Shaken, not stirred

A Construction Grammar account of contrastive negation in English

Olli Oskari Silvennoinen
Pro gradu thesis
English Philology
Department of Modern Languages
Supervisor: Roderick McConchie
University of Helsinki
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List of symbols, abbreviations and conventions

*  Ungrammatical
?  Questionable
?? Very questionable
#  Unintended meaning (e.g., #shaken but not stirred)
CAPITALS Stress in examples (e.g., WHAT is an antonym?)
Overstrike Ellipsis (e.g., Lee loves Kim, and Kim loves Lee)
SMALL CAPS Name of a semantic concept (e.g., SIZE as the concept domain for large and small)

1S  First-person singular (in glosses)
AdjP  Adjective phrase
AdvP  Adverb phrase
BNC  British National Corpus
CG  Cognitive Grammar
CxG  Construction Grammar
NP  Noun phrase
PP  Prepositional phrase
VP  Verb phrase
1 Introduction

1.1 Contrast and opposition

Most English speakers are aware that there are two ways to make a martini. This is not the result of studying the various ways of preparing cocktails. Rather, it is caused by the following all-too-familiar utterance:

(1) Shaken, not stirred.

Ordinarily, *shake* and *stir* are not regarded as semantically related. However, in (1) their semantics are contrasted and a binary pair – *martini shaken* and *martini stirred* – is created in the domain of TYPES OF MARTINI. However, the nature of this process is unclear; more specifically, researchers disagree whether the contrast in (1) amounts to contextually determined opposition as opposed to mere contrast.

Opposition is a much discussed but poorly understood phenomenon. It is related to antonymy, contrast and incompatibility, although researchers interpret these relations in various, sometimes contradictory ways. Apart from linguistics, it is studied in at least mathematics, philosophy and psychology. Opposites are thus not merely a matter of language; rather, they are said to be essential for human cognition, which, it is frequently claimed, has a natural tendency to dichotomise. Within linguistics, traditional studies of antonyms – lexical items with opposite meanings – have focused on inherently incompatible pairs such as *high*/*low*. More recently, however, researchers have started to focus on how antonymous meanings are used and created in discourse (e.g., Justeson & Katz 1991; Davies 2012; Jones et al. 2012). This broadens the definition as well as the class of opposites considerably, some might say indefinitely (Mettinger 1994:62 and references cited therein). My thesis will mostly draw on and contribute to this tradition, although I shall consider its limitations as well.

My window into the inner workings of opposition in discourse is the *X not Y* construction and other forms of contrastive negation. Some of these forms have grammaticalised into negative-contrastive constructions – fixed syntactic patterns for expressing contrastive negation. I shall argue that it is their appearance as *X* and *Y* in this construction that makes us construe *shaken* and *stirred* as opposites. On the other hand, I aim to show that the oppositeness construal is not automatic: there is something in the pair *shaken/stirred* that enables it.
A key assumption in my work is that form and function are linked. I regard the negative-contrastive constructions as meaningful units of language. Thus, I follow work done within Construction Grammar in studying this linking from a usage-based perspective. A practical implication of this is that my study is empirical: my claims about the constructions being studied are based on real language use.

Contrastive negation has been studied from many points of view. However, different research traditions have seldom, if ever, taken one another into account: for example, generativist scholars have largely ignored, and been ignored by, work done in corpus linguistics and discourse analysis. One of my goals will be to bring together research done in these different schools of linguistics.

1.2 Overview

My thesis is a study in corpus-based syntax and semantics, aiming to unite these two perspectives in the description of contrastive negation. My data is newspaper discourse from the British National Corpus (BNC). This thesis will consider the following research questions:

1. What is the prevalence and distribution of contrastive negation in the corpus?  
   1.1. What differences obtain between newspaper genres?  
   1.2. What differences obtain between forms of contrastive negation?  
2. What kinds of contrast hold between $X$ and $Y$?  
3. How can contrastive negation be described in a constructionist framework?

The three main questions correspond to three steps in analysis. The first question is essentially sociolinguistic, although it does rely on an understanding of the syntactic and semantic properties of the constructions that are discussed in the literature. The second question falls into the realm of semantics (understood broadly), and its answer is sought in close analysis of the examples found in the corpus. The third question concerns grammar and aims to explain a part of the competence of native speakers of English: what do speakers need to know when they use contrastive negation?

These three steps are reflected in the structure of my thesis. First comes the identification of the constructions being considered, the family of contrastive negation, which is discussed in chapter 2. The second step involves the analysis of the contrast relations that hold (if they hold) between the $X$s and $Y$s in these forms; to this effect, chapter 3 surveys lexical contrast relations such as antonymy and co-hyponymy, as well as pragmatic contrast. Thirdly, I combine the formal with the
functional, using Construction Grammar as my framework; this is the topic for chapter 4.

After theory, I move on to data and methods in chapter 5. I then present the results of my three-step analysis: where the constructions studied were found, what kinds of contrast they created and/or exploited, as well as how this interaction of forms and meaning can be worked into a construction-based account of \( X \ not \ Y \) and its sister constructions (chapter 6). Chapter 7 discusses these results in the light of previous research and draws conclusions.
2 Contrastive negation

2.1 Forms of contrastive negation

The $X$ not $Y$ construction is a member of the family of contrastive negation or negative-contrastive constructions.\(^1\) The first part of the construction ($X$) is asserted, and this assertion is reinforced by the second part ($not$ $Y$), in which a parallel element is negated. The construction therefore implies a contrast between $X$ and $Y$. The construction can be used with all major phrase types, as these sentences, drawn from the British National Corpus (BNC), exemplify (the negative-contrastive construction is in square brackets):

(2) Conservative MPs who took part in a recent Gallup survey thought standards would [VP fall, not improve], if these changes took place.

(3) […] but her real ambition is to be [NP a movie star, not an actress on the stage].

(4) These distinctions are hierarchical, but they are [AdjP relative, not absolute].

(5) We are talking about governing and developing South Africa [AdvP today, not tomorrow].

(6) The appointment of my brother was decided [AdvP by the Health Authority, not by me].

It may even be used with subordinators (7) and subordinate clauses (8):

(7) We are now talking about [if, not when,] the UK economy ever recovers.

(8) He's more likely to walk out [when he's at the top, not when he's at the bottom].

All the examples given so far are structurally parallel in that $X$ and $Y$ are of the same phrase type. For example, both _shaken_ and _stirred_ are past participles that function as AdjPs. However, the structural parallelism is not absolute; in (9) it is replaced by the functional parallelism of a locative NP and PP:

(9) We were [NP some 4-500 yards from the villa, [ not [AdvP in the garden as has been repeatedly suggested]]].

$X$ not $Y$ and its sister constructions are treated variously in reference works. An early description is by Gates and Seright (1967), who show that the $X$ not $Y$ construction is related to other ‘negative-contrastive constructions’, which they call its ‘transformations’. These are exemplified by NPs in (10):

\(^1\) Some researchers include a comma in the name of the construction: $X$, not $Y$. However, there does not need to be any punctuation mark between $X$ and $not$, nor does the mark need to be a comma, so I have followed the old adage, ‘when in doubt, leave it out’.
I shall adopt the names *X but not Y* and *not X but Y* for these constructions. Gates and Seright point out that in all of these constructions the negated element is optional from a strictly truth-functional point of view. This means that in (10)a, *this book* is the head and *not those* is its non-restrictive modifier. They argue that the latter is therefore subordinate, not coordinate, which can be seen from the fact that in all three sentences in (10) the verb agrees with *this book*, not with *those* or *those books*. As (10)c shows, the asserted part of the construction is the head even when this is not readily apparent from the syntax. Figure 1 presents Gates and Seright’s analysis of the syntax of *X not Y* constructions.

**Figure 1. A subordination analysis of X not Y (Gates Jr. and Seright 1967:138)**

\[
\text{Business} \iff (\text{not} \rightarrow \text{pleasure}) \quad \ldots
\]

In Figure 1, ‘=’ highlights the parallel nature of the two parts, its arrowhead ‘<’ means that the part on the left is the head and the part on the right the modifier, and the parentheses mean that *not pleasure* is the non-restrictive part of the construction that can be omitted without altering the syntactic behaviour or truth-conditional properties of the phrase as a whole. Figure 2 presents a similar analysis of the corresponding *not X but Y* construction:

**Figure 2. A subordination analysis of not X but Y (Gates Jr. and Seright 1967:138)**

\[
(\text{Not} \rightarrow \text{pleasure but}) \Rightarrow \text{business} \quad \ldots
\]

A different approach, along with terminology, is adopted in *A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language* (Quirk et al. 1985). It focuses on *not X but Y*, which it describes as *not (only) X but Y*. Contrary to Gates and Seright, the *Comprehensive Grammar* only mentions the *X not Y* construction in a footnote, and
even then as merely an asyndetic variant of the *X and not Y* construction.\(^2\) Together, they are called types of repudiatory coordination. (Quirk et al. 1985:940–941.) The *X but not Y* variant does not seem to merit a mention in its own right, although it does appear in an example (Quirk et al. 1985:976).

Of the more recent reference works on English grammar, the *Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English* (Biber et al. 1999) does not discuss negative-contrastive constructions. The *Cambridge Grammar of the English Language* (Huddleston & Pullum 2002), on the other hand, does. It introduces three variants of *not* in coordination: (i.) *X not Y*, (ii.) *not X but Y* and (iii.) *X but not Y*. The *Cambridge Grammar* asserts that the negation in these constructions is sub-clausal, although the *not X but Y* construction can be used clausally as well (*They aren’t now leaving on Friday but on Saturday*). (Huddleston & Pullum 2002:811.)

The *Cambridge Grammar* thus contrasts with Gates and Seright (1967) on the syntactic rank of negative-contrastive constructions. It also differs from them in its account of negatively contrasted finite VPs, giving the following example (Huddleston & Pullum 2002:812):

(11) The night turned viciously cold under a sky crowded with stars that *shone, not twinkled*, in the diamond-clear air. (cf. *shone, didn’t twinkle*)

The argument is that, since the negation is sub-clausal, *do*-support is impossible in sentences like (11). This directly contradicts examples in Gates and Seright (1967:140), cited in (12) and (13):

(12) a. He ran—he did not walk—to the station.
   b. *He ran, not walked, to the station.

(13) a. Run, don’t walk, to the station.
   b. *Run, not walk, to the station.

Thus, there does not seem to be a consensus on *X not Y* constructions headed by finite VPs.

McCawley divides ‘forms of contrastive negation’ into five types, three of which are short forms, two expanded forms (1991:190, examples slightly simplified):

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\(^2\) In the interests of clarity, all constructions that are posited in various works are called ‘constructions’ and named in the vein of *X but not Y*, even if the original source does not use this terminology and/or notation, as is the case of Quirk et al. (1985).
According to McCawley, the basic form of contrastive negation is *not X but Y.* It is also the underlying form from which the ‘reverse form’ *X not Y* is derived; in the process, *but* is deleted (McCawley 1991:196). In the ‘anchored form’, the negation is anchored to the sentence rather than the constituent (McCawley 1991:195); this corresponds to Huddleston and Pullum’s clausal use of *not X but Y.* I assume that the reverse form includes both asyndetic and overtly coordinated constructions.

So far, all examples have presented continuous constructions, in which the asserted and the negated element are adjacent. However, McCawley points out that the latter element of short-form negative-contrastive constructions can be extraposed. He even suggests that the extraposed variants of the reverse and anchored forms are more grammatical than the non-extraposed ones, the basic form displaying the opposite behaviour (McCawley 1991:191):

(15) a. John put not gin **but vodka** in the punch. (basic form)  
   b. ??John put not gin in the punch **but vodka**. (basic form extraposed)

(16) a. (?) John put vodka, **not gin,** in the punch. (reverse form)  
   b. John put vodka in the punch, **not gin.** (reverse form extraposed)

(17) a. (?) John didn’t put gin **but vodka** in the punch. (anchored form)  
   b. John didn’t put gin in the punch **but vodka.** (anchored form extraposed)

The contrasted elements can thus be separated. In McCawley’s view, the extraposed variants in (16) and (17) are more natural than (15) because the basic form is a coordinate structure while the reverse and anchored forms are somewhere between coordinate and subordinate (McCawley 1991:192, 198). His analysis of the basic form is thus different from not only Gates and Seright’s (1967) but also Huddleston and Pullum’s (2002).

The constructions mentioned until now are not equal in terms of contrastiveness. For instance, *X and not Y* may be used non-contrastively as well.3 Furthermore, at least intuitively, it does not seem that the paradigm of negative-contrastive constructions is a symmetrical one: the literature does not suggest clausal

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3 An example of this is How to buy a flat and not lose sleep (result of a Google search for ‘and not’ on 26 September, 2013).
variants for \( X \text{ and not } Y \) and \( X \text{ but not } Y \). The variety of forms for expressing contrastive negation discussed in the reference works cited above is summarised in Table 1. Note that the phrasal forms have extraposed variants, which are not indicated in the table.

\textit{Table 1. Forms of contrastive negation}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phrasal forms</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( X \text{ not } Y )</td>
<td>shaken, not stirred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( X \text{ and not } Y )</td>
<td>shaken and not stirred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( X \text{ but not } Y )</td>
<td>shaken but not stirred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{not } X \text{ but } Y )</td>
<td>not stirred but shaken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{not } X, Y )</td>
<td>not stirred, shaken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anchored ( \text{not } X \text{ but } Y )</td>
<td>It’s not stirred but shaken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clausal forms</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clausal ( X \text{ not } Y )</td>
<td>It’s not stirred, but it’s shaken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clausal ( \text{not } X, Y )</td>
<td>It’s shaken, it’s not stirred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clausal ( X \text{ not } Y )</td>
<td>It’s not stirred, it’s shaken.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some studies note that these constructions seem more natural with a contrastive intonation (e.g., Horn 1985:134), which sounds plausible, though I do not know of any empirical phonetic studies targeting these constructions. Horn also points out that contrastive negation needs to be unincorporated: i.e., it cannot be in the form of a negative prefix, for instance:

(18) a. not probable but certain  
    b. *improbable but certain (Horn 1985:140)

In addition, he argues that contrastive negation does not always act like negation with regard to polarity items such as \textit{some} and \textit{any} (Horn 1985:135):

(19) John didn’t manage to solve SOME/*ANY of the problems—he managed to solve ALL of them.  
    (Horn 1985:132, 135; slightly modified)

Horn conjectures that the requirement for unincorporated negation (18) and the failure to trigger negative polarity items (19) stem from the same thing, which in his opinion is that negative-contrastive constructions are ‘operating […] on another level’ (Horn 1985:140). I return to this question in the next chapter.
Before moving on, it is useful to consider similar constructions from a cross-linguistic perspective. English uses the coordinator *but* in many of these constructions. However, in constructions of the form *not X but Y*, it does not have its basic sense: rather, the *but* here is corrective, whereas its basic meaning is adversative. Other languages make the meaning distinction explicit: Finnish has adversative *mutta* and corrective *vaan*, and the same is true of Spanish *pero* and *sino*, Swedish *men* and *utan*, German *aber* and *sondern*, and Hebrew *avot* and *ela* respectively. Furthermore, Romanian, which divides the conceptual space of adversativity into two subtler shades of meaning, nevertheless does not fail to make the correctiveness distinction as well. (Izutsu 2008:655.)

However, the *but* in *X but not Y* is not corrective but adversative, as the following comparison with German illustrates (Konietzko & Winkler 2010:1437):

(20) a. Sandy plays soccer but not tennis.
   b. Sandy spielt fussball, aber nicht tennis.

Incidentally, Libyan Arabic does not allow for this kind of construction:

(21) a. *anē mšēt l-s-sināma, lakan miš l-s-sūg.
   I went.1S to-the-cinema, but not to-the-market
   ‘I went to the cinema, but not to the market.’ (Intended reading)

   b. anē mšēt l-s-sināma, miš l-s-sūg.
   I went.1S to-the-cinema not to-the-market
   ‘I went to the cinema, not to the market.’
   (Algyani 2012:131)

English contrastive negation is also economical when it comes to the negative element. English uses the general-purpose negative particle *not*, whereas French may choose the emphatic negative marker *non pas* instead of the less marked *pas* (Gross 1977:46):

---

4 The terminology is based on *Iso suomen kieliooppi* (Hakulinen et al. 2004: §1101), which lists adversativity, correctiveness and exception as ‘contrastive relations’. Confusingly, Izutsu (2008) uses the heading ‘opposition relations’, which include contrast (corresponding to adversative), concession and contrast. As this terminological conundrum shows, contrast is a widely used and abused notion in linguistics. Its definition will be discussed in chapter 3.

5 The *X but not Y* construction is not always considered to be a form of contrastive negation. In the generative tradition, a distinction is sometimes drawn between negative-contrastive constructions (such as *X not Y* and *not X but Y*) and bare argument ellipsis with negation (such as *X but not Y*) (e.g., Algyani 2012). However, I consider both types of construction to be negative-contrastive, regardless of what type of ellipsis they are (an issue that is not raised in the framework that I am working in; see chapter 4). Note that bare argument ellipsis (or ‘stripping’) also covers constructions that are not negative, e.g., *Ali bought a flat, and probably *Ali bought a car, too* (Algyani 2012:130).
(22) a. *Max n’a pas abattu un if, mais (il a abattu) ce pin.
   ‘Max didn’t fell a yew, but (he felled) this pine.’

b. **Max a abattu non pas un if, mais (*il a abattu) ce pin.
   ‘Max felled not a yew, but (*he felled) this pine.’
   (Gross 1977:47; translations from Horn 1985:158–159)

2.2 Meanings of contrastive negation

Given the rarity of full synonymy in language, it is not surprising that there are subtle differences between the constructions. The difference between \(X \text{ not } Y\) and \(X \text{ but not } Y\) has been noted in several of the works cited above. In \(X \text{ but not } Y\), it is expected that \(X\) and \(Y\) could be compatible but happen not to be. In the other constructions, \(X\) and \(Y\) are conceived as mutually exclusive alternatives. Therefore, according to Huddleston and Pullum, the (a) version is correct while (b) is anomalous:

(23) a. **They died in 1984, not 1983.

