Browsing by Subject "D49"

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  • Kemppainen, Kari (2005)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 19/2005
    This paper considers effects of price regulation in retail payment systems by applying the model of telecommunications competition by Laffont-Rey-Tirole (1998).In our two-country model world there is one retail payment network located in each country and markets are segmented à la Hotelling.We show that the optimal price under price regulation is the weighted average of pre-regulation domestic and cross-border prices where the degree of home-bias in making payments serves as the weight.Furthermore, we find that the general welfare effects of price regulation are ambiguous: gross social welfare is higher under price discrimination than under price regulation in the special case where costs of access to banking services (transportation costs) are high.However, there also exist cases where prohibitively high transaction costs make price discrimination to reduce total welfare.Finally, if transportation costs are reduced sufficiently, segmentation of payment markets is eliminated.Markets then become fullyserved as in the original Laffont-Rey-Tirole model, suggesting that price discrimination would be beneficial for welfare. Key words: payment systems, price regulation, retail payments JEL classification numbers: D49, G28, L59
  • Kemppainen, Kari (2003)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 16/2003
    In this study, the interaction between the competition-cooperation nexus and regulation in retail payment systems is analysed by applying the main lessons from the theory of network industries. This is justifiable on the grounds that the payment systems industry inherently has many characteristics in common with network industries.On the other hand, since the provision of payment services also has many special characteristics, the regulatory tools commonly used in many other network industries cannot be applied directly.In general, the main role of payment system regulators is to provide a level playing field for different service providers.To secure dynamic efficiency, the regulators also need to ensure adequate incentives for innovation and investment.In this respect, it is important that they do not take too restrictive an attitude towards cooperation among payment service providers.In addition to general policy analysis, the study also analyses developments in the European retail payment system field and the roles and aims of market participants. Key words: Competition policy, payment systems, retail payments, network economics JEL classification numbers: D49, G28, L98