Browsing by Subject "K42"

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  • Goel, Rajeev K.; Korhonen, Iikka (2009)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/2009
    Published in Economic Systems 35 (2011) 109-124 as "Exports and Cross-National Corruption: A Disaggregated Examination"
    This research examines the connection between a country's export structure and corruption, incorporating disaggregated data on exports for a recent time period over a large set of nations. We ask whether various types of exports (e.g. agricultural, mineral, manufacturing and fuel) exert similar influences on corruption across nations. Our results suggest that corruption decreases as nations attain prosperity, as economic and political freedoms increase, and with a larger government size. Ceteris paribus, transition countries are also found to be more corrupt. Ethnic and linguistic fractionalizations exert opposite influences on corruption, while religious fractionalization does not seem to matter. Although the effects of ore and manufacturing exports are statistically insignificant, agricultural and fuel exports affect corruption significantly. Our findings for fuel exports support previous research, as well as uniquely demonstrate that the impact of fuel exports is sensitive to the prevailing corruption level. We conclude with a discussion of policy implications. Keywords: corruption, exports, resource curse, government JEL codes: H11, K42, O13
  • Lonsky, Jakub (2020)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 24/2020
    This paper studies the origins and consequences of the Russian mafia (vory-v-zakone). I web scraped a unique dataset that contains detailed biographies of more than 5,000 mafia leaders operating in 15 countries of the (former) Soviet Union at some point between 1916 and 2017. Using this data, I first show that the Russian mafia originated in the Gulag – the Soviet system of forced labor camps which housed around 18 million prisoners in the 1920s - 1950s period. Second, I document that the distance to the nearest camp is a strong negative predictor of mafia presence in Russia’s communities in the early post-Soviet period. Finally, using an instrumental variable approach which exploits the spatial distribution of the gulags, I examine the effects of mafia presence on local crime and elite violence in mid-1990s Russia. In particular, I show that the communities with mafia presence experienced a dramatic rise in crime driven by turf wars which erupted among rival clans around 1993 and persisted for much of the 1990. Further heterogeneity analysis reveals that mafia presence led to a spike in attacks against businessmen, fellow criminals, as well as law enforcement officers and judges, while politically-motivated violence remained unaffected.
  • Pääkkönen, Jenni (2008)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 30/2008
    This paper explores the optimal law enforcement strategy of a Leviathan government in the presence of organized crime. The government is considered too weak to prevent an upsurge in crime, so it allows the mafia to generate a positive payoff by extracting rents in the shadow economy. From a strategic standpoint, the government, if it has the possibility to monitor shadow production and fine offenders, may not want to shut down illegal production or kick out the mafia, but instead can use its policing activity to capture additional revenue through fines on illegal firm activities and an increased tax base when mafia-harassed firms return to the legal sector. The option of escaping into the shadow economy can benefit some firms, even when this utility is diluted by the presence of a mafia. Monitoring hurts both legal and illegal firms, while the government benefits. JEL Classification: H26, H41, K42. Keywords: organized crime, shadow economy, taxation.
  • Goel, Rajeev K. (2008)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2008
    Published in Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Vol. 15, Iss. 3, 2012 as "Business regulation and taxation: effects on cross-country corruption"
    This paper uses recent data on a large cross-section of countries to study the determinants of corrupt activity. The main contribution is to examine the effects of different types and severities of government regulations on corrupt activities. The results show that greater prosperity and democracy lead to less corrupt activity. Variables representing the degree of fractionalization across three dimensions and least developed nations are statistically insignificant. Having more regulation, including number of procedures and time involved across four categories (business startup, licensing, property registration, and taxation), leads to greater corruption. More regulatory procedures, especially for business startups and property registrations, have the most corruption-enhancing effect. Whereas lengthier procedures also generally spur corruption, there are important differences. Finally, higher regulatory transactions costs do not seem to significantly impact corruption. Policy implications are discussed. Keywords: Corruption, Business startup, Licenses, Property, Taxes, Fractionalization, De-mocracy, Prosperity JEL Classification: H26; H87; K42.
  • Fungáčová, Zuzana; Määttä, Ilari; Weill, Laurent (2016)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 18/2016
    Published online in Comparative Economic Studies as "Corruption in China: What Shapes Social Attitudes Toward It?"
    ​This research investigates the determinants of corruption in China using micro-level data. We use survey data on 6,000 households from 28 provinces to estimate logit models that show how corruption perceptions and attitudes to corruption are shaped by individual and provincial determinants. Respondents who see themselves as lower class, as well as members of the Communist Party of China, are more likely to perceive and reject corruption than other respondents. People in rural areas perceive less corruption, but do not differ in their attitudes toward corruption.