Anscombre and Ducrot state four conditions for using the French equivalent of \(\text{not } X \text{ but } Y\) (1977:24–25, my translation):

Let \(p\) and \(q\) be two clauses: for them to be conjoined by \(\text{SN}\) [i.e., corrective but]/ (after possible deletions of their common parts), several conditions must be fulfilled.

(1) \(p\) must be a negative clause, analysable as \(\text{Neg} + p’\) […]

(2) The use of \(p \text{ SN } q\) is only possible within a single utterance: the same speaker must have uttered \(p\) – i.e. denied \(p’\) – and uttered \(q\). […] \(^7\)

(3) By saying \(p \text{ SN } q\), the speaker presents \(q\) as the justification for his \[sic\] refutation of \(p’\); which does not necessarily require that \(q\) logically implies the falsity of \(p’\). All that can be said is that the use of \(\text{SN}\) presents \(q\) as refuting \(p’\). […]

(4) Not only does \(q\) serve to refute \(p’\) but it must do so directly. The utterance of \(q\) must be a characterisation – regarded as incompatible with that given by \(p’\) – of the same fact that \(p’\) attempted to characterise. […]

I assume that these conditions also hold for all English forms of contrastive negation, but with some caveats. First, I do not assume that the phrasal forms are derived

\(^6\) Pullum has recently written a blog post on this difference, using \(\text{shaken, not stirred}\) as an example: in the context of making martinis, \(\text{but}\) is impossible, since shaking undoes the effects of stirring, so doing both to a drink is superfluous. He also suggests that \(\text{but}\) produces a conventional implicature in this context. The post, which was written for the \textit{Lingua Franca} blog at the \textit{Chronicle of Higher Education}, can be accessed at http://chronicle.com/blogs/linguafranca/2012/12/11/shaken-not-stirred/.

\(^7\) Anscombre and Ducrot note that \(p\) and \(q\) may be uttered by different speakers if the latter speaker continues directly from the utterance of the former, adopting the former speaker’s words as her own in the style of Huey, Dewey and Louie (1977:25).
(‘after possible deletions’) from the clausal ones. Second, whether the negative part is \( p \) or \( q \) – i.e. \( X \) or \( Y \) in my terminology – depends on the form at hand.

The corrective nature of contrastive negation has since been discussed by Izutsu (2008). Similarly to Anscombe and Ducrot’s refutation, her notion of correction means that some piece of semantic content is rejected and replaced by another, comparable piece, which is asserted (Izutsu 2008:671). Izutsu’s study is couched in Cognitive Grammar (CG). CG is closely related to Construction Grammar (CxG), on which this study is based, so it will be useful to look at her analysis of the semantics of negative-contrastive constructions more closely. The analysis is presented in Figure 3.

Figure 3. A Cognitive Grammar analysis of not \( X \) but \( Y \) (Izutsu 2008:671)

The following is based on Izutsu (2008:668–669). The left-hand side of the figure represents the clause that is being corrected; the right-hand side represents the clause that handles the correcting. The meaning to be corrected is that \( \text{John is American} \), i.e., he is assigned the value \( \text{AMERICAN} \) in the domain of \( \text{NATIONALITY} \). The correspondence between the actual clause (represented by the dark square on top) and its meaning (represented by the curved square) is shown on the left-hand side of the figure by the dotted line that connects the sentence to the letter \( J \) (symbolising \( \text{John} \)), which is in the appropriate box among different nationalities.

On the right-hand side, there are two dotted lines from the actual sentence \( \text{He is not American but British} \) to the conceptual representation. One of these, analogous to the left-hand part of the figure, signals that the meaning \( \text{John is American} \) is cancelled. The other assigns \( \text{John} \) to the correct \( \text{NATIONALITY, BRITISH} \).

This description is admittedly complex. However, it makes several important predictions concerning contrastive negation. First, the corrigendum (here: \( \text{(not) American} \)) and the corrigens (here: \( \text{(but) British} \)) should have a shared domain, and
they should occupy different regions in it. Second, the constructions should function as responses to either previous discourse or implied information. Third, the piece of discourse or implication being corrected is mirrored in the meaning of a negative-contrastive construction, albeit in a negated form. This wholesale rejection lends contrastive negation its rhetorical force (Izutsu 2008:673).

In Izutsu’s analysis, phrasal forms of contrastive negation are varieties of constituent negation, which refers to all negation that affects only one constituent of a clause and contrasts with clausal negation. On the other hand, there is a long tradition of considering all forms of contrastive negation as fundamentally clausal (e.g., Anscombe & Ducrot 1977:24). Even though I do not endorse it myself, I will discuss this line of research briefly. Klima argues that the negated part of the construction actually corresponds to a clausal structure (1964:301). Thus, a sentence containing the $X$ not $Y$ construction would express two propositions, of which one would be affirmative and the other negative. The underlying structure posited in this kind of analysis would probably correspond to what McCawley called the extended reverse form, i.e. clausal $X$ not $Y$:

(24) a. Suggestions, not corrections, are needed. (Klima 1964:301)

b. Suggestions are needed, corrections are not needed.

This would mean that not corrections in this example is an elliptical structure, an idea that recurs in generativist studies even today (e.g., Konietzko & Winkler 2010). In this research tradition, simple reverse negative-contrastive constructions are usually considered a variety of bare argument ellipsis (e.g., Konietzko & Winkler 2010:1436), also known as stripping. An important factor for ellipsis is parallelism, and this is true for contrastive negation as well. In (24) for instance, suggestions and corrections are in parallel structures, save for the negation, and the purpose of the ellipsis is to highlight this. The parallelism, along with the other semantic and formal similarities of these two words, facilitates a contrastive reading of them (see Konietzko & Winkler 2010:1449 for references and discussion).

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8 An analysis that adopts the underlying form suggested in (24)b will need to explain why the order of corrections and not is also changed. My framework, which does not treat these constructions as elliptical, leaves this question aside. See chapter 4.
2.3 Summary

As this chapter has shown, researchers have taken many positions on contrastive negation, not all of them easy to combine. I shall now attempt to weave these different strands together and consider the question that is the foundation for everything that follows: what counts as contrastive negation, and what does not?

A necessary syntactic condition for contrastive negation-hood is that a construction should have two parts: the corrigens and the corrigendum. The corrigens is affirmative and it is sometimes marked by corrective but. The corrigendum is negative, and this is obligatorily marked, usually by not.

A necessary semantic condition for negative contrast is correction through replacability: the corrigens and the corrigendum should in theory be replaceable by one another. This means that they should be members of the same set, no matter how context dependent (this is a question to which I shall return in the following chapter).

A corollary of negation and replacability is that the corrigendum is redundant from a truth-conditional point of view: shaken is truth-conditionally equivalent to shaken, not stirred. I therefore assume that contrastive negation is pragmatically motivated; the nature of this motivation is the topic of the following two chapters.

There are also questions that I leave open at this stage. These include whether negative-contrastive constructions are coordinate, subordinate or whether some of them are something in between.
3 Contrast

As their name implies, negative-contrastive constructions create a contrast between two linguistic elements. Until now, I have used this term as if contrast were an unproblematic notion. In fact, the concept has a long and somewhat diverse history in linguistics, which means that defining it needs particular care. The challenge is not made less significant by the fact that contrast is also an everyday notion that some linguists use in a pre-theoretical sense.

This chapter explores contrast from two angles. First, I shall present pragmatic accounts of contrast. Second, I delve into contrast as a lexico-semantic phenomenon by considering the traditional structuralist lexical relations such as antonymy. Based on recent corpus studies, I shall argue that it is useful to consider these relations as one aspect of contrastiveness in language. Finally, I shall bring these perspectives together, discussing the interplay of pragmatic and lexical contrast.

3.1 Pragmatic contrast

3.1.1 Contrast in information structure

Within pragmatics, contrast is a relatively established notion in the study of information structure, although the term has been used for a rather disparate set of phenomena (Repp 2010:1335). Five criteria have been suggested for an expression to exhibit information-structural contrast, but there is disagreement on which of them are relevant (Molnár 2002:149). The criteria are: highlighting, dominant contrast, membership in a set, a limited set of candidates and explicit mention of alternatives.

Highlighting and dominant contrast are linked. Contrasts are always highlighted constituents, i.e., foci. Focus is a basic notion in information structure. It can be defined as the ‘information centre of the sentence’ that presents new information (Molnár 2002:148). It thus stands apart from ‘presupposition’, information that is old and non-highlighted. Many but not all foci are contrastive; under the definition adopted here, contrastive sentences must exhibit ‘dominant contrast’. In other words, contrastive sentences present or at least suggest alternatives for the focused constituent and reject them (Molnár 2002:148–149). Naturally, in

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9 This use of the term ‘presupposition’ is different from its usual sense as a kind of pragmatic inference. See chapter 4 of Levinson (1983).
negative-contrastive constructions dominant contrast obtains between the corrigendum and the corrigens.

Contrastive negation features quite prominently in the literature on information structure. According to Repp, correction is one of the main functions of contrast (2010:1334). In addition, Drubig has argued that the X not Y construction can be used to identify a focused constituent in a sentence (2003:22). Consider (25):

(25) He interrogated the man who invited the ex-convict with the RED shirt,
   a. *not the BLUE shirt
   b. *not with the BLUE shirt
   c. *not the ex-convict with the BLUE shirt
   d. not the man who invited the ex-convict with the BLUE shirt. (Drubig 2003:22)

Drubig argues that the grammaticality of the (d) version is proof that the focus is the ex-convict with the red shirt, and not the red shirt (a), with the red shirt (b) or the ex-convict with the red shirt (c). If my reading of Drubig is correct, he does not claim that the (a), (b) and (c) variants are ungrammatical per se, but that they are so when the highest-level NP is the focused constituent. This view ties in with Drubig’s generativist assumption that focus is a syntactic feature which is part of the deep structure of the sentence.

The number of foci in a sentence is not restricted. For example, the not X but Y construction may exhibit multiple paired foci, i.e., multiple contrasts (see chapter 4 for more on paired focus):

(26) a. Ivan sent, not an album to Albania for Anna on her anniversary, but a book to Bulgaria for Boris on his birthday.
   b. Ivan sent, not an album but a book, (and) not to Albania for Anna on her anniversary, but to Bulgaria for Boris on his birthday.
   c. Ivan sent, not an album to Albania for Anna, but a book to Bulgaria for Boris, (and) not on her anniversary but on his birthday.
   d. Ivan sent, not an album to Albania but a book to Bulgaria, not for Anna but for Boris, and not on her anniversary but on his birthday.
   (Fillmore, Kay & O’Connor 1988:521–522)

For my purposes, the last three of Molnár’s criteria – membership in a set, limited set of candidates and explicit mentioning of alternatives – are particularly interesting. By default, negative-contrastive constructions have two slots for elements to be contrasted (e.g., X and not Y in the X not Y construction). Consequently, at least two members of a contrastive set are mentioned in them. However, it is entirely possible
that either $X$ or $Y$ is a coordinate structure. In addition, it is at least logically possible that the contrastive set includes members that are not explicit in the construction.

Membership in a set is more problematic than it appears, as two well-worn examples show (one of which is repeated from the introduction):

(27) Shaken, not stirred.
(28) Make love, not war!

*Shaken* and *stirred* clearly exhaust a domain, thus forming what Molnár calls a ‘limited set’ that is explicitly mentioned. Information structure and lexical semantics seem to converge in Molnár’s account of contrast, since paradigmatic lexical relations are one way in which contrastive sets can be generated (Molnár 2002:149), and it does not seem difficult to extend this analysis to non-canonical or contextually construed lexical relations as well, such as the one between *shaken* and *stirred* (see sections 3.2 and 3.3). By contrast, *love* and *war* are hardly conceptually related. Rather, since both require *make* as their predicate, their link is grammatical and metalinguistic. Thus, the notion of set is to be understood in a loose sense.

Another feature of contrastiveness with implications for the present study is the ‘requirement to exclude alternatives’, which means that ‘contrast comes with an element of rejection or correction’ (Repp 2010:1335, 1338). If members of a contrastive set change places, the resulting expression has truth values different from the original: *Make war, not love!* is a case in point. Although not all forms of contrast are corrective, I deemed this a necessary condition of contrastive negation in the previous chapter.

### 3.1.2 Negation and contrast

Perhaps the most influential take on the pragmatic contrast effected by the constructions under study is that by Horn (1985). According to his analysis, *not* is pragmatically ambiguous, i.e. it has two uses: descriptive and metalinguistic. Descriptive negation is the familiar, unmarked use that concerns propositions. Metalinguistic negation, on the other hand, is marked. It is ‘a means for objecting to a previous utterance on any grounds whatever, including […] the way it was pronounced’ (Horn 1985:134). This means that it is the utterance itself that is negated, not the propositional content:

(29) Ben Ward is not a black police commissioner but a police commissioner who is black. (cited in Horn 1985:133)
For Horn, the main function of contrastive negation is to express metalinguistic negation (1985:170), and he does not seem to say much about descriptive uses of negative-contrastive constructions. While Horn focuses on *not X but Y* and the extended forms, his analysis has been understood to apply to *X not Y* as well (McCawley 1991:190). His account has been fiercely debated – indeed, McCawley wrote his descriptive article largely as a rebuttal to it. McCawley concurs with Horn that contrastive negation ‘lends itself particularly easily to metalinguistic uses’ (1991:189), yet he finds that it is not solely or perhaps even primarily metalinguistic. This is the view that seems to have won, as later studies have constrained, downplayed or even neglected to mention the metalinguistic potential of these constructions (cf. Geurts 1998; Huddleston & Pullum 2002:811–812; Jones et al. 2012:109, among others).

Arguing against Horn’s division into descriptive and metalinguistic negation, Geurts (1998) has put forward a more fine-grained classification. He contrasts descriptive negation with denials, utterances ‘used to correct an earlier statement or some contextually salient assumption’ (Geurts 1998:275). Denials include Horn’s metalinguistic negation as well as normal, descriptive or descriptive-like negations that have a corrective purpose in discourse.\(^{10}\) Geurts divides denials into four categories, which are listed here with examples:

\[(30)\] **PROPOSITION DENIALS**
If Ramon hadn’t been Spanish but French, he would still beat his donkey.

\[(31)\] **PRESUPPOSITION DENIALS**
Barney didn’t take his WIFE to Acapulco—he isn’t even married—but his GIRLfriend.

\[(32)\] **IMPLICATURE DENIALS**
A: Julius had six beers.
B: He didn’t have six beers: he had at least seven.

\[(33)\] **FORM DENIALS**
A: Kurt swallowed a whole to[mə:]to.
B: He didn’t swallow a to[mə:]to but a to[mer]to.
(Geurts 1998:280, 287)

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\(^{10}\) Geurts first lets on that negations are of two types: descriptive negation and denial. However, on the very same page, he says that ‘the division between descriptive negation and [proposition] denial must be a fluid one’ (Geurts 1998:275), and later he suggests that a contrastive negation functioning as a proposition denial ‘is supposedly used descriptively’ (1998:280). What I take from this is that there is a cline going from pure descriptive negation to pure denial, with proposition denials falling somewhere in between.
Proposition denials affect the surface-semantic content of the sentence, such as Ramon’s nationality, whereas presupposition denials target a pragmatic inference, which in this case is Barney’s marital status. Implicature denials should actually be called scalar denials: they negate one place on a scale – here, NUMBER OF BEERS CONSUMED – and suggest another. Form denials concern the linguistic material of which the utterance is made and are thus metalinguistic; apart from pronunciation, they may target vocabulary choice, morphology and sentence structure, among other things.

Each type of denial can in principle be expressed using contrastive negation. However, Geurts asserts that ‘contrastive negation very rarely occurs in presupposition denials and is nearly always used in implicature and form denials’ (1998:281), although he does not support his claim with any quantitative data. I shall assume that all contrastive negations are denials but that not all denials are expressed through contrastive negation. It could be conjectured that negative-contrastive constructions are specialised in the expression of denial but that they are not the only means for it.

To summarise, for the purposes of this study, I define pragmatic contrast as a relation established between two (or more) expressions that are explicitly mentioned as contextual alternatives and whose differences are made salient. These differences may be related to form, as is the case of metalinguistic negation (i.e., form denial), or they may be related to the semantics of those expressions.11 The following section aims at developing a framework for the description of semantic differences using the terminology of lexical semantics.

### 3.2 Lexical contrast

#### 3.2.1 Lexical contrast: codified or created in use?

Traditionally, lexical semantics has been approached from a structuralist perspective, although some ideas in this vein go back to Aristotle (Jones et al. 2012:6–8; Parsons 2012). Structuralists see lexical contrast as the property of specific lexical items: antonymy, for example, is a relation that holds between words such as high and low. The emphasis has been on cataloguing and classifying the kinds of contrast that can exist between words (see, e.g., Cruse 1986). Contrast is in langue, not parole.

