The Gendered Social Organisation of Defence
Two Ethnographic Case Studies in the Finnish Defence Forces

Helsinki 2009

Key words: Civil-military relations, ethnography, the Finnish Defence Forces, gender, masculinities, men, military, New Public Management, peacekeeping, security, social networks

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I have never liked the word deadline, even though time-limits help us to organise. My PhD thesis deadline was a ‘birthline’. In August 2008 I wanted (and needed) to get the manuscript to the pre-reviewers before the expected date of birth of our first child. I was able to make it, with the help of Anna and the arriving baby who stayed unborn till the due date. The doctor had told us that according to the ultra-sound she would be a girl. But he is a boy. I dedicate this book to our son, Vilmer Olof August Tallberg, to the future.

In Helsinki, 10th January 2009

Teemu Tallberg
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ABBREVIATIONS

Independently of the original language of the abbreviation, explanations are here only in English.

Official and commonly used abbreviations:

(BG) HQ  (Battle Group) Headquarters
CIMIC  civil-military cooperation
EU  European Union
FINCENT  Defence Forces International Centre
MPK  National Defence Training Association of Finland
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO  non-governmental organisation
OSCE  Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
RMA  revolution in military affairs
UN  United Nations
UNDOF  United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
        (peacekeeping operation in Syrian Golan Heights since 1974)
UNIFIL  United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
        (peacekeeping operation in Lebanon since 1978)
WVF  World Veterans Federation

Unofficial translations and pseudonyms:

DAPP  Defence Administration Partnership Programme (not an official name, translation by the author)
MBM  management board member (of PROSEC)
PROSEC  Provisioning Service Centre of the Defence Forces (not an official name, translation by the author)
PROV  Provisioning Development Project (not an official name, translation by the author)
RI  research interviewee
RTRO  Radnata Troops (operation) (pseudonym)
1 INTRODUCTION: THROUGH GENDER AND THE MILITARY TOWARDS PEACE AND EQUALITY

Two cans of soup

In her book *Maneuvers*, Cynthia Enloe (2000) entitles one chapter with the question “How can they militarize a can of soup?” She ponders on the Heinz tomato and noodle soup in which the alphabet-shaped pastas were at some point changed into ones in the shape of Reaganistic Star Wars satellites. Through the very fact that such presence of the military and war in the everyday life often remains unnoticeable, unproblematised, and seemingly harmless, while it touches so many, Enloe opens up a critical view to the forms and processes of militarisation.

Perhaps the gross Finnish version of the same theme tells something about the military in the Finnish context. At the national Security and Defence Fair 2005 (see Chapter 6 ½) the Defence Command (general headquarters of the Finnish Defence Forces) was handing out cans of pea soup for the fair visitors. The cans were covered in camouflage wrappings with a handle. On one side of the wrapping the text was “Gas weapon to be taken home. Information on the Defence Forces as an employer at www.mil.fi”. On the other side of the wrapping were the user instructions in Finnish accompanied by drawn illustrations: “1. Take a firm grip of the weapon [picture of a hand holding the can of soup]. 2. Pull off the cotter pin [hands opening the can]. 3. Hit the target [hand pouring the soup in to a kettle]. 4. After usage, rear danger area 1-3 meters [a picture of a plume of gas]. 5. When you have recovered, think what you would like to do for a living and visit www.mil.fi.”

* * *

1.1. The escaping gender

Gender, the military, and organisations. What does that combination bring to one’s mind? Wars are about men killing each other. Armies are hierarchies with strict discipline and order, they make men out of boys. Roman legions, Napoleonic wars, Prussian manoeuvres. Generals, world wars, Cold War, NATO, Warsaw Pact. The photo of napalm-burnt Kim Phuk. Fleets, platoons and brigades, bayonets, tanks and gunships, missile systems and nuclear weapons. *Rambo* and *G.I. Jane*. Darfur, Guantanamo, and Abu Ghraib. The old days of proper, fair play wars are gone, it’s all technology, terrorism, and messy civil wars nowadays. Women are now getting into militaries, aren’t they, but should they?

Gender is in the company of the military and organising, as so often also otherwise, easily reduced to something simple and irrelevant. Men are men and
women are women, there is the difference and opposition between them, and that is it. The same applies for both militaries and organising in general: gender may be recognised in tensions between organisational members, but these are framed as minor deficiencies in the functioning of the organisation, and to be managed by somebody at the human resources department. Within organisations gender is, however, a silenced and hidden, but strong, undertow of formal organising, and a key axis of informal organisation.

It is the taken-for-granted character of gender that makes it a potentially powerful analytic tool. When turned into focus, the embedded ‘genderedness’ enables questions, observations, and understandings of distinct sort. For looking at militaries and organising, gender provides a starting point that opens them up as social systems, as combinations of relations, discourses, and practices of power, as everyday encounters and processes, and as contingent objects of political action. The social logic of gender suggests divisions and connections that organise the gamut of human existence.

Gender is a many splendoured thing, but inequality is like a rope. The inequality-rope ties people together in ways that wring and hurt. Sometimes it is obvious that it is gender that the rope is primarily made of. Sometimes it is age, ethnicity, class or socio-economic status, sexual orientation, (dis)ability, religion or ideology, or some other thing that is the strongest strand. Often these fibres are so delicately intertwined that they are difficult to disentangle. That is one reason why it is difficult to cut the rope: we know that things are not right but the reasons escape us and are fouled into knots. There are other reasons, too. It is not easy to cut down ties that keep people together, even when the relations are dissatisfying. Furthermore, for some people pulling the ropes tighter may be quite satisfying. Perhaps this is as far as the rope-metaphor carries. Gender alone is a complicated dynamic, and no final word can be said on this in this thesis either.

1.2. Organisation

The title of this thesis refers to defence as a gendered social organisation. ‘Organisation’ as a term stretches from concrete organisations, such as individual companies or associations, to a metaphor framing almost anything with a perspective of certain structural or processual character of ordering disorder. Both sides of the concept are at work in the following attempts to analyse the gendered character of organisational and social relations of defence. Two distinct organisations within the Finnish Defence Forces are studied. Still, the perspective taken suggests that there is an organisation of different dimension, a ‘social organisation’, that not only covers certain organisational relations – social relationships of organisation members – but also connects these into a larger whole that can be studied, namely ‘the social organisation of defence’.
This formulation contains a perspective of linkages from the everyday organisational practices and interactions, through dynamics of different levels of military-related organisations, to the institutional structures of defence. Furthermore, it builds on a conception of organisations as social processes. As Morgan (1990: 92-93) has stated:

Organizational outcomes, whether we are thinking in terms of strategy or structure, are produced through the actions of individuals and groups within the organization. Thus we need to consider in more detail these sets of social relationships. Organizations are social constructs. Their form, purposes, strategies, cultures […] do not come fully grown into the world; they are shaped in processes of social relationships embodying power dimensions.

1.3. Social organisation

Though the conceptualisation of the studied phenomena as ‘social organisation of defence’ derived from a focus on social relationships in their organisational contexts, ‘social organisation’ soon seemed to pull behind it a vast scientific tradition, if not two. Works of Charles Fourier from the 19th century (Beecher 1986) and Charles Cooley (1909) applied, respectively, the concept of social organisation while they paved the way, for their part, for Marxist traditions (Fourier) and pragmatism (Cooley) in social sciences. The meta questions central to sociology – perhaps especially functionalist sociology – have been formulated in terms of ‘social systems’ (Parsons 1956) or ‘social organisation’, as in works of Morris Janowitz (Burk 1991). Along with ‘culture’, understandings of societies as social organisations comprising of groups, communities, and institutions have been central to different streams of anthropology. Sometimes differentiated, sometimes parallel use of ‘social organisations’ and ‘institutions’ or ‘social institutions’ has created more complexity to the discussions.

In this study, social organisation refers to three intermingling things. First of all, it is used to emphasise the role of social interaction and social ties in organisations and institutional processes. The focus is on how organising takes place as social connections and divisions between people in and around defence. Secondly, social organisation points to the different social logics involved in the organisational ties and interactions. Gender, class, age, ethnicity, and other social power relations carry with them, at times intersecting, at times contradicting logics of division and connection, exclusion and inclusion, discrimination and bonding.

Thirdly, ‘the social’ transgresses organisational structures in terms of networks. At the same time as the ‘social organisation’ approach builds on network approaches to organisations, it problematises them. To what extent, for example, are interorganisational networks separable from organisational, intra-organisational, or personal network relations? What kind of knowledge is produced when networks are looked at extracted from their context and by blotting out the social dynamics within them? These questions do not only link
with the problematic of organisational borders, but even more so with the overall dilemma of social sciences: On what level should one situate the explanatory emphasis?¹

1.4. The military

At a general level the main interest that lies behind this study concerns the role and significance that the military and national defence currently have in Finnish society. Sociologically, four frameworks of social dynamics become relevant: organisational dimensions, gender, networks, and civil-military relations. The study examines the social realities of military organising and connects them to the larger discussions, structures and developments in security and defence. Therefore the study can also be described as organisational sociology of the military with a specific focus on gender.

A new era in Finnish defence has been underway at least since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. New phases are always based on and understood in relation to the preceding ones. After the wars that Finland was involved in during World War II, the defence organisation was rebuilt in a new geopolitical and societal context. This context was for decades remarkably determined by Cold War and the proximity of the Soviet Union, and though it narrowed down the latitude of defence development, it did not prevent Finland from all international military cooperation. UN peacekeeping has been a part of many Finns lives since 1956. It has lately enlarged into crisis management involving both military and civilian activities, and being carried out also under NATO and EU leadership. Participation in rapid deployment troops of the European Union has added in a new format into the repertoire of international security participation. Discussions around joining similar NATO activities are ongoing in Finland (December 2008).

In addition to this politico-military context, and in more narrow terms, this study has taken place in a generational turning point. While new veterans with field experiences of violent conflicts will be generated by the rapid deployment troops of the EU, the troop of the last Finnish war veterans is diminishing to none, and the organisations of the war veterans are facing changes in their activities. The journal *Kansa taisteli* [The People Fought] was publishing true stories on front experiences until 1986. Still, domestic war literature has maintained its popularity, and new generations of film-makers produce new interpretations of war history.

In terms of academic discussions of war, defence, the military, and the nation this thesis is part and product of a stream of studies that are both reinterpreting the past and trying to grasp ongoing changes. Many of these attempts have

¹ Within studies on organisations and work, ‘social organisation’ has been used somewhat similarly, but without gendered analysis, by Manning (1997/1977) in his dissection of policing as drama.
included and even based on critical gendered analysis. In Finland this has perhaps taken place more in humanities than social sciences. Historians, gender researchers and others have adopted the perspectives of gender and ‘new military history’ (Bourke 2006; Kinnunen & Kivimäki 2006) in analysis of, for example, representations and practices of conscription and military training (Ahlbäck 2004a; 2004b; 2006), collectively silenced homosexuality in and homosexual experiences from Finnish wars (Mustola 2006), masculinity and violence in literature (Jokinen 2006; 2009 fc.), and entanglement of corporeality and femininity in Finnish nation building (Valenius 2004). Emphasis has, still, been largely on the past, while political scientists with current focus have mainly stayed on more theoretical and macro levels (Kantola & Valenius 2007). It still seems to hold what Erik Allardt (1989) wrote twenty years ago: Military sociology has been excluded and has excluded itself from academic sociology, and the present-day role of the armed forces in lives of Finns remains mainly unstudied.

Relations between militaries – both antagonistic and cooperative – have played and will play a central role in matters of war and peace. It is fair to say that these relations, along with a perspective of high politics, have crowded the mainstream of research into wars and conflict. With the changes in the nature of wars, the effects of violent conflicts on civilian populations have become both more grave and more visible in their full variety. At the same, the changes have involved a diversification of parties in conflicts, including different civilian, paramilitary, and hybrid civil-military troops, organisations, and actors. Realities of violent conflicts have for long been stretching the distinctions between war and peace, and civilian and military spheres.

Still, wars are not the only forum of civil-military encounters. Also for many societies with long periods of peace, crucial questions pertain to the role of the military as a part of a democratic society. How are the armed forces to be controlled by the civilian society? How are the existing military machineries and the use of violence legitimated as instruments of power? What are the consequences of upholding military structures and operations for the surrounding society and its members? To what extent is peace constrained by war and preparations for war?

In this research the reasoning for studying the military is not how to organise for war but how we live the peace. In this sense the study deviates from the majority of research done by the Finnish Defence Forces and within the National Defence University. With more than sixty years of peace in Finland it becomes emphasised here that the military plays an important role in societal development, and many aspects of this role remain unacknowledged if the prime focus of research is on goal attainment of national defence and its organisational operationality in crisis situations. Interfaces between civilian and military organisations and actors are key points of studying the changing roles of the military in peacetime.
1.5. Defence and peacekeeping

The notion of ‘defence’ covers a lot and touches many things. According to a key principle of the defence policy of Finland, all citizens and all branches of the society are to be involved in ‘total defence’ in crisis situations. Still, there are organisations whose main purposes are directly tied to defence and that thus compose the defence sector. In the Finnish case these organisations include the Finnish Defence Forces, the defence administration, defence industry and companies, and the non-governmental defence organisations.

These defence arrangements are not only linked by organisational interaction and cooperation, but also by cultures, routines, and normative and regulative structures. This aspect of coherence in the defence field makes defence an institution that can be studied through the relevant organisations. Still, the ‘gendered social organisation of defence’ is not the subject of comprehensive examination in this thesis. ‘Gendered social organisation of defence’ is a more general conceptualisation of a phenomenon that is studied here from the perspective of two social and organisational locations, and that as such requires further attention.

The current processes of re-institutionalisation of the Finnish defence and security sector, and the recent restructuring of the Defence Forces involve two key transitions, a strategic and an organisational one. The shift of emphasis taking place in defence strategy is from the territorial defence of the whole country towards “securing the functions vital to society” (Sallinen 2005; MoD document 2006a). This shift from geography to institutional functioning gives reason for institutional analysis of defence organising, and is intermingled with the reorganising of the Defence Forces in terms of redefining its core and support functions. While the Defence Forces is concentrating on its newly formulated core functions, other defence sector actors, as well as many other civilian organisations, are more closely integrated into support of defence in particular, and security organising in general.²

Of the defence sector organisations, this study looks into the major actor, namely the Finnish Defence Forces. What has to be emphasised here is that unlike in some other national contexts, the Finnish Defence Forces has until very recently consisted of both the armed military forces and a wide range of supportive structures. The Defence Forces’ administrative authority is the Defence Command, the supreme headquarters of the Chief of Defence. The Defence Forces is divided into the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and additional institutions. It stretches from conscript and other military training, and the organising of military crisis management, to technological and other

² Grammatically, the Finnish Defence Forces is in this thesis referred to using singular forms. As no established practice of whether to use singular or plural forms exists, and the Defence Forces’ documents (in Finnish and English) include both forms, the choice of singular forms has been made to indicate that the Defence Forces has historically been and is structurally one organisation.
research units, and military bands, and further to military medicine and organisation for provisioning. Thus, ‘the Finnish Defence Forces’ does not mean merely the so called fighting forces.

Peacekeeping and crisis management are as a whole becoming more clearly one core function of the military in Finland, as in some other countries. Since the first decades of peacekeeping, views and vocabulary have changed. The variety of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) involves new linkages and interactions between and among women and men, civilian and military practices and organisations, as well as countries and supranational institutions (Cockburn & Zarkov 2002). During the history of peacekeeping military operations and operators have been searching for their role in the field among conflict prevention and peace-building diplomacy, development cooperation, and humanitarian aid (Schmidl 2000a). UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld has often been quoted to have said that “peacekeeping is too important to be undertaken by soldiers, but soldiers are the only ones who can do it.” In a rephrased form it is still necessary to ask the question in the heart of this dilemma: What are the implications of having military men in the core of peace operations?

1.6. Main aims of the study

The main aims of this thesis include, firstly, contributing to the discussions in the area of gender and organisations. Building on the existing feminist research on organising, the study draws from critical research on men and masculinities to develop analysis of gendered relations and practices in organisations. Specific attention is given to men’s practices and relations that are so often left without gender analysis. Despite doing all this in the particular context of military and defence organising, useful observations and results are provided for understanding, among other things, social networks, authority relations, care, cooperation, partnerships, career planning, humour, and personnel policies in any organisational contexts.

Secondly, the study seeks to make a methodological contribution. This involves consideration of the ethnographic approach and participant observation in the light of differing experiences and positions of the researcher in the two case studies. Additionally, the methodological contribution encompasses reflections on the challenges and possibilities of profeminist ethnography.

Thirdly, the thesis participates in the discussion on organising of defence in national and international levels. The study is a discursive intervention to these discussions, intended also to create a new talking space. This is done by approaching defence with concepts of organisation studies, feminist research and critical studies on men. The discussions on defence and security are, as such, constrained in many ways, some of which are in the heart of this dissertation. The manner in which, for example, the Ministry of Defence has challenged citizens to an active “debate regarding the future of our military
defence” (MoD document 2006a) does not necessarily create spaces for such discussion. When the mentioned strategy of the ministry until 2025 states that general conscription is the best way to organise national defence, and that this is supported by both citizens and state governance, what is there to discuss? Still, conscription has been critically discussed (Rummakko 2006).

Fourthly, related to the previous aim, the study aspires to develop gender analysis on what kind of effects do the changes in defence policy have on defence organising. The new emphases and investments on crisis management and international missions, and on support responsibilities of the Defence Forces to other officials, are clear sites of these changes and inertia, like are the involvements of civilian organisations in military and security organising. The two case studies in this thesis embody these changing relations, and they represent the two sides of the core–support distinction that structures the defence organising more and more thoroughly.

1.7. Architecture of the thesis (with some tasters)

The thesis comprises of eight chapters and an interlude. After the Introduction, Chapter 2 discusses militaries in the light of their roles in societies and their relations to the state, other administrative branches, and the private sector. Key focus is on civil-military relations, and the theorising of this borderline in terms of New Public Management, militarisation, and securitisation. As a reconciliation and an application of these theories, I suggest a framework of ‘security mainstreaming’ for analysing the defence sector. The introduction to the context of the Finnish defence sector takes place in parts in different chapters. It is in many respects partial and purposefully focused on organisational and gender aspects of the sector.

Chapter 3 summarises in short the offerings of social network analysis for the study of organisations. In Chapter 4 research and theorising around gender and organisations is reviewed with a particular focus on men’s (homo)social relations and practices. At the end of the chapter the different frameworks and conceptualisations on gender, organisations, networks, and the military are brought together for the purposes of this study.

Chapter 5 introduces the ethnographic approach, and discusses the chosen and evolved strategy of analysis and writing, as well as research ethics and the positioning of the researcher within the project and the fieldwork. Research materials are listed in short.

Chapters 6 and 7 include the empirical analysis of the two case studies – the peacekeeping and the provisioning cases – respectively. The chapters apply different styles of writing and layout (discussed in Chapter 5.2) in the ethnographic representation. Tasters of this are served below. Between the chapters is an Interlude (Chapter 6 ½) that reflects upon the research process and the relationship between the two case studies in terms of epistemology.
Chapter 8 pulls together some key reflections on the methodological, organisational, and societal implications of the study.\(^3\)

The empirical part of this thesis consists of two ethnographic case studies that are in this section introduced in brief. The process of choosing of the two cases and the complementing relationship between them is reflected upon especially in the Interlude (Chapter 6½). Both cases have been anonymised in terms of recognisable personal information of the participants, names of the organisations, and the exact time periods of the fieldwork.

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Another rainy day in Radnata. We stop the car at the gate as we do every time when entering the camp. No loaded guns inside the camp walls. The same safety routine as always: Slipping the magazine out of the pistol, pulling the slide back to make sure that there is no bullet in the barrel chamber, and firing the empty gun into a box of sand. This time there are local boys playing ball on the street. They look at us. I feel awkward pulling out the gun and handling it in the street. When I pull the trigger above the box, for a split second I am not sure if I emptied the weapon. Every so often it happens to some peacekeeper that an accidental gunshot sounds. But I’m lucky, and relieved with the empty click. I wave at the boys on the street and they wave back at me.

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Case I (hereafter known as ‘the peacekeeping case study’) looks at the headquarters of a bi-national Battle Group that was a part of a multinational NATO-led peacekeeping operation. The main task of the peacekeeping troops in the post-conflict area of Radnata (pseudonym) was to ensure a safe and secure environment for the local population and the various international actors (mainly UN, OSCE, EU and NGO’s). In the beginning of the fieldwork the situation in Radnata had been peaceful for a long time, but at the end of the fieldwork phase violent disturbances took place between the ethnic parties.

The focal research participants were more than 60 Finnish officers serving in the Battle Group headquarters. Approximately half of the Finnish troops personnel in Radnata rotated every six months; the usual service period of an individual peacekeeper was 6-12 months.

I conducted the fieldwork of the peacekeeping case study as a complete member researcher (Anderson 2006). Fieldwork involved a process of applying for peacekeeping training, training for 5 weeks in Finland, and service as a

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\(^3\) Two remarks on punctuation may be of use already here. Quotation marks are in this thesis used to refer to direct quotations from literature, research interviews, and suchlike. Apostrophes, instead, are used for distinguishing terms from other text, and emphasising that certain critical distance is kept to them (for example ‘total defence’). In the quotations, three dots in square brackets [...] are used to show that a passage of the original text has been excluded. Three dots without brackets stand for a pause in the interview extracts. In the interview extracts, as well as elsewhere, abbreviation TT refers to the author, Teemu Tallberg.
peacekeeping officer for 6 months. Collected material consists mainly of participant observations stored in research diaries, taped interviews with colleague peacekeepers, formal and informal documents, and contact diaries kept by certain research participants.

I arrive at the centre for the first time. The house reminds me of a modern university building, not a military site. Actually the building includes also university units, city organisations, and companies, all doing research and development around nutrition and healthcare. At the end of a corridor I find a glass door with the complicated name of the organisation: Provisioning Service Centre of the Defence Forces. The door is locked and the doorbell does not seem to function. Finally a woman comes to open the door. She is sorry for the mess. The corridors are filled with boxes of new computers and wrappings of new furniture.

Case II (hereafter known as ‘the provisioning case study’) looks into the reorganising of the provisioning and catering function in the Finnish Defence Forces. Reorganising took place in terms of a provisioning development project PROV (2002-05) that resulted in formation of a new Provisioning Service Centre (PROSEC). The development project was one among seven similar projects under the Defence Administration Partnership Programme (DAPP). These projects involved reorganising of information and salary administration, clothing, maintenance, transportation, provisioning, and medical services of the Finnish Defence Forces. The DAPP was linked to the wider administrative guidelines of increasing efficiency in state governance.

The ethnographic fieldwork in the provisioning case study focused on the last phases of the PROV development project and the start-up of PROSEC, especially its headquarters. In addition to the headquarters of 25 employees, the centre consisted of more than 20 provisioning service units around the country with altogether around 700 employees. After getting a research permission from the Defence Command (general headquarters of the Defence Forces) and access to PROSEC, I spent during a four-month period 27 field days participating in the everyday life of the headquarters: meetings, training sessions, PROSEC opening seminar and party, visits of the PROSEC management to garrisons and service units etc. The gathered material includes fieldnotes, formal interviews, and various official and unofficial documents. Interviews were mainly conducted with the management board members and other personnel members at the PROSEC headquarters.
2 ORGANISATIONS AND MILITARIES IN SOCIETIES

The role of the military has been central and multifaceted in the historical and social development of societies and organisation. The military has been a constituent institution of societies, along with other power structures, such as economy, politics, kinship, and religion. Along with the church, armies have been key sites of creating early (pre-modern) administrative structures and practices of organising (Raadschelders 1998: 191-214; Talbot 2003). While modern professional militaries have been bureaucratic extensions of state bureaucracies, current developments are forming new relations of security organising, and defence networks (Martin 1984; Krahmann 2005a).

The purpose of this chapter is four-fold. Firstly, it presents a perspective on the literature on intersections of militaries, organisations, and management. Secondly, the chapter pays specific attention to military organising in terms of interfaces between the state and business, public sector organisations and private actors. Thirdly, the same interfaces are theorised from another perspective by applying conceptualisations from political science and studies of international relations. After discussing the frameworks of civil-military relations, militarisation, and securitisation, fourthly, the framework of ‘security mainstreaming’ is introduced. Along the way, and especially in the introduction of security mainstreaming, examples are drawn from the organisation of defence in Finland in order to outline the context of the case studies in this thesis.

2.1. Interlinkages: sociologies of organisations, management, and the military

The first and foremost purpose of the military has been to stand by as a resource and act as an instrument for offence and defence in terms of warfare. This crude generalisation still applies to a large extent, but several reservations are necessary. Most urgently, military systems and actions have huge consequences on their environments outside wars, and wars can no longer be understood only as battles between militaries. Changes in the military have thus been closely connected to changes in the nature of wars and violent conflicts, but not only to them.

As military historians have shown revolutions in military affairs (RMA’s) take place through dialectic relationship between militaries and their complex environments. The doctrinal, tactical, organisational, and technological innovation and adaptation in military systems takes place as both anticipation of and reaction to the surrounding changes. The five revolutions in the history of Western militaries discussed by Murray and Knox (2001) stem from: 1) the birth of nation states based on organised and disciplined military power (17th century); 2) merging of mass politics and warfare during the French revolution (end of 18th century); 3) Industrial revolution providing enhanced possibilities
of supporting, supplying, and moving massive numbers of troops (late 19th
century); 4) First World War as a combination of earlier RMA’s; and 5) Cold
War developments in terms of nuclear weapons, ballistic missile delivery
systems, and computerisation.

Latham (2002) has criticised the RMA approach for narrowing varying war-
related phenomena into a series of epochs each initiated by an RMA. According
to him, RMA approach concentrates on changes from one warfighting paradigm
(i.e. specific configuration of military technologies, doctrines and organisational
forms) to another. Instead, Latham emphasises the connections of warfighting
with “transformations in the social organization of warfare and deeper changes
in the nature of war as a historically constructed social institution” (ibid. 233):

“[A]s the nature of organized political violence in any given era is the
product of complex social, political, technological, strategic and cultural
processes, an RMA must necessarily involve some deeper form of socio-
military change. From this perspective, the concept of revolution in military
affairs encompasses changes as diverse as the transition from the ‘Age of
Tools’ to the ‘Age of Machines’ (van Creveld, 1989); the shift from ‘Second
Wave’ to ‘Third Wave’ social structures (Toffler and Toffler, 1993); the
strategic changes ushered in by the end of the Cold War (Freedman, 1998);
and the transition from ‘modernity’ to ‘postmodernity’ (Gray, 1997)”
(Latham 2002: 233).

Although many patterns of warfare existed long before and elsewhere, the 18th
century Europe was, according to Holsti (2004), when war became
institutionalised. While the European monarchs were – as a part of the rise of
the modern state – centralising political control of militaries in their hands, the
military profession, thought, and practice formed under a particular conception
of war in terms of recruitment, training, funding, soldier’s identity and its
external signs, strategy, tactics, and peace negotiations and treaties. Physics and
engineering laid the basis for the military as a discipline with its own academies
and journals. In its core the institutionalisation involved certain evolving
distinctions in which the norms, rules, and etiquette of war were embedded. Combatants
were distinct from civilians, who would not be targets of military
actions. Belligerents became more clearly separate from neutrals that became
defined by their rights and responsibilities in terms of diplomacy and trade with
the belligerents. State governments became to command the militaries. Like the
other distinctions, the one between peace and war was moulded and
strengthened by regulations and international laws (ibid. 275-282).

As Holsti (2004: 283-299) argues, after World War II de-institutionalisation of
war has taken place in terms of these distinctions eroding and norms and rules
of war being violated. War, as described above as an institution, has become
somewhat obsolete and replaced by varying military interventions, terrorism,
and collapsing states and intra-state wars. At the same time, certain re-
institutionalisation is taking place as, on one hand, the latest RMA with its
techno-strategic paradigm involves some return to targeting, control, and
standardisation of war practices, and, on the other hand, the non-combatant roles of militaries are becoming more and more patterned around peacekeeping, monitoring and implementation of peace agreements, rebuilding, and other activities that aim at promoting peaceful conditions in line with humanitarian and other international law.4

In their typology of forms of military organisations, Moskos et al. (2000) describe the current postmodern (equalling post-Cold War) military through particular changes. These include structural and cultural rapprochement of military and civilian spheres; lessening of differences across internal divisions of the military (branch of service, rank, and combat versus support functions); change of emphasis from fighting wars towards missions of less clear military character; loosening ties between military and the nation state and growing role of international missions authorised by supranational entities; and internationalisation of militaries (such as Eurocorps) (ibid. 2).

Based on its special characteristics, military organising involves specific developments of its own, but it is in many respects also subject to akin pressures as other fields of organising. Winslow (2003) has noted that the military and private sector organisations are in many respects facing similar or even the same development trends. With a perspective on Canadian society, Winslow parallels the decrease of stability in security environment with increasing instability of markets for business, as well as the downsizing and restructuring in both the Army and business economy. Multinational peace operations and interventions across the world come to remind of geographically dispersed actions of and demands to companies in global markets. Additionally, information technologies are increasingly exploited in both fields to achieve a competitive edge over rivals.

With this macro-military-historical background I shall next turn to a more focused discussion on the organisational and sociological perspectives and what they can offer to the study of militaries and defence.

2.2. Organisations in societies, defence as an institution

‘Organisation’ is a complex term. As much as it suggests an ordered structure of most anything, organisations are in constant change both internally and in terms of their borders and relations with their environments. In this study organisations are approached primarily from a perspective of social phenomena. Although I use both terms – organisation and organising – I see organisations primarily as processes. Organisations as “social places of organizing and social

4 On basis of Holsti (2004: 283, 294) one could argue, that while along with World War II the Clausewitzian idea of war as extension of policy was overthrown and the use of military force as a statecraft was de-legitimised outside self-defence, since then the forms of using force with known political purposes are arising, with ethically more and less debatable goals (Chomsky 2003).
structurings of social relations” (Hearn & Parkin 2001: 2; italics original) involve a constant dynamic of institutionalisation, including re-institutionalisation and de-institutionalisation (Scott 1995). These processes are one way in and through which organisations link with other social forms. A social network may form into an organisation, organisational and inter-organisational developments play a role in institutions. Previous research around these interlinkages can pave the way for analysing defence as an institution through its organisations.

For a student of military organising, much of the literature on organisations provides a surprise. Organisation theory and studies sometimes, indeed often, take for granted that ‘organisation’ equals business companies. In the book Networks in and around Organizations (Andrews & Knoke 1999) the article ‘The Dynamics of Inter-Organizational Relationships’ (Ebers 1999: 32) starts:

“Over the past 20 years, there has arisen a burgeoning literature on inter-organizational relationships and networks [a long list of references]. Among the prominent research questions that this research has addressed are the following: Why do firms (increasingly) engage in inter-organizational cooperation and when? With whom are firms likely to ally and why? How do firms organize and control their cooperation?”

Ebers’s conceptual framework for studying interorganisational relationships (ibid. 34-39) does as a model seem at first sight fit for analysing, not only businesses, but also, for example, military organising or relations between public and private organisations. Still, the basic assumptions about organisational relations as markets narrow down the scope of application in away that discourages its use:

“[T]hrough cooperation organizations can access complementary resources and/or capabilities or can closely coordinate their use of resources; in this way, they hope to enhance their competitiveness, for example in terms of improved products, better or wider market access, or faster market entry” (ibid. 34).

Similar restrictions pertain to certain extent to new institutionalism. In their article on organisation of societal sectors Scott and Meyer (1991) define the societal sector as “1) collection of organizations operating in the same domain, as identified by the similarity of their services, products or functions, 2) together with those organizations that critically influence the performance of the focal organizations; for example, major suppliers and customers, owners and regulators, funding sources and competitors” (ibid. 117). In terms of

5 Readers interested in organisational relations can be faced with even narrower definitions of interest. For example, in The Blackwell Companion to Organizations Gulati et al. (2002) write about ‘Organizational Networks’: “In this chapter, we move from reviewing the impact of social networks on behavior to studying their formation and their implication for firm performance.” (Ibid. 282; italics original.)
conceptualising the defence sector this definition serves as a basis, but has to be accompanied with other approaches.

In the social sciences the military is sometimes seen as one of the constituent institutions of societies along with politics, economy, legislation, kinship, religion, and other power orders (Gerth & Mills 1991/1970: for example 221-222; Mann 1988; Giddens 1990). In analysing the role of the military in society with a perspective from the inside of defence organisations, there is a need for a framework that both stretches from individual to macro phenomena and enables focused analyses at the organisational level. The institutional framework has proved to provide fruitful theorising for this purpose.

As Scott (1995) shows, the early institutionalists of the late 19th and late 20th century in economics, political science, and sociology did not pay much attention to organisations. The development of institutionalism in relation to organisations and organisation studies may be seen as a process of sophistication in distinction of organisations and institutions, and the different layers involved. The growing interest in the 1970s and 1980s in organisational fields, or in other words, interorganisational systems as societal sectors, marks one of these steps. The foci of concern of organisation studies have covered several levels of analysis and the relationships between the levels, namely, the world system, societal level, organisational field, organisational population, organisation, and organisational subsystem (ibid. 56).

The different strands of institutionalism have defined ‘institution’ in different ways. Scott defines that institutions "consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour. Institutions are transported by various carriers – cultures, structures, and routines – and they operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction" (Scott 1995: 33). As such, institutions give rise to and support organisations, and contribute to social stability; they are characterised by taken-for-grantedness and self-restoration. Ahrne makes a similar distinction between organisations and institutions: “Institutions are ideas about which social activities can be organised and how they should be organised. [...] Organizations are materialized institutions” (Ahrne 1994: 4).

These conceptualisations seem to resonate with a school of theory of quite different sort, namely the historical-diffusionist school. This approach in cultural anthropology, discussed by Allaire and Firsirotu (1984) in relation to organisations and management, suggests certain historical contingency: the time, place, and circumstances of organisation’s evolvement can through values and ideologies affect the organisational structures and practices. Organisations as socio-cultural systems and “as social actualisations of their genesis and historical transformations” (ibid. 202) may thus preserve features that are in conflict with their tasks, goals, or surrounding society. Historical-diffusionist approach is also interested in “migrations of cultural traits” between systems and places, and acculturation and assimilation producing change.
At least at first sight this seems to fit or make sense in relation to the observations and questions discussed above. One might, for example, trace the possible roots of practices and organisational structures of peacekeeping through the history of both Finnish warfare and peacekeeping. Or one could hypothesise about how military organisations, their structures and practices, have preserved certain ideologies and values related to men, gender, ethnicity and nationality. What could be the systems and places that are relevant as receivers and senders of migrating gendered cultural traits appearing in peacekeeper communities? Whether the historical-diffusionist approach serves as a useful instrument of contextualising and analysing the data or whether it operates on too general a level to be applied, remains a question.

In the study of the gendered social organisation of defence, two things in Scott’s theorising are especially valuable. Firstly, according to Scott, institutions are embedded and embodied in carriers. Cultural carriers involve rules and laws, normative expectations and values, as well as cognitive codifications. Routines involve conventions and patterned actions based on unreflected knowledge and beliefs (Scott 1995: 53-4). Social structural carriers refer to “patterned expectations connected to networks of social positions” (ibid.), that constrain and empower behaviour of actors. Though Scott’s social structural carriers do not involve gender, ethnicity, age, or other such social structures or relations, it is not impossible to read them into the framework. Many understandings of gender – also the one in this study – resonate with the systems of constraining and enabling social expectations and positioning. Still, it is the understanding and centrality of power that makes the difference.

Secondly, Scott’s discussion on organisational fields (or societal sectors) provides a basis for looking at the interorganisational connections in the defence sector. Idea of organisational field is a way of conceptualising the environment of organisations, and adding a layer that relates organisations with each other, and mediates between them and institutions. The term refers to a “community of organizations that partakes of a common meaning system and whose participants interact more frequently and fatefuly with one another than with actors outside of the field” (Scott 1995: 56). As will be discussed below, the changes in the defence sector may be interpreted in terms of re-institutionalisation of various organisations under the umbrella-institution of security.

Ahrne (1994) extends the understanding of organisations from business enterprises and voluntary organisations to states and families. Organisations are all characterised by four common principles: affiliation, collective resources, substitutability of individuals, and recorded control. Ahrne criticises the views in which organisations are analysed within the environment of only other organisations, not individuals and institutions. He points to tensions that can take place between institutional demands and “the inner logic of coordination” in organisations (ibid. 106).
Ahrne uses the metaphor of organisational centaurs. Based on Goffman’s (1961) ideas on ‘dual involvement’, ‘expressions given’ (actions on behalf of organisation) and ‘expressions given off’ (personal traits and feelings) actors are seen as centaurs with human and organisation parts. Still, individuals have several affiliations, and actually human interaction mostly takes place as interaction on behalf of organisations. Organisations are social mechanisms that accumulate individual action into social processes and social change.

Ahrne describes networks as personal, creative, dynamic, ‘authorityless’ and blurry-bordered sets of exchange relations, where the human part of the actor is more important than the organisation part. Here the view that human interaction takes place between organisations by affiliated members presents an alternative for social network analysis. Ahrne sees networks as complementary to organisations, with no collective decision-making or control and no accumulation of collective resources and power (Ahrne 1994: 76-78). For this reason networks would be secondary in analysis of social processes and change. Because of the principle of substitutability, networks resting on personal contacts are vulnerable (ibid. 43). Ahrne also pays attention to the facts that networks have a role in organisational interaction, in how people become organisational affiliates, and that networks can turn into organisations.

In terms of the military, the institutionalist framework opens different possibilities of seeing the relationships of organisations and institutions. The military might be seen as an institution that manifests as military organisations. As will be discussed in this thesis, this view constructs the military as a separate constellation in a way that does not fit the reality of Finnish defence organising, and in a way that may reproduce gendered inequalities. Instead, this study builds on seeing (national) defence as an institution that materialises in organisations of the defence sector, mainly the Finnish Defence Forces, defence administration, defence industry, and voluntary defence associations. What is becoming apparent is that defence is continually adapted and adapting itself as a part of wider security system.

Moreover, as an institution, national defence creates tensions in defence sector organising. What Ahrne (1994) discusses less is what and how institutions as cultural regulators enable organisational interaction and cooperation and how different institutions may pose demands on an individual organisation. As argued above, ‘national defence’ may to some extent serve as a proper institutional frame for analysis of defence sector organisations, but it involves an inner division that complicates the picture, namely the one between civilian and military spheres. There are differences according to this division both between and within organisations in terms of the affiliations that the organisation members have.
2.2.1. Bureaucracy and hierarchy – the military as an ideal type in organising and management?

Many military organisations match with several of the qualities attached to bureaucracy as a form of organising. They involve hierarchical authority, detailed division of labour, standardised routines, and impersonal relations among staff (Martin 1984). Militaries involve continuity in terms of specialised professionals serving according to prescribed rules, and as hierarchies they differ in essence from private organisations and markets (Beetham 1987: 3-4). Along with others, Kovitz (2003) has suggested that the military is characterised by stagnation and segregation from the larger civilian society. As such the military and its organisations are resistant to change – not least in terms of women entering the military – and tend to preserve the institutional and cultural structures and practices that in turn the military relies on. Moskos and Burk (1994), in contrast, have emphasised that military organisations are not rigid, hierarchical and unchanging bureaucracies, but vary historically and culturally, and have different roles in the society. In any event, the relationship between the military and organising in modern and latter-day societies cannot be reduced to bureaucracy.

It has been argued that instead of being a newborn product of modern economy and business, management and organisation grew out of a long tradition of military manoeuvring of troops and equipment. There may be several reasons for the tendency in the “liberal-capitalist West [to deny] any association with militarism with its connotations of Prussian/German excesses, reactionary conservatism and repression” (Talbot 2003: 338). Talbot (building on Hoskin & Macve 1990) puts a lot of emphasis on the M-form model of organising that was drawn from the US Military Academy and transformed to the US railroads and further to US business management. For the needs of the industrial age, military models existed as the only form of large-scale management, and when they proved functional, they were reproduced in new contexts. In the post-industrial era – with network forms of organising (or N-form model) – battlefield success of organisation models seems to remain the primary criteria for military organising with support from the masculine martial and warrior traditions. At the same business and civilian sector seem increasingly eager to apply military structures practices (Talbot 2003).

Stokes (2007) has noted that in management and organisation writing, it is primarily managerialist texts that have engaged with military. These privilege militarised discourse and language, and routinely build on military classics like Sun Tzu’s The Art of War (1965 [6th century B.C.]) or Carl von Clausewitz’s On War (1968 [1832]). Furthermore, the managerialist accounts seldom reflect upon the blurring boundary between the military and the non-military. Instead

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6 See, for an illustrative example, Pech and Durden (2003) on manoeuvre theory in strategising, and their arguments “supporting aggressive strategies that exploit the elements of speed, surprise and flexibility” (ibid. 168).
they reproduce a relationship of reciprocal learning and enhancement between the two separated realms, around themes like leadership, strategy, teambuilding, and planning. Entanglement of popular cultural representations of war in this context is not unknown in Finland either (see Artto et al. 2000; Lundberg 2005).

Mutch (2006) has, instead, discussed the remarkable linkages between the military and organisation theory. Military practices and experiences have directly affected theorising on organisations in many ways, but what Mutch emphasises is that the unreflective use of military metaphors can result in false dichotomising. Drawing on and constructing bi-polarity between, on one hand, military-like organising with strict and mechanical command, control, and hierarchy, and, on the other hand, “more fluid analogies, particularly those based on networks” (ibid. 755) distracts the attention from persistence, centrality, and functioning of hierarchies in all (other than military) organisations.

Here two things in Mutch’s argumentation are worth special attention. Firstly, that the analysing and opening up of military organising in its complexity might provide, among other things, new organisational metaphors (Morgan 1997), such as the one Mutch elaborates on basis of the Green Jackets, the “light infantry units [of the British army], with their strong focus on decentralized decision making supported by strong regimental culture” (Mutch 2006: 763). As the two ethnographies in this thesis show, military organising involves complex dynamic concerning social and organisational relations and between different paradigms of organising.

Secondly, as Mutch argues, the unpacking and re-evaluation of military metaphor, though important, should not displace the attention on mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell 1991) in relation to military structures and practices. In this thesis, the mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change are later on applied in order to develop the analysis on the gendered social organisation of defence. Both the hybrid organisation of peacekeeping in terms of reservists and professional soldiers, and the inter-sectoral partnerships of defence involve exchanges of organising practices and discourses. Gender and men’s homosocial relations play an important role in mediation between the military, administration, and businesses.

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7 Both Artto and Lundberg draw in their management books from Väinö Linna’s novel The Unknown Soldier (1954). Tienari et al. (2004) have argued that the central discourse concerning ‘good leadership’ in the Finnish context draws from a military discourse while constructing a masculine image of “assertive and situationally sensitive leadership from in front” (ibid. 51; translation from Finnish by TT).
2.3. The state, public sector, and New Public Management

In studies on public sector administration and New Public Management (NPM), armed forces have rarely been discussed. Defence is not easily perceived as part of public services that have framed and been the focus of research on NPM. Still, militaries have for long been connected to and affected by, as well as affecting, both other branches of state administration and the private sector.

2.3.1. State-military-business relations

Participation of private businesses in military activities has for long been entangled with concerns about military armament and organising escaping democratic control. The growing interdependence between states and military industries was paid especial attention to in the Cold War United States. In his study on elites of the United States, Mills (1959) stated that “there is a military clique, but it is more accurately termed the power elite, for it is composed of economic, political, as well as military, men whose interests have increasingly coincided” (ibid. 224). Mills saw a mutually contributing dynamic between the rise of “military capitalism of private corporations” and the weakening of politics as a democratic system (ibid. 274-6). In 1961 Dwight D. Eisenhower in his farewell speech as the US president warned – in pursuance of recognising its necessity for national defence – about the ‘military-industrial complex’ and its potential to change societal structure, misplace power, and overshadow democratic processes.8

With the more present-day increase in peacekeeping, crisis management, and other cross-national military interventions, the challenges seem to follow. Klein (2007) argues that the active institutionalisation of privatised warfare model launched for the war in Iraq is resulting in ‘disaster capitalism complex’. In the United States, downsizing of Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs was coupled with new division of labour, where soldiers carried out core combat operations and major companies took over both supportive military tasks and rebuilding. The ratio of contractors (working directly for the US government) to US soldiers has increased. As it was 1:100 in the first Gulf war (1991), it soared both up until the Iraq invasion (1:10 in 2003) and during the occupation (1.4:1 in 2007) (Uttley 2005: 1). Along with the growth in privatisation of military and security services, also the research interest on the subject has been wide (Singer 2003; Avant 2005; Krahman 2005a, 2005d; Schreier & Caparini 2005; Matlary & Østerud 2007; Krishnan 2008).

Involvement of private companies in military activities is definitely a new form of military and security organising, but rarely have the state armed forces been the only players in battles and armed conflicts. Mercenaries were, during the development of modernity, gradually replaced by nationally organised citizen

8 http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/speeches/farewell_address.html
armies (Avant 2000), but they still play a key role in a variety of violent conflicts around the world. Meanwhile, the armed forces have not always 'stuck to their guns', by restricting themselves only to military matters. If the privatised military and security industry is one side of the coin, the other side is the militarisation of the private sector. Military entrepreneurship (Mani 2007) embodies the involvement of incumbent military officers in cross-sectoral networks, and the ways in which they secure their elite positions by combining military and economic prestige. Some forms of more implicit militarisation of the private sector have been discussed above, but many issues remain understudied, for example in Finland, the role of career-changing and post-retirement officers or other military trained and educated managers in businesses.

Within the context of privatisation of warfare, the relation of militaries with states and businesses changes and gets more complex. The division of security and defence work changes, and militaries get drawn into and have to participate market-like competition. It is indicative how the economic framework is used to discuss the military. For example, Dahlbom (2005) describes the Swedish armed forces of the post-industrial service society as a ‘mobile resource’:

“From having been an enormous public educational institution, with extremely little market value, our defence force is encouraged to change into a small number of specialized, operative forces, able to intervene quickly on an international market” (ibid. 147).

The fact that national and supranational military organisations are competing and cooperating in crisis and post-crisis areas with private and semi-private security companies implies that the continuum of peacekeeping, crisis management, 'rapid deployment' and other military interventions does provide a market to be exploited. Finnish defence doctrine seems in terms of territorial defence and mass conscription further away from these developments, but perhaps not for long with the increasing emphasis on international defence cooperation.

2.3.2. New Public Management and security governance

Though a contested concept, NPM is broadly used to refer to importing into public administration the principles and practices of entrepreneurial and private sector management, competition, output control, standardising and measuring of performance, disciplined resource allocation, and decentralisation, as well as privatisation and marketisation of public services. These are presented and applied by the supporters of NPM as solutions for welfare state’s problems in organising of public administration according to principles of bureaucracy (Osborne & McLaughlin 2002). In order to cut inefficiency and ineffectiveness in provision of public services, outsourcing and partnerships have been argued for. These modes would enable the cutting of costs through “the ‘discipline’ of the market” (Grimshaw et al. 2002: 487).
Contracting is claimed to enhance monitoring and control on service provision, and spur motivation, innovation and productivity. Re-organisation of support functions is to enable concentration on core functions and thus better performance. Pressures on cooperative arrangements involve both marketisation in terms of public-private partnerships and efficiency aims in terms of public-public partnerships (ibid.).

Critics of NPM have pointed out, among other things, that the dispersed flock of ideas and practices called NPM is a passing fad and has failed in combining efficiency with successful public service provision. Quantifiable short-term savings at the organisational level may damage the quality of service provision, erode public sector ethos among workers, and create costs in the longer run at the macro level. Public-private partnerships have shown to involve, additionally, problematic power imbalances among partners, loss of expertise from public sector, as well as, instead of stability and security, fragmentation of both service provision and public services as working environment (Osborne & McLaughlin 2002; Grimshaw et al. 2002).

In studies on public sector administration and NPM, the armed forces have rarely been discussed. It is not so easy, nor unproblematic, to perceive national defence as part of public services, which have framed and been the focus of research on NPM. Still, a gendered connection of different sort between managerialisation and the military has been found by Hopton (1999). Hopton states that new management ideologies are replacing militarism as a key mechanism of social control and maintenance of the patriarchal state. While the standing of militarism is not so certain due to changes in global politics, in the role and tasks of the military, in military technology, and in public attitudes, managerialism provides with a more refined version of masculinist organising. It is, on the face of it, infused by the promotion of economic efficiency and effectiveness, cooperation, and excellence in free markets, but is actually rooted in masculinist practices and discourses of competitiveness, domination, authority, risk taking, and elitism. Additionally, public sector managerialism reproduces the language and imagery of militarism.

In Finland, defence policies and the recent developments in defence organising resonate with the claimed changes in state governance from hierarchy model to open system model. Instead of centralised state control governments are more “obliged to govern at a distance by influencing, persuading and [...] providing system-wide integration and regulation” (Newman 2003: 16). As I shall argue, in Finland the processes of security mainstreaming are increasingly bringing into the defence sector the “patterns of state-society interactions based on ‘co-‘ arrangements – collaboration, cooperation, co-steering, and co-governing” (Newman 2003: 17). At the same time as security mainstreaming reflects these state-level changes in governance, it affects organisation of and work in the Defence Forces.
The shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ has also been seen to restructure security arrangements more widely. Krahmann (2005b; 2005c) has argued that non-state actors have gained importance as both security providers and as causes of new security threats. She claims that tackling contemporary security threats – civil wars, transnational crime, terrorism, diseases, and spread of small arms – requires multilateral cooperation and local involvement of those who are directly affected by the threats. The need for flexible and adaptive arrangements that can stretch across national borders is met with international regimes and organising, as well as by states promoting the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and private companies as security actors. The latter development is driven also by financial pressures on states to outsource and privatise security functions. Still, the networked collaboration between states, NGOs, private security companies, and international regimes involves also fragmentation of capabilities, expertise, and authority in terms of, among other things, directive norms and interests, resource distribution, decision making, and policy implementation. Thus “security governance” has become a key challenge for policy makers, security actors, and researchers (Krahmann 2005b; 2005c).

2.4. Civil-military relations

The defence sector and the actors involved in security arrangements are bound by a variety of cooperative, as well as competitive and tense, organisational and social relationships. These relations involve distinctions and linkages in terms of state and non-state, and public and private actors. Yet another differentiation serves the analysis of the field. The civil-military division cuts across institutional, political, cultural, social, economic, technological and other phenomena, structures, and processes.

2.4.1. Civil-military relations theory

In the research of civil-military relations one basic question deals with the democratic control of the surrounding society on the military. According to Huntington (1985/1957: 2), a central objective in national defence policy is reproduction of an institutional system that maximises military security without sacrificing other social values. In other words, the civil-military challenge is to have a military both strong enough and subordinated enough to do what civilians ask them to do (Feaver 1996).

When narrowly understood, the civilian control of the military refers to parliamentary decision-making, administration and legislation (vertical control), but more widely it includes also horizontal control by the civil society and the media, as well as internal, subjective control of the military (Lambert 2005). What is at stake in managing defence are strategic decisions on means and ends of defence, organisational decisions on arrangement of resources and responsibilities, social decisions concerning armed forces and society, and
*Operational* decisions on employment of armed forces (Bland 1999). Recent research has emphasised the intermingling of civil and military spheres, the relevance of international defence arrangements, and the fact that ‘mature democracies’ risk of civilian rule being overthrown by the military is no longer central. Therefore, the relevant question for Burk is, instead of democratic control, how to get military organisations that are based on specific values and practices to reproduce and protect democratic values (Burk 2002). 9

In military sociology attention has been paid to whether the military and soldierhood – especially officer corps as a professional group – should remain a politically neutral, autonomous field of expertise that is subordinate to objective social control, or should soldiers be closely integrated to political life and prevailing societal values. The concepts of *divergence* and *convergence* have been used to analyse this division and processes related to it (Huntington 1985/1957; Janowitz 1960; Caforio 2003). The division bears many connections. Divergence model of autonomous military and political neutrality of officers may be seen to link more closely with interest of political scientists in power relations between institutions. Convergence model of ‘politicized military’ with emphasis on integration and mutual shaping between the military and civilian society has been developed and studied among sociologists (Feaver 1996). 10

Views have (in the context of United States) differed in whether the military represents mainstream ideologies and values – unlike political and cultural elites – or has it become alienated from civilian society, even hostile towards it, and resistant to change, and, thus, disrespected and unsupported by the society (Feaver et al. 2001).

One challenge for the mainstream civil-military relations framework comes from the fact that the military is in many societies serving a variety of purposes. Use of coercive power as protection for external enemies has extended towards non-traditional military missions, and assistance of other state authorities in tasks like construction and disaster relief. Feaver (1996) has pointed out that the military may also channel other civilian interests, such as wealth redistribution to certain corporations or regions through defence spending, and levelling of injustices between social groups. Still, militaries can be seen to be and reproduce structures of injustice in terms of gender, class and ethnicity.

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9 In the face of certain occurrences related to the current war on terrorism, this question seems somewhat misleading. To what extent is it relevant to frame the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib in Iraq (Morgan 2006; Reinke 2006) as a failure of the military in reproduction and protection of democratic values? Is, in turn, the keeping of detainees at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba a success for democracy as state leadership supports it?

10 The two models arise from studies of Huntington (1985/1957) and Janowitz (1960) that can be seen to study the nature of relationship of military profession with the state (Huntington) and the society (Janowitz) (Segal 2007). It is worth noting that the state and professions have been seen the central “institutional agents” (Scott 1995) driving rationalisation and homogenisation of organisations (DiMaggio & Powell 1991).
Another challenge comes from the close attachment of most civil-military relations theorising to paradigm of national defence and security in general, and to the US context in particular. Third challenge for civil-military theorising comes from the rationalisation and application of market relations’ logic in the state (see Morgan 1990: 121-154). Economic efficiency is setting standards also for military organising. The challenge that political control poses on military organisations has always included economic steering, but the introduction of New Public Management in state administration and the ways in which the Defence Forces organisationally networks with the markets may call for specific analysis. Another challenge for the civil-military relations framework is posed by feminist research on women, war and militarisation that are discussed in Chapter 2.4.3.

