Browsing by Subject "P16"

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  • Francis, Bill B.; Hasan, Iftekhar; Sun, Xian; Wu, Qiang (2016)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 5/2016
    Published in in Journal of Corporate Finance 2016 ; 38 ; june ; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.03.003
    ​We show that firms led by politically partisan CEOs are associated with a higher level of corporate tax sheltering than firms led by nonpartisan CEOs. Specifically, Republican CEOs are associated with more corporate tax sheltering even when their wealth is not tied with that of shareholders and when corporate governance is weak, suggesting that their tax sheltering decisions could be driven by idiosyncratic factors such as their political ideology. We also show that Democratic CEOs are associated with more corporate tax sheltering only when their stock-based incentives are high, suggesting that their tax sheltering decisions are more likely to be driven by economic incentives. In sum, our results support the political connection hypothesis in general but highlight that the specific factors driving partisan CEOs’ tax sheltering behaviors differ. Our results imply that it may cost firms more to motivate Democratic CEOs to engage in more tax sheltering activities because such decisions go against their political beliefs regarding tax policies.
  • Lyubimov, Ivan (2016)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 12/2016
    ​We study a developing economy in which the representative firm’s production function exhibits complementarities between human capital and the available level of technology. The firm invests in the acquisition of new technology, while employees decide how much human capital to acquire. The rate of human capital accumulation positively affects the economy’s growth rate, and therefore in our baseline case a reform that improves the educational system boosts growth. An important caveat, however, is that the absence of robust institutions may lead to lax enforcement of property rights and limit the incentives for firms to invest in new technology. The lack of investment in technology constrains demand for human capital and undermines the success of the education reform. It can even lead to a brain drain as individuals take advantage of the education reform and then move to an economy with higher demand for their acquired skills. We also consider our model findings with respect to the real-world case of Russia. Our main conclusion is that measures to improve the school system need to be accompanied by other institution-building measures that enhance property rights, promote good management practices and reduce incentives to engage in corrupt behaviors.
  • Delis, Manthos D.; Hasan, Iftekhar; Ongena, Steven (2019)
    Journal of Financial Economics 2
    Published in Bank of Finland Discussion Paper 18/2018 "Democratic development and credit".
    Does democratization reduce the cost of credit? Using global syndicated loan data from 1984 to 2014, we find that democratization has a sizable negative effect on loan spreads: a 1-point increase in the zero-to-ten Polity IV index of democracy shaves at least 19 basis points off spreads, but likely more. Reversals to autocracy hike spreads more strongly. Our findings are robust to the comprehensive inclusion of relevant controls, to the instrumentation with regional waves of democratization, and to a battery of other sensitivity tests. We thus highlight the lower cost of loans as one relevant mechanism through which democratization can affect economic development.
  • Delis, Manthos D.; Hasan, Iftekhar; Ongena, Steven (2018)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 18/2018
    Does democratization reduce the cost of credit? Using global syndicated loan data from 1984 to 2014, we find that democratization has a sizeable negative effect on loan spreads: a one-point increase in the zero-to-ten Polity IV index of democracy shaves at least 19 basis points off spreads, but likely more. Reversals to autocracy hike spreads more strongly. Our findings are robust to the comprehensive inclusion of relevant controls, to the instrumentation with regional waves of democratization, and to a battery of other sensitivity tests. We thus highlight the lower cost of loans as one relevant mechanism through which democratization can affect economic development.
  • Saka, Orkun; Ji, Yuemei; De Grauwe, Paul (2021)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2021
    We first present a simple model of post-crisis policymaking driven by both public and private interests. Using a novel dataset covering 94 countries between 1973 and 2015, we then establish that financial crises can lead to government interventions in financial markets. Consistent with a public interest channel, we find post-crisis interventions occur only in democratic countries. However, by using a plausibly exogenous setting -i.e., term limits- muting political accountability, we show that democratic leaders who do not have re-election concerns are substantially more likely to intervene in financial markets after crises, in ways that may promote (obstruct) private (public) interests.
  • Hao, Liang; Rong, Wang; Haikun, Zhu (2020)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 20/2020
    Economic activities have always been organized around certain ideologies, yet little is known about how ideology shapes corporate behavior and how it is different from other political forces. We investigate the impact of politicians’ ideology on corporate policies by exploring a unique setting of ideological change in China from Mao’s ideology to Deng’s around 1978. Using textual analysis based on keywords in People’s Daily, we find a discontinuity in ideological exposure among people who later became city mayors. Those who were at least 18 years old in 1978 and had joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are more likely to have adopted Mao’s ideology, and those who did not join by 1978, due to age limit, but joined soon thereafter were more likely to have adopted Deng’s ideology. This ideological difference has had an enduring effect on contemporary firm and city policies. Firms in cities governed by mayors with Mao’s ideology have made more social contributions, lowered within-firm pay inequality, and pursued less internationalization than those with Deng’s. These effects are stronger in firms with political connections, less state ownership, and more government subsidies as well as in regions that are more market-oriented and not “revolutionary bases.” Our results are robust to OLS regressions with various pair fixed effects besides regression discontinuity. We further find that corporate policies promoted by Mao’s ideology are associated with slower firm growth but greater stakeholder engagement.
