participation. One of these is that the organisations needed to perform activities directed towards goals and methods that define integration and social inclusion, mostly in terms of labour market inclusion. Many immigrant organisations that participated in the programme had no or very few experiences of performing such activities. In fact, other activities connected to the more cultural or political aspects of integration, to which most of the regular activities of the organisations in the study relate, were not supported by the programme.

The social service production and the social economy enterprise as an organisational form appear however to offer possibilities to add a more communitarian perspective to the activities, which otherwise focused on integration and social inclusion in terms of labour market inclusion. A Swedish organisation, for example, received financial support from the programme, to start a service providing elderly care in the mother tongue. The interviewee describes the situation of elderly people from their ethnic group as very dramatic with people dying in their homes ‘[...]as a consequence of segregation and isolation. They have no possibility to reach the public municipal elderly care or help and support services’. The two-ended objective is very clear in the description: ‘We have as one of our aims this with employment, but it’s only one of them and the user’s perspective is the other’. The interviewee sees that the foreign-born population in the own ethnic group is rapidly ageing, while the public service shows little interest in meeting its needs in terms of being able to handle the contact with the municipal authorities and provide elderly care in their own mother tongue. The second
aim is described as follows: ‘our members are all clients at the employment office (laughs) […] In the existing structures there is a certain discrimination […] To have another mother tongue, which otherwise counts as a deficiency, in our activity becomes an advantage’.

The activities immigrant organisations have been involved in are quite important when analysing the interaction of the organisations with the political opportunity structure. We can interpret these activities as a way in which the political opportunity structure affects the organisation by shaping their activities in directions that are consistent with the aims of the programme. We could also see them as strategies for the organisations to reorient their activities in order to mobilise resources. In some cases it is more a form of selection as the organisations have been chosen because they were already performing these kinds of activities. The empirical data show examples of all three types of processes.

The following parts will present and discuss the way in which immigrant organisations describe and evaluate their access and participation in the programme and its consequences for the organisation. It is important to remember that the views, opinions, and evaluations expressed by the organisations’ representatives are, however, dependent upon their expectations. Participants’ satisfaction is not principally determined by the amount of resources that they received and the influence that they were able to exercise in the partnerships. Rather, it is a function of whether there was a discrepancy between the expected and the actual conditions and outcomes of the participation, when comparing with the conditions of other organisations working in the same partnership and comparing with working in other projects and partnerships.

**Entering the partnerships**

Another important dimension of the participation in the programme is how immigrant organisations have accessed the partnerships in which they have performed their activities and the perceived conditions. A major concern here is whether the organisations have been the initiators of the partnership or invited afterwards, and why. Another important issue is what resources
(money, skills, networks etc.) were required in order to access the partnerships and afterwards, continue in the programme.

Only in a few exceptional cases is the partnership described as a result of the immigrant organisations’ own efforts and ideas. Most organisations have entered the partnership by invitation from a larger, stronger organisation from the public or the third sector, as described by a representative of an Italian immigrant organisation:

One large international organisation, a centre for migration knowledge met together with some Italian associations. But they couldn't do these projects without the immigrants, so they called us because they knew us already. So then we entered the partnership. Because without us, it wouldn't be possible and that's why we have entered.

This is a quite common way of describing the access to the partnership by ethnic organisations, especially the Italian ones, i.e. being invited by an already formed group of organisations. This representative is not alone in describing the reason for getting access to the partnership as a way for the other organisations to ‘include the immigrants’ through an ethnic organisation. In this way, immigrant organisations have become the link between their partnership and immigrant groups that were targets for the activities and among whom they sometimes hired people for working in the projects. Thus, not only did immigrant organisations assume a representational role for immigrants in the partnerships, they also guaranteed that individual immigrants were recruited and included in the activities. Considering the fact that many immigrant communities are loosely organised, it is possible that some participating immigrant organisations that are more structured, visible and ‘connected’ functioned as a link between the development partnerships and other immigrant organisations that are too loosely organised to become a regular partner. Previous studies of the Equal programme support such a hypothesis.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{55} Scaramuzzino et al. 2010.
As a political opportunity structure, Equal thus seems to be open for immigrant organisations that are already connected to networks that include strong public or third sector organisations. Among the Swedish immigrant organisations, it was common for the organisation to have been already included in a network of organisations that were collaborating in common projects. Access to the programme in these cases came through being part of the network of organisations jointly deciding to apply for Equal-funding as a partnership. In other instances, the immigrant organisations were not already partners in the preparatory phase, but were contacted by the partnership and offered access when the process had already been running for a while, especially in the Italian programme.