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11 The notion of contrast developed here comes close to the Relation of Contrast by Murphy (2003, cited in Jones et al. 2012:8–10).
Another possibility is to regard contrastive relations as things that are created in language use. This is the view taken in most work in the tradition of Cognitive Linguistics (Jones et al. 2012:13). Antonymy, for example, is seen as a relation between meaning construals in discourse, not abstract lexical items in the mind (Croft & Cruse 2004:165). It is a conceptual rather than purely lexical phenomenon (e.g., Vogel 2009; Jones et al. 2012). Indeed, Jones and his colleagues go on to claim that almost any word pair can be construed as antonymous, especially with the help of contrastive constructions such as \( X \not= Y \). However, even in broadly cognitivist work it is possible to classify the kinds of items that enter into contrastive meaning construals. For instance, Jones et al. (2012) acknowledge that word pairs such as high/low are inherently antonymous.

I follow Murphy et al. (2009) by treating lexical contrast as a superordinate for more particular contrast relations between words, such as antonymy and co-hyponymy. The terminology in this area of lexical semantics is in flux, so the choice of contrast as the basic term needs justification. There is a growing tendency to broaden the meaning of antonymy to cover other kinds of contrastive relations as well. For example, Jones et al. (2012) sometimes discusses what I mean by contrast under the label of antonymy, and a similar usage can be seen in such works as Lobanova, van der Kleij and Spenader (2010). On the other hand, Davies (2012) makes the closely related term opposition the umbrella term for the meaning relation created by contrastive constructions. The rationale seems to be that keeping contextual antonyms such as shaken and stirred apart from other contrastive relations is difficult at best.\(^\text{12}\) In addition, it is frequently claimed that thinking in terms of binary contrasts is fundamental to human cognition. This may pose the risk of a vicious circle: the importance of binary thinking leads to a broad conception (and a large number) of antonyms, and the prevalence of antonymy is then used as proof for stating that humans really think in a binary way. I prefer to define antonymy as one kind of lexical contrast.

Obviously, not just any pair of lexical items can be meaningfully regarded as contrastive, even if they do have different meanings, at least without strong

\(^{12}\) I should note that, while using antonym as the umbrella term for contrast, Jones et al. (2012) and Murphy (2006) do use contrast in a technical sense as well, as pragmatic specification for contrastive and antonymous constructions (see the following chapter). I have opted for using the same term both for the description of lexical relations and for the construal of these relations in grammatical or lexical constructions.
contextual support: civilian/banana is an unlikely contrastive pair in any situation. Both similarity and difference are required (Cruse 1986:197). Thus it is natural that lexical contrast has been studied from the point of view of paradigmatic meaning relations (cf. Cruse 1986:86).

3.2.2 Kinds of lexical contrast
I concur with Jones et al. (2012) that lexical contrast is both codified and created in use. This section outlines the major types of lexical contrast that have been suggested in the literature.

There are four basic meaning relations between expressions: identity, inclusion, overlap and disjunction. In lexico-semantic terms, identity is synonymy, inclusion is hyponymy (and in my opinion meronymy as well), overlap is compatibility, and disjunction is incompatibility (Cruse 1986:86–93; I have modified the terminology somewhat). I divide disjunction into binary and non-binary: in lexical semantics, the former is paralleled by antonymy while the latter’s counterparts are co-hyponymy and co-meronymy (cf. Cruse 1986:159–160, 257).

Synonymy might seem like an unlikely candidate for a contrast relation. Absolute synonyms are obviously not semantically contrastive, since there is no difference between their meanings to highlight, which is the prerequisite for contrast.13 However, plesionyms or near-synonyms, such as foggy/misty can be contrasted, as in (34):

(34) It wasn’t foggy last Friday – just misty. (Cruse 1986:285)

It is in fact debatable whether plesionyms are a sub-group of synonyms or of compatibles. Cruse argues that synonymy is a matter of more-or-less, not either-or. Under this view, absolute synonymy glides into connotationally differentiated or cognitive synonymy and plesionymy, which in turn becomes compatibility at some point of the scale (Cruse 1986:267–268).

There is textual evidence for this view of plesionymy. In Storjohann’s corpus-driven study, German plesionyms were found to act in two ways: as synonyms and as contrastive pairs (Storjohann 2009). Furthermore, these two uses were associated with different lexico-syntactic frames; the German equivalent of X not Y was found, unsurprisingly, to be associated with the contrastive use (Storjohann 2009:2153).

13 Of course, a metalinguistic contrast may in principle be established between absolute synonyms. At this point, I leave aside the question of whether language allows absolute synonymy.
Storjohann argues that neither similarity nor difference is paramount for the description of plesionyms – both can be foregrounded according to the speaker’s discourse needs.

Hyponymy and meronymy have received little attention as contrast relations. Hyponymy refers to such lexical sets as animal : cat, dog, etc. where the superordinate term animal is called the hyperonym and the subordinate terms, or kinds of animal, are its hyponyms. The relation between hyponyms of the same hyperonym is co-hyponymy, a kind of incompatibility.\(^{14}\) Meronymy is the term for part-whole relations, such as hand : palm, thumb, index finger, etc. where, analogously to hyponymy, meronyms of hand are co-meronyms with each other.

Compatibility has perhaps been even more below the radar than hyponymy and meronymy. That two words have meanings which sometimes overlap is not particularly interesting: harmless and heavy are compatibles, and that is the end of what can be said of their relationship from a lexical point of view. However, when there is a common superordinate between two compatibles, the notion may begin to have some interest (Cruse 1986:92). Cruse gives the example of dog and pet, which not only overlap but also have the same hyperonym, animal, despite not being in the same hyponymous sets.\(^{15}\)

Antonymy and co-hyponymy are the most naturally contrastive relations. I follow Jones et al. by defining antonyms as words or expressions that have opposite meanings in a certain context (2012:2–3).\(^{16}\) This means that the notion includes both highly general pairings such as high/low and more contextually dependent ones such as shaken/stirred. There are two criteria for a word pair to count as antonyms: first, they must be incompatible, and second, they must be minimally different (Cruse 1986:197; Jones et al. 2012:3). Taking shaken and stirred as examples, a martini is necessarily either shaken or stirred, so the incompatibility criterion is fulfilled. In addition, these two words share most of their meaning (in this context at least): both

\(^{14}\) It is also possible that a co-hyponymous set does not have a readily lexicalised hyperonym (Cruse 1986:142).

\(^{15}\) Compatibility may have grammatical significance. Recall from the previous chapter the difference between shaken, not stirred and #shaken but not stirred. It could be said that the latter construction requires compatibles as X and Y. Since shaken and stirred are incompatibles in the context of martinis, shaken but not stirred is anomalous. However, see footnote 30 for an opposite case in my data.

\(^{16}\) Some authors (e.g., Cruse 1986; Mettinger 1994) use the term antonym in a more restricted sense. To them, binarily contrastive pairs are called opposites, whose two main subtypes are complementaries and antonyms. The former refer to non-scalar (or non-gradable) opposites such as dead/alive while the latter are scalar (or gradable) opposites like high/low.
to denote ways in which the ingredients of a martini can be mixed. That their difference only emerges in this highly restricted context fulfils the criterion of minimal difference. In fact, there should be a high degree of sameness in the meanings of antonymous words.

Antonymy differs from other semantic relations such as synonymy or hyponymy by its potential for being a property of specific lexical items, not merely concepts (Jones et al. 2012:69–70). While one might invent new synonyms for any given word, antonyms are often paired: in psycholinguistic elicitation experiments, for example, *good* is overwhelmingly cited as the antonym of *bad* (Jones et al. 2012:51–52). Sometimes these pairings can be highly conventionalised, in which case they are referred to as canonical or good antonyms. *Hot/cold* is a canonical antonym pair, while *hot/cool* is not (Jones et al. 2007:130). Generally, canonical opposites are conceptually salient and have similar connotations (Cruse 1986:262); the former of these properties may be the reason for which antonymy is particularly prevalent among adjectives (Jones et al. 2012:4). Pairings within a given semantic field can be highly specific: in the domain of SIZE, for instance, *big/little* and *large/small* are both good antonym pairs, but *large/little* is not (Justeson & Katz 1991:1). That a given pair appears so readily as either canonical or non-canonical (or good or bad) is referred to as the ‘clang’ phenomenon (e.g., Jones et al. 2007:131).

Antonymy can be said to be a special case of incompatibility (Cruse 1986:257). In this study, however, I shall limit the use of the term incompatibility to the disjunctive contrast between three or more concepts, which are lexicalised or construed as co-hyponyms. This means that antonyms are cases of binary disjunctive contrast, as defined above. However, the line is sometimes blurred: a corpus-driven study of Dutch antonyms and their grammatical contexts found that there is a group of co-hyponyms that frequently function antonymously in texts (Lobanova, van der Kleij & Spenader 2010:44–46). In fact, some word pairs oscillate between co-hyponymous and antonymous readings, as evidenced by judgment tests conducted on native speakers. Consider (35) and (36):

(35) *Journalisten van die media hebben de afgelopen maanden regelmatig nieuws gepubliceerd over het verloop van het onderzoek en de verhoren van verdachten en getuigen.*

In recent months, journalists from the media have regularly published news on the progress of the investigation and on the interrogation of suspects and witnesses.
In the first example, the similarities between *verdachten* ‘suspects’ and *getuigen* ‘witnesses’ are foregrounded (both are interrogated), while in the second one, they are construed as opposites (either of them but not both is ‘in the greatest danger’). These results mirror Storjohann’s findings on plesionyms (2009), which were reported above. They corroborate the earlier finding that even co-hyponyms have syntagmatic functions, in addition to being paradigmatic meaning relations: at least in German, they co-occur in coordination (Storjohann 2007:4), as one might expect.

### 3.3 Pragmatic and lexical contrast: contrastive constructions

#### 3.3.1 Contrastive constructions

Geurts suggests that ‘the contextual interpretation of an expression need not coincide with any of its lexical meanings (if it is a single word) or with any of its compositional meanings (if it is a nonlexical expression)’ (1998:288). A guiding assumption for this study is that lexical contrast may be created pragmatically, by using certain grammatical configurations. In this section, I shall review research that explores this interplay between grammar and lexis, especially with regard to negative-contrastive constructions.

Among the lexical contrast relations, antonyms have attracted the most sustained interest from a grammatical point of view in recent years. Steven Jones’s study on antonyms in discourse is particularly interesting for the present project (2002, cited in Jones et al. 2012; see also Mettinger 1994). Jones searched a 280-million-word corpus of newspaper discourse for pairs of co-occurring antonyms, which yielded sentences such as the following (Jones et al. 2012:26–27, 34–36):

1. The manager of one of the bars taking part in the teach-in said all his boys were **straight**, not **gay**.
2. Those your **new** ones or your **old** ones?
3. He still doesn’t know the difference between **right** and **wrong**.

Jones found that when antonyms co-occur, they tend to do so in particular lexico-syntactic frames, such as *X not Y* in (37), *X or Y* in (38) and *the difference between X and Y* in (39). In negative-contrastive constructions one member of the antonym pair is the corrigens, the other the corrigendum, as (37) demonstrates. He calls these
contrastive frames, and divides them into groups according to the discourse functions with which they seem to be associated.\textsuperscript{17} The classification is presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Contrastive frames in Jones et al. (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse function (% of antonym co-occurrences in newspaper discourse)</th>
<th>Frames and examples (antonyms in bold, frames underlined)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major functions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ancillary Antonymy (38.7)</td>
<td>Frames: no frames associated with this function \textit{As the old adage puts it, oppositions do not win elections, governments lose them.}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ordinated Antonymy (38.4)</td>
<td>Frames: both X and Y, neither X nor Y, X and Y alike \textit{They’re winter shoes that you can wear outside or inside.}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minor functions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional Antonymy (3.0)</td>
<td>Frames: from X to Y \textit{The diagnosis of Oti’s knee injury has lurched daily from optimistic to pessimistic and back again [...]}.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negated Antonymy (2.1)</td>
<td>Frames: X not Y \textit{The manager of one of the bars taking part in the teach-in said all his boys were straight, not gay.}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrogative Antonymy (n/a)\textsuperscript{18}</td>
<td>Frames: X or Y? \textit{Is she a big or little girl?}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparative Antonymy (6.8)</td>
<td>Frames: more X than Y, X is more AdjP/AdvP than Y \textit{It is easier to agree with Mrs Thatcher than to disagree with her.}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Antonymy (5.4)</td>
<td>Frames: Z between X and Y \textit{He still doesn’t know the difference between right and wrong.}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Residual functions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idiomaticity\textsuperscript{19}</td>
<td>\textit{We’ll search high and low.}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremity</td>
<td>\textit{I am not completely afraid and not completely unafraid.}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simultaneity</td>
<td>\textit{But that strength could also be a weakness.}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The two major categories in Jones’s analysis are Ancillary and Co-ordinated Antonymy. Ancillary Antonymy refers to cases in which one antonyms pair co-occurs with another, resulting in a reinforced contrast. In Co-ordinated Antonymy, on the other hand, the contrast is diluted. (Jones et al. 2012:28–30.)

\textsuperscript{17} Jones and his collaborators have made slight modifications to the original classification in Jones (2002), and their most recent take on the subject is in Jones et al. (2012:chap. 2); this is the basis for Table 2. Davies (2012) has proposed certain modifications to Jones et al.’s earlier work, but he does not seem to have been aware of Jones et al. (2012). Interestingly for my purposes, Davies seems to treat frames of negative contrast as primary (2012:52), whereas for Jones et al. their role is more peripheral.

\textsuperscript{18} Interrogative Antonymy as a category was not recognised in Jones’s original 2002 study, on which the figures in this Table are based (Jones et al. 2012:34). According to Jones et al., in comparable Swedish data the figure for Interrogative Antonymy is 1.2% (Jones et al. 2012:34–35; originally from Murphy et al. 2009:2165).

\textsuperscript{19} Residual functions together make up 5.6% of antonym co-occurrences in Adult-Produced Writing.
Contrastive negation is associated with Negated Antonymy. However, the latter also relates to such constructions as \textit{X as opposed to Y}. In fact, since the categories are intended as discursive and not grammatical, including a co-occurring antonym pair in any of them should not depend strictly on whether the pair appears in a specific construction or not. What matters is the function of the pair in discourse, and this only correlates with the sentence frames. In practice, all negative-contrastive constructions with co-occurring antonyms are instances of Negated Antonymy, but not \textit{vice versa}.

Jones and his colleagues go on to link these frames to canonicity, arguing that the more a pair is used in contrastive constructions, the more canonical it is (Jones et al. 2007:130; Jones et al. 2012:57). They searched the web for ten seed antonym pairs in seven constructions. The seed pairs had been identified in a psycholinguistic elicitation experiment. In each search, only one member of the pair was used in the search, and the other slot was replaced by a wildcard (e.g., the word \textit{beautiful} in the \textit{X and Y alike} construction was searched twice: as ‘beautiful and * alike’ and ‘* and beautiful alike’; the procedure was repeated for its antonym, \textit{ugly}). The purpose was to see whether the wildcard position would be filled by the antonym identified in the previous experiment. The results largely confirmed the findings of the elicitation study. (Jones et al. 2007; Jones et al. 2012:57–68.)

As to the other lexical contrast relations, the links between lexis and grammar are weaker. I noted above that plesionym pairs have been found to co-occur in certain negative-contrastive constructions, and this seems to highlight the difference between the pair (Storjohann 2009:2153). On the other hand, co-hyponyms have not been found in negative-contrastive constructions to any great degree (Storjohann 2007), though this might be caused by their infrequency or the difficulty in extracting the constructions using corpus-driven procedures (Lobanova, van der Kleij & Spenader 2010:42). Therefore, my study may be able to complement previous work on the ways in which co-hyponyms are negated contrastively, provided that they are.

\section*{3.3.2 How opposites are created}

The previous section concentrated on canonical antonyms in contrastive constructions. However, Geurts’s point about the semantic malleability of words and other expressions means that there is more to antonymy than canonicity. Contrast is inherent in the constructions that I am studying; they create contrasts instead of
merely being repositories for them. Whether this amounts to the creation of novel pairs of opposites is another question. Davies suggests that of the contrastive constructions identified by Jones (2002), negative-contrastive constructions in particular serve to ‘trigger’ new oppositions (Davies 2008; 2012). Murphy has made a similar suggestion in less deterministic terms (Murphy 2006; Jones et al. 2012). She points out that not all of Jones’s constructions impose an oppositional interpretation on the elements being contrasted. Indeed, they seem to differ in this respect: *X and Y alike* is very close to forcing *X* and *Y* to be opposites even if their basic meanings themselves are not canonically antonymous, whereas constructions such as *X and Y* require strong contextual support to be contrastive, let alone to construe contextual antonymy (Jones et al. 2012:106–108). This could be seen as an instance of ‘constructional polysemy’ (Goldberg 1995:33).

I would argue that negative-contrastive constructions are somewhere between the extremes exemplified by *X and Y alike* and *X and Y*. First, as noted several times in this chapter, researchers have made various proposals as for the typical contrastive items in these constructions, and most of these are not directly related to or even compatible with canonical antonyms or contextual oppositeness. Second, even though they are frequently confused, negation and opposition are actually two separate phenomena, so reinforcing *X* by *not Y* should not make us expect that the two are automatically opposites. For instance, pairs such as *man/woman* are obviously antonymous, but it is unclear which should be regarded as the negated version of the other, or indeed whether this kind of analysis would suit such pairs.

How, then, do we tell opposites and non-opposites apart? If neither the basic meanings of lexemes (as per Davies) nor the syntactic frame (as per Murphy and her colleagues) gives us a conclusive answer, the only method that is left is the analysis of the concept domain that is being construed. A particular concern is ‘pseudo-binarity’ (Mettinger 1994:73), which means mentioning explicitly only two out of what is implicitly a multiple set of co-hyponymous items. It is of course possible to extend the notion of antonymy to cover at least some co-hyponyms (Lobanova, van der Kleij & Spenader 2010), but to me this seems to confound rather than clarify matters.