It should be obvious that participation and inclusion into national defence activities can be said to be ‘diverged’ by gender. Still, civil-military relations theory mainly ignores gender. Is the gendered divergence between civilian and military spheres outside the scope of the theoretical framework? If one broadens the application of the divergence-convergence conceptualisation from the democratic-administrative control of professional soldiers to the general (non-)involvement of men and women in defence, new aspects about the civil-military divide arise, aspects of both binary divisions and the diversity of women’s and men’s positionings in relation to the armed forces, war, peace, security, and violence. (See Zarkov 2006; Connell 2000.)

**2.4.2. Defence and security**

Security can refer separately or as combinations to national security, internal security, political security, military security, economic security, social security, environmental security, and other. Central notion of security in this study is national security and the processes of change concerning the role of defence in security organising. To open up the dimensions of national security, some have unpacked it and analysed the construction of state interests by looking at the collective identities of states and governments, and the cultural-institutional contexts of national security policies (Katzenstein 1996).

One of the transformations from nation-state bound understandings of security towards broader frameworks is the merger of security and development in the concept of human security introduced in the United Nations’ *Human Development Report* (UN document 1994) (C.A.S.E. Collective 2006). Human security is actively applied as the new, though politically contested, frame of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Under the grand narrative of human security ‘crisis management’, ‘civil-military coordination’ and ‘conflict prevention’ describe the key forms of action (Kaldor et al. 2007). Human security paradigm is said to represent a change from national security towards “security of individuals and communities, expressed as both ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’” (ibid. 273). The human security framework seems to have gained most weight as a central part of foreign policy in countries like
Canada and Finland where participation in peacebuilding processes is central component of foreign policy and national identity (Winslow 2003; Kronlund & Valla 1996).

The role of defence in the new organising of security is not always clear. Defence can be seen from within the defence branch in tension with other security efforts, and even threatened by them in terms of status and economic investments. When specifying the key challenges of ‘total defence’ in Finland the Ministry of Defence states that:

many so called ‘soft’ threats (such as social exclusion, economic inequality, deceases, environmental problems) can take the focus away from the fundamental purpose of total defence as the model of the national total security. In this case security is put in the place of total defence, and the starting point becomes to be the topical threats at each point of time and actions requiring short-term resources. Cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and the Prime Minister’s Office becomes emphasised. The risk is the segmentation of total defence. When a more peaceful world (less susceptible for crisis) of openness and cooperation progresses, production of ‘hard security’ is taken to be uneconomic (MoD document 2007a: 7; translation from Finnish by TT).

On basis of this excerpt it seems that, from the MoD perspective, peaceful times lead into unwanted dispersion of security organising. The ministry’s framework of national security and ‘total defence’ does not involve totality of security. The widening understanding of security moves the focus too much to “soft threats” that are seen as short-term problems vis-à-vis “hard security”. The dynamic between ‘total defence’ and re-institutionalisation of the security sector shall be returned to in Section 2.5.

2.4.3. Militarisation

In addition to theorising around civil-military relations, two other concepts deal with the same interface, namely militarisation and securitisation. If the intention of civil-military relations theorising is to find a bearable balance between the democratic civilian control over the armed forces military, and a military that is independent enough to be functional, militarisation critique focuses on the overt and more covert processes of military expansion. Enloe (1987; 2002) has defined militarisation as a socio-political process of spreading militarism whereby military solutions, ideals, practices and needs get prioritised, valued, and regarded normal. While militarisation naturalises militarism, it blurs the boundary between military and civilian life. Militarism involves not only ideology, but also sets of institutional arrangements and everyday practices (Adelman 2003). Enloe puts great emphasis on the interlinkages between military, economic, and gender structures, and on the empirical study of the militarisation of women’s lives (Enloe 1988; 2000; 2007).
Altinay’s (2004) historical ethnography into the Turkish military-nation shows the variety of ways in which militarisation works in and pervades a society. Through a dynamic of ethnic divisions and regional ‘backwardness’ military skills and participation have been constructed as part of progress and education. Altinay’s analysis shows the cooperation between different institutional forces in order to maintain the entanglement of manliness and participation in military activities.

In terms of the Finnish context studies on militarisation provide essential observations, but the theorising also raises two kinds of questions. Firstly, why is it that analysis and critique based on militarisation has only marginally and for a short period in 1980s flourished in Finland (cf. Isaksson 1988)? Is the critique actively marginalised, or has the theory not found forms that would fit the societal and historical context in Finland? Secondly, in the light of contemporary Finnish defence organising with its ‘total defence’ principle and intersectoral networks of actors, does militarisation grasp what is taking place? Is it so that involvement of businesses or third sector actors in ‘total defence’ either militarises them or demilitarises the military? Or is it necessary to look at the civil-military encounters as more complex renegotiations on and reconstruction of both civil-military and gender relations?

### 2.4.4. Securitisation

Securitisation refers to threat construction. It implies that security is not the opposite of insecurity, but that the definition of security conditions what is considered insecurity, a risk, or a threat (C.A.S.E Collective 2006). As Ole Wæver (1995) states, something becomes a security problem when elites proclaim it to be one. The process of redefining security intersubjectively and discursively sets the stage for the state to intervene new areas of life. Rulers may, for example, securitise political opposition and the changes threatening their power by equating current circumstances and security.

Another Wæver’s example is securitisation of environmental problems. While the calls for attention and resources for ‘non-military aspects of security’ were a threat to security elites during the Cold War, after 1989 ‘new security threats’ provided bases for their renewed societal relevance. Framing and naming something, for example environmental degradation, as a security problem tends to imply that the state (why not other actors?) should provide defence (with the use of armed forces?) from the threat that comes from somewhere outside the status quo (not from inside?) and the prevailing order deserves to be protected (should it not actually be changed?). Wæver asks:

“Is it a good idea to frame as many problems as possible in terms of security? Does not such a strategy present the negative prospect of, in a metaphorical sense, militarizing our thinking and seeing problems in terms of threat-vulnerability-defense, when there are good reasons for not treating them according to this formula?” (Wæver 1995: 64-65.)
The securitisation framework puts the emphasis on how societal elites discursively formulate securities. As Hansen (2000b) has pointed out, subjects of security do not always have a possibility to securitise a problem even if they wanted. The power dynamics between the hegemony and the resistance to the hegemonic formulations and actions of security are often gendered. Here I apply these notions to the analysis of social and organisational networks. The processes of change around security and defence are visible in structures and practices of defence organising. The evolving inter-organisational networks of defence and the cooperation across the civil-military divide comprise dynamics that I call ‘security mainstreaming’. The political, cultural and organisational processes of security mainstreaming involve widening and deepening preparation for crisis situations and conditions – preparations also outside the Defence Forces and the defence administration. In these processes the understandings on and relations of different securities are re-negotiated, while at the same, security mainstreaming positions women and men differently and anew in terms of security and defence.

2.5. Security mainstreaming

In order to specify and bring the theoretical discussions heretofore closer to the defence organising in Finland, I shall look into to some recent events and some more institutionalised practices in the Finnish defence sector. I shall argue that certain challenges in applying theorising on civil-military relations, securitisation, and militarisation could be overcome by incorporating in the frameworks elements from organisation studies. For this purpose I argue here for a perspective of security mainstreaming, which will be discussed further in Chapter 8.

A working group that was set to study the needs and options of procuring heavy air transport capacity for national use gave its final report to the Finnish Ministry of Defence in the end of 2006. When the report was published, the reactions of airline company Finnair gained wide media attention. The working group was suggesting that at least two Multi Role Tanker Transport aerial tankers would be procured to Finnair. The report outlined a model of national cooperation that would serve the heavy air transportation needs of military crisis management troops, rescue and evacuation operations, the police, the Boarder Guard, and humanitarian aid. The cooperation would tap into Finnair’s maintenance system and pilot training, and it would, as the working group argued, politico-economically support the state's current majority shareholder status in Finnair. Finnair management that had not been directly included in the working group, emphasised in its unwilling responses the priority of business economic premises in company’s operations. Finnair found highly problematic that the state would be able in this way to intervene Finnair’s
business activities and guaranteed that in crisis situations Finnair would participate in rescue and evacuation operations independent of its ownership\textsuperscript{11}.

The described case of heavy air transport illustrates what I call security mainstreaming. In the changing security environment and under economic pressures new solutions for arranging national defence are sought for. Administrative paradigms that advocate efficiency, cooperative networks and synergy-seeking have entered also the armed forces. The end of Cold War that actuated a reformulation of security threats in many countries has, additionally, in the Finnish context changed the military’s room to manoeuvre and enlarged the possibilities of the Defence Forces to open up to the surrounding civilian society. Along with others, these developments are contributing to the processes of security mainstreaming in which preparations for crisis situations, as well as the civil-military divide itself, are renegotiated and reorganised. These political, cultural and organisational processes take place through intersectoral encounters between a widening variety of actors that are becoming connected to security and defence organising.\textsuperscript{12}

In Finland, the principle of ‘total defence’ is central to national defence policy, and it has been defined to mean interlinking of military and civilian activities, and promoting the commitment of public and private sector actors as well as voluntary organisations for maintaining security (National Defence University 2005)\textsuperscript{13}. Still, in the defence sector, the state is the central actor that organises defence, mainly through the Defence Forces and defence administration. Other actors directly involved in defence are defence industry and voluntary defence organisations.

In addition to ‘total defence’, central principles of Finnish defence solution include men’s compulsory military service and territorial defence of the whole country. In Finland general conscription means that more than 80\% of men do their conscription by going through an armed military training of 6-12 months. This produces mass reserve troops for defence purposes. Men stay in the reserve

\textsuperscript{11} In addition to cooperation with a commercial partner in organising heavy airlift procurement, the committee suggested another option to be studied further, namely cooperation in framework of either the European Union (EU) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The two models were seen to support each other, and the latter option was stated to deepen international networking, compatibility, and cooperation capabilities (MoD document 2006b). In spring 2008 negotiation and decision-making process concerning Finnish participation in airlift fleet consortium NSAC (NATO Strategic Airlift Capability) was still ongoing (on NSAC, see http://www.nato.int/issues/strategic-lift-air-sac/index.html).

\textsuperscript{12} ‘Security mainstreaming’ is not a term used within the defence sector, but a concept introduced here for critical analysis of the sector. Unlike in other mainstreaming practices and conceptualisations, in security mainstreaming the emphasis of the term is not on promotion of something that is considered marginal (for example, gender equality or environmental sustainability), but on the processes of inclusion and redefinition (cf. Walby 2005). Mainstreaming of security at the societal level, as discussed here, should not be confused with the ideas of mainstreaming of security management in organisations (cf. van Brabant 2001).

\textsuperscript{13} Term ‘total national defence’ is used in many occasions synonymously with ‘total defence’.
or the auxiliary reserve until the age of sixty. Less than 3% of all those taking the basic military training are voluntary women.

The ‘total defence’ principle and the goal of integrating civilian actors in national defence contradict with the understandings of a clear division between the civilian sphere and the military. In the heavy air transport example above collaboration falters, but the ‘total defence’ principles are also actualised in the peacetime defence organising in Finland. In addition to the general conscription of men, other practices that create organisational and social networks in the field of defence are many. Here I take up in brief four examples of both recent and more long-standing institutionalised practices in the Finnish defence field which cross the civil-military divide.

First, National Defence Courses have been arranged since 1961 for decision makers and influential persons from branches of politics, economy, administration, culture, science, and communications in order to “provide a total view of Finnish foreign, security and defence policy and to improve knowledge in national defence and to enhance cooperation and readiness between the national defence and the other sectors in society”.\(^{14}\) Of the up to now 7 000 participants 850 (12%) have been women.\(^{15}\) Another example is the National Emergency Supply Agency (Huoltovarmuuskeskus) that was established in 1993.\(^{16}\) Its task is to enhance the maintenance of basic societal activities in crisis and emergency situations, and to coordinate the related cooperation between different sectors of public administration, businesses, and the Defence Forces.

Thirdly, whereas the National Emergency Supply Agency and the National Defence Courses function as builders of inter-organisational networks and social cohesion in the upper echelons of the society, strong enhancement of voluntary defence activities aims at the same direction in lower levels. One of the key arguments behind the new emphasis of defence policy on voluntary national defence is that the strong will to defend the country among Finns needs channelling (DC document 2002a). On the other hand, it is clear that the change of emphasis in national defence towards more reliance on voluntary organisations is furthered by larger societal changes ‘from government to governance’ and towards the growing importance of the third sector (cf. Anheier 2002).

In Finland voluntary national defence training was started in 1991, and since 1999 it has been organised under National Defence Training Association (‘Maanpuolustuskoulutusyhdistys’, MPK). In 2008 the new, unprecedented law on voluntary national defence\(^{17}\) fortified the military training given outside the

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15 (Ibid.)
17 *Laki vapaaehtoisesta maanpuolustuksesta* (law on voluntary national defence) 556/2007.
Defence Forces, and established the position of National Defence Training Association as an association under public law (‘julkisoikeudellinen yhdistys’). In this new law the development of women’s opportunities to participate in voluntary defence is enacted as one of the three tasks of the association.

Linked to other voluntary defence activities, the new regional troops (‘maakuntajoukot’) also started in 2008. Although they are wartime troops, this regional organising form binds together in a new way authorities, voluntary defence associations, reservists, and the Defence Forces for providing also executive assistance for civilian authorities. Cooperation among voluntary actors of defence and security is planned to be supported with a national network of cooperation centres (‘toimintakeskusverkosto’) (MoD document 2007b).

Fourthly, in 2002 the defence administration launched a partnership programme that headed for reorganising of the Defence Forces’ support functions. Partnerships, outsourcing and the development of existing service production by the Defence Forces itself are part of the reforming of relations between public and private sector actors in the defence field. The programme involves both close long standing relations between the defence industry and the Defence Forces, and participation of purely civilian service providers from public and private sector. One project of this Defence Administration Partnership Programme is studied in the latter case study of this thesis.

As also the history of organising the security of supply shows, close cooperation on crisis planning between private sector and the military is by no means a new phenomenon (Seppinen 1996). It is the forms and configuration of these alliances, as well as their depth and the vocabulary they are described with, that change. Whereas in Finland the term ‘partnership’ in relation to national defence was to a large extent introduced in 2002 with the Defence Administration Partnership Programme, elsewhere public-private partnerships (PPP’s) have involved a variety of security arrangements. In the United Kingdom outsourcing and contractor support in terms of partnerships play a central role in deployed military operations (Uttley 2005). In Europe in general, PPP’s are along with national regulation main control mechanism concerning private military and security companies (Schreier & Caparini 2005; Krahmann 2005d). In June 2007 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) organised a conference in order to forge in its member states public-private partnership between state authorities, civil society and business community for combating terrorism. ‘Partnership for peace’ has since 1994 served as an appellation for the cooperative bilateral relations between the

18 http://www.mil.fi/reservilainen/maakuntajoukot/
19 http://tietokannat.mil.fi/kumppanuusohjelma/
20 http://www.osce.org/atu/25898.html
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its non-member partners, mainly former eastern block and non-allied European states.\textsuperscript{21}

Such processes of security mainstreaming, as the partnerships and outsourcing of Defence Forces’ support functions studied in this research, may in the framework of militarisation appear as either demilitarisation of the military, or as militarisation of the civilian organisations and other actors involved in defence activities. Security mainstreaming approach aims to encompass these simultaneous processes, and to see their relation to New Public Management and to the internal gender and civil-military dynamic of the Defence Forces. Furthermore, in the analysis below it is emphasised that the ‘security’ that is mainstreamed is a product of securitisation processes that are often closely intermingled with processes of security mainstreaming.

\textsuperscript{21} http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/index.html
3 NETWORKS AND NETWORKING

This study originated from the idea of looking at what men’s social networks have to do with men’s power: Do old boys’ networks exist and how do they work? What at first seemed an approach suitable for this purpose – social network analysis – proved later on to be too demanding to be used as only a complementary method of analysis for a certain part of the research material. Furthermore, the collection of relational data for social network analysis failed during the fieldwork of the peacekeeping case study (Case I) to a large extent and for several reasons (see Chapter 5). With deeper familiarisation with the organisation of national defence in Finland, also the research interest refocused away from the egocentric networks of individual men. The network analysis framework became a side-track in terms of methodology. As the research process proceeded and the role of organisational and inter-organisational relations became central in understanding the developments in the Finnish defence sector, theorising on networks took on a new role in the study.

The purpose of discussing networks and networking here is to have a loose theoretical frame with which the different structures of social and organisational relations arising from the studied settings can be analytically described. In the ethnographic analysis and reporting the meshing of different explicit and implicit personal and organisational relationships is not trimmed into uni-level sociometrics, but preserved representationally in context. Both case studies in this thesis provide the possibility to specifically analyse qualitatively the processes of forming organisations and related networks. As Pescosolido (2007: 211) has argued, “[t]he ability to form and maintain social ties may be just as important as their state at one point of time.”

In addition, the juxtaposition of ‘network’, ‘organisation’ and ‘gender’ as approaches to social relations seems to bear fruit. The three can be seen as different logics of social division and social connection with their own power dynamics that sometimes support, sometimes contradict each other. Social networks provide a perspective that may permeate the usual levels of organisational analysis from individuals, groups, and organisations to societal sectors and institutions. Networks are also a central counterpoint in discussions of organising; network forms are seen as an option of bureaucratic organisation. As will be discussed later on, the centrality of network forms of organising and cooperating poses new challenges to gender equality. The following discussion on organisations and networks appears in a different light if it is read bearing in mind the specific focus of this study: both organising and networks in and around organisations are often about men’s social relations and practices.

3.1. Social network analysis

As with many other concepts, ‘network’ has been used within many frameworks and with many meanings that are not necessarily in accordance with each other.
With the rise of discussions around information society, information networks with both social and technological aspects have become an increasing area of interest (Savolainen 1998; Wellman 2001; Uotinen et al. 2001). In social studies of science and technology actor-network theory has brought humans and non-humans into same categorisation as ‘actants’ in processual networks of mutual dependence, influencing and strengthening of positions (Law & Hassard 1999). In an actor-network, an act is linked together with all of its influencing, interlinking factors (Monteiro 2000).

Another set of discussions has evolved around business networks. What has been called industrial networks or ‘markets-as-networks’ theory has paid attention to the nature of economic activity consisting of more than detached transactions, i.e. of more constant linkages between actors (cf. Axelson & Easton 1992). In relation to organisational studies, while the studies on business networks have primarily focused on inter-organisational networks and studies on communication networks have looked at intra-organisational networks (Rogers & Kincaid 1981: 96), research done on social networks has looked into both kinds of linkages.

Social network analysis arises from the structural approach in the social and political sciences. This approach rejects the a priori “categories of actors, forms of action and roles that can be shown intuitively to correspond to groups, events and relationships” (Berkowitz 1988: 480). It has also criticised the use of network as a loose metaphor to describe several kinds of phenomena. Instead, the different streams of the structural approach focus on the patterned relationships that constrain interactional processes between social actors. Categorisations and clustering can only emerge from observed patterns of interaction and exchange; social classes consist of particular positions within a structure. The structural approach suggests, in addition, that social changes are based on structural changes. Roles, statuses, norms, values and sanctions, for example, are by-products of changes in relationships between individuals, groups and organisations (Wellman & Berkowitz 1988; Berkowitz 1988; Castrén 2001).

The basic idea of network analysis perspective is that social structures can be represented as networks, i.e. as sets of nodes (social system members varying from individuals and groups to nation-states) and sets of ties connecting the nodes (Wellman & Berkowitz 1988). The focus can be on networks as wholes or on personal, egocentric networks. Egocentric networks have sometimes been distinguished from categorical networks (for example collegial networks in organisations) (Lonkila 1999). Network ties between nodes can be studied with different methods and instruments.

In addition to strict focus on structural form of networks, their relational content – substance and qualities of network ties – has also gained attention (Raider & Krackhardt 2002). Communication has been suggested to be the essential quality of network relationships; many concerns in communication
network analysis (Rogers and Kincaid 1981) and social network analysis overlap. In more detail, network ties can consist of and be utilised for several things, such as exchanging goods and services, information exchange, different forms of support (financial, emotional, helping), companionship, appraisal, liking and respect as well as demands, obligations and monitoring (Pearlin & Aneshensel 1986; Wellman & Berkowitz 1988; Salancik 1995; Mattila & Uusikylä 1999). Still it might be necessary to distinguish between the ‘more structural’ side of relational content (kinship, co-worker ties, interlocking directorates etc.) and the ‘more processual’ side of it (giving support, exchanging goods and information etc.).

Network analysis is appropriate for analysing relational data, i.e. the contacts, connections, group attachments and meetings that relate agents to each other. The sources (questionnaires, interviews, observations, texts etc.) set no limit for using network analysis; it is the type of data that determines whether or not network analysis can be applied (Scott 1991; see also Johanson, Mattila & Uusikylä 1995). Graph theoretic, sociometric and algebraic notation schemes are often used for describing and presenting social network data (cf. Wasserman & Faust 1994: 69-91).

Pescosolido (2007) has stated that principles that at least sociologists of networks share would include, among others, multi-levelled contextualisation of social networks (in terms of organisations and different levels of networks), and connections between social networks, individual bodies, and physical and mental capacities. However, not everybody agrees. Network analysis has been criticised for its inadequacy as an overall research strategy: it needs to be supported by other perspectives. Critics have pointed out that social network approach often ignores the qualities of the actors and their environments, the factors that have led to the interaction, and the substance of the relationship. When the focus is on finding explanatory structural patterns, new or weak ties may be unnoticed. Structural determinism, as an implicit model in some network studies, lifts the compelling network above the cultural and political discourses and individual intentions: ‘social consciousness’ and culture are explained with social networks. In structural instrumentalism social action is given explanatory significance, but the individual may be seen as an overtly rational utility maximiser. Structural constructionism has instead tried to bring together culture, agency and structure (Emirbayer & Goodwin 1994; Lonkila 1999; Castrén 2001).

One way to avoid the mentioned problems of the network approach has been application of the notion of configurations. It implies that the ‘social’ hinders and empowers in form of configurations (such as networks), which are unstable and changing by nature, and open to cultural influences (Castrén 2001). Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994; Emirbayer 1997) have emphasised the need to move from “snapshots’ of social structure” towards an approach that would pay attention also to 1) the cultural structures (discursive frameworks and cultural idioms) that constrain and enable action alongside network structures, 2) human agency, the capacity of social actors to change and reproduce cultural
and network structures, and 3) historical mechanisms leading from one network configuration to another.

Although this study is far from being able to meet these criteria of structural constructionism, it shares the emphasis on agency, and cultural and historical framing of the networks in focus. On the other hand, looking into the passing intra-organisational relations of peacekeepers or taking ‘snapshots’ of their egocentric networks with such a broad framing may be less reasonable than in case of, for example, the social networks behind social movements (cf. Emirbayer & Goodwin 1994; see also Saaritsa & Teräs 2003). Furthermore, social network analysis is in this study applied to such a narrow extent that direct contribution to it is slight.

3.2. Organisational networks, network organisations, and networks of organisations

There is a major expansion in research literature within organisation and management studies on the growing importance of networks, networking and network organisations. Though this is in some ways a long-established trend, this recent emphasis is in part driven by the continuing and changing impact of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and the technological and social aspects of networking through ICTs (Wellman 2001). In some cases this growing interest in networks within organisation studies is linked to debates on the possible, though contested, movement from ‘modern’ to ‘postmodern’ organisational forms (cf. Nohria 1992). Thus, for example, Thompson (1993) has summarised (with critique) such suggested new organisational forms and structures as:

- Decentralisation
- Federal organisation: central business functions disaggregated to small independent units
- Initiative, drive and energy coming from the parts, not the centre
- Firmly anti-hierarchical: flat organisations achieved with, among other things, ‘downsizing’ and shrinkage of middle layers which results in narrowed status differences, more effective and direct ways of communication, and lower costs
- Networking: informality, equality and horizontal links
- Breakdown of bureaucracy.

The relationship between concepts of ‘network’ and ‘organisation’ is a complex one. According to Nohria (1992), the importance of network analysis in studying organisations arises from two rather different perspectives: Firstly, almost all organisations are in important respects social networks, and secondly, organisations’ environments can be seen as a network of other organisations. Nohria continues that actions of actors in organisations can be best explained in terms of their position in networks of relationships, and as networks constrain actions, actions in turn shape networks. On a more general level, network as a
form of economic organisation has been contrasted with hierarchies and markets (Powell 1990).

The trifurcation of focus between intraorganisational, organisational and interorganisational levels of networks has been central in network research on organisations. Studies on intraorganisational networks have, again, involved different levels of analysis. Unit of analysis has been relationship of two social actors (dyads), network of individual actor (egocentric network), or group as a whole (Raider & Krackhardt 2002). ‘Organisational networks’, by contrast, refers ambiguously to studying egocentric network of a focal organisation (Gulati, Dialdin & Wang 2002). Inter-organisational networks have gained more attention than intra-organisational, and especially interpersonal, networks (Kilduff & Tsai 2003: 4; Johanson 1999; 2001).

One label that has gained a lot of popularity in analyses of these ‘postbureaucratic organisations’ (Thompson 1993) is the network organisation. In relation to modern bureaucracies, network forms of organisations are suggested to be better adaptable for complex, turbulent environments. Integration across formal boundaries in and of the organisation characterises the network organisation and lays the structural bases for “interactions of problems, people, and resources” (Baker 1992: 398). This vertical, lateral and spatial integration involves varied social relations from task-related communication and advice-exchange to informal socialising, promotion decisions and other. Burt (1997) has stated that shift from hierarchy to network organisation is procedural and, before all, from formal to negotiated informal coordination. Structural changes are by-products of this process. Burt’s research strategy to cope with this change in organisations lays on the notion of social capital: strong correlation within the organisation between relative success and network constraint – the extent to which the success of the management depends on social capital – characterises a network organisation. Insights into cross-organisational managerial networks have been provided by studies on interlocking directorates (cf. Mizruchi 1996).

The problem of organisational boundaries and organisations’ relationships to their environment has been tackled in many ways. The environment may be seen in three ways: 1) as a residual category (including everything in the society that concerns the organisation); 2) as consisting of multiple and multiform organisational networks; or 3) as not really existing, but with society being made up of organisations, bureaucracies, the market qua organisation and ‘organisations without walls’ (Strati 2000). With the last mentioned concept Strati makes an attempt to capture the dynamics of organisational tasks invading people’s personal life through multiple, imprecise memberships in ‘worlds’ (such as ‘world of fashion’) and through processes of giving meaning to organisational actions. On the other hand, it has been suggested that work organisations are a vast arena, where people have their most direct relationship to their society, and because of that it is reasonable to study the society in organisations and their everyday life (ibid.).
In studying networks and organisations, several attempts have been made to overcome the division into structure and action/agency. A central way of trying to solve the problem of organisation–environment relations has been to abandon the conceptions of organisation as a group of people or as a structural entity or as the structure of the interrelationship between the entity and its environment, and instead to see organisation as a process of organising. The above-mentioned notion of ‘actor-network’ is another example. It tries to cross the distinction between network actors and their connections (Breiger 2004).

‘Processes-in-relations’ has been used to refer to what network analysis focuses on (White 1997), and ‘structure-in-process’ points to organisational order and its legitimacy being negotiated, that is, being based on action and interaction of the organisation’s subjects (Strati 2000: 96-98). Calás and McGuire (1990) have approached interorganisational networks by focusing on networking activities. They see network-relations as socially constructed on-going processes creation and reproduction of certain organisational forms. Instead of considering interorganisational networks as static, instrumental and functional by nature and looking for universal patterns in them, Calás and McGuire propose that network structures are situational products of dialectics between symbolic action and power relations.

An approach that shall be left to be developed further elsewhere concerns the different processes of organising and relationships between networks and organisations as social formations. This involves developments from networks to organisations and vice versa, networks and organisations within each other and phased permutations of their structures and relations in time. Some of these aspects are relevant in the forthcoming analysis of the case study organisations, but theorising beyond the mapping of some possible permutations and relations (presented in Appendix 1) remains outside of the scope of this thesis.

As the analysis of the development in the defence sector will show (Chapter 6 and 7), inclusion of network theorising serves several purposes in study of the gendered social organisation of defence. A key one involves the reflection on the ways that discourses of networks and networking are used in the observed organisations. Networks may be discursively juxtaposed with hierarchies and inflexibility, but as social relations they do involve power relations in terms of both interorganisational and individual ties. The fact that these chains of ties intermingle and linger in and out of workplaces and other organisations becomes evident in ethnographic fieldwork in and around organisations. To set both the network discourses and the meshing social ties into perspective with a power lens, it is necessary next to look into the dynamics between and studies on organisations and gender.
4 GENDER IN ORGANISATIONS AND NETWORKS

The definitions and usages of gender as a concept in various disciplines and research approaches are numerous. Applications of gender vary from an analytical concept to gender as a taken-for-granted variable. At the end of this chapter, I shall draw from the different applications of gender as an analytical concept, and suggest a more loose definition of gender as a social logic of division and connection. Additionally, I shall discuss the way in which conceptualisations of gender, organisation, and social networks are reconciled for the purposes of this study.

4.1. Gender and organisations

The growth of international interest in and research on gender relations in organisations has been considerable during the past 30 years. Interest in issues of gender in organisations dates back at least to the 1970s (Acker & Van Houten 1974; Kanter 1977; Feldberg & Glenn 1979; MacKinnon 1979). After decades of gender absence in organisational studies, several scholars have brought up the fact that gender matters in organisations and that it is therefore important to gender organisational analysis (Mills & Tancred 1992; Savage & Witz 1992; Wahl 1992; Halford & Leonard 2001).

Contemporary feminist and other gender researchers have produced a sizeable quantity of research on women's work, both vertical and horizontal segregation of working life, and women in management (Adler & Izraeli 1994; Women and Work 1999; Aaltio-Marjosola 2001; Wirth 2001). There are cross-national studies on the gender gap in the power elites of business and political life (Epstein & Coser 1981; Vianello & Moore 2000). Considerable attention has been paid to gender structures and the construction of gender in work organisations (Wahl 1992; Eriksson 2000). There has also been linking of general gendered approaches and the study of gendered patterns of networking and mentoring in organisations (Travers & Pemberton 2000).

In Finland, the issues of gender equality in working life and men and women in power in organisations have been studied from the statistical point of view (Veikkola 1997; Lehto & Sutela 1999; Pulkkinen 2000). Gender policies and gendered practices in organisations have sometimes been studied (Rantalaiho & Heiskanen 1997; Hearn, Kovalainen & Tallberg 2002), as have gendered organisational cultures and ‘doing gender’ in organisations (Kinnunen & Korvajärvi 1996; Korvajärvi 1998), but men’s practices or patterns of their social relations in organisations have seldom been foci of explicit and critical gender analysis.

Acker (1991) has argued for several reasons why theorising gender and organisations is important. She sees organisational practices and processes as playing an important role in the gender segregation of work, in income and
status inequality, as well as in the production of individual gender identities (especially for the men’s part) and cultural images of gender. Acker’s framework classifies interacting processes through which “advantage and disadvantage, exploitation and control, action and emotion, meaning and identity, are patterned through and in terms of a distinction between male and female, masculine and feminine” (ibid. 167). The processes include 1) construction of divisions along lines of gender; 2) construction of symbols and images linked to those divisions; 3) interactions along and across lines of gender; 4) production of gendered components of individual identity; and 5) implications in processes of creating and conceptualising social structures. As result of these processes in organisations, gendered organisations occur and are reproduced.

A different view on gendered organisations has been taken by Britton (2000), who discusses critically, but constructively, three ways of seeing organisations and occupations as gendered. Firstly, organisations can be seen as inherently and essentially gendered; this has applied especially to studies on bureaucracies. Acker (1991) also has seen gender as a “constitutive element of organisational logic” (ibid. 168). Britton states that this view does not give room for social change nor for testing the theory as ‘ungendered’ organisations do not exist, and organisations cannot be more or less gendered than others. Secondly, in what Britton calls the ‘nominal approach’, gendering is a question of numbers: occupations or organisations are feminised when a female majority occurs. This often oversimplifying approach conflates sex with gender. Thirdly, studies have paid attention to the hegemonic symbolic, ideological and discursive aspects of gendered organisations, or, in this case, mostly occupations. Here, Britton emphasises the importance of contextualising the gendering processes and distinguishing between the levels of analysis: the cultural construction of an organisation or occupation may be rigid though on the individual or interactional level processes of reflection and resistance might be strong. Britton suggests that “meaningful organizational change might be better served [...] by trying to identify and understand the factors that give rise not to ungendered organizations but to less oppressively gendered forms” (Britton 2000).

4.2. Gendered networks and gendered social capital

In studies on social networks, the basic observation is frequently that similarity in terms of social characteristics and categories generates connections among people. This social similarity is referred to as ‘homophily’. Distinctions have been made with the terms ‘induced homophily’ (as a result of availability of similar alters) and ‘choice homophily’ (as a result of preferences for interaction) (Ibarra 1997), and ‘status homophily’ (similarity based on formal, informal, or ascribed status) and ‘value homophily’ (based on values, attitudes, and beliefs) (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook 2001).

Many of the studies that have brought together gender and networks have been looking at the differences between women’s and men's networks. ‘Homophily by gender’ has been used to refer to a relationship pattern of, in gender terms,
similar persons being more likely to have relationships with each other than
dissimilar ones. Studies on workplace relations have shown that formation of
cross- and same-sex ties is affected by both social structural factors (gender
composition at the workplace, status distinctions etc.) and personal dispositions
(Straits 1996). Studies that have looked at the managerial networks and co-
worker ties show that men’s social networks are more homophilous than
women’s (Straits 1996; Ibarra 1992; 1997). It seems that at managerial levels of
business organisations in particular, as both men and women network mainly
with men, the dynamics of networking have a different basis: for gaining social
capital men follow the logics of homosociality and women the logics of

Instead of merely looking at the differences in women’s and men’s networks,
could gender be thought of in network terms? Smith-Lovin and McPherson
(1993) have suggested something of this kind. They see the stability of gender
differentiation arising from network relations and structural positions, which
affect perceptions, beliefs, resources and contingencies. Homophily by gender
directs men and women into different social worlds through the life course
starting from childhood networks. Positionings in networks affect perceptions,
beliefs, resources and contingencies linked to gender. Smith-Lovin and
McPherson importantly emphasise the historicity of networks as well as the
differing organisational contexts generating networks and being modified by the
networks. They also stress the complexity of networks, which often receive
narrow presentations in network studies that concentrate on only one type of
relation (exchange, friendship, a certain kind of communication etc.). With the
term ‘hypernetwork’, authors refer to the interlinkages of organisations created
by individuals of a certain organisation.

Aside from the fact that Smith-Lovin and McPherson (1993) open up important
perspectives on the role that socialisation contexts and networks in different
life-historical periods have in sustaining gender inequality (cf. Jackson 1990),
their study includes some problems. The view of their study seems to rest on the
bipolar understanding of gender and allocates little room for analysing gender
structures and processes among women or among men. When Smith-Lovin and
McPherson (1993) start by saying that “[i]n one sense, it is impossible to have a
network theory on gender” (ibid. 223), they notice the tension between the idea
of homophily by gender (or homosociability) and network approaches. Still,
they leave undeveloped the possibility of approaching gender that is offered by
the more strictly ‘anticategorical’ network view. Instead of looking at networks
of similar nodes (women or men), one could analyse the relationship between
two orders: the social classes deriving from the occupation of particular
positions within a network structure, and the sex division. This comparison
would provide structural information on gender relations. This might also be a
method to avoid the absence of theorising on power in studies of homophily
(Holgersson 2006).
4.3. Men and masculinities

Within the field of gender studies, this research project identifies with profeminist approaches and principles of studying men. This means that the project engages with feminist politics, research, and theorising in their diversity, and aspires to contextualise and critically reflect upon its own research objectives and questions, the conducted empirical analysis, and the project as a whole in terms of gendered power relations. On a personal level, profeminist interests arise from women’s experiences and my own observations of the oppression of women; from experiences and observations of men’s power (as both an object and a subject of power); experience of the justification and reasonableness of feminist critique of, among other things, gendered power relations; and the anxieties, frustration, and action deriving from these experiences (cf. Hearn 1994a).

4.3.1. Critical studies on men

For many centuries, men, masculinity and men’s powers and practices were generally taken for granted. Gender, when put on the agenda or studied, was largely seen as a matter of and for women. Men were generally regarded as ungendered, natural or naturalised. This has now been changing to some extent; it is much less the case than even twenty years ago (Brod 1987; Connell 1987, 1995; Hearn & Pringle 2006). Nonetheless, the state of research on men varies in different countries, and much of the available information on men is provided by sources and research that do not study men as men (Hearn et al. 2004).

The range of studies that has evolved regarding men specifically has been multidisciplinary, carried out under different labels and with varying societal and political intentions. The idea of ‘critical studies on men’ serves as a more appropriate framework for studying men than the ambiguous term ‘men’s studies’ (studies by men, on men, or for men?). Critical studies on men include a feminist or profeminist commitment, and they are based on the tradition of feminist studies. Gay studies, too, have been a relevant part of theorising and research around men. Critical studies on men view men in an explicitly gendered way in the context of gendered power relations (Hearn 1998a; 1998b). In other words, as has been often emphasised, it is important when studying men, men’s practices and masculinities to look not only at men and men’s relations, nor only at relations between men and women, but at the gender system as a whole (Connell 1995). This means first of all that men of different age, ethnicity, nationality, sexual orientation, ability, socio-economic status etc. are not treated as a single category of men, but seen in complex relations with each other. Secondly, this means that men’s issues should not be dealt without the aspect of power and men’s domination over women – though seeing gender only as a social structure of men’s domination over women is simplistic (Connell 1987).
The limited amount of work devoted specifically and explicitly to men’s practices in working life and especially to men in powerful positions suggests that there is immense scope for extending critical gender analysis in the study of work, organisations and management (Collinson & Hearn 1996; Hearn et al. 2004: 27). Much research on gender relations in organisations has not considered the gendering of women and men in organisations with equal thoroughness. Concern has been expressed that the growing literature on men and masculinities has not paid sufficient attention to certain influential dynamics and their effects: “[T]he planet’s fate may well depend on how men act in certain organizations, such as in the military, science labs, multinational corporations, state bureaucracies and supranational institutions” (Martin 2001: 588). Connell (2002), too, has emphasised the importance of understanding the institutionalisation of masculinities in transnational organisations and the impact of these on peace strategies.

4.3.2. Men and masculinities in and around organisations

Issues of gendered dynamics and equality in military organising are at the same time about the exclusion or controlled inclusion of women, and about the social and cultural practices of men’s communion that are enabled and reproduced by the military. Men’s social bonds and practices are a central way in which national defence is constructed as a societal institution and as military organisations. While focusing on men in organisations and institutions of hegemonic masculinity, it is necessary to keep in mind that an important view on men’s practices in organisations is provided by women (Martin 2001; Kronsell 2005).

Some critical research has been done on men and masculinities in organisations and managements (cf. Cheng 1996; Collinson 1992; Collinson & Hearn 1996). The centrality of paid work for men’s identity, status and power, and the nature of organisations as sites of workplace power relations and construction of gendered subjectivities have been acknowledged in these studies among other things. Empirical studies on men in organisations have often concentrated on men in subordinated positions. The dynamics between multiple masculinities and different forms and locations of work organisations have been noted (Collinson & Hearn 1994; Hearn & Parkin 2001).

This thesis does not particularly look into the multifaceted and crucial questions of men’s violences and organisational violence (Hearn 1994b). In regard to military organisations, the studies on linkages between military cultures and domestic violence (Adelman 2003) portray the bleak influences traversing the civil-military line, and between work organisations and homes. War rape (Copelon 1995; Hansen 2000a), sexual violence and harassment in and around military organisations (Miller 1997; Firestone & Harris 2003), as well as the connections of these violences to masculinity and gendered power relations (Price 2001; Harrison 2002) are other research foci in need of attention, also within organisation and management studies.
4.3.3. Homosocial(bi)lity and ‘men only’

From the point of view of the research in progress, an important, though seldom used and under-developed set of concepts is related to the homosocial bonds between men. Men’s homosociality has been approached by both sociological and social psychological studies (Kilduff & Mehra 1996; Wharton & Bird 1996), organisational ethnography (Andersson 2003), as well as textual and literary studies (Sedgwick 1985; Soikkeli 1996). Lipman-Blumen (1976) and Kanter (1977), as well as their critics, offer key elements for analysing men’s networks and organisations. In the following, these issues will be looked into in more detail.

In her groundbreaking article ‘Toward a Homosocial Theory of Sex Roles’ (1976), Jean Lipman-Blumen defined homosocial as “the seeking, enjoyment and/or preference for company of the same sex” (ibid. 16). Men’s interest in men as well as women’s exclusion from men’s arenas is based on men’s power over resources and women’s lack of resources. Lipman-Blumen sees men deriving satisfaction for all other needs than, in most cases, sexual needs from men. Homosocial order is reflected in division of income, in division of labor in the family and in exclusion of women from political and law enforcement bodies and sports. Still, Lipman-Blumen sees also the marginalisation of those men not capable or willing to meet the standards of the homosocial world. Similarly to Remy (1990), Lipman-Blumen locates a tension between family life based on heterosexual relationship and men’s homosocial activities: both are striving for men’s resources. Lipman-Blumen’s theory is problematically based narrowly on sex role theory and on the idea of exchange and needs determining social order.

Rosabeth Moss Kanter has in her study Men and Women of the Corporation (1977) analysed social relations between men in the management of a large business conglomerate. According to Kanter, scientific management is infused with a masculine ethic that is carried out in practices of homosexual and homosocial reproduction. Social homogeneity is striven for because a common language and shared experiences make communication and cooperation more fluent and predictable. ‘Homosexual reproduction’ refers to practices that exclude women from managerial posts, as senior managers appoint their ‘own images’. This process of replicating management reinforces “the belief that people like oneself actually deserve to have such authority” (ibid. 63) as well as assumptions that managers will be male breadwinners; correspondingly women are excluded from senior management because of their assumed conflicting loyalties between home and work. ‘Homosocial reproduction’ refers to processes by which certain managers and men are selected and differentiated according to their ability to display appropriate social credentials. The social homogeneity of male managers may lead to the exclusion of both women and many men.

Collinson and Hearn (1995) and Witz and Savage (1992) both provide sympathetic critiques of Kanter’s homosexual/social reproduction. Collinson and Hearn argue that these concepts demonstrate the complex unities (homosexual reproduction) and differences (homosocial reproduction) between
men and masculinities in management, but Kanter fails to address the question of asymmetrical power when she de-genders power by explaining the need for homogeneity in management as tackling the uncertainty inherent in managerial work. Collinson and Hearn emphasise that attention should be paid to the interrelations, overlap and mutual reinforcement of power relations and practices, unities, networks, and vertical and horizontal differences between men and between men and women. They suggest that asymmetrical power relations can be revealed by research studying such issues as men in senior positions and their networks, women’s experiences in management, discrimination in recruitment, paternalism, and extensive informality in routine interactions between men managers (ibid.; see also Collinson & Hearn 1994).

Both Bird (1996) and Lindgren (1996) have paid attention to how the norms of being a man are constructed and preserved in homosocial interaction and practices. Bird locates homosocial processes that maintain three hegemonic masculinity ideals: emotional detachment, competitiveness and the sexual objectification of women. Lindgren puts the very same elements into an order. In her study on doctors and nurses, she interprets the subordinating talk on women among male doctors as a ritual strengthening of these ideals. In a group of men with similar experiences, competition arouses these synchronised rituals that result in ideal masculinity, in relation to which men aim or are compelled to calibrate their personal manhood. Respect is shown by not showing emotions. Lindgren sees the shared relationship and resistance to superior powers and the possibility to work on one’s masculine identity as the basis of homosocial attraction. Additionally Holgersson (2003) has shown how the challenges in recruitment processes turn situations towards informality. In her study, this informality enables homosocial processes that involve the evaluation of managing director candidates against male bourgeois virtues, and the pressure for conformity, as well as homosocial care, especially between men of different generations.

The term ‘male homosociability’ used by Witz and Savage (1992) represents both the way in which women are dispossessed of corporate power and the way that access to organisational power is decided between men. Witz and Savage find Kanter’s use of the word ‘homosexual’ misleading, as “it is heterosexuality which structures organizations, and within which men establish both their difference from women – as they simultaneously forge a male homosociability – and their power over them” (ibid. 51).

Roper (1996), on the other hand, criticises the term ‘male homosociability’ for suppressing the aspects of desire and prefers Sedgwick’s (1985) concept of homosocial desire that “captures the ambiguities between the ‘social’ and the ‘sexual’ in men’s networks” (Roper 1996: 213). The concept brings up in formally heterosexual settings a category of intimacy that may occur, as in Roper’s material, as “high levels of energy” flow from “the chemistry being right” (ibid.; see also Husu 2001: 332-334.)
Homosocial desire may be seen both as consolidation of men's power in terms of homosocial bonds and heterosexuality, and as a potential footing for problematising heterosexuality and men's power. In general and in practice, men's close interaction may easily come to clash with the norm of heterosexuality, engendering 'homosexual panic' in men (Sedgwick 1985; van Leer 1989). It is often homophobic practices and discourses that serve as boundary-building between (homo)social and (homo)sexual interaction and thus provide support for homosociality and the consequential aspects of gender segregation (Britton 1990).

4.3.4. Fratriarchy and fratriarchal bonds

The idea of gendered power that men's networks entail is well expressed in such popular concepts as the "old boy network" or "hyvä veli verkosto" ["good brother network"]. The concept of 'fratriarchy' has sometimes been used when pointing to the power held by "brotherly" groups and alliances of men (Soikkeli 1996; Veijola & Jokinen 2001) or pointing to the very basis of democracy and societies based on it (Derrida 1997). It has been noted that fraternity, deriving from the ideals of French revolution, has been central to socialism and nineteenth- and twentieth-century liberalism, and the modern civil society has been said to be based on fraternal order (Pateman 1989). Nations as imagined communities build on fraternal comradeship that as a conception plays a part in hiding societal inequalities and oppression, and in harnessing male citizens to war (Anderson 1991: 6-7).

Though the idea of fraternity points to bonds between equals and to the centrality of horizontal relations, the organisational forms of brotherhood are still characterised as selective (criteria, rules, borders), competition-orientated and hierarchical (Bay 1995). These kinds of practices are often documented in ethnographies of male-dominated organisations, like the systems of selection (resisting, testing, complaining about, adapting) among fire-fighters for both new procedures and new probationers (Baigent 2001: 138-9). Martin (2001) has made a distinction between mobilising contesting and affiliating masculinities: instead of men acting in concert only to distance and differentiate themselves from others by showing superiority, obtaining control over others, or obtaining benefit from work done by others, men also align and connect with others in ways that benefit self, others or both.

Fratriarchy as a theoretical concept and as the other form of androcracy (‘rule by men’) in contrast to patriarchy has been discussed by Remy (1990). He emphasises the critical aspects of the concept: ‘Fratriarchy’ refers to such configurations of men that involve displays of gender domination. Analysing...
fratriarchies brings out the conflicts that structure men’s lives, and the conflicts between duties towards family and fraternities, or more broadly, conflicts between patriarchal and fratriarchal order. Though fratriarchal duties, practices and social orders can often be seen supporting patriarchy as part of it (Soikkeli 1996; Tallberg 2003b), also studying the contradictions between the two orders can bring out the complexity of relations among men.

4.3.5. Humour

Humour can be seen as a currency, as one medium of exchange among men. It may serve as a way of giving social support or shaping friendships, as a major force in social inclusion and exclusion, and in many other ways. The contents, mechanisms and dynamics of humour involve relevant gendered aspects.

Many studies on humour bring up the questions of power and resistance. A sense of humour is, as are all ‘senses’, collective, historical, and cultural, and entangled in different ways with social relations. Laughter can be seen as a social action that in opposition to hierarchical power relations brings people to the same level. Instead of one-way authoritarianism based on division and exclusion, two-way collegial laughter poses a threat to the ‘official’ by providing a possibility for seeing things in another way (Weckroth 1991a).

On the other hand, humour can easily become a reproducer of societal structures playing down resistance and lessening deviance (Weckroth 1991b). Mulkay (1988) has stated that humour can challenge the status quo only to the extent that it is given “serious meaning by means of criticism and confrontation that is already operative within the serious domain” (ibid. 5). Humour may seem to condemn and disrupt existing social patterns (for example political satire), but on a more fundamental level it works to maintain the social structures that lay the basis for it (ibid.). Similarly, Lyman (1987), who has looked at the role of humour in male bonding, sees joking as a “social relationship that suspends the rules of everyday life in order to preserve them” (ibid. 150).

In organisations, humour can operate as management of monotony, high pressure or dangerous work, and as a means by which social frustration and conflict is expressed (Collinson 1992: 105). Humour often takes place as the tackling of tensions between people that are structurally bound to each other and at the same time feeling structural conflict with each other (between, for example, a boss and a subordinate or a mother-in-law and a son-in-law) (Lyman 1987). Humour is intermingled in the gendered experiences gained in the arenas of sports and military that provide skills for participating competitive societies and work organisations (Acker 1991).

As many other studies (Mulkay 1988; Collinson 1992), Lyman’s case study on university fraternity men brings up the centrality of gender and sexuality as both the content and social logic of joking. In a group joking relationship, male
bonding takes the form of serial kind of intimacy and negotiation on the latent tensions and aggression between group members. Joke form serves as pedagogy for controlling emotions, but at the same time sexist jokes suspend the rules of responsibility and allow men a “withdrawal into a microworld in which their anger about dependence upon work and women may be safely expressed” (Lyman 1987, 157). Mutual bantering serves the purposes of group cohesion and definition. Positioning oneself as the target of ridicule shows loyalty to the group and acceptance of the joking culture (Collinson 1992). The idea that ‘being cool’, i.e. showing control of aggression, is valued (Lyman 1987: 161), comes close to observations about showing respect to other men by not showing emotions (Lindgren 1996).

Lyman (1987) suggests that the male bond is built around the erotic of rule breaking. Activities with an element of risk and shared danger build comradeship in which the individual self is subordinated to group identity in comparison to friendship, the intellectual and emotional affinity to another individual. Lyman states that the dynamic of the fraternal bond as a joking relationship functions as the rules of rule breaking: Expressing anger at work may be a taboo, but men’s social groups, constructed as shame cultures, provide the model of rule-governed aggression useful for organisations. The idea of rules of rule breaking resonates with the certain secrecy often attached to men’s organising (for example Freemasons) and it raises the question of the linkages between men’s social relations, the dynamics of joking relationships, and severe organisational violations such as sexual harassment and violence or corruption.

The idea of both men’s bonding and humour as providers of freedom from other social ties and responsibilities, a form of ‘creation of one’s own space’, comes up, but is also problematised in other studies on men and organisations. Collinson (1992; see also Collinson & Collinson 1989) shows how the discourse of men shop-floor workers in a lorry-producing factory, maintained by swearing, masculinism and explicit joking relations, serves as an expression of personal power and significance. The low value of shop-floor workers poses a problem of identity for the men and the problem is entangled with the feminisation of management and office workers. This is allowed by the management as a way of control to keep the tension/attention away from the hierarchical relations. Symbolic expressions of men’s sexuality (such as sexually aggressive talk or pornography) are sometimes allowed or encouraged in the same way in organisations to build cohesion and alleviate stress (Acker 1991). Collinson also shows how the shopfloor workers have the unrecognised potential to collectively ‘manage’ production through humour (Collinson 1992).

Interwoven with the role of humour in bringing men together and suspending the rules and responsibilities restricting the autonomy of men is the use of humour in constructing and reproducing the hierarchical gender order. Jackson (1990) has referred to a network or continuum of formal and informal men’s organisations from boarding schools and scouting to pub culture and football terraces. Jackson discusses the importance of joking in these contexts of
“solidarity and support” where heterosexual masculinity “takes refuge”. To Jackson, joking, swearing and bantering are norm-enforcing mechanisms regulating women and subordinated masculinities and policing the boundaries of manhood. The emotional structure of the male bond is constructed as a defensive confirmation while the internal fears and tensions of men’s groups are channelled by putting pressure on ‘outsiders’ (ibid). The issues of age, (dis)ability, ethnicity and social-class, among other issues, are often intertwined with these practices of regulation.

4.4. Men, gender relations, and military organisations

As has been discussed above (Chapter 2.4.), defence as an institution is both internally diverging and stratified in terms of men’s and women’s participation and involvement. Men’s social relations and practices are key constructs in the institution and organisations of national defence. While these social constructs enable homosocial networking across the defence sector, including military-administration-business-NGO relations, they also require cooperation between institutions for maintenance of the linkage between manliness and the military. In the Finnish context, conscription lays the basis for the gendered divisions and connections of defence that extend to transnational defence organising.

The purpose of this section is two-fold. It aims at, firstly, summarising the key issues on gender and the military that have been discussed above at different points, and, secondly, relating these issues to the discussions around men and homosociality.

There are clearly many ways in which militaries are gendered (see, for example, Enloe 1988, 2000; Goldstein 2001; Woodward & Winter 2007). However, the relationship of men and masculinities to the military is far from being straightforward. Although militaries are male-dominated in all senses of the word, this is often a simplification of the military realities. As Hearn (2003) has pointed out, all armies do not consist of men but also of women and children. In militaries where soldiers are only or almost only men, women often work in service and administrative tasks. Additionally, the effects of male-dominated military organisations on women and children outside them can be vast.

Neither are military masculinities and men’s relations to the military to be reduced into a narrow scope. As Tallberg et al. (2008) have suggested, the different strands of research around gendered civil-military relations should build more consciously on each other and be complemented with further studies that explicitly gender men. Elaborations are needed on: men’s varying experiences in and around militaries and war; gendered militarised encounters in pre- and post-conflict contexts, and during both crises and peace; men and gendered violence in military institutions and military conflicts; and construction of masculinities on the borderlines of and resistant to “the man-soldier-military-war tangle” (ibid. 93).
Although the gendered nature of war and the military has gained research and activist attention, the connections of men and masculinities to these issues has only quite recently been subject to gendered analysis. Socialisation and rites of passage that intertwine transitions from boy to man, from civilian to soldier and from outsider to loyal group member have gained research attention (Arkin & Dobrofsky 1978; Winslow 1999; see also Tallberg 2003b). Soldiering and warrior ideals, militarism, violence, misogyny, and racism have been studied both respectively and intermingled (see Morgan 1994; Karner 1998). Lately, along with the change of focus in theorising from masculinity to the variations in men’s lives, attention has been paid to ‘military masculinities’ (Barrett 1996; Higate 2003) and, more specifically, men and masculinities in peacekeeping (Cockburn & Zarkov 2002; Higate & Henry 2004; Whitworth 2004; Higate 2007).