Some interviewees describe gaining access to the partnership as a result of the partnership being interested in their knowledge about immigrants and their needs. One of the representatives for a Swedish organisation describes how the partnership came into contact with them as their organisation was starting to gather information about the target groups. ‘It was the partnership which came in contact with our organisation. We had already started a project with Objective 3\textsuperscript{56} money […] We had made a mapping to see which needs our ethnic group had’. The immigrant organisation thus became an important source of ‘inside’ information for the partnership about the needs and perceptions of potential users.

Many of the immigrant organisations which gained access to the Swedish Equal programme already had experience with running EU-financed projects, and all had previously been granted public financial support for activities, had some kind of administrative office, and at least one paid staff. In contrast, while many Italian organisations had extensive experience with receiving public funds from the municipality, the province, and the region for most of them, Equal was their first experience with running an EU-financed project. Among the participating immigrant organisations in the Italian programme, there seemed to be some differences between different types of

\textsuperscript{56} Programme financed by the EU structural funds ‘…to support the adaptation and modernisation of education, training and employment policies and systems in regions that were not included in Objective 1’ (regions whose development is lagging behind). Online. Available HTTP: <http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/regional_policy/provisions_and_instruments/g24207_en.htm>.
organisations. Both the hybrid organisations and the cooperatives could rely on strong networks, relatively abundant financial resources, and offices with paid staff, whereas the ethnic organisations seem to have relied to a larger extent on fewer resources and almost only voluntary non-paid work.

Two interconnected factors that seem to play a major role in how the organisations are able to access the opportunity structure are the type of organisation and its starting conditions in terms of resources, competences, and contacts. In Sweden, the interviewees’ descriptions of access to the programme are more similar, which could be explained by the more similar starting conditions of the organisations. The greater variation in descriptions of access in Italy could, on the other hand, be connected to the larger gap between the organisations’ starting conditions. There is, for example, a huge difference between some ethnic organisations’ very poor starting conditions and those of the stronger trade-union affiliated hybrid organisations. It is quite common that the weaker organisations felt that they were invited to join the partnership because the partnership needed to include representatives for immigrant groups, get in contact with these groups, and gather information about them, rather than because there was a real desire to cooperate with them in the activities. Consequently, this could affect their view on the participation.

**Participation in the partnership**

In addressing the dimension of ‘participation,’ I intend to explore the conditions under which the organisations’ representatives perceive to have participated in the partnership and hence, in the programme. My focus here lies mostly on the challenges the organisations face in the participation.

When it comes to the actual participation in the partnership and the programme, there were different experiences among the immigrant organisations as expressed by their representatives. Many of the Italian immigrant organisations find the administrative burden of the participation almost too heavy to bear for the organisation.
It was very hard from the administrative point of view. I don’t want to blame anybody, but the rules for the accountancy were not clear, it was like every time we made the accountancy, the department showed up with a new rule […] the administrative part engaged a considerable amount of resources, our resources which were taken from our ordinary activities.

Among weaker Italian ethnic organisations, the lack of financial resources is described as a major obstacle to the participation. A representative for one of these organisations explained that the participant organisations needed to be able to guarantee financial coverage for 70–80 thousand Euros, which was impossible having a small budget. The interviewee sees this as one of the main reasons why immigrant organisations cannot grow even when resources are available, i.e. because of the poor starting conditions in terms of lack of resources. This was also the case in the Equal programme:

Few immigrant organisations fulfil the criteria for the application, because they don’t have the funds. In our partnership there was supposed to be many associations. At the first Equal meeting we had, there were many immigrant associations. Then gradually with the criteria that were set up, many of them left because they couldn’t solve the problem of having the budget that the participation required.

