Browsing by Subject "COVID-19"

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  • Bank of Finland (2020)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 5/2020
    The global economic crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic intensified in March 2020. The health crisis and the lockdown measures necessary to contain the epidemic led to an exceptionally sudden and sharp decline in output worldwide in the first half of the year. In 2020 as a whole, the global economy is expected to contract by about 4–6%, and the euro area economy by about 8–10%. The euro area economy would seem to be diving a little deeper this year than the United States, but the pace of recovery is very uncertain for both. China saw the most difficult phase of the epidemic and thus the sharpest economic contraction in the first quarter of 2020. China’s recovery has been facilitated by the production and export of remote work equipment and protective equipment for the coronavirus disease. The pandemic shock has had a dampening effect on inflation. Unemployment is on the rise, but the euro area has avoided sudden mass unemployment through furloughs and government aid.
  • Bank of Finland (2021)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 2/2021
    Payments are changing. In the same way that technological progress influences so many of the day-to-day activities of households and businesses, it affects how we make payments. The coronavirus pandemic has irreversibly changed how we live during the past year and has accelerated many long-brewing developments. The future of payments may arrive sooner than anticipated just one year ago.
  • Bank of Finland (2020)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 5/2020
    The worldwide economic crisis caused by the corona pandemic peaked in March 2020. In the early part of the year both output and consumption contracted suddenly and strongly; in other words, goods and services were both produced and consumed considerably less than before. The global economy is forecast to contract in the current year by around 4–6%, and the euro area economy by around 8–10%. Prior to the corona crisis, in 2019 the economy grew 2.9% globally, and 1.3% in the euro area. In the current year, the euro area economy would appear to be diving slightly deeper than the US economy, but the pace of recovery for both is very uncertain. Unemployment is growing, but in the euro area sudden mass unemployment has been avoided through the deployment of furloughs and various support measures.
  • Bank of Finland (2021)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 1/2021
    The crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic swept the Finnish economy into a sudden recession in 2020, but the progress with vaccinations means we can already see light at the end of the tunnel. The negative economic impacts of the crisis have so far been less than feared, and the most recent economic forecasts are encouraging.
  • Bank of Finland (2021)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 3/2021
    The COVID-19 pandemic will ease due to the vaccination programme, and as a consequence the Finnish economy will start to grow at a brisk pace. As the COVID restrictions end and uncertainty decreases, households will be able to consume more freely. With economic growth also strong globally, this will give a fillip to Finland’s foreign trade. The pandemic is, however, not yet finally over. There is still the threat that it could worsen again, and this casts a shadow over both the growth outlook for Finland and that for the global economy as a whole. The Finnish economy will grow 2.9% in 2021 and 3.0% in 2022. The rapid growth will, however, be temporary, and the pace will slow to 1.3% already in 2023.
  • Bank of Finland (2020)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 6/2020
    The economic recession caused by the pandemic has so far been milder in Finland than elsewhere in the euro area, but the coming winter will still be difficult. Vaccinations do, however, bring hope of an end to the crisis, both in Finland and around the world. COVID-19 will gradually be left behind in the course of 2021 due to the vaccines, and household consumption will drive growth of 2.2% in the Finnish economy. This will strengthen to 2.5% in 2022. At the end of the forecast period in 2023 the economy will be growing only slowly, as the conditions for growth in the Finnish economy in the long term are weak.
  • Tiililä, Nea (2020)
    Euro & talous. Blogi
    Koronakriisillä on mittavat vaikutukset Afrikan valtioihin. Itse taudin leviäminen alueella on ollut ennakoitua vähäisempää, mutta taloudelliset vaikutukset ovat sitäkin kauaskantoisempia. Alueen pitkä talouskasvun kausi on päättynyt ja Afrikka päätyy ensimmäiseen taantumaan 25 vuoteen. Maanosan valtioiden elvytysvara jää kauaksi kehittyneistä maista. Kriisin vaikutukset heijastuvat ennen kaikkea heikoimmassa asemassa oleviin ruuansaannin, koulutuksen ja välttämättömän terveydenhuollon heikentyessä.
  • Kärkkäinen, Samu; Viertola, Hannu (2021)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 3/2021
    The COVID-19 pandemic and resulting lockdown measures have imposed severe constraints on the consumption opportunities of households, and demand has especially collapsed in a number of service industries. Households have accumulated a significant amount of savings since early 2020 due to the shortfall in consumption caused by the pandemic. The release of these savings into private consumption or housing demand over the next few years may result in economic growth proving much stronger than anticipated in the baseline forecast.
