Rajeev K. Goel and Iikka Korhonen: Composition of exports and cross-country corruption

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All opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank of Finland.
Rajeev K. Goel¹,² and Iikka Korhonen

Composition of exports and cross-country corruption

Abstract

This research examines the connection between a country’s export structure and corruption, incorporating disaggregated data on exports for a recent time period over a large set of nations. We ask whether various types of exports (e.g. agricultural, mineral, manufacturing and fuel) exert similar influences on corruption across nations. Our results suggest that corruption decreases as nations attain prosperity, as economic and political freedoms increase, and with a larger government size. Ceteris paribus, transition countries are also found to be more corrupt. Ethnic and linguistic fractionalizations exert opposite influences on corruption, while religious fractionalization does not seem to matter. Although the effects of ore and manufacturing exports are statistically insignificant, agricultural and fuel exports affect corruption significantly. Our findings for fuel exports support previous research, as well as uniquely demonstrate that the impact of fuel exports is sensitive to the prevailing corruption level. We conclude with a discussion of policy implications.

Keywords: corruption, exports, resource curse, government

JEL codes: H11, K42, O13

¹ We thank the seminar participants at the Bank of Finland for their comments.
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Tiivistelmä


Asiasanat: korruptio, vienti, raaka-ainekirous, hallitus
1 Introduction

Most of the effects of corruption on economic activity are undesirable. Despite ample evidence that corruption tends to hamper economic growth (see e.g. Bulte and Damania, 2008; Davis and Tilton, 2005; Kronenberg, 2004; Leite and Weidmann, 1999), it appears that in some cases corruption can actually improve economic efficiency in countries with rudimentary institutional set-ups (see e.g. Lui, 1985; and Meon and Weill, 2008). Study of corruption is important both because of its prevalence and an increasing consensus that coordinated corruption control is needed at the international level to deal with countries struggling to stay competitive in a global economy.1

We are interested here in the connection between a country’s exports and corruption. There are many ways a nation’s resource exports may affect corruption. Torvik (2002) develops a model where increased resource endowments increase the number of entrepreneurs engaged in rent-seeking related to those resources. The result is that entrepreneurs try to obtain quotas or entitlements to natural resources rather than focus on direct production. This increased competition can motivate entrepreneurs to offer bribes or government officials to solicit bribes. In empirical studies, prevalence of mineral wealth is often associated with the intensity of corruption, although there is some debate surrounding this issue (for a literature review, see Stevens, 2003). Oil and other hydrocarbon fuels get frequent mention. When a country has readily accessible oil reserves, for example, a fight over rights can erode the quality of public institutions. More generally, intense competition to capture economic rents accruing from exploitation of natural resources creates ample opportunities for corruption.2 The situation may be worst in countries with poor-quality institutions or a highly fractionalized society. Damania and Bulte (2008, p. 5) argue that, under certain conditions, resource endowments in a country permit governments to “extract greater surplus (bribes).” The present research is an attempt to bring empirical evidence to bear on these issues.

Detailed incorporation of the role of exports at the disaggregated level, including agricultural, mineral, manufacturing and fuel exports, over a fairly large set of nations in a recent time period may be viewed as the main contribution of this work. Focus on possible

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1 Lambsdorff (2006) and Treisman (2000, 2007) provide summaries of studies in this field.

2 As a rule, tax rates on personal income are low in countries with large resource endowments. This may make public officials less accountable towards the general public, and may lead to greater tolerance of corruption.
agriculture exports-corruption nexus has been especially missing. Our underlying hypothesis here is that understanding the role of various export types on corruption may help in the formulation of effective policies to control corruption.

Figure 1 shows the share of various raw material exports across countries as a percentage of total merchandise exports in 2004. Two observations stand out. First, there are wide variations across export types and countries. Some exports fluctuate more than others (and these variations change differently across nations over time). In our sample, agricultural exports were highest in Burkina Faso forming 72.3% of the country’s merchandise exports, while Algeria had the highest percentage of fuel exports at 97.4% of merchandise exports in 2004. Second, the quantitative differences in export shares mask qualitative differences across raw materials. Obviously, agricultural exports have a shorter shelf life than ores and metals, this distinction could crucially affect the rent-seeking opportunities associated with them (see Douoguih, 2005; and Gylfason, 2000). In addition, ease of extraction depends on the raw material involved and its location. For example, natural gas or oil extraction may require specific technical knowledge, but geographic and geological realities may force activity into fairly small areas, making operations easy to monitor. The same may be true for significant ore or mineral occurrences (e.g. kimberlite intrusions). On the other hand, activities such as timber felling in a country with vast forests may be quite decentralized and thus more likely to evade the attention of corrupt officials.
The paper is structured as follows. The second section provides some theoretical underpinnings for our empirical estimation. The third section presents the data, while the fourth section explains our estimation methodology. The fifth section discusses the results, and the final section concludes.

