Browsing by Subject "G32"

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  • Shen, Chung-Hua; Huang, Yu-Li; Hasan, Iftekhar (2012)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 13/2012
    This study proposes an information asymmetry hypothesis to examine why bank credit ratings vary among countries even when bank financial ratios remain constant. Countries are divided among those with low and high information asymmetry. The former include high-income countries, those in North America and West Europe regions, and those with strong institutional environment quality, whereas the latter group possess the opposite characteristics. This study hypothesizes that the influences of financial ratios on ratings are enhanced in low information asymmetry countries but reduced in countries with high information asymmetry. The sample includes the long-term credit ratings issued by Standard and Poor's from 86 countries during 2002-2008. The estimated results show that the effects of financial ratios on ratings are significantly affected by information asymmetries. Countries wishing to improve the credit ratings of their banks thus should reduce information asymmetry. JEL classification: G21; G32; G38 Keywords: Bank rating; Financial ratio; Information asymmetry; Institutional quality
  • He, Qing; Huang, Jiyuan; Li, Dongxu; Lu, Liping (2016)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 19/2016
    ​This paper examines the governance role of banks in replacement of underperforming CEOs in firms listed on Chinese stock exchanges. Under most circumstances, the findings suggest that the presence of outstanding loans does not increase the probability that a poorly performing CEO will be forced out and replaced. However, there is a positive and significant effect if the under-performing firm relies heavily on secured and short-term bank lending. Bank loans increase the likelihood of a forced CEO turnover in private firms, especially where joint-equity banks serve as the main lenders to the firm. There is no similar increase in the probability of a CEO turnover for state-owned firms or firms that borrow mainly from state-owned banks. Thus, where state ownership of banks and listed firms implies inefficiency or reluctance on monitoring borrower performance, there is an opportunity to improve loan contract arrangements to improve the mon-itoring role of lending banks.
  • Vauhkonen, Jukka (2003)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 13/2003
    In most countries, banks' equity holdings in firms that borrow from then are rather small.In light of the theoretical literature, this is somewhat surprising.For example, according to agency cost models, allowing banks to hold equity would seem to alleviate firms' asset substitution moral hazard problem associated with debt financing.This idea is formalised in John, John, and Saunders in a model where banks are modeled as passive investors and bank loans are the only source of outside finance for firms.In this paper, we argue that this alleged benefit of banks' equity holding is small or non-existent when banks are modeled explicitly as active monitors and firms have access also to market finance.Key words: banks' equity holdings, firms' capital structure, social welfare JEL classification numbers: D82, G32
  • Li, Delong; Lu, Lei; Mu, Congming; Yang, Jinqiang (2019)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 18/2019
    Overconfidence and overextrapolation are two behavioral biases that are pervasive in human thinking. A long line of research documents that such biases influence business decisions by distorting managers' expected productivity. We propose a new mechanism in which the biases change firms' precautionary motives when external financing is costly, finding that the influences of biases on investment, payouts, and refinancing are stronger for financially weaker firms. Moreover, biased and rational firms display di erential responses to economic booms and busts holding financial positions constant. Our work illustrates that managerial traits, when interacting with imperfect capital markets, drive firm dynamics in business cycles.
  • Dang, Tri Vi; He, Qing (2016)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 13/2016
    Chinese companies sometimes appoint a government official (bureaucrat) as CEO on the expectation of benefiting from the political connections of the new hire. Based on a sample of 2,454 CEO transitions our empirical findings are consistent with the implications of a simple contract model in oligopolistic markets. Firms that appoint a bureaucrat as CEO obtain more credit and subsidies. They have positive abnormal announcement returns, negative abnormal long-run returns and larger variance of long-run returns. Furthermore, they experience a deterioration in operating performances, increased rent-seeking behavior of the management and weakening of corporate governance. The results from the split share structure reform in 2005 corroborate the supportive findings for the preferential treatment hypothesis.
