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Kärkkäinen, Pekka

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Psychology and the Soul in Late Medieval Erfurt

Pekka Kärkkäinen, University of Helsinki

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Abstract

In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries the University of Erfurt was one of the strongholds of the via moderna in Germany. The present article examines how this school’s identity was manifested in discussions on the soul and its powers, engaged in by three Erfurtian philosophers: Johannes Carnificis de Lutrea, Jodocus Trutfetter and Bartholomaeus Arnoldi de Usingen. In the various forms of their expositions these authors reveal a rather uniform stance concerning doctrinal issues. Their positions are largely based on the tradition of the via moderna going back to the early fifteenth century, and their argumentation is deeply bound to the problems arising from this school’s position. Comparisons with concurrent Thomist and Scotist sources show that the Erfurtians describe the positions of other schools in an appropriate manner, although the arguments for and against these positions are often borrowed from the authorities of their own school rather than from contemporaneous discussion.

Keywords
Erfurt, *via moderna, De anima*, Aristotle commentaries, psychology

1. Introduction

As we may see from the records of the famous Erfurtian collection of medieval manuscripts, the Bibliotheca Amploniana, almost every major western commentary on Aristotle’s *On the Soul* was already to be found in Erfurt by the early fifteenth century.¹ Several new commentaries were also written, many of which still exist in manuscript form. These include commentaries by Henricus Toke of Brema², Johannes Nayl of Wartburg³, Johannes of Zelandia⁴ and the *Exercitium circa libros de anima⁵*, which originates from Erfurt and has been attributed to Henricus of Hildesheim.⁶

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¹ Both the university library and the Amplonian collection consisted of a considerable amount of items. See Erich Kleineidam, *Universitas Studii Erfordensis I* (Leipzig, 1985), 361–3.
⁶ To these should perhaps be added a commentary on *De anima* (München UB
Having such a remarkable resource of Aristotelian psychology, Erfurt was also one of the strongholds of the late medieval school of the *via moderna*. As the *alma mater* of the young Martin Luther, the university has also received attention as the scholastic context of the Lutheran Reformation. Therefore, for the study of the development of Aristotelian psychology in the early sixteenth century, Erfurt provides an interesting case for the observation of the importance of school identities for the teaching of Aristotelian psychology on the threshold of the Renaissance and the Reformation.

The present study inquires into the commentaries of Aristotelian psychology which were published between 1482 and 1517 and which are available only in printed form. The first to be printed was the *Exercitium librorum de anima* by Johannes Carnificis of Lutrea (Kaiserslautern) (d. 1479) who was a licentiate of theology from Erfurt and later archdeacon of Mainz.\(^7\) Lutrea’s commentary was later succeeded by several expositions on natural

\(^7\) Johannes Carnificis de Lutrea, *Exercitium librorum de anima* (Erfurt, 1482). As archdeacon, Lutrea was made to participate in the judicial process against his former colleague Johannes Rucherat of Wesel, who was accused of heretical teaching. In addition to his *De anima* commentary, printed in Erfurt posthumously in 1482 by Paulus Wider de Hornbach, a collection of sermons and a description of a Mainzer synod in 1472 have survived from his writings. Some correspondence between Lutrea and Johannes of Wesel has also survived, and has been edited by Gerhard Ritter. On Lutrea’s life and writings see Kleineidam, *Universitas Studii Erfordensis II* (Leipzig, 1992\(^2\)), 312; Joachim Ott, *Die Handschriften des ehemaligen Fraterherrenstifts St. Markus zu Butzbach in der Universitätsbibliothek Giessen*, part 2 (Giessen, 2004), 271–2.
philosophy, which regularly also included a section on philosophical psychology. These were written by two authors, Jodocus Trutfetter of Eisenach and Bartholomaeus Arnoldi of Usingen.

Jodocus Trutfetter (d. 1519) was probably the most respected Erfurt philosopher of his time. His major work was a large textbook of logic, the *Summule totius logice*. Apart from other works on logic, he, being already a doctor of theology, also published late in life a textbook on natural philosophy, the *Summa in totam physicen*, whose eighth book deals with Aristotle’s *De anima* and *Parva naturalia*.

Bartholomaeus Arnoldi of Usingen, usually called Usingen after his birthplace, was Trutfetter’s younger colleague at the Faculty of Arts. He published textbooks solely on philosophy until 1516, and thereafter several theological treatises. Like Trutfetter, he attained a doctor’s degree in theology, but only after joining the Order of the Augustinian Hermits. Most of his works on natural philosophy include a section on psychology, and one of these was reprinted as late as 1543 to be used in the teaching of natural philosophy in Erfurt.

After a few introductory remarks on available textual sources on

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8 Jodocus Trutfetter, *Summule totius logice* (Erfurt, 1501).
psychology in late medieval Erfurt, I will delineate some of the formative elements of the identity of the *via moderna* in an Erfurtian context. The Erfurt authors of the period professed themselves to be adherents of the *via moderna*. However, they also discussed the opinions of other schools of thought in their works. My main objective will be to show to what degree the local tradition of the *via moderna* determined the Erfurtians’ positions in the material discussing psychology as a science as well as some general issues concerning the soul. I will also compare their ideas with certain concurrent Thomist and Scotist authors dealing with the same subjects. This, I think, will enable us to see more clearly the distinctive contribution of the Erfurt *via moderna* to psychology in the early sixteenth century German context.

2. Sources

The earliest printed work for the teaching of psychology written in Erfurt was Johannes of Lutrea’s *Exercitium in libros Aristotelis de anima* from 1482. It is not clear what period of time its contents reflect, since its author had died already in 1472 and his teaching activity could have taken place anytime between his graduation as a master of arts in 1456 and his becoming a licentiate of theology and archdeacon in 1466. Nor can a possible redaction of the commentary by a second hand be ruled out. A similar type of work was published in 1507 by Bartholomaeus of Usingen (*Exercitium de anima*).¹¹

Formally, the two *exercitia* are nearly identical. They both consist of

questions which are treated according to a uniform pattern: 1. title of the question; 2. a varying number of notanda, where terminological divisions and definitions are presented; 3. answers to the questions followed by conclusions and their proofs; 4. arguments against the conclusions and their responses. In the fourth part there is a minor difference between Lutrea and Usingen: the former posits the responses directly after the individual arguments, whereas the latter gathers the arguments and responses into small groups. Both exercitia announce which passage of Aristotle’s De anima the questions are related to. Lutrea does this only by short notices at the beginning of the individual questions. Usingen is more systematic: he adds the division of books and tracts in the headings, and also gives short summaries of Aristotle’s text before examining individual questions. Regarding the contents of the questions, significant differences exist. As a general notion one could say that the number of counter-arguments in Usingen’s exercitium is considerably higher than in Lutrea’s work. In order to elucidate the position of the via moderna in Lutrea’s and Usingen’s commentaries it is helpful to compare them with a similar treatise from an author of a different philosophical school. In his Cursus philosophicus, Erasmus Friesner of Wunsiedel provides us with a fairly contemporaneous example of a

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Thomist commentary of a similar kind.\textsuperscript{13}

