Browsing by Subject "välittäjät"

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  • Francis, Bill B.; Hasan, Iftekhar; Sun, Xian (2012)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 28/2012
    Using a sample of U.S. mergers and acquisitions, this study evaluates how banking relationships influence acquirers choice of financial advisors. Specifically, it examines: i) acquirers previous relationships with advisors in various financial activities: M&A advisories, equity issuings and lending activities; ii) the optimism of analyst recommendations; and iii) how acquirers past satisfaction with their financial advisors determines the choice of financial advisors. Overall, the findings suggest that the influence of banking relationships on a firm s choice of financial institutions is limited in the area of M&A advisory business. The implications from the traditional relationship banking studies may not be suitable to explain how firms choose advisors, due to the wide variety of practices in investment banking activities. The evidence portrays that firms with M&A experience are more likely to switch financial advisors with poor deal outcomes. Firms without M&A experience, on the other hand, are more likely to choose their underwriters as financial advisors, especially when they provide overly optimistic analyst coverage prior to the transactions.
  • Francis, Bill B.; Hasan, Iftekhar; Sun, Xian (2012)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 31/2012
    Published in International Review of Financial Analysis, Volume 32, March 2014, Pages 143-158
    This paper examines the determinants of the choice of financial advisors and their impact on the announcement effects of US acquirers in cross-border M&As. Two hypotheses are tested: one pertains to the acquiring firms' home preference in selecting financial advisors, and the other relates to advisors' experience in target countries. Evidence supports the home preference hypothesis in the selection of advisors in cross-border M&As, particularly in all-cash paid transactions where acquirers take the entire risk of not realizing the expected synergy value. We also observe home preference among investors as acquirers that picked US advisors experience significantly higher positive abnormal returns in all-cash paid transactions than those without US advisors, even when the chosen US advisors do not have significant experience in the target country. Finally, home preference at the choice of financial advisor may be costly if US acquirers pass by more experienced because of home preference.
  • Kultti, Klaus; Takalo, Tuomas; Vähämaa, Oskari (2018)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 20/2018
    We study the ability of competitive coordination service platforms (such as auction sites and real estate agents) to facilitate trade in a directed search model where buyers have unit demands and each seller only has one good to sell. The sellers’ capacity constraint leads to a coordination problem as in a symmetric equilibrium without intermediation some sellers receive multiple buyers while some are left without any customers. We compare this equilibrium to one where sellers and buyers can choose to become intermediaries who coordinate the meetings. We find that roughly 20 percent of agents become intermediaries. As a result, a large part of the supply and demand in the economy vanishes. Moreover, the large amount of intermediaries actually reduces the meeting efficiency. Jointly, these effects imply that the gains from trade are roughly 25 percent lower than in the economy without intermediation.
  • Kultti, Klaus; Takalo, Tuomas; Vähämaa, Oskari (2021)
    Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 2
    Published in BoF DP 20/2018.
    We provide an example where establishing competitive coordination service platforms is so lucrative that they end up reducing welfare. We consider a canonical directed search model in which buyers have unit demands and sellers' capacity constraint leads to a coordination problem: in a symmetric equilibrium without intermediation some sellers receive too many and some too few buyers. We compare this equilibrium to one where sellers and buyers can choose to become intermediaries who coordinate the meetings. In this setup, roughly one‐fifth of agents become intermediaries. As a result, a large part of the supply and demand in the economy vanishes. Moreover, the large amount of intermediaries actually reduces the meeting efficiency. Jointly, these effects imply that the gains from trade are lower than that in the economy without intermediation.