## 2 Theoretical background

Theoretical research on corruption has the advantage that it can borrow from the broader literature on the incentives for engaging in illegal activity, whereby rational law-breakers (bribe-takers and bribe-givers) weigh the relative costs and benefits of their actions (Becker, 1968). Law-breakers engage in a corrupt activity when the perceived benefits outweigh the expected costs. Benefits may include obtaining preferential treatment in obtaining government contracts, securing services one is not entitled to, or jumping the queue to receive services. In the case of natural resources, benefits may include entitlements or export quotas. The costs of engaging in the corrupt act may be a fine or prison time. Social, institutional and cultural factors also affect the perception of what constitutes a corrupt act. Thus, the government’s task in corruption control is two-fold: streamlining processes to lower leakages (benefits from corruption), while strengthening the apprehension and punishment of perpetrators. The more consistent the government is in its pursuit of corruption, the better the space of corrupt acts is defined.

Researchers on corruption have taken these basic arguments and incorporated the nuances of corrupt behavior to understand incentives for engaging in corrupt activities. This literature borrows from the literature on industrial organizations and auctions to determine the effect of discretion with government officials in awarding favors and the role of competition between or among bribe-takers and bribe-givers (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; and Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, 1999). In other words, the primary focus here has been on examining the incentives for engaging in corrupt practices.

In contrast, we here emphasize the impact of various resource endowments on perceived corruption. The rationale for the linkage between resource endowments and rent-seeking behavior is that presence of resources shifts the focus of some entrepreneurs away from production to exploiting rents from the resources. Impatience or urgency in securing
these rents leads to bribe offers (for theoretical models, see Baland and Francois, 2000; and Torvik, 2002; for a literature review, see Stevens, 2003).

Many studies focus on a small set of countries or use earlier data to compare the factors that crucially impact corruption (for literature surveys, see Treisman, 2000; Jain, 2002; and Lambsdorff, 2006). From the set of factors affecting corruption, a few emerge as significant across multiple studies (Serra, 2006). In our empirical exercise, the control variables we apply are economic prosperity, the nature, strength, and efficacy of the government, as well as cultural and religious factors. It is an empirical regularity that more affluent societies have less corruption. The quality of public institutions will inevitably have an effect on corruption. In addition, there is empirical evidence that certain religious denominations can affect the level of corruption. All these considerations are brought to bear in the formal analysis of the causes of corruption in section 4 below.

3 Data

In our estimations, we use data culled from various sources (a summary of our data and data sources appears in Table 1). Our corruption variable is based on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), a compilation of expert comments and opinion surveys of perceived corruption in 180 countries. Although the time-series properties of the index may be susceptible to the number and frequency of surveys in any given country, its cross-sectional value is quite good (which is why it has been used in numerous studies of corruption over the past decade). The CPI value for each country also tends to change little from one year to the next. These properties of the CPI are the main reason for our choice of a cross-sectional investigation. The CPI ranges from zero to ten with higher values showing a lack of corruption. To facilitate interpretation of results and conform to our underlying regression assumptions, the index was rescaled and unbounded (our dependent variable is $\ln\left(\frac{10-CPI}{CPI}\right)$, so that a higher score signifies higher corruption. We are
mainly interested in the effects of different resource endowments on corruption. Taking data from the World Bank Development Indicators, we measure the share of four product categories in a country’s total exports:

- exports of agricultural raw materials (AGexp),
- fuel exports (FLexp),
- exports of ores and metals (ORexp), and
- manufacturing exports (MNexp).

