Browsing by Subject "D83"

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  • Rantala, Anssi (2003)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 30/2003
    This paper demonstrates that the adaptive learning approach to modelling private sector expectations can be used as an equilibriumselection mechanism in a natural-rate monetary model with unemployment persistence.In particular, it is shown that only one of the two rational expectations equilibria is stable under least-squares learning, and that it is always the low-inflation equilibrium with intuitive comparative statics properties that is the learnable equilibrium.Hence, this paper provides a basic theoretical justification for focusing on the lowinflation equilibrium.Earlier contributions, in which the high-inflation equilibrium was ignored, mainly because of its unpleasant characteristics, are not theoretically satisfactory.Key words: adaptive learning, monetary policy, multiple equilibria, persistence JEL classification numbers: C62, D83, D84, E52
  • Libman, Alexander; Vollan, Björn (2015)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 14/2015
    Anti-Western conspiracies are frequently used by Governments to strengthen their power. We investigate the impact of conspiracy thinking on expectations of collusion among individuals in Russia and China. For this purpose, we conduct a novel laboratory experiment to measure expectations of collusion and several survey items related to conspiracy thinking. Our survey results indicate that anti-Western conspiracy thinking is widespread in both countries and correlates with distrust. We find a significant effect of anti-Western conspiracy thinking in China: Anti-Western conspiracy thinking correlates with lower expectations of collusion. We explain this result by stronger ingroup feeling emanating from the anti-Western sentiment. Our paper provides a first step in analyzing the economic implications of conspiracy thinking for society.
  • Lehtoranta, Antti (2014)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 30/2014
    Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), I document that childhood experience of father's job loss decreases the propensity to own stocks as an adult. If this experience takes place at the age of 5–10 years, the probability of owning stocks decreases by 2.9 percentage points in a sample with mean stock market participation rate of 17%. This finding is robust to alternative definitions of age ranges and controlling for random unobserved effects. I also find an effect of similar magnitude in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data. Keywords: stock market participation, personal experience, job loss
  • Ru, Hong; Yang, Endong; Zou, Kunru (2020)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 15/2020
    This paper documents a strong delayed response to COVID-19, which is caused by the SARS-CoV2 virus in countries that did not encounter the SARS disease in 2003. The SARS outbreak was caused by a similar virus, SARS-CoV-1. Individuals in countries that developed SARS infections in 2003 search more intensively for COVID-19-related information on Google during the first outbreak of COVID-19 in Wuhan, China, in late January 2020. Governments in countries that have not experienced SARS respond significantly slower in implementing containment measures to combat COVID-19 than countries that have experienced SARS. Furthermore, the timely responses of individuals and governments are more pronounced in countries that reported deaths caused by SARS, which left deeper imprints. Consequently, COVID-19 case numbers and mortalities have been substantially higher in countries that did not experience SARS deaths. Our findings suggest that the imprint of the early experience of similar viruses is a fundamental mechanism underlying timely responses to COVID-19.
  • Gibbs, Christopher G.; McClung, Nigel (2019)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 19/2019
    We provide suffcient conditions for when a rational expectations structural model predicts bounded responses of endogenous variables to forward guidance announcements. The conditions coincide with a special case of the well-known (E)xpectation-stability conditions that govern when agents can learn a Rational Expectations Equilibrium. Importantly, we show that the conditions are distinct from the determinacy conditions. We show how the conditions are useful for diagnosing the features of a model that contribute to the Forward Guidance Puzzle and reveal how to construct well-behaved forward guidance predictions in standard medium-scale DSGE models.