Davies (2008), who focuses on contextual antonyms, suggests some criteria for making this distinction. Apart from syntactic frames, he relies on the domain that the terms share and the feature that differentiates them, which he calls planes of
equivalence and difference respectively (Davies 2008:162). This resembles the notion of minimal difference, discussed above. However, he also links non-canonical opposites to better-known conceptual pairings. He illustrates this with an example drawn from Mettinger (1994:69):

(40) ‘Mind you, I don’t think Rex would have actually murdered MacKenzie, but he might have left him to die. The same thing before the Lord, but not the same thing before the law. If he did, retribution’s caught up with him[...]’.

Here the non-canonical opposites Lord and law are both JUDGEMENTAL AUTHORITIES, which is their plane of equivalence (Davies 2008:170–171). The plane of difference ‘is difficult to lexicalise precisely but it could be MATERIALITY’ (Davies 2008:171).20 Furthermore, they draw on a more conventional opposition between the concepts HEAVENLY and EARTHLY. At the same time, they evoke the conventional opposition MORAL/LEGAL, in which case their plane of equivalence would be METHODS FOR EVALUATING AND ENFORCING DECISIONS, and their plane of difference would be DEGREE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVOLVEMENT (Davies 2008:172).

To me, Davies’s approach seems exceedingly complicated, and I also find that is has potential for over-analysis. In addition, he never explains or exemplifies his criteria with reference to non-opposites. This leaves the uncharitable reader with the impression that anything that happens to be in the right syntactic frame is a pair of antonyms as long as the researcher’s imagination stretches to making up a shared domain, however cumbersome that may be. However, Davies does usefully highlight the conceptual nature of antonymy: sometimes a familiar opposition is achieved with unfamiliar words.

My approach to lexical contrast relations takes its lead from Cognitive Linguistics. I regard the different kinds of contrast as something created – construed – in discourse rather than as static parts of the language system. Antonymy, for instance, arises when speakers present a semantic domain as somehow bisected into opposing parts (Paradis & Willners 2011; Jones et al. 2012:chap. 7; see also Paradis 2005).

To say that lexical contrasts are created in discourse is not to discard the possibility of a default construal for a given lexical item (Croft & Cruse 2004:103–104). In fact, the notion of canonical antonymy depends on default construals. Since

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20 I have changed Davies’s notational conventions slightly so that they conform to mine.
Cognitive Linguistics does not assume a strict boundary between semantics and pragmatics, all semantic relations are seen as pragmatically realised, even if they follow convention: even typical choices are choices. Semantic relations are also seen as conceptual, so they are not tied to specific lexical items. This is another version of Davies’s point that a familiar opposition may be realised in unfamiliar words, context permitting. Even default construals are relative to a semantic domain (Croft & Cruse 2004:104). Conversely, unfamiliar oppositions may be construed with familiar words. For example, the canonical opposition black/white has been metaphorically extended from its original domain of MONOCHROMATIC COLOUR into other domains, such as COFFEE (black coffee ‘coffee with no milk’ vs. white coffee ‘coffee with milk’) and LEGALITY OF TRADE (black market ‘illegal market’ vs. white market ‘legal market’) (Jones et al. 2012:114).

3.4 Summary
This chapter has looked into the notion of contrast in linguistics. There have been a number of suggestions on what contrastive negation is primarily for, and they are difficult to reconcile. Are negative-contrastive constructions mainly for metalinguistic negation or are they the paradigmatic means for making a denial of any kind? Is the negation in them somehow special?

The work on contrastive constructions discussed in this chapter has led to two predictions that bear on antonym research in general and my study in particular. First, it has been suggested that constructions such as X not Y serve to create antonym pairs. This idea stems from the fact that a given communicative situation may give rise to a contextually determined antonym pair like coffee/tea (Cruse 1986:198). If such cases are accepted, defining the boundaries of antonymy becomes problematic, but if they are not, we risk ignoring many relevant aspects of contrastiveness. Second, Jones et al. have argued that the more an antonym pair appears in contrastive constructions, the more canonical it is (2007; Jones et al. 2012:64, 69–70), so I should expect to find a number of canonical antonyms as the corrigens and the corrigendum in my data.
4 Construction Grammar\textsuperscript{21}

In the preceding two chapters, I have shown that there are many related but slightly different ways to express contrastive negation and that their lexical fillers – the corrigendum and the corrigens – may have various semantic and pragmatic relations. There would seem to be an interaction between the grammatical forms and the lexical items that are inserted in those forms, potentially with rhetorical consequences. This chapter considers an attempt to capture this interaction in terms of a general linguistic theory, Construction Grammar (CxG).

4.1 What is Construction Grammar?

As the name implies, Construction Grammar revolves around the notion of grammatical construction. While most linguists use the concept pre-theoretically to refer to any structural unit, construction grammarians employ it in a special sense (Moravcsik 2006:202).\textsuperscript{22} To them, constructions are ‘learned pairings of form with semantic or discourse function’ (Goldberg 2006:5). The central idea is that grammar is meaningful and differences in form are dovetailed by differences in function. Goldberg expresses the idea more fully:

Any linguistic pattern is recognized as a construction as long as some aspect of its form or function is not strictly predictable from its component parts of from other constructions recognized to exist. In addition, patterns are stored as constructions even if they are fully predictable as long as they occur with sufficient frequency […]. (Goldberg 2006:5)

This obviously raises the question of where the bar is set for ‘sufficient frequency’, but to my knowledge no universally or even broadly supported limit has been suggested. There is almost certainly individual variation in the extent to which certain patterns of grammar and lexis are pre-processed.

A major part of the CxG ethos – some might say pathos – has been to contrast the theory with mainstream linguistics, which takes its lead from the works of Noam Chomsky. The latter tradition views grammar as an autonomous part of cognition. A line is drawn between competence and performance, although the specific names

\textsuperscript{21} This chapter, as well as section 6.3 have benefited from discussions with and comments from Jouni Rostila, whose help I gratefully acknowledge.

\textsuperscript{22} In the previous chapters, I have exploited this ambiguity by using the word construction without committing myself to either of its senses. From now on, however, construction will have the meaning given to it by proponents of CxG.
given to these terms have varied. According to the classic definitions, competence is ‘the speaker-hearer’s knowledge of his language’, performance ‘the actual use of language in concrete situations’ (Chomsky 1965:4). Syntactic competence consists of highly abstract sentence structures and rules which are best studied by relying on the intuitions of a native speaker, not real language use. Competence is considered largely innate and syntax unmotivated by semantics. (See, e.g., Radford 1997.)

CxG shares Chomsky’s focus on the psychological aspects of language but distances itself from him in other respects (Goldberg 2003:219). Instead of globally applicable phrase-structure rules (as described in tree diagrams), CxG takes more idiosyncratic properties of grammar as its starting-point (Croft & Cruse 2004:236–247). In other words, while generative grammar adopts a top-down perspective, CxG opts for a bottom-up approach. The rationale is that the descriptive apparatus needed for irregular patterns will handle the regular cases as well, but the reverse is not thought to be true (Goldberg 2003:220).

This bottom-up perspective also informs the way in which CxG views the relationship between form and function. Even small differences in form are thought to reflect differences in function (Goldberg 2006:9). Following the tenets of Cognitive Linguistics, this means that there should be no synonymy between constructions (Goldberg 1995:67). However, the opposite is not true: one surface form may well have several meanings, so constructional polysemy is possible (Goldberg 2006:36).

The choice of CxG as my framework stems from the goals of my study as well as from previous research. As to my goals, they relate to the meanings of negative-contrastive constructions. Since I am exploring the interplay between syntax and semantics, it is natural that I use a theory that attempts to take both into account. Furthermore and as discussed below, there is a recent proposal on how contrast can be accounted for in CxG (Murphy 2006; Jones et al. 2012), so applying the theory enables me to test it.

The theory has not been without its critics. CxG assumes that language consists of constructions only – as Goldberg puts it, ‘it’s constructions all the way down’ (2003:223). In a scathing essay, Itkonen points out that such a view risks making construction an empty notion (2011:600, 604). He also points out that, contrary to what some adherents of CxG proclaim, the notion of construction does not do away with traditional grammatical concepts such as parts of speech or clause
elements (cf. Leino 2010:76–77). In fact, ‘it is the “elementary particles” – and only
them – that are used to describe constructions’ (Itkonen 2011:600, my translation).
He suggests that the notion should only be used when its meaning is clear (Itkonen
2011:604). I shall attempt to heed this advice.

CxG is actually a family of theories, with differing emphases and notational
in principle neutral as to the exact version of CxG. However, following Murphy
(2006) and Jones et al. (2012), my notation is essentially a simplified version of
formal CxG, which has been developed primarily by Charles Fillmore and Paul Kay
(see also Fried & Östman 2004).

4.2 Families of constructions
I pointed out above that CxG assumes that no two constructions are exactly
synonymous. This does not mean, however, that there are no links between
constructions. If one construction is formally or functionally based on another, it is
said to inherit properties from it (Goldberg 1995:72; cf. Fried & Östman 2004:71–
72). For example, negative-contrastive constructions inherit negation from a more
general negative construction.

Constructions that are members of the same inheritance network form
families in the Wittgensteinian sense in that members of the family loosely resemble
each other (Goldberg & Jackendoff 2004:536). There may also be inheritance
relations from one member of the family to another. An example of this is probably
the shaken, not stirred construction, which is almost certainly stored as a unit and
which is a special case of the more general X not Y construction, whose syntax,
semantics and pragmatics it inherits (Croft & Cruse 2004:263).

Inheritance is linked to motivation: when one construction inherits from
another, it is motivated by it as well (Lakoff 1987; cited in Goldberg 1995:70–73).
The negation in negative-contrastive constructions, for instance, is understood on the
basis of the negative construction because it motivates them. This entails that
inheritance networks are an integral part of the description of a construction.

Goldberg identifies four kinds of inheritance links (Goldberg 1995:75–81).
The relation between the negative and the negative-contrastive constructions is a
subpart link: negation is part of contrastive negation. It is also an instance link:
contrastive negation is a special case of negation (cf. Goldberg 1995:79). Polysemy
links are between constructions that have similar forms but different meanings; an example of this is X and Y which sometimes instantiates a contrastive construction, sometimes a non-contrastive one. Finally, metaphorical extension links refer to such cases as the resultative construction (e.g., Pat hammered the metal flat), which can be seen as a metaphor of caused motion (e.g., Pat threw the metal off the table): the process of becoming is similar to the process of moving. This can explain their formal similarity – verb, followed by the object that moves or changes, followed by the target location or end state – as well as some of their other properties (Goldberg 1995:81–84).

There are obvious shortcomings in Goldberg’s classification. Since subpart links result in corresponding instance links by definition, the distinction between the two is theoretically redundant. Furthermore, metaphorical extension links are actually a form of polysemy. (Leino 2003:84.) Therefore, I shall only mention instance and polysemy links in the remainder of this thesis.

Following Goldberg, I assume that inheritance is often partial. This means that often only some of the properties of a construction are inherited by another (Goldberg 1995:73–74). Features may be overridden at lower levels of the construction network, for instance, which constrains the generalisations (Goldberg 1995:110).

Inheritance should be kept distinct from derivation (Goldberg 1995:107–108). No underlying or deep structures are posited in CxG. My working hypothesis is that the various negative-contrastive constructions introduced above are all free-standing items in their own right. In other words, none of them will be posited as the ‘basic form’ from which the others are transformationally derived (cf. McCawley 1991).

4.3 Contrast in Construction Grammar

To my knowledge, there are no studies that specifically target negative-contrastive constructions using CxG as the framework. However, there have been studies that have alluded to at least some of the forms of contrastive negation discussed in chapter 2 from a constructionist perspective. Interestingly, they apply contrast relations to the analysis of grammar, be they pragmatic (Fillmore, Kay & O’Connor

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23 In unification-based forms of CxG, inheritance relations are taken to be total (Goldberg 1995:74). For instance, Fried and Östman state that ‘[i]f construction A inherits construction B, it means that A contains all the specifications that hold for B, in addition to features idiosyncratic to A’ (2004:71). By contrast, the conception of inheritance adopted by Goldberg ‘is designed to allow for subregularities and exceptions’ (Goldberg 1995:73), which makes it more suitable for my study.
1988) or lexical (Murphy 2006; Jones et al. 2012). In this section I first review Charles Fillmore, Paul Kay and Mary Catherine O’Connor’s classic 1988 study on the let alone construction, with special reference to their notion of paired focus constructions. Then I revisit Steven Jones’s and M. Lynne Murphy’s studies on antonyms and contrastive constructions. I end this section by considering parallelism as a contrastive construction.

4.3.1 Paired focus constructions

Fillmore and his collaborators set out to investigate sentences such as (41):

(41) A: Did the kids get their breakfast on time this morning?  
B: I barely got up in time to EAT LUNCH, let alone COOK BREAKFAST.  
(Fillmore, Kay & O’Connor 1988:512)

B’s answer consists of a clause followed by a fragment introduced by let alone. Fillmore, Kay and O’Connor point out that there are a number of similar constructions (1988:517):

(42) He doesn't get up for LUNCH, let alone BREAKFAST.  
(43) He doesn't get up for LUNCH, much less BREAKFAST.  
(44) She didn't eat a BITE, never mind a WHOLE MEAL.  
(45) She didn't eat a MEAL, just a SNACK.  
(46) She beat SMITH at chess, not to mention JONES.

The attentive reader will have noticed that (45) is negative-contrastive. In all these examples, there is a fragment introduced by some kind of connective and the fragment is connected to a parallel constituent in the main clause (Fillmore, Kay & O’Connor 1988:517). These two constituents are focused, and therefore these constructions are called paired focus constructions. Since the constituents are juxtaposed in the process, thus highlighting their differences, I would argue that we may equate paired focus with pragmatic contrast, and paired focus constructions with contrastive constructions (cf. Molnár 2002; Jones et al. 2012).

These constructions are elliptical, as Fillmore, Kay and O’Connor note. However, they point out that the analyses of these constructions tend to be isolated from one another,

involving, for example, separate and unrelated rules of gapping, conjunction reduction, right node raising, stripping, and the like, and containing little if any analysis of constructions containing conjunctions like if not, in fact, but only, just, and so on. (Fillmore, Kay & O’Connor 1988:517)
They thus reject the Chomskyan focus on different kinds of ellipsis mechanisms, favouring a unified treatment of fragment constructions instead (cf. Algryani 2012; Konietzko & Winkler 2010). However, they give few details on how to do this. My own approach, which I believe to be in the spirit of their work, is to treat paired focus constructions as an example of surface generalisation. In other words, I favour surface similarities over derivations from more ‘basic’ forms as explanations in the analysis (Goldberg 2006:25). Applying the notion of inheritance links (Goldberg 1995), I would posit a very schematic Paired Focus Construction, of which the more specific constructions in (42)–(46) are instances. Naturally, negative-contrastive constructions would also instantiate the Paired Focus Construction.

There is thus some research background on which to build a comprehensive CxG account of contrastive negation. I now turn to a more recent example of such a background.

4.3.2 Constructions, contrast and antonymy

A controversial aspect of CxG is that every individual lexical item is also a construction. This idea is a corollary of Goldberg’s definition above: words as free morphemes have minimal form associated with function, and this pairing is not predictable from other constructions. The upshot is that the traditional boundary between an essentially list-like lexicon and a rule-based grammar is blurred. All linguistic forms ranging from lexemes and idioms to highly abstract configurations such as the ditransitive construction are conceived as items on a list, sometimes called the ‘constructicon’ (Goldberg 2003:219).

The idea of ‘lexical constructions’ has been applied to the analysis of the contrastive constructions introduced above. As first pointed out by Murphy (2006:9–10), the contrastive constructions are constructions in the CxG sense of the term. The latest formulation of Murphy’s ideas is in the sixth chapter of Jones et al. (2012), and this is the version that I shall present here. The aim is to account for why antonym pairs frequently co-occur, why these co-occurrences generally take place in a limited number of syntactic contexts, and why some antonym pairs are entrenched as lexical and not merely semantic associations (Jones et al. 2012:102). Discussing Negated Antonymy, they note that

[b]ecause a range of antonyms – some canonical, some construable in context – is found in each of these frames, we can conclude that the complete phrases (e.g. black,
not white) are not simply fixed idioms, but that there is an interaction of the frames and opposed pairs. (Jones et al. 2012:108)

This is in fact a special case of a more general phenomenon that CxG strives to capture:

[L]inguistic expressions often reflect the effect of interaction between constructional patterns and the words that fit in them: words, whether heads or dependents, contribute specific semantic properties to any larger construction they occur in, but a construction may also modify some of those properties, as well as add features of its own. (Fried & Östman 2004:22)

The process whereby different constructions are put together is called unification (Fried & Östman 2004:25). If two constructions have features that are compatible, these features may unify, and the combination of these constructions is licensed. To give a simple example, the constructions much and snow both have the semantic feature values [MASS], [SINGULAR] and [–BOUNDED], and the unification of these features licenses the expression much snow (Fried & Östman 2004:33–34). By contrast, *much book is ungrammatical because book has the feature values [COUNT] in lieu of [MASS] and [+BOUNDED] in lieu of [–BOUNDED], and these fail to unify, blocking the expression (Fried & Östman 2004:34–35).