Economic prosperity and political freedom (democracy) in a country have been widely used as control variables in studies of causes of corruption. The general consensus is that the level of corrupt activity declines as nations become more prosperous (GDPpc) and democracy grows (DEM). The underlying rationale here is that the desire to circumvent legal channels via corrupt means decreases with greater prosperity and the rising opportunity cost of being caught. Further, greater press freedom and civil liberties (the two main components of political freedom) in a democracy act as checks against corruption if they cause government officials to fear exposure of their corrupt dealings (see Bulte and Damania, 2008). More economic freedom (EF) entails less government intervention in the economy (e.g. banking and trade restrictions, regulatory bottlenecks, or corporate tax rates), thereby reducing the opportunities for government officials to solicit bribes (fewer “tollbooths” in the parlance of Shleifer and Vishny, 1999). Our measures of economic and political freedom are widely used in the relevant literature (see Table 1 for details). Open economies usually have fewer controls, so we employ the degree of openness of an economy as another measure of the level of economic freedom. We postulate that openness of the economy (OPEN, sum of exports and imports as share of GDP) could affect corruption as a determinant of susceptibility to corruption. Indeed, in their examination of the relative effects of economic and political freedoms on corruption across countries, Goel and Nelson (2005) find that greater economic freedom is more effective at reducing corruption than greater political freedom.

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3 Our use of GDP data for 2005, while employing the CPI for 2007, helps make the prosperity variable somewhat predetermined.
The government plays a crucial role in corruption as it has monopoly control over the provision of many services. This control presents rent-seeking opportunities to bureaucrats in charge of disbursing government goods and services. The size of the government (GCONS) captures the magnitude of government machinery. Greater size could imply higher spending on monitoring and policing, but it could also imply more red tape (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). In our sample, government size in 2005 ranged from 4.1% of GDP in Cambodia to 44.6% of GDP in Eritrea. Cross-country studies generally find that the level of corrupt activity goes down with a larger government size (Goel and Nelson, 2005).

Ethnic, linguistic and religious differences within and across nations might dictate the prevalence of corrupt practices (Paldam, 2002). For example, Japan is ethnically and linguistically more homogeneous than, say, the United States. We thus argue it may be easier to formulate corrupt relations in certain contexts (Lambsdorff and Teksoz, 2004) and harder in others where religious or ethnic beliefs see certain acts as corrupt. Fractionalization of a society can give rise to clan-based behavior, where members of an ethnic, linguistic or religious group favor each other over outsiders. This kind of behavior can increase corruption. To capture these differences consistently across nations, we employ three indices of fractionalization:

- ETHNIC is an index of ethnic fractionalization,
- LANG is an index of linguistic fractionalization, and
- RELG is an index of religious fractionalization in a country.\(^4\)

These data and the corresponding details are available from Alesina et al. (2003).

Turning to the role of exports, we disaggregate a country’s exports into four categories:

- exports of agricultural raw materials (AGexp),
- fuel exports (FLexp),
- exports of ores and metals (ORexp), and
- manufacturing exports (MNexp).

\(^4\) Many studies use composite indices that capture the ethnolinguistic fractionalization in countries. Our use of separate fractionalization indices is more revealing and we find different effects across fractionalization types (see below).
As shown in Figure 1 above, there are wide variations in the share of these exports across nations. Further these materials are qualitatively different, which might affect the rent-generating opportunities associated with them. For instance, the perishable nature of agricultural exports would add a sense of urgency to these transactions, while manufacturing or metals exports do not face similar limitations. Further, the non-renewability of certain fuels would add another qualitative dimension of associated transactions, corrupt or otherwise. Whereas there is some research that examines the nexus between exports and corruption, examination of exports at a disaggregated level is rather rare.\textsuperscript{5} Recognizing that the data might be unable to capture certain subtle differences across groups of countries, we use two dichotomous control variables. TRAN is a dummy variable identifying transition countries to see whether there are some unique characteristics in these nations that spur corruption (Kronenberg, 2004). There might be disproportionate rent-seeking opportunities in initial years due to large-scale privatization or underdeveloped checks and balances. Institutions might also be underdeveloped in the least-developed nations (Bardhan, 1997). However, rent-seeking opportunities (i.e. size of the discretionary pie) might be small in these countries. On the other hand, least-developed nations might be more eager to control corruption in order to qualify for foreign assistance. To see whether these influences matter, we include DEV as a dummy variable that identifies least-developed nations as classified by the United Nations.