Besides the \textit{exercitia} there is yet other, but more variant, type of commentary, called \textit{compendium}, which includes roughly all other expositions where the contents of the \textit{De anima} are treated in Erfurt. It has been suggested that these emerged out of the need of ever younger generations of students to fully understand the difficult lectures on Aristotle’s natural philosophy.\textsuperscript{14}

Usingen’s \textit{Parvulus philosophie naturalis} from the year 1499 is formally a commentary on an earlier treatise of a similar title, written probably by the early fifteenth century author Peter Gerticz of Dresden; Usingen added his own commentary in the midst of Peter’s text printed in boldface.\textsuperscript{15} The work consisted of three parts (\textit{tractatus}): two on physics and one on the soul. This would mean that it was written for baccalaureate studies, because the areas required for the master’s level were missing.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{13} Erasmus Friesner de Wunsiedel, \textit{Cursus philosophicus} (Frankfurt, 1509). As an example of a Scotist set of questions, Jan ze Stobnicy’s \textit{Parvulus philosophie naturalis, cum expositione textuali ac dubiorum magis necessarium dissoluzione ad intentionem Scoti congesta in studio Cracoviensi} (Basel, 1516; first publication in Cracow in 1507) although formally a compendium, will be used below. On Stobnicy, see ‘Jan ze Stobnicy (1470-1518 lub 1519)’, in \textit{700 lat myśli polskiej. Filozofia i myśl społeczna XIII-XV wieku}, ed. J. Domański, (Warszawa, 1978), 477–8.

\textsuperscript{14} Kleineidam, \textit{Universitas II}, 155–6.

\textsuperscript{15} Bartholomaeus Arnoldi de Usingen, \textit{Parvulus philosophie naturalis} (Leipzig, 1499). Peter of Dresden’s \textit{Parvulus philosophiae naturalis} was a concise exposition of the main contents of Aristotelian natural philosophy. On Peter of Dresden’s treatise and Usingen’s use of it, see Lalla, \textit{Secundum}, 77–86.

\textsuperscript{16} It has been maintained that Peter of Dresden’s \textit{Parvulus} was widely used in the city schools, so that there would be a continuity with the material used already before academic studies. It cannot be determined if it was intended that the graduated masters would be so equipped to lecture on Peter of Dresden’s \textit{Parvulus} in the schools. See Kleineidam, \textit{Universitas II}, 156.
For the purpose of comparison it is fortunate that another commentary on Peter of Dresden’s Parvulus has survived, also printed in Leipzig in 1499, namely Johannes Peyligk’s Philosophiae naturalis compendium. Whereas Usingen had written his textbook in the spirit of the Erfurtian via moderna, Peyligk, who was active in Leipzig, followed Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome instead. In addition to Usingen and Peyligk, a further example of the Parvulus genre of commentaries will be used below, the Parvulus philosophie naturalis by the Krakow Scotist Jan ze Stobnicy. This commentary provides us with a contemporaneous Scotist perspective on Peter of Dresden’s Parvulus and is therefore helpful in differentiating the positions of the main philosophical schools of the time.

Usingen also published another exposition of the De anima, which was included as a part of his Compendium naturalis philosophie (Erfurt, 1505–7). It deals with subject matter broader than what the Parvulus deals with, and contains tracts of the De generatione et corruptione, Meteora and De somno et vigilia, among others, which were used in the master’s studies. On the other hand, it contained only elucidations of terms and the divisions of their different meanings; the large questions present in the Parvulus are missing. This may be partly due to the fact that in 1507 Usingen published his Exercitium de anima,

17 Johannes Peyligk, Philosophiae naturalis compendium (Leipzig, 1499). Usingen’s commentary was printed by Erfurtian Bachelor of Arts Wolfgang Stöckel on the 23rd of February and Peyligk’s by Melchior Lotter on the 12th of September.
18 Stobnicy, Parvulus.
which consisted solely of questions.\textsuperscript{19}

Trutfetter’s \textit{Summa in totam physicen} resembles for the most part the form of Usingen’s \textit{Parvulus}, being made up of lecture text and questions. There are still traces of the text of the \textit{Parvulus philosophie naturalis} by Peter of Dresden, printed in boldface type, but one cannot consider it a commentary in the proper sense. The scope of the textbook is not restricted to the \textit{Physics} and \textit{De anima}, as the topics discussed in master’s studies are covered also. In several cases Trutfetter describes various opinions on the matters, although the main purpose of his handbook (\textit{epitome}) is to describe “in a simple manner of exposition and in a plain style the position of those who are called nominalists.”\textsuperscript{20}

3. Authorities and school identity

The University of Erfurt in the late Middle Ages represented the tradition of the \textit{via moderna}. Despite the obvious freedom of their conception of the \textit{via moderna}, the academics of Erfurt professed themselves largely as teachers of this school.\textsuperscript{21} Central to the \textit{via moderna} in Erfurt were from the beginning two notions above all: the rejection of the realism of universals and rejection of the plurality of substantial forms in the same subject. These doctrines were

\textsuperscript{19} On different versions of Usingen’s compendium of natural philosophy, see Lalla, \textit{Secundum}, 87; 402–4; 408–9.

\textsuperscript{20} Jodocus Trutfetter, \textit{Summa in totam physicens} (Erfurt, 1514), f. a5\textsuperscript{r}.

\textsuperscript{21} Kleineidam, \textit{Universitas I}, 179–89.
prescribed at least for the members of the collegium *Porta coeli* in the statutes written by Amplonius Rating of Bercka, the founder of this influential collegium. These were mentioned together with the rejection of the Hussite heresy, to which the notion of universal realism was apparently seen to be connected. Yet the realism was defined as “the Platonists present it”, which left a certain vagueness to the formulation. Amplonius also recommended that the scholars take into account, in addition to the “modernos”, such teachers as Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Alexander of Hales and Henry of Ghent.22

From such writers as Johannes Rucherat of Wesel and Johannes of Lutrea we find more specific descriptions of the status of universals, and these writers also affirm unequivocally the unity of the substantial form.23 For Johannes of Wesel the rejection of realism implied that there is no *res universale*; rather, a universal is an concept formed in a created mind to represent many singular entities in the world. To Wesel, universal concepts represented the objects of cognition in such an imperfect and confused manner that he would not accept that such universals exist as ideas of species or genera in the divine mind.24

24 On Wesel’s nominalism in general, see Wöhler, *Der Nominalismus*, 367–80. “Quantum ad quartum articulum sciendum: secundum viam modernam nullae sunt res nisi singulares et universalia non sunt nisi entia fabricata in anima creata, quibus multae confuse et imperfecte intelliguntur et repraesentantur, quare in divina mente non est ponere tales universales cogitationes propter
However, he does not reject the notion of ideas in God altogether: God has ideas of creatures, since the divine essence “represents all things, which have been produced by God insofar as they imitate the divine essence.”  

Even these ideas are distinct from each other merely on the basis of their differences in the human mind. In the divine mind there are no principles of diversity between ideas. However, the universal concepts are not ficta without any correspondence to the external world, insofar as their referents are singular beings, which are conceived in a universal manner, viz. without their individuating properties. Lutrea expressed basically the same conviction by stating that there is no universale in essendo, that all entities are singular in their being, although there are universals in the sense of universal terms or mental concepts, that is to say universales in significando.

imperfectionem; quare etiam non videntur ponendae ideae in mente divina specierum et generum. Sed solum ideae sunt singularium rerum producibilium a divina essentia.” Cited according to Kleineidam, Universitas II, 23 fn. 173. See also Wöhler, Der Nominalismus, 371 fn. 20.