A strong discourse and key issue arising in many studies around men and military is the cluster of men’s bonding – associated sometimes with exaggerated masculine attributes and behaviours – providing cohesion that enables optimal combat performance and reduction of stress and strain within the fighting forces (Winslow 1999; Firestone & Harris 2003; Rosen, Knudson & Fancher 2003; Whitworth 2004; Woodward & Winter 2007; cf. Salo 2008: 41-42). Readiness for military action is built on the unity of soldiers that has sometimes been operationalised in terms of horizontal and vertical bonding. The former refers to cohesion at small unit levels in terms of off-duty associations, friendships and support; the latter refers to cohesion among soldiers and their leaders and confidence in the chain of command. Additionally, organisational bonding refers to cohesion between military personnel and their higher organisations, and institutional bonding to cohesion between personnel and their military branch (Rosen et al. 2003; Siebold 2007).

In this military context of indispensable social cohesion, certain organisational violations and injurious gendered practices (such as bullying and violence, excessive use of alcohol, or negligent sexual acts) may become interpreted as necessary male bonding or its ‘collateral damage’ (cf. Harrison 2002). They may add on to or serve as substitutes for shared risky and stressful experiences as the basis of group cohesion. Furthermore, the presumption has often been that cohesion grows from homogeneity, and, for example, women in the military

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23 The references mentioned here are partly reproducing the cohesion argumentation, and partly critical towards it. The stress and strain within the fighting forces is here brought up by no means to belittle the stress and strain caused by militaries in conflict and non-conflict environments.

24 This is not to over-emphasise the role of exaggerated manhood and organisational violations within the armed forces, or even say, that men’s bonding and rituals are the basis of military effectiveness. King (2006) has critisised military sociologists for explaining social cohesion in military units with intimate personal bonds and informal rituals. He argues that comradeship is primarily the result of formal training and collective drills, and that professional military competence and contribution to collective goals are the prerequisites for camaraderie. For further discussion, see Siebold (2007) and King (2007).
may, thus, endanger cohesion and military unit effectiveness (Segal 2007; Nuciari 2003). I shall henceforth refer to the above depicted entanglement as the dogma of male cohesion to evince the ideological and gendered character of this scheme of things, and to contrast it with both the actual tensions within military organisations and the diversity required by the changing tasks and organising of defence.

Besides (de)constructing the cluster of men’s bonds, gendered behaviour, and combat capabilities, studies concerning military cultures and organisations have often emphasised issues such as socialisation and initiation, combat training over other military activities, and stagnation and separateness of military organisations from the wider society. The studies on homosociality in organisations and managements have, for their part, seen the basis of homosociality in the attraction of men’s power and access to resources, the shared experiences and understanding that provide predictability and fluency of communication and cooperation, and the possibilities for resisting common authorities and working on one’s masculine identity. Together, these two areas of research seem to frame the question of men’s social relations in military organisations as a remote, exclusionary, untouchable, and even deviant, research object. This study, however, tries to open an approach to these themes through the idea of men’s bonding as everyday power practices and structures. This does not, and should not, mean ignoring of the organisational and institutional structures that enable men’s social connections and uphold gendered power relations. On the contrary, it means an analysis that roots macro structures in the social relations and micro practices that they are embedded in.

As arenas of militarised social encounters, many military organisations are infused with civilian actors, influences, and engagements. This diverse character may create organisational tensions and also serve as a basis for change within the armed forces. In contrast to earlier studies on men’s bonding and cohesion and homosociality, I suggest a slightly different, additional vocabulary of hybridity tensions and management. By hybridity, I refer broadly to the intermingling social, organisational, and cultural differences and divisions within military organisations. I am consciously not using here the term ‘diversity’, as I agree with Prasad, Pringle and Konrad (2006) in reserving diversity for discussions on inclusion, respect, and valuing of difference, especially in regard to systematically discriminated and historically disadvantaged groups. Neither would this describe what took place in the defence forces’ organisations studied. The central axes of hybridity were the intersecting civil-military division, task division and task stratification, and gender relations. Instead of a monolithic understanding of, for example, peacekeeping organisations or peacekeeper identity, the hybridity approach may unpack their heteroglossic and composite features, the historical, social, and
cultural traits and tensions within them, as well as the role of the dogma of cohesion in maintaining them (cf. Kapchan & Strong 1999).

Though the earlier studies, especially on homosociality, have brought up the dynamics behind men’s cooperative power (cf. Martin 2001), the focus seems to have been narrowed down to fluent, conspiracy-like processes between men. In this case, a hybridity approach is more suitable for making sense of those social practices and discourses that partly also sustain the contradictions between rule-sets and keep the negotiation on social hierarchies going. This is not so much a critique of the theory of homosociality as an effort to develop its scope in the analysis of most-often male-dominated and male-concentrated military organisations. The hybridity approach resonates with the shift of focus from singular masculinity to multiple masculinities (cf. Carrigan, Connell & Lee 1985; Connell 1995) in its attempt to widen the perspective on men and gender by including both similarity and difference (or cooperation/support and competition/oppression) between men in the examination. Still, in this thesis, the study of gender as a logic of both social division and social connection mainly involves looking at homosocial logics on the level of social interaction, and the important analysis of heterosocial logics remains, unfortunately, marginal (cf. Bird 1996).

4.5. Concluding on three frameworks

The possible approaches to the three main concepts discussed above – gender, organisations, and networks – and their interrelations are numerous. This wealth of opportunity does still involve gaps in theorising as well as clashes to be overcome between areas of research. In this section, I shall first, as an attempt to clear the air already buzzing with terms, briefly summarise and suggest seven possible overlapping ways to look at how the three concepts can be, and how have they been, seen in relation to each other. After that, I discuss the way the three concepts come together in this thesis. I shall suggest considering gender as a ‘logic’, and, finally, reflect on how studying men’s social relations as homosocial practices fits into the discussions around postmodern organisations.

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25 One may also ask to what extent peacekeeping as a hybrid of war/violence and peace/security, and ‘the peacekeeper’ as a hybrid form of negotiated civilian/reservist and military masculinities, are vested with additional prestige as long as their inner tensions remain covert.

26 Lupton (2006) has suggested reflecting whether all professions, organisations, or industries depicted as female-dominated are actually dominated by women otherwise than in numbers. Depicting them as female- or male-concentrated distinguishes the aspect of proportional majority from power aspects; both to be paid attention to, as well as their interrelations. In this study, the peacekeeping organisation could be described as male-dominated and concentrated, whereas in the provisioning case the issue was more complicated.
Gender, organisations, and networks can be seen

1) as structures that constrain and enable action. In this sense, they are separate from each other and have their own logics. They direct social action in distinct ways that compete with each other and may clash with each other.

2) as action, that is more or less directed by structures. Focusing on networking, gendering and organising emphasises the nature of the phenomena as processes and practices.

3) as intermingling dynamics. Organisations, for example, can be seen as essentially gendered so that no organisational phenomenon can be analysed satisfactorily without considering its gendered aspects.

4) as variables. Different models may be compiled by taking each as an ‘independent variable’ explaining others: changes in gender divisions or other dimensions of the gender regime as well as changes in the network structure of organisational members or organisations may be seen as explaining features of the organisation in question. As in the first approach, the ‘variables’ are taken to be somewhat comparable.

5) through each other as models or metaphors on different levels. Gender can be seen as an organised order or as organising processes. Organisations can be grasped as networks, and organisation can be seen as existing as a part of or in the environment of a network of organisations. Furthermore, networks and social divisions (such as based on gender, class, ethnicity, language, age etc.) may be seen as creating the informal organisation existing parallel to the formal/official organisation (Morgan 1997: 186-196), which is an important feature in literature relevant for this study.

6) as approaches to the society (network society [Castells 2000], gendered society [Kimmel 2000], ‘clan society’ of organisations [Strati 2000]).

7) as contexts for each other. Contextualising may involve different layers and different uses of the concepts. While studying networking or gendered practices on the individual or network level, a certain organisation or the network society may be providing the context and background against which the phenomenon is analysed.

One of the main theoretical oppositions relevant and fruitful in studying gendered social relations is the dialogue between network analysis and other approaches in social sciences. Discussions around such social divisions as gender, class, ethnicity, age etc. are about divisions, about social positions and separation, about ‘what comes between people’. Network approaches, on the other hand, often seem to be about the opposite, about the connections and linkages between ‘nodes’ – though not always so much about what it is that connects the nodes, but about the structure of the relations.

Still, divisions or systems of separation can also be seen as kinds of bonds in at least two ways. On the one hand, to follow the same logic of separation connects
those who are separated. On the other hand, social divisions are also about sameness (shared experience, meanings, attributes, positions in structures etc.) among the members of a certain social class. Gender, together with other social divisions, makes distinctions between people, primarily according the man-woman/masculine-feminine bipolarity, but the other side of the gender-coin is that there are also aspects that make, for example, men a ‘gender class of men’ (Hearn 1994a).

To talk about gender as a social structure may cause confusion in relation to the network approach. Network analysis suggests that structures are revealed with analysis of social network patterns, and these structures can be illustrated as networks. Whether or not that is possible or reasonable in the case of gender remains to be seen. For the purposes of studying men’s networks and gendered power in and around organisations, I suggest considering gender as a logic of both social division and social connection. Here logic does not refer to philosophy or cognition, but to the social logic that systematises in an often taken-for-granted way social relations, discourses and practices, and can, thus, be analysed in and through them. Reasoning on and argumentation for a certain gender order can be included in the ‘gender as a logic’ view, but they are not the main emphasis. The view covers more widely the ways in which gendered divisions, connections and causalities are socially enacted, manifested and reproduced. Unlike structure, logic gives room for resistance, for counter- and illogicality. Taking gender as a logic reserves the notion of structure for its more strict use as a reference to patterns of (social network) relations.

Defining gender as a social logic of division and connection carries both pros and cons. On the one hand, it is loose enough for the purposes of an ethnographic approach as it does not direct attention towards any particular level of analysis or certain type of material. On the other hand, the definition is clearly a simplification of complex phenomena and it may discard many aspects of gender. A central concern in this respect is the sensitivity of the conceptualisation in relation to power: should one, instead, talk about the “social logic of unequal division and connection”?

The important aspect of conceptualising gender in terms of social division and social connection is that it combines different understandings, and provides a ‘path’ through them. If the gender difference and division between women and men has been and still is the centre of understandings of gender, it has been elaborated in many directions during the history of gender studies. Building on connections of solidarity and unity among women has been the essence of the feminist movement. This collectivity has been problematised and strengthened by highlighting and analysing the differences and relations among women. Parallel development has later taken place in gender studies on men and masculinities, where the unifying aspects of male subjectivity, masculinity, and men’s hegemony have been complemented with a more subtle understanding of men’s differing roles and mutual power relations within the gender system. In addition to these advancements on divisions and connections among women
and men, respectively, the logic of connections across the gender division has been problematised, not least by the queer critique of heterosexuality.

What such a loose conceptualisation of gender enables is the approaching of other major axes of difference as similar phenomena (cf. Moore 1994: 49-50). Intersectionality opens up as the intermingling of different social logics. There are two features in this conceptualisation of intersectionality that need attention. Firstly, again, whether the conceptualisation should include the notion of inequality. What are the implications of widening the understanding of gender, ethnicity, sexuality, age, etc. beyond inequality? Is there anything beyond the character of these social relations as systems of power and oppression (Hearn & Parkin 1993; Collins 2000)? Secondly, the question is: does the conceptualisation carry any analytical weight if it can cover almost any social phenomenon? Bureaucracy and other ways of organising can also be seen as logics of social division and social connection, so can language, democracy, fashion, schooling, art, et cetera. This may be overstretching the term ‘intersectionality’. That said, to look at the intermingling of gender and different logics of organising as sometimes differing and sometimes overlapping ways of positioning and relating men and women is not far from some central works on gender and organisations (Acker 1991, and others building her theorising).

What this discussion on intersectionality can give to analysing the gendered character of relations and relationships among men is the understanding of the ‘genderedness’ of same-sex relations. One way to break the invisibility of gender in relations between men is to see how it constructs other social divisions and connections. The age difference of 20 years between two people is different depending on the gender of these people. All the permutations involve different logics.

As an approach to organisations, the analysis of social relations and networks around a certain organisation comes closer to the ideas of organisation without walls (Strati 2000) and a hypernetwork (Smith-Lovin & McPherson 1993) than to the perspectives on intra- versus interorganisational networks. Personal social networks include intra-, inter- and non-organisational ties. What is lost with this emphasis in the focused information on certain type of organisational ties is gained in the comprehension of dynamics of intermingling gendered bonds and their role in organisational life. Approaching organisations through personal networks comes close to the studies of dynamics and inconsistencies between formal and informal organisational structures (Rogers & Kincaid 1981: 96), but problematises the distinction with the help of theorising on network organisations versus organisations that can be described as more hierarchical and bureaucratic.

The basic assumptions in discussions around network organisations raise interesting questions in relation to men’s networks and homosociality. Vertical, lateral and spatial integration in organisations and across their borders as well as the shift towards informal coordination and the growing importance of social
capital among management increase the centrality of personal networks. It may be that in changes from more to less bureaucratic forms of organisation gender as a logic gains more importance concerning how organisational relations of coordination, cooperation, recruitment etc. are configured, and men’s homosocial practices become more central. Studying men’s network structures and practices may contribute to the discussions on the nature of change in postmodern organisations by bringing the questions of gender and power to the discussions on network forms of organisations. Furthermore, in all the various ways discussed in this chapter, research on gendered social relations and homosociality in and around organisations can produce knowledge on organisational power relations, and contribute to the efforts to promote equality in working life.
5 METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH MATERIALS

5.1. Ethnography

The background of ethnography as a scientific approach is in anthropological and sociological research since the 1890s. While anthropologists from Europe and the United States were replacing armchair methods with fieldwork in their studies of non-Western cultures, sociologists of the “Chicago School” and in the United Kingdom were conducting ethnographies on location in urban and industrial environments (Linstead 1993; Tedlock 2000). In sociology and other social sciences, the popularity and position of ethnography has varied, whereas in cultural and social anthropology its status as the primary research method has remained strong (Delamont 2004).

Many issues have been suggested as the descriptive features of ethnography. Listing them immediately generates conflict and contradiction even in one’s own mind. This may be because ethnography, like various other approaches, has evolved in so many directions and transformed into so many varieties that common principles are hard to determine. Or perhaps it is the nature of ethnography that demands a certain room to manoeuvre and for using the “ethnographic imagination” (Atkinson 1990) to tackle occurring problems instead of facing the field, the gathered materials, and the challenges of writing and ethnographic representation with a prescribed template. In the following, I use the rich terminology arising from various, and even conflicting, descriptions of ethnography.

Ethnography has been defined as a type of method or fieldwork activity, an intellectual effort or paradigm, and a narrative or rhetorical style, with particular characteristics in terms of technique, methodology and epistemology (Linstead 1993; Bate 1997). Ethnographies study culture, social relations, and the ‘symbolic world’ with a focus on the experiences and meaning-giving of those people that are studied. The studied actions and phenomena are kept in context by becoming involved in direct and sustained social interaction with the subjects in the field or in their ‘natural setting’. The relationships between the researcher and those researched provide a point of reflection that generates central perceptions about the research object.

Ethnography can be characterised by more or less theoretical, analytical, or thick description, inscription, transcription, textualisation, translation, narration, or representation, depending on style and taste. In this continuum, ethnographic texts vary from primarily descriptive ethnographies to emphasising “theory as a precursor, medium, and outcome of ethnographic study and writing” (Willis & Trondman 2002: 396). Ethnography can involve a certain open-endedness in terms of engaging both research participants and the readers in the process of interpretation.
In terms of technique and the gathering of research material, the heart of ethnography are the observations made and recorded in the field. Participant observing can involve full involvement in the studied community or a more remote relationship with it, and observing can be overt or covert to different degrees. Participant observations are usually supported by formal and informal interviews, collection of artefacts, documents and other secondary data, or by systematic counting. As such, the methods of ethnography do not distinguish it from other qualitative research. Thus it is often referred to as an approach rather than a method (cf. Bate 1997: 1152).

The notion of culture is embedded in ethnography. Two central elements of ethnography are present in the etymology of the term which refers to writing (graphe/grafein) on a people sharing a culture (ethnos): depiction of a community. When applying the holistic ideals behind ethnography by situating research participants’ interpretations and actions and by presenting observations in the context of other observations, one produces representations that are in their thickness describable merely as a representation of culture. Epistemologically, this multi-levelled co-embeddedness represents a different form of knowledge than the knowledge that is representable with models, diagrams, and figures (cf. Kondo 1990: 9).

As a research framework, ethnography enables the study of different levels of analysis and the couplings between them. At the same time, ethnography invites and insists on recognising the connections and couplings that strive and spread in varied directions and, thus, become excluded in studies applying more focused methodology. This dynamic is the source of both possibilities and limitations for ethnographic research. Participant observation can provide close attachment with micro-level phenomena of social realities, but this should not restrict the scope of ethnographic reach and applications.

Burawoy et al. (1991; 2000) have pursued “global ethnography”, the study of globalisation through its effects in local contexts. The strategy of the extended case method involves a focus on relations between different local sites (such as organisations), and on how everyday interactions shape and are shaped by the macro world. As Burawoy (2000: 6) states, the industrial and organisational traditions of ethnography have played a part in – and still involve the danger of – ‘interiorising’ ethnography into institutions and organisations, and cutting down the wider and historical connections from analysis.

In its extensiveness and depth, ethnography provides a suitable approach for gathering data both on organisations by and large, and, in particular, on the gendered culture and social practices and relations in organisations. Critical and feminist ethnography deriving mainly from social and cultural sciences has paid considerable attention to the traditions, challenges and possibilities of ethnography (Okely & Callaway 1992; Wolf 1996; Skeggs 2001; Prasad & Prasad 2002). In particular, the practices of representation and poetics have been reflected upon regarding the presentation of ethnographic accounts (Clifford &
Marcus 1986; Atkinson 1990; Jeffcutt 1994; Gill 1998). Critical ethnographies develop a critique of the studied cultures and pursue actions for change. While conventional ethnography describes what is, critical ethnography asks what could be (Madison 2005: 5).

Critical fieldwork has been taken up in critical studies on men. That said, there may well be elements to apply more thoroughly, such as those that Comstock (in Prasad 2005: 149-150) has outlined. Comstock has suggested a five-step process to be followed in carrying out critical research: Firstly, the researcher has to engage in a dialogue (preferably in their natural settings) with the subjects in order to understand their lifeworlds. Secondly, the sociocultural structures and processes that constrain and mediate individual understandings have to be grasped. The third, analytical step involves juxtaposing the two earlier ones through ideology critique, i.e. the analysis on the “accounts of reality that both conceal and legitimate social asymmetries and injustices” (Prasad 2005: 139; italics original). Fourthly, research should involve sharing the information and interpretations with the research participants with the aim of raising awareness. As a continuation from this, the researcher should, fifthly, cooperate with research participants in order to encourage them to act for change.

As Linstead (1993) has noted, ethnography as a methodology has several advantages. It has the capacity to embody a variety of perspectives and settings; it serves as a methodological and discursive response to epistemological and existential fragmentation; it is strongly based as a qualitative account on theoretical description; it adapts easily to the ‘linguistic turn’ in social analysis; and it incorporates an awareness of subjectivity. However, none of the strengths of ethnography come automatically, but require reflexivity. Furthermore, it is important to regard ethnography as an approach in the whole meaning of the term ranging from techniques to epistemology (ibid.). What is central is the position from which the ethnographer takes part in the knowledge construction: not (at least only) from the scientific position “of an observer fixed on the edge of a space, looking in and/or down upon what is other” but from a position of subjective experience, “a moving position already within or down in the middle of things, looking and being looked at, talking and being talked at” (Pratt 1986, 32).

Excursus: Metaphors of ethnographer

The fact that ethnography has been applied and developed in many environments, conditions and scientific traditions and that it now covers a whole range approaches and subcategories, is reflected in the variety of metaphors that exist to describe the role of the ethnographer.

Ethnography is sometimes seen as close to any human observation, to the basic understanding of the processes of everyday life. To start learning from scratch with an effort to minimise the effects of the researcher’s presuppositions on the results has been compared to open childlike learning. Apprenticeship and being
a novice as ideals (Jarvenpa 1998) often come up implicitly in ethnographers’
ponderings on naivety as strategy: unawareness and ‘stupid questions’ may
provide a thorough picture on the understandings of the informants of their
own culture and a position for the researcher to be humbly among other
participants instead of maintaining an ‘aristocratic’ distance (Katz 2004). This
way, the unarticulated commonsense becomes visible (Van Maanen 1979).

From the point of view of ‘ethnography as everyday observation’, the question
that concerns the epistemology of ethnography would be how the knowledge
produced by ethnography differs from any other observations of, for example,
an artist, advertiser, park bench sitter or journalist (Linstead 1993). What is
additional in ethnography are the several phases and activities of producing the
ethnography as a product – both before, during and after observing. Ethnography is not only (or perhaps not at all) detective work for finding out the
truth (see Squire 1990; Alasuutari 1989).

A step towards a more interactive relationship between the researcher and the
observed reality is the blacksmith ethnographer (Rosen 1991), who forges the
theoretical model to fit the observations. Claude Lévi-Strauss’ ‘bricolage’
(1966/1962) has been central to the derivation of craftsman metaphors in
ethnography and more widely in social sciences and qualitative research.
Differently from the (perhaps more positivistic) engineer who chooses the tools
and raw materials according to the purpose of the project, a bricoleur makes do
with the means at hand, elements collected and reserved on basis of their
potential use.27 (On the bricoleur see also Humphreys, Brown & Hatch 2003.)

One of the strongest metaphors for the ethnographer is that of a cultural guide
(Gill 1998) or translator (Crapanzano 1986; Asad 1986). The latter implies the
metaphor of culture as language, as system of meaning that can be
communicated from one collective to another in terms of the latter's
understanding. How this communicated culture is absorbed and represented
respectively brings about further metaphors. The language metaphor continues
in Geertz’s (in Crapanzano 1986) reading of culture as a texts “over the shoulder
of those to whom they properly belong”. This intriguingly differs from the
ethnographer as a cross-dresser “wearing insiders’ clothes while gradually
acquiring the language and behaviors that go along with them” (Tedlock 2000:
455), and the ventriloquist ethnographer (Geertz 1988) who speaks not about,
but from within another form of life.

The problematic of participant observation is often discussed through the
reconciliation of the two roles (participant and observer) (DeWalt & DeWalt
2002) and through the balancing of the tension between, on the one hand, the
necessary closeness to the people and phenomena studied and, on the other
hand, the detachment and distance from them which enables analysis.
Postcolonial critique has brought up the point that this dualism as such carries

27 As such, the work of Lévi-Strauss and Geertz contains positivistic aspects (Linstead 1993).
along the problems of ‘othering’ to the applications of anthropological tradition in, for example, organisational ethnography (Prasad & Prasad 2002).

The echoes of anthropology are strong in the metaphor of the castaway or captive ethnographer, which might seem to suggest that the deeper the participation the better. The metaphor builds on written accounts of actual experiences of living unwillingly in foreign cultures. This ideal of the participant observer living with and learning the language and lifeways of the collective in focus contrasts with the ‘mere traveller who passes through’. As Pratt (1986) notes, the metaphor captures possible aspects of the fieldwork experience: the sense of dependency, lack of control, vulnerability to being either isolated or never left alone in the collective, and, I would add, the state created by the longing to go ‘back home’ or away from the prevailing circumstances.

Drifting and being reformulated in the research site (Rosen 1991) is central to the artistic metaphors of ethnographer. Humphreys et al. (2003) have made an extensive contemplation on the resemblances between a jazz player and an ethnographer. Both involve a certain self-exploration but are at the same time collective and social activities. Authors describe ethnography as joining in and jamming along until the ethnographers get “a feel of the tune that their subjects are playing” (ibid. 13; original italics).

The emphasis is quite different in approaches where the ethnographer is taken as an author (cf. Humphreys et al. 2003). Seeing ethnography “as a kind of writing” (Pratt 1986) and “true fiction” (Clifford 1986a) puts weight on representation and its politics and rhetoric. To elevate the role of ethnographer as punster or trickster (Crapanzano 1986) may show the results of trying to convince both those studied and other readers on the credibility and relevance of the written accounts. As such, the problematisation of ethnographic authorship seems itself highly problematic: Many of the attempts to escape the burdens of authorship seem to be quests for authenticity, which at least from postmodern angle maybe seen problematic, even a distraction (Jeffcutt 1994).

As a pragmatic summary of the texts mentioned earlier (especially Rosen 1991; Linstead 1993; Jeffcutt 1994), one could have a step-by-step rule of thumb of ethnography. As a part of postmodern textual strategies Linstead (1993: 100) mentions “a movement from the hermeneutics of interpretation to the poetics of representation”. Instead of only going to the field, describing action as such, and getting the answers to one’s questions from the ‘informants’, instead of stopping at the interpreting of these actions and answers through ‘contextualising as meaning-giving’ (Rosen 1991), ethnography involves a further step of representation and poetics: paying attention to ethnography as a particular discourse of scientific writing and to textual construction in ethnography. Additionally, one more step is needed, both further on and especially, in the later and post-research stages, back to the research process for subsuming and
making apparent the politics involved and the action and change striven for with the work.28

Though the several phases – or plateaux to avoid the misleading chronologicality – of ethnography need separate attention, a more unifying frame is required instead of specified (illusion of) control. *Ethnographing* might mean not putting emphasis on the management of and disruptive juggling between closeness and distance or between the positions of participant, observer, interpreter, and author, but more on the textual understanding of data as the variety of ‘things that come along’ and on intertextuality in analysis crossing over the borders of different material, literature, autobiographic or autoethnographic accounts, art, or other cultural products. This bricolage of texts discussing with each other would provide multiple voices that the ethnographer from her/his moving position then organises with attention to representation and poetics without the totalising judgement of interpretation (Lodge [1990] cited in Jeffcutt 1994). Understanding ethnographing this way may also partly solve the question of contextualising. Texts would mutually contextualise each other back and forth in dialogues. A fundamental issue to avoid is seeing these texts as reified from their producers and production histories, but instead to see “the ethnography to be a hierarchical structure of powerful stories that translate, encounter, and recontextualize other powerful stories. It is a palimpsest” (Clifford 1986b: 120-121).

5.1.1. Organisational ethnography

In management and organisation studies, ethnography has been found to be a useful approach to explore in detail the phenomena in focus through experience-based knowledge (for example, Kunda 1992; Morrill 1995; Rosen 2000). Morrill and Fine (1997) have listed five substantive areas of organisational sociology where ethnography has made important contributions. *Informal relations* and the dynamics between them and formal organising were already central in the Hawthorne studies in the 1920s and 1930s. Interactional and cultural aspects became even more central in studies on *organisations as systems of meaning*. Studies on *organisations and their environments* have shown how relations and pressures external to organisations affect their internal structures, decision making, and outcomes. The ethnographic approach has proved to be valid also in analysing organisational *change*. *Normative behaviour and ethics* have been studied both in organisations considered deviant (organised crime, gangs, crime families), and concerning the dynamics of deviance, morality, grievances, conflicts, and disputes in any organisation (ibid.).

28 In this project, as so often, this last-mentioned step of action for change takes place mainly in terms of dissemination, but it will be referred to below in terms of my participation in the UNSCR 1325 Network.
What seems to characterise many ethnographies of organisations and work places is a certain ‘second look’. Studies on informal organisational arrangements and relations have questioned the primary nature and rationality of formal organising. Conflicts and deviant behaviour have been brought up in ‘normal’ organisations, whereas researchers of ‘deviant’ organisations have brought up their conventional and harmonious aspects (Morrill & Fine 1997). Similarly, complexities have been uncovered in studies on ‘unskilled’ ‘routine’ jobs, and the work of professionals and semi-professionals has been shown to be predictable and routinised (Smith 2001). This ‘second look’ has also been important in “exposing and explaining power, conflict and inequality” (ibid. 223). In terms of organisation theory, ethnographic studies have been said to bring in history, context, actor-centredness, and processuality, which the mainstream theory often ignores (Bate 1997: 1155).

The ethnographic approach is based upon being sensitive to and building on the practices, understandings, concepts, categorisations, and problems of the research participants. One tension involved in ethnographic research is between, on the one hand, the needs, hopes and expectations towards the study that arise from the field, and, on the other hand, the academic starting point and goals of research. In this study, the organisational studies framework brought in the managerial practices and organisational decisions and changes that were a central part of the everyday life of the studied communities. The fact that I, as a researcher, was coming from a business school and a department of management and organisation aroused assumptions in the research participants concerning what I was interested in and what was expected of them in, for example, the research interviews. Together, these issues were directing the study towards a situation where the research would concentrate on the problems at hand in the organisation, and the researcher would begin to do the job of those working in the studied organisation, even to compete with them. In conducting organisational ethnography around gender this aspect is crucial, as gender often becomes silenced in workplaces rather than being an outspoken challenge in the organisation or a key content of everyday work.

5.1.2. Ethnography and networks – a reflection

Network analysis has been used in analysing ethnographic data (Thurman 1979; Schweizer 1997; Fleisher 2005), but I would argue that there are challenges in building an ethnography on social network analysis. The two approaches are partly pulling in different ontological and epistemological directions. Perhaps it is indicative that whereas organisational ethnography is a well-developed branch of organisation studies, and several ethnographies have studied gender, the ethnography of social networks has not had its heyday.

These two approaches – ethnography and social network analysis – can and have been combined, but it is reasonable to ask whether networks can be studied through ethnography. An ethnographer might be prone to say that this is obviously possible, both in case of explicit and implicit networks of, for
example, individuals or organisations, but she/he would concentrate on the substance of the ties and the processes of networking in their cultural and social context. A social network analyst would perhaps see ethnography as instrument for gathering relational data that can be analysed in order to abstract the social structure outside of the predetermined and predominant social categories of researchers and research objects. This again would be opposite to the holistic goals of ethnography to build on experiences and understandings of the research participants, and to embed the studied social action and structures in their context throughout the research process from fieldwork to writing up. To a social network analyst this could, again, be only a metaphorical use of the network concept and, thus, disregarding of the potential and principles of network analysis. And so on.

My attempt is to resolve this tension – if only for the purposes of this study – in two ways. Firstly, I have above defined the term ‘network’ loosely in relation to the concepts of ‘gender’ and ‘organisation’ as a parallel logic of social division and social connection (see also Tallberg 2003a). These three intermingling social logics can manifest themselves as processes and structures, in experiences, interaction and discourses, more explicitly or more implicitly, and through analysis. This framework, arising from a selective reading mainly of research and theorising that bring these terms together, was originally built for studying gendered networks in organisations, but it is open for other social logics arising from the empirical data. In this study on defence organising, the dynamic around the civil-military divide became the central intersecting logic. Secondly, this study is an ethnography into networks. This means that when networking, network-like relations, or references to networks came up in the fieldwork, they were paid specific attention to and elaborated in interview situations and other discussions.

5.1.3. Autoethnography

In addition to ethnography, some attention has to be paid to autoethnography. There are at least three different uses of the concept autoethnography. In addition to the double sense of 1) studying one’s own culture/collective/organisation/group through ethnography, and 2) autobiographical writing that has ethnographic interests (Reed-Danahay 1997), autoethnography has referred to 3) “instances in which colonized subjects undertake to represent themselves in ways that engage with the colonizer’s own terms” (Pratt 1992: 7).

Anderson (2006) has made a distinction between evocative and analytic autoethnography. Evocativeness refers to the goals of “narrative fidelity and compelling description of subjective emotional experiences [that] create an emotional resonance with the reader” (ibid 377). Though evocative autoethnographies are conducted in arenas close to the ethnographer, they neither turn the observing and analysing eye upon the researcher and her/his
biographical connections with the studied setting, nor represent her/him textually.

Analytic autoethnography, instead, is characterised by five features. Complete member researcher status can result from membership in the studied community prior to deciding to study it, or “conversion” or “immersion” during fieldwork. Analytic reflexivity involves awareness of the researcher’s relations to research situations and her/his effect on them. This is linked to and represented in the narrative visibility of the researcher’s self. Dialogue with informants beyond the self keeps up the relation to the field and prevents slippage into solipsism. Commitment to theoretical analysis aims at the use of empirical evidence for theoretical development and understanding of social phenomena (Anderson 2006).

I interpret Anderson’s outline of analytic autoethnography so that the use of autobiographical reflection can be done selectively. Instead of framing the studied cases with my own autobiography, I reflect on my experiences prior to this research project to the extent that they were evoked in the field and during the analyses. Especially in Case I (the peacekeeping case study), the relevant reflection point would be my time in military service as a conscript some ten years before participation in the peacekeeping mission. In Case II (the provisioning case study), my experiences from academic bureaucracies and from the peacekeeping mission in Case I became more central.

In terms of autoethnography being about “studying one’s own culture” it is necessary to problematise one’s belonging in certain respects. When is one studying one’s own culture? What kind of multipositionality and prosessuality is involved in relation to the actors involved in the study? The experiences from the field concerning role conflicts are essential for reflecting on the different ‘belongings’. In this sense, academic autoethnography might involve ‘glancing’ at the organisation(s) involved in the production of the knowledge, namely, the academic community and traditions involved in the process of doing research.

5.2. Analysis / Writing

One of the several tensions linked to ethnographic approach concerns the role of analysis. If analysis is understood as deconstruction of data and their reconstruction according to a theoretical framework that is appropriate for reaching the research goals, this chopping up may contradict the efforts of ethnography to appreciate the ways, forms and logic of the observed reality. One of the key strengths of the ethnographic approach is the possibility of forming knowledge on processes in their context and thus providing an alternative for approaches that build more directly on theoretical abstraction.

This is not to say that the primary goal of ethnography is authenticity in presenting realities. Along with the critiques of authenticity (Rabinow 1986; Jeffcut 1994), the emphasis in ethnographic research has moved towards
representation, even to the extent that ‘analysis’ rarely belongs to the vocabulary. Some have even suggested that ethnographic research be evaluated in terms of quality of fieldwork and how the report is able to present it (Humphreys et al. 2003). To the extent that analysis takes place in the ethnographic process as an exploratory ‘intrusion’ into the studied collective and processes, it takes place as much during the fieldwork as in the reporting. The process of analysis that goes on in writing fieldnotes, having discussions and doing formal interviews as well as producing ethnography as text raises the challenge of separating analysis and writing (Crang 2003). Reflexive writing is therefore one way to tackle the key epistemological challenge of making the research process visible in the reporting.

I approach analysis as the “practical action of describing and relating things to answer specific needs and questions” (Crang 2003: 133), with special attention in presenting not only the findings and conclusions, but also the mediating processes of finding, thinking, and transformation in between them. Important terms for the strategy of sense-making and representation are ‘conjunction’, ‘recontextualisation’ (cf. Crang 2003), and ‘bricolage’ (Lévi-Strauss 1966/1962; Humphreys et al. 2003): the different materials are brought in to contextualise each other, and meaning is constructed through the tensions of the materials’ “framework of intelligibility and that brought by the researcher” (Crang 2003: 135).

As writing is central in ethnography it has been discussed widely (Clifford & Marcus 1986; van Maanen 1995; Atkinson 1990). In terms of attempting to be reflexive in writing, it is necessary here to pay attention to the ‘invitations’ posed by different genres of writing. These arise from both the disciplinary styles and varieties of scientific representation, as well as from fiction genres close to the studied phenomena (this will be discussed more in Chapter 6 ½).

Ethnography as ‘translation’ of a certain empirically observed reality into the ‘language’ of the scientific community – or some part of it – involves the challenges that have been discussed above. What poses a further complication in this study (as in many others) is the challenge of preserving the cultural nuances of the studied collectives, or at least some of ‘the feel’ of the fieldwork experiences, while representing them through text written in a language that is not the native language of the research participants, including the researcher. Although the dynamic between the mainly Finnish-language research material and the English-language representation of the analysis on it is not without analytical benefits, the mediation of even something as simple as the central meanings in an interview extract or some written document has occasionally transpired to be more difficult than expected. The differences in national defence systems and vocabularies mean that direct translations are not possible on all occasions, and many nationally-specific features need extended explanation. These challenges with the bi-linguality of the project have partly been solved by reflections on the terminological differences between Finnish and English, by also including the Finnish terms in the text where necessary,
and by incorporating the original transcripts of the paraphrased interview extracts and other texts in Appendix 5. For translation, the BILC word listing on military terms has been exploited when applicable, as well as English translations of the public documents of the Defence Forces.

The centrality of the written text in representing ethnography has been problematised in many ways, not least by visual anthropology and ethnography (Boonzajer Flaes & Harper 1993; Ruby 1996). Taking photographs or video taping in military contexts and using them in publications proved difficult because of strict regulations that were mainly based on security reasons. This, combined with the challenges of anonymising research participants in visual recordings, led to the exclusion of photographs from this thesis. This research project had no resources for using such innovative approaches as drawn pictures illustrating the studied social situations (see Eräsaari 1995).

Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis involve the contextualised description and analysis of the studied two cases. The writing strategy in these chapters partly follows the somewhat traditional line of qualitative research reporting of interview studies, in which analysis and interview extracts form a dynamic. In Chapter 6 (and to some degree in Chapter 7), a central role is given to descriptive passages that are italicised and marked with side-lines. These passages vary in length and character, and some of them are titled. The evocations and narratives are not direct representations of fieldnotes, but have been constructed in the writing phase of the thesis based on the fieldnotes and other research material.

5.3. Positioning and ethics

In order to keep some track of the different hats that I am and have been wearing in the process leading to this thesis, I shall refer to myself using a variety of labels. These represent the changing positions during the course of conducting different phases of study, the different participant observer positions that were born in the interaction in the field, and the different positions I am taking and constructing for myself textually. Positioning is also one aspect of research ethics, but the main ethical dilemma discussed in this chapter is anonymising. The end of this chapter is an introduction to the gathered research material and the process of fieldwork in the two case studies.

5.3.1. Positioning the researcher

Several authors have referred to the challenges posed by the fluidity of borders between the field and the ‘non-field’ as well as the participant observing and other activities and orientations. The difference between the positions as a participant observer in the two case studies does in some respects contrast with 29 http://www.dlielc.org/bilc/MiliLang_1.html
a third position, namely my position as a doctoral student. Although neither the organisational context nor the process of conducting the study and the related doctoral studies have not been documented and cannot be represented here in the same detail as the two case studies, I shall include some autoethnographic reflections concerning the position as a doctoral student.

“How did you come to study something like that?” This question that I have been posed several times when explaining my research does not only show general curiosity but also an implicit understanding of the fact that the process leading into certain research settings and themes does matter. It involves reasoning and active choices that still are bounded.

In terms of choosing the first case study and getting access to the field, matters of ethnographic representation, positioning and reflexivity intermingle. It might be tempting to present a narrative of passionate eagerness to study themes around men and military that then led into a demanding process of obtaining access to the peacekeeping organisation and conducting fieldwork in exotic circumstances among men that were far from the familiar academic circles. Instead, the process was melding differing research interests, and personal career and economic interests (cf. Anderson 2006), and seems now, a couple of years later, surprisingly smooth.

There is a complicated dynamic between positioning of the researcher, epistemology, and career that is seldom discussed. This may be especially relevant in such social science branches as management and organisation, where both more practically and more theoretically orientated contributions in doctoral theses are welcomed. To put it briefly, in my case this meant the following: The starting point was to take an outsider’s view of the military. Very quickly I came to understand that in Finnish society – especially for the majority of men that have served in the army – the military is actually close rather than far, and its pervasiveness in society is supported by a media environment filled with news and representations of war and militaries. Therefore, in addition to ‘revealing the secrets behind the barbed wire’ (or perhaps instead of it), it is necessary to obscure the not-so-unfamiliar military.

This study is not only looking into the problematic of the civil-military dynamic and the realities on the fringes of the Finnish Defence Forces, it is also taking place in this border area. The academic environment and the scientific frameworks of business management and organisation are increasingly familiar for many in the Defence Forces. Nonetheless, for many in both academia and the defence branch, the combination of business and organisation research with military and gender has been a baffling idea. Additionally, as a reservist, the civil-military borderline cuts through my personal identity, as with most Finnish men.

Through the participation in varying depth in two very different organisations of the Finnish Defence Forces and with other relevant engagements (being a
reservist and participating in the drafting of the national action plan on UNSCR 1325), I came to see myself more and more as an autoethnographer. At the same time, my knowledge on security and defence issues and my social networks in the field grew. As will be discussed in more detail below (in Chapter 6 ½), during the fieldwork and the analysis the pressure on my original research focus and goals was two-fold. On the one hand, certain pre-assumptions seemed false and questions difficult to study. On the other hand, the field was ‘craving’ solutions to certain other challenges. The participants had their practical and organisational problems that began to distract my attention, too, and more data grounded theorising suggested its own directions.

Similar challenges are most probably familiar and mundane to many researchers, but especially for PhD students at the later stages of their study this process intermingles with career planning. The crucial question is (in ethnographic terms) whether one ‘goes native’ and pursues a career in the studied organisation or branch by prioritising the practical organisational problems in the PhD study, or whether one focuses on translating the observed reality into theorising and pursues an academic career. This may be the crux where the securing of post-doctoral career paths in academic institutions affects the scientific quality of theses.

### 5.3.2. Anonymising the cases

Contextualisation of the case studies follows the chosen research focus and the principle of anonymising. This means that in the peacekeeping case study information about the particular peacekeeping operation and the post-conflict area and circumstances are limited to a minimum. Pseudonyms are used, and instead of precise information approximates are given to describe, for example, the scale of the military and international presence in the post-conflict area. In the provisioning case study, the restructuring process and the organisation in focus were anonymised to a lesser extent, for reasons discussed below. In both case studies, some minor references that could have been included in the thesis in order to provide more information, have been excluded if their titles or other reference information would have directly enabled the identification of some of the research participants or organisations involved in the study.

The question of anonymity was probably the most troublesome issue in the process of conducting this research. During the fieldwork in the peacekeeping forces, I had the fixed idea that I cannot be too careful concerning the anonymity of my peacekeeper colleagues. Intermingled with other reasons, this led to a situation where I felt I could not and did not communicate my experiences of the time in Radnata to the extent I wished, and perhaps should have, in order to build a dialogue with research participants and handle my own anxieties caused by both peacekeeping and research experiences, and the
reconciliation of the two activities.\(^{30}\) Even several years later, I felt unsure about inviting some of my ex-peacekeeper friends to my wedding as I felt this would jeopardise their anonymity. Still, anonymising the case was in practice possible to a satisfactory extent.

In the second case study on the Defence Forces’ provisioning project and the new service centre, the problem of anonymity took a different form, one that at times felt insurmountable. It became even clearer than in the peacekeeping case study that there is a strong tension between the responsibility to secure sufficient anonymity of the informants and the ethnographic practices of and belief in thick holistic description of social processes. The alternatives were, firstly, laying out in detail all relevant observations with precise dates, locations and references to documentary material erasing only the names of individuals as, for example, Puukka (2005) did in his study on the Ministry of Defence and Defence Command with regard for the principle of transparency in state governance. At the other extreme, the alternative was to try to anonymise all identifiable characteristics of both the organisations and the individuals involved.

This dilemma led to complicated considerations regarding describing and reporting spuriously the whole reorganising as taking place in the Finnish police forces, in the Swedish defence forces, or concerning an unnamed ‘supply function’ in the Finnish Defence Forces. The last option was first applied in writing but proved to be problematic, especially as it made the ethnography elusive and disembodied. Discarding either layer of contextualisation – the military or the national context in Finland – seemed impossible without losing both the possibilities of analysing micro-macro connections in historical context, and the potential to contribute to the scarce social science literature on the Finnish Defence Forces, let alone its gendered analysis.

The two crucial questions concerned, firstly, what aspects of the studied organisation would it be necessary and possible to name and discuss in the research reporting, and, secondly, for whom the organisation and the research participants in focus should and could remain anonymous? The fact that the development project and the service centre that was created as a result of the project were dealing with a specific task – provisioning and catering – made the case unique and recognisable. If the centre had already existed for a while, the time period of the fieldwork would not be as obvious as in this case, where the process of establishing the organisation is in focus. Here the problem of anonymising links to other ethical dilemmas in studying organisational transitions instead of more stable collectives (Buchanan & Bryman 2007).

\(^{30}\) I agree with Rager (2005) on the importance of paying attention to ‘self-care strategies’ in doing fieldwork. Still, in this research project, I experienced most stress after rather than during the fieldwork phases. This stress was more related to the process of conducting research than to any post-peacekeeping effects or emotions.
Regarding anonymising, it is also necessary to consider the different parties involved – both the research participants and the audiences. Anonymity is always limited by the fact that research participants can spread information about their participation in the research. In this case, the process of applying research permission from the Defence Forces, too, has eroded the convenience of anonymising. Information on my research proposal has been available without my initiative to employees of both the Defence Forces and the Ministry of Defence through electronic archives. Based on this information, employees from both institutions have spontaneously contacted me during the research process. Another layer to be considered is the general public and media: to what extent can and should anonymising be used as an attempt to control the possible media publicity and representations?

All these considerations have to be judged proportionately in relation to the nature of the data that have been collected and how the information has been gained. The research permission for the provisioning case study (see Appendix 2) was received specifically to study the provisioning development project PROV and the newly founded Provisioning Service Centre. Interview contracts with interviewees were made (see Appendix 6) and information leaflets concerning the research were disseminated in order to make the participants aware of the purposes for which the data were collected and the voluntariness of participation. These documents guaranteed confidentiality and that names or other identification information of research participants would not be published at any stage of the study. If during the fieldwork I had promised or given the impression that I shall not name the organisations that I am studying, or if I had been demanded to do so, considering anything else would have been out of the question. To a certain extent, it is possible to evaluate that the data collected from the provisioning case study do not include such information of an organisational level that would be ethically problematic. However, it does include sensitive individual level information that had to be anonymised and selectively modified in more detail. Additionally, for the same purpose, some documents are anonymised, or minor documents left unmentioned, in the references.

Based on this argumentation, in the analysis I have started from the transparency principle, but included un-anonymised information only to the extent that it has been necessary for analytical reasons. This is to make both the analysis and reading of the thesis possible in the relevant institutional and organisational framework. Total transparency was abandoned in order to support individual-level anonymity. This means that, for example, official documents and media sources that have been used as data sources have been listed in the references, but not always named in detail. Concerning individual anonymity, the representational strategy has included changing some personal information of informants and other persons involved, as well as places, times, and other details.
Here, anonymising has been discussed at length not only because it seemed to create most anxiety during the research process, but also because it can open a view into the complex connections that it creates through its implications between theorising, methodology, representation, and politics.

5.4. Research process and materials

The two case studies of the research project involve processes of access, participant observation, data gathering, and field exit that partly resemble each other and partly differ between the cases in ways that provide for a fruitful methodological comparison. These processes were closely intermingled with the development of the theoretical framework of the study, and the experiences from the peacekeeping case study fed into the research set-up of the provisioning case study. Thus, the reflective discussion on the fieldwork processes follows the chronological order of the thesis project is and takes place between the presentations of the two case studies in the Interlude (Chapter 6 1/2).

Overall, gaining research access to the Defence Forces as smoothly as I did within both the case studies is encouraging in terms of future studies on the Finnish military. This is similar to the dynamic around political anthropology of political and administrative elites. As Rhodes (2005) has suggested, such an ethnographic approach is necessary and several successful attempts to conduct close observing certainly exist.

Peacekeeping case study

The peacekeeping case study looks at the headquarters of a bi-national Battle Group in the post-conflict area of Radnata. The focal research participants were the 61 Finnish officers serving in the Battle Group headquarters around the turn of the millennium.

I conducted the ethnographic fieldwork of the peacekeeping case study as a complete member researcher (Anderson 2006). The fieldwork involved a process of applying for peacekeeping training, taking the training of 5 weeks in Finland, and being in service as a peacekeeping officer for 6 months. Working fulltime as a peacekeeper in varying circumstances created certain limitations for data collection but it also gave a valuable viewpoint for observation through participation. The ethnography resulted in masses of material that can be divided in to four groups that are here briefly commented upon:

1) Participant observation:
   a. Observations (the ‘flow of everyday life seen loosely through research interests’) were recorded everyday throughout the training and service period. Office work often enabled the making of notes simultaneously. Describing the amount of fieldnotes is challenging, and perhaps even misleading. Fieldnotes
involved around 400 A5 size pages of hand-written notes, 100 A4 pages in electronic format, and additional notes in calendars and other smaller notebooks.

b. More structured observations were made in the form of participant lists that were gathered from several activities in the peacekeeping camp, such as hobby groups, church service, saunas, and dinners.

2) Contact diaries: The 120 Finnish officers of the peacekeeping Battle Group were sent a contact diary to be kept during nine days that would include both days spent on mission and on leave. This part, though carefully planned, was the unsuccessful method of data gathering: Only 10 questionnaires were returned. The consequent lack of quantitative relational data posed problems for the basic operational structure of the study, that is, for looking at the dynamics between men’s practices and discourses and the network structures of the actors involved. This directed the study more toward ‘traditional’ ethnography.

3) Interviews: 12 formal interviews were conducted with officers between the ranks of major and second lieutenant. Research contracts were signed with every interviewee in order to agree on interview consent and the usage of the interview material. The interviews lasted from an hour to more than three hours (altogether around 23.5 hours). Interviews were free in form, but covered the themes described in Appendix 3. Interviews also gave information on issues that have been analysed but presented in the research reporting only to a minor degree, such as on men’s social relations in their life-historical contexts. Other discussions were recorded in fieldnotes during and after the conversations.

4) ‘Documents’: The documents include several kinds of material, such as training material, lists of personnel, telephone catalogues, organisational charts, orders, memos, listings, reports, news articles, the annual book of peacekeepers 2003-04, issues of the informal Juhani magazine of the Battle Group, and recordings from Radio Supa.

**Provisioning case study**

The provisioning case study looks into the reorganising of the provisioning and catering function in the Finnish Defence Forces. Reorganising took place in terms of a provisioning development project PROV (2002-2005) that resulted in the formation of a new Provisioning Service Centre (PROSEC). The ethnographic fieldwork in the provisioning case study focused on the last phases of the PROV development project and the start-up of PROSEC, especially its headquarters.

In addition to the headquarters of 25 employees, the centre consisted of more than 20 service units around the country with a total of approximately 700 employees. After receiving research permission from the Defence Command (general headquarters of the Defence Forces) and access to PROSEC, I spent 27 field days over a four-month period participating in the everyday life of the
headquarters: meetings, training sessions, PROSEC opening seminar and party, visits of the PROSEC management to garrisons and service units etc. The material gathered includes the following:

1) Participant observation: Fieldnotes involved around 200 A5 size pages of hand-written notes, 50 A4 pages in electronic format, and additional notes in smaller notebooks.

2) Interviews: The 17 formal interviews were mainly with the management board members (8/8) and seven other personnel members at the PROSEC headquarters. Again, research contracts were signed with every interviewee in order to agree on interview consent and the usage of the interview material. The interview material of 32.5 hours involved discussions on the themes listed in Appendix 4. Additionally, most interviewees from the PROSEC headquarters were asked to draw a picture or diagram depicting their relations and closeness to the other HQ employees.

3) ‘Documents’: The vast documentary material of the Defence Administration Partnership Programme (DAPP) and the provisioning development project PROV was accessed through the Defence Command archives and collected from various other sources during and after the fieldwork phase. The material involved various written orders, minutes of meetings, accompanying letters, invitations, reports, and memos. Other document material included magazines of the Provisioning Service Centre.
6 ORGANISING, GENDER, AND SOCIAL RELATIONS IN AND AROUND A PEACEKEEPING BATTLE GROUP HEADQUARTERS

In this chapter, I first lay out the historical, political and structural context for the peacekeeping case study (Case I). Particular attention is paid to the general conscription of men, as it lays the gendered basis for all defence organising. The description of the Finnish defence system and conscription are followed by a review of the forms and conceptualisation of peace operations, as well as a brief consideration of the international and Finnish history of peacekeeping. Issues and studies around gender and peacekeeping are then discussed. The ethnography covers a month’s peacekeeping training and six months’ service as a peacekeeper in Radnata in the Balkans.

6.1. Organisation of Finland’s defence

Finland is a country of 5.3 million people bordered by Sweden and Norway on the west and the north, Russia in the east, and Estonia in the south on the other side of the Gulf of Finland. Finland gained its independence in 1917 after a hundred years of Russian (and before that Swedish) rule. The general interpretation of history (Suomen..., 1995) has been that the nation that was torn apart in Civil War of 1918 between the Reds and the Whites was reunited in the Winter War (1939-40) and the Continuation War (1941-44), both fought mainly against the Soviet Union. The successful resettlement of population that lost their homes as a result of the territorial concessions to the Soviet Union and the ability to pay the war reparations at top speed led the way to a booming economy and a fresh start for the nation. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, Finnish politics were overshadowed and built heavily on the relationship with its eastern neighbour and in a general spirit of cautiousness and neutrality. Finland joined the United Nations in 1955 and the European Union in 1995. Finland is not a member in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), but in 1994 it joined NATO's Partnership for Peace programme.


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31 Radnata is a pseudonym for a post-crisis area where a peacekeeping operation was ongoing at the time of the fieldwork. The pseudonym is used to enhance the anonymity of those who participated in the research. For the same purpose, names and other individual characteristics of the research participants, as well as certain details concerning the peacekeeping organisation, have been changed.
population growth, population migrations and epidemics.” These threats are responded to with regional security cooperation with neighbouring countries and through strengthening the European Union (EU) as a security community, as well as through the Partnership for Peace programme of NATO which has enabled participation in NATO-led crisis response operations. Regarding Finland’s participation in international security cooperation, the emphasis has been moving from peacekeeping towards a broader involvement including military and civilian crisis management and EU rapid response forces. The German-Dutch-Finnish Battle Group was in readiness for the first time at the beginning of 2007 and the Swedish-Finnish-Estonian-Norwegian group in 2008.

