Browsing by Author "Shy, Oz"

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  • Shy, Oz; Stenbacka, Rune (1998)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 22/1998
    This study demonstrates that the common view, whereby an increase in competition leads banks to increased risk taking, fails to hold in an environment where consumers can choose in which bank to make a deposit based on their knowledge of the riskiness incorporated in the banks' outstanding loan portfolios.We show that, in the absence of deposit insurance, competition between differentiated banks will increase the returns from diversification.We offer a welfare analysis establishing that introduction of competition into the banking industry can only improve social welfare.However, competition cannot always guarantee that diversification will occur to a socially optimal extent.Finally, we show that deposit insurance would eliminate the beneficial effects of banks competing with asset quality as a strategic instrument. Keywords: Risk taking in banking, banks' portfolio diversification, bank competition, deposit insurance
  • Shy, Oz; Tarkka, Juha (2001)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 22/2001
    This paper investigates the market consequences of alliance formation among stock exchanges.These alliances enable brokers to match investors internationally at their local market, thereby eliminating the need for brokers to maintain memberships in foreign stock exchanges.We sort out the conditions under which alliance formation increases profits for stock exchanges and brokers, and how changes in fee structures affect investors' participation rates and welfare.Finally, we examine several methods for implementing access fees and their welfare implications.Key words: stock exchange alliances, access fees, competition among stock exchanges
  • Shy, Oz; Tarkka, Juha (1998)
    Bank of Finland. Discussion papers 21/1998
    We develop a theoretical framework aimed to model the pricing of electronic money (electronic cash cards) and the market domain in which it will be used.We first calculate the fee structures of electronic cash- and charge-card industries for the monopoly and competitive cases.We show that the different market structures do not affect the domain of electronic cash cards and the displacement of currency in daily transactions.We provide a welfare analysis to determine whether a market equilibrium generates an underutilization or overutilization of the electronic cash cards relative to currency.Finally, we evaluate the threshold investment costs, both general and POS-specific, which would prevent the emergence of this industry. Keywords: Electronic Money, Smart Cards, Displacement of currency