Browsing by Subject "J63"

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  • Juurikkala, Tuuli; Lazareva, Olga (2006)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 4/2006
    Published in Economics of Transition, Volume 20, Issue 1, pages 113-136, January 2012 as "Non-wage benefits, costs of turnover and labour attachment. Evidence from Russian firms"
    Just as in established market economies, many Russian firms provide non-wage benefits such as housing, medical care or day care to their employees.Interpreting this as a strategic choice of firms in an imperfect labor market, this paper examines unique survey data for 404 large and medium-size industrial establishments from 40 Russian regions.We find strong evidence that Russian industrial firms use social services to reduce the costs of labor turnover in the face of tight labor markets.The strongest effect is observed for blue-collar workers.We also find that the share of non-monetary compensation decreases with improved access to local social services. Keywords: Non-wage benefits, labor turnover, labor attachment, Russia JEL codes: J32, J33, J42, J63, M52, P31
  • Bonthuis, Boele; Jarvis, Valerie; Vanhala, Juuso (2015)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 2/2015
    This paper analyses euro area Beveridge curves at the euro area aggregate and country level over the past 25 years. Using an autoregressive distributed lag model we find a significant outward shift in the euro area Beveridge curve since the onset of the crisis, but considerable heterogeneity at country level. We test for factors underlying these developments using the local projections method of Jordà (2005). Skill mismatch, high shares of workers in the construction sector, as well as high pre-crisis financial slack and home ownership rates appear strong determinants of outward shifts in Beveridge curves in response to a negative shock. Higher female participation rates mitigate these effects. Keywords: Beveridge curve, crisis, mismatch, unemployment, labour shortages, vacancies
  • Jones, Derek C.; Kalmi, Panu; Kato, Takao; Mäkinen, Mikko
    International Journal of Human Resource Management 22
    Published also as BoF DP 33/2017
    We investigate the role of individual incentive (II) and group incentive (GI) pay as determinants of worker separation using a large panel data set from Finland during 1997–2006. For white-collar workers, GI pay is associated significantly with an increased probability of separation (diminished employment stability), but in large firms only. For blue-collar workers, II pay is associated with a decreased probability of separation (enhanced employment stability), in both small and large firms. By providing results for different forms of performance pay in a single study, some of our findings are novel. In accounting for differences in our empirical findings compared to those in earlier studies, our results suggest that outcomes depend on the differing institutional contexts found in coordinated market economies (such as Finland) and liberal market economies.
  • Jones, Derek C.; Kalmi, Panu; Kato, Takao; Mäkinen, Mikko (2017)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 33/2017
    Online First International Journal of Human Resource Management as "The Differing Effects of Individual and Group Incentive Pay on Worker Separation: Evidence using Finnish Panel Data". https://doi.org/10.1080/09585192.2019.1691624
    This paper investigates the role of individual incentive (II) and group incentive (GI) pay as determinants of worker separation. We use a large linked employer-employee panel data set for full-time male manufacturing workers during 1997-2006 from Finland. We follow actual job spells and switches of individual employees and define separation as worker exit from his current employer. The key finding for white-collar workers is that group incentive pay is associated significantly with increased probability of separation and hence diminished employment stability, but in large firms only. For blue-collar workers our results consistently indicate that individual incentive pay is associated with a decreased probability of separation and hence enhanced employment stability, both in small and large firms. Our finding that group incentive pay increases the risk of separation for white-collar workers is more consistent with theoretical work such as Lazear (2000) and Fehr and Gaechter (2000), while uncovering that individual incentive pay decreases employment stability for blue-collar workers supports theoretical work such as Parent (1999) and Paarsch and Shearer (2000).