Browsing by Subject "talletussuoja"

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  • Jännäri, Kaarlo (1997)
    MARKKA & TALOUS 4
  • Rahoitustarkastus (2008)
    Rahoitustarkastus tiedottaa 1/2008
    Pohjoismaiselle mallille kysyntää pankkivalvonnassa FATF:n maatarkastusraportti ja uusi rahanpesulaki Riskien ja epävarmuustekijöiden kuvaukset pakollisia myös osavuosikatsauksissa Talletussuojaan liittyvät asiat kiinnostivat vuonna 2007 Tapahtumakatsaus
  • Rahoitustarkastus (2007)
    Rahoitustarkastus tiedottaa 6/2007
    Talletussuoja EU:n alueella vähintään 20 000 euroa – suojat vaihtelevat maittain Työryhmä valmistelee lainsäädäntöä pikaluotoille Toiminnan ulkoistamista koskeva sääntely on uudistunut Rahoitustarkastus antoi ohjeen poikkeusoloihin varautumisesta Uusi luottotietolaki varmistaa luotettavien luottotietojen saatavuuden ja turvaa yksityisyyden suojan Saatavan lopullinen vanhentuminen Määräyskokoelman standardit velvoittavat ja ohjaavat Rahoitustarkastus julkaissut nyt myös englanninkielisenä selvityksensä listayhtiöiden vuoden 2006 IFRS-tilinpäätöksistä Tapahtumakatsaus
  • Valori, Veli-Pekka; Vesala, Jukka (1998)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 72 ; 3 ; March
  • Riksdagen (2016)
    Riksdagens bankfullmäktiges berättelse till Riksdagen
  • Peresetsky, A.A.; Karminsky, A.M.; Golovan, S.V. (2007)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 2/2007
    Published in Russian in Economics and Mathematical Methods (ЭКОНОМИКА И МАТЕМАТИЧЕСКИЕ МЕТОДЫ), v. 43, n.1, 2007, pp. 3-15 as "Deposit interest rates in the Russian banks, market discipline and deposit insurance system" (ПРОЦЕНТНЫЕ СТАВКИ РОССИЙСКИХ БАНКОВ. РЫНОЧНАЯ ДИСЦИПЛИНА И СТРАХОВАНИЕ ДЕПОЗИТОВ)
    This paper examines the extent to which the observed diversity of private deposit interest rates in Russia is explained by bank financial indicators.We also test for whether the introduction of the bank deposit insurance scheme in 2005 affected deposit interest rates.Our results suggest market discipline in the Russian banking system involves Russian depositors demanding higher deposit interest rates from banks with risky financial policies.This discipline seems stronger than in developed countries.Our study suggests also that the risks taken by banks increased after introducing the deposit insurance.Key words: banking, deposit interest rates, moral hazard, deposit insurance, Russia JEL codes: D43, E53, G21, P34
  • Niinimäki, Juha-Pekka (2001)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 16/2001
    There is substantial evidence that new banks and rapidly growing banks are risk prone.We study this problem by designing a relationship-lending model in which a bank operates as a financial intermediary and centralised monitor.In the absence of deposit insurance, the bank s limited liability option creates an incentive problem between the bank and its depositors, the likely outcome of which is a reduction in the amounts of resources allocated to monitoring its borrowers.Hence, the bank must signal its safety to depositors by maintaining the equity ratio held.The optimal equity ratio is dynamic, ie new banks need relatively more equity than established banks, which enjoy profitable old lending relationships charter value that reduce the incentive problem.However, if an established bank grows rapidly, its share of old relationships also decreases and the bank will have to raise its equity ratio.With deposit insurance, regulators should set higher equity requirements for new banks and rapidly growing banks than for those in a more established position.The results of the model can be extended to more general inter-firm control of credit institutions. Keywords: financial intermediation, relationship banking, financial fragility, bank regulation, deposit insurance, moral hazard, product quality
  • Karas, Alexei; Pyle, William; Schoors, Koen (2006)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 13/2006
    Published in Oxford Economic Papers, Volume 62, Issue 1, 2010: 36-61 as How do Russian depositors discipline their banks? Evidence of a backward bending deposit supply function.
    Using a database from post-communist, pre-deposit-insurance Russia, we demonstrate the presence of quantity-based sanctioning of weaker banks by both firms and households, particularly after the financial crisis of 1998.Evidence for the standard form of price discipline, however, is notably weak.We estimate the deposit supply function and show that, particularly for poorly capitalized banks, interest rate increases exhibit diminishing, and eventually negative, returns in terms of deposit attraction.These findings are consistent with depositors interpreting the deposit rate itself as a complementary proxy of otherwise unobserved bank-level risk. JEL Classifications: G21, O16, P2 Keywords: market discipline, deposit market, transition, Russia
  • Suomen Pankki (2017)
    Euro & talous. Analyysi
    Suomen rahoitusjärjestelmän vakauteen ei kohdistu välitöntä uhkaa. Nordean kotipaikkamuutoksen myötä pankkijärjestelmän rakenteelliset haavoittuvuudet kuitenkin kasvavat. Toteutetut sääntelyn ja valvonnan uudistukset sekä jäsenyys pankkiunionissa lievittävät pankkisektorin kasvun aiheuttamia riskejä, mutta pankkiunionista vielä puuttuvan yhteisen talletussuojan perustaminen on tärkeää. Tulosidonnainen lainakatto olisi tarpeen, jotta rahoitusvakautta varjostavaa kotitalouksien velkaantumista saataisiin hillityksi.