These two types of obstacles in the participation, the administration and the budget, are both related to the resources of the organisations and were not present in the interviews with the Swedish representatives. This could partly be explained by two factors. On the one hand, it could be related to the national administration of the Equal programme, as many of the conditions for participation vary across national programmes, since they were set up by the national governments. It is possible that the Swedish authorities, following a tradition of user-friendly bureaucracy, have been able to simplify, to a higher degree, the administrative burden that lies on the organisations. On
the other hand, the relatively stable situation of the Swedish organisations, and the fact that they had a longer experience of handling public funds in comparison with some of the weaker Italian ethnic organisations, could also explain these differences.

A common experience for some Swedish and Italian immigrant organisations is the difficulty of making themselves heard in the partnership. ‘Every month we sat in meetings with the steering group. Honestly, we felt that it didn't give us so much. It was talk, talk, talk and in the end, when it came to a “real” level, it was up to us alone to bear the project and carry it on,’ says a Swedish representative. The same representative mentions a commonly expressed obstacle to communication; the administrative language that was spoken in these meetings:

Because the others were people from the municipal authorities, they have another language, a bureaucratic language. We in the association are not used to it. We want more substance: ‘what shall we do now?’, ‘how are we going to do that now?’ That’s how we thought in our association. That’s the way we many times felt that we were talking passed each other.

An Italian representative expresses the lack of influence as a consequence of the general weakness of the organisation at the moment of participation: ‘I don't think that we were one of the partners that had a voice in the partnership: we played our role and that’s it’ said the interviewee. This could also be seen as a strategy of the organisation to enter the partnership and play a role according to the possibilities offered in relation to the starting conditions.

Another strategy adopted by participant immigrant organisations to influence the partnership was to be very insistent from the beginning that their perspective be included in the project. Another representative for an Italian organisation explains, ‘The pathetic thing is that the first issue I raised during the first meeting was how we can speak about women without talking about the work of the foreign women, which are massively present
in the Italian families’. It took this particular organisation one and a half years to make the other participants start to focus on this issue. The representative felt that many other participants found their insistence very annoying: ‘...it looked like I was some kind of maniac about this issue and that I was not being open enough for encounter on other levels […] I think I was being perceived like that’. The representative also found some allies in the partnership in researchers from the university that started to reiterate their perspective giving ‘[…] a scientific base to my spontaneity’ as expressed by the interviewee. Being insistent about the importance of their perspective and finding allies among the participants proved to be a successful strategy for this organisation.

Overall, the Swedish organisations were more satisfied with the conditions of participation than the Italian organisations. Some representatives for Italian cooperatives and some hybrid trade-union affiliated organisations, however, described their participation as characterised by the same conditions as other organisations in the partnership, which few other Swedish or Italian ethnic organisations would agree with.

As a political opportunity structure, the Swedish Equal programme appears to provide fewer barriers for the participation of immigrant organisations than the Italian programme, which seems to offer harder conditions for participation. At the same time, the Swedish organisations more often describe their position as subordinate than the Italian organisations, with the exception of the Italian ethnic organisations. In understanding this apparent contradiction, it helps to remember that the ability to take advantage of an opportunity is affected by many factors that may also influence the way the representatives value the significance of the participation for the organisation, not least the initial expectations but also the way in which the partnerships are organised.

It also seems that Equal, as a political opportunity structure, offers better conditions of participation to the more structured and better connected organisations, even if it is difficult to measure the level of satisfaction among the interviewees. Overall, the starting conditions for Swedish immigrant organisations, as we have seen, seem to be more even, which could explain
why the Swedish representatives’ evaluations of their participation are more similar to each other. It seems also probable that the Italian ethnic organisations’ weaker starting conditions, compared with inter-ethnic and hybrid organisations, affect their experience and explains the major differences in the evaluation of the participation by the Italian organisations.

Besides the lack of resources, one of the major obstacles that the organisations experience in interaction with the other organisations in the partnership is the lack of linguistic and cultural competence. Some interviewees describe the participation as challenging because of the bureaucratic language and because of the administrative skills and resources required to participate. A handful of interviewees, mostly from ethnic organisations, also mention the discriminatory structures in society which made their participation in the programme and the implementation of the activities difficult because of ethnic or gender-based stereotypes: ‘And then women are always unfortunate… because you see how it is here for immigrant women. They are victims of trafficking and prostitution. All these things… exploited at the workplace, raped. They can’t act because they are already stereotyped as weak.’