The data include cross-sectional country level observations for about 130 nations for 2007 (or the closest year available). Details about the variables used, definitions and data sources are provided in Table 1. Next, we will briefly examine the underlying data. Table 2 gives the basic statistical indicators for different variables. Figure 2 shows that there is a negative correlation between per capita GDP and the level of corruption. This correlation has been documented in the literature before. However, our research will add to this discussion by examining whether the correlation holds when a number of pertinent variables, especially exports under various categories, are taken into account.

\textsuperscript{5} In the study of Petermann et al. (2007), the authors examine the effect of ore and fuel exports on corruption across countries with different income levels (see also Douoguih, 2005; Leite and Weidmann, 1999; and Bulte and Damania, 2008). Our study differs substantially from Petermann et al. in that we:

- use a greater degree of export disaggregation,
- employ more control variables,
- use a sample of countries nearly twice as large, and
4 Estimation

Following the above discussion, we arrive at the following general estimation model. The level of corrupt activity in a nation is determined by the factors outlined in equation (1) below, including economic, social, political, and governmental.

\[
\text{Corruption}_i = f(\text{Economic prosperity}_i, \text{Political freedom}_i, \text{Economic freedom}_i, \text{Government size}_i, \text{Fractionalization}_{ij}, \text{Exports}_{ik}) \quad (1)
\]

\[i = 1, \ldots, 132\]

\[j = \text{ETHNIC, LANG, RELG}\]

\[k = \text{AGexp, FLexp, ORexp, MNexp}\]

A number of specific variables are used in this study to capture the right-hand-side control variables mentioned in (1). They are discussed in detail below, with additional technical details provided in Table 1.

As was explained above, our dependent variable is a transformation of the corruption perceptions index (CPI) from the Transparency International, \(\ln[(10-\text{CPI})/\text{CPI}]\). Therefore, in our estimation and the subsequent discussion, an increase in the corruption index
means increase in corruption. We control for political and economic freedom, as well as per capita GDP, government size and different measures of fractionalization.

The main focus of our study is the effect different exports have on corruption. To reiterate, we use our four export categories: exports of agricultural raw materials (AGexp), fuel exports (FLexp), exports of ores and metals (ORexp) and manufacturing exports (MNexp). As shown in Figure 1 above, there are wide variations across nations in the share of these exports. Further these materials are qualitatively different, which might affect the rent-seeking opportunities associated with them. Whereas there is some research that examines the nexus between exports and corruption (see Jain, 2001; and Lambsdorff, 2006), examination of exports at a disaggregated level is rare.

The estimation is conducted using the STATA software package. In keeping with the requirements of the study and the nature of the data, three different estimation methodologies were employed:

- ordinary least squares or OLS (Tables 2 and 3), and
- two-stage least squares (2SLS) (Table A1).

5 Results

Tables 2-3 and A1 present different variations of equation (1) using appropriate estimation techniques. The overall fit of the all the models estimated is quite good. We discuss the findings of each table below.6

Baseline models

The baseline models include a number of factors affecting corruption that have been used elsewhere. However, our sample size is larger and the data are more recent. We do not include resource disaggregation in these models as our primary objectives here are to provide a benchmark and facilitate comparison with the extant literature.

The results show that greater economic prosperity reduces corruption, a finding consistent with the extant literature (Serra, 2006). Both greater economic and greater po-
litical freedom reduce corruption, albeit the coefficient on DEM is statistically insignificant in one case. The findings with respect to economic freedom are robust whether economic freedom is measured via an index (EF) or through the degree of openness (OPEN). The relative effectiveness of economic freedom over political freedom in controlling corruption has been shown in earlier studies (Goel and Nelson, 2005). Ceteris paribus, larger government size seems to curb corruption. Apparently, larger government is associated more with checks and balances to reduce corruption and less with increased red tape. The coefficient on GCONS is negative and statistically significant in models 2A-2C estimated in Table 2. 7 To capture whether more affluent nations have more effective large governments, model 2D adds an interaction term between per capita GDP and government size. In this case, the coefficient on GDPpc loses statistical significance. Interestingly, now the coefficient on GCONS changes sign (and is statistically significant), while that on the interaction term (GCONS*lnGDPpc) is negative. This implies that, while a larger government might contribute to corruption by adding more bureaucracy, more affluent nations benefit from the corruption-reducing aspects of government size.