  • Bank of Finland (2021)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 6/2020
    During the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, fiscal policy has been deployed to support households and businesses hit by the crisis. At the same time, fiscal stimulus has been stepped up to bolster economic recovery. After the crisis, once the economy has returned to a sustainable growth path, the upward trend in the public debt-to-GDP ratio must be halted and fiscal space rebuilt. Changing the course of the public finances will require broad consensus on long-term objectives, clear short-term interim targets, and concrete measures over the coming years. With the coinciding rise in age-related expenditure, rebalancing the public finances will be difficult.
  • Bank of Finland (2020)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 4/2020
    Monetary policy implementation in recent years has largely centred on asset purchase programmes and long-term refinancing operations. As a result, the balance sheets of the Eurosystem national central banks have grown significantly, while balance sheet risks related to monetary policy implementation have increased.
  • Bank of Finland (2021)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 2/2021
    COVID-19 is accelerating the payment revolution 3 Future of payments at hand 6 COVID-19 pandemic causing permanent change in payment habits 13 Payment and settlement systems subject to oversight 30
  • Bank of Finland (2021)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 3/2021
    Bar raised for economic policy – demographic trend and public debt weigh on national economy ... 3 Forecast: Finnish economy takes off as pandemic eases ... 7 Households use their savings more quickly than anticipated ... 28 Public purse carried households and businesses through the COVID crisis ... 33 Forecast tables for 2021–2023 (June 2021) ... 44
  • Bank of Finland (2020)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 5/2020
    Monetary policy is supporting economic recovery — but the outlook for employment remains weak 3 A fragile recovery from the pandemic crisis has begun 6 Corona crisis has increased the risk of stagnation in the euro area 46
  • Bank of Finland (2020)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 2/2020
    Editorial: Regulation has strengthened the financial system’s resilience 3 Financial stability assessment: Pandemic demonstrates necessity of risk buffers 6 Coronavirus shock will further weaken bank profitability in the euro area 19 Banks must be able to finance firms and withstand loan losses amid the coronavirus pandemic 24 Nordic countries are vulnerable to housing market risks aggravated by the coronavirus pandemic 35
  • Bank of Finland (2020)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 3/2020
    The worst-case scenario in the corona spring did not materialise, but we will still need stamina for the long haul 3 Forecast tables for 2020–2022 (June 2020) 7
  • Miettinen, Paavo; Saada, Adam; Tiililä, Nea; Vauhkonen, Jukka (2020)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 2/2020
    Stricter capital requirements since the global financial crisis have improved the ability of banks to lend and absorb losses in a crisis situation like the coronavirus pandemic. A robust lending capacity is now needed to finance fundamentally sound Finnish companies with liquidity needs. It must be ensured that banks are well-capitalised to withstand future loan losses.
  • Kaaresvirta, Juuso; Laakkonen, Helinä (2021)
    BOFIT Policy Brief 5/2021
    China became the world’s largest lender to emerging and developing economies over the past decade. At the same time, concerns on the debt sustainability of many of these countries have grown. Some countries have found themselves struggling to repay their loans and China has had to renegotiate debt restructurings bilaterally. As covid-19 pandemic hit many of the borrowers hard in 2020, China committed with all other G20 countries to the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) to temporarily suspend official bilateral debt payment of 73 beneficiary countries. While China’s overseas lending remain opaque, there is little evidence that China intentionally practices “debt-trap diplomacy.”
  • Kaaresvirta, Juuso (2020)
    Bank of Finland Bulletin. Blog
    Tensions between China and the United States have once more been on the rise. The US has heavily criticised China about its handling of the coronavirus pandemic, cyber security violations, and has tightened the screws on Huawei. Trade has also come back into the discussion after the truce made during the winter, when the countries signed the Phase One trade agreement on 15 January and agreed to reduce some of the additional tariffs.
  • Ru, Hong; Yang, Endong; Zou, Kunru (2020)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 15/2020
    This paper documents a strong delayed response to COVID-19, which is caused by the SARS-CoV2 virus in countries that did not encounter the SARS disease in 2003. The SARS outbreak was caused by a similar virus, SARS-CoV-1. Individuals in countries that developed SARS infections in 2003 search more intensively for COVID-19-related information on Google during the first outbreak of COVID-19 in Wuhan, China, in late January 2020. Governments in countries that have not experienced SARS respond significantly slower in implementing containment measures to combat COVID-19 than countries that have experienced SARS. Furthermore, the timely responses of individuals and governments are more pronounced in countries that reported deaths caused by SARS, which left deeper imprints. Consequently, COVID-19 case numbers and mortalities have been substantially higher in countries that did not experience SARS deaths. Our findings suggest that the imprint of the early experience of similar viruses is a fundamental mechanism underlying timely responses to COVID-19.