Johannes Rucherat de Wesalia, Lectura Ioannis de Wesalia super Primum, Secundum et Tertium Sentantiarum cum Kiliano super quartum, Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Ms. Theol. Lat. Fol. 97, f. 80va: “...ideo sequitur quod idea nihil aliud sit quam essentia divina inquantum ipsa est repraesentativa omnium quae producibilia sunt a deo tamquam imitantia ipsam essentiam divinam.” Cited according to Wöhler, Der Nominalismus, 375 fn. 41.

Wöhler, Der Nominalismus, 371.

Lutrea, Ex., ff. 10V; 11V. Whether or not there are such universals in the divine mind is not clear to Lutrea. He seems to endorse a position similar to that of Wesel’s according to which the divine mind is one simple idea of created things, so that the diversity of ideas of singular beings is not in a proper sense attributed to the divine mind. See Lutrea, Ex., f. 52f: “Et sic deus primo intelligit se et in hoc quod intelligit se, tunc invenit similitudines et ideas omnium alium rerum, quia essentia divina est idea omnium rerum, ex eo quia in causa semper est idea rei causatae, modo essentia divina est causa omnium aliurum rerum.” Both Wesel’s and Lutrea’s wording seem to imply that they were attributing the ideas
In the works of Jodocus Trutfetter we find a most detailed account of what models of thought the nominalist position on universals excludes. He makes it explicit that “our position” is that of the nominalists (nominales), according to which there is no universality in things themselves, and it is only signs which have this property. Contrary views, which he describes largely following Ockham’s criticism in 1 Sent. d. 2, are to be labelled as the positions of the realists (realistas). Like Wesel, Trutfetter rejects the extreme version of nominalism, according to which universals were only “ficta, without any correspondence in the things (sine rei respondentia).” This does not imply, as some of the realist critics would maintain, that the nominalist position as such would be untenable or that there should be any real communicability in beings. Trutfetter’s most severe criticism is directed against views which seem to imply any kind of real communicability of universal natures. According to him, the idea of a real unity of universal natures is connected to the Hussite heresy, which the Church had condemned at the Council of Constance. This remark reveals that to the divine mind as Marsilius Inghen did, rather than attributing them to creatures (as known by the divine mind) as did Ockham. On the difference between Ockham’s and Marsilius’ positions, see Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen, Marsilius of Inghen: Divine Knowledge in Late Medieval Thought (Leiden, 1993), 153–6. See also Wöhler (Der Nominalismus, 375–7), who argues for Ockham’s influence, but does not discuss Marsilius’ view. On Marsilius’ influence on Wesel, see Wöhler, Der Nominalismus, 379 and on metaphysics in Erfurt before Wesel, see E. P. Bos, ‘Thuo of Viborg and Marsilius of Inghen’, in Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition. Acts of the symposium ‘The Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy’ January 10–13, 1996, ed. S. Ebbesen and R. L. Friedman (Copenhagen, 1999), 523–39.

the question of universals was for the Erfurtians a matter of a particular scholarly tradition rather than a topic open to philosophical discussion.\(^\text{29}\)

The only plausible way to posit universal natures in the extramental world would be, according to Trutfetter, to interpret individual natures as universal in a weaker sense, that their universality is not realized until the intellect recognizes them as universal. The Scotist view, which posits a common intention in the things themselves, could be tolerated if the common intention was to be understood merely to mean that there is some objective principle in the singular substance of its being known as a universal nature, and that this principle resides in the thing itself prior to any operation of the intellect.\(^\text{30}\) The Thomist view, however, seems for Trutfetter not liable to err. Trutfetter describes it as something which does not posit universal natures that are really or formally distinct from individuals in the extramental world, but rather where universal natures are only rationally distinguished through the operation of the intellect.\(^\text{31}\)

\(^{29}\) Trutfetter, *Summule*, ff. D2\(^v\)–D3\(^r\); D5\(^f\); Wesel had already explicitly rejected such an idea of universal natures. See Wöhler, *Der Nominalismus*, 371. The appeal to the condemnation of Wyclif was not unusual in the *Wegestreit*. See Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, ‘*Via antiqua and via moderna* in the Fifteenth Century: Doctrinal, Institutional, and Church Political Factors in the *Wegestreit*’, in *The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory*, ed. L. Nielsen and R. Friedman (Dordrecht, 2003), 20–2. However, Trutfetter’s intention does not seem to be only polemical, since he refers also to Thomist writers, who deny the real communicability of beings.

\(^{30}\) Trutfetter, *Summule*, f. D1\(^f\); “Haec si intelliguntur, quod in re ipsa ex sua natura ante omnem intellectus operationem sit ratio obiectiva intentionis communis, sic quod res ipsa ex natura sua possit communiter vel concepi et respondere huic communi intentioni, tolerari possunt, si modo sane intelligantur.” See also Trutfetter, *Summule*, ff. D4\(^f\)–D5\(^r\); *Veteris artis*, f. A4\(^v\). Trutfetter mentions Scotus himself and the Scotist Antonius Andreea as proponents of this view.

\(^{31}\) Trutfetter, *Veteris artis*, f. A4\(^f\)–V: “Caeteris visum est naturam, quae aliquo
It is worth noting that Trutfetter’s analysis accommodates two major traditions of the rivalling realist schools, the Thomist and the Scotist; these are accepted within orthodox Christian doctrine without endorsing their positions as such. On the Thomist view he even notes that it does not differ substantially from the nominalist view, and that the differences consist of the mode of speaking and the use of some terms. It remains as the main difference that whereas the Thomists attribute universality to things in the manner described above, the nominalists attribute it only to signs.\(^\text{32}\)

modo et incomplete est universalis, esse realiter in singularibus, nec realiter sed ratione solum et consideratione intellectus ab illis distinguiri, ita quod eadem res secundum esse suum est singularis et secundum esse intellectus universalis, vel ut alii dicunt, sub uno conceptu universalem et alio singularem, cum quibus sentit Thomas Aquinas ut diximus.” See also Trutfetter, *Summule*, ff. D2\(^V\)-D3\(^R\), D5\(^R\)-D6\(^V\). Trutfetter’s knowledge concerning Thomist views depends, in addition to Aquinas himself, on a number of sources. He explicitly names Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, Peter of Palude, Thomas Sutton, Bernardus Lombardi, Hervaeus Natalis, Petrus Niger, Guilhelmus de Maricalmo, Johannes Capreoli and even Robert Holcot as proponents of this view; perhaps he also has Silvester Prieries in mind (cf. the list of sources in Trutfetter, *Summule*, f. A4\(^R\)-V). Trutfetter refers to Aquinas’ *De ente et essentia* as well as his tractates on universals. On Aquinas’ view in the *De ente et essentia*, see L. J. Elders, *The Metaphysics of Being of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Leiden, 1993), 211.