In the case of contrastive constructions, the grammatical patterns should unify with a pair of words or other expressions. For example, the X not Y construction would unify with the words black and white to license black, not white (cf. above). However, this is not enough to explain how speakers tend to pick antonym pairs for these constructions. To overcome this problem, Murphy suggested that canonical antonym pairs are in themselves constructions (Jones et al. 2012:111–116). For instance, the opposition black/white is so entrenched that it is almost certainly learnt as a pair by any competent speaker of English. It thus meets Goldberg’s definition of a construction. Obviously, black and white exist as independent constructions as well; they may be considered daughters of the black/white construction (Jones et al. 2012:116) or, recalling the previous section, the black/white construction may be seen as an instance of both of them (Goldberg 1995:79).24

24 Murphy has previously held that antonym pairs are metalinguistic knowledge (Murphy 2003; cited in Jones et al. 2012:103) – in other words, their being ‘conventional associations’ is ‘knowledge about the words (as opposed to one’s lexical/linguistic knowledge of the words)’ (Jones et al. 2012:103, emphasis in the original). In her later work (Murphy 2006; Jones et al. 2012), she explicitly rejects the metalinguistic analysis, preferring to regard the conventional links between canonical antonym pairs as normal ‘knowledge of the words’ – i.e., as constructions.
Figure 4 presents this analysis more formally. The antonym construction, represented in the upper part, has three levels: syntax (syn), pragmatics (prag) and lexemes (lxm). Syntactically, the antonym construction is lexical [+LEX] and not phrasal [–LEX]. It differs from other lexical constructions by not being a single lexical item, which is specified by the other syntactic feature, UNIT, whose value is two according to the number of daughters. Pragmatically, it has the feature CONTRAST between the daughters, which means that ‘the two daughters are considered to be minimally different for the purposes at hand’ (Jones et al. 2012:116). It is a feature of the antonym construction only, not the daughters individually. (Jones et al. 2012:116–118.) It thus corresponds to the ‘aspect of [the construction’s] form or function [that] is not strictly predictable from its component parts of from other constructions recognized to exist’ (Goldberg 2006:5) in the definition of a construction given above.

Unification enters the stage when contrastive constructions are considered. According to Murphy’s analysis, they too include the pragmatic feature CONTRAST, and it is the unification of this feature that attracts antonym pairs to contrastive constructions (Jones et al. 2012:120). A simplified CxG description of this unification is in Figure 5. The figure also sketches the internal structure of the X not Y construction: not Y is a construction of its own. Fuller descriptions of negative-contrastive constructions and the other constructions that they instantiate are in section 6.3.
Figure 5. Unification of a contrastive construction and an antonym construction (following Jones et al. 2012:120)

The analysis presented so far works well for canonical antonyms. It has also been extended to cover non-canonical or contextual antonyms and even non-opposites. Contextual antonyms are handled by positing an entirely schematic, generic Antonym Construction. It has a form similar to the one in Figure 4, with the exception that it is lexically unfilled. In fact, the generic Antonym Construction is argued to license the more specific, lexically filled antonym constructions, such as black/white. (Jones et al. 2012:116–119.) The specific antonym constructions may be said to be instances of the generic Antonym Constructions, which would explain why they inherit the feature CONTRAST from it (Goldberg 1995:79). Figure 6 presents the Antonym Construction.

Figure 6. The Antonym Construction (Jones et al. 2012:119)
Thus far, my prose descriptions have mentioned antonymy, whereas the feature matrices use the term contrast. The reason for this is that antonyms that co-occur in discourse are a special case of contrast:

The pragmatic feature specification $\text{CONTRAST} \{x,y\}$ requires that the two daughters in the Antonym Construction are interpreted as contrastive within the context. This means that the pragmatic antonym relation is fixed at the pair level, in a top–down fashion. In other words, if canonical antonyms are conventionalized, lexically filled instantiations of the Antonym Construction, then a language user may know that they contrast from the fact of their conventionalization, not because of any particular semantic properties of the two daughters. This is not to say that semantic properties are not relevant [since] in most circumstances the most relevant feature of lexemes is their meaning, and therefore pragmatic contrast aligns with semantic opposition. (Jones et al. 2012:118)

The theory therefore strives to explain (a.) why antonyms seem to have privileged access to contrastive constructions, and (b.) why other pairs of expressions may also appear in them.

4.3.3 Parallelism as a construction

Antonyms sometimes co-occur in an environment that highlights their contrast but does not readily count as a construction. This is especially true of Ancillary Antonyms (Jones et al. 2012:123):

(47) The rich are stupid; the poor are ignorant.

The example displays parallelism. Parallelism is known to create a contrast (Jones et al. 2012:124; Repp 2010:1334). Since this is a formal configuration that is paired with a specific meaning, Jones and his colleagues argue that parallelism itself is a highly schematic construction. The Parallelism Construction also carries the pragmatic feature $\text{CONTRAST}$ as well as the syntactic specification [unit 2], to account for the potential for discontinuity. Although Jones et al. do not offer a feature matrix for the Parallelism Construction, I try to sketch one in Figure 7.
Since a fuller description of parallelism is beyond the scope and aims of this study, I make do with a prose description (cf. Fried & Östman 2004:30) in the syntactic component of the Parallelism Construction, saying simply that ‘X and Y are structurally similar’. The similarity may be syntactic but also phonological or morphological. The Parallelism Construction may instantiate other, more specific constructions, including the Paired Focus Construction, which I posited above. It will be useful when I describe the clausal forms of contrastive negation.
5 Data and methods

5.1 Data: newspaper discourse

The data for this study comes from the national broadsheet newspaper component of the British National Corpus (BNC), which I accessed through the BNCweb interface.25 There are eight subcategories in the national broadsheet component, which is part of the written component of the corpus.26 The total word count of this part of the BNC is about three million words. However, I shall only use three of the eight subcategories: Arts, Editorial and Sports, totalling 754,888 words, which is approximately one quarter of the whole broadsheet newspaper component. The whole BNC comprises approximately 100 million words, of which ten per cent are spoken language. Table 3 presents the subcategories of the national broadsheet component, their contents as specified on the website, and their word counts.

Table 3. National broadsheet newspapers in the BNC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Number of words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>Arts/cultural material</td>
<td>352,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>Commerce &amp; finance</td>
<td>430,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>Personal &amp; institutional editorials &amp; letters-to-the-editor</td>
<td>102,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>Miscellaneous material</td>
<td>1,040,943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Home &amp; foreign news reportage</td>
<td>668,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>Science material</td>
<td>65,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Material on lifestyle, leisure, belief &amp; thought</td>
<td>82,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>Sports material</td>
<td>300,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3,043,004</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total: Arts, Editorial, Sports</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>754,888</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were several reasons for studying newspaper discourse. First, several previous studies on lexical contrast have used newspapers as their data source (Davies 2012; Jones 2002, cited in Jones et al. 2012; Storjohann 2009), so the results will be comparable to theirs. The second reason was my intuition that newspaper genres

25 The BNC was originally compiled by the BNC consortium, led by Oxford University Press. BNCweb is a user interface developed at the University of Zurich. For more information, see Berglund, Hoffmann, Lee & Smith (2002).
26 Lee (2001) describes the genre classification and the reasoning behind it.
differ in their potential to attract these constructions, possibly because of their argumentative value. Previous research (e.g., Biber 1989) shows that genres favour certain kinds of structures over others in order to be more persuasive or less involved, for instance. Examining contextually related but functionally differentiated genres potentially allows for determining whether contrastive negation is a genre feature or not. The choice of these three genres – Arts, Editorial and Sports – is motivated by their differences: editorials are argumentative while sports materials are narrative, and arts materials are a mixture of expository and argumentative (cf. Biber 1989:4). I am therefore in a position to test whether my intuition about the rhetorical import of negative-contrastive constructions is true.

I also considered compiling my own corpus of more contemporary newspaper discourse, but ultimately decided against this because of the amount of labour and the copyright issues involved. BNC texts are at least 20 years old, which should be borne in mind when interpreting the results. On the other hand, the BNC is easily and publicly available, which enhances the reproducibility of the study.

The idea of a web-as-corpus study such as Jones et al. (2007) was also quickly abandoned. The reasons for abandoning the Internet as a data source stem from the nature of the constructions being studied as well as from the research design. The constructions themselves are extremely challenging to locate in a vast body of data. This is due to the fact that the only stable parts in them are very frequent items in the English language. $X$ not $Y$, for instance, can only be found by searching for *not*, a word with a very high frequency, for which this construction is only a relatively marginal use. Therefore, the amount of noise in a web-as-corpus study would make the research unfeasible. In fact, Jones et al. cite $X$ not $Y$ as a construction that is particularly unsuitable for a web-as-corpus study (2007:133). Furthermore, in Jones et al.’s 2007 study, the queries were made with either $X$ or $Y$ filled, which facilitated recall; as even this was out of question for my study, which aims to find out exactly what the fillers are without constraining the range of possible observations, finding a representative sample of the constructions on the web would have been extremely difficult if not downright impossible.

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27 *Not* is the 23rd most frequent item in the BNC when the contracted form *n’t* is excluded from the count. Together they would make it to top 15. For a list of all words in the BNC in the order of frequency: http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/bncfreq/lists/1_2_all_freq.txt (accessed 11 September, 2013). I shall consider the proportion of contrastive negation among all forms of not-negation in the next chapter.
5.2 Methods: corpus-based linguistics

Methodologically, my study is corpus linguistics. A corpus can be defined as ‘a large and principled collection of natural texts’ (Biber, Conrad & Reppen 1998:4). Corpus linguistics can be characterised as the empirical study of language using corpora that are processed largely or even exclusively with the aid of a computer.

Most previous corpus-based studies on contrast relations in discourse have started with a pre-selected list of words and proceeded to examine the grammatical contexts in which these words appear (Justeson & Katz 1991; Jones 2002, cited in Jones et al. 2012; Jones et al. 2007; Storjohann 2007; 2009). Another group of studies has opted for a more open-ended approach, looking for a particular semantic relation such as oppositeness without specifying what opposites are being looked for (Mettinger 1994; Davies 2008). On the other hand, all grammatical studies on contrastive negation have so far been based on anecdotal, intuition-based or experimental data (Gates Jr. & Seright 1967; Quirk et al. 1985; McCawley 1991; Drubig 2003; Konietzko & Winkler 2010) and even when they have been corpus-illustrated, the genre balance of the constructions is not accounted for (Huddleston & Pullum 2002). Furthermore, the grammatical accounts make few remarks about the lexical fillers of the constructions, and the same is true of semantic and pragmatic accounts of contrastive negation (Horn 1985; Geurts 1998).

My study will aim to enrich the existing research picture on contrastive negation by considering a data set that is larger and more systematic than the previous grammatical, semantic and pragmatic studies while also being more focused on form than the previous lexical studies. I assume that differences in genre distribution are evidence of functional differentiation – in other words, construction-hood (Honkanen & Leino 2012:553).

I searched my data mechanically for all sentences containing the word not (and the contracted form n’t). Therefore, my data only includes contrastive negation using not within one orthographic sentence. In other words, I exclude possible variants using other negators (such as shaken, never stirred) as well as those straddling a sentence boundary (such as I want my Martini shaken. Not stirred.). This yielded 4,443 tokens of not/n’t, in all kinds of negative constructions. I converted the tokens to Microsoft Excel and then selected those examples that I judged to be contrastive negations. I identified different forms of contrastive negation and classified the examples; further information on classification principles will be given
when I discuss the results. This means that the analytical technique was interactive, combining automatic searches with human judgment (Biber, Conrad & Reppen 1998:4). The analysis was largely theory-driven, yet adhering to the principle of total accountability: all examples had to be classified and explained. My study should therefore be described as corpus-based rather than corpus-illustrated or corpus-driven (Jantunen 2009:102–103).

The relationship between theory and data is fraught with problems in a study such as this. The first step of my analysis – the identification of the examples that form my data – was theory-driven. It was based on previous research on the forms and functions of contrastive negation. The second step – the interpretation of the contrast relations in my data – was more grounded in the data. I tried different ways of classifying the data and allowed the final set of categories to be influenced by the examples themselves. This poses obvious hazards for the reliability of the analysis: I try to counter these by making the categories and the procedures of analysis as explicit as possible when I discuss the results. The third step – the Construction Grammar account of contrastive negation – was again theory-driven but buttressed by the complexities of the data, as uncovered in the first two steps.
6 Results

This chapter will present the results of the corpus analysis. The first section presents quantitative findings on the different constructions and their genre distributions. The second section is both quantitative and qualitative, discussing the pragmatic and lexical contrast relations found in my data. The third section is qualitative and theoretical, attempting a CxG account of the results in the first two sections.

6.1 Contrastive negation in the corpus

6.1.1 Overview

This section presents the frequencies of the forms of contrastive negation. I begin with the numbers and then explain the criteria used to arrive at them.

I started with 4,443 sentence tokens with either *not* or *n’t*: 2,054 in Arts, 792 in Editorial and 1,597 in Sports. I then identified all instances of contrastive negation and classified them according to form. At this stage, repeated instances of the same example were discarded; this problem seemed to plague Sports in particular, which may mean that the figures for this sub-corpus are somewhat lower than they should be. However, I judged the difference to be so small as to not influence the general trends in the data.

This procedure yielded 343 tokens of contrastive negation. Table 4 shows the prevalence of contrastive negation in the three subcorpora as well as the percentage of contrastive negation among all forms of *not*-negation. It also shows the normalised frequency of contrastive negation, i.e. how often it appears per 1,000 words.

*Table 4. Contrastive negation in the three subcorpora*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Arts</th>
<th>Editorial</th>
<th>Sports</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contrastive negation (n)</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of contrastive negation among all forms of <em>not</em>-negation (%)</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of contrastive negation normalised to 1,000 words</td>
<td>0.520</td>
<td>0.974</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.454</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 presents the frequencies of the forms of contrastive negation found in the three subcorpora.
Table 5. Raw frequencies of forms of contrastive negation by subcorpus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of contrastive negation</th>
<th>Subcorpus</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>Editorial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X \text{ not } Y$</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X \text{ and not } Y$</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X \text{ but not } Y$</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{not } X \text{ but } Y$</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{not } X, Y$</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anchored $\text{not } X \text{ but } Y$</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anchored $\text{not } X, Y$</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clausal $\text{not } X \text{ but } Y$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clausal $\text{not } X, Y$</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clausal $X \text{ not } Y$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total: raw frequency</strong></td>
<td><strong>183</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the tables show, more than half of my examples are in Arts. Editorials also have their fair share of negative-contrastive constructions, even though the subcorpus is much smaller than Arts. By contrast, Sports has a very weak presence of contrastive negation, despite being roughly the same size as Arts.

The three subcorpora differ dramatically in the prevalence of contrastive negation. Contrastive negation is almost five times more frequent in editorials, comment pieces and letters-to-the-editor than in sports journalism, while Arts falls somewhere in between. According to the $\chi^2$ test, the differences between the subcorpora are statistically significant ($\chi^2 \approx 102.72$; d.f. = 2; $p < .0001$). They are also expected since the genres are different. The finding supports the hypothesis that contrastive negation is associated with persuasive and argumentative discourse while being rare in narrative. However, even in the Editorial subcorpus, the frequency of contrastive negation is relatively low.

I only studied three relatively specialised subcorpora of the BNC, so I cannot draw detailed conclusions on the popularity of the different forms. However, some features of my data are so salient that they probably stem from sustained patterns of distribution and are therefore discussed here. The most frequent form of contrastive negation in my data is phrasal $\text{not } X \text{ but } Y$, followed by $X \text{ not } Y$. That the difference is in this direction is caused by Arts, in which $\text{not } X \text{ but } Y$ is much more frequent. In Editorial they are virtually tied, and their order is reversed in Sports, in which the most frequent form is in fact phrasal $X \text{ but not } Y$. The latter form is very infrequent in Editorial but moderately frequent in Arts. Of the clausal forms, it is the asyndetic
form not $X$, $Y$ that is by far the commonest, and this is mainly due to its prevalence in Arts. These distributional facts may be interpreted as supporting the view that at least some of the various forms of contrastive negation are different constructions that are functionally differentiated.

Unlike chapter 2, Table 5 divides the anchored form into two: anchored not $X$ but $Y$ (48) and anchored not $X$, $Y$ (49):

(48) It is used by vast numbers of people who do not live there but take lunch at its many bus stops. (E)\textsuperscript{28}

(49) Censorship, the pious say, is not involved, only federal funding of art offensive to the majority. (E)

The criterion by which these examples were included in my data was correctness through replacement: $X$ replaces $Y$ in the common ground, or vice versa. This same criterion meant excluding constructions such as the following:

(50) There has been a welcome pile of new recordings issued recently; not just of the symphonies, but of the concertos and chamber music as well. (A)

(51) For random instance, CBS has recently released (£9.99 each) not only Cronenberg's 1986 The Fly and its far from negligible 1958 forerunner, but also the 1959 quick-buck sequel to the latter, Return Of The Fly, a collector's item, though not necessarily in qualitative terms. (A)

Formally, these sentences resemble contrastive negation, and they are often treated alongside it in reference works, but functionally they are different. Whereas contrastive negation replaces one term with another, in these constructions, both terms are asserted. In (50), for instance, there have been symphonies as well as concertos and chamber music. The first parts of this construction type include not only, not just, not merely and not simply. The latter part may be reinforced by also or another additive element, but this is not obligatory.

Less frequently, the reverse forms had similar add-ons. However, these seem to have a slightly different meaning:

(52) a. Wired purports to be about America not just Belushi, but this is trite stuff about decadence in Tinseltown […]. (A)
b. #Wired purports to be not just about Belushi but America, but this is trite stuff about decadence in Tinseltown […]. (constructed)

\textsuperscript{28} From now on, the numbered examples will have source references as follows: (A) for the Arts subcorpus, (E) for Editorial and (S) for Sports. Examples constructed by the author will also be marked: (constructed). Relevant properties of the examples will be highlighted with \textbf{boldface} or, when necessary, \textbf{boldface plus italics}. Square brackets indicate truncations, comments or other modifications that are not part of the original corpus example.
The (b) version has a clearly additive meaning that is absent in (a), which does present a contrast between two states of affairs. Therefore, cases such as the (a) version will be included in my data. The correctiveness filter also accepts cases such as (53):

(53) Robbins observed also that the world, not higher education alone, will suffer if ever they cease to regard (the advancement of knowledge) as one of their major functions. (E)

The case resembles that of (52) above. I count this as a bona fide example of the $X$ not $Y$ construction, because it does serve to reject an idea in the common ground, that only higher education would suffer. The word alone is in the scope of the negation, and therefore does not function the way only does in not only $X$ but $Y$.

