Browsing by Author "Karas, Alexei"

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  • Karas, Alexei; Schoors, Koen; Weill, Laurent (2008)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 3/2008
    Published in Economics of Transition Vol 18, Issue 1 (January 2010), pp. 123-141
    We study whether bank efficiency is related to bank ownership in Russia. We find that foreign banks are more efficient than domestic private banks and - surprisingly - that domes-tic private banks are not more efficient than domestic public banks. These results are not driven by the choice of production process, the bank's environment, management's risk preferences. the bank's activity mix or size, or the econometric approach. The evidence in fnicl suggests that domestic public banks arc more efficient than domestic private banks and that the efficiency gap between these two ownership types did not narrow after the introduction of deposit insurance in 2004. This may be due to increased switching costs or to the moral hazard effects of deposit insurance. The policy conclusion is that the efficiency of the Russian banking system may benefit more from increased levels of competition and greater access of foreign banks than from bank privatization. JEL classification: G21; P30; P34; P52 Keywords: Bank efficiency; state ownership; foreign ownership; Russia
  • Karas, Alexei; Pyle, William; Schoors, Koen (2019)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2019
    Using evidence from Russia, we explore the effect of the introduction of deposit insurance on bank risk. Drawing on within-bank variation in the ratio of firm deposits to total household and firm deposits, so as to capture the magnitude of the decrease in market discipline after the introduction of deposit insurance, we demonstrate for private, domestic banks that larger declines in market discipline generate larger increases in traditional measures of risk. These results hold in a difference-in-difference setting in which state and foreign-owned banks, whose deposit insurance regime does not change, serve as a control.
  • Karas, Alexei; Schoors, Koen; Lanine, Gleb (2008)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 19/2008
    We suggest an additional transmission channel of contagion on the interbank market - the liquidity channel. Examining the Russian banking sector, we and that the liquidity channel contributes significantly to understanding and predicting interbank market crises. Interbank market stability Granger causes the interbank market structure, while the opposite causality is rejected. This bolsters the view that the interbank market structure is endogenous. The results corroborate the thesis that prudential regulation at the individual bank level is insufficient to prevent systemic crises. We demonstrate that liquidity injections of a classical lender of last resort can effectively mitigate coordination failures on the interbank market both in theory and practice. Apparently, liquidity does matter.
  • Karas, Alexei; Pyle, William; Schoors, Koen (2006)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 13/2006
    Published in Oxford Economic Papers, Volume 62, Issue 1, 2010: 36-61 as How do Russian depositors discipline their banks? Evidence of a backward bending deposit supply function.
    Using a database from post-communist, pre-deposit-insurance Russia, we demonstrate the presence of quantity-based sanctioning of weaker banks by both firms and households, particularly after the financial crisis of 1998.Evidence for the standard form of price discipline, however, is notably weak.We estimate the deposit supply function and show that, particularly for poorly capitalized banks, interest rate increases exhibit diminishing, and eventually negative, returns in terms of deposit attraction.These findings are consistent with depositors interpreting the deposit rate itself as a complementary proxy of otherwise unobserved bank-level risk. JEL Classifications: G21, O16, P2 Keywords: market discipline, deposit market, transition, Russia
  • Karas, Alexei; Pyle, William; Schoors, Koen (2010)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 8/2010
    Published in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Volume 45, Issue 1, February 2013, Pages 179–200 as as Deposit insurance, banking crises, and market discipline: Evidence from a natural experiment on deposit flows and rates
    We explore how the introduction of explicit deposit insurance affects deposit flows into and out of banks of varying risk levels. Using evidence from a natural experiment in Russia, we employ a difference-in-difference estimator to isolate the change in the deposit flows of a newly insured group (households) relative to an uninsured control group (firms). This approach improves on earlier studies seeking to identify the effect of deposit insurance on market discipline. We find that the relative sensitivity of households to bank capitalization diminished markedly with the introduction of an insurance program covering their deposits. This was not true for firms, however. We then show the finding is not an artifact of the two groups responding differently to a minor banking crisis that arose at roughly the same time.
  • Juurikkala, Tuuli; Karas, Alexei; Solanko, Laura (2009)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 8/2009
    Published in Review of International Economics, 19(1), February 2011: 109–121
    This paper focuses on the role of the banking sector in monetary policy transmission in an emerging economy with a rapidly developing financial system. Specifically, we exam whether the central bank's monetary policy stance affects banks' lending behaviour. Based on a comprehensive quarterly dataset on all Russian banks from 1Q1999 to 1Q2007, we find evidence for the existence of a bank lending channel in Russia. Contrary to several studies on developed economies, the level of a bank's capitalization matters for the transmission process. Better capitalized banks are less likely to adjust their lending practices following a change in the monetary policy stance.