\(^{32}\) Trutfetter, *Summule*, f. D6\(^V\): “Quibus dilucide sequitur inter sententiam Thomae Aquinatis et recentiorum philosophorum, quos modernos vocamus, in hac re nullam fere esse diversitatem, sed solum in modo loquendi et usu quorundam terminorum. Nam quod ille attribuit rei ex modo considerandi, hi magis proprietati sermonis, intendentes signo rem tali modo significanti, attribuunt. Nam ut ille rem sub una consideratione singularem et alia universalem appellat, sic hi signum sub eiusmodi consideratione significans.” Usingen seems to understand the Thomist and Scotist positions in a similar manner, endorsing the favourable interpretation of the Scotist position. See Usingen, *Summa compendiaria totius logice*, (Basel, 1507), f. c7\(^V\). On Usingen’s position in general, see Lalla, *Secundum*, 278–85. On the problems of Usingen’s conceptualist position and its consequences for his semantics, see Lalla, *Secundum*, 357–370.
Concerning Erfurtians’ teaching of philosophical psychology, their most
evident background is to be found in the Buridanian tradition of natural
philosophy. This can be clearly seen even in the earliest of our sources, Lutrea’s
*Exercitium*. Its titles of the questions correspond to other similar collections
following the example of Buridan’s *Questiones de anima*. The same applies to
Usingen’s *Exercitium de anima*.\(^{33}\)

It is not easy to point out which of the question commentaries among the
Buridans had a direct influence on Lutrea and Usingen. One cannot reject the
possibility of a continuous Buridanian tradition of *exercitia* in fifteenth century
Erfurt. In fact, many early fifteenth century manuscripts of the *De anima*
commentaries from Erfurt have survived and some of their titles suggest that
they are formally question commentaries like Lutrea’s and Usingen’s *exercitia*.\(^{34}\)

Even when Buridan’s direct influence is not evident, one may count his
*Questiones de anima* as one of the works which have, at least indirectly,
influenced these two *exercitia*.\(^{35}\) Among later authors who belong to the
Buridanian tradition of *questiones de anima*, only Lawrence of Lindores is

\(^{33}\) On the importance of Buridan to the teaching of philosophy in Erfurt, see

\(^{34}\) Cf. the two early *Quaestiones super I–III libros “De anima” Aristotelis* and
*Exercitium circa libros de anima* mentioned above in footnote 3 and 5.

\(^{35}\) In what follows, if not noted otherwise, I shall refer to the questions of
Buridan’s third and final lecture on the *De anima* (=*QDA* 3) edited in: Peter
of His Commentary on Aristotle’s Book on the Soul with an Introduction and a
Translation of Question 18 on Sensible Species*. (Diss. Indiana University, 1984)
and John Alexander Zupko, *John Buridan’s Philosophy of Mind: An Edition and
Translation of Book III of His ‘Questions of Aristotle’s De Anima’ (Third
Redaction), with Commentary and Critical and Interpretative Essays* (Diss.
Cornell University, 1989).
explicitly mentioned by Usingen. Lutrea does not refer to Lawrence’s views in the corresponding passages, although he also mentions the same author in a place where Usingen does not. Lutrea is also missing a question found in Lawrence (“Utrum quelibet pars quantitativa animalis sit animal”), which appears in Usingen’s *Exercitium*. This would imply that Usingen relies more heavily than Lutrea on Lawrence’s *Quaestiones de anima*, although it was no novelty in his time and had been available in Erfurt since the early fifteenth century. It is interesting to note that the question “Utrum quelibet pars quantitativa animalis sit animal” appears again in Trutfetter’s *Summa*, although he never mentions Lawrence of Lindores by name.

A number of references to earlier authors in Lutrea’s and Usingen’s *exercitia* may be plausibly traced back to Buridan’s *Quaestiones de anima* as their immediate source. These would include numerous references to the Arabic philosophers, mainly Averroës and Avicenna, and further, references to Albert

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36 Usingen, *Ex. an.*, f. H3v. The context of this reference suggests that it refers to Lindores’s commentary on *De anima*.

37 Lutrea, *Ex.*, f. 38v, where Lindores is mentioned sharing the position of the Arabic philosopher Avempace (Ibn-Bajja).


39 See Wilhelm Schum, *Beschreibendes Verzeichniss der Amplonianischen Handschriftensammlung zu Erfurt* (Berlin, 1887), manuscript no. 343, which is an Erfurtian copy of Lindores’s *Quaestiones* dating from the year 1436.

the Great and Thomas Aquinas.\footnote{The use of such authors as Albert, Aquinas and Giles of Rome (among others) in addition to the nominalist position was prescribed to the masters by the status of the Porta coeli (see footnote 22 above for reference). Tabarroni and Ebbesen criticize the view supported by Kleineidam that the impact of these prescriptions was decisive in the works of the early collegiates Heinrich of Runen and Thuo of Viberg. See Kleineidam, *Universitas I*, 182; 185; Andrea Tabarroni, ‘Introduction’ and Sten Ebbesen, ‘Introduction’ in Thuonis de Vibergia opera (Copenhagen, 1998), XX; XXII.}

Apart from the Buridanian background, which forms the basis of the *exercitia*, is a growing number of other authors whose works have obviously had some influence. First of all, the general influence of Albert the Great should be mentioned. This was mediated above all through the *compendia* on natural philosophy. The most important of these was the *Historia naturalium* or *Philosophia pauperum*, as it was also called. This exposition of natural philosophy although attributed to Albert the Great, was compiled out of Albert’s writings on natural philosophy apparently by another author. This tract did not have a direct influence in Erfurt, as it did in several other German universities in the late Middle Ages. However, it served as a basis for the *Parvulus philosophie naturalis* by Peter Gertitz from Dresden, to which Usingen published a commentary in 1499. It also appears that later expositions on natural philosophy extracted their basic text more or less from the *Parvulus*, modifying it to fit the requirements of the nominalist doctrines. As well, the *Tractatus de anima* by Pierre d’Ailly, which is not infrequently referred to by Usingen, used the pseudo-

Furthermore, in the Parvulus Usingen refers to certain theological works that were not mentioned in Lutrea’s Exercitium. Among these, the Sentences commentaries of Ockham and Gregory of Rimini as well as Ockham’s Quodlibeta also belong to the sources of Pierre d’Ailly’s Tractatus. Biel’s Collectorium in quattuor libros Sententiarum, which was not printed until 1501, was referred to for the first time in the Exercitium in 1507, when Usingen utilized it rather extensively.43

In the latest of the sources, Summa in totam physicen, Trutfetter uses almost all the authors mentioned in the earlier expositions by Lutrea and Usingen, and among these the importance of Biel’s Collectorium cannot be overestimated. In addition to this, he refers to a number of works not mentioned by Lutrea or Usingen. These include a medical work, Conciliator differentiarum philosophorum et medicorum by the Italian Pietro d’Abano; works of the Augustinian theologian Alfonso Vargas of Toledo; and a contemporary compendium of philosophy, Margarita philosophica, by Georg Reisch. Trutfetter was even aware of the latest developments in the Church, and could thus in 1514

philosophische Psychologie des Peter von Ailly, Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie 6 (Amsterdam, 1987), 30–1.

