Browsing by Subject "Bailouts"

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  • Tölö, Eero; Jokivuolle, Esa; Virén, Matti (2021)
    Journal of Financial Services Research 1
    Published in BoF DP 29/2015 http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:bof-201512151482
    Using the Eurosystem’s proprietary interbank loan data from June 2008–June 2020, we show that larger European banks have had a lower cost of overnight borrowing than smaller banks. The size premium remains significant after controlling for a large set of other factors but has decreased over time, especially in countries that were stricken by the Sovereign Debt Crisis. A difference-in-differences analysis suggests that the decline in the size premium is related to the actual bail-in events, not to the implementation dates of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive as such. This finding is robust to controlling for the effect of the ECB’s long-term refinancing operations. Overall, the results suggest that the regulatory move towards bail-in rather than bailout policies to deal with financially distressed banks has reduced the too-big-to-fail expectations concerning large banks.
  • Pancrazi, Roberto; Seoane, Hernán D.; Vukotic, Marija (2019)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 25/2019
    We examine the welfare effects of bailouts in economies exposed to sovereign default risk. When a government of a small open economy requests a bailout from an international financial institution, it receives a non-defaultable loan of size G that comes with imposed debt limits. The government endogenously asks for the bailout during recessions and repays it when the economy recovers. Hence, the bailout acts as an imperfect state contingent asset that makes the economy better off. The bailout duration is endogenous and increases with its size. The bailout size creates non-trivial tradeoffs between receiving a larger amount of relatively cheap resources precisely in times of need on the one hand, and facing longer-lasting financial constraints and accumulated interest payments, on the other hand. We characterize and quantify these tradeoffs and document that welfare gains of bailouts are hump-shaped in the size of bailout loans.