Browsing by Author "Kato, Takao"

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  • Jones, Derek C.; Kalmi, Panu; Kato, Takao; Mäkinen, Mikko (2017)
    Industrial and Labor Relations Review 2
    The authors investigate whether productivity is greater if firms use employee involvement (EI) in decision making and financial participation (FP) as complementary practices. Based on representative panel data from Finnish manufacturing firms, the study uses diverse specifications to examine different theoretical explanations of the productivity effects of complementarities. The authors find virtually no evidence to support the theory of complementarities when EI and FP are simply measured by their incidence. They do find some evidence for complementarities using cross-sectional data (controlling for several covariates that related work has found to be important for firm performance) and also when analyses use measures of the intensity of FP. In accounting for differences in empirical findings across varying settings, the findings suggest that outcomes depend on the institutional context and are sensitive to variation in measurement and analytical methods.
  • Jones, Derek C.; Kalmi, Panu; Kato, Takao; Mäkinen, Mikko (2017)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 33/2017
    Online First International Journal of Human Resource Management as "The Differing Effects of Individual and Group Incentive Pay on Worker Separation: Evidence using Finnish Panel Data". https://doi.org/10.1080/09585192.2019.1691624
    This paper investigates the role of individual incentive (II) and group incentive (GI) pay as determinants of worker separation. We use a large linked employer-employee panel data set for full-time male manufacturing workers during 1997-2006 from Finland. We follow actual job spells and switches of individual employees and define separation as worker exit from his current employer. The key finding for white-collar workers is that group incentive pay is associated significantly with increased probability of separation and hence diminished employment stability, but in large firms only. For blue-collar workers our results consistently indicate that individual incentive pay is associated with a decreased probability of separation and hence enhanced employment stability, both in small and large firms. Our finding that group incentive pay increases the risk of separation for white-collar workers is more consistent with theoretical work such as Lazear (2000) and Fehr and Gaechter (2000), while uncovering that individual incentive pay decreases employment stability for blue-collar workers supports theoretical work such as Parent (1999) and Paarsch and Shearer (2000).