43 See, for example, Usingen, Parvulus, ff. 83r; 86v; 95r. In the Exercitium Usingen refers even to Diogenes Laertius, whose works were available in Latin first through Renaissance translations. See Usingen, Ex. an., f. Q1r. In his question in the quodlibetal disputation in 1497, which was printed as an appendix to Parvulus, Usingen quotes several authors who do not appear in the rest of his works. These include Paul of Venice, Thomas of Strasbourg, Marsilio Ficino, Petrus Nigri and John Rucherat of Wesel. See Usingen, Questio de quiditate quantitatis continue in disputazione de quolibet Erfordie A. D. 1497 determinata, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wöhler in Bochumer philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter 6 (2001), 162; 167; 180.
refer to the latest decrees of the ongoing Fifth Lateran Council.\textsuperscript{44}

4. Psychology and the soul in general

4.1. Psychology as a part of natural science

The Erfurt nominalists Lutrea and Usingen discuss the science of the soul in the initial questions of their \textit{exercitia}. Their position is that as a natural science, \textit{scientia de anima} concerns knowledge of singular extramental entities called souls, since natural philosophy is about \textit{res}, and logic is about signs. However, \textit{scientia de anima} also consists partly of knowledge of signs, such as the universal term ‘soul’. Both kinds of knowledge are based on the conclusions which form the material basis of this science. These conclusions are considered to be necessary truths, and knowledge of them is, according to Lutrea and Usingen, what Aristotle meant in his remark that knowledge concerns necessary truths (cf. Aristotle, \textit{An. Post.} 1). By means of this conceptual construction Lutrea and Usingen could maintain their nominalist conviction that there are no universal and necessary features in extramental things themselves, and that universality manifests itself only in the mind through universal concepts and the necessary features predicated of them. Nonetheless, natural science consists of a knowledge of extramental entities and universal invariances at the same time.

\textsuperscript{44} Trutfetter seems to be the first of these authors to quote Biel, which he did in a retrospective description of a quodlibet in 1497, printed in his \textit{Summule} in 1501. There he quotes Biel’s \textit{Canonis misse expositio}. See Trutfetter, \textit{Una conclusio cum corollariis in disputazione de quolibet Erffordie A. D. 1497 posita}, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wöhler in \textit{Bochumer philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter} 6 (2001), 160. The reference to the Fifth Lateran Council is found in the \textit{Summa}, f. Y4\textsuperscript{r}.
Lutrea admits that the distinction between the mental and extramental object of scientific knowledge derives from the philosophers of the via moderna. Similar problems do not arise among philosophers of the realist via antiqua, who consider natural science as a pursuit of knowledge of the invariable universal features of beings in the extramental world.\footnote{Lutrea: “Utrum de anima sit scientia tanquam de objecto proprio et adaequato illius scientiae...unde triplex est scibile. Propinquus est quod propinquius terminat actum assensivum ipsius intellectus ut est conclusio. Remotum est quod remote terminat actum assensivum ipsius intellectus ut est terminus conclusionis. Remotissimum est quod remotissime terminat actum assensivum ipsius intellectus ut est res, quia res extra animam, actus autem assensivus in anima est... Sequitur quod differentia est inter scibile primum et propinquum. Res enim bene dicitur scibile primus sed non dicitur scibile propinquus. Res dicitur scibile primus quia prima scitur quia ipsa directe per modum objecti scitur, sed termini et conclusiones reflexe sciuntur. Et illa distinctio scibilis in propinquum et remotum et remotissimum habet ortum ex via moderna. Antiqui non curant illam distinctionem quia ipsi dicunt quod solum de illo sit scientia quod significatur per genera et species ut de rebus universalibus. Et fundant se super hoc quia scientia est verorum necessariorum aeternorum impossibiliter aliter se habentium. Modo omnia illa sunt corruptibilia praeter ea qui significantur per genera et species. Sed nos dicimus quod de omnibus rebus mundi sit scientia et distinguimus de tripli scibile, et scientia est verorum necessariorum aeternorum impossibiliter aliter se habentium tanquam scibilium propinquorum non autem remotissimorum... respondetur ad quaestionem quod anima est subiectum praesentis notitiae et de ea est scientia tanquam de scibili remoto et remotissimo.” Ex., ff. 1\textsuperscript{r}–4\textsuperscript{r}; Usingen: “Utrum scientiae de anima, anima sit proprium et adaequatum subiectum” Ex. an., ff. A2\textsuperscript{r}–A4\textsuperscript{r}. Similar ideas come across in the preface of Trutfetter’s Summa. Lutrea devotes a separate, although very short, question to the doctrine of complexe significabilia as formulated by Gregory of Rimini and Henry of Langenstein, which he rejects, whereas Usingen argues against the doctrine only briefly in his first question, and slightly more at length in the opening question of his Exercitium phisicorum (Erfurt, 1507). See “Utrum complexe significabilia sint ponenda” Lutrea, Ex., f. 14\textsuperscript{r}; Usingen, Ex. phis., f. A3\textsuperscript{r}, Ex. an., f. A2\textsuperscript{r}. see also Parvulus, f. 7\textsuperscript{v}. On the antiqui, see Lutrea: “Antiqui non curant illum distinctionem, quia ipsi dicunt quod solum de illo sit scientia quod significatur per genera et species ut de rebus universalibus.” Lutrea, Ex., f. 1\textsuperscript{r}. Usingen does not explicitly mention the rivalling view of the}
As Lutrea’s remark would suggest, a Thomist like Johannes Peyligk is not likely to separate the object of natural science from its immutable features and does not have to construct an equivocal concept of the object of science in order to satisfy the diverse requirements concerning the object of natural science. Nonetheless, even Peyligk has to explain how an object of natural science can be an entity of the extramental world, whose existence is contingent and possesses universal and necessary features at the same time. At the beginning of his treatise on natural philosophy he discusses the question of whether natural science is possible, since scientific knowledge concerns necessary and immutable truths. His answer is that although the existence and several features of natural entities are contingent, necessary predications can be made concerning these. The truth of these predications even depends on the existence of singular entities of nature, but it is important to note that scientific knowledge does not concern the necessary truth of conclusions, but rather what the conclusions affirm of the features of the extramental entities. Movement is a necessary feature of someone walking, even if it is only contingently true that Socrates is walking. The contrast with Usingen’s via moderna remains surprisingly moderate, since Peyligk also thinks that knowledge is about extramental entities, and that the immutable part of it consists of a propositionally explicated relation between a subject and its predicates. However, he quotes Aquinas, who notes that “nothing is so contingent that it would not include some necessity.”

via antiqua.