Another construction type excluded because of the correctiveness criterion is the following:

(54) Nobody was quite sure how many degrees he had started and not finished, not even Boris, but he had been at the place so long he could remember when they used to spell it Freshmen's Fair. (E)

The negated part does not contrast with anything but reinforces the subject pronoun nobody. There is no frame or domain in which one entity is asserted and another rejected.

Contrary to what the surface form might suggest, the not just $X$ but $Y$ construction is not found in (55), which again is negative-contrastive:

(55) Far from mimicking the Statue of Liberty, the new statue holds a gun – not just any gun but an AK-47, the weapon used by the army to blast its way into Peking. (E)

This too is a replacive, metalinguistic construct, and the meaning of just is slightly different from that of (50), since it modifies any instead of not.

Just and more rarely only also make regular appearances in the phrasal not $X$, $Y$ frame without reducing its correctiveness. Of the seven instances of this form which are in my data set, six are like the following:

(56) All our careers were decided by one central agency, and these were not musical people — just bureaucrats. (A)

In this case, the function of just and only is presumably to make the contrast more explicit, since the negative-contrastive frame itself is rather ambiguous.
Many of the negative-contrastive forms are polysemous with non-contrastive constructions, which were naturally discounted:

(57) I couldn't face having kids and not being able to kick a football to them. (S)
(58) Seven players — Carling, Oti, Hill, Moore, Mullins, Linnett and Teague — attended the session but did not train with the squad. (S)
(59) Not a snap or a twang, but the hamstring had gone for the second time in successive matches. (S)

The examples superficially resemble the X and not Y, X but not Y and not X but Y constructions, but they do not meet the condition of correction through replacement. The second example also does not follow Huddleston and Pullum’s rule on how finite VPs are negated in negative-contrastive constructions. In the third, the but is not of the corrective type.

The X but not Y sequence is particularly problematic in this regard: it was often impossible to ascertain whether a given example was corrective or not. The interpretation was made on a case by case basis. The lexical fillers played a role in the decisions: the more closely related and entrenched a pair, the more replacive it seemed to be. Incidentally, the ambiguity did not arise in extraposed constructions:

(60) Offices may have been relocated, but not allegiances. (S)

There were very occasional cases that resembled clausal X and not Y (61) and X but not Y (62). However, they were not corrective. This is in keeping with previous research, which does not recognise clausal variants of these forms as contrastive negation.

(61) He states, for example, that Freudian psychology leads inevitably to the conclusion that love is a force immanent in the world, and is not just a product of the human psyche […] (A)
(62) He is one of the jewels of radio, a playwright who understands the medium, but who doesn't use radio merely as a way of playing tricks that wouldn't work on stage or television. (A)

My study focuses on constructions. Therefore, I also left out sentences such as the following, which resembles contrastive negation but does not display a structurally parallel negative-contrastive construction:

(63) Asked if he was bored, he replied: ‘I'm a little bit tired, I wouldn't say bored.’ (S)

However, I did include

(64) ‘I did not ask for the job — it was offered to me,’ Taylor said. (S)
in which even the voice of the VP is changed from active in the negative part to passive in the affirmative one. This is because the participants remain: I and the job. What is replaced is the whole VP, and in this instance this includes its voice.

6.1.2 Grammatical forms of contrasted elements

This section explores the grammatical classification of the elements appearing as X and Y in forms of contrastive negation. I only discuss the phrasal and anchored forms (n=302); in the clausal forms (n=41), the contrasted elements are both clauses by definition. In this section, I shall not consider differences between subcorpora. Instead, results for all forms of contrastive negation in different genres are pooled together. These findings are presented in Table 6.

Table 6. Contrasted elements by grammatical category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of contrastive negation</th>
<th>Grammatical category</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AdjP</td>
<td>AdvP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not X but Y</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not X, Y</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X not Y</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X and not Y</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X but not Y</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anchored not X but Y</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anchored not X, Y</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As in previous studies on contrastive constructions (e.g., Lobanova, van der Kleij & Spenader 2010), NPs predominate. This is particularly clear for X not Y. By contrast, in not X but Y, PPs are slightly more frequent.

The phrasal form of not X but Y seems to favour maximal projections of PPs:

(65) a. When, I wonder, did it become fashionable for politicians to talk not about the world but about the planet? (E)
b. ? When, I wonder, did it become fashionable for politicians to talk about not the world but the planet? (constructed)
c. When, I wonder, did it become fashionable for politicians to talk about the planet, not the world? (constructed)

The (a) version shows the pattern in my data: the preposition is repeated in both corrigens and corrigendum. The less redundant (b) version seems to me to be less acceptable. The X not Y constructions appears more versatile, as the (c) version shows. However, there was also the following example, which does sound natural:
In my own university, for instance, the number of first year students of biology that we have been able to accept this year has been entirely constrained not by the quality of our applicants but [by] the physical size of our teaching laboratories. (E)

Here, by is not repeated, but the whole PP is still under the scope of the negation, which sets this example apart from the (b) version of (65). These syntactic constraints may help to explain the differences between the distributions of grammatical forms in $X$ not $Y$ and not $X$ but $Y$.

It was very rare for $X$ and $Y$ to have different grammatical forms or for them to be (subordinate) clauses. These are labelled ‘Mixed’ and ‘Clause’ in the table. In addition, there were two cases that could not be placed in any of the categories:

(67) Like when I used to play a seeded player, I didn't think ‘OK, I'm going to lose to a seed’ but ‘All right — this is my opportunity to beat a seed’. (S)

(68) If libel awards (decided by juries) appear high relative to, say, personal injury awards (made by judges against published scales), surely the latter ought to be revised upwards, not the former downwards. (E)

The first case contrasts (fictional) quotations, while the second exhibits what Jones and his colleagues (2012) called Ancillary Antonymy (see chapter 3).

To finish this section, I revisit the question of finite VPs in negative-contrastive constructions. The category ‘VP’ in the table includes anything from to-phrases and participial constructions to full predicates. This notwithstanding, it is quite rare for any of the forms to contrast VPs and even rarer for those VPs to be finite. In fact, the only full finite VPs to be contrasted in my data are in the anchored forms:

(69) And the fact that the film is not frightened of its sexual aspects but treats them with some taste is another point in its favour. (A)

Finite VPs are extremely common, so it might be expected that they would appear in all forms of contrastive negation. My data therefore weakly supports the conclusion that there is a constraint against full finite VPs in the phrasal $X$ not $Y$ construction and its overtly coordinated sisters.

6.1.3 Extraposition and other forms of discontinuity

McCawley suggested that extraposition is more natural for what he termed the anchored and reverse forms. By contrast, he suggested that the basic form would resist extraposition. In my data, negative-contrastive constructions were seldom discontinuous. However, discontinuity took on forms not discussed in previous
research. When the intervening element is tagged to the clause rather than a part of it, I do not consider the construction extraposed:

(70) Today gives Mr Kinnock his chance, not to be serious about wanting to win – he has amply proven that – but to say why he deserves to win. (E)

Since the clause separated by dashes is an aside that is not part of the structure of the main clause, I classified this example as non-extraposed but still discontinuous.

Table 7 shows the extent to which different kinds of discontinuity appeared in the various forms of contrastive negation.

Table 7. Forms of discontinuity in the data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of contrastive negation</th>
<th>Extraposed</th>
<th>Intervening adjunct</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X not Y</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X and not Y</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X but not Y</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not X but Y</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not X, Y</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anchored not X but Y</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anchored not X, Y</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clausal not X but Y</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clausal not X, Y</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clausal X not Y</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Countering McCawley, the anchored not X but Y and the phrasal X not Y were not particularly open to extraposition or even other discontinuities; in fact, the former did not exhibit any extraposition. In further contrast to McCawley, phrasal not X but Y was particularly open to discontinuity, although extraposition itself was quite rare.

The most common discontinuities in contrastive negation are extraposition in the X not Y construction and an intervening adjunct in the not X but Y construction. This might be explained at least in part by the overall frequency of these two forms. In addition, not X but Y is the most explicit form of contrastive negation, which might explain why speakers can confidently break it into two parts without loss of intelligibility.

6.1.4 Related constructions

I tried to gather my data with as few preconceptions as possible, by only searching for not and n’t and then manually sorting contrastive negations from non-contrastive
ones. This allowed me to uncover constructions which are both contrastive and negative but which have not been identified as forms of contrastive negation in the literature. The first group of related constructions consists of phrase patterns that were identified on both formal and functional grounds:

(71) But elsewhere, despite quite a bit of stodge, there has been evidence of lively and (that old critical standby) interesting, if not necessarily very innovative, work from a wide range of quarters. (A)

(72) Further moves can be expected, if not from without then certainly within and anyone with a feel for football, particularly [sic] as represented by Manchester United's history, will draw some comfort from the possibility that Bobby Charlton will eventually emerge as their figurehead. (S)

(73) It is useful (though not always vital) to have played a significant part in the development of popular music. (A)

(74) Contradictions in a system which expects players to concentrate on football, yet not be paid (unless you count scholarships?) are causing increasing problems. (S)

All these examples are syntactically analogous to the forms discussed above: $X \text{ CONJ not } Y$ (or $CONJ X \text{ not } Y$ in (72)). There are thus good reasons to discuss these constructions alongside those traditionally labelled negative-contrastive, although they are not part of my data proper.

The forms with $if \text{ not}$ are the most established in this group. They are frequently mentioned in grammars and other literature, albeit not in the context of contrastive negation. I only collected data on these forms systematically for the Arts and Editorial subcorpora. In Arts, $X \text{ if not } Y$ appeared 15 times, which means it is in the same league as $X \text{ and not } Y$ (10 tokens) and $X \text{ but not } Y$ (21 tokens). The form $if \text{ not } X, Y$ appeared only twice in Arts. There was also one instance of clausal $X \text{ if not } Y$:

(75) Any model of the mind which allows for such a possibility is not a simple one, and hints at, if it does not actually affirm, the existence of the unconscious. (A)

In Editorial, the $if \text{ not}$ forms were much rarer: $X \text{ if not } Y$ appeared only thrice, and $if \text{ not } X, Y$ twice.

The forms $X \text{ though not } Y$ and $X \text{ yet not } Y$ are less studied and they were also much less frequent in my data. In the two subcorpora studied systematically for these constructions, only $X \text{ though not } Y$ appears at all: three tokens in Arts, none in
Editorial. Semantically, these forms seem to come close to $X$ but not $Y$ in that $X$ and $Y$ are construed as potential compatibles.

Another group of related constructions is semantically similar to but syntactically different from the established negative-contrastive constructions:

(76) Jarman does **not so much** wear his homosexuality on his sleeve **as** brandish it like a day-glo banner. (A)

The semantics of this construction resembles that of $not X$ but $Y$. As to form, the **not so much $X$ as $Y$** construction varies on the placement of **so much** and $X$:

(77) But once the authorities had clamped down, it was **not** a case of political Stalinism **so much as** bureaucratic perfidy and complete lack of imagination. (A)

One example reflected this variation inadvertently:

(78) As one is encouraged to endorse broad humanitarian concerns, one is also expected to respond **not so much** to specific songs or artists **so much as** to generic types of music. (A)

The construction also varies on the element that introduces the corrigendum, which can be either **as** or **but**:

(79) Thank goodness we were never occupied — not so much because of what the occupiers might have done to us, **but** because of what we would probably have done to each other. (A)

The **but** is corrective. For this reason, these variants of this construction could be seen as instances of **not $X$ but $Y$**, and in fact Huddleston and Pullum call these forms a ‘blending’ of the two (2002:1317). I chose not to include these instances in my data, as reported in previous sections. The exclusion has only a minimal impact on the statistics, since **not so much $X$ but $Y$** is quite rare.

There was also a clausal form:

(80) With him art does not so much represent nature as human nature creates through art. (A)

Phrasal **not so much $X$ as $Y$** is the most common form of this construction, appearing 19 times in Arts, six times in Editorial. The other forms only make sporadic appearances.

---

29 The **$X$ yet not $Y$** form was detected when perusing the Sports data, which was not classified for the forms related to the traditional negative-contrastive constructions.
6.2 Contrastive negation and contrast relations

6.2.1 Pragmatic contrast relations

This section presents the analysis of contrast relations, starting with contrast as a pragmatic concept. I used Geurts’s classification of the mechanisms of denial (1998), since he explicitly suggests that negative-contrastive constructions can be divided into his categories. The classification is coarse-grained and describes a phenomenon that is probably best conceived of as a matter of degree and not kind, as Geurts himself points out. However, broad patterns in the data may be detected, and these are shown in Table 8.

Table 8. Pragmatic contrast relations in the data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of contrastive negation</th>
<th>Proposition denial</th>
<th>Presupposition denial</th>
<th>Implicature denial</th>
<th>Form denial</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$X \not Y$</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X \text{ and not } Y$</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X \text{ but not } Y$</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{not } X \text{ but } Y$</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{not } X, Y$</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anchored $\text{not } X \text{ but } Y$</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anchored $\text{not } X, Y$</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clausal $\text{not } X \text{ but } Y$</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clausal $\text{not } X, Y$</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clausal $X \text{ not } Y$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (%)</td>
<td>297 (86.6)</td>
<td>1 (0.3)</td>
<td>31 (9.0)</td>
<td>14 (4.1)</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The verdict from the various forms is virtually unanimous: contrastive negation prototypically affects the propositional content of utterances, not their scalar implicatures or formal properties. The finding is unsurprising as such, but it contradicts previous research, in which it was suggested that either implicature or form denials should be prototypical (Horn 1985; McCawley 1991; Geurts 1998).

Among the most frequent forms, $X \not Y$ in particular seems most strongly associated with proposition denial. On the other hand, $X \text{ but not } Y$ is at least somewhat frequent with implicature denial. The negated part of the $X \text{ but not } Y$ construction is often semantically stronger than its affirmative counterpart:
(81) Environmental protection and wealth creation are in tension but not necessarily in conflict, and indeed there can be little hope of improving the quality of the environment without the resources to do so. (E)

In this example, tension is the weaker term which could amount to conflict, but does not (‘necessarily’) in this case. The correction helps the reader to identify the extent of conflict that obtains between ‘environmental protection’ and ‘wealth creation’.

Other examples of implicature denials follow:

(82) Architects/Engineers RMJM have been flying high recently, rubbing shoulders with royalty, not once but twice within a week. (A)
(83) All right, many of them were, but not all. (A)
(84) Maybe yesterday's groupings were not actually bent, just massaged to satisfy World Cup convention. (S)

Examples (82) and (83) highlight the fact that scalarity is often lexicalised: the sets \{once < twice\} and \{many < all\} are probably entrenched in the language system. Sometimes it was difficult to decide if a denial targeted propositional content or a scalar implicature. Cases such as the following were classified as proposition denials:

(85) A good education is a comfort but not a protection against the hazards of life. (A)
(86) It is used by vast numbers of people who do not live there but take lunch at its many bus stops. (E)
(87) We were not disappointed but we were a little hurt. (S)

and these as implicature denials:

(88) The project flourished because France was an authoritarian, but not totalitarian, state. (A)
(89) The surprising [sic] thing is not that this is happening now, but rather that it was staved off for so long. (E)
(90) I felt what was happening was we were going not in the direction of addition, but of total change. (S)

A special class of proposition denials that resemble (scalar) implicature denial is like the following:

(91) He is a judge – and, as it turns out, not just any judge, but the judge who once sentenced Miss Madrigal to death. (A)

Here it is not the scalar position but the specificity of reference that is corrected. Thus the example does not meet Geurts’s criteria for implicature denial even though an implicature is denied – this time, a non-scalar quantity implicature. In other words, in this example, the writer suggests that describing the person in question as
‘just any judge’ would be less informative than the situation requires (see Levinson 1983:101). Although such cases are not frequent, they might call for a revision of Geurts’s classification.

Presupposition and form denials are also sometimes difficult to tell apart from proposition denial. Conforming to Geurts’s prediction, I could only find one instance of presupposition denial in my data:

(92) With Severiano Ballesteros, Nick Faldo, Ian Woosnam and several leading Americans also in the field, Olazabal does not have the incentive of trying to gain a place in next week’s World Matchplay at Wentworth: he has already been invited to play in the event this year. (S)

The denied presupposition is that Olazabal would not yet have gained a place.

All form denials targeted word choice, which is only natural in written discourse. Sometimes this seems to alter the propositional meaning:

(93) These data came, not from what Dame Mary Donaldson (letter, 3 October) chose to call ‘emotional, uninformed and often inaccurate outbursts’ of the Pro-Life lobby, but from publications of IVF teams, the Director of Australia’s National Perinatal Statistics Unit and the Commonwealth Department of Community Services and Health. (E)

(94) They're not really bookies these days, they're just debt collectors. (S)

The first example in particular could easily be classified as proposition denial as well. Other examples were more clearly metalinguistic:

(95) And they would call him Michael, not Mick. (A)

(96) When, I wonder, did it become fashionable for politicians to talk not about the world but about the planet? (E)

6.2.2 Lexical contrast relations

This section explores the fillers of the negative-contrastive constructions from a lexical point of view. First, I look into the default construals of the expressions: are they co-hyponymous, antonymous or something else? Second, I analyse the context-dependent construals to which these default construals are subjected. The first part of the analysis uncovers such things as canonical antonyms, while the second part is concerned with contextual antonyms, among other things.