  • McClung, Nigel (2020)
    Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control December
    This paper examines E-stability, determinacy, and indeterminacy in a general class of regime-switching models with lagged endogenous variables. Using determinacy conditions from Cho (2016, 2020), our first result extends McCallum (2007) to models with time-varying parameters: the unique mean-square stable equilibrium is E-stable if agents have current information and one-period-ahead decision rules. Further, we address the existence of E-stable non-fundamental equilibria, and find that Iteratively E-stable equilibria of indeterminate switching models can exist. Finally, we show that indeterminate New Keynesian models with persistent, recurring interest rate peg regimes admit Iteratively E-stable equilibria. In special cases, the Iterative E-stability condition coincides with the Long Run Taylor Principle.
  • Eusepi, Stefano; Gibbs, Chris; Preston, Bruce (2021)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 11/2021
    We study zero interest-rate policy in response to a large negative demand shock when long-run expectations can fall over time. Because falling expectations make monetary policy less effective by raising real interest rates, the optimal forward guidance policy makes large front-loaded promises to stabilize expectations. Policy is too stimulatory in the event of transitory shocks, but provides insurance against persistent shocks. The optimal policy is well-approximated by a constant calendar-based forward guidance, independent of the shock’s realised persistence. The insurance property distinguishes our paper from other bounded rationality papers that solve the forward guidance puzzle and generates important quantitative differences.
  • Mäkinen, Taneli; Ohl, Björn (2014)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 7/2014
    We study firms' incentives to acquire costly information in booms and recessions to understand the role of endogenous information in explaining business cycles. We find that when the economy has been in a recession in the previous period, and firms enter the current period with a pessimistic belief, the incentive to acquire information is stronger than when the economy has been in a boom and firms share an optimistic belief. The cyclicality of the aggregate learning outcome is moderated by the price system, which transmits information from informed to uninformed firms, thus dampening information demand. Though learning from equilibrium prices acts to stabilize fluctuations by discouraging information acquisition, it can be welfare-enhancing to make information prohibitively costly to obtain. JEL codes: D51, D83, E32.
  • Verona, Fabio (2013)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 18/2013
    Published in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Volume 46, Issue 8, December 2014:1627–1656
    Investment in physical capital at the micro level is infrequent and large, or lumpy. The most common explanation for this is that firms face non-convex physical adjustment costs. The model developed in this paper shows that information costs make investment lumpy at the micro level, even in the absence of non-convex adjustment costs. When collecting and processing information is costly, the firm optimally chooses to do it sporadically and to be inactive most of the time. This behavior results in infrequent and possibly large capital adjustments. The model fits plant-level investment rate moments well, and it also matches some higher order moments of aggregate investment rates. Keywords: investment dynamics, information costs, inattentiveness, lumpy investment JEL classification: D21, D83, D92, E22
  • Barnett, Alina; Ellison, Martin (2012)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 10/2012
    Disinflationary episodes are a valuable source of information for economic agents trying to learn about the economy. In this paper we are particularly interested in how policymakers can themselves learn by disinflating. The approach differs from the existing literature, which typically focuses on the learning of private agents during a disinflation. We build a model where both the policymaker and private agents learn, and ask what happens if the policymaker has to disinflate to satisfy a new central bank mandate specifying greater emphasis on inflation stabilisation. In this case, our results show that inflation may fall dramatically before it gradually rises to its new long run level. The potential for inflation to undershoot its long run level during a disinflationary episode suggests that caution should be exercised when assessing the success of any change in the policymaker's mandate. JEL classification: D83, E52, E58 Keywords: Disinflation, Escape Dynamics, Learning, Monetary Policy
  • Verona, Fabio (2013)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 16/2013
    In this paper, I introduce lumpy micro-level capital adjustment into a sticky information general equilibrium model. Lumpy adjustment arises because of inattentiveness in capital investment decisions instead of the more common assumption of non-convex adjustment costs. The model features inattentiveness as the only source of stickiness. I find that the model with lumpy investment yields business cycle dynamics which differ substantially from those of an otherwise identical model with frictionless investment and are much more consistent with the empirical evidence. These results therefore strengthen the case in favour of the relevance of microeconomic investment lumpiness for the business cycle. Keywords: sticky information, general equilibrium, lumpy investment, business cycle JEL classification: D83, E10, E22, E32
  • Sihvonen, Markus (2019)
    Journal of Economic Theory July
    I analyze the survival probabilities of different types of agents in a general equilibrium model with disagreement over idiosyncratic uncertainties. I find that such biases create a separation between individual and group level survival: even when the survival probability of a single irrational agent tends to zero, these agents may still succeed as a whole. Effectively the irrational agent population can survive due to a vanishingly small group of increasingly rich agents. Disagreement over idiosyncratic uncertainties distorts savings decisions and interest rates, but idiosyncratic risks are not priced. Simulations confirm that the limiting results are relevant when the population of irrational agents is large.