If the view of the extramental object of psychology was to divide nominalists from their Thomist counterparts, another problem concerning the object of psychology brought them together. Both defend the view that the object of this science is the soul, in contrast to the view (supported by Albert the Great, Giles of Rome and the Scotists) that the object would be the ensouled body. The borderline does not in this case lie between the camps of the *via antiqua* and *via moderna*, but rather between various authorities of the *via antiqua*. Therefore it is not unnatural that Peyligk shows more interest in the topic than his colleague Usingen in Erfurt. Peyligk’s two arguments for his view are similar to those found in the Erfurtian *exercitia*. These include the defence of the idea that the soul, and not only the soul-body composition, can be considered as the subject of vital operations, as well as the argument based on the distinction between the soul as a subject in which all knowledge inheres and as the subject of a particular science of psychology. Usingen even uses literally the same distinction *subiectum inhesionis* vs. *attributionis* as Peyligk in his response to the contrary argument. Erasmus Friesner devotes a question to the topic of whether there can be a science of the soul, but only briefly addresses the argument that the soul is corruptibiles quia ex contrariis compositae, ergo ipsarum nequit esse scientia. Dicendum ad maiorem quod scientia non dicitur perpetuorum, quia extrema ipsius conclusionis demonstratae, ut subiectum et passiones ei inesse demonstratae, sint perpetuae, quia ut sic de his inferioribus non posset esse scientia eo quod nullum ipsorum est perpetuum...sed dicitur scientia perpetuorum ratione habitudinis propriae passionis ad subiectum et econtr, quae, quia est perpetua, sufficit ad scientiam de corruptibilibus habenda. Similiter dicitur de omnibus propositionibus necessariis, quae perpetuae dicuntur veritatis a sola habitudine extremorum, non ab extremis. Dicente Porphyrio: sive Socrates sit, sive non sit, semper est risibilis et homo. Regula beati Thomae: nihil est adeo contingens, quin aliquid necessitatis includit.”
itself cannot be the subject of science.  

The Scotist Jan ze Stobnicy argues that the object of this science is the composition of soul and body, although he mentions it only as the “more probable” view and that it is “commonly held among the Scotists.” He introduces three arguments in favour of this position: (1) there must exist a coherence between the object of this science and natural science in general, and since natural science considers the moving body as such, the object of psychology must be the ensouled body, (2) the composition is more than any of its parts, which renders the ensouled body more suitable as the object of this science than the soul alone, and (3) the composition, and not the soul alone, is the proper subject of the vital operations. Argument (1) arises from the Scotist notion of the object of natural science, which is not shared by Aquinas or Buridan who define it as *ens mobile* instead of *corpus mobile* found in Scotus. Therefore the nominalist and Thomist authors do not object to this particular argument in the discussion on psychology, but rather to another related one which states that the human intellectual soul cannot be the object of psychology, since it is immovable. Argument (3) is identical to the first objection in Peyligk’s discussion and is also found in the discussion of the Erfurt nominalists as noted above.  

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48 Stobnicy, *Parvulus*, ff. 93r–4r: “Tractatus tertius parvuli philosophiae naturalis tribus libris de anima Aristotelis correspondens, cujus subiectum secundum probabilorem opinionem est corpus animatum, hoc est compositum ex corpore et anima et non ipsa anima. Quod probatur tripliciter. Primo sic: sicut se habet
A considerable number of pages are devoted to the first book of De anima in the question-commentaries. After the treatment of the object of psychology, Lutrea’s and Usingen’s exercitia discuss certain questions arising from the first book of the De anima. These include the honourability and goodness of knowledge, the dignity and difficulty of the science of psychology, the priority of universals vs. singulars and the contribution of accidents to the knowledge of substances. In comparison, Friesner discusses in his Thomist commentary the question of the dignity and difficulty of psychology and of the contribution of accidents to the knowledge of substances. He additionally discusses two questions not found in the Erfurt commentaries: whether there are some functions where the soul does not communicate to the body and whether the dialectical definitions are void. All these themes are absent from Usingen’s Parvulus and Compendium, as well as from Stobnicy's Parvulus, which all begin their expositions with a definition of the soul (Stobnicy after an initial question about the science of the soul), with Peyligk bringing into the discussion the

scientia ad scientiam, ita subiectum ad subiectum...Secundo: scientia honorabilior inter scientias naturales debet habere subiectum honorabilius inter omnia entia naturalia...Tertio: illud est subiectum scientiae de quo passiones consideratae in illa scientiae primo et principaliter dicuntur...Ex quibus omnibus concluditur, secundum hanc opinionem quam communiter tenent Scotisantes, quod haec scientia tractat de anima, non tanquam de subiecto primo seu adaequato, sed tanquam de principio formali subjecti primi.” Cf. Lutrea, Ex., ff. 2v–3r; Usingen Ex. an., ff. A3r–v; Friesner, Cursus philosophicus, f. aar.

49 Here the order and titles of the questions follow Lawrence of Lindores’s commentary. See Lawrence Moonan, ‘Lawrence of Lindores on Life in the Living Being’, in Classica et mediaevalia 27 (1966), 371.

50 Friesner, Cursus philosophicus, ff. aar–2rab. See especially f. 2ra-b: “Utrum aliquae operationes animae proprie qua non communicat corpori...Utrum diffinitiones dialecticae sint cassae et vanae.”
dignity of psychology. Trutfetter takes notice of the first book of *De anima* (following the example of Georg Reisch) by discussing the ancient views of the nature of the soul presented by Aristotle but no other topics connected to Aristotle’s first book.\(^{51}\)

### 4.2. General questions concerning the soul

At the beginning of the treatment of the second book, the Erfurt *exercitia* posit the question of whether the soul is a substance in advance of the questions about the definition of the soul. The soul is designated as a substance, since the essential parts of the substances (form and matter) are substances in a proper sense. According to Usingen, the quantitative parts of substances, such as head or arm, are also called substances; Lutrea mentions only matter and form.\(^{52}\) The

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\(^{51}\) The *compendia* follow the structure of Peter of Dresden’s *Parvulus philosophie naturalis*, which is generally very similar to the structure of Pierre d’Ailly’s *Tractatus de anima*, since both derive much of their structure from the pseudo-Albertinian *Summa naturalium*. The Erfurt *compendia*, as well as Dresden’s and d’Ailly’s earlier treatises, begin with a definition of the soul and then proceed to discuss the various potencies in a fairly systematic manner. It may be noted, though, that the later writers of the *compendia* do not systematize their material to the extent that they would treat species, habits and acts separately from the treatment of different potencies, as did d’Ailly. Usingen discusses passions and habits, commenting briefly on the corresponding passage in Peter’s *Parvulus*, but Trutfetter devotes longer passages to passions and habits after the treatment of various potencies, which may indicate the influence of Pierre d’Ailly’s *Tractatus*. Neither of them discuss acts distinct from the respective potencies. See Usingen, *Parvulus*, ff. 112\(^{V}\)–3\(^{R}\); Georg Reisch, *Margarita philosophica*, (1508), f. e4\(^{R}\); Trutfetter, *Summa*, ff. Gg4\(^{R}\)–Hh4\(^{R}\).

discussion of the soul’s definition\textsuperscript{53} and of the plurality of forms\textsuperscript{54} as well as the distinction of potencies\textsuperscript{55} takes place in all the expositions. The answer to these follow the position of the Buridanian \textit{via moderna}: there is only one substantial form in a human being, which is the intellectual soul and there is no real distinction between its potencies, nor between the soul and its potencies.\textsuperscript{56}

The Erfurt commentaries also describe competing positions like those of the Thomists or Scotists. The comparison between the discussion on the distinction between the soul’s potencies in Usingen’s \textit{Parvulus} and Peyligk’s \textit{Compendium} shows that the description of the Thomist position was understood in a similar way by both authors, but the arguments were chosen in a different manner. This might well be due to the process of abbreviation, since in the \textit{compendia} it was not possible to present the various arguments comprehensively. Yet there seem to be more obvious reasons. Even if both authors refer to Aquinas’ main proof in the \textit{Summa theologiae} (I q. 77 a. 1 co.) in

\textsuperscript{53} Lutrea, \textit{Ex.}, ff. 17\textsuperscript{v}–20\textsuperscript{v}; Usingen, \textit{Parvulus}, ff. 80\textsuperscript{v}–2\textsuperscript{r}; \textit{Ex. an.}, ff. C6\textsuperscript{r}-D2\textsuperscript{v}; \textit{Comp.}, f. K3\textsuperscript{r-v}; Trufelter, \textit{Summa}, ff. X4\textsuperscript{v}-6\textsuperscript{v}.