  • Francis, Bill B.; Hasan, Iftekhar; Sun, Xian; Wu, Qiang (2016)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 5/2016
    Published in in Journal of Corporate Finance 2016 ; 38 ; june ; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.03.003
    ​We show that firms led by politically partisan CEOs are associated with a higher level of corporate tax sheltering than firms led by nonpartisan CEOs. Specifically, Republican CEOs are associated with more corporate tax sheltering even when their wealth is not tied with that of shareholders and when corporate governance is weak, suggesting that their tax sheltering decisions could be driven by idiosyncratic factors such as their political ideology. We also show that Democratic CEOs are associated with more corporate tax sheltering only when their stock-based incentives are high, suggesting that their tax sheltering decisions are more likely to be driven by economic incentives. In sum, our results support the political connection hypothesis in general but highlight that the specific factors driving partisan CEOs’ tax sheltering behaviors differ. Our results imply that it may cost firms more to motivate Democratic CEOs to engage in more tax sheltering activities because such decisions go against their political beliefs regarding tax policies.
  • Kang, Shulong; Dong, Jianfeng; Yu, Haiyue; Cao, Jin; Dinger, Valeriya (2021)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 4/2021
    This paper investigates how government-led banking liberalization affects credit allocation by banks using as a quasi-natural experiment the establishment of city commercial banks (CCBs) in China. Based on more than three million corporate financial statements spanning over 16 years, we find that the establishment of CCBs led to a 6–14 % drop in debt funding for private firms, as well as a 1–2 % rise in their funding costs. At the same time, private infrastructure firms enjoyed a nearly 6 % increase in debt funding and more than 100-basis-point drop in interest costs despite their inferior credit quality. The debt financing of private firm appears most severely affected in municipalities where officials face high promotional pressures or fiscal constraints.
  • Hasan, Iftekhar; Minnick, Kristina; Raman, Kartik (2020)
    Journal of Corporate Finance June ; 2020
    Using detailed loan level data, we examine bank lending to corporate customers relying on principal suppliers. Customers experience larger loan spreads, higher intensity of covenants and greater likelihood of requiring collateral when they depend more on the principal supplier for inputs. The positive association between the customer’s loan spread and its dependence on the principal supplier is less pronounced when the bank has a prior loan outstanding with the principal supplier, and when the bank has higher market share in the industry. Longer relationships between the customer and its principal supplier, and between the bank and the principal supplier, mitigate lending constraints. The evidence is consistent with corporate suppliers serving as an informational bridge between the lender and the customer.
  • Hasan, Iftekhar; Wu, Deming (2016)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 9/2016
    Do banks use credit default swap hedging to substitute for loan sales? By tracking banks’ lending exposures and CDS positions on individual firms, we find that banks use CDS hedging to complement rather than to substitute for loan sales. Consequently, bank loan sales are higher for firms that are actively traded in the CDS market. In addition, we find evidence that suggests that banks sell CDS protection as credit enhancements to facilitate loan sales. This study employs identification strategies similar to the “twin study” design to separate the effects of borrower-side and lender-side factors, and to minimize the omitted-variables bias.
  • Westman, Hanna (2014)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 28/2014
    Failure in bank corporate governance has been seen as a contributing factor to excessive risk-taking pre-crisis with devastating implications as risks realised during the financial crisis. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence on the impact of managerial incentives on bank crisis performance is scarce. Moreover, bank strategy has not previously been accounted for. Hence, this paper presents novel findings on drivers for risk-taking and crisis performance. Specifically, I find a positive impact of management ownership in small diversified banks and non-traditional banks, the monitoring of which is challenging due to their opacity. The impact is negative in traditional banks and large diversified banks, indicating that shareholders induce managers to take risk where the safety net creates incentives for risk-shifting to debt holders and taxpayers. These findings have implications for both academic research as well as policy making particularly in the domain of corporate governance. Keywords: banks crisis performance, management ownership, traditional vs. nontraditional banking, diversification, safety net, bank opacity and complexity
  • Hasan, Iftekhar; John, Kose; Kadiyalad, Padma (2016)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 13/2016
    We augment the LLSV creditor rights index with a new “restructuring index” that measures the incentives provided to creditors to grant concessions outside formal bankruptcy. We study the joint impact of the two indexes on a firm’s leverage policy. We show that the two indexes have at most a statistically weak effect on the level of long-term debt. Instead, the two indexes affect the distribution of long-term debt into bank debt, public debt and private placements. Bank debt increases when the values of both indexes are high. Public debt increases when the creditor rights index is high, but the restructuring index is low, and private placements increase when the restructuring index is high, but the creditor rights index is low. Smaller firms with fewer tangible assets borrow more from banks when both the creditor rights and restructuring indexes are high. When aggregated at the country level, these firm-level results suggest that bankruptcy law can influence the relative importance of credit and equity markets as sources of financing GDP growth.