  • Lonsky, Jakub (2020)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 24/2020
    This paper studies the origins and consequences of the Russian mafia (vory-v-zakone). I web scraped a unique dataset that contains detailed biographies of more than 5,000 mafia leaders operating in 15 countries of the (former) Soviet Union at some point between 1916 and 2017. Using this data, I first show that the Russian mafia originated in the Gulag – the Soviet system of forced labor camps which housed around 18 million prisoners in the 1920s - 1950s period. Second, I document that the distance to the nearest camp is a strong negative predictor of mafia presence in Russia’s communities in the early post-Soviet period. Finally, using an instrumental variable approach which exploits the spatial distribution of the gulags, I examine the effects of mafia presence on local crime and elite violence in mid-1990s Russia. In particular, I show that the communities with mafia presence experienced a dramatic rise in crime driven by turf wars which erupted among rival clans around 1993 and persisted for much of the 1990. Further heterogeneity analysis reveals that mafia presence led to a spike in attacks against businessmen, fellow criminals, as well as law enforcement officers and judges, while politically-motivated violence remained unaffected.
  • Hasan, Iftekhar; Wachtel, Paul; Zhou, Mingming (2006)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 12/2006
    Published in Journal of Banking & Finance, vol. 33, Issue 1, January 2009, pp. 157-170
    There have been profound changes in both political and economic institutions in China over the last twenty years.Moreover, the pace of transition has led to variation across the country in the level of development.In this paper, we use panel data for the Chinese provinces to study the role of legal institutions, financial deepening and political pluralism on growth rates.The most important institutional developments for a transition economy are the emergence and legalization of the market economy, the establishment of secure property rights, the growth of a private sector, the development of financial sector institutions and markets, and the liberalization of political institutions.We develop measures of these phenomena, which are used as explanatory variables in regression models to explain provincial GDP growth rates.Our evidence suggests that the development of financial markets, legal environment, awareness of property rights and political pluralism are associated with stronger growth. JEL Classifications: O16, P14, P16, O53
  • Bircan, Çağatay; Saka, Orkun (2019)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 1/2019
    We use data on the universe of credit in Turkey to document a strong political lending cycle. State-owned banks systematically adjust their lending around local elections compared with private banks in the same province. There is considerable tactical redistribution: state-owned banks increase credit in politically competitive provinces which have an incumbent mayor aligned with the ruling party, but reduce it in similar provinces with an incumbent mayor from the opposition parties. This effect only exists in corporate lending as opposed to consumer loans, suggesting that tactical redistribution targets job creation to increase electoral success. Political lending influences real outcomes as credit-constrained opposition areas suffer drops in employment and firm sales. There is substantial misallocation of financial resources as credit constraints most affect provinces and industries with high initial efficiency.
  • Gu, Xian; Hasan, Iftekhar; Zhu, Yun (Elsevier, 2019)
    Journal of Banking & Finance February
    This paper investigates how political influence affects firms’ financial flexibility and speed of adjustment toward target leverage ratios. We find that at the macro level, firms in environments with high political advantages, proxied by provincial affiliations with heads of state as well as political status and party rank of provincial leaders, adjust faster. At the micro level, firms that are state-owned, have CPC members as executives, or bear low exposure to changes in political uncertainty adjust faster. When interacted, the micro-level political factors have more significant impact.
  • Francis, Bill B.; Hasan, Iftekhar; Zhu Yun (2013)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 27/2013
    This paper provides original evidence from institutional investors that political uncertainty during presidential elections greatly affects investment. Using U.S. institutional ownership data from 1981 to 2010, we find that institutions significantly reduce their holdings of common stock by 0.76 to 2.1 percentage points during election years. More specifically, institutions tend to sell large proportions of their positions when Republicans win presidential elections and then keep their positions at below-average levels through the first year of the new administration. Conversely, when Democrats win presidential elections, institutions tend to keep their positions at above-average levels for the first year of the new administration. The difference in ownership rises to 2.4% by the end of the first year of new administration. Changes in institutional ownership in election years are sensitive to the uncertainty of the outcome. Our results also show that institutions benefit from these holding strategies during the pre-election periods. Keywords: political uncertainty, presidential election, institutional investor, investment JEL Classification: G23 (Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors), G28 (Government Policy and Regulation), P16 (Political Economy)
  • Fungáčová, Zuzana; Määttä, Ilari; Weill, Laurent (2016)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 18/2016
    Published online in Comparative Economic Studies as "Corruption in China: What Shapes Social Attitudes Toward It?"
    ​This research investigates the determinants of corruption in China using micro-level data. We use survey data on 6,000 households from 28 provinces to estimate logit models that show how corruption perceptions and attitudes to corruption are shaped by individual and provincial determinants. Respondents who see themselves as lower class, as well as members of the Communist Party of China, are more likely to perceive and reject corruption than other respondents. People in rural areas perceive less corruption, but do not differ in their attitudes toward corruption.