Again, ceteris paribus, corruption in transition countries (TRAN) is higher suggesting the influence of disproportionate rent-seeking opportunities and perhaps underdeveloped systems of checks and balances. Interestingly, the coefficient on DEV that identifies the least-developed nations is negative and statistically significant. This implies that, with the level of GDP per capita held the same, either the least-developed nations were heeding international pressures in curbing corruption or there was greater mis-measurement in the corruption indices in these cases. 8

Turning to the indices capturing the degrees of fractionalization, greater ethnic fractionalization seems to increase corruption, while more linguistic and religious fractionalizations have negative signs, with the sign on religious fractionalization statistically insignificant. Greater ethnic fractionalization can lead to more corruption in cases where there is lack of general trust across different ethnicities and money is used to grease rela-

6 Since the dependent variable (and some control variables) is measured via an index, appropriate caution should be exercised in the interpretation of the findings.
7 It is worth pointing out that the size of the governments masks other, possibly relevant, governmental attributes such as the structure and form of the government. Incorporation of government quality measures is beyond the scope of this paper.
8 It should also be borne in mind that the overall size of the rents that can be potentially sought is relatively small in developing nations.
tions and build trust. On the other hand, linguistic differences may curb corruption where the inability to communicate acts as a barrier to the formation of corrupt contracts.

**Export composition and corruption**

Table 3 reports OLS results when exports are disaggregated across our four categories (AGexp, FLexp, ORexp, and MNexp) to reveal differential influences in these categories on corruption. The findings with respect to GDPpc, DEM, GCONS and TRAN mirror those from Table 2. Specifically, greater economic prosperity, greater economic and political freedoms, and larger government size all reduce corruption. In terms of the magnitude of impact, a one percent increase in per capita GDP leads to a roughly half percent reduction in corruption. Again, corruption was higher in transition countries.

Turning to the effects of various exports, agricultural exports seem to reduce corruption, while higher fuel exports increase corruption. The effects of ore and manufacturing exports are statistically insignificant. In terms of magnitude, the absolute value of the coefficient on AGexp is nearly twice that on FLexp. It might be the case that the nature of these commodities affects the relative discount rates of bribe-payers and bribe-givers with different impacts on the level of corrupt activities. For instance, we can infer that perishable agricultural goods would warrant that transactions be executed expeditiously reducing the time for formulation of corrupt contracts. Also, agricultural production tends to be more dispersed, making it more difficult for corrupt officials to monitor. This positive impact of agricultural exports can be seen as supporting the notion that some resources can be a “blessing” (Stevens, 2003). On the other hand, the scarcity and relative longevity of fuels might turn out to be conducive to corruption, and their relatively concentrated extraction makes it easier to demand bribes.

Further, to account for possible nonlinearities between democracy and resources, models 3G and 3H include interaction terms between DEM and AGexp and FLexp, respectively. Coefficients on both the interaction variables are statistically insignificant. This implies that the effect of natural resource endowment does not depend on the degree of democracy.

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9 In a study comparing the relative effects of fuel and non-fuel mineral exports, Petermann et al. (2007) note mixed effects of mineral exports on corruption. This somewhat contradicts the earlier study of Douoguih (2005), which finds the effects of non-fuel mining significant under certain situations.
The overall finding that when it comes to corruption, not all type of exports are alike and this has important implications for the formulation of effective domestic and international corruption control policies.

Robustness check

We perform a robustness check on our findings. It involves allowing for endogenous government size. The corresponding results are reported in the Appendix.

Endogeneity of Government Size

It has been argued that corruption might be endogenous with respect to some of its determinants. In other words, some factors that cause corruption might in turn themselves be affected by the level of corrupt activity. Arguably the most prominent of these factors is the government size (GCONS in Table 1). On the one hand, a large government affects corruption by increasing rent-seeking opportunities (as potential bribe-seekers offer money to circumvent bottlenecks) and via greater spending on monitoring and enforcement. On the other hand, greater corruption may bloat the government machinery through increased red tape as “tollbooths” are set up.

To account for the possible simultaneity between corruption and government size, we ran a version of the baseline models presented in Table 2 (Model 2A), by allowing government size to be endogenous. The corresponding two-stage least squares (2SLS) results, using population (POP) and literacy (LIT) as additional instruments, are reported in the Table A1. The results are very similar to Model 2A. Specifically, greater economic prosperity, more economic freedom and a larger government size all reduce corruption, while, other things being the same, corruption is greater in transition nations. The effect of political freedom or democracy is statistically insignificant.