  • Mäkinen, Mikko; Solanko, Laura (2017)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 16/2017
    Published in Russian Journal of Money and Finance, 77, 2, 2018, 3–21
    This study examines whether changes in CAMEL variables matter in explaining bank closure. Using a unique set of monthly bank-specific balance sheet data from Russia, we estimate determinants of bank license withdrawals during 2013m7-2017m7. We make two key findings. First, changes in CAMEL indicators are always significantly correlated with probability of bank closure, and the magnitude of parameter estimates decreases with the lag length. Second, while the one-month lagged levels of capital, earnings, and liquidity are significantly associated with the probability of bank closure in the subsequent month, the level of liquidity is the only significant indicator for longer lags. Our key contribution that changes in CAMEL variables matter more than levels is robust to various robustness checks.
  • Francis, Bill B.; Hasan, Iftekhar; Hunter, Delroy M.; Zhu, Yun (2017)
    Journal of Corporate Finance October
    BoF DP 16/2017
    There is scant evidence on how risk-taking incentives impact specific firm risks. This has implications for board oversight of managerial risk taking, firms' development of comparative advantage in taking particular risks, and compensation design. We examine this question for exchange rate risk. Using multiple identification strategies, we find that vega increases exchange rate exposure for purely domestic and globally engaged firms. Vega's impact increases with international operations, declines post-SOX, and is robust to firm-level governance. Our results suggest that evidence that exposure reduces firm value can be viewed, in part, as a wealth transfer from shareholders and debt-holders to managers.
  • Francis, Bill B.; Hasan, Iftekhar; Hunter, Delroy M.; Zhu, Yun (2017)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 16/2017
    Published in Journal of Corporate Finance, 46, October 2017: 154-169
    There is scant evidence on how risk-taking incentives impact specific firm risks. This has implications for board oversight of managerial risk taking, firms’ development of comparative advantage in taking particular risks, and compensation design. We examine this question for exchange rate risk. Using multiple identification strategies, we find that vega increases exchange rate exposure for purely domestic and globally engaged firms. Vega’s impact increases with international operations, declines post-SOX, and is robust to firm-level governance. Our results suggest that evidence that exposure reduces firm value can be viewed, in part, as a wealth transfer from shareholders and debt-holders to managers.
  • Mäkinen, Mikko (2021)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 8/2021
    Can a major financial crisis trigger changes in a bank’s risk-taking behavior? Using the 2008 Global Financial Crisis as a quasi-natural experiment and a difference-in-differences approach, I examine whether the worst crisis-hit Russian banks – the banks that have strong incentives to behavior-altering changes – can decrease their post-crisis exposure to risk. A shift in risk-taking behavior by these banks indicates the learning hypothesis. The findings are mixed. The evidence concerning credit risk is inconsistent with the learning hypothesis. On the other hand, the evidence concerning solvency risk is consistent with the learning hypothesis and corroborates evidence from the Nordic countries (Berglund and Mäkinen, 2019). As such, bank learning from a financial crisis may not depend on the institutional context and the level of development of national financial market. Several robustness checks with alternative regression specifications are provided.
  • Hasan, Iftekhar; Meslier, Céline; Tarazi, Amine; Zhou, Mingming (2018)
    Journal of Economics and Business January-February
    This paper examines the effects of bank alliance network on bonds issued by European banks during the period 1990–2009. We construct six measures capturing different dimensions of banks’ network characteristics. In opposition to the results obtained for non-financial firms, our findings indicate that being part of a network does not create value for bank’s bondholders, indicating a dark side effect of strategic alliances in the banking sector. While being part of a network is perceived as a risk-increasing event by market participants, this negative perception is significantly lower for the larger banks, and, to a lesser extent, for the more profitable banks. Moreover, during crisis times, the positive impact on bond spread of a bank’s higher centrality or of a bank’s higher connectedness in the network is stronger, indicating that market participants may fear spillover effects within the network during periods of banks’ heightened financial fragility.