However, in the Government report, general conscription of men and territorial defence system continue to be the basis of national defence. New foci are executive assistance arrangements with the civilian authorities, security of society’s vital functions and supply, as well as the development of voluntary national defence. As a result of the reassessment of security threats, reformulation of the Defence Forces’ tasks, and economic pressures on public spending, the Defence Forces has recently been going through a vast restructuring process. The changes, including downsizing and cost-cuts, were consolidated when the new management and administrative structure of the Defence Forces came into effect from the beginning of 2008.

In 2007, Finland’s defence budget was 2 213 million Euros, of which salary costs and ordnance covered nearly 60%.

The same year, the Defence Forces had 15 400 permanent employees comprised of civilians and employed soldiers and excluding conscripts. Nearly half of the Defence Forces’ employees were civilians, and half of the civilian employees were women. Only since 1995 has it been possible for women to become employed officers in the Finnish Defence Forces. In 2007, 1.2% of employed officers were women (DC document 2008b).

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32 The proportion for crisis management was 2% of the defence budget, but this is only 45% of the total costs; maintenance costs of the crisis management troops are included in the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml?s=120). As Poutvaara and Louhela (2007) have pointed out, defence costs would in countries of mass conscription look very different if the labour costs of conscripts (the lost work income for the military service period) were included. In Finland, the costs would be 30-40% higher than the statistics show and Finland would be among the top countries within the EU by the proportion of defence costs in relation to the Gross National Product. Difficulties in defining what is calculated as defence costs reveals the ongoing construction of what defence is and the blurring of the civil-military division in processes of security mainstreaming (cf. Savela 2006; Iivonen 2007).

33 This includes all officers, excluding non-commissioned officers. The personnel of the FDF is discussed in more detail in Appendix 1 and Chapters 7 and 8.
6.1.1. Conscription as a gendering institution

Conscription of Finnish men was established during the Russian regime in 1874. After the Civil War, national defence was built on conscription and the existing structures of the White Civil Guards.\(^34\) Finland’s defence policy has since World War II been built on territorial defence and mass male conscription. A significant majority of Finns supports the maintenance of both conscription and military non-alliance as the basis of national defence (Laitinen & Nokkala 2005; MoD document 2008).

As an institution, conscription is the most central societal practice gendering the national defence. More than 80% of Finnish men attend the compulsory military service that has varied in length over the course of time and according to personal tasks from 6-12 months. Every year, more than 25 000 conscripts are trained in Finland. Men stay in the reserve or the auxiliary reserve until the age of sixty. For women, military service has been possible on a voluntary basis since 1995. The few women (some 400 per year) that have participated in the same training as male conscripts have added 1-2% yearly to the total number of military trainees (DC document 2005).

The alternative options for conscription are unarmed military service and civilian service. Exemption from armed service during peacetime is given for religious and ethical reasons or health reasons. Annually, approximately 2 500 men choose civilian service, which takes 12 months. Conscientious objectors (or ‘total objectors’) that find none of these options acceptable are convicted to imprisonment of maximum 181 days. Yearly 40-80 men are convicted. A growing proportion – around 15 to 20% – of the drafted men is exempted for health reasons either before or during their military service. Additionally, male Jehovah’s witnesses and inhabitants of the demilitarised province of Åland are mainly exempted from conscription. Unequal treatment in terms of both the convictions of total objectors and the privileged position of Jehovah’s witnesses has aroused criticism regarding the Finnish legislation from, among others, the Council of Europe, the UN, and certain Finnish NGOs (Tulonen 2007; Repo 2008).\(^35\)

Conscript training lays a gendered basis for other military training and a professional military career as well as for participation in and cultural capital concerning national defence. It reproduces defence and the military as men’s

\(^{34}\) The White Civil Guards (‘Suojeluskunta’) were mostly untrained, paramilitary militia troops that were established before and during the Finnish Civil War of 1918. During the Civil War, they constituted the bulk of the White army of the conservative-led Senate that subdued the resistance of the socialists and workers (the Reds). After the Civil War, the White Guards remained a voluntary extension of the Finnish military. In the 1930s, the White Guards were entangled in a right-wing extremist movement and an attempted coup d’état. The White Guards were disbanded in 1944.

arenas. That said, conscription involves more complicated dynamics in terms of gender and other dimensions of equality. As only men have the obligation to serve in the military, conscription, as a gendered civic duty, may be seen as discrimination against men (Kotro 2007). However, at the same time, conscription can be regarded as an institutionalised form of power that privileges certain men materially, socially, and symbolically. Mass male conscription may be seen as upholding the patriarchal power order and men's violence, and connecting citizenship with masculinity: Through institutionalised practices, violent capabilities are reproduced as a legitimate part of men’s capacities (cf. Jokinen 2000: 198; Nokkala 2001: 65-72) and conscription is constructed as a transition into laudable manhood with full societal rights and responsibilities (Tallberg 2003b). Discussions around women’s participation in military service in Finland have often involved conflicting views on whether or not such participation benefits gender equality (Holli 1999). Research on how conscription builds gendered power relations among men has started only recently (Jokinen 2000; Tallberg 2003b; Ahlbäck 2004b).

The Government report to Parliament on security and defence policy (PMO document 2004) states that:

Due to conscription, the obligation to defend the country can be met equally throughout society. At the same time this creates a foundation for the strong will of citizens to defend their country and for commitment to national defence. It also guarantees transparency of the Defence Forces’ activities in society at large.

Different views on conscription as a tool of democracy, social equality and citizen education have to be seen against the gendered structure of conscription (cf. Svedberg & Kronsell 2002). Argumentations, such as those above, for the legitimatisation of conscription in Finland often bring up the point that the armed forces are in the democratic control of the citizens as long as the ‘citizen-army’ (‘kansanarmeija’) is preserved. In other words, conscription is presented as at least a partial solution for the civil-military relations problematic: it is constructed as a legitimate and secure option in contrast to the more risky alternative of a professional army (see discussion above in Chapter 2).

The discourse of a “citizen-army” is in these terms misleading (Laitinen & Nokkala 2005: 82) because the democratic control of the army by the citizen-soldiers is control by the majority of men, not by the people. On the other hand, the discourse reveals the way that conscription genders citizenship: the core of the people includes men that are fit for fighting. The argumentation reproduces citizenship and nation as gendered constructions. As Altinay (2004: 58) has stated, “any attempt to de-gender nationalism and citizenship needs to

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36 This is not to say that women’s conscription and participation in military defence cannot go hand in hand with women’s exclusion from political power and equal citizenship. For the case of Israel, see Klein (2002) and Sasson-Levy (2007).
incorporate a discussion of universal male conscription”. (See also Svedberg & Kronsell 2002.)

For the sociological analysis of the defence field, the state of civil-military relations is a crucial point of departure. In Finland, the processes of security mainstreaming that take place in civil-military encounters have to be examined in the light of the mass conscription system. Here, the questions can only be touched upon: To what extent have the institutions of conscription and ‘total defence’ converged in the civilian and military spheres? What are the ways in which the ‘total defence’ principle and the strong tradition of men’s conscription support each other in Finland and build gendered cohesion among the actors of the field?

6.2. Transnational and national peacekeeping and key organisations

On the one hand, looking at peacekeeping in the framework of defence may be considered problematic. Defence, with its national goals, organisation, and other attachments, contrasts and may be in conflict with international involvement, in terms of both politics and resources. On the other hand, at least in the Finnish case, the organising of peacekeeping activities is so closely, and in varied ways, linked with the organisation of national defence that such a framing can be argued for. Crisis management is gaining increasing importance as one of the core functions of the Defence Forces. Conscription training provides a basis for peacekeeping recruitment and training, and field experiences in peacekeeping missions are seen to contribute to national defence competence. Furthermore, through the security discourse, peacekeeping and crisis management are constructed as an element complementing national defence in the system of securing the home country (cf. PMO document 2004; DF document 2008: 37). It is fair to ask to what extent the history of participation in peacekeeping operations has provided the basis for other more current Finnish involvement in transnational defence cooperation.

6.2.1. Definitions of and developments in peacekeeping

The forms and the vocabulary regarding peace operations, as well as the global map of ongoing operations, are in a constant state of change. A certain development in the forms of peacekeeping can be constructed, and the development is often discussed in terms of ‘generations’ of peacekeeping. However, features of all the ‘generations’ can already be seen in the pre-peacekeeping international cooperation, and most forms co-exist currently in the multitude of peace operations.

Traditional peacekeeping (or truce-keeping) involves monitoring of cease-fires and withdrawals of troops and other actions with the support of host countries and restricted use of force. Strategic peacekeeping (or ‘peacebuilding’ or ‘wider
peacekeeping’) may include deployment of military, police and civilian actors to enable resettlement of refugees, and reactivation and rebuilding of societal structures, such as public administration, electoral systems and democracy, the police and the court system. *Peace-enforcement* (or ‘assertive’ or ‘robust peacekeeping’) can involve combat in order to reach a solution to a conflict.

These forms of international intervention can also be seen as phases of missions that advance from preventative diplomacy and deployment to – if the prevention fails – enforcement, peacekeeping, and peace/nation-building. In addition to the categorisation above, Scmidl (2000b) has defined as the principle criteria for peace operations 1) the restoration or preserving of the status quo or transition to the status quo; 2) acting for the benefit of local population instead of conquering a territory; 3) principles of ‘minimum damage’ and ‘measured force’; 4) international authorisation for the mission; and 5) execution of the mission by either an international organisation, a regional arrangement or an *ad hoc* coalition with 6) a multinational personnel.37

The establishment of the United Nations in 1945 and the half a century of UN-centred peacekeeping that followed can be seen as being preceded by a pre-history of peacekeeping and continued by a diversification of peace operations and actors. Scmidl (2000b) has traced the roots of peace operations in the international cooperation of the late 19th century. This included cooperative actions for handling human suffering and other consequences of wars (Geneva and The Hague conventions, Red Cross), but also new international organisations around post, telecommunications, and meteorology. After World War I, the League of Nations institutionalised the formerly *ad hoc* diplomatic conferences. These developments created the politico-organisational basis on which the United Nations was founded after World War II.

Segal (1995) has divided UN peacekeeping into five periods. The division is not only based on changes in the nature of peacekeeping, but also on shifts in the international system. Already during the first phase of UN peace operations (1946-55) the basic principles of peacekeeping were formed, namely impartiality, host country consent, and refraining from use of force. The open hostility between the Soviet Union and the UN slowed down the development of peacekeeping, and the four first missions were carried out with no clear international constituency. Not only was the politico-military organising of peace operations tied to superpower relations, but also the main aim of 1950s and 1960s peacekeeping “was to keep the regions out of the Cold War which were not yet directly involved in the East-West confrontation, in order to limit the risks of New World War” (Scmidl 2000b: 10).

37 I primarily use the term ‘peacekeeping’ to refer to the variety of military activities by the international community in post-conflict areas. By ‘crisis management’ I refer to a wider involvement including both civilian and military crisis management. For further discussion on vocabulary around peace operations, see Schmidl (2000a) and:
http://www.nato.int/issues/crisis_management/crisis_response_operations.html
The second phase (1956-65) introduced more unified UN troops marked by blue helmets and authorised to use weapons for self-defence. The flexibility of the new Soviet leadership after Joseph Stalin and active promotion of peacekeeping by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld led to eight new UN operations. The unsuccessful UNMOC operation in Congo (1960-64) and the intensification of the Cold War led to a long phase of retrenchment (1966-85) when only three UN missions were launched. Nonetheless, many earlier-launched operations continued for decades, and when the cooperation in the UN framework faltered, several peace operations were organised outside the UN system. The fourth phase of “Superpower co-operation” (1986-89), and the fifth phase of “One superpower” (1990-94) gave a boost to UN peacekeeping, which spread geographically from South-East and South-West Asia and Latin America to Africa and Central Europe, but slowed down again due to failures in certain operations in the Balkans, Rwanda, and Somalia (Segal 1995; Schmidl 2000b; Salonius-Pasternak & Visuri 2006). Since the beginning of the 1990s, the end of Cold War, the “war against terrorism” by the United States and its allies, and the proceeding globalisation have also affected the framework of peacekeeping and, with the difficulties faced in the 1990s peacekeeping operations, fitted peacekeeping into a wider frame of crisis management (Salonius-Pasternak & Visuri 2006).

6.2.2. Peacekeeping and Finland

Since World War II, peacekeeping has played different roles in national and international politics (Whitworth 2004: 33-38). In the case of Finland, during the Cold War the passive, moderate and conflict-avoiding foreign policy of a small non-aligned nation, supported by consensus-spirited domestic politics, took a more active form in representations of a peace-loving ‘superpower’ of peacekeeping (cf. Salonius-Pasternak & Visuri 2006).38 Finnish peacekeeping troops have participated in UN peacekeeping operations since the Suez crisis in 1956. As Kronlund and Valla (1996) have argued in their study on the history of Finnish peacekeeping, there has been a long-lasting tension between national defence and peacekeeping as tasks of the Defence Forces. The societal relevance of the Defence Forces increased in the 1960s along with the new peacekeeping operations and the development of peacekeeping organisation in the new political framework of security policy that combined foreign and defence policies. Though there are still today differing opinions inside the defence organisation concerning international operations, in the period leading up to the 1980s peacekeeping was seen less as a burdening claim on defence resources and more as an asset providing international experience of warlike conditions for both military personnel and reservists. Peacekeeping has been part of both the construction of the national image and the legitimation of the Defence Forces. (Ibid.)

38 Finland is represented as a ‘superpower’ of peacekeeping in, for example, the Internet pages of Finnish Defence Forces (http://www.mil.fi/rauhanturvaaja/historia/index.dsp) and in the title of a documentary film on the history of Finnish peacekeeping (Levänen 1989).
In 2006, the law on military crisis management replaced the law on peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{39} Public debate in 2005-06 on revision of the legislation focused on the possibility of participating in operations without a UN mandate, but the changing nature of crisis management was also reflected upon in terms of the possible increase in casualties. The new law provides the possibility of also participating in other forms of military crisis management than operations mandated by the UN Security Council. Decisions on participation are made by the President, based on government suggestion. The Ministry of Defence tasks the Defence Forces, and directs and guides military crisis management. The amount of crisis management personnel is limited to a maximum of 2 000.

More than 32 000 Finns have served in a total of 30 peace operations (2006). Since the beginning in the 1950s, Finnish peacekeeping has been based on the voluntary participation of employed reservists and military personnel. Training given during compulsory military service lays the basis for shorter peacekeeping training that has been given in the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) (formerly a UN Training Centre) since 1969.\textsuperscript{40} In 2008, with a new locality and a more focused emphasis on training, FINCENT handed over national responsibility for crisis management operations to the Pori Brigade. The current role of FINCENT reflects the internationalisation of Finnish defence and the processes of security mainstreaming. For example, in the framework of Nordic defence cooperation FINCENT trains all Finnish, Swedish, Norwegian and Danish military observers. Additionally, the centre is co-organising training for civilian crisis management personnel with the Crisis Management Centre.\textsuperscript{41}

In 1995, a year after the UN had presented for the first time a specific request to its member states to increase the proportion of women peacekeepers (Connell 2002), voluntary military service equivalent to conscript training became possible for women in Finland. This change in law laid a basis for women’s wider participation in peacekeeping as military training is a prerequisite for peacekeeping training. However, the first Finnish women peacekeepers had already served in Golan and Lebanon in 1991 in tasks that did not require military training. Experiences of these first women peacekeepers and their male colleagues in the UNDOF and UNIFIL operations were studied through surveys (Kauppinen & Huida 1994). The study pays special attention to the issue of

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Laki sotilaallisesta kriisinhallinnasta} [law on military crisis management] 2006/211.
\textsuperscript{40} Because many Finnish peacekeepers have participated in several operations, the number of departures (47 000) is higher than the number of peacekeepers. \textit{Service as a peacekeeper} must not be confused with \textit{military service as a conscript}; conscript trainees never serve as peacekeepers. Reservists (i.e. those men that have had their obligatory military training, and the women that have taken the same training voluntarily) apply for peacekeeping training and service on a voluntary basis, and they are paid salaries for the peacekeeping service. Instead of an employment contract, the peacekeepers have a service engagement (‘palvelusitoumus’).
\textsuperscript{41} The Crisis Management Centre (CMC) was founded in 2007, and it is a governmental institution subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior. The Centre recruits and trains personnel for and conducts research on civilian crisis management and peacebuilding missions. (http://www.cmcfinland.fi/)
tokenism, and maps the peacekeepers’ background, service motivations, crisis situation experiences, attitudes towards national defence, and everyday interactions and behaviour.

Finnish peacekeeping veterans are organised as a national union (Suomen Rauhanturvaajaliitto). In 2008, the union had 29 associations as members, with 6500 reservists and employees of the Defence Forces. The union publishes a magazine (Sinibaretti). It is a member union in the World Veterans Federation (WVF) and in the National Defence Training Association of Finland (MPK).

In Finland, peacekeepers have not been studied empirically to a large extent. Still, the literature produced by journalists and peacekeepers themselves on field experiences covers many peace operations (Suomalainen 1995; Heikkinen 2006a; 2006b; Nyberg 2006), and includes fiction with peacekeeping as its central theme (Luoma 1994; Alftan 2006).

6.3. The 1+6 months

The presentations of the empirical part and the analysis employ different textual styles in order to tackle the challenges of ethnographic knowledge production (discussed in chapter 5). The analytic description of the training (6.3.1) and peacekeeping service (6.3.2.) phases are followed by a more focused analysis on the formal and informal management of peacekeepers’ social relations (6.3.3). The further reflections (6.3.4.) seek to deepen the preceding analysis.

6.3.1. Training

I am writing these lines in November 2007 in my office in Helsinki.42 I am having a chocolate cookie with strong coffee and hoping that the feeling of getting sick does not escalate into a fever. This week I should sing with our choir in three Christmas concerts and get going with the writing of Chapter 6 of my thesis.

The fever reminds me. Some years ago on a Sunday I arrived from a feminist research conference in Sweden. I wasn’t feeling that well, and I knew two things: stress makes me sometimes have a high fever peak, and this is not the time to get sick. Next morning, I had 38.5 degrees centigrade and a stiff neck. Still, at 07.04 a.m. I stepped into a train that would take me to the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre to start my peacekeeper training. In the train, I made the first notes on page one of my field diary: “Not the

42 As introduced in Chapter 1.7., also in Chapters 6 and 7, I use, as a form of ethnographic representation, narrative passages that are based on the research material (see Chapter 5.2). The passages are marked with italics and sidelines, as here.
best possible start but I am on my way now. Worried that I’d otherwise lag behind others and get stigmatised.”

The goal of the rotation training that I attended was to produce Finnish troops for a rotation of a bi-national Battle Group in the Balkans. The training involved a rotation of approximately 250 Finnish persons. The training period was four weeks. This period involved around 65 officers, the rest of the participants were other ranks. The first five days were for the officers only. The main training period of three weeks followed a week later. In the mean time, some special courses for other ranks took place (medical service and armoured vehicle drivers, for example), and some of the officers were involved in those. The main part of the rotation flew into the operation area a couple of days after the training period. Some, including myself, were taking special courses and moving to Radnata a week later than others (see Table 1).

Table 1    Organisation of the peacekeeping training period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5 days</th>
<th>9 days</th>
<th>3 weeks</th>
<th>4 days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer training: introductory week</td>
<td>Free (special courses for other ranks)</td>
<td>Main training period</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Main rotation to Radnata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special course on Civil-Military Cooperation (4 days)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

My participation printed in **bold**.

**Introductory week**

The first part of the training period (5 days) involved briefings and lectures, practical training, and preparations. These have been listed in Table 2.

As a whole, the training period was characterised by tensions around social control and formal and informal group formation, organisation of the training, and division between professional military personnel and reservists. The central dynamic was related to socialisation into the peacekeeping culture. Socialisation took place in the interaction between the training organisation and the peacekeeper candidates that had differing relations to the Defence Forces and former experiences of peacekeeping.

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43 ‘Other ranks’ here is equivalent to ‘enlisted ranks’ in the US Army, and includes the noncommissioned officers.
Table 2  Activities of the introductory week of the peacekeeping training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LECTURES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• History of and ethnic divisions in Radnata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tasks and composition of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Radnata Troops operation (RTRO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Finnish part of the Battle Group (including presentation of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rules of engagement (ROE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Communications and information transmission, access control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NATO maps and road network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Administration and personnel issues, salaries, conditions of enlistment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Engagement contracts, salary accounts, travel arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Preparations for troop training [during the forthcoming weeks]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Planning processes in the Finnish RTRO troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Standard operational procedures (SOPs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Situation reports, the Tactical Operation Centre (TOC), chain of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>command and information flows, reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Operating as “situation leader”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Use of pistol and gas mask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Briefing technique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Maintenance and measuring of physical condition in peacekeeping forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Life in Radnata [as a peacekeeper]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Military and service ranks, dress codes and marks of rank in the Finnish RTRO troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Supply chain in RTRO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRACTICAL TRAINING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Pistol shooting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Gas mask test</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BRIEFINGS AND OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Briefing by the commandant of the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Briefing by the forthcoming Chief of Staff of the Battle Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Medical examination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Equipping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Personal introductions of the officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cooper running test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sauna evening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Photo shooting (for official purposes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Medical examination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first day

When we arrive at FINCENT, we are equipped and accommodated. A division is made so that professional military officers and the reservists with previous peacekeeping experience are lodged at the FINCENT main building in double rooms with showers, while the younger reserve officers without former peacekeeping experience (including me) are accommodated in basic military quarters with some twelve men in a room with bunk beds and simple lockers. In practice, this also means a division according to rank: 2nd lieutenants are facing conditions very similar to conscription experiences while lieutenants and above have rooms of basic hotel level.

Introductions among around 60 officers take place in an auditorium where most of the lectures during the training are held. People are supposed to stand up, state their name, their upcoming task in Radnata, earlier peacekeeping experience and other. That ‘other’ usually includes family relations and hobbies. Jokes are made about wives pumping out children while men are abroad. Somebody has a dog called Major. The most often mentioned hobby is hunting.

Lunch in civilian clothes is lively. We sit in the small tables at the personnel side of the canteen. At the dinner we are wearing uniforms for the first time. In the long tables in the ‘shopfloor side’ among local conscripts our socialising becomes restrained; suddenly the memories of being once a conscript come back, and the upcoming everyday life in the military starts to unfold.

Later on, while queuing for medical check up, we have time for story telling. Those that have earlier peacekeeping experience stand out with their knowledge of the area we are going to and on the right terminology. A lot of talk about money and tax-free cars that men are going to bring from Radnata. Somebody says the daily allowances are gone if one buys 20 pirate t-shirts or goes to a hooker in Sofia. Snuff is being lent, I provide someone with marks of rank as I have spare ones.

The formation of social relations and ties among the peacekeeper trainees can be described as a process of interactional categorising. Information about one’s own and fellow trainees’ backgrounds are exchanged, commonalities and differences noticed, points of belonging searched for and found. In addition to the accommodation arrangements at the training centre, other factors that unite and divide the trainees are many. Some trainees are old acquaintances, especially those that are working permanently in the Defence Forces, or have common friends. Age, family situation, similar occupation, education level, hobbies, and place of residence, as well as branch and place of military service play central roles. Practices of social relating are also actively constructed.
On the first training week social relations develop rapidly. Smokers go smoking, university students discuss their studies. Among the equipment we have received is the headgear that we are to wear in the mission. They are not blue berets, because we are not attending a United Nations mission, but green. One evening we, the 2nd lieutenants, cut the cloth linings out from our new green berets and mould the felt headdress doused with water into a particular trimmed shape. This is, during the training, the clearest informal rite of passage towards us becoming a group of peacekeepers.

It soon becomes obvious that the trainees of the rotation represent a broad range of areas in Finland. An Internet based ice-hockey game gains a lot of popularity. We have access to computers in one of the classrooms. In the ice-hockey game, the players gather a team from the real players of the Finnish championship league and get points according to how their team members succeed in matches. Some money is involved; the one of us succeeding best gets a crate of beer. During leisure time, ice-hockey matches are watched on televisions and the wide screen in the auditorium. Local teams are supported by regional groups that form around them. Later on, the web-game follows with us to Radnata, where ice-hockey gets its own show in the Finnish peacekeepers’ private radio channel. Real team shirts of Finnish ice-hockey teams hang from the roof of the mess hall, resembling any Finnish ice-hockey arena.

The garrison environment in the training centre evokes a lot of memories from conscript service. My memories are a decade old; other 2nd lieutenants are younger than me. There are also conscripts trained in the garrison area where FINCENT is located. On Tuesday night, the newly-recruited conscripts that have just sworn their military oath are offered a concert by the girl band Tiktak. Unlike most military garrisons, the Soldier’s Home Canteen next to which the outdoor concert is held is not inside, but right outside the gates of the garrison area. Soldier’s Home Canteens are held at garrisons by a national NGO and its local associations. Employees are volunteer women, “Soldier’s Home sisters” as they are formally called. Tiktak gets an enthusiastic reception from the audience, which includes civilians. Many conscripts are so drunk that the conscript military police are ill-at-ease while trying to avoid seeing the forbidden circulating alcohol bottles. On the stage, local teenage

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44 The military oath is a legally-based vow that conscripts take during conscription after their basic training of approximately two months. The oath includes, among other things, promises of being “a trustworthy and loyal citizen”, defending the country in times of war and peace, and carrying out different responsibilities towards military superiors, comrades and possible subordinates. It is sworn on one’s honour and conscience. The oath ritual is usually accompanied with a religious service, a parade and a meal, and conscripts’ relatives can participate in the event.
The homosocial practices among peacekeeping trainees and peacekeepers constantly built moments and possibilities of reproducing social identities and attachments. Sometimes these practices formed longer paths, and often they involved intermingling of gender with other social logics. The ice-hockey game described above continued throughout the mission and served as a form of bonding for some also after the peacekeeping service. Men’s ice-hockey as such forms a complicated practice connecting together nationality, gendered power relations, physical strength, competition, and (the potential of) violence and danger. In the peacekeeping context, the game-practice served as a gendered set of links both to the home country and between peacekeepers of different local origins.

The reproduction of heterosexual assumptions and identities took place both in the everyday discourse, as well as in more general practices of the military culture, such as entertainment and shows with women performers. Everyday interaction involved both homophobic practices and practices of affirming heterosexuality. As seen above, age comes to mediate the gendered relations between men. Conscription-related practices of bonding across an age group (the military oath marked by and combined with partying) belong to the past of the peacekeeper trainees, while the distance to them and the new, developing position in the military system provide another base for mutual bonding. Still, the basis of the gendered configuration is not questioned. It is the excessive alcohol consumption of the conscripts and the young age of the performers that are out of place, not the setting with women giving an erotic performance for conscripts and their guests in a military environment. Within the gendered logic, women as entertainers and service personnel in the canteen fit in the military context.

**Clutter, rifles, and an eye infection**

The 2nd lieutenants that I live with for the first week are men mainly in their twenties. One 2nd lieutenant is a woman, but she is living in the main building with the only other woman of the whole training group. Most of the 2nd lieutenants are ‘in their civilian life’ starting or doing their studies in universities or polytechnics. Some have already been working, as policemen, doormen, in the media and tourism, serving in the military, or other. I can hear the same things that the surveys among the peacekeepers tell: the motivation behind becoming a peacekeeper stems from a need for a change, a will to enhance one’s own economic situation and language skills, and sometimes ideological reasons.
The conditions at the barracks resemble experiences in the service as a conscript, but without strict control. The assumption by the course leadership is apparently that the younger officers, the 2nd lieutenants, would self-organise their living. This, combined with the tight schedule of the first days, the slow adaptation to the military practices and the new environment leads into a clutter at the quarters. Equipment is not kept in order, and rooms get messy with dust and sand. At some point, a spare assault rifle is found lying around. We all have one, and they are supposed to be kept behind locks. The owner is discovered after a while.

On Thursday, we come back to the barracks from the shooting range and gas mask test. The sergeant major has left a written message: “Get the quarters in order!” One second lieutenant has left his locker open and his assault rifle is missing. Another guy cannot find his keys, but he is not sure if they have been lost in the woods or taken. Embarrassment, rage, and anxiety in the barrack room. “Real army stuff!” “They are fucking with us!” “I didn’t come here to mop!” The sergeant major cannot be found anywhere to clear things up. One of us says he knew something is going on when he had heard there is a talking-to coming up in the evening.

Before the talking-to, the atmosphere is serious. “One of us fucks up and we all suffer. This is going to be a pompous gathering.” The lieutenant colonel comes to the auditorium with the assault rifle; exceptionally he is wearing a t-shirt. He does not know where to start. He says the officers are supposed to be examples, especially we, the young officers, for the other ranks that are living in the same quarters as we are. “I don’t care about the mess, but the unlocked locker and the rifle.” He compares the case with a peacekeeper that had once boozed and crashed out on the street in Radnata. “In football terms the right thing to do would be to give a red card, but as I do not know whose rifle this is, I cannot do it. And I do not want to know. The owner can take what is his.” The sergeant major is more furious and hints that although we were supposed to be accommodated at the main building for the main training period, this might not happen: “A tent would be the right place for you!” He leaves the missing locker key beside the rifle.

Later on in the evening I hear from one of the second lieutenants that the lieutenant colonel had after the talking-to come to him informally with a twinkle in his eye asking if the talking-to had been “taken to heart”. In response to the second lieutenant’s nod, the lieutenant colonel had said that that had been the purpose of the talking-to.
The following morning, despite the cleaning we have been up to, the uncleanness has done its job: I wake up with an eye infection. On the break between lectures, elderly officers are standing in a circle in the courtyard chatting and smoking. With my swollen-shut eye, I go and ask the medical officer where I am supposed go for treatment. They give me looks. On my way to the clinic I ponder what they were thinking. Did they think I was the one whose rifle had been missing, and because of the collective punishment, I had been beaten up by my peers? I never get the thing clarified.

Above, the comment of the lieutenant colonel after the talking-to points to a dynamic practice of managing social relations in a military context. The talking-to and the succeeding ironic softening of the formal message imply a certain shared understanding of two social layers that are both necessary. In the formal layer, authority relations, rules, and military order call for certain procedures and sanctions, even emotions, such as anger and shame. The softening comment hints at the certain ‘theatrical’ nature of formal interaction: the scene had to be played out and it had an emotive purpose. At the same time, the comment hints at an informal layer where good-humoured collegiality, social cohesion and consensus among the peacekeepers and across-rank differences prevail. Later on in Radnata, this kind of reconciliation of the two social layers was revealed to be a central feature of the peacekeeper community and culture.

Violence appears in the descriptive passage above as a potential instrument of social control. Although the rare cases of violent behaviour between peacekeepers mainly took place in the context of alcohol abuse and one-to-one quarrels, the practice of collegial violence, so often emblematic to military training communities, was not unknown among peacekeepers. As an experienced soldier brought up in a discussion among peacekeeping trainees, some years back two men had been “caught canoodling” in the attic of one of the garrison buildings and “put in order”. At the peacekeeping mission in Radnata, one reserve officer staged another reserve officer, who had passed out, with embarrassing props and postures, and took pictures to give him a lesson.

Main training period

The structure of the main training period (3 weeks) was more complicated than the first introductory week. The main training period consisted of general preparations and arrangements, a practical training track (7 days), an operation exercise (4 days) and a shooting camp (2 days). When the other rank peacekeeper trainees joined the training, different training companies were constructed, and the headquarters personnel remained partly a separate training unit. Some officers participated the planning of the training, others took over the companies they would lead in Radnata. The operation exercise and shooting camp concerned the whole rotation, both officers and other ranks. Key officers made a week’s introductory visit to Radnata. The activities at the training track have been listed in Table 3.
Table 3  Track stations of practical training during the main training period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRACTICAL TRAINING TRACK STATIONS (7 days)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Weapons handling (assault rifle, pistol, shot gun, night vision devices)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Weapons handling (anti-aircraft weaponry)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Vehicle checking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mine safety (types of mines and explosives, actions in mine accidents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Medical training (first aid, medical supply and care arrangements in Finnish RTRO troops)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Foot patrolling (tasks and equipment, person checking)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Vehicle patrolling and orienteering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Building checking (division of work, techniques, reporting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Use of force (rules of engagement, warning shooting, detaining persons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• GPS navigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Communication technology (radio, phones etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Muscular strength test</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the training track

We are skirting the training track in the garrison area in groups. Many of the trainers at the stations are currently serving in Radnata and have been ordered to fly to Finland to train the next rotation. Some of these trainers find the teaching “a shitty job” compared to service in Radnata where “things are getting relaxed” as the rotation shift is drawing to a close.

At the shotgun training station the reserve corporal asks whether we (the trainees) know the weapon in question. The only woman in the group, a sergeant, hints that she is not acquainted with this particular type of shotgun. The teaching is directed at the sergeant who asks questions and models how to load and shoot. “Can a blonde insert the cartridge in the wrong way?” she asks to lighten the atmosphere. Afterwards I and my lieutenant colleague admit to each other that neither of us has seen, let alone used, any type of shotgun before.

Medical training involves fractures, burns and eye injuries, bleeding, and basic resuscitation. The trainers are professionals in nursing and rescue and fire service that are leaving for Radnata as corporals, some apparently with previous peacekeeping experience as they use the slang fluently: when hygiene is discussed we are warned about “jalla and other stomach problems”. When the men have to feel each others’ limbs for fractures we are told that “there is
nothing homogeneous about this. Humour, humour.”45 “Fingers up, hands off of the nipples”, was the mnemonic for the right CPR (heart and lung resuscitation) touch.

Many think that, of the training stations, the medical training was organised best. In the feedback session, the medical trainers emphasise that in real life accident situations there should be no uncertainty about who takes charge. The one who knows things best takes the lead. The lieutenant among the trainees ironises that “it is self-evident who leads” and points the marks of rank in his collar. The senior lieutenant with previous peacekeeping experience stands up and seriously addresses the group: “Regardless of the rank, the one who has the expertise and masters the situation at hand takes charge; that is exactly what we strive for down there”.

As above, the bodily and social closeness between men was often handled with homophobic humour. The practices of distancing from connotations of homosexuality were, in other words, to enable and protect the cluster of homosociality and heterosexuality in the face of other constraining logics and circumstances (like CPR training or accommodation arrangements). Another, similarly central tension of social logics throughout the peacekeeping mission, concerned authority. Rarely was the negotiation between expertise and rank order – or civilian professionalism and military hierarchy – as clearly spelled out as above. The idea of allowing a situational logic to dictate who “takes charge” poses a challenge to the logic of hierarchy and determined chain of command.

Both during the first week of the main training period and the operation exercise, the officers had, as many thought, too much time for undefined self-planned “acquaintance with upcoming tasks” and “physical exercise”. A common feeling was frustration with waiting, bad planning, and uncertainty. Weekly training schedules changed several times, even in a day. Some pondered to what extent this was on purpose. A common understanding was that the continuous three-week training period did involve testing and control aspects: In closed garrison conditions, the rotation collective would learn to know each other and to work together, and those that were not suited or capable enough would be weeded out, not only via formal tests and interviews, but also through collective control.

The observations about the ad hoc aspects of the training got confirmation many months later in an interview with a major who was part of the rotation personnel. He was highly critical towards how the training had been organised:

45 Whereas in English the word ‘homo’ is generally considered to be abusive (unless used in certain specific contexts, say, between gays and with irony), in Finnish it is used both as a legitimate general term (equivalent to ‘gay’) and as a degrading word of abuse (cf. Lehtonen 1999).
"We were already discussing [with some] personnel in Niinisalo [the training centre], and there were probably some reservists too, that the rotation training shouldn’t be so low in standard. That if you think about rotation training, that it took, how long did it take for us, 4-5 weeks in total? It’s two times a refresher course of a large battalion, 500 people in total. If you think, if some battalion is put through a refresher training […] then there is someone preparing it, some major that prepares the thing fulltime for half a year. Then there are documents made, and in the end-phase, one cannot say hundreds but tens of people participate; they prepare for the last 2-3 weeks only for the battalion refresher training so that some benefit comes out of it. This is the way one should think about the Radnata rotation. Now there’s preparing one, two, three gentlemen, Ralf Holopainen, that is [in practice]. What else does he do? He thinks of when the rotation flies in. He thinks of all these things, not just the training. So our training took place so that officers came to the auditorium, old [training structure] bases from year X and Y, OK then, who is oldest on the basis of seniority after the commander, Alenius, you’re going to be chief of intelligence in Radnata, but now you act as the chief of training company. All those men… It’s not the task of Alenius to do this; he should familiarise himself with documents, what intelligence does, what’s the situation in the [Radnata] area, these kinds of things, to read three weeks and take the training we took. Second oldest, aha, Pyykkö, you act as the chief trainer of the headquarters people. What subjects, which days, what to train, who? All big question marks. Anyone can get prepared if one’s commissioned day or two [before], one would find out who’s involved and what their task is and so on. But when everything is suddenly dumped on you, this is no way to educate. As I said already in Niinisalo, that if one were to give conscripts machine gun training and one were to start so lously that the weekly schedules would be distributed [only just] on Thursday, it would be all tongue-lashing and criticism. Let alone if it was [training for] cadets or personnel at any institution in this country. But that Niinisalo is the kind of place that it is simultaneously like a monitoring situation or test, that if you start whingeing in here, there’s not going to be any contract and you’re not going to Radnata.” [Major] (Appendix 5, Extract 1)

The interviewee refers to something that came up several times later on during the fieldwork in the Defence Forces’ organisations, namely a practice of ‘expertise by appointment’. This ironically used expression was explicitly used by some research participants, and it has analytic potential in terms of looking at military organisational dynamics. As a whole ‘expertise by appointment’ involved a complex dynamic between giving and taking orders, respect, and replaceability of (military) organisational members. The implicit reasoning behind the practice seemed to be that situations and needs (for, for example, teaching a certain issue) arise with no warning, and almost any officer must be able to respond to them when ordered. In a spirit of mutual respect, even poor performances were more or less accepted, if there were signs of sincere effort to have done one’s best.

46 All the research interviews were conducted in Finnish. The translated extracts in this thesis are presented in their original Finnish form in Appendix 5.
As the interviewee implies above, the ordering of tasks followed a hierarchical logic (“who is oldest on the basis of seniority”) rather than a logic of substantial expertise. This sets the practice of ‘expertise by appointment’ in tension with the above described medical training feedback episode, where expertise was prioritised above rank. Still, in both cases, the situational logic seems to supersede: organisational reactivity, the capability to act on the basis of the occurrences faced, is what matters. These discursive and practical constructions serve as responses to necessity of ad hoc organising in the face of scarce resources (or just bad planning).

**Last days of the training**

On the last full day of the main training period, a padre that has formerly served as a peacekeeper in Lebanon gives a lecture on psyching up for the service in Radnata. He shows an extract from a Finnish feature film Talvisota [Winter War] (1989) where a colonel motivates the troops before going into battle. The other film we watch is a Finnish Defence Forces’ training film Tulikaste [Baptism of Fire] (2000). It is a short fiction about an imaginary present-day war and a debriefing after the death of a fellow soldier. After the film the padre talks to us about how each peacekeeper should get things in order at home when (s)he is leaving for a mission (family relations, income issues, etc.), about care and how colleagues should not be left alone in Radnata, and about gossiping that is often a symptom of stress.

In the evening, the same padre leads the rotation church service. Buses take us to an old wooden church in a nearby town. For the first time, everybody is wearing the smart vacation uniform and the beret. At the church door, the Soldier’s Home sisters hand out “Soldier’s hymn books” to us. A Gideonist major tells that the Gideons are mainly business men and civil servants, believers who want to support spiritual life where it is rare: “In a brotherly spirit we hand out Bibles to conscripts and peacekeepers, to prisons and hospitals.”

The padre says it is better to give than to receive, and that collecting heavenly good is more important than worldly possessions. He mentions the tax-free cars peacekeepers bring from abroad. He says that we are the hands and the feet of God in Radnata. Lyrics of the hymns talk about peace, binding up wounds, asking guidance for our work. I don't participate in the communion, but watch it like a film. The organ plays the background music for the characters that I have recently learned to know, the protagonists that kneel for the wafer, stand up and turn to the audience. “The bartender seems busy tonight”, the guy next to me comments on the serving of communion wine.
After the church service, a coffee gathering is organised at the garrison canteen. One lieutenant colonel from the training centre gives a short speech where he mainly discusses the recent fatalities of peacekeepers in Radnata. He repeats several times that “I don’t want to do another home visit like that [to the bereaved families] so follow the safety instructions”. Four times he says: “But, so much for the serious issues.” The padre had already in his lecture earlier referred to, and continues discussing at the end of the evening at the officers’ club, two suicides in Radnata the previous spring; both had involved alcohol use and been committed with guns. He says that the lieutenant colonel must have taken the suicides and the task of meeting the families quite hard as he constantly brings them up.

6.3.2. The six months in Radnata

Everyday life of peacekeepers

The main task of the RTRO peacekeeping troops in the post-conflict area of Radnata was to ensure a safe and secure environment for the local inhabitants and the various international actors participating in peacebuilding. The local population comprised mainly of people of two ethnicities that had been conflicting violently. In addition to the NATO troops, the largest international actors included the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), and a multitude of non-governmental organisations.

Radnata was divided into four distinct areas that were each covered by a multinational brigade of the NATO-led Radnata Troops (RTRO) operation. Finnish troops were the majority part of bi-national Battle Group (BG) that was responsible for one of the four areas with three other battle groups. The Battle Group’s area of responsibility (AOR) covered a bit less than 5,000 square kilometres with 4-5 towns. The Battle Group’s area of responsibility (AOR) covered a bit less than 5,000 square kilometres with 4-5 towns.47 (See the organisational chart of the Battle Group in Appendix 7.)

The Battle Group consisted of a headquarters, an HQ and logistics company, three other companies, and an airport platoon. One of the companies and a few of the officers in the BG HQ were of another nationality. Three quarters of the more than 500 peacekeepers of the BG were Finns. The companies were each based in a separate camp in the area except for the HQ and logistics company, which was based with the BG HQ in the main camp of the Battle Group, Camp Niilo.

47 Finnish peacekeepers were also serving at brigade-level and above in the RTRO operation, and the Finnish troops in RTRO were supplied by a National Support Element that was based outside Radnata in another state.
The sheriff of the town

Camp Niilo was named after the son of the first battalion commander when the camp was built years ago. It is surrounded by a barbedwire fence inside which a sawdust running track of less than a mile circles the camp. Peacekeepers live and work in ‘Morehouses’ and other buildings made out of large containers.48 The canteen, the sports arena, and the mess are larger sheds, depots and maintenance and construction functions are located in the different buildings of the old disused factory around which the camp is built. ‘Briefing rooms’ are mainly used for recreation. They are equipped with sofas, televisions, fridges and suchlike, and they are often right next to saunas. There are nearly twenty saunas in the camp.

In Camp Niilo, the privates and most non-commissioned officers have guard duties both outside and inside the camp. Inside the camp, the officers of the three lowest ranks (senior lieutenants, lieutenants and second lieutenants), in addition to their normal duties, serve approximately once a month as Duty Officer (DO). This involves responsibility for 24 hours for the operations of guarding the camp. During this time, the DO is not allowed to leave the camp. The listed tasks of the DO involve, for example, helping guards at the gate with entrance permission, giving orders on guarding routes and escorts inside the camp, checking the wall around the camp, checking the UXO (unexploded objects) collection point right outside the camp for delivered explosive material, closing the mess hall in the evening, and after that checking the several briefing rooms of different platoons, mainly for use of alcohol that was only allowed at certain times in certain places.

The outfit and equipment of the DO include a special belt with handcuffs and radio, an electric torch, and an armband and a bicycle both with text ‘Chief of Guard’. The DO is also to wear a headpiece, unlike others inside the camp. For security reasons, all soldiers empty their weapons each time they enter a camp. This

48 The accommodation containers are produced by a company called Morehouse Ltd, but the expression among the Finnish peacekeepers combines Finnish pronunciation of the ‘more’ with the Finnish word ‘talo’ (house). This formulation of ‘moretalo’ resembles other expressions in peacekeeper slang that resonate with the Finniscisation of English among Finnish-Americans (Kolehmainen 1937). Such expressions are, among others, ‘briiffari’ (briefing room), ‘duuti-offiseri’ (duty officer), ‘pose’ (observation post), and ‘kämppi’ (camp). Other popular sources of peacekeeper slang are abbreviations (for example ‘kuso’ from QSO referring to radio communication), and languages of mission areas (Arabic ‘jalla’ meaning literally ‘faster’ or ‘hurry’, in peacekeeping slang referring loosely to ‘bad quality’ or ‘dirt’; for example ‘jallatauti’ [jalla disease] meaning stomach flu or food poisoning). Many expressions used among peacekeepers are also widely known in and originate from general Finnish military slang (Penttinen 1984).
safety measure includes detaching of bullet case and shooting an ‘empty shot’ into a box of sand outside the camp gate. Guns are not allowed at all in the dining hall and mess. An exception to these rules is the DO, who is to carry a gun everywhere at all times with the bullet case attached.

The first time that I take up the shift as the Duty Officer (or Chief of Guard), a senior officer plays a joke on me that I am the sheriff. As I later on notice, the same joke is played on other DO’s by other officers and by themselves. It seems to be a nickname that has also been used earlier in other peacekeeping missions. I become very keen on this theme as it provides the possibility of various jokes and, as I later on notice, helps in dealing with the special position of power one has to take every now and then among co-workers and co-habitants.

I come to think that the sheriff refers to the Wild West, in the terms that I know it, mainly as a construction by cinema and other parts of the entertainment industry. As analysis on film Westerns has shown, Westerns are built on, on one hand, the tensions between the wild, unknown and uncontrolled prairie and the organised town, and, on the other hand, between the collective and the individual (Wright 1975). It seems almost too obvious to see the peacekeepers as cowboys herding the locals (cattle) in pairs and small groups (posses) with their side-arms, mainly driving cars (horses). Still, inside the camp even the spatial arrangements inspires images of frontier western towns: The ‘main road’ of the camp bears resemblance to them with small buildings in line, some of the buildings with simple signs and service desks to supply clothing and weapons, not to forget the barber’s shop, post office, general store and the church. The mess hall serves as the saloon. Among the archetypes of small village communities, the western town (like the military peacekeeping camp) is specific in the sense that it is geographically apart from its ‘origins’ and it is ‘built out of nothing’; it has a settler character.

The ‘Wild West’ itself comes up also as an explicit allegory. It is actively used (at least by me and my closest peacekeeper colleagues) metaphorically to communicate certain aspects in peacekeeping experiences. The office I am working in operates heavily with and among civilians (mainly locals and NGOs) and organises projects for winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of Radnatians. I share with others in the office a sense that Radnata is an undisciplined and primitive area of unrestrained (under)development with an atmosphere of violence and economic opportunism, a domain where the strong (such as organised crime, representatives of foreign NGOs, and armed peacekeepers) may operate quite freely without
The limiting regulations. This post-crisis phase of anomie takes the convenient discursive form of ‘Wild West’.49

The Battle Group headquarters was led by a Chief of Staff who was under the command of the Battle Group Commander. The headquarters consisted of seven offices that were functionally separated: Human resources, intelligence, operations, logistics and supply, civil-military cooperation, communications, and pioneering. Offices were headed by majors and captains with 3-14 subordinate officers and possible additional non-commissioned clerks. (See the organisational chart of the Battle Group headquarters in Appendix 8.)

During the training in Finland, some trainers who had experience from the BG HQ in Camp Niilo were already saying that “the walls between the offices are too thick”. They were referring to the stiff organisation and command structure that lead to slow information flow, unclear division of work and consequent double-work, as well as unnecessary “bad blood” between the offices. The offices of the HQ were situated all in a distinct area, and they were spatially separated, each consisting of one or several containers. Part of the office-containers were outdoors, whereas the offices of the Commander, the operations, and the intelligence were sheltered by fences, barbedwire, and the concrete constructions of an old building.

Flows of information and communication were a combination of formal structures and informal practices. Hierarchy and chain of command were materialised in the system of meetings. The BG Commander, the Chief of Staff, the HQ office chiefs, and the company commanders met in morning briefings. Afterwards, offices had their own meetings where tasks to be allocated and daily schedules were discussed. Companies, offices and some other units had their mail boxes in the copy room of the HQ. Additionally, inside the camp a central radio system was used for requests to contact a certain number by phone or for other notices.

In addition to legislation, a group of standing orders (‘pysyväisasiakirja’) provided the regulative basis for peacekeeping actions. The continuation and functioning of the Battle Group was also tied to a variety of forms of documentation: written orders, instructions, accompanying letters, notifications and announcements, invitations, reports, memos, statistics, and definitions of policies. In practice, continuity was still a challenge for the organisation.

Continuity pops up again and again in the discussions among peacekeepers. The fact that only around half of the personnel changes with each rotation does keep the Battle Group operative on the level of the whole organisation, but still. Although during the

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49 In addition, ‘the prairie/steppe’ was used customarily among all peacekeepers to refer to location of camps that were outside the urban areas. However, in Finnish this word (‘aro’) refers more to the east (especially to Siberia) than to the Wild West.
training in Finland some trainers brought in fresh experiences straight from Radnata and the key personnel of the rotation visited the Battle Group, some feel that they had to start from scratch when arriving in the area. When I start, my predecessor has already left Radnata, so my familiarisation with the tasks is mainly based on scarce documentation on what he has been doing. I never meet my successor, either.

The Battle Group had two more informal media. *Juhani* magazine provided news, information, and human interest stories around the Battle Group with style varying from greetings of the Commander and reports on visits of high officials to slapstick humour. Our own radio station *Radio Supa* was broadcasting a live radio programme made by the peacekeepers themselves.50 Some programmes were more or less ad hoc chatting and playing of records, while others were more regular and edited. The latter included a programme delivering greetings to peacekeepers from families and friends, and a programme reporting and discussing results and news around the Finnish championship league in ice hockey.

Accommodation of different social groups took place in similar container barracks and in rooms of one or two people, but the groups were divided into different ‘villages’ inside the camp. All women were accommodated together in one corner of the camp, the Commander, the Chief of Staff and other chiefs in their own complex. Other officers of the BG HQ were living in a block of 21 small buildings with an additional briefing room, a sauna with a bathroom, a toilet, and a barbeque shed. The area was known by the names of “Captain Village” and “Student Village”, according to its inhabitants’ highest rank and usual education of at least upper secondary school level. Rooms had electric heating, a telephone, and basic furniture, usually including a bed, some cupboards and possibly a table and a chair. The level of electronic entertainment varied according to individual purchase.

In the camp community, social interaction outside directly work-related contacts varied among peacekeepers. While some spent most of the time with their closest colleagues, others had distinctly separated work and leisure relations. Additionally, different social strategies were applied. By saying that “the accommodation is meant for sleeping”, one of the officers was referring to his way of coping with the constraints of the camp environment by doing a lot of things and spending time with others. Another officer working with policing and penal issues said that he saw enough people during the duty hours and spent rest of the time mostly by himself. He saw this as connected to a dynamic between not becoming (nor attempting to become) a member of any social

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50 ‘Juhani’ is a traditional Finnish man’s name. In peacekeeping slang, it is used for several purposes, including the equivalent of ‘thingy’ in expressions like ‘joku paikallinen perinnejuhani’ (‘some local tradition thingy’). The expression ‘supa’ is discussed in Chapter 6.3.2.
cliques in the camp and retaining personal objectivity in professional tasks. Both these officers had previous peacekeeping experience.

Recreation possibilities inside the camp included different sports and social activities. The sports arena was mainly used for floorball, basketball, volleyball, aerobics, and badminton. The gym was well equipped, while also the smaller camps all had more modest gyms of their own. The mess was the site of socialising, playing darts and billiards, and it had a separate room used as a library. More self-organised groups involved, among others, a small choir, an English discussion group, and a bridge club.

From the point of view of an individual peacekeeper, the organisation of supply was arranged so that cleaning the quarters and washing personal clothes were the only things one had to do oneself. Clothing provided by the employer could be taken for laundry. Breakfasts, lunches, and dinners were served at the canteen, and a haircut was available for free. While the kitchen personnel included peacekeepers as the chefs, several locals had also been hired as kitchen workers. The same applied to garage, construction and maintenance functions where several local men worked inside the camp. Laundry, haircut and sewing services were provided by local women. Bearing in mind that the camp circumstances were, still, at a basic level and remembering the problematic around cohesion and control, it is not surprising that some peacekeepers reflected upon peacekeeping as an experience in relation to such reality television shows as *Survivor* or *Big Brother*.51

Security regulations and mobility restrictions affected the everyday life of peacekeepers in many ways. In principle, peacekeepers were supposed to leave the camp only when the carrying out of tasks required this, always armed, with a vehicle, and never alone.52 Several other security practices were in use, including maintaining radio contact with the base. Each office of the headquarters had its own car.

| The thigh pocket of my camouflage uniform (that we mainly wear) is always full. It contains four laminated items: 1) a guide for general procedure of radio communication (“ALFA – FROM

51 Both *Survivor* and *Big Brother* are so-called ‘reality television game shows’. Both shows involve a group of players that are marooned on an island (*Survivor*) or a flat or a house (*Big Brother*). Different competitions and votes take place in order to reduce the number of competitors. The *Survivor* television format’s first production was the Swedish *Expedition: Robinson* in 1997. On the Finnish television channels, both the Swedish and the U.S. versions of *Survivor* have been shown in since 2001. Based on a similar Finnish format, the television series *Suuri Seikkailu* (Great Adventure) was shown on the channel *MTV3* from 2001-05. The *Survivor* format was applied in *Suomen Robinson* (Robinson of Finland). The two seasons of it came out on the channel *Nelonen* in 2004-05. The television series *Big Brother* originated from the Netherlands in 1999. Four seasons of the Finnish *Big Brother* were shown on the channel *Sub* from 2005-08. This was preceded by the broadcast of the UK *Big Brother*.

