The aim of the Internal Ratings Based Approach (IRBA) of Basel II was that capital suffices for unexpected losses with at least a 99.9% probability. However, because only a fraction of the required regulatory capital (a quarter to a half) had to be loss absorbing capital, the actual bank solvency probabilities may have been much lower, as the global financial crisis illustrates. Our estimates suggest that under Basel II IRBA the loss-absorbing capital of an average-quality portfolio bank suffices for unexpected losses with a 95%-99% probability. This translates into an expected bank failure rate as high as once in twenty years. Even if the bank s interest income is incorporated into our model, the expected failure rate is still substantial. We show that the expected failure rate increases with loan portfolio riskiness. Our calculations may be viewed as a measure of regulatory "self-delusion" included in Basel II capital requirements. Keywords: capital requirements, Internal Ratings Based Approach, Basel II,financial crisis.

The rating-sensitive capital charges on credit risks under the new Basel Accord are likely to increase the volatility of minimum capital requirements, which may force banks to hold larger capital cushions in excess of minimum requirements.We analyse this claim on the basis of numerical simulations on hypothetical bank portfolios, in which the bank's choice of capital cushion is assumed to satisfy a value-at-risk-type constraint.The results suggest that the size of the cushion depends on the bank's credit portfolio risk and its chosen approach for calculating the minimum capital requirement.Although the more ratings-sensitive internal ratings based approach imposes lower minimum capital requirements on sufficiently high-quality credit portfolios than does the standardised approach, this capital relief is countered by the need for larger relative cushions under the former approach.The results imply that the cushions induced by greater rating sensitivity may influence both banks' choices between proposed approaches for calculating capital requirements as well as the aggregate level of post-reform bank capital.Hence these cushions should be given due consideration in the final calibration of the Basel risk weights. Key words: new Basel Capital Accord, credit risk, internal ratings, value-at-risk

We survey 149 leading academic researchers on bank capital regulation. The median (average) respondent prefers a 10% (15%) minimum non-risk-weighted equity-to-assets ratio, which is considerably higher than the current requirement. North Americans prefer a significantly higher equity-to-assets ratio than Europeans. We find substantial support for the new forms of regulation introduced in Basel III, such as liquidity requirements. Views are most dispersed regarding the use of hybrid assets and bail-inable debt in capital regulation. 70% of experts would support an additional market-based capital requirement. When investigating factors driving capital requirement preferences, we find that the typical expert believes a five percentage points increase in capital requirements would “probably decrease” both the likelihood and social cost of a crisis with “minimal to no change” to loan volumes and economic activity. The best predictor of capital requirement preference is how strongly an expert believes that higher capital requirements would increase the cost of bank lending.

Suurin osa EU:n rahoituspalvelujen yhdentymisen toimintasuunnitelmasta on toteutunut, mutta tärkeitä hankkeita on myös edelleen kesken. Toimenpiteiden kansallinen implementointi on osin vasta alussa. Komissio päättää toimintasuunnitelman jatkotoimista vuonna 2005. Tämän artikkelin yhteydessä olevassa kehikossa esitellään lisäksi globaalin rahoitus-järjestelmän kannalta keskeisen elimen, Financial Stability Forumin, toimintaa.

Empirical evidence shows that a financial distress, faced by a bank or the whole economy, might cause large-scale withdrawals of deposits even when bank deposits are protected by deposit insurance, implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by a government. Building on Kiema and Jokivuolle (2015), we present a new model of such partial bank runs. In our model withdrawals are caused by the fear that both the bank and the government's deposit guarantee might fail in the future. Our focus is on a guarantee rather than on insurance, since the assets of deposit insurance funds might not be sufficient in large-scale systemic crises. Guarantee failure is possible because, being sovereign, the government may choose not to keep its promises. This option causes a fixed welfare cost (e.g. a reputational cost), which in a sufficiently severe crisis may be smaller than the costs from deposit guarantee payments. We also assume that, being welfare-maximizing, the government recapitalizes the bank during the early stage of the bank run. When decisions concerning deposit guarantee payments are made, recapitalization costs are already sunk costs, but the partial bank run has reduced the coverage costs that the remaining deposits might cause for the government. In this way, the depositors who withdraw funds during a partial bank run decrease the danger of a deposit guarantee failure and increase the incentives of the remaining depositors to keep their deposits in the bank. We apply our framework to the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), and we view the reliability of the Single Resolution Fund and its backstop as the counterpart to the reliability of the government's promises. It turns out that in an asymmetric shock that affects only a single eurozone country, the EDIS improves bank stability, but its effects might be ambiguous in a systemic crisis that affects the whole Banking Union.