  • Fungáčová, Zuzana; Weill, Laurent; Kochanova, Anna (2014)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 4/2014
    Published in World Development, Volume 68, April 2015, Pages 308–322
    This study examines how bribery influences bank debt ratios for a large sample of firms from 14 transition countries. We combine information on bribery practices from the BEEPS survey with firm-level accounting data from the Amadeus database. Bribery is measured by the frequency of extra unofficial payments to officials to "get things done". We find that bribery is positively related to firms' bank debt ratios, which provides evidence that bribing bank officials facilitates firms' access to bank loans. This impact differs with the maturity of bank debt, as bribery contributes to higher short-term bank debt ratios but lower long-term bank debt ratios. Finally, we find that the institutional characteristics of the banking industry influence the relation between bribery and firms' bank debt ratios. Higher levels of financial development constrain the positive effects of bribery whereas larger market shares of state-owned banks have the opposite effect. Foreign bank presence also affects the impact of bribery, albeit this effect depends on the maturity of firms' bank-debt. JEL Codes: G32, K4, P2 Keywords: bank lending, bribery, corruption, Eastern Europe.
  • Takalo, Tuomas; Toivanen, Otto (2003)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 6/2003
    Published in Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Volume 114, Issue 2, June 2012: 601-628
    We study a financial market adverse selection model where all agents are endowed with initial wealth and choose to invest as entrepreneurs or financiers, or not to invest.We show that often a lack of outside finance leads to the emergence of financial markets where availability of outside finance leads to autarky.We find that i) there exist Pareto-efficient and inefficient equilibria; ii) adverse selection has more severe consequences for poorer economies; iii) increasing initial wealth may cause a shift from Pareto-efficient to inefficient equilibrium; iv) increasing the proportion of agents with positive NPV projects causes a shift from inefficient to efficient equilibrium; v) equilibrium financial contracts are either equity-like or 'pure' debt contracts; vi) agents with negative (positive) NPV projects earn rents only in (non-)wealth-constrained economies; vii) agents earn rents only when employing pure debt contracts; and viii) removing storage technology destroys the only Pareto-efficient equilibrium in non-wealth-constrained economies.Our model enables analysis of various policies concerning financial stability, the need for sophisticated financial institutions, development aid, and the promotion of entrepreneurship. Key words: financial market efficiency, adverse selection, financial contracts, creation of firms. JEL classification numbers: D58, G14, G20, G28, G32
  • Koskela, Erkki; Stenbacka, Rune (2003)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 19/2003
    We study employment, employee effort, wages and profit sharing when firms face stochastic revenue shocks and when base wages and profit shares are determined through collective bargaining.The negotiated profit share depends positively on the relative bargaining power of the trade union and has effort-enhancing and wage-moderating effects.We show that higher profit sharing reduces equilibrium unemployment under circumstances with sufficiently rigid labour market institutions, ie sufficiently high benefit- replacement ratios and relative bargaining powers of trade unions.Conversely, profit sharing seems to be destructive from the point of view of employment when the labour market rigidities are sufficiently small. Key words: wage bargaining, profit sharing, efficiency wages, equilibrium unemployment JEL classification numbers: J51, J41, G32
  • Vauhkonen, Jukka (2003)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 14/2003
    According to empirical studies of venture capital finance, the division of control rights between entrepreneur and venture capitalists is often contingent on certain measures of firm performance.If the indicator of the company's performance (eg earnings before taxes and interest) is low, the venture capital firm obtains full control of the company.If company performance improves, the entrepreneur retains or obtains more control rights. If company performance is very good, the venture capitalist relinquishes most of his control rights.In this article, we extend the incomplete contracting model of Aghion and Bolton to construct a theoretical model that is consistent with these empirical findings. Key words: incomplete contracts, financial contracting, contingent contracts, control rights, joint ownership JEL classification numbers: G32