  • Valori, Veli-Pekka; Vesala, Jukka (1998)
    MARKKA & TALOUS no 1
  • Karas, Alexei; Pyle, William; Schoors, Koen (2010)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 8/2010
    Published in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Volume 45, Issue 1, February 2013, Pages 179–200 as as Deposit insurance, banking crises, and market discipline: Evidence from a natural experiment on deposit flows and rates
    We explore how the introduction of explicit deposit insurance affects deposit flows into and out of banks of varying risk levels. Using evidence from a natural experiment in Russia, we employ a difference-in-difference estimator to isolate the change in the deposit flows of a newly insured group (households) relative to an uninsured control group (firms). This approach improves on earlier studies seeking to identify the effect of deposit insurance on market discipline. We find that the relative sensitivity of households to bank capitalization diminished markedly with the introduction of an insurance program covering their deposits. This was not true for firms, however. We then show the finding is not an artifact of the two groups responding differently to a minor banking crisis that arose at roughly the same time.
  • Niinimäki, Juha-Pekka (2000)
    Bank of Finland. Discussion papers 21/2000
    We consider the joint effect of competition and deposit insurance on risk taking by banks when the riskiness of banks is unobservable to depositors.It turns out that the magnitude of risk taking depends on the type of bank competition.If the bank is a monopoly or banks compete only in the loan market, deposit insurance has no effect on risk taking.In that case the banks are too risky but extreme risk taking is avoided.In contrast, introducing deposit insurance increases risk taking if banks compete for deposits. Then, deposit rates become excessively high and force the banks to take extreme risks.Regarding the effects of increasing competition when there is deposit insurance, the results imply that deposit competition encourages risk taking but loan market competition does not.Our results can be extended more generally to insurance guaranty funds. Keywords: Deposit insurance, Insurance guaranty funds, Bank and insurance regulation, Moral hazard, Credit rationing, Financial Fragility.
  • Chen, Yehning; Hasan, Iftekhar (2005)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 24/2005
    Published in Journal of Financial Intermediation, Volume 15, Issue 3, July 2006: 307-331
    In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the transparency of banks and the fragility of the banking system.We show that information-based bank runs may be inefficient because the deposit contract designed to provide liquidity induces depositors to have excessive incentives to withdraw.An improvement in transparency of a bank may reduce depositor welfare through increasing the chance of an inefficient contagious bank run on other banks.A deposit insurance system in which some depositors are fully insured and the others are partially insured can ameliorate this inefficiency.Under such a system, bank runs can serve as an efficient mechanism for disciplining banks.We also consider bank managers' control over the timing of information disclosure, and find that they may lack the incentive to reveal information about their banks. Key words: bank run, contagion, transparency, market discipline, deposit insurance JEL classification numbers: G21, G28
  • Asplund, Tuulia; Tissari, Päivi; Tolvanen, Mervi (2018)
    Euro & talous 2/2018
    EU:n pankkiunioni on toiminnassa, muttei vielä valmis. Yhteinen eurooppalainen talletussuojajärjestelmä on pankkiunionin keskeisin puuttuva osa. Pankkiunionin vahvistamiseksi ja yhteisen talletussuojajärjestelmän edistämiseksi on tärkeää vähentää eurooppalaisen pankkijärjestelmän riskejä, joista merkittävimpiä ovat kriisiajoilta periytyvät järjestämättömät saamiset sekä pankkien suuret kotivaltioidensa velkakirjaomistukset. Myös kriisinratkaisun toimintaedellytyksiä tulisi yhä parantaa.
  • Haajanen, Jyrki (2016)
    Euro & talous 2/2016
    Euroopan komissio esitti marraskuussa 2015 uuden eurooppalaisen talletussuojajärjestelmän perustamista. Uusi talletussuojajärjestelmä aloittaisi toimintansa vuoden 2017 alusta, ja uudistukseen sisältyisi 8 vuoden siirtymävaihe. Sen aikana vastuu talletusten korvaamisesta siirtyisi vaiheittain kansalliselta tasolta eurooppalaiselle talletussuojajärjestelmälle vuoteen 2024 mennessä.
  • Francis, Bill; Hasan, Iftekhar; Song, Liang; Yeung, Bernard (2012)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 16/2012
    Published in Journal of Financial Intermediation, Volume 24, Issue 3, July 2015: 312–324
    This paper examines what institutional and bank-specific factors determine bank stock price synchronicity. Using data on 37 countries from 1996-2007, we find that bank stocks are more aligned with the whole market (1) during the financial crisis; (2) in countries that have more credit provided by banks; (3) in countries that do not have explicit depository insurance; and (4) in countries that have lower bank-level disclosure. The results hold for both emerging and developed economy subsamples. Furthermore, in emerging economies, bank stocks in countries with higher degree of state-owned bank are more synchronized with the whole market, similarly, in developed markets, lower banking freedom enhances bank stock price synchronicity. Finally, the effects of state ownership, protection of property rights, and bank size are all more pronounced when determining bank stock price synchronicity during the financial crisis period. Keywords: stock price synchronicity; financial crisis, bank ownership; deposit insurance; banking freedom; bank disclosure JEL classification: G12; G14; G15; G21; G38; N20