52 Patrolling on foot was exceptional among officers.
FOXTROT – MESSAGE – OVER” etc.; 2) a mine info leaflet with pictures of different models of mines, and instructions for cases of finding mines or encountering a mine accident; 3) a list and a map concerning “Out of bound boxes for RTRO”, places that are not to be visited (mainly motels, restaurants and cafés with connections to organised crime, areas with unexploded objects, and hazardous, abandoned industrial and residential buildings); and 4) a summary of basic words and expressions in local languages. I also have a notebook that suits the pocket perfectly. One side of it I use for peacekeeping duties, the other side for research fieldnotes.

The economic situation of the Finnish peacekeepers varies a lot in relation to their life situations, but some more general things can be said about the dynamic around peacekeeping service, money, and consumption. Economic benefits vary in different operations, but they are regularly among the most important motives behind applying for peacekeeping missions. The reasonable salaries are combined with daily allowances. In the RTRO operation, clothing, provisioning, accommodation, and flights to Finland on service leaves were provided by the employing organisation, the Defence Forces. During the service it is easy to live with very little spending:

“[...] I’ve spent six Euros at Iron’s, in total at Iron Base [large camp known for shopping opportunities]. One can say that I’ve exceeded my budget because I counted that one Euro per month should be enough. [TT laughs.] I’ve exceeded that, I’ve used more than a Euro per month but maybe I’ll get even now. Anyway, here this kind of shopping and doing supa [something fun][53] and all that seems to be a bit of a number one thing [...] The way I see it, one has to think about what the purpose is here, why are we here? I mean, one thinks why have these people come here, maybe the first thing that comes to mind is that it is their own interests and that one can purchase cheap goods and a handsome car and many other things, that one can spend as much time as possible out there somewhere else than in the camp.” [Male professional officer, captain.] (Appendix 5, Extract 2)

Within the dynamic of high income, small living expenses and relatively cheap prices, consumption played an important role in the social organisation of the peacekeeping collective and culture in Radnata. Shopping was done in local shops and PX (Post Exchange) stores in Camp Niilo and in other larger military camps of troops of other nationalities. While smaller items, such as shoes and other leather products, clothes, jewellery, and groceries, were bought from local shops, the PX stores provided, additionally, tax-free electronics, car tyres, alcohol, cosmetics, and brand clothes. The PX store, as well as the mess and the grill shop in Camp Niilo, were run by a Nordic company. The same company had similar functions in other camps in Radnata as well as in other operations across the Balkans.

[53] The expression ‘supa’ is explained more thoroughly on pages 102-103.
I'm shopping in the Norwegian camp with a colleague. We run into a Finnish guy in his late twenties serving in the French Foreign Legion. He explains that, after having done his military service in Finland, he had worked for a couple of years in “civvy street”, but got bored. He had then splurged his fortune in a couple of months, and gone knocking on the Legion’s door at Strasbourg. The training in Djibouti had been rough, now Radnata felt way too slow, and he had learned French from scratch. The minimum service time in the Legion was coming to an end for his part, after which he was planning to get a better paid job guarding African diamond mines or securing gas pipelines in Afghanistan.

On the way back to Camp Niilo, my colleague peacekeeper adds in another glimpse of migrating careers. When peacekeeping missions have been closed down unexpectedly or individual peacekeepers’ mission contracts have otherwise ceased in less than a year, some Finns with tax-free cars have had to find other jobs outside the EU to fulfil the requirements for tax exemption. Like my colleague, several peacekeepers have worked in fish factories in northern Norway.

Part of the post-conflict economy in Radnata was a specific field of enterprise that flourished in the neighbourhoods peacekeeping establishments. Right outside many military camps there were several shops selling pirate products, mainly clothes, music, and computer games. In addition to international hits and local traditional music, the supply usually included recent best-selling CDs from the countries that were represented in the particular camp. One shop outside Camp Niilo was known to have a deal with certain Finnish peacekeepers, who provided CDs from Finland for pirate copying by the local entrepreneur according to customer demand. The contradictory role of peacekeepers in terms of post-conflict economy was rarely reflected upon among peacekeepers.

All the officers (not only the office heads) at the BG HQ are exceptionally participating the morning briefing because of the tense security situation in Radnata. As part of the presentation on security incidents and events of the past few days, the Chief of Intelligence mentions a raid on an illegal printing house in the capitol of Radnata. The print has been producing, among other things, pirate CDs. “And you are buying them”, comments the Chief. The audience erupts in laughter, though the comment probably wasn’t meant as a joke.

One of the most common expressions of peacekeeper slang, both in Radnata and elsewhere, is ‘supa’. The word is said to originate from Suomen Pataljoona (Finnish Battalion) which has been the basic formation of Finnish troops sent to peacekeeping missions. The word ‘supa’ refers to everything fun and fancy, and,
like many other peacekeeper expressions, it is be used flexibly. As a verb
(‘supailla’) it refers mainly to driving around in the mission area with other than
work purposes. As a noun it can refer to almost any leisure activity, such as
sunbathing. As a prefix it is connected to, for example, an officer (‘supa-
upseeri’) who deals with leisure activities, such as travelling. As an adjective,
‘supa’ comes close to another central concept, ‘läyhy’, that brings up, with slight
irony, the high quality or luxuriousness of a commodity. When doing ‘supa’, one
may have bought a ‘läyhy’ watch.

At the ‘läyhy’ car park

On a sunny spring Sunday we cross the state border to the
neighbouring country and arrive at the ‘Läyhyparkki’, where
several hundred cars belonging to Finnish peacekeepers serving in
Radnata are parked. Mercedes-Benz, Audi, Volvo, and BMW seem
popular makes; some are sports cars, others are vans and station
wagons. The sandy field is fenced and guarded by a local company.

The Finnish peacekeepers’ car co-operative has recently had a
collective gathering at the car park to renew the ropes demarcating
the parking spaces and the numbered signs on them. The co-
operative co-ordinates the activities related to the park and the
shipping of the cars. Most peacekeepers have bought their cars from
Finland. Legislation demands that in order to be entitled to
purchase the car tax-free, the vehicle has to stay in the area for
several months during the presence of the worker’s at least 12
months’ employment outside the EU territory. Some peacekeepers
have driven their cars down to the Balkans, but most of them have
been shipped and transported by trucks. Driving the cars back to
Finland after the year at the mission is a constant theme of
discussions. Convoys are formed in advance, routes are planned
and stopover preferences debated, hotels are reserved, and
information exchanged over how to deal with customs on different
borders. The long journey home through Europe among friends
forms an important rite of passage.

The cars are fancier, otherwise the scene at the ‘läyhy’ reminds one
of the suburban car park described in a Finnish sociological study
(Kortteinen 1982) as men’s own space substituting for the losses of
such spaces caused in the process of mass movement from rural to
suburban environments. Peacekeepers wax their cars, music pours
out of car stereos. Bonnets are opened, engines and gear compared,
and jokes are made on ‘car make tribes’, the characteristics of the
Mercedes-men and others. I am taunted about being a ‘six-months-
man’ with no ‘sweetheart’ at the car park.

It is not every week that the peacekeepers visit the car park. After a
long time idle, the cars need to be driven so that the accumulator
does not run down. And it is enjoyable, of course. We change into civilian clothes and drive to a city close by. We are four men in our twenties and early thirties with three cars. Washing and cleaning the car by locals costs nothing, 2-3 Euros per car. At the car wash there are several employees per car, all men of our age.

Some time later, I realise that I have read a novel that, though far from the peacekeeping reality, tells something about the whole issue of ‘läyhy’ and consumption in the Radnata Troops. In Manillaköysi [Manilla Rope] (Meri 1957), Private Joose Keppilä finds a rope on a road and takes it with him. The Continuation War rages and lingers on around him in its madness. Joose thinks the rope is valuable at home, but as people might start asking questions about it or steal it, he ties the rope around his torso and hides it under his clothes. On the way home, Joose gets weaker and weaker as the rope strangles him, and when he finally drags himself home, his wife saves him by cutting him loose and the rope into pieces.

Anyway, Joose had worse luck than we did. A peacekeeper’s savings of a year, with the payback from the tax-free car that can be sold after two years from returning to Finland, serves as a nest egg to many of the young peacekeepers, and as a set-off of mortgage loans for many older ones.

During their service, many Finnish peacekeepers purchase and carry afterwards a specific sign of their peacekeeping experience: a ring. The history of the Devil’s Fist ring involves a gendered process around soldiering, peacekeeping, and expatriation. The ring consists of several intermingling parts that are linked together. The construction easily falls apart and is difficult to put back together. The ring is attached to mythology, suggesting that it would have been originally designed for wives of men that travel abroad. Such a ring could not be taken off without the construction falling apart and thus it prevented infidelity by the wives. Nowadays, the ring is used by peacekeepers themselves to signal unity and shared identity.54

Rituals and holidays played a particular role in the social organisation of the peacekeeping collective. The temporal and symbolic meanings of the main public holidays gained a special emphasis in Radnata. In addition to rotations and service leaves, the celebrations of Christmas, New Year, Easter, May Day, Midsummer, and Independence Day divide the organisational time into periods. Both in formal addresses and in discussions among the peacekeepers, spending

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54 Additionally, the uniform used by peacekeepers in formal rituals and during service leave trips gives the opportunity to carry symbols (ribbons) of the peacekeeping mission(s) that a peacekeeper has participated in in the past. A certain etiquette constrains the use of ribbons, and in Radnata use of ribbons was on some occasions forbidden, apparently in order not to emphasise the differences in peacekeeping experience within the Battle Group.
and celebrating holidays on a mission was contrasted with their character as family occasions. The discourse implied at the same time sacrifices linked to peacekeeping service and working abroad, traditional family values, and the special possibility of experiencing traditional holidays in a unique way in the peacekeeping environment.

Camp Niilo has an internal television channel. It merely means that DVD films are broadcast from the operation and communication centre of the Battle Group, the same films that can be borrowed from there. During the weekend of the Finnish Independence Day, two films are shown exceptionally time after time and around the clock for three days. The films are Tuntematon sotilas [The Unknown Soldier] (1955) and Rukajärven tie [Ambush] (1999), both telling about Finnish soldiers in the Continuation War. The so-often quoted lines from The Unknown Soldier are revived once again and adapted for the peacekeeping environment.

Visitors were not an unusual sight in Camp Niilo. The camp was said to be the showpiece of Finnish peacekeeping at the time, with proper living conditions and relatively secure surroundings. At the time of the fieldwork, the Finnish contingent in Radnata was the object of 105 visiting retinues in a year's time. The majority of these groups (67) were from the Finnish Defence Forces and on an introductory, inspection, or other work-related trip in the Finnish contingent in Radnata. Other visits involved Finnish company representatives to whom different maintenance and other functions had been outsourced (13 groups), Finnish politicians and high civilian officials (9 retinues), and military representatives of other nationalities (9 retinues). Additionally, three groups of journalists and two bands visited the contingent. Twice during the year – on Finnish Independence Day and on the Flag Day of the Finnish Defence Forces – more than 200 guests were invited to the camp for celebrations.

A special possibility of reflecting upon my double position as a participant observer and a peacekeeper came up when a researcher from a Finnish university arrived in Camp Niilo to study an issue related to civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) in Radnata. The researcher was given a vast briefing by the chief of the CIMIC office, and she interviewed a couple of officers at the office (including me) for the study. She also took part in a visit to a nearby town when the Battle Group was donating some second-hand equipment and clothes to locals.

What this two-day visit of the researcher showed was that, firstly, the interventions by visitors from outside the organisation involved a particular dynamic of ‘bracing oneself’ among the peacekeepers. The programmes of visitors were usually carefully planned and their schedules made tight to give an impression of efficiency and courtesy. In this case, the last touches were put to the performance with small practices, such as cleaning of office spaces and having a haircut. The discussions and preparations of the visit were clearly a
possibility for the office to reflect upon itself, what had been done and what are key issues in the CIMIC activities. Secondly, the visit showed how this ‘bracing oneself’ in an organisation may provide a researcher with a condensed set of information on the organisation. At the same time as the formal policies and received discourses within the organisation surface and the researcher can efficiently document them, their context and scope, as well as the informal structures and practices of the organisation, are difficult to reach.

Disturbances break out

A Radnatian manager of a local youth centre and a Finnish peacekeeping corporal who have earlier been in close cooperation with each other run into each other in the middle of rioting and disorder. The male manager is stunned and asks the female corporal what she as a clerk is doing in the shield formation. Clerk or chef, treasurer or builder, almost all Finnish peacekeepers have military training, and those who do, perform combat tasks, too, when necessary.

After a long period of peaceful development in Radnata, a series of individual violent events led to a short period of wide conflicts between the ethnic groupings in Radnata. Dozens of people were killed, hundreds were wounded, and thousands of Radnatians had to flee their homes. Finnish RTRO peacekeepers suffered only minor injuries, and avoided firing a single gunshot.55

Afterwards, the overall atmosphere among the Finnish troops was disappointed and surprised. The outbreak of conflict was regarded as unexpected, and it was obvious that the peace process had taken a big step backwards. The level of alert was increased for a long time, and security measures duly tightened in the area and within the RTRO troops.

There were also more ambiguous feelings and thoughts about the events and on the peacekeepers’ own involvement in them. Some of those that had been on service leave or tied to office tasks in the HQ during the disturbances had mixed feelings of worry (for colleagues in Radnata and in the ‘frontline’), disappointment and guilt (for not being able to contribute when it was perhaps most needed). A related feeling was a certain gratification among those that had been in the middle of the events, despite their unfortunate and grim character. The fact that the peacekeepers of the whole brigade got positive feedback for their performance during the events – for example a letter from the Brigade Commander speaking highly of the troops – may have enabled the open

55 In terms of research fieldwork, the period of and around the disturbances was recorded in less detail for two reasons. Firstly, I travelled to Finland for a service leave on the day that the disturbances broke out and returned to Radnata only after them. Secondly, the weeks after the disturbances were hectic across the peacekeeping organisation, narrowing down the already scarce time for taking fieldnotes.
expressions of satisfaction for participation and success. The expectations and attitudes towards ‘something happening’ were already varying months before the disturbances:

I'm having the Duty Officer shift again, emptying the mess after closing time. Mood in the mess has become much more cheerful after the camp of the Fox Company had been shut down and the company had moved to Camp Niilo. I engage in a discussion with one of the Fox Company privates, who is in his late thirties and a prison guard in his civilian life. He says he is glad that it is so peaceful in Radnata, and he does not understand his ten-fifteen years younger pals and peacekeeper colleagues who are “missing the action”. He explains how he had been doing a house search with them, how it was “one hell of an effort to hold them back when they're targeting people from nearby roof-tops. There’s more reason to be afraid of these kids than the locals. And I’ve seen this and that in the prison world.”

Ambiguity characterised the attitudes and feelings about becoming caught up in armed conflicts and escalating situations. As with other tensions, in this regard, too, humour embodied the ambiguities and served as a forum to work on them. This came clearly up in a Radio Supa broadcast on the Battle Group radio channel months before the disturbances in Radnata. In a Christmas holidays’ broadcast two peacekeeping songs were connected into “a trilogy” with a live recording from the Middle East on a Christmas years ago.

**Christmas fire in the radio**

One of the radio hosts puts on a live recording from an earlier peacekeeping mission he has participated in. The recording includes sounds of artillery fire and radio communications. On the tape a peacekeeper is confirming grenade hits, and announcing that roads are prohibited from use and that a shelter alert is on. One can hear the restrained nervousness and excitement in the voice. The recording is followed by a recorded song, eventually made by a peacekeeper that has served in the particular mission in the Middle East. The next song is Rauhanturvaaja [The Peacekeeper]:

"My days go by like sweet summer breeze, not even the clock seems to tick. Every now and then I hear the news: men are fighting over there somewhere. You went there to keep the peace, and I stayed here to wait for you. You promised to come back one day. Your image is constantly on my mind.

[Chorus:] For you and you alone, I fear when the fighting goes on.
Peacekeeping is your job, and cannons spit fire at you wherever you go.  
Promise me that you will come back one day.  
When you return home, then at last I will hold you in my arms.  

Your letter today soothed me. All is well, you wrote.  
Your best friends await you here. We could get together on your furlough.  
I tied a scarf in your helmet. It can only bring you luck.  
Although I was left crying for you, your precious words still ring in my head.  

[Chorus]

(Heikki 1999; translation from Finnish by Taneli Nordberg. For the original lyrics, see Appendix 5, Extract 3.)

After the live recording and the two songs one of the radio hosts says: “That kind of a triptych, I don’t even know what that means, but a trilogy anyway.” The host explains from experience how the artillery fire that was heard on the tape started in the middle of a Christmas meal, and speaks with a certain tenderness about the bygone mission. Later, he says that somebody from the Camp Niilo kitchen had just called to the studio and said that the live recording had made some of the listeners at the kitchen weep. The hosts laugh. The host with the experiences from the Middle East says that in the earlier mission “at this time of the year somebody always reported through the airwaves a reindeer sighting. But let’s hear a bit of different music now...”

The pop song *Rauhanturvaaja* [The Peacekeeper] was much played on the *Radio Supa* channel and well-known among the peacekeepers. Usually, the lyrics of the song were mocked for their naivety, paraphrased in an ironic manner, and put against the background of the circumstances in Radnata that were considered peaceful – or even too or exceptionally peaceful compared to other missions. In “the trilogy”, a continuum was constructed, if only for a moment, from the actual events and memories of a bombardment, through a song about the very peacekeeping mission and locality, to the lyrical longing between the home and Radnata. The moment of melancholy was securely ended by the the colleagues at the kitchen and arch humour.

The violent disturbances in Radnata also brought up gendered tensions between men and women. One of the interviewees described his experiences in Camp Niilo during the disturbances:

"When you’ve been ordered to take care of the [local refugees] you should understand what to do, and not like wring your hands like ‘dear, oh dear’. As there were young girls there [locals taking refuge inside the camp], and then there were Helen and Paula [peacekeepers] there, and then of course as they were there in the court yard and saw smoke climbing up, and as they
were 13-14 year old girls, they were crying. So there was me and Tom and then Helen and Paula. I went to say to those girls, ‘Could you do something as we are a bit awkward to interfere?’ And Paula went ‘Yeah, and we don’t even have an interpreter here’ and she left. Helen took a package of tissues and went giving them tissues and hugged the girls. And that was it, the girls were perked up ok! But Paula like, she got scared of the whole situation and, they were, as the story tells, they were totally panicked both Paula and Liisa in here when the refugees started to enter here.” [Male reservist, lieutenant.] (Appendix 5, Extract 4)

When asked about the problems and benefits of being a woman in a male-dominated working environment, a female reserve officer reflected upon how her male colleagues may have seen her in the context of the disturbances. The gendered issue of not fitting in the peacekeeper role is clearly difficult for her to put into words:

Interviewee: “For example, then during the riots, it was like, I and Ben would have left on a Pasi [an armored vehicle] to save those [members of a certain ethnic group] from somewhere, I think that there also, this is of course what I think, but I think that there were anyway a couple of them looking at, who was it now, some officers from the headquarters. I think they were like looking at me, we were wearing helmets as if we were leaving there, I think that they were a bit like yeah, does it behove to send that one there. I think that they can think that, like, is that the right place to put her anyhow.”

TT: “So how did it, what happened then?”

Interviewee: “We were going to leave with Ben, we had the gear on, helmets and protection vests and stuff, and Pasi was supposed to come there, we were supposed to get one Pasi and leave there, because houses were burnt and there was shooting and stuff, so to evacuate the [members of a certain ethnic group] from the houses, but […] It would have been exciting to go and so, it wouldn't have bothered me at all, but I think that there comes again this kind of old, mmm, it could still have an effect that that I’m not very tall and also otherwise, I think that it again for its part, it could lessen credibility, or something, in a battle. So, I would think that they didn’t necessarily, maybe it’s still so new, new thing and new thing, that it’s not easy to pu, put necessarily. And, so I think that probably some thought that is that the right place, that maybe it would be better that she would be nursing for those [ethnic group members] there, [laughs] nobody there said anything, and I didn’t speak with anyone or anything, but I would assume that this is what some thought.” [Female reservist, officer.] (Appendix 5, Extract 5)

In the excerpts above, ideas of the division of emotional labour (Hochschild 1983) are entangled with division of military work. The gendered logic is that comforting the refugee girls suits women better than men. The men not taking up this task does not seem to be the problem as much as the women ‘wringing their hands’ and fleeing the scene. Carrying out this logic is supported by implicit barriers of interaction between male peacekeepers and local girls or
women. Although the women peacekeepers have same training and requirements, and they are formally in the same position as men in terms of combat responsibilities, the context of violent disturbances brings up the hesitations around the suitable role and capabilities of women peacekeepers.

**Leaving Radnata**

As described above, the rites of passage of becoming a peacekeeper did not take the form of clear rituals. This may and does differ in other operations than the RTRO operation, as well as in the Battle Group’s other units than the officer-concentrated headquarters in the focus of this study. Many of the existing rituals are part of the common knowledge and storytelling among peacekeepers.\(^{56}\) The formal policies that have been introduced in order to prevent hazing and harassment in the Finnish Defence Forces have, with similar policies of NATO, also affected the peacekeeping cultures\(^ {57}\). Still, the formal practices of both training and entering a mission carry with them ritualistic characteristics of transformation. Rituals, both formal and informal, did take place when troops left the mission in Radnata.

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Three days before the rotation day an event called “distribution of standards” (little flags with a stand) is organised in the dining hall. The Battle Group Commander gives out medals of honour to three peacekeepers that have excelled during the recent violent disturbances. Unit by unit, those leaving the mission get up and stand in line. The commander gives everyone a standard of the Finnish contingent in Radnata:

“Thank you for good service.”

“Thank you, sir.”

Applause.

Some are honoured with a coat of arms of the Battle Group. A colonel from the brigade thanks the BG Commander (a lieutenant colonel) for the “considerable administrative task” that the leadership of the contingent has been. Coffee and pastries are served. Some men in my table ironise that they are going to build an ‘I Love Me’ corner at home for the pennant. One of the women jokes

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\(^{56}\) For example, one of these rituals is the ‘Litani vow’ taken by peacekeepers in Lebanon. The informal oath has been sworn collectively in the River Litani in order to have the right to wear the blue beret.

\(^{57}\) The term ‘hazing’ is often used to refer to harassment and bullying taking place in military organisations. It may involve rituals and traditions of indoctrination of military practices, and initiation from civilian to military life and between military ranks. A certain power dynamic is descriptive of hazing: The superior constructs the hazing as a part of training, punishment, or other organisational practices so as to make the distinction between hazing and legitimate actions ambiguous for the subordinate(s) (Pershing 2006). ‘Pennalism’ is sometimes used to refer specifically to similar oppressive practices among peers especially in male-dominated organisations (for example conscripts in the military, pupils in boarding schools, members in college or university fraternities) (Leimu 1985; Honkatukia, Nyqvist & Pösö 2006).
that she is going to take the pennant “and the other junk” to work to impress her male colleagues.

A separate event is organised in the mess hall for the headquarters’ personnel. The Chief of Staff hands out diplomas, traditional Finnish sheath knives with engravings, and CD-roms about the Battle Group. Additional ceremonies are organised in the offices, respectively. At some point, I see one of the Battle Group’s outbound firemen being handcuffed into a container and hosed down by his colleagues, in a good-humoured spirit, I believe.

The whole rotation does not leave the camp in one go. Some take the bus to the National Support Element base in the neighbouring country to continue from there with their new tax-free cars, some leave from the camp with their cars. The majority leave by bus to the airport. Each time a peacekeeper or a group leaves, all the available vehicles of the camp are gathered together to form an ‘honorary lane’ to the main gate. Trucks, ambulances, fire engines, tractors, armoured vehicles, jeeps and bicycles honk their horns and wail their sirens, and the peacekeepers remaining in Radnata salute and wave at the leaving troops.

6.3.3. Management of peacekeepers’ social relations

From the point of view of social organisation, a peacekeeping mission involves complex dynamics of construction and management of social relations. After the chronological description of the processes, structures and routines of peacekeeping, I shall in this section analyse in a more focused manner four forms of social relations: hierarchies; management of an office; alcohol use and its control; and social contacts outside the camp. The dynamic in focus is between the organisational hybridity tensions and the peacekeepers’ formal and informal social practices for managing these tensions.

Taking the approach of ‘managing social relations in an organisation’ implies that such actions do take place and that there is a need for such management. Here, by ‘management’ I loosely refer to both the formal organisational activities and the more informal activities of peacekeepers. The data are not approached with the intention of recognising or categorising all possible managing practices. Instead, a few extracts and practices are approached from the perspective of managing social relations. More detailed discussion on relevant human resource management and other organisational practices and policies is outside the scope here.

In the case of a military peacekeeping organisation, certain aspects can be relevant for framing the formal and informal management of the hybridity tensions. Many of these aspects closely resemble the general characteristics of ‘total institutions’ (Goffman 1961) with peacekeeping-specific features. They
include: expatriation and detachment from personal domestic networks; a conscription-related split in the peacekeeping organisation consisting of reservists (‘ex-conscripts’) and military personnel; compelled closeness in a small community; and pressures concerning the nature of work and situation of the post-conflict area.

Hierarchies

As Finnish peacekeeping troops comprise of equal numbers of regular military personnel serving in the Defence Forces and of reservists with military training, peacekeeping organisations involve encounters between the civilian and the military spheres. This central aspect of the hybridity of peacekeeping troops – comprising of military professionals and reservists that have expertise needed for their special tasks – is often brought up in public discourses as a strength of both Finnish defence and peacekeeping. Reservists are also depicted as better-educated and, because of their civilian life, better capable of interacting with civilians in the post-conflict areas than the professional soldiers. As such, reservists are considered to be in key position in terms of what is here referred to as militarised social encounters: reservists bring along civilian society into the military (building thus a hybrid organisation), and they serve as an idealised interface between the military and locals of the post-conflict area (cf. Tripodi 2001).

When I contacted the recruitment officer dealing with peacekeeper officer recruitment for the first time I addressed him on the phone quite formally according to my recollections of conscription. He told me quite strongly to stop such formality at once and that he found it appalling. During the very first days of the training the leader of the course combined the military formalities with strong efforts to create a collective atmosphere through gendered humour and cursing. Both these incidents illustrated the anxiety over and efforts to level the former conscript-superior relation that was built into several practices of the peacekeeping trainees. More generally, they reflected the complexities of an organisation involving military hierarchy, different expertise, and different military backgrounds.

Not only were these tensions descriptive for the earliest phases of socialisation and the managing of relations among the officers of the rotation, but they followed into the field and into relations between officers and other rank peacekeepers. Some peacekeepers saw the Battle Group organisation as lacking military character. Often, at least implicitly, the problem was located in the muzzy nature of the peacekeeping collective as a combination of a military organisation, a living community, and civilian work-life practices:

Interviewee: “[…] it would be good if this was a military community, but this is not. Here people only wear uniforms and that’s almost where it ends.

TT: “Do you mean that the difference is that there are reservists here or…?”
Interviewee: “No, I mean, that’s not a problem, but the discipline we have here isn’t especially strong. I wish we had strong discipline, but we don’t. Therefore it’s just a bunch of some kind that is doing something, a team. [...] Some have the kind of understanding that officers don’t have to be regarded as anything. [They say] ‘We’re the kind of experts that you don’t [want to] meddle in our affairs.”’ [Male professional officer, lieutenant.] (Appendix 5, Extract 6)

One way these tensions of intraorganisational relations were managed was humour and banter. Among the peacekeepers in Radnata, one central discursive device seemed to contradict the presuppositions I had on the basis of both personal experiences of and the academic literature on men’s interaction (Roy 1960; Lyman 1987; Curry 1991; Collinson 1992). Instead of ‘putting down’ and teasing peers on their weak points and failures, colleagues were addressed encouragingly, overwhelmingly and humorously, but not ironically, as “best of the best”, “heads of their class” etc. This did not take place only to level the rank, age and other differences, but also to create and sustain certain hierarchical relations: Although I was only working on my doctorate, I was repeatedly called ‘Doctor’, sometimes with reference to a speaker’s own lower education.

### Storytelling at the club

*On the third day of the peacekeeping training at FINCENT, a sauna-evening is organised.*

The officers’ club, where the socialising event continues, with its dark leather sofas, cigar smoke and available alcohol, differs clearly from the more modest training premises.

The discussion among the youngest reserve officers contains a long series of stories that seem to elaborate a common theme:

A famous ice hockey player had asked a doorman of a nightclub whether he knew who he was and boasted that he had more money than the whole queue altogether, but coincidentally an even more famous (and rich) formula one driver had also been in the queue.

In a restaurant, two groups of men had got into a quarrel, but when it had come out that there was an ex-convict present in one group, the other group had offered beers to settle the situation.

Somebody knew that a famous Finnish alpine skier had been confined to barracks when a cheery newspaper article had been written on his conscription experiences. The press was not told about the confinement.

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58 Differently from many cultures, sauna has, instead of an exotic or sexual meaning, a customary role in the lives of Finns. Most Finns have access to sauna at their home and they bathe 1-2 times a week. Sauna culture is characterised by relaxation, everyday hygiene, mostly gender segregated socialising (except for families), and asexual nudity.
A general’s son had finally got to the reserve officer school after the psychological tests had been done on him three times instead of the usual one. Where there is a will (of a general), there is a way.

The final story was about a musician who during his conscription had been sentenced to a confinement to barracks when he would have had an important studio recording session. His father happened to be a friend of the Chief of Defence. The brigade got a phone call from the Chief of Defence and the message had gone down the chain of command, but surprisingly the company chief had stubbornly refused to let the musician go. Finally a compromise was made.

From the perspective of managing hybridity tensions, these stories seem to be working on practices of power and hierarchy: ‘falling from the top’, humbling, misuse of formal power, resistance etc. Storytelling seems to try to make sense of the written and unwritten rules of men’s interaction. Wealth, the threat of violence, formal power and informality are played against each other in a negotiation of a ‘hierarchy of hierarchies’, which is not stable. Other passages in the data support the interpretation that these practices do not primarily construct cohesion that complements the rank hierarchy. They rather sustain the multiplicity of and the tension between different power axes among men.

Management of the office: bureaucracy and networking

My participant observation in Radnata focused on the office that I served in, namely the Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) office of the Battle Group headquarters. The personnel of the CIMIC office consisted of the Chief (major / lieutenant commander), Deputy Chief (captain), three staff officers (lieutenants and second lieutenants) and a clerk (non-commissioned officer). Spatially, the CIMIC office comprised a large space with desks for five persons and a small coffee room. A separate office room for the Chief lays right next door. A key task of the CIMIC office was liaison with civilians, both local and international, including municipal administration and NGOs.

I arrive at the mission area a week later than others in my rotation. The spirit at the CIMIC office is high; the Chief has left on vacation on the same day. The situation is made clear to me from the beginning by my colleagues at the CIMIC office: There is a gap and mistrust between the Chief, Major Otto Aho, and the rest of the CIMIC office staff. As one of the staff officers depicts the situation in an interview a few months after the Chief has changed:

Interviewee: “When we came here, there didn’t seem to be enough hours in a day. In the morning we came at eight and in the evening at eleven we were still there [in the office] and thought that this is enough. I mean, we were not led, the work of the CIMIC office was
not controlled at all, we just worked like hell, completely trivial tasks [...] Otto was a complete nonsense guy [...] Nice man, but totally incompetent for the job and much too self-indulgent, even for peacekeeping tasks."

TT: “Self-indulgent?”

Interviewee: “Yes, he liked to train and diet and invest in himself. He didn’t give a shit about what was going on at the CIMIC office or what our office should do or achieve. He just tossed them over... to our side, his own tasks. And it was a kind of panic all the time.”

[Male reservist, officer.]”

The spatially separate office rooms provided the CIMIC office people an opportunity for continuous discussions on the Chief, which came close to slander. Major Aho was portrayed as unfamiliar with the geographical area of responsibility and not keen on leaving his office, being too interested in, and taking much care of, his personal and extra-military administrative tasks back in Finland, as well as being meticulous concerning formalities and details of reporting. The portrayal of Major Aho seemed to build on the stereotype of a ‘no good’ bureaucratic leader. The discourse contrasted him with the Deputy Chief, Captain Pekka Jokinen, who is seen as the jester, the humour man, and the social centre of the whole camp;59

TT: “You mentioned earlier that ‘[when Pekka leaves] where can we get another Pekka that will put the spirit into the group?’ What is Pekka’s secret [TT laughs]?”

Interviewee: “Pekka is, Pekka is... [long pause] Well, in my life there aren’t many things I hate as much as self-important people. I mean the kind of who make being bumptious a thing. Pekka is not self-important. [...] He’s got some kind of a capability of creating an atmosphere that, he pulls the whole group along so that there is, in our office it is allowed to be a bit stupid. I mean in a way that you can... there is no need to show off.” [Male reservist, officer.] (Appendix 5, Extract 7)

The contrasting between Major Aho and Captain Jokinen was, then, linked to contrasting between rigid rule-following and loosened-up sociality. This was reflected upon by some peacekeeper colleagues through the career backgrounds of Aho as a manager of a technical unit, and Jokinen as, among other things, a long-time conscript trainer. Although some professional officers in Radnata were criticised for treating reservist peacekeepers too much like they were training conscripts in Finland, in the case of Jokinen, conscript training experience was seen to have made him able to better get along with reservists and to reconcile military demands and flexibility. These abilities and his

59 Captain Jokinen was mostly referred to and addressed with his first name or with one of his several nicknames by the office members and other officers.
position seemed to be so appreciated that he was easily forgiven his lesser knowledge in computing and English. Rather than managing, Jokinen was seen to ‘wheel and deal’ through social practices, such as the ‘Coffee Club’.

The Coffee Club was a central practice of socialising and networking through which a certain management of relationships and power was conducted. The origins of it remained unclear, but Captain Jokinen was the host and the gatekeeper. Before the daily morning meeting of the office chiefs, company commanders and other chiefs, coffee was made and served by Captain Jokinen in the coffee room of the CIMIC office that was conveniently located right next to the meeting room. The Coffee Club was, as Captain Jokinen himself pointed out to participants, a place where “things were handled nicely at the same time”. Many initiatives on organisational actions were brought up informally in the Coffee Club in order to ask advice and opinions, but most of the time the Coffee Club was chatting about various formal happenings and gossip in the camp. The Coffee Club was institutionalised to the extent that when Captain Jokinen left the mission, his successor was asked to take over and prepare coffee every morning.

These practices, personified by Captain Jokinen, clearly dealt with power. Through the combination of particular networking activities including holding informal and formal minor positions (the Coffee Club, disposal committee and car cooperative60), boosting morale in his own office, and active participation in banter and gossiping, Jokinen was bypassing formal rank order and the bureaucratic practices of the peacekeeping organisation. This seemed to contrast with the ways Major Aho carried out his managerial role. The power practices personified here by the two persons (Major Aho and Captain Jokinen) could be called bureaucratic and ‘networking’ or informalism, respectively. These power practices can be seen as different responses to the organisational hybridity tensions, but primarily they are themselves part of the hybridity, consisting here of formal versus informal relations as well as different expectations about and ways of working and organising work. These tensions are also present in a specifically gendered way in the following description of negotiating organisational alcohol policy.

**Alcohol use and its control**

Alcohol misuse is mentioned both in the peacekeeping training and in the historiography of Finnish peacekeeping (Kronlund & Valla 1996; see also Levänen 1989) as a key problem of Finnish peacekeepers. The tensions around alcohol in the RTRO data described below resonate with the discursive form that the problems of regimentation in general among peacekeepers have taken. The very same problems were brought up during the training that I took as, for

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60 The disposal committee was a nominated group of officers that made the official decisions on material and equipment to be put out of use.
example, in an article by a former manager of the Finnish peacekeeper training centre:

Perceivable soldierhood is maybe the hardest part and special attention is paid to that in the training. External observers judge the efficiency of the group by the dressing, saluting and other forms of military behaviour. The issues are not the best parts of the Finnish man, who considers himself a descendant of the backwoods soldier.61 (Hannukkala 1997; translation from Finnish by TT.)

Studies on men in Finland have shown a certain focus on ‘men’s misery’, especially in relation to unemployment, violence, suicides, divorce, homelessness, and alcoholism (Hearn & Lattu 2002). Instead of discussing men’s power, these studies reproduce the stereotype of a ‘miserable Finnish man’ complementing ‘the strong Finnish woman’. Two issues are notable here for purposes of this study. Firstly, as Hearn and Lattu show, most of these studies neither discuss the fact that they are studying men, nor provide gendered analysis on the studied phenomena. Secondly, the understandings on Finnish men as violent, self-destructive, and having alcohol problems is in stark contrast with the characteristics of an ideal peacekeeper.62

On the level of organisational practices in the RTRO mission, alcohol use was regulated strictly. Both the amount of consumption and the drinking areas were restricted. The so-called ‘two beer rule’63 was in force with the principle of each peacekeeper always remaining operationally fit. The mess that was the primary location of alcohol use served only low alcohol drinks (wine, beer, cider etc.) and soft drinks, and alcohol only between 1800-2200 o’clock. The only other permitted alcohol use was to take two low alcohol drinks to the sauna. Alcohol was never to be drunk outside military camps. A detailed application procedure was necessary when strong alcohol drinks were to be served on special occasions. The tax-free alcohol that was available in the PX (Post Exchange) general stores in most military camps was to be preserved in a separate locked alcohol container until acquired an hour before going on leave. Total alcohol bans were introduced for short periods of time during states of alert and around the times of rotations. Along with these regulations, additional practices, such as ration cards for alcohol, raids in quarters, and Duty Officer check-up rounds in briefing rooms, operated to regulate alcohol use.

61 The ‘backwoods soldier’ (‘korpisoturi’) refers directly to the way the Finnish soldier of the Continuation War was depicted by Väinö Linna in his war novel The Unknown Soldier (1954).
62 As an example of representations of ideal peacekeepers, in Levänen’s film (1989), the former peacekeeping commander (now former Finland’s Chief of Defence and Chairman of EU Defence Committee) General Gustav Hägglund states that Finland is widely accepted as an intermediator because of its neutral foreign policy. He describes Finns as peaceful, reliable, impartial, and jovial, and therefore especially suitable for peacekeeping.
63 Each peacekeeper was allowed to drink two beers in a night. At the mess desk, only two drinks were sold at a time.
Still, alcohol played a central role in the everyday practices of peacekeepers. The saunas were a place of socialising both among Finnish peacekeepers and at times of international visits. A common understanding that was also brought up during the training period was that a sauna with drinks serves as the most suitable stress relief and even as debriefing for Finnish peacekeepers.

The time of rotation is close and the alcohol ban is on. A bunch of peacekeepers is sitting in a briefing room, chatting about the ban. One major comment that “now that the ban is on, the de-briefing of returning peacekeepers falls on the folks at home”. Others agree that the farewells and the alleviation of anxieties and frustration of the final weeks would have required some partying. “Yeah, the old Fenno-Ugrian way of debriefing has to be skipped this time.”

Another alcohol-related practice was the so-called ‘steak evenings’ that were organised by the battle group once a month on Saturday evenings in each camp. On those occasions, free drinks were served with a variety of barbequed meat courses. Furthermore, a commonly discussed concern was the ‘lifeless and flat atmosphere’ and the decreased attendance of peacekeepers in the mess of the headquarters camp. The dynamics behind the situation seemed to be complex:

"[T]he person in charge of the mess said a few months ago that he has heard many comments that the professional officers watch the reservists – how much alcohol they drink, and make notes about it, that [the reservists] don’t dare to come because of that. I was puzzled about where that idea had come from [...] we had a 45-minute discussion with the mess attendant about that, [I said] that ‘try to explain that nobody watches anyone around here, it’s a misconception’ [...] As I’ve had discussions with HQ and LOG company leader [I’ve heard that] they’ve been made scared, I don’t know about them being threatened, but anyway [they’ve been] told that their people are not to go there. Thus, they drink in the saunas and barracks, wherever. And that’s not a good thing either.” [Male professional officer, captain.] (Appendix 5, Extract 8)

Here the discourse around alcohol use includes a social and spatial division similar to some arguments in Finnish alcohol politics supporting the channelling of alcohol consumption more towards restaurants instead of domestic use. In the interview extract above, though the ideal situation of ‘socialising in the mess’ implies a certain beneficial social control of public alcohol use, the captain is denying that this would involve a division into the controllers (military personnel) and the controlled (reservists).

Alcohol misuse was the most common reason for the forced repatriation of Finnish peacekeepers from Radnata. In the following, the social welfare officer of the Battle Group discusses the problems she faced while trying to introduce a new practice in alcohol misuse cases:

“...maybe I am also myself a bit tired. I wouldn’t like to go all the time and discuss certain things such as, for example, when some here have their
service suspended because of alcohol. So in a way there should be a system created so that the person would actually come to see, for example, me, because in that sense one worries a bit that when somebody leaves from here... where (s)he is going, does (s)he have a job, and if (s)he has a workplace, has (s)he informed them, does the family know and so on? Well, then I've tried to talk about this somehow. Because it is a difficult thing, it's unpleasant to interfere in it. Everyone says, ‘Yeah, that's terribly important’ and stuff, but then it ends [laughs] there. Then in some situations when I've heard that somebody gets the feather [i.e. is dismissed from service] I've contacted, for example, the superior, the company chief for example or alike. Often the reply has been, ‘Yeah, this guy can make it, all the guys here are the type that [laughs] can make it.’ [Female military official, captain.] (Appendix 5, Extract 9)

The case discussed above seems to include a mixture of conflict avoidance and face-saving that happens through emphasising the ‘bureaucratic’ procedure, going according to the regulations. On a principle level, the importance of such social issues as alcohol misuse and wellbeing after repatriation are recognised, but the managerial practice prefers the standing procedure of one warning and then repatriation in alcohol misuse cases. A possible interpretation is that the officers see all organisational intrusion in alcohol misuse cases as control and punishment; the peacekeepers are “guys that can make it”, and counselling would only be extra punishment. As other parts of the welfare officer’s interview show, the resistance towards including counselling in the formal procedure seemed to involve several intermingling elements, such as attitudes towards the welfare officer as a young woman and towards social counselling as a women’s branch, as well as a certain amount of ‘combat fatigue’ on the part of the officers involved on the verge of their repatriation.

| Having a coffee with the welfare officer at the mess after lunch. Talking about alcohol once again. We come to an interpretation that excessive alcohol use in the camp may be a cry for help, a kind of emergency exit. It seems to be difficult to face the fact that peacekeeping may not actually be “my thing”. So one drinks and takes the feather as it is otherwise impossible to leave. Is it easier to be “the one who messed up drunk” than “the one who couldn’t make it as a peacekeeper”? It is OK to go too far in the manly art of boozing, but not OK to admit having been wrong about one’s own capabilities, not to make the decision to quit oneself? The welfare officer says that officers in superior positions do not seem to be able to delegate the problems of their subordinates to her because they think they have to be able to take care of everything by themselves or they’re bad superiors. |
| Two other officers join our discussion. The first one says that two CIMIC guys in the Fox Company had recently got blasted and were |

64 In the Finnish language there is only one gender-neutral word (‘hän’) for both ‘she’ and ‘he’.
In the RTRO peacekeeper culture, the official level regulation was combined with informal social control, especially through gossiping. Alcohol misuse and sexuality were the central focuses of this kind of informal control. Gossiping and rumours as such were both formally and informally seen as a problem leading to misunderstandings and the weakening of morale. The fact that a lot of gossiping did take place was brought up in discussions between peacekeepers with a gendered twist: It was regarded as odd how the male-dominated community of peacekeepers could be so polluted with gossiping which was seen as a feminine activity.

As a form of control, gossiping among peacekeepers involved not only blame gossip but also praise gossip (Noon & Delbridge 1993; Soeters & van Iterson 2002). Good-humoured praising across offices, rank lines and other divisions could take the form of stories on ‘successful’ drinking, having fun and building team spirit. This duality of gossip seemed to recognise the tension between the strict regulation and the need for loose practices concerning alcohol use. Based on a certain tacit understanding about the practices of managing the social relations and wellbeing of peacekeepers, restrictions on alcohol were not followed to the extreme, but alcohol was regarded as a ‘ventilator’ to reduce stress and organisational tensions (cf. Johansson & Larsson 1998: 129). In these terms, alcohol seems to play a similar role in the RTRO data as pornography and misogyny among shopfloor factory workers in Collinson’s (1992) study.

Alcohol use was also intermingled in the construction of nationality and international relationships. The bi-national battle group was seen among the peacekeepers of both nationalities as comprising of two nationalities that both had a reputation as heavy drinkers and were thus closely bonded. Still, Finns – especially those that had visited parties of the other nationality in their own camps – were often of the opinion that the other nationality soldiers were able to relax, party, and enjoy themselves in the right way, unlike boozing Finns.

Social contacts outside the camp – ‘the home front’ and in Radnata

Another set of social bonds to be managed were the relations with family, friends and others, mainly in Finland. The way that the maintenance of and care for these relations were taken into account through the policies and organising by the employing peacekeeping organisation was well regarded by the employed peacekeepers. The employer provided free flights from Radnata to Finland on service leaves (approximately a week every five weeks), access to Internet and e-mail, free mailing to Finland, and mobile phone connections with lowered
prices and a domestic network. As a new thing, so-called ‘welfare phones’ were introduced for free private calls to Finland. In training materials and during training, the central message concerning home relations was that “things at home should be taken care of before leaving”. This applied also to employment and education arrangements. The law protects those leaving for peacekeeping missions from being laid off.

Expatriation and distance frame the discourses and practices of relations to the ‘home front’, mainly to the closest family, partner and possible children, but also parents and siblings. Practices of dealing with these relations were mainly kept personal and hidden in privacy. What was articulated can be described in terms of two perspectives: longing and ‘one’s own space’. The latter comes up in almost romantic visions of the peacekeeping mission period as a sphere of freedom and a refuge for reflection on past and future life:

“What attracted [me to the peacekeeping mission] for example was that one relationship I had there was a kind of, so-called ‘difficult’ one, and when it ended I figured it’s time to get some fresh air. [...] As I then didn’t have a relationship and I sort of thought that maybe one more trip, as it is possible, so that was the answer to this.” [Male reservist, captain.] (Appendix 5, Extract 10)

“...with [my then girlfriend] now-wife we had discussions in the summer – when we were seeing [so to speak] ‘irregularly in a regular manner’ in July – on whether we should start dating. I said that I don’t want to because I am leaving [in autumn] to Radnata and I want to come here free, so that I won’t have to think about things in Finland, about leaves or suchlike, that in a way it’s a burden if I am in a relationship and I’m here. [...] When I was [on an earlier mission in another country] I was going steady. And I know that my thoughts were all the time in Finland; when is the next leave and when will I see the person I care for? I did not want this...” [Male reservist, captain.] (Appendix 5, Extract 11)

Relationships – especially with girlfriends and partners – and the related responsibilities seem to involve demands that contradict with being on a mission. Still, in the case of this captain the originally unwanted dating partner had during the mission become the “now-wife”. Longing was now balanced by interesting tasks in Radnata, and the interviewee framed the turn as transition in life towards settling and calming down after years of various relationships and peacekeeping missions. A similar discourse of avoiding disturbing contradictions may also frame peacekeepers’ views on personal life-projects:

“I have always believed that whatever the thing is that you do, you do it properly: you’re doing your conscription you concentrate on that – it was good that I got into university [before starting military service], I didn’t

65 These three or four landline telephones were situated in a small room near the mess. They were introduced at Christmas and presented as a collective present. They soon became called ‘kiss phones’ among the peacekeepers.
have to [think about] any study things, just doing my conscription. At university, you concentrate on studying and partying [...] I didn’t go to work at all. That’s because dad gives me monthly allowance, which is a damn good thing. You concentrate on studying, and then, last summer I concentrated on work, and now here I concentrate on this.” [Male reservist, 2nd lieutenant.] (Appendix 5, Extract 12)

Though the ‘proper doing’ and ‘concentration’ in this interview extract also refer to other things, work (or studying as a similar activity) seems to be central in the discourse. Observational data suggest that this resonates not only with discussions on the importance of work for men’s identity (Collinson & Hearn 2005): Going on a peacekeeping mission is a wider experience that feels threatened by other engagements. The three extracts here can be seen to point to the wider theme often referred to as reconciliation between home and work.

Four general issues were brought up in the peacekeeping training concerning relations with the local population in Radnata: respect towards local cultures; impartiality and neutrality; caution and vigilance; prohibition of all sexual relations in the mission area (including relations among peacekeepers and with locals and internationals). In addition to this, peacekeepers’ contacts in Radnata were framed by restrictions of mobility.

Different positions and duties included different interactions with locals and internationals. Most contacts with the Radnatin community were task orientated, such as patrolling or activities of civil-military cooperation personnel; narrow and practical (medical help); and formal (involving celebrations of holidays, and contacts with heads of local institutions). Some peacekeepers seldom left the camp, some worked with locals inside the camp (mainly kitchen and other supply functions), some liaised widely with the local population. This hybridity in terms of relationships with Radnatinians was mediated by the above-mentioned perception of peacekeeping as an experience. Some of those remaining more in the camp were not satisfied with others having better possibilities to tour the area:

“I’m sure if one was free, if one could freely move and come and go, I would probably have friends there around the village and elsewhere, these local people, but now I haven’t even tried. Surely there are interesting people there, but I haven’t even tried to make friends. And maybe it’s better also considering the official duties that one doesn’t have bosom friends there. Of course, if the task was a bit different and one could move more freely, then perhaps, because then, in the previous mission [I] had them: local friends, family acquaintances and, one can say, also bosom friends.” [Male professional officer, major.] (Appendix 5, Extract 13)

The above-described management of peacekeepers’ social relations towards ‘the home front’ and towards others than RTRO peacekeepers was carried out through policies and practices of human resource management and security. Although these policies and practices seem to have developed in many respects through experiences from the participation of Finnish troops in earlier missions,
they are also compromises between different judicial, organisational, economic and cultural demands and strictures. In addition to more obvious security threats, these policies and practices reflect concerns in terms of peacekeeper's subjectivity. Those concerns were addressed also openly: some peacekeepers were known to have participated in multiple missions, one after another with diminishing relations (work, family or other) at home. On the other hand, long presence in an area and close relations to locals were seen as a breeding ground for dubious or even illegal activities. For these reasons, the length of service in one mission is mainly restricted to one year, participation on a certain mission is mainly restricted to one time, and participation in different missions in a row is prevented. Peacekeeping is not meant to be a profession.

6.3.4. Further reflections: homosociality, hierarchy, and beyond the peacekeeping mission

Gender involves relations between men. In the organisational contexts of peacekeeping, gendered divisions and connections among men are just as central as in heterosocial interactions. This gendered character of men's relations applies both in terms of the gendered construction of other social relations (Collins 2000) and in terms of situational social dynamic. The previous refers to the intersectionality of different social logics. The latter refers to the often ignored fact that events and episodes involving social relations and interactions are gendered also when they involve mainly or only men.

The empirical setting of the RTRO peacekeeping Battle Group headquarters above has provided a view on what has here been called militarised social encounters. With attention to formal and informal management of hybridity, that is, the varying differences and divisions among peacekeepers, four forms of social relations have been analysed more specifically: the intermingling social and organisational hierarchies, bureaucracy and networking as practices of managing an office, alcohol use and its control as arena of negotiating social relations, and the organisational and individual challenges concerning social contacts outside the camp. Before moving on, some additional observations are made here on the events depicted and analysed above.

The described case of “the lost rifle” displays an aspect of situational social dynamic. The outburst of “They are fucking with us!” marks the point where the system of equal homosocial relations is broken, and thus becomes visible. The existence of a homosocial system has not been merely a misassumption by the 2nd lieutenants. It has been actively built by trainers and senior officers of the rotation with the intermingling motivations of lessening the hierarchical tensions (with the dogma of male cohesion echoing in the background), and enabling mutual control. “Fucking” (as well as the original Finnish expression 66)

66 The Finnish expression equivalent to this sense of ‘fucking’ (‘vittuilla’) refers directly to female genitalia. The curse word usage of ‘vittu’ is very similar to usage of ‘fuck’ in the way that its use stretches from a kind of ‘comma’ in almost every sentence of a speaker to strong violent usage.
and “real army stuff” imply that the fratriarchal contract has been broken. Shattering of the emergent homosocial order with the imposition of command relations is discursively paralleled with breaking the norm of asexuality. The break is marked with aggressive sexual imagery.

The key dynamic seems to be between the social logics of homosociality (horizontal power balance) and hierarchy (vertical power imbalance). The question of control is central, and within the training and the peacekeeping collective there is an ongoing shifting between whether the control should be organised through regimentation practices or mutual ‘surveillance’. In training, the peacekeeping trainees and trainers interpreted the spatial isolation and social pressure as a test. In Radnata, the camp included institutionalised mechanisms that were (from the officers’ point of view) seen as mutual control. Shifts from peer positions to such positions of authority as the Duty Officer were problematic and smoothed over with different social solutions, such as humour and a culture of moderate regulation-following and zealousness.

Among the peacekeepers, there seemed to be at least two kinds of views on how to avoid development towards organisational anomie in the meaning of deterioration of normative rules and order. One professional officer said that peacekeepers in service should remember that, “what happens here does not remain here”, and that peacekeeper colleagues may meet each other in Finland in situations like job interviews “on different sides of the table”. This extension of mutual control contrasted with views emphasising stricter regimentation. Some saw the solution in the new existing system of recruiting younger peacekeepers for missions straight after their military service in Finland, especially those whose conscription involves special training for international missions. These troops would still be assimilated closely to military order and they would already have become cohesive during a longer progression than the rotation training. What here would be lost in civilian experience of the older reservists would be gained in terms of discipline and control.

The officer’s comment above (“what happens here does not remain here”) was presented as a counter-argument in relation to a discourse more common among the Radnata peacekeepers, namely, the discourse of “what happens here should remain here”. This latter discursive structure combined the formally required secrecy on operational and strategic issues (and the more informal culture of military secrecy) with the logic of exclusionary homosociality. This logic, for its part, combines the dogma of male cohesion with the permissive practices regarding minor organisational violations and offences.

