Browsing by Subject "P37"

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  • Lonsky, Jakub (2020)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 24/2020
    This paper studies the origins and consequences of the Russian mafia (vory-v-zakone). I web scraped a unique dataset that contains detailed biographies of more than 5,000 mafia leaders operating in 15 countries of the (former) Soviet Union at some point between 1916 and 2017. Using this data, I first show that the Russian mafia originated in the Gulag – the Soviet system of forced labor camps which housed around 18 million prisoners in the 1920s - 1950s period. Second, I document that the distance to the nearest camp is a strong negative predictor of mafia presence in Russia’s communities in the early post-Soviet period. Finally, using an instrumental variable approach which exploits the spatial distribution of the gulags, I examine the effects of mafia presence on local crime and elite violence in mid-1990s Russia. In particular, I show that the communities with mafia presence experienced a dramatic rise in crime driven by turf wars which erupted among rival clans around 1993 and persisted for much of the 1990. Further heterogeneity analysis reveals that mafia presence led to a spike in attacks against businessmen, fellow criminals, as well as law enforcement officers and judges, while politically-motivated violence remained unaffected.
  • Peresetsky, Anatoly (2008)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 14/2008
    Published in Russian in Applied Econometrics (Прикладная эконометрика), No. 3, 2008, pp. 3-14 as "Market Discipline and Deposit Insurance" (Рыночная дисциплина и страхование депозитов).
    The paper presents a study of Russian banks' interest rates on household deposits during the formation period of the deposit insurance system. It is shown that market discipline weakened after deposit insurance was effectively in place. JEL codes: G21, G28, P37 Keywords: deposit insurance, market discipline, deposit interest rates
  • Vernikov, Andrei V. (2007)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/2007
    This paper applies an analytical paradigm of institutional economics to the transition of the Russian banking sector, focusing on the interplay between ownership change and institutional change. We find that the state's withdrawal from commercial banking has been inconsistent and limited in scope.To this day, core banks have yet to be privatized and the state has made a comeback as owner of the dominant market participants.We also look at the new institutions imported into Russia to regulate banking and finance, including rule of law, competition, deposit insurance, bankruptcy, and corporate governance.The unfortunate combination of this new institutional overlay and traditional local norms of behavior have brought Russia to an impasse - the banking sector's ownership structure hinders further advancement of market institutions. Indeed, we may now be witnessing is a retreat from the original market-based goals of transition.Key words: banking sector reform, privatization, Russia, economic transition, institutional economics JEL: G21, G28, P34, P37