6 Concluding remarks

Using recent data from a large sample of countries, this paper studied the connection between a country’s natural resource endowments and corruption. Earlier empirical studies found that prevalence of mineral wealth was often associated with higher corruption levels (see Stevens, 2003). Here, we incorporated the role of exports at the disaggregated level...
over a fairly large set of nations and during a recent time period. Focus on possible agriculture exports-corruption nexus has been especially missing. Our main thesis was that understanding of the role of various raw material types on corruption can help in the formulation of effective corruption-control policies. We asked whether various types of raw material endowments exert similar influences on corruption across nations.

Based on several estimates with different estimation methodologies, the following conclusions emerge. The baseline models (Table 2) show that corruption decreases:

- as nations attain prosperity,
- as economic and political freedoms increase, and
- with larger government size.

The findings with respect to economic freedom were robust across two different measures. Transition countries were more corrupt, ceteris paribus, while corruption was lower in the least-developed nations. Degrees of ethnic and linguistic fractionalizations had opposite effects on corruption, while religious fractionalization did not seem to matter. The different relative impacts of the various types of fractionalization provide a richer insight compared to studies that employ composite fractionalization indices. Overall, the findings of the benchmark models generally support those in the literature (see Lambsdorff, 2006), albeit with more recent and larger data and in some cases with more detailed control variables.

Focusing on the possible differential effects across export types (Table 3), it seems that only agricultural and fuel exports significantly affected corruption. The effects of ore and manufacturing exports were statistically insignificant. Interestingly, while higher fuel exports increased corruption, greater agricultural exports had the opposite effect. In terms of magnitude, the absolute value of the coefficient on agricultural exports is nearly twice that on fuel exports. It might be the case that fuel endowments presented opportunities for rent-seeking behavior, while agricultural contracts were relatively more decentralized and in such cases the level of corrupt activity actually went down. However, the interactions of these resources with democracy failed to produce statistical significance (models 3G and 3H). The effects of the other variables, including economic prosperity, democracy, government size and transition nation status, reinforced the findings from Table 2. Further, the signs and magnitudes of these variables were quite robust to model specifications across the eight variations reported in Table 3.
Turning to the policy implications of our findings, it appears that different resource types affect corruption differently. Not all resource types can be seen as a curse, and some might well be a blessing. The signs and magnitudes of the resource effects vary in terms of their impact on corruption. Thus, it would be imprudent to base policies on a blanket notion that natural resource wealth necessarily leads to corruption. Further, the findings reinforce some policy recommendations from the literature that as nations achieve greater economic prosperity, the level of corrupt activity declines. However, corruption in the least-developed nations was lower, pointing perhaps to nonlinearities in the relation between wealth and corruption, or the inability of dichotomous variables to capture subtle institutional differences. Improvements in economic and political freedoms also seem beneficial for corruption control. The extra bureaucracy associated with larger governments does not seem to contribute to corruption. Rather, a larger government lowers corruption by strengthening checks and balances, especially in the most affluent nations. Policies paring government size are not supported with respect to corruption control. It seems that transition nations face peculiar issues regarding corruption control and would warrant special attention be given to such countries.