\textsuperscript{54} Lutrea \textit{Ex.}, f. 21\textsuperscript{r}; Usingen, \textit{Parvulus}, f. 88\textsuperscript{r}; \textit{Ex. an.}, f. D3\textsuperscript{v}; \textit{Comp.}, f. K3\textsuperscript{r}; Trufelter, \textit{Summa}, f. Y1\textsuperscript{v}. On this subject in Usingen, see Lalla, \textit{Secundum}, 169–80.

\textsuperscript{55} Lutrea, \textit{Ex.}, ff. 23\textsuperscript{r}-6\textsuperscript{r}; Usingen, \textit{Parvulus}, ff. 82\textsuperscript{v}–4\textsuperscript{v}; \textit{Ex. an.}, ff. E1\textsuperscript{v}-E5\textsuperscript{r}; \textit{Comp.}, f. K4\textsuperscript{r}; Trufelter, \textit{Summa}, ff. Y1\textsuperscript{r}; X3\textsuperscript{r}-4\textsuperscript{r}.

\textsuperscript{56} See for example: Lutrea, \textit{Ex.}, f. 21\textsuperscript{v}: “Respondetur ad questionem, quod in uno homine est tamen una forma substantialis et non plures, quae claudit in se omnes perfectiones omnium inferiorum formarum. Illa responsio est beati Thomae, Marsilii, Byridani, Aristotelis in hoc secundo De anima”; f. 23\textsuperscript{v}: “Respondetur quod potentiae animae sunt tantum quinque, nec ab anima nec inter se realiter distinctae.”
the description of the Thomist position, their sources vary when they present
further arguments. The choice of sources is related to their general aim to
present and defend their own school’s positions. In his description of the
Thomist position Usingen first mentions all the arguments in favour of this
position, which Gregory of Rimini also mentions in his discussion of Aquinas’
position, and adds some others which are for the most part also found in
Rimini’s same question with refutations. However, he mentions Rimini only
when discussing the opinion of the *via moderna* and the counter-arguments
against the Thomist position. Contrarily, Peyligk refers to a wider range of
works by Aquinas and Giles of Rome, and despite the brevity of the treatment
presents arguments not found in Usingen, such as: “Nothing except God operates
through his substance”. Therefore it seems clear that in the *Parvulus* Usingen is
not involved in an argument against contemporary Thomists, but rather
reproduces the traditional argumentation against Aquinas from his immediate
sources.

On the question of whether there exist other substantial forms besides the
intellectual soul in human beings, the Erfurtian *via moderna* contradicts not the
Thomist but the Scotist view. The Scotist position, which affirms the existence of
a separate form of corporeity, is described in similar terms in Usingen’s and

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58 Peyligk, *Comp.*, ff. K1\textsuperscript{v}–K2\textsuperscript{v}.
Stobnicy’s *parvuli*. It is perhaps worth noting that whereas Usingen discusses the question concerning the plurality of forms, Stobnicy formulates the question to ask whether there are three distinct souls. Consequently, Usingen refutes the Scotist view as well as that of Ockham, both of which disagree with his own Buridanian view (and, by the way, the Thomist view as well). Stobnicy stresses that his position, which posits only one soul, agrees with almost all the writers except Ockham “and his followers”, which in fact does not include Usingen’s Buridanian view. Only incidentally does he mention the originality of the Scotist position, which admits the existence of a separate form of corporeity. It looks very likely that the choice of question makes both writers’ own positions appear more widely accepted.\(^5^9\) Usingen’s choice of arguments for and against the Scotist view reveals again his debt to the authority of Gregory of Rimini. Both arguments for the view and their refutations date back to Gregory’s treatment of the question. Apart from the reference to Christ’s body in the grave, the arguments are not found in Stobnicy’s *Parvulus*. Again, Usingen’s discussion is focused on reaffirming the position of the *via moderna*, not on arguments with his contemporaries.\(^6^0\)

The two questions discussed above find a far more comprehensive treatment in the *exercitia* of Lutrea and Usingen. One could expect that the views of the rivalling schools might also be treated in a more adequate manner than in

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\(^{59}\) Usingen, *Parvulus*, ff. 86\(^r\)–6\(^r\); Stobnicy, *Parvulus*, f. 96\(^r\)–V.

Usingen’s *Parvulus*. Concerning the question of the plurality of substantial forms both Lutrea and Usingen list several more views, but the most important are the three also mentioned in the *Parvulus*. The remaining ones do not reflect any contemporaneous positions: they include three historical positions (Anaxagoras, Plato and Averroës) and two views discussed by Gregory of Rimini (John of Jandun and William of Auvergne). Furthermore, the discussion is not focused on contemporary arguments.\(^{61}\) The same applies to the question of the distinction between the soul’s powers, which in the argumentation against the Thomist position does not significantly differ from Usingen’s *Parvulus*.\(^{62}\)

Following these preliminary questions some differences appear between the themes discussed in the various types of expositions. The Erfurt *exercitia* discuss the question common in the Buridanian tradition of whether the soul is present as a whole in every part of the body.\(^{63}\) Usingen also has another question, apparently taken from Lawrence of Lindores’s *De anima*, namely “Whether every quantitative part of an animal is animal”.\(^{64}\) Lutrea discusses the same topic in his question concerning the soul’s presence in the body. Both affirm that quantitative parts fulfil the definition of an animal and therefore they are animal. Usingen notes, though, that the term ‘animal’ is then taken in an absolute sense.

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\(^{64}\) See the table of questions in Lawrence Moonan, *Lawrence of Lindores*, 371.
as signifying the nature rather than an individual.  

In his compendia Usingen proceeds directly from the questions concerning the soul’s definition and division of the potencies to those concerning the vegetative potency. In the corresponding passage of his *Summa*, Trutfetter discusses several themes concerning the intellectual and sensitive souls, such as opinions on their nature and origin. He especially emphasizes the Catholic Christian view of the intellectual soul, which is described in the form of doctrinal sentences. Then he also takes up both of the questions discussed by Usingen concerning the presence of the intellectual soul in the body, and presents a rather extensive digression into the problem of individuation while discussing the latter question. Only then does he return to ask the final questions concerning the distinction of the potencies. At the end of the chapter he writes a remark for the theologians who would question the importance of the study of such matters. There he refers to the traditional analogy between the human soul and the Holy Trinity, where the different potencies have been understood to stand for the different persons of the Trinity. 

