Browsing by Subject "K23"

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  • Mayes, David G. (2004)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 4/2004
    Published in Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Special Issue), January 2005: 161-181
    In the light of the inequity of the way losses from bank insolvencies and their avoidance through intervention by the authorities have been distributed over creditors, depositors, owners and the population at large in transition and emerging economies, this paper explores a number of regulatory reforms that would alter the balance between seeking to avoid insolvency and lowering the costs of insolvency should it occur.In particular it considers whether a lex specialis for dealing with banks that are in trouble through prompt corrective action and if necessary resolving them if their net worth falls to zero, at little or no cost to the taxpayer can be applied in the institutional framework of transition and emerging economies. Key words: insolvency, banks, transition, emerging economies JEL classification numbers: K23, G21, O16, G28, E53
  • Granlund, Peik (2002)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 25/2002
    This paper analyses bank exit (ie reorganisation and liquidation) legislation in selected financial centres: New York, London, Frankfurt, Helsinki and Tokyo.The focus is on bank exit legislation applicable to commercial banks.The legislation is analysed from the perspective of bank stakeholders, ie bank creditors, depositors and bank shareholders.The analysis is restricted to those legislative provisions that provide security and rights for stakeholders in case of bank exit.In addition to current conditions, the paper covers the main legislative changes of the latter part of the 1990s. Key words: bank, regulation, supervision, reorganisation, liquidation JEL classification numbers: G28, K23
  • Mayes, David G.; Nieto, Maria J.; Wall, Larry (2007)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 7/2007
    Published in Journal of Financial Stability, Volume 4, Issue 3, September 2008, pp. 232-257
    Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) provides a more efficient mechanism for dealing with problem banks operating in more than one European country. In a PCA framework, a bank's losses are likely to be substantially reduced. This reduction in the losses to deposit insurance and governments will improve the problem of allocating those losses across the various insurance schemes and make it less likely that any deposit insurer will renege on its obligations in a cross-border banking crisis. This paper explores the institutional changes needed in Europe if PCA is to be effective in resolving the cross-border agency problems that arise in supervising and resolving cross-border banking groups. The paper identifies these changes starting with enhancements in the availability to prudential supervisors of information on banking groups' financial condition. Next, the paper considers collective decision-making by prudential supervisors with authority to make discretionary decisions within the PCA framework as soon as a bank of a cross-border banking group falls below the minimum capital standard. Finally, the paper analyses the coordination measures that should be implemented if PCA requires the bank to be resolved. JEL classification numbers: G28, K23, F20 Keywords: banking supervision, European Union, Prompt Corrective Action
  • Granlund, Peik (2008)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 1/2008
    Published in Journal of Banking Regulation, 11, December 2009: 6-30
    In financial market studies, public supervision has rarely been found to have any effects on financial market development. This is true, even though the primary objective of supervisory legislation is the limitation of market failures and externalities. Studies conducted by eg the World Bank and La Porta & al imply that whereas private enforcement contributes to financial market development, there is limited evidence that public supervision does the same. The objective of the paper is to empirically investigate the relation between public supervision and financial market development. This is done by focusing on major legislative features directing the supervisor and hence affecting market participant activities. The markets investigated comprise banks, investment firms, investment fund companies and listed companies in the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, Poland and Estonia for the years 1996 to 2005. The results suggest that certain features of public supervision correlate with financial market development. Strong legal obligations for the supervisor to develop legislation correlate significantly with higher company market values. Emphasizing economic aspects in the formulation of supervisory objectives corresponds with higher market profitability. Furthermore, severe monetary sanctions applicable to company directors correlate negatively with market growth. Unexpectedly, the same is true for a high degree of supervisory independence. The results imply links between public supervision and financial market development in a manner not always in line with previous research. Why this is the case, requires further investigation. One possible explanation may be methodological, based on the fact that in the present study legislative features are perceived in a conceptual rather than a technical manner. Keywords: financial institution, regulation, supervision, utility JEL classification numbers: G28, K23, O16