Table 9 shows the distribution of the lexical contrast relations in different constructions. Again, findings from the three subcorpora are pooled. Antonyms and co-hyponyms are presented separately in the table, while the other contrast relations (plesionymy, compatibility, hyponymy and meronymy) together form the category of
‘others’. Furthermore, there were cases that resisted classification by lexical contrast relation, and these are classified as lexico-semantically ‘unrelated’.

Table 9. Lexical contrast relations in the data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of contrastive negation</th>
<th>Lexical contrast relations</th>
<th>Unrelated</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Antonyms</td>
<td>Co-hyponyms</td>
<td>Others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X not Y</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X and not Y</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X but not Y</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not X but Y</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not X, Y</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anchored not X but Y</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anchored not X, Y</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clausal not X but Y</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clausal not X, Y</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clausal X not Y</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As far as default construals are concerned, co-hyponyms dominate the constructions. The X not Y construction is the only one with a sustained presence of antonyms, but even there co-hyponyms outnumber antonym pairs by a ratio of more than four to one. Co-hyponyms are the most frequent lexical contrast relation for each of the forms barring clausal X not Y, which has only two tokens.

I shall now discuss each of the categories of Table 9 in turn.

**Antonyms.** I divided antonyms into several sub-classes. These were mainly heuristic, as I would argue that the different contrast relations have fuzzy boundaries. The first sub-class of antonym co-occurrence is naturally that of pure canonical antonyms:

(97) ‘This cannot be accident, it must be design,’ he commented when at the age of 65 his great hour came. (E)

There were also cases in which basically canonical elements were contrasted, but the contrast was not parallel. This non-parallel canonicity may have been due to different lexical categories or syntactic positions. Such cases also fall under the conceptual definition of antonymy (Fellbaum 1995; Vogel 2009):

(98) We are not criminals – we are a legal tax-paying enterprise which organises, up until now, perfectly legal, private, dance music warehouse parties. (E)
In this example, the noun criminals and the adjective legal are canonically antonymous but grammatically non-parallel.

The third sub-class that I distinguished is ancillary antonymy, I term I borrow from Jones’s classification. Ancillary antonymy makes use of canonical antonyms. All the examples that I could find were in the Editorial subcorpus:

(99) Martial law, capable of preserving order but not reversing economic decline, in turn yields to semi-pluralism as the principle of the party's monopoly of power is jettisoned to create a national consensus behind measures to salvage the country's economy. (E)

A fourth sub-class which can be considered canonical is what I have chosen to call placeholder antonymy. This is above all associated with \textit{X not Y}, although even with this construction it is relatively rare. Placeholder antonymy refers to negative elements that can function as antonyms for a variety of asserted elements. The term includes elements with varying degrees of entrenchment, and I make no claim as to its validity apart from its function as a heuristic classificatory device.

(100) It is the Americans who remake foreign films, not the other way round. (E)  
(101) In a White Paper of 1981, Sir Derek (now Lord) Rayner declared that the collection of official statistics should be cost-effective, and should meet the needs of central government, not the rest of the nation. (E)

Table 10 presents the frequencies of the antonym subclasses.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Form of contrastive negation} & \textbf{Pure canonical antonyms} & \textbf{Non-parallel canonical elements} & \textbf{Ancillary antonyms} & \textbf{Placeholder antonyms} & \textbf{Total} \\
\hline
\textit{X not Y} & 8 & 2 & 2 & 4 & 16 \\
\textit{X but not Y} & 3 & - & 1 & - & 4 \\
\textit{not X but Y} & 3 & 3 & - & - & 6 \\
\textit{Anchored not X but Y} & 1 & 2 & - & - & 3 \\
\textit{Clausal not X, Y} & 2 & 1 & - & - & 3 \\
\hline
\textbf{Total} & 17 & 8 & 3 & 4 & 32 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Antonym subclasses in the data}
\end{table}

Antonyms were much less prevalent than anticipated, even under a definition that is considerably looser than in most studies on lexical semantics. However, this may be explained by the contents of the largest group in Table 9, co-hyponyms.
Co-hyponyms. Co-hyponymy is the most basic of all semantic relations. If there were no compelling reasons for choosing another contrast relation, a pair of elements was taken to be co-hyponymous, provided that they were in the same domain:

(102) The Conservative Party is not looking for experts, but it is looking for men and women who have a good working knowledge of contemporary politics and a proven track record of experience in the party, and who above all know their own minds. (E)

The hyperonym for this example is POTENTIAL CONSERVATIVE CANDIDATES, and two groups are explicitly mentioned, without suggesting that these would be the only possible kinds. The term experts has been active in the common ground, and the writer seeks to reject it. In accordance with Cruse (1986:286, 288–289) and Storjohann (2009), I would argue that such uses resemble plesionyms – speakers try to make fine semantic distinctions:

(103) Goldwyn did not conceal his origins, but would sometimes embroider on them. (E)

On the other hand, also confirming previous research results (Lobanova, van der Kleij & Spenader 2010; Storjohann 2007), many co-hyponymous pairs are more sharply contrastive:

(104) At home, on both wings of her Cabinet, are ministers who regard green politics as no more than the latest fad; the election will not be won by fighting on the beaches, in the air, and in the green belts, but once again in the pockets of the people, is their view. (E)

(105) The father says: ‘It was just sheer luck that that was a toad, not a nuclear train.’ (E)

Both of these examples evoke more familiar contrasts: ENVIRONMENT/ECONOMY in (104), SMALL/BIG in (105). There do not seem to be any principled linguistic reasons for the difference in interpretations. Rather, it seems to be an effect of encyclopaedic knowledge. On the whole, categorising co-hyponyms required subjective interpretation of the concept domains involved. Here are more examples:

(106) What is good about the current production is that it does not seek to tilt the play either way: it allows us to decide where we stand. (A)

(107) A London elocution teacher, Edwina Pickett (inundated with demands for lessons), adds, ‘I get girls who want to marry well, who don't want to marry a lorry driver.’ (A)

(108) This is not the time to talk of the end of history—more a time for some good history lessons. (E)

(109) Market economics is about efficiency, not morality. (E)
Win or lose, I guarantee we will not return **with our tails between our legs**, but **with a hell of a lot of dignity and applause from you blokes**. (S)

We have to accept this is **showbiz** now, not a **sport**. (S)

I would argue that the contrastive use of co-hyponymy amounts to contextual antonymy, i.e., antonymy construed in discourse. However, (106) demonstrates that the antonymy may be particularly weak: there is no ‘clang’, just two ends of a contextually determined scale. This seems to be a very frequent way of using co-hyponyms in negative-contrastive constructions, as Table 11 shows.

*Table 11. Co-hyponym subclasses in the data*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of contrastive negation</th>
<th>Contextual antonyms</th>
<th>Other co-hyponyms</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(X \text{ not } Y)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(X \text{ and not } Y)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(X \text{ but not } Y)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\text{not } X \text{ but } Y)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\text{not } X, Y)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anchored (\text{not } X \text{ but } Y)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anchored (\text{not } X, Y)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clausal (\text{not } X \text{ but } Y)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clausal (\text{not } X, Y)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clausal (X \text{ not } Y)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>152</strong></td>
<td><strong>129</strong></td>
<td><strong>281</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the classification is based on subjective interpretation, the numbers are only indicative. However, they do point towards rather robust tendencies. Of the phrasal forms, \(X \text{ not } Y\) seems to be particularly conducive to contextual antonymy, while \(\text{not } X \text{ but } Y\) is much less so. As might be expected, \(X \text{ and not } Y\) broadly follows the pattern of \(X \text{ not } Y\) while \(X \text{ but not } Y\) does not. Of the clausal forms, \(\text{not } X, Y\) emerges as strongly contrastive.

Taken together, the previous two tables suggest that the forms of contrastive negation differ in the strength of the contrast that they create: \(X \text{ not } Y\) is more strongly contrastive than \(\text{not } X \text{ but } Y\). Furthermore, the intuitively felt difference between \(X \text{ not } Y\) and \(X \text{ but not } Y\) is borne out in the analysis of lexical fillers, lending support to the analysis as a whole.
Others. There were also occasional plesionyms, compatibles, hyponyms and meronyms in the data, grouped together as ‘others’ in Table 9. Table 12 shows the breakdown of these relations by form of contrastive negation.

Table 12. Other lexical contrast relations in the data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of contrastive negation</th>
<th>Plesionyms</th>
<th>Compatibles</th>
<th>Hyponyms</th>
<th>Meronyms</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$X$ not $Y$</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X$ but not $Y$</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not $X$ but $Y$</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anchored not $X$, $Y$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clausal not $X$ but $Y$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clausal $X$ not $Y$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The typical cases are plesionyms in $not X$ but $Y$ and compatibles in $X$ but not $Y$.

Plesionymy was commonest in Arts. It often bordered on the metalinguistic:

(112) We are there to attend not a play but a performance. (A)
(113) The play's the thing, but, in a one-man show, the actor is the play: not Ben Kingsley in Edmund Kean, but Ben Kingsley as Edmund Kean or even, as those ultra-butch radio commercials put it, Ben Kingsley IS Edmund Kean. (A)
(114) When, I wonder, did it become fashionable for politicians to talk not about the world but about the planet? (E)

The category also includes playfulness:

(115) Not full blown excess, but perhaps a demi-Pete Townsend. (A)
(116) Maybe yesterday's groupings were not actually bent, just massaged to satisfy World Cup convention. (S)

Cruse suggested that the boundary between plesionymy and compatibility is not clear-cut, and this shows in my data as well. The following examples were classified as plesionyms:

(117) Claire was shattered but not crushed. (A)
(118) The project flourished because France was an authoritarian, but not totalitarian, state. (A)

Interestingly, these cases are in the $X$ but not $Y$ construction, which I expected to favour compatibles.

Compatibles were expressions that I did not find synonymous though they clearly occupy overlapping regions in the same semantic domain:
It is part of a Royal Ballet project called A Chance to Dance, designed to stimulate an interest in ballet, **principally** but not **exclusively** among black children, in deprived areas. (A)

Their abilities are being not exactly **wasted**, but certainly **under-used**. (S)

I also counted the following kind of example as compatibles:

(121) He is a judge—and, as it turns out, not **just any judge**, but **the judge who once sentenced Miss Madrigal to death**. (A)

(122) As so often with British policy, it is **the right thing**, but not **enough of it**—although Nigel Lawson promised in Washington that we would do more. (E)

(123) **SOME time ago**, but not **so far back that it can be dismissed as incidental**, a belligerent centre-half, who needed very little encouragement in such nefarious matters, was instructed to discover how fast the visiting centre-forward could limp. (S)

In these cases, the contrast is between a generic member or subset of the domain and a specific one.

However, the core of the category of compatibles was examples such as the following:

(124) Why then must the street in which she lives, in a row of **handsome** but not very **grand** Georgian houses, be protected by gates and railings which can without hyperbole be described as neo-palatial? (E)

(125) **ENGLAND fly out to Poland today confident of securing the draw that will be sufficient to take them to the World Cup finals, stirred but not shaken** by a warning from Bobby Moore. (S)

For example, the house in the former example could be both **handsome** and **grand** but happens to be only **handsome**. In the latter example, compatibility is scalar: the mental state of the English team only amounts to **stirred** on a scale where **shaken** represents a more extreme value. Consequently, if the team were **shaken**, they would also be **stirred**, which confirms that they are compatibles.

There was only one case of hyponymy (126) and another of meronymy (127), both in the **X not Y** construction:

(126) The result is a genuine triumph, thanks to a troupe of singers, the same cast as at York, willing to give their best in attitudes ranging from completely recumbent to perilous perching on ladder or chaise-longue; dragging themselves around on all fours and wrapping themselves in curtains; and generally behaving as though **the entire cast** (not **just the noble lovers**, as in the script) is ripe for the psychiatrist's couch. (A)

---

30 It may seem odd that **shaken/stirred** is classified as a pair of compatibles here but as antonyms in **Shaken, not stirred**. However, this example concerns mental state, not martini-making. It is a case of unfamiliar contrast with familiar words. Thus, the analysis is not incoherent but entirely consistent with the general spirit of my theoretical framework – the exception that proves the rule.
Robbins observed also that the world, not higher education alone, will suffer if ever they cease to regard (the advancement of knowledge) as one of their major functions. (E)

Interestingly, in both of these examples, the contrast relation is reinforced lexically, through just in (126), and alone in (127).

Unrelated. There were also cases which were not readily analysed in terms of lexical contrast relations. According to the cognitivist view, lexical relations only exist within frames or domains. However, negative-contrastive constructions are sometimes used to reject the very frame that has been active in the common ground between the speaker/writer and their audience:

(128) She wasn't meant to be happy, she was meant to be with me. (E)

The emotional state of a person and their choice of partner are different domains that are in principle independent of one another.

6.3 Contrastive negation in Construction Grammar

6.3.1 Overview

Section 6.1 showed the different forms of contrastive negation as well as their distribution in the corpus. Section 6.2 demonstrated that these forms are associated with different kinds of contrast. In this section, I shall argue that these patterns of use are evidence of semantic differences. In other words, I try to find and describe the different negative-contrastive constructions in the Construction Grammar sense of the term. I also relate these constructions to others that motivate them. Particular attention will be paid to the feature CONTRAST, whose properties are discussed in the last sub-section.

This part of my study is informed by the view that grammatical categories are fuzzy. Language is not algebraic but probabilistic. The links that I posit between constructions are best seen as tendencies, not rules without exceptions. However, I do claim that while the boundaries are porous, the centres of the concepts that I propose are clearly distinguishable (see Croft & Cruse 2004:95; Itkonen & Pajunen 2010:55). Moreover, the central cases are generally more frequent than the peripheral ones.
6.3.2 The constructions

Distribution-wise, phrasal *not X but Y* and *X not Y* are the major forms of contrastive negation. They are quite close in meaning, but the analysis of contrast relations managed to tease out some differences. Since *X not Y* is more strongly associated with both canonical and contextual antonyms, I would argue that it is more strongly contrastive than *not X but Y*. In addition, *X not Y* does not seem to allow scalarity phenomena, whereas *not X but Y* is not so constrained. There are thus strong reasons to consider these two forms semantically and not merely syntactically different.

Figure 8 shows the *X not Y* construction. The syntactic component (*syn*) shows the form of the construction – lexical *X* followed by *not* followed by lexical *Y* – and its grammatical category (*cat*). The potential for extraposition is signalled by ‘(…)’. The category is specified as ‘#1’, which means that it comes from the similarly specified category of *X*, the head of the construction. As seen in chapter 2 and corroborated by the corpus analysis in section 6.1, members of any syntactic category may appear as *X*. However, finite VPs seem to favour other kinds of negation, which is not expressed in the figure to preserve clarity. Specifying the category at this level is important because it determines the syntactic behaviour of the construction, that is, where it may appear in a sentence.

The semantic component (*sem*) includes the NEGATION as well as its scope, which is considered its valence. The pragmatic component (*prag*) does the same for CONTRAST. The valences for these features are represented by ‘{…}’ (Fried & Östman 2004:44). The valence for NEGATION is one-place, and the valence for CONTRAST two-place.

The lower part of the figure represents the parts of the construction: *X* and *not Y*. The latter is further analysed into *not* and *Y*, with *not* being the head. *Not Y* is itself a construction called the Constituent Negation Construction (see below). Both *X* and *Y* are slots for lexical constructions, which is why they have a lexeme component (*lxm*). The category of *Y* is unspecified ‘[ ]’, since it need not be the same as that of *X*. 
Figure 8. The X not Y construction

Figure 9 shows the not X but Y construction. The semantic and pragmatic specifications are the same as those for X not Y. It would be possible to represent the difference in the strength of the contrasts of these two constructions by a prose description in the pragmatic component. However, this is left out for the sake of readability.

The anchored form of not X but Y does not differ much from the phrasal variant. This leads me to treat it as an extension of the phrasal variant: anchored not X but Y is an instance of the not X but Y construction. Unlike X not Y, this construction does not necessarily get its grammatical category from the asserted member of the contrastive pair. My formulation of the not X but Y construction is thus not specified for the grammatical category or rank of the contrasted elements: both X and Y may be lexical, phrasal and clausal. Since not X but Y contrasts constituents of different grammatical categories relatively frequently, the formulation of the construction need not require that the contrasted elements are of the same kind. This solution is both parsimonious and intuitively plausible as it takes the surface similarity of the not X but Y forms into account.

The but Y part of the construction utilises the semantic feature AFFIRMATION \{Y\}, mirroring NEGATION \{X\}. This feature is added because of the corrective but.
Both of the two major forms of contrastive negation differ quite clearly from \(X \text{ but not } Y\). Previous research has suggested that the \(X\) and \(Y\) in this form are construed as potential compatibles, and my data seems to support this: \(X \text{ but not } Y\) is more likely to house pairings whose default construals are compatible and which are near to each other on the same scale. It is therefore semantically differentiated from the other phrasal forms, i.e. a construction in its own right, represented by Figure 10. Here the pragmatic component includes the feature COMPATIBLE \{X, Y\}, as opposed to CONTRAST. Compatibility is actually a kind of contrast, as discussed in chapter 2. Otherwise, the construction is similar to \(X \text{ not } Y\).

\(X \text{ and not } Y\) is more difficult to separate from \(X \text{ not } Y\). However, it does not have canonical antonyms in my data as the contrastive pair, suggesting a lesser degree of contrastiveness than \(X \text{ not } Y\). It is also less frequent and does not seem to allow
extraposition. Moreover, since the replacive meaning does not derive compositionally from the parts of the construction, it seems to actively produce a meaning of its own, reaching the highest threshold for constructionhood. Therefore, it too can be analysed as a construction of its own. Its representation in Figure 11 is very similar to that of \( X \) not \( Y \), needing no further comment.