The culture of cooperation and mutual control within the peacekeeping organisation and collective was entangled with the fact that peacekeeping as such is not a job or a career path. Especially among reservists, personal

Also, in all-male situations the words may be more easily used. Still, the two words may have slightly different connotations and they may be different in terms of severity.
commitment to a ‘short-term job’ was thus bounded, and motivations arose mainly from two rationales: economic benefits, and the different strands of experiences that going on a peacekeeping mission provided. These strands included relevant working experience in terms of peacekeepers’ civilian or military careers, experience of working abroad in an international organisation, and ‘testing and challenging oneself’ by exposing oneself to potentially demanding experiences.

The intermingling of homosociality, hierarchy, and control intersects with the division between reservists and professional military officers, or, more roughly, the civil-military division. Whereas for a reservist the peacekeeping period is a fixed-term issue and as a whole a relatively separate episode from one’s social environment in one’s home country, for professional soldiers the situation is different. The nation-wide collegial networks of professional officers, which were recurrently activated in Radnata in the everyday discussions between officers, imply a different social structure. The Finnish Defence Forces as a collective and as an organisation frames the peacekeeping service of the professional officers differently from reservists. The exchange of information on military colleagues in Finland, their whereabouts and undertakings, makes visible the social organisation that is fostered by the constant rotation of officers in brigade-level units across the country.\textsuperscript{67} This structure also serves as an instrument of informal social control among professional officers. Additionally, peacekeeping experience attaches closely to military careers as an important, sometimes unavoidable, phase. It may also serve (as in case of at least one research participant) as a stepping stone for a higher pension because the higher salary from peacekeeping service on the verge of retirement affects one’s pension level.

The organisational connections to the Defence Forces in Finland, which may be quite invisible for many reservist peacekeepers, can take the form of very direct control in the eyes of professional officers. In an interview of a professional officer this control reaches the Battle Group top and entangles with the reoccurring dynamic of the rotation organisation. The officer is describing at length how the Battle Group commander had hushed up a long-developed plan for changing the Finnish peacekeeping training and rotation system, and how the career system prevents innovation within the Defence Forces:

”...I’m talking in general about persons of the lieutenant colonel level, that are in a particular position like the commander of the Battle Group in question was; he is in the phase that he is being watched closely, whether or not he’s going to become a colonel, does he get into the General pipeline. 80 colonels and 25 generals follow his movements all the time. And if there then were a proposition like this made, let’s change the age-old system that

\textsuperscript{67} ‘Brigade-level unit’ is, though formally correct and used by the Finnish Defence Forces, not a felicitous translation for ‘joukko-osasto’. ‘Joukko-osasto’ can be a brigade, regiment, air command, or suchlike, but what is central here and below is that ‘joukko-osasto’ is a key level in peacetime defence organising, and a ‘joukko-osasto’ is usually situated in a certain locality.
the Defence Forces has had, that the good side, that the rotation is every half-a-year, that this has been the practice since Lebanon or some 25 years, [would lead to] ‘is that the colonel that suggested it?’ And it’s obvious if one thinks whether one wants to become a colonel: does one want to present this proposition? ‘What does this thing matter if I’m getting out of here in four months? This proposition will not be presented, full stop.’ That’s a big weakness of the Defence Forces.” [Male professional officer, major.]

(Appendix 5, Extract 14)

As a part of the gendered social organisation of defence, peacekeeping produces and reproduces different paths and relations that intersect with the civil-military division. The idea of a “General pipeline” (‘kenraaliputki’) brings up the role of peacekeeping service as part of the military career paths and a wider ensemble of required experience of professional officers. The career paths as well as social networks of those who have participated in peacekeeping missions are ways in which peacekeeping engages with national defence and, especially through reservists, with the society more widely. More thorough questions concerning these and related less common careers (the legionnaire mentioned above) remain open, but the role and careers of military and civilian employees in the Finnish Defence Forces organisation is in the heart of the second case study on provisioning discussed in Chapter 7.

Before that, it is time for an Interlude.
**6 ½ INTERLUDE**

As they proceed, research projects in general – and ethnographic studies in a particular way – become part of the field that they study. Research and researchers are affected by the material, social and discursive practices and structures that surround the research object. Recognising that this took place in the peacekeeping case study in a problematic way laid the basis for a critical re-evaluation and redefinition of the direction and goals of the research project. In this Interlude chapter, that phase of the research process, leading from the first to the second case study, is laid out with the aims of reflexivity, learning-in-process, and spelling out some of the central choices made concerning empirical fieldwork, methodology, and research reporting.

**The problem with Case I**

The original idea of this research project was to discover how, if one looks at organisations as gendered power structures, are men and men’s networks involved in them. In addition to feminist research on gender and organisations and theorising on men on masculinities, the popular concept of “old boys’ networks” drew attention to how men’s social relations and networks are related to organisational power. My earlier interest in soldiering and discovery of the lack of sociological research on the military in Finland directed the empirical study towards the Finnish Defence Forces.

The research questions of this study are presented within this thesis only in Table 4. Although formulating questions of a different sort – from research questions to analytic questions on the research material gathered and questions for research participants and interviewees – played a key role in maintaining a certain research focus, it also created a tension regarding the ethnographic approach. Having a small number of key questions did not serve the purposes of keeping an open mind both during the fieldwork and in relation to theories able to make sense of the field, and of sustaining a live and reciprocal dialogue with the research participants. Nor did the research questions help in the writing phase in formulating the conclusions of the project. Giving a lot of weight to reducing the two ethnographies into ‘results’ or ‘contributions’ in terms of research questions clashed with the efforts to maintain a holistic approach to the studied phenomena and construct a thick description of them in their context. Still, it has been possible to carry out these ethnographic principles only partially. Furthermore, these epistemological choices do not prevent presenting

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68 “While the UN Charter includes among the central aims of the organisation to ‘maintain international peace and security’, it lacks any reference to ‘peacekeeping’ as such. Therefore, peacekeeping operations are sometimes called ‘Chapter VI ½’ missions, falling between Chapters VI (‘pacific settlement of disputes’) and VII (‘action with respects to threats to the peace...’)” (Schmidl 2000b: 6).
some of the ‘results’ in a more conventional form to other audiences, and in other forums and genres of publications.

Table 4  Research questions of the project in 2003 and 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>January 2003</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Do men’s networks structure and gender organisations, and if so, in what</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ways? What is the relationship between men’s networks and gendered power?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What are the forms and structures of men’s networks? How do men’s networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>function, for what purposes do they exist, and how do men link to them?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How are masculinities and relationships between men constructed in networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and organisations, and what is the role of homosocial desire in these</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>processes?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>January 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• What is the dynamic between gender and organising of defence?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How are relationships between men constructed in organisations, and what</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is the role of homosociality in these processes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is gendered divergence taking place in the Finnish defence sector?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the comparison of the research questions of 2003 and 2008 shows, the original focus of the study revolved around men’s social networks and power in organisations. The former questions were without any mention of defence or the military. This focus directed the fieldwork and observing in the peacekeeping troops, as well as the preliminary analysis of the gathered material. The latter research questions put the gender problematic more into context, but even the constant formulation of them did not seem to grasp what the ethnographies were telling. The reluctant shaping and reshaping produced only synthetic questions.

Reflecting back on the peacekeeping case study showed that the constraints in the field and the theoretical and methodological choices that were made had redirected the focus of the study more towards organisational culture and social practices than men’s egocentric networks. The choosing of an organisational site as a starting point and conducting a long-term ethnography there suggested a more data-driven approach than originally planned. When the attempts to gather relational data for social network analysis through contact diaries proved difficult in the field, other data sources became more central, namely, field observations, organisational documents, and interviews.

Regarding the three general social logics that constructed the theoretical framework of the study – organisation, gender, and networks – the ethnographic setup seemed to better trace the organisational and gender aspects
of the observed setting than the networks as they are defined in social network analysis. This is not to say that ethnography is in contradiction with studying social networks. On the contrary, this has been done successfully, as discussed earlier in the methodology chapter. Still, in terms of ethnographic observing and interviewing, a suitable way to study the egocentric networks of men would be to follow in a snowball method fashion the network ties occurring during the fieldwork. Such an approach could have been possible to pursue in the peacekeeping setting in Radnata, but as the interest was not merely on intra-organisational networks, and my position in the peacekeeping organisation, as well as the circumstances in the field, restricted my contacts and mobility, the snowball method was not applied.

While the network perspective was at this point losing its centrality in the framework of the study, a new social division was becoming more relevant, namely the civil-military division. In the preliminary analysis of the data from the peacekeeping case study, the civil-military dynamic showed itself to be in play in several social relations and practices around peacekeeping. The attempt to theorise this dynamic led to my familiarising myself with literature on militarisation, securitisation, and civil-military relations. The civil-military division that arose from the data directed, for its part, the search for another empirical case to be studied.

Although the framework of profeminist ethnography and the focus on men’s organisational practices were able to provide critical observations about the peacekeeping organisation, the study was, at the same time, working counter-effectively. The emerging written description of the peacekeeping community was reproducing the Finnish military in a way that is problematic for several reasons. It was holding the male soldiers as the central protagonists, and thus reproducing women’s marginal position in the military. By looking mainly into the intraorganisational interactions and structures, the case study maintained a setting where the organisational power relations, violations, and problems may be seen as secondary to the untouched cluster of military masculine heroism and work for peace and security. Focusing on a peacekeeping collective was reproducing the military as a separate and distinctive organisation – despite the subordination of the military to the civil society in Finland and the (inter)dependence of the peacekeeping organisation with different civilian and military organisations in Radnata. Additionally, studying peacekeeping troops depicts the Finnish military as a constantly operating and active organisation instead of promoting an understanding of its central quality as latent organising for national defence. In sum, the peacekeeping case study was supporting the image of the military as a monolithic, distinct and specific institution of men, the image that it was set to critically question.

A more difficult entanglement to unpack was related to genres of research and writing on the Finnish military. Knut Pipping’s (1978/1947) classic work of military sociology on his experiences in a machine gun company during the Continuation War has for the most part remained without subsequent
research. As Harinen (1993) has shown Pipping’s approach and results resonate strongly with those in Väinö Linna’s *Unknown Soldier* (1954), the novel that has, with its two film versions and several dramatisations, influenced interpretations of the Finnish wars (Jokinen & Linko 1987; Nummi 1993), organising of the Defence Forces (Syrjö 2006), as well as the understandings of Finnish soldierhood, leadership and national identity.

From the first sketches on what kinds of themes and issues could arise from the ethnographic material on the Finnish peacekeepers in Radnata, I noticed unintended similarities with the tradition of Pipping (1978/1947) and Linna (1954). The tensions that I analysed in the data between bureaucracy and networking, formal and informal practices, organisation and disorganisation, control and violations/resistance were the central themes around which the old tradition of interpreting the military dating from Pipping and Linna circled. I only much later noticed the similarity, too, of my method with Pipping and Linna: using one’s own personal experiences in a military unit, and presenting the view from the ‘eye level’ of a participant. The conventions and cliché-like themes (‘Finnish drinking habits’, sauna, ‘the Finnish soldier’) were also difficult to discuss: the ethnographic mode suggested descriptions that would only be plain variants of the known archetypes if specific analytical effort was not made in order to distance oneself from them and re-read them.

After the fieldwork in the peacekeeping troops, it was necessary to reconsider and revise the plan to have four case studies. This original plan was based on the idea of comparing formally and informally gendered work and non-work organisations that have more or less strict organisational structures (see Table 5).

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69 Pipping’s study, originally written in Swedish in 1947, was translated into Finnish in 1978. In 2007-2008, the Finnish association of military sociology (Sotilassosiologinen seura ry) was advertising as its major project of recent years the translation of Pipping’s book into English (Pipping 2008). Other Finnish military sociological research has been rare and scattered. Mainly it’s been published in a military sociological series of the Military Academy which includes seven issues between 1981 and 1992. These studies dealt with, among other things, Swedish research on defence (Harinen 1981), the credibility of Finnish defence (Pentti 1985a; 1985b), the effects of religion and the church on the will to defend (Lilius 1987), and cohesion in military units (Harinen 1992). Additionally, in 1961-62, Randell (1965; 1970) studied the attitudes of conscripts to the military, patriotism, and conscription.

70 As depicted in Chapter 6, the *Unknown Soldier* (Linna 1954) also served as a reference point within the peacekeeper community. This makes the entanglement even more complicated.
Table 5  Originally planned research set-up concerning the empirical case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strict organisational structure / work environment</th>
<th>Loose organisational structure / non-work environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formally gendered</strong></td>
<td>Peacekeeping unit</td>
<td>Men’s exclusive leisure network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Informally gendered</strong></td>
<td>Corporation</td>
<td>Student organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to limited resources, the reasons for reconsideration were theoretical and methodological. The nature and amount of data that the ethnographic fieldwork in the first case study produced suggested that a closer look into two cases would contribute more than studying three more organisations in lesser detail. Retaining only the peacekeeping case would have provided a somewhat different study, and although solutions for the above discussed problems of the peacekeeping study could have been sought elsewhere, balancing the whole with another case study and with a clearly different view on the military was proceeded with.

Non-work organisations are important for men’s social relations and understudied in organisation and management studies, but giving them up seemed reasonable in terms of focusing the study. Although the original setting was collapsing, a comparison of the military setting to a business corporation seemed to involve a fruitful dynamic. In the information that I gave to the research participants in Radnata, I said that I was going to compare the data and results from the peacekeeping organisation with a similar case study in a major Finnish corporation.

Nonetheless, what soon started to appear more important was the multi-levelled contextualisation of the completed case and the possible second case. The central observation in the reflections on the peacekeeping case study was that men’s social relations and practices in military organisations are linked to a wider frame of defence in terms of structural, social, and cultural constraints. Although both the organisation of ‘peacekeeping-turning-into-crisis-management’ and the everyday life of peacekeepers were in many ways affected by transnational processes and security structures, national defence seemed a more appropriate frame of contextualisation in terms of understanding the observed gender relations and organisational practices.

**Searching for Case II**

With these complications, the choosing of the second case became a lengthy process. For a while, the plan was to look into a corporation in the defence
I gathered information and material on the largest Finnish company in the defence industry, the Patria Group. As the largest private sector employer in some small towns, the organisational networks of men at certain Patria factories could have been an interesting starting point for an ethnography on a local community. The militarising effects of defence industries, as well as large garrisons and other military organisations on their base communities is an uncharted field of research in Finland (cf. Thanner & Segal 2008).

I also conducted a mini-ethnography on the Security and Defence Fair 2005 organised in Tampere. This involved two days' participant observation in the fair events and among the fair exhibitors covering the defence sector (from defence industries and NGOs to administration and the Defence Forces), and ranging additionally from border guard, police, prison, fire and rescue, and vehicle administration to hygiene control, meteorologists, military gear and weapon shops, and second-hand bookshops. More than 15 000 visitors participated in the fair, which was especially marketed for families and schools. The organising committee of the fair included representatives from the Defence Forces, voluntary defence organisations, and ministries. The mini-ethnography included an interview with the chair of the fair organising committee, a company chief executive and a chair of a voluntary defence organisation. Already as such, the variety of the exhibitors and the changing titles and slogans of the fair, which has been organised since 1992 every third or fifth year, tell much about the change in the framework of defence: “National Defence – Our Common Interest” has changed into “Security is done together”, and the “Defence Fair” has gradually become first the “Defence and Security Fair” and then, in 2008, “Security and Defence Fair”. The data gathered on the Security and Defence Fair 2005, as well as on the defence and aerospace company Patria Group, remain to be analysed outside this thesis project.

A crucial point for the research process was an interview I had with a representative of the then Association of Finnish Defence Industries. The association was tasked to enhance networking within the defence industry, coordinate relations with the defence administration, and lobbying. In addition to the recently enhanced networking, the defence industry had expanded from domestic to international markets and moved from production of particular products to production of systems. The glimpse that the interview offered into the networks connecting the defence industry, defence administration, politicians, and the Finnish Defence Forces opened up the defence sector as structures of cooperation. These connections brought up many questions about the relations between civilian and military actors and organisations, and about the blurring of the civil-military distinction. Definitions of the defence industry

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71 A search of the Internet also produced an interesting list of the chairs and ex-chairs of Finnish voluntary defence organisations, all men and mostly with high positions in businesses.
72 In addition, a national fair on safety and security is arranged separately in liaison with fairs on real estate security and work-wellbeing (http://www.tamperenmessut.fi/html/turvallisuus/index.html).
73 Currently the Association of Finnish Defence and Aerospace Industries (AFDA).
provided an example of this in terms of companies producing dual-use items and technology, such as hydraulics used for both civilian and military purposes.

The interviewed representative of the Association of Finnish Defence Industries brought up the problems in the cooperation between the military and the businesses around defence technology. These involved differences in the cultures of military and civilian organisations. As a recent example, he brought up the challenges of the Defence Administration Partnership Programme (DAPP) that involved a variety of negotiations and forms of contracting between the Defence Forces, defence administration, and civilian service providers.

After considering the possibility of studying the working groups of the Association of Finnish Defence Industries and the personal and interorganisational networks linked to them, I searched for more information on the DAPP. The programme opened a view into a variety of issues around the development of the defence sector, namely, the restructuring of the Defence Forces, partnerships and outsourcing, New Public Management in the defence administration, employee structures and policies within the Defence Forces, defence and security policy planning, and international defence and security cooperation. Obtaining the necessary access to study the structural change from within the Defence Forces in a particular development project was an exceptional opportunity.

The new framework of the study, which was now combining the gender and organisation perspectives with a new way of contextualising the empirical studies, suggested a new relationship between the two case studies. The defence sector organisations in focus would not be compared as much as they would represent two vantage points regarding defence as a gendered institution. In this respect, the relationship between the case studies should be complementary.

The provisioning case study and the peacekeeping case study complemented each other in several ways. Compared to the peacekeeping organisation, the process around the Defence Forces provisioning involved a different (but again multifaceted) dynamic in terms of civil-military encounters (see Table 6).

The peacekeeping case study was on a clearly military organisation and represented an ascending core function of the Defence Forces, whereas provisioning was increasingly becoming a support function involving non-military organising. These dynamics intermingled with the gendered division of work apparent in the male-concentrated peacekeeping organisation and the female-concentrated provisioning branch. The geographical and organisational contexts were also complementary, as the peacekeeping case study took place abroad within a multinational organisation, while the provisioning case study remained inside the Defence Forces in Finland. Additionally, the standing rotation organisation in Radnata was in a different phase compared with the starting new provisioning organisation.
Table 6  Intra- and extra-organisational civil-military encounters in the peacekeeping and provisioning case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil-military encounters</th>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case I</td>
<td>Reservists and military officials vs. professional officers</td>
<td>Peacekeepers vs. local and international civilians in the post-conflict area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case II</td>
<td>Civilian vs. military employees of the Finnish Defence Forces</td>
<td>The Finnish Defence Forces vs. its civilian partners</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

My involvement during the last few years of the PhD project in activism plays an important role in the research process. In 2007-2008, I participated in the ‘1325 Network’ of non-governmental organisations, researchers and other activists. The network drew its name from the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security (UN document 2000). The network aimed at getting the Finnish government to compile a national action plan for carrying out the obligations of the UN member states stated in the UNSCR 1325.74 This participation involved observations that made my earlier participant observations in the peacekeeping troops appear in new light. Together, the network activism, literature on civil-military relations, and the fieldwork on the second case study on the Defence Forces provisioning project led to the formulation of ‘security mainstreaming’ as a connective term describing the developments in the defence sector. Security mainstreaming seemed to make sense also of the developments in organising around crisis management, and it helped in connecting the introspective peacekeeping case study with a wider context.

This is the development behind the transformation of this study from “Men’s Networks, Gendered Power and Organisations” into “The Gendered Social Organisation of Defence”.75 What was supposed to be a focused study on egocentric networks of men in and around different organisations became, through the two case studies, a double exposure on the gendered social practices and relations of everyday life that build and are, at the same time, constrained by, the institution of defence.

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74 Resolution 1325 draws attention to the position of women in wars, in conflict prevention and resolution, and in peace building and peace operations. Since the adoption of the UNSCR 1325 in 2000, some countries have taken national action to implement the demands of the resolution. The National Action Plan of the Finnish government for implementing the resolution was launched in September 2008 (MoFA document 2008).

75 The former formulation served as the working title of the project during the period 2001-2007.
7 ORGANISING, GENDER, AND SOCIAL RELATIONS IN
AND AROUND A DEFENCE FORCES SERVICE
CENTRE

This second case study looks into the reorganising of the provisioning and
catering function in the Finnish Defence Forces. This took place in terms of a
development project that resulted in the formation of a new Provisioning
Service Centre of the Defence Forces (PROSEC). The development project was
one among seven similar projects under the Defence Administration
Partnership Programme (DAPP). The ethnographic fieldwork focused on the
last phases of the development project and the start-up of PROSEC, especially
its headquarters. Before discussing the DAPP and PROSEC, they will be
contextualised by taking a look at the structures, organisational culture, and
restructuring within the Defence Forces.

7.1. Restructuring of the Finnish Defence Forces

If the Finnish Defence Forces were a corporation, in 2007 it would have been
the 12th largest company in Finland in terms of personnel, with total costs that
equalled the turnover of the 27th largest Finnish company (DC document 2008a;
Talouselämä 2008).76 In 2007, the Defence Forces had nearly 15 400 permanent
employees comprising of civilians and employed soldiers and excluding
conscripts. In the same year, of these Defence Forces’ employees nearly half
were civilians, out of whom half were women, working mainly in financial and
other administration, and provisioning. Only after opening the possibility of
voluntary military service to women in 1995 has it also been possible for women
to enter higher military education and become employed officers in the Defence
Forces. In 2007, of the employed military officers 98.8% were men (DC
document 2008b).77 Conscription and the Defence Forces in general have
remained heavily gender-segregating and male-dominated institutions.

The territorial defence system as one of the bedrocks of Finnish defence has
been represented in the organising of defence throughout its history. After the
Finnish Civil War in 1918, the defence was organised on the basis of the regional
organisation of the civil guards. In 1930s, 27 military districts (’sotilaspiiri’)
were formed. After World War II, the peace agreements and truce control
commission of the Allied forces affected the defence revision process of 1945-49
which established the frame of defence organisation for decades. In the late

76 In a large survey among students of technology in Finland in 2007, the Defence Forces was
the 11th most preferred future employer. The largest Finnish corporation in the defence industry,
Patria, was seventh. In 2006 and 2007, both technology and business students considered
Nokia to be their most preferred employer.

77 This includes both college-level educated (’opistoupseerit’) and university-level educated
officers and special officers (’erikoisupseerit’). Among the university educated officers, the
proportion of men in 2007 was 98.1% (DC document 2008b).
1960s there were 25 and in 1971 23 military districts in the seven military counties (‘sotilaslääni’). In 1993, the military districts were dismantled; the new management and administration system consisted of three national military commands (‘maanpuolustusalue’) and 12 military counties. Still, the two-level regional administration has remained throughout with the military counties/commands taking operational responsibility, and the more local military districts (or equivalent units) handling drafting, mobilisation, and local defence. (Puukka 2005: 148-154; Visuri 2006; Syrjö, Karjalainen & Elfvengren 2006: 120-129; 246-256).

The most recent restructuring of the Defence Forces culminated in the new management and administrative structure that came into force on 1 January, 2008. The basis and requirements for the restructuring were laid down in the Government report to Parliament “The White Paper on Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004” (PMO document 2004). The structural change process was presented both within the Defence Forces and in the media as the largest defence restructuring since the 1950s. Although the restructuring involved several developments on the basis of strategic and operational principles, it was mainly framed inside the Defence Forces as a collective effort to survive the economic demands and to maintain a credible national defence (cf. DF document 2005).

7.1.1. A prior case of defence reorganising: Real estate administration and construction

One central part of the recent restructuring has been the reorganising of the support functions of the Defence Forces. This process had already started some years before the actual restructuring in terms of the Defence Administration Partnership Programme (DAPP). Though the partnership programme involves new elements in terms of organising the supply functions of the Defence Forces, the trend towards differentiation is by no means new. As one of his case studies, Puukka (2005) analyses the reorganising of real estate administration and construction in the branch of defence administration. The case is worth looking into in brief because it bears many resemblances, in terms of the political and organisational process, to the PROSEC case.

In the very first stages of the lengthy real estate administration and construction project (1987-2000) the then Minister of Defence was already arguing for the changes by referring to the channelling of the scarce resources to central tasks directly related to defence, and, when it comes to other services, leaning more on purchasing of services and cooperating with authorities outside the defence administration. The reorganising process involved three phases: The starting phase included efforts to move the real estate issues from the remit of the

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78 One central goal in the Defence Forces’ structural reform has been to restore personnel costs to the level of 2004. In 2005-2007, in the Defence Forces 254 employees were laid off, and in July 2007, 45 of these were still without a job (DF document 2007).
As the real estate and construction events show, the processes of restructuring in the defence branch have involved intricate trajectories, and power struggles and contradictions both within and between the defence administration and the Defence Forces. Some of these trajectories are the efforts to find balanced ways of governing organising based on a customer-provider relationship between organisations and branches of administration. Although in the real estate case the partnership cooperation mainly involves different types of real estate property being owned and governed by partners outside the defence branch, it does illustrate the unfolding of security mainstreaming both in terms of intersectoral involvement in matters that have previously been dealt within the defence branch, and in terms of renegotiating the civil-military relations.

In his study, Puukka analyses the military culture as power games between paradigms. The major cultural tension within the Finnish military comes from the supremacy of the ‘battle paradigm’ emphasising the wartime tasks over the ‘administrative paradigm’ (Puukka 2005: 252-256). In addition to these tensions, the military culture in the Defence Forces involves a certain homogeneity. Puukka highlights the principle of self-sufficiency as a characteristic of military culture. When the principle is threatened, “defence mechanisms” (sic) occur that cause problems and resistance to change (ibid: 143-144, 220). Laaksonen (2004) has argued that the organisational culture of the Defence Forces is based on having military leadership in all parts of the Defence Forces; the system of ‘reposting obligation’\(^8\) that homogenises the Defence Forces; the hierarchical structures and the military command system that unifies organisational conceptions of power; and traditions, rites and rituals linked to a common ideology. As Laaksonen continues, during the early phases of the DAPP, the partnership strategy was defined clearly and the organisation was being restructured accordingly, but organisational culture was ignored and expected to follow the strategic and structural changes without specific managing (ibid. 91-93; 104).

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\(^7\)http://www.phrakl.fi/phrakl/Publish.nsf/$all/449DDA4AAB7860C1C2256FC70048EA7

\(^8\) An employee of the Defence Forces has an obligation to accept an appointment if the employer appoints him/her to another equivalent or superior post elsewhere. Moving is supported economically by means of subsidies.
A favourable interpretation might be that the real estate case was illustrative of the challenges in the public sector organising during the 1980s’ and 1990s’ transition phase from a planning society to a competitiveness society (Alasuutari 1996; Heiskala & Luhtakallio 2006), and that the defence branch partnership projects of 2003 could and would be building on the experiences and lessons learned from the earlier projects. As the PROSEC case will show, a more accurate interpretation can be quite the opposite. Many of the challenges regarding the “recognition of the distinctive qualities of service provision in the public sector” (Grimshaw et al. 2002: 499) and the contradictions “between the claims made for bureaucratic reform and actual experience of work under the conditions it proposes” (Stokes & Clegg 2002: 243) have survived the twenty odd years of New Public Management in the Finnish Defence Forces.

7.1.2. Defence Administration Partnership Programme (DAPP)

The Defence Administration Partnership Programme (DAPP) that started in 2002 comprises of seven projects. The programme aims at the reorganising of the support functions of the Defence Forces through outsourcing, development of its own existing service production, or other arrangements. The seven partnership projects concern transportation, maintenance, data and payroll administration, clothing supplies, health care, and provisioning. Currently (December 2008) the programme is still operating, and three of the seven projects are ongoing. As a whole, the DAPP directly touches the majority of the Finnish Defence Forces’ civilian employees.

The Defence Forces strives for the stated goals of the DAPP – cost efficiency and quality – by differentiating and reorganising activities so that the Defence Forces can focus on its ‘core functions’. This is the crux where New Public Management lays the basis, for its part, for the new structures of the Defence Forces. The distinction between core and support functions has in the result-based defence administration been defined so that:

‘core functions’ refers to things that are crucial for success, whereupon all other things belong to the class of support functions [...] The concept of core functions should be approached simply from the assumption that we define the critical issues that an organisation must/should by itself take care of in order to succeed in its operation (Krogars 2000: 33; translation from Finnish by TT).

The functional and economic objectives of the DAPP are closely tied to aims of inter-organisational collaboration. The DAPP began with an order (DC document 2002b) from the Defence Command (general headquarters of the Defence Forces) planning department, which stated that the purpose of the Defence Administration Partnership Programme is to integrate the Defence Forces more tightly into the Finnish society and produce a surplus for all parties of the cooperation. This means building
such cooperative relationships that also function in different stages of raising readiness.81

A double dynamic is involved in the combination of, on the one hand, redefining the tasks of the Defence Forces in terms of core and support functions and, on the other hand, pursuing closer connections with the surrounding society. At the same time as the Defence Forces backs away and limits itself to its core functions, security mainstreaming stretches out. While the line of divergence between the military and the non-military draws a smaller circle than before around ‘the core’, divergence as such is transcended by new convergent relationships. ‘National unity’ is not mentioned, but it echoes in the economically-phrased reasoning on synergy and in the temporal continuum of co-preparedness from peace to war. Though the purpose statement talks about integration of the Defence Forces “into the Finnish society”, the DAPP means, in fact, also integration of more civilian actors into security and defence organisation.

The ways in which this two-way development of convergence and divergence takes place involves new vocabulary. In 2002, the defence administration defined and made a distinction between ‘outsourcing’, ‘partnership’ and ‘strategic partnership’. These are central forms in which security mainstreaming takes place between the Defence Forces and its commercial partners:

“Outsourcing refers to buying services and work performances from suppliers outside the Defence Forces.

Partnership refers to long-lasting contracts made with suppliers outside the Defence Forces for buying services or work performances and to be carried out only in peacetime.

Strategic partnership refers to long-lasting cooperation between the Defence Forces and service or product provider, where the relationship is based on mutual trust, involves both wide-ranging sharing of information and shared goals of development, and is characterised by preparing for crisis” (DC document 2002b; translation from Finnish by TT).

The Service Centre Working Group that was set up by the Minister of Defence in spring 2005 analysed the different options for organising the different service centres under the defence administration in terms of their administrative and economic position. In its final report (MoD document 2005), the working group looks into four possible options for organising the service centres: 1) a service centre as part of the Defence Forces; 2) a service centre as an independent bureau subordinated to the Ministry of Defence; 3) a service centre as an independent bureau subordinated to some other ministry (but also producing services for defence administration bureaus); 4) Services purchased from markets. The report emphasises the striving towards separation between

81 http://tietokannat.mil.fi/kumppanuusohjelma/perustietoa.php; translation from Finnish by TT.
control/coordination (the ministry), customer/purchaser (the Defence Forces), and provider/producer (service centres) in the organising.82

One of the pilot projects of the DAPP concerned transport equipment maintenance. The final report of the project (Laitinen 2004) points out that the Defence Forces has to a large extent been self-sufficient in service and other production not only in order to secure supply in all circumstances, but also because of inexperience in outsourcing and partnerships, and difficulties in estimating the costs of its own service production. Pilot experiences showed that, in order to succeed, partnerships between the Defence Forces and civilian companies required, among other things, trust and clear roles between partners, risk management, sensitivity to location and brigade-level unit-specific needs in contracting83, and sufficient resources during transitional phases. On the web pages of the DAPP, the project manager of the transport equipment maintenance project said that the biggest challenge faced was the reconciliation of military and civilian practices and cultures.

An illustrative example of the dynamics in and around partnerships is the lifecycle-form of services. With the increasing role of high – and high-priced – technology in defence, risks concerning operability grow. Contracts between the military industry and the Defence Forces therefore include lifecycle support and maintenance services through which the risks and responsibility concerning operability remain with the company, and the customer relationship continues through the lifecycle of the product. As in many other branches, in maintenance and repairing, too, the deepening partnerships of the Defence Forces mean in practice that the civilian shopfloor personnel of the Defence Forces in these functions move into and continue their work as personnel in the private partner companies. One of the criticisms of outsourcing the Defence Forces’ support, also mentioned in the maintenance pilot project report, is that know-how inside the Defence Forces may severely decrease (Laitinen 2004).

The experiences and challenges of partnerships were also tackled in a Defence Forces’ seminar that I attended with one of the PROSEC managers during my fieldwork. The event had around 100 participants from the Defence Forces and defence administration, businesses, educational institutions, and the media. The goal of the event was to share information on the changes in the Defence Forces’ procurement and to build networks among local and national actors in the field of defence.

82 What within the provisioning case was termed the ‘tilaaja-tuottaja’ model or relationship, has been in research literature referred to with several synonyms and English translations with slightly different meanings and uses, such as ‘user-producer’, ‘purchaser-provider’, or ‘customer-supplier’. Here the term ‘customer-provider’ will mainly be used.

83 The specific form of contracting (‘toimintatapamalli’) that was also used in provisioning involved parts that were negotiated on the level of the whole Defence Forces as well as parts negotiated with each customer, i.e. each brigade-level organisation.
As the seminar showed, before the DAPP the Defence Forces had already been on many levels linked to civilian actors through the procurement of goods and services. An example from the brigade-level unit that was organising the event showed that on a local level partnerships existed, for example, in cargo and conscript leave transportation, driving instructor services, office machine and sports equipment maintenance, occupational health care, and medicine logistics. The state central procurement company Hansel also does the tendering for the Defence Forces. Increasing centralisation and large scale partnerships may mean growing benefits for the Defence Forces, but for small local businesses, cooperation with the Defence Forces is becoming possible only through the larger partners of the Defence Forces. As many speakers from the Defence Forces emphasised, the goal in the current developments is to integrate the Defence Forces with the society during peace time so that no large scale changes are necessary in organising supply during crisis situations.

Although cooperation between the Defence Forces and civilian actors, especially the military industry, is nothing new, the analysis of the DAPP and reorganising of provisioning shows that on many levels the new forms of co-organising cause tension and challenges that require active adjustment. Partnership was one such form that needed more than a formal definition. The way three of the seminar’s speakers referred to partnerships drew a peculiar picture.

In the morning session of the one-day partnership seminar, one commander who had been involved in the first Defence Forces’ partnership pilots summarised his argument by saying that partnerships with civilian organisations have to stand crisis situations “not like loose cohabiting nowadays, but like an old-time marriage that bears and endures all things”. As he was also emphasising the possibilities that partnerships open “for us to concentrate” on military core functions, the civilian organisations were given the supportive position in the ‘marriage’. Through the marriage metaphor the organisational relationships between military and civilian spheres are reproduced as gendered and according to gendered division of labour.

Later on in the afternoon, a representative of the defence industry refers back to the commander’s marriage allegory in his presentation. He says that partnership indeed has to be long-lasting and flexible in order to achieve shared interests, and “occasionally purchased services are briefer relationships”. The speaker seems disappointed that the audience does not react to the prostitution allegory with laughter. One of the last speakers is from a local city-owned technology centre. He wants to lighten the end of his speech with “a joke on partnership: A woman comes to man in a restaurant and asks: ‘You’d probably want to hug me, right?’ ‘Yes’, says the man. ‘And kiss me?’ ‘Yes, sure!’ says the man again. ‘Ok, now be careful, here comes the hundred euro question ...”
It is illustrative that these men discuss the civil-military partnership through a discourse of intimate heterosexual relationships. The marriage allegory implies the problematic of the military ‘bachelor’ having been carrying out its own support and human services instead of a supportive partner. The allegory also implies that this partnership is hierarchically ordered in terms of superior core and more marginal support: Thanks to partnership, the military can concentrate on the important tasks.84

When the representative of the defence industry likened purchased services with prostitution, he did simultaneously two things: Firstly, he strengthened the primary nature of the gendered union between the military-husband and the civilian-wife. Secondly, as a representative of an actual partner of the Defence Forces he gave from this ‘wife position’ the right to ‘the husband’ for ‘short-term relationships’. The last joke perhaps reveals a more cynical view of inter-organisational partnerships – as commercial exchange instead of equal reciprocity – but also confirming the unity of men against women’s assumed sexual power. In these addresses of the three speakers, gender as a logic is put in action both to build connections between and unity among men, and to strengthen the hierarchical division between men and women in terms of sexuality and division of labour.

The DAPP involves a rich starting point for learning in terms of civil-military co-organising. The focus in this study, however, is not primarily on the practical development of partnerships between military and civilian organisations. The analytic focus is more on the processual and social aspects and consequences of reorganising support functions in the Defence Forces, and more generally, on the gendered social organisation of defence. Thus, the following analysis goes with a certain focus deeper into one of the DAPP development projects in which the public-private partnership dynamic remains somewhat marginal, and leaves aside the other DAPP projects that may have involved more central and apparent participation of private companies.

7.2. The Provisioning Service Centre of the Defence Forces (PROSEC) and its headquarters (PROSEC HQ)

In this section, I shall lay out the analysis of the provisioning case study (Case II). Compared to the first case study on peacekeeping, the provisioning case study involves a different context within the military, one that may be less easy to visualise and imagine than a peacekeeping camp as it involves complicated, evolving, and spreading organisational relations and a newly centralised but multi-locational organisation at its centre. Nevertheless, it is perhaps appropriate that the complexity and struggles of everyday organisational

84 The allegory has been used in the same dubious way in a ‘classic’ article by Powell (1990) when describing network relations as opposed to market relations and hierarchy relations: “Surely this patterned exchange looks more like a marriage than a one-night stand, but there is no marriage license, no common household, no pooling of assets.”
processes, to a certain extent, enter into the ethnographic reporting, too, instead of either being silenced or fully uncoiled.

After having looked above at the Defence Administration Partnership Programme (DAPP), I shall below discuss the provisioning development project that led to the founding of the new Provisioning Service Centre (PROSEC). The main emphasis will be on the ethnographic fieldwork phase that covered the final stages of the development project, the start-up of the centre, and its first operating months. That said, some reflections are also made on provisioning in the Defence Forces before the project, and on the history of provisioning and catering in Finland.

After a more chronological progression, I shall concentrate on the thematic issues that arose from the field. This part consists of four sections (7.2.3.-7.2.6). The first of these sections looks into the formation of and challenges related to the organisational relations of the PROSEC HQ with its subordinate service units and the Defence Command above it. The second section analyses the construction of civil-military boundaries in terms of gendered work practices, and discursive and symbolic practices. The decision-making process on the location of the PROSEC HQ is, in the third section, discussed with its implications and links to the personal networks and relations of the PROSEC HQ employees. In the final section before the brief conclusion, the separate pilot outsourcing project, which was an offspring of the provisioning development project, is discussed in terms of public-private partnership relations and security mainstreaming.

### 7.2.1. Provisioning before PROSEC

Before the Defence Administration Partnership Programme, provisioning in the Defence Forces was handled by the Defence Forces itself. The around thirty provisioning units were parts of brigade-level units and under the command of supply officers. On the national level, under the Chief of Supply (a general), a senior inspector in the Defence Command coordinated provisioning with two planner-developers elsewhere. Basically, the founding of PROSEC meant that the provisioning service units were no longer parts of brigade-level units, but formed an organisation of their own with a new headquarters directly subordinated to the Defence Command (see Figure 1).
In the years preceding the provisioning development project PROV, several changes had occurred in the regional level organisation of the Defence Forces. By the time the PROV started, the five regional level positions of provisioning chiefs and the position of senior inspector of provisioning were all held by civilian women. As one of these women described in an interview, the development during the 1990s had changed dramatically when result-based management had entered the Defence Forces. Whereas provisioning had earlier been a practically independent linear branch and had had its own resources that were centrally distributed from the Defence Command with regional coordination, from the mid 1990s on, all financial and human resources were divided first at the national level and then between branches at the regional level within military commands. Garrisons became profit centres within which provisioning became marginalised:

MBM1: “The voice of our branch was no longer listened to there. Even if I had in the military command [regional administration] shouted with my head red that the thing is now that we shall not put that post into that service unit any more, that they have enough human resources there. Then when the personnel side there [in the military command administration] discussed the thing amongst themselves, soon they were of the opinion that ‘We won’t take the post away; let’s put it there and fill it’. And when talking about money, if we needed to buy some machine for example, and it is absolutely necessary, then if the money planners were of the opinion that there’s no money, then there was no money. While previously, before that [the money] was in one lump in the Defence Command, back then it was easier to get and affect these things. But now the ability to influence issues was gone [...] And then the developing was only done in individual brigade-level units. And when you think about the branch as a whole, we were so dispersed. Everyone was doing this and that, whereever, and we kind of
didn’t have teeth for anything. That was probably where we ourselves got the idea that for God’s sake, one just cannot cope and continue with this work if there’s not going to be some radical change coming. That’s probably why we went along like 110 on the speedometer when somebody said that yeah, now we have to start developing."85 (Appendix 5, Extract 15)

Organisationally, the introduction of result-based management meant closer ties to host military units for provisioning centres and looser connections to other provisioning centres. The regional level saw the occurring problems and felt the loss of power. The dispersion and loss of influence created a footing for the commitment of provisioning personnel in the forthcoming PROV project. Although the project looked into the disliked option of outsourcing, the other option involved a promise of return to the unified provisioning organisation, now only with a different financial basis.

In addition to the five women from the national and regional level of the Defence Forces’ provisioning, the PROV project group consisted of several chiefs of provisioning service units, three representatives from labour unions and two other people. The group was led by an officer, Lieutenant Colonel Jansson. Out of the sixteen members in addition to the project manager, two were men. The project group originally organised itself as 16 work groups that were later on reorganised. The board of the project had 21 members from the Defence Command, the Ministry of Defence, different military headquarters and brigade-level units, as well as from labour unions, but in reality it met rarely and had a minor role in the project. Many of the project board members played a central role in the project, but mainly in person through the project manager Jansson.

The following table (Table 7) presents the key events of the studied provisioning development project.

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85 As clarified in the glossary at the beginning, ‘MBM’ refers hence to members of the PROSEC HQ management board, ‘HQE’ to other employees of the PROSEC headquarters, and ‘RI’ to other research interviewees.
Table 7  Provisioning development project PROV and start-up of PROSEC in the framework of the Defence Forces’ restructuring

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 2002</td>
<td>Result negotiations between the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 November 2002</td>
<td>Defence Command order on carrying out the partnership programme DAPP in 2002-03 → Development projects: partnership pre-detections and pilot projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2003</td>
<td>LtCol Jansson starts as project manager in the provisioning development project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 December 2003</td>
<td>Final report on the pre-detection: service centre model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 November 2004</td>
<td>Defence Command proposal: Establishment of PROSEC and PROSEC HQ (including location and excluding administrative system)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 December 2004</td>
<td>Decision by the Minister of Defence on establishing PROSEC (against the suggestion of the Defence Command concerning the location)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2005</td>
<td>PROSEC director starts her work; recruitment process for other posts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2005</td>
<td>Rest of the PROSEC managers start their work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 January 2006</td>
<td>PROSEC starts; rest of employees start their work at the PROSEC HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 April 2008</td>
<td>Minister of Defence sets up a project to elucidate four options for developing the Defence Forces' provisioning: operating as part of Defence Forces; service centre subordinated to MoD; incorporation into a company; organising through partial or total purchasing of services, outsourcing, or partnership arrangements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.2.2. Founding and starting PROSEC

In the order (DC document 2002b) that started the DAPP the goals were already set so that the development of provisioning would consist of two distinct processes: one looking into the possibilities of partnership with companies providing catering services, the other mapping the costs and development potential of the Defence Forces’ own provisioning organisation. Years later, provisioning came to be based on developing the existing Defence Forces’ provisioning towards a service centre model. One of the existing service units was outsourced as a partnership pilot case; the Finntown pilot project was to
serve as a point of reference for the development of provisioning within the Defence Forces.

The founding of the Provisioning Service Centre of the Defence Forces (PROSEC) was the key result of the PROV development project. It meant that the more than twenty service units around the country that had been parts of the brigade-level units and under military command were separated from them in administrative terms. These service units were united as a service centre that would be led by a new headquarters, the PROSEC HQ. In the shopfloor service units, the premises, employees and tasks remained mainly the same as before. The PROSEC organisation of around 700 employees was, as one of its key tasks, to produce more than 16 million meals annually for conscripts and employees of the Defence Forces, both in the industrial kitchens at garrisons and in field environments. Another key task of PROSEC was the planning and organising of military provisioning for crisis and war situations. By the time of its start-up, PROSEC was the largest public sector catering organisation.86

The reasoning for the restructuring was stated in the final report of the PROV project group. The main arguments were the strengthening of research and development related to the supply function, better matching with crisis situation needs, and economical and functional organisation according to business economic principles (DF document 2004). The PROV development project had focused on finding the key processes of provisioning according to which the new organisation would be modelled. Functions that were to remain in the provisioning service units were service production, planning of work, operative purchasing, and handling and storage of goods. Strategic and operational planning, financial and personnel administration, research and development, training, supply contracting, and information gathering and reporting were to be centralised at PROSEC HQ.

The PROSEC headquarters were to a large extent organised accordingly into a process organisation with seven sectors. Each sector had a manager and one to four other employees. The service units around the country were divided into four regional groups, and four of the HQ managers would act, in addition to their sectoral tasks, as regional managers having responsibility for four to eight service units.

The major criticism from the PROSEC HQ personnel on the PROV project concerned the economic planning. The financial manager was recruited from the private sector. Many at the PROSEC HQ saw that she was double burdened by the situation when trying to simultaneously learn the state economic administration and start up the economic administration of PROSEC from scratch. Experts in the project group had been mainly from the existing Defence Forces’ provisioning organisation and labour unions with no special expertise in

86 Of all organisations providing catering services in public sector organisations, PROSEC was third largest after CaterComp (pseudonym) and another private company.
economic planning. External assistance was purchased from a consultancy company from where four consultants were involved in the project, especially in the cost-benefit analysis and assessment of profitability concerning the new organisational model. Some PROSEC HQ personnel saw these calculations as overpositive.

HQE: “I do criticise Jansson and the actions of the project group in the sense that they didn’t understand that in the project there should have been an economy person closely involved from the beginning. Now, it has been the case that Jansson and somebody else, apparently the consultant, did the budgeting and preliminary calculations. There should have been a person that would have, as planned, been taken in when PROSEC started [...] When the information seeped through on what had been done, what preparations, are the information systems in order, what does the finance demand, what’s the level of know-how in our forthcoming service units concerning economic issues, and what have the planning and finance departments in the Defence Command done? I realised that nothing has been done, absolutely nothing!” (Appendix 5, Extract 16)

In general, in the interviews many of the PROSEC HQ managers and employers discussed the early stages of the organisation as having been a contradictory phase. On the one hand, starting up a new organisation was found to be an exciting challenge where there were plenty of opportunities to influence the practices that would be adopted and to see the results of one’s own work. On the other hand, most interviewees felt that the HQ employees should have started earlier in order to plan, familiarise themselves with the issues, and make those decisions that would be needed when the organisation started but that were instead done during the process. Although the first year was acknowledged to be a transition period, the organisation was still supposed to be functioning. In addition to economic planning, IT systems and human resource management were worrying the PROSEC management at the start-up. The PROSEC HQ put its trust on the service unit employees and their professionalism: “No matter what, they make the food in there and the conscripts will get their meals.”

7.2.3. Relations of authority and cooperation

The start-up phase in the PROSEC HQ meant the building and defining of connections in several directions. Within PROSEC, the new management built relations with the service units around the country through extensive visiting and a new personnel magazine, and by encouraging the units to contact the HQ in all matters. The opening ceremonies of the centre and the guest list describe the organisational linkages framing PROSEC. The majority of the nearly 130 guests were from within the Defence Forces, representing both customers (commanders and supply officers from each brigade-level unit) and PROSEC employees (service unit chiefs). Other groups invited were businesses around food production, wholesale, and kitchen appliances. Additionally, representatives of local educational institutes, municipal administration,
religious parishes, and media were invited, as well as Members of Parliament from the HQ district.

**The opening day: priests, Latino rhythms, and bold exchanges**

A hectic noon at the PROSEC HQ. Everybody seems to work until the last minute before the ceremonies. Usually, during the first months of the PROSEC the headquarters have often been half-empty as the managers and others have been out visiting PROSEC service units around the country, getting and giving training, or having meetings with clients (military units), the Defence Command representatives, suppliers of kitchen utensils and machinery and food supplies, and others. Today, it is as if everybody is present, bustling about service contracts, invoicing and prices, personnel and salary issues, posting and archiving (“Do we need a safe for confidential documents?”), software problems in reporting, research and development cooperation and projects around provisioning, and goodness knows what else.

At 1 p.m., the ecumenical ceremony starts in the large meeting room. I shake hands with people that turn out to be a song group from the orthodox parish. We all stand through the ritual. Attending are the HQ people, Project Manager Jansson, and some guests from local military units. The Lutheran bishop says that armies march on their stomachs, but man does not live by bread alone. He and the Orthodox Father bless the HQ premises. The renovated offices and new furniture shine in their freshness.

The opening ceremonies start two hours later in a large auditorium in a nearby university building. The director of PROSEC and the Deputy Chief of Supply give speeches, the Minister of Defence, a colonel from the local military county, and a representative of the city pass their greetings. I know the programme was planned to stand out as different from military ceremonies, but the discrepancy is surprisingly palpable between the stiff audience and the jamming Latino rhythms of the military orchestra and its flirting young male singer. Some say afterwards that they were expecting marches.

At the buffet, the atmosphere loosens up. One of the service unit chiefs tells us a funny story about how she got to fly in a helicopter in some military manoeuvres. She says she had baked a layer cake for the pilots in order to get in, and that she would never ever want to fly in a helicopter again. I keep thinking that I am over-interpreting as I see the story crystallising the social order and the division of work in the military: a bold exchange of a cake for a flight is made across the gendered civil-military borderline. After the horrors of the air amidst the war-like manoeuvres, the status
quo is restored: “Never again!” “Is anything changing with PROSEC?”, I ponder, hiding amongst the greenery when the PROSEC director comes to me: “How are you, you look so pitiful here alone. Let me introduce you to some people...”

PROSEC and the Defence Command

During the first operational year of PROSEC, the new centre was not able to function according to the planned customer-provider model because of its contradictory statutory position. Instead of outsourcing, the project arrived at a model that was named “internal partnership”. This meant that PROSEC was to act as the provisioning service provider and the brigade-level units as customers.

Organisationally, PROSEC was subordinated to the supply department at the Defence Command and the director of PROSEC reported to the Chief of Supply. This hierarchical relationship clashed with the principle of separating the service producer from the service user. As both the brigade-level units and PROSEC were under the command of the Defence Command, PROSEC was in practice part of its client. In terms of accounting, the Defence Forces is one accounting office:

TT: “So you wish that you were subordinated to the Ministry of Defence [instead of the Defence Forces]?”

MBM2: “I...yes. In order to make this customer-provider model actually work. Now that we charge internally, it’s nothing but circulation of toytown money...factually. Allocated money just goes around from one place to another.” (Appendix 5, Extract 17)

This organisational arrangement was planned to be temporary, but no date was set for when PROSEC would be separated from the control of the Defence Command. Neither was there a decision on how this would take place. The arrangement clashed with the application of business economic principles. As an ‘internal partner’, PROSEC was to have a ‘zero based budget’ and to cover its costs through service contracts with the brigade-level units that, for their part, got their funds through negotiated allocations from the Defence Command. Both budgeting and the customer-provider relationship seemed threatened by the Defence Command authority:

MBM3: “I heard about one thing that had been drafted in, and we thought it wasn’t what we wanted. I thought I would call [a general in the Defence Command] directly, and I did, and afterwards I thought it was better so.”

TT: “So the thing had been drafted there...?”

MBM3: “Yes, an option that didn’t, it concerned budgeting, they had thought that we would have an allocation. It totally contradicted the customer-provider model. I called and said that I heard something like this
and that I see it as very worrying, then the model doesn’t actualise and we don’t meet the goals, everything is endangered.” (Appendix 5, Extract 18)

MBM4: “One concrete example: the selling of food tickets. We would like to sell them from the service units, and the brigade-level units want the same. The Defence Command doesn’t understand at all, they think that no new cashiers should be founded, and now they sent an order that the brigade-level units will continue selling the tickets. So, if one thinks about customer orientation and the customer-provider model, then this is totally contrary to it all, that our customers and we as a service provider agree that ‘Ok, let’s do it this way’, and then there is a third party that says no and orders something else, which generates dissatisfaction in the brigade-level units which falls on us. It is really difficult to get [the Defence Command] to understand that this should work so that the Defence Command guides through owner-management, […] zero-result expectation, efficiency and economic demands, and goal-setting, and that’s it.” (Appendix 5, Extract 19)

The relationship between PROSEC and the Defence Command funnelled most of the problems that PROSEC faced. The authority-based bureaucracy of the military was seen in PROSEC as a hindrance for renewal and application of business models. During the PROSEC start-up phase, it was unclear what regulations constrained and what was the division of power between PROSEC HQ and the Defence Command concerning the procurement of supplies, pricing, the recruitment of the PROSEC managerial board, the incentive system, the salaries of HQ employees, and the hiring of workforce.

Intermingled with the problems in relations of authority were the complications of different conflating reforms within different levels of the Defence Forces, including, among other things, changing IT systems and restructuring of the Defence Command. The disinclination of some parts of the Defence Command to cooperate smoothly was interpreted as power struggles and fear within the Defence Command:

MBM5: “An additional thing mixing in can be that currently the personnel at the Defence Command is cut down, they can think sort of that, ‘Are our tasks taken away now?’, that their personal future is in danger. It’s understandable that people struggle; it comes very close to someone’s personal future. They think that if all decision-making power and things are transferred to us so ‘What’s left to me anymore?’ So it’s pretty human. There’s many kinds of dynamics going on.” (Appendix 5, Extract 20)

HQE: “We are like a young horse that has a terrible urge to go, but as the shafts are so tight one can’t go. The shafts in this case are the standing orders, the dated attitudes of, for example, the decision-makers, and the organisation has been built in a centralist manner. In our organisation, in our hierarchy, we have put the power into Defence Command, which doesn’t necessarily know what’s going on in the field. We have to explain things simply and in detail in order to get them through. Certain things become emphasised in the Defence Forces. If we were under some civilian
administration, we maybe wouldn’t bump into so many things that now create a straight ‘No’. What becomes obvious here is that in here you get by so easily hiding behind security or secrecy or something else, very easily.” (Appendix 5, Extract 21)

Orders and networks

One of the things that were valued in the military, especially by those PROSEC HQ members that had previously worked in civilian organisations, was the principle of following rules and carrying out decisions. Many interpreted the military practice of giving and taking orders positively. Order-based organising was seen as effective and clear, and the approval and preference of orders was both in practice and discursively linked with the possibility of discussion in planning phases preceding decisions. Instead of silencing, hierarchy and formulated procedures channelled even vigorous criticism. Trust that the system would not clog up due to suggestions or objections gave a certain latitude.