One of the reasons why Italian hybrid organisations seem more positive about their experience of participation might be their possibility to access both Italian and immigrant representatives and their cultural and social competences: ‘the thing is that to run an association is something, as you can imagine, that requires also a certain capacity to handle bureaucratic mechanisms of applications, authorisations, permits, financing that, in my opinion, require a considerable capacity to handle the Italian bureaucracy. And I realise that in this game those who have a different culture than ours, the Italian one, have to struggle. Thus they risk losing a bit of enthusiasm on this. This is something that I realise is valid in general for the immigration in Italy’, says a representative of an Italian hybrid organisation.

Overall, the fact that the participation of some immigrant organisations in the Equal programme was subordinated to the interests and will of stronger public and civil society organisations to include them, could actually have led to a weaker position for these immigrant organisations in the
partnership and a more limited possibility to affect the projects, which, in turn, could be an explanation for their more negative perception of their participation.

Consequences for the organisations
The last dimension in this analysis is connected to what happened after the end of the Equal programme and focuses on how the experience of participation has had durable effects on the organisations.

In spite of the different obstacles, all of the interviewed representatives for immigrant organisations saw the participation in the Equal programme as a positive experience for the organisations. A commonly described achievement is connected to the activities made possible through the programme; to have had the possibility to experiment with new methods of working with the target group, or to develop a regular activity with new target groups. It has often meant also the possibility of hiring people and paying wages, which was especially important for those organisations that usually rely only on voluntary work. Some interviewees also mention personal growth and capacity building; how they have learned how to handle the accountancy for larger projects and the pay rolls, and work in partnership with larger organisations, and how their knowledge about other groups, discrimination, and the host society has increased.

It has given the opportunity to test our capability and expand our knowledge; to clarify our role against the public sector […] it has also had the value of making us recognized in the regional panorama. We have become, in the eyes of others, a serious and reliable discussion partner in all the issues that we, since Equal, have been confronting and handling jointly with the other actors in the regional migration panorama.

Another representative expresses his satisfaction with having had the opportunity:
[…] as an association and as president of an association to talk to politicians and people located very high in the administration. I took advantage of the situation for talking not only about Equal but also of the conditions of our group and about rights […] It has given me the opportunity to express my views.

Of course, the evaluation of the consequences for the organisations is highly dependent on whether the organisation has been able to continue or even make permanent the activities they have experimented with. One Swedish interviewee described with disappointment what happened when Equal ended and the funds ran out: ‘The association exists and goes on and we try to keep things rolling all the time but it’s more difficult because it’s not possible to volunteer all the time. Moreover, you can’t claim that people should come here and help all the time.’

It is clear that for the larger organisations, Equal has been one project beside many others, although even the most established immigrant organisations value Equal as one of the largest projects they have ever participated in, in terms of the budget, the number of organisations involved, and, not least, the trans-national dimension. For most of the smaller organisations, which were not so established at the beginning of the project, the participation has meant a huge boost of budget, resources, contact networks, activities, and knowledge. For some organisations, participation has also meant access to other collaborations and partnerships, and through these participations, access to new funds. For others, Equal remains a ‘golden age’ in the history of the organisation and they express a disappointment for the waste of knowledge and experience caused by the ending of the activity.

Equal seems to be a political opportunity structure that allows certain access to opportunities for Swedish and Italian immigrant organisations. For some medium-sized organisations, it has been a huge opportunity to strengthen their positions in relation to other organisations. Some smaller organisations, on the other hand, seem to have had rather small possibilities to influence the partnership and gain access to resources through participation. They have not been able to replace the lost financial support with
new resources after the end of the programme. For these organisations, the opportunity structure has been temporary in its effect. For the larger organisations, which were not as dependant on Equal for their survival or for their development, it has meant a new experience in their organisational curriculum vitae. This pattern seems to be valid both for the Swedish and the Italian organisations.