*Figure 11. The \( X \) and not \( Y \) construction*

The rarest phrasal form is not \( X, Y \). It is almost always accompanied by *just* or another element that strengthens the contrast and makes it more explicit. However, its clausal form is quite frequent. Since the phrasal, anchored and clausal forms seem quite similar from a semantic point of view and my analysis did not uncover any substantial differences between them, I posited a very general not \( X, Y \) construction that encompasses all three forms, in the style of not \( X \) but \( Y \). Figure 12 presents the construction.
This leaves us with clausal \( X \) not \( Y \). This form is quite different from the phrasal form of \( X \) not \( Y \): if one does not assume a derivational relationship between the two, there is no reason to consider them linked. Furthermore, clausal \( X \) not \( Y \) is exceedingly rare with only two examples in my data. Therefore, I do not posit a clausal \( X \) not \( Y \) construction. Instead, I believe that the contrastive interpretation is licensed by the Parallelism Construction: the \( X \) and \( Y \) clauses are parallel (save for the negation) and therefore exhibit the feature CONTRAST. Therefore, not all cases of contrastive negation seem to be manifestations of an entrenched negative-contrastive construction.

6.3.3 Relations among constructions

Why are negative-contrastive constructions the way they are? This section attempts to motivate their properties by linking them to other constructions and by establishing links among the negative-contrastive constructions themselves.

In the theory chapters of this thesis, contrastive negation was linked to paired focus constructions, which I equated with contrastive constructions. These include the pragmatic feature CONTRAST \{X, Y\}, which means that they highlight or otherwise utilise the difference between the contrastive pair. That a seemingly disparate group of constructions should share a feature specification can be seen as an inheritance from a common source, the schematic Paired Focus Construction. All contrastive (or paired focus) constructions would thus be instances of the Paired Focus Construction. This analysis basically assumes that contrast is a well-defined, unitary phenomenon in language that is present in many parts of grammar, of which the negative-contrastive constructions and other forms of contrastive negation are
only a subset. In other words, the contrast that is displayed by the *let alone* construction is the same contrast that appears in *X but not Y*, for instance. Since paired focus is a part of speakers’ knowledge of the forms and functions of English, it should be described as a construction if we believe Goldberg’s assertion that all our knowledge of language is in the form of constructions.

Figure 13 represents the instance links from the Paired Focus Construction to contrastive *X and Y*, the negative-contrastive constructions discussed above as well as any number of other contrastive constructions. Each grey arrow is an instance link, and the feature that the lower-level constructions inherit, i.e. *CONTRAST {X, Y}* , is shown together with the link.

*Figure 13. Instance links from the Paired Focus Construction*

The Paired Focus Construction was originally invoked as an alternative to generative analyses that treat paired focus constructions as instances of various ellipsis mechanisms (Fillmore, Kay & O’Connor 1988). Consequently, the elliptical nature of the phrasal forms of contrastive negation is downplayed in the current approach. This is in keeping with the non-derivational, ‘what you see is what you get’ character of CxG (Goldberg 2003). Phrasal forms of contrastive negation are not seen as reduced versions of the clausal forms, for instance (cf. Klima 1964; Konietzko & Winkler 2010). Given that the phrasal forms greatly outnumber their clausal counterparts, this assumption seems plausible.

The figure above treats negative-contrastive constructions as a single unit in the constructicon. As I showed in the previous section, this is a gross simplification. The non-derivational nature of CxG means that, *a priori*, no link is posited between *X not Y* and *not X but Y*, for instance, even though both of these constructions are negative-contrastive. In fact, the only relation between these two constructions is that they happen to be inheritors to many of the same parent constructions.
However, it is entirely possible to link similar constructions on formal grounds as instances of a schematic surface generalisation (Goldberg 2006:25). There is a striking similarity between \(X \text{ and not } Y\) and \(X \text{ but not } Y\) as well as \(X \text{ not } Y\), which could be represented as \(X \emptyset \text{ not } Y\). The similarity among these constructions can be captured by positing the schematic mid-level construction \(X \text{ CONJ not } Y\), which acts as a sub-regularity that licenses the more concrete constructions. Conversely, we may say that the more concrete constructions are instances of \(X \text{ CONJ not } Y\).

The \(X \text{ CONJ not } Y\) template does not motivate only the canonical forms of contrastive negation, which have been the primary object of this study. It is also present in such constructions as \(X \text{ if not } Y\), which are not corrective in the strict sense adopted here. Contrastive negation is thus not an island in the sea of grammar; some phenomena cut across or overlap with it. Figure 14 shows the instance links between \(X \text{ CONJ not } Y\) and its daughter constructions, with the canonical forms of contrastive negation highlighted.

*Figure 14. Instance links from the \(X \text{ CONJ not } Y\) construction*

![Instance links from the X CONJ not Y construction](image)

Of the constructions identified above, \(\text{not } X \text{ but } Y\) as well as \(\text{not } X, Y\) are left out of this sub-regularity. \(\text{Not } X \text{ but } Y\) also seems to be coordinate, but the meaning of \textit{but} is so different that it warrants a construction (or lexical item) of its own (Izutsu 2008). There is thus a polysemy link between the adversative and the corrective \textit{but}. This is shown in Figure 15.
The two negative-contrastive constructions that do not instantiate the $X \text{ CONJ } not \ Y$ template are similar in several respects. First, the negative element in them precedes the affirmed one. Second, they are both flexible as to the grammatical forms of the contrasted elements: they are the only ones to have anchored forms and, if we discount the very rare clausal $X \text{ not } Y$, clausal forms. Similarly to $X \text{ CONJ } not \ Y$, there are analogous non-contrastive negative expressions such as $if \ not \ X, Y$. This warrants positing another surface generalisation. It is probably syntactically looser than the first one: its form is here conjectured to be $(CONJ) \ not \ X \ (CONJ) \ Y$. Figure 16 depicts the instance links from this schematic construction.

In addition to contrast, any analysis of the inheritance links of negative-contrastive constructions will need to account for negation, which is a complex phenomenon that takes superficially different forms in phrasal and clausal variants of contrastive negation. The more metalinguistic uses of contrastive negation also seem to subvert certain features of ordinary, descriptive negation (Horn 1985). Describing how the various forms of negation interact with negative-contrastive constructions is beyond the scope of this study. I shall treat NEGATION as a semantic feature that applies to one of the members of the contrastive pair and that is inherited from a more general Negative Construction. In the forms of contrastive negation that do attain
constructionhood under the current analysis, the negation is nearly always constituent negation, which most likely has its own construction. However, in the constructions motivated by \((\text{CONJ}) \text{not} X (\text{CONJ}) Y\), the negation may also be clausal if the form is anchored or clausal, so this construction instantiates the Constituent Negation Construction only optionally and may also be an instance of clausal negation. Figure 17 represents this graphically, with the optional links depicted by dotted grey arrows. The various forms of clausal negation, such as the negation of auxiliaries and negation with \textit{do}-support, are not described here.

Figure 17. Instance links from the Negative Construction to the Constituent Negation Construction and the negative-contrastive constructions

I have now shown how the various forms of contrastive negation are motivated by instance links to individual parent constructions. Figure 18 will present these links together. Note that zero coordination (or asyndeton) is analysed similarly to but as involving a polysemy link between two constructions that are formally similar but have different meanings, one ADDITIVE (motivating \(X \text{not} Y\)) and the other CORRECTIVE (motivating \(Y\).

Of course, even this figure is incomplete. One crucial omission is fixed phrases such as \textit{shaken, not stirred}, which are probably entrenched as lexical items themselves – i.e., constructions – and are therefore instances of the more schematic patterns. Neither does it include constructions motivated by the negative-contrastive constructions: \textit{not so much X but Y} and \textit{not only X but Y}. 

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Figure 18. The inheritance network of negative-contrastive constructions
6.3.4 Contrastive constructions and CONTRAST

Contrastive constructions and CONTRAST form a class in grammar. They have already been shown to behave in a similar way with regard to canonical antonyms, which can be argued to be a particularly contrastive type of lexical filler (Jones et al. 2012). Until now, studies have largely concentrated on measuring the contrastiveness of lexical items; for example, pairs such as hot/cold are more antonymous than hot/cool and this is shown in their rates of co-occurrence within contrastive constructions (Jones et al. 2007).

My study differs from most of the previous ones because I approach lexical contrast using grammatical patterns as my starting-point, not the other way around. Even those studies that have started with constructions did not consider a specific semantically delineated area of grammar but a number of contrastive construction types at once (see Davies 2008; Lobanova, van der Kleij & Spenader 2010). By studying constructions that resemble each other semantically and syntactically, I am in a position to say something about the nature of contrast – and CONTRAST – itself.

My central claim is that the negative-contrastive constructions differ in their contrastive potential. $X \text{ not } Y$ is the most strongly contrastive, $not \ X \text{ but } Y$ is moderately so, and $X \text{ but not } Y$ exhibits a contrast that is qualitatively different from the one effected by the other two, which is reflected in the fact that the difference only becomes salient in the analysis of pragmatic, not lexical, contrast. This finding ties in with the difference previously noted between $X \text{ and } Y$ and $X \text{ and } Y \text{ alike}$: the former has a broader range of meanings, stretching from entirely contrastive to non-contrastive, while the latter is likely to coerce an antonymous interpretation of relatively unrelated expressions – in other words, to create contextual antonyms.

My hypothesis was that negative-contrastive constructions are between these two extremes. This seems to be supported by my data. The zero value is not available to them but the maximal value – i.e. canonical antonyms – is. However, they can also be used for mid-level contrasts. In other words, they do not uniformly create contextual antonyms, contrary to what some studies have seemed to suggest (cf. Davies 2008).

Figure 19 shows a graphic representation of the degrees of contrastiveness that a construction may exhibit.
Figure 19. Degrees of contrastiveness

The horizontal grey lines represent the extent to which a given construction is vague with regard to contrastiveness. $X \text{ and } Y$ is maximally vague and may reach zero contrastiveness, while is $X \text{ and } Y \text{ alike}$ displays very little variation. Negative-contrastive constructions are in-betweeners in this respect.

A central assumption here is that contrastiveness is both gradient and discrete. It is gradient because one construction can be more contrastive than another, and instances of the same construction may differ in the strength of the contrast that they help to produce. It is discrete because some constructions are not contrastive at all. Consequently, in order for a sentence to be allowed on the scale, it has to meet certain conditions. I do not subscribe to the view that all foci are contrastive (cf. Molnár 2002) but prefer a more restrictive definition of contrast as a grammatical and pragmatic concept.
7 Conclusion

– James Bond: Vodka martini.
– Bartender: Shaken or stirred?
– James Bond: Do I look like I give a damn?31

The previous chapters have shown that contrastive negation is a multi-faceted phenomenon that defies easy explanations. Attempts to describe it through any single factor – be it contextual antonymy, metalinguistic negation or anything else – have proved too simplistic. Negative-contrastive constructions appear to be flexible expressions that fulfil many functions in discourse. This is why, contrary to what the epigraph might suggest, we should care about it.

To my knowledge, my thesis is the first full-length corpus study of contrastive negation. Previous studies have largely been based on intuition or hand-picked examples, but this has not prevented the authors from making guesses as to the relative frequencies of different mechanisms of denial, for instance. I do not advocate abandoning intuition altogether as a method for the study of grammar. However, my study is further proof, if any was needed, that only representatively sampled corpus evidence is acceptable data for claims about the frequencies of linguistic elements. Pullum has made this point even more bluntly:

Looking back at the syntax published a couple of decades ago makes it rather clear that much of it is going to have to be redone from the ground up just to reach minimal levels of empirical accuracy. Faced with data flaws of these proportions, biology journals issue retractions, and researchers are disciplined or dismissed. (Pullum 2007:36)

It is perhaps a particular indictment of the field that of the three papers whose claims I have either falsified or at least severely qualified – Horn (1985), McCawley (1991) and Geurts (1998) – two were published in Language. Incidentally, these two studies are on pragmatics rather than syntax, which suggests that the problem identified by Pullum runs even deeper than he says.

Terminological inconsistency was another challenge with which previous studies presented me. I chose the name ‘contrastive negation’ because it is largely

theory-neutral and contains contrast, the major theoretical concept in this study. The number of terms coined for the constructions that I have studied also stems from conflicting ideas of how to study them: emphasising the functional in the study of these forms has sometimes led to monikers that may be informative and even useful as such but which become cumbersome as their number increases. Examples of such terms include repudiatory coordination, metalinguistic negation and négation polémique. Formalists are not innocent of this either: stripping makes little sense to someone who does not subscribe to the notion of ellipsis that is suggested or who disputes its application in this context.

My study is couched in the tradition of Construction Grammar. This is not simply a matter of notation. Rather, it runs through even those parts of my study that do not make reference to the theory. From the beginning I have tried to connect form to function, and both of those to use. The theory has provided me with an overall vision of language and the place of contrastive negation in it. It has also given me a rigorous notational convention to follow, so that my claims are as clear and explicit as possible. In return, my thesis is a small contribution to scholarship within this paradigm, and as such it lends support to it.

There are also caveats to a theory-driven approach such as mine. Researchers may only see what they want to see, and that is particularly true of studies that make extensive use of subjective interpretation. I have tried to counter this by making my analytical criteria as explicit as possible and by providing as many examples as possible. Thus, if the reader disagrees with my analyses or wants to use a different framework on the same phenomenon, I hope to have given her tools for exactly that. That said, the empirical analysis turned out to be much more difficult than originally envisaged, but I have tried to let the challenges show.

The picture of contrastive negation in English is by no means complete. I only studied the constructions in three small subcorpora of the BNC. Most of the genre variation remains unexplored. Spoken language in particular is absent from this study. This also means that the prosodic features of negative-contrastive constructions were not addressed, even though they have been remarked on in previous studies. However, since these remarks have been largely if not exclusively unempirical, they need to be subjected to testing against representative data.

The discourse functions of contrastive negation should also be investigated in more detail. My study focuses on the sentence in which a given construction is
located. This ignores the way in which the paired foci are used and reused interactively. Prosody and discourse functions are key notions for Interactional Linguistics, which has recently been applied in conjunction with Construction Grammar and other forms of Cognitive Linguistics (see Etelämäki et al. 2009).

Contrastive negation could also be studied from an argumentative point of view, à la Ducrot (see Tuomarla 2010). My data suggests that negative-contrastive constructions are associated with genres that are concerned with persuading the addressee. Are the negated elements ascribed to the listener/reader or to a third party? Are they picked up from previous discourse or are they evoked simply to conjure up a virtual adversary? This line of research could be profitably combined with the approach in Davies (2008), which takes its lead from Critical Discourse Analysis.

Even from a constructional point of view, much remains to be done. I have discussed such constructions as not only X but Y, X if not Y and not so much X as Y only cursorily. Much more could be learnt about contrastive negation if they were taken into account. Most of the other contrastive constructions have not been subjected to the level of scrutiny that I have attempted here either.

In conclusion, my results support the view that grammar is not made of hard-and-fast rules but categories with fuzzy boundaries. This is essentially the line taken in the cognitive, but not the formal, variant of Construction Grammar. Methodologically, my study reinforces the idea that corpora, not just intuition, are needed in linguistic research.
References


Murphy, M. Lynne. 2006. Antonyms as lexical constructions: or, why *paradigmatic construction* is not an oxymoron. In Doris Schönfeld (ed.), *Constructions all over: Case studies and theoretical implications*. Special volume of


## Appendix: Coding categories

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<tr>
<th>SUBCORPUS</th>
<th>Arts</th>
<th>Editorial</th>
<th>Sports</th>
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| DATA SET | (Is the example part of the data or not?) | Yes | No |

| FORM | Clausal $not X but Y$ | Clausal $not X, Y$ | Clausal $X and not Y$ | Clausal $X but not Y$ | Clausal $X not Y$ | (Clausal $not only X but (also) Y$) | (Clausal $not so much X as/but Y$) | (Clausal $X if not Y$) | Phrasal anchored $not X but Y$ | Phrasal anchored $not X, Y$ | Phrasal $not X but Y$ | Phrasal $not X, Y$ | Phrasal $X and not Y$ | Phrasal $X but not Y$ | Phrasal $X not Y$ | (Phrasal $if not X, Y$) | (Phrasal $not only X but (also) Y$) | (Phrasal $not so much X as/but Y$) | (Phrasal $X if not Y$) | (Phrasal $X though not Y$) | (Phrasal $X yet not Y$) |
|--------|------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|

| FORMAL PROPERTIES | (Is the example extraposed or is there another form of discontinuity?) | Extraposed | Intervening adjunct | (none) |

| GRAMMATICAL CATEGORY | AdjP | AdvP | NP | PP | VP | Adverbial clause (*) | Complement clause (i.e., that-clause) (*) | Wh-clause (*) | Mixed | Other |

| PRAGMATIC CONTRAST RELATION | Proposition denial | Presupposition denial | Implicature/scalar denial | Form/metalinguistic denial |

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32 The form categories in parentheses were not included in the data set. Some of these categories were not identified for all of the three subcorpora analysed.

33 The classes marked with ‘(*)’ form the group ‘subordinate clauses’ in chapter 6.
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<th>Compatibility (*)[^34]</th>
<th>Co-hyponymy</th>
<th>Hyponymy (*)</th>
<th>Meronymy (*)</th>
<th>Plesionymy (*)</th>
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[^34]: The classes marked with ‘(*)’ form the group ‘others’ in chapter 6.