A parallel discourse was built in relation to the prevailing understanding of military organising and orders, a discourse that valued this system but stated that the reality was no longer accordant:

RI1: “In the old days, when everything came on paper and was ordered and commanded, it was clear, one knew that this is how the system works. I remember when I came to the house [=the Defence Forces], people said that ‘things can be discussed and fought out up until the decision comes, but then when it comes, it’s the end of the gab’. Everyone agrees with what the order or decision says, it’s the word of God, then there is no more discussion. Up until then one can disagree...”

RI2: “But now the culture has changed, some years ago in fact, in that when an order arrives saying how things are, the next day there’s a new order [saying] that it doesn’t matter, now we do this, or one withdraws the order. Never before was it so that an order was worth nothing. [...] There’s a saying among the officers that in the Defence Command there should be one more general: the post of deciding general.” [Two women in expert positions interviewed together] (Appendix 5, Extract 22)

The other side of military bureaucracy and the clear chain of command was how things actually proceeded. The challenge was to know the persons whom to contact to affect the state of affairs and get things done. Shortcuts to key persons were seen to hasten work and decision-making processes and to enable the bypassing of problematic individuals or units. One interviewee with longer experience in the Defence Forces talked about a new “culture of playing games” where ignoring the chain of command and hiding information are part of power struggles.

At the PROSEC HQ, this dynamic of formal and informal channels was intermingled with the civil-military division. Employees with a background in
the Defence Forces thought that for PROSEC, as a new type of organisation, and especially for the managers from the civilian sector, the threshold to bend the bureaucratic procedures and the command chain might be lower – for the benefit of PROSEC. Those that had recently entered the Defence Forces complained about not knowing who to contact and how the military system differed from their earlier work organisations: which organisations, departments, and units in the Defence Forces are responsible for what? How do the military ranks restrict communications, what is appropriate?

The PROV project and founding of PROSEC were in many ways linked to the social networks of Project Manager Jansson. The PROSEC managers saw that LtCol Jansson’s relations to the Defence Command – having worked there – and to the Ministry of Defence, his experience of and contacts concerning supply and provisioning in the Defence Forces, as well as his knowledge and involvement in municipal politics and administration were crucial for the whole provisioning development process. Jansson himself agreed and added to the list the officers of his age class and other officers whose head union steward he had been at one point of his career and who were now in powerful positions in the Defence Forces.

When the PROV project was drawing to a close and PROSEC was starting off, the question was how Jansson’s networks could be transferred to the PROSEC HQ. The PROSEC director set great store by the several meetings that she had with Jansson and his contacts in military administration and units. As such, Jansson’s social capital became utilised when he retired from the Defence Forces after the PROV project and became a consultant of public-private relations and cooperation in the very consultancy company that participated in the PROV project.

At the PROSEC service units

The director of PROSEC and some of the other PROSEC managers visited all the 24 service units around the country before the opening of the centre. Visits followed more or less the same script each time. They included discussions with the commander and other representatives from the brigade-level unit concerning brigade-specific supply requirements and the new organisation of provisioning. Afterwards, the management board got acquainted with the service unit premises and presented itself to the service unit employees at a coffee reception. In their short presentations, the management board members emphasised that along with the establishing of PROSEC this particular branch of supply service was no longer a trivial support function of the Defence Forces, but the core function of the new centre. The centralisation of planning, development, human resource management, administration, and procurement at the PROSEC headquarters would enable the service units to focus on customers and the production of high quality services. The management board did not want the headquarters to become an ivory tower, and they talked about the distribution of power and responsibility to service unit superiors.
Shopfloor personnel in the service units were worried and confused about what the organisational change would mean in practice and in terms of their work. During the service unit visits by the management board, via their representatives in the organisational cooperation body, and in informal situations, the provisioning employees claimed they were uninformed. The employees were also tackling the organisational and social changes of becoming non-members of the garrison communities that they worked and often lived in: could the personnel of PROSEC still use, for example, the medical and computer support services of their previous host military units? Would attitudes towards them change among military personnel? One commander stated that in organisational restructurings in the Defence Forces, the most severe worries among many are “Can we keep our [local] flag, who takes care of our [military] traditions?”

The realities that were encountered in the reorganising process were apparent in a meeting over coffee between one of the service unit superiors, the development project manager and a couple of PROSEC managers:

The unit superior, a woman with a long career at the service unit, wishes that the 20-year-old plans for renewing the premises surrounding us would be carried out. She reads out her notes from her cross-ruled notebook, and they go in to the Communicator mobile phone of Project Manager Jansson. The superior is troubled by the weak work motivation and the health problems brought on by the high average age (44 years) among the unit employees; 15% of the unit personnel have limited working abilities. While the project manager talks about “inward entrepreneurship” and “diversified know-how”, the unit superior hopes to get a chance to transfer her career experience of 35 years as a superior to someone younger before facing retirement.

Concerning the future of PROSEC, the views of the management and their message to the shop floor differed somewhat. The service unit employees that were worried about the organisational change and possible future development towards outsourcing were soothed, but in the interviews the managers admitted that they saw this development as possible. During the above-described visit to a brigade-level unit, the personnel asked directly whether there was a possibility that PROSEC would be sold to CaterComp, a major company in the catering business. The project manager replied that no such investments that the founding of PROSEC had required would have been made if such plans existed. However, in the starting phase of PROSEC both the existing plans of the Ministry of Defence (MoD document 2005) and the views of the PROSEC management board already included anticipation of a possible future outside the Defence Forces:

MBM6: “Yeah, I do see a certain development that this won’t operate for too many years under the Defence Forces. I see this development going further, probably under the Ministry of Defence and possibly at some point
also as a service centre of the state administration. And then as a public utility. And then it's hived off and sold out [laughs], this is how they usually go." (See also MBM2 above.) (Appendix 5, Extract 23)

Excursus: Historical continuities and parallels

It remains unclear to what extent the PROSEC managers were familiar with the history of provisioning and catering in the Finnish public sector and workplaces in general. This history follows to a large extent the imagined progress of PROSEC described above by the PROSEC manager, and it involves parallel organisational trajectories of privatisation and monopolisation since the times of World War II. At the same time, it draws gendered historical continuities between the wartime and today.

In Finland after the Continuation War, the women of the dismantled paramilitary Lotta Svärd organisation set up a support foundation for Finnish women (Suomen Naisten Huoltosäätiö). Within the foundation, an association (that soon became a company) was set up to organise work for women, especially displaced persons, after their wartime tasks. The first line of business was provisioning of the vast war reconstruction and rebuilding sites. The company (Työmaahuolto Oy) gained a good reputation with organising the catering of large events – such as the Olympic Games of 1952 in Helsinki – and opening the first Finnish restaurant where women were allowed without the company of men. In addition to the restaurant business and workplace catering of major state-linked companies, Työmaahuolto Oy and its subsidiaries were involved in the first steps of airline catering and organising the school meal system. In 1978, the company was sold to CaterComp (Kleemola 1994; Hakkarainen & Huovinen 1999).

Similarly, the state nourishment centre (Valtion ravitsemiskeskus) was originally established in the late 1940s for war reconstruction and rebuilding sites in Lapland and elsewhere. In the 1960’s and 1970’s, the centre grew as the school meal system widened and the state strove for organised workplace provisioning for all its employees. The enlarging state office was incorporated into a public utility at the end of the 1980’s and into a state owned company in 1993. At this point, the centre had 16% share of the personnel restaurant branch in Finland. Less than a year after the latest conversion, the state sold the company to its large private competitor, again CaterComp (HE document 1992).

7.2.4. Social construction of civil-military relations

On the level of the Defence Forces organisation, the analysis of relations between civilian and military personnel and the division into these two spheres is central. The division between soldiers and civilian employees is gendered and in many respects follows the general horizontal (according to branches and
professions) and vertical (male majority in upper levels of hierarchies) division of work (Kolehmainen 1999). The civilians and the soldiers in the Defence Forces also differ in terms of their education and labour unions. The civil-military division is also apparent in the discursive and symbolic construction of both the Defence Forces in relation to its environment and the social structures within the Defence Forces.

**Gendered rotation practice: “Women stay, officers circulate”**

Within the Defence Forces, soldiers lead civilians. In most units and chains of command, the civilians – whether they are shopfloor workers or experts – are directly or ultimately subordinated to military foremen. Despite the large proportion of civilian employees in the Defence Forces, their experience of tenuous professional collectivity stand against the tightness and continuity of the relations between professional soldiers:

RI3: “After all, this organisation, the Defence Forces, is divided into civilians and soldiers. We don’t have the kind of networks inside the house [the Defence Forces] that the soldiers have. Soldiers are in a special position because a soldier always helps a soldier. They’ve been on the same, they may have been since doing their conscription, followed their careers and having friends... They do have the support and the networks in a different way here inside the organisation. We are, for example here [in our organisation], each one is alone the expert in one’s field.” [Woman in a superior / expert position.] (Appendix 5, Extract 24)

No military personnel were included in the PROSEC headquarters. The management board emphasised the successfulness of the recruitment that brought in expertise equally from the civilian side of the Defence Forces, other public sector organisations and the private sector. A combination of former Defence Forces’ employees and managers and experts from ‘outside’ was seen to guarantee continuity and familiarity with the institutional environment, as well as the potential for change.

Nonetheless, most of the interviewees at the PROSEC headquarters saw that it was beneficial that there was one male member in the management board with a short career as an officer. This manager himself thought that in addition to his professional military experience, his personal networks were of use to the new organisation:

MBM7: “I have of course my own cadet course brothers at every garrison, good friends, that is. But I did, on basis of my earlier tasks, get acquainted with remarkably many other people too; I mean officers from somewhat

87 The largest union in the defence administration and the Border Guard, Maanpuolustuksen Henkilökuntaliitto (MPHL ry, under STTK), states on its slogan that it is “in the cause of civilians” (“siviilien asialla”) (http://www.mphl.fi/). Military personnel is mainly unionised in Upseeriliitto (under AKAVA), Päällystöliitto and Sotilasammatiliitto.
earlier cadet courses. So that I do have contacts there, at every garrison, based on earlier assignments and also through hobbies. Just to mention the Officers’ Sports Association where the commander of the Southern Command is at the moment the chairperson, so through that I’ve got contacts with a bit elderly officers. They’ve been pretty useful.” (Appendix 5, Extract 25)

In addition to the common training and the activities in voluntary organisations, the assignments during a military career in different brigade-level units and other military organisations across the country create connections between professional soldiers. Many interviewees brought up the career planning and circulation of officers as well as the problems involved:

RI1: “...many people who are not acquaintances in that sense, when they hear that one is working in the Defence Forces they say ‘Good God, how come you’re there as there are so many men, how does one get along with them?’ I’ve always said that ‘I can deal with them, if only we could get the bitches out’. I mean it’s awful how women eat each other up [...] We civilians are permanent but the officers change. They change every 2-4 years. Every time an officer changes, they come as a spring chicken, they don’t know anything about what they’re going to work on. This is the point when a woman strikes: ‘I shall tell you what your tasks are. You can always get help from me. I can tell you how the previous officer has done things and where you can find the papers.’” [Woman in an expert position.] (Appendix 5, Extract 26)

As one of the PROSEC managers analysed, the circulation of officers stems from the career development framework, and the needs of the organisation are left aside. When officers in managerial positions change constantly, development responsibilities are formalities and the commitment to organisational changes is weak. Continuity is upheld by subordinate administrative personnel who, according to the interviewed manager, do not – in fear of losing their jobs – strive for rationalisation of practices even if they were to see a need for it.

This atmosphere of fear and stagnation also involves power relations. The gendered division of work between women’s maintenance routines and male officers’ rotation of managerial assignments results in power conflicts among the subordinate administration. This may worsen the workplace climate, lessen the possibilities of women to see their common interests, and strengthen stereotypical understandings of women’s inability for cooperation.

**Discursive and symbolic negotiations**

The analysis of the PROSEC founding process and the micro processes it includes bring up the varying dynamics of a unique process of security mainstreaming. One central feature that makes this process a security mainstreaming process is the attempt and need to renegotiate the organising – in this case of provisioning – in terms of the civil-military divide. This distinction and division between civil and military spheres was apparent but
also reworked in many discursive and symbolic aspects of the PROV development project.

Regardless of the background of the informant, all research participants from the PROSEC HQ used the spatial distinction of inside(rs)-outside(rs) to mark the organisational boundaries of the Defence Forces. Perhaps most clearly this spatial distinction came up in relation to the process of recruitment of personnel for the PROSEC headquarters. The project group saw that new expertise, views and practices were needed for introducing the new business economic operations model. Therefore, an external consultant was used during the project, and half of the PROSEC headquarters personnel were hired from ‘outside’, namely the private sector, municipalities and other public sector areas.

At the end of the final meeting of the PROV project group, Project Manager Jansson stands up and says that he is offended. He has heard that in a recent meeting of a defence personnel union the recruitment process concerning PROSEC HQ had been publicly panned. The main criticism had been linked to what many Defence Forces’ employees had thought, that no new civilians from ‘outside’ should be hired as the Defence Forces’ workforce was cut at the same time all around. Jansson emphasises that 2/3 of the recruited PROSEC HQ personnel were former Defence Forces’ employees, despite the fact that of the applicants only 9% were from ‘inside’. “I wouldn’t like to hear these kinds of things from the general corps, but directly. That applies also in the future”, he concludes pointing at the PROSEC director. Later on, project manager Jansson complains to me one-to-one that the problem with the union in question is that it only has members from the Defence Forces: “They are against all personnel cuts because it means cuts in their membership fees and officials’ salaries.”

The inside-outside division is closely linked to the theme of change and renewal. The ‘outside’ was discussed in connection with such expressions as the “new blood and new winds” and “views and know-how” that “young, energetic, and well-educated” employees would bring to the Defence Forces. One PROSEC manager described herself as coming to the Defence Forces “out of the blue, from the deep forest”. On the other hand, the PROV project and other similar projects were described as in many ways too “inner circle” or “homespun” as mainly Defence Forces’ employees were involved in them. PROSEC employees with previous experience from the Defence Forces were discussed as “the oldies” or “old stagers” having been “longer in the house” or “fostered by the organisation”.

PROSEC had major challenges with its organisational identity linked to the civil-military divide. The themes of ‘breaking the mould’ or ‘transgressing the borders’ in the Defence Forces and building the organisational identity for PROSEC were central for the whole process of organising PROSEC and how the
people in the headquarters discussed it. The change that the new organisation was supposed to bring and that the PROSEC HQ eagerly wanted to promote, met with adversity, and caused a lot of fear and suspicion both within and especially outside PROSEC. PROSEC was a civilian organisation, and yet it was in many respects equivalent to a brigade-level unit and under the command of the Defence Command; the head of the centre came from a public utility with no military-related experience, and she was the first woman to work as an equivalent of a commander in the Finnish Defence Forces. The civil-military identity problematic came up recurrently in the everyday life of the organisation:

A management board meeting is coming to a close.

MBM A: “Were there any other issues?”

MBM B takes up the issue of stamps. Others laugh. MBMb explains that they are for secrecy stamping and signing. He suggests that the stamp could consist of the text ‘PROSEC’ and the name of the place of each service unit, and have the Finnish Lion in between them.

MBM A: “Or perhaps our own logo?”

MBM B: “Everybody has the lion.”

MBM C: “But are we part of that ‘everybody’? I once again pose this question.”

MBM B: “I’ll find out about the regulations.”

The civil-military divide became visible – literally – in the planning of the visual appearance of the new organisation. When the planning of the logo of PROSEC started only some weeks before the organisation started, the planning group of three PROSEC managers and the forthcoming Communications Planner shared a view that differed from the Defence Forces traditions:

HQE, Communications Planner: “In the way that we didn't, didn't want our logo to follow the heraldic guidelines so strictly, so that it would be like the symbols of military units, but that we would go for a more the kind of, like the logos of today's business life. [...] When we were sitting around the same table we had, kind of had the same view that now we shall break some boundaries, with a purpose. [...] If we think about the symbols of brigade-level units, they very often have the historical aspect in them signs. That it, part of the sign comes from some old sign or respects the the history of some sign. So now, the starting point was to begin with the visual symbol to represent the togetherness and to build already with the sign this workplace or work community into a kind of... that would it be like a kind of visual manifestation of team spirit or this PROSEC.” (Appendix 5, Extract 27)

The planning of the logo originated from the fact that a person at the Defence Command, responsible for the visual appearance of the Defence Forces, had been serving in the military as a conscript together with the PROSEC communications planner. The draft form of the sign was welcomed both by PROSEC employees and the graphical designer in the Defence Command. Still, in the first meeting of the PROSEC cooperation body (‘yhteistoiminta- eli YT-
elin’) it was criticised: Costs could have been saved by involving PROSEC employees in the planning instead of an advertising company.

Permission was applied for the use of the logo from the Defence Command, and five months later the first issue of the PROSEC personnel magazine revealed that the Chief of Defence had just approved the logo. The collision of military heraldry and business aesthetics resulted in a business-like visual sign with colours that were congruent with other signs of brigade-level units. The other similar service centre in the Defence Forces did not have a logo at that stage.

In addition, the hierarchical structures of the Defence Forces that were seen as a problematic inheritance from the military organisation were represented in a new way. The brochure that included pictures of HQ personnel and their information had the sector teams sprinkled around, and the “serious faces with a grey background” were extracted from the background. In her presentations, the centre director repeatedly used the organisational chart of PROSEC that placed her and the HQ in the bottom, the service units above the HQ, and the brigade-level units as clients at the top.

7.2.5. The location of the PROSEC HQ and some implications

The location of the PROSEC HQ and the decision-making process behind it involved many linkages to the social and organisational networks around PROSEC. The location issue connects together dynamics from national politics to the private lives of individuals and from the organisation of work to interorganisational relations. What is highlighted is the complexity of social relations and the relational character of institutional processes.

The HQ placement process

The PROV project group was not tasked to make a decision on the location of the service centre headquarters, but it did look into three alternative ways to organise it. A SWOT analysis was made on having either a) a virtual headquarters with operating units across the country, b) a centralised headquarters in one municipality, or c) a headquarters split into two so that training and development would be geographically separated from the other functions of the headquarters. The last-mentioned option was based on the fact that the Defence Forces provisioning already had a separate research and development centre in existence.

The strengths and opportunities of the virtual headquarters option concerned personnel, in that it would be easier to recruit due to the possibility of

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88 A ‘SWOT analysis’ is a planning and evaluation tool based on mapping the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of, for example, a certain organisation, process, project, or business venture.
telecommuting and less need to move. The option was considered operationally weak as it did not support crisis organisation; it also would have threatened to maintain the old ways of working, and prevented team working. The project group recommended the centralised model that would be operationally and economically most effective with closer ties among personnel and a united organisational identity. The main recorded threat was that the views of the Defence Forces would not be taken into consideration in choosing the location of the headquarters. It remains unclear how the PROV project group foresaw this soon-to-be-actualised threat.

After the final report of the PROV, Project Manager Jansson made an analysis, with assistance, for the basis of Defence Command’s proposal concerning the location of the PROSEC HQ. An analysis was made of five localities based on four general criteria. In order of importance and weighting in the assessment, the criteria concerned personnel factors (recruitment, securing and preserving human resources and know-how on provisioning), operational factors (especially proximity to central partners in cooperation), economic factors (avoidance of investment needs and costs concerning premises and support services), and regional effects upon local business life, employment and population development. The criteria were laid out in a statute concerning location assessments.

The Minister of Defence made the decision against the Defence Command proposal. He emphasised regional policy arguments, and chose the location that received least points in the analysis. According to the Defence Command assessment, the place chosen by the minister was the most unsuitable both according to the above-mentioned weighting of criteria and with regional factors weighted as the most important criterion. The decision spawned a written question by a Member of Parliament who suggested that the decision had already been made before the assessment. He also pointed out that the PROSEC HQ would be located in the minister’s constituency. The parliamentary representative asked whether the decision was legal and whether the legislation on the regionalisation of state functions was restricting government discretion and would thus need revision.

In the reply – and in the replay of the discussion eight months later in the main national newspaper – the Minister of Defence argued that the decision was based on the Defence Command assessment that had been completed in the Ministry of Defence. The substantial argument was that long term development of provisioning had to be taken into consideration, and the chosen location provided the centre a good environment in terms of cooperation in research and development. In the discussion, the local university and its research on obesity and eating behaviour was mentioned, as well as the local polytechnic with programmes on catering, domestic services, and tourism. The Minister’s reply also mentioned that service centres under defence administration might in future also provide services for other branches of state administration. According to the Minister, the placement decision continued the politics of
regionalisation of state functions primarily outside the capital area. It was prepared and discussed in the ministerial working group of administration and regional development, and in the coordination group of regionalisation where it was unanimously supported and, thus, not taken to a government meeting.

The multilayered social context of the placement process

As such, the specific political and administrational tensions around the regionalisation of state administration are outside the scope of this study. The assessment of the costs and benefits of the location decided for the PROSEC headquarters would be a study of its own. One can only say with regard to the recruitment, as a director at the Ministry of Defence noted in the newspaper discussion, that the chosen location did not seem to be a major problem in terms of attractiveness as more than thousand people applied for the 25 positions in the headquarters (Iivonen 2005). Still, the issue of the PROSEC HQ location brings to light some connections within the social organisation of defence to be discussed. Here they can only be mentioned in brief, and, thus, they require further inquiry.

One of these connections is the confrontational interaction between the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Command. This civil-military relationship has been discussed thoroughly by Puukka (2005), who suggests the dissolving of the decades long tension between “the battle paradigm” and “the administrative paradigm” with the merger of the Ministry and the Defence Command into a “security ministry” of comprehensive crisis management (ibid. 265-266). Although the tensions may have also slowed down the provisioning development project, the primacy of the civilian authority did not show signs of suffering at the organisational level. As one of the PROSEC managers said, she had feared an outbreak of work-to-rule when she started in her job after the HQ placement decision had been made, but, against all odds, she encountered no signs of criticism after the decision.

Regionalisation policy as such resonates with ‘territorial defence’ as a bedrock basis for defence. Territorial defence refers to both the strategic principle of defending the whole domain of Finland with a mass army (Raitasalo 2008), and in practice, as a prerequisite of carrying out this principle, a certain geographical coverage in terms of military sites and units. As Raitasalo (2008) argues, although the position of territorial defence – and the mass conscription of men that it has been seen to require – is still strong within the Finnish defence system, three other elements have gained ground since the end of the Cold War; namely, military crisis management, networked high-technology warfare, and the framework of protecting the vital functions of the society (ibid. 130-161).
As mentioned earlier, the wide personal network of Project Manager Jansson was central to the process that led to the founding of PROSEC. It turned out that Jansson – who had made the original assessment on the PROSEC HQ location that was then turned down by the ministry – and the Member of Parliament who had made the written question concerning the HQ placement decision, had a connection. They were representatives of the same party in the same city council.90

When Jansson’s connection to the parliamentarian came up in the research interview, Jansson linked it with the interview question on ‘old boys’ networks’, and made observations about networking:

Jansson: “Old boy’s network is more the kind of, for you, for me, for you, for me. But here there has been nothing for me, everything has… Well I’ve had, in a way, that I’ve probably had, I’ve been given the kind of references for this job that I’m now going to get a good, pretty good position [after retirement] probably. That’s kind of what I have to say about it. If that’s about being in an old boys’ network, I don’t think it is. [...] This is about know-how, about putting the network skills to use, for the benefit and good purposes of this community, which is also profitable for society. When we come to this kind of a solution that, if we think in economic terms, for example, it [PROSEC] is soon going to save five million Euros per year, for the defence of the fatherland, for more important things.” (Appendix 5, Extract 28)

Project Manager Jansson’s deliberation and relationship with the parliamentarian show the complexity of the network dynamic. Firstly, they show the entanglement of the substance and qualities of network ties with their usage and the meanings given to networking. Even though the structure was the same, a network is not the same when it is used for different purposes or according to a particular logic (for example the old boys’ network with reciprocal use for the benefit of the network itself or the dyad parties versus the ‘common good’). The context and valuation of social contacts leads to different networking practices and strategies. In the interview, Jansson compares the American way of thinking about networks (“What do I do with a man without relations”) and the Finnish view (“It’s a crap bloke who lives off relations”).

Secondly, Jansson’s use of contacts shows how an egocentric network connects, not only different networks, but also different logics and social structures to pursue a certain goal. The bureaucratic military chain of command is, much through Jansson, in the use of the provisioning development project, but so are his ties to the officers of his age group around the country, the defence administration with its own administrative logic, the media through “trusted

90 According to the Finnish penal code (Rikoslaki [The Penal Code of Finland] 39/1898, chapter 45 [military offences], 19§ [illegal political activity] and 27§ [soldiers]) military officers and trainees for military posts cannot be members of political parties or party-political associations. LtCol Jansson was elected to the city council as an independent candidate from the list of the particular party. After retiring from the Defence Forces, he joined the party.
journalists eager for news if one knows what to offer”, and, if need be, the political machinery. Jansson’s social capital is constructed as a multilayered dynamic of opportunities for taking advantage of different social structures.

Additionally, Jansson’s contact with the parliamentarian creates a loop in terms of the civil-military problematic. While the civilian defence administration (mainly the Ministry of Defence) retained its primacy in relation to the military throughout the PROSEC HQ placement process, LtCol Jansson outflanked the civil-military division and balance that are maintained by such regulations as the prohibition of soldiers’ political activity. His position as a soon-retiring officer involved in politics was quite exceptional, but the loop he catalysed points to the subtle complexities behind the formal civil-military relations.

Families, personal relations, and moving

The effects of the Defence Forces restructuring trickle down to personal lives and the relations of those working in the Defence Forces. For many of the PROSEC HQ employees, the new occupational environment and challenges were mingled with changes in their and their families’ lives. The ‘reposting obligation’ of the Defence Forces’ employees did not directly affect any of the new PROSEC HQ staff. Still, for some, the change of workplace was more or less forced. As one HQ employee explained, he knew his former post in the Defence Forces was soon going to be done away with so he practically had to apply and take the job at PROSEC. Although the new job was pleasing and fitted him, his spouse had just accepted a job in the old neighbourhood and the newly built house of the family was now for sale.91 The PROSEC HQ employees that had been employed by the Defence Forces prior to starting in PROSEC were, partly exceptionally for civilian employees, entitled to subsidies when moving closer to PROSEC HQ from a considerable distance.

Among the PROSEC HQ employees, a few of those that had to move because of their new jobs, had moved across the country back to a familiar neighbourhood, some closer to their families, or with a view to spending their retirement nearer to kin. Some were already living on the area when they had applied for the jobs, others were now contemplating the the pros and cons of their old and new domicile and the possible changes that would ensue in their lifestyle.

For many, the start-up phase of PROSEC meant certain choices and sacrifices in terms of their families and other social relations, and leisure activities. The start-up was a transition stage after which one could familiarise with the new place of residence and start again hobbies temporarily put aside. As one interviewee said, she had spent months in her new home town, but knew

91 At least three of the eight PROSEC managers were at the time around the PROSEC start-up building a house in the town where PROSEC HQ was located.
practically no locals outside the workplace and had not really been anywhere except at work and home.

Five out of the fifteen PROSEC HQ members that were interviewed were or had been married to another Defence Forces’ employee. They, as well as most of those that had worked for the Defence Forces before, had experienced several changes in their place of residence for work-related reasons. One of them was a single mother, in whose interview the agency and coping strategies of individuals within the context of organisational and residential changes came up in a way that took the interviewer by surprise:

HQE: “I wasn’t so worried about myself, I thought I would cope, but one thinks about the kid that, tearing her out of the school in the middle of the term, that must have been quite hard for my daughter, or not hard because we had talked about it. I started well in advance to prepare for it, that this shall maybe happen, that we move. Still we couldn’t avoid the tears when the decision came. But she has maintained relations there, next week she’s going to Oldtown for school [laughs] for a couple of days.”

TT: “Oh? To school for a couple of days?”

HQE: “Yeah, to see her [old] classmates. It’s been agreed with the schools. Matilda was well in advance familiarising herself here with everything; she started in East Bay School, she went there, too, for a day before the actual schoolgoing, got to familiarise and be there [...]”

TT: “That’s a new thing to me that schools too have that kind of [system]...”

AK: “Well the kid has herself organised that, she asked for permission from the teacher and then from the other end, too, about whether she can come to say hello. I don’t see any problem in it; on the contrary it is for the child, that you think how she feels about it.” (Appendix 5, Extract 29)

7.2.6. City of Finntown pilot project / CaterComp

During the PROV project – one year before PROSEC was established – a pilot project of outsourcing had already started in one of the provisioning service units. Although early in the project the option of outsourcing through partnerships had already been abandoned as the basis of reorganising provisioning, there was a need for a point of comparison for the development of the service production by Defence Forces’ provisioning service itself. The pilot project at the Finntown military units served that purpose.
### Table 8  Key phases of the Finntown pilot project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 2002</td>
<td>Result negotiations between the Minister of Defence and the Commander of the Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 November 2002</td>
<td>Order on carrying out the Defence Administration Partnership Programme DAPP in 2002-03 → Development projects: partnership pre-detections and pilot projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 April 2003</td>
<td>Partnership working group of the PROV project suggests a partnership at the units in the City of Finntown (and that another regiment that was also planned to be piloted should be left out)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 April 2003</td>
<td>Pre-contract between the City of Finntown and the Defence Forces; Request for Information (RFI) discussed in the PROV project board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 May 2003</td>
<td>Defence Command order: One of the two planned piloting projects to be continued; full analysis of the possibilities of developing the Defence Forces’ own provisioning services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2003</td>
<td>Defence Command analysing the replies from the private service providers to the RFI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October-November 2003</td>
<td>Presentation of the division of costs between the City of Finntown and the Defence Forces at the commercial working group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2003</td>
<td>Tendering / Request for Qualifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2004</td>
<td>The Cooperation within Undertakings procedure (‘YT-menettely’): information to and consultation with the personnel⁹²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March-April 2004</td>
<td>Individual CwU discussions 2 April, the Minister of Defence accepts the CaterComp tender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-June 2004</td>
<td>Termination of employer contracts and new contracts with the new employer (CaterComp)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 June 2004</td>
<td>PROV project final report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2004</td>
<td>Round of official opinions on the PROV final report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 December 2004</td>
<td>Signing of the partnership contract (3 years): PV, CaterComp, City of Finntown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 January 2005</td>
<td>CaterComp starts in the Defence Forces’ units in Finntown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2009</td>
<td>CaterComp provides provisioning services at the Defence Forces’ units in Finntown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁹² The Cooperation within Undertakings (CwU) procedure (‘YT-menettely’) is part of the personnel involvement systems governed by law (http://www.mol.fi/mol/en/03_law/06_personelinvolment/index.jsp).
Though Table 8 is only a summary of key events in the pilot project, it shows the variety of parties and different administrative practices involved. The partnership was as such special because it did not involve only the Defence Forces and CaterComp, but also the City of Finntown as a customer. Co-organising this way required specific arrangements in order to avoid breaching the legislation on public procurement. While on one level the whole chain of events was a business-like outsourcing process with Requests for Information and a tendering, on another level the development was structured in terms of a military hierarchy involving reporting to the Defence Command, which gave the guidelines for proceeding in the form of orders. The PROV project group was involved in both logics while running its own internal process. The employees at the provisioning service unit were involved through practices framed by employment regulations and human resource management.

Within the pilot project, the Defence Forces’ employees of the pilot provisioning unit became employees of CaterComp, one of the largest businesses in the field. According to the partnership contract, for three years the terms of employment of the employees would remain equivalent to the terms that they had had in the Defence Forces. The partnership contract between the Defence Forces and CaterComp was for three years with an optional two extra years.

In a widely distributed union magazine, the employees of the outsourced service unit talked about their experiences of the first half a year in CaterComp. The working atmosphere had worsened, the amount of work had increased as the workforce had been cut, and control by the employer had tightened. Temporary employment contracts replaced permanent ones, and the employees expected the salary level to decrease when the private sector terms were applied. As one research interviewee pointed out, in the event of a new tendering after the CaterComp partnership, the employees at the outsourced service unit might again stay the same while the service provider company would change.

The manager that was responsible for the Finntown pilot project at CaterComp said in a research interview that the public sector is slow in opening the catering branch for private service providers. She defined the first year of the service relationship with the Defence Forces as a difficult one. Reasons included the launching of a new IT-system in the service unit at the same time as the changing of the employer and most of the service unit superiors. These transitions together increased pressures on and change resistance among the employees. Nonetheless, the key difficulties were related to the unfamiliarity of the Defence Forces organisation as operational environment. As the interviewee said, CaterComp was like “Alice in Wonderland” in the military context, and for long the company was “a scary wolf” for the former Defence Forces’ personnel. CaterComp consulted with two former officers during the process of learning the new structures, vocabulary and culture of the partnership customer.

In the interview, the CaterComp manager pondered on the partnership:
"We have now signed a contract, but I couldn’t profess that we are partners yet. Partnership requires truly that one has to know, both parties have to know each other pretty well. On the organisational level, and also on the personal level. And the partnership has to bring something more than the basic contract, and it has to kind of bring some surplus, some profit, something... The profit or the surplus can be financial, it can be... perhaps to do with company image, it can be expectations for the future. [...] The Defence Forces is a very valuable contract for us. It is much more valuable than the customer relationship in terms of turnover. And the value comes of course from the fact that it is unique. [...] The Defence Forces has for the first time given its services to be taken care of by someone else, and it is, we are pioneers in it, it is, we take it humbly as an honour.” (Appendix 5, Extract 30)

The “floundering in the snow” through the first year was based on future expectations from CaterComp’s side. The partnership provided an opportunity to develop by learning about the special characteristics of the Defence Forces as a customer. This learning in CaterComp was dependent on the extent to which actual partnership in terms of reciprocity would take place in the long run.

Via the partnership and by taking over the ex-Defence Forces’ employees at the service unit, CaterComp was also able to develop skills in something that would put them in an advantaged position in terms of possible future markets of military provisioning, namely, expertise in the strategic planning of provisioning in times of crisis. During the whole process of reorganising the Defence Forces provisioning, this aspect of crisis planning and provisioning in the field and under battle conditions was the key argument in forestalling a wide-range outsourcing. According to an interviewee, when the administrative service centre of the Defence Forces was moved in 2008 from the control of the Defence Forces to that of the Ministry of Defence, the Chief of Defence had taken the stand that the line goes there: provisioning has to remain close to the Defence Forces for reasons of defence readiness. Nevertheless, the competition around the stakes and key assets in provisioning goes on. In 2008, CaterComp increased its shareholding in a Nordic company that is specialised in provisioning within the military.

7.3. Concluding on an unconcluded process

One and a half year from the start-up of the Provisioning Service Centre of the Defence Forces (PROSEC), the television news reported that the outsourcing projects in the Defence Forces have not provided the expected savings. The chairman of the Defence Committee confirmed that savings are the primary reason for outsourcing the Defence Forces’ support functions. CaterComp personnel at the provisioning service unit in Finntown were also interviewed. The cook was saying that she would rather work for the Defence Forces. An official at the Ministry of Defence explained the non-attainment of savings by saying that private service providers have to make new investments when having the Defence Forces as customer. In addiitton, the old terms of
employment concerning the service personnel create costs that end up in the prices.

In terms of security mainstreaming, the reorganising of the Defence Forces’ provisioning was not a clear-cut case. Instead, it showed the complicated dynamic of processes of and renegotiations on organising, the civil-military division, gender, and networks. The plan to involve civilian businesses in support of defence organising was turned around, and the provisioning units of brigade-level units were cut apart into an organisation of their own, an “internal partner” of the Defence Forces with both civilian and military features. The first years of PROSEC were characterised by a tense position of ‘in-betweenness’, and renegotiation of the different social and organisational logics.

Broadly speaking, one might look at the provisioning development project, PROV, the resulted reorganising, and PROSEC and its probable future as a long road towards privatising a public service. Unlike some earlier development projects, the PROV project included the employees’ organisations in the planning and comparison of possible future organisation. This inclusion did not serve as planned as an information channel to the employees, who still, on the verge of PROSEC starting, were confused and afraid of what actually is going to change. The inclusion of the employees in the project did serve as a basis for personnel commitment and a broadly-based consensus on developing their own functions instead of an external partnership.

Differently from the general way that the project was presented in documents and meetings, the cynical interpretation would be that founding PROSEC was for the shop floor employees – who avoided privatisation and possible loss of earnt benefits – beneficial only for the time being. During the PROSEC interphase most of them would retire, and a new generation would be brought up with the business-like organising and values within a semi-corporate environment. Most of the PROSEC managers, as well as the project manager, were in the interviews quite frank about the probable future phases of PROSEC, that would include 1) existing as a subordinate bureau of the Ministry of Defence, more freedom and an actual business and service relationship with the Defence Forces, 2) the possibility of expanding its activities and becoming a service centre for the whole state administration, and/or 3) becoming a public utility or a state-owned company. These possibilities were intermingled with the frustration over the unclear authorities and division of power (mainly in relation to the Defence Command), and the contradiction between, on the one hand, the urge to strive for the output goals set in terms of economic results, and, on the other hand, playing around with “toytown money” as a simulation of an actual customer-provider model. In other words, PROSEC is not yet participating in the internal quasi-markets of the Defence Forces, let alone of the state services (cf. Powell 2003).

At the same time, the Finntown pilot project was providing mixed experiences of outsourcing, including its results. The Defence Forces’ employees of the
Finntown service unit had, according to the contract, been transferred over to CaterComp with their old terms of contract for three years, but they felt that with the new private employer their workload had increased and working conditions worsened (cf. Grimshaw et al. 2002: 498). The pilot project gave the Defence Forces valuable information and a point of comparison in terms of developing PROSEC. At the same time, it gave one major corporation in the catering service sector the opportunity to strengthen its position in the branch and pave the way for development in a marketised new sub-branch, namely, military provisioning.
8 DEFENCE AS GENDERED SOCIAL ORGANISATION: PRACTICES AND STRUCTURES AROUND DEFENCE SECTOR ORGANISATIONS

8.1. The notions of ‘contribution’ and ‘reflection’

Before making some conclusions on the findings of this research endeavour, I would like to note some challenges of research that apply to scholarly work drawing from a variety of traditions and approaches. Although I am summarising here the key reflections on this thesis in terms of particular areas of research, I find partly problematic the doctoral norm of targeting the contribution of research to a clearly defined single disciplinary category or subcategory (cf. the discussion on research questions in Chapter 6 ½, pp. 127-128). The benefits of following this criterion, which is emphasised perhaps especially in the evaluation of academic theses, are no doubt many, for example, in terms of accumulation of scientific knowledge, as well as perhaps careerwise. This criterion may, however, be seen to contradict with the often cherished principle of striving towards crossing – sometimes even transcending – disciplinary borders.

As basic research, doctoral research projects involve a tension between remaining within the ‘home discipline’ and facing a multitude of research from different disciplinary backgrounds around particular research objects (such as the military, for example). Theoretical and methodological traditions and approaches seem countless and their relations fuzzy. The multiplicity of sub-disciplines, research traditions and strands may give the student of a particular issue the feeling that gathering together merely the most important literature around an issue already involves a range of frameworks and arguments so different from each other that applying them together may involve problems of inconsistency and contradiction.

However, it is exaggerated to talk about this fuzziness as interdisciplinarity or transdisciplinarity. Inconsistency and contradiction may exist between different approaches, and this has to be paid attention to, but often, as in this study, the disciplinary borders are hardly crossed or even mapped in detail, let alone transcended in a systematic manner. Such ‘strand-hopping’, that may be more or less interdisciplinary, needs, perhaps, a vocabulary of its own as it usually takes place either within a discipline, across close disciplines, and/or involves sources that are themselves cross-disciplinary in different ways.

One might conceive of these tensions through the concepts of social network analysis. Finding structural holes in established research areas of ‘knowledge network closure’ represents basic research, whereas interdisciplinary work

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93 The term ‘structural hole’ refers to a missing link in or between networks of people, groups, organisations, or alike. Brokering these contacts can produce value (Burt 2001).
builds loose ties between separate knowledge networks. The transdisciplinary aims of articulating the complexities that are left between disciplines are perhaps more reasonable in wider projects than doctoral theses.94

8.2. Methodological reflection: The possibilities of profeminist ethnography of work and organisations

The two case studies of this thesis both involved fieldwork and participant observation as the central data-gathering method. The differences between the positions that I had in relation to the studied organisations and the research participants (Table 9) provide a basis for comparison.

The two case studies differed in terms of length of the fieldwork phase, character of participation, access and opportunities for observing, as well as the central organisational environments and research participants. The peacekeeping case study involved a relatively long fieldwork phase, mostly abroad, as a full member of the studied organisation and with service responsibilities. This enabled more sustained relationships with the research participants and more direct personal experiences of the organisational dynamic than in the provisioning case study. On the other hand, the participants in the provisioning project and the personnel of the Provisioning Service Centre headquarters were somewhat more positive towards the research, and integrative in relation to me, even as an outside observer. Within the provisioning case, my relations to the shopfloor workers at the service units (kitchens) were limited and restricted by both the focus on the PROSEC headquarters, and, perhaps, by my role as an academic visiting the service units with the new management. In the peacekeeping organisation, the formal and informal organisation of social ties kept reservists and Battle Group HQ officers of lower ranks, such as me, somewhat apart from both professional officers of higher ranks, and private soldiers on the 'shopfloor' of peacekeeping.

A recurring theme in my fieldnotes from Radnata, especially in the early phases of the fieldwork, was a feeling of dispersion and confusion in terms of my combined role as a (forthcoming) peacekeeper and a participant observer. The excessive worry about keeping my colleagues and other research participants informed about the research and making notes on everything, and especially the anxiety felt in building collegial and friendly relationships while research interests were banging around at the back of my head, involved aspects that are worth unpacking both in terms of self-care (Rager 2005) and in terms of developing the possibilities of profeminist ethnography.

94 See Ramadier (2004) for discussion on distinctions between unidisciplinary, multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research.
### Table 9  Aspects of participant observation in the two case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CASE I: Peacekeeping in Radnata</th>
<th>Case II: Provisioning Service Centre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fieldwork time period</td>
<td>7 months, full-time (excluding service leaves)</td>
<td>27 days in a period of 4 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researcher role</td>
<td>Complete member researcher (Anderson 2006)</td>
<td>Participant observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>Research permission from the Defence Command of the Defence Forces + peacekeeper application and training process. Full access as an organisational employee, restricted by work tasks and position in the peacekeeping organisation</td>
<td>Research permission from the Defence Command of the Defence Forces + consent of the Provisioning Service Centre HQ management. Access as a mere participant observer partly restricted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consent</td>
<td>Central research participants informed in meetings and in written form. Contracts with interviewees.</td>
<td>Central research participants informed in meetings and in written form. Contracts with interviewees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary activity during fieldwork</td>
<td>Working full-time in the organisation.</td>
<td>Observing full-time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central fieldwork environments</td>
<td>a) FINCENT peacekeeping training centre: garrison and barracks, outdoor and indoor training locations, canteen, soldiers' home, officers' club, vehicles. b) Radnata: Camp Niilo (accommodation, offices, canteen, mess hall, sports and recreation facilities etc.), other camps, locality, vehicles.</td>
<td>Provisioning Service Centre Headquarters (meeting rooms, offices, corridors), garrisons and vehicles (during visit trips), parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central research participants (in relation to researcher)</td>
<td>Officers of the Battle Group headquarters: mainly older men and more senior in rank.</td>
<td>Managers and other employees in the headquarters of the Provisioning Service Centre of the Defence Forces: mainly civilian women.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the informal discussions in which I was explaining my double-role at the peacekeeping mission as both an independent researcher and an employed peacekeeping officer, I was often asked which idea came first: going on peacekeeping mission or doing research there. Depending on who was asking – usually either an academic colleague or a peacekeeper colleague – I felt that there were certain normative assumptions behind the question. Either I was as a researcher drawing from experiences of peacekeeping without prior proper research planning or an originally academic interest, or I was, perhaps, a
peacekeeper that had come to serve with dubious motives and with engagements that might prohibit full attention to peacekeeping tasks. The two activities were seen to be in tension with each other, and, if not, at least I was sensitive and aware enough of the contradiction to hear the tension hinted at.

Questions of consent and informing the research participants are very different in ethnography compared to, for example, interview research. Making a research contract regarding interviewing (see Appendix 6) provides both the interviewer and the interviewee with some form of mutual awareness and the possibility of control over the interview and its subsequent usage. Participation in an interview is usually voluntary. In ethnography, the refusal to participate of a particular informant would be a more complicated challenge. In both the ethnographies in this thesis the long period during which the participant observing took place made it probable that in other situations the research participants were less aware of researcher presence than in others; one forgets. Additionally, in neither case did the participant observation concern a precisely defined group of people. When meeting new people in the first case study (for example Radnatians or peacekeepers of other nationalities), I did not bring up the fact that I was doing research, and this would not have been proper, either, in terms of the primary peacekeeper role. In the provisioning case study the same applied, but if I was introduced or introduced myself, the researcher role was primary and more evident.95

These notions show some of the tensions and blurriness around the distinction between overt and covert fieldwork, consent, informing participants, and the roles of the researcher in the field. Another, perhaps more subtle, dynamic involves gender and trust in building and maintaining relations with the informants. The discussions around relations in the field, especially in terms of balancing between closeness and distance (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995; Alvesson 2003), have been many and they have sometimes touched gender aspects (McKeganey & Bloor 1991; Hsuing 1996; Ortiz 2005).

Some of the critiques of and developments in ethnographic research have been trying to deconstruct the powerful position of the academic observer by offering the position of ‘the ones’ to ‘the others’, that is, finding ways for the objects of study to become agents of the study. In these efforts, as in feminist ethnography (Skeggs 2001), research methodology and processes are applications of ethical and political proscriptions. What then would be the ethnographic application of making ‘the ones’ ‘the others’ (Hearn 1996) which might serve as a profeminist agenda?

95 During the fieldwork, I articulated the problematic by toying with the idea that I would wear a badge saying that I was a researcher, and pondering what else the badge should say. See Calvey (2008: 912) on ‘nomadic’ and covert ethnography, and field “ethics as contingent, dynamic, temporal, occasioned and situated affairs”.

An important point of reflection for developing methods of profeminist research on men in this regard is offered by qualitative research done on elites (Hertz & Imber 1995; on military and defence elites, see Cohn [1987] and Gusterson [1995]). In doing ethnography on men in positions of power, the application of a profeminist agenda cannot be to use the traditional objectifying approach; studying those in positions of power does not wipe away the possibility of patronising the ‘natives’, of taking the position of a ‘besser-wisser’, someone who always knows best. Taking a political stance towards the power elites inevitably creates a tension with reaching (at least some level of) authenticity in absorbing and depicting elites’ cultures, as it does in studies with objectives of emancipating and empowering those that are less powerful and under study. A political stance is about presuppositions and consciousness about them, is it not? Is there a way out of the trap where positioning oneself (good) creates presuppositions (bad), but being ‘free and open’ and humble towards the studied culture (good) is delusional objectivism (bad)?

Nor can the application of a profeminist approach be the emancipatory attempt to ‘give voices’ to those men that are studied. More in accordance with the political agenda is to show who has had the loudest voices and to deconstruct these voices. Especially as men have been ungendered and taken for granted in mainstream management research, profeminist ethnography on men’s power in organisations comes close to ‘home base anthropology’: that is, making the apparent and familiar strange. The efforts of critical management anthropologists towards defamiliarisation by epistemological and cross-cultural critique (Linstead 1997) need to coincide with critical gender analysis. This ‘othering’ opens an interesting door for profeminist ethnography from “encounters with difference” (Prasad & Prasad 2002: 187) towards encounters with sameness.

In my fieldwork, the idea of ‘encounters with sameness’ resonates with the experiences of recognising myself in and through shared experience, discourses and practices, but also in what I assumed to be strange or found even disagreeable. To use the jazz player metaphor of an ethnographer (Humphreys et al. 2003), it may not always be desirable or possible to jam along with other men. It is these recognitions and strangeness, attraction and dissatisfaction, belonging and shunning, complicity and abnegation in relation to the material and discursive practices of men that provide a key location of profeminist ethnography.

This can be illustrated with one of the subject positions encountered during the research process, a position that bears theoretical capacity relevant for analysing men’s experiences, especially of military. That is the position of ‘veteran’. The ways in which this subject position is culturally constructed in the Finnish context would deserve an analysis of its own, but what I see as relevant for this study is the dynamic around ‘experience that only the brothers can understand’, be that peacekeeping, conscription, or other. The social logic of trauma – in terms of having shared a particular experience that remains a part
of the identity connecting individuals with same experience – is in the military context fortified by the combination of military secrecy, the dogma of male cohesion, and the taboo nature of violence. Furthermore, the logic of trauma structures also the positive aspects of military experiences: the joyful, exciting, elevated and indelible memories are embedded in a particular, one-off collectivity. The logic of ‘veteranship’ constructs for its part the gendered social organisation of defence.

The emphasis here on encounters with sameness does not and should not mean that attention is directed only at issues that are familiar and at research material that opens fluently for interpretation, or that voices from outside the ‘realm of sameness’ are silenced. Nor should it mean prioritising ethnographers’ experience and discarding one of the central principles of ethnography, the sensitivity to meanings and understandings of those under study. Still, there are three arguments that support the development of this line of analysis: it may solve some of the dilemmas discussed above concerning profeminist ethnography on men; it serves as an analytic tool that matches the conceptualisation of ‘gender as a logic’ presented earlier; and it incorporates the central ideas of analytic autoethnography while providing new angles to it.

8.3. Organisational reflection: Men’s practices and social organisation in military contexts

On the one hand, gender takes place as practices, and, on the other hand, gender is taken for granted in the many contexts that lack practices of gender reflexivity. As a result of this, gender is continually reproduced in everyday life, and it gains weight as a logic that orders social existence and interaction. Regardless of their stability and well-established character, gendered practices require acts and interactions to be maintained. It is possible and necessary to study the practices of hiding gender that are both material and discursive.

That said, it is not only within the realm of individuals and groups and their actions and interactions that changes towards decreasing gender inequality can take place. Organisational and institutional policies and practices need attention, too, both in terms of active gender equality measures, and evaluation of the gendered consequences of organisational changes and operations. The perspective of the social organisation of institutions can help to infer how changes in certain social logics can able (or disable) change within others.

What has in this study been called the ‘dogma of male cohesion’ involves a configuration of gendered practices within the military. The heart of this configuration is in the discursive and material connections that are built between the dynamic of men’s interactional connections in military units and optimal combat performance. The dogma of male cohesion stretches across the military organisation, intermingled with other cultural and structural practices of unity (uniforms, command structures etc.). Additionally, the social and cultural meanings that connect men’s interactional bonds and cohesion in
military contexts with ideas and practices of national(uni)ty, are many and support the dogma.

Several studies have brought up the different ways in which the need for unity and cohesion of troops and teams has been constructed as the reason for restricting women’s participation in military organisations. The functional rationality of the chain of command has been combined with social similarity and unity that has been seen to guarantee success in combat. The tensions between the two logics – rationality of hierarchical structures and the logic of relying on men’s social bonding – have in this study served as a point of questioning the gendered power structure upheld with the dogma of male cohesion.

The changes in and around the defence sector pose challenges to the dogma of male cohesion. Many of them are linked to questions of organising. Equality and diversity issues have entered defence organisations because of external pressures and a need for widening employee recruitment bases. These pressures and needs are linked to closer contacts with civilian actors, intensified competition with other sectors for educated workforce, and technologisation of militaries. Defence systems that are networked with a variety of civilian organisations and based on high technology call for a more organic division of labour than the mass armies of mechanic solidarity.

The peacekeeping case study showed the centrality and the instrumental use of the combination of mutual control and bonding. The training period was constructed and experienced as a test situation where trainees were encouraged to team up and, at the same, as during the service, it was constantly made clear that in cases of misconduct a peacekeeper can be repatriated and replaced. This reveals a more general social dynamic of military organisations between the dogma of male cohesion and replaceability. The mechanism of striving for similarity, close and tight connections, and balanced interaction is supposed to work against the need for substitution as may be necessary because of misconduct, even if such misconduct should not take place if there is the required cohesion. More generally, the rotation system of the peacekeeping forces and the circulation of officers employed in the Defence Forces require the dynamic of constant – and as rapid as possible in order to be operational – building of cohesion in the face of replacements. The linkages of this dynamic in the peacetime armed forces to the issue of replacement in wartime troops (due to wounding and deaths) need an analysis of their own. The dynamic between the dogma of male cohesion and general question of replaceability (in terms of the four dynamics italisised above) is also in line with the observed practice of ‘expertise by appointment’.

One aspect in the civil-military dynamic is the role of reservists. In countries of mass male conscription, reservists are central to the gendered social organisation of defence. In addition to professional officers, in Finland reservists also comprise the other major pool for peacekeeping recruitment.
Though the civil-military division arose from the peacekeeping case study material as a key categorisation, the tensions between peacekeepers from reservist and professional military backgrounds should not be overemphasised.

8.4. Societal reflection: Gendered divergence and security mainstreaming – militarisation in new clothes?

This study has looked at defence through its social organisation. It has meant a focus on ‘the social’ that transgresses organisational structures and borderlines in terms of networks and intermingled social logics. The analysis of the gendered social organisation of defence in Finland has been framed by the context of a variety of changes taking place in defence organising in general, and in the Finnish Defence Forces in particular. The interlinkages between defence policy and strategy, the changing administrative paradigm in the defence branch, and the gendered organisational dynamics within the Defence Forces (Figure 2) have been, through an ethnographic approach, grounded in the everyday life of defence sector organising. The two case studies have represented an emerging core function of defence organising, namely military crisis management (studied through a peacekeeping organisation), and the renegotiated role and organisation of support and supply in the Defence Forces (studied through a provisioning development project). Within the change processes, several continuums and inertias have also been located, related to the social logics of division and connection that enable and constrain action within the institution of defence, namely, the social logics of organisation, gender, and civil-military relations.