In closing, we offer the caveat that, in the absence of the ability to measure actual corruption, we have proxied the level of corruption with an index of perceived corruption. Thus, while the CPI has gained wide acceptance and continues to improve over time, it is not without limitations (see Treisman, 2007). Further, the role of institutions is quite important in the context of their bearing on corruption (Knack and Keefer, 1995). However, not all these institutions are equally amenable to quantitative measurement. Finally, there is the fine, yet important, distinction between petty and grand corruption. Some countries have mainly grand corruption (e.g. the United States), while others have both grand and petty corruption (e.g. India and Nigeria). Differences in corruption types can crucially affect perceptions about corruption (and the resulting indices). This aspect deserves additional attention in the literature.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International (10 highly clean, 0 highly corrupt), 2007 (3.98; 2.09)</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPpc</td>
<td>GDP per capita (PPP 2000 international $), 2005, (9649.41; 10498.98)</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EF</td>
<td>Economic Freedom in a country, (% free), 2007 (60.56; 10.59)</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM</td>
<td>Sum of a country’s political rights and civil liberties scores, (higher score, more democratic), 2007 (-6.71; 3.83)</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCONS</td>
<td>General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP), 2005 (15.80; 6.76)</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AExp</td>
<td>Agricultural raw materials exports (% of merchandise exports), 2004 (4.44; 9.56)</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FExp</td>
<td>Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports), 2004 (16.51; 25.92)</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORExp</td>
<td>Ores and metals exports (% of merchandise exports), 2004 (5.79; 10.30)</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNExp</td>
<td>Manufactures exports (% of merchandise exports), 2004 (50.89; 30.72)</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEN</td>
<td>Exports plus imports (% of GDP), 2004 (94.55; 54.02)</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHNIC</td>
<td>Ethnic fractionalization (0.44; 0.26)</td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANG</td>
<td>Language fractionalization (0.40; 0.28)</td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELG</td>
<td>Religious fractionalization (0.43; 0.23)</td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP</td>
<td>Population, 2005 (3.59E+07; 1.32E+08)</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIT</td>
<td>Literacy rate (% of literate population above age 15), 2006 (79.10; 20.75)</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAN</td>
<td>Dummy variable = 1 if a country is a transition economy, 0 otherwise (0.15; 0.36)</td>
<td>VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEV</td>
<td>Dummy variable = 1 if a country is considered least developed, 0 otherwise (0.26; 0.44)</td>
<td>VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>Corruption Perceptions Index, World Bank (+2.5 highly clean, -2.5 highly corrupt), 2007 (-0.07; 1.00)</td>
<td>VII</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All data are by country

Data sources

II. World Development Indicators CDROM, 2007
III. [http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/countries.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/countries.cfm)
IV. [http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw08launch/FIW08Tables.pdf](http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw08launch/FIW08Tables.pdf)
V. Alesina et al. (2003)
VII. [http://www.govindicators.org](http://www.govindicators.org)
Table 2
Cross-country causes of corruption: Baseline models

(Independent variable: ln\((10-CPI)/CPI\))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2A</th>
<th>2B</th>
<th>2C</th>
<th>2D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ln GDPpc</td>
<td>-0.31**</td>
<td>-0.64**</td>
<td>-0.57**</td>
<td>0.06</td>
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<td>0.82</td>
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Notes: Variable definitions appear in Table 1. The numbers in parentheses are absolute values of t-statistics based on robust standard errors. ** denotes statistical significance at least at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% level. All models included a constant term, but those results are not reported here to conserve space.
Table 3.  
Export Composition and Corruption  
(Dependent Variable: ln ((10-CPI)/CPI) 

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<th>3C</th>
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<th>3E</th>
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<td>-0.06** (3.3)</td>
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<td>-0.01 (2.4)</td>
<td>-0.01 (2.4)</td>
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<td>0.006 (1.5)</td>
<td>0.005 (1.5)</td>
<td>0.005 (1.5)</td>
<td>0.005 (1.5)</td>
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<td>0.005 (1.5)</td>
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<td>-0.001 (0.4)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.4)</td>
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<td>DEM*AGexp</td>
<td>0.0002 (0.1)</td>
<td>0.00001 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.00001 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.00001 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.00001 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.00001 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.00001 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.00001 (0.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEM*FLexp</td>
<td>-0.004 (1.2)</td>
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<td>-0.003 (1.3)</td>
<td>-0.003 (1.3)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.4)</td>
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<td>F-value</td>
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<td>39.0**</td>
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<td>31.2**</td>
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<td>R^2</td>
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<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.70</td>
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</table>

Notes: Variable definitions appear in Table 1. The numbers in parentheses are absolute values of t-statistics based on robust standard errors. ** denotes statistical significance at least at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% level. All models included a constant term, but those results are not reported here to conserve space.
Appendix

Allowing for endogeneity of government size

**TABLE A1.**
Causes of corruption: Allowing for endogenous GCONS

(Dependent variable: ln ((10-CPI)/CPI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>t-value</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>EF</td>
<td>-0.05**</td>
<td>(3.8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCONS</td>
<td>-0.02**</td>
<td>(3.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAN</td>
<td>0.27**</td>
<td>(3.3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 89

F-value = 65.1**

R² = 0.75

Notes: Variable definitions appear in Table 1. The reported results are the second stage estimates of a 2SLS regression, with POP and LIT as additional instruments for GCONS. The numbers in parentheses are absolute values of t-statistics. ** denotes statistical significance at least at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% level. The model included a constant term, but those results are not reported here to conserve space.
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