Browsing by Author "Pyle, William"

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  • Pyle, William; Schoors, Koen (2011)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 33/2011
    Published in The Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 58, No. 2 (May 2015), pp. 451-480 by Alexei Karas, William Pyle and Koen Schoors
    Russia's tremendous inter-regional variation in the pace of industrial land rights reform has meant that geography has helped determine the current tenure status of firms' production plots as much as any individual firm characteristics. By exploiting both this difference in the pace with which land reform has been carried out across Russia's federal subjects and a unique micro-level dataset, we present evidence strongly consistent with the proposition that more secure rights to land facilitate access to external financing. This finding is confirmed by other evidence from the survey that points to private land serving as an important source of collateral for Russian lenders and borrowers. JEL: 016, P25, P31, R14, R52 Keywords: industrial land, property rights, Russia, collateral
  • Pyle, William (2005)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 19/2005
    Published in Europe-Asia Studies, Volume 58, Issue 4, 2006: 491-521
    Drawing on a unique set of surveys, this article explores the question of whether Russia s post-communist business associations are generally antithetical to or supportive of the broad objectives of economic restructuring.Contrary to the most widely cited analysis as to the purposes of collective action in the business community, the survey evidence demonstrates that association members have embraced market-adapting behaviors at greater rates than non-members.The responses of both firms and associations, moreover, suggest that the associations themselves are, at least in part, directly responsible.These findings point to the conclusion that in contemporary Russia the net returns to collective action in support of market development are high relative to those for purposes that are less benign.
  • Karas, Alexei; Pyle, William; Schoors, Koen (2019)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2019
    Using evidence from Russia, we explore the effect of the introduction of deposit insurance on bank risk. Drawing on within-bank variation in the ratio of firm deposits to total household and firm deposits, so as to capture the magnitude of the decrease in market discipline after the introduction of deposit insurance, we demonstrate for private, domestic banks that larger declines in market discipline generate larger increases in traditional measures of risk. These results hold in a difference-in-difference setting in which state and foreign-owned banks, whose deposit insurance regime does not change, serve as a control.
  • Castañeda Dower, Paul; Pyle, William (2016)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 17/2016
    Inefficiently organized, factory-dominated cityscapes have been one of the more enduring legacies of the twentieth century experiment with socialist central planning in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Drawing on a unique survey of large, formerly state-owned urban industrial firms in Russia, we explore how land tenure reforms affect the pace at which this legacy is being erased. Specifically, the privatization of plots is shown to promote the development of a rental market that transfers land use rights away from socialist-era industrial users. We address the potential endogeneity of land tenure in two ways, including using a measure of regional variation in urban land policy as an instrumental variable.
  • Pyle, William (2007)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 18/2007
    Published in Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, (2011) 27(1): 2-31.
    This article explores the inter-relationship of collective action within the business community, the nature of the political regime and the security of firms' property rights. Drawing on a pair of surveys recently administered in Russia, we present evidence that post-communist business associations have begun to coordinate business influence over state actors in a manner that is sensitive to regional politics. A firm's ability to defend itself from government predation and to shape its institutional environment as well as its propensity to invest in physical capital are strongly related to both its membership in a business association and the level of democratization in its region. Of particular note, the positive effect of association membership on securing property rights increases in less democratic regions. The evidence, that is, suggests that collective action in the business community substitutes for democratic pressure in constraining public officials. Key words: collective action, property rights, political institutions, business associations JEL codes: D7, K4, P48
  • Pyle, William (2009)
    Bofit. Focus/Opinion. Expert view 4/2009
  • Pyle, William (2020)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 17/2020
    This article links Russians’ individual experiences during the late-Gorbachev and early-Yeltsin years to the beliefs those same individuals espoused in the Putin era, over a decade later. Drawing on questions, some of which are retrospective, from the first wave of the Life in Transition Survey, I show that a range of attitudes – including diminished support for markets and democracy and stronger support for reducing inequality – can be explained by whether an individual suffered labor market hardships (wage cuts, arrears, and/or unemployment) in the half decade from 1989 to 1994. More recent labor market disruptions, surprisingly, bear no such relationship to beliefs in 2006. Relative to the rest of the former Soviet Union, this pattern is unique. Though an explanation is difficult to pin down, one speculative hypothesis is that Russians were uniquely impressionable during this exit-from-communism period. Individual economic hardship, in conjunction with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, may have been particularly disorienting for those living in the country in which communism first took root. Life experiences during these years of instability, uncertainty, and diminished status may have left a uniquely deep and enduring impression.