The vegetative soul is hardly discussed in the *exercitia*. Lutrea devotes to it only one question, which asks about the justification of the division between

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66 See Pekka Kärkkäinen, ‘Theology, Philosophy and Immortality of the Soul in the Late *Via Moderna* of Erfurt’, *Vivarium* 43 (2005), 337–60.
67 See Kärkkäinen, ‘Nature and Individual’.
the three nutritive potencies.\textsuperscript{69} Usingen adds in his \textit{Exercitium} the question of whether the generation of a being like oneself is a natural operation of a living being.\textsuperscript{70} As well, in the \textit{compendia} the treatment of the vegetative soul is relatively short. Usingen presents in the \textit{Parvulus} two questions concerning the augmentative potency.\textsuperscript{71}

5. The legacy of Erfurtian psychology in Wittenberg?

Little is known about the relevance of the psychology of the \textit{via moderna} regarding later developments in psychology. This applies in particular to the psychology of the Erfurtians. Johann Eck is one of the authors who has acknowledged his debt to Trutfetter. How much this applies to his psychology has not been studied.\textsuperscript{72} Another author, whose influence on later psychology was particularly important, also mentions Trutfetter’s natural philosophy in a

\textsuperscript{69} Ex., ff. 29\textsuperscript{v}-30\textsuperscript{v}.


\textsuperscript{71} “Utrum quaelibet pars aucti augeatur” and “Utrum in qualibet species quantorum dabilis sit maxima, similiter minima quantitas, sub qua forma potest stare in materia.” Usingen, \textit{Parvulus}, ff. 90\textsuperscript{v}–F1\textsuperscript{r}. Usingen discusses the latter question in the \textit{Exercitium phisicorum}, E6\textsuperscript{r}–F2\textsuperscript{r}. See also Truttfetter, \textit{Summa}, f. Dd3\textsuperscript{r}.

\textsuperscript{72} Arno Seifert, \textit{Logik zwischen Scholastik und Humanismus} (München, 1978), 17–8.
favourable manner. In the preface to his *Commentarius de anima* from 1540, Philipp Melanchthon recommends his students to study Trutfetter, in addition to similar works from Juan Luis Vives and Johann Bernhardi of Feldkirch (also known as Johannes Velcurio). The latter was Melanchthon’s colleague in Wittenberg before his early death in 1534, and the work Melanchthon refers to is probably the psychological part of his natural philosophy, which was first published posthumously in 1537 and subsequently became a rather popular textbook through several reprints. Melanchthon’s remark would thus encourage us to compare Trutfetter and other Erfurtians with the psychology of the Wittenbergians Bernhardi and Melanchthon himself.

If continuity between the Erfurtians and Wittenbergians were to be observed, would that further imply that natural philosophy in Wittenberg transmitted some ideas which originated from the *via moderna* into early modern natural philosophy? This seems to be true at least to some degree. Therefore it is important to determine whether the alleged continuities are also related to specific positions of the *via moderna* and not merely to common scholastic views.

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73 Philipp Melanchthon, *Commentarius de anima* (Wittenberg, 1540), f. a5r, see also Kusukawa, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1995), 86.

74 The full implications of such a transmission of ideas would require a thorough study of the history of the reception of Melanchthon’s and Bernhardi’s psychological ideas. For present purposes it is worth mentioning that Bernhardi’s definition of the rational soul and the summary of its powers was quoted (without mentioning the source) even as late as 1621 by Robert Burton in his *Anatomy of Melancholy*, 1.1.2.9 ed. T. C. Faulkner, N. K. Kiessling and R. L. Blair, vol. 1. (Oxford, 1989), 157, 24–35. See also J. B. Bamborough’s commentary in Burton, *Anatomy*, vol. 4 (Oxford, 1998), 186; 192.
Despite the more consciously Humanist style of the Wittenbergians, some similarities with Erfuritian psychology can actually be found, even concerning the themes discussed above. According to Johann Bernhardi, the subject of psychology is the soul itself.\textsuperscript{75} Furthermore, he states that there is only one soul in a human being, and that it is rational and responsible for sensory and vegetative functions (\textit{fungentem officiis quoque sensitivae ac vegetativae animae});\textsuperscript{76} in a similar way, the powers of the rational soul, intellect and will, are not essentially distinct, but distinguished only with respect to their functions.\textsuperscript{77} These formulations point to an affinity with the position of the Erfuritian via moderna, although Bernhardi does not discuss in detail the distinction between different kinds of souls or the soul’s powers.

Melanchthon mentions in his \textit{Commentarius de anima} from 1540 the discussion of the unity of the human soul. He finds it acceptable to talk of three souls in a human being and even mentions Ockham as an example of such a position. Melanchthon’s view arises from his interpretation of the Aristotelian \textit{entelekheia} as a principle of bodily movements, which according to him is only applicable to the sensory and not the rational soul. In his view, therefore, an

\textsuperscript{75} I refer to Johann Bernhardi of Feldkirch’s, \textit{Commentarii in universam physicam Aristotelis}, IV, praefatio 6 (Tübingen, 1544, first printing in Erfurt, 1537/38), f. 171\textsuperscript{r}, which contradicts the Scotist view, but is in agreement with the Thomist view, as discussed above. Cf. also the Scotist position of Pierre Tartaret, \textit{Expositio super tota philosophia naturali nec non Metaphysica Aristotelis cum textu} (Lyon 1498/99), fol. 107\textsuperscript{v}. Tartaret was used in the teaching of natural philosophy in Wittenberg before the Reformation. See Kusukawa, \textit{Transformation}, 50.

\textsuperscript{76} Bernhardi, \textit{Commentarii}, IV.3.1, f. 199\textsuperscript{r}.

\textsuperscript{77} Bernhardi, \textit{Commentarii}, IV.18.2, f. 230\textsuperscript{r-v}.
essential distinction is made between sensory and rational souls. The former is
an Aristotelian entelekheia, which is a form of the body and corruptible like all
forms of matter. The rational soul is, on the other hand, an immortal spiritual
substance, which forms, together with the body, the substance of a human being.
Although Melanchthon formulates his position after a discussion on ancient
views such as Aristotle’s and Galen’s, it is interesting to note that he finds
support for his view in Ockham, the venerabilis inceptor of the via moderna.78

These examples show that at least in Bernhardi there is a tendency
towards the type of psychology found in Erfurt. This impression is confirmed by
the general outline of his treatise, which follows more or less the outline of
Pierre d’Ailly’s Tractatus de anima or the psychological part of Trutfetter’s
Summa in totam physicen. In addition, concerning the question of the
multiplicity of souls, Bernhardi presents a position similar to the Erfurtians,
although this was shared by other schools as well. Contrarily, Melanchthon
actually disagrees with the Erfurtians who reject Ockham’s position.79 However,
the omission of detailed questions makes it extremely difficult to relate
Bernhardi’s or Melanchthon’s treatises to different scholastic schools. Still,
given the examples above, this looks like a possibly rewarding task for future
research.

6. Conclusions

78 Melanchthon, Commentarius, f. 15r–6v.
79 See, for example, Trutfetter, Summa, f. Y2r.
The Erfurtian authors discussed above seem to have a rather solid identity as philosophers of the *via moderna*. In the various forms of their expositions they reveal a rather uniform stance concerning doctrinal issues. Their positions are largely based on the tradition of the *via moderna* going back to the early fifteenth century, and their argumentation is deeply bound to the problems arising from this school’s position. Comparisons with concurrent Thomist and Scotist sources show that the Erfurtians describe the positions of other schools in an appropriate manner, although the arguments for and against these positions are often borrowed from the authorities of their own school rather than from contemporaneous discussion.