**Figure 2 Framework of change and continuity in Finnish defence and security organising**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defence policy and strategy: principle of <strong>total defence</strong></th>
<th>Administrative paradigm: New Public Management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal organisational dynamics in the Defence Forces: Gendered divergence</td>
<td>Security mainstreaming</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The social and organisational aspects of the defence sector changes have in this thesis been conceptualised in terms of security mainstreaming. Those aspects of the Finnish defence doctrine that emphasise ‘total defence’ and intersectoral cooperation between civilian and military actors for national security have found new support from the administrative paradigm of New Public Management. Partnerships, outsourcing, and bringing business economic
models and private sector management practices into the Defence Forces and defence administration may be the offspring of economic pressures on state governance, but they also fit the ideology of ‘total defence’.

Various institutionalised practices – such as National Defence Courses, the National Emergency Supply Agency, and the newly founded regional troops – have been created in line with the ‘total defence’ principle. These institutions, together with the Defence Administration Partnership Programme (DAPP) studied in this thesis, are signs and sites of security mainstreaming, of political, cultural and organisational processes that reshape the organisation of civil-military relations as well as the meanings of defence, war, and peace. In these processes, varying civilian organisations in the private and public sector are integrated in efforts that aim at minimising changes in crisis situations: Coordinated networking is supposed to provide structures that enable society to function similarly in wartime as in peacetime.

Scholars of network forms of organisations have characterised network organisations as enduring exchange relations that are not governed by a legitimate organisational authority (Podolny & Page 1998), but build instead on reciprocity, trust and a “spirit of goodwill” (Dore 1983). While the Finnish Defence Forces is becoming – and attempting to become – more and more a network organisation, both internally and in terms of defence sector cooperation, the tensions between bureaucratic and network logics may be growing. These tensions are visible in the worries concerning the controllability of defence organising partners external to the Defence Forces, as well as in the organisational practices bypassing the chain of command. Network organisations are to a great extent also social organisations (cf. Powell 1990).

In the context of the Finnish defence sector, the ethos of cooperating is infused by patriotism. Ideas of national unity and security serve as experiential fuel for enduring relations. Still, as network interaction in the defence sector takes place between male-dominated organisations and between individual men, the related practices and notions of nationality remain gendered and exclusive, tense and fractured. The ways in which the ideas and discourses of national unity and security are functioning and exploited in defence sector organising are many. As such – and especially in terms of ‘total defence’ and security mainstreaming – the discourses around defence that materialise in the strategic planning and other policy documents of the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Command call for further critical analysis.

The gender logic of defence also characterises the division of work within the Defence Forces, but not as a static state of affairs. The development of productivity in the defence administrative branch, and the corollary restructuring of the Defence Forces are changing the composition of the Defence Forces personnel both in terms of gender and in terms of civilians versus professional soldiers. Focusing on core functions in the Defence Forces has meant that the Defence Forces has been both ‘militarised’ and ‘masculinised’, at
least in terms of numbers. Despite the closure of several detachments, the proportion of professional soldiers in the Defence Forces’ workforce increased in 2001-2006 by 4.4% while the proportion of civilian employees decreased by 11.1% (see Appendix 1). In the same years, the number of women employees decreased by 11.1% while number of men remained steady (DC document 2006; 2007). In the light of these figures, it is worth noticing that the extensive recruitment campaigns of the Defence Forces that started in 2001 have emphasised the varying roles of women in the Defence Forces, and have been especially targeted at the civilian workforce in 2004 and 2007.

As far as restructuring of the Defence Forces takes place as differentiation between the male-dominated military core and the outsourced and downsized female-concentrated support functions, the development can be labelled as gendered divergence. The gendered division of work intersects in the Defence Forces with the civil-military divide. In a situation where the civilian employees feel dispersed and where the structures of career planning and circulation support the networks of the military personnel, the process of gendered divergence in the Defence Forces may be supported by the collective efforts of the officer core to secure their position. Still, here the gendered nature of the divergence is not a simple case of men versus women. As can be deduced from the percentages above, the proportion of civilian men employees has in 2001-2006 decreased just as much as the proportion of civilian women employees.

The ‘total defence’ principle and the security mainstreaming involve processes that cannot be analysed fully in terms of divergence and convergence. The developments drawing in opposite directions came up in the analysis of the case study that looked at the provisioning project of the Defence Administration Partnership Programme (DAPP). On the one hand, the focusing and centralising on core functions in the Defence Forces is leading to the militarisation of personnel, and to a clearer divergence in terms of organising. Military core functions are to be carried out by organisations and professionals clearly diverged from support functions. It seems that in the case of the DAPP, the New Public Management results in marketisation of Defence Forces civilian employees. Still, in the studied provisioning project this differentiation was not unproblematic. The organisational distribution of responsibilities concerning wartime and peacetime functions was unclear between the new Provisioning Service Centre (PROSEC) and the new organisation of military supply units.

On the other hand, the deepening of ‘total defence’ and expanding of civil-military co-organising through partnerships point to convergence across the civil-military divide. The participation of non-military organisations in defence

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96 All percentages presented here refer to proportions of person-years, not persons. The published personnel figures of 2007 are not included in the calculations as the basis of the statistics has been changed into proportions of persons in the latest human resource report of the Defence Forces. Appendix 1 provides information on proportions of men and women over a slightly longer period.
through different cooperative networks blurs the boundaries between civilian and military organising. The involvement of, for example, businesses may militarise them in certain respects, but the dynamics are more intricate than that. For the CaterComp, the Defence Forces is just one interesting customer that brings certain new demands for expertise. At the same time, the co-organising is one way in which the models of business economic operations enter the Defence Forces, not least in terms of “learning to be a customer”. Therefore, the discourses and practices of New Public Management can be seen as a new form of control on the armed forces. It may be asked whether the analysis of the civilian control of the Defence Forces should take into consideration not only the state and the third sector, but also the markets? At least in terms of the economy, the regulation of the armed forces seems to be partly moved from the state to the markets.

One possible interpretation of the ongoing developments in the field of defence would be that security mainstreaming is the process after which certain issues can be desecuritised and after which the former field of defence and security institutionalises as a new set of organisations and other collective actors. This kind of development has already been seen in the reformulation of military peacekeeping into crisis management that involves civilian crisis management at its core. The repeatedly occurring key challenges of crisis management – civil-military coordination and cooperation – originate from security mainstreaming. The extent to which security mainstreaming opens possibilities for political action and new institutionalisation around securities, is a question in need of further empirical study and of interest for feminist researchers and activists, as well as the peace movement.

Another intermingling way to proceed with interpreting the change of the defence institution is through the connections of nationality, technological development, and the dogma of male cohesion. Social cohesion resonates with the coherence of the nation as an idea. Social cohesion, included in the gendered ideas of nation and national unity, is both a resource for supporting the dogma of male cohesion in military organisations, and a superstructure to be reproduced in organisational practices. The postmodern and post-nation tendencies that are shaking these cohesions are, among other things, giving way to a search for alternatives to conscription. The parallel developments of professionalisation and technologisation of the military may be shifting the narratives of cohesive coherence to new spheres. What are the new coherencies among technologies and organisations regarding, for example, increasing cooperation between Finnish information technology and the defence industry and the Defence Forces, and between national and transnational defence arrangements? On and through what kind of social cohesions are those arrangements built?

An additional way to continue the analysis of the organisational structures and practices of the defence field could be the perspective of the internal cohesion of the whole field. Inside the Defence Forces, the career planning and promotion
system functions as vertical integration, whereas practices linked to officer training, such as ‘cadet brotherhood’, build horizontal integration. The principle of territorial defence and the circulation of officers in different units around the country bring in a geographical aspect to the internal integration. Outside the Defence Forces, the field of defence unfolds as intermingling and overlapping networks. Through conscription, conscripts and reservists are integrated in similar vertical, horizontal and geographic terms. Some of the DAPP projects are strengthening the close relations between the defence industry and the Defence Forces. As the National Defence Courses and the National Emergency Supply Agency are binding elites and civilian organisations together and to defence, regional troops are embedded in local communities and organise relations between voluntary defence organisations, the Defence Forces, and authorities.

Study of these social and organisational networks is crucial for the discussions on the gendered organising of national defence and, more generally, on interlinkages between organisations, gender equality, citizenship, and democracy. The question for the future is where, how, and by whom peace and security are defined and organised. It remains to be seen to what extent scholars of management and organisation shall participate in searching for answers to these questions: a quest in which their work could be of utmost importance.
REFERENCES

The references section is divided into three parts: ‘Research literature’, ‘Internet sources’, and ‘Documents and other sources’. English translations referring to originally non-English publications are in square brackets. These translations are by the author of this thesis when written in lower case (for example [Women, men and leadership]), and by the author of the publication in question when written with capital initial letters (for example [The Expansion of Military Politics]).

Research literature:


Kantola, Johanna and Valenius, Johanna (2007): *Toinen maailmanpolitiikka: 10 käsitetettä feministiseen kansainvälisten suhteiden tutkimukseen* [The other world politics: 10 concepts for feminist international relations research]. Tampere: Vastapaino.


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Our Noble Nation. The National Tropes and Väinö Linna’s Novels The Unknown Soldier and Here Under the Northern Star. Porvoo: WSOY.


Puukka, Ilkka (2005): *Valtapelit hallinnossa: Tapaustutkimus sotilaskulttuurin puolustuksesta puolustushallinnon uudistamisessa* [Power Games in the Administration: A Case Study on the Defence of the Military Culture During the


Veijola, Soile and Jokinen, Eeva (2001): *Voiko naista rakastaa? Avion ja eron karuselli* [Can one love a woman? The carousel of marriage and divorce]. Helsinki: WSOY.


Internet sources:


http://www.phrakl.fi/phrakl/Publish.nsf/$all/449DDA4AAB7860C1C2256FC70048EAA7


**Documents and other sources:**


DF document (2004): (anonymised) [Final report of the provisioning development project PROV 28 June 2004]


Hakkarainen, Tellervo and Huovinen, Maarit (1999): *Lotta sodan ja rauhan töissä* [Lotta in works of war and peace; biography of Tellervo Hakkarainen]. Porvoo: WSOY.


Iivonen, Jyrki (2005): Sijoituspäätös tehtiin asianmukaisesti [Placement decision was made properly]. Helsingin Sanomat, 10 August 2005.

Iivonen, Jyrki (2007): Suomen puolustusmenoja liioiteltu [Defence costs of Finland have been exaggerated]. Helsingin Sanomat, 19 February 2007.


Linna, Väinö (1954): *Tuntematon sotilas* [The Unknown Soldier]. Porvoo: WSOY.


MoD document (2005): *Puolustusministeriön hallinnonalalle perustettujen ja
suunnitteilla olevien tilaaja-tuottaja –malliin pohjautuvien palvelukeskusten
hallinnollisen ja taloudellisen aseman järjestämistä selvittäneen työryhmän
(palvelukeskustyöryhmän) loppuraportti* [Final report of the service centre
working group]. Dnro 327/4260/2005. Helsinki: Ministry of Defence of
Finland.

Helsinki: Ministry of Defence of Finland. Available from:

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hankintamahdollisuudet Suomessa. Työryhmän loppuraportti* [Need and
Possibilities of Procurement Concerning Heavy Airlift Capabilities. Final Report
of the Working Group]. Helsinki: Ministry of Defence of Finland. Available
19 March 2008]

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[Strategy for coordination of total defence]. Helsinki: Ministry of Defence of
Finland.

toteuttamismahdollisuuksia. Työryhmän loppuraportti* [Grounds and
realisation possibilities of a national network of cooperation centres. Final

MoD document (2008): *Suomalaisten mielipiteitä ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikasta,
maanpuolustuksesta ja turvallisuudesta 2008* [Finns’ opinions on security
politics, national defence, and security 2008]. Maanpuolustustiedotuksen
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18 December 2008]

and Security”. Finland’s National Action Plan 2008 - 2011.* Available from:

Helsinki: Ministry of the Interior.


Savela, Olli (2006): *Suomen puolustusmenot ovatkin EU:n keskitasoa* [Finland’s defence costs are, after all, on average EU level]. *Tieto&trendit*, 10 (12): 6.


APPENDIX 1  RECENT CHANGES IN THE DEFENCE FORCES’ PERSONNEL

Table a. Proportions of men and women in the Defence Forces staff in 1999 and 2006*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Men (number / proportion)</th>
<th>Women (number / proportion)</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>12,065 (72.9%)</td>
<td>4,475 (27.1%)</td>
<td>16,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>11,613 (75.6%)</td>
<td>3,745 (24.4%)</td>
<td>15,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHANGE 1999-07</td>
<td>-3.7%**</td>
<td>-16.3%</td>
<td>-7.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table b. Proportions of person-years of professional soldiers and civilians in the Defence Forces staff in 2001 and 2006***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Professional soldiers (person-years)</th>
<th>Civilians (person-years)</th>
<th>Others (person years)</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>8,061 (48.6%)</td>
<td>7,991 (48.1%)</td>
<td>549 (3.3%)</td>
<td>16,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>8,415.6 (53.1%)</td>
<td>7,106.6 (44.8%)</td>
<td>327.4 (2.1%)</td>
<td>15,849.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHANGE 2001-06</td>
<td>+4.4%</td>
<td>-11.1%</td>
<td>-40.0%</td>
<td>-4.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables a. and b. cover roughly the period of the recent restructuring processes and the years from which information has been publicly available. Figures in the tables are drawn from and counted on the basis of annual reports and annual human resource reports of the Finnish Defence Forces (DC document 2000; 2004; 2007; 2008b).

* In 1998 and 1999 the proportion of women in the Defence Forces was still growing. Between 1999-2007 the proportion of women has declined steadily (DC document 2004).

** Concerning 1999 the number and the proportion of women and the total number of employees have been available in different sources that may have involved different definitions concerning who is included in the total number of employees; the number of men and the percentage change concerning men are, thus, estimates from the available figures.

*** The group of ‘professional soldiers’ includes officers of different training and rank, as well as military professionals (‘sotilasammattihenkilöt’). ‘Others’ include so called contract soldiers (‘sopimussotilas’) and employees hired with employment subsidies (‘työllisyysvaroin palkatut’).
### APPENDIX 2  MAPPING OF NETWORK – ORGANISATION RELATIONSHIPS AND PERMUTATIONS IN TIME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NETWORK – ORGANISATION RELATIONSHIP</th>
<th>EXAMPLE</th>
<th>GRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Network completely outside organisation(s) (no relation to any)</td>
<td>Park bench / chat network (or not applicable?)</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Network Illustration" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network completely outside organisation (some relation/link)</td>
<td>Latent link to network members’ work organisations</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Network Illustration" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network organisation</td>
<td>A company with cooperative units (U) with other companies</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Network Illustration" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network of organisations</td>
<td>Network of small enterprises</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Network Illustration" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network inside an organisation</td>
<td>Sports team of a company</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Network Illustration" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal intraorganisational networks as link between organisations</td>
<td>Sports teams of companies</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Network Illustration" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation as a result of network being structured</td>
<td>Founding of an association</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Network Illustration" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation left, network/secondary organisation (SO) constructed</td>
<td>Ex-peacekeepers network/organisation; “Class of ’68”</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Network Illustration" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary networking/organising when organisation members leave the primary organisation</td>
<td>College (O) College choir (SO) Choir of ex-college students/employees (N/TO)</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Network Illustration" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation deconstructed, network left/vanishes</td>
<td>Company in bankruptcy</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Network Illustration" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network staying, organisations changing</td>
<td>A long-time network of scholars changing universities</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Network Illustration" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal (egocentric) network linking organisations</td>
<td>Individual’s (I) network</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Network Illustration" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal (egocentric) network linking networks</td>
<td>Individual’s network</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Network Illustration" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 3  RESEARCH PERMISSIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PÄÄESIKUNTA</th>
<th>ESITTELY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kansainvälinen osasto Helsinki</td>
<td>Pv:n operaatiopäällikölle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>563/8/D/I</th>
<th>29.09</th>
<th>Esittelijä</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Esittelijä Kansainvälisen osaston pääällikkö</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Esitetään, että Helsingin ruotsinkielisessä kauppakorkeakoulussa johtamisen ja organisaatioiden laitoksella väitöskirjaansa tekevä VM Teemu Tallbergille myönnetäisiin tutkimuslupa tutkia miesten välisiä sosiaalisia suhteita rauhanturvayksikössä. VM Tallberg on valittu mukaan rotaatioon ja VM Tallbergilla on tarkoituksena pitää kenttäpäiväkirja sekä kerätä muuta tutkimusaineistoa väitöskirjaansa varten rauhanturvaajan työnsä ohella. Tutkimuslupa-anomus on liitteenä.

Kenraalimajuri

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hyväksyn</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIITTEET</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tutkimuslupa-anomus (paperiasiakirja)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JAKELU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teemu Tallberg</td>
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<tr>
<th>TIEKOSKI</th>
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<tr>
<td>PEkoul-os PvKvK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PÄÄESIKUNTA</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huolto-osasto Helsinki</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| R4166/8/D/II | 26.10.26 | Esittelijä Puolustusvoimien huoltopäällikkö |

Esitetään, että valtiotieteiden maisteri Teemu Tallbergille myönnetään lupa vääristäjatutkimuksen toisen osa-aineiston hankkimiseksi.

Perustelu:

Tutkimuksen arvioidaan hyödyttävän puolustusvoimia eikä tutkimustäyä aiheuta kustannuksia puolustusvoimille. Lisäksi tutkimuksella voidaan arvioida olevan yleishyödyllistä merkitystä. Toteuttamisen yksityiskohdistaa mahdollisine rajoihin Tallberg sopi [[1]] johtajan kanssa. Viite:
1. PEkoul-os:n PAK 01.02.23 Puolustusvoimissa palvelukseen kohdistuvat tutkimukset

Kenraalimajuri

Hyväksyn
Kenraalinluutnantti

LIITTEET
Tutkimuslupa-anomus (paperiversiona)

JAKELU
Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu
Valtiotieteiden maisteri Teemu Tallberg (os. Helsingin ruotsinkielinen kauppakorkeakoulu Hanken Johtamisen ja organisaatioiden laitos PL 479 00101 Helsinki)

TIEDOKSI

Tämä asiakirja on elektronisesti allekirjoitettu.
APPENDIX 4  INTERVIEW OUTLINE (PEACEKEEPING CASE STUDY) IN ENGLISH AND FINNISH

RESEARCH INTERVIEW

This interview structure has been planned for interviewees that have not filled in the contact diary. In case of those who have, the outline should be whittled down and more emphasis should be put on themes and issues arising from the contact diary. Also more emphasis can be put on certain events arising from the contact diaries.

Presenting the issue:

✓ social relations in organisations in focus, but in terms of contextualising them, questions also on life history and social relations in general
✓ if interviewee sees appropriate, a contract on anonymity and use of information can be signed
✓ anonymity
✓ to be mentioned: questions do not have to be answered if one does not want to

1) Life history and demographic information
   - Childhood and family (professions of parents, siblings)
   - Education and career (places, degrees, workplaces and tasks)
   - Changes in residence (as child and since)
   - Changes in family relations
   - Checklist: age, family relations, education, profession, places of residence, earlier peacekeeping experiences and service in the Defence Forces)

2) Mapping of personal relations/networks
   - In relation to work (especially in the Defence Forces)
   - Earlier peacekeeping experience → friendships, participation in organisations, networks
   - Formal positions: political and religious participation., associations, clubs and other (the Lions Club, hunting clubs etc.)
   - Sports and other hobbies (collecting, culture etc.)
   - Local community (village/municipality, neighbourhood, military collectives)
   - Family and kin
     - Living where?
     - How wide? Who are most important?
     - Keeping connections? Meeting where?
   - Friends
     - How many good friends?
     - How do you keep in touch?
     - Going out, having meals / coffees, hobbies etc.?
     - Travelling?
3) Experiences from the Radnata mission
   o Why did you participate / life situation when leaving for the mission?
   o Start: training in Niinisalo / elsewhere, leaving Finland, familiarisation, socialisation
   o What are your tasks and responsibilities in the Battle Group?
     ▪ What is important in your job?
     ▪ What principles important for taking care of your job?
   o Do you have friends in here? Who?
   o Organisational networks and ‘camp’ networks:
     ▪ Who do you work with? Why?
     ▪ With whom do you spent time in Radnata?
     ▪ More precisely: with whom (according to what one does on spare time)
       - do you do sports / hobbies?
       - do ‘supa’ with?
       - do you go to ‘läyhy’ car park?97
       - do you drink?
   o Have you seen your service mates / been in contact with them during service leaves?
   o Comparison: work and life in Radnata versus at home
   o Have you been in contact from Radnata with your personal friends or acquaintances concerning work-related issues?
   o Experiences from peacekeeping missions

DRAWING OF NETWORKS / SOCIOGRAM

4) Networks and women
   o Do you belong in networks?
   o Do you have networks? How do they function, what connects the network members? Does one get benefits from belonging to them / what does it take/require?
   o Have you been actively networking?
     ▪ When? Why With whom?
   o What role do networks have in your work in a) Finland b) Radnata?
     ▪ Have you used your relationships a) inside the peacekeeping organisation b) outside it?
   o Men / women in your networks?

97 For ‘supa’ and ‘läyhy’, see Chapter 6.3.2.
What kinds of relationships do you have with women? What kind of relationships are ‘appropriate’?

What do you think about the following things and expressions:
- trust?
- friendship?
- “old boys’ networks” / men’s power?

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**TUTKIMUSHAASTATTELU**


Asian esittely:
- Sosiaaliset suhteet organisaatioissa, mutta niiden kontekstualisoimiseksi elämänhistoriaa ja sosiaaliset suhteet kaiken kaikkiaan
- Jos näet tarpeelliseksi, voidaan kirjoittaa sopimus anonymiteettiä ja tietojen käyttöä koskien
- Anonymiteetti
- Mainittava että kysymyksiin ei tarvitse vastata jos ei halua

1) Henkilöhistoria ja demografiset tiedot
   - Lapsuuden perhe (vanhempien ammatit, sisarusten määrä)
   - Koulutus- ja työhistoria (koulutuspaikat, tutkinnot, työpaikat ja –tehtävät)
   - Asuinpaikan muutokset (lapsuuden perheen mukana ja sen jälkeen)
   - Muutokset perhesuhteissa
   - Tarkastuslista: ikä, perhesuhteet, koulutus, ammatti, asuinpaikat, aiempi rauhanturvavakomemus, aiempi palvelus puolustusvoimissa

2) Henkilökohtaisten sosiaalisten suhteiden/verkostojen kartoitus
   - Työhön liittyvät (ennen kaikkea pulustusvoimissa)
   - Aiempi rauhanturvavakomemus ➔ muodostuneet ystävyyssuhteet, organiosaatöihin osallistuminen, verkostot
   - Muodolliset asemat: poliittinen ja uskonnollinen osallistuminen, järjestöt, kerhot ja klubit (Lions, metsästyskerhot ym.)
   - Urheilu, muut harrastukset (keräily, kulttuuriharrastukset jne.)
   - Paikallisyyhteisö (kylä/kunta, naapurusto, sotilasyhteisö)
   - Suku
     - Missä asuvat?
     - Kuinka laaja? Ketkä keskeisiä?
     - Pidetäänkö paljon yhteyttä? Missä merkeissä tavataan?
Ystävät ja tuttavat:
- Kuinka monta hyvää ystävää?
- Miten pidätte yhteyttä?
- Ulkona käyminen, ateriointi/kahvittelut, harrasteet/kulttuuririiennnot...
- Matkustelu?

Ovatko sosiaaliset verkostot / ystäväpiiri muuttunut viime vuosina / Radnatassa olen aikana?

Onko sukulaisia, ystäviä/tuttavia puolustusvoimissa, käynyt rauhanturva­tehtävissä, töissä poliisissa, palokunnassa, vankein­hoitolaitoksessa, vartijana tms.?

3) Kokemu­set Radnatan missiosta
- Miksi lähdit / millaisesta elämäntilanteesta?
- Missioon saapuminen: koulutus Niinisalossa / muualla, Suomesta lähteminen, perehdyttäminen /tutustuttaminen, sosialisaatio
- Minkä ovat henkilökohta­iset tehtävät/ vastuualueesi taistelu­uosastossa?
  - Mikä työssäsi tärkeää?
  - Missia periaatteita pidettävä mielellä, että työ hoituu?
- Onko sinulla tällä ystävíä? Ketkä?
- Organisatoriset verkostot ja ’leiri’verkostot:
  - Kenen kanssa teet työtä? Miksi?
  - Kenen kanssa vietät aikaa Radnatassa?
  - Tarkemmin: kenen kanssa (Sen mukaan mitä kaikkea vapaa-aikana tekee!)
    - harrastat/liikut?
    - käyt supailemassa?
    - käyt läyhyparkissa?
    - ryppäät?
- Olet­ko nä­h­ny­nt / ollut yhteydessä nykyisiin palvelusto­vereihin lomilla?
- Vertailu: työ ja elämä Radnatassa vs. kotona
- Olet­ko ollut yhteydessä henkilökohta­isiin tuttu­ihin töiden merkeissä Radnatasta käsin (rt-tehtäviin liittyen)?
- Kokemus­set rauhanturva­tehtävissä / missioissa toimin­misesta

4) Verkosto­ja ja naiset
- Kuulutko verkostoihin?
- Onko sinulla verkostoja? Miten ne toimivat, mikä ihmisistä yhdistää? Saako niiden kautta etuja / mitä ver­koisto­ihin kuuluminen vaati?
- Olet­ko pyrkinyt aktiivisesti verkosto­itumaan?
  - Milloin?
- Miksi?
- Kenen kanssa?
  - Mikä merkitys suhteilla/verkostoilla on työssäsi a) Suomessa b) Radnatassa?
  - Oletko käyttänyt hyväksi suhteitasi joita sinulla on a) rt-organisaation sisällä b) sen ulkopuolella?
  - Verkostoissasi miehiä / naisia?
  - Millaisia suhteitaa naisiin / millaiset suhteet 'sopivia'?
  - Mitä ajattelet seuraavista asioista ja ilmaisuista: 
    - luottamus
    - ystävyyys
    - ”hyvä veli verkostot” / miesten valta?
APPENDIX 5  INTERVIEW OUTLINE (PROVISIONING CASE STUDY) IN ENGLISH AND FINNISH

RESEARCH INTERVIEW

Interview structure shall be formulated for each interviewee on basis of previous information according to interviewee’s position, tasks, and other aspects. Each interview involves some or all the following themes:

1) Personal / work history
   a) How / why did you come to PROSEC?
   b) Did you know beforehand any of the current PROSEC employees or anyone from the Defence Forces?

2) PROV-project and other background of PROSEC
   a) PROSEC and outsourcing
   b) Terminology: "customer-provider model", "internal partner", "(strategic) partnership", "service centre", "nett budgeting", "process organisation"

3) PROSEC and PROSEC headquarters
   a) How did the strat-up phase feel like?
   b) What has happened since? (key tasks)
   c) Own responsibilities / division of work in PROSEC HQ?
   d) Relationships within PROSEC
      i) Drawing assignment
      ii) How would you describe relationships within the PROSEC HQ?

4) Cooperation and future
   a) Cooperation within PROSEC and in relation to service units?
   b) (Personal work) relations with interest groups
      i) Customers?
      ii) Cooperation with whom?
         - in private and public sectors?
         - elsewhere in the Defence Forces? In the Defence Command? In the Ministry of Defence?
         - other organisations (associations)?
      iii) How does the cooperation take place in practice?
   c) Pilot project of outsourcing: Finntown / CaterComp
      i) Relations to the project / participating organisations?
      ii) Any comparison done between PROSEC and pilot project?
   d) Future of PROSEC?

5) The Defence forces as an organisation and an employer
   a) What is it like to work in the Defence Forces?
      i) Compared to experiences in private / other public sector?
Soldiers versus civilians: relations and cooperation, tensions and conflicts?
Women-concentrated branches within the Defence Forces
How do things proceed: networks versus chain of command/bureaucracy
  "Old boy's networks": what do you think of the concept? Have you ever run into?

6) Hobbies and social networks
  Participation: associations, political parties, parish work...
  Friends and relatives (geographical locations)
  Work-centred friendships?

TUTKIMUSHAASTATTELU
Haastattelurunko muotoillaan jokaisen haastateltavan kohdalla erikseen aiemman tiedon pohjalta ja haastateltavan aseman, tehtävien ja muiden seikojen mukaisesti. Kussakin haastattelussa keskustellaan seuraavien teemojen pohjalta:

1) Henkilö/työhistoria
  Miten / miksi päädyit PROSEC:iin?
  Tunsitko entuudestaan ketään PROSECin työntekijöistä tai Puolustusvoimista?

2) PROV-projekti ja PROSEC:n taustat
  PROSEC ja ulkoistaminen
  Termistö: "tilaaja-tuottaja –malli", "sisäinen kumppani", 
  "(strateginen) kumppanuuus", "palvelukeskus", "nettobudjetointi", 
  " prosessiorганисаatio"

3) PROSEC ja PROSEC:n esikunta
  Miltä alku tuntui?
  Mitä tapahtunut tähän mennessä? (keskeiset työtehtävät)
  Oma vastuualue / työnjako PROSEC:n esikunnassa?
  Suhteet PROSEC:n sisällä
    Piirrostehdävä
    Miten kuvasit suhteita PROSEC:n esikunnan sisällä?

4) Yhteistyösuhteet ja tulevaisuus
  Yhteistyö PROSEC:n sisällä ja suhteessa palveluyksiköihin?
  Suhteet sidosryhmiin
    Asiakkaat?
    Mitkä keskeisiä yhteistyötahoja?
      - yksityisellä ja julkisella sektorilla?
- muualla Puolustusvoimissa? Pääesikunnassa? Puolustusministeriössä? 
- järjestöt?
  ▪ Miten yhteistyö käytännössä toimii, toimintatavat?
  ▪ Ulkoistamisen pilootointi: Finntown / CaterComp
  ▪ Onko suhteita sinne?
  ▪ Onko tehty vertailua?
  ▪ PROSEC:n tulevaisuus?

5) PV organisaationa ja työnantajana
   ▪ Millainen kokemus on olla Puolustusvoimissa töissä?
     ▪ Verrattuna yksityiseen sektoriin / muuhun julkiseen sektoriin
   ▪ Sotilaat vs. siviilit: suhteet ja yhteistoiminta, jännitteet ja ristiriidat?
   ▪ Nais-alat Puolustusvoimien sisällä
   ▪ Miten asiat etenevät: verkostot vs. virkatie/byrokratia
     ▪ ”Hyvä veli” verkostot: mitä termi tuo mieleen? Oletko koskaan törmännyt?

6) Harrastukset ja suhdeverkostot
   ▪ Jäsenyydet: yhdistykset, puolueet, seurakuntatoiminta...
   ▪ Ystävät, sukulaiset (maantieteellinen sijainti)
   ▪ Työkeskeisiä ystävyys suhteita?
APPENDIX 6 INTERVIEW AND SELECTED OTHER EXTRACTS IN THEIR ORIGINAL FORM IN FINNISH

Anonymising applies also to these extracts; most names, places and other such details mentioned in the original interviews have been changed.

Extract 1 (pp. 93)


Extract 2 (p. 101)

“[...] mulla on menny 6 euroa Iron’iin rahaa, Iron Base'iiin yhteensä. Voi sanoa että mä oon yli budjetin koska mä laskin että euro kuukaudessa pitää riittää. [TT nurahtaata] Mä oon yliittäny sen, on menny ememmä kun euro kuukaudessa mutta nyt ehkä pääsen tasoihin. Ni töenä on just tämmönen shopiapu ja supiapu ja kaikki muu ni tää on ykkösasia vähän [...]. Mä niinkin nään näät, pitää miettiä että mä on tääl tarkotus, mä takia tällä ollaan. Kuitenki tässä miettiä että mä takia näät ihmiset on tänne tullu, ehkä tulee mieleen ensimmäisenä et se on se oma etu ja että saadaan hankittua halvalla tavaraa ja saadaan hankittua komea auto ja monta muuta asiaa, että saadaan vietettyä mahdollisimman paljon aikaa tuolla jossakin muualla ku leirissä.”
Extract 3 (song lyrics, pp. 107-108)


[Kertosäkeistö:]


[Kertosäkeistö]"

(Heikki, Susanna (1999): Rauhanturvaaja [Peacekeeper]. From album Pakene [Run Away]. Published with the permission of Suomen Mediamusiikki Oy / © Saarnipuu Kustannus Oy.)

Extract 4 (pp. 108-109)

"Sut on käsketty huolehtimaan [paikallisista pakolaisista] ni kyllä sun pitäis tajuta mitä tehään ja et osaa mitä tehdään että ’väit voi-voi’... Ku siinä oli nuoria tyttöjä, siin oli Helen ja Paula oli siinä paikalla ja sitten tottakai ku ne oli siinä pihalla ja näki että savu nousi ja tottakai 13-14-kesäset toimot niin itkettäähän se. Sit olin minä ja Tomi sit olin Helen ja tuo Paula. Mä menin niille työille ja olin sanomaan että ’voisittekse nyt tehä jotain ku me nyt ollaan Tomin kanssa vähän niinä huonoja tuohon menemään?’ Nu Paula oli: ’Nii, eikä meillä ole edes tulkki tällä’ ja lähti pois siitä. Helen otti nenäliinapaketin ja meni antaa nenälinana ja halas niitä tyttöjä. Se oli sillä selvä, ne tytöt pirtistäsi siitä ihan OK. Mut Paula niinku se säikähti sitä koko tilannetta ja, nehan oli niinkun tarina kertoo ja nehan oli ihan paniikkissa molemmit sekä Paula että Liisa tällä sillon ku rapes tulemaan niitä pakolaisia tänne sisään.”

Extract 5 (p. 109)

Interviewee: “Esimerkiks sillön mellakoitten aikaan, niinku siin oli sillain, että minä ja Ben ois lähetty siitä Pasilla pelastamaan niitä [tieten etnisen ryhmän jäseniä] sieltä jostain, niin mä luulen et siinä kans, tään on taas tietyt mitä mä luulen, mutta tota mä luulen et siinä kuitenkin katto sitte ne muutamat, ketä siinä nyt oli esikuntausseerei jotain siin, niin mä luulen et ne vähän niinku katto mua, oltiin kypärät päässä niinku et oltas lähössä sinne, niin kyl mä luulen et ne siinä vähän niinku, et joo et pitää-, kannattaaahon tota laittaa sinne. Kyl mä luulisin että, että ne ehkä saattaa miettii että, et Onks to nyt niinku oikea paikka laittaa kuitenkaan.”

TT: "Niin miten siin, mitä siin tapahtu sitte?”

Interviewee: "Siis sillain ku meän piti lähtee siitä Benin kans, me oltiin siinä varusteet päällä, kypärät päässä ja suojaliivit ja muut ja Pasin piti tulla siihen, meän piti saada
yks Pasi ja lähtee sinne, ku oli taloja polttettiin ja sit siäl ammuttiin ja muita vastaavaa, niin niit [tietyn etnisen ryhmän jäseniä] evakuoidaan sielt taloista, mut. [...] Ois ollu ihan jännä lähtee ja näin, mutta se ei niinku mua ois haittannu yhtään, mut mä luulen et siinä ehkä sitten taa tulee semmossia vanhoja ööö, edelleenki siin voi si taas vaikuttaa se, et mä en oo mikään kaueen isokokonaen ja muutenkin, mä luulen et se taas sit osaltaan semmos-, siinä jossain taistelussa uskottavuutta tai muuta, muuta semmesta niin vähentäää. Et sinäää et, että mä luulisin että ne ei välttämättää niinku, ehkä se on edelleen kuitenki se on sen verran uus, uus asia ja uus asia, ettei oo niinku helppo lai-, laittaa välttämättää. Ja, ja, niin niin mä luulen, et siinä varmaan jokkun sillau ajatteli että, et onkohan se sitte oikee paikka, et ehkä se ois parempi et se ois tuola hoivaamassa noita serbejä tuolla, [nauraen] tuolla siis ei kukaan ei sanonu mitään, eikä enkää mä jutellu kenenään kaa eikä mitään mutta, olettaisin että voi olla, että näin joku ajatteli.”

**Extract 6 (pp. 112-113)**

Haastateltava: ”[...] täähän ois hyvä ku tää ois sotilasyhteisö mutta eihän tää ole. Täällähän ihmisisillä on vaan sotilaspuvut päällä ja siihen se melkeen loppuu.

TT: Meinaatko että se tekee tästä erilaisen että täällä on reserviläisiä vai?...

Haastateltava: Ei, vaan se että tota, ei se varmaan, kyllähän se saadaan ruotuun mutta ei täällä oo mitenään jämäkkää kuria. Oiski jämäkkää kuri, mutta ku ei ole. Se on sitte joku lössi vaan joka jotain tekee, tämä. [...] Joillakin on semmonen taito luoda sitä henkeä et se vetää muun porukan mukaan, et siinä tuolla on niinku, tuolla meidän toimistossa on lupa olla vähän hölmö. Siis sillä tavalla että voi niinkun... ei tarvii sille tärkeillä.”

**Extract 7 (p. 115)**

TT: ”Mainitsit kanssa Pekan tässä että ’mistä saadaan tämmön Pekka joka puhaltaa hengen tähän porukkaan?’ Niin, mikä on Pekan salaisuus [TT nauraa]?”

Haastateltava: ”Pekka on, Pekka on tuota... [pitkä tauko] Siis, mä en elämässäni montaa asiaaa inho niinkun paskantärkeitä ihmisiä. Siis semmosia jotka tekee sen tärkeyden itse asiakseen. Ja Pekka ei oo tärkee. [...] Sinon joku semmonen tietty taito luoda sitä henkeä et se vetää muun porukan mukaan, et siinä tuolla on niinku, tuolla meidän toimistossa on lupa olla vähän hölmö. Siis sillä tavalla että voi niinkun... ei tarvii sille tärkeillä.”

**Extract 8 (p. 118)**

”[M]Jessin vastaava sano tossa, siitä nyt on muutama kuukaus aikaa että tuota, hän on kuullu paljon kannanottoja että täällä kapaiset kyttää reserviläisiä ku ne tuota, että minkä verran ne juo alkoholia ja tekee merkintöjä siitä, että ne ei uskalla tulla sen takia. Mää sitten ihmettelin että mistäähän semmonen oikeen tullu [...] messin hoitajan kanssa varmaan kolmen vartin keskustelu asiasta että ’koita nyt sanoa että ei täällä kukaan kyttää ketään, se on ihan harhaluulo’, et kyllä täänne voi tulla. [...] EHK:n [esikunta- ja huoltokomppania] joukkueenjohtajan kans käyn keskustelua siitä niin ne on aika pitkälle kyllä peloteltuki osin, en tiedä onko ihan uhkailltu mutta kuitenki sanottu että meiän porukka ei mene. Sitte ne rypiskelee sit tuolla saunoilla ja körmyissä ja kuka missäki. Et ei sekään niinku hyvä tilanne ole.”
Extract 9 (p. 118-119)

"...et ehkä jopa on vähän ite väsähtänyt siihen et mä en jaksais koko aika käydä puhumassa tietystä asiosta, no esimerkiks justiin semmosta että ku täällä alkoholin takia osalla keskeyttyy palvelus, ni sitte tavallaan tälläsestä että tehtäis joku järjestelmä että se ihmisten ihan oikeesti tulis käymään esimerkiks mun luona että koska siinä mieles vähän huolestuttaa et ku joku tääll lähtee et, mihin se menee, onko sillä töitä, ja jos on työpaikka niin onko sinne ilmottanu, tietääkö perhe ja tälläsestä näin. No, tästä oon sitte yrittäny puhuu että mites tämmöst näin ni se niinku, jotenko, koska se on vaikee asia, siihen on ikävä puuttua mut niin, sillä siihen en saanu ehkä vähän, kaikki ehkä sanoo et 'joo et kauheen tärkee' ja muuta, mut et sitte se jää [naurahtaa] sille tasolle. Sit joissain tilanteissa ku oon kuulutu et joku saa sulkaa ni sitte oon ottanu yhteyttä sitte esimerkiks siihen esimiehen, vaikka kompassian pääillikköön tai vastaavana. Ni sitte usein se vastaus on sit kuitenki 'joo, kyl tää kaveri pärjää, kaikki kaverit tääl on semmosi [naurahtaa] jotka pärjää'."

Extract 10 (p. 121)

"Mikä nyt veti esimerkiks, oli se että mulla tossa yks suhde oli sellanen, niin, niin sanottu vaikee ja ku se päätty ni mä totesin että nyt lähdetään haukkaa happea. [...] Kun nyt en ollu parisuhteessa ja tavallaan ajattelin että jos vielä yhen reissun tekis, kun on mahollisuus, ni se oli niinku ratkasu tähän."

Extract 11 (p. 121)


Extract 12 (p. 121-122)

"Ja mul on aina ollu se että se mitä tehään ni keskitty kunnolla, ollaan intissä, keskitytään siihen, se oli hyvä et pääs kouluun, ei tarvinnu mitään koulujuttuja, vedettiin se inti. Koulussa keskitytään kouluun ja bilettämiseen, sanotaan niinku opiskeluun keskitytään, en käyny töissä ollenkaan. Seki on sen takku ku faija antaa kuukausirahaa joka on hemmetin hieno homma. Keskitytään opiskeluun ja nyt sit, viime kesänä keskityin töihin ja nyt taas sit täällä keskityn nyt tähän."

Extract 13 (pp. 122)

"Varmaan jos olis ihan vapaasti, vois liikkua ja mennä ja tulla, niin nulla todennäköesti olis ystäviä tuolla kylällä ja muualla, ihan näitä paikallisia ihmisiä
sitten, mutta nyt mä en oo ees yrittäny. Toki siellä on ihan mielenkiintosia ihmisiä, mutta mä en oo ees yrittäny ystävystä en koomin. Ehkä on virinkin hoidon kannalta parempi, että ei oo semmosia sydänsyväitä tuolla. Toki jos tehtävä olis vähän erilainen ja pystys vapaammin liikkumaan, niin ehkä sitten. Koska sillön edellisessä missiossa niitä oli paikallisia ystäviä, olis perhetuttuja ja ihan vo anoo, että sydänsyväitäkin.”

Extract 14 (pp. 125-126)


Extract 15 (pp. 144-145)


Extract 16 (p. 148)

suunnittelua ja talousosastot tehneet? Ja mä totesin että ei oo mitään tehty, ei yhtään mitään!"

**Extract 17 (p. 150)**

TT: "Sä toivot että olisitte puolustusministeriön alainen?"

MBM2: "Mää... Kyllä. Sen takia että tää tilaaja-tuottaja -malli toimisi aidommin. Nyt kun me toisiaan sisäisesti laskutetaan, sillä se ei oo mitään muuta kuin leikkirahan pyörittystä... faktilisesti. Että määrärahat vaan kiertää paikasta toiseen."

**Extract 18 (p. 150-151)**

MBM3: "Kuulin yhdestä asiasta mitä oli valmisteltu ja meidän mielestä se ei ollut mitä haluttua. Ajattelin että soitaan [kenraali pääesikunnassa] suoraan ja soitinkin, ja jälkeenpäin ajattelin että parempi niin."

TT: "Eli asia jota oli valmisteltu siellä...?"

MBM3: "Kyllä ja vaihtoehto joka ei, liitty budjetti asiaan, oli ajattelu että meillä olisi määräraha; sehän sotii täysin tilaaja-tuottajamallia vastaan. Soitin ja sanoin että kuulin tämmöstä ja näen sen todella hualustuttavana, sillä mittä ei toteudu eikä tavoitteet eikä täytty, vaaranantu kaikki."

**Extract 19 (p.151)**


**Extract 20 (p. 151)**

MBM5: "Sitte tässä voi vielä sekottua se että nythän pääesikunnan henkilöstöä vähennetään, voi olla sellastakin vielä että viedään koton, yhtä heiltä tehtäviä semmosia mitä, että heidän oma henkilökohtainen tulevaisuus on vaarassa. Se on ymmärrettäväkin et kamppailaan, se tulee hyvin lähelle jonkin ihmisen omaa tulevaisuutta. Ajatellaan että yhtä Jos meille sirtetään akki, että asiat ni 'Mitäs muille jääkään tässä enää?' Ni se on aika inhimillistä. Että monenlaisia muutosvoimia tässä meneillään."
**Extract 21 (p. 151-152)**

HQE: "Me ollaan kuin nuori hevonen jolla on kauhee halu päästä mutta kun ne aisat on
niin ahtaat niin ei pääse. Ne aisat on just pysyväisääkköyset, vanhat asenteet esim.
päättäjillä, ja organisaatio on rakennettu keskusjohtoiseksi. Meidän organisaatiossa,
meidän hierarkiassa meillä on päätoimikuntaa on lyöty pääasikuntaan joka ei välttämättä
kentän toimintaa tunne. Meidän pitää erityyppistä aiheista tarkkaan ja yksinkertaisesti
jotta saataisiin ne läpi. Määrittyt asiat korostu Puolustusvoimissa. Jos me oltais
jossain siviilialan alla niin ei ehkä niin moneen asiaan törmätäis sillä lailla että
roolissa jyrkkä ei. Täällä korostuu, täällä menässän turvallisuuden tai salaamisen tai muun
taakse herveen helposti."

**Extract 22 (p. 152)**

RI1: "Ennen vanhaan kun kaikki tuli paperilla ja kaikki käsittiin ja määrtiin, se oli
selkeä et sen tiesi että systeemi toimi näin. Muistan kun tulin taloon, sanottiin että
'asioista voi keskustella ja riidellä niin kauan kun päätös tulee, mutta kun se sitten tulee
niin silloin puhun pois'. Kaikki on sitä mieltä että niinä käskyssä tai päätöksessä lukee,
se on Jumalan sana, sen jälkeen ei enää keskustella. Siihen asti voidaan olla eri
mieltä…"

RI2: "Mut nytt on muuttunut kulttuuri sillä tavalla, joitakin vuosia sitten jo, että kun
roolissa käsky jossa on sanottu ettei se olla pois, seuraaava päivänä tulee uusi käsky että ei
sillä ole mitään merkitystä, nyt tehdään näin, tai kumotaan se käsky. Koskaan
aikeammin ei tullut sitä että ei käskyllä ollu merkitystä. [...] Upseeripiireissä on
tämmönen lausahdus että pääesikunnassa tarvittaisiin vielä yksi kenraali: päätävän
kenraalin virka."

**Extract 23 (p. 154-155)**

MBM6: "Joo, kyllä mä nään sen tiety syö kehityskulun että täää ei herveen montaa vuotta
puolustusvoimien alaisuudessa toimii. Kyllä mä nään sen että täää kehityskulku jatkuu
että todennäköistä on ministeriön alaisuudessa ja jokaisen sitten
valtionhallinnonkin palvelukeskus. Ja siitä voi olla että jatkuu liikelaitokesi. Ja sit se
yhtiiöitetään ja sit se myydään pois ja [nauhau], tälleehän nään menee."

**Extract 24 (p. 156)**

RI3: "Kyllä liikaa tämmä organisaatio, PV, on jakautunut siviilleihin ja sotilaisiin. Meillähän
ei ole sellaisia verkostoja täällä talon sisällä kun sotilailla. Sotilaat on erikoisasemassa
koska sotilas auttaa aina sotilasta. Ne on ollut samalla, saattanut
varusmiespalveluksesta asti olla, seuranneen uransa ja on kavereita... Kyllä heillä on se
tuki, ja ne verkostot erilaiset täällä organisaation sisällä. Me ollaan, esimerkiksi täällä
[organisaation nimi] jokainen on sen alansa asiantuntija yksin."

**Extract 25 (p. 156-157)**

MBM7: "Mut se et tietysti mulla on joka varuskunnassa on kyllä tottakai omat
kurssiveljet niin on hyviä ystäviä. Mutta kyllä mä aikasempien työtehtävien perusteella

**Extract 26 (pp. 157)**

RI: "...monet jotka ei oo sillä tavalla tuttuja, kun kuulee että on PV:ssa töissä niin sanovat että 'Herran jumala, kuinka sää siellä kun siellä on niin paljon miehiä, et miten niitten kanssa tulee toimeen?' Ni mä olen aina sanonut että "niitten kanssa kyllä tulee toimeen kun ne akat saatais pois". Siis tää on aivan hirvittävää että naiset syö toisasta [...]

**Extract 27 (p. 159)**

HQE: "Sillä tavalla että ei, ei haluttu että se meidän tunnus noudattaa niin tiukasti heraldisia ohjeita, et se on niin joukko-osastotunnuksen kaltainen se merkki, vaan lähetään hakemaan enemmän tämmöstä niinkun, nykypäivän liike-elämän kaltasta merkkiä. [...] [Kun] istuttiin saman pöydän ääressä niin meillä oli se, oli jo tavallaan yhteinen näkemys siitä että nyt rikotaan rajoja, ihan tarkotuksella. [...] Jos ajatellaan noita joukko-osastotunnuksia, niissä kuitenkin hyvin useesti on se historiallinen aspekti olemassa niissä merkeissä. Että se, osa merkistä tulee jostain vanhasta merkistä tai kunnioitettaan jonkun tietyn merkin, merkin historiaa. Että nyt on, se lähtökohta oli lähtee sen visuaalisen tunnuksen avulla kuvaamaan tää PROSEC:n tämmöstä yhteenkuuluvuutta ja tekemään niinku sitä sen merkin avulla jo työpaikasta tai työyhteisöstä semmosta niinku... Että oisko se semmonen niinku visuaalinen ilmentymä me-hengelle tai tälle PROSEC:lle.”

**Extract 28 (p. 163)**

Extract 29 (p. 163)

HQE: "Itsetäni en kantanut niinkään huolta ku aattelin että mä pärjään, mutta lasta
mietti että, repäseminen koulusta kesken lukukauden niin se on varmaan ollu tyttären
ailaa ko, no ei se mikään kova paikka kun siitä oli puhuttu, mä aloin jo hyvissä ajoin
valmistautumaan siihen että nän tulee ehkä käymään, että muutetaan. Mutta itkuhan
siitä pääsi kun se päätös tuli. Mutta hänkin säilyttänyt sinne suhteita, että ens viikolla
lähtee jo [tietyn kaupungin] kouluun pariksi [naurahdella] päiväksi.”

TT: "Aha. Koulun pariksi päiväksi?”

HQE: "Niin, lähtee morjestaan luokkahavereita. On koulujen kanssa sovittu. Matilda
kävi jo hyvissä ajoin täne tutustumassa tuohon, alotti [koulun nimi], niin meni
sinnekin päiväksi jo ennen kun oli varsinaisen koulunkäynti, pääs tutustumaan ja oli
siellä. […]"

TT: "Toi oli mulle ihan uus juttu että kouluillakin on tommosta…”

HQE: "No se on lapsi järjestää ite että se on kysyny opettajalta luvan ja sitten toisesta
pääätä kanssa että voiko tulla tervetulimään. En mä nään siinä mitään, et päinvastoin se
on lapselle, että mietitään siitä että miltä hänestä tuntuu.”

Extract 30 (p. 168)

"Me ollaan nyt sopimus allekirjoitettu mutta en vois väittää että me ollaan
kumppaneita vielä. Se kumppanuuus edellyttää aidoist sitä että pitää tunteet, kumpikin
osapuoli pitää tuntea aika hyvin toisensa. Pitää tunteet ne organisaatiot, pitää tunteet
henkilökohtasella tasollakin. Ja sen kumppanuuden pitää tuoda jokakin enemmän kuin
perussopimus, ja sen pitää niin kun tuoda jotaan lisäävää, jotaan voittoa, jokakin… Se
voitto tae se lisäävää voi olla taloudellista, se voi olla… ehkä tämänne yrityksuvaan
liittyvää, se voi olla odotuksia tulevaisuudelle […] PV on hirveen arvokas sopimus
meille. Se on paljon arvokkaampi kuin sen liikevaihdon verran oleva asiakkuus. Ja se
arvo tulee tietystä siitä että se on ainutlaatuinen. […] PV on ensimmäistä kertaa
palveluitaan antanut jonkun muun hoidettavaksi, ja se on, me ollaan edelläkävijöitä
siinä, se on, me otetaan sen nöyränä kunniana vastaan.”
SPECIAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISING IN THE PROVISIONING DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME AND IN THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE PROVISIONING SERVICE CENTRE OF THE DEFENCE FORCES

The research project looks at the reorganizing of provisioning in the Defence Forces from the perspective of social networks and the start-up of the new headquarters organisation. The study focuses primarily on the headquarters of the Provisioning Service Centre (PROSEC HQ), but also the Finntown pilot project is studied. The study is part of Teemu Tallberg’s PhD studies in the Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration (Hanken) in Helsinki.

Information given to the researcher during the study is treated confidentially. The names or other identification information of the research participants are not published in any phase of the research. Information gathering and analysis are conducted according to present legislation. The Defence Command has given a permission to conduct the study. Results of the study will be published in scientific journals and books.

RESEARCH CONTRACT (two identical copies)

This is a research interview. Researcher Teemu Tallberg has informed me on the issues above and I agree to participate a research interview.

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APPENDIX 8  EXAMPLE OF A PEACEKEEPING BATTLE GROUP ORGANISATION (AS OBSERVED IN RADNATA)
APPENDIX 9
EXAMPLE OF A PEACEKEEPING BATTLE GROUP
HEADQUARTERS (AS OBSERVED IN RADNATA)

67 officers + 8 non-commissioned officers (clerks working in the HQ but not counted in the strength of the HQ and logistics company)


166. GYÖNGYI KOVÁCS: Corporate Environmental Responsibility in Demand Networks. Helsingfors 2006.


INGMAR BJÖRKMAN et al. (Eds.): Innovation, Leadership, and Entrepreneurship. A Festschrift in Honour of Professor Martin Lindell on his 60th Birthday. Helsinki 2008.