  • Karas, Alexei; Pyle, William; Schoors, Koen (2006)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 13/2006
    Published in Oxford Economic Papers, Volume 62, Issue 1, 2010: 36-61 as How do Russian depositors discipline their banks? Evidence of a backward bending deposit supply function.
    Using a database from post-communist, pre-deposit-insurance Russia, we demonstrate the presence of quantity-based sanctioning of weaker banks by both firms and households, particularly after the financial crisis of 1998.Evidence for the standard form of price discipline, however, is notably weak.We estimate the deposit supply function and show that, particularly for poorly capitalized banks, interest rate increases exhibit diminishing, and eventually negative, returns in terms of deposit attraction.These findings are consistent with depositors interpreting the deposit rate itself as a complementary proxy of otherwise unobserved bank-level risk. JEL Classifications: G21, O16, P2 Keywords: market discipline, deposit market, transition, Russia
  • Pyle, William (2009)
    Bofit. Focus/Opinion. Asiantuntijan näkemys 4/2009
  • Pyle, William; Solanko, Laura (2010)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/2010
    Published in Public Choice, April 2013, Volume 155, Issue 1-2, pp 19-41
    Why are some lobby groups less benign in their external effects than others? Nearly three decades ago, Mancur Olson (1982) proposed that less-encompassing lobby groups with their constituents collectively representing a narrow range of sectors are more apt to seek the types of subsidies, tariffs, tax loopholes, and competition-limiting regulations that impose costs on the rest of society. To the best of our knowledge, Olson s oft-cited hypothesis has yet to be actually tested, due perhaps to the absence of adequate data on general policy preferences of various types of lobbies. Thus, we examine a pair of surveys from 2003 and 2004 which were targeted at managers of business associations (lobby groups) and their enterprise constituents to directly test Olson s hypothesis. Managers from a diverse array of Russian industrial firms and business associations were asked similar questions regarding their attitudes to policies that explicitly benefit well-defined sectoral or regional interests and, implicitly, impose external costs. The pattern of responses is striking. Managers of less-encompassing associations and the constituent firms of such groups are much more apt to see such policies in a favorable light. In contrast, more-encompassing associations and their member display greater skepticism toward narrowly targeted government interventions. Our results strongly support Olson s hypothesis.
  • Karas, Alexei; Pyle, William; Schoors, Koen (2010)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 8/2010
    Published in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Volume 45, Issue 1, February 2013, Pages 179–200 as as Deposit insurance, banking crises, and market discipline: Evidence from a natural experiment on deposit flows and rates
    We explore how the introduction of explicit deposit insurance affects deposit flows into and out of banks of varying risk levels. Using evidence from a natural experiment in Russia, we employ a difference-in-difference estimator to isolate the change in the deposit flows of a newly insured group (households) relative to an uninsured control group (firms). This approach improves on earlier studies seeking to identify the effect of deposit insurance on market discipline. We find that the relative sensitivity of households to bank capitalization diminished markedly with the introduction of an insurance program covering their deposits. This was not true for firms, however. We then show the finding is not an artifact of the two groups responding differently to a minor banking crisis that arose at roughly the same time.
  • Pyle, William (2011)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 26/2011
    The voluminous literature on the privatization of Russian industry overlooks, almost completely, the story of enterprise land rights - a story that does not jibe well with the standard narrative of post-Soviet reform. This paper explains the path that has led to significant inter-regional variation in the ownership status of lands underneath urban industrial enterprises. It then introduces unique data from a survey of 359 large industrial firms across several dozen of Russia's largest cities to explore why some firms have purchased their production plots whereas others continue to lease or hold these lands under the old Soviet system of tenure. In exploring both inter-regional and inter-firm variation in land rights, we find evidence consistent with the proposition that the decisions of regional officials and (the managers and owners of) firms are guided by securing rights over real estate rents. Keywords: urban land, property rights, Russia JEL codes: K11, L6, P26, P31, R33