Browsing by Subject "H26"

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  • Hasan, Iftekhar; Wu, Qiang; Zhang, Hao; Hoi, Chun-Keung (Stan) (2014)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 3/2014
    Published in Journal of Financial Economics, 113 (2014) 109-130
    We find that firms with greater tax avoidance incur higher spreads when obtaining bank loans. This finding is robust in a battery of sensitivity analyses and in two quasi-experimental settings including the implementation of Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 48 and the revelation of past tax sheltering activity. Firms with greater tax avoidance also incur more stringent non-price loan terms, incur higher at-issue bond spreads, and prefer bank loans over public bonds when obtaining debt financing. Overall, these findings indicate that banks perceive tax avoidance as engendering significant risks. JEL Classification: G21; H26 Keywords: Tax avoidance; Cost of bank loans; Information risk; Agency risk; Audit risk; FIN 48
  • Francis, Bill B.; Hasan, Iftekhar; Sun, Xian; Wu, Qiang (2016)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 5/2016
    Published in in Journal of Corporate Finance 2016 ; 38 ; june ; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.03.003
    ​We show that firms led by politically partisan CEOs are associated with a higher level of corporate tax sheltering than firms led by nonpartisan CEOs. Specifically, Republican CEOs are associated with more corporate tax sheltering even when their wealth is not tied with that of shareholders and when corporate governance is weak, suggesting that their tax sheltering decisions could be driven by idiosyncratic factors such as their political ideology. We also show that Democratic CEOs are associated with more corporate tax sheltering only when their stock-based incentives are high, suggesting that their tax sheltering decisions are more likely to be driven by economic incentives. In sum, our results support the political connection hypothesis in general but highlight that the specific factors driving partisan CEOs’ tax sheltering behaviors differ. Our results imply that it may cost firms more to motivate Democratic CEOs to engage in more tax sheltering activities because such decisions go against their political beliefs regarding tax policies.
  • Hasan, Iftekhar; Hoi, Chun-Keung (Stan); Wu, Qiang; Zhang, Hao (2017)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 21/2017
    Published in Journal of Accounting Research, Volume 55, Issue 3, June 2017: 629-668
    We investigate whether the levels of social capital in US counties, as captured by strength of civic norms and density of social networks in the counties, are systematically related to tax avoidance activities of corporations with headquarters located in the counties. We find strong negative associations between social capital and corporate tax avoidance, as captured by effective tax rates and book-tax differences. These results are incremental to the effects of local religiosity and firm culture toward socially-irresponsible activities. They are robust to using organ donation as an alternative social capital proxy and fixed effect regressions. They extend to aggressive tax avoidance practices. Additionally, we provide corroborating evidence using firms with headquarter relocation that changes the exposure to social capital. We conclude that social capital surrounding corporate headquarters provides environmental influences constraining corporate tax avoidance.
  • Hasan, Iftekhar; Hoi, Chun-Keung (Stan); Wu, Qiang; Zhang, Hao (2017)
    Journal of Accounting Research 3 ; June
    BoF DP 21/2017
    We investigate whether the levels of social capital in U.S. counties, as captured by strength of civic norms and density of social networks in the counties, are systematically related to tax avoidance activities of corporations with headquarters located in the counties. We find strong negative associations between social capital and corporate tax avoidance, as captured by effective tax rates and book-tax differences. These results are incremental to the effects of local religiosity and firm culture toward socially irresponsible activities. They are robust to using organ donation as an alternative social capital proxy and fixed effect regressions. They extend to aggressive tax avoidance practices. Additionally, we provide corroborating evidence using firms with headquarters relocation that changes the exposure to social capital. We conclude that social capital surrounding corporate headquarters provides environmental influences constraining corporate tax avoidance. Copyright ©, University of Chicago on behalf of the Accounting Research Center, 2016
  • Pääkkönen, Jenni (2008)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 30/2008
    This paper explores the optimal law enforcement strategy of a Leviathan government in the presence of organized crime. The government is considered too weak to prevent an upsurge in crime, so it allows the mafia to generate a positive payoff by extracting rents in the shadow economy. From a strategic standpoint, the government, if it has the possibility to monitor shadow production and fine offenders, may not want to shut down illegal production or kick out the mafia, but instead can use its policing activity to capture additional revenue through fines on illegal firm activities and an increased tax base when mafia-harassed firms return to the legal sector. The option of escaping into the shadow economy can benefit some firms, even when this utility is diluted by the presence of a mafia. Monitoring hurts both legal and illegal firms, while the government benefits. JEL Classification: H26, H41, K42. Keywords: organized crime, shadow economy, taxation.
  • Goel, Rajeev K. (2008)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2008
    Published in Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Vol. 15, Iss. 3, 2012 as "Business regulation and taxation: effects on cross-country corruption"
    This paper uses recent data on a large cross-section of countries to study the determinants of corrupt activity. The main contribution is to examine the effects of different types and severities of government regulations on corrupt activities. The results show that greater prosperity and democracy lead to less corrupt activity. Variables representing the degree of fractionalization across three dimensions and least developed nations are statistically insignificant. Having more regulation, including number of procedures and time involved across four categories (business startup, licensing, property registration, and taxation), leads to greater corruption. More regulatory procedures, especially for business startups and property registrations, have the most corruption-enhancing effect. Whereas lengthier procedures also generally spur corruption, there are important differences. Finally, higher regulatory transactions costs do not seem to significantly impact corruption. Policy implications are discussed. Keywords: Corruption, Business startup, Licenses, Property, Taxes, Fractionalization, De-mocracy, Prosperity JEL Classification: H26; H87; K42.
  • Hasan, Iftekhar; Kim, Incheol; Teng, Haimeng; Wu, Qiang (2016)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 26/2016
    This study examines whether foreign institutional investors (FIIs) help explain variation in corporate tax avoidance and whether mechanisms such as tax morality, investment horizon, and corporate governance underlie the relation between FIIs and tax avoidance. We find robust evidence that FIIs are negatively associated with corporate tax avoidance. Moreover, this negative association is dominated by FIIs from countries with high tax morality, FIIs with long-term investment horizons, and FIIs from countries with high corporate governance quality. We conclude that FIIs play an active role in shaping corporate tax avoidance policy.