  • Ellison, Martin; Sarno, Lucio; Vilmunen, Jouko (2004)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 3/2004
    Published in Macroeconomic Dynamics, Volume 11, No. 4, September 2007 , pp. 519-541
    In this paper, we examine the incentives for central bank activism and caution in a two-country open-economy model with uncertainty and learning.We find that the presence of a strategic interaction between the home and foreign central banks creates an additional motivation for caution in monetary policy.An activist policy designed to help the learning of the home central bank is suboptimal since it generates a strong reaction from the foreign central bank.As joint learning by the home and foreign central banks is shown to be detrimental to welfare, the optimal policy is cautious. Key words: activism, learning, monetary policy, open economy JEL classification numbers: D81, D83, E52, E58, F41
  • Moreno, Diego; Takalo, Tuomas (2021)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 3/2021
    We study the optimal precision of public information disclosures about banks assets quality. In our model the precision of information affects banks' cost of raising funding and asset profile riskiness. In an imperfectly competitive banking sector, banks'stability and social surplus are non-monotonic functions of precision: an intermediate precision (or low-to-intermediate precision if banks contract their repayment promises on public information) maximizes stability, and also yields the maximum surplus when the social cost of bank failure c is large. When c is small and the banks' asset risk taking is not too sensitive to changes in the precision, the maximum surplus (and maximum risk) are reached at maximal precision. In a perfectly competitive banking sector in which banks' asset risk taking is not too sensitive to the precision of information, the maximum surplus (and maximum risk) are reached at maximal precision, while maximum stability is reached at minimal precision.
  • Ambrocio, Gene (2020)
    Review of Economic Dynamics January
    Published in Bank of Finland DP 24/2015 http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:bof-201511261453
    I provide a theory of information production and learning that can help account for both the excessive optimism that fueled booms preceding crises and the slow recoveries that followed. In my theory, persistence and the size of expectation errors depend on information production about changes in aggregate fundamentals. In turn information production, via credit screening, tends to fall during both very good and very bad times. The former gives rise to episodes of rational exuberance in which optimistic beliefs may sustain booms even as fundamentals decline. I also document evidence from survey forecasts consistent with the model predictions.
  • Ambrocio, Gene (2015)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 24/2015
    Published in Review of Economic Dynamics 2020 ; 35 ; January ; pp. 263-282 ; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2019.07.002
    I propose a theory of information production and learning in credit markets in which the incentives to engage in activities that reveal information about aggregate fundamentals vary over the business cycle and may account for both the excessive optimism that fueled booms preceding financial crises and the slow recoveries that followed. In my theory, information about aggregate fundamentals is produced along two dimensions. First, optimistic beliefs lead to a fall in private investment in information reducing the quality of information available, an intensive margin. This gives rise to episodes of rational exuberance where optimism sustains booms even as fundamentals decline in the buildup to crises. Second, the quantity of information is increasing in the level of economic activity, an extensive margin. Thus, recoveries are slow since the low levels of investment and output provide little information about improvements in the state of the economy. Consistent with model predictions, I find supporting evidence in terms of a U-shaped pattern in macro-uncertainty measures over the business cycle. I also discuss the implications on endogenous information production on cyclical macro-prudential policy.