Browsing by Subject "P31"

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  • Pyle, William; Schoors, Koen (2011)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 33/2011
    Published in The Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 58, No. 2 (May 2015), pp. 451-480 by Alexei Karas, William Pyle and Koen Schoors
    Russia's tremendous inter-regional variation in the pace of industrial land rights reform has meant that geography has helped determine the current tenure status of firms' production plots as much as any individual firm characteristics. By exploiting both this difference in the pace with which land reform has been carried out across Russia's federal subjects and a unique micro-level dataset, we present evidence strongly consistent with the proposition that more secure rights to land facilitate access to external financing. This finding is confirmed by other evidence from the survey that points to private land serving as an important source of collateral for Russian lenders and borrowers. JEL: 016, P25, P31, R14, R52 Keywords: industrial land, property rights, Russia, collateral
  • Solanko, Laura (2006)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 2/2006
    During the Soviet period industrial firms not only formed the backbone of the economy but also directly provided a wide range of benefits to their municipalities.Firms were in charge of supplying a great variety of social services, such as housing, medical care and day care.The need to divest at least some of these functions was generally accepted already in the early 1990s.Industrial firms' engagement in the provision of infrastructure services, such as heating, electricity and road upkeep has to date received much less attention.Using a unique dataset of 404 large and medium-sized industrial enterprises in 40 regions of Russia, this paper examines public infrastructure provision by Russian industrial enterprises.We find that, first, to a large degree engagement in infrastructure provision - as proxied by district heating production - is a Soviet legacy.Second, firms providing district heating to users outside their plant area are more likely to have close relations with the local public sector along many other dimensions. Keywords: Russia, infrastructure, firm performance JEL Codes: P31, P35 (Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions), H54
  • Juurikkala, Tuuli; Lazareva, Olga (2006)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 4/2006
    Published in Economics of Transition, Volume 20, Issue 1, pages 113-136, January 2012 as "Non-wage benefits, costs of turnover and labour attachment. Evidence from Russian firms"
    Just as in established market economies, many Russian firms provide non-wage benefits such as housing, medical care or day care to their employees.Interpreting this as a strategic choice of firms in an imperfect labor market, this paper examines unique survey data for 404 large and medium-size industrial establishments from 40 Russian regions.We find strong evidence that Russian industrial firms use social services to reduce the costs of labor turnover in the face of tight labor markets.The strongest effect is observed for blue-collar workers.We also find that the share of non-monetary compensation decreases with improved access to local social services. Keywords: Non-wage benefits, labor turnover, labor attachment, Russia JEL codes: J32, J33, J42, J63, M52, P31
  • Vernikov, Andrei (2009)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 24/2009
    The purpose of this paper is to carefully assess the size of public sector within the Russian banking industry. We identify and classify at least 78 state-influenced banks. For the state-owned banks, we distinguish between those that are majority-owned by federal executive authorities or Central Bank of Russia, by sub-federal (regional and municipal) authorities, by state-owned enterprises and banks, and by state corporations.. We estimate their combined market share to have reached 56% of total assets by July 1, 2009. Banks indirectly owned by public capital are the fastest-growing group. Concentration is increasing within the public sector of the industry, with the top five state-controlled banking groups in possession of over 49% of assets. We observe a crowding out and ero-sion of domestic private capital, whose market share is shrinking from year to year. Several of the largest state-owned banks now constitute a de facto intermediate tier at the core of the banking sys-tem. We argue that the direction of ownership change in Russian banking is different from that in CEE countries. Key words: Russian banks; transition; banking; state; government; public sector; state-owned banks; state-controlled banks; state-influenced banks JEL codes: G21, G28, P31, P43.
  • Mattlin, Mikael (2007)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2007
    This paper reviews recent regulatory and policy changes that affect the Chinese central government's ownership and authority over the capital allocations of strategic state-owned enterprises (SOE).The paper examines the reform of the central government's relationship with key SOEs as a consequence of the establishment of the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) in 2003, the coming introduction of a centralised operating and budgeting system for SOEs, and the government's ongoing re-evaluation of its ownership policy.SASAC appears to have the potential to develop into a major actor in China's domestic capital allocation, with an active role in strategic financing and restructuring of key sectors of the Chinese economy. The data reviewed for this paper strongly suggests that the Chinese central government aims to retain significant ownership control over key SOEs and, by extension, over a major part of the domestic economy.The new operating and budgeting system is set to significantly enhance central government control over SOEs' capital allocation. Key words: State-owned enterprises, privatisation, corporate governance, China JEL classification: G32, G38, P26, P31
  • Pyle, William (2011)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 26/2011
    The voluminous literature on the privatization of Russian industry overlooks, almost completely, the story of enterprise land rights - a story that does not jibe well with the standard narrative of post-Soviet reform. This paper explains the path that has led to significant inter-regional variation in the ownership status of lands underneath urban industrial enterprises. It then introduces unique data from a survey of 359 large industrial firms across several dozen of Russia's largest cities to explore why some firms have purchased their production plots whereas others continue to lease or hold these lands under the old Soviet system of tenure. In exploring both inter-regional and inter-firm variation in land rights, we find evidence consistent with the proposition that the decisions of regional officials and (the managers and owners of) firms are guided by securing rights over real estate rents. Keywords: urban land, property rights, Russia JEL codes: K11, L6, P26, P31, R33
  • Hildebrandt, Antje (2002)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 11/2002
    In advanced market economies, the use of trade credits is an important way of short-term financing and generally considered as being part of normal business practice.Some transition economies, however, have experienced a rapid accumulation of trade credits which have led to interlocking webs of arrears and collective bailouts by the government.In this paper, firm-level data is used to test whether trade credits are just part of normal business practice comparable to more advanced market-economies or whether trade credits represent a systematic phenomena supporting soft budget constraints of firms in transition.The results suggest that trade credits are not just normal business practice but that they can have negative spill-over effects on other firms by worsening their financial situation.We conclude that the problem of interlocking effects is more pronounced in countries with less developed institutions, low financial intermediation and, overall, no credible commitment to market economic reforms. Keywords: inter-enterprise arrears, soft budget constraints, transition economies JEL-classification: P31, P35, L10