Regulators restrict bankers’ risk-taking by bonus caps or deferrals. We derive a structural model to analyze these compensation regulations and show that for a risk-neutral banker subject to positive switching costs of reducing bank risk, a bonus deferral is impotent while a sufficiently tight bonus cap reduces risk-taking. The model suggests that a bonus cap that equals fixed salary (as in the EU) reduces risk on average by 13% under conservatively calibrated positive switching costs. Further, the bonus cap would have considerably reduced risk-taking incentives in most US banks that did poorly during the global financial crisis. We also show that the bonus deferral is effective if the banker is risk-averse and the switching costs are not too high.

Although beneficial allocational effects have been a central motivator for the Basel II capital adequacy reform, the interaction of these effects with Basel II's procyclical impact has been less discussed. In this paper, we investigate the effect of capital requirements on the allocation of credit and its interaction with procyclicality, and compare Basel I and Basel II type capital requirements. We consider competitive credit markets where entrepreneurs of varying ability can apply for loans for one-period investment projects of two different risk types. The risk of a project further depends on the state of the economy, modelled as a two-state Markov process. In this type of setting, excessive risk taking typically arises because higher-type borrowers cross-subsidize lower-type borrowers via a pricing regime based on average success rates. We find that risk-based capital requirements (such as Basel II) alleviate the cross-subsidization effect and can be chosen so as to implement first-best allocation. This implies that the ensuing reduction in the proportion of high-risk investments may mitigate the procyclical effect of Basel II on economic activity. Moreover, we find that optimal risk-based capital requirements should be set lower in recessions than in normal times. Our simulations show that when measured by either cumulative output or output variation, Basel II type capital requirements may actual be slightly less procyclical than flat capital requirements. The biggest reduction in procyclicality is however achieved with optimal risk-based capital requirements which are considerably higher than Basel II requirements and which are adjusted downwards in recession periods. Keywords: Basel II, bank regulation, capital requirements, credit risk, procyclicality JEL classification numbers: D41, D82, G14, G21, G28

We construct a measure of a bank's relative creditworthiness from the Eurosystem's proprietary inter-bank loan data: average overnight borrowing rate relative to an overnight rate index (AOR). We then investigate the dynamic relationship between AOR and the credit default swap price relative to the corresponding market index of 60 banks during 2008–2013. Price discovery mainly takes place in the CDS market, but AOR also contributes to it. The lagged daily changes of AOR help predict CDS. This indicates that AOR includes private information, which the CDS market does not immediately incorporate. We further show that the private information advantage is concentrated on days of market stress and on banks, which mainly borrow from relationship lender banks. Such borrower banks are typically smaller, have weaker ratings, and are likely to reside in crisis countries. Competent authorities can use AOR as a complementary indicator of banks’ concurrent health.

The EU's Financial Services Action Plan is largely a reality; however, important initia-tives continue to be pending. National implementation of the required measures has in part only started. The Commission will decide on further steps to be taken in respect of the Financial Services Action Plan in 2005. The box attached to this article provides greater detail on the work of the Financial Stability Forum, an organisation of key importance to the global financial system.

We suggest a complementary tool for financial stability analysis based on stochastic simulation of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE) of the macro economy. The paper relates to financial stability research in which financial aggregates crucial to financial stability are modelled as functions of macroeconomic variables. In these models, stress tests for eg banking sector loan losses can be generated by considering adverse scenarios of macro variables. A DSGE model provides a systematic way of generating coherent macro scenarios which can be given a rigorous economic interpretation. The approach is illustrated using a DSGE model of the Finnish economy and a simple model of Finnish banking sector loan losses. Keywords: DSGE models, financial stability, loan losses, stress testing JEL classification numbers: E13, E37, G21, G28