Participation in the Equal programme also provided immigrant organisations with the opportunity to work with new activities that express other functions and roles in the welfare and integration systems than the traditional ones, which are more directed towards cultural or political activities. Many of the organisations in the study, especially the ethnic ones, have a strong focus on cultural activities in their regular activities. For these organisations, the Equal programme opens up the possibility to work with issues connected to discrimination, labour market participation, welfare services, etc., which are more common among hybrid organisations, especially in the Italian context.

Conclusions and discussion

The study shows that Equal might have been a significant new political opportunity structure for immigrant organisations in Sweden and Italy, even if participation included very few organisations, and the conditions experienced for participation and outcome were different among the organisations. The most important opportunity that participation in the Equal programme offered the Swedish and Italian immigrant organisations was resource mobilisation. Resources, such as money, knowledge, networks of organisations, and legitimacy in their own group and in the wider society, are all mentioned by the representatives. As a political opportunity structure, Equal seems to have been open for organisations that already have a certain organisational strength to handle the participation, which is consistent with previous research on the access of civil society organisations to the European level of opportunity structures. Even if we find examples of

immigrant organisations that were able to obtain an independent position in their partnership, many, especially ethnic organisations, described their position as very dependent on stronger actors. In general, the findings suggest that the organisations had a quite deterministic view on their possibilities to participate, which is more consistent with the political opportunity structure approach than with resource mobilisation theory.

The fact that the activities carried out by the immigrant organisations in the two national programmes were quite similar is remarkable, especially considering that the role of civil society organisations in the two social welfare systems is very different. It could mean that the programme has been able, in some way, to stimulate projects at the national and local level with similar activities, even if the methods and the target groups were sometimes different. This could actually mean that the Equal programme has, to a certain extent, contributed to a Europeanization of the national civil societies and of the national social and integration policies.

The way in which the national contexts seem to affect participation is by shaping different immigrant organisational fields. The relative strength of the Swedish ethnic organisations, which have been granted subsidies for some decades now, as well as access to several forms of consultation bodies, might have been an important factor, allowing them a stronger participation to the European programme than their Italian counterparts. The weaker position of the Italian ethnic organisations in the organisational field also gave them a weaker participation in the programme. The Italian hybrid organisations, through their access to other strategic resources in terms of personnel, money, and connection to other networks, found a much stronger position in the partnerships. Overall, the marginal position that immigrant organisations have in both countries’ national welfare and integration systems, should be seen as an important factor impeding their access and full participation to the programme.

Other factors, which might have played their role in shaping the participation of immigrant organisations in the Swedish and Italian Equal programme, include the internal functioning of the partnerships and their different profiles, as well as the internal processes inside the organisations.
The theoretical approach adopted for this study explains organisational processes through their institutional environment. Further studies focusing more on the interaction inside and between organisations could shed some light on other factors affecting immigrant organisations’ use of the political opportunity structures available. Furthermore, the fact that other organisations not representing immigrants, but working with integration issues (i.e. human rights organisations), are not included in the study makes the results not necessarily extendable to cover the whole of the organised civil society that participated in the programme. The fact that Italian hybrid organisations seem to follow a partly different pattern shows that the fact that the organisations are not only for immigrants but by immigrants is an important factor. It might be interesting to compare these results with the participation to the Equal programme by other organisations by and for discriminated and/or marginalised groups and see if they have perceived their participation in the same way.
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Immigration and welfare are two salient and charged themes in today’s political discussions. State and non-state actors have worked to expand, retrench, and extensively reform welfare states in the years following World War II, and these struggles have coincided with the thorough politicisation of immigration.

Borders and barriers have been torn down and re-built at an increasing tempo over the last 20 years as migration has risen to the top of the political agenda. The aim of this volume is to examine how the welfare state, as a normative and institutional framework, shapes immigration discourse and policy and, in turn, how the welfare state, as an ideal and as an arrangement of policies, is shaped by immigration.

The six chapters of this volume examine a variety of encounters between migrants and welfare states, ranging from the Swedish multicultural immigrant policy of the 1970’s to contemporary integration programmes in Finland and France. All of these studies further ongoing discussions on the theme of the relationship between welfare states and migrations, making this volume a timely and relevant contribution to an important contemporary topic.