Browsing by Author "Jones, Derek C."

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  • Jones, Derek C.; Kalmi, Panu; Mygind, Niels (2003)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 7/2003
    Published in Post-Communist Economies vol 17, no 1 (2005), pp. 83-108
    In this paper we use rich panel data for a representative sample of Estonian enterprises to analyse diverse issues related to the determinants of ownership structures and ownership changes after privatisation.A key focus is to determine whether ownership changes are related to economic efficiency.While employee owned firms are found to be much more prone than other firms to switch ownership categories, often "employee owned" firms remain "insider-owned" as ownership passes from current employees to managers and former employees.Logit analyses of the determinants of ownership structures and ownership changes provides mixed support for several hypotheses.As predicted: (i) wealth and resource constraints play a crucial role in the determination of ownership, with foreigners buying firms with the highest equity levels and insiders buying firms with the lowest equity valuations; (ii) risk aversion explains subsequent ownership changes, especially away from employee ownership; (iii) allocation of ownership depends on the pre-privatisation origin and location of the firm, and these factors also influence subsequent ownership changes.Finally we compare our findings with those achieved by using more conventional approaches to analyze efficiency that use very similar data.Reassuringly the evidence presented in this paper is consistent with the view that efficiency considerations drive ownership changes (while earlier analysis for Estonia and for many other transition economies has identified the impact of ownership on economic performance.)However, the findings in this paper also establish that there are important influences besides economic efficiency that affect enterprise ownership and ownership changes.JEL-numbers: G3, J5, P2, P3 Key words: Privatisation, ownership change, employee ownership, transition economies, Estonia
  • Jones, Derek C.; Kalmi, Panu; Kato, Takao; Mäkinen, Mikko (2017)
    Industrial and Labor Relations Review 2
    The authors investigate whether productivity is greater if firms use employee involvement (EI) in decision making and financial participation (FP) as complementary practices. Based on representative panel data from Finnish manufacturing firms, the study uses diverse specifications to examine different theoretical explanations of the productivity effects of complementarities. The authors find virtually no evidence to support the theory of complementarities when EI and FP are simply measured by their incidence. They do find some evidence for complementarities using cross-sectional data (controlling for several covariates that related work has found to be important for firm performance) and also when analyses use measures of the intensity of FP. In accounting for differences in empirical findings across varying settings, the findings suggest that outcomes depend on the institutional context and are sensitive to variation in measurement and analytical methods.
  • Jones, Derek C.; Kalmi, Panu; Kato, Takao; Mäkinen, Mikko (2017)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 33/2017
    Online First International Journal of Human Resource Management as "The Differing Effects of Individual and Group Incentive Pay on Worker Separation: Evidence using Finnish Panel Data". https://doi.org/10.1080/09585192.2019.1691624
    This paper investigates the role of individual incentive (II) and group incentive (GI) pay as determinants of worker separation. We use a large linked employer-employee panel data set for full-time male manufacturing workers during 1997-2006 from Finland. We follow actual job spells and switches of individual employees and define separation as worker exit from his current employer. The key finding for white-collar workers is that group incentive pay is associated significantly with increased probability of separation and hence diminished employment stability, but in large firms only. For blue-collar workers our results consistently indicate that individual incentive pay is associated with a decreased probability of separation and hence enhanced employment stability, both in small and large firms. Our finding that group incentive pay increases the risk of separation for white-collar workers is more consistent with theoretical work such as Lazear (2000) and Fehr and Gaechter (2000), while uncovering that individual incentive pay decreases employment stability for blue-collar workers supports theoretical work such as Parent (1999) and Paarsch and Shearer (2000).